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ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
2nd CORPS COMMAND
MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE DEPARTMENT

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
STATE SECURITY SERVICE
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Fall of Srebrenica

To: GENERAL STAFF, BH ARMY, SARAJEVO
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Through our operative work to date implementing OI /intelligence investigation/
Guber, we have obtained the following intelligence regarding the fall of the
Srebrenica safe area into the hands of the Chetniks:

In June 1995, the security situation in Srebrenica had worsened significantly. The Chetniks made a habit of moving the lines during every UNPROFOR unit shift, entering further into the safe area. When a new UNPROFOR unit arrived, it would accept the situation it found and was not interested in what had happened before. This was also the case during preparations for a new UNPROFOR unit shift rotation. Chetnik forces were observed massing on the edges of the safe area when the Dutch Battalion was expecting a shift change.

The Chetniks asked UNPROFOR to withdraw from the observation posts into the safe area. The commander of the Dutch Battalion informed Ramiz BEČIROVIĆ, acting commander of the 28th dKoV /Army Division/, of this, and said that they had rejected the Chetniks' request to withdraw and that they would request assistance from NATO forces.

When the Chetniks attacked the UNPROFOR checkpoint at Jadar, UNPROFOR withdrew between 400 and 500 metres, and the UNPROFOR commander again informed BEČIROVIĆ that he had received an order from his superior command to withdraw from all the observation posts. They also informed their government of this, and their government ordered them not to withdraw. The commander therefore informed his superior command that he would not withdraw from all the observation posts.

During this crisis in Srebrenica, prior to the Chetniks' attack, the acting commander was asked by UNPROFOR to negotiate with the Chetniks. According to him, he informed the Corps Command, General Staff, Presidency of the Republic of BH and

the government of this, but he received no instructions whatsoever from anyone. They therefore would not negotiate with the Chetniks. At this time, the defence lines were reinforced. All the brigades were put on the alert, including the 285th Žepa Brigade, which received a separate mission to monitor its own zone of responsibility. Since the 283rd br /Brigade/ did not have its own zone of responsibility, they were given part of the zone held by the 282nd br towards Podravanje, from Šljivova, inclusive, to Čavorka inclusive. Part of the 284th bbr /Mountain Brigade/ was also inserted here in the Kiprova sector, while the 282nd br received the sector from Jasenova to Čičovački Potok. In this way, the brigade's zone of responsibility was reduced by over half, because it was believed that the attack would come from this area.

It was believed that there would be a limited attack to capture the road which they could use for the mine. At about 0400 hours on (Thursday) 6 July 1995, the all-out artillery and infantry attack on the Srebrenica enclave began. That day, about 1,500 shells were fired at Srebrenica, although UNPROFOR representatives had two infantry attacks in the Bukova Glava (Javor) – Zeleni Jadar area, which were repulsed. In other areas there were only acts of provocation. The Chetniks infiltrated a group into the Vidikovac suburb and the hospital sector through the tunnel linking Srebrenica to the Sase mine. This group opened fire on the suburb, and after several minutes of fire withdrew again through the tunnel. The 28th dKoV Command knew of the existence of this tunnel, but they thought that it had been blocked because this had been done in 1993. That is to say they did not know that the people had taken some pipes from the tunnel and that the tunnel had been cleared. An order arrived from the 2nd Corps Command and General Staff to draw the enemy's attention using sabotage operations and thereby reconnoitre the enemy's rear in order to assist the operation to lift the siege of Sarajevo. BEČIROVIĆ designated several groups which were tasked with reconnaissance and to fire only if they had to. All the groups carried out their reconnaissance tasks without combat operations and all of them returned. One group went in the direction of Kragljivoda with a combat mission, and they destroyed one vehicle and killed three soldiers. One group was infiltrated into the Rupovo Brdo area, which also entered into combat and killed four Chetniks. All the sabotage and reconnaissance platoons from the Žepa area were tasked to enter the Han Pijesak – Vlasenica road in the direction of Han Pogled, Han Pijesak and Sokolac. By decision of the commander of the 285th br, nine groups were formed, and they carried out these missions. These groups were involved in fighting, and destroyed about 60 Chetniks. One group entered the village of Višnjica and torched several houses. When these sabotage platoons returned from the Žepa area, work continued in Srebrenica to raise the combat readiness level, particularly on the Zeleni Jadar axis. When information was received that several buses of Chetniks had arrived in Zeleni Jadar from the direction of Kragljivoda, Hakija MEHOLJIĆ, chief of the Srebrenica SJB /Public Security Station/ was asked to place SJB members at the disposal /of the defence/ and so they too were involved in the defence of free territory. The Chetniks launched an infantry attack on the Ljubisavić sector, and this attack was successfully repulsed. Ibro DUDIĆ, commander of the 282nd br, was constantly in the field, from where he reported on the situation in these areas.

