Page 6796

Wednesday, 12 June 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.

MR. NICE: Before we return to the ambassador's evidence, can I just deal with two things? First can I request that we have half an hour this afternoon, perhaps at half past 3.00, to deal with the Rule 70 issue? The representatives concerned are available and the matter has got to be sorted out for the timetabling of the witness. That shouldn't interfere with cross-examination of this witness, either because by then there would have been enough time for cross-examination or because I understand the witness is prepared to stay on tomorrow if that's necessary.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, let us deal with that first. What will be the application in relation to it?

MR. NICE: It will be for the government concerned to come and make its position clear in a way that I simply can't make clear.

JUDGE MAY: We had notification that there may be such an application, so we've had a chance to consider it, and we are not in favour of it. We don't think it appropriate. If counsel cannot make the matter plain, then we don't think it appropriate for governments to appear.

MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, may I nevertheless have time at the end of the day to deal with it because I will be provided with more ⁶⁷⁹⁷ information --

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. NICE: -- and I will have the representative to assist me. And these are difficult matters, and indeed I've taken a course of dealing with them far more openly than they're typically dealt with. Because to date I think they've typically been dealt with in other Chambers on an entirely ex parte basis, and I've avoided doing that.

JUDGE MAY: Quite right, too, if I may say. Clearly, matters of this sort should, as far as possible, be dealt with openly. But you've heard our views.

MR. NICE: Certainly. I'll convey those to the government concerned. But in any event, if we may provisionally have half past 3.00 as the time for dealing with that.

Second, I want to be in a position to make a final decision about Vllasi, as well as to have a decision made about the other witness.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: I know you've had a summary. I've provided the fuller document.

JUDGE MAY: We have it.

MR. NICE: It's not a statement. It's called investigator's notes, but it's effectively a draft summary. And it may be that we can have a few minutes in that half-hour session this afternoon.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll read it during the adjournment.

MR. NICE: I'm grateful. And I believe you've already had a copy of the statement of the witness to whom the Rule 70 application relates so ⁶⁷⁹⁸ that you can consider him.

And with that, we'll turn, if we may, to the evidence of the ambassador.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

WITNESS: WILLIAM WALKER [Resumed] Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. Ambassador, I've been given an indication, really by sign language, I think, but I understand it to mean that can you and I leave a gap between question and answer, if we're not to incur the wrath of the interpreters.

A. I will try.

Q. We reached the stage yesterday where you were about, in your narrative, to leave Racak. You've given us your general conclusions, and you can be asked further questions about those. But one thing I hadn't asked you is this: One of the propositions that has been advanced since the discovery of the bodies at Racak was that the bodies had been in some way redressed, that their clothes had been taken off, and perhaps uniforms had been taken off, and they had been redressed as civilians. Of course, you're a layman, you don't have forensic scientific skills or medical skills, but nevertheless, from what you saw?

A. My firm layman's conclusion from what I saw on the ground, the positions of the bodies, the clothes worn, the bullet holes and the blood, the fact that it was in the middle of winter up a very slippery, steep slope, and any changing of clothes and that sort of thing would have to have been done in the darkness of night, in the middle of the night, and I ⁶⁷⁹⁹ consider that story, that version, that interpretation that somehow these bodies were redressed to be ludicrous.

Q. Now, you've dealt in your statements in detail with what precisely happened as you returned from Racak, and I don't need to take you through that in any detail at all, but there is one proposition that's been raised and that has been the subject of evidence and that I'd like your help with and that's this: Telephone calls, if any, made either to OSCE officials, to NATO, or to United States officials between the time of your leaving Racak, or indeed while you were at Racak, and the time that you delivered the press statement in Pristina.

What summary can you give us of your recollection of making phone calls and your explanation, if any, for what's been said about them?

A. I've been asked many times that question, and I sincerely have no recollection of myself talking to some of the people who have later said they talked to me. This would include people in Vienna with the OSCE and others.

I have no doubt that I did tell others to make sure the news of what had happened that morning was conveyed to as many people as we could get it to. I certainly wanted OSCE headquarters, I wanted the capitals of the OSCE Member States to know what had happened. So I'm sure I told people to inform as many people as they wanted to. If people claim I spoke to them either while I was at Racak or on the way back or before the press conference, I have no doubt. I don't question that. I probably did. But there was so much happening at the time, I was so involved in the events that I saw on the ground, trying to ⁶⁸⁰⁰ figure out what it all meant and then, when I got back to the office, trying to construct what I was going to say at the press conference, I frankly have no memory, no recollection of -- of talking to any of these people. But this does not mean I did not. If they say I did, I'm quite sure they are not lying.

Q. Thank you. Back in Pristina, you eventually -- not eventually. You in due course made a press statement.

A. That is correct.

Q. And first of all, give us of your account of that statement and then we'll look at the printed document itself.

A. As I might have mentioned yesterday, when I was at Racak, a number of journalists asked me questions about what I had seen and what I thought of it, and I believe I made comments that I would try to recollect my thoughts and when I got back to Pristina, I promised to hold a press conference.

When I got back to Pristina, I told my staff to put together a press conference, and that was done.

Between my arrival and when the press conference started, I spent most of the time, if not all of it, in my office with my computer, trying to collect my thoughts and put it into a statement. The statement was essentially a description of what I had seen, a description of how the news came to the KVM the night before from General Loncar's office, and then my conclusions as to whether or not what we had been told by the government and what we had seen coincided, and my conclusion was they did not coincide. ⁶⁸⁰¹ I said that on what I had seen -- again, I emphasise that I was not a specialist, I was not a crime scene investigator, but from what I had seen, the stories did not jibe. From what I have seen, it appeared to me to have been a number, perhaps as many as 40 or more, men and boys had been taken away, unarmed, and later turned up dead. I described it as a massacre. I said that I would hope that the government in Belgrade, if it disagreed with my conclusions, would admit trained criminal investigators so that they could go to the scene and determine what had in fact happened. I specifically mentioned investigators from this Tribunal. And I opened it up for questions.

I think some of what I'm saying now, as my words that afternoon, came out in the questions and answers rather than in my formal introductory statement.

Q. Thank you.

MR. NICE: May we now look at the exhibit, please, which is in the bundle before the Judges at page 14, but here comes the exhibit itself to be separately produced. Sorry, not page 14, Your Honours. I gave you the wrong page. It's -- and it will become exhibit -- I think it's going to be Exhibit 229. No?

THE REGISTRAR: That should be the Exhibit 230.

MR. NICE: 230. Thank you. And if the Chamber's happy to work with the exhibit just produced, this is the -- can we put a copy on the overhead projector, please, so that those viewing may see it? I'm sorry, I don't think it is in the bundle. It should have been. There it is. ⁶⁸⁰²

Q. Headed "Massacre of Civilians in Racak." It reads: "On the 15th of January, the KVM reported a serious deterioration of the situation in the Stimlje area. Racak, Malopoljce, Petrovo and Belince villages (south and west of Stimlje) were all affected. VJ and police forces prevented KVM patrols from entering the area but late in the afternoon the KVM patrol did get to the village of Racak. Verifiers saw one dead Albanian civilian and five injured civilians, including a woman and a boy, suffering from gunshot wounds. The KVM also received unconfirmed reports of other deaths in the area. Residents of Racak claimed that men had been segregated from women and children and that 20 males had been arrested and taken away. The verifiers took the details and evacuated the casualties before the onset of darkness." And had casualties been evacuated?

A. Yes, they had.

Q. The next paragraph, in summary, asserts a wholesale violation of the cease-fire.

The next paragraph speaks of verifiers - of teams, including verifiers, going to the village, and KDOM units sending patrols. The next paragraph sets out the accounts of surviving residents speaking of the killings taking place on the 15th of January and giving an account of the VJ and the police and security forces being involved. The next paragraph dealt with the arrival of the first KVM teams on the 16th of January and finding bodies in the houses and then the 23 male victims on high ground.

The next paragraph touches on initial reports that led to your ⁶⁸⁰³ going to the village and your writing the following: "On arrival, villagers guided me to a site where I saw, much to my horror and shock, the bodies of over 20 men who had obviously been executed where they lay. I do not have the words to describe my personal revulsion, or that of all those who were with me, at the sight of what can only be described as an unspeakable atrocity. Although I only saw the bodies of 20, mostly elderly men, many shot at extremely close range, most shot in the front, back, and top of the head, KVM verifiers moved about and counted an additional number.

"In all, 45 bodies were observed, including three women and one child. They were all in civilian clothes. All looked like humble village inhabitants. Although I am not a lawyer, from what I personally saw, I do not hesitate to describe the event as a massacre, a crime against humanity, nor do I hesitate to accuse the government security forces of responsibility.

"The FRY government must produce the names of all involved in the police and VJ operations around Stimlje, who gave the orders, who executed those orders. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia must come in, with visas, at the invitation of the FRY government, or without, to investigate this atrocity, and this must be accomplished in the next 24 hours."

And the press release goes on to say further about the facts as verified by the KVM, and how that was violations of international humanitarian law, and how, in the last paragraph, you met with - or the last substantial paragraph - how you met with KLA representatives, who ⁶⁸⁰⁴ articulated their frustration and anger and indeed expressed their desire for revenge, although orders in the KLA headquarters were for continued restraint.

Mentioning there of this Tribunal, what was the position of the then Prosecutor, Justice Louise Arbour, at about that time?

A. I believe it was the following day I received a call from Judge Arbour, and we discussed what I had seen briefly and what I had said briefly, and I told her I thought it was very important that either she or people from this Tribunal, investigators, criminal investigators, come to Kosovo and do a thorough investigation. Judge Arbour reminded me that she had not been able to obtain a visa to enter the former Yugoslavia. She asked me if I thought it advisable for her to try to enter. I told her I thought that would be the best thing. I told her that if she was denied entry or her people were denied entry, that that would indicate that the government was not terribly serious about finding out what had happened at Racak. She said that she would personally get on a plane the following day, I believe it was, on the 18th, and try to enter via Skopje, Macedonia, in other words, the southern border.

I told her I would send people down. I had something to do the following day. I can't remember what it was. I told her I would send some of my people down to try and facilitate her entry. I sent my French deputy, Mr. Keller. They went down, and I later received word that she had tried to make entry at the border, had been denied entry, and had been told she did not have the proper documentation.

Q. Before we turn from the press statement: The words used, did ⁶⁸⁰⁵ anybody else contribute to or cause you to use any of the words, or were they your choice?

A. My statement was totally my creation. These were all my words.

Q. Then can we move from the statement and the events at Racak to the fallout from it, which the Chamber can find at paragraph 64 and 65 of the second witness statement.

What was the effect of your statement in Belgrade and indeed elsewhere?

A. It had immediate and, I would describe, dramatic impact. I had not anticipated as much impact as it seemed to have. But the following day we were receiving newspaper accounts and telephone calls from all over Europe, and elsewhere, talking about the events at Racak, asking about the events at Racak. There was a tremendous reaction to it.

Q. The effect eventually on you was what, your status in Yugoslavia?

A. Given the reaction, I decided to drive to Belgrade and asked to see President Milosevic. Government representatives were already coming out with very critical comments on my statement, and I thought it best that I go and speak to Mr. Milosevic directly. My people asked for an appointment. We were told he's busy, so we sat in the hotel for I think most of the day, maybe longer. And at night, when I was going out to dinner, some journalists, some Serb journalists, came to the hotel and they asked me what I thought of having been declared persona non grata. And that was how I learned that the government had, in fact, issued a statement over the radio, over the media, without informing me that I had been given 48 hours to leave the country, that I was persona non grata. ⁶⁸⁰⁶

Q. In fact, were you forced out as quickly as that or were you able to stay with what was called frozen status or something?

A. The OSCE chairman in office went to President Milosevic. In various conversations, as I understand it, including a face-to-face discussion, at first my 48 hours was extended to, I think, 72 hours, and at the very last minute I was informed that an agreement had been reached that I was in something called a frozen persona non grata status, which I never quite heard defined and had never heard of before.

Q. In the event, you didn't see the accused again?

A. I'm sorry?

Q. You didn't see the accused again?

A. No.

Q. You did, however, stay in Kosova until the withdrawal of the OSCE generally?

A. Yes.

Q. Perhaps in a sentence or so, just explain that withdrawal and your part in it.

A. After Racak, the level of cooperation from government authorities, what little we had before Racak, disappeared. Our verifiers, our people, found themselves in increasingly difficult and dangerous situations when they were out and about patrolling. The chairman in office of the OSCE, after what he said were lengthy discussions with the principal players in the capitals of Europe and North America, called me and said, "Since you are finding it increasingly difficult to fulfil the mandate of the mission, and since things appear to be getting increasingly difficult in ⁶⁸⁰⁷ terms of security for your people," at first he asked me if I thought it would be wise to withdraw, and later he -- and I agreed that I thought it would be, and later he ordered me to withdraw the mission, in mid-March, late March.

Q. And as we've heard from other witnesses, everyone on the mission was got out, and I think that you stayed until the end and were the last person across the line, with General Drewienkiewicz.

A. That is essentially correct. We thought we had gotten all 1.400 and some people out. A few days later, we discovered that two or three verifiers who had been on vacation or on leave and had not gotten the word that the mission had been withdrawn showed up in Belgrade. But essentially, we got everyone out under our evacuation plan, via Skopje; not only the people, but almost all of our equipment.

Q. I think I will ask you to look at a couple of other documents before we turn to a couple of events after your withdrawal. First of all, can we look at what's already been produced as Exhibit 94, tab 33, which is a statement I've just handed in. Then it can go straight on the overhead projector. 94, tab 33.

This is a statement for the press issued by Milutinovic, the president. Do you remember that?

A. I remember reading it, yes, when it came out.

Q. We can follow it on the screen to save time. "In the wake of the statement of Ambassador William Walker, head of the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo ... the President of the Republic ... made the following statement: ⁶⁸⁰⁸ "When yesterday ... police undertook to arrest terrorists who killed a police officer ... in a terrorist attack, in the vicinity of Racak...," and I'm skipping some words, "... terrorists attacked them from automatic weapons, portable launchers and mortars. The police had to respond to such terrorist savagery in line with their powers. The OSCE mission and Ambassador Walker were duly informed of undertaking the arrests. Immediately after the clash, an investigating team arrived at the scene headed by an investigating judge ... Danica Marinkovic and the Deputy District Prosecutor ... the terrorists, who took positions on the neighbouring hills, opened fire and prevented the investigation." Did you yourself see anything of Judge Marinkovic?

A. I've never met the lady.

Q. Did you hear about her involvement at Racak?

A. I subsequently heard that she was the investigative judge in the case.

Q. Move on: "... on the 16th of January," in the statement, "the on-site investigation was once again prevented because William Walker demanded the investigating judge to go there without police protection, thereby preventing the competent judicial authorities from carrying out their legal obligations."

Any truth in that?

A. No.

Q. "However, at the same time, Ambassador Walker, accompanied by foreign and journalists of Albanian separatist newspapers whom he personally invited, visited the scene and took advantage of the absence of ⁶⁸⁰⁹ judicial and other state authorities so as to make the statement containing falsehoods and personal assessments which are totally baseless."

Any truth in the particular assertions there about you inviting Albanian separatist newspaper journalists?

A. No.

Q. It goes on to make the following observations and I'll deal with them in a block to save time so far as we can.

"He even went on so far as to personally assess what happened, to pass judgements and even to give orders what should be done next - and all that in a sovereign country.

"In this act of deceiving the world opinion, according to well-known recipes attempting to stage some kind of new "Markale," Ambassador Walker secured the full protection of his proteges from the terrorist so-called "KLA." The series of lies and fabrications he accused our state authorities in an obvious attempt to divert the attention from terrorists, murderers and kidnappers and to once again protect them the way he had been protecting them all along. Ever since he came, he turned a blind eye only to the crimes of the terrorists. Security of citizens, security and responsibility of the police does not interest him, and in his today's statement he has passed judgements on the authorities of Serbia and Yugoslavia, their competent authorities, and accused them of "violating the cease-fire" - for what if not for protection of terrorists to whose crimes has remained silent."

There's an assertion of bias and prejudice. What do you say to ⁶⁸¹⁰ that, Ambassador?

A. I say it's an incorrect interpretation of my actions and words. I tried to be as neutral and evenhanded as possible. I tried to denounce violence, kidnappings, assassinations wherever they occurred from what side they occurred.

Q. Just go to the end of last passages -- thank you very much. "The attacks on terrorists, even when launched from mortars and other heavy weapons he does not consider to be illegal. Such an attitude does not come for the first time to the fore in his statement and in his preventing that the investigating judge carry out her duty according to the oaths of her -- the laws of her own country. He probably forgot that he is not Governor or a Prosecutor or a Judge in Serbia or in the FRY but the representative of the organisation of 54 equal states and the head of the mission whose task is not to rule the country of a sovereign country but to observe and report accurately. By his statement of today, he forgot himself because he seems to favour the role of the prosecutor and the judge at the same time."

Were you assuming such a role or were you, in your judgement, performing your duties as commissioned to do?

A. I was charged with telling the OSCE what was happening in Kosovo, and what I was doing was trying to discharge that responsibility.

Q. And then, finally, I'll just deal with the first sentence of the next paragraph.

"Even though it is indisputably clear that the police was provoked and compelled to defend itself from terrorist attacks, Mr. Walker ⁶⁸¹¹ ignored that fact and proclaimed the event as a conflict with the civilian population."

