⁵⁷⁶⁵

Wednesday, 29 May 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 10.30 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

WITNESS: JOSEPH OMER MICHEL MAISONNEUVE

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Ryneveld, we'll take one adjournment, at about 12.00, for 20 minutes.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour. Examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

Q. General Maisonneuve, would you tell the Court your full name, please.

A. Joseph Omer Michel Maisonneuve.

Q. And General Maisonneuve, I understand that you are currently a Major General. You are presently the Assistant Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff for the Canadian Armed Forces in Ottawa; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Is it also fair to say, sir, that you've spent about 30 years in the armed forces?

A. Yes.

Q. You've been an armoured officer? ⁵⁷⁶⁶

A. Correct.

Q. And, sir, have you been involved in the command of troops?

A. Yes. I have commanded troops all the way up to unit command, which is a regimental command, and also have served time as a staff officer in major operations and in formations in Canada and abroad.

Q. And just before we move on to that, a unit, just for people like me who --

A. About a thousand -- a thousand people.

Q. I see. And, sir, when you said you've also served abroad, have you spent any time in the Balkans?

A. Yes, I have. I spent one year as the Chief of Operations for UNPROFOR, from 1993 to 1994. That's my time in the Balkans.

Q. All right. And do you have any experience in training troops in all-arms combat?

A. Yes, I have trained troops, and I have trained with troops up to a brigade level, which is a formation of about 5.000 people, participation in many exercises and manoeuvres.

Q. I see. And in addition to being in the Balkans, do you have any other experience abroad?

A. I have spent three tours in Cyprus with the UN mission there. I've also spent two years in France and on exchanges with the US army, US armed forces.

Q. Now, sir, did you become involved with KVM, the Kosovo Verification Mission, and if so, when?

A. Yes, I did. In November of 1998, I was sent to Vienna to head the ⁵⁷⁶⁷ KVM support unit for about three weeks, and then I was asked to deploy to Kosovo to head the first Regional Centre to be opened in Prizren. I spent essentially three months there, until the mission was evacuated in March of 1999, and I then went into Albania.

Q. All right. We'll get back to your involvement there later on. Now, sir, did you in fact provide a statement to the officials of the Office of the Prosecutor on the 10th of March in the year 2000?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And have you had an opportunity of reviewing that statement, making some minor corrections as recently as yesterday, the 28th of May, 2002?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And at that time, sir, did you solemnly declare that the contents of that statement with the attachments and with those amendments you pointed out were true to the best of your information, knowledge, and belief?

A. Yes, I did.

MR. RYNEVELD: Might that statement at this point be entered as an exhibit in these proceedings.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 175.

MR. RYNEVELD: Now, Your Honours, you have the benefit or will have the benefit shortly of copies of the 92 bis statement of this witness. Pursuant to the request of the Trial Chamber to take part of this witness's evidence live, the version of the statement that we are now distributing has in fact received numbering of paragraphs for ease of ⁵⁷⁶⁸ reference. So the advanced copy that the Court may have received in order to determine whether it was appropriate to bis him has now got paragraph numbers, and it might be of assistance to you to know that I propose to deal live with paragraphs 21 through 37, which deal with the VJ; paragraphs 42, and then 45 through 50 which deal with his connection with the MUP. And those are the paragraphs that I want to deal with live.

Q. Now, General --

JUDGE MAY: You're also going to deal with Racak live.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, absolutely. And that is contained in those paragraphs that I've just outlined.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. General Maisonneuve, is it fair to say, sir, that in your statement, the way it was taken, the first seven paragraphs --

MR. RYNEVELD: Perhaps might the witness also have a copy of this before him to -- it would assist, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Certainly.

THE WITNESS: I do have a copy, actually. Thank you.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

Q. Paragraphs 1 through 7 deal with your background, is that correct, setting up of the OSCE?

A. That's correct.

Q. And then paragraphs 8 through 20 deal with the OSCE/KVM mission that you've -- that are contained in the statement?

A. That's correct. ⁵⁷⁶⁹

Q. And then at paragraph 21, you -- from paragraphs 21 through to paragraph -- sorry, I think it's -- 37, you deal with the incidents at Racak and your observations of the VJ?

A. Yes.

Q. And then moving to paragraph 38, you deal with the Ministry of the Interior, or the MUP, right through to paragraph 52.

A. Right.

Q. Thereafter, you speak about the KLA and the KVM Refugee Task Force in Albania, which starts at paragraph 56.

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. All right. Turning, if I may, to those areas that I, at the Court's request, will be asking you some further detailed questions, you've already told us, sir, that you joined the KVM, I believe, in Vienna in -- I believe it was in 1998; is that correct?

A. November of 1998, yes.

Q. Now, at some point, did you become the head of the KVM's Regional Centre in Prizren?

A. Yes I did. That would have in been the middle of December of 1998.

Q. And this Regional Centre, is that the RC Prizren? Is that what they're referred to in the documentation?

A. Yes, that's what's referred to in the documentation. What it was, the KVM itself covered all of Kosovo but it was divided into five Regional Centres, basically covering the five administrative districts of Kosovo, and Prizren was the administrative district in which my Regional Centre ⁵⁷⁷⁰ was operating.

Q. Thank you. I'm going to leave a little bit of space between my next question to allow for translation.

Sir, to your knowledge, were there any VJ brigades with elements positioned in the RC Prizren, which was your area of responsibility?

A. Yes. There were essentially two brigades operating in my Regional Centre. The 549th Brigade operated out of Prizren itself. That's where its headquarters was, with the main responsibilities of the border with Albania. And there was an element of the 243rd Brigade, which was based in Urosevac, which also had some elements deployed within the administrative district of Prizren.

Q. And you've told us that there were five different Regional Centres. The area of Racak/Stimlje, was that wholly within your area of RC Prizren or was that on the border of -- with another RC district or what can you tell us about that?

A. It was actually totally within Regional Centre 5, which is the Pristina Regional Centre, but right outside my area, near the boundary between my area and Regional Centre 5, so it was in RC 5.

Q. I see. And returning to the two VJ brigades, the 549th and the 243rd, do you know whether they were part of a larger organisation within the VJ?

A. Yes. Both of them belong to the Pristina Corps.

Q. I see. Well, if I might just distinguish between the two. Let's start with the 549. Do you know what type of a brigade that was?

A. It was a motorised brigade. ⁵⁷⁷¹

Q. Motorised brigade.

A. Motorised brigade, which means it was carried in mostly trucks and dismounted a lighter brigade. Obviously for the reason that it was operating mainly along the border region, and so in very wooded operations, they could not use heavy weapons.

Q. You say they operated mainly along the border. Was that because of -- was there a particular area of jurisdiction that they were involved in?

A. Yes. That was their area of responsibility, was taking care of the border. They had border battalions that belonged to them and so forth.

Q. Do you know who the commander of that brigade was?

A. Colonel Delic.

Q. And did you ever meet Colonel Delic?

A. Yes, I did, on several occasions.

Q. And how would you describe him?

A. I would describe him as a -- a professional soldier. He was actually quite straightforward and we always had very productive discussions when we met.

Q. And did you in fact -- you mentioned that you had discussions. Did you in fact have a meeting with Colonel Delic on the 4th of February of 1999?

A. Colonel Delic, I believe, was the 1st of February. Yes, it was the 1st of February.

Q. Sorry. I got you the wrong date. 1st of February, yes. And ⁵⁷⁷² attached to your statement, sir, did you produce minutes that were recorded of your meeting with Colonel Delic?

A. Yes, I did. In fact, every meeting that I attended with members of the parties, I would always have a note-taker with me that would then produce a record of meeting. In this case, when I met him on the 1st of February, we had some discussions. Primarily I wished to open a field office near the border, and so we were in discussions of his responsibilities and whether this was within his authorities or not.

Q. All right.

MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, if I could ask you to turn, if you would, please, to the attachment that's -- it's got a number of numbers, but it's dated the 1st of February, 1999, and it's entitled "Record of discussions, visit to commander VJ Brigade Prizren, held at officers' recreation facility."

Do Your Honours have that document?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

Q. Witness, do you -- do you have that particular document in the bundle?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. You have that as well. All right. Well, sir, these were the minutes that were taken by your assigned note-taker? What was his name?

A. Captain Chris Weissflog.

Q. And he is in the list of people that are noted to have attended that meeting; is that right? ⁵⁷⁷³

A. Yes, he is.

Q. And there is a legend of initials at the top of that document, showing "D" meaning Colonel Delic, "M" meaning you, and then the other participants are also listed on that document; is that correct?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. Now, sir, what can you tell us of this -- first of all, you've reviewed this document, and does it accurately compare with your recollection of what went on at that meeting?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. All right. Now, sir, can you tell us, if you would, please, what significance you attach to these particular notes of the meeting that you had with Colonel Delic?

A. Well, in essence, it shows that Colonel Delic did not have a completely free hand. He was not operating individually in his brigade area. He was part of a chain of command, as any military force that I, of course, have come in contact with usually does. He -- I was asking him to -- to agree to open a field office near Pleneja, which was within five kilometres of the border area, and he was explaining that he did not have the authorisation and he had to seek it from higher. I also got a sense, of course, that he was a disciplined officer and that his forces obeyed to his commands. I had previously dealt with him and received the same type of sense from him. If you go to the next page--

Q. Just before we do that, if I may, on this document there are dots or bullet points. This reference that you make to the fact that he needed higher command, is that reflected -- ⁵⁷⁷⁴

A. Fifth bullet there.

Q. Fifth bullet point. All right. And there's a "D" ascribed there.

A. Yes, that's Delic speaking that he wasn't personally against Pleneja but he felt he must have authorisation from his command, i.e., from higher command.

Q. I see. All right. And you were about to address our attention to the next page.

A. Right. If you go to the next page, the second bullet down, where he says, "I'm not authorised to decide on this," and he talks about General Loncar, who was the liaison, VJ liaison officer at the Pristina level, and Delic says that he's not the commander, he's a liaison officer, and therefore he had no authority. Loncar had who no authority to agree to the deployment of the field office.

Q. And the reference to, "I am not authorised to decide on this," what was the reference to what he was not authorised to decide on? Are you able to --

A. Yes. This is the question of whether we would be allowed to patrol near the -- within the five-kilometre area of the border.

Q. I see. And again, that was outside -- he said that was outside the scope of his authority?

A. That's correct.

Q. Turning to the next page, three of four, about halfway down the page, we see the sixth bullet point down on the page, again there's the initial "D." What, if anything, do you make of that? ⁵⁷⁷⁵

A. Well, here he -- this is where I got a sense that he was firmly in control of his forces where I was telling him that his people had been intimidating the locals, and he -- he was saying there that intimidation by his forces, he saw that as a breach discipline and that he -- he always thought, or he always told me that he would deal with them.

Q. All right. So this -- from your meeting with Delic, then, you came to the opinions that you've earlier stated, and these are some of the --

A. Correct.

Q. -- things that you point to in terms of why you arrived at those decisions. Okay.

Well, if we could move very briefly, then, sir, time is of the essence to --

JUDGE MAY: Before we do, do you want these exhibits entered?

MR. RYNEVELD: Absolutely, Your Honour. They are part of the bis package, so they are part of the last exhibit number, but it might be of some -- I'm in the Court's hands as to whether you think it would be assistance to the Court to have them with separate numbers.

JUDGE MAY: I think it would be of assistance since some of the package are documents which have already been exhibited.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. And not all of the documents that are attached to the bis package, so to speak, will be actually referred to. They're part of the bis'ing but they're not part of the live examination.

JUDGE MAY: Let us, therefore, give these separate exhibit numbers now, and any additional documents that you want exhibited which were in ⁵⁷⁷⁶ the package, you can refer to later, if you would.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Can we give this a number, please.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 176.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

Q. If I might then turn, if that meets with Your Honours' approval, to the 243rd Brigade. You mentioned there were two brigades. What type of brigade was it and who was its commander, if you recall?

A. This was a mechanised brigade, meaning it was -- soldiers there were carried in armoured personnel carriers, and its commander was Colonel Jelic.

Q. All right. And -- I'm sorry. You've told us earlier what a motorised brigade was. What is a mechanised brigade?

A. That's what I say, their soldiers were carried in armoured vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, and therefore they were equipped with armoured vehicles.

