Milosevic Transcript 2002-05-14

⁴⁸¹⁹

Tuesday, 14 May 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, can we just tidy up a few things arising from yesterday's cross-examination and sort out the exhibits. But before I come to those, there is one point that I would have dealt with in re-examination which I think is important to point out straight away. The Court may remember some cross-examination about the discoveries at Racak by an Irish OSCE member called Eamonn Smith, and there was the suggestion being made that ammunition of Chinese manufacture had been found. And when challenged about the nature of his cross-examination, the accused moved us on.

Now, the statement of Smith and another man with whom he was working at the time say absolutely nothing about Chinese manufacture. On the contrary, the only identification so far as the ammunition is concerned in both of their statements taken together is that there was Cyrillic writing on some of the ammunition found in the area. The matter having been raised, I'll deal with it evidentially, probably, in due course, as I now must.

The exhibits, we've done our best to make things easy for the -- for us overnight by draft translations of untranslated documents, but I've barely looked at some of them myself because they've only just become available. Can I suggest we -- to avoid things getting unsatisfactory or ⁴⁸²⁰ being found to be unsatisfactory later, can I suggest that we deal with the exhibits that the accused presented in the order in which he presented them.

So if we start with Exhibit D2, which is this document, we do have a translation in English of that, and I'm going to invite the Chamber to say that this is not a document that it should accept at the moment because it's basically an expert report. Now, expert reports can be admitted as part of a party's evidence, and if they are presented, the other party has a right to cross-examine. If this document is simply taken, its status is entirely unclear but it no doubt will be relied upon as an expert's report without the expert being called. So if I can ask you to consider it and with that objection in mind. You will see that it's a publication, scientific journal, headed the Racak case, then there are the authors, Dobricanin, Matejic, Milosevic and Jaksic. There is then -- the subject, it's a discussion of the Racak incident and the result of autopsies on the bodies. There's then a history. And then over the page, an introduction and some reference to factual matters, as we can see, with William Walker's name. Then on the third page, the findings and discussion.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We see this. One suggestion is that we mark it for identification and not admit it.

MR. NICE: I can't improve on that. Then can we come to the next one, which is D3. This one was a document I was going to introduce in re-examination myself in any event, and I did ask the witness one question about it. It's the report of the Judge, the investigating local Judge, ⁴⁸²¹ Danica Marinkovic, and we have a draft translation for you of that.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: I've already referred to the one point that I wanted to refer to, and so there's no objection to that as a document. We then come --

JUDGE MAY: Let's hand those round so we've got them.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the next document is D4, which the accused presented without any translation. We do have this in-house so there's no challenge to its provenance or anything of that sort, and I've now been able to provide a draft report -- draft translation. So although we're using the version submitted by the accused, there being no reason not to, it does exist in the files here with the ERN number should we need it. The draft translation of D4 shows it to be an on-site investigation report, signed again by that same judge, and summarising bodies found and dealing with the report of lists of weapons, trenches, and so on. So that becomes D4.

There are then three more documents, and I don't know what numbers have been associated with which and in which order. He handed in three more documents, which we've tried to process overnight and we have now obtained draft translations.

JUDGE MAY: Are these the Internet documents?

MR. NICE: I'm not sure what he said about them.

JUDGE MAY: Well, before we get there, there is the extract from the Human Rights Watch book.

MR. NICE: Right. Well, that book we have for you. We don't have ⁴⁸²² quite enough copies to meet our usual copy provision duties, but we have enough for the Chamber and Registry and the accused and so on. And it's much like "As Seen As Told," the book summarising events from all perspectives, and the accused wanted it to go before you and we would be happy for that to happen. So can --

JUDGE MAY: Very well. That should have -- that should have the next number. Which is the number of the book, please?

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, we actually skipped one before we get to --

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE REGISTRAR: Because we've given another Exhibit D5.

JUDGE MAY: Let's go back to the book. That would suit you if it's D6, would it?

THE REGISTRAR: Correct, Your Honour. D6.

JUDGE MAY: So the book will be D6. Now let us go back to D5.

MR. NICE: And if the Registry could hold up whichever D5 is so that I know which one it is.

JUDGE MAY: If you give it to me, I'll deal with it. Yes. Of course, having said that, it's in B/C/S.

MR. NICE: If Your Honour could hold it up, I --

JUDGE MAY: It's the number numbered 4 by the accused. Perhaps the simplest thing is to hand it to the Prosecution.

MR. NICE: Yes. Right. We can hand in a draft translation of that. I have barely read it myself. It's a document that purports to be from the Republic of Serbia's Autonomous Province of Kosovo, dated the 9th ⁴⁸²³ of March 1999. It says that it is official notes made on the 9th of March, following the analysis of material from the pre-criminal proceedings in connection with the Racak incident. And the draft and probably summary translation goes on to say that the deaths were not caused by a criminal act committed by members of the RS MUP. Now, I know nothing of this document. I'm in no position to accept its authenticity. I know nothing of its provenance, and I find it hard to see how it can be admitted for any purposes save if it's admitted for -- at this stage for identification but not for --

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We will mark it for identification and not admit it.

MR. NICE: Now, there are two more documents. One appears to be an extract from a book and one is something that the draft translation is apparently part of a speech, although the single sheet -- I don't know which number is going for which at the moment. Can we come to the one-page document next or the, I think it's the three- or four-page document.

JUDGE MAY: Is there a further extract from a book?

MR. NICE: Yes. If this is the extract from --

JUDGE MAY: We've got two now in front of us. One is the excerpt from the book, the other one is a draft speech.

Turning first to the excerpt from the book.

MR. NICE: If we can be told what number that would have. I'm not going to object to its production. I don't know anything about the book at the moment. ⁴⁸²⁴ The Chamber will see that the points that I think the accused rely on are on the second page of the draft translation where there's a reference to Mrs. Ranta, and the Court's already indicated to the accused that Mrs. Ranta can always be called as a witness if her material is to go in. Whether the book should be identified at this stage as an exhibit or simply produced for identification purposes is a matter about which I'm comparatively neutral.

JUDGE MAY: I think this would be 7; is that right? D7?

THE REGISTRAR: That will be marked Defence Exhibit D7.

MR. NICE: Is that being produced or for identification only?

JUDGE MAY: We'll consider that.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We'll admit that.

MR. NICE: Very well. And then the last one, I think, which must become Exhibit 8 is a -- Exhibit 8 is simply a photocopy, as I have it, a part photocopy of part of a sheet of paper which is said in the draft translation to be a draft speech for the second anniversary of the Lodza battle, and it is a speech praising the KLA. Where it comes from, who is it by --

JUDGE MAY: We'll mark that for identification. D8; is that right?

THE REGISTRAR: Correct, Your Honour.

MR. NICE: In which case, Your Honour, I think that tidies up the exhibits from yesterday.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. There are, I'm told, three other documents which ⁴⁸²⁵ the accused wished to have admitted. Perhaps I could have them in front of me. They are marked -- he has marked them 8, 9, and 10. They are, apparently, one from the Wall Street Journal -- in any event, have you got these?

MR. NICE: I haven't seen them.

JUDGE MAY: Well, perhaps it would be convenient -- we will stop there for the moment on these exhibits. You might like to have a look at those ones, and you can address us on it. And I will also explain to the accused what has happened so far and give him the chance to address us on it.

Mr. Milosevic, as you've heard, we've been going through the various documents which you produced yesterday and asked for admission. The last three which have come from the Internet we will deal with later when the Prosecution have had a chance of considering them. The position is this: That we've admitted all the documents so far but for two -- three, I should say. We have not admitted the report from the scientific journal of the faculty of medicine. That appears to be an expert report. At the moment, it's been marked for identification, which means that it's been noted that it's been put in but it hasn't been admitted, and you'll have to call evidence about that if you want it admitted.

The next item which we've not admitted is described as an official note of the Republic of Serbia, Province of Kosovo and Metohija, District Public Prosecutor's Office, dated the 9th of March, 1999. And similarly, the letter on the second anniversary of the Lodza battle, again a draft. ⁴⁸²⁶ And the reason that they have not been admitted but simply marked for identification is that they -- the provenance where these items come from isn't clear. And again, if you want them admitted, you'll have to call some evidence about that to explain what the documents are. Now, is there anything you want to say to us about that since you haven't had the opportunity of addressing us?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me start from the last one. As for this exhibit, I tendered it when the witness was questioned about the presence of foreign elements within the terrorist organisation of the KLA. It's no draft. It is a telegram that was published. It was sent by one of the KLA commanders to the participants in the anniversary of the Lodza battle. They consider that to be important. You may remember that this was near Pec. Some witnesses here said the civilians had been attacked. It was a major battle with large scale KLA forces involved. In this telegram, he thanks the fighters of the KLA and the foreign units or, rather, participants from other countries, which is, doubtless, additional proof that one of their so-called commanders pays homage to these foreigners. And this is linked to the other exhibits that you are going to look at subsequently that speak of the presence of Al Qaeda in Kosovo and also other terrorist organisations that are very well known in the world.

So this corroborates from their side as well - that is to say from the side of the Albanian terrorists - the presence in their own ranks of foreign fighters, these holy fighters of Al Qaeda, et cetera. So I think that it can certainly be admitted into evidence. ⁴⁸²⁷ Number two that you mentioned that you not including, that you are not admitting, that is the public prosecutor who is in charge, and he looked at this according to the law on criminal proceedings in Yugoslavia. He looked at the Racak case, and he established that in accordance with the law on the interior, the police intervened, or, rather, that no crime was committed there. That is the position of the state authority in charge, that is to say the public prosecutor in charge, whose sole right is to establish whether there are grounds for criminal prosecution or not. So this is an official document, and therefore, I believe that it should also be admitted into evidence.

As for this Praxis Medica scientific journal which has not been admitted so far either, I bore in mind that this document was marked by a number given by this other side, K021747 -- 0212747, that is, and the other pages, 8, 9, 10. Many facts were presented there, and this denies any possibility of presenting Racak as a crime. This is not a political text, this is a professional text, and it looks at the thoughts expounded by university professors and other persons who were involved in the entire proceedings. So I believe this should be admitted into evidence too. I also would like to say, and I hope that I'm not making a mistake because I'm not familiar with your procedures, this also means that the tapes I played here and that have to do with everything that you have seen - I don't have to describe all of that now, the presence, et, et cetera - that all this should be exhibits too because --

JUDGE MAY: Let me stop you there and see if there's any opposition to that. The tape. ⁴⁸²⁸

MR. NICE: That the tapes be exhibited? They should be. I had overlooked that and they should have been given a number.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, we should have dealt with it at the time. What would a number be?

THE REGISTRAR: We will give the videotape Defence Exhibit D9.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, since you mentioned your lack of familiarity with the procedures, I'd like to point out that the forensic report that you sought to have tendered is governed by a particular procedure, the testimony of expert witnesses, and what is to be done is that you should file the statement of the forensic analyst as an expert witness, and the other party will have, I think it is 30 days within which to indicate whether it accepts the statement or whether it wishes to cross-examine the expert witness, which is the point that Mr. Nice made. So that the other party does have a right to cross-examine, and that is why we were not able to admit it. If the other party wishes to accept that statement, then the statement can be admitted and would be admitted without cross-examination.

So that is the particular procedure relating to the forensic report, and you will no doubt wish to bear that in mind. Well, the other -- the other exhibits that you sought to have tendered, we have marked for identification for different reasons relating to the provenance, as explained by the Presiding Judge.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, it may assist the accused, now that he's ⁴⁸²⁹ obviously researching the materials we're supplying to him, to understand that where material is supplied under, for example, Rule 68 as being potentially exculpatory, that doesn't mean it can simply go in as an exhibit because it's been produced by us. It's simply handed over by us as material that may assist him, but the rules of production of exhibits are still going to apply.

As to the newspaper articles, I'll read them as soon as I can. In any event, the Court will remember that there's an outstanding bundle of newspaper articles that were considered in part by the accused, put in in part by the accused, and being further considered by us. It may be in due course it will be sensible to have a single collection of newspaper articles and simply to add to them with any newspaper articles that the Chamber thinks is useful.

JUDGE MAY: We should deal with those three before we forget the point.

MR. NICE: Yes. I'll deal with them all collectively, I hope, by tomorrow.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. NICE: I think, incidentally, it was more than one video that the accused produced. The booth will know. I think it was three or two rather than one in three parts.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, it was one video and he had different segments on one video.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you. Mr. Nice, while you're on your feet, it may be convenient to deal ⁴⁸³⁰ with another matter, which is the next batch of Rule 92 bis witnesses.

