³³⁶⁸

Thursday, 18 April 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the next witness, I've asked to be found. I couldn't find him this morning. I don't know which room he's in at the moment. He's going to testify in open session and won't require any pseudonym.

While he's being brought in, can I make use of the time to mention two points about witnesses. I hope to conclude this witness, that is, Veton Surroi, today and tomorrow, leaving enough time tomorrow for at least one 92 bis witness. I hope it may be more, but at least one. And I'm going to have to take a 92 bis witness out of order. Number 3 of that list, Latifi Rahim or Rahim Latifi has I think final Ph.D. exams or something similar. I'm not quite sure what it is. I beg your pardon, Number 4, Zhafer Beqiraj and he has final Ph.D. exams for Monday. He's made every effort, I understand, to have the examiners to adjust their timetable but it hasn't been possible for them to do so and therefore, he simply has to go home on Saturday. Sorry. Not number 3, number 4, Xhafer Beqiraj.

The second witness timetable issue relates to Ambassador Vollebaek, who is serving ambassador to the United States, of Norway. He was originally scheduled to come here and came here during the period of time when the accused was unwell. He then reorganised his diary to come ³³⁶⁹ next Tuesday and, of course, next Tuesday was then identified as a day when the Court could not be sitting. He's looked at his diary again. He can come on the 8th and 9th of July but on no other day, and given his position and the accommodations he's already made for us, I hope that Monday and Tuesday will be days when his evidence may be given.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Towards, one hopes, the very end of your case on this part of the indictment.

[The witness entered court]

MR. NICE: Indeed.

JUDGE MAY: As for the other witness, clearly his evidence must be heard tomorrow. We should make every effort to hear this witness's evidence today and tomorrow. Of course it will partly depend on you, Mr. Nice, and how quickly you can get through it.

MR. NICE: I intend to deal with the summary wherever possible by yes/no answers wherever possible and to deal with it if I possibly can in two sessions which will therefore leave the accused two sessions, if he requires them, for cross-examination.

JUDGE MAY: And there seems to be evidence about earlier events. I think those are matters which you can probably leave out unless they're really essential.

Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

WITNESS: VETON SURROI

[Witness answered through interpreter] ³³⁷⁰

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. If you'd like to take a seat.

MR. NICE: Following on from Your Honours' last observation, I shall be dealing with background matters and in particular, although I understand the Court's made some observation about education, with education, but from a particular point of view, because they are relevant, but I will deal with them all, wherever possible, in summary and Mr. Surroi will, I think, understand that.

I should also lead unless -- on matters that are non-contentious, to save time.

Examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. But first can you give us, yourself, your full name.

A. My name is Veton Surroi.

Q. You are a Kosovo Albanian, the son of a diplomat, having lived in Bolivia and Mexico, also briefly in London, an educated man, speaking several languages, and by occupation a journalist and publisher; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Your first work as a journalist was with the newspaper Rilindja?

A. Yes.

Q. Between 1982 and 1990. As a result of something you published there, were you -- or did you lose that job?

A. That's correct. They stopped me from writing for a year in my own newspaper.

Q. This, I think, was following the publication of an article or an interview, indeed, with a Croat intellectual, Branko Horvat, who observed that Kosovo should be a republic within Yugoslavia; is that correct? ³³⁷¹

A. Yes, that's correct.

JUDGE MAY: There is a problem with the transcript.

MR. NICE: That I haven't checked.

THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness please speak up and into the microphone the interpreter requests.

JUDGE MAY: It's working. Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Surroi, you've been asked by the interpreters over the headphones, which you do not need to use, to speak up and into the microphone.

I think that that same newspaper was, on a date in 1990, closed and reopened under a management board of Serbs; correct?

A. Yes. With the establishment of emergency measures in Kosova at large, when not only Rilindja but the Prishtina radio and television were also closed down and the Assembly was suspended and all the other institutions of the Kosovar Albanian autonomy.

Q. Did you start a weekly news magazine in September 1990, being its publisher and editor-in-chief, and if so, can you give us its name so we can pronounce it correctly?

A. Yes. Its name was Koha, and it was the first Albanian weekly, independent Albanian weekly.

Q. Thank you. In 1991, was there a period of shutdown of the newspaper?

A. The Koha newspaper had been registered in Croatia, which was one of the two Yugoslav republics where private newspapers could be ³³⁷² registered. The beginning of the war between Serbia and Croatia made it impossible for the publication and distribution of the Koha newspaper.

Q. And it restarted publishing in what year?

A. First of all, following an impediment towards its registration by Serbia, which lasted for about six months, it re-emerged in 1995.

Q. Thank you. Was it then shut down again later on, and if so, in what year and, in a sentence, in what circumstances?

A. After publishing a photo montage called Anschluss 1989, which showed the accused, the security, the state security organs encircled the publishing house and stopped the distribution of the newspaper in the month of April 1996.

Q. What happened to the staff and the building?

A. The state security personnel, the Serbian state security personnel questioned some of the members of the staff, inquiring about the methodology of the operation of its staff, the eventual responsibility of the people who contributed to the newspaper was the printing press was closed down and sealed up with a state security -- with a state security seal.

Q. Did this event draw any international attention? Just yes or no.

A. I think that subsequent to a series of protests at the state -- state security organs in Serbia and organisations of the free speech in particular, this case fell into oblivion and the newspaper was allowed to operate.

Q. Paragraph 6. Did Koha become a daily paper as the Koha Ditore in April 1997? I beg your pardon. There became a daily newspaper and then ³³⁷³ you had a magazine and a daily newspaper.

A. Yes. That very same year, a daily appeared.

Q. You were the proprietor of both?

A. Yes.

Q. The editorial policy of your titles being what? Paragraph 7.

A. We always attempted to have an independent or a policy that would be critical and also professional and open to all sources of information.

Q. What, if any, identifiable attitude did you take to the party of Ibrahim Rugova?

A. I've been critical, especially towards the manner of the reality being represented, which would represent almost half of the truth. But I've also tried to represent the attitudes and political stance of the party and Mr. Rugova in person.

Q. In particular, did Mr. Rugova and his party hold and express views about the future of Kosovo and its independence?

A. Yes. Mr. Rugova personally, and his information apparatus, gave the impression that the question of the independence of Kosova was a matter of days, and that the entire international community was dealing on a daily basis with the question of Kosova. Over a critical period, for instance, prior to the Dayton talks, the Democratic League of Kosovo apparatus was basically going about saying the question of Kosova would be solved, resolved at Dayton.

Q. Was that an attitude that your newspapers espoused as realistic or were you critical of it?

A. We clearly pointed out, based on several sources, that this was an ^{3374 BLANK PAGE 3375} aberration of reality, this was. And it was our own professional duty to inform Kosova's citizens as to where Kosova lay, the occupied Kosova lay, Kosova that was occupied by the Serbian forces.

Q. Finally, so that on these general matters we can see how this affected your standing and the way you were viewed, were you regarded, as a result of the attitude of your paper, as being particularly anti-Serbian or not?

A. We've clearly been against the Serbian regime, power regime, and fascist ideology, whilst at the same time being open to the views of Serbian citizens who enunciated liberal opposition attitudes. At the same time, we were the only newspaper to break the taboo, the only Albanian newspaper to break the taboo by beginning to refer to the independent news agency Beta, as a result of which, extremist circles, on several occasions, accused us of representing Belgrade's platform and Belgrade's information.

Q. We'll come to other events concerning the newspapers a little later, but now travel quickly over the same period of time, just touching on your own political activities. For one way and another, you've been involved in political activities or politics all your life. Would that be correct?

A. Yes, I do see myself as an activist of civil society.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, I'm sure you'll bear in mind that we must keep the politics to the relevant.

MR. NICE: Certainly.

JUDGE MAY: The danger is if there is too much politics discussed, ³³⁷⁶ the trial gets sidetracked.

MR. NICE: I'm indeed aware of that, and I was going to touch on this witness's background just for context and arguably for reasons of credibility should any aspect of his evidence be challenged by the accused.

Q. The position is this, Mr. Surroi: You've set out or there's been set out for you in the summary how you wrote articles for the Croatian press which were critical, how you were a participating member of the Yugoslav democratic initiatives, UJDI, as long as 1989, which was a movement for the democratisation of Yugoslavia represented throughout the former Yugoslavia; is that correct? Just yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. You helped form the first trade union for construction workers in 1989; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You were involved in the parliamentary youth movement from 1990 to 1992, but you then resigned from that as a defined political organisation, and I think thereafter revealed your interest in politics in other ways.

A. Yes.

Q. And you can tell, if anybody wants to know about it, in detail of demonstrations, including those you had a part in organising; for example, the candle demonstration in February of 1990, which was a demonstration over the killing of some 30 people in previous demonstrations.

A. Yes.

Q. 1991, you were known as a person who had organised anti-war or ³³⁷⁷ violence protests called the Burial of the Violent Day and, as a result of that, you were imprisoned for 60 days, initially, where you served only two? D

A. Yes.

Q. Much later, paragraph 15 - and we'll hear about this when we come to your meetings involving the accused - there was a demonstration following the massacre at Prekaz in 1998, and as a result of your involvement in that demonstration, what happened to you?

A. I was beaten up by a number of Serb policemen as I was protesting whilst sitting on a Prishtina street, and I suffered injuries in my arm.

Q. I'm going to ask you to deal not in a way that's actually set out in the summary but in much more general terms with something to do with education. The Chamber's already heard quite a lot of the history of the education agreement, so we can deal with it with you very swiftly as a history, but could you please explain in a few sentences why it is that education for Kosovo was an important issue in a way that it might not be for other Western countries and therefore not be readily understood by those who do not have Kosovo experience?

A. The Albanian people in Kosova was almost totally illiterate at the end of World War II. This is part of an old heritage amongst the Albanians, given to the fact that the first unified Albanian alphabet dates back to 1908; i.e., very late. Secondly, the heritage of the Yugoslav kingdom meant that there were no Albanian schools allowed to open. There were two fundamental factors: First the overwhelming need of a people to get education in its mother tongue; and secondly, ³³⁷⁸ demographics. Albanians are the youngest people in Europe, therefore, there's a greater number of people growing up and needing education than in other Western countries. And at a time when Albanian schools in Kosova were being shut down, that is, following the years 1989, 1990, every fourth Albanian citizen in Kosova was tied, in one way or another, to the educational process, be it as a student or a teacher. The -- and in the political growth of the Albanian people in Kosova, with the expansion of the autonomy, was closely linked to the increased -- to its increased capabilities to get educated, which led up to the university and the profound enhancement of studies therein.

Q. Was the significance of education to Kosovo Albanians something that was readily recognised and understood by others, for example, those in government elsewhere in Serbia?

A. It was clear that part of the conflict between the anti-Albanian ideology in Serbia and the Kosova Albanians centred on the education, and the persistent efforts to curtail Albanian education finally erupted after the abrogation of the autonomy and manifested itself in the shutting down of Albanian schools as a form of stopping the growth of the Albanian people in Kosova and its maturation as a state-forming subject -- political subject.

MR. NICE: There are only three exhibits with this witness. One, please; K2408. This is a Security Council report of the 24th of December, 1992.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 101.

MR. NICE: Page 17, in the top right-hand corner. ³³⁷⁹

Q. Mr. Surroi, you've reviewed this document, I think.

A. Yes.

Q. Would you care to comment on the contents of the Kosovo passage, starting at paragraph 47 concerning -- education is mentioned there, but just do so very briefly because it's document of record that we can then refer to.

A. The document in question reflects the political attitude that we took at that time and which was that because the question of Kosova's political status was a difficult one to solve, the question of the status should not obstruct the right of the citizens of Kosova to receive education in their mother tongue. And from that time, it was the Albanian political -- politicians insisted always in a peaceful manner on agreement and on involving the international community on solving an extraordinarily difficult problem, which was education, which affected the great majority of the citizens of Kosova.

So in 1991 and 1992, which this document is concerned with, we tried -- we tried at international conferences, at meetings with international politicians to create a way of opening schools in some way despite the unsolved nature of the Kosova question. This was part of our policies of -- in a peaceful manner and through dialogue of solving everyday social problems while leaving the question of status for a time when conditions would be right.

Q. Now, with those general observations in mind with this document of record to which we may refer, we can now go to paragraph 18 but simply pass through history because the Chamber's already heard of it from other ³³⁸⁰ witnesses.

There was the education agreement brokered by Sant' Egidio in September 1996, which you understood from other sources was signed and eventually announced but not implemented.