Remind us again. Had the Serb forces taken any opportunity, in your visit to Racak, to explain the position or to get witnesses to talk to you, to explain the position? Or soldiers or policemen?

A. Not to my knowledge. As I mentioned yesterday, we invited General Loncar to accompany us, and he declined. That was the only effort I saw to reach out and find out what the government was saying other than what we had heard from General Loncar the night before, the 16th.

Q. And was there any evidence before you, suggested to be indisputably clear, that the police were provoked and compelled to defend themselves?

A. Not before me, no.

Q. Was there any evidence before you at any time of Serb casualties arising at Racak?

A. As I said in my statement, when the purported clash was described to us by General Loncar's office on the evening of the 15th, we had been told there were no government casualties.

Q. Thank you very much.

MR. NICE: You can take that document off the overhead projector and replace it with 94, Exhibit 94, tab 36, again to save time, and we'll see how your change of status was documented, or we'll look at part of this document. Starting at the top, please.

Q. This is a statement from the federal government and it's dated -- I haven't got the date. We'll see -- ^{6812 BLANK PAGE 6813} "At today's extraordinary session chaired by the Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic, the Federal Government considered the latest events in Kosovo and Metohija and the pressure put on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The government thinks it is a new campaign of the international community and decisively refused the groundless, false and malevolent assertions on events that took place in the village of Racak. "The federal government considered the activities of William Walker, Director of OSCE ... and concluded they are in flagrant --"

THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Nice, please slow down when reading. Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. "-- OSCE mission. Mr. Walker's activities went far beyond his mandate ...."

Next paragraph. And move up one paragraph, please. It then says:

"... Mr. Walker is to leave the Yugoslav territory within 48 hours," and then says this:

"Regarding cooperation with The Hague Tribunal, the government --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, you are being asked to slow down.

MR. NICE: Sorry.

Q. "Regarding cooperation with The Hague Tribunal, the government confirmed Yugoslavia's readiness to fully implement the agreement signed with the Tribunal. However, The Hague Tribunal has no jurisdiction in Kosovo and Metohija whatsoever since the war is -- since the issue is not war but terrorism and our state's legitimacy to fight it. ⁶⁸¹⁴ "The representatives of the Tribunal may come into our country -- in our country and negotiate on the realisation of the Agreement, but they can't inspect and investigate in Kosovo and Metohija." And you can read the rest. Just one thing, Ambassador, arising from that. It suggests here that there was no recognition of the right of this country to deal with terrorism. What do you say about that?

A. My personal opinion would be that a government certainly has a sovereign right to deal with terrorism but in a rational and reasonable fashion, not going in and essentially executing unarmed civilians in a village such as Racak, which is what was done.

Q. Thank you. There are just two remaining topics, each of which I'll ask you to deal with succinctly but in your own manner, without my interruption, because I think it will be quicker. At Rambouillet, the Kosovo Albanian representatives did not sign. There was an adjournment, as it were. You took part or were present. Can you just explain why, in your judgement, they weren't prepared to sign at that first opportunity?

A. I only attended the opening session of Rambouillet, having completed what was the KVM's mission, which was to get the Albanian delegation, including the KLA members, to Paris for the talks. I then returned to Pristina.

At the conclusion of the first round of the Rambouillet talks, as you said, the Albanian delegation said it was ready to sign but was not going to sign and asked for a two-week break in the talks. When the Albanian delegation returned to Kosovo, I was asked to try to determine ⁶⁸¹⁵ what had been on their minds, why they made this, "We are ready to sign but we're not going to sign at this moment. "

So I went and talked to a number of the delegates who were in Rambouillet, and I talked to at least three KLA commanders and asked them to tell me why they had asked for the two-week delay. Their answer was something along the lines that while at Rambouillet, the delegation recognised that they were dealing with a historic moment for their people, for their constituents, and that what they signed their names to would be of incredible importance to their people.

They also said that this was the first time in their memory that Albanians from Kosovo had been at a negotiating session in person, negotiating for their own future, and in their first encounter in international negotiations, they found they were dealing with Madeleine Albright, Robin Cook, the foreign ministers of Europe and North America, and they were somewhat overwhelmed with their own lack of experience in negotiations.

They said that although they read the document they thought they could sign many times, they were worried, they were concerned that there might be some things in there that, with their inexperience, they were not totally grasping, and therefore they wanted to take some time out to go over this document. And they also wanted to touch base with their various constituencies to make sure that the Albanian population that they represented was truly in favour of their signing it. They told me that they had conducted whatever sort of survey they could do and had come to the conclusion that the Albanian population wanted peace, wanted their ⁶⁸¹⁶ delegation to sign on their behalf. So they returned to Rambouillet, to France, and indicated their willingness now to sign.

Q. The second topic, different: The book or books "As Seen, As Told," prepared by the OSCE, just explain what triggered their preparation, bearing in mind that it may be the Chamber will be hearing in due course from Sandra Mitchell, who will be able to deal with methodology.

A. When the mission terminated in Kosovo, we moved into Macedonia. Shortly after our exit, the NATO bombing campaign began, and also began an exodus from Kosovo of tens of thousands of refugees. This exodus overwhelmed the Macedonian government, the Albanian government. The people were put into very hastily constructed camps. Since I had 1.400 people who had recently been in Kosovo, who had worked with the Albanian population, we were asked by Mrs. Ogata from UNHCR, we were asked by the Macedonian authorities, by others, to help in the initial days of the camps.

I visited, I think, most of the camps in Macedonia, and later visited some of them in Albania. The conditions were horrendous, and everywhere I went, people in the camps, not only in the camps - sometimes I visited villages where the people were living outside the camps, the refugees - people approached me and I heard story after story after story about what had happened in their villages while they were being driven out, et cetera.

Sandra Mitchell was an officer on my staff in Kosovo who I had come to respect. I had given her the task of dealing with the human ⁶⁸¹⁷ rights situation in Kosovo, and in our Macedonian exile, I asked her to put together a team to go to the camps and to collect as many of these stories of what had happened to these refugees. I told her that we wanted only first-person accounts. We didn't want hearsay; we didn't want people talking about things they had heard about, but only things that they had witnessed.

Sandra put together a team of five or six people. I think some of them were lawyers. I remember specifically there was a Danish lady, a German lawyer, several other people from various nationalities. And they spent the remaining time that we were there as a mission in the camps compiling depositions, sworn depositions, as I say, of these tales of abuse, and that was eventually compiled into -- I'm sorry. I didn't know the title of the document, but what we call the OSCE Human Rights Report.

Q. Thank you, Ambassador. You will be asked further questions.

MR. NICE: My further apologies for going too fast in the reading, to the interpreters.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Milosevic. Microphone, please.

JUDGE MAY: Microphone.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The microphone is on. The light is on. My question was: How long are you going to limit my cross-examination to?

JUDGE MAY: Three hours, no more. If you refrain from arguing with the witness, if you refrain from repeating the questions, if you ask ⁶⁸¹⁸ short questions, you will be able for get much more done. So you follow that line.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know that I've argued with witnesses. But let me say before I start that I expected that you would shorten the time for my cross-examination, in view of yesterday's proclamations with respect to Rule 92 bis, because Drewienkiewicz testified for two days, Maisonneuve also took two days, and their chief, according to you, should be exposed to cross-examination for three hours only, and I think that that is --

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... further time, which is taken off your time for cross-examination. Now, move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Very well, Mr. May. I just said this for it to come out in the record, and not to waste time. The opposite side began its examination-in-chief yesterday with the diplomatic career of the witness, as a career diplomat. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Is it true that, by Clinton, in June 1993, you were nominated and appointed ambassador to Panama, and that it was on the basis of the position of the senate, and on that grounds, that he refrained from actually sending you there?

JUDGE MAY: Do you understand the question?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

A. My "nomination" is a bit overstating it. The Clinton White House was thinking about nominating me to go to Panama, but one senator objected. And in our system, one senator has the ability to impede a ⁶⁸¹⁹ nomination and confirmation, so I did not go to Panama.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And was the reason for this, for impeding this, as you termed it, amongst other things, your false testimony with respect to the deaths in Salvador, where you were ambassador?

A. The senator's reasons for opposing my nomination have never been made clear, either to me, nor to the State Department.

Q. Let me remind you of "It's Official." That is the title of the Washington Post of the 16th of June, 1993, where it says: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... officer William Walker, former ambassador to El Salvador and before that a diplomat in Bolivia, Honduras, Brazil and Peru, to replace Deane Hinton in Panama." [Interpretation] And then, two days later, also in the Washington Post, on the 18th of June, we have the following correction: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... on the nomination of career diplomat William Walker to be ambassador to Panama, as was reported here on Wednesday. There are hints of some Senate unhappiness with Walker, formerly ambassador to El Salvador..." [Interpretation] Did that have anything to do with the reactions of the Panama public and church?

A. I have no idea why the Washington Post said that, nor what the reaction of the Panamanian people and church might have been.

Q. All right, then. Let me remind you of this, in connection with the fact that this challenging was linked to your previous work in El Salvador and the writings of the New York Times, for instance, on the 24th ⁶⁸²⁰ of April, 1990. Only the portions which make reference to you, so I'm not going to quote the entire newspaper article:

[In English] "[Previous translation continues]... Walker said there was no evidence the military was involved in the Jesuits' murder; rebels dressed in Government uniforms might have done it, he suggested. Those preposterous propositions were exploded five days later by President Cristiani's statement."

JUDGE MAY: What's the question?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question is -- may I just finish my quotation from this New York Times article, which I was quoting, because it talks about the Roman Catholic archbishop: [In English] "Four church women from the United States were murdered. Two US labour representatives were shot in the Sheraton Hotel as they met a land reform leader ... The murder of six Jesuit priests last November has brought the issue forward again. There is no doubt that the killers were in the armed forces; President Alfredo Cristiani said so on January 7... What is at stake is not just a minimum level of decency in El Salvador. It is our own honour."

Q. [Interpretation] Is it true that you made a false representation of the events in El Salvador?

A. No. Your Honour, might I explain the --

JUDGE MAY: Certainly.

A. I was ambassador in El Salvador from 1988 until 1992. The murder of the nuns, the killing of the two labour leaders, both of whom were my friends, occurred well before I got there. During my period as ⁶⁸²¹ ambassador, the guerrillas launched a final offensive in November of 1989, in which, as you say, and as the Washington Post and New York Times describe, six Jesuit priests were killed.

When I made the statement that we did not know who had killed them, that men in uniforms with ski masks could have been either from the government military or from the guerrillas, this was before it was discovered who had actually done the killings. You say President Cristiani announced and took responsibility for his military in killing the Jesuits on the 6th or 7th of January. The embassy had already stated that on the -- I believe the 2nd of January.

I have with me a letter, if you're interested, from the Congress of the United States, indicating what I did, what my embassy did, to investigate, determine who had killed the Jesuits, and then insist that those responsible - a colonel, several lieutenants, and soldiers - be brought to justice, and they were brought to justice and they were convicted. And as I say, it was with the full cooperation of Bill Walker, the ambassador, as well as his staff, as well as the US government, that that was the end of the Jesuit case.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, that's precisely where I wanted to continue. Again I'm going to quote the Washington Post on the 21st of March, 1993, the Sunday edition. It carried a long article:

[In English] " ... Walker told a news conference after the murders. 'And it's not a management control problem that would lend itself to a Harvard Business School analysis.' On January 2nd, 1990, ⁶⁸²² Walker told representative Joseph Moakley, Democrat Massachusetts in Washington that 'anyone can get uniforms... The fact that they [the killers] were dressed in military uniforms was not proof that they were military.' The same day that he met with Moakley, US Army Major Eric Buckland, a military advisor in San Salvador, told his superiors that a Salvadoran army officer had named Military Academy chief Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Moreno as the ringleader in the Jesuits' killing." [Interpretation] Therefore, this confirms that you gave an inaccurate statement, and later Cristiani dealt with it too. But what is of particular significance to me is --

JUDGE MAY: Before we go any further, let's find out who wrote this article that you've been quoting.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This article was carried by the Washington Post.

JUDGE MAY: You've told us that. Who was it who wrote it so we may know who makes these allegations.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can hand it over to you as an exhibit. The length, 2.976 words. "Twelve Years of Torture..." is the headline.

JUDGE MAY: I'm asking for the reporter's name.

THE ACCUSED: [In English] Byline: Guy Gugliotta, Douglas Farah, Washington Post Foreign Service Body.

JUDGE MAY: Do you know who he is?

THE WITNESS: I know Douglas Farah very well. He's a friend of mine, yes. ⁶⁸²³

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Comment, if you can, on what is suggested here. It is said you made an inaccurate statement.

THE WITNESS: I made an inaccurate statement, in hindsight. At the time I made it, it was what we knew, which was uniformed men had killed the priest. We did not know from whence they came; that on the 2nd of January I was in Washington speaking to Congressman Joe Moakley, also a friend, who was in charge of a committee of the Congress of the United States trying to get to the bottom of the Jesuit case. He asked me if we had uncovered the culprits. I told him we had not, that it could have been one side or the other.

That same day, unbeknownst to me, in El Salvador, the case broke open when a major on my staff came forward and recounted a conversation he had with an El Salvadoran colonel, his counterpart, and it was revealed in that conversation that a unit of the Salvadoran army had killed the Jesuits.

So what I am saying is that my statements throughout this were as accurate as I could make them at the time, but later, when it was discovered who had killed the Jesuits, as I say, I was then in the forefront of those trying to bring justice in the case, to bring military officers to justice, which was unprecedented in El Salvador. But the colonel, the two lieutenants, and some soldiers were in fact convicted after the United States government put incredible pressure on the Salvadoran government to bring these officers before a tribunal.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've now spent the best part of quarter of an hour to 20 minutes on events in another continent a decade ⁶⁸²⁴ before. If it was an attempt to attack in some way the witness's credibility, you've had the opportunity of putting your case and the witness has dealt with it. Now, move on to some other topic more related to the indictment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, since you have limited my time, please allow me to use it the way I consider best. This is a witness who was obviously in charge of carrying out - how should I put this? - some sort of covert operations.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, when we come to that, you can put all that. But you're not wasting the time of the Court with events so long ago and of such little relevance. Now, let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. On the 11th of December, 1989, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, in a long article -- I'm going to quote only a short excerpt: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... Jesuit colleges in the United States, accused the US Ambassador in El Salvador of trying to discredit the witness. In --"

JUDGE MAY: No. Your attempt to discredit this witness with events so long ago the Trial Chamber has ruled as irrelevant. Now, move on from El Salvador. You've been given your clear instructions. If you want to continue with the cross-examination, you must follow them, because the time of the Court is limited, and it cannot be taken up with irrelevant matters such as this.

Now, move on to events closer to the indictment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is directly related to the ⁶⁸²⁵ continuity of the witness's activities.

I'm going to move on from El Salvador. I'm just going to refer to yet another case which points to continuity in terms of such activities of the witness. It relates to Nicaragua. [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... filed in US district court by independent counsel Lawrence Walsh. Walker was responsible for setting up a phony humanitarian operation at an air base in Ilopango, El Salvador. That 'humanitarian' air base was used to run guns, ammunitions, and supplies to the fascist Contra mercenaries attacking the Nicaraguan Revolution. Walker was also the US ambassador to El Salvador from 1988 to -- from 1988 to 1992," and so on.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness deal with the allegation. Mr. Walker, have you followed what the allegation is?

THE WITNESS: I believe so, Your Honour. During my 40-year career as an American diplomat but especially during my -- the later years of my career as ambassador to El Salvador, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central America and Panama during the 1980s, you know, I, as well as the policy -- policies that I was implementing, have come in for a great amount of criticism in the free press of the United States and the press of the world, as a matter of fact. It is not surprising to me that you can bring articles up that make allegations like that. All I can say is this is, you know, water off my back, press criticism of US policies and the person who was implementing them, Bill Walker.

JUDGE MAY: The allegation appears to be that in Nicaragua or in El Salvador, it's not clear, a humanitarian base was used to run guns, ⁶⁸²⁶ ammunition, and supplies, et cetera. Is it a matter on which you could comment?

THE WITNESS: Yes, it is, Your Honour. The -- as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central America during the late 1980s, this was later condensed into the word "Contragate," I was responsible for bringing humanitarian assistance to the Contras, which was a policy that had been confirmed by the US Congress several times.

Unbeknownst to me, unbeknownst to the State Department, unbeknownst essentially to the world, a colonel, Oliver North, in the National Security Council was doing things that were eventually determined by Judge Walsh and his commission to be illegal, and that had to do with the supply of armaments to the Contras.

The base, the air base that was mentioned, Ilopango, is in El Salvador. That is where we were bringing in humanitarian supplies, as I said, that I was responsible for, and sending them on to the Contras. Oliver North and some other people were using that same air base to bring in illegal supplies, i.e., armaments. The Walsh report noted this, that the same air base had been used for both types of supplies, legal and illegal.

The Walsh report, as I said, did not in any way imply that the supply of humanitarian material to the Contras was either illegal or, you know, should not have taken place. That was, as I said, a policy that had been approved by the Congress several times.

Does that explain it, Your Honour?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's go on to the next topic. ⁶⁸²⁷

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So the policy was humanitarian assistance. Please comment on this: It relates to you. [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... "in Kosovo. This time his actions give backing to different Contra army, the Contra Kosovo Liberation Army." [Interpretation] Is that right?

