³²⁵³

Wednesday, 17 April 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld. Is there a matter you want to raise before we go on?

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour, there is. Very briefly, I believe at the close of business yesterday, the Court ordered that the statement be marked as an exhibit. I'm just wondering, in light of the fact that we did move into closed session for one very brief period, that -- I'm asking if the Court might either seal that exhibit and mark it confidential so that it doesn't go into the public domain, or it will have to be the subject of some redaction in order to ensure that the purpose of going into closed session is not obviated by the exhibit itself being a completely open document.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We will seal it.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: There is one matter, Mr. Ryneveld, while you're on your feet. We've got a new list of 92 bis witnesses. I don't know if you're dealing with this aspect of the case.

MR. RYNEVELD: Part of the aspect of the case.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, let me point this out: That as I understand it, some of these witnesses have not yet been ruled on by the ³²⁵⁴ Chamber. We ruled, I think, on 23 witnesses, as I recollect. There's now 33 on the list which you propose to call. Not all have been specifically ruled on, I think I'm right in saying.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. Thank you for bringing that to my attention. Perhaps during the break -- needless to say, we would be proposing to call those witnesses first that the Chamber has already ruled upon. Otherwise, we'd have to seek an oral application before they would be permitted to give evidence, but thank you for raising that with me; but so as to save time, after this witness has been -- has completed his evidence, we would propose to start the 92 bis proceedings and hopefully the ones we have lined up are ones that are part of the 23 that the Court has already approved. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: I think the first in the original list, the first six were.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: But perhaps you could look into that.

MR. RYNEVELD: I will certainly during the break. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

WITNESS: RICHARD CIAGLINSKI [Resumed] Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. [Interpretation] Yesterday, at the end of your testimony, you explained how an officer gave you a map with precise indications of the places of attack of the Yugoslav forces on the KLA.

A. I said an official gave me the information about how the Serbian forces would attack the KLA. ³²⁵⁵

Q. And on the map, you drew the exact spots and directions, the routes that you got from him, the axes that the forces of Yugoslavia used. That's what you claimed.

A. I said that he pointed out to me on the map what later appeared to be and generally was the way the Serbian forces dealt with the KLA, yes.

Q. You marked the direction they took on the map. You indicated it and then marked it on the map.

A. I marked the general direction of the main body of the forces. Obviously, there were many more sort of battles going on around Kosovo, but the activity day-to-day by the Serbian forces followed generally that direction that I gave, yes.

Q. Since you claim that the map was shown to you by an official officer, are you conscious of the fact that if that were to have been correct and as there are facts in this connection that you are an officer of the enemy side who -- and which prior -- immediately prior to the attack on Yugoslavia, you were an officer, then -- and as the office -- if the officer gave you those facts, then he would have jeopardised the lives of his many comrades, members of the Yugoslav army. Are you aware of that?

A. In the first place, Mr. Milosevic, I wasn't aware that, as verifiers, we were your enemy while we were in Kosovo. We were actually working very closely with your forces, being completely impartial and certainly not behaving in any form as an enemy.

Secondly, this official was, I believe, so fed up with the whole thing that he was prepared to give me an indication of what was going to ³²⁵⁶ happen, knowing that we were going to leave and there would be no internal possibility of anything being able to be done by, as you would say, the enemy forces from outside to your plan.

Q. You said that he gave it to you after a meeting at which you discussed the withdrawal of the mission. Is that correct?

A. We had been discussing the withdrawal over several sessions, but by this point we had already indicated that we probably would be leaving.

Q. And as everyone in Yugoslavia knew, not only the soldiers but the whole population knew that the mission was withdrawing to enable the start of the bombing, the NATO bombing, I assume you would have no doubt as to the fact that your interlocutor knew about this too.

JUDGE MAY: There are two questions there, Colonel. The first question is this: Did the mission withdraw to enable the start of the bombing or the bombing to start. The second question is: Did the interlocutor know it? Perhaps you'd like to answer them separately.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. The first answer is: There was certainly no intention to withdraw because we were about to start bombing. The reason we withdrew, I already made clear in my evidence, was because (a) our job was becoming too dangerous from the activities of the MUP and the VJ towards us; secondly, the number of your forces had increased dramatically and, therefore, there was general fighting taking place. Access was, therefore, restricted. We couldn't go to the border. We basically couldn't do our work. And this is exactly the reason we gave for why we left Kosovo. For no other reason.

And the second -- sorry. I apologise. Your second answer about ³²⁵⁷ the -- my interlocutor, whether he knew that we were leaving, he certainly knew but what he thought was going to happen next, I have no idea.

Q. But the whole planet knew that the mission had withdrawn so that it should not be subjected to NATO bombing or, rather, that the states which had representatives in the mission withdrew their men and the OSCE made a decision to that effect, that the people should be withdrawn, not to have to be exposed to the NATO bombing, which was completely imminent at that time. Is that so or is it not?

A. Of course it's not. As I said, the only reason we withdrew -- we would have happily stayed for whatever time it required to conclude our mission. We left because we could not work. The subsequent action was not connected with our departure.

Q. However much you claim that it wasn't connected with your departure, you know full well that at the border towards Yugoslavia, especially in Macedonia, there was an amassment of NATO troops and everywhere - in the information media and everywhere else - the threat of bombing was voiced, and the Yugoslav forces stepped up the border belt, their presence in the border belt, and we sent reinforcements precisely because war was imminent, the threat of war that loomed over Yugoslavia. Are you aware of that?

JUDGE MAY: There are a number of assertions there. The first is that there was -- NATO troops were massing on the border towards Yugoslavia. Is that so or not, Colonel?

THE WITNESS: We certainly had an extraction force sitting in Trnovo which was intended to help us pull out of Kosovo if our sort of ³²⁵⁸ extraction wasn't permitted by Belgrade. And yes, there were forces building up in Macedonia.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let's get this right. And then the next point that's being made is that the threat of bombing was being voiced everywhere, in the information media and elsewhere. Can you assist us as to that? At the time was there that threat?

THE WITNESS: I think the media in general were saying that -- words to that effect, that a war could start and that there was a threat of bombing, yes. I think that was quite clear in the media.

JUDGE MAY: And the final point that's made is that Yugoslav forces were being reinforced near the border. Again, is that the position?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the Yugoslav forces were being reinforced throughout Kosovo. All the garrisons were being strengthened. Certainly all the border areas, the bridges, the tunnels were prepared for demolition, which is standard procedure if the country's under threat, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Of course. So in fact, you confirm that Yugoslavia, at that point in time, was on a state of alert with war imminent. Is that true?

A. Yes. I think you can say that you were prepared for war, yes.

Q. So we were faced with the danger of war in view of everything you said a moment ago, the build-up of forces in Macedonia and the generally known threat that the bombing would start. Is that correct or not?

A. I think there was -- what you say is correct that there was a ³²⁵⁹ build-up of forces in Macedonia, and the media were speculating that there would be a bombing attack against possibly Kosovo.

Q. Was it only the media that was speculating or were there statements quite clear, crisp statements from the top officials of the western countries who said that an intervention would take place, as they called it, an intervention against our country?

A. I think in general, Mr. Milosevic, I can't answer this question because I don't really -- can't remember at the time what the press exactly were saying, which officials from which countries, what they were saying, but I think that I will go along with your story that there was speculation that there would be bombing.

Q. Well, you can explain this away as being speculation, but I don't think there's a single western leader who did not make statements of that kind publicly. Do you remember that?

A. I do not remember that.

Q. Very well. Now, is it logical that a country, which is being threatened with the imminent danger of war and which wishes to defend itself, should bring in troops in the area to the terrain which is the forefront of its defence vis-a-vis the enemy, which is concentrating its forces and building up its forces on the other side of the border? Is that logical for you as an officer?

A. The build-up of forces began very early on. It began after Christmas. The deployment, of course, in Kosovo started before Christmas, and it continued throughout that period, well before we left. There was certainly a slight increase or an increase just prior to us leaving, but ^{3260 BLANK PAGE 3261} the -- your major forces were already in place long before the speculation began.

Q. You said yesterday on several occasions that there had been an increase in our forces in March, and several times you mentioned the month in March, in actual fact, and as you know, March is quite a long way after Christmas. Do you remember what you were saying yesterday?

A. I certainly remember what I was saying, and I was saying that we saw the T72s arrive in March. And as I just said a few seconds ago, there was an acceleration in March, but your forces were arriving from -- from January.

Q. All right. So in March, the build-up of forces increased, and as you know, in March the NATO pact aggression took place on Yugoslavia. Is that something that is known to you or not?

A. Are you asking me whether I knew that the bombing started in March?

Q. Yes. I said the NATO pact aggression began in March against Yugoslavia.

A. Yes, I believe the bombing did start in March.

Q. Therefore, our forces came in in March. And that was quite obviously the 11th hour for preparing our defence forces for the defence, because the war against Yugoslavia started in March. Is that correct or not?

A. You were already preparing your defences at the end of February and the beginning of March.

Q. Well, that's up to us. It's our affair to prepare for defence. I ³²⁶² assume that a country that is faced with an aggression has the legitimate right to prepare for its defence. Is that so or not?

JUDGE MAY: That's a comment.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. But I hope we've cleared up the question that at the time when the discussions were held, the talks were held that you indicated and which you claim had to do with the preparation of the mission's withdrawal from Kosovo and Metohija, that it was quite certain that an aggression, a NATO pact aggression against Yugoslavia was imminent. Is that correct or not?

JUDGE MAY: I think we've been over this as far as we can, and this witness really can't add anything more to what he said.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Therefore, if that is so and as it is obvious, I should hope, is it then clear that an officer giving out information, alleged information, about a possible operation on the part of its own forces and gives it to the enemy's side in that way jeopardises the lives of tens of thousands of his colleagues and friends? Is that clear?

JUDGE MAY: Well, this is all comment by you. What you can ask the colonel is this: Did it occur to you that this official was jeopardising lives?

THE WITNESS: The action to which this official was referring was an action against the KLA. He wasn't divulging any plans, preparation plans, at all of what might be coming after our departure. Had I passed this information to the KLA, and yes, it would have jeopardised the term. ³²⁶³ By this time I had a very good working relationship with the Commission for Cooperation and confidentiality was important. I had a respect for the commission and a respect for this person. And therefore, my respect grew from the fact that, as a liaison officer to this commission, I did not divulge anything from this commission back to the KLA. If I saw something on the Serbian side, I did not report this to the opposition as I did not report anything ever that I saw of KLA preparations to the Serbian side.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, I suppose it's clear to you, and we can see from what took place, and we also see this from the statements of the so-called commanders of these terrorist KLA groups, that NATO Air Force were the air forces of the KLA because they actually worked in cahoots together. Is that something you're aware of or not?

JUDGE MAY: This is getting well away from the witness's evidence, and it's a matter of comment by you. And if you have evidence of it, you can call it in due course.

Colonel, can you assist as to this: It's alleged that the KLA and NATO were working together. As far as you were concerned, was there any evidence of that?

THE WITNESS: No.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, are you bringing into question the claim that NATO was the enemy's side vis-a-vis Yugoslavia and the KLA was likewise the enemy's side? Are you challenging those assertions? ³²⁶⁴

JUDGE MAY: It's not for me to challenge assertions. Now, you are here to question this witness. You can do so. But if you simply continue to make assertions, you'll be stopped. Now, the witness has dealt, as far as he can, with various assertions and questions you've made. Now, have you got anything else you want to ask him?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course I want to ask him some more things because I consider the facts to be indisputable, that NATO and the KLA together were --

JUDGE MAY: No. No. You can make speeches in due course. Now, confine yourself to questions at this time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I asked my question on the basis of the fact that -- that is to say, I'm asking that this official who allegedly showed him the map must have realised that by doing so, he would have threatened --

JUDGE MAY: We have been over this. It is an abuse of the process for you to make speeches, Mr. Milosevic, at this stage. It's also an abuse to go over the same ground. Now, can we go over something else?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a very important topic, because it is quite obvious that there's another manipulation of this false indictment to compensate and to soften --

JUDGE MAY: These are not -- these are not questions. Now, if you want to go on asking -- cross-examining this witness, you must do so properly, Mr. Milosevic. Now, move on to another question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. May I then just ask questions. ³²⁶⁵

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know that in all 78 days of the NATO aggression, NATO succeeded in destroying only eight tanks belonging to the Yugoslav army in the 70 days of its bombing? Are you aware of that fact?

A. What I'm aware of is what I was told by your officers when I arrived in June, was that you had destroyed -- you claim to have destroyed 13. How many wrecks and damaged tanks you drew, we didn't see, I have no idea.

Q. Well, now I'm asking you as a military man, as an expert. If you, your side, had had information from this alleged map that you got concerning the operations of the Yugoslav forces, would those losses have been necessarily much bigger? Because you claim that you got this map which had the deployment of the Yugoslav forces and the places where they would operate, and I believe that this is sufficient information. So had you really had this, wouldn't these losses have had to be bigger or not?

A. This is an impossible question to answer for many reasons. In the first place, the activity was throughout Kosovo, even though it might have been concentrated in certain areas. We did not have any time lines, any time scales that we knew where you would be. We had no details, exact details of the operations. We had no people actually in Kosovo who were being able to sort of spot targets or look at targets; therefore, reconnaissance was extremely difficult. And I'm not denying that you have very well-trained and very professional forces who make -- who are probably one of the best armies, best trained armies in Europe, and ³²⁶⁶ therefore, they are very skilful at camouflage, at diversion, and giving any enemy, as you would call them, a hard time.

Q. Colonel, isn't it clear that had you had this information that you claim you had had, the losses of the Yugoslav forces would have had to be bigger? Because you claim that you had information about the actual places of attack, about the dynamics of the attack involved, and that you had received this kind of map. And we all know what these maps look like. And wouldn't the losses have had to be bigger than eight tanks in 78 days of bombings, bombings day in, day out?

JUDGE MAY: That seems to be the same question as you asked before.

The map, as I understand it, Colonel, was related to how the KLA were to be dealt with. It had nothing to do with NATO.

THE WITNESS: Correct, sir.

