⁴⁷¹⁰

Monday, 13 May 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, Your Honour. If I may, just before we start today, just so that there's no confusion about the order of witnesses, at the end the last day, we did provide a further letter outlining a witness -- proposed order of calling witnesses, and as you can see, we have the present witness listed first, then Isuf Loku, followed by General Drewienkiewicz, DZ. The proposal this morning is that after this witness's cross-examination completes, we would propose calling General Drewienkiewicz for the remainder of the cross-examination to ensure that he is dealt with and can leave today because, as you know, it's very, very difficult; followed then by Isuf Loku for the balance of the day. It's our proposal that that should take the rest of the day, and we would not start any further witnesses after Isuf Loku.

That is, of course, my proposal, and it's always up to the Court.

JUDGE MAY: The general has come back for today, is that right, and only today?

MR. RYNEVELD: Today and only today. It just seemed to me, out of an abundance of caution, it would be smarter for me to propose that General DZ go after the cross-examination of this witness is complete.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, it's to complete the cross-examination, ⁴⁷¹¹ which is due to take two hours.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I too have something to say first of all. During the weekend, I read the statement of some other kind of protected witness, K3. Now, I did not receive the name of that particular witness, although I see that he has been planned for testimony tomorrow. So I request that his name be disclosed to me. And I should like to draw your attention to the fact that, in reading his statement, I was able to conclude only that it was a trickster that we are dealing with or some sick person, because from the statement we can see that he was an employee, a clerk of --

JUDGE MAY: Let's deal with the cross-examination now. We'll come to those -- any other witnesses tomorrow. It may be that at the end of today, we can have a discussion about them. But the witness is here and we should conclude his evidence, and we can come back to these issues later. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, how much time have I got left for this witness? Could you be so kind and tell me, please?

JUDGE MAY: Three-quarters of an hour.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. At least bear in mind that we didn't start at 9.00 sharp.

WITNESS: NIKE PERAJ [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] ⁴⁷¹² Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. You said that the units of the KLA left Djakovica at the beginning of 1999 and left to take to the hills, as you said, not to draw the civilian population into a war. Now, how come you know the reasons for their withdrawal?

A. I never said that the KLA units were in Gjakove. I only said that those KLA units were not in Gjakove.

Q. All right. Then let me put that question a different way. If they left the Djakovica region -- all I'm going to ask you is this, and related to things that happened when you were there, and as far as I was able to understand, you were there in Djakovica from the end of 1998. Now, who, if they left the Djakovica reason, who then killed Gasper Karachi [phoen]? That took place on the 30th of January, 1999; Arben Seluku, which took place on the 20th of February, 1999. And in both these cases members of the Verification Mission were present, even as many as 40 of them, actually, reporters and so on. Now the next person, Sylejman Bajrami, on the 28th of February, 1999; Fadil Tolaj, on the 10th of March, 1999; Fetih Domi on --

JUDGE MAY: Let the -- let the witness -- let the witness answer. You're reading out a list of names. He's got to try and remember if you want him to answer.

Mr. Peraj, can you help us about the alleged murder of these people?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really don't know who killed these persons, and this is the first time for me to hear most of these names. ⁴⁷¹³

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, you were in Djakovica, at that time. Now, Arben Seluku, for example, was killed in the town itself on the 20th of February, with the presence of the Verification Mission, the OSCE mission. Is it possible that you knew nothing about that, in view of your position and post of an officer in the army working in the command of the town?

A. I did not work. I was never engaged in who was getting killed or didn't know anything. I might have heard of some events when they appeared in the media, but of this, I know nothing.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, would you clarify for me, because it's not clear: You're alleging that these persons, or some of them at any rate, were killed in the presence of the Verification Mission. Do you mean to suggest that the members were present at the killing or that they were present in the village?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Djakovica is a town, and these people were killed by the KLA, and those killings were verified by the verifiers who, of course, after the killing -- they weren't present at the actual killing, during the actual killing, but they went to verify afterwards. And I'm mentioning these people, the people who were killed, at the time during which the KLA says there were no KLA members in the area, in the region. So quite simply, as you can see, he does not -- he knows nothing about that, and Djakovica is not a large town.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, have you heard of the killing of Sabah Zeki or Xhemail Smaci? That took place in February 1999, all of it. ⁴⁷¹⁴

A. I said earlier that this has nothing to do with the statement I have given here. I know nothing of this. Please ask me about what is contained in my statement.

Q. All right. So you know nothing about any one of these killings that were perpetrated in Djakovica at the time when you claim there were no KLA members there. So not a single one. I don't want to carry on enumerating the names, because if I understood you correctly, you say you know nothing about a single one of them; is that right?

A. I may tell you that in Gjakove, during the period I was there, there's never been fighting between the KLA and the Serb forces.

Q. All right. You said that the KLA units would carry out operations from time to time, and as you say, these were against the Serb forces. Now, did they endeavour not to -- to pull the civilian population into a war, and that's the reason why they took to the hills and woods, as you said?

A. I said already that there wasn't any fighting in the city. In the mountains, in the forest there may have been and certainly there has been fighting.

Q. Very well. I understood that it was your duty during the aggression to transport the bodies of the soldiers who were killed. Is that correct?

A. First, I wish to say that there wasn't any aggression. It was a NATO intervention not an aggression.

JUDGE MAY: Don't bother about that. Just deal with the question, if you would. Don't bother about the comments. ⁴⁷¹⁵

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is true that I carried the bodies from Gjakove to Prizren, Prishtina, and Nis.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And who killed those young men, the young men that you transported?

A. I didn't see who killed them. I know that they were killed in the fighting and that the opposing forces killed them.

Q. And who were those opposing forces, as you say?

A. Of course it's evident; the Serb forces and the KLA.

Q. Otherwise, the KLA at the beginning of 1999 planned an operation from Albania. Is that true?

A. I know nothing, but I think it must not be true.

Q. Well, you said something like that on page 15, the second paragraph, in your statement from the 12th to the 15th of February, 2001. Can you remember whether that was true or not?

A. That was publicised by the information media from Belgrade, allegedly that Albanians are fleeing from Kosova for Albania, especially the young people. And there in Albania, they are getting organised to form larger units so that when NATO decides to send in its infantry troops, those forces will allegedly join NATO forces and take part in its operations. But this was not the case, and this was taken as a pretext to fight and to exterminate hundreds of Albanians, especially young people, and not allow them to go to Albania. This was used as a pretext, and this is one of the reasons why many Albanians were killed, massacred, and shot dead at various police checkpoints before they were sent to Albania from ⁴⁷¹⁶ Kosova.

Q. Please. I'm going to read out on page 15 of your statement a passage. It says: "The KLA," that is one of the headings. It says, "The KLA had left the Djakovica area by the time the NATO bombing started and planned operations from Albania. There was no real resistance from the KLA from the beginning of 1999."

Were you telling the truth then or are you telling the truth now?

A. It is true that some of them went outside the borders of Kosova because they were pressured by the Serb forces to leave those places where they were situated.

Q. So is what you said in your statement correct?

A. It is correct as it is correct what I said now. I could talk about it for days, if you like.

Q. All right. Quite obviously we don't have days, we just have minutes, but I merely wanted to take note of what you said. Now, is it true that in June 1999, in your village, the 137th KLA brigade was present?

A. Were not in my village.

Q. All right. In the village of Ramoc?

A. Yes.

Q. And you, through a member of your family, warned them that an attack was being planned, and they succeeded in escaping; is that right?

A. I spoke about it also Thursday. I already showed that an attack was going to take place. First, I didn't know that there was any KLA troops there, but I knew that about nine families were in a valley in the ⁴⁷¹⁷ south part of Ramoc, and I feared that they would fare the same things as the inhabitants of Meja and Korenica. That's why I went there, to warn them about what might happen, and wanted to see what was going on there.

Q. Just give shorter answers to my questions. So when I ask you is it correct, you can just say yes or no.

You said you want to warn several families. And in the third paragraph of page 15 you say -- it is the following paragraph after the one I quoted: "At the beginning of June 1999, the army surrounded the KLA's 137th Brigade." Then it says in brackets, "About 126 uniformed members and 40 volunteers."

So you're talking about a figure of 126 members of the brigade and 40 volunteers. So in all, that is 166 KLA members and not nine families that you wanted to warn. So when were you speaking the truth; then or now?

A. The truth is also what I said in my statement, but I wanted to make clear why I went there, namely, to save those families that were close to this KLA unit when it was there. And then I found out, after the operation that was launched that the people were really there. And I suggested to them to leave so that they wouldn't face anything bad, the population and whoever was there, because we were talking about the war to come to an end.

Q. Your explanation is quite clear, but I'm referring you to your statement.

Now, during the NATO aggression, before that, in the Djakovica area, there was the KLA Operative Zone of Dukagjin; is that right? Yes or ⁴⁷¹⁸ no; just say yes or no.

A. I didn't say anywhere in my statement the name of Dukagjin Operational Zone.

Q. All right. Now, in that fighting, the fighting that you say that the KLA members were few and that they had withdrawn, can you say how many soldiers were killed? Because you transported the bodies to the towns you mentioned. In the Djakovica area. I'm just referring to the Djakovica area for the moment.

A. What soldiers do you mean?

Q. The soldiers belonging to the Yugoslav army, of which you were a member at the time.

A. I know that approximately about 40 of them were killed.

Q. Well, I have a list of 61 soldiers who were killed in that fighting, in those battles, but we can't go through that all now and analyse it. You say 40.

Now, you also say that the MUP, according to your information, had a settling of accounts to carry out with the KLA; is that correct?

A. I said that it was likely but not it really happened.

Q. All right. So this is your assumption. You are putting forward information about the MUP and its armaments, but you don't know that data for sure. You're making assumptions there too; is that right?

A. I'm not making assumptions because -- if the Judges allow me, I'd like to give some figures about this.

JUDGE MAY: About the MUP and the KLA; is that right?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] About the number of the victims and ⁴⁷¹⁹ the missing persons.

JUDGE MAY: Let the accused finish his cross-examination and then counsel for the Prosecution can re-examine, if he thinks it's important.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You say that the Yugoslav army tried to place all the units under its command but that some individuals were working for a Greater Serbia because that was the idea that the politicians had. Now, who asked for that Greater Serbia? How -- what do you base that statement of yours on, in fact?

A. On the basis of what I said in my statement. It was not me but you and your scholars, your politicians, had already stated that Kosova was a cradle of Serbia, and they kept saying it in various information media. Then there was a song, "From Vardar to Triglav, this is all Serb lands." These were sufficient for us to believe in this theory, because we could hear that everywhere.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... "From Vardar to Triglav, from Djerdap to the Adriatic," that was a song that was called -- the title of which was "Yugoslavia" and it was a very popular song, a very happy tune and a very nice song and the name of that song was "Yugoslavia." And nobody sung what you are claiming that they sung -- sang. But let's move on. I have very little time. You've been mentioning people who had daily meetings, but you never attended those daily meetings; is that correct?

A. I attended almost regularly the information or briefings that were being held in the headquarters where I was stationed, but I also took part ⁴⁷²⁰ in other meetings which happened by accident when I happened to be there, you know, looking after some things there.

Q. On page 8, in the last paragraph of your statement dated the 12th of February, you speak of meetings but you do not mention yourself. You do not mention your own participation in these meetings. Is that right or not?

A. I said -- I mentioned, tried to explain when I was present in those briefings or meetings. I don't see the point of going on with this topic.

Q. Well, the point is that you did not attend these meetings, and this is what it says in your statement. It just says in your statement that you attended some informal meeting. Is that right or is that not right?

A. I said before and I'll say it again: I took part in both regular meetings and occasional meetings.

Q. You spoke of an informal meeting, and this was in a private house, at that. Was it a dinner or was it some kind of a party? What was this informal meeting that you refer to at a private house?

A. It was not a party or a wedding. It was the day when Ponosevac was buried, and then people gathered from the MUP and the army to take part in the funeral, and I happened to be there by chance.

Q. All right. So that was no meeting. It was people who were sitting there and who came to attend the funeral. So it's a good thing you've clarified this.

You also talk about the way in which the MUP made decisions and ⁴⁷²¹ whether they consulted with the army of Yugoslavia or not, but you don't know anything for sure about that? You do not have any reliable information, you're just making assumptions again, aren't you?

A. This is not speculation, but these things were said at this short meeting, and indeed these things -- then these things subsequently happened in Meja and Korenica.

Q. We'll get to Meja. I just wanted to establish that this was no meeting. It was an informal gathering at a private house on the occasion of this man's funeral, this man who had been killed by the KLA terrorists, and that is quite different from what you had been saying.

JUDGE MAY: Well, it's not -- it's not really. It's your comment, Mr. Milosevic, in fairness to the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You mention in your second statement that a friend of yours from military security told you about the plan for ethnic -- the ethnic cleansing of Albanians. Do you know that, as far as communications in our country are concerned, for years this expression "ethnic cleansing" was used to denote a crime in public communication, in the media, when people talk to each other. Generally speaking, "ethnic cleansing" always denoted a crime. Is that right or is that not right?

A. First, put your questions one by one and not with ten questions in one sentence, because then I can answer more clearly.

Q. All right. Is it correct that in public life and in private life, among people, in the media, the expression "ethnic cleansing" was used to denote a crime, for years? ⁴⁷²²

A. I can say freely that there was ethnic cleansing both in Kosova and in my home in the municipality of Gjakove. You can ask someone else for a more detailed analysis.

JUDGE MAY: Try to answer the question, if you would. The question was: Is it right that in public life and indeed in the media and in private life, the expression "ethnic cleansing" was used to denote a crime?

