⁷²⁰⁴

Tuesday, 2 July 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I understand there are some matters you want to raise about the hearing in your absence. There was a transcript. You should have had a copy of it, so you should know what happened.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. First and foremost, I think that sitting in any way in my absence, especially if some rights of mine were discussed, is wrong, because my presence is compulsory during such a sitting. And therefore, I object.

Secondly, in relation to the fact that you discussed some kind of examinations and the condition of my health, first and foremost, I want to say that I have no objections whatsoever with regard to the prison doctor. He behaves in a correct, professional manner. I pointed out to him that I am not asking for any kind of sick leave. I'm not asking for anything. I want to tell you that you should not harbour any illusions that I seek anything of you. I am not going to accept any kind of examinations by any kind of commission if my own doctor who treated me over the past few years is not on that same commission.

The third thing I wish to say has to do with the proposals of the other side to have nine witnesses that are supposed to testify under Rule 92 bis do not be cross-examined. I categorically oppose that, and I remind you that you yourselves have ruled that all witnesses, even those under 92 bis, are supposed to be subjected to cross-examination. ⁷²⁰⁵ On the 11th of March, 2002 - this is in the transcript, on page 1964, line 16 - that was precisely your decision, as far as I could see. [In English] "It is right that witnesses should appear for cross-examination." [Interpretation] That is your decision. On the 17th of April, 2002, in the transcript, page 3360 --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt you because we decided in that case that we would leave the decision about whether to allow those witnesses to be called until a later date, until we'd heard the evidence of the events about which they give evidence from other witnesses. So what we will do is this: We will hear the other witnesses about those events. We will then make a decision as to whether the evidence should be accepted under Rule 92 bis, and at that stage we will give you the opportunity to address us on the matter. So for the moment, that is not on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I'm not going to present this now. Only in principle, in relation to your decisions concerning 92 bis witnesses, I wish to remind you that on the 17th of April, you said precisely that -- when you were dealing with the question of the cross-examination of 92 bis witnesses, you allotted one hour to me and five minutes to the other side because these are written depositions. In practice, it is the opposite that happens. The other side has unlimited time, and even that hour that you yourselves allotted to me, you shortened that to 45 minutes, although you know that, in principle, cross-examination can last ten minutes or ten hours, for as long as necessary. It shouldn't be shortened. At any rate, you have deviated ⁷²⁰⁶ from your own decisions in this regard.

The third thing I wish to say by way of an objection is the fact that reports are not being submitted. For example, expert reports in part have not been discovered at all, and in part they have been disclosed only in the English language. And you know full well that I cross-examine all experts.

As for the history expert, we have a report only in English. For the financial expert, only in English. For the military expert, there is no statement whatsoever, no findings whatsoever. As for the demographer, we haven't get a statement or any findings. As for the MUP expert, I haven't got a statement or any findings. As for the constitutional expert, no findings, no statement. For the constitutional and criminal expert Srdja Popovic, as it says here, there is no statement, no findings. In addition to that, I wish to object to disclosing witnesses -- witnesses by statements from -- by witnesses from Serbia. I am being given their statements in the English language and I'm sure that they gave statements in Serbian. K33, no statement. K37, no statement. K38, no witness statement, K39, no witness statement. K35, although it is a Serb, again I have the statement only in the English language. Dragan Karleusa, who certainly gave his statement in the Serbian language, I have his statement in English. Radojkovic, also in the English language. Then R3 I have no statement whatsoever. R4, R5, R6, R7, no statements. Therefore, I think that with regard to everything I've said to you, no further comment is necessary.

In addition to that, the next thing I wish to deal with -- ⁷²⁰⁷

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- is the following: Several times I asked that you decide or, rather, pass a writ of disclosure that will make it incumbent upon the intelligence services of the relevant states to disclose the information that they have available. On the other hand, I see that for a long time now there has been discussion here with regard to the application of your own Rule 70, which is supposed to protect even regular Prosecution witnesses from providing information that these witnesses -- that these witnesses could consider unfavourable to be presented here. Therefore, I think that any court of law anywhere in the world would have to proceed from the fact that they care about the truth. And these requests are contrary to that. I want this information to be disclosed.

As for the request of the other side, not only not to have information disclosed but to have certain witnesses freed from the obligation to respond to certain questions related to this kind of information, this is a question of principle, actually.

JUDGE MAY: We will -- we will be coming to that on Friday. So there's no need to address us on that now.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then just -- then just one more objection, because I saw that you discussed the punishment of Witness K12 because he didn't want to testify. I wish to remind you of the existence of a declaration against torture that was adopted by the United Nations.

JUDGE MAY: This is irrelevant to you. Absolutely nothing to do with you. The contempt proceedings -- the contempt proceedings are ⁷²⁰⁸ nothing to do with you and are between the Court and the witness. Mr. Nice, is there any matter you want to raise? No. You have been allowed to go on for a very long time. You are now dealing with irrelevant matter.

Yes, Mr. Nice. Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, only a couple of matters arising from what the accused said. I will revert later today as to the service of material in relation to K33 because we are now two days late in respect of his material, and I'll come and explain why I hope by the end of the day. The Court has the list of witnesses which of course has had to be amended in light of the two weeks that we haven't been able to sit. I'm -- I don't see any problems with keeping the diary full, but looking ahead, not now because it will take time now, but looking ahead, I understand that the travel difficulties to and from Kosovo and getting tickets are such that if I'm going to have to advance witnesses from there, I've got to start making my plans by this Friday. So therefore, admissibility issues for the period between now and the 26th of July are, wherever possible, best addressed by this Friday so that I can make arrangements for filling time with witnesses should that be necessary.

JUDGE MAY: Will you let us know what there is that you want ruled on.

MR. NICE: Certainly, yes. I should alert the Chamber to two things I haven't told you about before in terms and that don't appear on the list. Merovci has got to come back very briefly to deal with a tape. I think the accused was going to provide a tape. I'm not sure if he has ⁷²⁰⁹ yet. I think I've got a copy myself from another source, but he's got to come back.

Hendrie was not cross-examined as to the suggestion that the photographs he took were photographs of something that was a setup. I could deal with that in rebuttal but it's frankly much better to deal with the issue while it's fresh in everybody's memory. So I'm going to ask to slot him in at some stage. He's not on the list. And lastly, the Court recalls that there's a witness named Jemini who gave an account of what he overheard from his building of a radio contact between the neighbours -- not the neighbours, between soldiers in the neighbouring building. He was cross-examined as to the accuracy or honesty of that. The person with whom he was in company in hiding was contacted I think before the witness went back. There are statements from him and there's an application in written form coming to add him. So those are the only three additions.

And so far as Sandra Mitchell is concerned, we would be assisted by a ruling on her position. She's scheduled for Thursday but we'd be grateful if we could know about her. She's actually in The Hague at the moment, so were we to fall short of witnesses for any reason, we could perhaps take her evidence in chief if we can, as it were, whistle her up. And I think that de la Billiere, Sir Peter de la Billiere may require some abbreviation of service if he's to give evidence on the day listed, but that's all.