JUDGE MAY: Was NATO mentioned in your conversation?

THE WITNESS: Only in the last part, where the reference was made to the expulsion of the civilians, that it would save NATO a job later.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Doesn't it seem illogical to you that a Yugoslav officer would claim that NATO would have work to do because of civilian expulsions, and NATO was finding a pretext in this way to attack Yugoslavia? Is this officer a moron? I mean, why would he say this?

JUDGE MAY: That sounds like a comment. Yes, next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know that your superior, also a British general, ^{3267 BLANK PAGE 3268} Drewienkiewicz, the day before yesterday, in response to two of my direct questions, also under oath, stated that there was no plan against the Albanian population and that there were no indications of the existence of any kind of plan to expel the Albanians?

A. I'm sorry, I have no idea what General Drewienkiewicz said yesterday during his evidence.

JUDGE MAY: You can ask this witness if he knew of such a plan or if there were any indications.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, he claims that the answer is yes, and I am claiming that he is not telling the truth, because I'm saying that had he known this, Drewienkiewicz, who was his superior, would have had to know this, which doesn't work the other way around, that is, that he had to know everything that Drewienkiewicz knew. So therefore, there is no doubt that his superior had to know what he knew, because it was the witness's job to inform his superior about every important piece of information, and this information --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. One question you can ask out of all of that, which is mainly a comment: Did you tell the general about this conversation? Can you remember?

THE WITNESS: I did relate the conversation to General DZ, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So it is clear that Drewienkiewicz would have had to say that there was at least some indication that what this witness is claiming --

JUDGE MAY: This witness can't answer for the other witness. It's a pure comment. You can make it in due course. Meanwhile, you must ask ³²⁶⁹ questions which he can deal with.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but the witness confirmed that he did inform Drewienkiewicz about this, and Drewienkiewicz claimed that there were no indications of this kind.

JUDGE MAY: You're wasting time.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know that this person you mentioned - don't worry, I'm not going to utter the name itself - the person that you mentioned could not have had any kind of combat-related information, even that concerning a plan of attack against the KLA? Are you aware of that fact?

A. As I gave -- said in my evidence, this man was on the commission. He was very aware of what went on throughout Kosovo. He knew of all operations that were taking place. He had a huge amount of experience. And I can't believe for one second that he wouldn't actually know what was -- what was going on from that part of the operation. It's not credible.

Q. And do you know -- now, why am I asking you this? Do you know that the Commission for Cooperation with the KVM, that is to say with you, its members and the mission itself, including the head of the mission and the members of the mission were not in the chain of command at all, either in terms of the army or the -- the army or the police?

A. We always took the members of the commission to be representatives of the government, the army, and the police, because if we ever wanted access or information from the police, we would speak to the members of the commission. If we wanted to know anything at all about the military dispositions, about future intentions, activities which had taken place, ³²⁷⁰ we also spoke to the military on this commission. And therefore, we -- what else could we assume is that -- but that these people were actually spokesmen for their services and spokesmen for the government? What was the purpose of the mission otherwise?

Q. These people are precisely what you said now. Their purpose was to cooperate with your mission, that is to say, they conveyed your requests, and they asked on your behalf the appropriate commands or authorities for certain things that you had asked for. Do you remember that yesterday you explained that when you came to the mission you no longer commanded your unit or you were not held responsible by any superior command in the British army? Didn't you explain that yesterday?

A. I certainly did.

Q. Well, the same goes -- can't you assume that the same thing goes for the members of the Commission for Cooperation, whose job is to cooperate with you, not to command units? For example, do you know that General Loncar, who was the head of the mission, did not even participate in meetings of military or police commanders? Or any members of the mission, for that matter. They were members of this commission. They were not persons in the chain of command. Are you aware of that or are you not aware of that?

A. I said that the members of the commission were very aware what was happening militarily. They knew what was happening in terms of police operations and military operations because they had an effect upon them. I don't see what commanding military units has got to do with this. All ³²⁷¹ I'm saying is that they knew what was going on in Kosovo and what was planned for Kosovo. They don't have to command anything to have that information.

Q. Well, you yourself explained, and I hope that that was obvious from your practice as well, that every day you had meetings with them and that within 24 hours, they received from the appropriate authorities information as to what had happened so that you could exchange this, use it, verify it, et cetera. They were your partner in verification, and they had to obtain this information from some authorities. They didn't gather the information themselves. Doesn't this seem logical to you?

A. Yes, it's logical. It means that they had to speak to the military and to the commanders -- and to the police commanders to know what was going on. So they had contacts and knowledge about what was happening, yes.

JUDGE KWON: Colonel, if you make your answer more simple, we can get on more easily. The question put to you was not whether they were -- Mr. Loncar and some other officials were aware of the fact which was happening at the time, rather the question was this: Whether they were in chain of command or not. You can make the answer simpler.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, they were obviously not in the chain of command.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And are you aware that in our army, and I hope in other armies, too, that there is the principle of single seniority, and whoever is not ³²⁷² in the chain of command cannot have available any kind of information that has to do with the future activity of any particular unit.

A. I do not know about this principle in your army, no.

Q. Do you know that there cannot be lateral commanding? There can only be a single chain of command. Are you aware of that or not?

A. I'm aware of it, of the existence of a chain of command, yes.

Q. And are you aware of the fact that our Commission for Cooperation with you, although it consisted of some officers as well, it was, nevertheless, a civilian commission too?

A. I was not aware that it was purely a civilian commission.

Q. And do you know that General Loncar was a retired general, therefore a civilian?

A. I know that General Loncar was a retired general and a civilian and he was replaced by General Brankovic who was a serving general.

Q. We'll get to that later. And do you know how come General Loncar, who was a retiree, came to that position?

A. No.

Q. And do you know that he came to this position at the request of William Walker, head of the mission, that he addressed to me personally, and that is because he had very good experience from his cooperation with General Loncar in Eastern Slavonia, and he wanted someone whom he knew well, whom he trusted, and whom he appreciated as an honest man and a good person to work with. He wanted to cooperate with him again. So this was an expression of our goodwill that we asked General Loncar to head this commission. Do you know that? ³²⁷³

A. I did not know that.

Q. Otherwise, I see that you do not know about this. However, I have to put this as a question to you because I have been asked to act that way. Do you know that General Brankovic did not replace General Loncar actually?

A. You surprise me, Mr. Milosevic, because General Brankovic introduced himself, and I was introduced to the new commission with General Brankovic as the head of this new commission.

Q. You probably understood each other that way, just like when you were saying that you were replacing Donna Phelan; it was somebody else. However, General Loncar did not leave the commission. Until the 23rd of May, he was the vice-chairman of this federal commission of ours and he was that all the time and head of the mission in Kosovo. And General Brankovic was not General Loncar's superior. On the contrary, it was General Loncar who was the superior of General Brankovic. Do you know that?

A. No. As far as I was concerned, General Brankovic announced himself as the boss of the commission and he was the person we spoke to. And he was present at all the meetings, not General Loncar.

Q. General Brankovic replaced Colonel Kotur, not General Loncar. And you were in charge of cooperation on military matters but also within the function of this civilian mission, not within any kind of military function. Are you aware of that or not?

JUDGE MAY: It's no good arguing with the witness. You can call your evidence if it's different, but you've heard his evidence. He's said ³²⁷⁴ that Brankovic was in charge. That's his evidence. Now, in due course, if you want to rebut it, you can, but there's no point going on arguing. That is the way that time is wasted in cross-examination, why we have to impose these time limits.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The matter is that I want to ascertain here how much this witness actually knows from all the things that he has been claiming to know, and obviously, he doesn't know that much. What I am presenting here are undeniable facts with regard to these appointments.

JUDGE MAY: You're not presenting anything. You're asking questions. Now, if you want to test his knowledge of the commission in some other way, do so, but there's no point going on about Brankovic because he's given his answer.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know -- well, this is just an example, it's of no major significance. The matter is that he is ill-informed, and he drew the wrong conclusions. Do you know that this commission had a coordinating role only within the framework of cooperation with the OSCE, to coordinate this cooperation between the OSCE and the Yugoslav authorities in charge? This was a Commission for Cooperation. That was its name. Do you know that?

A. Yes, it was a mission for cooperation, not a mission for coordination, as you said.

Q. Cooperation. In order to cooperate, you have to have coordination between the organs that are cooperating. Isn't that logical? ^{3275 BLANK PAGE 3276}

A. Yes.

Q. And do you know who the chairman of the commission of the federal government for cooperation with the mission was and how many members this commission had?

A. Are you referring to the commission chaired by General Loncar?

Q. There was a commission of the federal government. Loncar was its vice-chairman, and the seat of this commission was in Pristina. However, on the whole, the commission that was appointed by the federal government - and this was no secret because decisions of the federal government are published in the Official Gazette and are therefore public - do you know who the president of the commission was?

A. The only commission that I knew about was the commission headed by General Loncar in Pristina. That was the level that I worked at.

Q. And General Pellnas in Belgrade, who also communicated on behalf of your mission with headquarters in Belgrade, who did he liaise with if there was only what was in Pristina?

A. I have no idea who General Pellnas is, and this is the first time I've heard his name.

Q. Swedish general who was also your representative in Belgrade, and he communicated with the government in Belgrade.

A. Sorry.

Q. Bo Pellnas.

A. Yes. Sorry. I misunderstand the pronunciation. I did see him. He was working in Belgrade, yes. He was our representative to your government in Belgrade. ³²⁷⁷

Q. And he communicated with the commission headquarters in Belgrade, that is to say, this commission that was set up by the federal government.

A. You're absolutely right. And he found his work, I believe, so difficult that he eventually resigned and left.

Q. And do you know, since I hope that we have explained the civilian nature of this commission that worked with you, and we --

JUDGE MAY: You put points when you should be asking questions, which are tendentious, argumentative.

Do you agree that it was a civilian commission or not, Colonel?

THE WITNESS: This was a joint civilian-military-police commission, sir.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know that this alleged map that you have been referring to, which obviously did not exist after all, or any map, according to the rules of service, could not have been carried out of the operations department of the unit that it belonged to, even if it were a map of a pure exercise only?

A. Are you referring to the map that he pointed out, the outline of manoeuvre?

Q. Oh. So you are speaking about a map that is actually an outline of manoeuvre?

A. The map that I was shown was a blank map, and he pointed out on this map how the operation and the manoeuvre would take place.

Q. Oh. Now we've come to a new fact. On a plain map, he showed you ³²⁷⁸ with his hand how activities would be carried out against the KLA. So that is what we have asserted.

JUDGE MAY: That was his evidence, as I recollect it, yesterday.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right. Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And did you say yesterday, because obviously my understanding was different because you kept talking about this map and this plan, and now it turns out that there was no plan, that he was showing you on a geography map how the attack against the KLA would take place. Do you still claim that this officer told you that there was a plan to expel the Albanian population?

A. He showed me on the military map the plan how to -- how they would deal with the KLA, and then said they would also expel the civilian population, yes. Not part -- not as part of this military operation. That was to come later.

Q. Did he say this to you in connection with a plan? Did he say that there was a plan or was this his personal opinion?

A. As I said yesterday, the -- the plan of operation, plan of the manoeuvre against the KLA, were not -- could not have been just his personal opinion, and he did not give me that impression. He said, "This is how we would do it; this is how we will do it. And this is -- when this is completed we will expel the Albanians."

I have no idea. I cannot tell you what he was thinking, exactly whether -- I can't be inside his head. I just do not know whether it was his personal plan, but I doubt it, because the plan was so detailed and it ³²⁷⁹ then took place in that -- the general manoeuvre actually happened that way, well, he must either have been clairvoyant or he knew about it. And why then should he make another comment which is untrue or just his wishes or his hopes? When he's just given me one factual bit of information, I presumed the second piece of information was also factual.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel, when he said that, did you follow it up with a request for further information or elaboration or anything of that kind?

THE WITNESS: The impression I had, Your Honour, was that he had already told me far too much. What he told me was virtually in hushed tones over the map, and I knew it wasn't the time or the place to actually try and elaborate on that, and I could tell from his manner that he wasn't prepared to elaborate on that. That was all he was prepared to say.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The elimination of KLA units, at all events, would, regardless of this statement of yours about the talk, be a legitimate task of the army; is that correct?

A. Sorry. I don't understand the question.

Q. Would the elimination of the KLA be a legitimate task of the Yugoslav forces?

A. I suppose if you were at war with the KLA, then yes. I don't know -- I don't --

JUDGE MAY: I think it's probably a matter for us. It's a matter of law if it's legitimate or not. ³²⁸⁰ Mr. Milosevic, you've been now two hours with this witness, so if there are other topics you want to cover with him, you should do so now.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There are very many topics, and I hope that you're not going to interrupt my cross-examination this time too.

JUDGE MAY: I'll interrupt it if it's not proper. If you ask proper questions, it won't be interrupted. And one thing you should remember is that the questions should be short, and that way we'll get through more topics.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let me follow on from my previous question. In the KLA, did the KLA play the role of NATO infantry in the NATO aggression?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. And did you see the statements made by their commanders such as Thaci, Haradinaj, and the others, who precisely bear out what I said a moment ago?

JUDGE MAY: He's given his answer. He said no. If you've got some evidence to the contrary, you can call it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not to prolong my questions about this quite obviously rigged Prosecution issue with respect to the map, I demand of you that the witness who was mentioned by -- the person that this witness, this lieutenant colonel mentioned, the witness who allegedly talked to him and gave him this information should be heard here and that you will issue all guarantees to him that he will not be detained and so ³²⁸¹ on and so forth. And I am asking for this, for him to be protected, because there is a lot of dirt thrown at an officer of the Yugoslav army that he supplied the enemy, prior to the aggression, with this information. He was smeared. And as you know, what we're talking about here will not be a secret for all times. And the man has children and grandchildren, and his name should not be smeared by a rigged-up thing of this kind. So I am asking that this witness be heard here in the courtroom along with all the protective measures for secrecy that can be accorded him, because all this is a fabrication, a pure fabrication, and that is quite obvious.