Now, doubtless the accused is talking about the former Yugoslavia. Is that right or not, or can you not assist?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's quite right that it was mentioned in the media that ethnic cleansing was a crime.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So a friend from the military security said to you that a crime would be carried out. That is one side of the matter. And the other is that you did not refer to this in your statement that you made two and a half months after the events concerned, not even the first one you gave a year or so before the second statement. Why did you never mention that before, that somebody told you that a crime would be carried out?

A. First I should say he did not say that it would happen but it did happen. And in that informal meeting, in that conversation, it was mentioned that the terrain would be cleansed of the population.

Q. That is to say that he was telling you that a crime had been planned. Yes or no.

A. He didn't say it was planned. These were not things that were unknown. You didn't have to write it on posters. But they were very, ⁴⁷²³ very clear measures, and what happened, happened.

JUDGE MAY: The question was: Why didn't you mention this conversation in your first statement? That is the statement of the 18th of April, 2000.

A. Perhaps at that time I didn't remember.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. This will suffice as an answer. In the village of Meja, the officer Prascevic was killed and a few other persons, including the brother of the local policeman --

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch the name. It was read out very fast.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I did not hear your answer.

A. I didn't understand that a question was being put to me.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Repeat the question, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You mention, you mention that in the village of Meja, the KLA killed Prascevic, a MUP officer, in April and four other men, including the brother of a local policeman Shegrad. Is that correct? That was my question.

A. I know from information we got from the army, and it was also published, that Inspector Prascevic and other policemen, five in all, fell into an ambush of the KLA and were killed. That is my answer.

Q. All right. You mention a meeting where allegedly Stojanovic issued an order to carry out a retaliation because of Prascevic. Is that ⁴⁷²⁴ correct?

A. He didn't say that he would take revenge.

Q. You said -- you said - we just clarified this - that at this meeting before the funeral, he said that heads would roll, et cetera.

A. Please. I didn't mention the word "revenge" but he said that at least a hundred heads must roll and that everything should be cleared up. And I believe he said it from fury after, because he had -- because Prascevic was his friend.

Q. Yes, at the funeral. But this Stojanovic who you mentioned as having issued the order, he was a good friend of yours, wasn't he?

A. I knew him because he -- we came from the same place and we had -- we were on friendly terms.

Q. All right. Let's move on to this central event of yours. You say that this operation was commanded by General Lazarevic; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And you claim that this action was carried out in the village of Meja against the civilian population; is that right?

A. Yes, that's quite right.

Q. That is to say the commander of the corps commanded some operation against the civilian population of a village. Is that your assertion as an army officer?

A. It is not the question of one village but of various villages of Reka e Keqe, and Carragojs valley. And I mention in my statement, please, that the operation was led by General Lazarevic from Gjakove, and General Kotur and Colonel Stankovic were in the field as well as the police ⁴⁷²⁵ officers from the village of Duzhnja.

Q. Please. Let's not waste any time. I need precise answers to precise questions. This operation, as you call it, was it an operation that was against the KLA? Yes or no.

A. There was no KLA at all in that area, because on the 27th and the 28th, not a single member of the Yugoslav army or the police forces was killed and nor anybody from the KLA, and nobody was wounded. It is very well-known who was -- who suffered in this operation and who prepared it.

Q. All right. All right. Just make it as short as possible. I took this map that you provided. Let's not put it on the overhead projector because this is going to take up a lot of time. We can put it on the overhead projector, on the other hand. However, since you claim that this was not an operation against the KLA but that it was against the civilian population, please take a look at it. How many places are there here on the map? The region of Kosare, the road between Djakovica and Decani, that's where Meja is and Ponosevac and Stubla, and the area of the village of Morina and the village of Molic. I'm just mentioning a number, a number of villages in which soldiers were killed by the KLA. That is to say, lives were lost.

And look at this. For example, on the 21st of April --

JUDGE MAY: What is the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My question is: Since the witness claims that this was an operation against the civilian population, not against the KLA, how is it then possible that on the 21st of April, the KLA killed there Arifaj ⁴⁷²⁶ Naser, Lazarevic, Ljubodrag, soldiers of the VJ? Lazarevic Boban on the 21st of April. Then Prascevic Milutin on the 21st of April. Slavkovic Zoran --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer. Let the witness answer. No. Now, you've heard what's been put to you. What is said is that if this was an operation which did not involve the KLA, how is it that Yugoslav soldiers were killed, if that is the case?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, Your Honour. I mentioned before and I say again very seriously that during this operation on the 27th and 28th of April, 1999, in the area that I mentioned, the Carragojs valley, including all the villages roundabout, not a single soldier was killed during these two days, either by the Yugoslav forces and the police or by the KLA; and only civilians were killed. This is entirely the truth.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, before we go on, do you want the witness to answer anything about the plan which is on the overhead projector or can we put it back?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a question that goes to the heart of the matter, because this is what it's all about. I took his map, and I compared it to the list of killed members of the army of Yugoslavia. So in that area, in the month of April, many members of the army of Yugoslavia were killed, and the operation was carried out against the KLA that had killed these members of the army of Yugoslavia. There's a different question as to whether other soldiers were killed on that day, but here I have some information that the witness would have to be aware ⁴⁷²⁷ of. This is an entire list of soldiers who were killed on that day. I'm not the one who drew this map, he did.

JUDGE MAY: How many soldiers do you suggest were killed during the operation in the valley?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll give you the exact dates. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 30, 31, 35, 6, 7, 8 -- 38. Thirty-eight soldiers lost their lives.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Very well. Let the witness -- the witness is giving evidence. Let him deal with it.

What is suggested is that 38 soldiers -- 38 soldiers lost their lives. Now, as far as you're concerned, is there any truth in that or not?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Maybe more or less soldiers were killed, but they were killed in the region of the border area in Koshare, a place called Potok Moliqi, then along the borderline where fighting was taking place now and again. But the fact that there were no KLA troops in that area, probably they have withdrawn and there has been fighting. But in that area that I have presented in the map, there wasn't any fighting. There wasn't any casualties on either side. Only the civilians suffered; women, children, young people, innocent people. Totally innocent people suffered.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please. It is precisely in this red circle of your map are the locations where these 38 soldiers were killed from the 11th and the 21st ⁴⁷²⁸ of April onwards. All these different dates. So this was no two-day operation. This went on for several weeks. The killing of soldiers --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, the witness has said that's not the case. He's given his evidence about it. If you want to call evidence to the contrary, you can. Now, you have two more questions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The village of Stubla, Ponosevac or, for example, the village of Opljaz or Orize that is near Meja, is that the border area? Or the road between Djakovica and Decani; is that the border area? Look at this village here. It is in the very depth of his map. Stubla, Ponosevac, Buncevac. Please look at that. It is in the very background. The village of Meja as well. And people were killed in the village of Meja. Is that correct or not?

JUDGE MAY: He's said not. He's given his evidence about it, and there's no point arguing. Yes, you've got one more question and then that's the time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think that it is unfair to restrict my time with this witness to only one more question. I have a great many questions left.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know, since you said last time that you knew about the order that paramilitary forces were not permitted, do you know of the order issued by the Supreme Command that fire may not be opened if civilian lives may be jeopardised? Are you aware of that order as a member of the command in Djakovica? ⁴⁷²⁹

A. If the laws were implemented, especially the war laws, certainly what happened wouldn't have happened, but unfortunately, those laws were not enforced.

JUDGE MAY: So there was a law, was there, or an order that paramilitaries were not to open fire if civilian lives would be jeopardised? Was there such an order or law?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There wasn't such a law.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm not talking about a law. I'm talking about an order, the order not to open fire if civilians may be jeopardised. As a member of the army of Yugoslavia, are you aware of that or not? I'm not talking about paramilitaries now. Now I'm talking about the army and the police.

A. Personally, I know that no force, not only in Yugoslavia, Serbia, or Kosovo, but not a force anywhere has a right to fire whether there are civilian lives jeopardised. This is a general principle. But there wasn't any such order per se to prevent them from shooting, firing.

JUDGE MAY: We must now bring the examination to a close. Mr. Wladimiroff, do you have any questions for the witness?

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Yes, Your Honour, but it would only take ten minutes. Perhaps you could allow the accused a few minutes more.

JUDGE MAY: No. We've decided on the time.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Right. Questioned by Mr. Wladimiroff:

Q. Mr. Peraj, could you assist the Court with this by answering to a few questions about the Meja incident: You told the Court about a ⁴⁷³⁰ military report of the incident prepared the next day; is that right?

A. If you are asking me about the report that was prepared in the house of culture in Gjakove after the murder or massacre of Meja, yes.

Q. You did not mention that report in your first statement of the 18th of April, 2000. Why?

A. I said even earlier that probably for the moment it didn't come to my mind, but I am repeating that even now, if I could, I would have given more ample facts and concrete evidence to prove my point.

Q. Your first statement was given one year after the incident; was it not?

A. Yes. You have the dates there in my statements, and this is the truth.

Q. Have you read the report or have you only seen it?

A. Which report are you talking about?

Q. The military report that was drawn up or prepared directly after the incident on the 28th of April, 1999.

A. I saw it with my own eyes. I saw them, Major Zdravko, writing it on the computer.

Q. May I repeat the question: Did you read it or did you see it?

A. I saw him writing it and then I read it partially.

Q. What was the contents of the report? Was it a military report about the assessment of the situation in the area, or was it a more or less police report stating the facts of the incident, or was it a report of any other kind?

A. The report was to inform the Supreme Command of what was -- or ⁴⁷³¹ what had happened in that operation which was undertaken.

Q. What do you mean by "Supreme Command"?

A. The report was sent to the corps command which, for its part, would collect all the reports and would report it back to the 3rd Army, up to Belgrade, to the Supreme Command that was in Belgrade. In the report, it said that during the operation in May [as interpreted], 68 terrorists were liquidated, it said expressly, while in Korenica village, 74 terrorists were liquidated. And there were other facts and information given about what happened during this operation.

Q. How come you were able to read the report?

A. I worked in that office. That was part of that command where I worked. And they used to write to prepare such information as well as other information. We were responsible to get the necessary death certificates for those who were killed. It was part of the job of the Gjakove command.

Q. Was it given to you --

MR. RYNEVELD: Excuse me. Just while the matter is still on the screen, I wonder if we should get clarified, at line 24, 10:00:05 whether during the operation in May or Meja. It could make a difference later on and it might be more difficult to catch. Perhaps, Mr. Wladimiroff, you could get that clarified now.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: I will.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

MR. WLADIMIROFF:

Q. The transcript indicates that you said that the report dealt with ⁴⁷³² the operation in May. Did you mean the month of May or did you refer to the place of Meja?

A. I am talking about the month of April, 27, 28th of April, not May.

Q. Thank you. Now, was this report given to you to read or was it on a table and you took the opportunity to read it?

A. I was there when it was being written. I read it out of curiosity first. It was not secret from me. I didn't receive any written report, of course, but the report was there, was being written there and addressed to a higher command than ours for its information, which would then send it to the Supreme Command in Belgrade.

Q. Would you please answer my next questions as short as possible. Simply answer the question and not deal with other matters I'm not asking. Now, by whom was the report prepared?

A. Allow me to give you a brief explanation. Every day there was a briefing in the morning held between the military and the police officers in the morning, 8.00 in the morning, and 6.00 in the afternoon. And when there was a person who got all the notes of these briefings and gave those notes to the major to prepare a report which was then signed by the garrison commander and sent to higher chains of command.

Q. So the answer is the major prepared the report; is that right?

A. The major prepared it on the basis of the notes served to him from other structures. He was then responsible for compiling the whole report.

Q. So what did you see, the report drawn up by this major or the other report that were given to him?

A. The report took these notes from the notebook that was kept during ⁴⁷³³ these briefings that I mentioned. Then he referred to those notes to complete the report.

Q. The question was -- the question was: What did you see or read, the notebook or the report?

A. I didn't read the notebook. I read part of the report which he prepared. And for me, that was most important. That was something that drew my attention, that about the number of the victims.

Q. Did you read the report while he was writing it?

A. Yes, while he was writing it on the computer.

Q. Did that report contain more than one page?

A. Usually the reports, depending on the events of the day, contained some pages but not very many, because they had to transmit it through military communication lines because it was difficult to send them in letter form.

Q. I asked you about this report. Did this report contain more than one page?

A. As far as I remember, when he printed it, there was one and a half page.

Q. Did you see or read the report while it was on the screen of the computer or after it had been printed?

A. I read it while he was writing it. And then I was there, I saw him print it and put it in an envelope.

Q. The answer is you read it while it was on the screen of the computer?

A. Yes. ⁴⁷³⁴

Q. Did you see the first page or did you see him writing the second page?

A. I didn't understand your question.

Q. When it was on the screen and you had the opportunity to see it, did you see more than one page or only one page?

A. I already said that the report consisted of one and a half page, approximately.

Q. So --

A. And on the first page, I saw the figure 68, 74, somewhere in the middle of the first page, as far as I remember.

Q. Did you see the top of that page?

A. Yes.

Q. And who were the addressees if there was more than one addressee?

A. The report was addressed to the corps, the Pristina Corps command.

Q. Why do you say, then, that the report was sent to Belgrade? Is that a guess? You assumed that would happen?

A. It was not my assumption, but this was the normal practice. A lower command sent the report to a higher command. For us, it was the Prishtina command. Then for that command, it was a 3rd Army command which for its part, of course, would send it to the General Staff in Belgrade. From there, it went to the corps command, that report, and then I don't know what they did. But it was meant to be sent to the Supreme Command in Belgrade, of course.

Q. Let's concentrate on this: You read that the addressee was the ⁴⁷³⁵ corps command in Nis; is that right?

A. No.

Q. What did you read, then?

A. Not to the corps command in Nis; I said in Prishtina. It was there. Not in Nis. In Nis, there was the command of the 3rd Army.