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: It may be you're not in a position to deal with them, but can I indicate the preliminary view of the Trial Chamber about them? It reflects particularly K5.

The witnesses who deal with Racak - that's Bilal, Avdu, Drita Emini, Agron Mehmeti, and Xhemajl Beqiri, Nesret Shabani, those statements are all admissible. However, the Chamber is not at the moment satisfied as to K5.

MR. NICE: This is the -- can I come back to K5 at a slightly later stage? You mean he's not permissible under 92 bis.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. I'm not sure that's an appropriate procedure, given the nature of the evidence.

MR. NICE: In which case, if that's the provisional view, and unless I'm able to persuade you to the contrary, his evidence will have to be given in full.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: The issue of the summarising witness will turn up fairly soon. That's Barney Kelly. I'm going to have prepared, I hope today, a note on the relevant law. It's been before this Chamber similarly but not identically composed in the past and will be familiar territory but it ought to be served on the amici and on the accused and I'll try to have that done today or tomorrow so that a very short oral presentation by me will remind the Chamber of the issues.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. ⁴⁸³¹

MR. NICE: Can I have a couple of minutes in private session to deal with protection of witnesses, but it really is only a couple of minutes and then we'll be ready to press on with the next witness.

[Private session]

(redacted)

(redacted) ⁴⁸³² Page 4832 redacted, private session.

⁴⁸³³ ^{BLANK PAGE} ⁴⁸³⁴ Page 4834 redacted, private session.

⁴⁸³⁵ Page 4835 redacted, private session.

⁴⁸³⁶ Page 4836 redacted, private session.

⁴⁸³⁷ Page 4837 redacted, private session.

⁴⁸³⁸

(redacted)

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're now in open session.

MR. NICE: Just before the witness is called by Mr. Saxon, one other administrative matter. The next report on disclosure under Rule 68 will be served on all the parties, I hope, tomorrow, bringing things up-to-date.

In our efforts to ensure that we set the parameters for Rule 68 appropriate -- in an appropriate way for this case, we are considering the requests by the accused Ojdanic, as he sent a detailed request setting his parameters, and we are considering those. It is rather helpful to have those parameters in mind because of the proximity of the two accused, in association with the two accused.

I'll hand it over to Mr. Saxon.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have something to say with respect to procedure. One more technical matter, if I may. ⁴⁸³⁹ I was informed yesterday that for this week, we have a new witness, Merovci, who would be heard immediately after the secret witness that nobody has ever heard of. So once again, I demand that the order of witnesses be ascertained for at least one week and not to have changes and surprises each week which I cannot hear about when I'm in the detention centre during the weekend. I hear about them on a Monday, usually by the end of business on Monday, as to who the next witness will be or the witness after. And usually there's somebody new who appears every time whose statement I do not have or whose statement I received the night before and so on and so forth.

So --

JUDGE MAY: Let us see what the position is.

MR. NICE: Merovci was originally scheduled as the very first witness in the case so that he should have been the subject of preparation at that stage. He was unable to attend at that early stage and eventually became available whenever it was, I think last week, and he was notified as a witness coming this week last Thursday, so the accused should have had a week to remind himself of the preparation he no doubt would already have made at the beginning of the trial.

JUDGE MAY: Clearly, though, it is -- just a moment. Clearly it's difficult for him in the circumstances which he's in in the Detention Unit. So we must ask you to keep this to a minimum. How long will this witness be, the next two witnesses?

MR. NICE: It will take all of tomorrow, I'm sure. The first witness won't take very long, but once we start K3, that will take all of ⁴⁸⁴⁰ tomorrow, I'm sure.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes. No. We -- we --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is quite untrue that I was informed on Thursday. The Registrar informed me of this yesterday, just yesterday, on the first working day of the week, that Merovci has been included for testimony this week. I received no information on Thursday. It was the last working day last week and I did not receive any information to that effect.

JUDGE MAY: We will -- we will see in future that you are informed as early as possible. That particular witness will not be giving evidence today or tomorrow but, at the very earliest, on Thursday. Yes.

MR. SAXON: Good morning, Your Honours. The Prosecution calls Mr. Mr. Isuf Loku.

And, Your Honours, while we're waiting for the witness to come in, the evidence of this witness will pertain to an area that is depicted on page 12 of your Kosovo atlas, at the very bottom of the page.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

WITNESS: ISUF LOKU

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Saxon: ⁴⁸⁴¹

Q. Sir, is your name Isuf Loku?

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Loku, were you born on the 2nd of August in 1965?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you born in the village of Kotlina in the municipality of Kacanik in Kosovo?

A. Yes.

Q. Is the village of Kotlina to the south of the town of Kacanik?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Mr. Loku, on the 11th of June, 1999, did you provide a statement to representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor concerning events that you witnessed and experienced earlier in 1999 in Kosovo?

A. Yes.

Q. And on the 11th of March this year, 2002, in the village of Kotlina, in the municipality of Kacanik, in the presence -- were you provided with a copy of the statement that you had made in 1999 in the presence of representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor and a presiding officer appointed by the Registrar of this Tribunal?

A. Yes.

Q. And at that time, were you able to confirm that the copy of the statement provided to you was true and correct?

A. Yes.

MR. SAXON: Your Honour, at this time I would offer the statement of Mr. Loku into evidence under Rule 92 bis.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be marked Prosecutor's ⁴⁸⁴² Exhibit 144.

MR. SAXON: Your Honours, Isuf Loku is a 36-year-old Kosovo Albanian man from the village of Kotlina in the municipality of Kacanik. Mr. Loku lives in the hamlet of Dreshec in Kotlina. Mr. Loku's statement describes how his village was attacked by Serb forces on the 8th or 9th of March, 1999. Mr. Loku hid nearby and observed that shelling was coming from the direction of Globocica. Among the Serb forces were 13 tanks and two armoured personnel carriers. Mr. Loku observed VJ soldiers and policemen entering his village. Mr. Loku observed as these Serb forces looted and burned the homes in his village. Seventeen homes were burned in the village that day. Several days after this attack, Mr. Loku found the bodies of two residents from Kotlina.

On the morning of 24 March 1999, Serb forces began to shell Mr. Loku's village again. Mr. Loku and some relatives hid on the Sheshi mountain nearby. Mr. Loku observed Serb forces advancing toward Kotlina. Again, he saw tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Loku saw flames coming from the centre of Kotlina. Mr. Loku returned to his village at about 8.00 in the evening. He found one of his neighbours, Zymer Loku, who was badly wounded by machine-gun fire and subsequently died. At about 10.00 that same evening, Mr. Loku and other residents of his village decided to flee to Macedonia. Mr. Loku arrived in Macedonia early in the morning of 25 March 1999. Two of Mr. Loku's brothers disappeared after the attack on Kotlina on the 24th of March, 1999.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. ⁴⁸⁴³ Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] According to you, the village of Kotlina, on the 8th or 9th of March, 1999, was attacked by artillery fire; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. When did that happen; on the 8th or the 9th?

A. On the 9th.

Q. All right. Now, again according to you, after that attack, the attack that followed from all sides - that's what you said - but mostly from the direction of Globocica and the village of -- it says here Gurri i Zi, I don't know what we call that in Serbian, and from the local Kashani road, all the inhabitants flew from the village to take to -- fled from the village to take to the mountains, Mount Sheshi; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Then that means -- or let me put it in the form of a question. Does that mean that, as you say, the Serbs in fact attacked an empty village if, as you say, all the inhabitants had taken to the Sheshi mountains? So the Serbs in fact attacked an empty village, and they shelled it and fought to gain control, you say, from 7.00 until 11.00 on that same day. Is that it?

A. They shelled it from the -- from 9.00 to 11.00 from Gllobocica village. Then they arrived in our village, looted it and raided it and burned the houses. That was how it happened.

Q. I'm asking you -- and I'm taking this question by question. You said everybody left. They went to hide and then they fought to gain ⁴⁸⁴⁴ control of the village from 7.00 to 11.00. Now, tell me, please, what stopped the Serb forces for a full four hours from entering the village which, as you say, was empty? So what stopped the Serbs from entering for a period of four hours?

A. They shelled the village for three hours, and then after that, they arrived in our village.

JUDGE MAY: The question, I think, was this: Was there any reason you could see why they couldn't go into the village earlier? Was there any reason that occurred to you why that couldn't be done?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First they shelled it from Gllobocica. After the shelling stopped, they came to the village, they arrived in our village.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And how far away is Mount Sheshi from your village?

A. It is very close to the village.

Q. Well, I guess it is close if you fled to the Sheshi mountains. But I'm just asking you how nearby or how far away it is.

A. It is about 50 metres away from my own house, where we had taken shelter in that mountain.

Q. Oh. You fled into a mountain that was 50 metres away from the village?

A. We left our houses after the shelling, and we stayed there, close by, as I said. Only after the shelling we left the houses and took refuge in the Sheshi mountain, where we stayed.

Q. All right. When you sought shelter there, when you fled from your ⁴⁸⁴⁵ houses, if I understand you correctly, you found shelter 50 metres away from your house. So you fled only 50 metres away from your house. Is that what you're saying?

A. My brothers and my neighbours were there. The others went in the direction of the centre of the village.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Loku, it was the distance which we're concerned about. The translation appears to have come out as the mountains being 50 metres from your house. Is that right, 50 metres?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let's be very specific about this. Mount Sheshi is 50 metres away from your house; right?

A. Yes. It is about 50 metres. But the mountains is quite high, I would say.

Q. After the shelling, you fled 50 metres away from your house and you felt safe there; is that right?

A. It was not that we felt safe there, but that was the only place we could go.

Q. All right. When the Serb forces entered the village, did they do anything to you, because you stayed there 50 metres away from house, didn't you?

A. They didn't see us. They entered the houses, they raided them, they looted them, then burned them, and then left later.

Q. So you were 50 metres away from your house, but they did not see you; right? ⁴⁸⁴⁶

A. Yes.

Q. How did you manage to hide that way? Where is it that you were hiding?

A. It is a mountain with forests, and we hid there and stayed there all day.

Q. And how many of you were there there?

A. Thirteen people.

Q. Thirteen of you were 50 metres away from the house and nobody saw you?

A. Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Loku, perhaps you can help us with this concept of 50 metres. If you look at this courtroom, from that end to that end, how would you say the distance was that you fled in relation to the distance in this courtroom? Was it twice as long, thrice as long or six times as long, or how would you put it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was three times as big.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Three times as long.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As long, yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Than you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Actually, I don't know whether it's worth continuing, but I shall continue my questions.

Who did you see? You were watching the soldiers enter the village. They were 50 metres away from you. Who did you see?

A. We saw Serb and police -- Serb army and police. They were the ⁴⁸⁴⁷ ^{BLANK PAGE} ⁴⁸⁴⁸ ones that we saw.

Q. And how many of them were there?

A. There were many. I couldn't count them. They were together, army and police.

Q. Yes. Approximately, what does "many" mean? Was there a thousand of them, 2.000, 5.000, 500? How many of them were there, approximately?

A. I saw about 25 near my own house. That was the closest possible distance I could see that.

Q. Near your house. And you didn't see anybody else but those 25 soldiers?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you see anybody else apart from these 25 soldiers?

A. No. I saw only those soldiers.

Q. So according to what you have been claiming, it is 25 soldiers that entered your village. Yes or no.

JUDGE MAY: No. To be fair to the witness, he didn't say that. He said he saw 25.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's precisely what I'm asking him. He is testifying about the number of soldiers that entered the village. He said that he saw 25 of them.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. That's as far as he can say. He saw 25 himself.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. How many of them were policemen and how many were soldiers?

A. I think about ten were policemen and the others were soldiers. I'm talking about those who were near my own house. ⁴⁸⁴⁹

Q. All right. Tell me, how did they arrive there? Did they come in some kind of vehicles or did they come on foot?

A. They came there by tanks, armoured cars, trucks; all sorts of vehicles.

Q. How many tanks did you see?

A. Thirteen.

Q. And how many armoured vehicles did you see?

A. I saw two armoured vehicles. There may be more, but I only saw two.

Q. All right. And how many trucks did you see?

A. Ten trucks.

Q. All right. In 13 tanks, ten trucks, and two armoured vehicles, that's a total of 25 combat and non-combat vehicles, that is to say combat and transport vehicles. Those are the ones you saw with your own eyes. Twenty-five soldiers and policemen arrived in these vehicles. Is that right or is that not right?