JUDGE MAY: That has nothing to do with this witness at all. If you have an application, you can make it. Now, meanwhile, let us conclude this cross-examination. In my own view, you should have no more than a further hour, which will give you the same as the Prosecution. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that it would be fair for me to be accorded more time than the Prosecution, because the Prosecution is able to prepare with countless associates and helpers, but I have to go through all this on my own, and this is all new ground for me.

JUDGE MAY: That -- that -- that, Mr. Milosevic, we have in mind, that you are on your own and they are many more. We do consider that. But we also consider the time that's wasted in your making speeches and going over the same ground again and again. We balance the two in coming to a decision on how much time you should have.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I hope that we will be able to devote a little more than an hour to this witness. I now have to ^{3282 BLANK PAGE 3283} see where I left off yesterday in his statement and testimony.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You said in your statement that it was not envisaged that the KLA should have its representative, but their positions put before the commission were put forward by others. Actually, I'm looking at page 3 of your statement, paragraph 2 from the bottom in the Serbian text, that this was put forward by Major David Wilson or another British officer. That sentence. "The KLA was never meant to have a representative present," et cetera.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have his statement. Thank you. Yes, have you found the passage?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I have. I wasn't aware there was a question. So ...

JUDGE MAY: Yes. What's the question, please?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The question was the following: What was the task of these people that had contacts with the KLA? As I can see from Drewienkiewicz's statement, he says that somebody else except for David Wilson worked in that area. Who were those other people?

A. David Wilson and then later David Meyer, who was also British, worked directly with the KLA, liaised with the KLA and behalf of General DZ. I believe that other nations might have also had representatives with the KLA who would also try and talk to them and reason with them to prevent any confrontations, which is one of our acquired tasks.

Q. Drewienkiewicz says that there were two David Wilsons, both from ³²⁸⁴ Britain, and quite by chance, as he says, both were liaison officers with the KLA. One David Wilson worked as a liaison officer with the KLA from Pristina and the other as a liaison officer for the KLA from Prizren. This other one, as representative of KVM, was a representative in Rambouillet. Now, that's what Drewienkiewicz says. Are you aware of that?

A. I certainly am. David Wilson, as you say, the taller one who worked at Prizren, was the KLA liaison officer in the Prizren area only, and he was the one we sent to Rambouillet. And David Wilson, the smaller one, was based on DZ's staff and worked directly to General DZ as the -- within the headquarters of the OSCE. So he was responsible for liaising with all the OSCE KLA liaison staff.

Q. Did he convey information to the KLA and back from the KLA? Was that a two-way feedback, two-way information?

A. He would negotiate on behalf of DZ with the KLA and pass information, which was important to prevent any activities, any actions, or any misunderstandings, yes.

Q. He did not give out information to the KLA in connection with -- that is to say, with respect to the terrorist activities that they were carrying out, he didn't use that?

A. He would not pass any information that was sensitive. So, for example, if he heard during a meeting with the Commission for Cooperation at the headquarters that there was a Serbian convoy coming down, that's the sort of information he would not pass. If there was information being sought by the Serbian side, then this information would be passed back and ³²⁸⁵ any information that the KLA could give back would be passed back to the Serbian commission, the Commission for Cooperation.

Q. And was his role -- give us a yes or no answer to save time, please. Was his role to insist that the KLA adhere to the cease-fire, that is to say, not to launch attacks? Was that his function or was his only purpose to inform?

A. No. We also had the function of telling them not to participate in any of these actions. We tried to prevent both sides from any action.

Q. You say on that same page, in the following paragraph: "It is my upon that Loncar and his subordinates really saw the OSCE/FRY Commission for Cooperation and the KVM as a means of proving to the world that they were the innocent party, but they were very specific as to what they wanted us to verify."

Is it not logical that under a conflict, when you had conflicts with terrorist units and groups, that the government was acting legitimately and is the innocent party when it is exposed to terrorism, terrorism towards the police, the organs of power and authority, and the citizens themselves? Is that so or not?

JUDGE MAY: Will you answer that or not?

THE WITNESS: I'm just wondering how many questions were in that.

JUDGE MAY: Well, pick one and answer it.

THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, in a conflict, for example, the -- if you are being attacked by terrorist groups, of course a government does have the power and the right to defend itself.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ³²⁸⁶

Q. And what else did the government do but protect civilians and representatives of the government from terrorists?

A. One of the things it did, it used disproportionate force on many occasions. And these were the sort of events that they would not wish us to verify, but they were very happy for us to verify if they had been attacked by the KLA.

Q. Well, they helped you to verify all the other cases that took place in the field. That was not brought into question, and we saw that from the reports. But answer me this, please: What does it mean what you say at the end of that paragraph, where you say that they really did consider the cooperation to be beneficial because they were the innocent party? And at the end of that paragraph, you state the following: You're talking about Loncar, and you say that it would appear that he never understood the OSCE/KVM, and that quite obviously he found -- he was irritated by the fact that he could not force -- he was irritated by the fact that he could not force the OSCE and the KVM -- he couldn't get them to say bad things about the KLA. He was obviously annoyed that he couldn't get the OSCE and the KVM to say bad things about the KLA. That's what you say.

Now, does that -- is that clearly -- does it clearly show your biasness with respect to the KLA, that is to say, to the advantage and on the KLA's side? Yes or no; were you biased or not? So he couldn't get you to say anything bad, any bad things about the KLA.

A. I think again, Mr. Milosevic, you've asked me several questions here. When I say that he never seemed to come to grips with the OSCE and ³²⁸⁷ he was obviously annoyed he couldn't get us to say bad things about the KLA, you have to expand that to say, that we wrote daily reports, and if there was a KLA terrorist attack which killed innocent people, innocent policemen, soldiers, we made these press releases. We don't have any control over the press. If the press refuse to publish these, for some unknown reason, that was not within our gift. But every action, every activity was passed to the press office, who then passed it to the press authorities.

Q. Are you well known of the Glodjani KLA torture sites where tens of people were thrown into Radonjic Lake, and did you know about the mass sites of Serb -- Serb suffering? Are all these crimes things that quite simply have to make oneself ask what it means when you state that he was annoyed that he couldn't get the OSCE and KVM to say bad things about the KLA? Don't you know about all the crimes?

JUDGE MAY: This is a speech. You're asked, Colonel, about Glodjani, the site there. Do you know anything about that?

THE WITNESS: No.

JUDGE MAY: You were asked about Radonjic Lake. Do you know anything about that?

THE WITNESS: No.

JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered these questions as best he can.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. That's a very good thing.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ³²⁸⁸

Q. On the following page, you talk about the 27th of December and the tension. I don't want to mention for what reasons. You spoke about that yesterday. The KLA took a farmer prisoner, a Serb farmer, and opened fire on the police, seriously wounding several policemen. You state that yourself here: "They were holding a Serb farmer, Dragoslav Zdravkovic. A MUP patrol had gone in to rescue the farmer but had come under fire and sustained heavy injuries." Those are your words, I am reading from your statement.

Loncar informed you that the army had ordered tanks to enter and that the MUP would lead the attack and so on and so forth, because he was annoyed -- he was irritated and very angry and keen for the VJ and MUP to carry out the attack, as you state. So he informed you what they were supposed to do. And then you go on to say, "And challenged us to go in ourselves." What does that mean that "he challenged us to go in ourselves"? Wasn't it your business to verify it? So he called upon you and he challenged you. That's what you say.

A. What he said was that we should go in there, sort it out, and bring him out. Therefore, he challenged us. It certainly was not our -- part of our agreement, according to the agreement, to actually carry out operations and negotiate hostage releases. We were the Kosovo Verification Mission. However, our mission began to change direction like this, and if we could help and if we were prepared to stick our necks out, but as an unarmed force, we were prepared to do it in order to prevent any conflict.

Q. My question is the following: Yesterday in your oral testimony, ³²⁸⁹ you spoke about this incident on the 27th of December, and you said precisely that it was an incident carried out by the army and police. That's what you said. And then we saw what the incident was about, in actual fact, that it was of a Serb farmer that had been held and that the police had been wounded, and you yourself mentioned yesterday that there were one to two thousand members of the KLA with a whole truckload of ammunition. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, is it possible to say, given this situation, that the KLA, with ammunition and thousands, that a Serb farmer was held and wounded? Is it possible to say that the Serb forces caused that particular incident as you said so yesterday? Is it possible for you to say that? Yes or no, please.

A. No. Of course they didn't cause it. The Serb forces did not cause the incident, no.

Q. But that is precisely what you said yesterday.

JUDGE MAY: I don't remember him saying that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, take a look at the transcript and you'll find it.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's go on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And everything ended in a normal fashion, with the understanding of whatever, but we're not going to waste time on that now. Then you go on to talk about the meeting that was held afterwards, and you say that Sainovic hurled a whole load of insults at you and said ^{3290 BLANK PAGE 3291} that the Serbs had the right to use the force they did. I assume that he could not have said it that way, but he might have said that he had -- they had the right to act against terrorists and that he said -- and you said, "We were not doing the verification honourably and accused us of smuggling weapons and include the Americans and Germans, et cetera." Now, was that not correct? Was it not so? Was it not true that certain members of the Verification Mission undertook spying tasks, including helping the KLA to smuggle weapons? Is that true or is it not? Just yes or no, please.

A. I don't know anything about this smuggling of weapons.

Q. And you were an expert in weapons. Do you know where the weapons came from, where the KLA got their weapons from?

A. I believe the weapons came across the mountains from Albania, by mule trains and by humans, humans carrying them across the mountains.

Q. Then you go on to explain, as an example of Sainovic's capacity to get things done was when, during that meeting, we asked to be permitted to visit about 11 KLA prisoners. Now, can you even assume that Sainovic as president of the Commission for Cooperation would be able to do this? That is to say, in order for him to be able to accomplish this, he would have to ask the Minister of Justice for permission to do that. He wouldn't be able to do it on us own back without permission.

A. Yes, I accept that he would have to refer it but he gave us every indication that this would be done and, later that evening, we were given permission to do it.

Q. Of course. The commission decided to do what you had asked ³²⁹² because it was logical and that's what you did.

Then you go on to explain, towards the end of that paragraph, the following: That Sainovic could speak on behalf of Belgrade and Loncar could only affect local matters. What is illogical there? Why should not political issues go via politicians and what is illogical in the fact that the Vice-Premier should see to political issues? Is there any mystery there in that respect?

A. No.

Q. And then what does this whole description mean about Colonel Kotur having a camouflage uniform, that he was from an elite special unit? He was sent to the commission by the General Staff of the army, who was the sole competent authority to give representatives for civilian matters just as it puts forward people for being military attaches in an embassy, for example. Do you know that they could have taken any uniform? They could have worn a marine uniform, a naval uniform, had you been by the sea, on the sea, and that his uniform did not note any affiliation to any special unit of any kind.

A. What I was trying to get at here was actually he was actually wearing a uniform, as was Colonel Mijatovic at meetings and therefore this indicated that this was not a purely civilian mission.

Q. Well, he wore what he found comfortable, and he might have worn a civilian -- civilian clothing too, just like Colonel Mijatovic could have worn anything, a police uniform, whereas he was in civilian clothing. For his function and post in the mission, it had no bearing, it was of no importance. And none of them, as a member of the commission, could have ³²⁹³ commanded anything.

We've cleared up this point about your mistaken conclusions as to the structure of the mission.

JUDGE MAY: No. That's just a comment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. All right. I'm just looking at something else.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, what is the point of your assertion here that at the football stadium there was a piste for helicopters, helicopter takeoffs and landings. Are you aware of the fact that this stadium in Pristina for helicopters was the only spot near the centre where helicopters were able to land and that helicopters had landed there for decades, 20 years ago, 30 years ago? I myself landed there 25 years ago on that runway in that same spot. Where else can you land in Pristina unless you want to land in the middle of the city square with the kiosks selling frankfurters --

JUDGE MAY: We don't want to know about the kiosks selling frankfurters. Now, is the point of this that it is the only helicopter landing place in Pristina? Is that the point?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Why then all this mystification and linking it up to the proximity of --

JUDGE MAY: Let's put it to the witness. It's what's said is that this was the only helicopter landing place and there was nothing sinister or anything of that sort in it being close to the MUP headquarters. Can you assist us as to that?

THE WITNESS: There was an airport not far way where helicopters ³²⁹⁴ also landed but this was a convenient place in the middle of town, the only place, adjacent to the MUP headquarters and the VJ headquarters and most of the flights were either government flights or MUP or VJ. It's as straightforward as that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. That's quite clear. The airport is quite a distance from town.

Now, on page 7 of your statement, some observations are made which bring into question your assertion about the impossibility of you going about your business, and I'm going to quote both these points. You say: "Whenever I encountered a problem of going to a certain area, I would call up Mijatovic --" and you're referring to Colonel Mijatovic, member of the commission, Loncar's. "... I would call Mijatovic on the phone and he would then contact the local MUP commander who would then give us permission to pass. Mijatovic also helped us to access certain police stations. On the 17th of March, 1999, at a meeting with Mijatovic, he informed me that he had come into contact with all the command points of MUP and introduced procedure which would ensure us to have access," et cetera.

And then several paragraphs after that, you say the following: "Kotur showed me a letter from Major General Lazarevic, that is the commander of the Pristina Corps at that time, which ordered all VJ units to give access to KVM patrols." So even when we're talking about the police force and the army, you had orders enabling you to move around without any impediment. Can you then speak of a refusal to cooperate or ³²⁹⁵ efforts to thwart successful cooperation and to make it impossible for you to perform your tasks? From what yourself have written, is that so or not?

A. The documents that you refer to and the access was done at that level. However, it was never -- it was never passed down to the units on the ground, and therefore we could stand for as long as we wanted to try to get into certain areas, open areas of ground which the VJ or the MUP were holding, and we could not get in. I was one of the few people with a satellite telephone who could ring Colonel Mijatovic and say, "I am at this location. I have a commander with me, can you please remind him of the agreement that we have, the letter that you -- that General Lazarevic had produced to give us access. And then grudgingly, after a long time, we'd be allowed through. But this access was not general -- the letters were not disseminated, and the access was very, very -- extremely difficult.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we're going to -- the time's come for the adjournment, but if you want to make one more point, you can. Ask one more question, rather.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I was just following on from what the witness said. You said that you had this surprise factor with your patrols in touring and inspecting certain points. How can you surprise somebody if you can move around without anybody's -- if you don't have the permission to move around? You said that you surprised them. You took them by surprise when you conducted your inspections. Now, if you were able to surprise someone, ³²⁹⁶ that implies that you have freedom of movement. Now, is that in contradiction to what you said that you were unable to move around and that you didn't have permission and access?