Q. My ignorance of military terms is obvious, I'm sorry. And do you know where they were based?

A. They were based in Urosevac. This is where the headquarters of the brigade was.

Q. I see. And do you know which elements, if any, of that brigade fell within the RC Prizren's area of responsibility?

A. Right. The -- the Urosevac brigade had a combat team, a force of about 150 people with tanks and armoured personnel carriers, deployed on the Dulje Heights. This was one of the agreed-to deployed combat teams. ⁵⁷⁷⁷ But also outside of their barracks, they had other elements which -- they had basically a company of all-arms deployed also in the area of Racak on top of the -- as well as the combat team in Dulje. So they had a couple of elements outside their barracks. The Dulje combat team was within my area of responsibility and, therefore, I had to have relations with the brigade headquarters in Urosevac.

Q. I see. Now, you may have answered this in the course of your question [sic], but was Racak then within the 243rd's area of responsibility?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. Now, sir, did you hear of an incident in early January involving the KLA near Racak?

A. A couple of -- a couple of incidents we heard about, one of which happened directly within my area of responsibility. On the 8th of January - so about a week before Racak - there had been an ambush carried out by the KLA in Stimlje pass, which was a very narrow pass that went through the Dulje Heights. And my -- my people arrived on the scene right after the ambush. There had been -- two policemen were killed right at the moment of the ambush and then another policeman, MUP policeman died in the hospital later, and we took the KLA to task on that one. And there was also another incident involving -- and that one was outside my area of responsibility, was within RC5's area of responsibility, involving again the MUP and a police car that I understood had burned or something like that. This was an incident that happened much closer to the time of Racak. ⁵⁷⁷⁸ So there had been a couple of incidents by the KLA.

Q. All right. You said you took the KLA to task on that. Was there a particular individual you dealt with?

A. Yes. My main contact for the entire Prizren Regional Centre was a KLA commander who called himself Drini. So I met with him right after the ambush to explain to him that this was not -- these were -- this was firmly against the agreement, against the ceasefire, that he was only inviting retaliation by doing these -- doing these things. And at that point, he commented that he had not personally ordered the ambush, it had been accomplished by a -- one of his local commanders.

Q. I see. Well, moving then to the Racak incident itself, the 15th of January. Did you at some point become aware of an operation by Serb forces near Stimlje?

A. Yes. On the 15th of January, the -- General DZ had -- who is the Deputy Head of Mission for operations, had called a meeting of all Regional Centre heads in Pec. At about -- well, towards -- throughout the morning, we'd been receiving reports of an operation against Racak by the VJ and the MUP, and -- to the point where it seemed to be a very -- very important -- a major operation, and therefore, General DZ asked me to go down to -- to take over the operation. Because the operation was in Regional Centre 5, the commander of Regional Centre 5 had not yet been deployed, been appointed, and so he asked me -- General DZ asked me to go and take command of the operation even though it was outside of my area of responsibility.

Q. I see. And did you or did KVM have verifiers near Racak at the ⁵⁷⁷⁹ time of the incident?

A. Yes, we did. We had a couple of patrols from Regional Centre 5 and, of course, when I was tasked to go down there, I actually dispatched a couple of my own patrols as well to go to Racak and assist Regional Centre 5's patrols on the ground.

Q. And do you know, generally speaking, what sort of vantage point they would have had? Were they --

A. Yes. Our patrols actually were on the heights surrounding Racak and observing the operation. They observed VJ tanks firing into houses that we believe were occupied because we could see plumes of smoke. And in fact, in those houses, we went down after the firing stopped and let the people out of the basements. These are the reports that I received from my -- my verifiers.

I myself arrived on the ground at about 4.30 in the afternoon, and as I was proceeding towards there, I was receiving reports of the firing and so on, which stopped about 3.30. The forces from the VJ and the MUP pulled back at that point, and so when I was travelling towards the -- towards Racak, the -- the day was coming to a -- it was January, so -- so darkness fell very quickly, and so instead of going into the village of Racak, I was told they were -- that my people had actually picked up some Albanian wounded and were going to bring them to -- to the hospital. So I decided to go to the hospital and to get the hospital ready to receive the wounded. The hospital was situated right beside the police station in Stimlje.

Q. All right. Now, if I can just back up a little bit. You've ^{5780 BLANK PAGE 5781} indicated that you had your verifiers up in the hills. I believe you indicated that they observed VJ tanks firing into houses. When you say "VJ tanks," are we talking --

A. T55s were the type of tanks that they were using. So there were T55s. There were also -- I had some of my people in -- observing the area around and in particular that area that I was mentioning where they had -- the VJ had also deployed an element and saw some of the howitzers pointed towards Racak and the villages surrounded -- surrounding the area.

Q. Did they report seeing any similar type of weaponry in the village itself?

A. No tanks in the village, no.

Q. And to your knowledge, did the MUP have tanks and heavy equipment?

A. MUP did not have tanks. They had -- but they had Pragas and armoured vehicles, VRDMs and so on. They didn't have tanks.

Q. So if there was a T55 tank, that would have been VJ?

A. That was a VJ, absolutely.

Q. Did they report seeing the MUP at the same time?

A. Yes, the MUP were in the village. My assessment after receiving all the reports, and I put the assessment in -- in my statements, my assessment was that the VJ had provided long-range support, if you wish, around the village, support to the operation that was carried out by the -- by the MUP. The house-to-house search and the cleaning of the village, if you wish, was done by the MUP, dismounted MUP.

Q. I see. General Maisonneuve, because of your extensive experience, do you have any personal experience with the use of tanks or heavy ⁵⁷⁸² artillery and other heavy weaponry in combat operations?

A. Yes, I do, in exercises and manoeuvres certainly.

Q. Have you ever trained in or planned anti-insurgency operations?

A. No, I have not, no.

Q. Why not?

A. Well, in fact, heavy weapons -- I'm an armoured officer and so use of tanks and use of armoured infantry is usually done for -- it's not used in counter-insurgency operations. It's usually done for major combat engagements in wide open spaces and against armoured enemy. If you're going to use -- anti-insurgency operations are usually done by much lighter forces than tanks and so on.

Q. Are there any reports that the KLA had tanks and heavy artillery?

A. No, the KLA do not have tanks. Certainly not to my knowledge.

Q. Sir, from your experience, would it ever be appropriate for tanks or anti-aircraft weapons or artillery or weaponry of the kind to fire at civilian structures?

A. Absolutely not. In fact, this was one of the points I made to the brigade commander from Urosevac when I did meet him, was that I thought that the use of such weapons in firing against civilian targets such as houses when in fact we had not observed any fire being returned or in fact any fire previous to the tanks firing into the houses was indiscriminate and inappropriate use of force.

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, what would be the more appropriate way of dealing with that situation?

THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honour, if there is no -- if there's no ⁵⁷⁸³ firing coming from a house, then you would deploy infantry and move up to the house. If you're fired upon, obviously you would return fire, but professional force does not fire unless -- unless there's a need to fire. If there is a need to bring supporting fire down, you would do it with small arms and so forth. So you actually deal with -- with an enemy with usually proportional forces. There's no doubt that if you need to, you would amass vastly superior forces so that you're prepared to deal with anything but if you're not being fired at, you would not indiscriminately fire and certainly not with heavy weapons.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. Now, sir -- I'll just wait for translation. Were you or your observers aware of a KLA presence in Racak?

A. We were aware of -- of light KLA presence, and in fact, it was confirmed by the -- certainly in statements by the KLA to me after, that the village had been lightly not even defended, if you wish, but they had scouts and a few fighters in the village. But this was not a place that we considered was held by a very strong KLA force.

Q. All right. Now, you've told us about this particular incident in Racak and the observation of tanks and heavy artillery. During the remainder of your stay in Kosovo, were there other times where you saw Serb forces direct heavy weapons against civilian structures?

A. Oh, that happened on several occasions. It seemed to be the modus operandi of the Serb security forces that any type of provocation, no matter how small, would result in an overwhelming use of force ⁵⁷⁸⁴ disproportionate to the actions of the KLA or the perpetrators, and this was constantly one of the things that I reinforced to the Serbs but also to the KLA when I met with them, saying I don't know why you're provoking them because you know that it always results in disproportionate use of force.

For example, in the Stimlje pass where I said the three policemen eventually died there that were ambushed by the KLA, within -- within a few minutes, a tank pulled out of the Dulje combat team position and moved out so it could fire directly into a village called, I believe, Slapuzane. A small village, firing into the village without any provocation, firing at civilian houses and would automatically cause -- you know, any time this would happen, it would automatically cause the locals to pick up whatever they had on their -- you know, and move out of the village, stream out of the village to the next village until things quieted down and then they'd come back. But it was -- you know, this type of retaliation always happened, always seemed to me to be, certainly in my opinion, disproportionate and overwhelming and actually just indiscriminate.

Q. I see. Sir, returning to the 15th of January for a moment. I think you've told us already that you went to the hospital to prepare them to receive wounded as a result of the things that you had seen; is that correct?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. All right. Did you see the police that evening? When I say police, I mean the MUP. ⁵⁷⁸⁵

A. Well, yes. I saw a couple of MUP soldiers or members of the MUP that came over to the hospital, and they were arrogant and were wondering why we were trying to get the doctor up and were not at all pleased to see us roust the doctor and the ambulance to provide help to the Albanian.

Q. I see. The following day, the 16th of January, sir, what if anything did you do that day that's relevant to the proceedings before the court?

A. Well, first of all, on the 15th in the evening, I organised for my patrols to return early in the morning. I also wanted a presence by Regional Centre 5 patrols in the village, and so we decided that we were going to go back and come back early the next morning.

JUDGE MAY: General, you're being asked, if you would, to slow down for the record.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour. So the 16th in the morning, my verifiers arrived approximately 7.00 in the morning in Racak, and reports started filtering back from them that they had -- they were finding bodies and that a major operation had actually taken place the night before in Racak. By the time I made my way to Racak, it was approximately 9.00 in the morning. I went in and observed -- I went in Racak myself and observed the -- a few bodies, and I had -- and they were bodies of elderly -- elderly men. And I had then also prepared a meeting with the brigade commander from Urosevac who I thought was going to show up on the 16th of January.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. Before we get to that meeting, if I may, sir, some of your ⁵⁷⁸⁶ observations. Did you attend an area known as the gully?

A. Yes, I did. And this would have been -- but this would have been after my meeting, I believe.

Q. All right. Perhaps I'll come back to that. We'll go to the meeting -- we'll try to deal with the 16th in a chronological fashion, then. You tried to arrange a meeting with whom?

A. With Colonel Jelic, the brigade commander from Urosevac.

Q. That would be the 243rd.

A. The 243rd. And he did not show up but his liaison officer did, a Lieutenant Colonel Petrovic.

Q. I see. And again, did you have a note-taker with you for that meeting?

A. I did. And I believe the notes are attached.

Q. Yes.

MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, if I can ask you to turn to the attachment, it appears to be a two-page attachment, dated the 16th of January, RC Prizren, "Record of discussions visit to 243 Brigade Urosevac, held at Brigade Headquarters at Urosevac" and with four people attending, in the legend

THE WITNESS: Page 15, at the bottom of the page, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. Now, according to the legend, sir -- again, this is a formality: This is an accurate record and accords with your recollection?

A. Yes, it does. ⁵⁷⁸⁷

Q. What can you tell us, sir, about this particular meeting?

A. Well, this was a meeting where -- where, of course, I was incensed after -- after seeing the damage and the dead bodies, and I was actually coming to take the brigade commander to task and ask him to confirm that he had been involved, that his forces had been involved. I also mentioned the Tribunal. And at that point, Lieutenant Colonel Petrovic confirmed that the MUP had actually participated, had actually done the action, but had been supported by a Praga and a tank from the brigade, from the VJ.

Q. And your allegations and his response are reflected in these notes; is that correct?

A. Yes, that's correct. It's --

Q. The third -- the third bullet point is "M," that's you.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. You said you saw atrocities in Racak, you assessed VJ and MUP were responsible?

A. Right.

Q. "Fifty people killed, non-combatants." Did you tell him that?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And what else did you tell him?