A. Yes.

Q. To make the point -- no. I beg your pardon. It wasn't implemented, in summary, for what reason?

A. I think that the Sant' Egidio agreement was in fact exploited in order to create a block in the negotiating process in which the negotiation process would lose its impetus and -- on the Albanian side, while the entire problem of Kosova would be concentrated on the question of whether one school or another would be opened or not. In fact, the agreement and the delays in implementing it was a tactic to delay a solution of the Kosova question.

Q. Paragraph 22. At about the same time as the agreement was being made, were there demonstrations concerning electoral practices?

A. These were the demonstrations after the agreement, and these were in Belgrade. And these had to do with local elections which the opposition parties called electoral theft. And this led to a sense of outrage among the citizens of Serbia.

Q. Any consequences of those demonstrations you would want to refer to or comment on?

A. I think that the weakness or the response of the opposition in Belgrade led to a crackdown by the state apparatus. And in fact, also in some cases at the beginning of the 1990s, as long -- until the war to ^{3381 BLANK PAGE 3382} confrontation. The confrontation between the Serbian regime and the opposition was reflected later in the war that began in Croatia. For us in Kosova, the deterioration of internal relations between the government and the opposition in Serbia was a signal to us that the moment was coming when the Serbian regime would -- would -- would distract public attention towards Kosova because this was a nationalist ploy.

Q. Next series of negotiations on which you can give, if asked, some personal assistance of the Bertelsmann Science Foundation talks, which occurred in autumn of 1996 and into 1997; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the course of these talks which happened in Rhodos in Greece and I think elsewhere, but you had contact with a political party run at the time by the Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs, Dusan Mihajlovic.

A. This is the present Interior Minister, Dusan Mihajlovic. At that time, he was part of the civic alliance.

Q. And you've listed others involved at that time in paragraph 23. How seriously were these negotiations taken, and in a sentence, what was their result? And we can produce a document that deals with it and then move on.

A. There were three basic issues. First, we all believed that a track 2 for negotiations had been opened. And second track negotiations did not involve members of the government, but nevertheless, the readiness to negotiate would be conveyed to them.

Secondly, at this meeting, we participants from Kosova showed our ³³⁸³ readiness to start on a new way towards approaching a solution of the Kosova issue of not confronting the issue of the status, a question which should come at the end, but to create a framework of administering a kind of peaceful process that would, on the one hand, lead towards improved living conditions, and secondly, would lead to discussions of -- about the end of these negotiations which could be approached without prejudice. Thirdly, we conveyed to both sides the fear that the -- the lack of negotiating process would lead to war, would lead to a deterioration of the situation because this situation would be unstable over a long period of time. So we insisted at all costs on avoiding war and finding a peaceful solution.

MR. NICE: The second exhibit of this witness, K2824.

Q. I think the second meeting was in Halki in Greece; is that correct?

A. In Munich and then in Halki.

Q. This is a five-page document dated --

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 102.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

Q. Dated 1997 from Halki. The Joint Recommendations, we can read it at our leisure, but we can see on the first page, third paragraph under Joint Recommendations for Resolution, an observation that comprehensive democratisation of Serbia is necessary but not a sufficient precondition for reconciliation, and further observations on what is required. And over the page, under Confidence Building and Practical Improvements, "The education agreement of September 1996 should be implemented without ³³⁸⁴ further delay." And an explanation of what would be required. Was this document, and we can see, scanning our eyes over it, other topics covered such as disarmament on 3 at paragraph 5(e). Is this document one that, in your judgement, fairly represented the then-positions?

A. This is a document that reflected the way in which the issue could be solved, and it reflected a fair range of the scope of the debate, and of course, both the Albanian and the Serbian sides had opposite attitudes towards this document, but nevertheless, the document represented the degree of consensus that might have been achieved at that moment.

Q. And just, I think, a couple more questions about this negotiation process. Paragraph 27, you've mentioned Mihajlovic, and there are others - Tanic and Simic - who were involved. What was their position on the probabilities of maintaining the status quo in Albania at that time -- in Kosovo at that time?

A. All the Serbian participants took the view that the status quo could not be maintained, and they warned of a wave of violence, and they were all, without exception, against this wave of violence that was being prepared and which they themselves were sensitive of.

Q. And they were signed up to, they were in agreement with this document that we've looked at, for their part?

A. Yes. As far as I know, the promise was that this attitude would be conveyed to the Serbian authorities.

Q. And that brings me to the last question, last two questions on the topic. The Serbian authority of the accused and his party, had they ³³⁸⁵ participated in these talks themselves at all?

A. We have information that one of the participants, who was one of the members of the government coalition, obliquely conveyed the position of the government.

Q. Can you name that person or not?

A. Mr. Tanic represented the New Democracy Party, which was a part of the government.

Q. Then finally on this topic, did you understand whether a copy of the document we've now looked at in brief was passed to the accused or not?

A. According to the information that was given to me personally by the Bertelsmann Foundation, this document was part -- was given to German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in Belgrade, and there, with two participants in the meeting, it was handed over to the Serbian authorities, including the accused himself.

Q. You were in due course, as we shall hear, to participate at Rambouillet. The attitude of the Albanian, Kosovo Albanian negotiators at the Bertelsmann meetings was it, in your judgement, consistent with or inconsistent with the line taken subsequently at Rambouillet?

A. I think it was consistent in the sense that we insisted on finding a framework of self-administration which would leave the question of Kosova's status open. But the question of Kosova's status would not be prejudged in advance and -- but everyday -- everyday issues had to be solved first, and first an administrative framework had to be found which would not pre-judge Kosova's political status and then we could talk about ³³⁸⁶ the question of status. All the efforts of the Rambouillet delegation were concentrated on stopping the war.

Q. We'll come to Rambouillet in a few minutes. For completeness, passing over or passing through paragraphs 29 and 30, was there a further series of talks or couple of talks called the Project on Ethnic Relations which happened in Belgrade in 1997? Did you have some part in those, including in the second meeting in New York?

A. I took part in both meetings. In the first meeting in Belgrade, there was Professor Agani and myself. And later, the Albanian participants were broadened. And in this first meeting at Belgrade, one of the members of the leadership of the Serbian Socialist Party, Mr. Pecvic, a member of the ruling party, was also present.

Q. In the event, did these meetings come to anything?

A. I think they showed two things. First, they showed the readiness of the Albanians of Kosova to -- to insist on a peaceful solution. And second, they showed that they -- there was a great gulf between the Albanians' attitude and the attitude of the Serbian regime. And indeed, to some extent, the standpoint of the Serbian opposition.

Q. Thank you. Next in order -- it may not be in chronological order but it probably is, an offer to mediate by a man called Pacolli but that didn't come to anything?

A. As far as I know, as the late Professor Agani told me, a businessman who had ties with the Serbian regime and the accused offered his services as a mediator, but this offer was immediately refused by Professor Agani. ³³⁸⁷

Q. We then come to events of which the Chamber has already heard from another witness, and that is the meetings involving Mr. Bakalli and the DB. You weren't involved in those yourself. Did you hear anything about them?

A. I was informed about these meetings only after they were held.

Q. Were you informed of any threats about what would happen to villages in Kosovo?

A. The mediator at these meetings was a member of my staff, and he told me that the results of the meeting with the state security head, Stanisic, was a direct threat that if a solution were not found between Belgrade and Prishtina, the Serbian regime had identified ethnically pure villages that would be destroyed.

Q. Was that, in the climate in which you were operating, something that was taken seriously or something that could be shrugged off as mere words?

A. Knowing where these words came from, we took them very seriously. At that time, we had the impression that Stanisic was a trusted person of the accused and his message to us was a very serious one.

Q. So when later you learned of the dismissal of Stanisic and Perisic, how did you interpret what was happening then?

A. For me, it was a surprise. And bearing in mind the standpoint, the rather milder standpoint taken by General Perisic, who at that time had a rather less confrontational tone and was inclined to avoid confrontation, the dismissal of these two members of the government's inner circle could have been interpreted as an omen of war or of a ^{3388 BLANK PAGE 3389} deteriorating situation.

Q. Now for the reference of the Chamber, at paragraph 35, I only want to focus on the title of this paragraph. You don't have it in front of you but there's a paragraph in your summary headed "Koha Ditore role during the war and Jashari attacks." Now, the war, which war are you speaking of? More important so that we can understand your terms of reference, when did it start?

A. I think that the war started -- started with the attacks on Prekaz and the massacres of the Jashari family.

Q. Thank you. And the date of that was?

A. The first siege in Drenica was in January; the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998.

Q. Do you remember the date of the killings?

A. March.

Q. What role did your newspaper have in relation to those events and to what degree did it become involved with people from around the world?

A. At that time, our newspaper was the only one that reported from the scenes of events. And what our reporters saw was a major massacre under preparation. And there was the Deliaj family and the Jashari family, and people were being executed in front of their own homes. And because this attracted international attention to the cases, we opened our offices to all the diplomats and the correspondents from foreign countries in order to urgently convey an alarm and to sound the alarm in the world that a war was under way against the citizens of Kosova, against the Albanians of Kosova. ³³⁹⁰

Q. We then have heard already of the formation of something called the G15. Was the United States diplomat Gelbard involved at this time as well?

A. Mr. Gelbard was very much involved, especially in the idea that the Albanians of Kosova should form a negotiating team that would urgently enter into negotiations with the Belgrade regime. And as a result of this atmosphere that had been created, the G15 negotiating group was formed, and this was supposed to represent the broad spectrum of Kosova opinion.

Q. And you were a participating member.

A. I was a member of the G15 group as an independent member.

Q. Was Mr. Gelbard particularly significant in persuading Mr. Rugova what attitude he should take in relation to the work of G15?

A. I think that Mr. Gelbard was a key figure in persuading Rugova that a broad spectrum of people should be represented in this negotiating group, especially in a situation in which Mr. Rugova believed that he had been elected the President of Kosova.

Q. Shortly after the formation of this group, was there some concern about the apparent absence of international mediation in the crisis, and did Ambassador Holbrooke then take a role?

A. For us, it was a sine qua non condition that there should be international mediation in the negotiations with Belgrade. Not only did we not trust the sincerity of the opposite side, but we had been -- we had been inured to ten years of failed negotiations with Yugoslavia, and we thought that international mediation was a key factor in their success. And this trust was further reinforced when the referendum in Serbia was ³³⁹¹ organised against involving international mediation. And at this moment, the statement by Ambassador Holbrooke was decisive, and by the very fact of going to Belgrade and to Prishtina and arranging a forthcoming negotiating process, he showed not only that international mediation was possible but also vital and productive.

Q. You speak of the organisation or is it arrangement of the referendum on international involvement. Probably obvious, but just tell us, which way did the vote -- which way did the vote go?

A. The voting led to an overwhelming majority against international mediation after what I would call a very intense propaganda on the part of the government's side against international involvement.

Q. We go now to the meeting with the accused of the G5 group, of which you were a member, some of the evidence having being given unchallenged thus far. The meeting involved Mr. Rugova, Fehmi Agani, Mahmut Bakalli, Pajazit Nushi, and yourself.

A. Yes.

Q. I think there was some concern, paragraph 40 of your summary, about Mr. Rugova's ability to meet on his own and it was thought preferable to go in as a group; is that right?

A. I was surprised at the announcement of the news that Mr. Rugova would meet with Mr. Milosevic, and together with Professor Agani and Mr. Bakalli, we decided that it would be difficult, from a moral point of view, to meet the accused whom we considered to be responsible for crimes in Kosova and, nevertheless, we shouldn't leave Mr. Rugova alone, because we had doubts in his competence to conduct a fruitful meeting with the ³³⁹² accused.

Q. You set out your -- or there are set out in your summary other concerns you had about -- reflecting the wishes of Ambassador Holbrooke, but let's not be under any illusions. G5 and G15 had what as their ultimate goal, so far as Kosovo's independence was concerned?

A. There was this consensus among the Albanians of Kosova, which was reflected in the G15 and G5 group, and this was that the status of Kosova should be a matter for self-determination by its people, i.e., the independence of Kosova for which the people of Kosova had already spoken out.

Q. The meeting was on the 15th of May at the White Palace, as we have already heard. Is this the first time, or the only time that you met the accused?

A. This was the only time that I met the accused.

Q. I'm not going to take you through the various, in a sense, domestic details of the meeting. You can tell us about them if they become relevant and if you're asked. But at the stage of greetings between the accused and the members of the G5, was there any indication that he'd met any of them before, from things that were said?