A. There's no contradiction whatsoever. The surprise inspection was carried out along the main roads, whereas your units were not positioned, your major units were not positioned on the main roads. They were positioned around villages, in the countryside, and therefore there can be no contradiction. There are two -- they're two separate events.

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, just before you rise, in relation to the next witnesses, the Chamber will recall I said a couple of days ago it was possible that we might seek to call not K22 first but the first 92 bis witnesses. All the witness are here, but because K22, who originally made arrangements to come before the Easter break before the timetable changed only arrived last evening, it will not be possible to have helpful and complete summary of his evidence, I think, until tomorrow. He's here, and the summary is in the process of final preparation, but I don't think it will be ready until tomorrow. So if this witness fishes, I would ask that we take one, at least, of the 92 bis witnesses first.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Very well.

--- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. On the 15th of January, 1999, you were in the area of Decani ^{3297 BLANK PAGE 3298} with the representatives of the MUP when it was agreed that the KVM should escort the MUP to that area when there would be a change of shifts at their forward posts. This was done because you wanted to check lest there be any reinforcements at the forward posts. Then the KVM were shot at for a while. The way you had put it then, it was unclear as to who had done the shooting. That was your position, that it was unclear. Wasn't it obvious that it only could have been the KLA, because you were accompanied by the police and it was quite obvious that the police would not shoot at a convoy that they were escorting themselves? Why was it your assessment that it was unclear as to who had done the shooting?

A. I don't recall saying that I was unclear. I was very clear that the shooting had taken place by the -- by the KLA, and the -- I believe Ramush admitted later that this was the case. He apologised for wounding two of my people, and put it down to the fact that they thought we were Serb secret police driving around in what appeared to be OSCE vehicles leading the convoy into this forward position, and that's why they had done it. So it was the KLA.

Q. Yes. That is only a direct statement of the KLA, something that could have made you give up on your original thought that you did not know who had done the shooting and that suspicion could be cast on both sides.

A. In the initial stages for the first 24, 36 hours, we had no idea who'd done the shooting, and we couldn't imagine any reason at the time why the KLA should wish to shoot at orange vehicles. Therefore, it was unclear. We just couldn't work out why the Serb, the MUP, or the VJ would want to shoot at us, and we couldn't figure out why the KLA would to want ³²⁹⁹ to shoot at us. It wasn't normal for us to be shot at.

Q. It was less clear to you why the KLA would be shooting at you than why the army would be shooting at you. What you are saying now, isn't that the most specific kind of evidence of your partiality as far as the KLA is concerned? Yes or no?

A. It is not partiality because we were shot at. Even I was shot at, or shots were fired in my direction, to keep me out of certain areas by your forces.

Q. What were our forces doing, shooting at you?

A. Absolutely. Even the Podujevo on -- east of Gornja Lapastica, there was an occasion where we were told not to go somewhere because we would be shot at by the KLA and the area was unsafe. We then saw one of your vehicles deliberately move around, and we saw the shots being fired from that vehicle in our general direction to frighten us, to prove to us that it was dangerous and we shouldn't be there. This was one of your control methods to make sure that we did not venture where you didn't want us to go, because most verifiers were civilians and they were afraid of being shot at.

Q. Yes. But now you're saying that shooting could have taken place but it didn't. So did this vehicle shoot at you or not?

A. Sorry. Can you repeat that question?

Q. This MUP vehicle that you mentioned just now, did it shoot at you or did it not shoot at you?

A. It did shoot at us, yes. On a previous occasion. Not the 15th of January occasion. ³³⁰⁰

Q. Did it hit someone?

A. No. The intention was to frighten us.

Q. They were shooting into the air to frighten you?

A. Yes.

Q. Why is this not mentioned in any one of the Verification Mission reports, this kind of incident, that somebody was shooting in your direction? I mean, from the security forces of Yugoslavia and the army of Yugoslavia.

A. I think you will find that it was reported on numerous occasions in the OSCE reports.

Q. Are you going to assert now that there were occasions when the army and the police shot at the verifiers?

JUDGE MAY: Well, that's what he's been saying.

THE WITNESS: Exactly. Thank you, Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. These are new facts indeed, and I bring them into question, absolutely.

There is an assertion among your sources that all evidence was presented to the chief of mission so that he could establish whether some act would be a violation of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement. The Head of Mission had the exclusive right to ascertain whether a particular act was a violation of this agreement. Yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. So what purpose did you serve, all of you, all the verifiers, if it was only your chief, William Walker, who could decide whether a ³³⁰¹ particular act was a violation or not?

A. We could all easily see whether something was a violation. Therefore, we could report this violation to William Walker, who would then pass it through official channels, through Bo Pellnas or directly to General Loncar or via Keller to Mr. Sainovic.

Q. So it was only Walker who could assess what a violation was and what was not a violation. Nobody else from the mission could do that.

A. I mean, he was the chief, and therefore any sort of reporting upwards went under his signature, I mean went under his authority. He was our chief. However, if I went to a meeting and I was authorised to say something was a violation, I would say it at the meeting with General Loncar.

Q. Was Walker the only person who was authorised to accept or not accept a particular member of the mission to carry out his duties or not?

A. I suppose he was ultimately responsible, as the boss, but I shouldn't think for one second that Walker was involved in selecting every member of the mission of 1.400-odd people, plus another 1.500 civilians. He wouldn't be doing anything but vetting people's applications.

Q. And are you aware of a particular case when the Deputy Head of Mission was appointed, the one who was in charge of police and judiciary, Giovani Kesler [phoen], an Italian judge, he was?

A. I am aware that he was appointed, yes.

Q. Yes. But there is an explanation here, that he said that when verifying police standards, the international community should not do anything that should upset the Serb authorities. And Walker refused to ³³⁰² accept his appointment so the post remained vacant for a longer amount of time. Are you aware of that?

A. No.

Q. You were supposed to get 40 verifiers for the police, but then only ten arrived subsequently. Are you aware of that?

A. Yes. We had difficulties in recruiting policemen who could be released from their duties in their countries and come to Kosovo. These weren't the only verifiers we had difficulty in recruiting.

Q. And the fact that he refused an Italian because he said that the Serbian police should be treated properly, that is what is contained in the statement of your boss Drewienkiewicz.

JUDGE MAY: The witness does not know anything about this.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I am making him aware of it because he's not aware of it.

JUDGE MAY: No. We're not going to get anywhere with this sort of questioning.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You said at one place in your statement that you found out later that NATO had intercepted radio communications showing that Serbs were more deeply involved in the alleged slaughter - you're talking about Racak - than they had admitted, and that they had actually issued orders for these people to be killed. You -- what kind of interception is this? Because you say you found out, that you learned about this. What is this that you learned about this interception of some conversation that indicates that somebody had given orders to have these people killed? ³³⁰³

A. I heard from several sources who commented to me that. Because I myself was interested as to the truthfulness of this whole event, and I was sort of playing devil's advocate at one point, and I was told, you know, "We can assure you that there has been information provided from signals, radio intercepts." I presume these must have been intercepts in Macedonia or somewhere nearby where these conversations had been overheard. This is something I was told. This is something that -- these are not documents that I have actually read or held in my hand.

Q. That's the only thing I wish to clarify. In your statement, you also said the MUP and the army of Yugoslavia always called the members of the KLA terrorists. Do you think that they were terrorists or do you think that they were not terrorists?

A. I think there were some terrorists, and there were also a great number of people who were village militia, people who were sort of guarding their properties and their families. So, yes, some of the people you referred to as the KLA, I have no doubt that they carry out terrorists activities and behave as terrorists.

Q. And why were you bothered then by the fact that the military and the police were calling them terrorists? Because you knew yourself that they were terrorists.

A. Because this tag was being applied to virtually all Albanians. It wasn't specific, the number of small terrorist cells.

Q. Well, these people who were shooting at the military and at the police, were they terrorists or were they not terrorists? Those who planted bombs underneath buses and marketplaces and shops, were they ³³⁰⁴ terrorists or were they not terrorists?

A. They were terrorists.

Q. You are saying that there was coordination between the army and the police, and you also say that this was organised. And if it were to be organised, the lowest level would have to be the level of major, the rank of major. This is your expert opinion. I'm not challenging it. But my question is: Is it logical if there is both army and police in a certain area, that they should know where they all are and that it's normal for the army to know where the police is and for the police to know where the army is? Isn't this logical for you because they belong to one and the same state?

A. Yes. I said major because major is usually a battalion commander in your forces, and yes, it's logical that they should know what each are doing and therefore there is general knowledge of what is happening.

Q. So this is something that is quite logical in terms of the behaviour of any police or army. Yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. You described an event after the incident on the Podujevo-Pristina road when an army patrol was ambushed and when a colonel was killed. You say the army of Yugoslavia then brought the tanks in and closed in on the village and then threw up an outer cordon about one or two kilometres away and then an inner cordon with the tanks and then sent the infantry in to search the town for the sniper. There were no retributions, no destruction, and no killings. Do you consider this to be a logical and normal act on the part of the military? ^{3305 BLANK PAGE 3306}

A. The reason I put this statement in was to actually show that when the VJ had carried out an operation, they actually performed this within all the legal frameworks and acted humanely and decently, and also performed well as a military unit, in contrast to what the MUP did.

Q. You are talking about the role of the MUP in Kosovo and Metohija, and you are talking about the kind of role it had, on the basis of which you've been saying, it is your assertion that it did not have a police role. You even say that they were not involved in regulating traffic, in combatting crime, et cetera. Did you see any traffic police during all that time, during your stay in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. I -- during my time in Pristina, I did see a few ordinary policemen in the streets, carrying out their duties and occasionally controlling traffic as well, yes.

Q. Is it clear to you that these policemen who controlled traffic are also members of the MUP?

A. Yes, it is very clear.

Q. Well, how can you say, then, that the MUP did not perform these functions?

A. The majority -- I only saw a few policemen carrying out these functions. All other MUP, 99 per cent of the MUP I saw in Kosovo, were performing a military function.

Q. In searching for terrorists, murderers, those who plant bombs, is that a military or a police function?

A. It's a function in which the -- the police have primacy, and if they require, for example as in Northern Ireland where now we work against ³³⁰⁷ the terrorists, we use the army in support. But they carry out an investigative type of operation, the police.

Q. Well, in this case, the police is carrying out investigative operations and looking for the perpetrators of crimes. Is that clear or is that not clear?

A. I think the methodology is different, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. In addition to traffic, what do you think? Who else but the police could have been searching for perpetrators of crimes, arresting criminals, looking for perpetrators of murders, looting, all other criminal offences? Who else could have been doing that except for the police? Because it is your claim that the police was not carrying out those functions.

A. It is the police responsibility to carry out those functions, but all the activities that we observed that MUP carried out were typical military, infantry, armoured, dismounted, infantry type of procedures.

Q. You wrote here in your statement that there were local policemen and members of the traffic police who did not belong to the MUP. They wore regular police uniforms with white belts -- that is what traffic policemen wear anyway so they would be more visible for all the participants in traffic -- and they just carried sidearms. The MUP wore combat outfits, et cetera, et cetera.

It was your understanding that these were also members of the MUP. Isn't that right or is that not right?

A. We believe that the traffic police were a subdivision of -- a small subdivision of the MUP, but we referred to -- generally to the MUP ³³⁰⁸ as the people in combat kit with Kalashnikovs and webbing, helmets, et cetera, because they were -- 99 per cent of the MUP in Kosovo appeared to us to be these people.

Q. And are you aware of the MUP structure? MUP means Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of the Police. You're aware of that, aren't you? And do you know in that structure there is an administration for the traffic police, there is an administration for the combatting of crime, preventing crime, various other administrations, or departments, rather, for issuing passports, et cetera, et cetera. Are you aware of this entire structure, according to which the MUP caries out its regular duties just like any other police in the world?

A. There were the people in the mission whose responsibility was understanding the structure. Mine was working, trying to sort of coordinate the activities, working on the ground and trying to sort of work the verification. Thank you for the explanation.

Q. And can you tell me how you explain the fact that there were such great differences in the statement you give with respect to -- compared to the statement of your boss, Drewienkiewicz? For example --

JUDGE MAY: It's not a matter for him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Very well. These are vital differences, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it true that in the monthly reports of the OSCE compiled on the basis of your daily and weekly reports about the situation in Kosovo from mid-January to mid-February 1999, that it states that in Kosovo, urban ³³⁰⁹ terrorism was on the rise?

A. I can't recall exactly, but if that's what it says, then I accept it.

Q. And is what you say in the statement also true, that the level of conflict was reduced but the KLA attacked the Serb police? Yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. What did the KLA use to attack the army and MUP units with? Because your verification of weapons was -- also implied recording the types of weaponry, their deployment, and so on. So what did the KLA use to attack the army and MUP units?

A. They obviously used Kalashnikov or -- a whole variety of assault rifles, ranging from Kalashnikovs to Armalites [phoen]. We even saw one person, who must have drawn the booby prize, with a British rifle. They obviously explosives, they used rocket-propelled grenades. They used mortars. These were the normal sniper rifles of large calibre, often American. This type of weapon or Russian Draganoff rifle. These were the type of weapons that the KLA would use as their weapon of choice.

Q. And in addition to the mortars, did they also use hand-held launchers when attacking armoured vehicles, fortified positions and so on?

A. Yes.

Q. What calibre of mortar did they use?

A. They used -- at the beginning, they used a smaller calibre mortar, and towards the end, they had acquired a much larger calibre. So it ranged from 60 millimetres right up to 120. ³³¹⁰

Q. How did they come by those mortars? How did they procure them? Because they're heavy ones, 120 millimetres. How were they able to get them?