A. Well, I mentioned all the -- you know, the fact that his tanks and heavy artillery had moved out and that the -- they still had not moved back to their barracks, which was against the agreement.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. And then I -- of course, I was speaking with the liaison officer, this was not the brigade commander. So I was not happy not to be able to ⁵⁷⁸⁸ speak to the brigade commander himself to mention that to him. And then at the end when I -- or at the beginning -- at the end of my state -- first statement when I mentioned, "Do you have anything to say?" and you see I think it's bullet about eight down, where he says, "Stimlje was done by the MUP with Praga -- Praga armoured vehicles and one tank," and then I guess understood there that this was the VJ in support.

Q. I see. All right. So basically he's blaming it on the MUP with support from the VJ at that point?

A. Right. And then I -- that's the -- the next bullet is where I mention the Tribunal and the fact that I thought that this behaviour was certainly not in keeping with a professional army's behaviour.

Q. Okay. Now, did you then have a second meeting with VJ officers at a later date?

A. Yes, I did --

JUDGE MAY: We ought to exhibit that document.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, sorry.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 177.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

A. On the 16th, I also met with the MUP commander in Stimlje.

Q. Yes. Before we move to the MUP commander in Stimlje -- I'll return to that, if I may, later. I want to go from your meeting with Petrovic, who was the liaison officer for the VJ, to a subsequent meeting you had on the 4th of February, still with the VJ --

A. Right.

Q. -- and compare and/or contrast what occurred or what you were told ⁵⁷⁸⁹ at that second meeting.

A. Right. The second meeting, I'd been -- right from the 16th of January, I had been attempting to meet with the commander of the brigade from Urosevac and had on a number of occasions requested meetings, and it didn't happen until the 4th of January, and that's recorded in the record of discussion at page 18 at the bottom of the page.

Q. Right.

MR. RYNEVELD: Do Your Honours have the 4th of February 1999 "Record of discussions visit to commander of VJ Brigade Urosevac" at the -- I think it's pages 18, 17, and 16 of the attachments. Thank you.

Q. First of all, sir, again attending - we have a legend - again you have your note-taker taking these notes, and again, this accords with your recollection of what transpired?

A. It does.

Q. And we have you there. We have, among other people, we have Colonel Kotur, the VJ chief liaison officer to the KVM headquarters?

A. Right.

Q. And "D" is Colonel Krsman Jelic?

A. Yes. It actually should be a "J." In the legend, that should be a "J" throughout the --

Q. All right. And Petrovic, the chap you spoke to earlier, was also present?

A. That's correct.

Q. All right. Well, sir, what happened at that meeting and what if anything is of significance in your -- ⁵⁷⁹⁰

A. Well, first of all, in this -- this meeting I was -- again I was unhappy because he had refused to meet me or certainly had not met me until I had almost forced him and through, I think it's through Colonel Kotur, that I was able to meet him.

Again, I mentioned or I -- I asked him where he had been on the day, and he -- he was rather evasive about where he was. He also would not confirm that -- that he had operated with the MUP during the Racak operation. He was saying that in fact his forces had not fired into the village but had fired in the outskirts towards other -- another two villages, Belince and -- I can't remember the name of the other village. But the point was that he did not -- he did not confirm that his forces were actually operating along with the MUP at that meeting.

Q. And did he acknowledge that VJ forces were in fact operational?

A. Oh, he did, and he -- their approach there was that the MUP and the VJ were operating independently but simultaneously, which was -- which is probably -- it's totally against -- it's just so farfetched because in any military operation, the one thing you want to do when you're firing real bullets is to make sure that you are coordinated down to the most exact manner; and the way you do this coordination and cooperation is you meet ahead of time to discuss areas where your forces will be operating, where you will base your forces. You discuss points of coordination such as reporting lines, areas where you're going to fire, direct your fire, means of coordination, such as radio call signs, you ensure that your frequencies are all the same so that you're all operating on the same radio nets. It's got to be -- I mean, if you're firing real bullets, you ⁵⁷⁹¹ don't want to have blue-on-blue engagements.

Q. This is an obvious question, but why do you need that kind of coordination?

A. Because you don't want to have your friendly forces firing against friendly forces and you want to be able to -- you want to be able to direct your forces and command them properly. So in my -- in my military opinion, there had to be coordination between the MUP and the VJ.

Q. To what extent and to what level?

A. Well, I would say certainly at the brigade level. This was an operation that involved, you know, significant forces from both the MUP and the VJ, and so I would say a brigade or higher level perhaps even.

Q. Did "J," which I guess is Jelic, acknowledge responsibility for that brigade? And I'm asking you to turn to page which is written -- it's number 17. And I think there are a bunch of bullet points that start with a question to you or by you of Jelic whether or not he was the officer in charge for the VJ forces on the ground at Racak on the 15th of January. Do you see that?

A. Yes, I do. In fact, he responds that, "This is a brigade and I'm responsible for the whole region." He was in fact responsible for the whole brigade. There is no denying that.

Q. All right. And does this page 17 there, it almost seems to be an attempt at a transcript of the narrative conversation that takes place. Is that -- to the best of your recollection, is that an accurate portrayal of how it went?

A. Yes, that's how the discussion went. ⁵⁷⁹²

Q. Well, sir, as you're listening to this explanation, what was your impression? Were you buying it or did you accept it?

A. No, I did not buy it. I thought he was very evasive in his -- in his explanations and seemed to be tap dancing around the question.

Q. And how did this explanation compare, in your opinion, with the explanation you'd received from Petrovic just days earlier?

A. Well, it didn't jive. Certainly Petrovic, to my mind, had confirmed that tanks and Praga had been involved, tanks from the VJ had been involved, and luckily, I think in this case, I had managed to speak to Petrovic very quickly after the actual operation so that he had not had time to receive the party line, if you wish, from his brigade commander.

Q. Just one more question about this area, sir. Did your observers report to you seeing VJ forces engaging targets between Racak and Belince on the 16th of January as Colonel Jelic attempted to explain to you?

A. No, they did not.

Q. What did they see instead?

A. They said they saw -- they told me that they saw tanks shooting into houses that were on the outskirts of Racak that were occupied.

Q. You were about to turn to your meeting of the 16th of January with the MUP when I asked you to turn to that. Could we do that now?

MR. RYNEVELD: And that, Your Honours, is covered in paragraphs 45 to 50 of his statement.

JUDGE MAY: The 4th of February exhibited.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 178. ⁵⁷⁹³

MR. RYNEVELD: Now -- and I'm going to ask you, Your Honours, the document 16th of January, with the MUP, is pages 13, 12, and 11 of the attachments.

Q. Again, sir, this is a record of -- of a meeting that you held with Janicijevic?

A. Correct, yes, it is.

Q. And he was the chief of the MUP, was he?

A. He was the chief of police in the area of Racak.

Q. All right. And very quickly, sir, could you tell us the significant aspects of the -- of this particular conversation and --

A. There are a few interesting aspects. First of all, he described the operation from his point of view. I was looking for -- myself and Gil Gilbertson, who was the deputy head of RC 5 - in fact, he was the one asking most of the questions in this case - we were looking for who was in charge of the -- of the actual operation and who had commanded it and how many people had been involved. He confirmed that there were approximately 100 of his members involved. He also confirmed that he was in charge. I believe if you go to page 2, or to the second page of the statement, at the top, about five or six bullets down, he confirms that a hundred men were involved. And about two-thirds of the way down, I asked him if he was in charge of the 100 policemen, and he said, "If it is of your concern, yes."

Q. And during that conversation, was it put to him that the VJ basically blamed the MUP?

A. Yes. In fact, I about -- again about two-thirds of the way down, ⁵⁷⁹⁴ just a little below the 100 policemen statement, Gil in fact says that, "We just left the VJ; they put the blame on you." And he denies that they were with the VJ. And the MUP in fact maintain that this was a MUP operation without VJ involvement.

Q. And what was your impression of this particular meeting, sir?

A. Again, this was another meeting where I thought that the answers did not match what actually happened on the ground, and they produced with great elan the weapons that they said they'd captured during the operation; a 50 calibre machine-gun and a grenade -- grenade launcher. But this did not match my view of what happened and what my observers had seen on the ground.

Q. Dealing with paragraph 42 of your statement, how would you generally describe the MUP's behaviour towards the KVM and the Kosovo Albanian population, from what you could see?

A. Well, in all my dealings with the MUP, I believe they tried to -- I believe our relationships with the OSCE, KVM, and the MUP were -- relationship was professional, straightforward. My -- the chief of police in the Prizren area certainly tried to portray himself as a professional police officer who was well aware of community policing, community policing approach, and so that's how he liked to portray himself. But on the ground, I -- certainly we found another -- another approach. We found that at many of the checkpoints, the police were overbearing, arrogant, sometimes beat up innocent civilians. And their behaviour was usually only tempered when we had people immediately at the scene. So in some of the major checkpoints, I refused to let my people leave, and I would set ⁵⁷⁹⁵ up permanent observation posts because I knew that that was the way that the -- the only way that the police would actually behave according to normal -- what I thought were normal standards of behaviour.

JUDGE MAY: Exhibit number.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 179.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. All right. Sir, I invited you earlier to give us comments about things you actually saw at the gully, and you indicated that you'd had a meeting and I said we'd come back to it. Let's come back to it.

A. Right. After coming back to -- back to Racak, I was told that General DZ and Ambassador Walker were actually going to come to Racak, and so I went back into the village and my verifiers took me up to the area that you referred to as the gully. At that location were about 20 bodies from what I could count. They were laid in a bit of a line. It was one particular area where there were about eight or ten bodies together. From what I could see, they had been shot at close range, most in the head -- mostly in the head, the back or the front, and -- and the men were -- they were all men, first of all, and they all -- they did not look like men of what I would consider fighting age. They looked like several elderly people, mostly villagers, some wearing the typical Albanian caps there, and they looked like, as I say, they had been -- they would have been shot from -- from close range.

Q. From what you could see, was there any evidence to you, just as a professional person but as a layman, that these -- as to whether or not ⁵⁷⁹⁶ these bodies were shot in situ or are you able to tell?

A. I could not tell that. The one thing I did -- I do remember, though, is the bodies, some of them were covered in dew, and dew comes down, of course, in the morning, so would have been there certainly in the morning.

Q. And just so we're clear, what time did you see these bodies in the gully?

A. I would say probably around 11.00.

Q. A.M.?

A. A.M., yes.

Q. Now, had you, as part of the KVM, heard reports earlier about men and women being separated and men going missing?

A. Well, I'd heard that on, you know, different occasions. Certainly in the case of Racak, I saw a report after the -- after the -- the actual incident and probably a few days later that said that some -- some of the men had been rounded up. My verifiers didn't report that to me directly, but of course the KVM, at their level, had reports from all the Regional Centres, including Regional Centre 5, and I heard reports then that some 20 men had been separated from their wives and taken away at some point during the operation.

Q. And at the time those reports were prepared, was that before or after these bodies were found in the gully, do you know?

A. I can't really say but I would say before they were found.

Q. Very briefly, sir - I'm trying to finish you in about an hour - so I have just a few more questions. I think you've answered most of this ⁵⁷⁹⁷ already, the degree of coordination of forces would be involved in an operation like Racak, and I think you've given us partially the answer that I was anticipating. The other aspect of it would be the firing by VJ or firing by an army unit. How do you avoid friendly fire casualties?

A. Well, again as I mentioned, the only way to avoid that is to coordinate ahead of time -- ahead of the operation that -- that portions and elements will fire in a certain area and other elements will fire in another area, and you do that by -- on a map, say, drawing a line or drawing a coordination measure that allows you to say, okay, move your fire from here to there at this time or on my order. And as your other friendly forces progress, the fire gets moved over, if you wish. And that way -- this is the type of coordination that has to take place before an operation.

Q. My final question, then, sir, is: What -- if you were asked to sum up, what was your assessment of the military operation in Racak?

A. Well, my -- my assessment is that it was -- it would be an operation that -- that was against very lightly-defended -- a lightly-defended locality that used as -- as was the modus operandi heavy, indiscriminate firing in overwhelming fire against civilians and -- and certainly the bodies found throughout the village, which in fact when I -- after DZ and Ambassador Walker left, I went back and personally saw one young lady, probably 18 years old, and a 12-year-old boy among the bodies, and so I would say that this was not a legitimate -- legitimate military operation.

Q. Thank you, sir. The -- ⁵⁷⁹⁸

JUDGE MAY: Before you finish, we have attached to the statement - it may be as well if you get the witness just to briefly go through them - various reports.

