²⁹³⁵

Friday, 12 April 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, we're sitting today until 1.00 or perhaps a few minutes after. What we'll do is this: We'll hear the evidence for about an hour and a quarter, then at 10.15 we'll take a break for quarter of an hour, another hour and a quarter or so and a second quarter of an hour break.

MR. NICE: In the document of the witness, we're at page 32, paragraph 219, and tab 42 in the bundle. If the bundle could be before the witness. I don't think it is.

WITNESS: KAROL JOHN DREWIENKIEWICZ [Resumed] Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. This, I think, is a transcript of a conversation between you and General Loncar.

A. Yes. This is the wording of what was said when we both came out of the courtyard, having seen what was in there, and there was then a requirement to -- to brief the press, which General Loncar and I did together, and this was a note that was made by one of the officers with me, which was then written up straight away.

Q. You express the view in your statement that, as we can see on the second page of this if it's placed on the overhead projector, General Loncar expressing Racak concerns or Racak-like concerns, you taking the ²⁹³⁶ view that you weren't going to mention Racak.

A. Yes. I was very conscious that there were -- while there were some similarities, there were also some very substantial differences and that it wasn't going to assist anybody to -- to start comparing this event with Racak, which had already achieved a notoriety of its own. And so the one thing I was trying not to do was to escalate the situation further. However, I was extremely keen that there should be a proper investigation of this event because, while there were differences, it was certainly not an open and closed case, as far as I could see. Only four of the deceased had actually been in any semblance of insurgent uniform - that is, four of the 25 - only 12 weapons were there; and the exchange rate for people who appeared -- who were alleged to have fought back, that of 25 dead and no wounded on the one side for one dead on the other struck me as remarkable.

Q. On the first sheet, we see your recording General Loncar as asserting in the briefing, as it were, that all of them were armed, and these civilian terrorists, according to their clothes, we cannot say they did not use weapons.

A. That is correct.

Q. As I think was touched on yesterday, this incident, grave as it may have been, was somewhat lost in the events that followed. Would that be about right?

A. Yes. We had hoped that the Finnish forensic team which had been prevailed upon to carry out the investigation of the -- of the bodies from Racak could be persuaded to stay on and to carry out investigations here. ²⁹³⁷ This proved not to be the case, and they were withdrawn within days of -- in fact, within a day of this event. So that was not possible. Moreover, the next day, we started to get members of the Contact Group arriving to discuss the aftermath of Racak. And while I briefed this incident to various people that came in, as you say, it was swallowed up and was never fully followed up.

Q. The next few paragraphs, indeed to the end of the document that you're referring to, I'm going to be selective as to passages. If you'd be good enough to follow me.

A. Yes.

Q. On paragraph 221 and on the 16th of March at a meeting in the Pristina barracks --

A. Yes.

Q. -- you were expecting new MUP liaisons - the last line, really - as part of this meeting.

A. Yes. We were taken into the barracks and introduced to a number of new liaison officers, a very large number of new liaison officers, and this seemed to be a change to all the practices that had evolved over the previous month. We were certainly expecting to have about an equal number of police and army liaison officers. In the event, they were all army liaison officers, which surprised me somewhat.

Q. And suggested a shift --

A. From --

Q. -- of emphasis.

A. Yes. I got the impression from this that the army were taking the ²⁹³⁸ lead in -- in the -- in the campaign from that moment.

Q. At paragraph 222, at about the same time, within a day or so, you were introduced to serving General Brankovic, supposed to be retired General Loncar's replacement; is that correct?

A. Yes. Again, I got the very firm impression that a different personality with a different relationship to us had been introduced and that Loncar was going to be replaced by someone who was who was going to, I got the impression, be even more hard-line.

Q. 224. Evacuation started or occurred on the 20th of March, although it was sadly incomplete as to the evacuation of computer hard drives containing personnel lists.

A. Yes. Every office had a computer. All of the areas that I was responsible for removed hard drives and ensured that nothing was left behind which could -- could identify individuals who had been our civilian employees. Sadly, our administrative section, I understand, neglected to do that, and a list of our civilian employees was left there.

Q. Well, Sandra Mitchell, who is the person who may be able to help the Chamber most with the preparation of the OSCE published reports, is also the person who will be able to deal with the possible consequences of that oversight.

A. Yes, indeed.

Q. 226. Going back in time and covering matters not absolutely sequentially from now on, in February, had your conversations with Colonel Kotur led to certain possible implications or conclusions?

A. Yes. This was a mix of my conversations with Colonel Kotur and ²⁹³⁹ also Richard Ciaglinski's conversations. But between himself and myself - and I believe he will be coming to this court - we gained the very firm impression that there was planning going on for a VJ major offensive against the KLA throughout Kosovo and that this was planned to take place as and when the Kosovo Verification Mission departed. I have to explain that one of the things we were clear about was that if the violence got to a certain level, then we would have to withdraw the Kosovo Verification Mission, not least because the participating states of the OSCE were particularly concerned for the safety of -- of their people. And therefore, there was a level of violence above which the OSCE was not prepared to operate with an unarmed mission; and clearly, when we were starting to get people wounded, this became a matter of some concern, and so the evacuation plan was something which was always available.

Q. Now, paragraph 227 contains expressions of views on topics that are, of course, ultimately for this Chamber and may be the subject of other opinions by others, but I'll ask you to deal with it, not least because it may be thought to be something the accused would want. But you surveyed, retrospectively, your experiences to see what indications there may have been, if any, of a "master plan" for expulsion of the population.

A. Yes. I --

Q. And your opinion at the end of it was?

A. My opinion was that up until the moment that we drove out of Kosovo on the 20th of March, I came across no indications that there was a plan to expel the civilian population. I was absolutely clear that there ²⁹⁴⁰ was a plan to deal with the Kosovo Liberation Army, which would involve bringing in reinforcements of the Yugoslav army, and those reinforcements had started to arrive before we -- before we left. But I was not -- I saw no evidence myself that such a plan to expel the civilian population existed as at the 20th of March.

Q. Just to flesh that out a little bit, you, I think, take the view that bus and train transport could be organised at short notice. That was your --

A. Yes, it was. And when, a little time later, the Pristina was emptied of its inhabitants forcibly, using the train, this involved simply using one train that went backwards and forwards from Pristina to the border with as many carriages on it as could be put on it. Now, even in England, that could be done quite quickly.

Q. And I think another point you had in mind -- sorry.

A. And --

Q. Just --

A. And the --

Q. And the reason I stopped, General, was because of the translation problem. And if you keep picking up because you think I'm waiting for you, we'll never get anywhere. It's not your fault, it's mine. If I can just finish my question and then you can add what you want to say to the answer.

I think another point that you had in mind is that the first reports of mass killings that you received via sat phones, there was no indication of pre-planning in those that you were able to see at the ²⁹⁴¹ distance.

A. That is correct. We remained in contact. The liaison officers who had been assigned to work with the KLA remained in contact with them when we evacuated, and it was via them that we got the first contacts, the first reports, which were on -- in the course of the 24th of March, by which stage, of course, we were in Macedonia.

Q. 228. Another matter. Of course, the Chamber will in due course hear other evidence about these topics, but your view at the time, I think, as to refugee flows and how the figures compared with UNHCR was what -- with the figures provided by UNHCR?

A. UNHCR made a number of statements along the lines of, As a result of actions, 10.000 people have become refugees and internally displaced. That may have been the number that started from a place, but the -- the tendency of the villagers in the next village to take people in and give them shelter meant that it was very difficult to actually find these 10.000 people to be able to really verify that there were 10.000 people away from their homes. We certainly went out looking for them, and of course, we had a lot of people on the ground to try to find large groups of people in the hills, and we found it very difficult to find those people. So our estimates tended not to be as great as those provided by UNHCR at the time. And again, that's before the evacuation.

Q. You were -- you nevertheless generally deferred to UNHCR, when it was necessary, for the conflict between impressions and statistics to be --

A. Yes, indeed. ²⁹⁴²

Q. -- resolved.

A. We were there to support each other and not to make life difficult for each other.

Q. 229. You record a demeaning remark made by Kotur about Kosovar Albanians not knowing how to bury or honour their own dead.

A. Yes. This was one of certainly two remarks that I recall Kotur making to me in the course of a day that we spent going around the border zone. On coming out of an Albanian village, we went past the -- their cemetery, which was set in a copse of trees, and he said, "Look. Look at this, they don't even bury their dead properly." And a few minutes later, he said, "You have to understand that these are very primitive people," which I told him that I profoundly disagreed with. And --

Q. Is that -- let me interrupt you there. Was there an attitude that was unique to Kotur or not?

A. It is my opinion that that was an opinion that was shared by the people that I dealt with in the -- in the Yugoslav establishment.

Q. Let's move to the next exhibit, 43. Tab 43, OTP reference 2802, paragraph 230. Now, this document, which is an English document from the OSCE by Ciaglinski, provides reports on deployments along the border with Albania. And its significance?

A. This was produced while the Rambouillet negotiations were under way and was as a result of a request from Rambouillet to get -- give an opinion from the ground on what the security situation was and might be on the border between Kosovo and Albania, the point being that, at that stage of the Rambouillet negotiations, there was talk of withdrawing Yugoslav ²⁹⁴³ police and security forces from inside Kosovo except within the border security zone since that was -- that was allowed for at that stage of the Rambouillet negotiations. And a figure, a strength figure for the forces that would be allowed in that zone had been postulated. As a result of my experience on the border with Colonel Kotur earlier and an appreciation we had done in the KVM and subsequent discussions with both Colonel Kotur and with General Loncar, we put this together, which really laid out what we saw the facts to be and the sort of strength that we felt would be needed in order to make this border secure, having allowance for the fact that the Yugoslav army did not have night vision devices, intruder alarms, and all the other modern stuff that -- that is available elsewhere. And the conclusion was that you needed a lot of people, which wasn't -- wasn't -- the number we came to was actually quite a lot bigger than the number that was being discussed at Rambouillet.

Q. All right. See if we can deal with a few paragraphs by some yes/no questions to save some time. 231 was an area in Glogovac and I think an area at a battery factory in Mitrovica, to the first of which the KVM were never given access and about which you both had -- about both of which you had suspicions that they may have been covert paramilitary bases.

A. Yes. We attempted to get into them and were not able to do so.

Q. Next, 223. I think you've covered -- sorry, 233. You've really covered your developing state of mind about the chains of command for the MUP and the VJ being separate or connected, and nothing you need to add to ²⁹⁴⁴ that?

A. I don't think so, no.

Q. Although at 234, you make the point that the chains of command were "more closely linked than we thought..." Was that the incident at Rogovo, and how do you connect that with what you saw at Racak?

A. At Racak, it dawned on me that if you are going to put policemen in -- into the village as -- on foot or in vehicles while they are being covered by Yugoslav army who are manning the heavy weapons on the -- on the hills, there must be a very, very tight degree of coordination between those two -- the people who are running those two activities. And I realised that you could only do that if -- if there was, at the very least, a joint command post where radios -- radio nets out to the police and radio nets out to the army units were all coming in to one place. It simply could not be done otherwise without a very grave risk of hitting your own people. A blue-on-blue engagement, as we call it.

Q. Thank you. You also included in your reasoning, so far as Rogovo is concerned, that Loncar was in the police chain of command; is that right?

A. That's right. The policemen at Rogovo, two weeks after Racak, were reporting to Loncar and asking him for instructions, and he was giving instructions and they were going off and getting on with them. I say this not by knowing the language but by watching what was going on, and it's quite clear when someone goes up to someone and asks for instructions and is given instructions by a superior and goes off to do them. It's not -- you don't face each other and talk in a way that you do ²⁹⁴⁵ when you're having a conversation. There was an air of command about Loncar when he was -- when he was at Rogovo that was the same with the military and with the police people.

Q. Something - paragraph 240 - reflected also in the hostage-taking negotiations.

A. Yes, indeed. Again, there were moments when I spoke to Loncar over the phone and was able to get an answer straight away rather than him saying, "Well, I'll have to get back to you." He was able to say, "Yes, we'll do that."

Q. 241. You explain how in the first few weeks of February 1999, the VJ and the MUP were responding much as they had done in December and January, but then you say that, from the middle of January, they regularly left a foot on the ground, and as time went by -- by which you mean a platoon-sized foot. And as time went by, your assessment was that by the 3rd of March they had the equivalent of how many companies?