One afternoon, two or three days before all the units were withdrawn, the 28th dKoV Command was informed that the defence line had been penetrated and assistance was requested. Reinforcements were sent from the sabotage and reconnaissance company, about 15 men, to the sector that had been penetrated. The same commander asked for authorisation to withdraw his men from the right side of the wing, that is to say from

Visovi and along the Zeleni Jadar – Srebrenica road, saying that they would be surrounded. BEČIROVIĆ did not allow this, and this part of the defence line pulled back during the night, allegedly without authorisation. It is typical that in this attack, the Chetniks came by tank into the immediate vicinity of an UNPROFOR observation post, and that they shelled it. In response, UNPROFOR withdrew from the observation post, and while doing so, one member of the Dutch Battalion was wounded. He later died, and our side was accused of killing him.

That day, the Chetniks advanced towards Srebrenica. Civilians from the Slapovići camp and other suburbs fell back in the direction of Srebrenica and Potočari. During the night, the forces were consolidated and a decision was taken to attack the Chetniks in the morning in the Bojna sector, overlooking Pusolići, in their newly-achieved lines. Early in the morning, this counterattack was launched. On the left wing the Chetniks were pushed back to their previous positions, but tank crossfire and several men wounded meant that the right wing could not maintain the tempo of the left wing's attack, and so the attack was stopped. Several dozen Chetniks were killed in this attack, but our losses are not known. It is assumed that they were not major. About 600 soldiers, volunteers from all units of the 28th dKoV, were involved in our attack. The municipal presidency promised these soldiers that they would be rewarded with flour, and a financial reward was promised for the tank destroyed.

The heavy weapons which had not been handed over to UNPROFOR were in use during the fighting. One mountain gun remained in the position, but /illegible/. /illegible/ fired a Red Arrow anti-tank rocket launcher, and after he was forced to withdraw, he threw the launcher and three rockets into a stream. The infantry weapons which had been kept by UNPROFOR were removed and put to use.

Preparations were made with representatives of the civilian authorities to dig in men at the new line, and preparations were made for a shift change. However, during the afternoon, soldiers withdrew of their own accord towards the town, so the Chetniks who were removing the bodies of their dead once again reached the positions they had held the previous day. During the night of 10-11 July 1995, they once more attempted to consolidate their forces to launch a new counterattack, with the intention of infiltrating men into the rear and firing on the front line and rear simultaneously. At about midnight, the UNPROFOR commander requested a meeting with the commander of the 28th dKoV and representatives of the civilian authorities. Osman SULJIĆ, president of the municipality, Adem SALIHOVIĆ, mayor of the municipality, Suljo HASANOVIĆ, secretary of national defence, Hamdija FEJZIĆ and Ramiz BEČIROVIĆ, were present at this meeting. The UNPROFOR commander informed them that the Chetniks had been given an ultimatum to which they were to respond by six o'clock in the morning. This required the Chetniks to pull back to their positions prior to the capture of the UNPROFOR observation post at Zeleni Jadar. If they rejected the ultimatum or failed to respond to it, heavy air strikes would follow, involving about 100 aircraft. The zone from Zeleni Jadar to our units' new position would be considered a dead zone, where anything that moved would be targeted. After this announcement, and consultations with the members of the division command gathered there and some of the brigade commanders, a decision was taken to postpone the planned counterattack in order not to be exposed to aerial attack. The decision was changed for the units to remain on the lines achieved in order to prevent

any further advance by the aggressor and for the units to move to clear the ground after the aerial operations. A little after six o'clock in the morning, two British officers came to the post office building, where the commander of the 28th dKoV was. They requested targets for the aircraft since the Chetniks had not responded to the ultimatum. Ekrem SALIHOVIĆ, assistant for intelligence, who is now at the division command in Tuzla, was assigned to take these officers into the field. They were able to see the targets, tanks, etc. in the banned zone.

It was reported that the defence line had been attacked at the Koštur trig point, and that Chetniks had been observed moving between Zeleni Jadar and Slapovići. The units withdrew to the reserve positions in the Buća sector very quickly, apparently without the authorisation of the 29th /as printed/ dKoV commander and offering little resistance.