MR. RYNEVELD: Certainly.

JUDGE MAY: I have in mind the -- yes. The report of the 17th of January, I think it is, or 15th and 16th of January, pages 9 and 10.

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. I wrote that myself, actually.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. It would be helpful just if the witness would go through that.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. If you have a copy of that --

A. I do.

Q. -- there, perhaps you could just very briefly assist Their Honours with respect to your notations there.

A. Right. In fact, Your Honour, that kind of resumes the points I've been making throughout that in fact on the 15th I was at a meeting and I was sent to the area of Racak to look after the operation. I went to the hospital, and we evacuated some casualties, and I decided at that point that we should -- on the 15th, that we should meet with the commander of the brigade in Urosevac to discuss these actions. It speaks then on the 16th of January about our patrols going into -- into Racak, my arrival and briefing, then the meeting at the officers' club in Urosevac with the -- in fact, at that time it was not the brigade commander, it was with Petrovic, the liaison officer. Then the MUP chief. And when it says, "report attached," those are two reports that you've ⁵⁷⁹⁹ already, I believe, admitted as exhibits.

Then I briefed the Deputy Head of Mission Operations and the Head of Mission, and -- and that essentially recounts the rest of the day. And at the end is my assessment, as I mentioned, I believe, earlier, of the events as I saw them. That's the evening of the 16th. When I came back, I wrote this report, that I -- my assessment was that the VJ had provided long -- long-range fire support from the high ground surrounding Racak while the MUP did the house-to house clearing and the dismounted operations within -- within Racak.

JUDGE MAY: That should be given an exhibit number.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 180.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. If you could turn next, if you would, to your report on page 8. I believe Their Honours expressed an interest in that. Just wait for a moment, though.

MR. RYNEVELD: Sorry, Your Honours. I've asked the witness also to look at your page 8, because I believe that's the other area of interest to the Court that you've expressed.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just before you do that, I just wanted to ask the general on what did he base the assessment that the VJ provided long-range support?

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. That's based on my discussions with my verifiers on the ground who had been actually -- and I actually also went up to, you know -- throughout the day that I was touring around ⁵⁸⁰⁰ the village of Racak, I actually went up to the high ground above Racak where my verifiers had seen the tanks providing support. And of course, I make that assessment from -- based on their reports and reports of all the other verifiers in the area and my own military assessment of how I would carry out such an operation. If it had been a heavily-defended locality, that's how I would have carried out the operation.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Thank you.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. Would you then very briefly, Major General, turn to page 8, which is the report of activities of the RC 1 Prizren for the 17th of January, 1999.

A. Right. This -- obviously I wrote this one on the evening of the 17th after the operations of the day, and we were -- we were advised at this point that on the morning of the -- on the -- on the morning of the 17th, that the Yugoslav authorities wished to -- to have a -- perform an investigation, and that they wanted to do so with -- with a large element of security provided by the MUP. So I met with the Deputy Head of Mission, General DZ, in Stimlje before 8.00, and we agreed that I would then take three patrols into the city -- into the village, sorry, of Racak and its surroundings to -- to keep an eye on what was going on actually in the village. There was a KLA presence in the village at that point, and I coordinated the movements of my patrols while General DZ was meeting with the presiding judge.

Around 11.00, she had refused to actually go into the village escorted by the KVM and still wanted to go in with a heavy MUP force, and ⁵⁸⁰¹ in fact, they began their movement shortly thereafter, and I had to evacuate the OSCE patrols who were very close to the firing that was ongoing.

Q. A couple of questions to elaborate on that, if I may. Do you remember, was Judge Marinkovic the presiding judge?

A. She was the presiding judge, yes.

Q. Do you know a Colonel Ciaglinski?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Did you hear from him in any way before your evacuation?

A. Oh, yes. In fact, I was in contact with -- with General DZ and with Ciaglinski on the radio, and they are the ones that advised me that she had decided not to agree to go in with a light force but wanted to go in with a heavy force, and they basically told me to get the people out as quickly as possible. That's when I coordinated the evacuation of my verifiers.

JUDGE KWON: Just a minute.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE KWON: On this report, I see these conditions the KLA was asking at the time. They asked MUP move back of hills; is that right?

THE WITNESS: That's right.

JUDGE KWON: Was it agreed with the judge or the Serb authorities in advance?

THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour. What happened is we had been keeping in contact with the KLA in the villages and hoping that they would actually exercise restraint as well. We didn't want a huge fight to break ⁵⁸⁰² out here and have all kinds of casualties on both sides, so we were -- we had been saying, you know, the presiding judge is going to come in with KVM, if we can manage to convince her to do so, so she can do an investigation, an independent investigation, and you know -- so we were trying to being very accommodating to both sides. But of course, tempers were very high, and the KLA did not want -- want this to happen. They didn't want any Serb presence in the village whatsoever. In spite of that, we continued to negotiate with them. And in fact it happened about the same time as she said, no, I'm going in with a heavy presence, that's when we received -- the KLA, okay, we'll agree, with these four conditions. So it was too late. It came after the fact, if you wish. So we weren't able to -- she hadn't agreed to them anyway, so it was too late and she --

JUDGE KWON: What concerns me is a matter of some principle. It's matter of sovereignty. A judge cannot enter the village without the protection of her own country. So that -- that seems to be the problem. What would be your assessment on that?

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. That's -- that's a good point. And in fact, we had no problem with having a -- having a light escort, i.e., if she had said I want to take one or two personal protection guards. But the MUP had deployed a complete company of MUP in armoured vehicles on the outsides -- on the outskirts of the village, and they wanted to go in and -- almost as another military operation. And that's what ended up happening; they went in with armoured vehicles and so forth, into the village. ⁵⁸⁰³

JUDGE KWON: So it might be some useless question, but if the OSCE people had remained there and accompanied the investigating judge, had the KLA also fired the shootings against the group?

THE WITNESS: Yes, they did. The KLA actually, you know, started retaliating but then moved out because they had a light presence, and in fact, the MUP began firing as opposed to going in and just escorting the judge. They mounted this as another military operation.

JUDGE KWON: So even against the KVM people, if they had remained.

THE WITNESS: If they had remained there, yes. In fact, that was the concern of DZ, myself and all of the OSCE, was us getting caught in the middle of the operation.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. RYNEVELD: I'm sorry, Your Honours, I've been not too good with the exhibit numbers. Did we give page 8 an exhibit number?

THE REGISTRAR: No. Exhibit 181.

MR. RYNEVELD: And one question, if I might be at liberty. It's a question that I forgot to ask. Just my last question, then.

Q. Sir, did you become aware of whether or not the Serb forces had suffered any casualties during the 15th of January 1999 incident?

A. I subsequently became aware that they had suffered one injury. There was one injury to one of their members.

Q. And from a military perspective, what does the difference in casualties tell you, if anything?

A. Well, if -- you know, 50 mostly civilians or -- I'll just say civilians on one side and one casualty only on the other side means that ⁵⁸⁰⁴ in fact the area would have seemed to be very lightly defended.

MR. RYNEVELD: Those are my questions. Thank you very much, Major General, would you answer other questions.

JUDGE KWON: How about the rest of the documents?

MR. RYNEVELD: I'm sorry. Was it not entered as an exhibit under 92 bis?

JUDGE KWON: Meetings with the KLA commanders and some notes.

JUDGE MAY: It may be helpful to deal with those.

MR. RYNEVELD: Certainly. I was simply following Your Honours' instruction that you wanted me to deal with those two particular areas, so I'm happy to deal with that now, if you want that live.

JUDGE MAY: Pages 7 onwards, it may be helpful just to deal with those.

MR. RYNEVELD: Sure. Thank you.

Q. Yes. Witness, if you could look at pages 7 and 6, which is the 17th of January notation of the record of discussions with the gentleman you've already referred to in evidence as Drini.

A. Right.

Q. What can you tell us about that?

A. Well, this was meeting that I had in fact quite soon after -- on the 17th of January with KLA about -- about Racak. He seemed to be -- Commander Drini, at this point, was obviously very disappointed at the actions. He is the one that told me at this point that he had -- that the village had been very lightly defended, which was what our verifiers confirmed, and that the -- the attack there actually served to set a ⁵⁸⁰⁵ climate of fear amongst the people. In fact, this was corroborated later by our -- our people.

After Racak happened, it -- on several occasions, we would get -- we received phone calls at 2.00 in the morning from villagers in some other village, villagers who were terrified because a MUP or unidentified white vehicle had driven through the city at 2.00 in the morning, and they -- the statement they always made was, "We don't want another Racak to happen." So Racak had actually set the scene for -- for great fear throughout -- throughout Kosovo.

So this was a -- this was a meeting to discuss the arrangements there and what had happened and so forth. And what the -- to ensure that the response from the -- from the KLA was going to be muted and that they were going to continue to stick to the principles of the arrangement -- the agreement.

Q. Turning next --

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 182.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. I take it Your Honours want me to deal with the remaining documents as well. I may as well just quickly go through those.

Q. The 28th of January 1999, page 5, appears to be a record of discussions again with Drini, held at the KLA meeting house.

A. Yes. And this one here was about -- was after the events in Rogovo where about 25 Albanian people were killed, most of whom in this case certainly looked like they were KLA members. And I also wanted to discuss with -- with Drini at this point the opening of different field ⁵⁸⁰⁶ offices and what -- his actions in different areas. He, at one point, attempted to place a deadline on the KVM, and I in, I think about the fourth bullet from the bottom, I explained to him that the KVM did not do deadlines. This was more of a regular meeting with Drini.

Q. Your general impression of your meetings with Drini were what? Sorry.

A. Well, again straightforward. He had been -- he had been a professional officer in the Yugoslav national army, the JNA, had done Staff College, in fact had gone to Staff College with the commander of 549 Brigade, Colonel Delic, which is one of the interesting situations you find yourselves in in some of these situations.

MR. RYNEVELD: Number for this document.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 183.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. Then there are some handwritten pages dated the 26th of February, 1999, and the 4th of March, 1999. One is called -- the 4th of March is called, "Points from Drini." Is that your handwriting?

A. No. That is Douglas Young, who is one of my verifiers. He's the one who actually had the meeting. I was not at this meeting. But this is a meeting when in fact he was -- Drini was actually taken to task for having targeted Serb villages, and that's at the point at which he mentioned that he knew the Geneva Conventions. And we were adamant that some of the problems that we were facing were because of -- of uncontrolled elements on both sides.

MR. RYNEVELD: Next number. ⁵⁸⁰⁷

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 184.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. There's different handwriting for the 26th of February document.

A. Right. The 26th of February was a meeting at which my -- again my note-taker here was a Captain Weissflog. It was a meeting that took place after Randubrava, which was another incident where the KLA were attacked by the MUP there. Randubrava is a little village near Prizren, and this was more of a -- again a general meeting to discuss those events.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 185.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. And finally, you don't appear to have been present at a meeting of the 23rd of January for Kostrice, but I take it these people were some of your verifiers, were they?

A. Yes. Mike Morwood was the second in command of my -- of my Regional Centre, and the others were my verifiers as well.

Q. And the significance of this document, sir?

A. Now, this one is on 23rd of -- 23rd of January, which was following another event where there was a car ambushed at Bela Crkva. We were discussing -- we were discussing the future and the -- again, this was another meeting where he was trying to put the 15-minute rule on us where if we didn't take action, KVM didn't take action within 15 minutes of an incident happening, that they were going to deal with it themselves, and that's when we told him that we don't do deadlines.

Q. And in these meetings, it's clear that the KVM was explaining to the KLA the terms and conditions that you were operating under; is that ^{5808 BLANK PAGE 5809} correct?

A. That's correct. We were certainly -- we tried to -- to be impartial, and in my view we were.

Q. Thank you, sir. Those are my questions.

MR. RYNEVELD: Oh, last document number.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 186.

JUDGE MAY: We will take the adjournment now. We'll start again at quarter past.

General, would you remember in this and any other adjournment there may be in this case not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over, please.

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We'll adjourn now.

--- Recess taken at 11.53 a.m.

--- On resuming at 12.15 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] In cooperation with the Albanian terrorists, you were preparing the illegal criminal aggression of NATO against Yugoslavia; right?