JUDGE MAY: Who again? What are you quoting from, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I put a question. So I'll tell you what I've quoted. Never mind. That's no problem.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is that right or is that not right? The question is -- I'm quoting myself. Let's put it that way. Is that right or is that not right? I'm quoting Gary Wilson. I'm quoting an article by Gary Wilson. Is this right or is this not right?

A. I'm not sure I understood the question. If the question is was either I or were the people of the KVM supplying the KLA, the Albanian population, with assistance during my tenure as head of the KVM, the answer is no, we were not.

THE WITNESS: Was that the question, Your Honour?

JUDGE MAY: The question was: Did you -- you were giving your backing to a different Contra army, the KLA. I think you've answered the point. Would you -- I suppose, put it this way: Did you back the KLA during your time?

THE WITNESS: No, we did not. We often condemned the KLA for acts of violence. ^{6828 BLANK PAGE 6829}

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. We'll get precisely to that. And now in relation to this, this linkage in respect of such activities, in relation to Racak, it says: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... the site of the alleged massacre and declared that he knew all the facts. He was the judge, jury, and executioner all in one. Not even a district attorney in any United States city could so boldly make such a declaration: Guilty first, evidence later."

And then --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness deal with that allegation.

THE WITNESS: Again, I'm not sure what the quotation is from or what I'm dealing with. If the question is did I consider myself judge, jury, and executioner all in one, my answer is no, I did not.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, tell me, Mr. Walker, since it is claimed: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... Walker? Is he the Richard Butler of Kosovo, as many in the Balkans now believe?"

[No translation] [In English]... "[Previous translation continues]... Kosovo team was a spy team like the UNSCOM group in Iraq, Walker replied, `I hope everyone on my mission is trying to gather as much intelligence as they possibly can.' Questioned again, 'Are you reporting it back to Washington?' Walker reported -- Walker replied, 'A lot of it comes back to Washington, but it goes to all capitals" and so on.

JUDGE MAY: Let us hear -- let us hear where this quotation is from. ⁶⁸³⁰

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a quotation from Gary Wilson's article too. But I assume that he is not challenging --

JUDGE MAY: When and where did Gary Wilson write this article?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I haven't got that here now, but you can take it from a website that I'm going to give you. This is the website: [In English] US-Kosovo Policy -- [Interpretation] Here's the website so you can check it exactly, the date and everything else. Unfortunately, I do not have everything I need here so that I could know all that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, were you really involved in these activities, Mr. Walker? Was this the main thrust of your activities, parallel to the official mission that you were conducting?

A. I was pursuing my official mission, which was to try to tell the OSCE and the capitals of the member states of the OSCE as much as we could possibly gather in terms of the reality of what was happening in Kosovo. That was our job. We were verifiers, which implies gathering information and telling people about it.

Q. Only that?

A. No. As the mission progressed from the beginning, we took on other tasks, a number of which were at your direction. You might recall when you told me that two journalists had been kidnapped by, as you call them, the so-called KLA, and you told me that you expected my mission to get them released. So that started a process in which we tried to do that several times, including the release later of some VJ soldiers who were ⁶⁸³¹ captured by the KLA as well as some people from the KLA that your forces had taken prisoner. So we -- we got involved in that sort of activity. I was also asked by the Serb community in Kosovo to try and determine what had happened to members of their families who had disappeared.

So what I am saying is that, over time, the mission took on other tasks besides the collection of information and the dissemination of that information to the OSCE and beyond.

Q. I put a question not only in relation to the information that you have been speaking about but also in relation to intelligence information. I'm going to quote the Sunday Times for you, London, the 12th of March, 2000: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... "Kosovo guerrilla army. American intelligence agents have admitted they helped to train the Kosovo Liberation Army before NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia. ... Central Intelligence Agency officers were cease-fire monitors in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, developing ties with the KLA and giving American military training manuals and field advice," et cetera, et cetera. "Many of its satellite telephones and global positioning systems were secretly handed to KLA... Several KLA leaders had the mobile phone number of General Wesley Clark, the NATO Commander. ... The American agenda consisted of their --"

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness deal with these allegations, series of allegations here being made and quoted by you.

The first suggestion is that, Ambassador -- Let the witness deal with these allegations. ⁶⁸³² What's suggested is there were cease-fire monitors who were CIA officers developing ties with the KLA and giving American military training, et cetera.

First of all, is there any truth in that suggestion?

THE WITNESS: If there is, it's not to my knowledge. I knew of no personnel on KVM staff who were either with the CIA nor who were giving training to the KLA.

JUDGE MAY: And it's said that many telephone and global positioning systems were handed to the KLA and the leaders had the telephone number of General Clark. Do you know anything about that?

THE WITNESS: No, I do not. I know that the KLA did do most of its communications via cell phones and that sort of thing. Where they got them, how they acquired them, who they communicated with, I have no personal knowledge of that.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In that same article, precisely in relation to what you have been saying now, that you know nothing about this, it says -- this is the Sunday Times that I have been quoting: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... dismissed suggestions that he had wanted war in Kosovo, but admitted the CIA was almost certainly involved in the countdown to airstrikes."

So that's inaccurate. Is that right, Mr. Walker?

A. If I -- let me reread your quote here. I do dismiss --

MR. NICE: While he's doing it, might we know the author of this ⁶⁸³³ document and if this is allegation against the witness directly but the text --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] By all means. Sunday Times, 12th of March, 2000, Tom Walker, [In English] Aidan Laverty. A-i-d-a-n, Aidan Laverty. Tom Walker and Aidan Laverty, from Sunday Times, London, 12th of March, 2000. "CIA aided Kosovo guerrilla army."

[Interpretation] All right. Can we proceed?

JUDGE MAY: No. Let the witness just deal with that.

THE WITNESS: I do dismiss suggestions that I wanted war in Kosovo. I have probably said numerous times that I'm sure the CIA was interested in what was happening in Kosovo, as I'm sure the intelligence services of a number of countries, including your own, were interested in what was happening in Kosovo.

I am not with the CIA. I have never been with the CIA. I have worked with members of the CIA, but as I said, not in connection with Kosovo.

So I -- as I say, I'm sure the CIA was interested in knowing what was going on. I'm sure they read our reports, OSCE reports. What Tom Walker of the London Times derived from this, I know not. THE ACCUSED [Interpretation] All right. Before I move on to my next question, I would like to -- I've been trying to communicate with that lady by sign language but apparently she can't see me. I have a video cassette here, and I would like to have it played, please. The footage is very short. Very short video clips. And I kindly ask the technical service to play the video clips one by one and that is what I ⁶⁸³⁴ shall request. I don't know whether the technical people can actually hear me as I say this. So it's a series of different video clips.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. While they arrange this, Mr. Walker, do you know a Canadian officer, historian, Roly Keith? He has several diplomas. He has served with the Canadian military for 30 years, also with NATO, an historian. He was head of your office in Kosovo Polje, of the Verification Mission in Kosovo Polje. Do you remember him?

A. I have no recollection of that name whatsoever.

Q. All right. You'll probably remember him. Mr. Walker, in your statement, you say on page -- well, let me not quote it now. I'll quote it if you think it's not that way.

You talk about the NATO aggression. Is it correct that NATO bombed Yugoslavia because America and its Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, wanted war?

A. That is not my understanding of why NATO began the bombing.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Please, could you play the first video clip. I hope that you will recognise -- well, could we also have the sound track, please.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] America, headed by Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, judging by various sources like Time Magazine, wanted war, and Yugoslavia was a sacrificed lamb or a target. And this was a way of rallying Europe together in the twenty-first century. It is clear that President Milosevic - I have no intention of ⁶⁸³⁵ defending him or attacking him - was elected president three times. Yugoslavia has been a democratic country for quite some time now, and it's quite irrelevant whether you like him or not. And that cannot be a justification or an excuse."

JUDGE MAY: Now, Mr. Milosevic, who was that?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is a member of the Verification Mission, head of the office of the Verification Mission in Kosovo Polje, an officer of the Canadian army.

JUDGE MAY: We will ask the witness whether he recognises the gentleman or not.

THE WITNESS: No, I do not, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. The gentleman's views are quite irrelevant. If you want to call him as a witness, you can, but you're not going to examine this witness about him. It's merely his views. Now, do you want to play any more of your tape?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] By all means. You'll see more.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I think --

JUDGE MAY: We'll do it after the adjournment. And you're not to ask any questions about that. That was merely the views of that man, and he can give evidence in due course if he wants.

Mr. Walker, could you be back, please, in half an hour.

--- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.33 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. ⁶⁸³⁶

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I don't understand how you can limit my right to ask the witness to comment on the statements made by an officer who was a member of his mission and upon whose findings his report was in fact based. I don't understand that at all.

JUDGE MAY: He does not know the man who was on the television. The comments relate to the very issues which we're going to have to decide, and it's not a matter for the man on the television or for this witness; it's a matter for this Trial Chamber, which is going to have to decide these issues.

Yes. Now, continue, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Very well. I shall endeavour to get an answer. But does that mean that we have noted that Mr. Walker claims that this particular officer was not a member of the mission and was not an authentic person?

JUDGE MAY: No. He said -- what the witness said was that he didn't recognise the man.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What does that mean, that he didn't recognise him? It means that he cannot comment on his positions, if it is an officer who was head of a department in the mission.

JUDGE KWON: You can put the question to the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it true that during your stay at the head of the KVM, the police was a professional police force and that cooperation with the police force was good?

A. If you're asking me about the Serb police, there was a certain ⁶⁸³⁷ amount of cooperation; however, there were a number of incidents, including one that I was personally involved in, where I would have to say it was as unprofessional, as uncooperative as anything I've seen in my career with a purportedly professional police force.

Q. Well, your member - precisely, the one that they won't let me quote here - says that they got on very well and that they performed their duties professionally, and he was in the field, and not you. Is that so or not?

A. As I said, Mr. Milosevic, I do not recognise the person that was on the screen. We had over 1.400 members of the mission. I certainly knew only a small portion of that. I did not know this gentleman. He might have had very good relations with the police. As I said, I had at least one incident involving me personally in which a policeman came at me with a hand grenade, and I would hardly consider that to be professional police behaviour.

Q. Mr. Walker, in your statement, you devote two whole pages to the fact that a drunken policeman had an argument with the members of your security detail and that he apologised to you, in fact, and that you never saw the hand grenade yourself. And I don't see that this incident deserves this kind of attention that you are attributing to it. Is that right or not?

A. I personally thought it was a very serious incident. My security and the security of a number of people from the mission were involved. As you say, he was drunk, he was armed, and members of my security detail saw the grenade and whisked me away from his presence. When I returned, in ⁶⁸³⁸ very broken and drunken English, I believe he was trying to apologise. I thought the incident was serious enough to ask for an investigation by General Loncar. He promised to do so. He came back within a few hours and told me essentially that we had imagined the whole thing, that it was the fault of my unarmed security detail and that they had provoked this drunken, armed, grenade-carrying policeman; in other words, just the exact opposite of what had occurred.

Q. All right. Not to dwell on that point, you yourself said that it was established that he wasn't on duty and no weapons were used, as it says in your statement. That's right, isn't it?

A. General Loncar told me that he was an off-duty policeman from Belgrade. He said that the man was not drunk. He said the man was not armed. I personally saw a Kalashnikov rifle in his car, which the police put in the police car when they took him away, wearing a ski mask, shortly after the incident had occurred. I thought that was also fairly unprofessional police behaviour, to put a man who was supposedly in detention in the back seat of a police car, with a weapon at his side, and allowing him to go away with a mask over his face. But I am not a professional policeman myself. Maybe this is professional behaviour.

Q. All right. Let's not waste time, because I have many more important topics to cover.

You talk about ethnic cleansing in your statement. Do you know -- or rather, could you comment on, for example, a statement made by the member of your mission, who says:

"I can testify to the fact that in February and March 1999 there ⁶⁸³⁹ was no genocide. When it comes to ethnic cleansing, I was not present nor did I see events which could be characterised as ethnic cleansing. In connection to my previous answer, I wish to state that I was witness to a series of incidents, and most of them were caused by the KLA, for which the security forces, aided by the army, reacted." Is that correct or not?

JUDGE MAY: Before the witness answers, we need to know who has made this statement and when he made it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This same officer made this statement, and I have this on the tape too, which you won't allow me to play.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes. The officer, whose name was given, the Canadian, apparently said at some stage that he didn't see any ethnic cleansing. You can see, Mr. Walker, on the screen what it is alleged. Perhaps you can then comment on it.

THE WITNESS: I can't comment on what he saw or didn't see. Any comments I've made about evidence of ethnic cleansing was based on my own observations and those of other members of my staff. Who this gentleman was and why he made those statements, I have absolutely no idea.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You speak about refugees. Could you comment on the following statement, made by this officer of yours:

"In the past weeks or ten days in Kosovo, we continued receiving reports on hundreds and sometimes thousands of refugees from our area of ⁶⁸⁴⁰ responsibility. However, when my observers and I went to these locations, we would come across just several tens of refugees. This does not mean that there were not a hundred people on the move, but they were taken in very quickly by their relatives from Pristina or they took to the hills or somewhere else. And it was not ethnic cleansing - at least, that is not what I imply by that term - and even less was it a genocide. I was not witness to mass human rights violations. What I did see, and the things I did attend, were events which turned into a civil war very quickly, a burgeoning one, between the rebels, terrorists, as they were called by the security forces, and the security forces themselves, who were trying to protect and defend the communication devices throughout Kosovo." Was that so or not? Is that correct or not?

A. I again have no idea what this man was referring to, whether he's referring to refugees before the bombing, during the bombing. I certainly saw tens of thousands of refugees in the refugee camps that I referred to earlier, in Macedonia and Albania. They were all Albanians. Again, this gentleman, I have no idea where he was, what he was doing, who he was talking to, so I can hardly comment on his words.

Q. Well, I informed you a moment ago that he was the head of your office, the head of your bureau in Kosovo Polje.

JUDGE MAY: The witness has responded that he cannot comment on what the man claims to have seen. As I've said, if you want to call him as a witness, it's open to you to do so.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it true -- ⁶⁸⁴¹

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question wasn't whether he knew him. He said he didn't know him, but I asked him to comment what the man had stated. But we can move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it correct that the army and MUP recognised the agreement and abided by the agreement and that the KLA did not, the one that was achieved between Holbrooke and myself?

A. As I've said, in our meeting in November, I reported to you that there was non-compliance on both sides; i.e., the MUP, the VJ, and the KLA were all doing things that were specifically prohibited by the agreements.

Q. And can you comment on this: It is the statement where the officer claims that he was in villages in Kosovo, and, as you know, the KLA controlled for one year 50 per cent of the territory, a year before that. The security forces did not enter those areas, in keeping with the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, but the KLA did not stop at its own territory. They would keep effective skirmishes and moving into that territory, and so on and so forth.

Now, asked whether they supported the KLA, the answers were unclear, when the population was asked, in fact. Can I have your comments to that, please.

A. I'm not again entirely sure what the question is, Mr. Milosevic. I will repeat: The KVM, neither I nor any person on the mission who was doing what they were supposed to be doing, was in any way helping one side or the other. We were there to determine what the sides were doing and whether or not they were in compliance with the agreements that your ⁶⁸⁴² government signed.

I would have to comment on your bringing up the question of whether or not the KLA controlled territory. I specifically remember you telling me when I asked you about what we thought was our need to bring in a helicopter ambulance capability, with a Swiss helicopter, and I explained that we would need this if any of our people were injured, either deliberately or accidentally, while in territory controlled by the KLA, and you were offering a government helicopter to do that extraction, and you told me quite categorically that the KLA controlled no territory in Kosovo.

Q. The point was that the KLA was attacking, and not that it was controlling the territory. He mentioned one year previously, that they were in control one year previously, but it was the attacking that I was asking about. But let's move on.

Your cooperation, did it have to do with helping separatism? Is that true? How can you comment, for example, on this assertion: "On the basis of everything we know, I think that we in fact assisted the separatist movement and that the idea of a multicultural Kosovo was disappearing, just like the Serbs, the Romas, and Jews which were killed and forced to flee to save their own skins." Is that observation correct or not?

A. The observation that the KVM somehow was trying to promote separatism is ludicrous. It is not true. If there were individuals, again, who felt one way or the other about separatism, that I cannot comment on, but the mission, as I was instructed, had nothing to do with ⁶⁸⁴³ encouraging, promoting, advocating separatism.

Q. Very well. Now, you claim that all the people you talked to said that they had fled from Kosovo because of the threats that were being made to them by the police and not NATO. Could you comment on that statement made by your officer? And it was the following:

"A justification for war which can also be brought into question was the alleged ethnic cleansing and jeopardising of human rights which were allegedly committed when my colleagues and I were in Kosovo. This did not happen. The refugees were not fleeing Kosovo in the spring, while we were there, up until the time that NATO started the war on the 24th of March. According to my information, the UN Refugee Committee informed us that the first wave of refugees crossed the border only on the 27th of March, in large numbers. As you mentioned, hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons are the results of the civil war, but first and foremost are the results of the NATO bombing." That is what your officer claims. Is that true or is it not?