Q. Right. So you read in the top of the report that the addressee was the corps command in Pristina, nothing else?

A. The heading of the report, or the addressee, was the corps command in Prishtina.

Q. Nothing else?

A. But then this is how it happened. From there, it went on higher and higher.

Q. How do you know that that happened with this report?

A. I don't know what happened, and I was not even interested in what was going to happen with that report.

Q. Right. In your first statement of the 18th of April, you have said that you saw in the computer at the cultural centre that 68 men were killed in Meja, and that was, according to your statement, four days after the incident. Now you say it was the next day. So what was it?

A. I don't remember to have said four days after the event. I remember it was on the 27th, in the evening. It may be a mistake when they have taken down, or I don't know, what I said. But it was on the evening of the 27th of April, after 2200 hours, when the report was written which mentioned the number of those victims.

Q. In your statement of April the 18th, under paragraph 31, you said, ⁴⁷³⁶ and I will read it to you: "Four days later, the incident in Meja, I saw in the computer we had at the cultural centre that 68 men were killed in Meja," and so on.

In your last statement, you said it was the day after the incident, on the 28th. Now you say it was on the evening of the incident, on the 27th. So what is it?

A. Maybe the dates have got mixed up, but I am sure I can guarantee, I can sit in full responsibility that it was the report that was written in the late hours, after 2200 hours. And it was the 27th April 1999. I cannot rule out some mistakes in the days but what I'm saying now is absolutely true, because usually reports are not written fours days after, they are written on a daily basis. Everybody knows that.

Q. Right.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: That's all I ask, Your Honours.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, Your Honours, just two or three areas for clarification, if I may.

Re-examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

MR. RYNEVELD: First of all, this area that my learned friend Mr. Wladimiroff has been dealing with. In fairness, may I ask the Court to turn with me to the second statement -- or the first statement, of the 18th of April, 2000, on page 7, paragraphs 30 and 31. In the fairness to the witness, I believe we have to look at both of those paragraphs, just the way that they have been written, and they both have to be read together, I think, to put this in context.

Q. Witness, I'm going to read to you from your statement two ⁴⁷³⁷ paragraphs on this very issue about the timing of your seeing this report in the computer.

Paragraph 30, you were describing, you said: "I recall that three or four days before the massacre in Meja, Nikola Micunovic, also known as Dragan, told me that the valley of Carragojs was going to pay a very high price." You then go on to describe the killing of Milutin Prascevic, and you talked about some things. Then to paragraph 31, you say: "Four days later, the incident in Meja." Now, are you talking about four days after the discussion that you had with Dragan Micunovic? When you say, "Four days after the incident in Meja, I saw in the computer we had at the cultural centre that 68 men were killed in Meja and 74 men in Korenica." When you put those two together, can you tell us whether or not you're talking four days later, after you spoke to Micunovic, three or four days before the massacre, or is it four days after the incident in Meja you're talking about?

A. The truth is that what you mentioned; Nikola Micunovic said to me that the valley of Carragojs will pay dearly for this. He said this to me personally. And then I said to him, "What fault is it of the valley of Carragojs?" And he said that Korenica too will pay dearly. And that's what I mentioned.

Q. Yes. The focus of my question is not what was said, the focus of the question is to clarify what you intended when you made this statement. You recall that the conversation you have just related was three or four days before the massacre. Let's stop there. Is that true? Was this conversation with Micunovic three or four days before things ⁴⁷³⁸ happened in the Carragojs valley?

A. Before the events.

Q. Yes. And then four days later, after this conversation, did you look at the computer or did you look at the computer four days after the incident happened as opposed to four days after the conversation occurred?

A. I saw the computer on the day of the events, on the 27th, in the evening.

Q. So that would be three or four days after the conversation then; is that correct?

A. Of course, after the conversation that I'd had with Micunovic.

Q. All right. That was one topic. The second topic that I want to clarify is the issue of the map. And just for the record, the map shown to you on the ELMO, that Mr. -- that the accused showed you was Exhibit 143.3. That is -- I'm showing you now. That's the Meja map with the red circle around it. That red circle is intended to show the area depicted in 143.4; isn't that correct? That's the other map that you said was accurately, computer-generated map of the circles you would drawn on Exhibit 143.1. Is that correct, sir? This red circle is simply the general area of the other map, 143.4, that you had outlined?

A. That's right.

Q. All right. And do I understand your evidence correctly that you're saying that during the operation of Meja, you're restricting your evidence to the two days, the 27th and 28th of April, and you said that there were no casualties on those two dates. Is that what I understand ⁴⁷³⁹ your evidence to be?

A. I said that there were no people killed or wounded on the side of the KLA or on the side of the Serbian forces in this area I was talking about.

Q. Yes. But you're saying that civilians died but no armed forces on either side on those two days; is that correct? 27th and 28th of April.

A. That's right.

Q. Do I understand your evidence to be restricted to those two dates? Because the names that Mr. Milosevic was reading out to you had dates on the 11th and the 21st of April. Do you have any comment about deaths that may have occurred on the 11th of April or the 21st of April or dates outside of the 27th and the 28th of April?

A. There may have been killings, but I say again that the Carragojs valley and Korenica, there were none. Maybe there were in other areas around Koshare and the border strip, as far as Pashtrik. There may have been.

Q. Thank you. Sir, in your statement, you referred to -- first of all, you were cross-examined about the internal security operations. In your evidence, I think you indicated - in your written evidence - that General Perisic was opposed to the use of the army in internal security operations, and you talked about that on Thursday. Do you remember talking about that?

A. Yes. This is true. He said so, and I heard this with my own ears, and I saw the general at this meeting where I was present too.

Q. Do you know what happened to General Perisic? Did he remain in ⁴⁷⁴⁰ office?

A. No, he did not remain in office. I can't remember the exact date, but about two months afterwards, General Perisic was dismissed by a decree of the accused and, in his place, General Ojdanic was appointed. But I know that there were also problems because the new general was appointed without the approval of the Republic of Montenegro. I know that.

Q. One final area, one final question, if I may, Witness. You have been cross-examined, both by the accused and by Mr. Wladimiroff, about things that you saw or heard during either meetings or -- formal meetings or informal meetings or documents lying around. You've told us about those things, haven't you?

A. I didn't understand the question very well.

Q. That's my fault. I obviously asked it poorly. Let me try again. During cross-examination, questions were put to you about your particular function and why it is that you would have access to information that came out of formal meetings. Let's stop there. Do you remember being cross-examined about your ability to know what happened at these meetings?

A. I was in positions to see almost everything, but not secret things, but other things more or less completely; the amount of forces, the amount of weaponry, vehicles, other things of this kind. Yes, I was in these places. And while I was working in communications and also when I was an administrative officer for educational matters in the staff, I saw notes of many different kinds.

Q. Did you sometimes have access to copies of orders or plans or ⁴⁷⁴¹ telegrams or other communications that were lying around?

A. There were these things, and I often saw maps that were drawn and plans that had been drawn up with notes on them with different kinds of headlines and which these things were to be enforced stage by stage. And these were maps with figures on and plans that had been prepared. And when the time came, these plans were to be put in action and form a basis of duties.

Q. Here's my question following up on that, sir: Under cross-examination by the accused, he questioned how you could know that the operations in Djakovica were intended to cleanse the Albanian population. Did you ever see any documents, plans, telegrams, or other communications that supported your position?

A. The orders that came were, of course, simplified by superior officers. And I myself have seen in Gjakove how commanders in the field were issued with orders -- with an order that had come as a telegram, stating that cleansing of the population must take place and cleansing of all those who were not loyal to the state.

Q. Who did that telegram come from?

A. I do not know who it came from, but I suppose that it came from the superior command. It was then copied and sent to commanders in the field.

Q. Do you recall to whom it was addressed?

A. It was sent to all the units of the military units and no doubt the police units too. I'm not sure, but I know it was sent to the commanders of the units where I was working and other units that had come ⁴⁷⁴² to help them. And all these were given a document of this kind.

Q. My final question: When and where did you see that document?

A. I saw it in March 1999.

Q. I'm sorry, and the second half of that was where? Exactly where was it? What building, what office, where?

A. In the building -- in fact, it wasn't in the building of the palace of culture but in the house -- in the basement of the department store where the command was established.

Q. Thank you. Questioned by the Court:

JUDGE KWON: Did you --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Was it -- was it just the one telegram you saw with that kind of communication or more than one?

A. Telegrams that came were then written in the form of an order or an announcement and were sent to other units in the field.

JUDGE KWON: Did you mention the telegram just you've mentioned in the earlier statement or not, stating about the ethnic cleansing? I don't remember. I read the -- read about the telegram, about mentioning the ethnic cleansing in the statement. Why is that? You just -- you didn't remember that?

A. I mentioned during the session that I couldn't call to mind everything at the moment, and this is very true. But I didn't see a telegram exclusively about ethnic cleansing but other things were mentioned. And what it said was that the terrain should be cleansed of all people who are not loyal to the state of Serbia. That's how I ⁴⁷⁴³ understood it and that's how it was mentioned, cleansing. So that it wasn't the Serbs who were going to be cleansed from this area, it was well-known who was going to be cleansed.

JUDGE KWON: Did that mean to cleanse the KLA?

A. I said, when we're talking about the Carragojs valley, in those days, there was no KLA there. It was the population that was cleansed, because there were a lot of people who had taken refuge there. These were people from other villages, from Decan, Junik, Smolica, Borovina, other villages.

JUDGE KWON: Well, let's go back a minute to the other report which you said had been prepared by Major Vinter after the Meja operation. You said that the report was sent to the corps command in Pristina. Is that right?

A. Yes.

JUDGE KWON: And the report was saying that 74 terrorists had been killed in Korenica and 68 in Meja.

A. Yes.

JUDGE KWON: And did the terrorists referred to in the report mean the members of the KLA?

A. There were no -- it had nothing to do with the KLA. These were purely civilians. All of them were unarmed, defenseless civilians without uniforms.

JUDGE KWON: But according to the report, it says "terrorists" who were killed during the operation.

A. They wrote that -- they wrote this as a pretext, because they knew ⁴⁷⁴⁴ very well that there were no terrorists in the area. But they called all the Albanian population terrorists. I saw these bodies myself. Not one of them was military.

JUDGE KWON: Yes. You mean by "they," the Serb forces in the Meja operations area, they wrote to the corps command that 74 or 60 some, some 140 terrorists were killed during the operation. Then may I take it that the commander in Pristina had no idea that civilians had been killed during the operation, or if you think that the commander must have known exactly what was happening at the time, what would be your base of thinking?

A. They knew that the operation was taking place, but they didn't know the details. They took the details from the people who were in the field. And in the evening and when the briefing was held, members of the police, the MUP, and other army units came and reported. And from this report, notes were compiled about what had happened on that day and were sent higher up.

JUDGE KWON: I'm asking about the commander in Pristina who receives the report from the field. Did he know what was happening exactly? Did he know that civilians instead of KLAs were killed? And what is your base of thinking if you say they already know?

A. He knew very well who was killed, and he knew perfectly well. But he was unable to express himself differently or call these innocent people anything but terrorists. He got the news through radio communications, but these reports were written in this way.

JUDGE KWON: How did he come to know? My question was simply ⁴⁷⁴⁵ that.

A. It's not clear to me who. The commander or who else?

JUDGE KWON: The commander in Pristina, sitting in Pristina.

A. He learnt, first of all, from persons who were authorised to give him direct information by writing, in two ways. And in fact, he was also in direct contact with his personnel where he was.

JUDGE KWON: Okay. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [No translation]

JUDGE MAY: Put your microphone on and we'll hear it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I can't turn it on because you keep turning it on and off, as you know full well. Can I ask something in relation to Judge Kwon's question, please?

JUDGE MAY: Put the microphone, on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The light of the microphone is on, as you can see.

JUDGE MAY: Right. What's your question?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you hear me now?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In relation to this report by Mr. Kwon, if the witness read that 74 terrorists in Korenica and 68 in Meja and he believes that they were civilians, wasn't his duty then, as an officer, as an army officer, to say these are not terrorists, these are civilians? I'm putting this question because --

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We hear the question. It's a comment you can make. It's a comment you can make in due course. But we really must ⁴⁷⁴⁶ conclude the witness's evidence.

Mr. Ryneveld, what is the point?

MR. RYNEVELD: Just an issue -- sorry. Just an issue of fairness. The response to my very last question was not contained in either of his previous statements. The information came during a proofing session, but there was no opportunity because the matter had not been 92 bis'd. In fairness to -- I hadn't expected the subject matter to be expanded this fully. The purpose of the question was to show that he was in a position to obtain information such as documents, telegrams, even though he was a low-level or different --

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Ryneveld, I think we stopped the accused making comments, so we must ask you too.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. There is a point, though; that if there is some unfairness because I put this evidence in after the fact and no one has had an opportunity to cross-examine on it, I wanted the Court to be aware that this came up in re-examination but it was never disclosed. That's my point.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. RYNEVELD: I want to be perfectly clear.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Mr. Peraj, that concludes your evidence. Thank you for coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are now free to go.

The Court will adjourn for 20 minutes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

--- Recess taken at 10.40 a.m. ⁴⁷⁴⁷

--- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

[The witness entered court]

WITNESS: KAROL JOHN DREWIENKIEWICZ [Resumed]

JUDGE MAY: General Drewienkiewicz, thank you for coming back to the Tribunal to conclude your evidence. You are, of course, subject to the declaration which you made on the last occasion. Mr. Milosevic, you have, as we ordered, two hours more for cross-examination of this witness.

Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. Let us start from the oath that you made here to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Since we're still discussing Racak, my question is the following: Why did you omit in your statement that the police operation in Racak had been announced to you?