A. I didn't have the impression, and I was surprised by the closeness and the warmth with which the accused greeted members of the delegation.

Q. Just yes or no to this, if you wouldn't mind. So far as you were concerned, was the business of meeting the accused one that presented issues, including moral issues, for yourself?

A. Yes. ³³⁹³

Q. When it came for you to have a chance to contribute to the discussion, can you tell us, please - paragraph 44 - what you covered and how the accused responded?

A. I think that the most important part of this intervention, on my part, was about the violence and the massacre of the Jashari family. When I raised the question of the massacre of the Jashari family, the witness [as interpreted] interrupted me, saying that it would be insane to think that the Serbian police would kill children. And then he started to say how Adem Jashari was a criminal and so forth and that he had killed his family. I said, "Then why? In this case, why isn't it allowed for a team, an international team from a neutral country to come, an international forensics team, that would come to investigate how the Jashari family had died? And if they were killed by a shoot-out among themselves, then this would exculpate the Serbian forces from any responsibility. And on the other hand, if the opposite were proved, then a process to identify who was responsible could be begun."

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, the transcript has, and as interpreted, the witness as saying that it was the "witness" who interrupted. Yes, perhaps you could just clarify.

MR. NICE:

Q. You've heard what His Honour said, Mr. Surroi. Whether accurately translated or not, the transcript has you saying that it was the witness who interrupted you. Who was it who said it would be insane to think that the Serbs would kill children?

A. It was the accused. ³³⁹⁴

Q. The proposition that Jashari had killed his own family, coming to you from the accused, is that something that you heard before this day in all your dealings?

A. I had heard it, this interpretation, from the spokesman of the Serbian forces and from the Serbian media.

Q. Any other support that you as a journalist had ever found for it anywhere else, apart from those particular sources?

A. No, nowhere.

Q. The accused having given you this version of events and you having proposed the use of an international investigative team, what was the accused's reaction to that?

A. He only said, after an expression of annoyance, "We'll see," and then he looked at his secretary.

Q. How well-informed in detail did the accused appear to be about this event?

A. I had the impression that he was very well-informed because he explained to us details, according to his own interpretation, of how the operation had been conducted.

Q. Did he have or refer to any notes or was he speaking from memory or knowledge?

A. He didn't have anything written. He spoke very fluently, and I had the impression that he was persuaded of the truth of what he said.

Q. Let's cover a couple of other topics at this meeting. Was anything said by any of the delegation about education, and if so, can you, in summary, say what the accused's attitude to that was? ^{3395 BLANK PAGE 3396}

A. Mr. Agani in particular, because he was responsible for the signing of the Sant' Egidio agreement, raised the question of education as one of the issues which were also raised by the accused. Mr. Agani said it was quite incomprehensible how the implementation had been so late in being applied. And the accused, at the end of the meeting or at the end of this part of the meeting, said how the Serbian parliament was in the course of preparing a law on education which, according to him, would deal with certain issues and would make it possible to implement the agreement more quickly.

Q. Was anything said about the university?

A. It seems to me that the key words were about the university, because the Serbian rector of the university had obstructed the implementation of the agreement. And as we heard later as part of the purges that followed the law being prepared by the Serbian politics -- parliament, after purges at Belgrade University involving the dismissal of opposition teaching staff who disagreed with the regime, the rector of the Serbian regime in Prishtina was also involved and was dismissed. And then the -- the process of the share-out of university premises for Albanian students and Serbian students started to go faster.

Q. You were, of course, a newspaper publisher. Anything said about that?

A. At one point, the accused, trying to describe the climate in which he lived, he accused me of being a dictator [as interpreted] and said to me, "Mr. Surroi, has your newspaper ever been closed?" And he said -- he said this with a smile, and I said, "Yes, you have closed it." And he was ³³⁹⁷ surprised to hear this and said, "When?" And I said, "When I published a photo montage. But that's not the greatest problem today. The greatest problem today is violence and war, armed conflict."

Q. Another small translation problem. Who accused whom of being a dictator, according to the accused?

A. The accused was talking about public opinion, and he hadn't pinned down anybody in particular.

Q. He was speaking of other people accusing him?

A. Yes.

Q. The transcript had it wrong. And finally, did the question of Kosovo's status come up explicitly? If not, was it touched on by the accused at all?

A. The question of the status of Kosova was mentioned at the beginning of our meeting by Mr. Rugova, and he said that the citizens of Kosova -- and we were determined on independence, but then we passed to another subject and the accused did not pay any attention to this issue and didn't address the question of Kosova's status.

Q. But at the end of the meeting, was anything said by him, if not about independence, about nationalists or nationalism?

A. Yes. He did mention in particular whilst referring to pressure or what he described as internal pressures, he said, "Look, I've got my own nationalists," i.e. nationalists that do create problems for me.

Q. As a matter of interest, when you left the meeting, were you optimistic, pessimistic or about the same? We can see from the end of paragraph 41 how you really approached the accused, but how did you leave ³³⁹⁸ the meeting?

A. I concluded that the gap dividing us was huge and I foresaw difficult days ahead of us.

Q. The accused himself, his approach and manner throughout the meeting at that -- you haven't described it but you can, and did that change your view of him at all? Just yes or no.

A. The accused was someone who established quick relations with the interlocutors, tried to create an easy-going atmosphere, in fact, wanted to insert a motif of sympathy in the conversation.

Q. As you returned from the meeting to Pristina, what in fact happened, as far as food imports were concerned?

A. A few kilometres before the border between Kosova and Serbia, where a Serbian checkpoint was set up, we noticed a large convoy of lorries transporting different sorts of goods, and subsequently learned that in fact a blockade, a food blockade on Kosova had started. And these were the first results of this blockade.

Q. Any explanation given from Serbia as to what triggered this blockade?

A. I'm not exactly aware of the interpretation, but as far as we were concerned, this was an unusual coincidence, which means that at a time when we were supposed to talk on how to resolve the problems, new problems appeared to crop up. We agreed that this was an act of pressure towards Kosova.

Q. Was there change in military activity in the immediately following days? ³³⁹⁹

A. During that month, that is to say, during the month of May, the -- a huge operation of clearing up the border belt started, including in particular the Decani area. And towards the end of that month and the beginning of June, we faced an increased number of refugees, many of whom remained holed up -- up in the mountains on the border between Kosova and Albania.

Q. Any explanation given publicly for the particular timing of this operation and the consequential increase in number of refugees?

A. There was no explanation given with the exception of the official explanation that these were anti-terrorist activities.

Q. The meeting with the accused had been intended the first of a series of bilateral meetings involving G15; would that be right?

A. Yes. And another meeting over the following week was announced between our own negotiating team and the team that had been appointed by the accused, who actually included members of the Serbian government and the federal government.

Q. That second meeting occurred. Do you remember the date? Don't guess it if you don't.

A. A week later. It had been planned for the 22nd.

Q. The -- it was held, I think, in the offices of the LDK in Pristina?

A. Yes.

Q. You can list those present, if necessary, or just identify them from time to time, but -- in your evidence, but did the group you were facing appear to have any power to make decisions by themselves? ³⁴⁰⁰

A. I'm of the opinion that these came from the inner circle, as was the case of Nikola Sainovic or Ratko Markovic, but I think that in every single negotiating situation, they had no decision-making powers but only the right to consult, and the decision-making remaining with the man they considered to be their superior, their boss.

Q. Indeed, what appeared to you to be the purpose from their side of this meeting; negotiation or something else?

A. I did not detect a great deal of readiness to negotiate, even though a number of issues were put on the table, it was more a matter of form rather than content. For instance, we spent more than half an hour debating where to hold the next meeting. Whether it would be held in Belgrade, as we insisted, in order to set in motion a circle of such meetings in Belgrade, or at the government buildings in Prishtina, as they insisted, to create the impression that these were talks within -- held within the same region that were dealing with local issues which necessitate a local handling.

Q. Was there ever a third meeting held?

A. No, it wasn't, because this was also difficult to do, but also -- but also there was increased international pressure on us, in particular by Ambassador Holbrooke, to participate in this meeting. The situation, however, was deteriorating rapidly. And in lieu of creating a better atmosphere towards negotiation, we were heading increasingly into -- into more violence and open problems. We therefore insisted within the negotiating group that it would be futile to hold negotiations when the situation kept deteriorating. ³⁴⁰¹

Q. And you, the members of the G5, how had you been described at home in respect of your going to Belgrade?

A. There was many kinds of reaction, many of them unpleasant. Many of the labelling was unpleasant. Two of the members of the G15 resigned at the very moment when we decided to go to Belgrade regarding that if not some kind of treason, something bordering on treason.

Q. By this time, what number was put on internally displaced Albanians in the mountainous regions?

A. In May and the beginning of June, we faced a huge crisis. There were around 5.000 civilians who, given that snow had not melted yet, were hiding atop mountains on the border between Albania and Kosova with no food, no clothes, no heating; nothing.

Q. And I think Sadako Ogata was eventually involved, head of UNHCR?

A. We alarmed the American mediator Chris Hill, who had been accepted by the Belgrade side too. We told him that this was a huge humanitarian crisis in the vicinity or in the environs of Decani and, given that UNHCR staff were not allowed to travel at that stage, we contacted directly Mrs. Ogata so that she would intervene and be able to send humanitarian relief to the refugees.

Q. On the -- there were people killed in Ljubenic, as we've heard -- we haven't yet heard, on the 25th of May; is that right?

A. Yes. It was prior to our meeting with President Clinton, the meeting of four members from Kosova. This was one of the signals on -- bespeaking a red line of execution of civilians in front of their own homes. This was one of the incidents demonstrating the continuity of ^{3402 BLANK PAGE 3403} police and military activity.

Q. Following that, there was the Serbian university law that you've already told us about, initially presented by the accused in the meeting as being what? Something of a positive step?

A. Yes. He announced that there'd be a law which would clear up some of the matters.

Q. In the end, was it a positive step or otherwise?

A. I think it brought a good deal of damage to education in -- to the university in Serbia, and in fact at the same time the problems had exacerbated to that extent in Kosova at the moment that it was almost irrelevant whether Rector Popovic would remain in his position or not.

Q. And then we come to the meeting with President Clinton.

JUDGE MAY: That may be a convenient time.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we are obviously on target to finish the evidence in chief early in the next session, not within half the next session. So I hope the examination or cross-examination of the witness may indeed be concluded today. If the accused has very little to ask the witness, I will make arrangements -- were he minded so to express himself, I will make arrangements for some of the 92 bises to come here today, otherwise they will not, of course, be immediately in the building. We don't ask them to come here unless there is an expectation of their coming -- an expectation of their giving evidence.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Surroi, we're going to adjourn for 20 minutes. Could you remember in this and any other adjournment there may be during these proceedings while you're giving evidence, not to talk to ³⁴⁰⁴ anybody about it until it's over. That includes members of the Prosecution.

We will adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Surroi, you went to Washington on days in May of 1998 for meetings with the US government, including with President Clinton.

A. Yes.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... paragraph 64 and 65. What do you remember as the dates, please? And if you don't remember them, don't guess.

A. It was May the 29th.

Q. When you met the President, of what did you inform him?

A. I informed President Clinton, taking the example of the massacre at Ljubenic, that regardless of our readiness to negotiate and obtain a peaceful solution, the Serbian regime is escalating the situation with new acts of violence and the killing of civilians. I requested that a security framework of circumstances be created which, with international mediation, would enable the beginning of negotiations. That in turn would set up a self-administration process whilst, at the same time, paving the ground, the way for the status which remains or remained the biggest confrontational issue between Prishtina and Belgrade.

Q. Were your talks known of by others, including the accused? ³⁴⁰⁵

A. I don't think so. I don't think the contents of the talks would be known with the exception of the members of the talks. Yes. The meeting had been publicly announced throughout the world media.

Q. And what happened when you emerged onto the White House lawn with President Clinton? What did you discover?

A. At that moment, as we emerged from the White House, we got information from activists who had contacts with Prishtina, and then through my contacts with my staff that the situation had further escalated around Pec and Decan and that political and military activity had increased and the number of refugees had risen dramatically.

Q. Any particular reason given for the escalation? Any cause that you could identify?

A. I think that everybody on the Kosovar side that took part in that meeting considered this a response on the part of Belgrade towards our talks with President Clinton. This was a way of telling us that if you meet the American President, this is what happens.

Q. We return to Rambouillet in February 1999. In your summary, there is set out a number of not anecdotal but in a sense small-scale events that we needn't weary the transcript with and the Judges with unless it's strictly necessary, but tell us this: What view did you eventually form about how conscientious, how serious the Serbian delegation was?