A. Again, Mr. Milosevic, you are asking me to comment on statements made by a member of the KVM, for whatever reason he made those, and on the basis of what evidence he made those, I have no information. If you're asking me, you know, what provoked the exodus of refugees, massive exodus of refugees during the NATO bombing campaign, I spoke to hundreds and hundreds of refugees in the camps. I did not find a single one who said they had fled the bombing; on the contrary, some of them said they wished there had been more bombing. They all said they had fled the horrors, the mistreatment, the killings they saw, at the hands of your security forces. ^{6844 BLANK PAGE 6845}

Q. Yes. That's quite clear to me. But this man is not speaking on the basis of I don't know what facts which he read somewhere, but on the basis of his immediate involvement and work in Kosovo and Metohija, and that's why I asked for your comments.

My next question is the following: Is it correct that the KLA was the armed road to realising the idea of a Greater Albania?

A. I have no basis for answering that question. I do not know what the agenda of the KLA was at any point during the conflict, other than to protect the Albanian population, that they thought were their constituents, from harm.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should now like to ask that we take a look at Exhibit 11 from this tape. It is not the officer, Mr. May; it is a clip from Albanian television. And I'd like to ask the technical booth to pinpoint that particular section. It is number 11. You have got one over. You have 9, and then we come to 11, and it is a speech by KLA officers talking about what I have just been referring to. So it is number 11 on the tape. The tape has 20 clips and it takes no more than 20 minutes, Mr. May. But it doesn't matter. We skipped the one you didn't want to hear, and may we go on with this next one, then? He is speaking here about the goals of realising a Greater Albania, goals that were determined in 1912.

I don't think that's the footage. It is Exhibit number 11. It is footage that has been marked number 11. The speaker is wearing a uniform of the KLA, with all the insignia, the cap. There are quite a number of other KLA members standing round about. ⁶⁸⁴⁶ All right. While we're finding that number 11 exhibit, could you answer me this: Is it true that KLA was a terrorist group or terrorist organisation?

A. I am certainly aware that members of the KLA committed acts that I condemned that were violent acts, that were what I would have considered criminal acts; kidnappings, assassinations, that sort of thing. Whether you define this, you know, as a terrorist organisation, I never called them that, but I certainly denounced them any time they committed a criminal act such as I've just described.

Q. All right. You are well-informed of the 1160 and 1169 UN Security Resolutions, and 1203, all those Security Council Resolutions which were adopted, as you well know, in 1998.

A. I am aware of the Security Council Resolutions, and I was once very familiar with them. I have, you know, a relatively meager memory of them except in their -- in the broadest sense, as we sit here today.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I think we can see the clip. May we have the sound track with it as well, please.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The fate of Kosovo was decided at the conference of ambassadors in London. More than half of Albanian lands and more than half of the Albanian people were severed from independent Albania, and ever since onwards, the Albanian people of Kosovo have conducted and keep conducting a war of liberation. And the Kosovo Liberation Army in itself constitutes all the tradition of liberation war ever since." ⁶⁸⁴⁷

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So my question was: Was the KLA an armed part to realising a Greater Albania, whose goals were set --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop this. All you'll be asking, Mr. Milosevic, is this witness to comment on something an unidentified man is saying on television. Now, it's pointless asking him about it. You can play it to us in due course as part of your case and ask us to draw conclusions from it, but it's a waste of time to ask the witness about it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, all right, Mr. May. Let's not waste time.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As you vaguely remember the Resolutions, let me remind you that in 1160, it says that all acts of terrorism should be condemned by the KLA, committed by the KLA, and that all elements of the Albanian community should realise their goals through political means alone and that weapons and armament must be prevented with an aim to terrorist activities in Kosovo and Metohija.

And in 1199, this Resolution repeats the condemnation of terrorism for the realisation of any political goals on the part of individuals and groups. It condemns every outside support to activities of this kind in Kosovo, including weapons supplies, and insists upon the fact that the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians condemn all terrorist actions, and so on and so forth and calls for the member states to prevent the collection of money contributions on their territory which are used for the violation of Resolution 1160 and 1203. Terrorism is condemned again, and so on and ⁶⁸⁴⁸ so forth. And insistence is made upon the fact that the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians should condemn all terrorist activities and demand that such activities cease immediately.

Therefore, I am repeating my question of a moment ago. Are they a terrorist organisation or not, in your opinion, Mr. Walker?

JUDGE MAY: The witness has dealt with that. This is what I mean about your arguing with witnesses. Again, this is a point you can make to us, but it is pointless to continually ask the same question of a witness.

Now, ask some other questions. Get on to something else.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, in view of the fact that in this courtroom we very often heard mention of some kind of Serb paramilitary formations and units and the so-called Tigers, some so-called Tigers, and it was claimed that Serb forces wore black caps and that they had some units that were called the Tigers. Now, please, could you answer me this question: During your stay in Kosovo, were you informed of -- did you know of any Black Tigers within the frameworks of the KLA terrorist organisation?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may we see the next bit of footage, please, the next clip.

[Videotape played]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As you can see, black caps, black uniforms.

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "... of the KLA, the Black Tigers. ⁶⁸⁴⁹ We are specialised for guerrilla warfare and lightning strikes. On my left you can see the snipers. Eagle is a scout. He works close into the Serbs. The sniper's name is "Grape." He reckons he's sweet. Here they are. We also have this man who prefers to use an anti-tank bazooka. The others have Kalashnikovs in their hands."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Let's save time. Let's move on to the next video clip, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Tell me, did you meet with the commanders of the KLA? For example, Hill did. And did Hill report to you about your [sic] meetings with the KLA?

THE ACCUSED: Could we please see the next clip?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, while we're waiting --

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "They had the right to involve representatives of the international community. The meeting with American diplomats as well as -- and representatives of the KLA during this meeting, important elements and important points in national history were remembered."

[Audio quality poor] "UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS: This is commander -- which one. The officer standing in the door. He's the military commander. Okay."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thaci and Hill. [Audio quality poor] "UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS: Did she ask you difficult questions?" "No."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁶⁸⁵⁰

Q. All right. My question is: Did Hill inform you about these meetings and about their contents? As head of the Verification Mission, what kind of information did you receive in this regard?

A. Ambassador Hill and his colleague the ambassador -- the Austrian ambassador to, I believe, Belgrade, was he? They both came often to Kosovo while I was there. They did have meetings with the KLA as well as with your people. They told me occasionally what had happened, and I'm sure there were meetings when they didn't tell me much about it. It depended on when we got together.

That particular meeting, I have no idea whether I was told about what had happened at it. As I say, they had any number of meetings with the KLA.

Q. All right. But, Mr. Walker, you were not elected by the OSCE. You were chosen by Albright to that particular position; is that right?

A. That is incorrect. I'm sure that Secretary Albright was asked to put someone forward for the position. I don't know who asked her. My name was put before the leadership of the OSCE at a conference in -- at a meeting in Oslo, and then I assume it was confirmed by the full membership. As you probably know, Mr. Milosevic, the OSCE works by full consensus. That means full consensus among the 54 member states. So my nomination was put forward by this -- by the State Department, but it was accepted by and passed on by the full membership of the OSCE.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Please could you have the next video clip played.

[Videotape played] ⁶⁸⁵¹ "NARRATOR: And made the choice herself."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope you heard this.

[Videotape played] "NARRATOR: Was working for the OSCE. He was part of the American --"

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. This is different. No.

[Videotape played] "NARRATOR: Which vilified Slobodan Milosevic, demonised the Serbian administration, and generally was providing diplomatic support to the UCK or the KLA leadership."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. There were two clips that were played.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You saw Holbrooke who made an assertion that was contrary to what you said, that you were directly and personally appointed by Madeleine Albright. In the second video clip, we heard Roland --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness deal with that. Is there anything you can usefully add to that, Ambassador?

THE WITNESS: As I stated, Ambassador Holbrooke was correct in saying I was chosen by the Secretary of State, meaning I was chosen among State Department people to put forward as a nominee to head the OSCE mission. So she chose me among her people to put forward. That choice was accepted and confirmed by the OSCE leadership, the Chairman in Office, the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Geremek, as well as by the permanent council of the OSCE in unanimous consensus. ⁶⁸⁵²

JUDGE MAY: Yes. As to the gentleman on the tape who I think we've seen before, and I think he's the man whose views we've heard a great deal of, is there anything you want to say about this particular assertion?

THE WITNESS: Nothing other than these are his views. I don't know who he is or where he acquired his information, so I really can't comment on it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not the same person. You saw that this was a completely different person.

JUDGE MAY: It's another one, is it? It's another KVM man, is it? I thought it was Roland Keith.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Roland Keith from the KVM, that Walker gave diplomatic support to the KLA.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My next question is the following: Neither you nor Drewienkiewicz registered all violations of the agreement that were committed by the KLA; is that right?

A. Anything that came to our attention that appeared to be a violation of the agreement were duly reported to Vienna, to the OSCE in Vienna. I'm sure we missed some, but all those that came to our attention we tried very methodically to put in our reports that went forward to the OSCE in Vienna.

Q. And you personally, did you believe that it was the KLA that committed most of the violations of the agreement?

A. I would say in terms of numbers, the KLA probably committed a ⁶⁸⁵³ greater number of violations. But in terms of the scale of the violations, my personal opinion would be that the government forces burning down villages and, in the case of Racak, executing 45 civilians, that the -- the response by the government to whatever the provocation by the KLA was, was excessive. So in terms of numbers, if you're talking of numbers, I would say probably the KLA committed more. If you're talking about the scale, I think you're talking about the government far exceeding the KLA in terms of the violence.

Q. Well, when I say most violations of the agreement, this is a synthetic definition. You cannot distinguish between numbers on the one hand and the scale involved on the other hand.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have the next video clip played.

[Videotape played] "NARRATOR: William Walker's deputy was a British general. He and his colleagues could see what the KLA was doing but had no means of stopping or even discouraging it."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And the next one. The next one, please.

[Videotape played] "MR. NAUMANN: This is how William Walker himself reported the situation then in private."

"MR. NAUMANN: Ambassador Walker stated that the majority of violations was caused by the KLA."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁶⁸⁵⁴

Q. That was Klaus Naumann, president of the council of NATO, the one who said that you had discussed this mutually.

Mr. Walker, you're a member --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. You're not going to move over these things.

Can you remember saying anything to Mr. Naumann, Ambassador?

THE WITNESS: General Naumann was not the president of the council of NATO. He was the head of the military commission of NATO. He worked very closely with General Wesley Clark. As I say, I could have referred to the numbers of violations being on the side of the KLA, but I'm sure I also told him that the more massive violations were committed by the government forces.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You're a member of the organisation called Hands of Hope, the National American Albanian Council; is that right?

A. I was asked if I would be an honourary member of the board of directors not of Hands of Hope, which is a subsidiary organisation that brings scholarship students to the United States, but I'm -- if you're talking about the National Albanian American Council, yes. In the aftermath of my experience in Kosovo, I accepted to be an honourary member of their board of directors.

Q. All right. Do you remember the events that took place on the 10th of June, 2002? No. No. No. The 10th of June, 2002, the world today in Albanian, the Albanian American National Council conferred a decoration on the former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, Hands of Hope. ⁶⁸⁵⁵ In your speech, you said:

"It was my honour and pleasure to work under the umbrella and directives of Mrs. Albright, who is one of the most deserving persons for the entrance of NATO in Kosovo," et cetera, et cetera. "You have the greatest merit for getting Kosovo out of the grasp of the Milosevic regime," et cetera, et cetera.

Do you remember that, Mr. Walker?

A. I remember it very well. It's about a week ago, yes. I introduced Madeleine Albright, and in the speech I expressed my respect for her, and I did express that she was one of the key players in bringing about the eventual outcome in Kosovo.

Q. Who brought about NATO's entry into Kosovo. That's what you said. One of the most deserving persons in that regard. Is that right?

A. That is correct.

Q. You also gave information in connection with which you were not quite sure; is that right or is that not right?

A. I'm not sure I understand.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. What is the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Well, the question was very clear: Did you provide information for which you were not sure -- about which you were not sure; you were not sure whether this information was accurate or not?

JUDGE MAY: In connection with what?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, look at this BBC clip, or rather, Mr. Walker's statement for the BBC. Could you please have the ⁶⁸⁵⁶ next video clip played.

[Videotape played] "WILLIAM WALKER: Good afternoon. Thank you very much for coming. I know --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Walker condemned both the ambush on the border and the killings in the bar in equal measure.

WILLIAM WALKER: I would certainly call upon --" "WILLIAM WALKER: It really looked like it was a tit for tat, again, KLA hearing about their people being killed up on the border had done this in Pec.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There is a huge difference, isn't there, between people killed in a legitimate military exchange and a bunch of hooded unknowns walking into a bar and killing some teenagers.

WILLIAM WALKER: I think the point is: One, we really didn't know what had happened in Pec. Yes, the government was saying it was KLA gangsters who had come in and sprayed this bar. When you don't know what has happened, it's a lot more difficult to sort of pronounce yourself."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So in relation to my question, what is your comment with regard to this statement of yours, Mr. Walker: legitimate defence of the border, and you equate that to killing a young man, and your explanation is that you don't know and that you cannot exactly ascertain what this is all about. And the question was: Did you provide information that you were not sure of; you weren't sure whether it was accurate or inaccurate?

A. If the question is do I stand by what I said in that clip, I ⁶⁸⁵⁷ certainly do. I condemned both events, both the ambush and killing of KLA forces that were bringing weapons across the border from Albania into Kosovo. That was something that your government took immediate credit for, so I knew what had happened there. I knew who had done the killing. I condemned that as an act of violence. Not that I denied that a government had a right to protect its borders, but I said it was tragic that this had occurred. And it was certainly tragic that in the immediate aftermath there had been an incident in Peje, in Pec, in which some young male Serbs had been killed in a bar. I condemned that also as violence. What I said was I was going to condemn violence from whatever source. In the case of the bar incident in Peje, in Pec, no one took credit for that, and to this day we do not know who committed that act. You assumed, and I guess many people assumed, and maybe even I assumed that it was the KLA, but we did not know for a fact. Did I equate the two incidents? No, I did not. I was just saying they were both violent acts, and I expressed sorrow that they had occurred and condemned violence from whatever quarter.

Q. Please. The defence of a border, where a number of KLA numbers were killed, who were armed, and a number of them were taken prisoner as well, the OSCE, or rather, your mission, qualified this as legitimate action taken on the part of the Yugoslav authorities. So what was there to be condemned?

A. I was saying that I was against violence. I was hoping things like this would not happen again. One act of violence, one act of killing on one side usually provoked a reciprocal act from the other side. My ⁶⁸⁵⁸ quotation about tit-for-tat violence in another circumstance has already been mentioned. This is what the problem was when I was addressing the press conference in the immediate aftermath of both these incidents. I was trying to get people to calm down and not provoke further violence.

Q. All right. So the clash at the border with an armed column of KLA members and the operation of the Yugoslav forces is something that you qualify as killing, murder?

A. I think you've already said that the KVM mission conceded that a nation had a right to defend its borders against armed intruders. At the same time, I was saying it was a shame that people had been killed, that there had been a loss of life, and that there had also been the loss of life in the bar in Peje, and this was what I was trying to get across as a call for less violence. Certainly, as I've said, violence by one side seemed to provoke violence from the other.

Q. Well, that is the problem, this symmetry. But please, your reports about the KLA, in relation to the KLA, and the relations between the KLA and the peasants themselves, are a result of insufficient information; is that right or is that not right?

A. Our reports about the KLA, in relation to their relations with the peasants themselves, you know, we did not have total information ever. We had the information that came to us, that we were able to see with our own eyes. That is what we reported. Was this the total amount of information? No, it wasn't, but it was the best we could do.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Could we have the next video clip, please. It's very short. ⁶⁸⁵⁹

[Videotape played] "UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We encountered many villages where the villagers themselves told us, in very clear terms, that they would prefer to be left completely alone. Often times they felt that if a KLA group were to come into their village, that would actually put them under greater threat."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So it says that people were leaving villages because they were afraid of the KLA.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In connection with Rogovo, just one question --

JUDGE MAY: It didn't say that. It's merely somebody who has come along and said that the villagers occasionally wanted to be left alone. That's all. Now, can we have another question, or another piece of tape.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course. Of course. Left alone, not dragged into --

JUDGE MAY: You should not misrepresent what's said.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right, Mr. May. Let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In connection with Rogovo, just one more question. Is it true that you found out that on the 29th of January, 1999, in Rogovo, more than 29 Albanians had been killed and that most of them were KLA fighters who had previously tried to evade an army ambush and they were killed in the clash? Is that correct?

A. That is correct. ^{6860 BLANK PAGE 6861}

Q. Thank God something is correct. Now that we are talking about Racak, in your statement, you say the following: "As I was watching these bodies, I noticed a few things. First of all, judging by the wounds and the blood around them, and also the pools of dried blood on the land around the bodies, it was obvious that these were the clothes that the people wore when they were killed. There was no doubt in my mind that they died where they were lying. The quantity and the location of the blood on the soil in front of them, each and every one of them, was a clear indication of that."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In order to save time, could the usher please show these photographs in the proper order. They come from the documentation of the other side. They come from Mr. Nice. So could they please be shown on the overhead projector. I have questions in relation to all these photographs: Where is this blood by the bodies or by individual bodies? These photographs come from Mr. Nice's documentation, not mine.