JUDGE MAY: That is not fair. What he said was that he saw 25 near his house. He's also said that there were a large number of vehicles, which he's described. Now, that's his evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not that way, Mr. May. If you look at the transcript, you will see what I asked him. I asked him whether the soldiers and the policemen came on foot or in vehicles. His answer was that they came on tanks, in armoured vehicles, and trucks. And I asked him how these 25 soldiers came to his place, and that was his answer. ⁴⁸⁵⁰

JUDGE MAY: We have a picture of a large force arriving in trucks to the village, and 25 being seen, 25 soldiers and police being seen by the witness.

Perhaps we should ask him this question: Do you know if any police or soldiers went to any other houses besides your house?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

JUDGE MAY: Just let the witness answer. Let the witness answer.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't understand that you were asking him.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, they did, they went to other houses.

JUDGE MAY: Tell us what happened.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I could see them looting, raiding the houses, and burning them afterwards. This is what happened.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I proceed now?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. A short while ago, you said that you saw these 25 soldiers around your own house. Now you're saying that you saw soldiers around other houses as well. How many soldiers and policemen did you see around other houses?

A. I don't know around the other houses. They were further away. I saw them, but I don't know how many there were.

Q. All right. A minute ago you said that they were going to other houses, that you saw them going to other houses, and now you say you don't ⁴⁸⁵¹ know what happened, that they were further away. Now, which one is the truth; what you said a minute ago or what you're saying now?

JUDGE MAY: You know, you must be fair to the witness. There's not necessarily a distinction. He saw soldiers going to other houses, but he doesn't know how many.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, we hear what his answers are. There is no need for you to interpret his answers. All right.

JUDGE MAY: No. There's no reason for you to be unfair to the witness and put to him things which he didn't say. But let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Tell me, now, in your village were there ever any members of the KLA?

A. Yes, there were -- there were not.

Q. I'm sorry. The interpretation I got was yes, there were, and then there were not. Now, just tell me yes or no. Were there any or were there not any?

A. No, there were not. There were no KLA in Kotlina.

Q. All right. And then, in your opinion, why were the Serbs shelling an empty village, and why did they manage to enter this empty village only four hours after they had started shelling? Empty village from 7.00 to 11.00, they are shelling an empty village, and then they entered at 11.00 and there's no one in there. Why?

JUDGE MAY: That's a matter for them. You'll have to ask the Serb forces that. It's not for him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That seems logical to you, Mr. May; ⁴⁸⁵² is that right?

JUDGE MAY: The witness can't answer for somebody else. If you've got a comment about his evidence, you can make it in due course. Now, let's get on to the next question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right. All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. On page 1 of your statement, in the fourth paragraph, you say -- you can take a look at it now. The Serbs entered your village with 13 tanks, trucks, two combat vehicles, and there were -- there were several thousand Serb soldiers. That's what you say. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, now, could you please explain this to me? I asked you how many entered, and you explained to me that there were 25, that you saw 25 and that you didn't see anybody else, and in the statement you wrote that there were several thousand of them. And I will remind you that I asked you, when you said "many," I said, "How many? 500, 1.000, 2.000, 5.000?" And then in response to that, you said 25. And in the statement, it says several thousand. Now you said 25. Could you please explain this?

A. There were those that I saw near my house, but those that I didn't see around the other houses. There were a lot more around other houses but I saw these 25 were around my house. The others I don't know, but there were a lot more of them.

Q. Yes. But I asked you, apart from those whom you saw near your house, how many soldiers and policemen were in the village, and you said to me that you don't know, that you only saw 25. In the statement that ⁴⁸⁵³ you signed, you wrote that there were several thousand of them. When were you telling the truth; then or now? Tell me.

A. Well, that's how it was.

Q. All right. If that is correct, what could have prevented several thousand soldiers from entering that small village of yours? Why did they have to wait for four hours? What do you think? Several thousand people. Several thousand people entering into Kotlina.

A. I don't know. You may know.

Q. All right. But it is certain that you claim that there were several thousand of them; right?

JUDGE MAY: Let's move on. You've made that point.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know how many there were. There were a lot of them.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Do you know -- please, listen to me carefully and give me an accurate answer to my question.

Do you know that it is precisely in your village that one of the well-known prisons was where the KLA held detained Albanians who were loyal to the authorities? Yes or no. Please give me an answer. Yes or no.

A. There was no prison there. This isn't true.

Q. And do you know that this same kind of prison existed in the village of Ivaja?

A. There wasn't. I don't know.

Q. Tell me, how far away is the village of Ivaja from your village? ⁴⁸⁵⁴

A. It's five kilometres away.

Q. And I assume that you know this village well.

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Can you tell me how many members of the KLA were in the school, clinic, and mosque in your village on that day?

A. I don't know. I'm not from Ivaja.

Q. I said your village. In the following buildings: The school, the clinic and the mosque of your village.

A. What do you mean?

JUDGE MAY: It's being suggested, Mr. Loku, that on the day of the attack, the 8th of March, that there were KLA members in the school, clinic, and the mosque. Now, is that right or not?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, that's not right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And tell me, Milaim Loku, was he related to you?

A. He's a distant cousin.

Q. And do you know that he was the commander of this so-called sub-command of the 162nd Brigade of the KLA, the so-called Kacanik Brigade, and it was precisely for the village of Kotlina? Do you know that?

A. No, he wasn't a commander. He wasn't a soldier. He was a civilian. There was no KLA in Kotlina.

Q. All right. You claim that he and Emerllah Kuci were killed by sniper fire. Is that right or is that not right?

A. Yes, on the 9th of March. He was killed after a river [as ⁴⁸⁵⁵ interpreted].

Q. Do you know that your relative Milaim Loku lost his life precisely in that capacity, as commander of this sub-staff of the 162nd Brigade of the KLA in their clash with the army and the police?

A. He was killed by Serbian forces. He was a civilian. Milaim Loku, and Emerllah Kuci, both of them were civilians.

Q. And tell me, where were they when they were killed?

A. They were in the village, near the river.

Q. So that means that they were in your village, in the village of Kotlina; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. How could they be there when, in response to the first question I put to you, you answered that all the inhabitants of the village had left Kotlina?

A. I saw them on the 10th of March, after the Serbian forces left. That's when I found them.

Q. Yes. But you said that all the inhabitants of the village had left Kotlina. Why did they stay on there?

A. They didn't go away. They hid. They were in Kotlina, in the village. Everybody was there.

JUDGE MAY: It's time for the adjournment now. We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

Mr. Loku, could you remember in this adjournment not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over, and not to let anybody speak to you about it, including the members of the Prosecution team. Could you ⁴⁸⁵⁶ be back, please, in 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You explained that there were no KLA members in your village and that the relatives of yours --

A. Yes.

Q. -- are not members of the KLA. Tell me this now: Where were the closest KLA members in terms of your village? If they weren't in your village actually, where were they? What was the closest point at which they were to your village?

A. There was no KLA in Kotlina. I repeat it again.

Q. I'm not talking about Kotlina now. What I'm asking you is near Kotlina, how far off were they? Not in Kotlina. You said they were not in Kotlina. All right, then, but how far off were they? Where were they if they weren't in Kotlina?

A. The KLA was a long way away, in the village of Ivaja. There was KLA there.

Q. You said a moment ago that the village of Ivaja was five kilometres away from your own village; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, the soldiers whom you say entered your village, the several thousands of soldiers, as you said, first passed through Ivaja or did they first go through your own village? ⁴⁸⁵⁷

A. On the previous day, they had been Ivaja, but they came -- on the 8th they were in Ivaja, on the 9th they came to Kotlina but they didn't come through Ivaja, they came through Gllobocica and Gurri i Zi.

Q. All right. And how long did the fighting go on for in Ivaja?

A. All day. All day. I don't know; I wasn't there.

Q. All day. What does that mean? From morning to night or what? Or did it go on after dark as well?

A. From morning to midday probably. I don't know.

Q. And how many KLA forces were in Ivaja?

A. I don't know.

Q. Since the fighting went on from morning to noon, to the afternoon, I assume that there were quite a lot of KLA members in Ivaja. Did they escape? Did they flee from Ivaja in the afternoon?

A. I don't know.

Q. And how do you know then that the fighting went on from morning to afternoon?

A. Because I heard the gunfire from morning to noon.

Q. Now, afterwards, after this clash had ended, that is to say between the army and the KLA in Ivaja, did you meet members of the KLA? Did you come across them, you and the inhabitants of your village?

A. I didn't meet them.

Q. Not even afterwards, over the next few days? You didn't meet them then either?

A. I didn't meet them ever.

Q. And is Hazbi Loku a relative of yours too? ⁴⁸⁵⁸

A. He is a distant relative. He is a cousin but a distant one.

Q. All right. Now, was he a member of the KLA units?

A. No, he wasn't.

Q. Since he's a distant relative, is that something that you know for sure or do you only assume that to be true?

A. No. I know about this.

Q. And do you know that Hazbi Loku is a witness here in The Hague as well?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you see him last?

A. Two months ago.

Q. Did you talk about your testimony here and his testimony?

A. No.

Q. So both you and he know that you're going to testify in The Hague, but you didn't discuss it amongst yourselves; is that what you're saying?

A. Yes.

Q. And tell me this: From your family, both distant family and close relatives, how many of them were members of the KLA?

A. There were no members of the KLA.

Q. All right. Now, is it true, in connection with the event that you describe, that already on the next day, that is to say after the alleged attack by the Serb forces on your village in Kotlina, that the OSCE appeared?

A. Yes, on the 10th of March. That was when the OSCE came.

Q. And how many of them were there? ⁴⁸⁵⁹

A. Three.

Q. Three individuals. So just one OSCE vehicle; is that right? Just one vehicle arrived?

A. First came one. Then came others.

Q. I don't understand what you mean when you say one and then another. You mean one vehicle and then another vehicle? Is that what you're saying?

A. I meant that, later, five others came.

Q. Let's clear this up. So three men arrived in one vehicle first and then five others, five other people in the second vehicle. So this makes eight people in two vehicles; is that right?

A. In Dreshec neighbourhood came only one. Four others came in the centre of the village.

Q. I don't follow you. What do you mean when you say in the village of Dreshec? Your village is named Kotlina. Did they come to Kotlina or did they come to Dreshec?

A. Dreshec is a neighbourhood. I said a neighbourhood. I didn't say a village.

Q. All right. But I assume that they made a tour of the whole village.

A. Yes.

Q. And did anyone, any of the authorities - Serbia, Kosovo, Yugoslavia - was any official together with them or were they alone?

A. This I don't know. I have no information about that.

Q. All right. But you saw them. You say you saw them and that there ⁴⁸⁶⁰ were three plus five, which makes a total of eight. Did anybody else come with them?

A. There was the interpreter.

Q. And how long did they stay in your village?

A. They stayed there the whole day.

Q. Did they give you any kind of assistance on that occasion?

A. They took the inhabitants of Dreshec neighbourhood to Kacanik. Only the inhabitants of Dreshec neighbourhood because the houses were burned. Women, children, and elderly people.

Q. And how many houses are there in that part of town, the part of town that is called Dreshec, the Dreshec neighbourhood?

A. Seventeen.

Q. Does that mean that in the other part of the village, that is to say in the village proper, that the houses were all right?

A. That day, they only raided and looted those villages in the centre of the -- the houses in the village, in the centre of the village, on the 9th of March. They didn't burn them that day.

Q. But you said that the village was shelled for several hours. How come then that the houses weren't destroyed if the village had indeed been shelled for several hours?

A. The infantry troops came and set fire to the houses.

Q. Where?

A. Dreshec neighbourhood.

Q. All right. In the Dreshec neighbourhood. You said that it comprised 17 houses, and Kotlina itself was not damaged. Is that what you ⁴⁸⁶¹ ^{BLANK PAGE} ⁴⁸⁶² said? Did I understand you to say that?

A. Yes. Only -- they only raided the houses in the centre of the village on the 9th of March.

Q. All right. That's why I'm asking you. How is it possible that Kotlina remained untouched, was not damaged, if it had been shelled for a period of several hours, as you yourself described, before the forces actually entered the village?

A. The whole village was burned on the 24th of March, afterwards.

JUDGE MAY: Can you help us as to this: The point that's made is if there was shelling, were the houses damaged by the shelling or not?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Some were damaged, some not.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And did the representatives of the OSCE give you any kind of assistance? Did they help you in any way, apart from taking the inhabitants of that part of the village which is called Dreshec away to Kacanik, as you yourself said?