JUDGE MAY: Do you know anything about that?

THE WITNESS: All I know, sir, is that some of this equipment came over the border, over the mountains from the direction of Albania, but more than that, I do not know.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And how did they get American weapons that you mentioned a moment ago? How did they come by those?

A. I can only assume the same way.

Q. Do you know that in the course of 1998 and 1999, that is to say during the time your mission was there, the KLA effected a much larger number of terrorist attacks on the members of the army and the MUP and civilians, both Serbs and Albanians and Muslims as well, Romanies, Gorani, and all the others, than throughout the period of time that had gone before in the several years before that period? Are you aware of that?

A. I am aware that a great many attacks were carried out but I cannot give a qualitative assessment -- quantitative assessment. Sorry.

Q. Now this fact, the precipitous increase in the number of attacks while your mission was there, was that the subject of your attention and your analysis at the meetings you had with Walker, Drewienkiewicz, and so on?

A. Yes. These were topics that were discussed to see how we could persuade both sides to cease the hostilities and to reduce the number of ³³¹¹ deaths and attacks.

Q. And were you successful at all with the -- with the KLA in that respect?

A. I believe on occasion we were successful, and we managed to get the KLA to withdraw from certain forward positions after we had discussions with the Commission of Cooperation who asked us to remove, for example, near Podujevo, the whole line of hills. We did actually have the KLA agreement to pull away their snipers from the positions overlooking the road for quite a considerable time.

Q. As there was this drastic increase in terrorist attacks, how then were you able to report on the violation of agreement by the MUP when it was quite obvious that it was the KLA that did the violation in the first place?

A. We reported the violations as they came. So if -- if it was an attack launched by the KLA, we would clearly state this, that the KLA had shot, attacked, destroyed, and then we would also report the -- the subsequent Serbian action.

Q. And the checkpoints, do you consider those to be a preventive or repressive operation?

A. Well, the reason that Burns tried to keep the number of checkpoints down to a minimum was because a large number of checkpoints just prevented everyone from moving around Kosovo. And obviously I agree with you entirely that if the level of activity increases, then you can then be able to increase the number of control points and checkpoints. The number of checkpoints was always very large since our arrival. ^{3312 BLANK PAGE 3313}

Q. You yourself noted that you found and assessed as being a violation some 30-odd or 40 up to control points. Now, what does 40 control points mean on the whole territory of Kosovo and Metohija with 26 municipalities and several thousand settlements? Do you consider that to be an overly large number?

A. When they control the movement of around -- the whole of Kosovo. Kosovo, as you know, Mr. Milosevic, has only a small number of main access roads that can be used throughout the year, and with 40 patrols, you can effectively close off and totally control and stop virtually the traffic moving in Kosovo. It's easily done with 40.

Q. But was that not a necessity if it was -- if we had to uncover terrorists and their activities?

A. If this is what you were doing and not just preventing movement, which it appeared you were doing.

Q. And did your mission endeavour to see that weapons are taken away from the terrorists in order to reduce the level of crime that was permanently high?

A. (A) this was not a mandate, neither was it for us to take away your weapons as neither -- as it wasn't to take away their weapons. And we also weren't in any position, as an unarmed verification force, to carry this activity out.

Q. You had an overview of all the positions of the army of Yugoslavia and the MUP of Yugoslavia and all the weaponry. You had a complete overall picture of the positions and weaponry of the army of Yugoslavia. Is that true or not? ³³¹⁴

A. That's not true.

Q. But you did have regular meetings with members of the Yugoslav commission, and you discussed these issues with them, did you not?

A. We discussed this and the -- as I mentioned before several times, access to actually inspect or verify anything was rarely given.

Q. Well, you told us all the types of weapons yesterday that the army disposed of, and identified them. So you had an insight into everything that you presented here.

A. This was because we observed, very carefully, weapons coming in. For example, you did not declare that you had brought in new types of weapons, and when this was questioned, you said, "Well, they are much the same. A tank is a tank," I think the quotation was. "Like a woman is a woman," I believe the entire phrase went.

Q. And did you personally have meetings with the KLA?

A. I met them in the early stages. I -- because I was working near Podujevo and tried to negotiate with David Wilson, I met Remi, for example. And then later, the only meetings I had with the KLA would have been when I was given that authority by your government to visit the 11 prisoners in Nis. But my activity with the KLA virtually came to a standstill for the last couple of months. My main activity was cooperating and liaising with the VJ and the commission.

Q. And when you visited those 11 that you just mentioned, did you -- were you able to see that conduct towards them was proper, that there were no problems with regard to their treatment in view of the fact that they were in prison? ³³¹⁵

A. When I saw them, I had seen that they were now living in reasonable conditions and were well-dressed, but they recounted to me that they had all been given fairly unpleasant treatment in the period before my visit.

Q. Were there any traces on them of any kind of treatment of that kind, the treatment that you say they had experienced?

A. I did not ask them to undress and -- so I could inspect them. A lot of the ill-treatment was psychological, where, for example, prisoners were made to stand the entire day in their cells. They were not allowed to sit down or to lie down.

Q. That's what they told you, is it?

A. That's what they told me.

Q. And on the other hand, when they were set free, the soldiers, did they have any traces of beatings on them that were obvious? They didn't have to take their clothes off for it to become evident?

A. Are you referring to the KLA or are you referring to the nine soldiers that were captured by the KLA?

Q. I'm talking about the Serb soldiers, when they were set free. Did they have any traces of beatings on their person?

A. Well, when I saw the soldiers shortly after they'd been captured, one or two -- I videoed them and I passed the tapes to your commission, and yes, one or two of them did have marks about their faces where they had been beaten up, assaulted.

Q. So the difference between what you saw when you saw the Albanians and what you saw with the Serb prisoners, there was a difference there. ³³¹⁶ Now, have you ever been to Albania? Did you ever go to Albania during the duration of your mission?

A. No.

Q. And did the leaders of the KLA inform you of any of their intended activities? Did they make their plans known to you or anything of that kind?

A. No.

Q. Haradinaj, in his interview, speaks about many meetings with English, American, German and other military representatives --

JUDGE MAY: This witness says he didn't see them.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, all the reports that you sent out, did you send them out to the organs of Yugoslavia as well? To the Yugoslav authorities as well?

A. We had a system whereby our reports were passed to the Commission for Cooperation.

Q. So all the reports that you sent out were sent out to the Yugoslav authorities as well; is that right? That was your duty provided for by the agreement, because it says so, as you know.

A. As far as I know, we endeavoured to send as many reports as we could across to the commission. Certainly the reports were also sent to Bo Pellnas in Belgrade.

Q. Who had the duty to send them on further to the Yugoslav authorities. Yes or no.

A. Either he or the commission in Pristina, yes. Both. Either or. ³³¹⁷

Q. And that, to all practical intents and purposes, means that if somebody wasn't sent to the Yugoslav authorities, could not be treated as being an event, an incident.

JUDGE MAY: I don't think the witness can deal with that. Mr. Milosevic, you've now had over three hours, well over three hours with this witness. Another 20 minutes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's difficult for me to find my way in all these questions in only 20 minutes, but I'll do my best and skip over some things.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it true that the detained members of the KLA whom you visited in prison told you in actual fact that they involuntarily joined the KLA or, rather, that they were forced to enter the KLA?

A. Some did, yes.

Q. So they were forced to join the KLA; is that it?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you happen to ask them how they were forced to join the KLA?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did they tell you?

A. Well, one man told me that the KLA came to his house, and they told him that the following morning he had to have his suitcase -- a small pack ready because he was going to Albania to be trained as a terrorist, and he refused, and they said, "Well, if you refuse, we will kill you."

Q. Is it true that in the monthly reports of the OSCE for the period ³³¹⁸ from mid-January to mid-February 1999, it is stated that the KLA controlled the Albanian community through the police? It policed it and took reprisal measures towards those who had been accused of collaborating with the Serbs? Yes or no.

A. That's probably true, yes. As we understand it, that's true.

Q. And is it also true that in that report of yours, that same report, that mention was made in Pec of several Albanians who were denoted as being loyal to the Serbs and that they were killed in separate incidents? Do you recall that?

A. I don't exactly, but if it's in the report, then it will be true.

Q. And do you remember whether it is true that all the Albanians were killed by bullets, shot in the head, bullet shots in the head?

A. I can't remember in this particular incident how they were killed.

Q. And do you happen to know or did you know at the time how many abducted Serb civilians, members of the army or the Ministry of the Interior, at the beginning of 1999, were in the hands of the KLA?

A. I believe we had different numbers. I think at one point I heard numbers of greater than 20. The Albanians denied ever having such large numbers of police in captivity.

Q. And how many did your mission succeed in freeing of those individuals, apart from the several soldiers that we mentioned earlier on?

A. Very few.

Q. And do you know that several days ago, in Kosovo, at different ³³¹⁹ locations mass graves were found of Serb victims and that their identification -- the process of their identification is underway? Have you heard about that? Do you know that?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever go to the village of Dragobilje?

A. I can't recall.

Q. I didn't hear your answer.

A. I can't -- I'm not aware of having been in this visit -- in this village. The name doesn't jump out.

Q. Well, that's where the KLA headquarters were, and that's also where a forward point of the Kosovo Verification Mission was, as well as a forward post of KDOM for links and liaison with the KLA headquarters. I assume that --

JUDGE MAY: This is what you assert. Do you know anything about this?

THE WITNESS: One of the reasons why I would not know anything about this is because I was the liaison officer with the -- to the Serbian commission, and therefore this type of information would have actually been kept from me in case I accidentally gave it away, or I got tempted to go there, or whatever. So I did not go anywhere near this village, or know that the headquarters was there, or what presence there was from the OSCE, or what KDOM did there. And I presume that Mr. Milosevic is referring to the US-KDOM.

JUDGE MAY: The witness can't help as to this.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ^{3320 BLANK PAGE 3321}

Q. And do you happen to know -- that is to say, you mentioned yesterday on one occasion with respect to Ramush Haradinaj, their chief, in connection to that, do you know of his statement after the war when he said that meetings with the KVM were mutually significant in view of preparations for the NATO aggression?

A. I was not aware of this statement.

Q. Then I'll skip the next few questions, because quite obviously you don't know that.

And do you happen to know his opinion and the opinion of other chiefs, KLA chiefs, that they were practically saved with the arrival of your mission and that the presence of your mission enabled them to revive themselves, to become revitalised?

A. The only comment I ever heard them making was that obviously the KVM allowed them to feel safer in Kosovo, and they did talk about that their eventual aim was to achieve -- that what they were trying to achieve was even greater stability in the country by having a Western force, a NATO force, a UN force actually coming -- an armed force coming into Kosovo in order to keep the peace. These were the type of comments that were being made shortly after our arrival.

Q. And did you know about or did you discuss in your mission at all the links and connections between the KLA in Kosovo and the Al Qaeda of Osama bin Laden?

A. To my knowledge, never.

Q. And do you know that in November 2001 - and this is information that was published in the Wall Street Journal - that there was talk of the ³³²² presence in Kosovo and in Bosnia --

JUDGE MAY: We seem to be getting well away from the witness's evidence. Deal with the matters which he gave evidence about.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I will ask him -- I will deal with the matters which he talked about.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Since the agreement on the establishment of a mission stresses in principle the KVM's positions and option for cooperation and verification and a respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia -- I assume you know that. That's right, isn't it? That is what it says. On the other hand, I'm sure you know what the goals of the KLA terrorist organisation were, directed precisely against what was contained in your agreement with the Yugoslav government. Is that correct or not?

A. We know that they didn't sign the agreement, and they were not party to the agreement.

Q. Yes, but you cooperated with that side, with that party.

JUDGE MAY: We've been round and round this point, Mr. Milosevic, about the KVM and any relations they may have had with the KLA, and it's not going to assist us to go into it yet again.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So within all these restrictions and limitations, I shall try on abridge what I have here as far as possible.

You know that against the detained KLA members, legal proceedings, ³³²³ court proceedings were undertaken. I'm sure you know that.

A. Yes.

Q. And do you know that in the report of the OSCE, it is stated, it is also the mid-January, mid-February report 1999, they say that the verifiers of the -- for human rights notice that the recent trials in the district court in Pristina and Pec were conducted in conformity with international standards on legal procedure and that no violation of human rights was noted in these proceedings. Are you aware of that or not?

A. I don't remember that report, no.

Q. You don't know about the report.

A. No.

Q. It is your own report, January, February. So if it is not correct, then what I'm asking you isn't important. But as it is correct, or let us assume that it is correct without any responsibility on your part for saying that, why did Keller do this in relation to the KLA when legal proceedings were being conducted against them?

A. Sorry, what did Keller do?

Q. I said -- Keller is not important here, but the Verification Mission and its leaders - and Keller was a function of this - why did he insist that members of the KLA be released when legal court proceedings were being undertaken against them? Do you have an explanation for that?

A. I do.

JUDGE MAY: You do. Yes.

THE WITNESS: It's quite simple: There was an agreement made when we released the nine Serbian prisoners that the 11 Albanian prisoners ³³²⁴ would be released at some date subsequent, not too close to try to link the two, because we didn't -- the Serbian side, this was your insistence, of your people, we didn't want this to appear to look as if it was a we-will-release-them-if-you-release-ours, but that is in fact exactly what it was. It was a quid pro quo.

Q. And what about this principle quid pro quo? How is it being applied now when persons who are terrorists who are serving prison sentences in Serbian are being pardoned and released?

JUDGE MAY: It has nothing to do with the witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You attended the funeral in Racak?

A. I was not actually in the village of Racak. I was not far away.

Q. Yes. The KVM provided for additional patrols for this particular event. That's my understanding.

A. It did.

Q. Is it correct that, during the funeral, the KLA arrested between 40 and 60 Albanians because, as they had said, they were known as unfit for cooperation?