JUDGE MAY: Let's do this now. Put the photographs one by one, if you would, please, on the ELMO. Let the witness see them. They are, I take it, the photographs that were shown of the various bodies.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. Please put them on the --

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... so we can see them.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] One by one, in the proper order, the way I gave them to you. ⁶⁸⁶²

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Where did you see traces of blood there?

A. On that picture?

JUDGE MAY: Go on to the next one.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are there any traces of blood here anywhere?

A. I assume that's blood.

Q. You're talking about pools of blood on the soil, and on the soil there is no blood at all.

A. Not in this picture.

Q. Not on the previous picture either.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please go on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is there any blood, any traces of blood, any pools of blood here on the soil either?

A. Not on that picture, no.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please go on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Where is blood here?

A. I see none.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us go on.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. The next one, please. Yes, the next one.

Yes, the next one. And the next one. Yes. ⁶⁸⁶³

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not even here, there is no trace of blood anywhere on the ground, and we see that there are rocks all around. Let's go on.

Could you now please show this photograph.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the usher would hand back the photographs to the accused and collect the new one.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. The whole photograph, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please take a careful look at it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please keep the photograph there, and could you please come, Mr. Usher, so I can give you yet another photograph which you can show after this one. But keep this one on the ELMO.

As you can see, there are no traces of blood here. And now, could you please show this photograph on the overhead projector. Bear in mind that it is the same person. There's no doubt about that. There are no traces of blood whatsoever. And now please take a look at the other photograph. Please show the other photograph now.

As you can see, the same person, and now all of a sudden by this person there are traces of blood. Now the cap is moved --

JUDGE MAY: Pause there. Can you assist, Mr. Ambassador, as to those photographs at all? Does it look anything like what you saw?

THE WITNESS: It looks very much like what I saw, but these are ⁶⁸⁶⁴ only a few photographs out of the thousands of photographs that were taken that day. And I can assure the Court that in many of the photographs there is blood, as I described it, on the ground, around the wounds. And I think this latest photograph does attest to the fact that it's an elderly gentleman with the peasant skullcap in the vicinity of his head. All of the bodies, I would note, were in civilian clothes, as earlier described by me.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please. This particular photograph, just like you have a big door revolving on a small hinge, this photograph shows that the whole scene has been rigged, although there were a lot of photographs, so a selection wasn't made. On one photograph you see the same individual, without any traces of blood, lying there, lying down; on the second photograph you see the same individual with traces of blood on the stone next to him. Take a look for yourselves. We can see blood here, whereas --

JUDGE MAY: You'll have to call the photographer about this. The witness has said what he saw. He can't assist any further. If you make allegations of that sort, you'll have to provide some substance for them. Now, have you got any other questions you want to ask?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course. I have many more questions.

And as on the overhead projector -- you can't see this very well, but be so kind as to give Mr. Robinson, Mr. May, and Mr. Kwon a chance of seeing the photographs live on the paper in front of them so that they can see the difference. And can we clearly see that this scene has been ⁶⁸⁶⁵ staged or rigged.

JUDGE MAY: Oh, yes. Hand up -- sorry. Can you hand up the photographs, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Take a look at that man in the two variations, where there is blood and where there isn't blood, as Mr. Walker had occasion to see them.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes, we've seen the photographs. I don't think the witness can help any further. He's described what he saw. No doubt you can call your own evidence about it in due course.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's about, Mr. May --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My question is: Is this an obvious rigging of this scene, Mr. Walker?

JUDGE MAY: We have dealt with this. Those are simply your allegations, and if you make allegations of that sort, you must support them with evidence.

MR. NICE: Can I just inform the Court, so we don't lose track of it, these were photographs taken by Ian Hendrie. He's, of course, now finished his evidence. I don't think these allegations were put to him.

JUDGE MAY: I don't recollect that.

MR. NICE: I'm sure they weren't put to him.

JUDGE MAY: It can be dealt with in due course.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Walker, were the bodies brought into that location or not, or ⁶⁸⁶⁶ do you consider that that spot is where the killing took place?

A. My own opinion is that I am absolutely convinced that those people died where I saw them. My own opinion is that - and this was shared by everyone who was with me on the hill that day, with whom I discussed it - that none of these bodies were brought from elsewhere, and, as I say, they had died at that spot.

Q. So even this photograph, which quite obviously shows the rigging of this scene, you don't consider that these scenes have in fact been rigged, even with these photographs?

A. As I've said, I do not consider, from everything I saw, nor from those photographs, that any rigging had been done of the scene.

Q. All right, Mr. Walker. You said during your examination-in-chief that the Yugoslav authorities did not take the necessary steps to conduct an investigation and that you know that an official investigation did take place, led by Judge Danica Marinkovic. You also know that the forensic experts conducted an investigation, and you are well aware of the findings of the Prosecution, so all the findings of the official Yugoslav authorities and organs. Now, did the Yugoslav side conduct an investigation or did it not?

A. My understanding is the Yugoslav authorities, with the judge that you just named, did conduct an official investigation. Excuse me. I'm also aware that there was an official government forensic team that came to Kosovo, to Pristina, and conducted autopsies on the bodies from Racak.

Q. All right. And in view of the fact that the ground was as you described it, to an experienced man, didn't you find it suspicious that in ⁶⁸⁶⁷ addition to these serious injuries and wounds, and all the rest of it, that there should be so little trace of blood on the ground, on the soil?

A. As I've already answered and as I think I said in my statement, I did observe blood on the ground in the vicinity of a number of the bodies. Did I see it in terms of every body or could photographs be taken from an angle that showed no blood? That I cannot question. But I saw blood on the ground. I saw blood near the wounds. Yes, these were horrific sites to look at, and there was a lot of blood present.

Q. In your statement, you say the following: "I did not receive any warning or information that an attack was being prepared on Racak." Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And is it also correct that exhaustive information about Racak was received by you already on the afternoon of the 15th of January, 1999?

A. That is incorrect. I was in -- in Montenegro for most of that day, trying -- well, not trying to but talking to the president of Montenegro. I returned late in the afternoon to Pristina, at which point General DZ came to me and told me what had been communicated to him by Loncar's office, that is, that a clash had occurred with the KLA, that 15 had been killed, with no casualties on the government side. That was the first time that I remember that I believe the word "Racak" came to my notice.

Q. Well, all right. Do you know, Mr. Walker, that your verifiers were present from the very morning and observed Racak and the hill above Racak? ⁶⁸⁶⁸

A. I was told that -- by General DZ that when we heard about a problem in the vicinity of Racak, that our Regional Centre in Prizren, which was commanded by General Maisonneuve - who I believe has been a witness here - he dispatched several vehicles, several of our verifier vehicles, to the Racak area to try and see what was going on. They were told that for their safety's sake they should not go forward by -- at some roadblocks of your security forces, so they were compelled to stand off and, through binoculars, I assume, try to determine what was happening to the village of Racak.

Q. Well, I'm not going to waste time here. We saw a videotape on which we saw your verifiers observing Racak, and all I want to do is remind you at this point that General Drewienkiewicz, towards the end or perhaps at the very end of his testimony here during the cross-examination, even indicated the hill on the map where the observers were located, exactly above Racak and from which vantage point they were looking down at Racak and seeing what was going on. Are you aware of that? This was during all those events on the 15th.

JUDGE MAY: The witness will not be aware of what other witnesses said.

As for the evidence about the verifiers, as I recollect it, the video showed them during the course of that afternoon on the hill, observing.

Ambassador, I think the point is to suggest that you were better informed than you've said. When was the first time that you really got any firm information as to Racak? Can you help us as to that? ⁶⁸⁶⁹

THE WITNESS: When I returned from Montenegro late in the afternoon of the 15th, General DZ came and told me that he had been informed by Loncar or Loncar's office that this -- that a clash had occurred, an armed clash between the security forces of the government and the KLA, that 15 KLA had been killed, that no one had been killed on the side -- no one had been injured on the side of the government forces. General DZ told me that we had gotten some of our people close in. In fact, late in the afternoon, at least one of our vehicles, maybe more, had gotten into the village, had seen the results of the artillery bombardment of the village, had found at least, I think -- my memory was of three. I think maybe there was more wounded. Their first thought was to get the wounded out of Racak and to medical attention. I was also told that this had all happened in the -- as daylight was disappearing. We had a standing operating procedure within the mission which was that our patrols should not be out after dark, that it was very dangerous to be out after dark, that either side could see our vehicles as being from the opposite side and taking a shot at them.

So because they had people to get to hospitals, to medical attention, because they had daylight disappearing, they gathered up the wounded and took them away. That was what I heard the night of the incident.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Mr. Walker, are you acquainted with the fact that the verifiers were there from the very morning, that they were by Racak from early morning and that they observed Racak from the morning? ⁶⁸⁷⁰

A. I am not sure what time they got there. I just know that our office in Prizren would have gotten there as fast as they possibly could have. They wanted to go into the village but were stopped from going into the village and did have to observe from a distance. And everything I was told subsequent to -- to my going to the village and my press conference, everything I was told by the people who were observing was that the interpretation I had been given of the incident by the villagers of Racak was essentially correct, that is, bombardment by artillery and then entering into the village by special police forces who took the men away.

Q. I'm going to quote just one sentence from the statement by General Maisonneuve, who testified in this courtroom. It is to be found on page 9 of Maisonneuve's statement, the penultimate paragraph, one sentence.

"The verifiers saw smoke coming out of the chimneys in the village, which spoke of the fact that the civilian population, or at least those who had remained, were going about their usual morning daily duties."

JUDGE MAY: Now, what is the question for the witness? He can only repeat what he was told, and he's given his evidence about it. Quotations from statements of other witnesses isn't going to assist. Now, can we move on?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, we clarified this point with General Maisonneuve, that as his verifiers saw the villagers going about their regular morning duties and that the regular morning duties were something that they were able to see in the morning and not in the ⁶⁸⁷¹ afternoon, because your daily morning routines are done in the morning and not in the afternoon. And allow me to assume that the Head of Mission was quite certainly informed with what the verifiers had seen. Like my assumption --

JUDGE MAY: No assumptions. We will are dealing with the witness's evidence, and he's given it as to what he knew and when. Now, rather than continuing this argument, you would be sensible to move on. Your time is limited. What is your question for the witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, my question to the witness is whether he was informed about that or not.

JUDGE MAY: No. He's given his evidence as to what he was informed of.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You say in your statement that you received information from the office of General Loncar, a member of the Yugoslav army, that early on that day there was an armed conflict and so on and so forth. That is all on page 3. And you say: "General DZ told me that the VJ, as he was told by Loncar, from Racak," the unit, et cetera, et cetera. General Loncar, as you know, Mr. Walker - and this is my question to you - was a retired general and not a member of the Yugoslav army when he performed that duty of his in the mission. Is that correct or not?

A. You told me when I met you in the first meeting as head of the KVM that -- and I asked about General Loncar, you told me that the general had ⁶⁸⁷² retired. But we still call him "General," as I in retirement am still called "Ambassador." I did not know his status in terms of the army when I met him in Kosovo.

Q. Well, I assume you knew that he was the deputy of the president of the Commission for Cooperation with the OSCE, and you represented the OSCE. And his seat was in Pristina, while Nikola Sainovic, the vice-president of the federal government, vice-Premier, was, on behalf of the Federal Government, nominated as president of the Commission for Cooperation with the OSCE, that is to say, with you yourself. And I assume that the commission numbered 16 members from different departments so that altogether they could cover the problems and issues and have good relations with your mission.

Were you informed of that? Were you aware of that or not?

A. As I mentioned yesterday, I was first told that Mr. Andjelkovic was the head of the commission I was supposed to deal with. Then I later met General Loncar at the bottom of the steps of my aeroplane when I arrived officially as the head of the KVM. Mr. Sainovic I met subsequent to that, I think first in your office in Belgrade and then later we had dinner and he informed me of his position. I didn't get full titles in terms of the commission you mentioned with the 16 members. The first time I met Mr. Andjelkovic, he had a number of other people there who he introduced to me. I never saw them again, and I certainly never met with the commission again.

Q. Mr. Walker, you asked me, if possible, to include General Loncar - I did not know at the time whether he was retired or not when we saw each ⁶⁸⁷³ other the first time - because you had good cooperation with him. And yesterday you said that that was not the case.

Now, think again. Was it at your request that I asked General Loncar to come out of retirement and work in the mission or not?

A. It was not.

Q. You even said yesterday that he worked in Slavonia for you and that he was appointed here for reasons you were not aware of, although you asked about him, and none of that is correct. He worked in Slavonia for his own people, and he worked here as the government representative. So --

JUDGE MAY: No. The witness did not say that Loncar worked for him in Slavonia. That was not the evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's what it was interpreted as, and I was rather taken aback by it. But if you say he didn't, then --

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So Loncar was Head of Mission in Pristina, and the president of the Commission for Cooperation was Sainovic, and in that capacity you would meet both of them. Isn't that so?

A. I met a number of times with Mr. Loncar outside the presence of Sainovic. I met with Sainovic several times outside the presence of Loncar. I met with the two of them together several times.

Q. How do you explain the fact that Racak, for which nobody knew about, and you knew nothing about it on that morning, as it says in your ⁶⁸⁷⁴ statement, suddenly, even before anybody knew about it, became a sensation? And as you yourself say, "Lots of papers and journalists went to follow us, came after us." So it became a sort of sensation, a sensation that had been prepared. Yes or no, Mr. Walker.

A. I would question your description of my testimony. I said before January 15th, I had never heard of Racak. In the late afternoon of January 15th, I was told certain information about Racak. The following day, I went to Racak. The following afternoon, I gave a press conference. It was before journalists from Albanian media, Serb media, European media, North American media. My words were covered, I believe, in all of that media, and that is what caused -- that's what caused the attention of the world going towards this village of Racak. I think your description of those -- that sequence is a bit flawed.

Q. That, Mr. Walker, is your own description, and may I draw your attention to page 4 of your statement when Drewienkiewicz told you perhaps you personally should go to Racak because it seems that something bad happened there. I'm reading this from your own statement. And, "We have received" -- "We haven't received the full story from the government yet." And then I said, "Let's do that." And in the following paragraph, you said, "I noticed that there were a lot of journalists rushing around to get into their cars and follow us."

So before anybody knew anything, everybody tried to follow. You were expecting a sensation. Is that so or not?

A. With the possible exception of your last words "expecting a ⁶⁸⁷⁵ sensation," I'm not sure either I or anyone in my mission or the journalists themselves knew what to expect when we got to Racak.

Q. Nobody knew, and yet on page 6 when you describe all this, you say: "While I was watching this pile of bodies --" this was your first meeting with them -- "I was looking at the pile of bodies, a female American journalist, I believe, with either ABC or CBS, approached and said that she was about to broadcast live to the USA." So nobody knew what happened in Racak, whereas they had prepared all the technology necessary to broadcast live to the USA. What they did not know in advance, what had not been reported to them in advance because they had not expected a sensation of this kind.

Does that seem to you to be logical or not, Mr. Walker?

A. Logical or not, I think what happened was journalists that morning had already gotten -- some journalists had already gotten to Racak and perhaps had informed their colleagues back in Pristina that something was -- something fishy had happened. When I exited the building that morning to head for Racak, as usual there were a number of media cameras, that sort of thing, reporters, outside our headquarters, and they jumped into their cars and followed us to Racak. The American TV companies as well as the European TV companies quite often brought along their cameras and the facilities that were needed to broadcast live or not live, and ABC or CBS, whichever it was, did set up quickly and she did do a live interview with me.

Q. Mr. Walker, you know full well that the journalists who were in Racak, according to their own statements, say they didn't see anything ^{6876 BLANK PAGE 6877} special going on the previous day, and, therefore, that they did not expect a sensation to take place, the sensation that occurred when you left. But --

JUDGE MAY: That's not a matter for the witness. He can't comment on what journalists knew or didn't know.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My next question then: You say that on that particular morning, you were late to work in your office. That's what it says in your statement here. Were you late to your office because you had previously to take care of this sensational event and to take all the organisational measures necessary? Was that why you were late?

A. No. I was late to my office because it was a Saturday morning. The previous day I'd been flying and meeting the president of Montenegro. It had been a long and exhausting day, and I decided I would sleep in a bit late, but I got to the office around 9.00 a.m., which I considered late, but it was strictly because, as I say, it was a Saturday. I was not expecting anything unusual to occur, and it wasn't until I got to the office that General DZ came and informed me that, as I said earlier, something is fishy in Racak.

Q. You also say on page 6: "I had an interpreter for Serbian, but he wasn't with me on that particular morning." Why wasn't the interpreter for Serbian with you in Racak if you had in fact gone to see, as you say, the effects of the Serb forces? And I assume you expected to talk to one of the functionaries of the police force in the field. Why didn't you have a Serbian interpreter with you? Didn't you intend to talk to the ⁶⁸⁷⁸ Serbs?

A. I don't remember specifically, but I know my Serb interpreter was very timid when it came to going into a situation where Albanians had been harmed. When we were negotiating the release of the Tanjug journalist, for instance, with the KLA, he remained in the car, unwilling to get out of the car because he feared for his life, I guess. So my memory is unclear as to whether or not he was invited to go that morning, but all I can say is he was not with us.

Q. You say that the villagers, the farmers, when your people were there on the 15th, didn't know what had happened. And here we established, in fact, that the police withdrew before 1600 hours. So how do you mean? What do you mean that they didn't know what had happened if the police left Racak before 1600 hours and that from 1600 hours Racak was in the hands of the KLA again? Are you aware of that fact? Do you know about it?