A. I think that a great number of people within this delegation weren't even aware of why they were there. And with the exception of three or four people who came from the circle, the inner circle, they just wasted their time. In the first two weeks of negotiations at Rambouillet, ³⁴⁰⁶ we also noticed that even this inner circle had not come there to negotiate but to obstruct the negotiations.

Q. Your side, the Albanian side, was it taking these negotiations seriously?

A. Absolutely. It was vital for us. It was not only the issue of the present but the future was at stake as well. And we undertook those negotiations under very difficult circumstances in which, first of all, we had to keep in mind that we were temporarily giving up on the status of independence; i.e., these were not talks which would bring independence which was an aspiration of everyone's. And secondly, within the framework of these negotiations, we had to seek a way of dismantling the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army, which was a difficult issue, given that guerilla forces are difficult to persuade, to transform into civilian life. This is a difficult procedure in every other country where guerrilla movements do exist.

Q. Had there been an understanding either, at arrival at Rambouillet or before, as to the authority that would be vested in the negotiation groups and as to whether those groups would be seeking authority or direction from outside?

A. There was an agreement, a total agreement which we had reached with the mediators that the delegations would be fully empowered to make decisions. And there was the preliminary agreement that we would not seek consultation with persons outside the Rambouillet castle.

Q. Sainovic was one of the representatives on the Serb side. Did there come a time when he left the negotiations to go somewhere else? ³⁴⁰⁷

A. I asked Ambassador Hill, who was one of the mediators, why members of the Belgrade delegation were being allowed to go to Belgrade, and he replied that Sainovic had asked to consult with the accused because in fact it would be the accused who would make decisions. And according to Ambassador Hill, this might be -- this might help the negotiation process because the negotiations were more or less paralysed.

Q. The consequence of Sainovic leaving the talks included what, so far as your delegation was concerned?

A. One member of our delegation, Mr. Thaci, asked as a response that he, too, should go and meet with Mr. Demaci. And according to the mediators, in order to create the necessary equivalence, the balance, this was allowed.

Q. Well, those talks ended. The Paris talks in March occurred. On the Serb side, President Milan Milutinovic was one of the participants. What was his apparent authority?

A. He was -- he introduced himself as somebody who could assist the Belgrade delegation. But nevertheless, at a certain moment -- at the final moment, when it came to signing the agreement, according to the three international mediators, that is Majovski, Ambassador Hill, and Petric, he said that in fact his boss in Belgrade would have to make the decision and he could do nothing.

Q. Well, we'll move on from those talks. But without leaving the month of March of 1999, tell us, please, what happened to your newspaper at about the same time as the Paris talks.

A. Because we were late in getting back from Paris because we were ³⁴⁰⁸ not allowed to land at Prishtina airport, I was a day late, and when I arrived on a Sunday in Prishtina, I had heard previously that the Serbian authorities had -- had prosecuted the newspaper Koha Ditore for publishing a report by a Western news agency which had quoted Hashim Thaci, who had accused the Serbian authorities of destroying Albanian villages. According to the repressive Serbian media law which had been adopted by the Serbian authorities, this law punished any newspaper that presented facts which, according to the government's interpretation, were not true. And in an exceptional judgement taken on a Sunday, at which Bajram Kelmendi and Hasmi Bali were lawyers involved, we were fined a large sum. And if we did not pay this fine, we would be closed down. And after three days, the NATO bombing started, so that the newspaper was in fact closed not because of this law but because, on the night of the bombing, uniformed police entered the editorial office, killed our guard Rexhep Ramadani, and then either confiscated or destroyed all the equipment we had. One night later, our printing works was burnt.

Q. Have you ever known of your local courts sitting on a Sunday before?

A. This was entirely extraordinary, not only in Prishtina, but I have never heard of such cases anywhere.

Q. Last, we come to the NATO bombing, and just a few matters arising from that. I'm not sure you told us in your account of what had happened who your lawyer was. I don't think you did. Oh, yes you did; Bajram Kelmendi. Tell us what happened to Bajram Kelmendi, please. ^{3409 BLANK PAGE 3410}

A. Our lawyer was Bajram Kelmendi, and that Sunday afternoon we had a last meeting, and on the night of the bombing, a few hours after the bombing started, at his home, according to what his wife and brother-in-law said, they were taken by uniformed police, Bajram and his two sons were taken and taken to an unknown place and executed. On the morning of the 25th, his -- Bajram's brother-in-law told me that the police had taken the men of this family. And I phoned Bajram's wife, Nekibe, and confirmed this. Later, I heard that Bajram and -- they had taken the bodies of Bajram and his brother-in-law, and I heard that they had been executed.

Q. And for what type of legal work was Bajram Kelmendi well-known?

A. Bajram was a human rights -- a defender of human rights par excellence. He was one of the founders of the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, and he had been a defence lawyer in almost all the political trials. He had defended me personally several times, whether in my capacity as a newspaper editor or as an organiser of protests which were called the "Burial of Violence."

Q. Just a few final matters on the last page of the summary. The general attitude of the Albanian population to the NATO bombing?

A. Although most of us were opponents of violence, the bombing, the first bombings and the later bombings were welcomed with what I might call relief and even joy. They were indeed bombs aimed at a regime that had invaded us and enslaved us, and we thought and hoped, and as it turned out later, it turned out to be the case, that these bombs would bring us freedom. And none of us -- I do not think that any of us thought about ³⁴¹¹ the danger from the bombs because the Serbian soldiers, policemen, and paramilitaries were so very much more dangerous.

Q. Mr. Rugova and his position, whether he was thought to be free or otherwise and thought to be exercising free decision during the bombing, what's the position on that?

A. I think that Dr. Rugova and some other people were in fact hostages of the regime. And his behaviour during the war and during the bombing, and his public statements and his various writings which rather look like a kind of quisling behaviour, can be interpreted only in -- as the behaviour of a person who is frightened for his own life and the life of his family.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, that is the opinion of the witness. It is not of assistance to us with respect to him.

MR. NICE:

Q. Turning to another issue which it may be difficult to distinguish your opinion from the facts, but do the best you can. We're looking at the history of Fehmi Agani, and very briefly his relationship to the KLA. How well respected or otherwise was Fehmi Agani amongst Albanians, Kosovo Albanians?

A. Dr. Agani was a respected figure for the whole nation. And I can say that he was the sole figure within his party who was fully respected both by parties or movements that were somehow opposed or disagreed with his policies. I could say that Dr. Agani was a respected figure. And I saw this during the Rambouillet negotiations. He was respected by all of the participants in our delegation, including the members representing the ³⁴¹² KLA.

Q. Did he have, apart from at these negotiations, meetings and contacts with the KLA from time to time?

A. Even before, in 1998, Dr. Agani had had contacts with various political representatives of the KLA.

Q. And of course when you say at Rambouillet, he was respected by all participants, it's notwithstanding the criticism you make of the Serbian delegation, do you include that delegation as those who appeared to have respect for him?

A. I think that Dr. Agani was respected as a trustworthy and balanced person even though he was -- there were -- there were -- I think he was respected even in Belgrade, even though there were clear differences of opinion.

Q. As things worsened, was there an expectation that Agani would leave Kosovo?

A. I had heard rumours that he was preparing to leave. I'd heard from a personal friend of his. And the situation that was created during the bombing posed a danger of recreating political problems between representatives of the KLA and the LDK and various political parties, and Rugova's appearance in Belgrade would exacerbate the situation further within -- among the Albanians of Kosova, and I think --

JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry, I'm going to stop.

MR. NICE: I was going to --

JUDGE MAY: This is pure opinion.

MR. NICE: ³⁴¹³

Q. Yes. Can I move to the next question, please, Mr. Surroi. What, in the event, happened to him?

A. I saw news on the Serbian television and on foreign television about the murder of Mr. Agani. He was executed. According to Serbian sources, he was executed by KLA forces. But what we learned later --

JUDGE MAY: Again, Mr. Surroi, unless you've got some direct evidence about it, this is merely what you've heard, and we'll have direct evidence, no doubt, in due course.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I heard about his murder on television.

MR. NICE: I'm not going to trouble the Court with the third exhibit to which I made reference, which is a summary of Kosovo -- suffering by Kosovan violence to Albanians early in the 1990s.

Q. But I would like your assistance on one other topic before I close. As a man who has travelled around the world as well as throughout the former Yugoslavia, can you assist the Chamber with how Kosovo Albanians were either regarded or dealt with, not just at home but, for example, when they were in Serbia? What status, what jobs they occupied. If you can summarise that position for us, please.

A. The overwhelming majority of Kosova Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Belgrade, were manual workers. And indeed, in the 1940s and 1950s, they were well-known as being woodcutters, and they knew that anybody carrying a saw would be an Albanian. And then they delivered coal to houses. And even in the Serbian dictionary, the daily vocabulary, people didn't say, "Go and fetch a worker to cut wood," but ³⁴¹⁴ they said, "Go and find an Albanian to bring the coal." It had the same connotations of low value as -- as in California they say, "Go and fetch a Mexican to clean the yard." Or they might say in the south of Europe, in Spain or Italy or Greece, "You've got to find a Filipino to clean the house." It had this kind of association. They were identified with this kind of work that they did.

Q. And had that attitude changed significantly or at all by the time of the war with which you've been dealing?

A. After 1968, Kosova started to develop, especially in education, with the creation of a new elite. And there was a conflict between this kind of identity of the new elite who were educated and the old conception of the Albanians as manual workers.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much. That's all I ask. You may be asked further questions.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] As the son of a Yugoslav diplomat, practically all your life you spent -- you had a silver spoon in your mouth; isn't that right?

A. Yes, for a long period.

Q. Everything you achieved - we see this from your CV - was made possible for you by the Yugoslav society, starting from your material status all the way up to your education.

A. Yes. My parents catered for that. They were part of that society. ³⁴¹⁵

Q. I assume that you were also part of that society together with your parents.

A. Up until the moment when that society was destroyed.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, I haven't received an interpretation. I did not hear an interpretation. I didn't hear any sound whatsoever.

JUDGE MAY: Well, ask another question and we'll see if it's interpreted.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can hear you quite well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So were you also part of that society?

A. Up until that society was destroyed.

Q. Is it correct that the social status, standard of living, freedoms, human freedoms, human rights, everything else that defines the quality of life was incomparably higher in Kosovo and Metohija than in the neighbouring Albanian state, the Republic of Albania?

A. Until the year 1990, yes, it was higher than in Albania and far lower than the rest of Yugoslavia, including Serbia.

Q. There is no contest to the effect that Kosovo was an underdeveloped part of Yugoslavia. That is why it was developed at an accelerated rate. However, you say that that was until 1990. Do you know, for example, that your friend Christopher Hill, who you've often been mentioning in your statement and who was there much later, both in Albania and in Kosovo, do you know that he told me how he felt when he would leave Albania and get into Kosovo? He said that he felt as if he ^{3416 BLANK PAGE 3417} were entering Disneyland.

JUDGE MAY: That sounds like the opinion of Mr. Hill. You can ask him, if he's going to give evidence, about it. This witness can't comment on that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am asking him whether he told him something to that effect or not, because we are talking about comparisons.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we take into account comparisons, there are some regions of Bolivia which were so underdeveloped that when I returned from Bolivia into Kosova, Kosova appeared to me to be Utopia. I can't see how Albania enters into this equation vis-a-vis Kosova.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, it gets into the equation because it is probably undeniable, as far as you are concerned too, that Kosovar Albanians, economically, politically, socially, from the point of view of their rights, were much better off in Kosovo than they were in Albania which was their own state. Isn't that right or is that not right?

A. I grew up under the conviction that Kosova was my own state.

Q. You grew up under the conviction that Kosovo was some kind of an independent state?

A. I grew up with the conviction that Kosova was my fatherland, a part of Yugoslavia.

Q. As part of Yugoslavia, of course. As part of Serbia.

A. As a part of Yugoslavia.

Q. And do you share the view, if you look at this historically, when the Albanians were under the Turks and under the Germans and under the ³⁴¹⁸ Italians and under the Russians and now under the Americans, that practically only in Yugoslavia, only in Serbia - that is to say, in Kosovo and Metohija - that they were free and that they managed to develop freely and that that is why such progress had been made precisely in that area? Isn't that correct?

A. Absolutely not. Albania -- excuse me, interpreter corrects, Kosova is only correct at this stage only because its citizens are free.