A. By that stage, they had the equivalent of 15 companies, by which we meant about 2.000 men deployed outside barracks against what had been the agreement of 400, or three companies. So it's a factor of five.

Q. Some exhibits that we'll try to deal with swiftly: Paragraph 242, tab 44, a letter from you to General Loncar, alerting him. The first paragraph says it has come to your attention a significant amount of looting of private homes being done, followed by some specific examples being set out.

A. Yes. This was a follow-up to an earlier discussion I had had with General Loncar when I brought it to his attention that we were seeing ^{2946 BLANK PAGE 2947} signs of looting, and he said, "Well, I must have specific instances." And so I said, "Right, I'll get you some," and this was the result of it. And as you can see, they are specific places and specific times, and therefore, it should have been perfectly possible to know which units were there, but we at no stage received any follow-up to that, no explanation was offered, and to the best of my knowledge, no disciplinary action or instructions were -- were ever taken forward.

Q. I think in March the KVM became aware of an extension of the conscript service period. Its result, of course, in arithmetic terms, is obvious if those conscripted stayed in Kosovo rather than being deployed anywhere else?

A. Correct. It was always the understanding that there would be rotation of conscripts, that the ones who had served the full period of their conscript service would be released and the new intake of conscripts would be taken on and, by that means, the overall numbers would remain the same. So in order to take on your new conscripts but retain your old ones, obviously the number goes up by several thousand.

Q. Tab 45, OTP reference 2697. On this occasion, if the Court's papers are the same as mine, we have the declaration of where it was found at the first page. His Honour Judge Kwon's questions of yesterday are well in hand. I'm waiting for a translation of a piece of paper to deal with the problems of those documents most satisfactorily, but let's deal with this tab 45.

This document is a routine order, I think, dated the 15th of March, or a special routine order. ²⁹⁴⁸

A. 5th, I think.

Q. 5th of March. A document you hadn't seen until recently, I think.

A. That is correct.

Q. Would you tell us about it, please.

A. This document -- can we go to the next page of it -- is a special routine order to the units of the Pristina Corps which are engaged on boarder security duties, issued under the signature block of the corps commander, which as has been said, I have not seen before March 2002. But it states, and let us try to find where it states it --

Q. It's, I think, at the end of the second paragraph, isn't it, "If the --"

A. Yes, I've got it.

Q. "-- situation so requires."

A. It's that there. Down a bit. Down a bit. No. No, sorry. No, that way, I think. Yes.

That if the military and security situation so requires, the PRK, which is the Pristina Corps, will receive reinforcements and execute every task placed before it.

That statement that the Pristina Corps would receive reinforcements indicates an intention to breach the Naumann-Clark agreement of the 25th of October, 1998, in which it was stated that the force levels would return to their February 1998 levels and -- and would remain there. And so at this stage, which is two weeks before -- before we evacuate, the corps commander is already stating to his soldiers that they are ready to bring in extra troops, which I think firmly indicates ²⁹⁴⁹ that there was a plan to -- to reinforce heavily.

Q. And then we move to the end of the next paragraph, where the business of the extension of military service -- I think it was by 30 days, wasn't it?

A. It was at the time, yes. It's stated that the reasons for extending the period of military service, which applied to last March's intake of conscripts, had been understood as right and were accepted. That was clearly the corps commander's view; it may have not been the view of every conscript.

Q. At that time, did the KVM then become aware of an additional unit coming into Kosovo?

A. Yes. On the 16th of March, the KVM reported that a unit equipped with a different tank, a T72 tank, had arrived in Kosovo by rail. This was quite easy to notice in that every tank unit in Kosovo until that point had been equipped with the T55, which is a very different tank and just looks different in the way that -- you know, its profile is different and it's quite easy to see. It's one of the things that we spent a lot of time learning when we were young. And in fact, the man that saw it, actually saw them arriving was Richard Ciaglinski. So he can add to this as well.

Q. Tab 46 we can pass over because it is in fact duplicative of the tab two tabs before, I think.

A. Yes.

Q. 47, tab 47. If we go to that. And again, if the usher would be good enough to just briefly lay the original version on the overhead ²⁹⁵⁰ projector, the display, before turning to the English version. This is an attack order dated mid-February, 13th of February, when the Rambouillet talks were under way, I think. Your comment on it?

A. Yes. I had not seen this before a month ago, but this is a -- or this appears to be a Yugoslav military operation order dated mid-February, that is, while the Rambouillet talks were ongoing, indicating that the FRY forces were still initiating offensive action in the area around Mitrovica. And if you can see, with some of the forces, a company of the Kosovska Mitrovica PJP will break up the terrorist forces in a dynamic operation on the following axis and subsequently continue actions in the Bajgora village Kovacevic-Gornja Lapastica axis. This is a wide area. This is not moving against a small, you know, one location because you've got good intelligence. This is an area certainly 20 kilometres by 20 kilometres. And so this indicates a search-and-destroy sort of approach to terrorism rather than the focused move against specific targets.

Q. Paragraph 6 has its own characteristic feature to it, I think. The unit members are forbidden --

A. Yes. It's further down, isn't it. At the bottom, yes. Engage security organs principally in the counter-intelligence protection of units, inspection of security measures ... preventing theft and looting of property and checking out the territory. So it appears that there were orders given to prevent and provide against any looting of property, but I was not aware that this order was being given because it was certainly not reflective of the situation that we saw on the ground where buildings continued to be looted by the security forces after they had been secured ²⁹⁵¹ by them.

Q. The attempt -- the order to keep out the media, which we can find as well --

A. Yes.

Q. -- entering the zone of combat operations, how does that fit with the agreement that you'd had?

A. Sorry, can I -- sorry. Can I?

Q. On the same page, 4, just above 7.

A. I'm sorry, I'm lost. Yes, got it. It's there. Yes. Here we have the order to prevent any attempt by the media, by humanitarian or other organisations to enter the zone of combat operations and, to this end, to engage MUP points -- at checkpoints. By this, I read that the police forces were to be used to put out checkpoints which would prevent both the media and ourselves from entering the zone of combat operations, and that, as far as it relates to the KVM, was a clear breach of the agreement which allowed us complete freedom of movement throughout Kosovo in order to verify what was going on. So by this stage, there had clearly been a conscious decision to bar us from the areas where combat operations were taking place.

Q. Right. Move to the next exhibit.

JUDGE KWON: General, could you make comments on the second paragraph of the same page too.

THE WITNESS: The one that says, "During support, withdraw the civilian population from the zone of combat operations, making sure that terrorists do not use them as shields during the withdrawal"? ²⁹⁵²

JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.

THE WITNESS: I would say that I did not see any attempt, nor did I ever hear of any attempt to withdraw the civilian population so as to protect them. Rather the opposite, if anything. I saw very little attempt to segregate those that were fighters and those that were not.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. You spoke from time to time yesterday about how attitudes of KVM were softened by experience so that what at one stage would have been described as a serious situation rapidly became described as a normal or quiet day because your tolerance, as it were, had changed, your tolerance level had changed. And I think tab 48, which we can deal with I hope perhaps briefly, is a similar example of that, is it not? It's a Prizren report for the 15th of February, which we can see on the first page, under the summary, describes a quiet day?

A. Yes, a quiet day with limited activities of MUP, VJ and KLA.

Q. When one looks at the content of the document - and we needn't go into it detail - by earlier standards, would it have been anything like a quiet day?

A. No, this would have been an exceptional day certainly in late November, early December, or even in early January, I think. This would have been seen as a peak of violence. And so we certainly had been desensitised by this stage, and the word "quiet" certainly in February did not mean what "quiet" meant in December.

Q. Thank you. Tab 49, the daily report for the 20th/21st of ²⁹⁵³ February. Rambouillet talks still running. And we now see, I think -- find the passage, "Verifiers being assaulted by police officers," and your conclusion, from what you read here?

A. Was that the attitude to the KVM by the -- by the VJ and the MUP had changed and appeared to have changed officially. Specifically, we had two verifiers assaulted --

Q. Over the page, please, Usher, to page -- the second page, paragraph 4.

A. You can see -- yes. A serious assault occurred by police officers, that is, by Serbian police officers, against two international staff in the area south of Pristina on the 21st of February. And this was a situation where a vehicle was sitting by the roadside, watching what was going on. Policemen got out of a vehicle, went up to the verifiers, one put on a balaclava to -- so that he could not be identified, and a weapon was pointed at my verifiers, and the verifiers were then physically assaulted. And this was, I believe, the first time that this had actually happened. It was certainly the first time that it had happened by policemen in uniform.

Q. Thank you. Tab 50. OTP reference 1696. A daily report. Your comment on this?

A. This deals with an incident south-east of Mitrovica at which --

Q. The first page, I think at the bottom.

A. Yes, at Mitrovica, the -- there had been a murder in a village which -- in which both Serbs and Kosovar Albanians lived. This appeared to have started as a domestic dispute but became -- became more serious. ²⁹⁵⁴ The KLA became involved. The Serbian security forces became involved. And in the middle of it, the firing died down and the media went forward to interview various people and the firing started up again, which meant that we then had a firefight with the media in a -- taking cover in a puddle in the middle of the firefight. And that then took us about two hours to calm everybody down and extract the media, one member of whom was actually wounded slightly.

But the -- I think the real implication of it was that this was another incident in the middle of the Rambouillet negotiations where neither side was exercising restraint. Both were allowing themselves to be drawn into these encounter -- these encounter incidents, and nobody was trying to -- neither side was trying to damp them down because of the importance the negotiations going on at Rambouillet.

Q. Thank you. Tab 51, OTP reference 1697, just for completeness, and I don't think you want to add any comments about it, but this is the -- if we look at the original on the overhead projector briefly, this is the MUP report of the incident; is that correct?

A. That is correct, yes. It's the -- it's just the other side, the other version of it.

Q. It's there for completeness.

A. Yes.

Q. We can then move on to tab 52. We've now reached the end of Rambouillet. 26th of February. And this document, from yourselves, draws attention, on the first page, to harassment of 13. We can see it under 1B, internationals and eight locals detained at the border of Macedonia by ²⁹⁵⁵ the FRY authorities. How was this viewed?

A. This was seen as an extremely serious breach of the diplomatic status of the -- of the Kosovo Verification Mission. Every time a vehicle crossed the border into -- into FYROM, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, there was generally delay and there was generally invitation to open the vehicle to search which was always refused because of the diplomatic status.

In this instance, the first vehicle to arrive was asked to open the -- the rear of the vehicle for inspection. He declined and, at that point, every vehicle that arrived was similarly detained and the situation became quite threatening; and in the end, the only way that the situation was resolved was by the Head of Mission going down to the border and personally opening the boot of the vehicle in order to secure the release of his verifiers.

Q. Tab 53. 2804 OTP reference. Really I think a document -- I don't know that there's anything you particularly want to draw from it save to say that it is a reflective account of matters at the time and it's here for completeness; is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Document of reference for your evidence. Tab 54, OTP reference 2805, is a record of a 10th of March meeting. Your comment on it?

A. I think again this is a document which shows the sort of thinking we were doing at the time. It's talking about the possibility of a fracture within the KLA structure, which was clearly of interest to us at ²⁹⁵⁶ the time. And it is one of the documents which was produced from -- from one of the liaison officers who dealt permanently with the KLA.

Q. Paragraph 256 in your document. There were some operations in this period at Kacanik and Vucitrn about which you formed certain views, I think.

A. The two areas that were concerned were two separate brigade areas, and so it was my assessment that this must have been an operation that was planned at above the local level and therefore at least at the corps level from Pristina. By this stage there was a definite -- there was a definite feeling that there were ongoing -- there was an ongoing offensive attitude by the VJ and the MUP in the way that they were conducting the -- their operations.

They had a set procedure whereby the area would be sealed off by the police, who would put up checkpoints at all -- at all places where roads entered an area, and then the VJ and the MUP combined would then sweep the area inside the cordon. It was, therefore, difficult to get inside that cordon, although we did on occasions, and we were more forced to rely on the columns of smoke one could see coming from the villages where the operation was going on than being able in every case to get to the village and to report what was happening first hand.

Q. I think the size of units you can help us with.

A. Yes. What I certainly saw myself on at least one occasion, and this was reflected by reports of others to me, was that there were at least -- at least one and probably two company-sized units, that is, units of about 120 to 150 strong, of police which looked quite different to the ^{2957 BLANK PAGE 2958} average police that we had been dealing with. They looked fitter. They carried themselves more proudly. They -- their morale seemed to be much higher than the police units we had come across to date, obviously with the exception of the police at Rogovo that I've talked about earlier. These people at the time had very modern equipment, and webbing equipment as opposed to the rather battered stuff that some of the others had.