A. They brought some assistance to the sick people.

Q. Was there a doctor among them perhaps?

A. Yes.

Q. And the people they helped, what were they suffering from? Why did they need help?

A. I don't know. They were sick.

Q. All right. And Naim Loku and Lulezim Loku, were they also members of the KLA? ⁴⁸⁶³

A. No, they were not.

Q. According to you, during the second attack launched on Kotlina, which took place, once again according to your own explanation, on the 24th of March, 1999, you say you watched the attack and saw the arrival, as you say, of the Serb forces from a distance of about two kilometres. So you watched all this from a distance of about two kilometres. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that not the same position that you were in when you watched the attack on the 8th and the 9th?

A. No. It was elsewhere. I was near the centre.

Q. When were you near the centre?

A. On the 24th of March.

Q. Yes. But you say that you watched the attack take place from a distance of approximately two kilometres.

A. I was closer than that.

Q. Now, let's clear this up. You say that you were close to the centre, near the centre, and then you also say in your statement that you watched from a distance of two kilometres. So which is correct; that you were near the centre or that you watched from a distance of two kilometres?

A. The centre of the village is about two kilometres away from Dreshec neighbourhood, and I was near the centre, I said. And this is from where I saw the attack.

Q. So on the 24th of March, you watched the attack on Dreshec; is ⁴⁸⁶⁴ that right?

A. I heard the shells, I saw the shells coming from Gllobocica. Then they arrived in the centre of the village.

Q. But you say you were in the centre of the village.

A. I was nearby, close to the centre, not in the centre.

Q. Please. You've just explained to us that from close to the centre, from near to the centre with respect to Dreshec, you were two kilometres away. Isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And that the attack was launched on Dreshec. Now, as you say, you were watching the attack from a distance of two kilometres. So the attack was on Dreshec. Yes or no.

A. Yes. They fired in the direction of Dreshec.

Q. All right. That means that you saw them shooting in the direction of Dreshec on the 24th of March from a distance of two kilometres, which is where you were near the centre of the village. Is that it?

A. Yes.

Q. But a moment ago, you explained that Dreshec had been completely destroyed. That means all 17 houses.

JUDGE MAY: We go round and round these points. I don't think we're going to get much further with them. The witness has explained the best he can. Now, unless you've got a new point, let's move on rather than spending a lot of time on these distances and descriptions. We'll have to make up our mind about this evidence in due course.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but you can't make up your ⁴⁸⁶⁵ minds unless you hear my questions and his answers.

JUDGE MAY: Not if there's a vast amount of repetition. Now, you've got about six minutes more of this examination.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Very well. Let me hurry up then. But the witness is explaining that he watched the attack on Dreshec, which he claims was destroyed on the 9th of March, and that from the centre of the village.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, on the 24th of March, did you happen to see any army or police when this second attack took place?

A. Yes.

Q. And where were you watching them from, from that same place near the centre of the village?

A. When they came, they came from Gurri i Zi in the direction of Gllobocica, towards the centre. And this is where they stayed. And they killed and looted and burned the houses.

Q. All right. Are you talking about the 24th now or are you going back to the 9th of March? Because you said that they came from Globocica then too.

A. I'm talking about the 24th. They came again from Gllobocica and from Gurri i Zi, but now I'm talking about the 24th.

Q. And is it true that in the village, at that time when you returned after the attack, that you noticed Zymer Loku who was wounded, who had been wounded; is that right?

A. Yes. Yes. ⁴⁸⁶⁶

Q. Where was he wounded?

A. He was wounded in the right hand and in the right arm.

Q. I'm asking you what place he was at when he was wounded. So your answer -- according to your answer, he was in the village. You found him in the village. Is that right?

A. He was in his -- near his house. He was injured near the centre. I saw him myself.

Q. And as you saw him, did you talk to him?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know why he hadn't left the village previously then, like the rest of the people?

A. All were there. He was injured. He couldn't go to Kacanik. The others were killed and massacred and taken to Kacanik. He told me.

Q. On the 24th of March, in your village, were there any KLA members?

A. No, there weren't.

Q. Therefore, you're claiming that nobody in your village lost their lives in the fighting between them and the forces of Yugoslavia and Serbia.

A. The Serbs captured them.

Q. Who did they capture?

A. Twenty-two were massacred.

Q. You say that they captured them.

A. Yes.

Q. What happened next, after they had captured them?

A. They massacred, they buried them in a hole and covered the hole. ⁴⁸⁶⁷

Q. Did you see that?

A. I didn't see that when it happened, but after they left, I went to that site.

Q. And what did you see at that site?

A. They had covered them with earth. I saw some clothes lying around, some boots, some shoes. That was all I saw. It was night also.

Q. Well, how did you know they had been massacred if they'd already been buried?

A. Zymer Loku told me. He was injured but still alive.

Q. Yes, but that means that everything you're saying now is things that in fact you heard from others. You saw none of that yourself; right?

A. I saw Zymer Loku myself.

Q. All right. You saw Zymer Loku who was wounded. Yes. You saw him. But all the rest of it, everything else you've been talking about is something that you heard from him or from others. You didn't actually see it yourself; right?

A. Yes, that's right. I was close by, but I didn't see it with my own eyes.

Q. All right. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Wladimiroff, have you got any questions for this witness?

MR. WLADIMIROFF: No, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Saxon.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before this is continued, since you've provided a lot of these documents, as regards this book and its ⁴⁸⁶⁸ admission into evidence, I did not ask for the entire book to be admitted. I just asked for one sentence of Robert Gelbard to be admitted, and that has to do with defining the KLA as a terrorist organisation.

JUDGE MAY: We will consider that in a moment, but let's finish with this witness first.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought that this witness was finished.

Re-examined by Mr. Saxon:

Q. Mr. Loku, how many hamlets or neighbourhoods make up the village of Kotlina?

A. Three neighbourhoods.

Q. So besides Dreshec, what are the other two neighbourhoods of Kotlina?

A. Reka and Dreshec. Dreshec and Reka and the centre of the village.

Q. And are those three hamlets spread around the base of a mountain that you refer to as the Sheshi mountain?

A. Yes.

Q. Let's talk for a moment regarding the 9th of March, when your village was attacked. When the shelling began, were you at home?

A. Yes.

Q. Were your neighbours also at home?

A. Yes.

Q. And when people began to flee into the forest nearby, and you say you hid with a total of 13 people in one spot, had those persons all been at home when the shelling began? ⁴⁸⁶⁹

A. Yes. They all had been at home.

Q. Have you done your military service, Mr. Loku?

A. Yes.

Q. So you're familiar with firearms and the sounds of firing?

A. Yes.

Q. From the spot where you were hiding on the morning of the 9th of March, did you see or hear any return fire coming from your neighbourhood, Dreshec, going against the Serb forces who were entering?

A. No.

Q. From the spot where you were hiding, did you see or hear return fire against the Serb forces coming from anywhere?

A. No, no.

Q. You mentioned that you saw policemen and soldiers close to your house. Can you briefly describe the uniforms worn by the policemen that you saw?

A. Yes. It was blue, blue. The police were wearing blue uniform; the army, green uniforms.

Q. On the police uniforms, did you notice -- were you close enough to notice any writing on the blue uniforms?

A. Yes. On their left arm they, had the insignia "Milicija."

Q. Let's move briefly to the 24th of March. Can you explain where you were hiding on the Sheshi mountain that day?

A. It was in a high place but near the centre of the village.

Q. Could you actually see the centre of the village from where you were hiding on the 24th of March? ⁴⁸⁷⁰

A. I didn't see it with my own eyes.

Q. On the 24th of March, did you see or hear any return fire being directed against the Serb forces?

A. No. No.

Q. You mentioned, on the 24th of March that "they arrived in the centre of the village." Who do you mean by "they"?

A. The Serb police and army troops. Those are what I meant.

Q. After the Serb forces arrived in the centre of the village, what, if anything, could you see coming from the centre of the village?

A. After they left, I went and saw that the houses of the village were burned. The house -- the school was burned, the out-patient clinic was burned, the mosque was damaged but not burned.

Q. Whilst the Serb forces were in the centre of Kotlina on the 24th of March, were you able to see any flames coming from the centre of the village?

A. Yes. I saw the flames and the smoke rising up in the sky.

Q. Later that evening, you mentioned that you spoke to a wounded man named Zymer Loku, and in the translation it came through on the English transcript that Mr. Zymer Loku had been wounded in the arm and the hand. Did you say the arm and the hand or the leg and the hand?

A. In the leg and in the arm. In both places. In the right arm and leg.

Q. And did Mr. Loku subsequently die from his wounds?

A. Yes, after two hours.

Q. What did Mr. Loku tell you about the fate of the 22 men who had ⁴⁸⁷¹ been captured in Kotlina that day?

A. He said to me that the Serb forces came and captured them. They took women -- some of the women and children to Kacanik, some they massacred. He said, "I was injured, and I could see it."

Q. Did Mr. Loku tell you how the men were massacred?

A. He had seen them from a distance.

Q. What did he say, if anything, about how the men were massacred?

A. He said that they took them from that ambulance building and took them to a higher place. They beat them and then they massacred them.

Q. You mentioned in your cross-examination that these 22 men who were massacred had been buried in a hole. Did you mean a hole or a well?

JUDGE MAY: That's a leading question.

MR. SAXON: I'm trying to clarify what might be a translation error.

JUDGE MAY: No, but it's a very leading question, Mr. Saxon, and on rather an important issue.

MR. SAXON: I can --

JUDGE MAY: What sort of a hole was it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a hole dug by a villager to look for water, but he didn't find water and the hole was still open. That was it. Like a well.

MR. SAXON:

Q. Before the attack on the 24th of March, had that hole or well been -- was it still open?

A. Yes, it was still open. ⁴⁸⁷²

Q. During the attack on the 24th of March, did you hear any explosions that day?

A. Yes. I heard two explosions. It was about 5.00 in the afternoon.

Q. And when you came back to your village subsequently, what condition was that hole or well in?

A. It was covered with earth. It was flattened out.

Q. Have those 22 men been seen alive since that day, the 24th of March?

A. No.

MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honour. Nothing further. Questioned by the Court:

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Loku, you told about the massacre of 22 young men who were buried in the hole. You told us that you heard that incident from Mr. Zymer Loku. Is that right?

A. Yes.

JUDGE KWON: How did Mr. Zymer Loku know about the incident? Was he one of the captured men or --

A. He was there, and he had seen when they took them, those 22 people.

JUDGE KWON: How did he -- I'm not clear. Did you say that he was one of the captured men? Yes or no? Let me check it.

A. He was injured. He was not captured. He only saw the others being captured and taken up to that place where the hole was.

JUDGE KWON: Where did he see the incident?

A. He was near his own house. ⁴⁸⁷³

JUDGE KWON: You said you know Mr. Hazbi Loku, who is a distant cousin of yours.

A. Yes.

JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, where does he live? Does he live nearby from you?

A. No. He lives in the neighbourhood of Reka, the other neighbourhood that's called Reka.

JUDGE KWON: Milaim Loku is a brother of his?

A. Yes, that's right.

JUDGE KWON: Did you hear about the massacre of 22 young men from Mr. Hazbi Loku?

A. Yes.

JUDGE KWON: So you heard about that incident from two men; Mr. Zymer Loku and Hazbi Loku.

A. From Zymer Loku.

JUDGE KWON: Not from Hazbi Loku?

A. Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. And you didn't mention about the massacre in your written statement. Why was that?

A. Because I didn't see it myself. I wasn't present there.

JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Loku, that concludes your evidence. Thank you for coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are free to go.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

[The witness withdrew] ⁴⁸⁷⁴

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Wladimiroff.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Your Honour, before hearing the next witness, I want to raise an issue related to that witness. Should that be in private?

JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry, the accused raised a question about the book, and it may be convenient just to deal with that before we go on to the witness.

Mr. Milosevic, the reason that the book was admitted, amongst others, was the fact that you asked for it to be admitted. I've just been passed the part of the transcript where you asked that the book be admitted into evidence, and we said yes.

Now, are you asking now for the book to be removed?

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. I don't know what's going on with the microphone.

I asked for the statement of Robert Gelbard, envoy for the Balkans, to be admitted, in which he defined the KLA as a terrorist organisation. And that statement is contained in that book, and that is undeniable.

So it is as if I were asking for a special item to be admitted from an encyclopedia, not the entire encyclopedia. I invoke the book because --

JUDGE MAY: Very well. What -- are you now objecting to the book itself? And if so, why?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Because, first and foremost, I ⁴⁸⁷⁵ ^{BLANK PAGE} ⁴⁸⁷⁶ haven't read the book. Secondly, in the book, I found Gelbard's statement. And I thought, since you use that book, then the authenticity of that statement is undeniable, although it can be corroborated by various media records as well in terms of the time when this statement was given.