A. I don't believe it had been announced specifically. We had had many announcements that things would happen in response to other activities, other events. At no stage were we formally warned or was it indicated that there would be an operation specifically against Racak at a certain time. If that had been the case, I would have made sure that there were my people on the ground to ensure that things did not go out of hand.

Q. Yes. But you did have observers on the spot, didn't you? Yes or no.

A. There were a very few. They were not on the spot, they were in the area. They were within five miles, say.

Q. All right. We're going to get to that very soon. But during the ⁴⁷⁴⁸ first part of your cross-examination, you confirmed, in relation to my question, about the presence of Maisonneuve, that is, that your people entered Racak the first day after what had happened; is that right? Yes or no.

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Then answer me the following question: Why did you omit the fact that you certainly had to be aware of and that is that Associated Press cameras were there, et cetera, and some journalists, that they were present there during the operation?

A. I only became aware of that after the event.

Q. Even if you became aware of it after the event, you had to bear that in mind, I assume, when giving your statements in relation to the event in Racak. Is that right or is that not right?

A. In giving my statement, I have attempted at all stages to say what I knew at the time and not use hindsight.

Q. Yes. But you found out early enough, as far as I understood things. Even before the sensational statement about a massacre. Is that right or is that not right?

A. I was aware in the course of Saturday morning that there were some media there. I had no idea which media were there; they didn't report to me. I used the reports from my own people as being more objective at the time.

Q. And didn't it occur to you to try to get the recorded material that the media had from them themselves so that the situation would become clearer to you? ⁴⁷⁴⁹

A. Not at the time, no. They don't work for us. Their motives were not our motives.

Q. Well, I assume that everybody's motive was to record the event and to establish the truth. Do you think that's the way it is or do you not think so?

A. I was responsible for the observers on the ground, not for the media. I had no control over what the media did, where they went, or what they said. What they said was not always what I believed.

Q. Is it correct that Walker came only subsequently, after all of 16 hours from the time when your observers and the police left Racak, that he came to a stage-managed scene with the KLA? Is that right or is that not right?

A. It is true that Walker went to Racak on the Saturday morning and that my verifiers had left there in the dark on Friday evening. The reason he did not go any earlier and that I did not go any earlier was that we did not have a clear view of what had happened. We did not realise exactly how bad things were there. It was only in the course of Saturday morning that we got reports which appeared to indicate that the situation there was far worse than had been reported on Friday evening.

Q. And why, then, in the report of the 16th, that is to say Saturday, in the report that you sent, why is Racak not considered to be significant when the verifiers entered it on the 15th in the afternoon?

A. Because the reports that they received on the afternoon of the 15th indicated that there had been shelling, that people had been injured and wounded, that men had been taken -- that men were missing and nobody ⁴⁷⁵⁰ knew what had happened to them. But those were the facts that had been established that night. It was very confusing. And at the time, the people on the ground, my people on the ground, were told that the main priority for them was to help get wounded people to hospital, and that was what they did and that was what they reported.

Q. During your first examination, and you confirmed yet again today that you said that your observers were not there, and today you said in very precise terms that they were five miles away, that is to say, about eight kilometres away from Racak when all of this was taking place; is that right?

A. At the beginning of the Friday when the operation started, there were verifiers in the geographic area - that is, within five miles - who went there, went to the Racak area because of the firing they heard and the activity they saw. As a result of their reports which got to me around about lunchtime, just after lunch up at Pec, I ordered Maisonneuve to go there and to find out precisely what was happening because the reports were very confusing at that stage, and I wanted someone on the ground who had the experience and wisdom of Maisonneuve, and not all of the verifiers had his experience and wisdom.

Q. All right. Then allow me to show you a brief video clip, 34 seconds only.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the technical people please play it for us now.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. This is the moment when the forces enter Racak. This was filmed ⁴⁷⁵¹ by the journalists from Associated Press and other journalists. So we're going to see what is on this footage. So could you please just show the first clipping.

[Videotape played]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The sound too, please.

[Videotape played]

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Pay attention to this now. The police is entering Racak. Look up here, these orange vehicles and your observers. They were present from the very outset, from the very beginning of the police operation. So now I'm asking you the following --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Just a moment. That's what you say. It could show anything.

General, could you assist us to where and when that might be?

THE WITNESS: I don't know when the precise time was, but I believe that in the course of the preliminary operation, when there was firing into the village, not any of my people were present. They were attracted by the sound of the gunfire, and, therefore, they came to the village. And as that clip appears to show, they were behind the village, on the high ground, observing, when the police actually went in. I believe that that was in the course of the afternoon, probably about 3.00 in the afternoon if I have to put a speculative time on it. But I don't know precisely where or what the origin of that clip is, no.

JUDGE MAY: Would Maisonneuve be a witness as to that?

THE WITNESS: No, I don't think he would. He arrived as it was ⁴⁷⁵² getting dark, and that clip appears to show that it was daylight. And it got dark quite early. So I would say that's about 3.00 in the afternoon at the latest. It might be a bit earlier.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You say that your people were not there during the preliminary operation, but they were there when the police entered the village. And the entire testimony in relation to Racak was that it was the police who committed a massacre when they entered the village. So, then, it means that the police committed the massacre in the presence of your observers.

A. I think we did have people within several kilometres. The distance from that village up to that ridge is at least a kilometre, and because of the firing that had been going on, that was as close as the people up on the ridge were prepared to go in soft-skinned vehicles when there appeared to be very little fire discipline. In other words, that if they attempted to go into the village, they were as likely to get shot as not. What they saw from the ridge, they reported. They did not see people being killed. If they had done, they would have reported it. I think I would add that because this is very hilly countryside, it is very difficult to see precisely what is going on behind every fold of ground. That was why, in the absence of being able to go forward, the best thing to do was to get onto the highest piece of ground you could and see what you could from that ground. I've been on those ridges myself, and I know there's a lot of dead ground from those ridges. You certainly can't say all the way up onto -- onto the ridges behind the village, which ⁴⁷⁵³ is where the killings took place.

Q. Yes. But you saw that they were being filmed from the village. Just like the camera sees them from the village, they, from their position, see the village and what is happening in the village. Is that right or is that not right?

A. They would have seen into the village, but they would not have seen things in the detail that that film showed because they were some way away. And with the buildings in the villages, you would not get that clear view of the soldier, the armoured personnel carrier walking down the main street of the village in the way that that was shown.

Q. Well -- but you did see them there, that they were watching from up there. So do you believe your colleague from the OSCE now, the one I quoted to you during the first part of the cross-examination, that the OSCE had not only been informed but had actually been present throughout the action?

A. No, I don't think they were specifically informed. Because if they had been specifically informed that there was going to be a major police operation at a specific time, at a specific date, then we would have made sure people were there to watch it. We hardly ever -- in fact, I cannot remember ever getting advance notice of a specific planned operation in advance of the operation. At no stage in my entire time there did I ever receive advance notice that there was going to be a specific police operation or army operation in a specific location at a specific time. To say, "There have been terrorist attacks and we will do something about it" is not advance notice of that sort. ⁴⁷⁵⁴

Q. All right. But regardless of this explanation, I imagine that you are not questioning the fact that they were present and that journalists were present, as a matter of fact, during the police operation.

A. There were clearly OSCE people up on the ridge, and it was those people whose report came to me, saying that there was a major operation going on in this area, which caused me to send Maisonneuve down there so that he could bring his experienced eye to bear on it.

Q. All right. That means that from the beginning of the operation they were there, but they were not experienced enough, but then Maisonneuve came because --

JUDGE MAY: No. That is not what the witness said. But let's move on. We've exhausted this.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In your statement, you said that you did not see any evidence of any kind of fighting there. As a matter of fact, you made the assertion that the KLA had left the area, that is to say that there had not been any fighting. That is what you claimed.

A. That is my impression, yes, and I can certainly confirm that the area that I walked over, which was the trench system behind the village, had not been fought over.

Q. All right. Allow me to remind you yet again, in view of the position and in view of what you had heard and in view of what you had seen from your Verification Mission, and it seems to me that you had to know this.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please play the second ⁴⁷⁵⁵ video clip. Could we please hear the soundtrack as well.

[Videotape played]

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So this relates to what you said, that there had been no fighting and that you had not seen anything on the basis of which one could conclude that there had been fighting in Racak. I'm not going to play the entire film. I'm keeping it for yet another witness. My question is the following: Is it truly possible that you did not know a thing about this? You have two vehicles that are following the action, there are a few foreign TV crews and groups of journalists there and you did not know a thing about this; is that really possible?

A. I was up at Pec. I was not in Pristina where the communications normally went back to. And the report came to me via Pristina, so it took a bit longer. There had been instances when the first report was not exactly what really happened, which was why I wanted someone with a lot of experience to go there and find out what really was happening. I certainly didn't have the benefit of any film at the time. I would add that the film clip that I've just seen shows that there were -- and I heard the fighting -- the firing, shows that heavy weapons were being used, which were only owned by your forces, to support the entry into the village. There was then small-arms fire, which could have come from anybody, but in my experience, your police tended to fire at areas that might contain something they were worried about. They certainly didn't wait until they saw a target before they opened fire. So everything I've seen on that film clip shows that your police ⁴⁷⁵⁶ went into the village supported by heavy fire, probably firing at anything that moved or look suspicious. I didn't see any evidence on there of fighting coming back -- firing coming back in the opposite direction. So it is possible that the KLA were there at the start of the operation. It's also quite possible that they ran away quite quickly, as they often did, and that your people went into a village from which the KLA had left.

Q. And that they fired regardless of the fact that there were no KLA people there.

A. Yes. That often happened.

Q. All right. Now, does it seem to be logical to you, General, that the police should call the journalists, the cameramen, inform the OSCE and observers and monitors to attend and follow some sort of massacre?

A. No.

Q. And you informed the whole of the world public that this was indeed a massacre and that civilians had been killed. This triggered off a reaction on the part of many statesmen.

Now, you made your assessment although you had not completed an investigation or conducted post-mortems and things of that kind; is that right?

A. Yes. We had not conducted post-mortems. The judgement was made on the basis of the facts as they were seen at the time.

Q. Why were you so quick then? Why were you in a hurry?

A. I don't think we were in a hurry.

Q. Racak was a pretext for the bombing; is that correct? ⁴⁷⁵⁷

JUDGE MAY: No. That's not a proper question. You can ask the witness about what he saw or heard.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, all right, then. Did you hear or see that Walker, on the 10th of April, 2000, in Bonn, made the statement to the effect that the episode in Racak was decisive for the bombing; and do you agree with that?

JUDGE MAY: That's not a matter for the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, then, answer me this: Why did you not -- or, for example, perhaps you didn't want to look at some facts. And during your stay in Kosovo, were you aware of the facts and figures by the committee that conducted the post-mortems? I'm going to read out just some of the points. And the document is one which was disclosed by the Prosecutor, which includes part of that report. It is the Association of Physicians that I'm going to quote, from KO212750. That is the number of the document. It is page 73, and just the conclusion made by the professors who conducted the post-mortems and provided evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just ask Mr. May something? Could you clarify for me, please, whether the time, if I am presenting documents, be deducted from my overall cross-examination time or not? Your answer is very important to me.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It will be added?

JUDGE MAY: No. It will be part of the whole.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So it can only be within the space ⁴⁷⁵⁸ of two hours, is that it, altogether?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

Q. All right. Then I won't place the documents on the ELMO, on the overhead projector - it takes too much time - but I shall be giving them to you. They are the documents that I received with the numbers I received. And it says: "With all 40 post-mortems that were carried out there was not a single detail in which the opinions of all experts present were not of accord."

Then it says: "The presence of nitrate was found in 37 of the 40 bodies that were examined in the post-mortem. Throughout our work in the post-mortem halls, we had the presence of other people, the second secretary of the Finnish embassy in Yugoslavia, although he is not an expert, as well as two representatives of the OSCE and others. On no bodies did we find any intravital or post-mortem effects of blunt or sharp mechanical weapons or any blunt weapons. After every post-mortem, the findings and report were coordinated with those of the experts from Belorussia and 24 of them with the Finnish experts. That is because they turned up later on. During the overall procedure and the conducting of each post-mortem, a tape was made with the soundtrack as well and two or three cameras were used. The criminal investigation association and the Finnish team of experts all took part." All this is contained in this document and may I -- it please be introduced into evidence. And as I say, the number I read out was the number on the document in the upper right-hand corner. ⁴⁷⁵⁹

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, have you got a copy of it?

MR. NICE: No. I haven't yet managed to track down which particular document it is. It looks as though it may have come from the Racak binder, which will be helpful and interesting because of course the whole Racak binder will become an exhibit of the Prosecution's.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: If the accuse would like to tell us where it comes from, it would make life a bit easier.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here it is. It has your number here. K0212750. That is the number. 47 from the beginning, 12747 from the beginning.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't want to waste any time.

JUDGE MAY: That will be found.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, did you know about all this, what I've just read out and quoted from that document?

A. Not at the time, no.

Q. All right. And at the time, did you have the official report by the investigating Judge under the number that it has - I don't want to waste time reading it out - in which it was noted not only the number of weapons that were found on the 15th of January but your threats and demands that procedure be undertaken against the law of criminal proceedings? Are you aware of that note, that report? ⁴⁷⁶⁰

A. I'm not sure which document you're referring to. There are quite a lot that we've dealt with.

Q. It is the official note which speaks about the report made by the investigating Judge, and it is 14/99, the number. And that is where you will find the quotation I read out. I don't want to put it up on the overhead projector, but I consider that it should be admitted into evidence as well, as an exhibit.