A. I'm not sure what you have described is a fact, for instance, that the KLA was in charge again of the village. The monitors that we had in there found a traumatised village. They found women and children who had seen their men captured and taken off unarmed by your forces. As I said earlier, our people reported that this all occurred just before the sun went down and they had to leave the village. At that point in time, our monitors were not told about what was discovered the following morning, that is the bodies up this ravine that were some distance off from the village.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. It's now 1.00, time to adjourn. ⁶⁸⁷⁹

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, please, for cross-examination could you tell me how much time I have left?

JUDGE MAY: We will consider the position. Mr. Kay, is there any cross-examination anticipated for the amicus? If so, how long, please?

MR. KAY: There will be cross-examination but no more than 20 minutes.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We will think about the position. Mr. Walker, would you be back, please, at half past two.

--- Luncheon recess taken at 1.00 p.m. ⁶⁸⁸⁰

--- On resuming at 2.30 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've considered your cross-examination and its potential length. We will give you until a quarter to 4.00. That is an hour and a quarter, which will be considerably more than the three hours which I originally laid down. We will then hear cross-examination from the amicus, re-examination. We'll break for a short period, very short, and then we'll deal with the administrative matters, one of which, Mr. Kay, is to do with your terms and conditions.

MR. KAY: That's right.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As for the rest of the questions that I put to you concerning the scene in Racak, or rather, its rigging, I'm going to read something out to you: BBC summary of world broadcasts. It relates to reports of the French who were there, Associated Press, and the rest who were there. I can present the entire report, but I'm just going to read a few things. [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... is the question. In actual fact, the police surrounded an empty village that morning, walking around the walls. There was gunfire, because they were fired at by UCK troops entrenched on the hill. The combat redoubles in the intensity in the high ground around the village. The way the Associated Press journalists, who were at the bottom of the hill, saw it, the encircled UCK guerrillas desperately tried to break out in force. Supposedly, around 20 of them succeeded in doing so. Even the police admit this. So what really happened? Did UCK gather up the corpses of ⁶⁸⁸¹ the people actually killed by Serb bullets during the night to stage a scene of cold-blooded execution? The trouble, in fact, here is that on Saturday morning, the journalists only found a very small number of spent cartridges around the ditch of the apparent massacre. Did UCK intelligently seek to turn a military defeat into a political victory?"

JUDGE MAY: Where does that come from? You say it's the Associated Press, BBC summary of world broadcasts. What day is that, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: January 23rd, 1999, Saturday.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. And who is the journalist who provided this information to Associated Press?

THE ACCUSED: They are referring to the source Le Figaro, Paris, in French, 20th of January.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, you can call them. You can call them to give evidence. I don't imagine there's much point putting it to this witness. He's given his evidence about what happened. Can you comment at all, do you think, usefully, Ambassador, on what's been read out?

THE WITNESS: No, I can't. I've already testified to what I knew and when I knew it.

JUDGE MAY: Is it just the opinion of some journalist?

THE WITNESS: I don't know who the French who were there -- or that are being referred to. I don't know of any French that were on my party when we went up to Racak.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁶⁸⁸²

Q. Well, in your mission, your deputy was a Frenchman, for example. And since you're referring to the French anyway, in your statement you say that perhaps the French government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unwilling to accuse Milosevic's government of any kind of misdeeds, including Racak. That's what you said; right?

A. Referring to my French deputy, he was not with me in my party that went to Racak the day after the massacre. I have questioned some reports that were in the French newspapers after Racak in terms of their interpretation of what had taken place.

Q. I'm not asking you about your deputy. I'm not asking whether he was in Racak. I am asking you about the assertion you made in your written statement that the French government or, rather, its ministry was not willing to accuse the Milosevic government of any wrongdoings as in Racak. That's what you wrote. Can you explain that? What does that mean?

A. It means exactly what it said. I had some problems in terms of reporting that appeared in French newspapers questioning, on the basis of whose words I know not, my version of what had happened in Racak. Whether that emanated from the French Foreign Ministry or not, I don't know. My deputy, Mr. Keller, later denied that he was the source of it and in fact said that he was in agreement with my interpretation of what happened at Racak, that it was in fact a massacre.

Q. Yes. But you claim on this same page, number 10, when referring to Keller, who you mentioned awhile ago -- I'm going to read the entire sentence to you. It's very short. "Few in the mission believed him." ⁶⁸⁸³ Why do you say that?

A. Because that's a statement of fact.

Q. So you didn't trust Keller?

A. I'm saying when the articles appeared in the French newspapers saying that someone in the mission did not agree with Walker's interpretation, many people in the mission, or at least those who came and talked to me, ascribed the quotes to Ambassador Keller. A few days later, Ambassador Keller denied categorically that he was the source of those quotes in the French press. Many of those people who came to see me in the aftermath of that, commenting on the French press accounts and Mr. Keller's denial, told me that they did not believe him in his denial that he was the source of the quotes.

Q. You say that on that day when you were in Racak, that is to say on the 16th, you just have faint memories. That's what you said, that you talked to two or three men who wore KLA uniforms. And towards the end of the paragraph, you say - I don't want to waste time - "I do not recall that I ever saw any one of them again later."

Is that right? Is that what you assert?

A. I stand by my statement in my deposition, yes.

Q. However, Buja Shukri, a witness who was a commander of that area, he testified here a few days ago, he said that he did see you that day. He said that a meeting was scheduled with you through Mujota, their representative, who was in Racak on the same day and that the next day, in the village of Petrovo with Buja Shukri, near Racak, you had a meeting at 12.00 and that that meeting was held at 12.00. Is that right or is that ⁶⁸⁸⁴ not right?

A. If you're asking me if it was at 12.00, I have no recollection. Did I have a meeting with this gentleman? Yes, I did.

Q. So you did meet that gentleman the next day. It doesn't matter whether it's at 12.00 or not. I just gave you the exact time so that I would refresh your memory.

You met him the next day. You had a meeting with him the next day, isn't that right, in Petrovo?

A. I'm not sure it was the next day. I thought it was the same day. But I did have a meeting with him, yes.

Q. All right. But then this what you said, that you do not remember ever having seen any one of these people again, that cannot be true because you did go to another meeting.

A. I'm confused. Let me tell you what my memory is of the events. I went to Racak. I saw what I saw. Sometime in the village or on the way to my cars, someone came up and said that there was someone from the KLA - I think he was described as a regional area commander - would be willing to see me. We went to a nearby village, as you say. What the name of it is I'm not familiar with it, but we went elsewhere. It is not in Racak. He explained to me how -- how emotional he and his men were over what had happened in Racak and that he promised me that he was going to take retribution for it. I told him that that would be very unwise, that again this would only lead to tit-for-tat retaliation by your forces and that it would be much better if he could try to calm his people down and not do what he was threatening to do. When I say I never saw him again ⁶⁸⁸⁵ or, as far as I know, any of the people who were with him, that's exactly true. To my knowledge, I never met that man again. I had one conversation with him.

Q. You mentioned in your statement that one of the indicators of them not being members of the KLA was the fact that they were some elderly men. Buja Shukri, that same commander of theirs that you met, admitted here that two men, and he said what their names and surnames were, were aged 60 and 62 respectively, and they were KLA fighters, KLA members.

JUDGE MAY: The witness can't comment --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Does that mean anything to you?

JUDGE MAY: The witness can't comment on what other people said here. He's made his point. It doesn't seem to me that your question is going to add anything to it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, whether he's going to add something to it or not is a matter of assessment, but you know this full well.

JUDGE MAY: I know what full well? Yes. Let's rephrase the question.

Is it possible that the members of the KLA could have been over 60? Perhaps, Ambassador, you could tell us.

THE WITNESS: Among the KLA soldiers, fighting men that I saw during my time in Kosovo, there were some who appeared elderly. Whether they were over 60, I know not. But the vast majority were youngish men, I would say in their 20s, some in their 30s. Were there individual members ⁶⁸⁸⁶ who were over 60? Certainly it's possible, but my distinct impression was that most of them were well below that. These were fighting men under -- who were out under very harsh conditions. I don't think a life for the elderly.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Let's go on in order to be as expeditious as possible. You objected to Danica Marinkovic, Judge Danica Marinkovic. You say here on page 11 -- you call her a prosecutor here, but never mind. Investigating judge, prosecutor; it's similar. She insisted on going with the Finnish team to Albanian villages that were under KLA control. Marinkovic insisted that the team go with a strong escort of the MUP and the army.

Tell me, why would the investigating judge not go? Isn't it her duty to go? That is her risk. She is obviously a brave woman when she asked to go there where the KLA were. It's her job. That should be a reason for giving her recognition. And why, in your opinion, is that a reason to criticise Mrs. Marinkovic?

A. I am aware of two instances in which I was told of the judge's efforts to get to a site where something bad had happened. The first time the Finnish forensic team came to Kosovo while I was there, Dr. Helena Ranko [sic] - was that her name? - the head of the mission, was there to exhume some gravesites. I went out to see the team that was about to dig up a burial site. This was well before the Racak incident. Dr. Ranta and her team told me they were going to actually do the exhumation the following day. This was out in the middle of nowhere in ⁶⁸⁸⁷ very heavy snowy conditions, very cold. She told me they were going to do the exhumation the following day.

The next day, she came to the office and told me that she had cancelled the exhumation. Why? Because the judge had insisted on going in to that village with a very full security force behind her, and Dr. Ranta judged that this would put her people in danger, and, therefore, she cancelled the exhumation.

The second time I heard the judge's name was in the aftermath of Racak when she wanted to go into Racak with full force behind her, VJ, MUP. We had verifiers, I believe including General Maisonneuve, in the village. General DZ went up to where the judge was when she was standing off, about to go in with her full force. General DZ came and told me that he tried to talk her out of it, not out of going into the village but out of going in with such a full military and security force. He told her that for her to do so would probably only provoke something from the KLA, which was still in the vicinity.

General DZ told me that his request to her was denied. He told her that he would take her personally into the village, with a small unit of police or VJ. She turned that down as well. He finally, in his story to me, told the judge that if she was determined to go forward with a full military and police force, he asked that she give him at least time to get our people out of the village, because they would be in serious harm's way.

He thought he had her agreement to that. When he went off to communicate with our people in the village, she immediately started ⁶⁸⁸⁸ advancing --

Q. Mr. Walker, we've heard that story. My question was: Isn't it the job of an investigating judge to go? You've explained that. Towards the end of page 11, you say again that she insisted, saying that she had that kind of authority. Doesn't an investigating judge have that kind of authority? Isn't that the job of an investigating judge? You say that she rejected DZ's offer --

JUDGE MAY: The witness, when he was interrupted, was giving his account of what had occurred. Now, he can only repeat that account in response to what the investigating judge should or should not do. It is not going to be of assistance to us to hear more argument about these matters.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You presented here the statement of the president of the Republic of Serbia, President Milutinovic, and you say that he accused you of being against the Serbian people, or rather, that you want to destroy the Serb people. I cannot recall the exact wording, but I think that his statement was a good one. Isn't it accurate, Mr. Walker? Isn't his statement accurate?

A. It is very inaccurate. As you well know, in my experience in Croatia, I was there protecting Serb people, trying to get them the protection they would need when that became formally a part of Croatia. At that point you thought I was a protector of the Serb people. I have absolutely nothing against the Serb people. ⁶⁸⁸⁹

Q. Judging by what you did, that is not the conclusion that can be drawn. But please, let us see the next video clip. It is TV footage, and I think that it refutes your claims concerning Racak considerably, that the police attacked and killed, in cold blood, unprotected civilians.

[Videotape played]

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So they saw the police coming up, and even Thaci is refuting what you said. He said that there was heavy fighting and that they had sustained heavy losses and that the Serbs sustained losses. He explains it there.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, this is a waste of time. The witness has given his account of what he saw and heard. If you want to get this evidence in front of us, you can call the witnesses, but it's a waste of time to go on putting this kind of thing. These are the opinions of people who appear on television.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What was that you said about the people who appear on television?

JUDGE MAY: Move on to the next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My question was whether what Hashim Thaci says and what the KLA fighter from Racak says - and Hill used to meet with Thaci as well - doesn't all of this refute what you have been saying, Mr. Walker? Yes or no.

JUDGE MAY: You are wasting time. You are arguing with the witness, which you've been told not to do. It's just a waste of time. ⁶⁸⁹⁰ Now, move on to something else.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I put a question, Mr. May: Does this refute what he has been saying? That's no quarrel or argument.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. You say that you do not recall when you looked at the ditch -- it's not that you don't remember; you claim that there were no members of the KLA there. Right? When you examined these bodies, you were there with your verifiers, and you claim that there were no KLA there; right?

A. My claim is that I did not see anyone who I recognised as a member of the KLA while on the hill.

Q. All right. Thank you very much for this statement.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have the next video clip played.

[Videotape played] "UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: At the time Walker arrived, the KLA had retaken control of Racak."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And the next one, please. One more.

[Videotape played]

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As you can see, there is a red circle around KLA insignia. You'll see that now. Here's one more encircled. Here's a third one. As you are touring this site. Here's a fourth one, up there, on the left-hand side. Now I'm putting a direct question to you. Let us go back to this ⁶⁸⁹¹ direct question. The OSCE followed the events in Racak on the 15th of January; is that right or is that not right?

A. They followed them, as I have tried to describe in previous answers, yes.

Q. At that time, you had the report of your associate and you also had an opportunity to talk to your associates who had had discussions with the local people. So on the 15th of January, nobody had told you that there was a large number of persons who had been killed; is that right or is that not right?

A. The only report I had on the 15th was what I described being communicated to me by General DZ, his report from Loncar that 15 guerrillas had been killed in a clash with your troops.

Q. Yes, but you presented the information of the Verification Mission not in relation to General Loncar. I have already presented this. I am not going to present it again. It is dated the 16th, the day when you had your press conference. This is a document that was disclosed by the Prosecutor, "The Role of the Regional Centre," 03035952, B/C/S version, last paragraph, and then there's a part called "Assessment." In the English version it is K0075771. It says: A number of KLA members were killed, (eight), in parentheses, and some were wounded. This document was submitted earlier on. This is a document of your Verification Mission. On the 16th, when you spoke about the killing of innocent civilians in Racak, you already knew that a number of KLA members had been killed in Racak; is that right or is that not right?

A. I'm not sure what sort of a document you're referring to here. ^{6892 BLANK PAGE 6893} Did I know that some KLA members had probably been killed in the vicinity of Racak? I probably did. My reference to the people that I saw on the hill was that to me they appeared to be -- the evidence appeared to mean that these were civilians, and there were no signs of what had been described by Loncar as a military battle. As I say, I don't know what all these numbers in this document is and whether or not it was something sent in by my people or not. My people did know that there had been skirmishes in the Stimlje area in the days preceding Racak, but this, in my opinion, did not excuse the killing of over 40 civilians in Racak on the 15th.

Q. Well, the point is, Mr. Walker: As far as you can remember - and I hope that you remember well - on the 16th of January, when this report already existed, this official report of the mission that you headed, you said that innocent civilians were killed in Racak, only innocent civilians. You did not mention at any point that this was a KLA stronghold and that there was fighting going on there and that members of the KLA were killed. Is that right or is that not right?

A. Did I know there were KLA in the vicinity of Racak? Yes. Did I know there had been skirmishes with some elements of the KLA in the vicinity of Stimlje? Yes. Did I believe that that was what I had seen on the hill near Racak on the day of the 16th? No. I thought I was looking at, and I still believe to this day I was looking at, the bodies of over 40, perhaps 45, villagers who had been taken away, unarmed, and turned up dead the following morning.

Q. Mr. Walker, my direct question to you was: Why didn't you, if you held that press conference, why didn't you mention -- or rather, why did ⁶⁸⁹⁴ you keep quiet about the fact that a number of the KLA had been killed, if you believe that the other people were civilians and that there was fighting in Racak?

A. I used the press conference to describe what I personally saw when I went to Racak. I did not put before that things I had heard in previous days. As I said, the only time -- the first time I heard about the village of Racak was maybe 14 hours before the night of the 15th, when I had that preliminary report from General DZ.

Q. Mr. Walker, you were Head of Mission, as you yourself said, that numbered 1.400 people. Therefore, it is to be assumed that you talk about what the mission knows and not only about what you personally saw. Because if it were what you personally saw, then you wouldn't need all these people, these 1.400 people, working for you. Isn't that so?

A. That's absurd.

Q. Do you deny the fact that you knew, when you made the statement, that a number of members of the KLA were killed in Racak?

A. I did not know that. As I'm saying, I heard there were skirmishes in and around Stimlje in the preceding days. I knew that three or four days before, I think three policemen had been killed in that vicinity. I did not connect that in my mind with what I had seen in Racak on the morning of January 16th.

Q. All right. There's no point on insisting on that, because your mission provided this report the same day that you gave your press conference.

Now tell me this, please: As you are an experienced man and react ⁶⁸⁹⁵ in several places, in El Salvador, you explained that the fact that they were in uniform did not mean that they were members of the army, although a uniform does denote the army. Now, here civilian clothing in Racak was the criterion you used to say that they were civilians, although it is common knowledge that terrorists wear civilian clothing and that they need not be wearing uniforms. How, then, is it possible that one and the same man is using different criteria?