So my request is to admit his statement in which he defines the KLA as a terrorist organisation, and that is the core of the matter. That is what I insisted upon.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Would the Prosecution ask that the book be admitted?

MR. NICE: Certainly. And if it will assist, the Chamber should know that there is a witness coming who can give an account of the methodology of this book in the same way as the book "As Seen As Told" will be the subject of methodological explanation by witnesses.

JUDGE MAY: The solution may be this: That the passage to which the witness referred and that he put into evidence can be D6. The book can have a Prosecution number so that there's no muddle about that.

THE REGISTRAR: The book will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 145. The book will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 145.

MR. NICE: The next witness --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Wladimiroff had a point.

MR. NICE: Sorry.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Thank you, Your Honours. I was informed before the witness should be -- will be heard that his protection will be lifted and that evidence would be given in open Court, so I did not really ⁴⁸⁷⁷ reflect on the issue of protection and consequences thereof. I now did and I apologise for not being that alert, but really, Your Honours, I believe that I should submit to the Court that I have an objection to hearing the witness with the protection of face distortion. And there are two concerns: The first one I already addressed to your Court, and I think we can easily solve it by asking the witness for a formal identity, passport or such kind of document before he is giving his evidence. The other concern is of a more principled nature, that is, the assertion that he did not perform the functions that he claims he did in his statement. It may well be that cross-examination may not be able to deal with the issue properly, and I feel that the accused is entitled that the witness should make to give evidence in public as the accused is entitled to be given the opportunity for potential witnesses to come forward after having recognised this man as perhaps his name will not be known to the public at all.

So if he would be allowed to give evidence with face distortion, that function of a public trial will not work out, and that is my main concern, to ask you to reconsider your ruling on the matter. May I also remind the Court that the witness protection order in relation to this witness was made on March the 22nd when the Chamber considered witness protection orders as a group. There was no individual attention given to this witness. We are told that the witness will be the subject of a relocation programme. We don't know whether the witness insisted on this, but even if he had done so, the issue is whether such evidence as we are asking you to allow the witness to be in open Court ⁴⁸⁷⁸ without that facial protection would really jeopardise such relocation. Actually, nobody knows where he will be relocated, so it's highly unlikely that a face in court will endanger his new life. And on top of that, we believe that the Court may prohibit journalists or anyone else to make photographs or drawing sketches, because that would be a different position here.

So we believe that the facial distortion is not the appropriate way to address the issue raised by the accused because these are serious concerns which may not be solved if we have to deal with it by cross-examination only. Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll consider that.

MR. NICE: I don't know if the Court wants to hear from me further, but really, the provisions exist for protection of witnesses. This is a witness who, amongst other things, has been, on his evidence, tortured along with his wife. That drove him from the country, he's been in fear for his life ever since. He's prepared his evidence on the basis that he's going to be afforded some measure of protection. He's got the courage to come and give this evidence. Of course his identity is going to be well-known to an enormous number of people. As we can see from his statement, he was a close partner in politics with a man who is at present serving minister in the Serbian government. There is absolutely no risk of prejudice if he is afforded the advantage of his face not being beamed around the world just at the moment. And I have nothing further to say.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. One moment. We've really heard enough argument on this. ⁴⁸⁷⁹

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We're not going to change the order. It was plainly made at the time. It's right that the witness should have this protection in the particular circumstances. The trial will, of course, be public, and any prejudice to the accused seems to be totally minimal. Yes.

MR. NICE: May arrangements be made for the witness then to be brought in with the blinds down?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I add something?

JUDGE MAY: No, not on this issue, Mr. Milosevic. We have really canvassed it very broadly.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, while those arrangements are being made, I think that the Court has been provided with a list of individuals named in his statement, which may be of use because there are too many names, frankly, for most people to remember and so they're given with their positions. And there's also a selection of proposed translations that's been distributed I hope helpfully, and not in any sense impertinently, to the interpreters just simply so that the various different bodies referred to here can be consistently interpreted.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, as a matter of technicality, should the session be open before he takes the oath?

JUDGE MAY: Probably, yes. If you'll take a seat, we'll go into ⁴⁸⁸⁰ open session.

[Open Session]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration. You can do so sitting down. You can sit.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

WITNESS: RATOMIR TANIC

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Your full name, please.

A. Ratomir Tanic.

Q. Mr. Tanic, you're giving evidence with the benefit of face distortion because you are, in due course, going to live elsewhere than in your former home, and you are going to have further protections where you ultimately live, but in all other particulars, your evidence will be open. Do you understand that?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Paragraph 1. How old are you now?

A. Forty-six.

Q. Were you initially a businessman but then did you become involved in politics in Yugoslavia when multi-party politics was a possibility?

A. That is correct.

Q. Were you involved in the formation of something called the Civic Alliance?

A. Yes. I was one of the founders of the Civic Alliance of Serbia. ⁴⁸⁸¹ Later on, its vice-president as well.

Q. Were you involved from the beginning with a party called New Democracy?

A. No. My involvement in Novo Demokracija started in 1994/1995. The end of 1994, the beginning of 1995, that is.

Q. Its president was who, and what was your position in relation to him?

A. The president of Novo Demokracija was Dusan Mihajlovic. My status from the very outset was that of special advisor to Mr. Mihajlovic, primarily for international affairs. And after that, for questions related to Kosovo as well as certain matters related to ideology and doctrine. This was a political position, it was not a staff position.

Q. Did that party form a coalition with the accused's party, the SPS, and also with the United Left Party, the Yugoslav United Left party, JUL?

A. Yes, Novo Demokracija accepted Mr. Milosevic's invitation to form a coalition government or, rather, a national unity government at the time when it was necessary to prepare and reinforce the Dayton peace agreement.

Q. So in what year was that and how long did the coalition survive?

A. As far as I can remember, this was the period 1994/1995 -- or, rather, 1994. The coalition later ran in the elections together, the federal elections in 1996 under the name of SPS/JUL, Novo Demokracija-Slobodan Milosevic and the coalition effectively lasted until the end of 1997 when Novo Demokracija withdrew its membership in that coalition. Formally, the coalition was not dissolved until the new elections were held but, in essence, it ceased to exist at the end of ⁴⁸⁸² 1997.

Q. In a sentence, why did your party leave the coalition?

A. The leadership of our party - and this was confirmed by the executive organs of our party - had serious misunderstandings with Slobodan Milosevic in relation to agreements, basic agreements upon which this coalition was established. This has to do with three problems. One of these problems was the conflict policy in Kosovo. Instead of a political settlement that had already existed and that had already been concluded to such an extent that it could have guaranteed the resolving the Kosovo problem. Instead of that, Mr. Milosevic opted for a policy of conflict, and that is one of the reasons why we abandoned the coalition.

Q. That's history that we're going to explore in due course. As to your position, what were you doing by way of political activity, I mean work, between 1995 and 1998?

A. Well, among these activities related to the international community, these contacts with the international community and ideology and doctrine-based activities, I was engaged in discrete political dialogue with the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians together with a few other people from the parties in the ruling coalition in order to prepare a political settlement which would avoid further --

Q. Very well. Who authorised this work of yours in negotiation with Kosovo Albanians?

A. The negotiations or political dialogue, depending on what was when. Authorisation came from three sources. First by my president, the president of my party, Dusan Mihajlovic, in his capacity as president of ⁴⁸⁸³ one of the three ruling parties. The second authorisation came from the leadership of the security service, State Security Service; and thirdly, the authorisation came from Mr. Milosevic himself. Of course the authorisations were at different levels, but they were crystal clear in each of the cases.

Q. At that stage, who was the head of the security, the State Security Service, the SDB?

A. Mr. Jovica Stanisic.

Q. Reading your summary of your activity over the relevant period of time, did you perform broadly similar work later on in 1999? Just in a couple of sentences.

A. Yes. Yes. That's right. On the basis of the subsequent wish of the security services, and under specific circumstances, this is linked to the war with the NATO pact.

Q. So for whom were you acting at this time in 1999?

A. Well, first of all, I always worked on behalf of my own party in view of our membership in the ruling coalition and the fact that things hadn't been clarified yet, who was right and who was not right. So I worked in conformity, of course, with the interests that were defined by the State Security Service relating to Serbia's vital interests and the vital interests of Yugoslavia as well.

Q. Because by 1999 --

A. Yes, yes.

Q. By 1999, the coalition was over. So in the negotiations you were conducting then, who authorised your work? Was it just the security ⁴⁸⁸⁴ service or was there anybody else involved in that?

A. It was the SDB, the State Security Service and its leadership. However, this took place in times of war, when the Supreme Commander was Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, in fact. So no such authorisation could have been issued either without his agreement or without him tolerating that kind of activity. It was not possible, faced with a war, for the SDB service to authorise, as it saw fit, anybody to do any work whatsoever.

Q. Very well. Well, that passage of your life we'll turn to later. Before we turn to any of the detail, help us with this: Working for the State Security Service, did that bring you into contact with intelligence services of other countries? Yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you now please list the countries with whose intelligence services you came into contact.

A. England, Italy, Russia. I'm talking about working contacts. I wasn't working for anybody, but working contacts linked to intelligence problems and political problems.

Q. So far as the first period of your work is concerned, 1995 and onwards, was your making contact with these intelligence services known to those for whom you were working in the RDB, the State Security Service?

A. Absolutely so. It was absolutely well-known. It wasn't worked for, it was cooperation in analytical affairs and not in the classical sense of working, that is to say, linked to unilateral services of that type. But yes, absolutely. My contacts were well-known to everyone because they were legal political issues and involved an exchange of ⁴⁸⁸⁵ information. So it was activity that was legal.

Q. So far as --

A. By law.

Q. So far as you know, was your working in this way and making these contacts known to the accused or not?

A. Absolutely so, yes.

Q. Dealing now in detail a little bit more with this, so far as the United Kingdom or the English, as you've described it, security service is concerned, when did you first have contact with that service?

A. This was the period of the preparation for the Dayton agreements, which means 1993 onwards.

Q. And that, therefore, takes you through the first period of work that you're going to tell us about. But how long did it continue, your contact with the United Kingdom security service?

A. Well, they were continued without any interruption.

Q. Until what year?

A. Until 1999. The end of 1999, in fact.

Q. In the course of your contact with the United Kingdom security service, did that service provide you with some financial assistance?

A. For five or six years, no. And then in 1990, with respect to a study linked to the victims of the Kosovo conflict and linked to my book, the book that I had planned to write about Kosovo, I got a smaller sum to cover my -- the physical costs of research, and I used some of my own money --

Q. Can I stop you -- ⁴⁸⁸⁶

A. -- in that regard as well.

Q. The translation says in the year 1990. What was the year you were intending to say?

A. That's a mistake. 1999.

Q. Thank you. You say that they provided you with some assistance in respect of the book. How much, in money terms, did they provide you? Just for completeness.

A. Roughly speaking, about 5.000 euros it would be, linked to the expenditure for that kind of research.

Q. Did you also get some money for living expenses at any stage from the United Kingdom intelligence service, security service?

A. Yes, but after I had to leave Belgrade, after the attack on my wife and myself, under very unusual circumstances. I had to leave under extraordinary circumstances. I had to leave the country, and then I got a one-off assistance.

Q. Roughly how much? In whatever currency it was paid, probably easier.

A. Well, about 2 or 3.000 euros it would be now, the equivalent to 2 or 3.000 euros.

Q. And to complete this topic: Did you get any assistance from any other of the countries with whom you had been in contact, whether in the form of money or in the form of other assistance, for example, accommodation?

A. Not while we were carrying out - what shall I say? - these political matters or research work. I received assistance from the ⁴⁸⁸⁷ Hungarian press ministry, for instance, after I had left the country, for a brief period of time. This was to help me with my accommodation. But I was a private individual already at that time.

Q. Well, now, what you're going to tell us about is based on, first, your personal experience in liaison and negotiation; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Secondly, what level and what frequency of contact did you have with the security service, the SDB, of Serbia?

A. They were very frequent. Roughly speaking, in intervals of two to three meetings a week. Ranging from two to three meetings a week to one to two meetings a month, depending on whether the situation was critical or not. And as our work was analytical, they were working meetings and, of course, depended on the situation in the country, whether there was a major crisis going on or a small-scale crisis.

Q. At what level, with which individual in the SDB did you typically have contact?

A. The leadership level of the SDB of Serbia.

Q. And then who in particular?

A. Well, if the Court agrees, I would prefer to state this in a form of private or closed session, because I don't want to place these individuals in a difficult position, because they might be criticised for doing some things.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... can't on a regular basis so I'll come back to that in case we have a later request for private session. ⁴⁸⁸⁸ Did you have any contacts with the accused?