Q. Thank you. Tab 55. Briefly to indicate the circumstances about the 19th of February, under destabilisation. We see that you were having to face, according to intelligence passed to you, the possibility of the assassination of Walker or hostage-taking.

A. Yes. This was information which I was given which I then brought up with -- with the Serb authorities, seeking to get from them an assurance that this was -- was not the case. I have to say that I got some assurances but not -- not complete ones.

Q. This intelligence included, as a possibility, the wearing of the other side's uniforms by the MUP?

A. Yes. This was a persistent concern to us. Each -- at each incident, the possibility that -- that the uniforms of the other side were being used was always present.

Q. Thank you. Paragraph 258. On the 25th of February, you became aware of the KLA attempt to open a new zone of operations away from its former centres of interest, this time in Kacanik.

A. This is the area in the very south of Kosovo which has got the pass going through it from -- from the rest of Kosovo down to Macedonia and was the main route out for -- if we were going to evacuate, it was the ²⁹⁵⁹ one we used so it was of great concern to us.

The KLA made an appearance in this area, and there was, very quickly, a VJ counterattack which was actually successful and which secured the high ground on either side of the road that was going through it.

Once that had been done, the road was then picketed with a number of -- of VJ units at the key points along it, including the bridge.

Q. Thank you. Tab 56. An OSCE report of the 12th of March noting in the italicised passage on the first page no willingness of parties to de-escalate their military posture and clashes between the KLA and Serb security forces. And I think we can find reference to what you've just told us of the KLA stepping up their activities in Kacanik which led to the displacement of -- this is on the second page, in the third paragraph -- to the displacement of some 2.000 people.

A. Yes. This document was prepared for the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE for him to send to the United Nations, because he felt the situation was deteriorating so gravely and so quickly that this needed to be brought to the formal attention of the United Nations. You can see at the bottom of that third paragraph on page 2, an estimated 2.000 people had fled villages in the Kacanik area with some trying to cross the border to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. And that estimated 2.000 was our conservative estimate rather than anybody else's.

Q. And we see, of course, reference further down the page to a Serbian restaurant in Pec with injuries and then seven Albanians later killed. I mean, seven people, sorry, wounded, and one of them died, I beg ²⁹⁶⁰ your pardon.

A. Yes. And again this is another very, very serious day in which this had -- this was only just more than the normal level of violence by this stage.

Q. The time means that we probably shouldn't linger on it. In fact, at page 5 I think you can find reference to the detention of OSCE vehicles on the 25th and 26th of February --

A. Yes.

Q. -- contrary, as asserted, to the Vienna Convention on diplomatic --

A. Yes, indeed.

Q. -- immunities. Right. Paragraph 262. You've made an earlier reference to what hadn't been done to bridges by the KLA, but in February, you started noticing things that were being done to bridges, this time by the Serbs.

A. Yes. The bridges specifically in the Kacanik D file and specifically one large bridge and two tunnels were prepared for demolition in this period. Now, in order to do this, you have to put out a cable, which is time-consuming, all around the bridge so that the electric current can be -- can reach all of the explosives, and then at a later stage -- later state, you then attach the explosives. Both are time-consuming things, and, therefore, if you are going to adopt an increased alert, this is one of the things that traditionally you do. And it was certainly an indication to us that the level of preparedness of the VJ in this area had been increased. ²⁹⁶¹

Q. What could have been the military objective? Just explain for those who have no experience of these things.

A. The road from Kacanik down to -- down to Macedonia was obviously also the road from Macedonia up to Kacanik. And so, with NATO sitting in Macedonia in some force, if they were going to move into Kosovo, this was the logical and really the only feasible route in for heavy armoured vehicles at that time of the year. And so if that bridge had been blown, it would have been very much more difficult for such an entry to have taken place.

Q. Tab 57. A weekly summary by the data fusion cell of the KVM for the 26th of February to the 4th of March. Now, it deals with a number of topics, and we certainly won't go through it in detail. As to the MUP, and I think this will be on the second page, or starting on the second page, you deal with the preparations for demolition at the foot of the page -- or not you --

A. Yes.

Q. The authors have dealt with that at the foot of the page; is that correct?

A. That's correct. Which says: "A number of bridges, tunnels and culverts have been prepared for demolition on routes into and from Albania and Macedonia. The forces around the bridge demolition on the road from Djeneral Jankovic have been notably increased, possibly a reflection on the KLA security nearby." I certainly personally saw that and, having been trained as an engineer, I do know what preparing a bridge for demolition and preparing a tunnel for demolition looks like. ²⁹⁶²

Q. There's also a reference, if we can find it, to combat teams in excess of numbers being deployed and MUP patrolling in Orahovac and Suva Reka. If you can't find it immediately --

A. No, I've got it. "VJ forces within Kosovo have significantly increased their training and deployments throughout the province. Although there are significantly more VJ troops out of barracks than there have been since October, an estimated 15 combat teams deployed, their actions have been somewhat low key in light of what can only be described as KLA provocation. There's been a build-up of VJ forces on the periphery of Kosovo."

Q. You say of the KVM that, even at this 11th hour, KVM was punctilious in its objective reporting.

A. I think our words in the conclusion, saying, "In response to this, the Serbs have held back to a degree" does indicate the fact that we were still attempting to report what we saw as -- as dispassionately as possible.

Q. All right. Paragraph 264. I'm just going to deal with that, if I can, by a yes-or-no question. Apart from the incident of the man or the men in grey overalls or uniforms at Rogovo, it was difficult for you to gauge the build-up of MUP forces because they weren't confined to barracks and were operating in smaller groups, and you proposed to Loncar a regime for monitoring MUP rotations be established, and he rejected that idea.

A. That is correct.

Q. Tab 58, memorandum from the OSCE of the 16th of March dealing with visits to MUP police stations in Eastern Kosovo. Now, it speaks here of ²⁹⁶³ stations above the baseline. In the middle of the page. And it suggests, I think, that three more police stations need to be identified and these name various. The significance of this?

A. The significance is that while you could not do a formal head count on the MUP, you could obviously count where the police stations were. And so to find three extra police stations popping up was, at the very least, an indication that there were more police, and certainly it was indicated more locations from which police were operating. Again, this is information which should have been routinely communicated to the OSCE and which was not.

Q. Thank you. Tab 59. A fragmentary order. Tell us what "FRAGO" means.

A. A full operation order is normally many pages long, and so if you just want to get one message out, you send out a fragmentary order, which is abbreviated as a FRAGO.

Q. The figures of this one?

A. This was talking about the VJ and MUP reinforcements arriving in the area in the west of Kosovo and telling everyone to be on the alert for any other movement within their area. It was really a reminder to everyone to report everything that was happening at a time when there was quite a lot of movement going on.

Q. What's the date of this?

A. This is the 12th of March, which is a week before we evacuated. And so obviously there was quite a high level of activity going on at this stage. ²⁹⁶⁴

Q. And we've got this curious entry on the right-hand side, just above the word "FRAGO." Can you explain that?

A. Sorry. The 21st of June, 00, is, I think, the moment at which this was printed from the disk.

Q. For the copy, for production purposes.

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. There's another detail that you deal with in your document at broadly the same time. We'll just deal with it here. You were aware of a change in KLA leadership. First of all, where did you get that intelligence or information from, if you can help us? And then tell us what the effect of it was as you understood it.

A. The information came to me from the liaison officers that we had got on a permanent basis, co-located with the KLA and dealing with them on a daily basis. It would have been a combination of formal reporting and verbal reporting. Sometimes when things were particularly sensitive, it always didn't get committed to paper, for obvious reasons.

Q. And the nature of the change?

A. The nature of the change was that we understood that all of the -- I was going to say moderate but I would say less hard-line members of the KLA were being replaced by people who were more uncompromising, and this was as Rambouillet was drawing to a close so it clearly had grave implications.

Q. Tab 60, report of the 2nd of March. We can go to the second page of it for the Pec district.

A. That's page 2. Top of it, I think, Pec. There. In this, the ²⁹⁶⁵ chief of police -- the situation was tense in the area of VJ hill, which was a nickname of a location, as a result of a joint police -- army and police exercise by a reinforced tank company. The chief of police in Pec denied police involvement while the army representatives confirmed it. This indicated to us that there was an increasing level of inter-operation between the VJ, the army, and the police, which contrasts with the situation at the start of the mission, as I described it.

MR. NICE: Incidentally, the Court will have noticed that the quotation of the document in paragraph 269 is in error in the second use of the word "denied." It should be confirmed.

THE WITNESS: Yes. Sorry.

MR. NICE:

Q. You've dealt with this before and there's perhaps only one outstanding question to be asked, and that is: If there were joint commands, did you ever locate a joint command centre?

A. Not as such, but the proximity of the police and the army headquarters in Pristina was such that it could easily have been done.

Q. Yes. You told us these were buildings to which you were not given access.

A. Correct. And they faced each other across the road.

Q. Tab 61. A report. Again original, please, briefly to the overhead projector so that we can see the original in -- briefly. Thank you very much. And then we'll place the English translation on the overhead projector.

A. Yes. ²⁹⁶⁶

Q. General, this is a reported response by the VJ or MUP to a KLA attack on the 20th of March, a document you hadn't seen until recently.

A. Correct.

Q. On reading it, its significant to you being what?

A. Firstly, it's the response by the VJ and MUP to a KLA attack. It describes casualties in the MUP and the VJ, and indicates that this response to the original attack by the KLA was again a combined VJ and MUP operation. It's also significant in describing a policeman injuring himself with a negligent discharge from his own weapon. And I would point out that this indicates a poor standard of training in weapon handling that you would not expect in police forces which are dealing with terrorism and are attempting to portray themselves as being a professional force.

Q. I'll deal with 273 and 274 perhaps by some questions susceptible to yes/no answers to save time. I think you've dealt already with Loncar's apparent links to Belgrade and Sainovic.

A. Yes.

Q. He being able to give rapid answers to questions about VJ dispositions.

A. Yes.

Q. And likewise, when you needed decisions about KLA leaders being taken to Pristina airport for Rambouillet, Loncar was able to facilitate that very quickly --

A. Yes.

Q. -- which led you to the conclusion that he was linked to Belgrade ²⁹⁶⁷ with executive authority over some aspects of security forces.

A. Yes, that's the case.

Q. And over the VJ negotiations which you've told us about, one particular aspect that was significant was when a proposal was put to Sainovic by Keller, you received an answer very rapidly but you received it from --

A. From Loncar. And I got the impression that if they were not sitting in the same room, they were certainly talking at very, very regular intervals by telephone.

Q. And indeed, according to your colleague Pellnas, Sainovic had actually said something about delegated authority being given to Loncar.

A. Yes. This was over the issue of the helicopter, which we referred to earlier.

Q. So at paragraph 275; although Sainovic was regularly presented to you as the man with authority, or people did do that, was there ever any issue as to his constitutional position?

A. No. Everyone accepted that he was the man who had to be dealt with in -- over these issues. And significantly, we never ever heard the name Andjelkovic mentioned, who you'll recall was the leader of the Temporary Executive Council.

Q. And there was another example, in a sense, not of the gravest kind, where Ambassador Walker was accosted by drunken policemen and had to complain about it, raise the issue with Sainovic, who appeared to be aware of the incident already and said he'd deal with it?

A. Yes. He was not in any way surprised by it and did not in fact ^{2968 BLANK PAGE 2969} question the facts, which was often the case.

Q. You set out on these topics at 278, as you've already told us yesterday, I think, Kotur's views on one or two things and one or two individuals, but I think that may be a matter of detail into which I needn't descend.

A. Yes.

Q. Please, just a few exhibits.

JUDGE MAY: It's 10.15. This being a suitable moment, we'll adjourn for quarter of an hour.

--- Recess taken at 10.15 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.34 a.m.

MR. NICE: Tab 62, please, General. It's a Security Council Resolution, and it's included here. We can deal with it briefly. It demands the complete and verifiable phase withdrawal from Kosovo of military police and paramilitary forces. Do you have any comment on this or its timing?

A. This was dated the 10th of June, which was the authority to enter Kosovo. And of course, we entered Kosovo with the UN forces and with the NATO forces, starting on the 12th of June, and this was the authority for the deployment into Kosovo specifically of the UN mission to Kosovo.