A. That's preposterous. No, I was not.

Q. Oh. So your answer is you did not; right?

A. What was your question, that I was preparing NATO? No, I was not. And I was not in cooperation with anyone. I was an impartial ⁵⁸¹⁰ international observer.

Q. All right, we'll establish that. You started your statement by claiming the following in the first sentence: That you witnessed a crime. Since you have not been called here to judge whether something was a crime or atrocity or not, tell me, what are the official reports of the court authorities or the government authorities or of experts from Yugoslavia or elsewhere that you bore in mind when giving such an assessment of what happened?

A. My assessment is given in -- in light of my opinion and the events that I saw on the ground.

Q. You said that the task of the OSCE was to verify and monitor whether all the parties to the conflict were abiding by the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement. What were the conflict parties, and in your opinion, the terrorist organisation, the so-called KLA, could it have the -- could it be treated as a party to a conflict? This is on page 2, in the last paragraph.

A. The parties that were in the agreement itself were the -- the Serb authority forces on one side and the KLA and Albanian locals on the other side. In terms of whether a conflict existed or not, this is a matter of legal -- matter which I'm not qualified to respond to.

Q. Actually, you wanted to make the KLA a legitimate legal force and, inter alia, you wanted to make it more accessible. Is that right?

A. I don't understand the question. Accessible to what?

Q. Well, more accessible in terms of cooperation, more open to cooperation. ⁵⁸¹¹

A. The mission that I saw the OSCE as having was the verification of the agreement between yourself and Mr. Holbrooke, which had a number of -- which had a number of elements to it, one of which was to respect the ceasefire, to reduce levels of Serb forces, to -- to respect human rights and so forth. To do so, I did -- I had contact with the KLA, as they called themselves, and the Albanian local population, as well as the parties from the Serb authorities, both MUP, VJ, and administrative authorities.

Q. I am saying the following: That you wanted to make the KLA a legitimate force and that, in that sense, you wanted to make them become more open to others. Therefore, I would like to recall a document presented by the other side. You are the author of that document. It's called "The Implementation of Measures for Implementing Contacts." The page of the Serbian version is 03036214. It says literally, if the KLA wants to be recognised as --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment, Mr. Milosevic. If you're going to put a document to the witness, he must see it so that he's able to respond to it. Has this document been exhibited?

MR. RYNEVELD: I don't believe it was, Your Honour. It may have -- my recollection doesn't serve me on this particular document, but my associate Mr. Higgins is checking as we speak.

JUDGE MAY: Let's see if we can find it. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. This is what it says literally in the document: "However, if the KLA wants to be recognised as a legitimate force that is trusted, it has ⁵⁸¹² to be encouraged to become more accessible."

So you're trying to present a terrorist organisation as a legitimate force. Please admit this as an exhibit. This is an OSCE document, and you're the author of this document. Here you are. I'm tendering it in its entirety.

JUDGE MAY: Let us find the document. Have you got the English of it there, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, no, but I just have the Serb translation, and it has a number from the other side and 03036214 -- 12 is what it says. Here it is.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Why were you dealing in this anyway? Why were you wondering what had to be done in order to make the KLA a legitimate force, a force that would be trustworthy, at that?

A. I believe that the job of any international force, such as the KVM, has to develop trust with both parties or all parties to a conflict. In this case, I believe that the document you're referring to was a document that was looking towards measures that may be required in the event of an agreement between the Serb authorities and the -- the Albanian parties. And if that was the case, then we needed to put in place a certain regime of -- of not only verification but of shadow is what we had called it, where we would be accompanying the parties after an accord to ensure that both sides would comply with the accord. And so the whole question of trust, there's no doubt that when we dealt with both the Serb side and the Albanian side is that we acted on -- on a belief that trust ⁵⁸¹³ would be developed between the parties, between the international community, which I represented as the OSCE, and the parties.

MR. RYNEVELD: If I might interrupt just at the moment since Your Honours have asked. We have, we believe, located the statement, an English copy of that document, which is MM/6, can be brought to the courtroom in a moment or two. It was not exhibited, but I believe it is an attachment to his original statement.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My question was: Why did you deal with this anyway? Why was it necessary for the KLA to be a legitimate force? I link this to the question that was put to you by Mr. Kwon in relation to sovereignty. Do you think that terrorist groups can, in any state, be treated as a legitimate party to a conflict?

A. I can tell you the way I was trying to deal with both sides, and that includes the Serb authorities, by the way. I was trying to develop a level of trust where I could deal with them and actually request things from them and be told that things would -- certain things would happen so that we could verify their compliance with the agreement. And the agreement, again, was between yourself and Mr. Holbrooke, but included within the agreement was a certain behaviour by both your forces, the Serb authority forces, and the Albanian local forces, some of which were the KLA, self-proclaimed KLA, the local authorities -- Albanian local authorities, and the local population. And so we behaved totally -- we tried to behave totally impartially and verify the compliance of both sides to the agreement. It wasn't a matter of making anyone legitimate, ⁵⁸¹⁴ but if we were going to deal with the Albanian side, we had to deal with them on the same basis of trust that we had with your forces.

JUDGE MAY: Do we now have the document?

MR. RYNEVELD: I have one copy of the document.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. RYNEVELD: Copies can be brought down momentarily, but in fairness to the witness, perhaps he ought to see the document about which questions are being asked.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. The witness should see the document.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. It is MM/2B, by the looks of things.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. The interpreters cannot hear the speaker.

JUDGE MAY: Microphone. Microphone.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please speak into the microphone.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, it's no good. The interpreters cannot hear you. Could you speak into the microphone.

Now, has the -- rather than this, has the witness got the document MM/ --

THE WITNESS: I have the document, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: You've got it. We in fact have it --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.

JUDGE MAY: It was served with the original bundle, and it's MM/2B. I think this is it, 23rd of February, 1999? Is that right, General? ⁵⁸¹⁵

THE WITNESS: That's the one I have in front of me, Your Honour. In fact, it is the one that I mentioned which was a planning document which was never put into effect, but it was during the Rambouillet negotiations and we were leaning forward, if you wish, and planning for the eventual, hopefully, an agreement and looking at the measures that would be required in the event of such a -- an event. And as you see, that is -- in the introduction, that is what I say here.

JUDGE MAY: And while we're on it, is there any reference that you can remember to making them a legitimate organisation that the accused is asking you about?

THE WITNESS: Well, if you look at -- if you look at paragraph 4 -- the paragraphs are numbered. On page 2, paragraph 4 under KLA, it talks in there about the KLA's wish to be recognised as a credible and legitimate force, not that we wish to recognise them.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I quoted a sentence under paragraph 4A where you say: "However, if the KLA wishes to be recognised as a legitimate force that is believed, it has to be encouraged to become more accessible." That is the core of the matter, and I tender this into evidence, but we have to move on.

I'm asking you whether you distinguish between --

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that they do not have a copy of the document.

JUDGE MAY: I trust it will not matter. Let us exhibit the document the next Defence number. ⁵⁸¹⁶

THE REGISTRAR: That will be Defence Exhibit D20.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. General, if you'd like to hand that back into the Court if you would, please, and we can exhibit it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This takes up a lot of time.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm giving documents that have already been registered, I mean that the other side already has. I really think that this much time should not be wasted.

JUDGE MAY: Let's get on with it, then.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Because their authenticity is not questioned in any way.

JUDGE MAY: Let's get on with it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So do you distinguish between a political agreement between the government of the Republic of Serbia and the political representatives of the Kosovo Albanians and terrorists who kill, kidnap, and commit all sorts of other crimes on the ground?

A. Well, in this case, it was -- it was my duty on the ground to verify the agreement. The agreement called on both parties - your side, that is the Serb authorities in Kosovo, and the representatives of the Kosovo Albanians of all types - to comply with the provisions of the agreement, which were to in fact behave according to human rights. And the only way that -- one of which was to behave in accordance with human rights, to verify -- to comply with the ceasefire. And the only way that I could verify that and ensure that it did take place was to deal with all ⁵⁸¹⁷ parties, on your side and on the Albanian side.

Q. Let us keep the questions and answers short, please. In your opinion, is the KLA a terrorist organisation or not? Just say yes or no.

A. In my opinion, the KLA is an organisation that was -- that arose as a result of the -- the strife that the Albanian people were feeling on the ground. It was an assemblage of paramilitary forces, almost a rebel organisation.

Q. All right. Are you aware of the assertion made by Robert Gelbard, the US envoy to the Balkans, that this is a terrorist organisation? I have already introduced this into evidence so I'm not going to tender it again. Are you aware of that statement?

A. I'm not aware of it.

Q. And you must be aware of Security Council Resolution 1160 dated the 31st of March, 1998, and 1199 of the 23rd of September, 1998, then Resolution 1203 dated the 24th of October. All these Resolutions refer to terrorism in Kosovo. Isn't that correct? Therefore, why do you advocate having a terrorist organisation given legitimacy?

JUDGE MAY: That is not a fair question to the witness because it misrepresents what he said. He did not advocate legitimacy. He told you that he had to deal with both sides.

Now, you've been told, Mr. Milosevic, before that we waste a lot of time by trying to reargue points which you assert and which the witness has answered.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁵⁸¹⁸

Q. You explain in your statement that KDOM practically became one with the Kosovo Verification Mission. This is page 3, paragraph 4. It practically melted into it. Those are your words. However, Drewienkiewicz, when he testified on the 11th of April, said that part of KDOM remained independent, to be precise, the US part of KDOM that remained in Kosovo throughout. He said literally --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. "We managed to absorb part of KDOM. However, that part of American KDOM which remained independent stayed on at Kosovo throughout." Is that right or is that not right?

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that this was a quotation from the transcript.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So who is right? Is it you or him? You say that KDOM melted into the Kosovo Verification Mission whereas he says that part of it remained independent. So who is right?

A. In terms of the -- the -- when the KVM was put in place, the KDOMs that already existed on the ground, most of the KDOMs were actually absorbed, and the -- the agreement in fact that you signed with Mr. Holbrooke actually talks about the OSCE was going to absorb the KDOMs that were already on the ground. In fact, this is what happened within my Regional Centre, is I -- I deployed and took under command the UK KDOM and portions of the US KDOM. But I also believe that the portions of the US KDOM remained outside the KVM. ⁵⁸¹⁹

Q. All right. You knew that then as well. Why is it that you managed only to absorb part of American KDOM and who stopped you from doing this? Or, rather, the question is: Did you lodge any kind of protest with the Security Council or anyone because it was impossible for you to place the American part of KDOM under the KVM?

A. As I told you, I had a portion of the American KDOM under my command, under the KVM, and therefore, I was able, within my area, to operate with my forces without any difficulties.

Q. But I assume that there is no contest, that according to the agreement, KDOM had to be absorbed into the Verification Mission, folded into it. I believe that that is not being challenged. Yes or no.

A. In fact, some of the higher level agreements were not within my responsibility. I was given forces which included US KDOM, UK KDOM, portions thereof. I used them, and I -- in fact, I built up my forces on those portions of those two KDOMs.

Q. Can it be inferred then -- can it be inferred then that members of American KDOM who were not folded into KVM Kosovo, that they actually acted contrary to the agreement? Yes or no.

A. You would have to ask them that, because all the forces of the KDOM and the KVM that I saw acted in accordance with the agreement.

Q. And did you have any communication with American KDOM that was not under KVM control? Did you get any reports from them?

A. None.

Q. Where were they deployed, the members of American KDOM who were not under your control like in Racak, Dragobil, Glodjane, all these ⁵⁸²⁰ places? You don't know? And in your opinion, why was there no agreement between you and the Albanians? I mean, let me clarify this question. When Drewienkiewicz testified on the 11th of April, he said: "We understood that one of the reasons why there was no agreement with the Kosovo Albanians who had hoped that this would be a tandem agreement to the agreement we signed in Belgrade in October was the fact that there was a public threat made that any Albanian who had any kind of agreement with Ambassador Hill or anybody from the international community would either be killed."

So there was obviously no agreement with the Albanian side at any level, and I believe that that was one of the factors why there was no agreement of this nature. Do you agree with this assessment?

A. I'm not aware of the statement by General Drewienkiewicz or what you're talking about here, I'm afraid.

Q. So even if you don't know of this statement, did you know of the threats of the KLA, that they would kill any Albanian who would sign anything?