A. I was not aware of that.

Q. But in the OSCE report for the period of January and February, it is mentioned that, during the funeral in Racak, the KLA arrested Albanians with whom they did not have cooperation, and later on, members of the KVM were setting them free. In all fairness, it is not said whether they managed to release all of them, but do you know anything about this? ³³²⁵

A. The only thing I know about it is that your forces arrested a number of suspects in and around the Racak area during the funeral. And I know nothing about the OSCE releasing -- I can't imagine why we would be releasing because the OSCE did not actually hold anybody. We had no facilities to hold anyone.

Q. Maybe the interpretation was not right. The point was, in your report it says that the KLA was arresting Albanians and that the KVM made an effort to have them released. It's not that the KVM was arresting these Albanians. That's what I talked about. And I asked you whether you knew anything about that.

A. No.

Q. Do you know how many reports of yours during the mission were sent further on to NATO?

A. I wasn't aware of any of our reports being sent to NATO.

Q. Is it your assertion that you did not exchange information with NATO and that you did not sent information to NATO from the ground?

A. It is not my assertion at all. You asked me if we sent reports to NATO. I was not aware of any reports being sent. However, at one stage during the Rambouillet talks, when we thought that NATO would be the force coming into Kosovo, we did in fact have contact with NATO and we sort of briefed them as to what they could expect when they arrived in Kosovo - where they could be located, the types of roads, et cetera - which would allow the force to move in quickly and easily into Kosovo, as a result of Rambouillet talks.

Q. Since you were involved in armaments and technical equipment, can ³³²⁶ you say anything about the following: Is it correct that the members of the KVM, after going from Kosovo to Macedonia, maintained contacts with the KLA by way of satellite telephones and other means?

A. I believe a number of Albanians who were there and maybe asked some of our interpreters, did try to establish communications by satellite telephone.

Q. It was even established and even the press in the West wrote about this, that they had direct contacts, by way of these telephones, with the officials of NATO and even directly with General Clark. Do you know anything about that?

A. I would say that probably is untrue because one of my jobs when I arrived in Macedonia and in Skopje, after a number of weeks, I was seconded -- I was not seconded, I was made the liaison officer to NATO, between NATO and OSCE. And of course, there were other liaison officers there from the UNHCR and other NGOs. So I was one of many who attended some of the briefings, but I never -- never, in all of my time that I visited the NATO headquarters, I never heard anyone say anything about NATO having direct contact with the KLA.

Q. During the mission, did you have positioning devices, equipment?

A. You mean did we have global positioning systems? Yes, so that we knew where we were.

Q. Did you only establish where you were or did you also establish the positions of certain points of interest in terms of the ensuing NATO aggression?

A. We -- we obviously had maps of the whole of Kosovo, so we would ^{3327 BLANK PAGE 3328} not need to establish any positions of anything on the ground. We were interested to know where we were and where the -- the VJ, MUP, and KLA were on the ground so that we could make accurate assessments of what was happening in Kosovo.

Q. And how do you explain the fact that the largest number of facilities that were at any point visited by the verifiers was very precisely hit during the NATO bombings?

JUDGE MAY: It's not for the witness, I don't think. It depends upon the basis of the assertion.

Can you help, Colonel, as to whether there's any truth in that suggestion?

THE WITNESS: I can't because I wasn't involved in any of this targeting and the bombing. I was merely sort of sitting in Macedonia as a -- as an observer. But if the targets were barracks, then obviously, you know, everyone knew where these barracks were. We had an agreement with your government that overflight by various types of aircraft had been agreed, and therefore we knew -- everyone knew the location. Especially NATO, these were NATO aircraft that were flying over Kosovo, with your permission. So they would have known where the barracks were, and these are the targets, and yes, you know, the two coincided.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm not talking about barracks, I'm talking about other facilities and buildings, but I have yet another question. You returned to Kosovo as a NATO officer. How many of your colleagues also returned in that capacity, now in the capacity of NATO officer? How many of your ³³²⁹ colleagues from the Verification Mission?

A. In the first two days, it was just General DZ and myself, and then after I was there for a few weeks, I didn't see any other colleagues, British colleagues, and I can't remember seeing any of the colleagues from the OSCE there. It's possible that later, as a part of a natural roulement, units would have had personnel within them who had previously served in Kosovo with the OSCE.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, the time which we've allotted you is now up. If you've got one more question, you can ask it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's difficult for me to make a selection because I have many questions left, but I'm going to put the next one that I had here.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You spoke about a particular KLA building. You said that this was their hospital. And you said that Serb officers told you that this was a legitimate target. How do you assume that they could have known that this was a hospital when it was clear that the KLA were there and that nobody had marked this as a hospital and that nobody had informed the other party thereof?

JUDGE MAY: The evidence was not that it was a hospital, if it's the same one, but that it was somewhere where the KLA received medical assistance. The point is made it wasn't marked in any way.

THE WITNESS: However, it was known because the Serbian positions overlooked this building, and they would have seen wounded personnel being taken in and out of it on a regular basis. ³³³⁰

JUDGE MAY: And I think you said it was the doctor's house.

THE WITNESS: It was known as the area doctor's house.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you. Mr. Wladimiroff, have the amici any questions?

Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Ciaglinski, what you said earlier on in relation to the information that you have provided to us, the information you received from the person you mentioned, in your previous statement, you explained this, and it is recorded on page 6, the last paragraph of the English version. This is the unredacted version. We did not have this statement of yours until a couple of days ago, and I would like to ask you, before I put any questions to you, to read these two paragraphs in which you refer to this, because everything you said to us here -- I mean, what you said then is correct except for one single thing, that at that time you did not say at all that you had received any kind of information from that person with regard to expulsions. Can you explain why you did not say that in your previous statement?

A. Yes, I can. The -- when I discussed -- when I wrote this statement, this was something I had actually discussed with the statement-takers, and even giving the information I gave, I put a caveat at the end about this information and its confidentiality and the reasons ³³³¹ for it.

Because this man, who he is, I thought if I kept to the purely -- the facts as they were given there, the military facts, without elaborating any further, that would be sufficient without, if you like, getting him even further in the mire. I had a good relationship with this person, and the last thing I wanted to do was to damage him or destroy him or put him in danger. And I knew that I would have enough trouble trying to explain or to verify, to give some credence to this anyway, because it was a statement made to me in front of just my interpreter. And so basically I felt that was enough information and the second part wasn't required although I had discussed it. And as I said, I didn't want to incriminate him any further. Probably a stupid loyalty towards this man.

Q. According to the previous list of witnesses provided by the Prosecution, you were supposed to be questioned on the 18th. Mr. Slobodan Milosevic got sick. You were here in the Tribunal. You were at the Office of the Prosecutor. You talked to the Prosecutor. And after this talk we got a certain summary. Even then you did not mention any expulsions. Is that correct? Even then you did not say what you stated yesterday to the Prosecution?

A. Correct, because I felt that all that, that entire section was being deleted. There was no point to embellish it.

Q. But also now, when you were here during these past few days, only after these first conversations with you we ultimately got this summary, at first again you did not speak about this; is that correct?

A. Yes. ³³³²

Q. Thank you. You said that -- or rather, you gave an explanation, and I don't want to go back to that. But these maps that you got, were they used for offensive combat operations and for NATO bombings?

A. The maps were passed to NATO at the time of Rambouillet, which would have facilitated their entry and deployment around Kosovo. How they were used later, I have no idea. I did not have access to beyond a certain limit within the NATO headquarters in Skopje, and therefore I do not know what maps they were using.

Q. But therefore, I'm kindly asking you, Mr. Ciaglinski, to look at page 6 of the English version, the beginning of your unredacted statement, where you said then that you were supplied by maps, 1.000 to 1.000, that were later used in NATO offensives in regard to certain positions. You said that they were precisely used for that purpose. That's what you said. Is that correct?

A. You asked me if these maps were used for bombing. I do not know if they were used for that. But when I entered Kosovo as a NATO officer, I had these maps. So yes, we used these maps. We had these maps for the entry into Kosovo. But I have no idea if they were used for bombing.

Q. Please, I worked with my assistant, who is also an attorney, and perhaps we made a mistake in the translation, but I think we didn't because we paid particular attention to this. It says here that you said that after that, the maps were used in NATO offensives. These are your words. If I mistranslated them, then I do give up on this.

A. I was not privy to the operations as they were taking place --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ciaglinski, do you have your witness statement ³³³³ with you?

THE WITNESS: Yes I do, sir. It says: "Utilized in NATO offensive."

JUDGE KWON: Can you clarify your statement?

THE WITNESS: By "offensive" I meant here that we -- because it was referred to as an invasion. Therefore, the invasion of Kosovo. The entry into Kosovo to me is the offensive.

JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you. That is your explanation. I do not insist. Could you please just tell me another thing in connection with this? You said today, in response to Mr. Milosevic's questions, that you informed General DZ thereof.

A. Yes.

Q. About the expulsions and these other things.

A. Yes.

Q. Was this before you withdrew, as soon as you got this information and this map? Yes or no?

A. We -- I was given this information. I then passed it to DZ who chose not to believe it.

Q. Did you give this to him before you withdrew from Kosovo?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. I'm just interested in another thing, Mr. Ciaglinski, in relation to your statement. This is page 9, paragraph 4 of the English version of your statement. ³³³⁴ Yesterday when you spoke about this event, when the behaviour of the army was perfectly correct, you said that an officer had been wounded. And before that, you said that then when the army was very correct, that a colonel had been killed on that occasion. That is what it says in your statement. Is that correct?

A. I said a colonel was shot. I'm sure I didn't say he was killed. I don't recall anybody being killed during the operation at Labenda -- at Lebane. I think there's often a difference between shot and killed in the translation. "Shot" means not killed, just wounded. But we don't say the person was wounded, we say the person was shot.

Q. I am not an expert in that. I got a Serbian translation from the OTP of your statement, and in the Serbian version provided by them, it says that this person was killed. But if this is your explanation, I'm not going to insist.

You also refer to the action that you prevented with your activity, and you said that you invested great efforts in order to avoid a conflict because, near that village, there were between 1.000 and 2.000 members of the KLA. Is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. I wanted to ask you, in connection with that, whether as a peace mission you ever tried to find out what the total number of the KLA was. Near that village, there were 1.000 or 2.000 members of the KLA. Did you ever manage to find out, in terms of the information that you were collecting, because that is what you were there for, inter alia, did you ever manage to find out how many of the KLA there were anyway? ^{3335 BLANK PAGE 3336}

A. It was a very difficult, almost impossible task, because in the first place, we didn't even know who many of the leaders were and who was even in charge of the whole operation. And therefore, I think at the height, you know, just shortly before we left, we could only estimate that there were possibly as many as 10.000 people in some sort of uniform in this organisation loosely known as the KLA. But on this occasion, we actually saw very large numbers of people being brought in from many areas with tractors, with horse-drawn, mule-drawn carts, carrying ammunition and weapons. So this is why we knew what was coming in.

Q. Thank you. And did you have any approximate knowledge, at least, of the quantity of weapons they had, not only the type of weapons? Did you or did you not have this kind of knowledge? Just give me an answer to that effect.

A. We -- whenever we saw a new type of weapon that the KLA had acquired, we would note it, so we knew the new type of weapons coming in, and we roughly knew how many, that they all had a rifle, for example. We tried to guesstimate the number of mortars or rocket-propelled grenades, but they were just estimates and there was no way of actually carrying out an accurate assessment of what they had and how many weapons they had.

Q. I'm interested in another area now. You said that you visited this group of Albanians that were supposed to be exchanged for Serb prisoners, and you said everything that you said, I don't have to repeat all of that now. Do you know what they said to you? At that moment when they were in that convoy that was ambushed and shot at, were they wearing civilian clothes then? ³³³⁷

A. I believe that as they were crossing the mountains in winter, they would have been wearing a great number of clothes. I know that having seen some of the other photographs taken by -- both our verifiers and the VJ and the MUP, that some of them were wearing uniforms, yes. I mean, there is no dispute that they were carrying weapons and arms across from Albania.

Q. But what you said, you said that underneath their uniforms, they perhaps had an extra pair of trousers or something. How much clothing did they actually have? Because they were going through the mountains. You said, when you were describing what was seen, that all of this was double clothing.

A. They had a lot of clothes on. I mean, I was not there, I did not examine the bodies; I can only report on things that I read, heard, and saw the photographs. But I believe that they did wear several layers of clothing.

Q. You are talking about those who had lost their lives.

A. Yes, because we didn't see the other prisoners.

Q. And when did you see them? Because you visited them in prison, if I'm not mistaken.

A. The first time any of us saw them, because we were only shown the bodies at the time, up in the mountains north of Prizren, and the first time we then saw them later was when I went in. I was allowed to go and see them with my interpreter, when they were wearing the clothes that they had to wear in the prison. And these were their own clothing. Some of them were civilian clothing and some of them were combat-type uniforms. ³³³⁸ And these were the clothes that they had.

Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, I have to ask you something. You used a word "village militia" awhile ago. When you were working there, did you realise that in Serb villages and in Albanian villages, there were people who were wearing civilian clothes and yet carrying weapons? Albanians were defending their houses and Serbs were defending their houses. Were there people who carried weapons who were not in the KLA, who were not in the military, who were not in the police and nevertheless they carried weapons and they were defending their homes?

A. Well, of course. It's -- Kosovo was an area where virtually every householder has a weapon and virtually everybody has a gun.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, it's time for the adjournment. Are you going to be many more minutes, do you think?

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I would need about 15 minutes more.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn now. Twenty minutes, please.

--- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I have decided to cut down my questions, and I shall just be asking something with respect to three documents.

Q. My first question is as follows, and in fact, my questions refer to Exhibit 94 and tab 63, to be more specific. And it has to do with the ³³³⁹ chronology of the most important events from the 15th of October to the 18th of April, 1999.

You, Mr. Ciaglinski, said yesterday that you knew about that chronology. Somebody asked you about it. Now, I am interested in the following: My first question relates to the 25th of February. Could you take a look at that date, the 25th of February. The number is 110. Have you found it?

A. I have, yes.

Q. It says there that it was -- a change was noted in the leadership of the KLA on one side, and immediately after that it says, "The return of the KLA leadership to Kosovo, in the French C130." Now, what is C130? Can you explain to us what you learnt about the changes in KLA leadership? And how come what it says here, that the leadership in Kosovo was returned in a French C130? What is it? Is it a vehicle? Could you explain that to us? What is a French C130?