And Mr. Ryneveld will be taking the next witness, who is a substantial witness, Mr. Petritsch. ⁷²¹⁰

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've heard you. There's no call for comment on what the Prosecution has said. It's merely a matter of informing the Chamber of the current position. There's no need for comment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is not a comment, this is an objection. Do you allow me to -- I mean, are you going to keep my microphone on?

I oppose that. I oppose having material provided to me in a shortened period of time. Within ten days, that's become the rule rather than 30 days. You have proclaimed my alleged right here to defend myself. That can only be a reason to extend deadlines, not shorten them. And what you've allowed here is the shortening of deadlines. Now I've heard that this Sandra Mitchell is supposed to come on Thursday. I haven't got any statement of hers. Nothing has been given to me. And then --

JUDGE MAY: Let us look at it. Let us look at it. I'm going to ask the senior legal officer to come up.

[Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to give the Court's rulings on the various matters you raise.

The first matter you raise is an objection to our holding a hearing in absence of the accused, yourself. The position is this: That if there comes a time when for some reason or other an accused is for a long time absent, it becomes essential for the Court to deal with administrative matters, even in the absence of the accused. Nothing was ⁷²¹¹ done at that hearing, as you know quite well, to prejudice your position, and you've had the opportunity to raise matters now. If again you are ill and it becomes necessary to hold a hearing for administrative and other reasons, then such a hearing will be held, but you will get a transcript, and you will also have the opportunity to raise matters during the next hearing.

The next matter is this: Your application that you wish to have a doctor from Belgrade present during the medical examination. We will consider that.

Your next point was that cross-examination allowed to you is too short. I have explained many times, and I will explain again. A Court has an inherent power to limit the time available to the parties before it in the interests of justice. It's not right that a Court's time should be wasted on irrelevant matter. We have, therefore, considered your cross-examination of the witnesses, and I note that in at most two or perhaps three cases only out of the 70-odd witnesses that we've heard have you finished within time. We note that you take every minute available, and therefore, we have had to limit the time and come to the conclusions which we have had in the interests of justice and securing a fair and expeditious trial, as we must.

We -- just one moment. We turn next -- I turn next to your complaint about disclosure of expert reports and the absence of disclosure of statements in B/C/S. We shall order the Prosecution to address those matters. It would be best if you would deal specifically with the matters raised by the accused, and if you could let us have a schedule of those ⁷²¹² particular matters dealing with disclosure; what disclosure has taken place and where it falls short of the Rules, what is required in the Rules.

The final matter you raise which I'm dealing with is your application for what you call a writ of disclosure. Now, it is a matter which you've raised before, it's true, and what you say today is you want disclosure from the intelligence services, the relevant intelligence services.

Now, there is a regime in the Tribunal for parties to obtain documents or information by application to the relevant Judge or Trial Chamber. The Rule is Rule 54 bis, to which I draw your attention. You will see there the regime set out. It requires you to apply in writing, identifying the possible documents or information which you want, indicating how they're relevant to any matters in issue, and explaining any steps that you may have taken to obtain the assistance required. I'm not going through the rest of the regime. It is set out in the Rule, and you can read it.

Yes. Let's have the witness, please.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, certainly. And while the witness is coming in, most of the information on disclosure is already in the right-hand column of this document. Insofar as it falls short in respect to matters raised by the accused, I'll deal with it. So far as Sandra Mitchell, number 7, is concerned, I gather that the B/C/S translation that's referred to there as to be provided as soon as possible was in fact provided on the 27th of June. ⁷²¹³

JUDGE MAY: The 20 --

MR. NICE: 27th of June. And we'd grateful for a ruling as to whether she'd be subject to Rule 92 bis because we'll make the appropriate arrangements.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we'll consider that.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. The Prosecution then would call Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch.

[The witness entered court]

WITNESS: WOLFGANG PETRITSCH

JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness takes the declaration.

THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat. Examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

Q. Ambassador Petritsch, I understand, sir, that you are presently the permanent representative of Austria to the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation in Geneva; is that correct, sir?

A. That's correct.

Q. And is it also right, sir, that between August of 1999 and May of 2002, you were the high representative of the international community for Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A. That's all correct.

Q. And when you stepped down, that position was taken by Lord Ashdown; is that correct?

A. That's correct. ^{7214 BLANK PAGE 7215}

Q. Now, sir, I understand that you are also the author of a number of books, and one of those books is -- concerns the history of Kosovo up until the 24th of March, 1999, and it's entitled "Kosovo-Kosova Mythen, Daten, Fakten"; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Now, Ambassador Petritsch, while you were Austria's ambassador to the former Yugoslavia -- first of all, perhaps you could tell me, were you in fact Austria's ambassador to the former Yugoslavia, the FRY, and if so, what those dates were.

A. Yes, I was. Between September of 1997 and July, beginning of August of 1999 formally, officially.

Q. And at some time, sir, did you become the European Union's special envoy for Kosovo?

A. That's also correct, and the dates are between October of 1998 and July of 1999.

Q. While serving in that capacity, sir, did you have occasion to act as the European Union's chief negotiator at the Rambouillet negotiations?

A. Well, I was actually appointed by the Contact Group to be one of the three chief negotiators, along with Chris Hill from the United States and Boris Maiorsky from the Russian Federation.

Q. Can you tell us, sir, what the Rambouillet negotiations were about and when they took place.

A. The Rambouillet negotiations started on the 6th of February, and that was an initiative taken by the Contact Group. These are the six nations; United States, Russian Federation, and four European countries ⁷²¹⁶ like Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain. And they invited, rather, summoned the two sides, the Yugoslav side and the Kosovo Albanian side, to meet in Rambouillet, outside of Paris in the consul, to find a peaceful solution to the Kosovo conflict.

Q. And approximately when -- I think you said it was the 6th of February that it started?

A. It started on the 6th of February. Rambouillet ended on the 23rd of February, and then it was -- the negotiations were resumed after a hiatus of about close to three weeks, on the 15th of March in Paris, at Centre Kleber, and they lasted until the 19th of March.

Q. And just so that the record is clear, the year was what?

A. The year was 1999.

Q. I see. All right, sir. Now, we will get back to Rambouillet, but I just want to ask you something. During the course of your tenure, did you have any meetings with the accused in these proceedings?

A. I had several meetings during my stay in Belgrade, both in my capacity as the Austrian ambassador and then subsequently as the European Union special envoy. Also at the time of the Kosovo crisis in -- from July 1998 to December 1998, Austria held the European Union presidency as well.

Q. I see. And in addition to meeting with Mr. Milosevic, did you also meet with any members of his immediate staff or senior legal advisors or senior political advisors?