A. Yes.

Q. One? More than one? And in the most general terms --

A. More. More than one.

Q. Give us an idea of the frequency and the setting whereby you had direct contact with the accused.

A. More than one but not too often because I wasn't a personal friend or a close associate of the accused. So the contacts were more than once. Between five and seven times, to the best of my recollection throughout that time, but always in a working environment or at a reception or things of that nature.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we are now on paragraphs 7 to 13, but I'm going to come back to the earlier passages but I'll complete this:

Q. Whereabouts did you have these meetings?

A. Well, some of the meetings were, for example, annual meetings between our party and Milosevic as the head of the coalition. That was customary standard practice, and they took place in the Presidency of Serbia, with the presence of the delegation. My party's delegation was always present, and Milosevic was there too. So that took place two or three times.

On two or three occasions, this took place at receptions. For example, in July -- in the JUL party. He didn't go to receptions very often, but he did go to receptions of the Yugoslav United Left, the JUL party, and it was customary to use these receptions for an exchange of opinion. ⁴⁸⁸⁹ ^{BLANK PAGE} ⁴⁸⁹⁰ And the third circumstance were state holidays, such as the 29th of November holiday. Once again, they were a form of working and ceremonial reception. But let me specify with respect to receptions. These receptions always had a working character, and I think that is the technique used everywhere in the world.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Is that a convenient moment?

MR. NICE: Certainly, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now. Mr. Tanic, in this adjournment and any others there may be in your evidence, don't speak to anyone about your evidence until it's over, and don't let anyone speak to you about it. That does include the members of the Prosecution too. Very well. We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Tanic --

MR. NICE: Paragraph 14, Your Honour.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Tanic, let's go now to the formation of the coalition and its purpose. Your recollection of the formation is that it happened in what year?

A. During 1994. Of course, the coalition wasn't formed overnight but in the process of negotiation and agreement, and the official policy of ⁴⁸⁹¹ Serbia at that time, and Yugoslavia, took place in the preparation of the Dayton Peace Accords which would put an end to the war in Bosnia. Mr. Milosevic, on several occasions openly and privately, in his private talks, stated that we would now -- Serbia was now going to take quite a different policy and route and that he wanted to set up a peaceful coalition in Serbia which would support the Dayton peace agreements and that those were the motives for which he offered participation in the coalition Government of Serbia to parties from Depos.

Q. Mr. Tanic, you're going to have to be guided to some extent by me so we can keep the evidence suitably compact.

At any stage in the establishment of the coalition, did the accused make any connection of Kosovo's future to the work of the coalition or to Dayton?

A. In the establishment of the coalition, one of the questions was the Kosovo question, and the reason was that Belgrade wanted to avoid the fact that the Kosovo issue should be on the agenda of Dayton, and Mr. Milosevic said, him and his associates on several occasions, said that we ourselves in Serbia would enter into negotiations with the Albanians to solve the Kosovo question.

Q. Did you ever hear him say that yourself or was it only ever reported to you by others?

A. I heard him say that once himself. On two occasions, Mr. Mihajlovic, the president of my party, said that to me, and five or six times later, through the leadership of the State Security Service and it is incontestable. He said this once not to me but at a meeting that I ⁴⁸⁹² attended.

Q. And was anything said about his willingness to negotiate directly with Ibrahim Rugova?

A. Yes, absolutely so. He did show willingness of this kind. I know that from him personally on one occasion, but from all the other relevant factors, both international and domestic, who came into contact with him and myself as well.

Q. We now, then, embark on the period of your negotiations; and your authority to negotiate came directly from whom, please?

A. I said negotiations or a political dialogue. Sometimes it took the character of negotiations, sometimes as political dialogue over a period of three years, three or four years. And my authorisation came from the president of my party, Mr. Dusan Mihajlovic, from the leadership of the State Security Service, and on one occasion it was authorised by Mr. Milosevic himself, together with the platform --

Q. Right, stop there.

A. -- platform at which these --

Q. Thank you. The authorisation directly from the accused, when and how? Very briefly, please.

A. In the summer of 1995, a working meeting of the delegation of the ND, with Mr. Milosevic in the building of the Presidency of Serbia.

Q. Thank you. Paragraph 14. Just yes or no: Did you have any involvement in the school agreement of which we've heard?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. What part did you take in all of that? ⁴⁸⁹³

A. Well, to prepare the meeting. The agreement, I'm sorry. First of all, with Monsignor Vincenzo Paglia but with other associates of Milosevic's as well, who took part in the negotiations, and our party to all intents and purposes or, rather, Mr. Mihajlovic and myself were the moving souls of this agreement and in solving the Kosovo problem and the school agreement being one step in those negotiations and preparations.

Q. Thank you. Another idea that was I think referred to at the time was the South Tyrol model. Can you tell us how that came to be considered, by whom, and so on, and indeed what it was.

A. The South Tyrol model was elaborated by the Institute for International Politics or, rather, the director of this institute, Predrag Simic was his name. The Institute for International Politics and the Economy is an affiliation of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, so it is a semi-official institution in fact. And Mr. Simic, in the capacity of an expert, advocated the idea of following the model for the autonomy in the South Tyrol area and that that should be applied to the solution of the Kosovo question. And this was one of the desirable solutions that was put out at that time.

Q. Did you champion or espouse that? Was the idea picked up by anybody close to the accused?

A. As for me personally, I wasn't so much a champion of that idea. I wasn't quite sure that it would be able to function. But I do know, however, that the autonomy in South Tyrol was a component part of official policy, first of all with Mr. Ratko Mladic [as interpreted], who advocated that idea. I know that from Mr. Markovic himself. And our platform was ⁴⁸⁹⁴ somewhat different but not in direct contrast to the South Tyrolian autonomy model.

Q. Thank you. The transcript has the name "Markovic" incorrectly recorded as "Mladic."

A. Ratko Markovic was the name.

Q. He was the Deputy Prime Minister for Serbia at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. So these are a couple of the --

A. Yes, he was, one of the participants in the Serbian-Albanian dialogue, like Dojcilo Maslovaric and myself.

Q. In the dialogue, who was the principal negotiator, as you understand it, and what was your role, if you weren't the principal negotiator?

A. In a formal sense of the word, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic was the chief negotiator, because from time to time, he did take part in this dialogue. Very seldom, but usually when the platform was prepared. However, at working level, Mr. Ratko Markovic was the chief negotiator from a formal and legal point of view. I personally and the president of my party, Dusan Mihajlovic, were the driving forces you would put it -- as you would put it in English. I can't really find the right Serbian translation for that. But the president of my party and I were the driving force behind that dialogue with the Albanians in a political sense. But from a formal, legal point of view, it was Ratko Markovic.

Q. Now, right from the beginning, your meeting in 1995, was there a plan for a phased approach to these negotiations? ⁴⁸⁹⁵

A. Yes. That plan is contained in our platform that was expounded to Mr. Milosevic by us and, in principle, he espoused it.

Q. Can you tell us about the phases, please, and then we'll look at a document that records it. First phase?

A. Yes, there were three phases. It's a step-by-step plan. The first stage is a set of measures of confidence building in Kosovo in order to ease existing tensions in Kosovo. These are measures related to education, health, media, sports and, last but not least, certain security arrangements that would lessen the level of physical tension in Kosovo. That was the first stage. So these were confidence and security building measures.

Q. The second stage was to be what?

A. The second stage was a transition political solution for Kosovo in implementing the first phase. This would slowly lead to the reintegration of Kosovo Albanians in the political life of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Q. And the third stage was to be what?

A. The third stage was the status of Kosovo after the first two stages, and this phased approach was also the position of the European Union and the Contact Group. Identical, as a matter of fact.

Q. And when this phased approach was agreed upon by your party and presented to the accused, did he put any limits on the resolution of the problem with the Kosovo Albanians? Did he have any preconditions?

A. Only one. In principle, he agreed with this. Also when talking to foreign representatives, he agreed with this identical approach. And there was a constraint that was quite understandable, and that is that the ⁴⁸⁹⁶ definite solution of the status of Kosovo should not create conditions for the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and Yugoslavia. I emphasise this word "secession." The other things, as he put it - these are his words -: "We can agree on anything else." I mean with the Albanians, not with us from the Novo Demokracija party.

Q. Can we look, please, at an exhibit. Perhaps the -- the original original is here, and we can see it for what it is. Thank you very much.

A. May I please add something to the sentence that I said a minute ago, to that sentence because my concentration went down a bit, I'm afraid.

Q. If you omitted to say something that completes your answer, please say so.

A. Yes, just to complete it. This was no longer a precondition. The wish of Mr. Milosevic was that the NGOs should be present from the international community, not official structures of the international community, so that the impression would not be created that things were being dictated to Belgrade from abroad, but this was not a precondition.

Q. Well, if we look at the exhibit, Exhibit Number --

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this will be marked Prosecutor's Exhibit Number 146.

MR. NICE: You can see it and perhaps the witness can have it and we can lay it on the overhead projector.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I object to having this admitted into evidence. It bears no weight whatsoever in terms of evidence. Also, ⁴⁸⁹⁷ this person, whom I do not know, has been saying untruths only until now. This is no evidence concerning some kind of a platform. These are pieces of research in terms of the future of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in dialogue. This is a project of some kind of --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, let us -- let us hear the evidence about it, and if it turns out to be worthless, then we will reject it, but let us hear what it is first. We haven't heard anything about it. Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Tanic, can you just look at this document. It's a presentation or a booklet headed Exploring -- or titled "Exploring Futures for Kosovo, Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in Dialogue." That's on the overhead projector. The accused has made some observations about it. Can we just look, please, towards the end of this document. First of all, at the second-to-last collected item, which is on page 66. Page 66.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I would start at 68.

MR. NICE: I'm sorry. In which case, can the original just go on the -- if you've only been provided with an extract, Your Honour, I'm sorry about that. Can we just look at this page of the original on the overhead projector, in light of what the accused has just said. This booklet contains a collection of articles, and here we see one on page 66, "Results of a Discussion with Ratomir Tanic, Beograd and Zymberi." Who is the Ratomir Tanic referred to there? Look at the article, please. ⁴⁸⁹⁸

A. Judging by the article, I think it is me.

Q. Now let's look at page 68. This particular booklet is in fact dated August 1997. So insofar as it's going to assist with 1995, it's retrospective. But if we go to page 69, in the article headed "Project for the Settlement of the Serbian-Albanian Issue in Kosovo and Metohija," on page 69, it is set out that: "Representatives of Serbia and ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, as well as all representatives involved in the settlement of this question opt for a gradual, phased approach in the settlement of the Serbian-Albanian controversy in Kosovo and Metohija; that is, for a political settlement respecting the step-by-step formula." A further sentence, and then to take it briefly, it sets out the three stages; confidence building, basic political agreement, and status of Kosovo that you've already described for us. So does this article, published in 1997, reflect the agreement or the plan that you told us about?

A. Absolutely. It reflects the spirit of the talks as well. As for everything that causes any suspicion, I can give two or three independent sources in addition to this to prove that it is so. The article reflects the overall spirit of these negotiations that Mr. Milosevic was aware of.

Q. Thank you. Let's move on. On behalf of the Republic of Serbia government and apart from Ratko Markovic, were others involved in these negotiations, and if so, can you give us at least some names of those who were involved?

A. In these negotiations or, rather, in this political dialogue, it depended on the nature of the talks involved, there were only members of ⁴⁸⁹⁹ the ruling coalition taking part; SPS, JUL, Novo Demokracija. In that sense, every representative of Novo Demokracija was duty-bound to represent the agreed views of the coalition not only those of his or her own party.

In addition to myself and Ratko Markovic, the president of my party, took part, Dusan Mihajlovic, and also Dojcilo Maslovaric, a member of the leadership of the JUL and the future ambassador of then-Yugoslavia to the Vatican. And Ratomir Ivica took part, a member of the SPS. On two occasions Goran Percevic, the ambassadors of the Contact Group countries, and the Albanian representatives, but now we are only talking about the Serb side, if I understood things correctly.

Q. Yes.

A. They did not participate in all the meetings, not each and every person at every meeting, but in this process that went on.

Q. All right. Now I'm going to ask you to try and keep your questions shorter in order to abbreviate the total time that you will spend giving evidence.

Who was the principal Kosovo Albanian with whom you liaised, by name?

A. The late Fehmi Agani.

Q. And you've already mentioned that Monsignor Paglia.

A. Yes, but we're talking about Kosovo Albanians, right?

Q. Yes, but I'm just moving on now. You already mentioned Monsignor Paglia was involved for the Vatican.

How many meetings were there for this dialogue, roughly? ⁴⁹⁰⁰

A. Mr. Paglia, to put it quite precisely, was a representative of the Holy Father, John Paul II. He was his personal envoy.