And now my next question: At the time, you were informed of the minutes on the investigation, on-site investigation, because it was done in the presence of the OSCE, two Americans Gil Giverson [phoen] and L. Sullivan, as well as an Italian who was there by the name of Giovanni Fantini [phoen]. Then there was a forensic expert, Professor Dobricanin [phoen], and an interpreter Atah Damaj [phoen]. And nobody had any objections to make with respect to the investigation and on-site investigation conducted, and the public Prosecutor was there, Ismet Suftu [phoen], who was an Albanian himself. Do you know about that?

A. I don't know when the incident is that you're referring to.

Q. No. I'm talking about the minutes on the -- about the on-site investigation. The minutes about the investigation conducted on the spot. And it was done in the presence of these individuals whom I mentioned. And it is -- the minutes were compiled on the 18th of January, 1999, and it says the place of the event was attended by two Americans, Gil Giverson and L. Sullivan --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please be asked to read more slowly. ⁴⁷⁶¹

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. -- as well as an Italian, Giovanni Fantini.

JUDGE MAY: You're asked to read more slowly, but you've read this already.

General, can you help us to this? Do you know anything about the minutes of the on-site investigation?

THE WITNESS: I'm not aware of them specifically. They were certainly never brought to my attention by General Loncar, who was the normal means whereby information from the -- from the FRY side would be handed to us. So, no, I'm not aware of this document.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes. But if your representatives were present, that is to say these two Americans and one Italian, then I suppose it is their duty to inform you of the minutes that were compiled at an investigation which they attended. So your employees attended, so you must have known. And it says, among other things here, that they were there.

JUDGE MAY: The witness says he didn't know. Is that right, General?

THE WITNESS: There were many meetings at which people from the OSCE were present at which the FRY authorities present took minutes. At no stage am I aware of those minutes being made available to us at the time, ever.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So in these minutes with your three people plus an interpreter, also one of yours, says -- ⁴⁷⁶²

JUDGE MAY: The witness cannot assist as to the minutes. He knows nothing about them.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it clear, then, that the investigation on the spot was attended by three representatives of the OSCE plus a fourth person who was an interpreter, who was a technical person, but three representatives, basically, the ones enumerated here?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I would like to tender this into evidence as well, as an exhibit.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Just a moment. No doubt that will be part of the binder.

MR. NICE: I'm not sure about the second document. The first document we have tracked down. It was provided separately and is, I think, not part of the binder. So we're sending for documents of that and we'll have them brought down. And if the Chamber so decides, they will be produced as an exhibit. The second one we'll have to track down in the same way. It takes a minute or so because all it has is a number or some other --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, then. Do I need to get permission from the other side to tender documents into evidence?

JUDGE MAY: No. It's more convenient if they can produce copies. But you can put this document in since it can't be traced. If you want to hand it in.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here it is. I am handing them in, ⁴⁷⁶³ all three of them, all three documents.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Perhaps you can give them numbers. Just a moment while they're exhibited.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document which is numbered K0212747 will be Defence Exhibit Number 2. And the second document, which appears to be KPN.6P.14/99, that will be Defence Exhibit 3 ter, and the third document will be -- appears to be the same document. So there's only two.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I handed over three documents.

THE REGISTRAR: The third document will be Defence Exhibit number 4.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, could you give me a precise yes or no answer: Did you know anything about the contents in these documents, regardless of the fact that you say that the documents are unknown to you as such? But what about the contents, the contents that I quoted? Was that something that you were aware of or not?

A. No, not as you stated.

Q. And did you know at the time about the final report by the Prosecution, which is by law the institution that says whether grounds exist for filing a criminal suit or not?

A. No, because we were not there to enforce FRY law.

Q. Well, I assume that the mission was duty-bound to cooperate with ⁴⁷⁶⁴ the organs of power and authority on whose territory it was and to inform -- be informed and inform about procedures of any kind, particularly if they were criminal proceedings. Is that right or not?

A. That is precisely what we did at Racak, and we asked for the people involved to be investigated fully, and that never happened.

Q. All right. I'm going to remind you here that the Prosecution, who is the sole organ, according to Yugoslav law, that is competent to do so, "undertake all steps to refute an armed attack launched by the terrorist organisation called the KLA and in conformity with the law on internal affairs."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So may I tender this document into exhibit as well -- into evidence as well?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. As these facts are not something that was of interest to you, in your report of the 15th of January, you report that in Racak, by the verifiers, it was ascertained that one Albanian was killed and that five others were wounded. All this changed in the space of one day, without an investigation, without an expert finding, and everything was ignored. How do you explain that?

A. What we reported on the Friday night was what we had seen. What we reported on Saturday was what we had seen. In between Friday night and Saturday night, we saw a lot more. We counted a lot more dead bodies, and we made our own conclusions how they had died. We also invited your representative, General Loncar, to come with us, and he could have been there on Saturday and he could have seen it at the same time as we did. ⁴⁷⁶⁵ He declined.

Q. All right. Don't you know that the fighting with the KLA took place in three villages in the vicinity on that same day?

A. I know that your forces fired into several villages in that vicinity, not just Racak. All the way down the valley, the villages were fired into, yes. At no stage did I see any evidence of casualties to the KLA, nor was I ever shown weapons or uniforms which may have been worn or used by these KLA. It is my belief that they ran away very early on in the action.

Q. And did you know that Racak was a stronghold of the KLA, in fact?

A. No, I certainly didn't.

Q. And do you know, for example, that Hashim Thaci, for a BBC interview confirmed that Racak was the KLA stronghold and that there was serious fighting going on there? Do you know about that?

A. I would be very interested to know when he said that and to whom and in what circumstances. It sounds like being wise after the event to me.

Q. No I'm talking about his subsequent interview to the BBC. And that is easy to find, it's all public evidence so it can be ascertained. But do you know about it? If you don't, just say no.

A. No, I don't.

Q. And what about Maisonneuve when he returned from Racak on the first day? Did he tell you that in the Racak, from the launching of the operations, the KVM foreign reporters and journalists were present? Did he happen to mention that to you? ⁴⁷⁶⁶

A. Of course he knew and I knew, and the reports of the people who were there before him were included in the reports that came to us that night, but they were only able to tell us what they could see from the hillside.

Q. Yes. But you said yourself during the first examination here that your forces went into Racak that day and they didn't stay up on the ridge. Are you changing your testimony now or not?

A. No. I'm telling you different things that happened at different times. First there were people on the ridge who had arrived after the operation had started and who observed the firing into the village and reported that back to us. Maisonneuve arrived and conferred with them and then he and others went into the village after the firing had stopped at the end of the day after your police were leaving the village. At that point, they talked to the villagers, were told that there were wounded people, one person was dead, and that those were the main things they were concerned about at that moment. That was their main priority, to get the wounded to medical care. That was what they did. At that stage, no one was aware that the people up on the hill had been killed. And I would repeat again: By this stage, it was getting dark.

Q. All right. You probably knew about the fact that the bodies that you describe had on them several layers of clothing, boots and other clear indices characteristic of people spending a lot of time outside, say, for example, in trenches or the like. Do you remember that, those details?

A. I remember that several of the dead were wearing wellington boots ⁴⁷⁶⁷ which are not useful in cold country, so I would say that they were not all -- they were not dressed for fighting in the open and living in the open; they were dressed for working outside as farmers.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since we don't have a lot of time, it's running out very fast, I ask that the testimony which the other side gave here of Dr. Dusan Dunjic, who describes the state of affairs in which the bodies were found, to be tendered into evidence. So it is a statement, a Prosecution statement, and refers to Dr. Dusan Dunjic. I haven't got the number here, haven't jotted down the number, but I think the name will be sufficient for you to pinpoint the document and I ask that it be tendered into evidence.

JUDGE MAY: We'll consider that in due course.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you know that for at least 13 out of the 45 persons who are listed as killed, there are no tombstones, graves at the cemetery in Racak called the Martyrs' Cemetery?

A. No. But I know that when we counted up the number of dead that had been found in the different locations, it came to either 45 or 46 at the time.

Q. And at the time, during your stay there, do you know that bullets were found which had been shot from different positions, typical of armed combat, in the bodies?

A. I know that the bullets were found in the bodies, and I know what the state of the bodies was when I saw them.

Q. However -- now, do you know - and could this have led you to make ⁴⁷⁶⁸ different assessments - what the foreign press wrote about and reported? I quoted the Berliner Zeitung and Konkret [phoen] and so on and so forth. I quoted those to you. Now I'm going to quote something else, a portion from Elzecer [phoen] book Racak and Mrs. Ranta. It says only the Berliner Zeitung, in the German papers, dealt with this issue. On the 13th of March, 1999, it was published. "High representatives of OSCE were told that 45 Albanians were uncovered in mid-January in the village of Racak and that they were not the victims of Serb massacres over civilians. It says internally in the OSCE that this was rigged by the Albanian side and that the results were achieved from the centre of the Kosovska Mission, that is to say, independently of the expertise" --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop this. Who is this author you're quoting, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Elzecer, and the book is "Racak and the vagaries of Mrs. Ranta." And --

JUDGE MAY: No doubt you can call the witness -- the author to give evidence if you want, but it's pointless putting it to this witness. It's simply his or her opinions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you know that a statement published on the 17th of March was composed of only five pages and the overall report, according to the Berliner Zeitung was 21 kilogrammes in weight?

THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please speak -- read more slowly.

THE WITNESS: On the 17th of March, I was getting -- making -- ⁴⁷⁶⁹

THE INTERPRETER: Oskar Fischer [phoen] was the presiding officer of the European organisation at that time.

THE WITNESS: Okay. On the 17th of March, I was checking the evacuation plans so that we could get everybody out on the 20th if we were ordered to. That was my top priority at that moment. I'm afraid that I was no longer worrying about Racak at that moment.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right, then. But do you know that it was noted that the victims were not massacred with their heads cut off and only one case were there traces of a blunt object? In two cases, the heads were post-mortemly cut off. Do you -- by animals, eaten away by animals. Are you aware of that?

A. I was aware that one of the corpses down in the village had been decapitated. Yes. That is what we saw on the Saturday afternoon. Beyond that, the corpses on the hill, which were the group of, I think, about 23, were the ones which had been shot and had all fallen down all over one another. That was what we saw, that was what we reported.

Q. And do you know of this assertion by experts who say that if killings are undertaken -- executions are undertaken under command, then the -- the --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please be asked to read more solely. It is impossible to translate at this speed.

JUDGE MAY: You are asked to slow down. And in any event, who are you quoting now, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm quoting a report by the ⁴⁷⁷⁰ Pages blanches insérées aux fins d'assurer la correspondance entre la pagination anglaise et la pagination française. Pages 4770 to 4777. ⁴⁷⁷⁸ forensics -- forensic experts. And in the addendum, it says: "The contradictions between the information received and the results of forensic autopsy can be discarded only if we confirm or refute the cause of death." This refers to the first reports by Walker, who stated that it was the Serbs who had committed the massacre.

JUDGE MAY: It's not -- it's not a matter for the witness. This is something we are going to have to determine.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. So you're not going to accept this, then, as an exhibit.

JUDGE MAY: No.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, do you allow for the possibility that the bodies had been brought in, transported from somewhere else, et cetera? Do you allow for that possibility?

A. No. That was not the impression I gained at the time up on the hill. The bodies were too intermingled and jumbled over one another for that to be a possibility, in my view and in the view of those who were there with me.

Q. And do you know about what the Times said on the 20th of January, 1999? And he says precisely that the bodies had been brought in, on the basis of what the French journalist said. They come to that conclusion.

JUDGE MAY: This is the opinion of a journalist. It's of no use to us now. We're dealing with evidence. The witness has given his answer to the question which you put.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴⁷⁷⁹

Q. All right. Let's skip the journalist then. But I cannot skip over Helena Ranta, who speaks differently from you in relation to the possibility of having manipulated the bodies. Here's an opportunity to jog your memory.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the next video clip please be shown, and I kindly ask the interpreters to interpret.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "There was doubt here as to whether there was really a massacre in Racak. It pointed out something else and this is the first time she speaks of it for television spectators. "I am aware of the fact that this entire scene had been rigged, because that is indeed possible to do. That is what our first findings had indicated. Also, later forensic examinations that we carried out on the scene in 1999 show that, and we gave the results directly to the International Tribunal in The Hague.

"Ambassador Walker came to Racak on Saturday, and that was his very own decision, to qualify the event as a massacre. I have systematically avoided the use of that term.

"There is a suspicion that it was a massacre. What could have led to that in Racak? Helena Ranta has information to the effect that among the persons who were dead in Racak were members of the KLA as well. "At that time, Racak was a KLA stronghold. I am convinced that there is quite a bit of information that at that time there were undoubtedly conflicts, clashes between the KLA and the Serb forces. There is no doubt about that. ⁴⁷⁸⁰ "In addition to that, it was said to me, and I read information about that, that at that place and on that day, members of the KLA were killed."

JUDGE MAY: Yes. General, is there anything you can say about that? No doubt we shall hear this -- this witness in due course, but as far as you're concerned, is there anything useful that you can say about her opinions?

THE WITNESS: I don't think so, sir, no.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, you can call the witness. But the fact that we see something on television isn't evidence of it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, as for this particular lady witness, the other side have been mentioning her. And we see that the witness precisely speaks of that, that Walker used the word "massacre" and --

JUDGE MAY: We've been over this. Now, your time is limited with this witness, so it would be an idea to move on to something else.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I shall continue. However, I would like you to play the next video clip, just one more, and then there's another one after that, but we're going to wait for that next one. Now the following one, please. I hope I haven't made a mistake.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Walker gathered about 30 journalists, went there with them and, after a short while, he said that this was a massacre committed by the Serbs.

"At that moment, he could not have made any kind of judgement. ⁴⁷⁸¹ However, this opinion was taken over by the OSCE, the United Nations, all governments of the world.