On the Jadar – Srebrenica axis, the Chetniks started torching houses in Pasmilić. A large group of Chetniks was then observed attempting to enter the town itself, in the Učina Bašća suburb. This incursion was prevented.

The director of the hospital asked for the evacuation of the hospital and the wounded. At about 1200 hours, the commander was informed that a representative of MSF had secured the evacuation of the wounded to the UNPROFOR base. Soon after this, the commander was again informed by Dr Ilijaz PILAV, who is in free territory, that UNPROFOR would not allow the wounded into the camp. He was asked to go with him to the UNPROFOR camp in Vezionica, Srebrenica, to try to secure that the wounded were taken in. Upon arrival at the camp, the camp commander informed them that he had allowed the wounded into the camp, but that his intention was to transfer them to the camp in Potočari.

Since the Chetniks had reached Zaboljina, a suburb of Srebrenica, the previous night, people had broken into all the warehouses in the town and gathered all the stocks of food. Panicked, they were moving towards Potočari, where they were being sent by UNPROFOR soldiers, who said that they too intended to move to Potočari. At about 1300 hours on 11 July 1995, the Chetniks shelled the UNPROFOR checkpoint in Vezionica, where several thousand /illegible/ had gathered. /illegible/

On several occasions over the course of these events, the Chetniks took prisoner members of the Dutch Battalion along with all their equipment. They took them to their side. Two of their APCs were shelled by the Chetniks in the Bojna sector. One APC was shelled in the Dodilovac sector, and there was no adequate response to this from UNPROFOR. The Dutch Battalion forces conducted themselves entirely passively. Some of their stationary and patrol units surrendered to the Chetniks, but most of them were in the military base in Potočari.

At about 1500 hours on 11 July 1995, almost the entire civilian population of the town and surrounding villages set off in the direction of the main UNPROFOR military base in Potočari. By 2000 hours that day, about 20,000 refugees had gathered in the UNPROFOR camp in Potočari and outside it on the streets, in ditches by the side of the road, and in two almost completely destroyed factories. As the crow flies the Chetniks were only 200-300 metres away from the refugees. No one from the Dutch

Battalion addressed the refugees at this point. At about 2115 hours, Nesib MANDŽIĆ was called to the Dutch Battalion command by loudspeaker. He was informed by the commander of the Dutch Battalion and his deputy that over 30 Dutch soldiers and officers and all their equipment had already been captured and that the Chetnik General MLADIĆ had threatened to kill the captured Dutch soldiers immediately if even a single NATO aircraft appeared in the sky, and that he would issue orders to open fire on the refugees along with the destruction of the UNPROFOR military base in Potočari. Despite the fact that he was not the official representative of the civilians, at about 2215 hours, Nesib MANDŽIĆ, escorted by the commander of the Dutch Battalion and the liaison officer, arrived in Bratunac for negotiations which were attended by the following on the Chetnik side: Chetnik General MLADIĆ; Ljubisav SIMIĆ, president of the "Serbian" municipality of Bratunac; Miroslav DERONJIĆ, president of the terrorist SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/ organisation in Bratunac; and several others. It was suggested to the Chetniks that they authorise the safe evacuation of the civilians, escorted by UNPROFOR, to free territory.

CONTINUE DESCRIPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS...

The division command was in the old town sector and the hunting lodge. On the last day, 11 July 1995, it was impossible to approach this building because it was under constant fire from the Chetniks. When a tank came into the area from which the lodge was visible, the men abandoned the hunting lodge and therefore did not burn and destroy the building and all the division's documentation, either on their own initiative or on the orders of the acting commander. All the division's documentation probably fell into the hands of the Chetniks.

At about 1400 hours, the commander of the 28th dKoV left the UNPROFOR camp and was informed that NATO aircraft had set off on combat operations around Srebrenica.

At this time, there was no one from the municipality leadership in the post office building (where they had been ordinarily), and there were no ham radio operators or soldiers who were responsible for packet communications because they had all set off already in the direction of Kutlić village.

Small groups of soldiers occupied the defence line in Srebrenica. The chief of the division's operations section, Šemso SALIHOVIĆ, his administrative officer, Midhat SALIHOVIĆ, and a group of about 20 soldiers held the line at Bojna, but had to fall back. They occupied the hill overlooking the post office, and where possible slowed the operations and advance of the enemy infantry.

By the beginning of the attack on Srebrenica, civilians were already retreating towards the UNPROFOR camp in Vezionica in Srebrenica, and then were transported in lorries, UN APCs and by other means to the camp in Potočari.