Q. Yes.

A. And as for my dialogue, at least on ten occasions I talked to Mr. Paglia at various places; and with Mr. Agani, a minimum of 30 to 50 times, I cannot remember exactly over those four years.

Q. Was the state security, the SDB, supportive of what you were doing or not?

A. It was supportive of the entire process of political dialogue that would avoid a war in Kosovo, especially this course that was espoused by us. And we knew that, at that time, that was the official course that was also approved of by Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Did any other countries involve themselves in these negotiations? Just yes or no, and if yes, name the countries.

A. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. There were other countries. The countries of the Contact Group. Should I mention all the countries of the Contact Group? The United States of America, England, France, Germany, Russia, and, later, Italy joined in at the meeting at Florence.

Q. Thank you. And did NGOs take part as well?

A. In conclusion, the Bertelsmann Foundation took very active part there. Its document is presented here. That's why it's mentioned. It worked very clearly on behalf of the German and French governments, and this was in accordance with Mr. Milosevic's request that official structures not be involved in the dialogue but NGOs, rather. Also Mr. Paglia can be taken as a kind of NGO because he was religious leader of a ⁴⁹⁰¹ monastery. So ...

Q. Thank you. Were these negotiations occasionally reported in the press?

A. Of course. Regularly.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I've got a small collection of newspaper articles. What I would like to do now is simply put one on the ELMO, for reasons I'll explain, and then complete the collection tomorrow. The reason I only want to put one on at the moment is because, in copy form and in translation form, they've been redacted by deletion of, I think in all cases, the witness's name; and of course, since he's giving evidence with his name and since it's now being challenged that he's got anything to do with these things by the accused, his name as reported in newspaper articles is of some significance.

So if I can just, while we're dealing with this matter in sequence, put one of the exhibits before you, and I'll then get unredacted versions, I hope, for tomorrow.

Can we take -- can we produce -- if we can give them a number now, and if I can complete the exhibit tomorrow with other newspaper articles, and they can go in as the same exhibit number. It will become Exhibit Number?

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be marked Prosecutor's Exhibit Number 147.

MR. NICE: I can now hand in for this one, and just for the purposes of the overhead projector, if we could lay that on the overhead projector, please. ⁴⁹⁰²

Q. What you're looking at now, Mr. Tanic, is an unredacted and unedited version of a newspaper, and I think the newspaper, is it Politika?

A. Yes, this is Politika, the official newspaper of the government of Serbia.

Q. And its's headed, "How to Find a Solution for Kosmet."

A. Yes.

Q. And it may seem a silly thing to ask you but could you just read the subheadline and the interpreters will translate it for us. Could you just read the subheadline, please.

A. "Discussion about three possible scenarios: The crisis in Albania will move in the direction of more moderate requests of Albanians from Kosovo is believed by Ratomir Tanic, participant in this gathering." That is the subtitle.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note: Could the witness please spoke slower.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Tanic, you heard the request to speak more slowly, by the interpreters.

A. No. No, I didn't hear it. I shall observe it in the future. I do apologise. Thank you.

Q. The Ratomir Tanic referred to in this newspaper article and in others we will produce tomorrow, is that you or was there some other Ratomir Tanic?

A. Yes, it is I. ⁴⁹⁰³ ^{BLANK PAGE} ⁴⁹⁰⁴

Q. Well, I'll complete that exhibit tomorrow. The -- just briefly, let's go to paragraph 34 and then come back to 29. When you started this dialogue, did you believe that the accused was sincere in what he was doing? Just yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you believe that he genuinely wanted Kosovo's autonomy to be restored?

A. His explicit words were that we would do anything to prevent a war from occurring in Kosovo, that the autonomy of Kosovo is not a problem, that possible secession is only a problem, and I have no reason not to believe in what I heard from him and also from his closest associates on several occasions. At that time, of course.

Q. Let's just go quite quickly through the achievements, if there were any, of this dialogue process. Was there a meeting on the Greek island of Halki where there was simulated negotiations between the parties to the problem?

A. Yes, there was. This was a sequel to the Rhodos meeting and the public was informed immediately after the meeting.

MR. NICE: I ask to produce the next exhibit that deals with that.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be marked Prosecutor's Exhibit 148.

MR. NICE:

Q. You participated in this meeting yourself or not, Mr. Tanic?

A. Yes. Yes, I did participate in it myself.

Q. We have here a document headed the Bertelsmann Science Foundation, ⁴⁹⁰⁵ one of the NGOs, I think, to which you were referring, headed "Joint Recommendations on the Kosovo Conflict," and dated 1997. Look at that, please. Does this set out -- and I'm not going to go through it in detail, it's available as a work of reference, if necessary, for later. Does it set out the joint dialogue on page 1, paragraph 1; set out in paragraph 2 the need for urgent action; 3, summarise the recommendations or, rather, the premises upon which the recommendations were based; has a letter of intent drafted on the second page, and then sets out, "With confidence building and practical improvements" on the second and third page and so on. Is this the document that emerged from that meeting at Halki? Correct?

A. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.

Q. Thank you. As a result of or following that meeting, were there other meetings, particularly in Germany -- or the German embassy, I beg your pardon, in Belgrade?

A. On the basis of the recommendations of this NGO, two types of activities and meetings took place. One is international activity in the sense of the German and French diplomacies having adopted these recommendations and jointly defended them before the European Union. And the other activity were meetings that were held in Belgrade. Some -- I took part in some of them and one was held at the German embassy. These are working meetings, they're not receptions or --

Q. Yes, yes. At this meeting, was Ratko Markovic present?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. Did he give any view of the government or the SPS party or anyone ⁴⁹⁰⁶ on this proposal?

A. In relation to this proposal, he expressed principled agreement to it in the presence of the German and French ambassadors, principled agreement to the spirit of this, explicitly saying that the spirit of this agreement has been present for three years now. His only objection was in line with the objection that was voiced by Mr. Milosevic at the outset, that it should be reinforced, that it should not be a step towards secession. At that time, the problem of Albanian terrorism was already there. So these were the only two objections that Mr. Markovic had to the spirit of the agreement itself, but he did support it. Later if, I may add to this -- it is relevant to this piece of information. Later, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel and I think that Mr. Vedrine was also present, they came with the representatives of the Bertelsmann Foundation and they had a meeting with Milosevic and this topic was also dealt with. So it absolutely reflects the spirit of these negotiations that were held, and that is why this is presented here as well.

Q. Despite this joint recommendation and its apparent adoption, was there a speech in June 1997 that you can recall, and if so, please tell us about it. Speech by the accused. Paragraph 36.

A. As far as I can recall, the accused, Mr. Milosevic, after these preparations were completed in terms of the political dialogue, a serious political agreement could be turned to, between him and Mr. Rugova that is. After that, he abruptly backed off. I know that he backed off in internal circles as far as I can remember too. He made a speech in ⁴⁹⁰⁷ Pristina. However, independent of this speech in Pristina, he said that there would be no Albanian autonomy, not even the least bit of it, that first other matters had to be resolved. This was a new development because the return to autonomy was always something that was a self-explanatory thing.

Q. Now, just explain your answer. You say that he said this independent of the speech in Pristina. What did he say in the speech itself? Can you help us on this topic?

A. Well, I remember the backing off in the internal circles of Serbian government more than the speech itself, but the essence is the same; that Kosovo remains an integral part of Serbia, there is no autonomy, that it remains an integral part of Serbia, that there will be no more international representatives in the negotiations, and until this backing off international representatives were present, primarily Mr. -- Monsignor Paglia, and they took part in the education negotiations.

Q. I can't be sure but --

A. I do apologise.

Q. -- I think from the speed of interpretation that you will be thanked for going more slowly. If you notice the speed at which I'm going, it's intended to guide you in the speed of your reply.

A. Is there any need for me to repeat what I've said until now?

Q. No. The interpreters succeeded.

A. Is there any need for me to repeat my answer?

Q. If we move on, then, did you have any contacts with the accused over these years, and did any of these contacts touch on whether there was ⁴⁹⁰⁸ discrimination against the Kosovo Albanians? Paragraph 38.

A. One contact that I had with him, with Mr. Milosevic, pertains to the month of July 1997, the summer, at the reception hosted by the JUL. Before that, no. Between 1995 and the authorisation of the platform and then until then, 1997, there weren't any. There was just one more contact, but Kosovo was not discussed extensively. Since I already had information concerning this backing off, I availed myself of that opportunity to ask Mr. Milosevic why this political agreement is not entered when everything was completed in terms of everything he had been saying, not only to us, to Novo Demokracija, but also the other partners in the ruling Serb coalition and also to the international intermediaries.

Q. Now, keeping the speed of your reply at a level that you understand the interpreters would prefer, can you tell us what you recall the accused saying at this July 1997 reception?

A. Well, with Mr. Milosevic, it was very difficult to talk about the Kosovo question at that time. His answer was in anger undoubtedly, but it did reflect the position that I had heard a long time ago, and that was -- what he said, quite simply, was that he would show that there are fewer Albanians than 1 million or, rather, less than 10 per cent, and that therefore they could not have autonomy to the extent they want to have it as a constituent people. And suddenly this was a problem, the number of Albanians.

Q. You say you'd heard that a long time ago. Can you just explain where and tell us whether this was something that was otherwise new to you or whether it was a proposition in general circulation at that time, this ⁴⁹⁰⁹ proposition of less than a million, less than 10 per cent?

A. I have to explain this in a little more detail, but I'll be concise as possible. This assertion as to the number of Albanians was not mentioned at all up until the time, for example, the spring of 1997, through different contacts than the ones that I took part in, until the preparations had come to an end of a sort of political agreement, at least provisional for Kosovo sufficient to avoid a war at any rate. Now, when these preparations were completed and when Mr. Milosevic was confronted with the fact that the international community supported the spirit of that agreement, suddenly comments came in as to the number of Albanians. Not only from him but his associates as well and via the leadership of the SDB, I received this information; also via our parliamentary group in the parliament of Serbia, and suddenly people began to speak about this, that there were far fewer Albanians than 1 million, less than 10 per cent in fact, and that because of that, they couldn't have broad autonomy as a constituent people.

So something similar. In the end, I was able to hear from Mr. Milosevic himself. When he was angry. Not in an official meeting or anything like that, but it was compatible with what I had heard earlier on. Let me also remind you that there was a minimum of 1.200.000 Albanians in Kosovo, perhaps even a million and a half.

Q. Now, you've told us, then, what the accused said about the number of Albanians. Can you recall anything else that was said at that meeting about prospects for Kosovo, its difficulties or otherwise, what was going to happen? ⁴⁹¹⁰

A. Well, Mr. Milosevic suddenly, just like his closest associates, began to link the number of Albanians with terrorism and support to terrorist activities, and ultimately there was a definition that was repeated by Milosevic himself, at least as far as I remember with respect to that reception, and that was that the Serbian authorities should first of all quite simply reduce the number of Albanians to realistic numbers to settle accounts with terrorism and then to see what was going to happen with political negotiations.

That is what I can tell you at this point in time.

Q. How, was it explained, were the numbers to be reduced?

A. Well, nothing was said. Nothing specific. But there was only one way in reducing the number of the population of a matrix state from 1.200.000 to below a million to below 10 per cent, which means this would make it about 800.000, there's just one way of doing that, and that is through ethnic cleansing. This is no speculation or speculative thesis. There is no other way in which this can be achieved.

Q. You've spoken earlier about how there was an agreement sufficient to avoid or reduce, I think, but avoid the prospects of war. Was anything said, by either the accused or any others close to him, either at this meeting or at about this time in relation to the prospects of war or not?

A. A minimum correction: It wasn't an agreement, it was a negotiating process which went on for three years, and it ended in the results the spirit of which was expressed in the agreement. So it's not one political agreement, I'm talking about the negotiating process between the Serbs, the Albanians, and the international community, which lasted ⁴⁹¹¹ between three and three and a half years, so that is what I wanted to say.

Q. Slow down, Mr. Tanic. Slow down.

A. I do apologise. And in concrete terms, one of Mr. Milosevic's associates who explained the need for war in greater detail was Mr. Vladimir Stambuk, to quote an example. Not only him, but to quote an example. He, unfortunately, explained that to me quite specifically at a reception prior to the Milosevic-Holbrooke meeting in October in 1998, for example, where this same spirit of agreement cropped up, the one that I was talking about a moment ago.