JUDGE MAY: Now, that's enough of a general debate. Let's get on to what the evidence was.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. A short while ago, Mr. Nice asked you how the Kosovo Albanians were viewed within Serbia and, for example, in Belgrade. You said that they were manual labourers, which is for the most part correct. It is certain that there were a great many Serbs who were manual labourers as well, as is the case until the present day. But do you know that there were physicians, university professors, depending on the level of education, a considerable number of Albanian intellectuals who also lived in Belgrade?

A. I think that the proportions go greatly in the -- disfavourably towards the Albanians, and this disfavour has helped create a stereotype that obtains that when somebody wanted someone to cut wood before the winter, it was an Albanian he turned to. But I think that this stereotype has now been overcome or is in the process of being overcome.

Q. And do you ascribe that to the level of education or to some national criteria? ³⁴¹⁹

A. The stereotypes are always a product of low cultural levels or lack of communication and ethnic distances or other identity distances.

Q. You said that, for example, the Albanian language got its own alphabet only in 1908, and you also said how much the level of education lagged behind that of the other peoples in the Balkans. So this fact that the majority of them were manual labourers and all these other occupations that you mentioned, do you ascribe this to the level of their skills or to some kind of a national ethnic criterion? Did anybody discriminate against them according to ethnic criteria?

A. There absolutely existed a discrimination which was a product of the overall range of relationships, including here a history in the development of the education. The persistence of the Albanians to educate themselves, to have more education, has existed, among others, as a way of overcoming these stereotypes.

Q. And in any respect, as far as the treatment of Albanians is concerned, was the position of Albanians different in Serbia than it was as far as other minorities are concerned; Bulgarians, Hungarians, Slovaks, et cetera, not to mention all of them? There are 26 different ethnic groups in Serbia. So was it different at all?

A. Absolutely. The greatest number of political prisoners in the former Yugoslavia consisted of Albanians. A great number, over -- far larger than their proportion in the population.

Q. And do you know that now in West Europe, proportionately speaking, in terms of their presence in these countries, also in Switzerland, if you look at this, is the same? ³⁴²⁰

JUDGE MAY: What's the relevance --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is no connection at all with what we're talking about.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, that's right.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, he has indicated some kind of discrimination which never existed, and that is why it is relevant.

JUDGE MAY: Let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are you aware that, for example, in Belgrade during all these years there were between 70 and 100.000 Albanians living there? And do you know, for example, that when you walk along the main street, along the Boulevard of the Revolution, from the federal Parliament onwards, that there are many Albanian names and shops, the names of the shop owners? Do you know that never, during all this time over these past ten or 20 years or whatever, not a single shop window was broken and there was never any discrimination? Are you aware of all of that?

A. This is not true either. Many windows were broken after the incident at Paracin. A child became -- came under attack, a child of a baker's in Serbia came under attack. He was assaulted with a knife or some other cutting object, and his eye was popped out.

Q. I'm talking about Belgrade. I'm not talking about individual incidents. I asked you about Belgrade. I asked you if you knew about Belgrade. And as for what you mentioned just now, we can discuss it further.

THE INTERPRETER: Can the interpreter kindly request that the ³⁴²¹ witness please pause between question and answer.

JUDGE MAY: Can you pause after the question for interpretation.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were broken panes, windowpanes, in Belgrade as well. Belgrade's bakers also felt threatened and returned to Kosova.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You know full well that that's not true, but let's go back to the event in Paracin. You mentioned the event in Paracin. Do you know what that was all about?

A. Yes it had to do with the killing of four soldiers, and an Albanian was accused of this.

Q. Not four, many more soldiers. His comrades, his fellow soldiers were riddled with bullets by an Albanian. He did this. Everybody saw this. He killed people in the Paracin barracks, which was abhorred by the entire country. I imagine you remember that, because I should think that you should have condemned and that you did condemn an act of this nature.

JUDGE MAY: When -- when are we talking about, Mr. Surroi; what sort of date?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The second half of the 1980s.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Since you have been ascribing to me all the events that took place from 1989 onwards, to put it that way, could you answer the question why was there unrest, riots, demonstrations in Kosovo, in 1965, for example, in 1968, in 1980, 1981, et cetera? During all this time until 1989 and ³⁴²² 1990, why?

A. There is no relationship or similarity between the violence and demonstrations from 1989 onwards. Where similarities do exist, it has to do with the political demands of the Albanians for a republic status within the Yugoslav federation. And what put or should have been a normal constitutional debate was transformed into an object of repression. The violence came from the state and not from the citizens.

Q. I asked you why there was violence in 1965, 1968, in 1980, and 1981, and you are talking about different --

JUDGE MAY: We're going to deal with this briefly, because it's going back a long way. Mr. Surroi, you're asked why there was violence, if there was, in 1965, 1968, and the early 1980s. Can you deal with that briefly?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because the state confronted with repression by violence a political demand coming from groups which were not part of the political elite of the time. Demonstrations in the streets, peaceful demonstrations, were met with a violent response on the part of the organs of power.

This political demand was one that requested a republic status for Kosova within the Yugoslav federation.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And are you aware that throughout this time when allegedly the rights of the Albanians were jeopardised, a large number of Albanians held very high positions in the federation, in the republic in Kosovo, Metohija, in all the municipalities, and even in various places outside ^{3423 BLANK PAGE 3424} Kosovo and Metohija, beyond the republican level in Serbia, et cetera? Even your father was an ambassador. There were many people, Albanians, who held higher positions or similar positions, those of ministers, et cetera. Can this in any way be qualified as discrimination?

A. The evolution of autonomy, from 1968 onwards, brought the integration of the Albanians in various levels of the administration. In other words, their involvement in the elite. Nevertheless, this process went parallel with a process of a repressive state and a repressive system.

This period, nevertheless, was very much more liberal than the period when the accused took power.

Q. We will see that it is actually the other way around, but for example, throughout this time, you have been a journalist, a publisher, the owner of a paper. You worked freely, travelled freely, accumulated wealth. Did anybody put any obstacles in your way in terms of what you've been doing?

A. As I have said several times, I was obstructed.

Q. For the time being, I have heard of one example only of obstruction. I was surprised by that myself when you told me that during the course of that conversation. As you remember, I asked for it to be checked out. I received information that that was several years beforehand, that it is true that the rooms where your newspaper was were sealed for one day, not several days. And it was because some financial misdoings [sic] that you had committed at that time were being investigated. It wasn't due to any caricature of mine, a cartoon. ³⁴²⁵

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, what is the question? You're not here to make speeches. You know that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question was: Does he consider himself to have been free as a journalist, the owner of a newspaper and publisher during all those years while he worked in Yugoslavia, and he said that regime was repressive?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let -- let the witness deal with it. He's given one example. If there are others, no doubt he can give them.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I won freedom myself; my work. While confronting all the obstacles placed in my path by the system, I did not feel myself to be a free man as I do today. I didn't feel myself to be a free man when my colleagues were taken in for questioning by the state security. I didn't feel a free man as long as people were being killed in Kosova and there was no responsibility. They were killed by security forces and no one was held to account for this. I didn't feel myself to be a free man when the police beat me because I was protesting against war. I didn't feel myself to be a free man when I was sentenced to 60 days in prison because I protested against the war. Every person measures the consequences of what lies ahead of him and I could either give in to this or I could continue. I wasn't given freedom by a system or a state. I won this freedom myself.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Surroi, you are an intellectual. I think that there is no point in us listening to pathetic tirades as to how you have won your freedom. I asked you quite pragmatically. ³⁴²⁶

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we are equally not listening to comments of that sort from you. You can ask the witness questions. You can make comments to us in due course, but there's no point making that sort of comment.

Now, you're taking up valuable time. Let's move on to something else.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please try to give answers that are fact-related. Since you mentioned that various people were being taken away, and it is my assertion that there were no political prisoners in Serbia whatsoever over those ten years, is that correct or is that not correct?

A. It's absolutely untrue. Absolutely untrue. From the matter of isolation, which was a practice that existed only under this regime, when people were taken and placed in isolation without any recourse to due process, and all the political prisoners who were detained in Kosova sentenced whether to 60 days' imprisonment or to other sentences, the number of Albanians who suffered persecution grew enormously. The prisons of Serbia were crammed with Albanian political prisoners.

Q. Mr. Surroi, you've just said it now. They were sentenced to 60 days. This is not imprisonment imposed by a court at all. This is an administrative fine for disrupting law and order in a public place. Isn't that true, that this was an administrative fine? It meant that you were sentenced to 60 days in prison, but then you were released after 15 days. Isn't that true? ³⁴²⁷

A. That isn't true. I was released after two days, but I was sentenced to 60 days. And at the same time, procedures were initiated for what was called offending the feelings of Serbs and Montenegrins, which at this time was a matter in the penal code. I didn't -- I didn't create any kind of disorder in the city. I was protesting against the war alongside 200.000 other citizens.

Q. Well, among those 200.000 were a number of those who were causing violence, and you will remember that, and I imagine that's not contested.

A. Absolutely untrue. Not a single citizen ever caused violence or even noise. It was absolutely a silent protest.

Q. Since you've taken yourself to be an example of a victim who was persecuted, apart from those two days that you spent in prison after those demonstrations, were you ever in prison apart from that?

A. No.

Q. And from the ranks of the politicians, public personalities or any other prominent Albanians, who was in prison at all? Do you know of anyone who was in prison?

A. Hajrullah Gorani, chairman of the independent trade unions of Kosova was in prison; Rexhep Osmani, the chairman of the Association of Teachers of Kosova; Jup Statovci, now deceased, the former rector of the University of Kosova. There was the late, or rather, the missing Ukshin Hoti, a professor at the University of Kosova. There was one of the vice-presidents of the LDK was detained, and I could give you a list. There were the three lawyers. And all of these examples contradict what you said. ³⁴²⁸

Q. On the contrary. You mentioned a few persons. This is a single-digit number. And how much time did they spend in prison?

A. I think at least 60 days.

Q. So once again, this was an administrative punishment and not a court judgement, sentence.

JUDGE MAY: Well, they ended up in prison, whatever it was. But no doubt we can get the facts here rather than asking the witness to try and recollect. No doubt you or somebody else can supply us with them. Let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Of course, as it's quite clear that political prisoners in Serbia for those ten years, there were none. And the witness is --

JUDGE MAY: You're not giving evidence now.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And the witness is saying now --

JUDGE MAY: You're not giving evidence, Mr. Milosevic. Let's move on with questions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Was there any restriction of movement? Was anybody not able to get a passport? Were you all able to travel throughout the world, beginning with Rugova and yourself, and all the other Albanian public personages that you mentioned? Were they free to set up all kinds of political parties and so on and so forth? Yes or no.

A. I was prevented from travelling for a period, and my passport was taken from me. And thanks to the intervention of the Swiss authorities, I think, after six months, my passport was restored to me. ³⁴²⁹

Q. So it -- your passport was taken away from you for six months, you say. And throughout those ten years, did anybody, any of the Albanian politicians or public persons, have anything happen to them? Were they killed? Did anything happen?

A. Other citizens were killed. There were other citizens who were killed.

Q. Well, not by the authorities, quite certainly. Now, whether somebody was killed or not, killings exist in all countries, happen in all countries. I'm asking you whether there was anything that could have been -- could have resembled repression on the part of the authorities towards political leaders, political parties, the restriction of freedoms for them or anything that could resemble things of that kind.

A. Kosova was restricted in its freedom. There was a total lack of institutions. There was lack of defence through the law, and the citizens who were killed, these were not citizens killing each other, they were killed by the police. And this failure to punish these crimes became elevated to a principle in the course of these ten years. A policeman who has killed a child was never held to account. And when this happens once, twice, five times, this creates a general culture of a failure to punish in which a Serbian policeman could do everything and Albanian citizens had no defence. And within this kind of framework, it's not very relevant what kind of parties are created because there's no parliament for them to be represented in.

It is not important whether one kind of trade union or other is created because there is no legal process whereby this trade union can ^{3430 BLANK PAGE 3431} defend workers' rights.

Kosova was a state of outright violence, with a total lack of institutions for the protection of human rights. Under these circumstances, I believe, I think the violence against political leaders had an opposite effect and was to distract international attention.

Q. I didn't understand your answer very well. What served to attract international attention -- or distract, rather, distract international attention, as it says? I'm not sure I understood you there.

A. There has been no open violence towards political personalities because this would attract international attention.

Q. You are testifying here about facts, whereas what you're actually doing is expressing your opinion. You have now answered my question as to whether there was any violence against political persons, and you say there were not, but because we were sly, we didn't want to expose ourselves to the international community.