Q. In the meantime, the only information coming to you being bits and pieces, I suppose.

A. The -- I personally stayed in Macedonia until late April of 1999, when I then went back to the UK. And I returned to Macedonia on the -- on Friday, the 11th of June, and went into Kosovo with -- with KFOR on -- on ²⁹⁷⁰ the first day, as an extra liaison officer with them.

Q. Just a couple of things about what you found in Pristina, in the main police headquarters there, paragraph 282.

A. Yes. On the first day in Kosovo, people only went in in -- the advance elements went in, and I actually arrived in Kosovo, with a vehicle, on a permanent basis the next day, which was Sunday, I think, the 13th of June. At that point, there were a number of people taking up residence within the police headquarters which was rapidly emptying, and in the course of that, torture instruments were located in the basement and the cells of the main police headquarters in Kosovo.

Q. "Torture instruments" is a somewhat dramatic phrase and can cover a range of things from medieval times to the modern, so I think we better be a bit specific.

A. These were certainly sticks, clubs, and electric wires that were capable of being attached to parts of the body.

Q. On the subject of wires, did you see rather more substantial wires in the form of cables?

A. Yes. There was a lot of IT and communications cables which were running from the Pristina Corps headquarters building into the basement of the Grand Hotel, and it was in the basement of the Grand Hotel that I had the first meetings with the VJ officers to discuss the phase -- lines for the phased withdrawal of the Serbian forces.

Q. Without beating about the bush, this cabling being consistent with, if no more than that?

A. Well, certainly being capable of moving a lot of information. ²⁹⁷¹ Whether it was monitoring what was going on in the hotel or allowing operations that would normally have taken place in the Pristina Corps headquarters to be -- to take place from the basement of the Grand Hotel to protect them from air raids, perhaps.

Q. Before we look at the last half dozen or so exhibits, just two general comments on topics you haven't covered, one of them I think not in the statement, at least not collected in the statement at any paragraph. Paramilitaries. In the course of your time there, what if any observations did you make about paramilitary groups on the Serb side?

A. They certainly appeared to be able to -- they were able to appear quite quickly at will throughout the area, and it was my impression that they were not always coming from outside of Kosovo for specific events. Therefore, it was likely that there was an area from which they were operating within, within Kosovo.

Q. Well, you've already told us of a couple of --

A. Yes.

Q. -- I think. Were you able to see any pattern in events that could indicate how they were controlled or managed or not?

A. No, not specifically.

Q. Roughly how many occasions and how many different types of paramilitaries did you identify, if you can be specific at all?

A. I would say that the -- the one specific moment when I myself confronted them was when we -- we had the roadblocks in early January, but there were other occasions which indicated that there was activity going on at a fairly regular level, particularly the very constant level of ²⁹⁷² people being killed in the night and their bodies dumped. Whether it was Albanians who were said to be loyal to Serbs or Serbs who might have been friendly with Albanians, but there was a trickle of about four killings per week throughout the period that just went on and were never cleared up.

Q. But of course, you -- you're not in any position, as I understand your answer, specifically to connect them to paramilitaries or to any particular paramilitaries. It's simply a matter of inference, is that it?

A. It is my inference, and it certainly is in keeping with the pattern that has been observed in other insurgent campaigns, that paramilitaries exist and do these extrajudicial killings of people who they see as a threat or are informers or anything else that offends them.

Q. All right. Then turning to the other side now, on paragraph 283; you have summarised there your anecdotal analysis of the KLA types. Really in just a couple of sentences if you could boil down 283 for us.

A. I would say there were all sorts within the KLA. Certainly there was an element of criminality in -- in some of the people. In others, they seemed to be people who had taken up arms for more ideological reasons; and the degree of control that was exercised also varied tremendously. There were some commanders who we felt, if we went to them and said, "Can you do such-and-such," and they said, "Yes," they would do it. There were others who would say, "Well, maybe," and then would say, "Well, it's very difficult to control my people." And so there was a very wide spectrum from people who were on the verge of criminality or involved in criminality to people who genuinely felt that they were living ²⁹⁷³ with a repressive regime that needed to be replaced.

Q. And I think - for a couple of yes-or-no answers - that you thought the criminal element, if there was one, in the KLA, entirely anecdotally, increased the closer you got to Pec; is that right?

A. Yes, indeed. That was certainly our feeling, that in dealing with the commanders in that area, they were among the ones who were most difficult to get agreement with and get them to stick to an agreement.

Q. I think you also concluded that there seemed to be quite a degree of local autonomy given to local commanders.

A. Yes, absolutely. They all had the right of doing anything they felt they needed to do if they felt they were in danger, which is a pretty broad spectrum.

Q. So whereas, for example, at the time of the release of the prisoners, the eight VJ soldiers, KLA high command would give assurances. Those assurances might be more difficult of delivery by those further down the chain than would have first been presented.

A. Yes. Absolutely.

Q. A few remaining documents, then, please. Tab 63, OTP reference 2808, which is simply a chronology of events, and it's really a document of record for us and for the Chamber should we find it helpful to refer to it. I don't think we need refer to it otherwise. It's a chronology that you've produced of OSCE events.

A. Yes. Which I wrote on the 4th of May, 1999.

Q. We can see it and we can simply turn to it if and when we find it helpful. To save time, we'll simply note that it's there. ²⁹⁷⁴ Sixty-four, tab 64, which is a memorandum, I think key points from a meeting on the 29th of December?

A. Yes. I think we've referred to this earlier, but it is a meeting which took place in my absence, which is why -- which is why Maisonneuve was there in my place. But it also had Ciaglinski there, so you might want to invite him to --

Q. -- with Ciaglinski when he comes. I think it will be next week. Sixty-five, OTP 2810, is a summary, and between pages 4 and 10, I think, or contains between 4 and 10 a record of non-compliance; is that right?

A. That's correct. And this is another of the periodic documents we put together for the Chairman-in-Office in Vienna, putting everything into one document rather than letting them produce their own summaries.

Q. If we simply lay on the overhead projector the first page because it will do as a representative page.

A. The next one. It's the one after this. Sorry, we're one document behind at the moment. Yes, that's it. Get to page 4.

Q. Another document we have, and here we can see on the 20th of January, the MUP surrounding two houses suspected of harbouring KLA, ceasefire arranged, a fire with small arms, MUP firing on the houses, killing two men inside. And then the columns on the right-hand side set the non-compliance by reference to the paragraph numbers of the document that we've been looking at right from the beginning of yesterday.

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. Thank you. Then 66. I don't know if -- this is a record of a ²⁹⁷⁵ phone call you made with General Loncar. The significance?

A. This was in the lead-up to the start of the early attempts to go and verify units in their barracks, and the gist of it was that Loncar was saying, "Can you please delay everything, because everything will be sorted out at the meeting between Walker and Sainovic," which, remember, was not actually the case, but that was what this telephone conversation was about.

Q. Sixty-seven. OTP reference 2812. 23rd of December, 1998, so we've gone back in time. Meeting with Colonel Marinkovic. Significance of this?

A. This was after the first units had -- unit had come out of barracks and had gone to a -- the airfield south of Podujevo, and having gone there, we went to the unit and asked to see the commanding officer to talk to him about what precisely he thought he was doing out of barracks when there was an agreement that such action would not take place. And so it was the start of the series of events that led to increasing numbers of VJ being out of barracks. And again, it's a record that was made at the time on my behalf.

Q. Sixty-eight. It has a declaration as to a chain of custody or provenance, and then on -- so the original should be placed briefly on the overhead projector before we look at the English version of it. It's OTP reference 1320.

A. This outlines the security situation as at late September 1998. So it reflects a time when I was not present. But at this point, the assessment is that the VJ and MUP feel that they've gained the upper hand ²⁹⁷⁶ over the UCK, and significantly, perhaps, that they detected a UCK or a KLA presence in the Kacanik area in the south; and certainly by the time we got there, we did not feel there was such a presence later in the year.

Q. Go to the next exhibit, 69, OTP 2686. This document doesn't have a declaration as to where it's been found. That will have to be dealt with.

JUDGE MAY: Sorry. There's a matter I want to raise with this general.

I just wonder if you could help with something, General. If you go back to 68. I just want your assistance in interpreting the document. The main paragraph. Have you got it?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: If you just look at the main paragraph - it needn't be put on the ELMO - in the middle of the document. It talks about the security situation in the territory remains complex, and it's worst on the -- and it gives a number of -- the names of a number of villages, and it says on an axis. Then it goes on: "In the event of any action by the VJ and MUP on the --" and then two more village names, the village line "-- the main part of the terrorism should be expected along the line." Does that mean, as you understand it, literally a line or is it a reference to an area?

THE WITNESS: No.

JUDGE MAY: What does it mean? I've seen it in another orders. It's puzzled me as to what it means.

THE WITNESS: "Along a line," I would interpret, sir, as being the ²⁹⁷⁷ area that you can expect to find them. Clearly, when you're in an insurgency situation, you've got a fairly good idea about where you can expect to run into the insurgents and where the security situation is less tense, and it's -- it's of -- of interest to security forces, because they will have maps on which they've got blobs of different colours, saying, "When you go into this area, no vehicles on their own, always two vehicles, always have a radio, always have weapons with you," whereas outside that area, the situation may well be much more benign. We certainly drew similar circles on the maps of the areas where we knew we could confidently expect the KLA to be and areas where they might be seen and they might operate on an infrequent basis. And so to define an area as a "line" is not a precise thing, but it gives a commander who is going to go into this area the idea of south of a certain point you would, for instance, load your weapons. You would adopt a different state of alertness. You might put your steel helmets on and take your berets off. And so all of those things will come from this sort of statement.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. Sixty-nine, tab 69, 2686 document, the source of which will have to be dealt with in an addendum to the exhibit volume, but if we look at the original just briefly to see what it is, on the overhead projector, and then at the translation.

A. This is a report which is from the MUP and which describes the fact that two of the policemen who are clearly on detached duty in Kosovo ²⁹⁷⁸ have decided they've had enough and they want to go home, and this is dated the 20th of November. And so it is clear that there were morale problems within the security forces as early as the 20th of November.

Q. 70. I think one of our documentary reports, OTP 1563, and it's simply only of value in case we want to discover what the manpower position was of the KVM as at the 2nd of January.

A. Yes. And defines it as 492. Around 500.

Q. Thank you. Seventy-one and two -- 71 was photographs. 72 was a document you hadn't had a chance to review before Easter. Again it's a document the source of which will have to be covered in a supplementary piece of paper, but I think you may have had about 30 seconds to look at it yesterday morning.

A. Yes, indeed. This is the document which -- whose translation is the Yugoslav Army General Staff, a military secret internal, a memorandum for Yugoslav army members engaged in territory affected by terrorist sabotage raids, and dated June 1998.

MR. NICE: If the Chamber doesn't --

JUDGE MAY: We're short a copy.

MR. NICE: Just one copy or --

JUDGE KWON: Later.

JUDGE MAY: Later will do.

MR. NICE:

Q. This deals with the proper way of handling certain circumstances, General, and your brief observation on it would be what?

A. Well, if I can take you to the last page of the document which ^{2979 BLANK PAGE 2980} says what has to be done with this document. And it says that this memorandum shall be sent to units at company and independent platoon level. In other words, down to every group of around 40 or 50 men engaged in a territory where there's a possibility of terrorist sabotage raids, get through the whole --

Q. Speed when reading, General.

A. Sorry. Going to the next paragraph. "Systematically go through the entire reminder with all army members on the territory where sabotage and terrorist attacks are conducted and proper individuals -- prepare individuals and units to implement the prescribed procedures." And it finishes: "Officers in command positions shall be responsible for the consistent implementation of the reminder in their formations." This, I think, indicates that there was a set of rules to be followed in dealing with the insurgents, and it is clear that instructions were transmitted down the chain of command.

If we go back to the start of the document, on page 2 in the first paragraph, it says -- that's it. Yes. Sorry. This says it's the procedure to be followed by VJ members in an area under threat by -- affected by terrorist and sabotage activities.