A. Yes. I had several -- rather, many more meetings with his advisors than the accused. In fact, very frequent meetings with the ⁷²¹⁷ Deputy Prime Minister, Nikola Sainovic, who was Mr. Milosevic's Kosovo man, so to speak. And Mr. Sainovic was obviously the Vice-Premier of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I also had meetings with Bojan Bugarcic, the foreign policy advisor to the then President Milosevic.

Q. Now, sir, during your dealings with both the accused and the others that you have mentioned, did you form any impression with respect to who, if anyone, was in charge?

A. Well, let me put it this way: At the time of my arrival, of course I had a lot of information about the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and everything invariably pointed in the direction that there is one person who called the shots, so to speak, and that was Mr. Milosevic, first as the president of Serbia and then as the president of Yugoslavia. I was skeptical at the beginning, but then I started, in the course of my work there, I started to realise that this is indeed the case. For me it was quite significant when Mr. Milosevic became president of Yugoslavia, which is a far less - how should I say? - formerly a far less influential position. He, nevertheless, remained the political figure, number one, the undisputed leader of Yugoslavia, so to speaking, and that became clear in many -- on many occasions in my meetings, particularly with his advisors or Foreign Minister Jovanovic, Mr. Sainovic I've already mentioned, and many others. Everything pointed in the direction that indeed the final say is, in spite of the differences now in the former power, with the then Yugoslav president, Milosevic.

Q. Now, I take it, sir -- I asked you initially for an impression. Later on, I'm going to ask you for some examples which may or may not have ⁷²¹⁸ influenced that impression or reinforced that impression. In particular, I'd like to turn next, if I may, to whether or not there was anything that happened at Rambouillet which may have reinforced that view.

A. Well, Rambouillet, first and foremost, I think it is quite remarkable the change of mind in accepting the invitation to come to Rambouillet by the Yugoslav side because Mr. Milosevic invariably stressed that this is a Serb problem so it needs to be dealt with by Serb authorities, not even Yugoslav so much, Serb authorities. This is an internal problem, therefore, it has to be dealt with inside of Serbia. And of course the other side, these were terrorists and they were, therefore, not considered partners in any peace talks, referring to the KLA in particular.

Now, by -- by accepting the invitation to deal with this issue first outside of Serbia, secondly with international mediation and, thirdly, accepting the KLA as being part of the other side, so to speak, of the Kosovo Albanian side, that was, of course, a huge departure from a stated policy. And this decision was taken by the then president, Milosevic, the president of Yugoslavia, in spite of the fact that it has been a -- or considered a Serb internal issue. So that was, for me, at the time, of course, a hopeful sign that, with this change of mind, we would be able to reach a peaceful settlement of the Kosovo crisis.

Q. Yes. Now, was there anything that happened during the course -- once Rambouillet actually got under way, was there anything else that you noticed or knew or were told about which reinforced your earlier stated position? ⁷²¹⁹

A. Well, a second point which I consider very important is the delegation that was sent to Rambouillet. It was basically the delegation that had already in the past many months negotiated with Chris Hill, in particular, and then subsequently also when I joined Chris Hill as the European Union special envoy in the so-called phase of the shuttle diplomacy between Pristina and Belgrade when we were delivering proposals for an agreement back and forth, that these people whom we dealt with in this period of the shuttle diplomacy in the summer and fall and winter of 1998, these same people, well-versed, excellent experts on the Yugoslav side, came to Rambouillet. This again was, on the one hand, for me a positive sign inasmuch as we knew that they knew up to the minutest detail all the problems and issues. Also, of course, the unresolved issues in this complex issue, and so that was very good.

On the other hand, however, I also realised that, with the absence of Mr. Milosevic, the final political decision will be taken by Mr. Milosevic.

Now, it was at the time already criticised that well, without Milosevic, there's not going to be a settlement possible. He has to be there. And it was compared, of course, to Dayton. Dayton, Mr. Milosevic, as you might recall, represented the Serb side in these negotiations, and also the Yugoslav side.

At the time already it was clear with the modern means of communication, telephone and so on, mobile telephone which also played a crucial role in Rambouillet, it can be possible at any time to get, at crucial junctures, the go ahead from Belgrade, so to speak. So in this ⁷²²⁰ way, I was not so much worried about this. And indeed, there were very intense communications going on between Rambouillet and Belgrade. There was also -- of course, there were also visits. I recall distinctly one visit with Mr. Sainovic. Maybe there were two, I don't recall this exactly, to Belgrade in order to -- and it was -- above all, it was expressed to me by the negotiators on several occasions that this we cannot decide there. We have to -- we have to ask -- it was made reference to asking President Milosevic whether this is possible or not possible. So it evolved a very distinct and clear pattern that the mandate was with the negotiators, the expertise was with the negotiators, but in the end, the political decision to accept any agreement rests with President Milosevic.

Q. Thank you. Two comments, sir. The translators have to keep up with us, so I'm going to leave some time between my questions and your answers, and I'm going to ask you as well to just keep the translators in mind in giving your responses, if you would, please. Now, let me just see if I've got this straight. I think you've been very clear about the expertise of the negotiators and the fact that they would have to refer to Mr. Milosevic at some time. Perhaps you could clarify this for me: You said during Rambouillet. Are you talking about while the negotiations were going on, they would pause in the middle of negotiations and go check, either by phone or by trip to Belgrade, to speak to Mr. Milosevic? Is that what you mean by that?

A. Yes, basically.

Q. And who would do that? ⁷²²¹

A. Well, that is for me difficult to answer, but definitely Mr. Sainovic was the one, and Mr. Sainovic was, so to speak, the political head of the negotiating team, whereas the formal head was Professor Ratko Markovic, the Serbian vice-premier and eminent legal scholar. If I remember correctly, he's the author of the Serbian constitution. So he was, of course, intimately involved in the ins and outs and the intricacies of the subject matter.

Who else? I would not know exactly who it would be, but it transpired and it was very clear that there were regular contacts. Later on, around 11th of February, the Serbian President, Mr. Milutinovic, arrived. He stayed in Paris and also served as an informal point of contact, obviously, for -- for the Rambouillet delegation, the Yugoslav-Serb delegation, and then later on also occasionally dropped by and became involved more and move engaged and involved, however, more on a political level when it came to contacts with the Contact Group foreign ministers who were chaperoning, so to speak, these negotiations. I forgot to add that -- that the British and French foreign ministers were the two co-hosts, so to speak, of the Rambouillet conference.

Q. I see. Now, sir, earlier in your evidence you indicated to the Court that there were some things that you saw as being positive indicators that there was some hope for success at Rambouillet. One of the things you mentioned was the fact that President Milosevic allowed the talks and allowed the participants.

Once Rambouillet started initially, can you tell the Court ⁷²²² anything about whether or not -- or what your impression was of the attitude at the initial stages of Rambouillet by the Serb FRY delegation?