A. No. I'm not aware of that threat, no.

Q. But you do know, from the period when you were in Kosovo, that certain Albanians who were loyal citizens of Serbia were killed by the KLA and were victims because they turned a deaf ear to these KLA threats. Are you aware of that?

A. I'm not aware of that.

Q. Oh, you're not aware of that either, are you? You were head of the Regional Centre, as you explained. When you came, your first ⁵⁸²¹ experience was that the Serb forces, as they are being called here, were cooperative all the time, and you had free access to local representatives. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So what happened then? What changed this attitude? Was it the fact that you did not act in accordance with the agreement?

A. What happened to change what? I don't understand what you're saying.

Q. There was a change. You said first that the Serb forces were cooperative all the time and you had free access to local representatives. And you confirmed that that was right. Now, what happened? What changed this attitude? Was it the fact that you did not act in accordance with the agreement?

A. The attitude of the Serb forces in my area was, for the most part, cooperative; i.e., when I wanted to have a meeting with the Serb representatives, I requested a meeting and for the most part I received acquiescence and managed to do so. After the Racak incident, the Urosevac brigade commander, however, did not behave in accordance with the way my, if I can call him that, my brigade commander - the brigade commander in my area - behaved. He refused to meet me or certainly did not meet me until three weeks later when I managed to get Colonel Kotur to convince him. So that was a change, and certainly wasn't because of a change in my behaviour or the behaviour of my verifiers.

Q. I would like to remind you of the following: In the document that was provided by the other side, and you were the author of the document, ⁵⁸²² it was disclosed along with your statement, it is called, "First Impressions, Prizren Regional Centre." On page number 03036013, that is the Serb version, and the English version 0075622, in the last paragraph, it says: "Throughout, the Serbian authorities were cooperative and we had free access to the local representatives."

So I am going to tender this document of yours as well. I have it both in the English and Serbian languages. So please take a look.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have a copy.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to move on. I don't want to waste any time.

JUDGE MAY: If you're putting things to a witness, he must have the chance of seeing it.

MR. RYNEVELD: It's MM/2, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: MM/2. We have that, yes.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Which was the bit you were quoting to the witness, Mr. Milosevic?

THE WITNESS: At the top of page 2, Your Honour, it says: "Throughout, the Serb authorities were cooperative and we had free access to local representatives."

This is dated 23 December. It is, in fact, my first impressions after arriving about a week before, and I don't dispute that, that at that point, authorities were cooperative and I did have access when I requested it.

JUDGE MAY: Next Defence exhibit. ⁵⁸²³

THE REGISTRAR: D21.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. In your statement on page 7, in paragraph 1, you particularly highlighted the following, that Delic, that is the commander of the brigade who you talked to, he pointed out that Loncar was not his commanding officer.

A. Correct.

Q. Do you know that there was a commission of the federal government for cooperation with the OSCE?

A. Yes.

Q. That commission, including Loncar, could not have been in the chain of command, either of the army or of the police. Are you aware of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Also, are you aware of the fact that Loncar actually became a member of that commission? He was the person who was there in Pristina and he was supposed to cooperate with the OSCE, and this was done at Walker's request in view of their former cooperation in Eastern Slavonia, that they knew each other and had a good cooperation. Oh, you're aware of that too, aren't you?

And do you know that on the commission of the federal government, there was a total of 16 members and that Loncar was a retiree who, at Walker's request, was appointed to this team and that he was therefore in Pristina, otherwise, the chairman of the commission of the federal commission and that was appointed by the Federal Government was Nikola ⁵⁸²⁴ Sainovic, Deputy Prime Minister of the federal government. Are you aware of that?

A. I'm not aware of all the details that you've just given me but I was aware that Nikola Sainovic was --

Q. Very well. In your statement, you deal with the contents of the talks between yourself and Delic, and as far as I was able to gather, he said on the occasion, "I'm just doing my job and preventing terrorists from infiltrating with weapons." He was guarding the border belt; isn't that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Otherwise, this is also contained in the text which was disclosed by the Prosecution, which I should also like to tender into evidence. And you confirmed it, but I should like that document to be entered into the record. It is your own text: "I'm just doing my job and preventing terrorists from infiltrating with weapons. My personal opinion is that you can help us only in one way and that is to exert pressure on Albania so as to stop the shipment of arms across the border." And you say: "I agree. The Resolution of the Security Council ask that Albania stop bringing in weapons." I hope that that is not something that you're challenging.

JUDGE MAY: Let us see the document.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, that's a document we have seen before and, yes, that's what Delic said and that's what I replied.

JUDGE MAY: Is this in the exhibit which we have? No need for it to be exhibited again, then. ⁵⁸²⁵

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. He asked you to exert pressure on Albania to prevent this shipment of arms, and you agreed to do that; right? And I quoted this a moment ago because it was contained in the UN Security Council Resolution which demanded that Albania cease this practice; isn't that right?

A. I agreed that I had to pressure the Albanian side but I could not, obviously, pressure the country of Albania. But every meeting I had with the KLA or with local representatives, I -- I admonished them to ensure that they would not bring -- bring weapons and smuggle arms across the border.

Q. In your area, there was heavy fighting between the terrorists and the regular forces of the Yugoslav army and police force; is that correct? And in fact, you say that on page 3 in the last paragraph of your statement. You say: "There was fierce fighting between the terrorists and the regular forces of the army and the police"; right?

A. There had been, yes.

Q. This region, this area which came under your authority was one of the strongholds of the KLA; is that correct?

A. I don't think -- it would depend how you would signify or define a stronghold. Certainly there was a strong KLA presence in my area, as there was in other areas, yes.

Q. And is the observation correct that the Kosovo border region was and remains the smuggling route for drugs, arms, humans, and that only with the abolishment of the KLA could the border be secured? Would that observation be correct, to your mind? ⁵⁸²⁶

A. Definitely the border area was an area where there was a lot of smuggling across the border. Whether the abolishment of the KLA would be a way to stop it, I can't say whether that would work or not.

Q. Well, that's what it says in the OSCE document which has also been registered by the opposite side. It is your statement too. It says: "For several centuries, the Kosovo border region was used as an important route of contraband and smuggling for drugs, arms, human beings, livestock, et cetera --" I apologise to the interpreters for reading out so fast. "-- and of late, weapons and members of the KLA too." Now, "If the KLA were to be abolished completely, this lack of law and order in Albania and Albanian border patrols will make the authorities in Kosovo secure their borders." That was also something that the OSCE mission wrote, and I'd like to tender that into evidence as well, that particular document.

Now, I'm sure you're acquainted with the fact that the KLA was procuring weapons and rockets as well. You were told that personally; isn't that right?

A. Personally by whom? I had heard rumours that that was the case.

Q. Just rumours? They didn't tell you personally?

A. Who would tell me personally?

Q. Well, for example, in the document of the other side, whose author you are, which was disclosed with your witness statement, on the minutes of the 17th -- the meeting of the 17th of January, 1999, the --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please slow down in quoting figures. ⁵⁸²⁷

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The English version is K0075715, it says that the regional commander of the KLA, Drini, told you that he needed to get supplies of arms with special range firing abilities and rockets of the Katyusha type. So these weren't rumours. He told you that specifically although you don't remember him saying so.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Isn't that so?

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... General, can you deal with that or would you like to see the document?

THE WITNESS: I think I have it here, Your Honour, if you'd like to give me a second. Is there a date to that document?

JUDGE MAY: 17th of January. I understand it to be the meeting with Drini.

Don't interrupt. The meeting with Drini. It's our Exhibit 182, for the record.

THE WITNESS: Right. I have it here.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm quoting this. "D" is Drini, and it says: "D" Drini, Regional Commander, "M" Brigadier General Maisonneuve, and "C" is Chris Cobb-Smith, the liaison officer, et cetera, et cetera. The rest isn't important. "D: In the context of talks as to the exposure to special fire, he spoke about the need to procure special range weapons possibly of the Katyusha type." ⁵⁸²⁸

A. So he did say that, I guess, at this point.

Q. I have this here. I have the English. "In the context of receiving indirect fire, he spoke of the need to acquire indirect fire weapons, maybe Katyusha rockets." That is what is contained in your own report. So it is not a question of rumours, it is information that you received at the meeting with the commander whom you call Drini. And a moment ago, you mentioned him and said that you had regular meetings with him. You used the term "regular," I believe, regular meetings. Isn't that so?

A. That is so, yes.

Q. And what are you, as the KVM -- what did you do to prevent activities of this kind which were obviously, as we noted a moment ago, were contrary to the UN Security Council Resolution to the tasks that you had? So what did you undertake to prevent activities of this kind?

A. Well, actually, what we undertook was to ensure that, first of all, we would mention it at meetings that we had with -- with both sides, with -- particularly with the Albanian side. And as well, we patrolled as much as possible the areas around the border. Now, the problem we had, of course, was that the Serb forces would not allow us to get close to the border and to have freedom of movement, as the agreement had said, in the area. So we were partly kept from doing our job by the Serb side as well.

Q. Well, that is in contradiction with what you observed a moment ago, that they didn't prevent you but were cooperative. Did they prevent you or did they not prevent you?

A. I said they were cooperative in our dealings, I did not say that ⁵⁸²⁹ they were cooperative in allowing us freedom of movement in all the areas that we were supposed to have. But when they did request -- when I requested a meeting, I did usually get acquiescence.

Q. And you knew full well there were KLA plans to revive hostilities in January 1999 and that the following steps taken by the KLA was to transfer the campaign into the towns. They informed you of that; isn't that correct?

A. No.

Q. All right. If it isn't, then let me remind you that in the document whose author you are, which was disclosed along with your statement, on page 03035957 Serbian version, points 4 and 8, and K00570.4 and 7, it says: "Plans to revive hostilities are completed. The transference of the campaign to the towns is an active element of the forthcoming steps to be taken by the KLA," or words to that effect.

JUDGE MAY: What is the date of the document?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll tell you in just a moment. It is the minutes from the meeting with the KLA on the 23rd of January, Kostrice, 1500 hours, Morwood, Cobb-Smith, Lefever, Drini - one, two, three, four from the top - "Plans of the KLA for hostilities on a broad scale have been completed."

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let's -- let us -- Mr. Milosevic, let us find the document. It's Exhibit 186.

THE WITNESS: Right. I have the document here, Your Honour. In fact. It was -- it was --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish. Yes. ⁵⁸³⁰

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, this is a meeting at which I was not -- this was done by the four people that are there, the three from the KVM and the one from the KLA. I did see the document after, in fact, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So this was something you knew about. You said a moment ago that you didn't know about it. And at the beginning, you say that you're giving information not only on the basis of your own personal impressions but also on the basis of the reports sent in by your verifiers, which is quite logical because if all that was needed were your own personal impressions, I don't think you would need 1.300 verifiers. And it says here in the original document, your document K0075720: [In English] "KLA plans for a more general resumption of hostilities were complete." And at the bottom, it says: [In English] "Taking the campaign to the towns was an active element in the 'next military steps' of the KLA."

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness deal with it.

THE WITNESS: Okay. As I said, I did see it, I guess, at the time. In fact, that's my signature at the bottom that I say that I'd seen it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And as a KVM -- as the KVM, what did you do to prevent this development of events? These are serious things, to transfer terrorism to the towns, to revive hostilities, et cetera, et cetera. What did you undertake, as the KVM, to prevent all this?

A. Well, we -- we had a very aggressive patrol scheme, an aggressive scheme of liaison with the parties to ensure that they would not take any ⁵⁸³¹ kind of action such as that. That's the -- in fact, that was the problem with the KVM was the matter of how do you impose a solution? We could not impose a solution; we could not force the parties, either the Serb side or the Albanian side, to comply. We had to actually speak to them, to liaise with them and to make them understand that their behaviour should be a certain way.

In the case of the Albanian side, we often received threats and admonishment and they would tell us that they were going to take some action, and we continued to -- to explain to them that we weren't going to reply to threats. We were not going to use threats and agree to do -- behave a certain way. With either side. We didn't agree to any threats, and we would refuse to be threatened.

So this was not the first time they talked to us about hostilities and so on. This was barely a week after Racak, so they were very -- they were very tense still and -- and we were trying to get them to relax and not to retaliate after the Racak operation.

Q. And do you consider, Mr. Maisonneuve, that at that point, in view of the seriousness of this type of information that you received, that a public condemnation and publication of threats of this kind would have been fruitful in order to suppress activities of this kind? Public condemnation by the KVM and making these threats public, would that have been fruitful in suppressing these activities?