If you go down to the fourth subparagraph, they're to take rigorous measures to prevent unmilitary conduct by individuals, units and commands. So this is the instruction to the commander. If we go further down, into the area where there are bullets, bullet points, to the paragraph that starts, "While fighting outlaws and terrorists..." Yes, that's it. "When hostile groups conduct action from ²⁹⁸¹ fortified features or an inhabited place after issuing a warning, use artillery weapons for direct targeting and selectively destroy the enemy and the features from which activity is conducted." I would be very worried about this word "selective." I think this is a very loose document. It clearly condones the idea officially that you can use artillery against villages. Now, in my view, that is a very, very dangerous document to be putting down to a young officer and not necessarily giving him much more guidance than that. I don't know what guidance he got, but it is certainly not a document that would be issued in any army that I'm -- I've ever served in. And it gives too much latitude, I think, to the man on the ground. It's very dangerous. If we go on to paragraph 3, that deals with what to do with surrendered terrorists. Yes. And it specifically, at the next paragraph, it says that he is to be arrested - which is entirely right - but then at -- further down, we go down to a list of what it's forbidden to do. On another one, I think. Yes. "The following is forbidden: Killing detained persons, inflicting bodily harm on them, robbing detained persons, sick and wounded, desecrating corpses, looting them," and I think on the next page, "offending human dignity, rape, and forced prostitution."

So it is quite clear that the chain of command had issued orders that those people who wished to surrender should be allowed to surrender, which seems to me to be at odds with the exceptionally high kill rate of the -- of the incidents that I observed in which, if I add them up, over a hundred people were killed at a time when nine were captured and five were ²⁹⁸² wounded. So over a hundred killed for less than 20 wounded is an incredible kill rate if you are seeking to take the surrender of people who give themselves up voluntarily.

Q. Thank you.

A. If we go on to paragraph 4, "One should endeavour to avoid the use of artillery weapons and other weapons against citizens who are not offering any resistance, against places of worship, and the like." And that, again, is what one would hope to see, but the word "endeavour," again I would draw your attention to, because I think it should be written that every effort ought to be taken to. "Endeavour," is, frankly, weak in this sort of context, in my view.

Q. Maybe before allowing the point to fade, if we're allowed to do that, we could place the original, which is in Cyrillic, at paragraph 4. I don't know if we're allowed to do this. I've forgotten. And ask -- the witness won't be able to read it, but if the first line is susceptible to being read by the interpreters in the booth, if that's allowed, we will get an immediate translation of what's been written there. This is a draft translation.

Are we allowed to do that, Your Honour?

JUDGE MAY: I think you're allowed to do it; whether it can be done is another matter.

MR. NICE: If seems to me -- since emphasis is being placed on a word, I'd be unhappy about coming back months later when the point's been forgotten.

JUDGE MAY: The only way it can be done is if it's put on the ²⁹⁸³ ELMO.

MR. NICE: Yes, if it can be -- it has been.

JUDGE MAY: Is it on the ELMO now?

MR. NICE: It is. It's the first line of the paragraph there. If the interpreters are able to read it for us.

JUDGE MAY: Can the interpreters read the first line? Is it following the figure 4, Mr. Nice?

THE WITNESS: No. It's the paragraph immediately below.

JUDGE MAY: Is that what you want?

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: The paragraph underneath the figure 4.

MR. NICE: That's right, yes.

JUDGE MAY: Could the interpreters please interpret that for us, if they can read it.

THE INTERPRETER: "During the execution of combat operations against sabotage terrorist groups, seek to avoid the use of artillery weapons and weapons against citizens who do not put up any resistance."

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: That's enough, is it? "Seek" seems to be the word.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

Q. Thank you, General.

A. May I return to another bit of this document, please?

Q. Yes.

A. Which is in paragraph 5 -- sorry. Below the paragraph we've just done, in the next paragraph -- yes, that one. Can we... And this says ²⁹⁸⁴ that when citizens participate together with terrorist sabotage group members in armed action and offer them accommodation and food and supply them with weapons and ammunition, in such a case, they are all to be considered terrorist sabotage group members and are to be treated in the same way as terrorist sabotage group members.

I think that's an extremely dangerous statement to be issued by a General Staff. It would certainly cause any lawyer, any military lawyer that I have ever met, to -- to want to talk to the commander very seriously, because it's clearly giving a lot of licence to the people on the ground to deal with someone whose house happens to have been occupied for terrorist purposes suddenly becomes a terrorist in the same breath. And in the paragraph below, again if the school, hospital, or place of worship is used by the terrorist for observation, reconnaissance, or offering armed resistance, it also is considered that it gets treated in the same way. And so this is a very, very broad catchall phrase that suggests that if someone in a terrorist group has been spotted in the area of a mosque, then that gives the green light to be able to target the mosque, which is not at all the way I would see armed forces being instructed.

Q. Thank you.

A. And I think lastly, at 5.2. We have procedures for injured and sick saboteurs and terrorists, and that is the one -- sick and wounded, yes. And they get first aid, as they rightly should. As a comment on the whole document, I believe that, remembering where we are at this point in 1998 in the middle of the Balkans, in the ²⁹⁸⁵ light of events that had happened already between 1992 and 1999, I think this is an extremely loosely written document, and I feel it should have been far more specifically written. But even as it is written, I can think of many moments when these loose instructions were certainly flouted, and I can think of no moment when any commanding officer was, to my knowledge, actually disciplined for the breach of these very, very loose instructions, and I find that remarkable. Thank you.

Q. Thank you, General.

MR. NICE: Before I sit down, can I return to His Honour Judge Kwon's inquiry yesterday, which really starts with, as an example, tab 7, and provide the answer. In doing so, can I say that we will provide for insertion statements identifying the places where non-OSCE documents were found in line with the statements that have been associated with some of these exhibits coming from Mr. Milner, but number 7 was not one of those which had such an attestation.

It's worth observing, and I didn't observe this yesterday, that if we look at the last page of the original of this particular document, and perhaps the witness could see this as well but he may not be able to help further with it, it's worth observing that the copying list on this document, as on many of them or all of them, I'm not sure, includes, by surname only Milosevic, Milutinovic, Milic, Sainovic, Bulatovic, Ojdanic, Ojanovic and others. That's something that is reflected elsewhere. The position about these documents is that they were seized from a house in Pristina by an investigator. I'm not going to name the householder, and confidentiality will be sought or indeed taken for that ²⁹⁸⁶ householder. The documents come in the form I'm holding them up at the moment. Tab 7 is in the one in my right hand and on your left, which is the first two of booklets. I'll hand these in, perhaps, for inspection and then we'll decide how they ought to be dealt with. The title of the two booklets concerned are as follows: Temporary Executive Council, APKIM, Conversations with Foreign Delegations, and then the one which contains tab 7 is year one, number 2, December, 1998, and the second one, which contains tabs 10, 16, 18, 28, 34 and 38 is similarly titled except that it's number 3 and January 1999. I have -- and I have for distribution copies of those two cover pages. And perhaps it would be convenient if number 2 goes in as part of tab number 7 that we've been looking at, and then the next one -- yes. I'll distribute that first to avoid confusion.

So if that cover page can go in simply as part of tab 7. And then because the first of the documents that came from the second book is tab 10, if this other sheet can go in as part of tab 10. The registry's been good enough to allow us to provide the originals of the various exhibits, or the best originals that are in our possession, as it were, of the other tabs of this exhibit in due course. Can I ask that we consider the position of these books when I've handed them in, perhaps, and they've been inspected. Perhaps I -- perhaps the Judges would like to see them - I'm not sure - briefly now in light of their questions. But whether they should be exhibited now or whether they can come in as an exhibit on their own at a later stage. At the moment, they're held together by elastic bands because they had to be taken apart ²⁹⁸⁷ for the copying process.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We'll return these and they can be decided on in due course.

MR. NICE:

Q. Thank you, General. If you wait there, you'll be asked some further questions.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Drewienkiewicz, your department for operations was at the top of the chain of command of the Verification Mission, was it not? Is that right?

A. I was one of the, I think, six deputies. I was -- there was Walker, and Keller was his principal deputy, and the remaining deputies had equal status.

Q. Yes. But I'm cognisant of the explanation given by the person that you just mentioned, that is Ambassador Gabrielle Keller, who said that the department of operations had full responsibility, et cetera. Is that correct?

A. I answered directly to -- I answered directly to the Head of Mission in many respects, because my area was fast moving. However, when Ambassador Walker was away, I answered directly to Ambassador Keller since he was in the position of Head of Mission in the absence of Walker.

Q. How, then, can you explain this statement by Mr. Keller which I have quoted from his text? I'm not paraphrasing, I'm quoting him. [In ²⁹⁸⁸ English] "The officers of the KVM, supposedly a civilian operation, was successively militarised. I already mentioned the question of the chain of command. "

[Interpretation] What would you say regarding the extent to which the mention was militarised and how that chain of command functioned?

A. There were at the -- there were, at the start, a lot of military officers who were made available by the sending nations to the Kosovo Verification Mission. That was largely because they were available at short notice. It is in the nature of these -- of civilian organisations that the civilians, who are often experts and specialists, have proper jobs and, therefore, cannot simply drop everything and move at no notice to a new mission. They have to give notice in their own jobs, be contacted, decide that they want to do it, make their personal arrangements.

With military people, you can tell them to pack their bags and get on the aeroplane, as happened to me, within six hours. And so if a requirement comes up at very short notice, as this one did, then one of the options that the nations have is to put officers into civilian clothes and send them as unarmed people, which is what happened to us. It was certainly the intention that, as the situation was established on the ground and as the need for elections then came up, which were to be in the second half of the year that the KVM had a mandate, that the military would be reduced and that the electoral specialists would be brought in. But it would certainly have taken several months to get them, and there was great urgency and a need to get ²⁹⁸⁹ the mission effective as quick as possible.

Q. If I am understanding you correctly, military men were sent because it was more difficult for civilians to terminate their jobs and, to military men, you can simply issue orders. Is that the crux of what you have just said?

A. Yes. Yes, it is.

Q. In that case, my question is: Is it not the same as with soldiers that are assigned by order, that you -- can't you behave similarly with diplomatic officials of an adequate rank, which all the OSCE countries have in large numbers? What is the difference between assigning military men or diplomatic officers?

A. The difference, I think, is that they are available in much larger numbers, and they are from a culture which is prepared to move quickly and to live in uncomfortable conditions, and we knew that the conditions were going to be somewhat uncomfortable, certainly at the start of the mission. Because a lot of the early work was going to be establishing locations and going out and finding out what the situation on the ground was, it was felt that, while the military people did not necessarily have all of the right diplomatic skills, their early availability and their ability to operate in difficult situations, uncomfortable situations, made them better than the alternative, which was nothing, which was a few people arriving slowly.

Q. Regarding the decision to send predominantly military people, was one of the reasons the nature of the assignments given to them in the mission, regardless of the way in which it was defined in the agreement ^{2990 BLANK PAGE 2991} between the FRY and the OSCE?

A. The decision to send military people was a decision that was made by each individual state of the OSCE, and it varied. Some -- some states decided they would send only civilians. Some decided they would send none. And so it was -- there was no central decision by the OSCE permanent council. The only decision they made was that they wanted to build the mission up as quickly as humanly possible to its full 2.000 mandated strength. And as you see, that took quite a long time. And I have to add that one of the things I did in late December, early January, was to review where everybody was, because we knew that a number of people had been called forward from -- by Vienna to join the mission, and they didn't seem to be appearing at the right rate. And when we checked the names of those who had been called forward against those who had been -- who had arrived, we found that at the moment that we had about 500 people in the mission - we had thought we were going to have 800 - because 300 had decided that they didn't want to come. And that's the other problem with -- with dealing with people who are not subject to a military chain of command; they were able to decide that, watching the TV, it was probably not for them.

Q. Let us make a comparison in connection with the answer you are giving. You are aware that before an agreement was reached on the Kosovo Verification Mission between Yugoslavia and the OSCE, that a Diplomatic Observer Mission was set up consisting of diplomats, diplomatic staff of the embassies which various countries had accredited in Belgrade. I assume you're aware of that, the diplomatic observation mission. ²⁹⁹²

A. Yes. And in my experience, the diplomatic observation mission consisted of one or two diplomats with quite a lot of seconded military or ex-military contracted to increase their personnel. The formal number of diplomats in the diplomatic observer missions was, in my experience, quite a small proportion. Certainly not more than 25 per cent.

Q. Thank you very much. That in fact was the point of my question. So even the diplomatic mission was not really a diplomatic mission but a military one, according to what you have just said, because it was predominantly composed of military staff. That's right, isn't it?