A. Well, just merely by the fact that Yugoslavia accepted this invitation, it was very clear that they were aware that this new phase now will have to be brought to an end along -- basically along the lines of the Dayton negotiations and the Dayton accords. And since quite a few of those who were parts -- were part of this issue now on the Belgrade side were also in Dayton, of course it was clear to us that it must be clear to them that this Rambouillet accords will -- an agreement will consist of two parts; the civilian, rather, political part, and a military part in order to secure the implementation of the civilian part. So this kind of Dayton formula was, in fact, the theme, so to speak, of the negotiations or the talks leading up to Rambouillet, and then also, of course, in Rambouillet itself.

Q. What observations, if any, did you make with respect to the FRY Serb negotiating team's mandate in the initial stages?

A. Well, we were told that basically they have a mandate to negotiate, so to speak, the political part, that is constitution, the political setup, and so on. And it was also clear from the outset that there has to be a solution which would bring substantive autonomy to Kosovo. That was unanimously declared and supported by the Contact Group. That was basically the framework. And the -- with the invitation, the two sides also got -- received what was called the basic elements, a set of principles, about -- about the agreement that needs to be negotiated. There were general elements in there. There were -- there was about the ⁷²²³ governance in Kosovo, about the legislative, executive, the judiciary. There was one chapter for -- about human rights, and then also implementation where it was clearly spelled out, these are the principles, and according to the principles, the agreement has to be negotiated. By accepting these principles, and they were non-negotiable, they -- of course, both sides agreed to use this as a basis and to continue where in -- in the era of shuttle diplomacy, the negotiations stopped. And at the time of Rambouillet, we were -- we had sixth and seventh version, revised version, of the proposed agreement already there. So what I want to say with this is it was very clear to both sides what the framework is. No independence, however, substantive autonomy, on the one hand. And on the other hand, the very clear principles spelling out the political, judicial system, human rights, and so on necessary, and also the implementation points. So it was a very transparent and a very systematic approach that was taken. A lot has been learned in Dayton both for the international negotiators as well as for the Yugoslav side in particular, and that was then started and followed through. At the beginning, the Serb Yugoslav side made clear that they have now the power to discuss the political side of the agreement, basically. And that was -- and that was fine with us because we wanted first to have the agreement, so to speak, with all the nuances, how much -- what degree of autonomy, how does it concretely look like in the different bodies of governance and so on, and then the military implementation part which basically is, of course, very restricted in regard to what can be negotiated, because that derives, of course, from the civilian part. What ⁷²²⁴ do you need in order -- how many troops and so on do you need in order to secure the implementation of this agreement. This is a technical issue that needs to be decided by those who would provide the international military presence there.

So therefore, it was not -- it was not a part and parcel from the beginning, but it was for methodological and systematic reasons at the very end. However, we were confident already from the outset, and there were a lot of discussions, of course, already prior to Rambouillet, that since we're following the Dayton model, all sides know what it basically means. So therefore, again, a lot of negotiations were not necessary and also not called for.

Q. Let me stop you there, sir. Rather than get into the detail, shall we say, of the negotiations themselves, my next question is directed more about, given this background, given this backdrop of what you were hoping to accomplish, whether or not, in your view, progress appeared to be made towards reaching some kind of a positive solution during the initial stages. For example, between the 10th and 14th of February, 1999.

A. Well, in the beginning it was very, very difficult. On the 7th, 8th, 9th of February, because actually both sides -- the Kosovo Albanian side still had to get its act together. They were deeply divided between one side around Rogova and the other side around the KLA, Thaci, and so on. They had to first find and form a negotiating team which was obviously, for them, not very easy.

This time, of course, the Yugoslav side realised that the Kosovo side had difficulty, so there was no progress really achievable. We also ^{7225 BLANK PAGE 7226} had difficulties with the situation on the ground, in Kosovo, where there were several incidents happening which could have derailed the negotiations. So there was a very tense situation. However, once things started to roll on both sides, there was a very constructive phase with the Yugoslav side. Experts taking over, so to speak, from the politicians negotiating, hammering out compromise solutions, proposals that were then in turn passed on to the Albanian side. The Kosovo Albanians dealt with it and it came back, and so on. So it was this kind of negotiating situation which we were hoping for. But that went to a certain degree.

And it was clear, of course, that on -- on the Albanian side, they were not interested, really, in a political settlement because they did -- they wanted independence and not substantive autonomy. But what they wanted was NATO in Kosovo.

On the other hand, you had the Yugoslav side. They did not want NATO in Kosovo, but they wanted substantive autonomy. As little as possible, but nevertheless, they wanted this side. Now, it was very clear and it became very obvious to all sides, to both sides and of course also to the mediators and the wider group of internationals, that only the two together, the civilian side - political side - and the military side would be a viable -- would create a viable agreement and a solution. It was, of course, very clear that the Albanian side was highly concerned about the prospect of demilitarisation, of decommissioning of the KLA. And that was, of course, a precondition in order to create peace in Kosovo. And since -- since the Albanian side was ⁷²²⁷ very much dominated by the KLA, it was the toughest, of course, to negotiate with them and to bring them to accept this. That, of course, went only in exchange for NATO which, in their eyes, would provide the necessary security. And on the other hand, of course, and more importantly for us, only an international military could decommission and demilitarise the KLA. Because the VJ and the MUP had already proven that they cannot achieve this goal. So it was actually, objectively speaking, in the very interest of the Yugoslav side to get NATO to do the job that they were unable to accomplish. And it was, of course, also very clear that Albanians would have never agreed to VJ doing the job. Only -- they would have only accepted when an international military detachment would do this.

That was a very realistic and a very plausible situation, that basically nobody, including -- including voices from the Yugoslav side, was against.

Q. I appreciate, Ambassador Petritsch, that these were very complex negotiations and that there was a certain logic that you were hoping to sell to both sides. Accepting that to be the case, and I think you've done an excellent job of explaining that background, by the 20th of February, sir, did something occur with respect to Mr. Milutinovic about the political aspects of the proposed agreement?

A. Well, yes. I must say that Mr. Milutinovic who, as I already pointed out, was dealing more with the political side, dealing with the Contact Group foreign ministers, Albright, Ivanov, Vedrine and so on, and at the time with Vedrine, Cook, even Mr. Milutinovic, who was the fiercest ⁷²²⁸ critic, very cynical, very negative in general in this whole negotiations and talks, even he in the meeting with the Contact Group foreign ministers on the 20th of February, indicated that with the political agreement, they can live, so to speak. "They" meaning the Yugoslav side.

Q. To follow up on that, did you ever receive any correspondence on the 23rd of February from the person you've mentioned earlier? I believe you mentioned Professor Markovic.

A. Yes. The three negotiators, Maiorsky, Hill, and myself, we received on the 23rd of February, a letter --

Q. I'm just going to stop you there, sir. I see that you are now referring to the book that you wrote. I take it that contains the letter to which you're about to refer.