"A day later, NATO met at an extraordinary meeting, which was quite unusual. With this kind of behaviour, Walker had lit the fuse of war."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I don't want to repeat things yet again because Mr. May opposes this. What Christopher Chatelle [phoen] said in Le Monde and also what Le Figaro said - and I quoted these sources earlier - and they say contrary to what you have been saying. However, the question is the following: Since there were many statements made by persons who were there, did such statements encourage you to take a more comprehensive view of this matter, especially because the post-mortem had not been carried out yet, or the investigation? Simply one day Walker's statements, the next day the NATO extraordinary meeting before anything is actually established in relation to such a complex event. What would your explanation of this be?

A. All of these journalists weren't on that hillside. The people that were on that hillside with me were unanimous in their view that those people who were dead had been killed by your forces and had not been resisting at the time. We, at the time, asked or called for a joint investigation which might have established more facts, and you could have gone along and agreed with that investigation. You could have suspended the commanding officer while the investigation went on. You did nothing in that matter. Therefore, we ended up drawing our own conclusions. And I have given you my conclusions as I remember them at the time. And I ⁴⁷⁸² still think that they are as I gave them at the time.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, the time is moving on, and we must go out on to another topic. You have put very fully and at length a series of opinions about this matter. The witness has answered as best he could. So let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it is my understanding that I have an entire hour left, Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, but going over the same point from different directions over and over again is of no assistance to the Court and wastes time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a very important point, Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: I agree. It is an important point, but you have covered it fully. You have put a series of opinions to the witness which he can't deal with. He's given his evidence. Now, if there's something you want to ask him about what he saw, then you can, but simply putting opinions to him is of no assistance to anybody.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know the name of Eamon Smith?

A. No, but I think there's quite a lot of people with the name Smith around, so I may have missed a few.

Q. That's a verifier, an Irish officer, the first one who found the corpses. He stated that there were many casings there, practically only ammunition coming from AK47's. Are you aware of the fact that this ⁴⁷⁸³ ammunition was used by the KLA?

A. Both sides used the AK47, yes. It was the weapon of choice.

Q. Please. The OSCE report on KLA armament says: "The KLA used different kinds of small arms but most often AK47's. The largest number came from Albania after that country, in 1997, sunk into political and economic chaos." Do you know this from OSCE reports?

A. Yes, and I was observing the events in Albania in 1997 and I know that armouries were ransacked and a lot of weapons went missing, but the AK47 was also used by all of your forces.

Q. Well, our forces did not have Chinese manufactured ammunition. Are you aware of that or are you not aware of that?

A. I'm not aware that the batch numbers were ever made available to us. I'm certainly aware of an ability to use the other side's weapons. It's been done many times in the past.

Q. Well, I did not hear that that was ever established in the conflicts in Kosovo and Metohija and that the army and the police took ammunition from the KLA. Is this some new piece of information that you are providing here and now?

A. No. I am saying simply that I was not aware that only the KLA were using Chinese ammunition, and I saw no evidence to suggest that only the KLA were using Chinese ammunition.

MR. NICE: Before we move on --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Exclusively, no --

JUDGE MAY: Yes. ⁴⁷⁸⁴

MR. NICE: Before we move on, the question couldn't make clear if the Irishman named Smith has asserted that the ammunition is Chinese. Or if the questioning made clear, the transcript is deficient. I don't have the statement at hand. It might help if we clarified that before losing it by passage of time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, we are going to have that clarified some other time because I don't have time right now to go into this particular detail.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Could you please answer my following question: Are you aware of the findings of Dr. Milan Stulic, a professor at the University of Belgrade, at the school of law there? After a detailed analysis, he came to the conclusion that all persons killed --

JUDGE MAY: No. You can put this evidence before us in due course. There's no point, again, putting more opinions to the witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I am asking whether the witness is aware of this analysis made by Professor --

JUDGE MAY: Well -- are you aware, General, of the analysis of the professor from Belgrade?

THE WITNESS: No, I'm not.

JUDGE MAY: Next question, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. When we take all of this into account, is Diana Johnson perhaps right, on the 13th of May, 1999, in Paris, when she says -- ⁴⁷⁸⁵

JUDGE MAY: No. That's more opinions.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The last time you said that the order "terrorism" is an emotive word and it is more appropriate to use the term "the rebels." However, you stated in a document disclosed by the Prosecution, that is your diagram DZ, Serb version 0304656.60, on the right-hand side, you said, "Terrorism all over the province." Is that right?

A. It may have been. What is -- please, what is the point of the question?

Q. Well, the point is that last time, when I asked you about terrorism, you said that you did not wish to use the word "terrorism" because it's an emotive word, and in your own diagram, you wrote, "terrorism all over the province." In your diagram. So you then used this emotive term, as you had referred to it. Is that right or is that not right?

A. There were moments when we did use the word "terrorist" to describe activity, and we did it deliberately to make the point that most of the time we were not using the word. So when there were activities which were genuinely designed, in our view, to terrorise the population, we used the word "terrorist." And so we tried to use it more specifically not as a general catchall phrase.

JUDGE MAY: That would be a convenient moment for our break. We'll adjourn now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m. ⁴⁷⁸⁶

--- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, you have 50 minutes left.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You are aware of the Security Council Resolution 1160, dated the 31st of March, 1998? You are aware of its contents, aren't you?

A. In general, yes.

Q. And Resolution 1199 of the 23rd of September, 1998?

A. Again, in general, yes.

Q. And also Resolution 1203 of the 24th of October, 1998?

A. Yes, indeed.

Q. In all these Resolutions, terrorism in Kosovo is referred to; is that right?

A. I would need to check them, but I know that it is referred to in at least some of them.

Q. Well, I mentioned these three to you in which it is mentioned. Do you know and do you believe that the KLA is a terrorist organisation?

A. At the time, I think it had some elements which were -- which were capable of terrorist acts. I'm not convinced that the whole thing was a terrorist organisation. At the time, I thought that some of the resistance was as a result of the actions of your forces.

Q. All right. Tell me, do you know about the statement made by Gelbard, the US representative for the Balkans, who was also an expert on terrorism, that he said that the KLA was a terrorist organisation? ⁴⁷⁸⁷

A. I don't specifically know where or when he said that, but if that's his opinion, I -- I acknowledge that that was his opinion.

Q. I would like to ask that the book be admitted into evidence as well, the book that was brought into these proceedings by the Prosecution. That is a book by Human Rights Watch. It's called "Under Order." It quotes Gelbard's authentic statement in this regard, that is to say with regard to the nature of the KLA as a terrorist organisation.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. If you want to put it in, let's have a look at it. Or you can put it in after the hearing.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This document was provided by the other side in its --

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- in its entirety.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let's not waste any further time about it. We'll have the Prosecution look for it in due course.

MR. NICE: It's already exhibited. I'll give you the number in a minute.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please. Since you gave a descriptive answer and in rather relative terms, could you please give me a yes or no answer to the question whether the KLA is a terrorist organisation or not.

JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered it as best he can, and he's certainly not going to be badgered for a further answer.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please. This is a general and the ⁴⁷⁸⁸ executive chief of the Verification Mission in Kosovo. This is his testimony.

JUDGE MAY: We're not going to get any further on this particular point. We know what you say about it. We will hear some evidence. General, unless there's anything useful you think you might be able to add.

THE WITNESS: Well, if I can say, sir, that I do think they had terrorist elements in them, but I do not think that every member of this organisation was a terrorist as such. Many of the things that I saw would have made me think about joining the KLA if I had been an Albanian living there at the time. So there were moments when one's sympathy was certainly aroused for the local people because of the outrageous acts committed on them by the forces of law and order who were supposed to be protecting them.

I think I've probably gone further than my testimony is supposed to on that point.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you know, at least for the time when you were in Kosovo, about the crimes that were carried out against both Serbs and Albanians and Turks and Romany, various members of the population, by the KLA?

A. I'm certainly aware that the police suffered well over a hundred casualties in the year from March 1998 to March 1999, and that was clearly reprehensible.

Q. But except for the police, are you aware of all the civilian casualties among the Serb and Albanian population? ⁴⁷⁸⁹

A. Yes, I am, and I think I referred to the moments when bodies were found early in the morning at various times and generally at a rate of about four a week throughout the period from January through 'til when we left in March 1999. So, yes, we were aware of all of this level of underlying violence.

Q. Very well. Last time you mentioned on the events that took place in the village of Rogovo. In the document that the Prosecution provided together with your statement, with the diagram DZ, and the number was 03045366, and it was under point 85, in fact, where you spoke about Rogovo, and I quote: "Probably a shelter of the KLA but not all of them were armed," words to that effect. Is that correct?

A. Yes. I think that's more or less what I said.

Q. And last time, you also commented when photographs were shown of members of the police force, you commented that they were not typically dressed and accorded special weight to the circumstances and emphasised the police force, the police, as being the perpetrators of some kind of alleged crime; is that right?

A. I said I had some doubts as to the circumstances in which the action took place. Specifically, I was very surprised that in an action such as took place, no one was captured alive and no one was wounded, which seemed very odd if you look at any normal exchange of fire when at least as many people get wounded as get killed.

Q. Well, precisely because of a statement of yours like that, I should like to ask the technical booth to play the next excerpt, which relates to that, in fact. And it's the last remaining excerpt that I ⁴⁷⁹⁰ shall be playing.

[Videotape played]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we hear the soundtrack as well, please.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "29th of January 1999, 24 Albanians were killed and one Serb policeman. So there was a clash. It was not a massacre of civilians, as the Defence Minister claimed. "The historians and a foreign television crew provide evidence of what actually happened. Arms next to Albanians who were allegedly civilians. But they're wearing uniforms, and some of them had KLA insignia.

"The first observer of the OSCE that came to the spot was this man on the left here. He is German policeman Henning Hensch [phoen]. It is true what the Defence Minister said on the first day in his statement that I saw via Deutsche Welle, but this does not coincide with what I saw. Nevertheless, the official report about the event in Rogovo speaks about a massacre over civilians -- of civilians. We found a minivan there with 14 bodies that had been bullet-ridden. Three bodies were outside the vehicle. In the garage, there were five more bodies of KLA fighters wearing uniforms.

"Three hundred metres away, we found four more bodies. The bodies that the Defence Minister showed, we collected together and placed them in one spot. The Serb policemen, myself, and my two Russian colleagues. "So that's how this filming came into being about the alleged ⁴⁷⁹¹ execution as Minister Sharpe presented itself and they have nothing to do with what actually happened. It was quite clear that this was no case of massacre of the civilian population because, according to the OSCE, even the KLA commanders said that it was the fighters that had lost their lives there, fighting for the cause and ideal of Greater Albania. And the German minister, apart from that, turned it into a massacre."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So you saw there what the German policeman said, who was a member of your mission and who claims that it is true that what his minister stated does not correspond to what he saw on the spot and that it does not correspond with his report, the report that he sent in. Now, did you know about that?

A. I certainly didn't know about what the German minister said, but I can remind you of what I said I saw, which was that, I think, four people were wearing KLA uniforms, and I think 12 weapons were shown as having been found with the KLA, or with the civilians, four of whom were in KLA uniform. And I think I said that at the time in front of cameras as well, with General Loncar there.

Q. I don't understand what you mean. Explain this to me as a soldier.

If the police are shot at from 12 rifles and not 25, can the police count the rifles that the shooting was done from and then establish whether it would return fire or not, and are the 12 rifles that they were shot at, is that too little, even if there were only 12, as you yourself claim? Would that be considered too little, too few? ⁴⁷⁹²

A. I don't know exactly what happened at the scene when the police attacked, but I found it remarkable that everybody was killed who appeared to be on the -- inside that compound who was male. I don't know how many weapons were actually in the hands of the people inside. They could have been brought into the scene from outside by anybody, because there was a quite a long lapse between the incident and my people being allowed in to look at it, and your people were inside there throughout all of that time when mine had no access. So those 12 weapons could have been planted. Had there been good forensic evidence, had there been a proper forensic inquiry, then these facts could have been established. But you can't establish the facts when the investigating Judge comes in, spends one hour sloshing around in the ankle-deep mud and declares the investigation over, which is what happened.

Q. All right. When you say that all of them were killed, do you allow for the fact that someone might have escaped?

A. No. Some might have escaped, but I'm surprised, of the 25 killed, there were no wounded. That would make me worried as to what happened at the end of the fight.

Q. All right. A moment ago when you were describing everything that could have happened, theoretically speaking, that anything could have happened, now, on the basis of those assumptions that something could have happened but perhaps did not happen, would that be sufficient to interpret -- give an interpretation of the event which would give rise to a reaction, the kind of reaction that condemns, although it was obvious that it was a clash between the KLA and the police forces? ⁴⁷⁹³

A. Yes, because the fact that it was a clash between the KLA and the police forces does not give the police forces of any nation carte blanche to go in and kill everybody. Why were they not apprehended and put on trial?

Q. And do you maintain that an execution was carried out or that -- whether those men died in battle? All reports say that those people were killed in battle.

A. All the reports I've seen said that they were dead when we arrived. I don't know what happened at the end of the action. It is possible that people, all of them, were killed in battle, 25 of them sharing 12 weapons. It doesn't fit my experience of the KLA. They tended not to fight when they were confronted with overwhelming force; they tended to run away.

Q. Well, perhaps something like that did happen to a part of that group, namely that they did escape.

A. Then I'm surprised that we haven't met some of this large number of people that might have escaped.

Q. But you, nevertheless, say perhaps -- you say perhaps - a conditional sentence - that perhaps it might have been a clash between the KLA and MUP. You use the conditional tense.

A. Yes, I do, because this was two weeks after Racak, so it was in everyone's interest that any significant event like this was properly investigated and the facts established beyond reasonable doubt, and there seemed very little appetite among your people on the ground to do that. That was what made me suspicious, but no more than that because I had no ⁴⁷⁹⁴ evidence, otherwise I would have stated it.