A. Right. A C130 or Charlie 130 is an American built -- designed transport helicopter which transports troops or vehicles.

Q. So that means that that American helicopter was used --

A. [Previous translation continues]... sorry.

Q. That's why I'm asking you. But never mind. It was an American flyer. Now, do you know who the new leadership was?

JUDGE MAY: Let's make sure we're not at cross-purposes here. As I understand it, it's an American-built aircraft. Is that right?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

JUDGE MAY: And when it says a French C130, it's referring to ³³⁴⁰ whichever air force or whatever force it was, that it was responsible for transporting the people.

THE WITNESS: Yes. The French took it upon themselves to -- because it was in Rambouillet, they provided the air transport between Kosovo and France and back again, and this is why it was a French owned aircraft but American designed and built.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. It says something quite different here. First of all, you noted, and this is something that General DZ mentioned yesterday, he referred to the change in leadership and that the leadership was more rigorous and rigid than the previous one. And here note is made of what General DZ precisely said, and it says the leadership was changed, and this changed leadership arrived in Kosovo in that particular aircraft. Is that what happened or did it happen in some other way?

A. When we say that the leadership had changed, as a result of the chemistry and discussions in Rambouillet, certain people -- the same people who left are the same people that came back. It's just that their responsibilities within the group emerged differently. So different members of that group took on greater responsibilities and the others were, as a result of the talks, were pushed back into the background.

Q. I'm afraid that we're not understanding each other. It says here that those people were brought in from Albania. Where were they brought in from? Where did they come to Kosovo from? Where were they brought in from?

A. They came back from Rambouillet. ³³⁴¹

Q. Ah, from Rambouillet. But this changed leadership, when did that take place, this change of leadership?

A. I said that the people that flew out to Rambouillet were exactly the same that came back, so that the KLA leadership that went out came back. It's just that within the group certain individuals emerged as new leaders within that group and others who had previously been leaders of that group had dropped into the background. So there was, if you like, a realignment, a reassessment, their own reassessment as to who really had the greatest voice and the greatest authority within this group of people.

Q. Ah. That makes it clearer. Now with respect to this document, another point I'm interested in, point 121, the 9th of March. According to this chronology it says, and could you explain that, the worry that the KLA was losing control. Who was worried that the leadership of the KLA was losing control over the KLA?

A. I think -- well, I know that the concern was both within the KLA leadership and also within the OSCE, because we had -- we believed by talking to the KLA leadership we could actually have some influence and some moderating influence on what they were doing. But the local zone commanders, who were not necessarily part of this leadership, were beginning to operate -- some of them were beginning to operate without any reference back to the leadership itself, to the main leadership.

Q. Exhibit 94, tab 53, is the next one that I would like to look at. Do you know about this assessment of KLA views on the 15th of March?

A. I do, yes.

Q. And the last page, under "C", the abducted member of the Albanian ^{3342 BLANK PAGE 3343} police force, could you read that part, please? "Recognised, acknowledged that the security service of the KLA arrested a member of the Albanian police and that it was holding it in custody in its information centre. That is the first time that the KLA has recognised that it has a police unit, which is effecting that type of operation throughout the region." Now, you had this information, did you?

A. That they had a police force, a security unit? Which information?

Q. All -- everything it says under C.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that they do not have a copy of the document.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Everything you were able to establish via your liaison officer in fact?

A. Yes, it's true.

Q. Thank you. I don't wish to dwell on D and E, those sections. That relates to cease-fire. But I would like to move on to point 7. I don't want to read it all but it says that under certain conditions and circumstances, the KLA would probably attempt to transfer the fighting to the towns. So you had information of this kind, that unless certain conditions were met, the KLA would try to have the -- to take the fight into the towns and cities. Is that another piece of information that you disposed of, that you had?

A. Yes.

Q. And now the third document, which is not contained in Exhibit 94, ³³⁴⁴ but I have received it and it has to do with your own headquarters. I have it in English here. We needn't -- don't have to look for it. We can show it to Mr. Ciaglinski in English, and I will finish there. Would you have a look at the document, please, sir, and then I will have a question to ask you about it. I have the English version, and it is a Prosecution document 03045428. This is the English version. I do apologise. I've given you the wrong one.

JUDGE KWON: Put it on the ELMO, yes.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation].

Q. This, once again, is a report by the liaison officer of the KVM headquarters, and under 10, it says that a commander stated: "That if the peace agreement was signed, he would take his units to the hills and carry on guerilla warfare there. And the conclusion is that regardless of what will happen at the next round of peace talks, there is a definite willingness on behalf of members of the KLA to continue fighting." That is the report which your liaison officer wrote. Did you have knowledge of this?

A. Sorry, you said under paragraph 10, did you say?

Q. "B". It was point -- no. The conclusion was under 3. Conclusion, number 3. And it was signed by the liaison officer.

A. This was Chris Lucas's assessment.

Q. But this is something that you received at the headquarters. I think you were aware of this.

A. Yes. Chris Lucas was a colleague of mine.

Q. Thank you. ³³⁴⁵

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Ryneveld, yes.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour. Just a couple of questions in re-examination, if I may.

Re-examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

Q. Witness, yesterday in cross-examination and it was touch upon again sort of obliquely today by the accused, there is a discussion concerning correspondence with Donna Phelan under the signature, if I remember correctly, of the head of the OSCE mission. Actually, I'll read from the transcript, if I may. The question was: "The method that was initially planned by Donna Phelan," and your response was, "She was an experienced weapons -- CFE weapons inspector verifier sitting in the world of verification, et cetera." And you said, "Now, because we chose -- we sort of chose this method and also at the same time Donna Phelan and DZ had written a letter to Mr. Milosevic outlining how we'd like to do this and had no response. She assumes no response means that we had either no option at that point but to carry on with the method we thought of. When this method didn't work that's when we changed it almost immediately. Mr. Milosevic believes that we continued this way. We did not continue the confrontational technique, we went away from that." Now, there's a further dialogue, and Mr. Milosevic said he was not aware of having received letters from Donna Phelan from your verifiers, any one of your verifiers, I have to say that." Your response was, "Yes. First of all, the letter was drafted by Donna Phelan, and given -- signed by the head of mission. That was sent to you."

Now, that's the context about which I'm going to -- I'm going to ³³⁴⁶ ask you to look at a document, a letter which appears to have the date of the 23rd of November, 1998, addressed to his excellency Mr. Slobodan Milosevic as President of the Republic of Yugoslavia. About three pages, signed by Ambassador William G. Walker, with some attachments. I'd like you to look at that letter, if you would please. It's being distributed now. And ask the Court -- and I would ask you to review that letter and first of all, tell us if that is a letter to which you referred.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 99.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

Q. I'll give you a moment to have a look at the letter with attachments. Witness, I see you've had an opportunity to have a brief cursory glance at the letter. Is that indeed the letter to which you referred in response to questions by Mr. Milosevic?

A. Yes, this is.

Q. Now, does this letter contain, to the -- from what you can see, the areas that you were attempting to refer to yesterday that went to Mr. Milosevic which he said he didn't see?

A. Yes.

Q. Further, in the -- I'll get back to that letter in a moment. The cross-examination continued at -- just for the record, I'm reading from the page 3250 of the transcript, Your Honours, and 3251. After the portion that I simply read, Mr. Milosevic said, "I'm not aware of having received -- of having receiving the letters from Donna Phelan from your verifiers, any one of your verifiers, I have to say that. But in relation to this, what you've just described that you found in terms of the ³³⁴⁷ verification of the MUP, that is to say your teams did, did you send a report on this to the Yugoslav authorities or, rather, did you discuss this with the Yugoslav commission that was headed by General Loncar in Pristina?

"A. Yes. First of all, the letter was drafted by Donna Phelan and given and signed by the Head of Mission. That was sent to you. And secondly, the letter was, the full report of the findings --"

THE INTERPRETER: Would counsel please slow down.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. My apologies to the translators. I'm reading and then I'm speeding up.

Q. "The full report of our findings of the 27 positions that were more was passed to General Loncar of the Cooperation Commission, the full report.

"Q. And did you discuss this question with General Loncar and his associates?

"A. Absolutely. DZ personally discussed it with General Loncar.

"Q. So did you discuss it fully with General Loncar? When I say 'you,' I'm not referring to you personally. I'm referring to you the Verification Mission, the appropriate representative, that is." And I'm going to skip over. You said: "It was discussed with the Cooperation Commission and General Loncar, yes." Now, the second document I'd like to show you is a document that appears to be -- it's a draft translation of a document from the Federal Foreign Ministry office in Pristina, dated the 20th of December, 1989, it ³³⁴⁸ says, however it's clear from the context that it's 20th of December, 1999.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 100.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Madam Clerk.

Q. In particular, I would like to draw your attention, if I may, to the paragraph numbered 1, where it says --

MR. RYNEVELD: If I may, Your Honours.

Q. Do you have that now, Witness?

A. Uh-huh, yes.

Q. "At the initiative for the KVM for Kosovo and Metohija, General Drewienkiewicz and his associates request to meet urgently with General D. Loncar. In the presence of other members of the coordination team for Kosovo and Metohija, he brought up the problem of verification in the Podujevo region on the basis of our interests that the KVM intensify its patrols in this region to determine the actual state of affairs, something which our side had requested at several of the most recent meetings and discussions conducted by Vice-Premier N. Sainovic with the head of the KVM and by General Loncar at which General Drewienkiewicz was always present." I pause here to say it appears that the letter should be dated 1998, not 1989. It's just obviously a reversal of numbers. "General Drewienkiewicz said that per our request, they had intensified patrols in the Podujevo region and that, to their surprise, they established the presence of Yugoslav army units has been increased lately in an inappropriate manner given the current situation," et cetera, et cetera. ³³⁴⁹ Is this document the confirmation by the FRY authorities of the conversation that you related to in your discussions with Mr. Milosevic on this issue?

A. Yes.

Q. One final document I'm going to ask you to refer to, tab 3 of Exhibit 94, which we looked at yesterday, but in context of both the letter Exhibit 99 and the FRY authority's acknowledgment of notification. Tab 3, when you have it, consists of, first of all, what appears to be a record of meeting in Belgrade of the 25th of October, 1998, with a number of signatures. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. But then there is a statement attached to that, and looking at the second full paragraph of the statement following the signing page, and I think there's a number 3 written in the bottom right-hand corner, the second full paragraph says: "In order to further encourage the return to peace and normality, the state authorities of the FRY will bring down the level of presence and the equipment of security forces, MUP and VJ, throughout Kosmet to normal levels, i.e., to the levels preceding the outbreak of terrorist activities," et cetera.

It then goes on at the -- in the next portions of that agreement, statement, that they have announced -- "The state authorities of the FRY have announced the following measures," and they are enumerated on the next page. And paragraph 8 on page 4: "In order to ensure verification of these provisions, VJ and MUP commanders will provide to KDOM/OSCE detailed weekly reports of manning, weapons, and activities of their ^{3350 BLANK PAGE 3351} forces, and will provide immediate notification to KDOM/OSCE of any deployments contrary to these provisions and will explain the circumstances regarding such deployments."

Is that the agreement which was attempted to be addressed in the letter signed by Walker to the attention of the then-president of the Republic of Yugoslavia, the accused?

A. Yes.

Q. One further question, if I may, in relation to that. The information that is requested in the 23rd November 1998 letter, Exhibit 99 in these proceedings, would the KVM be able to carry out the mission without receiving the requested information?

A. Not as -- no.

Q. Thank you. Those are my questions, Witness.

JUDGE MAY: Yes?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as I was able to understand, the other party is trying to explain -- the opposite party is trying to explain some of the contradictions and referring to the issues that I raised and that I asked questions about. They are showing William Walker's letter addressed to me, and that is highly probable. And I was just surprised by the fact that Donna Phelan wrote to me, because I'd never heard of Donna Phelan up until this testimony, the testimony of this witness. And the letter shows precisely that there is no letter from Donna Phelan addressed to me. That is letter by the Head of Mission, William Walker. Therefore, that is completely uncontested. There is no letter from anybody else that I received. ³³⁵²

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We have the point.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] From the aspects of that assertion -- yes, I do assume that there is nothing that is challenged there. Secondly, look at the contents of the letter. It says: "Dear Mr. President, We are ready to start the operations to --" [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... Yugoslavia and OSCE." [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. [In English] "FRY provides certain specific information to KVM concerning security forces in Kosovo." [Interpretation] And then we come to the definitions, the definitions which are quite customary and usual: What heavy armaments mean - over 12.7 millimetres - what checkpoints are in respect to personnel and vehicles; what is meant by observation points - that they should not have more than -- not be manned by more than 30 people; and what company-sized teams are - they are the units that are the size of a company. That, too, is nothing that was contested. And as far as I was able to -- I understand, what he writes in the letter, and it's quite clear, anybody with elementary school would be able to understand it, all he's asking for is that these notions be defined in this way, and he seeks detailed information about all the forces in Kosovo and what should be brought in. And when we go through all this, that is up to the 21st in the month, that they expect to have these -- this information, as of the 16th of the month. And then he says in the middle of the second page: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... specific cooperation guidelines for KVM members including procedures for inspection of security forces. Once completed, we will inform you of these guidelines to ensure ³³⁵³ there is no confusion among FRY Serbian security forces concerning inspections to be executed by KVM verifiers."

[Interpretation] So he is speaking about the fact that, in expressing the mission's readiness to start work, he is saying that they are going to define, and precisely define, specific operational instructions, guidelines, methods and so on and that's what his explanation refers to.

Now, my question was linked to these methods and referred to the witness statement, to the effect that Donna Phelan developed a method of confrontation, confrontational.

JUDGE MAY: Now, is there some point or question that you want to ask the witness? Because otherwise he's being detained unnecessarily. If there is, you can put it to us and we'll see.

Re-cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. My question is as follows: From this letter of Walker's, which refers to very normal work prior to the start of the OSCE commission and information that it is going to develop methods and guidelines, are we able to conclude that some sort of method of confrontation would be developed? That is the question.