A. Yes.

Q. Rather than refer to that, sir, I would prefer perhaps if we could show you the originally signed copy that we can then distribute to the Court and the various officials. I understand you've got a copy in your book, but ...

Now, while this is being distributed, the copy of this letter, the version that I have here is actually a signed copy. It's in English, signed in English, and there is also a translation into B/C/S. Just for curiosity, sir, you speak B/C/S, do you? You speak Serbian?

A. Yes.

Q. And these negotiations that you were involved in, were they conducted in English, or in B/C/S, or -- ⁷²²⁹

A. They were translated. There was simultaneous translation. But in our informal contacts, they -- we spoke mostly English.

Q. You spoke English. All right. And so this letter -- sorry. Have you been provided with --

A. Yes.

Q. -- a copy of Professor Dr. Ratko Markovic's letter?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. First of all, could you look at that, please, sir, and it's dated the 23rd of February, 1999, at Rambouillet. It indicates that -- it's on the letterhead of the delegation of the government of the Republic of Serbia, and it lists the three of you; Christopher Hill, Wolfgang Petritsch, and Boris Maiorsky. Is that the letter to which you refer?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. And in this letter, sir, are there specific sentences perhaps that you might like to draw to the Court's attention that would indicate to you perhaps the state of or the spirit of negotiation that was --

A. Yes.

Q. -- reached as of that date?

A. Yeah. Well, to the letter part of the question, in the last paragraph there, the delegation expresses its full readiness to continue the work. And what is crucial for me now is -- and they say, "... in line with the positive spirit of this meeting." So at the very last day of Rambouillet, the Yugoslav head of delegation is clearly, in writing, indicating that there was a positive spirit in this meeting in ⁷²³⁰ Rambouillet. I think that that is very important, particularly for later accusations that that was all a sham and that this was -- that was not really done in order to reach a peaceful agreement and so on. And substantive-wise, the next-to-the-last paragraph is of crucial importance. And there it reads: The FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - agreed to discuss the scope and character of international presence in Kosmet, meaning Kosovo, to implement the agreement to be accepted in Rambouillet.

Now, what's important here is -- and this is fully in line with the status of the discussions and negotiations at the time, the scope and character of international presence, the size of the civilian presence, the size of military, and so on and so on. And crucial in this context is that it says "international presence." It is not restricted to international civilian presence. And that was, of course, discussed already prior to this letter because I should add in parentheses that this was the third letter that they sent to the same subject matter which over in the course of the afternoon became more constructive. And the last one, of course, is the one that is valid. That it clearly indicates international presence not restricted to civilian presence, including, of course, in this way what was crucial, that there is the possibility for a military presence. And that was the key, actually, which Professor Markovic and, of course, the whole delegation was very much aware of. I distinctly remember --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Petritsch, I must ask you, please, if you would, to try and shorten your answers. We are very, very pressed for time. ⁷²³¹

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ambassador, if you could tell me the reason why Mr. Ratko Markovic wrote this letter. Is it what was requested by the --

THE WITNESS: Because he is -- because he was the head of the negotiating team of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, as it's indicated on the top.

JUDGE KWON: What was the motive for him to write this letter?

THE WITNESS: Well, it was -- they were asked by the Contact Group foreign ministers to state their opinion to the status of the negotiations because that was the end of the negotiations. This was already the second time that the negotiations were prolonged for -- originally, it was one week foreseen for the negotiations. After one week, there was an assessment by the foreign ministers, since this was quite positive, the developments in the negotiations, to prolong this for yet another week. And then on the 20th of February, the second week ended and then it was decided since there was, again, progress to grant yet another three days. And then the 23rd - this is the date on this letter - was the very deadline for the negotiations.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. RYNEVELD:

Q. Now, Ambassador Petritsch, you've told us earlier about their mandate to negotiate what you believe was a political agreement, but did you form any impression about their mandate to negotiate the implementation at this stage of any agreement that would be reached?

A. Well, it was very clear that there was -- that they did not -- ⁷²³² that the negotiating team in Rambouillet did not have the mandate to negotiate the implementation side. And that was the reason why, in the end, the foreign ministers decided to postpone the -- and grant a three-week hiatus to the negotiations, exactly in order to clarify this implementation issue, the military side, so to speak, of this implementation issue, to be more precise.

Q. Now, you've just expressed to us the importance of the February 23rd letter, which, by the way, I'm just reminded I haven't yet asked to be marked as an exhibit. If I may do that before I forget.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 235.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

Q. You've talked about the main objection, if I remember correctly, about an international military presence to ensure compliance with the agreement. Was -- was one of the negotiators a Vladimir Stambuk? Do you recall whether he was present there?

A. Yes.

Q. And what, if anything, can you share with the Court about the negotiations as expressed by Mr. Stambuk?

A. Well, I had several -- of course, we had many, many - how should I say? - one-on-one meetings, informal meetings in the couloirs, at dinner or breakfast or wherever in Rambouillet, and on one occasion Vladimir Stambuk -- and we were discussing -- and he is a member of JUL. And when we were talking about -- when I was referring to the necessity to ensure the implementation of this agreement and for this we need, in order to demilitarise the KLA, international military presence, and if this is not ⁷²³³ granted then we will reach the end of our negotiations. And then Mr. Stambuk basically said well -- that if there is bombing of -- then it will -- this will mean a massacre in Kosovo. And of course it was -- I was quite impressed, to say the least, by this. It was very clear to me that he was referring to a massacre on the part of the Yugoslav army or MUP on the Kosovo Albanians.

We did not -- I -- since I was taken aback very much and shocked in a way, I did not further elaborate, but it left in me the distinct impression that there was a clear view, at least with Mr. Stambuk, what would happen if there would be a war or bombing happening in Kosovo.

Q. Now, sir, you've told us that the Rambouillet portion stopped. And did negotiations continue at another location at a later date?

A. Yes. As I already indicated, first of all it was necessary for the Yugoslav side to get its act together in regards to the implementation side, and this is what they also asked for. I remember a one-on-one meeting with Ambassador Branko Brankovic, who -- who was a member of the Yugoslav team, telling me, "Well, of course we know that we need a military component there in order to secure the implementation of the agreement, but we need more time. This cannot be done immediately here in Rambouillet."

On the other hand, we had the Kosovo Albanian side, and there the KLA was of course visibly shocked, the representatives, Thaci and so on, that they were asked to demilitarise. So basically to wither away. And he realised -- Thaci at the time realised that if he would sign now in Rambouillet, that would basically mean, or at least potentially, that he ⁷²³⁴ would be killed if he returns home and tells his people that he's just given up his own organisation.

So it was very clear that both sides needed time to explain this and to come to terms with this difficult issue. The one, the Yugoslav side with military implementation, of course.

Therefore, the foreign ministers granted this three-week interruption, and then we resumed the talks in Paris on the 15th of March.

Q. All right. And between the talks, between the 23rd of March [sic] and the 15th of March, did you engage in further discussions with Serb officials or any other shuttle diplomacy, I believe is the word you used?