PERIOD OF STAY IN POTOČARI
NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHETNIKS
CIVILIANS KILLED

NAMES OF COMMANDERS OF BRIGADES ETC.: 280th – Major Ibrahim MANDŽIĆ (son of Idriz); 281st – Major Zulfo TURSUNOVIĆ (son of Salko); 282nd – Major Ibro DUDIĆ (son of Husein); 283rd – Chief of Staff Captain Hazim DŽANOVIĆ (son of Behajja); 284th – Major Veiz ŠABIĆ (son of Velija); Srebrenica Independent Mountain Battalion – Ejub GOLIC (son of Atif).

The mayor of the municipality temporarily relocated to the Borković hamlet, and with him were packet communications and an amateur radio set, with operators.

The commander of the 281st Brigade, Zulfo TURSUNOVIĆ /name as printed/, notified the mayor and the acting commander that the brigade's lines were being successfully held, that the 283rd Brigade had abandoned the position at Bučje, and that he had taken it over, that the IDV /Reconnaissance and Sabotage Platoon/ commander NALIĆ aka Pupo had been killed in fighting in the village of Bučje, but that the Chetniks had been halted.

Not long afterwards, when the people had been evacuated from Sućeska, the commander and a good number of the soldiers from the 281st Brigade withdrew towards the village of Šušnjari. The commander of the 282nd Brigade Ibro DUDIĆ was already there, and the commanders of the 280th and 284th Brigades and the chief of the SJB /Public Security Station/ were in the house of Sidik MUSTAFIĆ. The mayor and president of the municipality and the acting commander of the 28th dKoV /Army Division/ also arrived at the house, and the chief of staff of the 283rd Brigade, a representative of the Mountain Battalion nicknamed Kezo, was also there. There, on the night of 11/12 July 1995, the decision was taken to break through towards Tuzla.

On the orders of the acting commander, the signals operators went on to a hill and tried to establish communications with the corps command, while the others continued their discussions to determine the manner of movement, the sequence of units, procedures for security, reconnaissance, and the rear of the column that would head for Tuzla. It was ordered that the entire civilian population located there should go, although they were trying to decide whether they should go with the army or head towards UNPROFOR.

The commanders were ordered to line up the units and form a column. This was all on the night of 11/12 July 1995.

Packet communications were established with the chief of staff of the 2nd Corps, who was notified of the situation in Srebrenica and the fact that it had in effect fallen, and that the units of the 28th dKoV intended to head for Tuzla. The chief of staff warned them that they were taking a risk, but their reply was that they had no other option. He asked to be given the movement route, and was told that the units would head towards Bajkovića.

On 12 July 1995, Čamila OSMANOVIĆ, Ibro NUHANOVIĆ, and Nesib MANDŽIĆ, acting as a delegation from the civilian population located at the UNPROFOR camp in Potočari, arrived at the hotel *Fontana* in Bratunac for talks with Ratko MLADIĆ. Numbers were not established when the column was formed and set off that evening, but some estimates put the number in the column at 10,000 to 15,000 people, including approximately 6,000 armed soldiers, not counting soldiers from Žepa. There were not many women and children in the column. There were possibly around 10 women. When the column was moving, the commanders received instructions, which reportedly included instructions to leave any dead soldiers, but to carry the wounded.

The formation put the 284th Brigade at the head of the column because it had the best knowledge of the terrain, and it was followed by the 280th Brigade with the acting commander within it, while the Mountain Battalion brought up the rear of the column.

The column set off from /?Buljim/ towards Kamenica. Right at the outset there were problems with the column because some panic broke out (people began panicking because they had some kind of vision). The column's first rest was ordered at around 1000 hours in the morning. During that time, part of the column had already crossed the Chetnik line. On arrival at the rest sector, various reports came in that some had been wounded or killed, that some had broken off from the column and gone off to the sides. All these reports provoked panic among those who had reached the rest area. After about 15 wounded men had been gathered, the order to move from that sector was issued at around 1600 hours. By this point it was realised that the column was no longer whole.

During that rest, a conflict broke out between the acting commander of the 28th dKoV and the commander of the 282nd Brigade, Ibro DUDIĆ, who, in the presence of the commander of the 281st Brigade Zulfo TURSUNOVIĆ, accused him of preparing his murder, and he threatened that if anything were to happen to him, he had given 10 men – of whom at least one would reach free territory – the task of killing him.