JUDGE MAY: This is an absurd question, absolutely absurd. Now, you're wasting everybody's time with this. Have you got any other questions? In particular, Mr. Milosevic, may I remind you that you made a number of allegations to other witnesses that this incident was to be used as a pretext for what happened thereafter and that Ambassador Walker was involved in that. So if you're going to put it to him, make sure you do before your time is up so he has a chance to answer it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In your statement, you say that you do not remember having talked to Clark, Holbrooke, Albright, or the OSCE prior to the press conference in Racak. You say, "I cannot exclude the fact that my memory is lacking on that score."

Let me remind you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see some footage? Can we have the video played, please?

[Videotape played] "MR. HOLBROOKE: Walker, the head of the Kosovo Verification Mission, called me on a cell phone from Racak. ⁶⁸⁹⁶ "INTERVIEWER: So you don't remember calling Washington at all? "GENERAL CLARK: I got a call from Bill Walker. He said, 'There's a massacre. I'm standing here. I can see the bodies.' "INTERVIEWER: And you didn't speak to General Clark or anybody like that?"

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you need to comment this at all? I leave it to you to decide.

A. I stick by my statement. When I had that interview with BBC, I had no recollection whatsoever of having talked to either of those two gentlemen. As I said yesterday, there were tremendous -- there was tremendous commotion and activity going on in the immediate aftermath of my visit to Racak and before I made the press conference. Did I talk to those people? Are they telling the truth when they say they talked to me? I have no reason to doubt it. I believe they are both very honourable and truthful people. So I just have to plead a faulty memory when I was talking to BBC. But I'm quite positive I didn't talk to Madeleine Albright, but I have no doubt that people on my staff were calling the various capitals of the OSCE member states to tell them what had been seen on Racak that day. Whether I made some of the calls or whether other people on my staff did, at this point in time, I have absolutely no recollection.

Q. All right, Mr. Walker. You do not know that. You did not know about the report of the 16th by your mission and about many other things you say that you cannot --

JUDGE MAY: No. This is all comment, Mr. Milosevic. What is your ⁶⁸⁹⁷ question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My question is: How then do you know and claim that I had to have been informed about each and every detail which took place in Kosovo? How can you say that, then? How can you claim that? How do you know what I did when you don't know what you did yourself?

A. I'm not sure I ever stated what I thought you knew or didn't know or said or didn't say in the aftermath of Racak. All I know is that from everything that was presented to me in my meetings with you, in my meetings with your subordinate, you were the Supreme Commander of the former Yugoslavia as a nation, that this -- these people in your chain of command reported up to you. They asked your permission to do things. So I assumed you tried to become as aware of what happened in Racak as you possibly could. I think that's all I've ever stated.

Q. Well, all right. Can you assume that any Supreme Commander -- let's forget about Supreme Commanders at all.

Can you assume that a corps commander, for example, holding a territory the size of Kosovo and Metohija must necessarily know about each and every detail going on in his village, in his area? Or even a brigade commander, to go even lower down the line, let alone the Supreme Command? So how do you draw these conclusions then and make your assumptions?

A. As I believe I stated in my first deposition, I do not believe any army commander, subcommander, soldier in the Yugoslav army or any member of the special police of the Ministry of the Interior would have done anything that they thought was in contradiction to your policies and your ⁶⁸⁹⁸ orders. I believe from everything I saw when I was in Kosovo that that was the culture of your military and police. I'm going on the assumption that a military operation such as took place in Racak would not have been ordered by a local commander or a regional commander or an army commander without knowing full well that you were in agreement with that operation.

Q. Now, as you were in Kosovo throughout that time, do you know that there was a strict order that the operations could be against the KLA only and that protection for all the civilian population, regardless of ethnicity, was to be respected? Was that something that you were made aware of? Was it the subject of what you were informed about?

A. I was probably informed about that, but if that was an order, it was consistently disobeyed by some of your subordinates.

Q. The Prosecution has presented here the original report which came about from the police on the events in Racak. It was sent -- I don't remember any more, but the Prosecution has that document, whether it was on the 15th in the evening or the 16th in the morning, but it is a collective report for that region, and it says there that there was a clash between the police and the terrorist band of Shiptar terrorists in Racak and that a large number of them were liquidated and that there were no civilian fatalities, casualities. That is the original report written on the same day. Do you consider that the commander in charge was lying to his superior command to whom he was sending this report? And it is the Prosecution which presented that report here.

A. I'm sorry, I'm confused.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Put the question again so it's clear to the ⁶⁸⁹⁹ witness.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I also think that the accused might rephrase his question. The document wasn't advanced by the Prosecution as a document of truth, and he knows that --

JUDGE KWON: I think it's Exhibit 177 or something like that. It's a MUP referred --

MR. NICE: It was adduced entirely to show its falsity, not its accuracy.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Did you see the -- Ambassador, did you see the report of the Ministry of the Interior Police on Racak at any stage?

THE WITNESS: I don't recall if I did or not, sir.

JUDGE MAY: No. There's no point asking the witness about it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, you claim that the Yugoslav side - and when you say that you mean me personally - that we didn't respect the agreement that Holbrooke and I drew up with respect to the reduction of the police and army in Kosovo. Is that so or not?

A. What I brought to you on the November meeting was a charge that your forces were in many ways in non-compliance with your agreement with Milosevic [sic], later written down in your agreement with the OSCE, yes.

Q. I don't understand that, because you see here we have a report by the BBC where -- and it relates to the time that you're talking about, and they quote General Klaus Naumann, who says, and I'm quoting: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... what he was asked -- what we had ⁶⁹⁰⁰ asked him to do. He withdrew within 48 hours some 6.000 police officers from Kosovo and the military back into the barracks. This was also confirmed," and so on.

[Interpretation] Therefore, he was abreast of these negotiations together with Clark. He confirmed that in keeping with the agreement, we did reduce our forces to the number that was required, that the army was withdrawn to the barracks except for the three companies that you know how they were deployed, and that we did comply with the agreement. Is that true or is it not?

A. It is not true. As I testified yesterday and as the letter I sent to you that was displayed yesterday, in accord with that, we were constantly asking you and your commanders for baseline information as to how many police, how many military, how many weapons, how many tanks, how many artillery pieces you had in Kosovo at the time of the agreement so we could determine whether the numbers were going up or down or sideways. When I'm talking about non-compliance with the agreement, I could mention things such as you were supposed to notify the KVM verifiers when your tanks, for instance, left cantonment. We often came across tanks on the streets going in different directions to different places, which you had not notified us about. Artillery pieces, that sort of thing. We came to the conclusion, and this was mostly General DZ and his people that were working under him in relation to your military, that there were flagrant violations of the agreements. As I say, maybe you did withdraw 6.000, but we were never able to confirm that because we had no baseline information from which to determine whether the numbers were ⁶⁹⁰¹ going up or down, although we repeatedly, repeatedly asked for those baseline figures.

Q. Mr. Walker, even the birds in the trees know that there was a total of 10.024 policemen which was made note of when those 6.000 withdrew. The normal state of affairs and the normal law and order enforcements, which meant that they could have been two to two and a half thousand on duty in Kosovo, because you know they were in five shifts, and all of them who are in Kosovo cannot work round the clock 24 hours. You knew about this figure, and this figure was sent in to you just like the figure on the Kosovo, rather, the Pristina Corps and its regular units and formations which did exercises and training and nothing else except for those three companies that worked those three points. Is that correct or not?

A. That is not correct.

Q. All right. I don't want to waste any more of my time on that because we've cleared that up with Drewienkiewicz. We went into it in considerable detail. Otherwise, when he was heard on the 11th of April this year, he said that a part of KDOM had remained independent and that it was not the US KDOM who stayed in Kosovo throughout -- the US KDOM who did stay in Kosovo throughout. Is that correct?

A. I'm confused.

THE INTERPRETER: The US KDOM stayed in Kosovo throughout.

JUDGE MAY: Did you hear that final translation, Ambassador?

THE WITNESS: Yes. When the KVM was set up, the original proposal was that over time, as quickly as possible, KVM would absorb the KDOMs. ⁶⁹⁰² There were KDOMs from the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, the EC. That's the ones I can remember. We started to absorb them as soon as we were set up.

The American, the US KDOM was by far the largest, having well over a hundred people when we first got there. We absorbed a certain number of them. We absorbed a certain amount of their equipment, but it was a process that required moving personnel around, et cetera, from one to another institution. It took time. And by the time we left Kosovo, there were still a small number of US KDOM who remained as US KDOM. I believe we had absorbed all the rest with the possible exception of the EC, where they said they would prefer to stay separate from my mission.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And what about the fact that part of the KDOM remained outside the KVM? Was [microphone not activated] informed about that?

A. I'm sorry, I missed a part of the question.

Q. The fact that a part of KDOM stayed outside the KVM, was that something that Vollebaek was informed of? Your official head, chief, boss.

A. I believe that the OSCE was aware that we had not absorbed all of the US KDOM by the time we'd departed, yes. Whether Knut Vollebaek was himself personally aware of this, I don't know, but certainly the OSCE knew that we had not absorbed all of the KDOM.

Q. All right. What you have just said implies that you didn't inform him about it. Isn't that so? Yes or no.

A. I have no recollection of informing Knut Vollebaek, the Chairman ⁶⁹⁰³ in Office of the OSCE, about either the presence or absence of the KDOMs.

Q. All right. And this American KDOM, was it directly linked with NATO command or not? Just say yes or no.

A. I have no idea.

Q. And did the KVM, from the time you arrived in Kosovo, undertake any action for training the KLA?

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry. Verifying KLA training sites. Interpreter's correction.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, what? The question is undertake any action to verify KLA training sites? Not to my knowledge.

JUDGE MAY: No, no.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE MAY: No. Did you undertake any action for training the KLA, it appears to say. Now, that was corrected.

THE WITNESS: It was corrected, I believe.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. To verify the places for the training of the KLA.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, we have it.

THE WITNESS: As I've said, I know of no verification of KLA training sites conducted by members of the KVM mission.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Drewienkiewicz answered to that same question, that it was right, correct. But we can look into that later on.

Now, did you make up any kind of report as to the sites for training? If not all of them, did you make up any kind of report at all ⁶⁹⁰⁴ on this, on training sites?

A. I'm sorry, but, you know, I do not have total knowledge of everything that was reported from the KVM mission to Vienna. This was a constant flow of information from our Fusion Centre which is where the information came in. Whether or not something was mentioned about KLA training sites or not, I don't know. I'm solely saying that nothing was brought to my attention that would indicate we were trying to verify or had verified or had reported on KLA training sites.

Q. And is it true that it was only you, you alone, you personally in the whole mission who was authorised to decide as to what was a violation of the agreement and what was not a violation of the agreement?

A. No, that is not true. I mean, you know, the agreements had been reached by other persons, and when we heard of something or saw something or reported on something, if someone in Vienna told us this looked like a violation, you know, we would look into it. I certainly, you know, did not unilaterally or with my immediate staff determine, you know, what we thought was non-compliance. It was a process of gathering information, vetting that information.

Q. All right. That's the answer I wanted to hear. Now, is it true that in your mission experts were engaged of the MPRI company, the MPRI company. M-P-R-I.

A. The MPRI I know is a company that worked in Zagreb when I was in Eastern Slavonia. In -- in Kosovo, I don't remember coming across MPRI, but this is not to say that they weren't there. That is a private company, US company. ⁶⁹⁰⁵

Q. All right. And when did you receive members of the families of the abducted Serbs for the first time?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, may I refer to my chronology?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: I -- the second meeting was on December the 26th. So the first meeting was several weeks before that. I'm not sure I have it here. I met with the families of the disappeared -- the families of the disappeared Serbs twice, and the second one was in December. I'm not sure of the date of the first.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And did the family members give you the names of the 111 abducted persons?

A. I think some of our people received -- what my plea was at both these meetings was that they give us as much information as they had about who had disappeared and the circumstances under which they had disappeared and anything you might know about where they were. The families thought we had total knowledge of everything going on and that we certainly knew where they were. The truth of the matter was we didn't. Those were both very, very difficult, very emotional, very heated meetings in which essentially we were unable to satisfy the demands of these people because we had no idea where their relatives or disappeared relatives were.

Q. And is it true that it was precisely the members of the families that they -- who told you that it was Dragobilje and Malisevo where all traces of these people were lost, where you had your representatives and the US KDOM had their representatives, both in Dragobilje and Malisevo? ⁶⁹⁰⁶ Did they tell you that? Did they inform you of that?

A. No, that's not what they told me at all. Some people got up and said, "We think we know where our father is, where our brother is, where our children are." That village might have been mentioned along with other places where they seemed to think their people were being held or where they had disappeared.

It was -- it was very difficult. As I say, these were people who were terribly emotional. Some of them made very little sense. Some of them were making demands that obviously my verifiers could not meet. Many of these disappearances had happened years before. So what I said was, "If you have any information about where your people might be, you let us know, and I will go with you to anyplace you designate to look for your relatives." My offer was never taken up.

Q. Please just answer me this: Is it correct that they informed you about their suspicions that all the abducted persons were in Dragobilje?

A. No. That is not correct.

Q. And is it correct -- or rather, do you remember the event where the members of the families of the abducted Serbs launched a peace march towards Dragobilje? Do you remember that particular event?

A. No, I do not.

Q. And how many times were you in Dragobilje?

A. The first time I went to Dragobilje was the first time I met with KLA soldiers, and as I said yesterday, I went there in accordance to your instruction to me to try and get the release of these two Tanjug journalists. That was the first time I went there. The meeting had been ⁶⁹⁰⁷ arranged by Shaun Byrnes of the KDOM, the American KDOM. I went there maybe two more times, three more times. Again, this was a place where the KLA apparently was in control and we could meet them to discuss such things as the release of people they had captured.

Q. All right. So therefore you were informed that it was in Dragobilje, where the KLA had their camps, where they kept these Serbs, and it was from that camp that you managed to have these two journalists released; isn't that so?

A. No, that is not correct. The day that we arranged for the release, I went to Dragobilje with some of my people, and the two Tanjug journalists who had been held captive were brought into the town by two vehicles from somewhere outside the town. I have absolutely no idea if there were others held in Dragobilje, and as I've already testified, the families did not tell me that this was an area in which prisoners were kept.

Q. All right. And when visiting Dragobilje with Sadako Ogata in December 1998, did you try to ascertain then whether the allegations made by the members of the abducted Serb families, did you manage to see whether that was the truth or not?

A. I'm sorry. When I went to Dragobilje with who?

Q. Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

A. No, I do not recall any conversation whatsoever about disappeared Serbs during that visit by Madam Ogata. We went first to Malisevo with Madam Ogata, and then she somehow indicated that she would like to go on to Dragobilje. So we took her there and we did a sort of a walk-through ^{6908 BLANK PAGE 6909} of the town. We talked to some of the people there. As I recall, we were not in contact with KLA types. It was mostly with the people of the village, their families, et cetera. But we did not discuss whether or not there were KLA prisoners in the area.

Q. All right. Please, just give me yes or no answers, because I have very little time left.

And do you know, with regard to all the crimes committed in Dragobilje and Glodjane, there are records from the actual crime scenes, police records as well? Yes or no.

A. I'm sorry. The question -- let me read the question.

Q. Do you know that with regard to all the crimes that were committed in Dragobilje and Glodjane, there are records from the actual crime scenes and also police records and court records?

A. No.

Q. And do you know anything about these crimes being committed by Ramush Haradinaj, Rasim Haradinaj, Daut Haradinaj, Kuci Haremi [phoen], and Dodek Erik, that they are the perpetrators of these crimes? Do you know anything about that? Just yes or no.

A. No.

Q. And do you know that all these civilians were tortured and then killed and thrown into a canal that feeds into the Radonjic [phoen] Lake?

A. No.

Q. And is it correct that the killing of the vice-president of the Municipal Assembly of Kosovo Polje, Zvonko Bojanic, is something that you characterised as a terrorist act? ⁶⁹¹⁰

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you ask the Albanian leaders to find the perpetrators of this terrorist act?

A. I asked them if they knew anything about it, if they took responsibility for it.

Q. Let me just skip a few questions. I have several questions here, but I'm going to put a compounded question to you. Do you know anything about the crimes committed by the KLA, while you were head of the mission, against the Albanians themselves, about their crimes against the Albanians themselves?

A. I know that there were crimes, there were things that happened to Albanians which were never solved, and there were people who thought they had been committed by other Albanians. I did hear those stories, yes.

Q. But you do not have any reliable information about this, if I understand you well.

A. I could mention one thing that goes back to the release of the two Tanjug journalists. At the time I was in the village of Dragobilje, waiting for the two prisoners to be brought forward. When these two cars came into the village with the two journalists, we noticed in the back seat there were two gentlemen who apparently were, if I remember correctly, blindfolded, and I asked the KLA leader there - I think his name was Bashota - who were the other two prisoners. He told me they were two Albanians who the KLA thought were informers, and they remained their prisoners. He told me also that they were not involved with the journalists and they were going to release them, but they were going to ⁶⁹¹¹ drive them back to their villages. I took that to be Albanians-on-Albanians sort of activity.

So yes, I have -- as I say, I heard a number of stories, a number of rumours, a number of interpretations that some of the events that brought harm to Albanians was in fact committed by other Albanians.

Q. And do you know that when Hizri Tala and Afrim Maliqi were killed, Ilir Dyrmishi was also killed, and Tefta Isaj was also wounded, but I hope he survived. Do you know of that case?