Now, the question is "Was there?" and your answer was there was not. So please give me an answer when I ask you. You say in your statement that Rugova had been taken away, that his house had been burnt, and afterwards, you saw that this was not true, of course. Now, did you have any idea as to who wanted to kill Rugova and burn his house down, for example? Have you any ideas about that? When you heard that, that Rugova had been taken away and his house had been burnt, what occurred to you? Who committed that?

A. My supposition at the time was that it must have been Serbian paramilitary forces. ³⁴³²

Q. And do you know that it was precisely the Albanian terrorists who had tried to kill Rugova and that he knows that very well himself?

A. I doubt this. I don't believe this at all.

Q. Do you know that on the wall of his house, an assassinator trying to jump over the wall who had tried to assassinate him, was shot?

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... just a moment. Let the interpreters catch up. What I said was the witness cannot know about this; he wasn't there. It's all secondhand. You can ask Mr. Rugova about it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is precisely what I'm going to do.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you know who protected Rugova, who prevented him from being killed by these terrorists?

JUDGE MAY: No, the witness doesn't know about it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you think it's logical that those same people who wished to kill Rugova and indeed attempted to kill Rugova --

JUDGE MAY: No. No.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You complained a moment ago that you were fined for publishing Hashim Thaci in the paper. Today, in the West, can anybody assert terrorism and give coverage to terrorism? You're a journalist yourself, you move around the Western world and I'm sure you know this very well. ³⁴³³

JUDGE MAY: That is not a proper question, that's comment. What were the circumstances in which you were fined and was it right that it was merely because you were reporting terrorism? That's what's alleged. When I say "you," the paper, I mean.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We published an agency report, an ordinary agency report, published by many newspapers in the world, and in this report, Mr. Thaci said that Serbian villages -- I mean, Albanian villages are being destroyed by Serbian forces. According to this law, the Serbian Information Minister, who considered that it was a lie that Serbian forces were destroying Albanian villages, and this is why we were convicted.

But this law, as you could see in other cases too, condemned any statement by anybody that the Serbian government might consider to be untrue.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As you know, Mr. Surroi, what you've just said is not true, because the law could only apply penalties for publishing obvious untruths. So according to that law, if you remember it and if you read it at all, when a paper publishes a notorious lie and cannot within the space of 24 hours prove that it is not a lie, then he would pay a monetary fine. And that's all that the law says.

And as you claim and call this conscious repression, then I would like to have that law read out independently of this testimony so that we can see that this witness is not telling the truth.

JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. We will get the law in due course and ³⁴³⁴ we'll refer to it. Now, is there anything else for this witness on that point?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As a journalist, you were well-known for your unobjective writing. Now, do you consider that during this testimony you are using half-truths?

A. I -- I think you should rephrase your question because it's insulting, saying that I'm using half-truths.

Q. From what you have said, it emerges, that is to say, something emerges not directly but you are inferring that there was no freedom of the press. Do you know how many papers and publications -- let us take just those that were published in the Albanian language in Kosovo and Metohija, which you could buy at every street corner. For example, in front of your house or in Pristina.

A. The number that you quoted in the course of these ten years did not correspond to the truth. It was a number made up by the information media ministry at the time, and it related to the number of newspapers that had been registered since 1945.

Q. I didn't give a figure.

A. And this is a matter -- this is if it's the number that you have been repeating in the last ten years.

Q. And how many papers during, let's say -- let's say from 1990 up until the year 2000, that ten-year period, how many papers came out in Albanian, in the Albanian language in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. There was a daily newspaper called Bujku and there were two weeklies. There was a monthly crossword magazine. There was one ³⁴³⁵ pornographic magazine that came out every month or two. There was a magazine for education called Shkendija and there were regional newspapers which were also for crosswords. Meanwhile, Prishtina radio television was closed, and there were many more Albanian language programmes on radio Moscow or on radio Helsinki than on radio Prishtina, which was controlled by the Serbian authorities.

Q. Did you have television news bulletins and news bulletins over the radio in Albanian? There were bulletins even in the Turkish language although there were far fewer Turks than Albanians. So did you have daily programmes in Pristina in the Albanian language?

A. From radio television Prishtina, which broadcast about 12 hours a day, when autonomy was abolished, there was a news programme contrived in the Albanian language but it was contrived by incompetent people who translated news from Serbian which they read out in an utterly incomprehensible form of Albanian. That was the Albanian language programme that you're talking about.

Q. How far journalists -- a good journalist is a relative question, and you're a journalist, so that must apply to you too. You enumerated some ten newspapers which were published during the time period that you stated. They came out freely. You could buy them anywhere. You also said that your own paper, the Koha, was registered in Croatia, that you did that because it wasn't possible in Serbia to set up a private newspaper. Do you happen to know that in 1990 - 1990 I'm saying - in Serbia a new Constitution was passed which introduced the multi-party system on the basis of which laws were enacted according to ³⁴³⁶ which you were able to register every private newspaper in Serbia, radio station, or other form of information media? So the press and electronic media. Are you aware of that?

A. At the time of registration, it was not -- there was not possible even for Belgrade newspapers, even for Vreme. Not even Belgrade papers could register in Belgrade, and they registered in Croatia too. What you're talking about happened later. And for a long time, none of us in Kosova wished to re-register, expecting that the state of emergency would be lifted in Kosova and Kosovar institutions would be created and we could register newspapers with them.

Q. That's another matter entirely as to what your motives were. What I was asking you was: Could you register your newspaper in Serbia? And at any rate, if you registered it in Croatia, you sold them quite freely in Serbia. Is that right or not?

A. Until 1991, yes.

Q. What about after 1991? How did you publish the Koha and Koha Ditore and how did you tell them, the newspaper in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. We registered with the Serbian authorities.

Q. Well, then, were you able to print and publish your paper freely, Koha and, after, the Koha Ditore in Kosovo and Metohija, in Serbia and so on? You could buy it in Belgrade as well.

A. I don't think you could buy that in Belgrade, you could have bought that in Belgrade.

Q. Yes, you could. There were private people bringing them in from Kosovo, and you could find the newspaper the Koha Ditore at the kiosk in ³⁴³⁷ Terazija square.

A. I don't think so in Belgrade. You could have bought Croatian newspapers, but I don't think you could have bought Koha Ditore. I have been through Terazija.

Q. Where you sent the Koha Ditore, I'm sure that nobody took it. Is that right? The Koha, the Koha Ditore?

A. Within the territory of Kosova during that period, there was no direct obstruction on the printing and distribution of the newspaper, with the exception -- with a few exceptions.

Q. All right. Thank you very much. At last I have got a concrete answer from you. And you say that there was no destruction in the printing and distribution of your paper.

Now, was any number, any issue of a paper -- I'm not saying a paper but an issue of a paper stopped and prohibited? You said that there was a caricature, a cartoon of my own which led to the shutting down of your paper. But do you know of a case of any single Albanian paper and any issue of that paper that was banned?

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter request: Can the witness please pause.

JUDGE MAY: Could we have a pause, please? And we will get on more quickly, Mr. Milosevic, if you don't comment on the answers, the ones which you approve of and those you don't.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it was very difficult to arrive at an answer, so I had to express my great satisfaction at having received one. But I won't comment. Don't worry. ^{3438 BLANK PAGE 3439}

THE INTERPRETER: I think I was misunderstood. I asked for the witness to pause between the question and answer.

JUDGE MAY: There is a comment from the interpreter. Will you ask the witness to pause between question and answer. That seems to be the problem.

Mr. Surroi, if you'd do that. In fact, it's coming up to the time for an adjournment. We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Until when was your paper Koha published in Croatia? How long did it operate under that regimen?

A. The registration should be valid even today in Croatia. It continues to be registered.

Q. That's not what I'm asking you. I'm asking you until when was your paper published under that registration? Until when did you distribute and register your paper under the Croat registration? Later on you were registered in Serbia.

A. Until 1991.

Q. And were you registered in Serbia in 1991?

A. No, in 1994.

Q. And how was Koha published between 1991 and 1994?

A. It was not published.

Q. So you started your newspaper again only in 1994?

A. Yes. ³⁴⁴⁰

Q. You described this one particular case, and you said yourself in your statement that this happened because there's some kind of cartoon of mine, that the paper had been blocked. Do you know whether this was the only case when some of my cartoons were being published in Albanian newspapers in Kosovo?

A. No. This was a photo montage, but we -- before that, we had published a -- a caricature of yourself and Saddam Husein. And the man who did that -- who drew that was given a 60-day sentence in prison.

Q. Was there any case of someone having closed down his newspaper because of some kind of cartoon of mine? Any newspaper. It doesn't have to be Koha Ditore.

A. No.

Q. And does that lead you to the conclusion that when you mentioned that it was because of my cartoon that it wasn't actually because of my cartoon?

A. No. It does not lead me to this conclusion. The inspectors, the security service inspectors questioned a few people regarding the author of this photo montage and who allowed that to appear.

Q. In what sense were you opposition in relation to Rugova? You say that in your statement, that you were in opposition to Rugova.

A. Personally, I thought that peaceful politics ought to have been dynamised. The peaceful resistance, the policy of peaceful resistance, by definition, means resistance, active peaceful resistance; protests, blocking institutions of the occupying power, the expression of the energies of the citizens towards freedom. And I never thought that a ³⁴⁴¹ weekly press conference could replace the peaceful resistance.

Q. Do you claim, as you do until the present day, that the police brutally attacked Adem Jashari?

A. Absolutely.

Q. And do you know that before that, since you mentioned his family, before that that you refer to and that you call an attack against his family, the police came to arrest Jashari and that they left because he was not at home, that nobody touched the family?

A. This does not justify their subsequent killing of children.

Q. Nothing justifies the killing of children, of course. But the question is: Who is responsible for that? And since you knew everything that was happening in Kosovo, as a journalist and as a public figure, precisely in relation to Jashari, I wish to put a few questions to you. Do you know that Adem Jashari, Sulejman Selimi and Hazir Pajazit, as far as back as September of 1995 attacked the police station in Podujevo when policemen were killed and wounded? Did you know of that event?

A. No.

Q. You didn't? And did you know that a week later, that is to say also in 1995, they also attacked the police station in Glogovac where two policemen were killed and four seriously wounded? Did you know that?

A. I wasn't aware, but you can elaborate further in the sense of what was the Serbian police seeking in Kosova.

Q. What the Serbian police were seeking in Kosovo? Is that what you're saying? ³⁴⁴²

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that Kosovo is the territory of the Republic of Serbia?

JUDGE MAY: We're going to get a long way from the case if we start this argument again.

Yes. Is there something else you want to put about Mr. Jashari?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know that in January 1996, Adem Jashari, with his group, killed two policemen who were working in Srbica?

A. We're returning back to the fundamental issue. What relation does this have to do with the killing of children and the massacre on the Jashari family?

Q. It does have to do with it because it's not the police that are responsible for that. And I am enumerating to you a series of crimes committed by Jashari due to which the police had come to arrest him. Do you know that they killed Skender Gashi from Glogovac in 1997 because he worked at the police, in the police force? Do you know that event?

A. No.

Q. You don't? And do you know in the same year they killed 20 people in their intensive terrorist activity? For example, the Kryeziu brothers were killed with their sons in the village of Sasare, near Kijevo, in the area of Drenica?

JUDGE MAY: Do you know anything about any of this?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not, and I still cannot establish what this has to do with the killings of the Jasharis. ³⁴⁴³

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, if you want to put something about the event which was discussed at your meeting about the killing of the Jasharis, you can, but this witness can't help as to the background.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you know --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. May, this has to do with a very, very major criminal who had committed a vast number of crimes, having killed many Serbs and Albanians, and therefore, the police came to arrest him. And the entire event boils down to this clash that was -- that took place during his arrest.

For example, these Kryeziu brothers, if you remember, were very rich men --

JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. Now, you're alleging that, first of all, that he was a criminal. That's not a matter for this witness to deal with. If there's any evidence of it, no doubt you'll put it before us. The witness himself was not, of course, there at the time, but since he's given evidence about it, we'll allow you to ask questions. But on the accounts that you've heard, Mr. Surroi, was this a case, as alleged here, in which the police came to arrest Mr. Jashari and afterwards there was a clash? Can you help us as to that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I -- I have no doubts whatsoever that the Serbian police went there to arrest Mr. Jashari. Mr. Jashari was an insurgent against a government which he considered to be illegal and illegitimate. I also have no doubts that weapons were used. But my question for the accused in Belgrade was to do -- why a group of forensic ³⁴⁴⁴ experts, independent forensic experts from a neutral country were not allowed to come and verify who killed the Jasharis. This is nothing to do with the conflict per se between the two armed parties but with the humanitarian right for civilians to be protected in cases of conflict.