A. Yes, but its task was diplomatic. Its task was not military.

Q. In name, certainly, but would you agree with this assessment, which also comes from your colleague Ambassador Keller: [In English] "Authoritarian. Sudden decisions were taken to remove people from their positions without justification beyond an alleged incompetence. The special position --" This is the point: "... the special position of operations gave this department a prominent role with responsibilities in all fields, even outside its theoretical competence." [Interpretation] My question is, in view of the fact that you were the head of that department of operations, and as Keller says, with responsibilities in all areas even beyond theoretic competencies, would that -- does it -- can one infer from this that you were in fact the Executive Chief of Mission?

A. I can certainly confirm that I picked up jobs which were not being done by others, even if they were not formally part of my task, because it was important that they were done. And this was done with the agreement ²⁹⁹³ of the head of the mission at the time. I specifically referred earlier to the -- the problem we had over dealing with the police actions, which was not formally my side of the -- of the mission but which was simply not being done in the early days. And I took it on -- I took it on myself to do this, to expand my activities into this area because of the degree to which it was becoming clear to me and to everyone else that police and military actions were connected increasingly.

I think I did become the Executive Chief of the mission, because the mission changed in its nature from being a long-term mission to one in which short-term events with an operational bias became the driving factor. And because of that, my department was in the best position to take the action that was required, and it was my department that every night got the reports from the other Regional Centres, from their heads, and we put it together for the Head of Mission. And so events moved me into that -- that position, I believe.

Q. That is what I had assumed. That is why I wanted to check it out. So you were, in a sense, an Executive Chief of the mission. So you had the whole mission and its activities within your responsibility. Though I must ask you now, since you just mentioned that you engaged in activities linked to the police, why did the nomination of the assistant for police affairs come late? Was it delayed?

A. As I understand it, the original nomination was not -- was not fully approved within the OSCE in Vienna, and another name was then substituted, and he arrived -- he was nominated in late December or early January and arrived in late January. ²⁹⁹⁴

Q. The person was an Italian lawyer, was it not?

A. The eventual man was an Italian judge, I believe.

Q. And before that?

A. I never met the man before. I was not in Vienna when he was -- when he was in Vienna.

Q. Is what was heard and what can be read in some places true, and that is that this first candidate was rejected because his position was that it was necessary to cooperate in a cordial manner with the police of Serbia? Do you know anything about that?

A. I have heard that secondhand, yes.

Q. And to what extent do you assume that that is true?

A. I think you would -- you ought to ask that of the people that were actually in Vienna at the time. Yes.

Q. Do you find it strange that a candidate should be rejected because he feels that one should have courteous relationships, relations of correct cooperation with the police of the country in which the mission is staying?

A. I think it was everybody's intention to have courteous relationships with the police of the country in which we were. So I don't believe, as stated like that, that that would have been a cause for rejection. Everybody went out of their way to be courteous, certainly at the start, and the diplomatic formalities were well observed. So I don't believe, put in the way that you put it, that that was any cause whatsoever for anyone to be rejected.

Q. Very well. There is an explanation here which I am again ²⁹⁹⁵ borrowing from your colleague Mr. Keller, so will you tell me whether you agree with him. He says, and I quote: [In English] "To take important decisions in the mission was the executive committee; in other words, the Head of Mission and his six deputies. In the day-to-day life of the mission, the meetings of the Executive Committee, one hour three times per week, where they wanted to handle the common business rather than making the important decisions after appropriate discussion." [Interpretation] Is this an assessment that you would agree with or does your opinion differ?

A. The content of the meetings, which I don't recall as being three times a week, I recall as being almost every day, were to deal with the most pressing events that we were dealing with at the time. At the beginning, therefore, they dealt with the problems of building up the mission quickly, and then, as the situation deteriorated, they increasingly focused on operational matters. There were also meetings for which there was preparation about things like how we were going to start to administer the elections, the process of voter registration and this sort of thing, but they became rather overtaken by events as the situation deteriorated on the ground.

Q. But this is contradicted to a major extent, the further explanation. The main consequences of the above: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... some of the mission members choose from the beginning to adopt a very aggressive behaviour with the official authorities."

[Interpretation] Is that true or not? ²⁹⁹⁶

A. I think it depends how you define "aggressive." We were certainly determined that our freedom of movement should not be curtailed because, if it were to be curtailed, we would not be able to do our job. And so if we were aggressive at the start, it was because of our -- our wish to be as effective as possible as quickly as possible. We were not always as diplomatic as Ambassador Keller might have liked or would have liked, but we weren't the product of -- of an entirely diplomatic system either.

Q. I'm not -- I don't think it was more or less diplomatic, according to what he says here. He said: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... deliberately sacrificed."

[Interpretation] Do you agree with that?

A. No, I don't. We were as polite as we could be, given that we had a job to do and it was important to get the job done. And there were moments when some of the diplomatic niceties had to take second place in the urgency of the situation. We were not there to get elections done any time in the next ten years. We were there on a one-year mandate with a mission that was being built up far too slowly, where the security situation was deteriorating daily. We were under constant pressure, indeed from your officials, to -- to expand our activities more, and in doing that, we may not have been quite as diplomatic as we should have been. We were perhaps more effective than we would otherwise have been by pushing forward, though.

Q. In my question, I am not identifying diplomacy with courteous behaviour, but, rather, do you assume that what should use diplomatic means to achieve calm, mutual understanding and to achieve the main goal, ²⁹⁹⁷ and that is to pave the way for a peaceful settlement? Don't you consider that to be the prime aim of diplomatic efforts?

A. Yes. And that was going on in parallel, certainly throughout November and December, when Ambassador Hill was doing everything in his power to secure a separate agreement with the Kosovo Albanian community.

Q. How, then, would you assess further explanations of your colleague who worked with you, Ambassador Keller, who says: [In English] "In a constructive atmosphere about our real problems, such as our standards of work, the interpretation of the agreement, the figures of troops, different realities on the ground. We lost whole weeks of unproductive talks about the medical evacuation helicopter, the weapons of the bodyguard, or other secondary matters. We never tried, at the upper level of the mission, to associate the Yugoslavs to our work." [Interpretation] Is that true?

A. I think that is one, one opinion. I think the -- some of these issues, while small in themselves, were seen as precedents and were seen as indications of good faith or otherwise by the authorities. And when it appeared impossible to get agreement on these small issues, I think they assumed a larger importance because of their symbolic nature. There was a feeling, well, if they won't even let us fly a medical evacuation helicopter in, how are they supposed to be cooperating with us?

Q. You have just mentioned this medical helicopter. Accidentally [as interpreted], that question was put to me personally by Mr. Walker in its time, so my question now is: Are you aware of the fact that I immediately, on the spot, when I was asked, responded by saying that we ²⁹⁹⁸ would immediately give you our own helicopter so that you can use it for the same purposes for which you planned to use the Swiss one? Are you aware of that?

A. Yes, I was aware of it, and that was not what we were seeking. You have to remember that the OSCE member states were extremely concerned about the safety of the men and women that they made available to this mission. One of the early things we did was an assessment of the medical facilities in Kosovo, and they gave us a lot of grounds for concern. As a result of that, we wanted a properly, fully-equipped medical helicopter with a doctor and a paramedic in it available to us, and that was agreed by the permanent council of the OSCE and it was agreed that a lot of money should be spent to hire such a facility.

That helicopter came as far as Skopje, having been hired, and sat on the ground in Skopje. The offer, as I understood it, was one of your helicopters which would have your insignia on it and which, in our view, would therefore be vulnerable if it was flying in areas where the Kosovo Liberation Army were. There were certainly instances of your helicopters being hit by small-arms fire, and so we did not want to end up with someone who started off being wounded, being evacuated in one of your helicopters that was subsequently shot down and a wounded man became a dead man because he happened to be in -- flying in one of your helicopters.

We also had doubts as to the technical excellence of your medical evacuation helicopters. They looked rather more like helicopters with a stretcher in them rather than what we had, which was a helicopter with a ²⁹⁹⁹ fully-equipped life support system, a doctor and a paramedic. So we didn't think that like was being compared with like.

JUDGE MAY: That is a convenient moment. We will adjourn now for quarter of an hour.

--- Recess taken at 11.49 a.m.

--- On resuming at 12.07 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll sit now for another hour, until ten past one.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Considering that you have explained all these things about needing life support systems, paramedics, the full medical team and all the other things that attended your needs, and all these things were offered by our side without any reduction, can you answer this question: Was this helicopter supposed to be used for other purposes, other than medical, so to speak?

A. The helicopter had room for the doctor, the paramedic, the pilot, and the casualty. So the idea of using it for aerial reconnaissance or observation was simply out of the question.

Q. And do you know, for instance, about the statement of one of your verifiers, a Swiss national, Pascal Neuver [phoen], who said, "We understood from the beginning that the information gathered by the KVM are used for completing the information gathered by NATO via satellites. We had the impression that we were gathering intelligence for NATO." And before you answer this question, I have another related ³⁰⁰⁰ question, to save time. Are you also aware that, after this statement, this man was warned by the Swiss ministry not to speak about this again, and he said that he had received threats?

A. There were two Kosovo Verification Missions. There was a ground Kosovo Verification Mission, which was the responsibility of the OSCE, and there was an air Kosovo Verification Mission, which was the responsibility of NATO. It was, therefore, important and part of our task to talk to NATO and to exchange information. One of the things we were able to do was to ask for aerial photos of villages which -- where there had been fighting and houses had been burnt, so that we could ascertain which were the villages which were in most need of help in terms of reconstruction. Because if you drove past a village, you often saw a lot of damage on the edge of the village, but if you actually saw the air photo of it, you could see that it was confined to a narrow strip at the edge of the village.

The best way of finding this sort of information out quickly on a grand scale was to do it from air photos, and that was what we would ask NATO to do on our behalf. That was entirely consistent with both our mission and NATO's mission, and we certainly were not responding to requests from NATO for information for intelligence purposes.

Q. I didn't understand you, really. You did or you didn't?

A. We did not respond to NATO when they requested us to get mission -- to get information specifically for intelligence purposes.

Q. And you are a NATO general, aren't you, I suppose?

A. I am a general from a country that is a member of NATO, or I was ^{3001 BLANK PAGE 3002} until I retired. At the time, I was assigned to the Kosovo Verification Mission I was detached from the Ministry of Defence to the British Foreign and Commonwealth office, and from there, to the OSCE, so I was not in the job as a NATO general any more than Ambassador Keller was there as a NATO diplomat.

Q. You haven't answered my previous question. Maybe it was my mistake because it was a long one. I mean the question before the helicopter, and it regarded the statement of Keller's. [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... associate the Yugoslavs to our work."

A. I'm sorry, I still don't understand the question.

Q. Is that statement that you never tried to associate the Yugoslav side in your work at the upper levels?

A. I think that's entirely untrue. I think we expended an enormous amount of energy attempting to gain more cooperation from the Yugoslav authorities that we dealt with. The specific example was the series of requests that were being put to the authorities in late November and early December when we were told categorically that all of this would be dealt with by Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic, in which -- which led to the meeting with -- between Sainovic and Walker at which Sainovic flatly refused all of the requests for assistance. That rather put the level of cooperation as low on the Yugoslav side rather than on our side.

Q. All right. I understand this interpretation on your part, but this statement of Mr. Keller's with which you absolutely disagree, as you say, and you say it's completely untruthful, the statement referred to the ³⁰⁰³ upper levels of the mission. And he also says, [In English] "Such a work was done, sometimes very successfully, which proves that it was not an impossible challenge."

That means -- I'm interested in your assessment of this cooperation at the level of Regional Centres and the efforts invested there as well as the relationships with local authorities.

A. I would say that at the Regional Centres, certainly at the start, the main relationships were with the -- the local military commander and the local police commander. The relationship with the civilian authorities was slower to evolve, not least because that was something that was going to need to be developed as we got involved in the process of electoral registration, which was not starting during the winter because we didn't have the specialists available at that stage.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, before the accused asks his next question, where he's cross-examining on the basis of statements, it would always be helpful if we could know what the statement is, because somebody like Ambassador Keller will have probably made many statements. Alternatively, if he's going to cross-examine extensively on a particular witness statement, if he could make it available to the Chamber, to us, and particularly to the witness to review.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, what are you quoting from Ambassador Keller?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Gabrielle Keller -- [In English] "Gabrielle Keller, Principal Deputy Head of Mission to the Watch Group on May 25, 1999." [Interpretation] And the title is: [In English] ³⁰⁰⁴ "[Previous translation continues]... mission."

JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In this annexure that you provided containing the agreement between -- this is number 2 in your table, annex under number 2, [In English] "General responsibilities, roles and missions. These reports will also be provided to authorities of the FRY." [Interpretation] And in point 3, under ii, Roman ii: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, other Kosovo authorities, political parties and other organisations in Kosovo, and accredited international and NGOs to assist in fulfilling its responsibilities."

[Interpretation] And then towards the end, on the last page, it says: [In English] "Each coordination centre will maintain a liaison relationship with the opstina authorities and the local leadership." [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. Thus, according to the rules of the mission, you were responsible for close cooperation from the top to the bottom, from the Federal Government and the Government of Serbia, the provisional government of Kosovo, to municipal authorities. Do you believe that, on your part, you did all you could to establish that cooperation?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. How, then, do you explain -- how do you understand this explanation from this official statement of Mr. Keller given to the Watch Group? [In English] "Nationals of OSCE countries not belonging to NATO ³⁰⁰⁵ who did not approve this behaviour felt more and more uncomfortable in a mission which did not reflect the sensitivity of their countries."

A. I think the first thing I would say is that Mr. Keller's evidence to the Watch Group was not given under oath, and it was his opinion at the time, which was May 1999, and we all had different emotions at that stage.

Having said that, the OSCE is a consensual organisation. In order to get a decision in Vienna, all the nations have to agree with it, and therefore, if any of the people in the mission felt that something was being done which trampled on their sensitivities, they had the ability to speak to their permanent delegation in Vienna and many of them did very often. Indeed, telephone lines tended to be swamped with phone calls to Vienna not coming through the secretariat but going down national lines, and quite a lot of our work was devoted to dealing with questions from individual delegations. And so there was a mechanism for any concerns to be dealt with, and that was quite regularly done.

Q. [Interpretation] All right. But we've just commented a moment ago on the reasons why the Italian judge, who was supposed to deal with police affairs and who considered that one needed to be easygoing and moderate in relations with the Serb police, was found to be unfit for the job.

A. I don't think it was the task of the Kosovo Verification Mission to be easygoing on anybody. It was our job to report what we saw and to deal dispassionately with the conditions that we found, and that was what we did. I think there is a difference between going down determined to make the mission work, and go down there determined to be easygoing on any ³⁰⁰⁶ party to the dispute. We weren't there to be easygoing; we were there to verify.

Q. Do you believe that this assertion is correct or not? Keller says: [In English] "Communication was insufficient internally and externally. Internally, very few meetings were organised for all mission members to discuss and explain the goals and means of our mission. Externally, it was still worse. The even-handedness of the mission was questioned from the very beginning. We never managed to clear this impression. By the way, did we really try?"

[Interpretation] And I'm asking you the same thing. Did you really try to be unbiased?

A. I think the quick answer is yes, we thought we bent over backwards. And I think I have produced documents which show that, as late as March 1999, we were attempting still to give unbiased views of the action of the different parties involved in the conflict. Certainly in the early days, there were briefings as members came into the mission and went through the induction centre for two days. They were briefed on the mission. I personally attended all but one of induction courses at which we explained what the mission was, what its mandate was, what it was trying to do, how it should act. Various of the heads -- the Head of Mission and the Deputy Head of Mission also came down, on occasion, to the induction course and spoke to everyone there.

Once people were spread out throughout the Regional Centres, obviously we couldn't bring everybody together to brief them. We certainly got everyone in Pristina together from time to time to brief ³⁰⁰⁷ them, and it was the responsibility of the Regional Centre heads to do the same for their people, and I know they worked hard at that. In terms of information going upwards, there was a constant evolution about the form of the report that was wanted in Vienna, and we did what Vienna wanted in that respect.

In terms of making the report available to other organisations, that was also done, and we welcomed other non-governmental organisations at our morning briefing at 9.00 and provided them with a copy of our -- of our morning update.

So I think we did do a lot to disseminate information from the start and as much as we were able to do, certainly until the last days when things got very fast-paced, and it was perhaps not possible to do that in the last days. Once we were down in Macedonia, I again went round all of the locations where the verifiers were and spoke to groups of them so that we spoke to everybody about where we thought the mission was, what the situation was, what would happen next. We put a lot of effort into briefing people, yes.

Q. You say that you invested efforts. Investing efforts and achieving a result are not one and the same thing. I hope you agree. Is this correct: [In English] "After some weeks of our presence, the global image of OSCE/KVM was to be anti-Serb, pro-Albanian and pro-NATO."

[Interpretation] Is this claim accurate as far as your image is concerned?

A. I don't think it was. We went out of our way to report events as ³⁰⁰⁸ they occurred as dispassionately as possible. There was certainly debate within the mission about how to describe the actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and it was certainly a topic that was discussed a lot, whether they should be called "terrorists" or "insurgents" or what. That was an active debate and went on for some time.

You will recall that, in the press statement in the wake of the killing of the three MUP in early January, that action was firmly described as terrorist, and the discussion that went through -- went with that was -- was considerable, but that was the decision that was made, that it should be so labelled.

And so I do not think that we were anti-Serb. I think we went out of our way to attempt to understand the sensitivities of the Serb population despite what we saw on the ground in terms of some difficulties in the way that particularly policemen treated Albanian civilians. We were verifying a similar agreement to NATO, and therefore we had to meet NATO and cooperate with them and they with us. We were certainly not anti-NATO. It is not the position of the OSCE to be anti-NATO. They were a partner in the -- in the process with us.

Q. When you were leaving Kosovo, there is an impression among a certain number of mission members that Keller refers to, and he says very clearly: [In English] "I was particularly impressed by the many verifiers who showed their sadness to leave a work in which they had been totally committed during four months. They felt something more should have been done to improve the situation. They gave examples of the small success stories, especially in Regional Centres. I will mention specifically the ³⁰⁰⁹ case of Malisevo, where long talks between mission members, VJ, and MUP, as well as UCK ended successfully with the return of an important part of the population back into the town. Other long and difficult talks about the time and frequency of security patrols around the town improved the safety of the surroundings. In other places, patient efforts by highly dedicated verifiers made contacts possible again between representatives of Serbian and Albanian communities. This was needlework rather than spectacular diplomacy or verification. Many more months would have been necessary to transform those little changes into global result and to create the necessary conditions for success of these talks." [Interpretation] Do you agree with these impressions of these verifiers that your colleague is referring to?

A. Yes, I do, and I would associate myself with all of that statement. We had not spared ourselves in those -- those months, nearly six months in some cases, and a lot of things were done at low level which did enable things to happen, like Malisevo to have its inhabitants return to it, and we were all part of that, yes.

However, at the top level, we kept encountering resistance with the officials, and they did not make our life easier. They did not work every hour that was sent to make things better, to make the job of the verifiers easier. Rather, we found that it was frustrated by the officials and our life was made more difficult.

So the things that were achieved were in some cases achieved despite the recalcitrance of the officials.

Q. As I know full well that the government had no intention of ³⁰¹⁰ thwarting your efforts, my question is: Which requests, apart from this one for a helicopter that you mentioned and for weapons, there was another one for weapons, can you gave us the cases when your requests were not met?

A. I can certainly add to those two the issue of visas, where we asked that we be given visas that were not single entry. And I recall that when my -- when my verifiers were wounded and the wounded man was transported to the border with Macedonia in one of our ambulances, and it was the intention to hand him over to a NATO ambulance that was waiting on the other side of the border, and the paramedics put him onto a stretcher and he was going to be carried on the stretcher over the border. At this point, your officials, your border officials, said, "Let me see the passport of all of the stretcher bearers." They had single-entry visas. They said, "Right. If you guys go over the line, you will not be allowed back. You will have to stay in Skopje and wait while you apply for another visa." So the wounded man had to be helped to his feet off the stretcher and stagger across the line to where he could be taken care of by the waiting medics to take him to the fully-equipped hospital. That was not cooperation on the ground. That was disgraceful.

Q. I do not have the impression that these were substantial problems. Things of that kind happen. Visas were given, as you know, a helicopter was offered, and as far as weapons are concerned, do you know that it says in this agreement specifically, explicitly, the one I quoted a moment ago and which you have provided in annex 2, that the mission is unarmed and that is why that request was rejected, that no one should be armed. Do ³⁰¹¹ you know that? Are you aware of that?

A. I am aware of that, and the issue of sidearms for diplomatic protection people to look after Walker was the issue that became the live issue. This was particularly -- came to the fore when Walker was accosted in the street by a drunken Serb with a hand grenade in his hand in broad daylight, about 50 metres from the police station, and the police who were supposed to be policing seemed unable to deal with this situation and prevent it from happening. It was that sort of event that made Walker fear for his safety and to request that -- or to continue to request that his personal security detail be allowed sidearms. In the circumstances, I think that was reasonable, given the failure of the police on the ground.

Q. We obviously have different opinions, but I think a fact that cannot be denied - and that brings me to my question - is whether any one of the mission members was hurt by the Serbian side during the duration of the mission, and were you well-protected by the appropriate forces of the Ministry of the Interior, including the period of your evacuation and all the other obligations that we assumed towards you as a state?

A. I can draw your attention specifically to the moment when two of my verifiers were pulled out of their vehicle and were assaulted by two of your policemen. That certainly was not appropriate behaviour by those policemen.

That aside, that is an isolated example, but it certainly took place, and I'm not aware of any disciplinary action or investigation taking place to do anything about it.

So towards the end of the mission, there was not a feeling that we ^{3012 BLANK PAGE 3013} were being protected by the appropriate forces. We got the feeling that we were being denied access by the appropriate forces of the Ministry of the Interior and of the army.

During the evacuation, I would specifically say that that was correctly carried out, and we were afforded every facility as we evacuated, including the provision of liaison people with communications from the Ministry of the Interior. So they get a tick for that, yes.

Q. I hope for other things too, because you haven't mentioned any other example except for this rough treatment by an individual policeman of whom you do not know whether he was subject to any disciplinary action or not.

So in spite of everything, let us go back to the issue. Keller says: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... UCK remained high." [Interpretation] Then he goes on, towards the end -- no, no, at the beginning. [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... as a call to participate in the improvement of the situation on the ground. Every pullback by the Yugoslav army or the Serbian police was followed by a movement forward by its forces, which the other side, of course, considered as a violation of the ceasefire. OSCE's presence compelled the state forces to certain restraint, at least in the beginning of the mission, and UCK took advantage of this to consolidate its position." [Interpretation] Is that true? Do you agree, at least in that respect, with the author?

A. Yes. That was the case in November and December, certainly in the area of Podujevo when we were building up the mission, and it was very ³⁰¹⁴ difficult to cover everywhere at once. We also took quite a long time to establish good working communications with the UCK, because it is quite difficult to establish working communications with an insurgent underground movement. They don't have offices in the middle of the town, and they don't appear in the telephone directory. You have to go and find them. You have to make your way past wild-looking young men with their fingers on triggers, and you have to talk your way into the presence of their leaders, and that takes a lot of time and effort. It's much more difficult than simply dealing with the authorities.

Q. But is my impression correct if I say that you endeavoured mostly to establish that the Yugoslav forces were breaching the agreement and that the Albanian terrorists were doing so to a much lesser degree?

A. I think that wherever we were able to fully see a situation such as in the ambush on the border in early December, where the facts were fairly clear, then we stated what those facts were. In that case, we stated that we felt that this was a legitimate ambush by a state's armed forces and that it was a serious violation of the ceasefire by the KLA, by the UCK.

In terms of the KLA coming forward into positions that had been vacated by the Yugoslav army, that certainly took -- took -- took place, and we protested it with the KLA, but at the time, we did not have very effective liaison and they choose to ignore it. Because the other thing that is difficult is that they don't have a -- quite such a good code of conduct and discipline and chain of command in an insurgent organisation as a regular army, and so you cannot expect a regular -- an irregular ³⁰¹⁵ force to do precisely what it's told all the time, quickly, in the way that regular forces can.