A. No.

Q. All right. I'm not going to ask you about individual cases. Could you please respond to the following question: Did you ever ask me for assistance in destroying terrorist bases of the KLA?

A. No.

Q. Did you know about these bases, since you visited some of them?

A. Did I know that the KLA had places where they had concentrations of their people? Yes, I did. If those were bases, I guess I know about KLA bases.

Q. And do you know that members of Al Qaeda were among the ranks of the KLA?

A. I believe that is not true.

Q. And did you see the congress report of the FBI, which confirms that Al Qaeda had its presence in Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia, et cetera?

A. I am not aware that the FBI has so declared.

Q. All right. And do you know that, for example, Al Qaeda within the KLA, that this fact was presented in the report of the American -- ⁶⁹¹²

JUDGE MAY: He says he's not aware -- the witness has given his answer about these matters, as far as he knows. It's as far as he knows. Now, Mr. Milosevic, there is a bigger question: You put to other witnesses that this incident at Racak was used as a pretext for NATO intervention. Now, if that is your suggestion, you want to make that suggestion, you must make it to this witness so that he can deal with it, because he was the one who raised Racak as an incident. Now, is it your case that this was used as a pretext for NATO intervention or not? If it is, you must put it to the witness so he can deal with it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course that is what I assert, and I assume that that can be derived from all my questions, that Racak was used and that it was rigged and that it was used as a trigger to start NATO aggression against Yugoslavia.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is that right, Mr. Walker?

A. That is not my interpretation of what happened, no.

JUDGE MAY: Were you involved in any such conspiracy or plan?

THE WITNESS: No, sir, I was not.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Walker, you claim in your statement that -- towards the end, you said to the members of the mission that they carried out their task very well. Did you mean by that that you carried out your task, that you rigged this and created a pretext for a NATO attack against Yugoslavia?

A. I think that my verifiers, on the whole, performed the tasks that were assigned to them very well. That's what I told them. I would like ⁶⁹¹³ to think that I performed the tasks that were assigned to me - which were the same tasks - very well, which was the verification of the agreements. I categorically deny that either I or anyone on my mission, that I know of, was involved in any conspiracy to bring NATO into the game.

JUDGE MAY: What is being suggested goes further than that, that this whole incident, this execution of 40-odd civilians, was in some way manipulated and rigged, is the interpretation we have from the accused, as a pretext for NATO to intervene, which means, if it were true, that you would have to be one of the organisers of such a plot. Is there any truth in the suggestion that this incident was rigged in some way or manipulated?

THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And what does Madeleine Albright's statement have to do with that, then? I had it here, and I interpreted it already, that it was necessary to keep up the tension in relation to Racak in order to mobilise the European allies. I quoted it. I gave an exact quote. But I assume that you know which statement of hers I'm referring to.

A. I believe I do, and I believe she was, in the aftermath of Racak, seeing the despicable things that your security forces had done to the civilian population. She felt that Racak was an example of what was occurring in Kosovo and that something had to be done to stop that sort of activity.

Q. All right, Mr. Walker. In addition to all the evidence that was put forth, and TV footage, and testimonies by journalists, and proof that ⁶⁹¹⁴ I presented to you here, don't you allow for the possibility that this scene in Racak had been rigged and staged? And you claim that you did not take any part in that.

A. I categorically deny that I saw anything indicative of a rigging, and therefore I did not take part in any rigging. I think that, in light of what I saw that day and what every other person that was on the hill with me, that spoke to me about it, everyone came to the same conclusion: that this was not a set-up, that this was the site of a real execution of over 40 civilians.

Q. And do you accept the fact, at least, that at 4.00 in the afternoon on the 15th, when the police left, and when Buja Shukri also said that they re-took Racak, this commander of theirs, and then until the morning of the next day, all that time the territory of Racak was under the control of the KLA? Is that an undeniable fact?

JUDGE MAY: It's not for the witness to say that. It's part of the evidence and we will have to assess it. All the witness can say is what he saw and did and the opinions which he formed at the time. He's now told us about that. Your time is now finished. Mr. Kay.

Questioned by Mr. Kay:

Q. Ambassador Walker, you've given evidence about your contacts with the Yugoslav government. I want to ask you about your contacts with the KLA and look at that aspect of your dealings with the OSCE. First of all, you personally, did you have dealings with the High Command of the KLA?

A. I had dealings with a number of people who I assume were ⁶⁹¹⁵ high-level officials of the KLA, yes.

Q. And by that you mean they appear to have power and control over their organisation?

A. I've mentioned the first time I met them. It was in the context of trying to free the two journalists. The person I talked to was Sokol Bashota. I have no idea exactly what level he was. He was not a decision maker. It took him some time to be able to determine that he could release those two journalists. They communicated, I think, by radio or by cellular phones or something. He had to get authority from higher up. He was the person I saw maybe on three or four occasions. I also met in the Podujevo area, just before Christmas, Commander Rremi, I believe was his name, trying to get him to stand down, as we tried to get the VJ to stand down, and not to go into battle with each other.

I also met a Commander Drini, who I believe was in the Peje region, if I remember correctly.

Again, these were local commanders. Where they sat in the hierarchy of the KLA, neither I know, nor, I think, did anyone know at the time.

Q. We saw a video clip, and we saw Hashim Thaci, for instance, within that video clip, and he's probably the best known of the KLA High Command. Have you met him, or did you meet him, first of all, pre the conflict?

A. I only met Mr. Thaci in November of 1999, when I went back to Kosovo. That was well after the NATO bombing had stopped. I did not meet ⁶⁹¹⁶ him during my time as head of the KVM.

Q. And for clarification, what event did you meet him at in November 1999?

A. I was invited back to Kosovo to be declared an honorary citizen.

Q. We've dealt with your dealings with the so-called High Command of the KLA, if I use that as an expression. Other senior members within the OSCE, what were their contacts with the KLA at a high level?

A. I think some of my military lieutenant-colonel-level types had dealings with some of the regional commanders in the Podujevo area. I believe the colonel whose name I can never pronounce, who has been a witness here, had some dealings with that commander.

JUDGE MAY: Ciaglinski.

THE WITNESS: That's the name. Sorry.

JUDGE MAY: Spelled very differently.

THE WITNESS: Sorry. I know General Maisonneuve, my Canadian commander or chief of the Regional Centre in Prizren, had meetings with the regional military commanders. There was a quite constant communication to try and calm things down when things were coming apart.

MR. KAY:

Q. For clarification: Dealings in this way by the OSCE with the KLA, what was the basis of your authority for dealing with that particular group?

A. As I mentioned several times, the first time I went to deal with them was in response to a request from the accused that I try and win the release of two journalists. The same was necessary -- those sort of ⁶⁹¹⁷ contacts were necessary when we were trying to stop the two sides from engaging in battle. We had to talk with the leadership, obviously, or as close to the leadership as we could get, in terms of trying to win the release of the eight VJ soldiers that had been captured. We felt -- and, you know, no one -- we reported all of our contacts to Vienna, and no one ever came back and said, "It is inappropriate that you deal with the leadership of the KLA." After all, we were trying to tell both sides when we thought they were in non-compliance or when we were trying to arrange a deal, such as the release of prisoners.

Q. You are obviously aware of the issue concerning the Yugoslav authorities and the KLA, who they viewed as being a terrorist organisation. That goes without saying, doesn't it?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. In relation to your dealings, then, with the KLA, did that compromise you in any particular way concerning information that you knew about an organisation that was viewed by the legal authorities as being a terrorist organisation?

A. I'm not sure what you mean by "compromise me in any way."

Q. Well, the information that you had about this particular group, the KLA, was that something that you had any duty to pass on to the Yugoslav authorities, or what?

A. I did not pass on information about the KLA to the Yugoslav authorities, nor did I pass on information about the Yugoslav security forces to the KLA.

Q. Within the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission agreement, which is ⁶⁹¹⁸ 21st of April, 1999, behind tab 2 of Exhibit 1994 [sic], the KLA isn't mentioned in the document that was your mandate, and was there any particular reason for that?

A. I believe the reason is that there was no formally arranged or secured agreement with the KLA, but there had been, I assume, verbal assurances by the KLA that they would abide by a cease-fire as long as the government abided by the cease-fire. So we felt we were there to enforce and tell about non-compliance with an agreement for a cease-fire.

Q. Taking a step back now and going back to that issue where I said: Did you think that you were compromised in any way because you would have known information about the KLA, which you say you weren't passing on to the Yugoslav authorities, would it be right to say that because of that, the Yugoslavs were suspicious of the OSCE and your mission, being aware that you had dealings with both parties?

A. I believe both sides, certainly at the beginning, had suspicions about the KVM. To me it was obvious that if we passed on information about the KLA to the government, that would have most certainly have ended our ability to go and talk to them to try and get prisoners released or try and get other things -- to get them to do other things. So it really never occurred to me to carry tales from one side to the other.

Q. You've described what would be a poor working relationship between you and the Yugoslav authorities on occasions, and I don't take it that you mean that the whole of your working relationships were blighted by uncooperation. I'd be right in making that comment, wouldn't I?

A. Yes, that's correct. ⁶⁹¹⁹

Q. But on the occasions that there were difficulties for you, this element of being suspicious over the OSCE and your motives was something you were presumably well aware of.

A. I was certainly well aware that the government in Belgrade thought that we were protecting, assisting, fronting for the KLA, because President Milosevic, Mr. Milutinovic in the statement that was read earlier, you know, openly accused us of these things, notwithstanding the fact that it was not true. So yes, I was aware of suspicions.

Q. And then moving on to that press conference concerning Racak on the 16th of January, it's right to say at that particular press conference you made no mention of the KLA as having been in a battle; is that right?

A. The press conference was not just my statement, but it was a series of questions that were thrown at me by journalists, some of whom were taking the Serb position, some taking the Albanian. The international journalists were, of course, just trying to make sure they had heard what I said. Was the KLA mentioned? I'm sure it was mentioned quite often. I recall vaguely some of the Serb journalists asking very provocative questions: if this wasn't all the fault or the manipulation or the rigging by the KLA of the scene. So that was brought up. All I described at the press conference was what I had seen and what I had concluded, and then suggesting that if anyone wanted to challenge my conclusions, that they should bring in trained criminal investigators, specifically from this body, to determine what had happened.

Q. You stress there that it was what you had seen with your own eyes. I take it you mean that. But you were also acting at this time ⁶⁹²⁰ upon information received by your officers within the OSCE, within the KVM?

A. Obviously, I was talking to General DZ, I was talking to Maisonneuve, I was talking to other people, and we all came to the same conclusion, which was the one I expressed at the press conference.

Q. Just taking this to another part of the information that could have been available at that time - one doesn't know whether it was or not to you - but the issue of nine KLA having been killed in some sort of battle, was that something known to you at the time?

A. No.

Q. Was that something that anyone told you about or put you in a position to understand that that may have been the case?

A. The only thing I can think of is what we got from Loncar the night before, which was that 15 KLA had been killed in a battle at Racak. Neither then nor later was I told that in Racak, as you say, nine KLA had been killed.

Q. I used that figure because we heard it from the commander of the particular group there, so it's in evidence in this Court. In relation to what Loncar had told you then, and he used a figure of 15, was that something that you used in your press conference as a way of trying to achieve a balance from the other side?

A. Loncar didn't tell me. He told DZ, who told me. I think I told the press conference that the government story that we had heard the night before, of a military clash in which 15 KLA were killed and no casualties on the government side, I mentioned that in the press conference, and I ⁶⁹²¹ said what I saw was not in accord with that, that there were over 45 people killed -- over 40 people killed, excuse me, maybe 45, and that they did not appear to me to be uniformed or armed representatives of the KLA.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kay --

MR. KAY: I'm literally winding it up now.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Kay, please. Microphone for Mr. Kay, please.

MR. KAY:

Q. You mentioned the particular fact that you said there was a duty to investigate this matter, that you stressed that at the press conference. In relation to the KVM, were you in any position or were you under any obligation or duty to investigate, take exhibits from the scene of crime, that sort of thing? Do anything in a meaningful way in relation to an investigation?

A. Well, we were certainly interested in trying to determine what had occurred there. As I said yesterday, I told my people that remained behind when I left Racak that they should go around and take as many pictures as they possibly could of the scene so that we would have some record of what we had seen on the ground. You know, I suggested that trained criminal investigators come in because, as far as I know, we did not have any on our staff. I told people that -- I think I told the press conference that, you know, if the government did an investigation by themselves, they would probably not be believed by the international community. Therefore, I recommended strongly that they bring in objective, trained criminal investigators, as I said, from this ⁶⁹²² organisation.

I guess the answer to your question is, you know, some of my people might have picked things up, cartridge shells, that sort of thing, to show to me, but no, I did not encourage them to do much beyond that.

MR. KAY: No further questions.

JUDGE MAY: I understand this court is required at half past four for another case. I had overlooked it. So we're required to finish at 4.00.

MR. NICE: I do have some re-examination.

JUDGE MAY: We'll have to ask the ambassador to come back.

MR. NICE: Not very much. Probably five minutes, ten minutes, but it's only proper in the light of what's been said.

JUDGE MAY: Right. Five minutes.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much. Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. The time of your press conference? What time was is?

A. Oh, the time. I think it was 5.00 p.m.

Q. So if the report that's been read from by the accused setting out the deaths of KLA soldiers was prepared by Maisonneuve in the evening, which is his evidence, do you know one way or another whether that was done before or after your press conference?

A. I do not know for a fact.

Q. Very well. Deal with that --

A. It was done in the evening, and it was probably done after my press conference. ⁶⁹²³

Q. Next point, and I'll take as few as I can. You've been asked about this being rigged. The whole thing being rigged. First of all, what was your reception when you got back to Washington, from the powers that be?

A. I'm not sure who I take "the powers to be" to be. My reception back in Washington, I would say, was mixed. As usual within an organisation like the State Department, there were people who thanked me and congratulated me on what I had done and there were others who, I think, were less enthusiastic about what I had done.

MR. NICE: A quick exercise with two photographs, Usher, please. We're pressed for time, sorry.

Q. You've been shown two photographs of a sequence of three under the suggestion of a rigging. It wasn't raised with the witness concerned. Let's look more carefully. The first one, please, shows two photographs. Look at them together. If the audiovisual will withdraw a little bit. Look at them both together. Thank you very much.

THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Nice, please speak into the microphone.

MR. NICE: Sorry. Shows the same man, thank you very much. One apparently with blood on it, one without. Can you leave it so that we can see both of them together, please. One can line up the black shadows and see they match, possibly taking a different view about the white shadows on the man's face.

Q. Do you notice, Ambassador, that the hat is in a different position and the rock immediately to the top left of the man's head in the top picture is missing in the lower one? Is that so? ^{6924 BLANK PAGE 6925}

A. It looks like that. It might just be behind his head but --

Q. Very well. Now, let's go to the next picture. It would appear to be the same man. If you can look at it, please. It's a little hard to see. Would appear to be the same man now with his head turned on the left-hand side, exposing a bloody wound. So his head had been turned to the left, it would have been turned in the area of the blood. Two questions and they're these: While you were looking at these bodies from a distance, were people examining them to see where their wounds were?

A. There were many people on the hill. There were family members from the village, some of whom were moving parts of the body, moving heads, that sort of thing, trying to recognise relatives. There were journalists who occasionally were sort of setting up pictures, that sort of thing, to try and --

Q. That's all I need for that.

A. Okay.

Q. The second thing is this: Implicit in the accused's suggestion in relation to those photographs basically was that people were wandering around, either with containers of blood to make the thing look that which it wasn't or moving bodies around in order to release blood to make it look that which it wasn't. Is there any truth in that as an implied suggestion?

A. None that I am aware of.

Q. Perhaps last -- or second to last question. One more on rigging. Have you ever been told of or heard any suggestion of the existence of ⁶⁹²⁶ evidence of these 40 bodies being carried, presumably in some kind of procession or by some group of people, and placed in the position they were in in this ravine?

A. Have I heard such allegations? I have heard such allegations, yes. I consider those allegations, again, to be ludicrous.

Q. You've heard the allegations in general. Have you ever heard of a witness who is said to support it?

A. No, sir, I have not.

Q. You were asked about the KLA having retaken control. You were shown a clip with some KLA soldiers in it and then you were asked no question about it. As a matter of fact, were there KLA people present at the time that you examined the bodies?

A. I cannot say there were or were not KLA people in and around Racak when I was there with my group. What I can say is that I did not come in contact with them nor see them.

Q. Until the moment when you spoke to the man, wherever it was, who you persuaded not to take revenge afterwards.

A. Correct.

MR. NICE: That's all I can ask in five minutes. Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: Ambassador, thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give your evidence. It is concluded. You are free to go.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the other matters, we can't deal with them today. ⁶⁹²⁷

JUDGE MAY: Tomorrow morning.

MR. NICE: May we deal with them first thing in the morning?

JUDGE MAY: First thing tomorrow morning, yes. And Mr. Kay, could I say we have a copy of the letter and the matters raised therein, and we will be taking it up.

MR. KAY: Yes. Shall we have two amicus or -- here tomorrow?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. KAY: You know why I ask the question.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Two amicus tomorrow. We will adjourn now. Half past nine tomorrow morning.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.06 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 13th day of June, 2002, at 9.30 a.m.