JUDGE MAY: As you heard the reports, what happened when the police went to arrest Mr. Jashari?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to one of the survivors of this family, a huge number of special police forces made a siege on the farm and started shooting indiscriminately, killing in the process almost all the members of this family, with the exception of a few who survived and left, fled.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you know from this information that the -- that Jashari shot at the police, that a policeman was actually killed by his gunfire and the gunfire coming from people who were with him in the house? Do you know that?

A. I'm not aware, but I wouldn't doubt this. This was a confrontation between two armed parties.

Q. You do not doubt that Jashari and his men shot at the police?

A. No, I wouldn't doubt that.

Q. And does it seem logical to you that -- I mean, I have given a few examples to you, but Mr. May interrupted me from continuing with the presentation of these examples --

JUDGE MAY: No. ³⁴⁴⁵

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. When Jashari killed --

JUDGE MAY: We're not going over this. He can't help. Now you can put the evidence, if you have it, in front of us in due course, but there's no good asking this witness about it. Now, you'll have to move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know -- do you know that this institution here, including the Prosecutor, has the statement of an Albanian witness, a protected witness, in all fairness, who says literally that the members of the family wanted to get out and they were begging him to get out and surrender as well, and that he himself killed Hamza Jashari because he wanted to go out and surrender, that he killed some other members of the family who wanted to go out --

JUDGE MAY: There's no point putting this to the witness unless he knows anything of it.

Do you know anything about this?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you know that the son of Adem Jashari who survived the incident --

JUDGE MAY: No.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. -- told the KLA what happened and they said to him that he should never tell anyone about that because his father is a hero to his own ^{3446 BLANK PAGE 3447} people and --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop this. Now move on from this topic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you know anything about the terrorist activities -- do you know anything about the terrorist activities of other groups of Hashim Thaci, Selimi, the Selimi brothers, et cetera? Do you know anything about that?

A. No.

Q. And do you know that there is existing evidence about this, and from Albanian sources at that, that are accessible to this Court because that's how I got them too, that they themselves organised their own attacks against peaceful Albanian villages in order to conceal some of their own crimes and blame this on the police? Do you know anything about that?

A. You are asking about things I haven't heard of, read about, or done myself.

Q. Well, do you notice that as far as the crimes of Albanian terrorists are concerned, you know nothing because you were not present, which I believe. I believe that you were not present because you are not a terrorist. But you know very well about the alleged crimes of the Serb police, and you were not present again but you do have information about this. Do you distinguish between the two?

JUDGE MAY: Can you answer the question or not?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My personal attitude has always been and remains that an organised force that has a chain of command and enjoys ³⁴⁴⁸ institutional support from a state, at that precise moment implementing an ideology or the fruits of an ideology manages to kill civilians, and this was the case with Serbian police in Kosova.

If I had any kind of information regarding any Albanian group which, based on a certain ideology, implements violence against civilians, I would speak out openly against this group in the very same manner.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And I am precisely giving you information that this institution has, that Hashim Thaci killed Albanian civilians in the interest of liquidating loyal citizens or members of the police who were Albanians or wealthy people he wanted to rob. And there is evidence about that.

JUDGE MAY: This is all your case. You can give evidence about it if you have any. It's not going to help to put it to this witness. In any case, it's difficult to see -- in any case, it's difficult to see how it can justify what is alleged to have happened. Now, move on to another topic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the witness is a journalist. He is a public figure, and according to what he is saying here, he knows everything that took place in Kosovo. The only thing that he does not know about is the crimes of the Albanian terrorists, even those committed against Albanian citizens.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. You've made that comment. Now we'll move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was asking questions with respect to the events that the witness keeps saying he knows nothing about. That's what we're talking about. ³⁴⁴⁹

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, who was behind the wave of terrorism that escalated in 1998 and 1999?

A. The Belgrade regime, because this was state terrorism.

Q. I'm talking about the terrorist activities of people similar to Thaci, Adem Jashari, and the rest who certainly didn't represent what you call the Belgrade regime but were criminals who killed Serbs and Albanians and policemen and postmen and foresters --

JUDGE MAY: We've heard about this. Mr. Milosevic, we have heard your case. You have put it numerous times. It's of no assistance to go on putting it.

Now, if you have got any questions about this witness's evidence you can ask it, otherwise we're going to bring this cross-examination to a close because it's pointless.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do have a lot more questions. I just don't know why you're not letting me ask them.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You mention meetings, alleged meetings of Bakalli with the representatives of the State Security Service, and you claimed that he had received threats saying that purely Albanian villages would be identified and destroyed if the Albanian -- unless the Albanian side agrees to certain demands. I don't know which demands you meant. Is that what you're saying? Is that what you claim?

A. I conveyed the words of the mediator that ethnically-homogenous Albanian villages had been identified, not would be identified, and that ³⁴⁵⁰ if there was any escalation... This was taken as a threat by the participants at the meeting.

Q. You say yourself in your statement that you were surprised by something like that. Did it seem probable to you that anybody could threaten to destroy villages, whole villages, and to explain it away by saying that Albanian villages would be identified when it is common knowledge to everybody in Kosovo about the hundreds of Albanian villages? There's no need to identify them. It's a reality, it's a fact of life, and nobody needs to investigate that in order to establish the fact.

A. I wasn't surprised at all, because having learnt from the war in Bosnia and Croatia, I knew that war would be equally genocidal in Kosova. I -- I heard about identification. I didn't say that -- I didn't hear that they would be identified, but I interpreted it identified as being within terms of military operations.

Q. In your statement, you talk about the fact that the goal was the independence of Kosovo on the basis of the right to self-determination. Do the Albanians have a national state of their own in the form of the Republic of Albanian?

A. Yes. The citizens of Albania have their state, and the citizens of Kosova would like their state.

Q. And do you consider that the right of a national minority to self-determination exists anywhere in the world, anywhere in the world and international law, when you have people of the same nation living in a neighbouring state, like the Albanians living in the neighbouring state of the Republic of Albania? ³⁴⁵¹

A. In this case, the basis for the politics is not the application of the Serbian doctrine in which the accused took part in drafting it, according to which territory where Serbian population live. We were talking about self-determination within the disintegration of a federation. Yugoslavia was made up of constituent units, and when it disintegrated, when the federation disintegrated, we thought and we still think in Kosova that Kosova would have the right to a view about its own future.

Q. All right. That position of yours is common knowledge. Now, I was asking you whether you knew -- whether you know that there is nowhere the right of national minorities to self-determination. There is the right of nations to self-determination. But let's move on to another area.

You said that after the meeting with me, you came across a food blockade in Kosovo. Where do you get this idea of a food blockade in Kosovo? You said you didn't know how this was explained, this -- that -- this thing that never happened, in fact.

A. Within a week, between the 15th and the 22nd, that is, after our first meeting with the Serbian regime, administrative measures in Kosova obstructed the arrival of food from Serbia. And people immediately noticed the shortage of milk and flour and to a degree sugar, but the milk shortage was the most immediately apparent. I'm not the person you should ask about this blockade; you should ask people in Belgrade.

Q. And tell me this: In your opinion, how long did that food blockade, what you call a food blockade, how long did it last? ^{3452 BLANK PAGE 3453}

A. Within that week; at the end of the first meeting, it was noticed that the day after, this matter eased somewhat.

Q. Do you know how long -- how many times it happened that there was no milk in Belgrade or in any other towns in Serbia, sufficient quantities of milk? How can you define a shortage of -- a temporary shortage of some foodstuff as a food blockade?

A. Because the trucks with food were being obstructed by the police and the customs authorities or, rather, the financial police at the border between Kosova and Serbia or, rather, a few kilometres before the border at the village of Rudari. This has been documented. The trucks were waiting. It's not that these articles were missing, it's because the trucks were prevented from entering Kosova.

Q. Did you ever think, having mentioned the financial police and so on, that it might be a control over the supplies of certain products in order to prevent tax evasions, which is something that the financial police has to deal with and that it wasn't a food blockade of any kind?

A. It's very strange how the same policemen allow the same lorries to enter after a week.

Q. Well, I suppose you assume that once they conducted an inspection of the trucks and their loads and the taxes to be paid, that they had no further reason for not letting them pass. And did you ever think that the food blockade couldn't only hit the Albanians, it had to affect the Serbs and the Turks and the Romanies and the Egyptians and the Muslims and everybody alike, that is to say, all the inhabitants of Kosovo?

A. Ninety per cent of the population of Kosova were Albanians. So it ³⁴⁵⁴ would hit at the majority. Meanwhile, various quasi-state organisations dealt with the distribution of vital supplies for the Serbian population. In the later period there were so-called crisis staffs which distributed not only food but also weapons to Serbian citizens.

Q. I'm not talking about supplies but of trading. How could you think that somebody could block -- the government could block trading in part of its territory and prevent the normal flow of goods, monies, trading, sales, and so on?

A. It's very clear, because circumstances were not at all normal and nor was the state normal.

Q. Does that seem to you to be like one of the fabrications that was bandied about, about a national poisoning incident in schools?

A. These two things don't have a direct connection between each other.

Q. Well, this latter is as true as the former. You talk about the conflict in the Decani region. Now, you as a journalist as least, do you have an insight into the statements made by Ramush Hajradinaj precisely by mentioning Decani, Prilep and so on, that part of the territory, when he said that everything should be turned topsy-turvy, upside down, and that attacks should be launched on all these places and to -- that shooting should come from all these places? Do you know of these statements of his, at least, if you don't know about the events and the incidents themselves?

A. No.

Q. You know nothing who created a roadblock on the main road, down ³⁴⁵⁵ there in Metohija, for example, or the mass terrorist operations that took place in the Decani area at the time?

A. I have no doubt that there were armed confrontations between armed units of the KLA and police forces, but my main concern was how can civilians be protected in this armed conflict? Part of this concern and a great worry of mine was establishing a five-kilometre-wide sanitary corridor which was installed by the Serbian authorities on the border between Kosova and Albania. The entire civilian population were evicted from their own homes by force by Serbian police and military forces. In those critical days of May and the beginning of June, my main preoccupation was how to protect these civilians who were lost somewhere in the forests and mountains between Albania and Kosova.

Q. I suggest, if possible, that you answer my questions more briefly because time is flying.

Now, do you know that it is precisely across that border, that is to say, the border under the control of the army and the police force, that large convoys of smuggled weapons were coming through from Albania in order to arm the KLA and the terrorist activities in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. I have no doubt, in that if the insurgents could have bought weapons elsewhere they would have done, but this was the nearest place.

Q. And do you know of the event when the KLA withdrew from Junik and crossed over into Albania that it took with it the entire civilian population of the village to use them as a human shield up to the border, and once they crossed over they returned the population back to the village, the village of Junik? Do you know about that incident? ³⁴⁵⁶

A. I don't know. This is your interpretation. I visited Junik during the war, and at that time, the majority of the civilian population had already been displaced from Junik and a section of the population from villages roundabout who had been evicted by Serbian forces had sought shelter in Junik and, from there, were moving to Albania. The civilian population were extremely scared by the Serbian police and military operations.

Q. And do you know why -- do you know why the members of the KLA took civilians as a human shield, that that was because they knew that the police would not shoot either at the terrorists -- they would not shoot at the terrorists if they thought there was the danger of civilians being hurt, that they knew about this order and that's why they took these civilians to be a human shield? Are you aware of that?

A. I don't believe this. The number of those killed in Kosova, the number of Albanians killed among the Albanian armed insurgents was proportionately much smaller than the number of civilians killed by the Serbian forces. So this shows the indiscriminate nature of their operations.

Q. As you've just mentioned a figure and taken it as an argument, tell me, please, how many Albanians died in Kosovo in those conflicts at the time.

A. I can't give a final figure because, after all, it hasn't been issued, but it is the proportion that is important.

Q. Yes, but if you take a number and place it as an argument, then I assume you have an idea of the number you're using to prove your argument. ³⁴⁵⁷ You're not just selecting one at random.