After the column had progressed three to four kilometres from the rest point, it came under fire. The men were overcome with panic, fleeing forwards, backwards, to the sides, and for about 10 minutes the firing was directed at one part of the column, and then it moved along the whole column. There were men killed and wounded at the front and rear of the column. The wounded were given treatment, and that is where they were when night fell. Since the column had been interrupted, no one knew how to move onward.

Infantry fire was heard from the sector where they had been resting. The scouts were already on the asphalt road in the /?Đuguma/ sector, and they determined that the road could be crossed. It was ordered that the road be crossed via a culvert under the road. This order was not followed, and instead the road was crossed on the surface. After crossing the asphalt, they crossed over the river Jadar and headed towards Cerska and Udrč. Sometime around dawn, after emerging from the valley, heavy infantry fire from PAMs /anti-aircraft machine guns/ rang out, from behind the first part of the column, because Chetnik armoured personnel carriers had reached the asphalt road, cut off the column, and opened fire on both sides of it. It is worth noting that the

crossing of the road was organised in such a way that the troops with weapons crossed first, and men without weapons remained on the other side of the road. Some of these men succeeded in making their way through towards Žepa after several days on the move. A rest was planned in the /?Drče/ sector, so they stopped there to wait for the rest of the column. According to the estimates of the acting commander of the 28th dKoV, around half of the men who had set off to break though reached this point. The commander of the 282nd Brigade and most of his men did not reach this point. When small groups started arriving, reports began to come in about the state of the rear of the column, that the Chetniks had surrounded them while they were still at the rest point, that the Chetniks had gone into the column and separated out various groups, and that many had been killed. There were some reports that some men had gone to negotiate with the Chetniks, but this could not be confirmed. In agreement with the commanders who were with the acting commander of the 28th dKoV, it was decided that they should return to sector of the asphalt road in order to attempt to rescue a large group of our troops who were surrounded there. At around 1400 hours they received a report that the Chetniks had withdrawn from the asphalt and that a large group of our soldiers had crossed the road and were heading towards /?Drče/. Then the decision was changed, and the Mountain Battalion and IDC /Reconnaissance and Sabotage Company/ were left at /?Drče/ with 20 soldiers from the 284th Brigade who knew the terrain there, with the task of gathering any men arriving in the /?Drče/ sector, and returning in the evening to attempt to rescue the remainder of the column. At around 1600 hours the column with the acting commander of the 28th dKoV left /?Drče/ and headed towards the village of /?Glode/. They did not experience any difficulties moving on that part of the road. When the scouts reached Glodansko Brdo /hill/ it was established that the hill was occupied by the Chetniks, so they went around the hill using a detour that the guides knew. They took a rest again after dawn. Sometime in the afternoon, the battalion arrived from the rear with a report that they had tried to reach the asphalt road to rescue the men, but they did not find the section of the column that had remained there, so they headed back towards the main body of the column. In the afternoon they headed towards the village of /remainder of page illegible/

/.../ commander of the 28th dKoV decided that the Mountain Battalion should be joined to the 284th Brigade. After passing through Ljiplje, they ran into an ambush, where they engaged battle, broke up the ambush, and /underlining by hand:/ took a Chetnik officer prisoner.

They crossed the asphalt road towards Snagovo without any particular problems, but when the rear reached that point a Chetnik vehicle arrived and fired on the column, so security destroyed the vehicle. They halted the column in Križevačke Njive /?the Križevac fields/ for a rest, and battalion reconnaissance was undertaken. At around 1200 hours on 15 July 1995, a report came in that the commander of the 284th Brigade and battalion commander Ejub GOLIĆ had been wounded, and doubt was expressed whether GOLIĆ would survive.

They formed a line heading towards Baljkovica, and later the main body of the column also set off. That evening fighting began with the aim of breaking through to free territory. They destroyed or captured three tanks in this fighting. They destroyed one tank in the morning when they set off for Baljkovica, they destroyed two trucks and one Praga, and captured one Praga. Night fell so they stopped fighting, and they

continued again in the morning. While this attack was going on, an attack was launched from the direction of free territory, led by commander Naser ORIĆ, but they were unable to breach the Chetnik defence line that day. That morning they, too, attacked the line again from the direction of Nezuk, and in coordination with other forces succeeded in linking up at around 1200 hours, when they met Naser. Our forces withdrew over this line for a number of days in small groups, and the Chetniks re-established their previous line two days later.

Reportedly, all the organs and parties at the senior level and the corps command were informed of all the problems that occurred in Srebrenica before it fell. All the reports were transferred via packet communications which were at the command, but the command of the 28th dKoV, according to the acting commander, was not getting any reports back or instructions on what to do.