Q. All right. But at that time you made no comment or objection to the cooperation between the police and the Verification Mission. You made no criticism of it.

A. I was not seeking more antagonism between the police and the verification unit at the time. I certainly did not express any satisfaction with what had been done. I described with General Loncar, in front of cameras, what I had been shown and made the point at the time of the time that had elapsed between arriving and being shown what was inside the compound. So you're right, I didn't speculate. I didn't think at that stage it was helpful to. The situation there was quite critical as a result of Racak, as a result of Walker having been made persona non grata. There was a lot of media speculation. I was not prepared to add to it in a way that would have been unhelpful.

Q. All right. But I'm sure you know that on that particular day, the 29th of January, 1999, at about 6.30 a.m., in that village of Rogovo, the Gjakove municipality, at a municipal patrol of the Djakovica SUP, a terrorist attack was launched by a rather large group of KLA members where Rakovic Predrag, a policeman was killed. Is that correct or not?

A. I don't know if that's correct. That's the account we were given but we didn't have people there at the time. I know a policeman was killed. I know that, in general, there was a clash between MUP and KLA in the early hours of that morning at that place. I do not know what specifically happened, what the sequence of events was, who started -- who started what, who saw each other first, who fired first, whether anybody ⁴⁷⁹⁵ attempted to surrender, what subsequently happened. I just don't know any of that, and that is why a proper forensic examination at the time would have been in everybody's interest.

Q. Well, why, then, did you not ask for an examination of that kind if you had your doubts at the time?

A. I actually did. We attempted to get the Finnish forensic team to stay on and carry out that investigation, but that was not possible for reasons that I wasn't -- that were never made clear to me. I certainly said let's do a proper forensic examination, and I certainly commented on the fact that it's very difficult to ascertain what precisely happened in an area several hundred metres square that is a very, very slushy, dirty, muddy area inside an hour. I felt it was a most inadequate investigation at the time and said so.

Q. And do you know that then, after the killing of the policeman -- or, rather, the attack by a large group of terrorists on the patrol, police patrol of the SUP of Djakovica, that the group of terrorists fled to the house of Seladin Salaja from whence it opened fire on the members of the police force and that, after that, they found the rifle belonging to the policeman who was killed, in the house, Predrag Rakovic?

A. That is not my reading of what happened. As I recall it, one of the corpses was found having been shot sitting on the lavatory. You don't go to the lavatory if you're in the middle of an exchange of fire. So there were suspicious circumstances about this -- this incident.

Q. And were you informed of the fact that the house of Berisha Xhderit was a terrorist base in Rogovo? Precisely in yard of that house ⁴⁷⁹⁶ was where the terrorists were killed.

A. We later were informed, I believe, that that was used as a terrorist safe house, yes.

Q. And do you know that from the van, the Isuzu van - I don't want to quote the licence plates - which was in the courtyard of this particular house, that they shot at the policeman from there, just as they did from the house? Did you know about that?

A. No. But there were over 200 bullet holes in that red van, and I think most of them were made by bullets going into it, not coming out of it.

Q. Well, I assume that you as a soldier know full well that when you shoot out of a van, you can't find holes from the bullets exiting from the -- fired from the weapons that were used to shoot at the policemen. Is that logical or not?

A. I think my point is I have no idea precisely what went on in the courtyard, but I know what I saw when I went into the courtyard, and the people -- and the van had been riddled with fire.

Q. Well, isn't it logical that if the shooting -- isn't that logical if the shooting was coming from the van, if they were shooting at the policemen from the van?

A. Not -- you don't shoot through the body of the van in order to shoot out of the van, no. I would say if you are going to shoot from inside the van, you shoot through the window.

Q. So in your country, when criminals shoot at the police, it is allowed only to shoot through the windows and not at a vehicle? It has to ⁴⁷⁹⁷ hit the window -- the windows; is that right?

A. When the police shoot at criminals, they shoot aimed shots and they account for every round they fire. There is no evidence that that ever happened with your police.

Q. And do you know that this group was led with the infamous Yahi Ibrahimaj [phoen] who was the organiser of the attack on the members of the police force two days previously, that is to say on the 27th of January, 1999, at the Bishtrizhine place when two policemen were seriously wounded? Do you know about that incident?

A. I know that there had been an attack on the police, and if you'd been able to catch the perpetrator on put him on trial, you could have sent him to gaol for a long time. But you would have needed evidence that stood up in court to do that.

Q. So despite all these assumptions, the ones that you've been talking about, and last time you saw a photograph of the van and the police forces, the bodies of the terrorists, and you come to a conclusion that it was in fact their liquidation. Is that a correct description, would you say, of what you did?

A. I have never said it was their liquidation in so many words, but I have always expressed doubt that so many people could be killed in such a way without anyone attempting to surrender and being -- being taken prisoner. Furthermore, the lack of evidence that was ever produced, the lack of a proper investigation at the time all makes me worry, in the context of where we were and when we were at the time, with Racak two weeks behind us, with the Contact Group meeting the next day, that it was ⁴⁷⁹⁸ in everybody's interest that the facts of this event be made as clear as possible. And I never detected any willingness on any of your officials to do that.

Q. Well, all right. Do you know that 14 automatic rifles made in China, not 12, as you said, but 14 made in China were found and a large quantity of ammunition as well, a pistol, the Zbrojovka, and six made-in-China bombs, grenades, a bulletproof vest, US-produced, and that in Xhderit Berisha's yard some spoons were found and bombs which were also made in China. Do you know -- are you aware of this whole list of things, of items that was discovered on the basis of the investigation carried out on the spot, on-site investigation?

A. The number of weapons I counted was 12. I did not see -- I think I may have seen a bulletproof vest but I wasn't aware that possession of a bulletproof vest was a capital offence anywhere.

Q. No, I'm not talking about that. All I'm doing is reading out a list of items found. I don't want to skip over a single of those items which might comprise fighting and combat equipment, and civilians don't usually wear bulletproof vests, especially the parts of the bombs that were found testified to the fact that not only did the shooting come from the house and the van but that grenades were thrown at the police as well. Does that seem to you be something that would be logical or not?

A. I had no reports of grenades being thrown at any time. I only heard reports of small-arms fire.

Q. Very well. So grenades are heavy weaponry; is that it?

A. I'm saying that the fire that was described by the people who ⁴⁷⁹⁹ described it to me and to my people was of small-arms fire, that is, rifles and automatic weapons. I don't recall hearing about grenades being used. But I'm not really sure what the relevance of whether they were or were not used was because both sides had access to them.

Q. Well, these were parts of bombs and grenades that were made in China. I quoted that a moment ago from the report, the on-site report. So they weren't thrown by members of the police force. That's clear.

A. Then it would have been terrific to have captured some of these people alive, to have put them on trial, to have produced all this evidence, and as I said, to have sentenced them in a proper court of law to a prison sentence. That's what everybody else does.

Q. Well, all right. Now, do you know how many terrorists were taken into custody in Kosovo and brought before a court of law?

A. I know that there were quite a lot of people who were detained, and we expended quite a lot of effort as a mission attempting to gain access to the prisons so that these people could be -- could be talked to. I'm not aware of very much access having been accorded, but I was not the member of the mission whose task this was. I am, however, aware that these requests were made and were routinely denied.

Q. I'm talking about something else, Mr. Drewienkiewicz. If you are suggesting that the police force did not wish to arrest these people but wished to kill them, then how come so many terrorists were indeed detained, taken into custody, and taken to court if it was indeed the police's intention to kill them rather than take them into custody? Why did it not then kill all those that it had arrested and taken to court? ⁴⁸⁰⁰

A. It was my experience that every time there was an attack on armed -- armed KLA, that there were very few prisoners ever taken. In my experience, I was aware of three incidents in which over a hundred people were killed and only -- only nine were taken prisoner. That's -- and I know that at the first of those incidents, on the border in December, a lot ran away. But nonetheless, the lack of prisoners in these exchanges does seem very odd to me.

Q. Mr. Drewienkiewicz, in this connection, in regard of this incident which you mentioned and brought up once again, in your first testimony you expressly stated that it was a legal ambush at the border. Do you still maintain that?

A. Yes, I do. I think it was a legal act for a sovereign state to defend its borders against people carrying weapons in.

Q. All right. Let's go back to Rogovo. Do you know that two terrorists wore camouflage uniforms, four black uniforms with KLA insignia, while the rest wore different kinds of semi-military clothing and that they were identified? I don't want to spend my time by reading all of these names, but a large number of them among those who were identified are not from the village of Rogovo. That is to say, they come from Klecka, Donji Ratis, Smolnice, Jablanica, Bucani, Drenje, Svarahiren [phoen], et cetera.

Doesn't that seem unusual to you that a large number of those persons who lost their lives were not from the village of Rogovo? Therefore, they were a formation that was not attached to that particular locality. ⁴⁸⁰¹

A. Yes. I'm quite prepared to accept that they didn't live in Rogovo, that they may well have been moving from somewhere, probably in Albania, to somewhere further east within Kosovo and that they overnighted in Rogovo, yes, okay, but that doesn't mean they all had to be killed.

Q. How did you get this idea that the police had the intention of killing all of them? They were simply exposed to fire from 6.30 a.m. And I said that to you awhile ago. It's not that the police attacked them, they attacked the police patrol, and then they fled and then they continued to shoot at the police.

A. That is one possible interpretation of the events, but I have no personal knowledge that that was the case. I have said what I saw. There were 25 dead people. Four of them were in KLA uniform. I saw 12 weapons. It is quite possible that they had all been using the house as a safe house overnight and were proposing to move on elsewhere into Kosovo the next day. They may well all have been KLA members. But I still don't see why they all had to be killed.

Q. And do you find it possible that what the police report says is true, that is to say that they killed a policeman first and that then these men got killed during the crossfire with the police? Do you allow for that possibility or do you preclude it?

A. No. That's certainly possible.

Q. All right. And do you know that in the monthly report of the OSCE from the 20th of February 1999 that pertains to the period between mid-January and mid-February, it says that one of the commanders of the KLA in Pec admitted that 18 out of 25 terrorists were members of the KLA ⁴⁸⁰² as far as this event was concerned? Are you aware of that? That's what it says in your report.

A. Yes. I remember that coming in. We got that information certainly several days, if not weeks, after the event. It was not at odds with our view of the event, that it may well have been a safe house used by the KLA because people were coming in from Albania on their way into the rest of Kosovo. So that was not different to what we saw as a possible scenario.

Q. You established in the document that the Prosecutor attached to your statement, that's the diagram DZ 03044567, under number 120, that you are concerned that the KLA leadership is losing control over KLA zones. My question is: Why were you concerned?

A. Because it was clear to us that the KLA were, from time to time, not obeying the orders that they received down their chain of command. It always took a long time for their orders to get down the chain of command. But there were moments when we felt that they were -- they were not restraining themselves at a time when their high command had told them to restrain themselves. I think it was specifically when Rambouillet was on.

Q. Last time, you provided a table containing violations of Security Council resolutions. Bearing in mind your system of designation, it seems that it was only the army of Yugoslavia that was violating the Resolution. However, if you look at the contents, many violations came from the KLA. For example, on page 20, the incident from the 22nd and 25th of January. You said this was a violation. This empty space means it was the fault of the army of Yugoslavia. And in the description of the 22nd, you say: "In ⁴⁸⁰³ Nebola the KLA abducted five Serb civilians. They say that they will not release them until the FRY releases nine Albanians from a border incident. The KLA threatens to start a new war at 0800 hours," et cetera, et cetera. How can you call that a violation by the army?

Or this other example that I mentioned of the 25th of January. Again, the space is filled out the same way. You say: "In Glogovac, the Verification Mission heard firing and the MUP said that they had wounded a member of the KLA who was shooting at -- who was shooting at him. The authorities showed an AK47 with ammunition belts which allegedly belonged to the wounded person, who was arrested and taken to hospital in Pristina." How can that be an incident that you ascribe to the forces of Yugoslavia? Both of them, actually. Do you have any explanation for that?

A. I would need to go through that -- through that entire table. The table was designed to show the sort of events that were happening and to show the level of violence that was happening on both sides. I think that was established quite specifically by that document. However, I was not the author of that document. That was put together by -- by some of the researchers in Pristina, and it was sent to, I think, the Security Council to indicate the level of compliance by both sides with their Security Council Resolutions.

Q. All right. But this was under your control. So irrespective of whether -- well, look at the 20th of January, for instance. Again a violation of the Security Council Resolution. You give the following description: "Three brothers were arrested for having weapons." That is ⁴⁸⁰⁴ to say, illegal possession of a weapon.

What is the incident involved that is ascribed to the forces of Yugoslavia? On the 20th of January, you say - page 19 of this document of yours - you say: "The village was surrounded by members of the MUP with eight to ten vehicles. Three brothers, two teachers, and a doctor were arrested for possession of weapons." That is to say, nobody was killed. The police was conducting a search. You know that according to the Criminal Code of Yugoslavia, illegal possession of weapons entails the possibility of a rather high prison sentence. I don't have to go into all of that now. So what is the violation committed by the Yugoslavs? Then you have here those empty spaces of yours, the little blanks that mean that it was the Yugoslav authorities that violated the Security Council Resolution.

Also on the 20th of January, you say --

MR. NICE: About time we had a question.

JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry?

MR. NICE: About time we had a question.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: And also, even if the general can follow what the accused is asking him, there's nothing on the ELMO to assist the rest of the public to follow what is being asked.

JUDGE MAY: Time is going on. Mr. Milosevic, you have got three more minutes. Is there a question you want to ask?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, but of course I have many more questions. Unfortunately, then I have to leave this diagram. It was not ⁴⁸⁰⁵ my understanding that I had only three minutes left. You told me that I had 50 minutes left when we started.