A. There was no method of confrontation developed as such but the method that was developed was because of the reaction of the Serbian units being inspected resulted in confrontation, and that's why we changed it. The letter also was not answered. The letter -- we did not receive the information about your troop sizes, the weapons held, the three points you mention at the front. None of those are in fact -- were complied with. ³³⁵⁴ The company group, I think it says 30 people. You breached that. The number of tanks and weapons you had at all these positions were greater, and so on. So I don't think any of those things were really complied with anyway.

Q. Well, you know very well, and you said a moment ago during your testimony that you were -- did have freedom of movement, and --

JUDGE MAY: We're not going to let you argue this over again. We've allowed you to ask the question because you haven't seen the document before. Now, it's time the witness was allowed to go.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And there's the other document that was shown which speaks about the good cooperation, as far as I'm able to see, because --

JUDGE MAY: We have it. We will be able to read it. Questioned by the Court:

JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Ciaglinski. I have a couple of questions. The first simple one is that it's about the information you heard from a high official concerning the proposed manoeuvre. You said that you reported it to General DZ, and you just said -- also said that he chose not to believe it. Is that the reason why that was not put into writing? I noticed everything -- what's happening was put into writing in detail. Yes.

A. Yes, Your Honour, exactly. It sounded so unbelievable that I think -- I know that DZ -- I discussed it with him, and he said, "Well, you know, this is just possibly one man's opinion." I tried to argue it as such that it was too detailed, but at the time there were so many other ³³⁵⁵ things happening, I think he just put it to one side.

JUDGE KWON: Was there any person you mentioned about --

A. Yes. I discussed this with many people.

JUDGE KWON: Okay. Then my next question is about the Racak incident. Were you involved in the making of the decision to pull out the KVM people from the investigation site when Judge Marinkovic decided to enter the village with armed policemen?

A. Yes, sir. DZ was there, and as soon as Judge Marinkovic said what she said, DZ looked at me, I left the room. From the balcony outside the police station, I got on the radio for a better signal and immediately I instructed General Maisonneuve to withdraw the troops.

JUDGE KWON: What I can't quite understand is this: You said that your mission had negotiated with the KLA that they would not have armed men in the area. That being the case, why did it necessarily follow that if Judge Marinkovic were to be accompanied by the MUP, it would undoubtedly provoke a gunfight?

A. Because although the KLA gunmen were not in the village, they weren't that far away, as were the MUP forces. They were sitting on one side of the hill, overlooking the village from one side, and the KLA were sitting out of the village on the other side. So it -- as soon as one lot entered, the other lot would enter as well. It was guaranteed.

JUDGE KWON: Given that KVM had already got a promise from KLA that there would be no armed men, might not one think that if the KVM mission at that time had not quit the place and instead accompanied the investigating judge, there might have been no gunfights? ³³⁵⁶

A. Well, the condition -- the only condition the KLA would accept was that if no armed MUP accompanied -- we offered to accompany -- both to flood the village with KVM and also to accompany the judge. She refused us.

JUDGE KWON: Wasn't it humiliating for a judge to be asked by foreigners, by its KVM mission to be protected -- not to be protected by the police of his or her own country? Did that kind of idea hit upon you at that time?

A. Yes.

JUDGE MAY: Presumably what you were concerned about was the risk of what happened; a firefight. If the judge insisted on going in with her own people, you were afraid, as I understand it, that they would be fired upon by the KLA.

A. Yes.

JUDGE MAY: And that's precisely what happened.

A. Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: General, thank you for coming. You're free to go. Thank you for giving your evidence.

[The witness withdrew]

MR. NICE: Your Honour, before we turn to the 92 bis witnesses, I have just a couple of or two or three broadly procedural matters that I'm wondering if I could just mention them now as there's a change in the type of evidence. None of them will take very long.

First, we understand that for reasons that are outside, I think, ^{3357 BLANK PAGE 3358} any of our control, the Albanian booth will cease to be available from the 10th of May. That's what we've understood. Now, we'll obviously do all we can to use the time between now and then with Albanian-speaking witnesses, but we are concerned that there will be probably some 35 or more witnesses, including 92 bis witnesses, who are likely to be using the Albanian language following that date, and we're also -- and so we're concerned about the effect of the withdrawal of the booth on that part of the case. And we're also more generally concerned about the absence, if there will be an absence, as I assume, of an Albanian language broadcast given the public interest, but that's -- all we can do is express our concerns on that topic if our information is correct.

JUDGE MAY: You can take it that the Trial Chamber will also be most concerned about that information is correct. It seems to me it's most important in a trial of this significance that there is proper translation and interpretation.

MR. NICE: The next thing that I have forgotten for a long time but I keep trying to remember to note is this: The Chamber may remember right at the beginning of the trial it asked for Mr. Tapuskovic for a note on the scope of matters historical that he would support as being relevant in this case. We've reminded him of it. It has yet to come, but I have to say that our historical expert evidence is in the process of development, and the sooner that we can have that note the more useful it will be, because it may of course identify issues that aren't immediately in our mind.

The next thing is that amongst outstanding issues, there aren't ³³⁵⁹ very many, but there's one concerning the 92 bis application for an humanitarian expert witness, and the Chamber may know from the way the application is drafted that there are particular reasons why in a sense it's helpful to have the decision, one way or the other, as early as possible, particularly if as will be the case we would call the witness if the motion is rejected. I'm sorry to not press you on that, but we have procedural difficulties given the particular humanitarian agency concerned.

Before I come to the 92 bis witnesses, there's only a couple of other things. We are preparing a further forecast witness list which we'll distribute as soon as we can. We hope it will be as precise as it can be subject to all the unforeseen circumstances. As it looks at the moment, the first municipality evidence, which will be in respect of a killing site and it will be killing site of Racak, should be reached at about mid-May. That's our -- that's our rough estimate. And accordingly, if and -- it's a matter upon which the Chamber has to decide, but if the Chamber is going to build in at all consideration of the safety of evidence about particular municipalities at any advanced stage, our forecast is that Racak, mid-May.

And then finally on general issues, I think it was some weeks ago now that I filed the latest Rule 68 position statement where I suggested that we should all, amici, the accused and we ourselves remind ourselves to ask the question has the accused in his cross-examination identified any new topics that require specific consideration for Rule 68 purposes given the approach we're making to Rule 68 purposes. I recall that for ³³⁶⁰ our side and at the moment, we haven't yet identified any new parameters, but we remain of course receptive to better ideas that may come from anywhere else in the Court including from the accused, as well as from the amici.

Your Honour, can I then turn to the 92 bis --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, before you do, I wonder if there's really any point starting a new witness at this time.

MR. NICE: I don't know how long the accused is likely to be in cross-examination of him. Before we come to him, there's probably a few ground rules that will be probably helpful to identify for 92 bis witnesses generally. I've got about three or four points I wanted to raise, but I don't think they'll necessarily be long in disposal, but I'm entirely content to put him back to tomorrow, in which case ...

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. There are one or two matters to deal with. It may be better to start the witness tomorrow than to break.

JUDGE MAY: Your Honour, K22 who is going to give evidence in open session, he will then come first, I think, because his timetable constraints are fairly tight, and we'd have the 92 bis witnesses as originally forecast to follow him, but might it be convenient to deal with the 92 bis witness giving issues now?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We have a ruling in mind on that, which it may be convenient if we deal with. What we have in mind is this: That the -- when the witness is called, we will allow five minutes for an introduction by the Prosecution. So that is merely some introductory questions to ³³⁶¹ allow the witness to become accustomed to giving evidence. His or her statement will, of course, be evidence. We will have read it. We will then allow cross-examination, that being the purpose of our original order. We have in mind the amount of time which has been taken in cross-examination, as I referred to today, a great deal of it in argument, comment, and the like. And in order to restrict that, cross-examination will be limited to one hour unless good cause for continuing beyond that time is allowed.

There will then be cross-examination from the amicus and re-examination.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, thank you very much for that. I think that probably covers all the points I was going to raise but about one or two. As to procedural formalities, the witness statements bear the witness's present addresses, and there's no reason for that to be made public. And so we have redacted versions, redacted only as to present addresses. I'm loath to have to burden the Registry and Chamber with two statements of each witness, but it's either got to be in that way because the statement itself will become a public exhibit, or alternatively, and I don't know which is going to be the easier to manage, we could simply serve a redacted statement in all cases with confidentially the sheet of paper that gives the address. Now, I think if I may say so from experience, probably the important thing is to ensure that the procedure is the one that's most convenient to those who have to handle the paperwork, and I express no view other than the interests of the witnesses dictate that their present ³³⁶² addresses shouldn't be revealed in a public document.

JUDGE MAY: Follow that course.

MR. NICE: Thank you. The Court will -- I now turn to the question of the five minutes, which was, curiously enough, a figure that had been in my mind as a possibility in any event. However, the question is what is to be covered in the five minutes.

The Chamber will recall that on an earlier occasion, I explained how many of these witnesses who were going to be subject to 92 bis, or may have been subject to 92 bis provisions, were concerned that their account should be told, and there's also a concern that there should be a context for the public hearing the evidence, who will only be able to get the full context from exhibited witness statements after the evidence has been given. And accordingly, I will intend, if this is indeed consistent with the ruling that you've just announced, I will intend in the five minutes, and by way of introductory questions, to give the broad structure or, indeed, it will be skeletal structure of what the witness can speak about so that everyone, including the public, may know that this witness is here to speak about X village and what happened in summary to the certain persons and so on. And if that does fit with Your Honours' ruling, then we will prepare the witnesses accordingly.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm very grateful for that clarification, and we will prepare things accordingly.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. The one matter which you should deal with is this, obviously; that if there is going to be a problem about the Albanian ³³⁶³ translation, we obviously need to cover as many Albanian witnesses before that date as possible, even if it means taking them out of order.

MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, it happens that we were probably going to have a substantially undiluted diet of 92 bis witnesses until the end of April, depending how long the accused takes with them, and that will be followed subject, I think, to one or two witnesses at the most, I haven't re-checked the list, by witnesses as to killing sites who will probably prefer to speak in Albanian in nearly all cases. So I think there was going to be pretty well solid Albanian speakers until the 10th of May in any event. But certainly we will reconsider the matter and possibly postpone any who would not be using the Albanian facilities. There still remains the problem, if it is a problem, of an Albanian language public broadcast in a case which so completely affects the interests of those who speak that language. But I'll probably find out after this that my information is wrong, but this was the information I was provided with yesterday from a couple of sources, and it became a concern to us.

JUDGE MAY: One matter that I raised to Mr. Ryneveld earlier was that some of the witnesses on the latest list have not yet been the subject of applications, so if you would get those in as quickly as possible.

MR. NICE: We understand that. We apologise for the oversight. It will be dealt with promptly.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] From what we have heard, that party ³³⁶⁴ over there wishes to testify instead of the witnesses, according to your Rule 92 bis. So that means the witness is not going to say what happened to him but Mr. Nice is going to explain what happened to the witness for the purposes and needs of the public, which I think has nothing to do with any manner of testimony that has been seen to date before any courts. So that he cannot testify instead of the witness and explain what happened to the witness instead of the witnesses themselves.

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... then the statement will be exhibited so the public, as you call them, can have it. Then you'll be able to cross-examine, which is the crucial point.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So that then is the problem, because we have here the written statement of an illiterate witness who signs his name with his finger, fingerprint, and then he was not able to read the statement at all, and then that side over there is going to explain briefly what it says in that statement so that the witness does not testify at all. And then it is understood that there will be a sort of possibility for cross-examination of what we haven't heard but just seen in a written statement whom we don't know who wrote it. My second point is this: I asked several times that I be told at least one week in advance the list of witnesses who are going to testify, because as you know, there are a great many of them. The last list, the latest list of witnesses that I received I received in the previous break, and it is quite different from the list of witnesses that was given to me the day before yesterday.

The statements of these first witnesses who are to testify ^{3365 BLANK PAGE 3366} tomorrow, according to your 92 bis Rule, that is to say, not to testify but that the Prosecution testify in place of them, I received that a moment ago precisely when this last session was to begin. And they are in Albanian and in English. I asked that the material be given to me and witness statements be given to me in the Serbian language, and at least one week in advance so that -- and that I have a list of witnesses at least a week in advance. I received a list of witnesses one hour ago, and the statements of these first witnesses are in English and Albanian or, rather, Albanian and English, and I received those half an hour ago. I saw them for the first time then, so I'll leave you to draw the conclusions.

I think that with procedure of this kind, this false indictment, together with the witnesses, is a shipwreck and you are dealing in manipulations which don't --

JUDGE MAY: We will hear no more comments of that sort. Now, let us get this straight. The first matter is that one witness, the witness to give evidence tomorrow, as I understand it, is in fact going to be K22. Is that right?

MR. NICE: Correct.

JUDGE MAY: And how long do you anticipate he's going to be?

MR. NICE: At least a day.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. So we're not talking about tomorrow's witnesses. Now, the next complaint is that the list has been changed substantially.

MR. NICE: Incorrect. But just dealing with things in order, the ³³⁶⁷ accused has had all these statements not only once but twice from us. Earlier, we provided them as a matter of convenience for him on a rolling basis because he will not look at the material he's had. He will have had the 92 bis application which covers these statements. He's had a letter giving the witness order on the 11th of April and the new letter is simply a revision and I'm not sure exactly of the number of changes of that letter. So there it is. So he's not taken by surprise. Can I deal with the particular problem that he identified in relation to the first witness who doesn't have the facility of reading and writing. If that is going to be an issue that the accused wishes to take, I can call the translator/interpreter who has today read the statement over to the witness. It's going to take a little bit more time, but she can come along and explain what she's done so if the accused wishes to assert there's been any interference in the due process of the witness having his or her statement read over, we can cover it, but it will take time, but it will be done.

JUDGE MAY: Let us wait for the cross-examination. We will adjourn now. Nine o'clock tomorrow morning.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

JUDGE MAY: No. We're adjourning now, Mr. Milosevic.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.38 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

the 18th day of April, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.