A. Yes, that's correct. We immediately went -- I immediately went back to Belgrade, and also Chris Hill joined me there. And either together or separately we had several meetings with Yugoslav and Serb officials, with a delegation, with the negotiators. The same applies to Pristina. And I also accompanied German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to a meeting with President Milosevic and his closest associates. That was, if I remember correctly, on the 8th of March.

Q. All right.

A. And so there were others, several other meetings and encounters in order to discuss exactly this issue of military implementation.

Q. If you permit me, sir, to shorten what I anticipate could be a detailed answer. Is it fair to say that on this 8th meeting, that there was a sort of a general meeting of a number of you and then at some stage Fischer and Milosevic retired for a separate one-on-one in one room and then you remained behind with Milutinovic? Is that correct? ⁷²³⁵

A. Yes. The larger -- the larger party remained in the larger room, and Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Fischer then went to a separate room for a one-on-one talk.

Q. Yes. And obviously you remained behind, and were you with Mr. Milutinovic?

A. And I used the time to discuss some of the aspects of the agreement with Mr. Milutinovic. But at the time, it became very clear to me that what we already feared and saw somehow dawning on the horizon was a total change in the attitude. Now it was not only the military issue which was so non-acceptable, at least verbally and publicly, it was also the political part that was basically already agreed where the Yugoslav side had, as the letter demonstrates, already indicated, "Okay. We can live with this. We can. There's still a few nuances, but in general we can. We are ready to do the next and crucial step." This kind of attitude was totally gone already prior to the meeting on the 8th of March. There must have -- something happened, so to speak, after the 23rd of February when this letter was written to us. There was a total change of attitude. And as was indicated on several occasions to me, it was Mr. Milosevic who did not like it and who then obviously in the course of the ensuing weeks between the 23rd of February and the 15th of March, decided not to continue the path of negotiation.

Q. Now, did you attempt to discuss the details of the Rambouillet agreement with Milutinovic on the 8th of March?

A. Yes. Definitely. I tried, but it was basically disregarded. It was not -- Mr. Milutinovic was not interested in the details, and he in a ^{7236 BLANK PAGE 7237} very polemic manner, actually referred to this as this is all fake and so on. I was already informed about this through an official statement on the Serbian side, I guess this is a written statement of the 5th of March, where it became so to speak official and public. The new line, I would say, of discrediting Rambouillet and undermining it.

Q. Now, sir, to your knowledge, had there been a parliamentary sitting between the 23rd of February and the 15th of March?

A. Not to my knowledge. I don't know where, who in fact formally decided on this fundamental change of the Yugoslav Serb approach to Rambouillet.

Q. Did that change in attitude continue when discussions continued on the -- in mid-March 1999 in Paris?

A. Yes, absolutely. From the very first day, it was clear that -- that there was no positive spirit on the Yugoslav side left. It was also quite characteristic that it was not Ratko Markovic who was still formally the head of the delegation who spoke, it was basically Milutinovic who took over and who fully dominated the negotiations and which were now not negotiations any longer. It was -- it was just done in a very accusatory verbal way. No constructive approach, no nothing where we could have seen a possibility to still -- to rescue, so to speak, this obviously now failing process of Rambouillet.

Q. I see. And when Mr. Milutinovic came to Paris, what, if anything, did -- what impression did you form as a result of what Mr. Milutinovic was saying in light of what had happened before?

A. Well, it was basically absolutely negative. It was nothing ⁷²³⁸ constructive there. I could not see -- although we were still hoping against hope, but rationally speaking, it was -- became very clear that this -- that the Yugoslav side is not ready to constructively re-engage in these negotiations. They backtracked, in fact. All what was already agreed was then disputed and there were formalities that were criticised and so on. So it was, in my opinion, very clear that the Yugoslav side was instructed not to achieve a positive outcome.

Q. Do you know by whom?

A. Well, I can -- I can only guess. And what I have said before, in view of who called the shots, it was Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Now, sir, I just want to go to a slightly different point in time. You've indicated to us that you had various meetings with Mr. Milosevic. Do you recall your very first meeting with Mr. Milosevic and when that was?

A. Well, the very first meeting was an occasion of the presentation of my credentials to President Milosevic when -- as Austrian ambassador.

Q. And that was when?

A. That was -- I arrived in September. It must have been in October of 1997.

Q. And at that time, sir, did you, as part of this -- at the time of this -- presenting your credentials, did you also deliver any kind of a message?

A. Yes. It was -- that's usually a rather ceremonial situation, presenting the credentials, but for me it was clear already by then, after a few weeks in Belgrade, that it was, although, as I indicated previously, ⁷²³⁹ a Yugoslav president is a more ceremonial post and does not have so much power, in fact, Mr. Milosevic continued to be the number one, so to speak, in Yugoslavia. So I thought this would be one of my rare occasions to talk substance with him, and I, in a way, abused the situation, the formal occasion, and addressed a few substantive issues. Not the least I appealed to President Milosevic to finally start cooperating with ICTY.

Q. Now, a year later, October of 1998, did you -- this is soon after your -- I believe you were just recently appointed as EU special envoy. Did you deliver a speech in Luxembourg to the foreign ministers?

A. As the European Union special envoy, I used to brief the European Union foreign ministers, either in Brussels or in Luxembourg, depending on where the session took place. The occasion that you're referring to in Luxembourg, there was a discussion when the already escalating situation in Kosovo was well under way, a humanitarian disaster with up to 300.000 displaced people inside Kosovo and outside, refugees, the European Union discussed the situation; political situation, humanitarian, human rights situation in Kosovo, and this was the occasion where I took the floor and gave a report on the situation there.

And in their communique, the European Union foreign ministers then made very clear reference to this and also asked the Yugoslav authorities to now finally start doing something against it.

Q. Now, after your appointment as the EU special envoy, did you meet again with Mr. Milosevic and other of his officials or, perhaps more frequently, his senior officials?

A. Yes, that's correct. More so with his immediate officials than ⁷²⁴⁰ with Mr. Milosevic himself, who at the time was more inclined to speak with the US special envoy, Ambassador Hill, whereas the European side did not seem to be so relevant to him, I must say, which was in fact even criticised by his closest advisors who also were of the opinion that in dealing more with the European side, one could find a more constructive solution, but that was not the case. But I was dealing very intensively with his foreign policy advisor, whom I mentioned before, as well as with Mr. Sainovic. These were my two principal contact points.

Q. Now, I take it as in most organisations, there is a sort of a hierarchical structure and normally one goes up the hierarchical ladder. Did you, during the course of your discussions and negotiations, choose to go outside of the normal chain of command, as it were?

A. Well, I must tell you that it didn't make a lot of sense to speak to -- or to follow this hierarchical ladder. It was far more successful to directly go to the boss, so to speak, or to his people, and this is what I in fact did most of the time.