A. The KVM received all meeting records. We sent them up to them as -- as documentation. Then it was up to the KVM to actually take action. Let me tell you, though, that whenever the KLA actually carried out such ⁵⁸³² actions, we did come forward and denounce them. And a particular example is the three policemen that were killed in the pass on the 8th of January. We put out a press release and we were very forward in denouncing these actions by the KLA, just as we were very forward in denouncing the actions of the Serb -- Serb authorities.

Q. All right. As for the killed policemen, I understand that, but I'm asking you this: These threats that were very serious and which you received officially, at an official meeting where minutes were kept, were they not reasons to condemn this and to make them public, to publish them in order to suppress these activities? Yes or no.

A. In terms of making things public, this was not within my domain. I did not have the authority to make anything public. I would send them up to the KVM headquarters and they would decide what was public and what was not. And we received threats like this all the time, from both sides, by the way.

Q. All right. So that came under Walker's competence, did it, not your own?

A. [Previous translation continues]...

Q. You say you arrived in December 1998, that you arrived in Pristina, and that you mentioned that 35 people were killed who were members of the KLA, and this was a legitimate military operation; isn't that right? That's what it says on page 4, paragraph 2 of your statement. You say that: "In all respects, it was a legitimate military operation." Is that correct?

A. That was my assessment. ⁵⁸³³

Q. All right. Now in your statement, on page 11, paragraph 3, you say that, in your area, there were acts on the part of the KLA which could be assessed as war crimes and from that it emerges that you were informed with the activities being taken by the KLA. According to your knowledge or the knowledge gained by your colleagues, the KLA in March, 1998, was already preparing for war, and according to your information, the KLA recruited people for war already at that time. Is that correct or not?

A. I don't know what document you're referring to in this case here. I don't think I made any assessment of what was going on in March of 1998. I was not on the ground at that time.

Q. Yes. But I'm thinking of your -- of your overall knowledge and information as to the preparations for war, recruitments being carried out and especially for this assessment and evaluation. And you're asking about the document. It is page 11, paragraph 3 of your statement, where you say that the conduct of the KLA could be characterised as a war crime -- war crimes. "I am aware of behaviour by the KLA that could be assessed as war crimes."

A. Right. I did in fact have in, I believe, the end of February of 1999, the KLA actually took two Serb civilians hostage, and I spent a long, long time negotiating with the KLA and speaking to them to let them -- to let them go, and I -- in fact, I spent a long time with the Serb authorities, explaining what was going on and taking care of ensuring that both sides were aware of what was going on. Because of our results, the KVM intervention, in fact, they did -- the KLA did manage to release one of the prisoners alive and the other had been killed and beaten. And ⁵⁸³⁴ those were observations that we made at the time. So I believe that is also against, obviously, human rights.

Q. And since in your statement on page 11, paragraph 3, you say that the heads of the coordinating centres liaised directly with other KLA representatives, (redacted)

(redacted)

(redacted) (redacted), on page 1 -- the number is 03036808. That witness was for the Nerodime area. And he says that in March 1998, following orders from the main headquarters of the KLA, they left and went to other parts to recruit people for war. And that is to be found in his statement.

Are you aware of that? Do you have knowledge of that?

A. No, I don't.

Q. All right.

MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And in 1998 --

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. RYNEVELD: (redacted)

(redacted)

(redacted)

(redacted)

(redacted)

(redacted) ⁵⁸³⁵

(redacted)

(redacted)

(redacted)

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In 1998, many of the KVM link this to a year of change. Is it true that these changes were precisely the consequence of the activities of the KVM?

A. I'm afraid I don't understand the question, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Rephrase the question, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The great -- major changes that took place in the sense of the expansion of the KLA in 1998, the KLA expanded in 1998, is it true that these changes are precisely the result of the activities of the KVM?

A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, the KVM deployed as of October, November, December of 1998, so that's very much towards the end, and I don't know how the -- it could have influenced any KLA expansion.

Q. That's what I'm talking about, that end-of-year period. Up until the arrival of the KVM, you see, they were completely thwarted. Now, to clarify this question, Ramush Haradinaj, for instance, one of their heads, the heads of these KLA criminals whose activities are well-known to the other side too, in a book, "Stories of War and Freedom, Talks with Ramush Haradinaj," on page 116 and 117, says that the arrival of the verifiers, the OSCE verifiers to Kosovo enabled the revival of the KLA, and the meetings with the verifiers were very long, lengthy --

JUDGE MAY: I don't think we're going to be helped by this. I ⁵⁸³⁶ don't know what you're talking about. Some book, is it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it is a book. I have the introduction and the beginning. Achieved agreement by Holbrooke, save the KLA, et cetera. The Verification Mission. I haven't got the entire book, but I will be providing a copy in English for you but I'd like to tender this into evidence because this document speaks about --

JUDGE MAY: No, we're not going to have it tendered into evidence. It's just a book and somebody's opinion.

Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not somebody's opinion. It is testimony by somebody who --

JUDGE MAY: It's not testimony. Testimony is evidence which is given from the stand over there in this case. It's nothing else. Now, let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, even the witness of the Prosecution, for which you did not want to have the name mentioned a moment ago, explains in his statement that in 1998, upon the arrival of the KVM, changes took place and that the political goal was left behind because of the negative reaction on the international plane.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are you aware of that?

JUDGE MAY: The witness can't answer questions like that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, you explain in your statement on page 5, last paragraph, that ⁵⁸³⁷ the Verification Mission could verify the violations of the agreement throughout Kosovo; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. And did you verify the fact that the KLA was burgeoning when the order came to mobilise the population, that is to say men over the age of 18 to be mobilised? Did you verify this fact, this information?

A. No, we did not.

Q. All right. And do you happen to know that it was precisely this order to mobilise which was issued, that it was issued very close to the illegal NATO aggression against Yugoslavia?

A. I'm not aware of that.

Q. And do you have an opinion as to why that order went hand-in-hand with the beginning of the NATO aggression?

JUDGE MAY: Irrelevant.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Irrelevant? All right, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, during your sojourn, did you verify, for example, in your area of responsibility the -- how many KLA members were armed, were under arms?

A. Verified, you mean in terms of counting and so forth?

Q. Your assessments. Did you verify the -- how many KLA members there were in view of the meetings you had, the information that was coming in from them, the general picture that you were able to gain sounding out the terrain? Do you know how many of them there were in the area, their units, the composition of their units, the weapons they had, ⁵⁸³⁸ et cetera?

A. We didn't have specific numbers and weren't able to gather specific numbers of totals and so forth. We had a general idea of how many KLA and where they were and how they were armed.

Q. All right. The OSCE monitored the events in Racak on the 15th of January; is that right?

A. Right.

Q. And this event was followed from the very morning, was monitored from the early morning; right?

A. Early morning on the 15th. No, actually it was monitored once we heard there was -- there was an attack going in. And the verifiers, I can't say exactly what time the verifiers got there on the 15th itself, but they were there midday, I would say, probably, and were there until the evening on the 15th.

Q. All right. On page 9, in the one but last paragraph, you say that they monitored these actions from a hill above Racak and that the verifiers saw smoke coming out of the chimneys in the village, which told them that the civilian population was going about their usual daily morning duties.

A. Correct.

Q. That's what it says in your statement. Now, if, according to what they observed, they were going about their normal daily village duties, then it was morning, right, when they turned up, when they came? Is that the logical conclusion which can be drawn and which can be deduced from your own statement? ⁵⁸³⁹

A. Well, I guess that would mean they can't go about their duty for the rest of the day if they do it only in the morning, according to yourself.

Q. Well, you say that, and I was quoting from what you said, that this indicated that the population was going about their daily morning duties. Now, if you took note of that, that they were going about their normal daily duties, it means that you were there from the morning. You weren't able to observe daily morning duties in the afternoon, for example.

And as you yourself state on page 8, paragraph 2, you went to Racak on the 15th. Now, what was your report on what you were able to ascertain on that occasion?

A. On the 15th, as has been already discussed in one of my reports, I arrived in the area about 1630, myself, 1630, 1700 hours. My verifiers had been on the ground before, and as mentioned before, they -- they had seen the action, part of the action that was going on in Racak. When I arrived, I went to the hospital and arranged for medical help for the wounded people, and -- so that -- I arrived on the ground, as I say, about 1600, 1700.

Q. So you arrived there. Your verifiers were there from the morning, they were observing what was going on. Then you came in after your verifiers, about 4.00 p.m., and you established what the situation was. What did you write in that report when you got there? You were in Racak on the 15th. So what did you find there? What did you establish there, rather? ⁵⁸⁴⁰

A. What I established was that there had been an action within Racak, that we had seen tanks and armoured personnel carriers taking part in the action, the VJ on the high ground firing towards occupied houses, and that we had seen the MUP go into the village and clear the village house to house. At that point, we also established that -- my verifiers established that there had been some wounded people, and we brought them out of the village the evening of the 15th, and that's what I reported.

Q. Yes. But just awhile ago, this morning when you were speaking, you said -- I'm paraphrasing what you said, but it is in the transcript, that the verifiers said to you that there was shooting on the outskirts of the village, around the village, not at the houses -- not at the houses in the village. So the word you used was "the outskirts" of Racak, and that's what your verifiers said to you. That's what you said only awhile ago. Isn't that right?

A. Yes. In Racak, yes.

Q. When you came in on the 15th of January, were there any members of the KLA in the village?

A. I'm told that there were. I received reports from my verifiers that they were lightly -- light -- lightly held at that point. A few members, and I can't say how many exactly, but there were a few members of the KLA, yes.

Q. So already in the afternoon when you arrived, the village was under KLA control yet again. You do know, I hope, that the entire world public has been informed by your boss, the head of KVM, Walker, that there was a massacre in Racak, that civilians were killed, and that a reaction ⁵⁸⁴¹ followed from all quarters. Mr. Nice actually --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, it's very difficult to follow if you're not asking questions. Now, what is the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So if that kind of assessment was made, although an on-site investigation had not been carried out and the results of the post-mortems had not come in, why was such an assessment given without the data that you obtained or that you could have obtained from the KLA and its commanders?

A. Your Honour, that's a question that I can't answer because it was done by -- by Ambassador Walker. That was his assessment. Is that what you're asking me, whether -- why was the assessment done?

Q. I'm asking you, Mr. Maisonneuve, in view of your obligations as a verifier - and I assume that there is also your obligation to tell the truth - you had to know, on the 15th when you entered Racak that it was KLA members who were killed there. Isn't that right or is that not right?

A. On the 15th, I did not know that KLA members had been killed. In fact, I did not know that civilians had been killed either. It was on the 16th that we discovered the bodies, and I can tell you, from my observations, that these bodies were civilians. In my assessment, they were not members of the KLA, the bodies that we found. An 18-year-old girl and a 12-year-old boy are not members of the KLA, to my recollection.

Q. All right. I'm not asking you about the boy. I'm asking you ⁵⁸⁴² about whether you knew that KLA members had been killed. And since your answer is no, I would like to remind you of the following: That in a document that you authored and that was provided by the Prosecution which is called "Report of the Regional Centre," 03035952 is the number of the Serbian version, the last paragraph, it says Assessment. The English version is 030 -- 0075712. The last paragraph says: "A number of members of the KLA were killed and a few were wounded." That's what it says here in your document.

A. This assessment was written on the 16th of January, Mr. Milosevic, not on the 15th.

Q. Well, I assume, since the 16th comes after the 15th, that you did write on the 16th what you established on the 15th.

JUDGE MAY: You are not -- you are not being just to the witness. He's told you clearly that on the 15th, he didn't know, but by the 16th, he did.

Now, are we going to advance any more by this particular line of argument? I think not. Can we move on?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is not being challenged at all, because I asked him whether members of the KLA were killed and whether he had to know about that, and he said no. And in his report of the 16th of January, it says that members of the KLA were killed. You can see this on the second page.

JUDGE MAY: He said he didn't know on the -- just -- just -- you haven't been paying attention. He said he didn't know on the 15th. That was his point. Then on the 16th, he's included it in his report. ⁵⁸⁴³

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, on the 16th, as far as I know, Walker proclaimed that this was a massacre of civilians. The 16th, not the 15th. So it was on this day, the 16th, when Walker proclaimed that there was a massacre of civilians in the report that bears the date of the 15th of January. And then on the 16th of January, that is to say that this was said on the 16th, it says that KLA members were killed. That is to say on the day when Walker speaks of a massacre of civilians in the official OSCE report, it says it is KLA members who were killed.