Q. We'll come to Mr. Stambuk later.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tanic, in answer earlier to the question about the reduction of the Albanian population, you said that there was only one way in which that could be done. That, of course, was your -- that's your own conclusion. What I want to find out was whether there was anything in the environment surrounding the negotiations, in the environment in which you operated, that led you to believe that that was the only way in which the population could be reduced. That is, ethnic cleansing.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, unfortunately, first we had direct experience from the past how the number of inhabitants is reduced in certain parts of the territory of the former Yugoslavia through ethnic cleansing which was carried out by the Serb, Croat, and Muslim forces. So this was a direct experience for myself as well, the most immediate experience. A concrete experience. ⁴⁹¹² Now linked to the Kosovo problem itself, there was the fact that the associates of the accused Mr. Milosevic on several occasions claimed that the Albanians were abusing figures, the number of inhabitants, the figures they were bandying about. This was partially true because they kept talking about 2 million. Now the realistic figure was about 1.200.000 to one and a half million. This was a realistic estimate. And one of the closest associates of the accused on several occasions repeated this, that quite simply these people should be thrown out, that there were many people who had come in from Albania in that period and that Josip Broz Tito's government gave them a passport to do this. Now, the accused never said this, I want that to be understood, but he tolerated similar statements for a long time and I couldn't think of anything else but that because the accused Mr. Milosevic, according to the constitution, is duty-bound to sanction statements and observations of this kind. If he let's them go unsanctioned, then what conclusion can one make but that perhaps a new ethnic cleansing was being prepared, and there is no other way in which it can be solved.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. I'm about to move from the July 1997 meeting that you had where you heard him speak directly. Is there anything else you can recall him saying, apart from what you've told us already; about the Albanians or about the prospects of war or the nature of war or anything else? And if not, we'll move on.

A. Well, if I can use the expression without being abusive, he sort ⁴⁹¹³ of muttered something else and said that the Albanian population were supporting Albanian terrorism and there was a sort of collective form of guilt but, as I said, it was fairly difficult to talk to him along any sensible lines with Mr. Milosevic, at least for people like myself. So that this was a comment which, to be honest, I have to say was verbal abuse, if I can put it that way, or offence, and it was in keeping with what was to happen in Kosovo later on.

Q. You may have covered this already, but just for completeness, the significance of 10 per cent, is that something that's to be found in the constitution or in some other formal document, and if not, how had 10 per cent become an apparently significant figure?

A. No. It is not mentioned in any constitutional document or legal document but we are a multi-ethnic state - Yugoslavia, that is - and in every multi-ethnic state in the world, including our own, there are different rights and we differentiate between constituent rights or minority rights. A figure of 10 per cent, for example, or rather, over 10 per cent clearly indicates that it is a constituent peoples that we're talking about; and this figure, over 10 per cent and over 15 per cent, was bandied about in previous ethnic cleansing, in Bosnia, to the disadvantage of the Serbs but also we're talking about an absolute number, not only a 10 per cent -- a percentage of 10 per cent, an absolute figure for Albanians, because it's one thing, you see, if --

Q. Probably enough on that. Dealing with the approach of the accused and those close to him generally to settlement of the problem, had there been a proposal to establish a European Union branch office in Kosovo - ⁴⁹¹⁴ paragraph 42 - to assist in the negotiations with Kosovo Albanians?

A. Yes. That proposal was put forward on several occasions.

Q. Was it at one stage apparently adopted as policy?

A. I'm afraid I don't follow your question. I don't understand it quite.

Q. My mistake entirely. Was there a plan to have a meeting with someone to set up such an office? If so, with whom?

A. There were meetings of that kind with diplomatic representatives, the ambassadors of all the Contact Group, they had meetings with Milosevic. But I too had a meeting along those lines with his wife, not as his spouse but as the president of one of the three ruling -- the leaders of one of the three ruling parties, and with an international representative, Mr. Martin Lutz, who was Carl Bildt's representative, the High Commissioner of the United Nations for ethnic relations.

Q. After that meeting, did the accused's wife tell you something about what was going to happen to this plan for a European Union branch office?

A. It wasn't the accused's wife. It wasn't a private matter. It was a question of the leader of one of the ruling parties. Mrs. Markovic, during the meeting, received this initiative very well. She had, of course, been informed of it earlier on. This wasn't the first time she had heard of it via me. And in principle, she agreed, as far as she was able to, to exert -- to -- in the political sense, spare upon her husband to have this office opened up indeed in order to help in the research of Serb victims. However, after the meeting, I was informed by her the next ⁴⁹¹⁵ day that nothing would come of it and that, quite simply, that they would be -- their conduct would be proper towards an international representative and that it was their affair to defend Serb interests in Kosovo, not Albania's.

Q. Obviously your views on whether negotiations were being conducted seriously or not are not perhaps material. It's for the Court to decide that. But did you have a meeting later, just before Rambouillet, with the same Ratko Markovic in which he expressed a view on whether the negotiations were serious or not? Can you just answer that question yes or no.

A. Yes, yes.

Q. Then can you tell us, please, what he told you about the seriousness or otherwise of those negotiations.

A. Well, we had rather a lengthy meeting precisely after the meeting with the British and German ambassadors to Belgrade, with the attendance of Mr. Branko Brankovic. After that, Mr. Ratko Markovic and I went to the building of the Presidency or, rather, the Government of Serbia, and we discussed the problem at length. It was studied seriously in Belgrade, not at the level of hearsay and rumour but on the basis of serious analyses, not gossip. And they said that this overall negotiating process in which he took part and I took part and already the other people I mentioned took part, that he was very serious to begin with but that solely things were coming to a head and that Mr. Milosevic, his initial support, began to wane and that Serbia's priorities had begun to change. He did not accuse anybody specifically but expressed serious reservations ⁴⁹¹⁶ and there was an about turn. They were my own reservations too, so we discussed them and then he said, contrary to the spirit of negotiation, he had got recommendations for Mr. Milosevic for a completely different type of platform for the negotiations with the Albanians, and we all knew that this was destined to fail because it was essentially different from the previous platform, so there were smoke screens being set up already and the situation which we call, in Serbia, the worse the better. We refer to situations like that in that way. And responsibility was passed on to the other side instead of taking strides forward in settling the matter.

Q. Paragraph 48. Did you, in 1997/1998 or thereabouts, learn from your contacts perhaps with the security services of other countries whether there would be support for elimination of the KLA?

A. Yes. I wish to stress once again that these were working meetings in the sense of exchanging analytical information and nothing that would resemble spying. The international community was very much concerned with the security aspect of the Kosovo problem and the whole wave of refugees, the drug trafficking trade which was linked to Albanian terrorism, trading in human beings and so on and so forth. And the signals were very clearly given that the new authorities, that Mr. Milosevic would have the green light for the breakdown of the terrorist organisation of the KLA, of course legally, through legal means, the legal use of force, and if Mr. Milosevic were to ensure a political agreement with the Kosovo Albanians for a peaceful settlement of the Kosovo problem. So these two matters were linked. They were interlinked. Not in the sense of a threat of any kind, blackmail of any kind, but with an explanation that I, together with ⁴⁹¹⁷ the State Security Service, put forward, that if there were no political agreements, then terrorism would get wings and fly and ordinary people who didn't wish to be terrorists would become terrorists in fact.

Q. Therefore, international support available, was that explained to the accused, so far as you knew? And if so, what was his reaction to the available international support for the elimination of the KLA?

A. This was explained to Mr. Milosevic not once but, if I can put it figuratively, a hundred times because this was a very important question; and I have absolute proof that this was explained to him at very high level contacts far above the level that I am ready to talk about. At all events, at Foreign Minister level and Prime Minister level, and our security service also worked very actively in that regard, and from all sources of information, including the sources of information that I had at my disposal, this support on the part of the international community to stop Albanian terrorism should there be a political solution was quite clear. It was presented to Mr. Milosevic and he was at first very exhilarated to hear of that support but, as I was subsequently informed, he cooled down very quickly and began to behave as if that support did not exist, as if the international community was supporting Albanian terrorism. So this was a complete inversion of the truth and that is where the State Security Service reacted and we had discussions on this question and that's how I came to know, in fact, that Mr. Milosevic saw that international -- inverted that international support or just kept quiet about it.

Q. In February and March of 1998 or thereabouts, were efforts - ⁴⁹¹⁸ ^{BLANK PAGE} ⁴⁹¹⁹ paragraph 53 - being made to get better facts about the position in Kosovo?

A. Yes. Those efforts were undertaken by General Perisic, in his capacity of Chief of the General Staff, and Jovica Stanisic, in his capacity as the chief of the state security of Serbia, together with Mr. Zoran Lilic. I was informed about that by the State Security Service of those efforts. By the leadership of the SDB, in fact.

Q. And the purpose of this fact-finding effort was what?

A. As I was informed by the leadership of the State Security Service and later I was able to substantiate that information by the military leaders, the object was to clear up the controversial facts about the true state of affairs in Kosovo. How many terrorists there really were, whether there were few of them, a medium number, or a lot, what their logistics were like, whether the population truly did support KLA terrorism or not, whether there was any responsibility for this by the Serbian police, whether there was army responsibility and accountability, so a serious report to be tabled, and study to be tabled to Mr. Milosevic on the basis of which the leadership of the army and the SDB leadership would demand of Mr. Milosevic to adjust his conduct in Kosovo to the existing state of affairs and to the laws and regulations of the country.

Q. As a result, were recommendations made to the accused?

A. Well, first of all, that mission, as I was informed once again by the leadership of the SDB and later on by the military leadership, this mission was abortive to begin with because somebody close to Milosevic was included in it and his task was to look at the results in the field and ⁴⁹²⁰ represent them in a different light. I don't know whether the Court will allow me to mention the name here of this person or not because I'm talking about Mr. Nikola Sainovic, in fact. That's who I mean. He included himself partially on his own in this mission and partially following an okay from Mr. Milosevic. Perisic and Lilic wanted to sidestep any of Milosevic's associates who wanted to reverse and turn the truth upside down. They wanted a clean and unbiased approach and insight. However, regardless of the presence of this particular gentleman, Mr. Sainovic, the conclusions from this mission did come forward and they took two or three directions. Do you want me to mention them or not?

Q. What were the recommendations?

A. Well, the recommendations, and we're talking about the spring of 1998 when the first fighting was under way between the Serb security forces and the Albanian terrorists, so the recommendations were, first of all, that the army and the police must begin to be active within the frameworks of the legal and constitutional frameworks and not, as they had been doing so far, through the private chains of command and insufficiently defined goals.

The second recommendation was that should -- if Albanian terrorism wanted -- was to be broken down within the frameworks of the constitution, a state of emergency must be proclaimed on part of the territory and that the KLA must be proclaimed a terrorist -- officially a terrorist organisation. The extraordinary situation was to be brought in by the Assembly of Yugoslavia, not the president according to his own whim, and the recommendation was that a political solution should be undertaken as ⁴⁹²¹ soon as possible, as quickly as possible, one which already existed so that Serbia and Yugoslavia should have a legal and political basis to apply force in breaking up Albanian terrorism because, otherwise, the Albanian terrorists would become freedom fighters, that is quite clear. So those by and large were the recommendations which were to be repeated through the position taken by the leadership of the State Security Service, by the leadership of the army, and by our own party and myself as well.

Q. Remembering the speed of your reply, please, you made mention at the beginning of that answer to private chains of command. What did you mean by that?

A. Well, it was common knowledge already in the second half of 1997 that the leadership of the State Security Service, the leadership of the army and a group of politicians within the ruling coalition which was colloquially referred to as The Reformist Wing, that they were opposed or, rather, shall I say that we were opposed - because I was one of the members of that group - that we were opposed to voluntaristic use of force in Kosovo for the simple reason that there was no need for it, not because somebody liked the Albanians more than the Serbs, but there was just no need for it. So confronted with this fact, Mr. Milosevic applied a private chain of command out of the institutions, sidestepping the General Staff, the leadership of the State Security Service, and the legal institutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia such as the Assembly, the government, and so on and so forth. And this was pinpointed as a problem already at the end of 1997 and it was particularly highlighted in 1998 ⁴⁹²² when the first more serious fighting started between the Serbian security forces and the Albanian terrorists where many civilians were casualties without any need to be.

JUDGE MAY: The time has now come for us to adjourn. Mr. Nice, we'll continue with the witness's evidence in the morning. Perhaps you could consider the timing of this. If possible, we should finish this witness this week, but there are very full answers. It may be that they could be given more shortly.

MR. NICE: We can do our best, as it were.

JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now. Mr. Tanic, could you be back, please, at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 15th day of May, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.