Q. Sir, you intimated earlier -- you've told the Court what your impression was about him being in charge and I indicated we would return to some additional examples which may have reinforced that impression. Is there an incident about an exchange of VJ and KLA soldiers that may have had some influence on that impression you formed?

A. Yes. In -- it was in early 1999, early January 1999. A group of VJ soldiers was taken hostage by the KLA, and in turn, a group of KLA people were then taken in by the VJ, and there was a situation where I was asked to help and mediate the release these two groups. And I was dealing ⁷²⁴¹ with Mr. Sainovic, and we were able to strike a deal and indeed the KLA released these VJ soldiers in exchange for the release of the KLA people by the VJ later on. It was not an exchange on the very same day, it was about ten days in between. And Mr. Sainovic, with whom I dealt in the situation, very clearly indicated that that was a decision of the president to -- to enter into this deal.

I could give you another example, in dealing with Mr. Bugarcic. When I was able to impress upon Mr. Bugarcic to invite an international forensic team to look into alleged massacres on both sides committed by Albanians, committed by allegedly the Serb side, that was also managed and in the end decided in a positive way, and Bugarcic clearly indicated it was the president who -- who took this decision in the end, which took me several months to negotiate. But in the end, it didn't look very good, because everything coming into Kosovo from the outside was, of course, unwelcome, and again, in this kind of complex and complicated situation, it was Mr. Milosevic who took this decision.

MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, I note the time. I'm at the end of paragraph 13.

JUDGE MAY: Is it a convenient moment?

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: How long do you anticipate being from now?

MR. RYNEVELD: No more than ten, ten minutes, perhaps.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you. Mr. Petritsch, we're going to adjourn now for 20 minutes at the usual time. Could you remember, please - I must give you the standard ⁷²⁴² warning - not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over, and that does include the Prosecution team. Would you be back, please, at ten to.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.

Q. Now, Ambassador Petritsch, I'm about to turn to a meeting that I understood you had with the accused Mr. Milosevic on the 22nd of March, 1999. And before I do that, you've earlier described to the Court in some detail your impressions of the logic behind the negotiations that were going on at Rambouillet and how it would be advantageous to each side. Without going into the detail of that again, I wonder whether you would tell the Court at this time whether or not you had a meeting on the 22nd of March, 1999, who it was with, and the purpose for the discussion.

A. Yes, Your Honours. The meeting on the 22nd of March was after the failed Rambouillet and Paris peace talks, and it was a last-ditch effort on the part of the Contact Group which sent three mediators to meet with Mr. Milosevic. And that happened on the 22nd of March, in the afternoon. I was together with my two colleagues, Mr. Hill and Mr. Maiorsky, and on the side of President Milosevic there were several people from the negotiating team; Mr. Milutinovic, Foreign Minister Jovanovic, some others from his -- from Mr. Milosevic's cabinet.

Q. Where did the meeting take place?

A. The meeting took place in the presidential palace, in Beli Dvor. ⁷²⁴³

Q. That's in Belgrade?

A. And that's in Belgrade, yes, that's correct.

Q. And why did you go there? You said it was a last-ditch effort. What was the message you were trying to deliver?

A. Well, our message was, as the negotiators, to impress upon President Milosevic that time is running out, that we need now a positive re-engagement on their side and that otherwise, we would end up in a cul-de-sac where we as the negotiators could not be of help any longer and that others, meaning the military, so to speak, would then take over, we were afraid. It was very clear to everybody that this was the only alternative, given the fact that for many, many months NATO had already put out its warnings, and it was very clear that the alternative to the Rambouillet accord was a military intervention on the part of the international community.

Q. What was -- what kind of reception did you receive from Milosevic?

A. Well, for me it was actually quite depressing, because I immediately realised that there -- that there was no real interest in identifying a way out of this situation. Mr. Milosevic seemed to me very aloof and not engaged in this issue. My impression in the course of these talks was that he had already made up his mind basically and was not really listening to -- was also very typical and very indicative of the situation that he presented us with a Kosovo Albanian newspaper, Koha Ditore, I don't know, from early February where they had printed one of the last versions of the agreement, of the political agreement, and he claimed that we preferred the Kosovo Albanian side and gave them something ⁷²⁴⁴ that they did not have. Obviously this was incorrect, because we always consistently in the previous months had shared all versions with both sides as mediators. That was, for me, quite interesting and depressing to see that not -- that this was a rather feeble attempt to prove to us that we were dishonest. And you need to imagine that this is not a Western plot, so to speak. That was very clearly, with the inclusion of the Russian negotiator, Boris Maiorsky, who as a real professional tried to find a solution. It was even more important, of course, politically speaking, for the Russian side to find a peaceful solution because the Russians, of course, realised otherwise NATO would call the shots, and that was politically devastating, of course, for the Russian side. So that was also in this situation that Maiorsky made an attempt, a rather hypothetical one, so to speak, by proposing to President Milosevic and addressing him and saying, "Mr. Milosevic, what would you say if we would reopen the whole agreement and start negotiating from the outset?"

Q. Yes?

A. Of course that was something which was not agreed and well beyond our mandate as negotiators. However, it attests to the fact how desperate the Russian side was in this situation. And even in this situation, Mr. Milosevic did not really react in a positive way. He was rather kind of saying, "Well, if you want, you can," something like this. He did not feel that he had a role in this.

So then in the end of -- at the end of our conversation, we said -- Mr. Maiorsky said, "Well, tell your negotiators to come to us. We're now all here in Belgrade, and let's now find a way." And nothing ⁷²⁴⁵ happened. That was the 22nd of March, only a few hours, as we know, prior to the start of the bombing campaign.

Q. While you remained in Belgrade, did Milosevic follow up in any way at all on that offer put by Maiorsky?

A. Not to my knowledge, and also I do not think anything happened, because Boris Maiorsky the next day called me up who originally had said, "I will stay here even if bombs fall." These were the words of Maiorsky. He then on the 23rd in the afternoon called me up and said, "I've been called back by my authorities to Moscow, and I'm leaving Belgrade the next day," which was the 23rd, the very day of the start of the bombing.

Q. Sorry. Just -- did you just say that the next day was the 21st or --

A. 3rd.

Q. 23rd.

A. 23rd, and then in the afternoon, that is when he called me. For me, it was then very clear; once the Russians have given up, then something must have really come to an end on the Yugoslav side. I stayed there, whereas Hill left on the 23rd. With him also Holbrooke, who was in parallel trying to convince Mr. Milosevic to agree to continue and agree to the agreement. I remained there and left a few hours prior to the start of the bombing campaign.

Q. Did something happen overnight on the 23rd of March?

A. Yes. In -- during the night of 23rd to the 24th, I received at my residence some anonymous calls and threats, obviously based upon the rumours that were spread in Belgrade that I had in secret -- or secretly ⁷²⁴⁶ promised independence to the Kosovo Albanians, which of course was utter nonsense. But it did the trick, obviously. And so I was in a situation where I had to call up presidential advisor Bugarcic and first of all tell him what has happened and ask him for -- to provide security for me; and secondly, to inquire whether there is still an opportunity to go back to the negotiations. And he answered both in the negative and suggested to me to leave the country.