JUDGE MAY: That was 47 minutes ago.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. To the best of your knowledge, were there any foreign fighters in Kosovo on the KLA side while you were there with the mission?

A. I never met any personally. I certainly heard an unconfirmed report that there were.

Q. I'm asking you about your knowledge. I'm not asking you about your encounters. You were the operations chief of the mission. I'm asking you whether you had any knowledge of this, not whether you encountered such persons.

A. I heard an unconfirmed report, and I then attempted to find out more about it and was never able to find out anything more about it. So it was not -- it never became fact, as far as I was concerned.

Q. And how do you then explain the telegram that was sent by their commander, Tahir Zenaj, on the occasion of the fighting around the village of Lodza? And he says that: "This is part of our recent history as a battle that was won with the professionalism, wisdom, and courage of KLA members and members of foreign troops." That's what he says in a telegram that was published publicly.

And here, on several occasions, I showed documents, including FBI documents, and hearings from the Congress about the presence of Al Qaeda, bin Laden's organisation, and other foreign fighters. ⁴⁸⁰⁶

JUDGE MAY: What is the question?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question is whether the chief of mission is not aware of any of this. I would like to tender this as Exhibit 7 and then as 8. "Al Qaeda Balkan links, Kosovo/Bosnia, Kosovo/Albania," it says here --

JUDGE MAY: Very well. You can submit those and we will have a look at them along with the other exhibits. Just a moment. We will ask the Registrar to note them, and we will consider them in due course and we'll see whether there's any objection.

Mr. Milosevic, that is your time. Now, Mr. Wladimiroff, have you any questions for the witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just say the following: The Republican Political Committee of the Senate of the United States, there are also explanations there. "From Terrorists to Partners" it is called, and so on.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. You can put those documents before us and we will consider admitting them.

Now, Mr. Wladimiroff, I'm afraid time is short, but you have ten minutes if you want to ask anything.

JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Wladimiroff. Mr. Milosevic, could you clarify about the number? You said this is Exhibit 7 and 8. What are 5 and 6?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I already gave these exhibits to the Registrar, and the Registrar has them.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. ⁴⁸⁰⁷ Mr. Wladimiroff.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Thank you, Your Honour. Questioned by Mr. Wladimiroff:

Q. May I ask you first a few questions about your army experience. Besides your specialist career as an army engineer, you also got other matters, I understand from your evidence, like manning -- that is, management of manpower aspects, and other logistical tasks; is that right?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Have you ever been specifically trained in matters of more general military nature, such as commanding combat situations?

A. Yes, indeed.

Q. Would you explain a little bit about that?

A. I have been through the army Staff College and have been trained there -- and have trained as an instructor there. I have been an instructor there actually instructing on command of operational troops.

Q. Thank you. Have you ever been specifically trained in matters of humanitarian law?

A. Only to the degree that is required by the British army, which is that one is given a mandatory lesson at periodic intervals on stuff such as the Geneva Convention.

Q. Thank you. Have you ever been in a commanding position to units that were engaged but in combat situations?

A. Not specifically, no.

Q. Have you ever been engaged with the drafting of manuals for soldiers in the field in combat situations? ⁴⁸⁰⁸

A. Yes. I have been involved in rules of engagement, discussions and formulation in Bosnia in the -- in the IFOR and then in the SFOR when I was Chief of Staff of IFOR and SFOR.

Q. Right. Do you know of any manual for combat situations of the British army or any other nation within NATO?

A. Sorry, any --

Q. Any manuals for combat situations of the British army or any other army within NATO? Are you familiar with these kind of --

A. Well, yes. Each nation has its doctrine which it teaches its people in, from the moment they go to Sandhurst as a cadet until the moment they leave. So, yes, each nation has its doctrine.

Q. You are familiar with the British one, I suppose?

A. Yes. Which version?

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between question and answer. Thank you.

THE WITNESS: British army doctrine has changed a bit over the period of my service, so which particular area are we talking about, please?

MR. WLADIMIROFF:

Q. Say the ones in the year 1999?

A. Yes, I was quite familiar with the way doctrine evolved in support -- in respect of peacekeeping operations during my army's involvement in the Balkans.

Q. You referred in your evidence to the Yugoslav manual for combat situation. Have you compared that manual with the recent manual of the ⁴⁸⁰⁹ British army?

A. Not line by line. I only was shown the Yugoslav version of it some weeks ago, by which stage I had left the British army.

Q. Right. A few other questions. One of your concerns was to avoid an anti-Serb reputation, and for that reason, you did not want to be seen with KLA commanders. Is that your evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was assigned to seek and maintain these contacts?

A. One of the officers who worked directly for me.

Q. Right. And who was he?

A. There were -- well, there were a number of them, but the one -- I would say Colonel Mayer [phoen] was the one who specifically I assigned in the first instance.

Q. Right. Was he --

JUDGE MAY: You're asked to pause.

MR. WLADIMIROFF:

Q. Right. Was this colonel directly one level under you within the OSCE?

A. He worked directly to me. We had a chief of liaison which was a position which was not filled at the time that he began to work with the KLA. A chief of liaison was subsequently appointed, and so an extra level of -- of oversight was inserted in the course of January, I think January or February.

Q. Right. And who was this liaison officer?

A. That was an Irish officer called Richard Heaslip. ⁴⁸¹⁰

Q. What was his rank?

A. He was initially a colonel and was promoted to brigadier in the field.

Q. What was the general verification policy towards the KLA?

A. To find out as much as we could about them, to establish contacts with them, so that we could pass messages to their leadership to attempt to get them to refrain from activity that would cause reaction by the FRY forces. In other words, to maintain the ceasefire that they claimed to have -- to have instituted in the course of October 1998.

Q. Was that policy comparable to the verification policy towards the VJ and MUP?

A. Not entirely, because when we -- when the -- when the original agreements were -- were formulated in October 1998, it was the hope and expectation that there would be a similar agreement conducted with the KLA and with the Albanian side generally. Unfortunately, that -- that agreement never came to anything. That was never produced. But work was going on in that respect to try to get an agreement with them, a formal agreement, right until about mid-December.

Q. About realities, to separate that from policies, was the verification activity towards the KLA comparable to the verification activities towards the VJ and MUP?

A. Yes, to the greatest extent possible. I think I've made it clear earlier that you can't simply go to the telephone book and look up insurgent organisations under "I". You have to go out and find them and you have to gain their willingness to cooperate with you to any degree. ⁴⁸¹¹ And they're a very suspicious organisation who don't readily communicate with you.

Q. Did the OSCE undertake any action to verify training facilities of the KLA?

A. Yes. Within Kosovo, yes.

Q. And outside of Kosovo; for example, in Albania?

A. We had no mandate in Albania. We were the Kosovo Liberation -- we were the Kosovo -- the Kosovo Verification Mission. And we certainly, at the time we started, did not expect to have more than liaison contact with -- with other missions in other countries.

Q. Actually, that was what I'm asking. Did you try to obtain any information about such training facilities in Albania?

A. I think we did, yes.

Q. And you got that kind of information? You received it?

A. No, not very much. It was very sketchy. It was very difficult to get.

Q. Was there a verification programme for Serb paramilitary units?

A. Within Kosovo, yes.

Q. Was that a separate programme or was that liaised with the VJ and MUP?

A. There was an attempt to -- to make the programme -- well, there was an attempt to engage the VJ and MUP in the process of verification, which they declined to take part in. When we started, we were attempting to go lay down the broad guidelines under which we would operate. Unfortunately, they didn't want to operate under guidelines or agree any ⁴⁸¹² with us.

Q. Was there an officer specifically designed to deal with this programme, with the paramilitary, of your office?

A. Sorry, whose paramilitaries?

Q. Was there an officer of your office specifically designed to deal with this verification programme for the Serb paramilitary?

A. Which paramilitary? There are Serb army and there are Serb police. Who are the Serb paramilitaries?

Q. Let me rephrase my first question again. Was there a verification programme for Serb paramilitary units?

A. Do you mean Serb police units?

Q. No. I'm asking for Serb paramilitary units. For example, Seselj's men or that kind of units.

A. No. There was no programme. We were attempting to verify all units which were legitimate arms of the Yugoslav army. If there was -- if there were paramilitaries, by which I would mean people who were not official servants of the -- of the FRY, we would have attempted to find out about them, but we would certainly have not wanted to -- to -- well, no. We would have found out as much as we could about them. There was not any attempt to make a programme, because certainly, at the start, we did not think there were any Serb paramilitaries operating.

Q. Was there any report, that you are aware of, dealing with Serb paramilitary units being active in Kosovo during the time you were there?

A. We became concerned that there may be, yes, in the course of January. ⁴⁸¹³

Q. Did you ever discuss with General Loncar the presence of paramilitary units, Serb paramilitary units in Kosovo?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. What was his position?

A. He denied it.

Q. Two final questions: The Racak incident, a video clip was made by one of your assistants, was it?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was this cameraman?

A. I cannot remember his name.

Q. Was he employed by the OSCE?

A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

Q. Have you been informed by the Yugoslav investigating magistrate at the Racak incident that weapons were found at the place and that photographs were taken of these weapons?

A. Yes. And I said, in that case, could we please have access to them, and we never got it.

Q. All right.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: That's all I ask, Your Honour.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I obviously can't re-examine the witness certainly in relation to documents in the time allowed. I know he's flying off tomorrow, I don't know what time his flight is, and I don't know if he's able to come back tomorrow morning, but if not, I've just got a couple of questions I can ask him and I'll have to deal with exhibits in his absence -- ⁴⁸¹⁴

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: -- but it will have to be tomorrow morning.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. I think the witness has come back and he's been here long enough, quite honestly.

Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Do you remember looking at this first video clip with orange vehicles on the hill? If we can give you the map, would you be able to identify where they were or not? Do you remember where we --

A. Yes. Yes, I can.

MR. NICE: While it's coming, Your Honour, it's -- I've got quite a lot to deal with about the exhibits that the accused put in. I know we get into trouble if we run beyond quarter to. If I ask this witness three questions now and he can't come back tomorrow and I have to deal with the exhibits without him, I hope that's acceptable.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Just to assist the Chamber, please, could you look at this and point out where the vehicles were travelling, which was the first part of the clip.

MR. NICE: Can it go on the overhead projector, please.

Q. Exhibit 94, tab 73. From your knowledge of the area, where were the vehicles travelling on that particular road?

A. I think they were inside Racak. This is the MUP vehicles with the policemen walking alongside.

Q. Yes. ⁴⁸¹⁵

A. I think they were going along this road, inside the village. So it would be at about that location, I would say.

Q. The video, at that stage, taken from there, where were the orange vehicles, so far as you could judge?

A. The orange vehicles were on the ridge line, which would be about there.

Q. So consistent with being taken from the same vantage point by the same video person at the same time or not, or can't you say?

A. You can't say because you don't know what magnification is being used on the lens.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, that's as far as I can go with that in the time.

Q. Second question: In the gulley where you were looking, with all the bodies, first of all, was there anybody, medical or otherwise, looking at the bodies with a view to lining up the wounds on the bodies themselves with the damage to the clothing?

A. I don't think there was anybody who was formally medically qualified. I do believe we had one policeman who had seen gunshot wounds at close range in the course of his service, and certainly one of the -- of the people with me had seen similar -- similar-looking bodies in Northern Ireland.

Q. What was the name of that person?

A. I would need to rack my brains, I'm afraid.

Q. All right.

A. But both of them indicated separately to me that they felt it was ⁴⁸¹⁶ impossible for those bodies to have been killed other than in the clothes they were wearing.

Q. Nobody drew to your attention any inconsistency between a bullet hole and a wound?

A. No. None whatsoever. The opposite, rather.

Q. The last question in the time allowed, although we'll look at the document tomorrow, one of the exhibits that the accused wants to produce for which we do have an English version is the report of the investigating Judge, and she says -- just give me one second to find it. She says of the weapons, in the report, that she was informed by police representatives that during the search, police -- members of the MUP had found weapons and parts of military uniforms and that "they had taken everything with them." Do you have any comment on that, on either whether it was said to you, whether it was the case, could have been the case, or whether you ever heard any such suggestion that all the weapons had been taken away by the MUP?

A. Yes. I cannot remember whether it was the judge, but certainly I can remember being told that there had been weapons and equipment found and, at the time and every time subsequently when this sort of conversation took place, I said, well, you must let us see this stuff. It must be produced. We can't just go on being told about this thing and being invited to believe the speaker because it had not always been the case that everyone had been entirely honest with all of the parties.

Q. Thank you.

MR. NICE: I see the time, Your Honour, and I've got just one very ⁴⁸¹⁷ short administrative announcement that I'll have to make before tomorrow's evidence but that's, in the time, all I can ask of this witness.

JUDGE MAY: Can you just deal with the administrative announcement.

MR. NICE: Yes. Tomorrow's witness, of whom the accused says he has no name, was provided to him in statement form on the 7th of February with the name written on it. It's a name he knows, I have no doubt, perfectly well from the context of the statement that's been served on him, and that witness will be giving evidence in open session. That's after I've dealt with the exhibits tomorrow, which will take a little bit of time to sort out and tidy up.

JUDGE MAY: And Mr. Loku, who has been hanging about.

MR. NICE: In which case it will come after Mr. Loku, Your Honour is quite right to remind me.

JUDGE MAY: We will deal with the exhibits tomorrow, those Defence exhibits, to see if there is any objection; if not, we'll formally admit them.

MR. NICE: There are objections, Your Honour, and tidying up for the others.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. General, thank you for coming. That concludes your evidence. You are free to go.

[The witness withdrew]

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn until tomorrow morning.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 14th day of May, ⁴⁸¹⁸ 2002, at 9.00 a.m.