Q. However, your government in London had the accurate data. I assume they could only have obtained them from you. Do you know, for instance, on the 18th of January, 1999, your Minister or, rather, Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Commonwealth, Mr. Robin Cook, at an official meeting - and I have a note on that meeting - said: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... has committed more breaches of ceasefire and until this weekend was responsible for more deaths. The Kosovo Liberation Army cannot defeat the Yugoslav army and instead of liberating the people of Kosovo, can only prolong their suffering. Neighbouring countries, in particular Albania, must be more resolute in halting the flow of weapons which fuels the conflict. The Kosovo Liberation Army has repeatedly broken the ceasefire and last month seized a number of Serb hostages." [Interpretation] So what Cook is saying, I assume, is coming, among others, from information that you provided, as you yourself said, as an officer of the Foreign Ministry, he receives. So I don't doubt that you truthfully informed your government. And what your Minister is saying is obviously at the expense of the terrorists, because that is the truth, and therefore, is it clear that there's a difference between what is truthful and what efforts were being made to prove on the ground to the effect that Serbs were permanently violating the agreement? Or maybe Cook was misinformed in this particular case.

A. I don't recall this statement, but I'm sure that he would have ³⁰¹⁶ made it from the available information, which would have included the reports that went from ourselves up to Vienna and to the states that are part of the OSCE. I also from time to time did talk to the Foreign Ministry, because I was rung up and asked specific questions. Now, the issue on the ground was that a KLA breach of the ceasefire would be far more difficult to spot because it would be quite often small-arms fire. A Yugoslav breach of the ceasefire would often be much bigger in terms of the use of tank armament and artillery armament and, therefore, certainly a FRY breach would be much louder and would attract a lot more attention. Therefore, when the FRY forces responded, it was our opinion that that response should be proportionate, and it quite often wasn't and therefore we would report it as being disproportionate. And I recall producing documents which indicated that this use of the word "proportionality" was used really quite early in the mission and continued to be one of the features of the discussions I had with General Loncar at regular intervals. But it was not sufficient to justify the shelling of a village with the -- with the answer that there had been a terrorist there half an hour earlier. This sort of disproportionate action would -- would only get your forces into trouble, which it did.

Q. Did you and the Americans - as you and the Americans were together - did you react proportionately in Afghanistan?

JUDGE MAY: That's a totally irrelevant point, a totally irrelevant point.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ³⁰¹⁷

Q. Are you reacting proportionately in Iraq, when no one is attacking you?

JUDGE MAY: No, Mr. Milosevic. Let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Okay. Let's go back to this: A moment ago you said that you are not familiar with this statement. It is the 18th of January, 1999, Secretary of State for Foreign Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Robin Cook said, but it wasn't just a statement, it was a meeting attended by others as well. For instance, Mr. John Randolf, Uxbridge - probably an MP from that area, I assume - says: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... sanctions and threats used against Belgrade. What sanctions and threats could be used against the KLA?"

[Interpretation] And then he's given the answer that you most emphatically condemned, that all international furor, and so on and so forth, but as you know, this was not productive. And therefore, London was fully aware of the situation regarding consequences and background. Are you aware of what Mr. Cook says now: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... in all its different manifestations, including the European Union, the Contact Group and the Security Council, is that we do not support independence for Kosovo. That is partly because the countries in the neighbourhood would strongly resent and resist any attempt to establish an independent Kosovo because --"

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker be asked to read more slowly please.

JUDGE MAY: You're being asked to read the English more slowly, ³⁰¹⁸ Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I'll keep track of the interpretation.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. [In English] "Always remember that the agenda of the KLA is not independence for Kosovo but a Greater Albania. It would also have an effect in Bosnia about which all honourable members should be concerned. It would be very difficult to resist the demand of Republika Srpska for independence if Kosovo were to secede --" not to secede -- "if Kosovo were to succeed in achieving it."

[Interpretation] And now we come to a very important statement which I would like to ask you about. In response to Mr. Cook said, Mr. Dave Campbell Davis [phoen], from Washington, says: [In English] "Is not the bottom line the fact that the KLA, in pursuing its objective of Greater Albania is making decision taking in a NATO, taking in a NATO extremely difficult --"

[Interpretation] You didn't interpret that correctly. "... taking in NATO becomes extremely difficult."

[In English] "[Previous translation continues]... cannot take any military action in Kosovo..."

A. I understand the point that is being made.

Q. [In English] "... the KLA will be solely to blame because it will have prevented such action."

[Interpretation] My question is: Is this sufficient to show - because obviously the speaker is aware of the planned NATO activities - is ³⁰¹⁹ this sufficient to show that the war against Yugoslavia had already been decided about? Because this meeting was held on the 18th of January.

A. To the best of my knowledge, and I was not in NATO at that stage, there was not any decision of that nature at that stage. There may well have been contingency planning, because that's what NATO does. It has contingency plans for all areas of NATO, from one end to the other. And if you're a military organisation, that's your professional job, so that you can deal with a situation as it arises, without saying, "Gosh, we've just noticed this, we haven't got a plan." That was the problem we had in Vienna in October, that we had to start to plan with the clock ticking, after the mandate had started.

So whatever NATO was doing at the time in the form of planning, I believe it was normal planning that any sensible organisation does if it has the capacity to do so.

Q. Yes, but you saw here that because of the obvious breaches by the Albanians, there was a danger, as Mr. Dave Campbell Davis [phoen] says, that this could spoil or undermine the reasons for NATO going in, for NATO carrying out its plan. He says very well here: [In English] "NATO cannot take any military actions then in Kosovo."

[Interpretation] If they behave in this way and that they would be to blame for preventing NATO from taking military action by their behaviour. That is why I'm asking you: Is this not sufficient proof that the intention to go to war already existed?

JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered that as best he can.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. ³⁰²⁰

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Cook responded: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... on more than one occasion this afternoon there is fault on both sides and the KLA must accept its responsibility for the present situation."

THE INTERPRETER: It's too fast, I'm sorry.

JUDGE MAY: Too fast. Can you read it again so that they can get it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. [In English] "As I have said on more than one occasion this afternoon, there is fault on both sides, and the KLA must accept its responsibility for the present situation because of its repeated breaches of the ceasefire."

[Interpretation] And then -- so this was on the 18th of January. That means after all these dramatic events that you have described, and he says:

[In English] "[Previous translation continues]... Kosovo Verification Mission for securing the release today of eight members of the Yugoslav army taken prisoners taken by Kosovo -- taken prisoner by Kosovo Liberation Army on 8th of January."

[Interpretation] And then he adds: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... the UCK not to repeat this irresponsible action. We welcome the restraint demonstrated on this occasion by the FRY Serb security forces which allowed the KVM successfully to negotiate the release of the abducted men. This restraint must continue throughout the whole Kosovo." ³⁰²¹ [Interpretation] Does this show that, at that point in time, and we're talking about the 18th of January, even Cook was not aware of the fact that Racak would be used as the trigger for the war? What is your opinion about that?

JUDGE MAY: I don't think the witness can deal with that. You must ask Mr. Cook.

THE WITNESS: May I comment?

JUDGE MAY: Well, yes. Briefly, please, General.

THE WITNESS: In talking about the restraint that had been demonstrated by the security forces when we were getting the eight soldiers off the hill, I do recall at one stage that I had to withdraw my people who were standing between the two sides because the order was being passed that an assault should go in by the security forces. And so there was restraint in that we did manage eventually to get a successful conclusion to it, but it was extremely hard. And it was made harder by the extremely awkward attitude of -- of the Serb security forces who kept us under constant pressure in this respect, not only forcing me to pull my people back on at least one occasion but also, as I think I mentioned, producing a column headed for Kosovo which looked extremely like special forces on their way. All of these things made it an extremely difficult and trying time. So I would qualify the description of the restraint.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The substance of the question I put to you really relates to a decision that had already been taken to find a reason for the war. And in this connection, you said yesterday something of importance, an important ³⁰²² testimony that fits into what your MP was saying, talking to Mr. Cook, that the KLA would prevent NATO from achieving its goal. You said that you entered Mr. Walker's office when he was calling up Mr. Holbrooke after Racak, and you quoted his words. I took note of them very carefully. "You can kiss your Nobel Peace Prize away."

In other words, "We found an excuse for the war." "You can kiss your Nobel Prize goodbye. We found a reason for the war."

Is it clear that Walker's task was to create conditions for the war?

A. No, absolutely not, and that's not my interpretation of what I heard him say. He was extremely stressed. He was talking to someone who he clearly knew very well, and he was feeling extremely frustrated. I think you should ask him what he meant by it, but it wasn't my interpretation that this was going to be an excuse for starting a war. And anyone you asked in the Kosovo Verification Mission would -- would disagree with you on that. We were determined to continue to make this mission work for as long as humanly possible, and every one of us was personally dedicated to that, and we put ourselves into some very difficult situations in order to attempt to continue to do that right up to the moment we left.

Q. I believe that that was the feeling of the majority of mission members, but this was a conversation between two individuals who knew what they were talking about. Nothing would come of peace and, "We have an excuse for the war." ^{3023 BLANK PAGE 3024} Does that explain another of Keller's assessments, one generally shared, that the KLA used the restraint of Yugoslavia and the Serb security forces to consolidate itself?

A. I think it -- the KLA did consolidate itself over that winter to a degree, and that is seen by the -- the column that was ambushed in early December, which had, as we understand it, about 140 people, each with a pack full of munitions with him.

So yes, they were doing that. But that was not, in our view, a -- a cause for disproportionate response by the security forces. Two wrongs do not make a right, and what is -- what an insurgent organisation does is not an excuse for regular security forces to mimic it.

Q. Will more light be cast on this fact with a quotation from an interview granted by the chief of the bandits - they call him a commander- Ramush Hajradinaj [phoen], who gave this interview in 1999 to Azari [phoen], and he says:

"The agreement signed by Holbrooke has saved the KLA. The arrival of the OSCE verifiers in Kosovo has enabled the revival of the UCK. We need to bear in mind that because of the difficult situation that we were in, we wanted a breather, and in concrete terms, this agreement was salvation for the OVK, especially for the Dukagjinii area." That is how they call Metohija. "The agreement was of decisive importance, and it assisted us a great deal to revive the army."

What is your impression? To what extent did you really assist them in reviving their army?

A. I don't think that that was our view of what our job was. I ³⁰²⁵ certainly know, with the benefit of hindsight, that there was work done to reinforce them over this period, but the purpose of the whole mission was to buy time for a diplomatic solution, for a solution that involved an election, and that's what we thought we were there for, rather than to act as -- as any party that was in any way favouring the Kosovo Liberation Army. That was emphatically not our perception of our role.

Q. Yes, but you see what he goes on to say. He mentions you. I don't mean you personally. He speaks about specific meetings with verifiers, and he says, in reference to those meetings: "We went further than discussing current topics and events. Our discussions went on to cover our ideas, the ways in which we intend to realise our goal, up to the need for cooperation of the KLA and other factors. Usually the lengthiest discussions were conducted with the military observers, especially with those from Britain, America, France, Canada, and other observers. They studied the goals, opinions, and ideas, and there were separate pre-preparations of NATO for the airstrikes that were to follow."

JUDGE MAY: What is the question?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I've just put the question a moment ago, and I am just elaborating on it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. To what extent did the KVM assist in the strengthening or, as he put it, "It helped us to revive or resuscitate the army"? And we see the context and the purpose of it.

A moment ago, your answer was that you did not act in that ³⁰²⁶ direction, but he is denying that with this explanation and reference to talks with observers, military observers especially, of various armies, English, American, and so on. I don't need to read that again. So was it like that or not? That is my question.

A. It was the job of the officers that I -- or the people that I assigned to be liaison with the Kosovo Liberation Army, to get to know them and to assess as part of their job what the strength and the possible intentions of the Kosovo Liberation Army was. And therefore, they had to have discussions with them, yes. They had to earn the trust of the Kosovo Liberation Army in the same way that the people I put with the VJ and the MUP had to earn the trust of the VJ and the MUP. That meant, for instance, that we did not reveal the locations that they had gone to. We didn't do it with the VJ and MUP, and we didn't do it with the Kosovo Liberation Army. And so these liaison officers dealt with one set of people, and trust was built up so that a proper assessment could be made of what the likely intentions were of these people. The use that they put the period that we were there to is obviously up to them. The period we were there was also an opportunity for Yugoslavia to have put into place the conditions that they were talking about in one of the early documents about establishing a multi-ethnic police force with representation from all the ethnic groups. You could have been doing that while the KLA were doing their work and that would have probably eroded support for the KLA, but you chose not to do that.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll have to call it a day there. We will ³⁰²⁷ adjourn now. Nine o'clock Monday morning.

General, would you be back then, please, to continue your evidence.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. NICE: The supplementary report of the last witness, Riedlmayer, 88A, is now available for distribution.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Perhaps you could hand it in.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.14 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday, the 15th day

of April, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.