JUDGE MAY: This is all general debate. Now, let us go back to the evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Let us go back. But I'm following the testimony of the witness, and that's why I'm asking these questions. I think that that is logical.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You represented the members of the government that came to the meeting in Pristina and members of the delegation in Rambouillet as being idiots. That is to say, you explained that they didn't even know why they had come, that the vice-presidents and members of the government who were amongst the delegation did not know what they were talking about, that the members of the delegation in Rambouillet spent their whole nights drinking and singing, and that the head of the delegation, Milan Milutinovic - and you said this - that he said in Rambouillet was unable to decide anything but had to refer back to me and ask me and that the delegation in fact had nothing to look for there. These are all things that you stated. So can you explain this to us, please? Can you truly describe the delegation of the Serbian government in that way, and the delegation of Serbia and Yugoslavia, made up of government members in negotiations with you and your colleagues in Rambouillet and in Pristina, can you really say that they were idiots?

A. I didn't use the word "idiot." I believe I said that apart from the inner circle of Sainovic, Markovic, Stanbuk, and later Milutinovic, the majority of the delegation didn't know what the conference was about. ³⁴⁵⁸ And as for the singing, it's a problem for the delegation why they sang and drank, but I heard them with my own ears. As for Milutinovic, I didn't say that he said to me. This is what he said to the intermediaries, and I'm passing on what the intermediaries said to me. And Milutinovic apparently said that he couldn't decide.

Q. That delegation in Rambouillet, as you very well know, was composed of the representatives of all the ethnic communities living in Kosovo. Are you aware of that?

A. Ethnically, they were members of different ethnic groups. Politically, they were all of the opinion of the ruling party, and their political identity was more important than their ethnic identity. They were part of a policy that had gone on for more than ten years in Serbia, creating so-called Albanian -- or so-called honest Albanians, so-called honest Turks and so forth. And these were people who were reconciled to the Belgrade regime. In the American literature, this is called "Uncle Tom syndrome."

Q. And did that policy, the one that you're making fun of, obviously, did it express the position of national equality for all national communities, ethnic communities living in Kosovo?

A. It's all part of an Orwellian kind of equality in which everybody was equal but the Belgrade regime was more equal than anyone else. The ideology of that state prevailed.

Q. So in Kosovo, where you do not contest that Serbs, Albanians, Turks, Muslims, Goranis, Egyptians, Gypsies and everybody else lives, and a delegation that was composed of all that is Orwellian in quality, ^{3459 BLANK PAGE 3460} whereas a delegation from your part, made up of exclusively Albanians, was democratic. Is that what you're saying? Is that your position?

A. The delegation that represented the majority of Albanians in Kosova had a much greater vision of the future and was committed, at Rambouillet, to much greater rights for minorities than the international mediators had anticipated. The quotas of rights for minorities were extended in the direction of positive discrimination in a way that was new for Europe, and this was the vision of the Albanian delegation.

Q. Now, how this is expressed and manifested is seen in present-day Kosovo reality, where there is no room for anybody except the Albanians.

A. From 120 seats in the Kosova Assembly, 20 seats are reserved for Serbs, although they have only 5 per cent of the population.

Q. And those are the ones that have military escorts and high security to take them to meetings of that so-called --

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... we are now going from the indictment. Let us go back to the evidence.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. To go back to Rambouillet, those two delegations, your own, that democratic one, and this Serbian and Yugoslav multinational Orwellian one, never negotiated in Rambouillet. Is that true or not?

A. On the contrary. We tried to negotiate throughout that period on the basis of the mechanisms tabled there that centred on the exchange of governments with the mediation of experts and legal advice.

Q. Let's be quite clear for the public, because what you're saying is not quite clear. Apart from the ceremonial meeting, did the two ³⁴⁶¹ delegations ever sit down to the table, the negotiating table, one opposite the other, to discuss the issues that were to be the subject of the negotiations or not?

A. No, because there was a mechanism according to which we were to exchange documents. There was no need for decorative or protocol meetings. These were working negotiations.

Q. That is to say that the delegations that were supposed to negotiate between themselves never actually met in order to negotiate because had they met, as you put it just now, this would just be a -- for decorative or protocol purposes; right?

A. There was a huge number of documents to be gone through, that it would have been impossible under that same format to discuss anything in any way that would be serious.

Q. All right. Your paper Koha Ditore published the entire text of the agreement from Rambouillet. I had it in my hands, your paper, I mean, before the meeting itself was held. Do you remember that at least? Because it is your newspaper.

A. We have published a number of drafts, preparatory drafts, towards Rambouillet, including the one you're mentioning. The Rambouillet agreement, the basic document, was only published with the completion of the Paris conference.

Q. And how do you interpret the fact that your newspaper Koha Ditore published the agreement before there was a theoretic possibility for it to be adopted? That is to say, before the meeting itself. And at the same time, the delegations that were supposed to reach this agreement never met ³⁴⁶² to discuss that agreement at all. How can you explain these two facts?

A. I can't explain them because you're wrong. Koha Ditore did not publish the agreement as reached at Rambouillet. Koha Ditore published in a number of issues the drafts which were given for negotiation to both parties during the autumn of 1998. And during 1999, we published a draft which gave the skeleton of negotiations at Rambouillet. But the document of the agreement of Rambouillet was only published subsequent to the Rambouillet conference and not prior to that.

Q. The former one was published after the conference, but the working paper that you refer to that you published in full, practically does not differ at all from the final document. You published the entire text of the document. You published its entire substance. Did you or did you not?

JUDGE MAY: Now, what he said -- what the witness has said is that he published the preparatory draft.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This preparatory draft and the final version differ very little.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And your explanation --

JUDGE MAY: Is that right, Mr. Surroi?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It is even theoretically impossible not to have changed, because we had three weeks of negotiations, and during these three weeks, the document has changed substantially.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ³⁴⁶³

Q. That is a logical explanation in principle, but as far as this concrete matter is concerned, you know full well that there is a published version of the Koha Ditore and it can be compared. And we haven't explained this. You said that the negotiations went on for three weeks. How come during these three weeks that the two delegations that are supposed to reach agreement between themselves did not sit down to negotiate the agreement?

A. There was not a lot of readiness from one side; and secondly, it wasn't very productive.

Q. On whose side was there no readiness? On both sides there was no readiness?

A. From our side, we were not ready because we did not consider this to be fruitful.

Q. So the delegations did not meet because your side did not want to negotiate with the Serb delegation.

A. And also because this was the format, the predetermined format that had been set out by the mediators, the American ambassador of the European Union and the Russian ambassador.

Q. Are you trying to say that this was according to the take-it-or-leave-it system, that is what a group of American intermediaries was supposed to impose?

A. Absolutely not. The document has been subjected to change based on negotiations, and it was not only the American ambassador but there was one from the European Union and Ambassador Majovski, representative of the Russian Federation. ³⁴⁶⁴

Q. But you know very well that Ambassador Majovski, the representative of the Russian Federation did not want to sign the document.

A. There was no need for him to sign it. It was the parties which negotiated, not this or that ambassador.

Q. I'm not going into the details now, the details pertaining to form. But it was clear, and it was publicly made clear that he or, rather, the Russian Federation did not support the Rambouillet agreement, especially those sections that referred to the right of NATO to de facto occupy Yugoslavia. Do you remember that? Because you were present.

A. Absolutely. The precedent had been established at Dayton where you took part and where Russia did not sign up to the military annex based on the principle of non-participation in NATO operation. There is no discrepancy here, and Foreign Minister Ivanov managed to explain this.

Q. On the contrary. There is a great deal of similarity because this was unacceptable from a political point of view. It's not that they were not participating but they were opposing the occupation of Yugoslavia. Is that right or is that not right?

A. I don't see this as being relevant at all.

Q. Well, it is very relevant, but we are going to leave this to Ambassador Majovski for when he testifies here. You said that the Serb side did not want the negotiations to take place in Belgrade, which is not true. And you actually refuted yourself by giving this oral explanation here, which I heard here this morning, that the reactions because of your trip to Belgrade were very unpleasant, that you were almost condemned for ³⁴⁶⁵ treason because you went to Belgrade, that that is how your circles in Pristina reacted to that.

Was that the main reason why you didn't want to go to Belgrade?

A. Those who accused us constituted a minority. However, I think that you have misunderstood this. On the contrary. We insisted on going to Belgrade, whilst the Belgrade delegation insisted that the following meeting be held in Prishtina.

Q. And the Belgrade delegation was upset because they had to come to your feet, so to speak, to Pristina rather than have you come to Belgrade. Are you aware of that?

A. They did not create this impression on Prishtina. On the contrary. They insisted that the following meeting be held in Prishtina.

Q. Obviously we cannot understand each other on that, but we can go on because this is easy to establish. You wrote in your statement that you published critical texts against me, but you were not allowed to publish them in the Bujku newspaper. That is what it says in your statement. That's not contested.

Who did not allow you to publish this in Bujku? Did I have Bujku under my control perhaps?

A. I can't see how those two things have been related together, but I have continued to write critical articles against yourself in many other newspapers. In principle, I have not agreed with the editorial policies at Bujku, so I do not see this as being a great problem. Whilst the answer to your question is no, you have not had any control over Bujku.

Q. In your statement, it looks as if I practically did, because you ^{3466 BLANK PAGE 3467} say that you were not allowed to publish in Bujku. It's not any different from that. There's no need for me to quote your statement because that is certainly what you said.

Why did you withdraw in 1992, in 1992 from political life and from involvement in political parties? You said that until then, you were in this movement of young parliamentarians of Kosovo.

A. I can't see how that can be relevant but I'll give you an answer anyway. Because political parties have to exist within a parliamentary context. In Kosova, your own government did not allow the parliament to convene and for a normal democratic parliament to exist. Under those circumstances and wishing to return to my own profession, that is exactly what I did, I returned to my own profession.

Q. And do you know at least you that boycotted all the elections in Kosovo according to your own decision and that a relatively small percentage of Albanians, only those who did not want to go by the dictate of your political leaders, voted in the elections that were held at republican and federal levels and municipal levels for the municipal authorities, and so on and so forth?

A. Yes, because those elections were organised by an occupying power.

Q. So you treat legal state authorities as an occupation power.

A. From the year 1989, Serbia has executed an Anschluss in Kosova. In 1999, with the final abrogation of the autonomy, of the Kosova autonomy, Serbia dissolved the Yugoslavia federation.

Q. And do you know that what you are saying and what you are calling the Anschluss were constitutional decisions about which the parliament ³⁴⁶⁸ of Kosovo also had their say and voted on it and the parliament of Serbia voted on it, and at that time, various positions in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia were held by Albanians, in Serbia too?

A. The Assembly which formally endorsed, if we can call it that, these changes had been encircled by police forces, and there were extraordinary emergency measures, and there was a lot of threatening of the MPs. And as if this were not enough, votes within that parliament were cast by people who were not even members of the Parliament of Kosova. And there is photographic evidence to support this.

JUDGE MAY: It's now -- it's now time to adjourn, Mr. Milosevic. It's quarter to. We will allow you to continue your cross-examination tomorrow, but you will be restricted to half an hour. It means that you will have had 40 per cent, nearly, more time than the Prosecution. You asked for more time than them and you can have it, but we must bring this cross-examination, in due course, to an end so you must prepare on that basis. We will then hear from the amici and any re-examination. Yes.

MR. NICE: Two --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But please, then, it should be borne in mind that this half hour be given to me, because the witness is using far more time than I am and he can give yes or no answers to questions. So this is really your responsibility, not mine.

JUDGE MAY: It is my responsibility, or our responsibility, rather. It seems to me that he's been answering quite fairly, and I doubt if he's taken up more time than you. ³⁴⁶⁹ Yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, three things: Obviously, we'd also noted that, by an extension of half an hour, he will have considerably more time than the Prosecution. I wasn't aware that the accused had asked for this specifically, save by implication.

JUDGE MAY: He mentioned it in argument the other day about one of the other witnesses. Yes.

MR. NICE: He's identified what he says is a protected witness in cross-examination. If he could provide us in some suitably discreet way with identification of who that witness is, we would be grateful, because it's not clear to us at all.

Tomorrow I've got to make maximum use of the time. I will bring the 92 bis witness, number 4 on the list, and probably two others in the hope that there won't be some rule of thumb occupation of an hour of time in cross-examination and that it can be tailored in order to make maximum use of the limited time available because normally in a morning session we would be able to get through three 92 bis witnesses.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I know who these other two are? Can I know who these other two are in addition to --

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]...

MR. NICE: Numbers 1, 2, and 4 on the list.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Surroi, would you be back, please, tomorrow morning at 9.00. ³⁴⁷⁰

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 19th day of April, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.