JUDGE MAY: All it says is a number of KLA members were killed. Now, what is the point of all this examination? I think we're just wasting time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the point, Mr. May, is very simple, and it pertains to the difference between a massacre of civilians and loss of lives by members of the KLA, and I consider that to be quite different things.

JUDGE MAY: What are you putting? Are you putting to this witness -- so that we can understand, are you putting to the witness that the dead bodies he saw were members of the KLA? Is that the point that you're putting to him? Because if that's the suggestion, he should have the opportunity of answering it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I claim that what it says in the OSCE report, that the OSCE knew on the 16th, that is to say on the day when Walker proclaimed that a massacre of civilians had taken place, that Walker knew this because he put it in his report in writing that it was members of the KLA who were killed. That is what I claim. And what the ⁵⁸⁴⁴ witness saw, I cannot claim anything of that nature, what the witness saw with his very own eyes. But that he did know on the 16th of January that KLA members were killed and that is the day that Walker talked about a massacre of civilians, that is something I do know and I imagine that is not being contested.

JUDGE MAY: General Maisonneuve, have you understood any of that, and can you comment on it if you have?

THE WITNESS: I guess I can say that my assessment on the evening of the 16th, which is the portion that he's referring to in the actual assessment, is that I thought at that point that a number of KLA members were killed in the village; but on top of that, of course, what came out was a whole number of civilians, definitely more than eight or -- certainly there were at least 20 and I believe I do mention in there up to about 50 is how many we thought had been killed in the village at that time, most of whom were civilians. I -- when I looked at the bodies myself on that day, all the bodies that I saw, I could not say that they would have been members of the KLA. They were people of older -- elderly people. Most looked like farmers, or very young as the boy and young lady were.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. [Previous translation continues]... on.

MR. RYNEVELD: If it is of assistance, I believe it's Exhibit 180 to which reference has been made. Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So you were in contact with the KLA that day in the afternoon, and ⁵⁸⁴⁵ this is what a Prosecution witness says -- I'm not going to mention his name: "The commander of the Operative Zone --" I'm going to skip some portions in order to save time, everything that he describes, how things started on the morning of the 15th of January between 6.00 and 7.00, that they did expect an attack and that they had fortified themselves -- "that the Serb forces approached our positions so shooting started. In the bunker, we had two soldiers who had fired three bullets which caused the soldiers in Racak to be on the alert. That was the signal." Then in his statement, the commander of the zone, that is --

JUDGE MAY: The witness cannot help about what this particular witness said. I'm going to stop this examination. It's quite pointless putting to this witness. You can put it to that one. There's no point putting it to this one.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please. I want to present these facts, and I want to link this up with the fact that the witness, General Maisonneuve, was in contact with the KLA and that they did inform him of these facts. I would like him to give me an answer. Did they inform them about any of these facts? I think that my question is quite legitimate. Since your witness --

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters cannot hear any of this.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, stop reading. When you met the KLA, General, did they tell you about any assault or any defence of Racak?

THE WITNESS: No, they did not, Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁵⁸⁴⁶

Q. Please. He says in his statement: "Nine soldiers killed during the first attack." I'm not going to mention their names although he does mention all the names. And then he says, further on, that: "In Racak, from October, November 1998, there were 47 soldiers of the KLA who were staying in the house owned by Muhamet Mustafa, who was one of the killed persons. They were called the unit of Racak. They had certain places where they took up positions."

JUDGE MAY: We're wasting time. You are trying to make speeches. The Prosecution case, and you should understand it, is this: That there may have been some fire from the KLA but that what happened was that people were killed and executed and the bodies found, and those are the bodies which the witness saw. They were not, they say, members of the KLA.

Now, no doubt it will be an issue for us to determine whether they were or not, and we will, but we are not assisted by constant repetition of evidence about which the witness cannot help us. You can call your own evidence in due course.

I have in mind that this witness has important public duties to perform, and he's being kept here, and the time of the Court is being taken up by this effort on your part to simply have your side read out continuously.

Now, have you got any other questions you want to ask the witness? Have you any other questions you want to ask this witness rather than argue with him about the KLA?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I protest categorically ⁵⁸⁴⁷ because, yesterday, Mr. Nice was spending as much time as he wanted yesterday here, and he said that Racak was a turning point in the events in Kosovo. You are not allowing me to legitimately cross-examine about that, and you assert that that is irrelevant.

I think that this is the gravest and most serious violation of my rights until now in terms of presenting the truth.

JUDGE MAY: I have not said that this is irrelevant. It's very important. What is irrelevant and improper is the way that you continue with cross-examination, reading out lengthy statements, frequently not asking questions about them, and dealing with matters which the witness can't help about. You have been told before that you will have the opportunity to call your own evidence. What you're supposed to do is to ask the witness about matters that he can deal with rather than reading out chunks of statements to him.

Now, there is quarter of an hour left. If you want to cross-examine this witness about something else, you should do so now rather than continuing in this particular line.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are you saying that I do not have the right to cross-examine him for more than 15 minutes more? Is that what you're saying?

JUDGE MAY: We will consider it. But if you waste time with constant argument, then we're very unlikely to grant you more time. Now, I suggest you move on to another topic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's not additional time at all, Mr. May. You are making it impossible for me to cross-examine, and ⁵⁸⁴⁸ it's not the first time. And especially now with this kind of key issue as Racak is.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please, Mr. Maisonneuve, your verifiers who were observing, did they inform you about this? Because this stems from the report of the zone commander that around 11.30 -- after 11.30, a counter-offensive started, that from Petrovo, they attacked Serbs in Racak with mortars and mortars hit the targets. That is after all the heavy weapons that Mr. Drewienkiewicz recognised when he was watching the tape.

JUDGE MAY: This is exactly the point that I've been making; a constant speech from you. Now, what's the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My question is: Did your verifiers inform you about the counter-attack carried out by the KLA? And it seems obvious here --

JUDGE MAY: All right. Stop there.

THE WITNESS: No. The answer is no, Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. On that day, you did have contact with the KLA. And you could have --

JUDGE MAY: Which day did he have contact with the KLA?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, he confirmed that he had contacts with the KLA on the 15th. So could you establish what their activities were, and could you not inform the world public of that side of the matter as well that I have been receiving to and the matter about which the commander of their zone ⁵⁸⁴⁹ gave a statement as well?

A. As I mentioned before, on the 15th of January, my observers, my verifiers, had contact with the KLA and confirmed to me that, in their view, the KLA had a very small presence in the village. And in my meetings subsequent to the 15th, this is what they also confirmed to me, the KLA did, that they had held the village very lightly and had not put up resistance in Racak.

Q. What kind of soldiers they were is not a matter for you to testify about and I'm not asking you about that, and everybody knows about that, for that matter. They fled like rabbits and they only shot from ambushes.

JUDGE MAY: This is exactly what I'm going to say, and I shall now -- I shall now consider whether we should continue this cross-examination. Just a moment. I'm going to confer.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We will allow this cross-examination to continue, Mr. Milosevic, but on this basis: That you ask short questions. Throughout this trial you've been making speeches instead of asking questions. The Trial Chamber has in mind that you're acting in person and you're not a professional advocate and, therefore, some leeway has to be given. But it's now time to stop the speech-making and begin concentrating on questions. You've had enough time to learn. You're not entirely new at it. So you have that warning, and unless there are questions from now on, cross-examination will be stopped. General, can you come back sometime between now and -- we will go on for another ten minutes. Can you come back to allow further ⁵⁸⁵⁰ cross-examination sometime between now and July the 26th? Can you make yourself available?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I could, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it correct that on that day, that is to say on the 15th of January, around 17.15 hours, the OSCE contacted Fehmi Muja, an officer in charge of moral and political questions in the KLA? Otherwise, he wore civilian clothes. He did not carry weapons. Is it correct that they contacted him and that, through him, a meeting was scheduled with the commander of the zone and then that meeting was held in Petrovo on that day -- that evening, rather? Is that correct?

At that meeting --

JUDGE MAY: Just stop there. Stop there. The first question is: Was there a meeting? Let the witness deal with it and then you can go on asking.

THE WITNESS: I'm not aware of that meeting.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did Walker meet with any KLA commanders on the 16th?

A. On the 16th, I believe he did.

Q. And do you know -- or, rather, were you with Walker in Racak on the 16th?

A. I was in Racak, but I was not at the meeting.

Q. Was the meeting held in Petrovo at 1300 hours? ⁵⁸⁵¹

A. I'm not aware of the exact times.

Q. Did Walker tell you that he was then informed about the entire military situation and about what had been happening, that he was informed by the Zone Commander?

A. He did not.

Q. And do you know that the witness I spoke about personally showed to the investigator of the Tribunal all the positions that they operated against Racak then, the KLA, that is, and within Racak, too, and where 47 soldiers were positioned and where the headquarters was and the positions in Racak and --

JUDGE MAY: You have been told to keep the questions short.

THE WITNESS: No. I was not aware that this person had shown the positions, no.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. How many bodies were buried at the cemetery in Racak?

A. You mean when they buried the bodies that were killed at Racak?

Q. Yes. How many bodies after that? Of course, I'm not talking about the cemetery from its very inception, no. Then.

A. I believe it must be around 40 to 45. There was a long period where the bodies were sent to Pristina before they were handed over to -- they were handed over back to the Albanian community there, and I don't know exactly how many were buried on the day.

Q. Very often there are these two different figures that one comes across, the ones that you mentioned a short while ago, Mr. Maisonneuve. How many persons were killed in Racak; 40 or 45? ⁵⁸⁵²

A. I don't have the exact numbers in my head, but I'm led to believe it was 45. The human rights verifiers that came from Pristina on the 16th and thereafter were the ones that were actually looking after and determining exactly how many bodies were found. I know my verifiers throughout the day of the 16th were finding bodies as they went along and looked at -- did their patrol within the village and talked to the Albanian side. Certainly, as I was driving there myself on the morning of the 16th, I was hearing reports and bodies -- the body count was going 20, 25, and so forth. By the time -- by the time that the 16th ended, I believe the body count was about between 40 and 45.

Q. And do you know anything about these five that keep missing? Who are these five who are never there? You don't know anything about that?

A. No.

Q. You know that at the funeral, because the KVM was present, a number of Albanians were arrested. Isn't that right?

A. I don't know, because my people -- my verifiers were not there. Racak is outside of my area and the -- the burial took place in Regional Centre 5's area. So I did not have any of my verifiers there.

Q. Did I understand you correctly when you were explaining this today, that because a head of the Regional Centre was not appointed, Regional Centre number 5, that this is what you were entrusted with as a prominent member of the mission, a general, et cetera? That is what I seem to understand from the explanation you gave this morning, that you were appointed.

A. Right, the actual operation during the Racak time, so the 15th, ⁵⁸⁵³ 16th, 17th. And then the operation was handed over back to the deputy head which actually did exist for Regional Centre 5. They were operating with a deputy head in the Regional Centre.

Q. All right. In view of what you've just said, that means that all reports that any verifiers would obtain in any context for the dates of the 15th, 16th, and 17th that you just mentioned, would have had to reach you as well. Did I understand you right?

A. Not necessarily. The verifiers that belonged to Regional Centre 5 would operate with me on the ground. We would gather their information obviously as much as we could, but then they would go back to their regional centre at the end of the day and make their normal reports up their normal chain of command with the deputy commander of Regional Centre 5 and up to the KVM. It's a matter of how the information is fused. So, in this case, my verifiers reported through me, obviously, to the KVM headquarters and the Regional Centre 5 verifiers reported through their own chain of command.

JUDGE MAY: We must -- we must adjourn. It's quarter to two. General, would you please arrange to come back for that -- speak to the Prosecution about that, of course, to make the arrangements. If you would come back, we would be grateful, before the 26th of July. We shall allow cross-examination of another hour and a half when the witness returns.

Thank you. We will adjourn now until 9.00 tomorrow morning.

THE WITNESS: Thank you Your Honour.

[The witness stands down] ⁵⁸⁵⁴

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 30th day

of May, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.