Q. And you did that on the 24th of March?

A. And on the 24th of March, in the afternoon, I left Belgrade.

Q. Thank you, Ambassador Petritsch. I understand, sir -- those are my questions. Before you answer questions of cross-examination, I understand you speak Serbian. Perhaps I could ask you -- I know that you will be able to understand, but could you wait for the translation so that the interpreters don't have the difficulty of trying to have people overlapping. Thank you very much.

A. I will, for once, listen to the translation.

Q. Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, it's now for you to cross-examine. We've considered the time, the time that you should have available, and we'll give you an hour and a half to cross-examine the witness. It will be 20 minutes longer than the Prosecution had of one hour and ten minutes or thereabouts.

I will ask the witness if he would be good enough to keep the answers as short as possible because time is limited. It will be taking up time for cross-examination. Of course, you should have the opportunity ^{7247 BLANK PAGE 7248} of explaining things, and you must feel to do so, but if you can keep, wherever possible, the answers short, it will enable more to be done. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I first of all know why you're limiting the time for my cross-examination at all?

JUDGE MAY: We have been through that. You know full well why the time limits are being applied. It's right you should know before you begin how long you've got rather than at the end. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Petritsch, is it true that several years ago in an interview to the Vienna Courier you said that your dog was of Serb ethnicity?

A. Do I answer immediately?

JUDGE MAY: Yes, if you can.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, may I explain? When I became ambassador to Belgrade, a street dog joined our household from the streets of Dedinje, by the name of Malena, and this dog is still with us.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You didn't answer my question.

JUDGE MAY: He has. Yes, what's the next one?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My question was as follows: My question was: Did you, in an interview to the Vienna Courier, say that your dog was of Serb ethnicity?

A. I have tried to answer the question. I think this is not a serious question because when a dog -- because a dog does not have an ⁷²⁴⁹ ethnicity.

Q. All right, then. Did you say that to the Vienna Courier or not? Let's put it that way.

A. To the best of my knowledge, I was never referring in these terms to my dog, but since my dog is from Belgrade and from Serbia, so to speak, it is, of course, a dog from Serbia or a Serbian dog in this broad sense, in this broad geographic and not in an ethnic sense.

Q. In your numerous statements, not only the one that you gave to this but to the media and your other statements, you said that you invested a great deal of effort for a peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis or, rather, a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo; is that correct?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. On the basis of that, can we say that without exception you were friendly disposed to all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia?

A. I think one of the key issues for -- as a foreigner for being of help in former Yugoslavia is to stick to the principle of equality, and that was, of course, also my guiding principle in Yugoslavia while I was there as a mediator, as well as the last three years in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the three ethnic communities - Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs - are trying to form and trying to live a peaceful life.

Q. And why do you think, for example, a million and a half Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not share that assessment of yours as to the impartiality point?

JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter what they think. You must ask the ⁷²⁵⁰ witness questions with which he can deal. He's given you his answer.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. How long were you ambassador to Yugoslavia?

A. It was from September 1997 to July -- I guess my date, formal date of the end of my ambassadorship in Belgrade is early August, July/August of 1999.

Q. I assume that you consider that that appointment of yours implies an above-average knowledge not only of the political situation in Yugoslavia but the history of its peoples as well, their relationships, the problems that they together had to face, et cetera; isn't that so?

A. That's correct.

Q. So you consider yourself to be well-informed. And then you wrote the book "Kosovo-Kosova," which you published in 1999; that's right, isn't it?

A. I published the book as a co-author with two scholars from the University of Gradska, Professor Kaser and Mr. Pichler.

Q. In your book, it says: "During the funeral of a village teacher that was killed on the 28th of November, 1997, for the first time in public three KLA fighters appeared in public in order to hold a speech with respect to that tragic event, and thereby, the KLA became the sole force fighting for the national interests and liberation of Kosovo and which will continue to fight along those lines and that the bloodshed of the victims will not have been in vain."

Are those your words, Mr. Petritsch? ⁷²⁵¹

A. These are not my words.

Q. That's on page 205 and 206 of your book. Is it true that on that same page, you said: "On the 4th of December, 1997, the KLA took over the responsibility for a series of attacks; among other things, the assassination on collaborationists and activists of the Socialist Party of Serbia, Dali Podgoli [phoen], around Stimlje on the 29th of November, and Qamil Gashi, an envoy, a deputy in the federal parliament and president of the organisation of the Socialist Party in Glogovac. In one of their demands, the KLA asked the premier of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, Paja Koposi [phoen], to hand over the money that had been collected from Kosovo Albanians living abroad." My question is as follows: Do you consider that these killings and these assassinations, like all the others that the members of the KLA perpetrated over the Albanian Serbs and others, were in the function of peace?

A. First I would like to say that of course I cannot now corroborate the correctness of the translation of the text that you have quoted from my book, but secondly, I would say unambiguously that no terrorist act is warranted and justified, no matter which side it perpetrates.

Q. As a former Yugoslavia -- ambassador to Yugoslavia, do you know how many requests for asylum were submitted to the Austrian authorities on the part of Albanians from Kosovo?

A. I don't know.

Q. All right. But I'm sure you know what the conditions are for giving asylum, granting asylum; right? ⁷²⁵²

A. I'm not familiar with the details of granting asylum in Austria.

Q. And your country, via its embassy in Belgrade, did it check out the authenticity of the documents that the Albanians used to allegedly prove their political -- that they were being politically persecuted?

A. We have provided, if I remember correctly, at one stage, the Ministry of the Interior in Austria with a political assessment of the situation for the Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia.

Q. And are you aware, once again as a former ambassador, that of the hundreds of requests for asylum in Austria, 98 were submitted on the basis of falsified judgements and sentences issued by the court in Kosovo? Just say yes or no. Did you know that or not?

A. I did not know that, and I do not know whether this is correct or not. That has to be checked with the appropriate authorities in Austria.

Q. And do you know at all whether your authorities persecuted Albanians from the territory of your own country for the crime of forgery? Do you know anything about that?

A. I do not know anything about this. This is not and never was in my professional realm.

JUDGE MAY: The transcript says persecuted. No doubt what it --

THE INTERPRETER: Prosecuted. Interpreter's mistake.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You claim that you had a meeting with me between seven and ten times and that at those meetings you were able to learn a lot about me and as you said, the control that I had, as you say, over all aspects in the SFRY. That's what it says on page 2 of your statement. ⁷²⁵³

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Do you know at all how many times you did actually have a meeting with me?

A. I do not know the exact number. I had at least, I can recall, four substantive meetings, and of course on several other occasions, maybe more formal protocol occasions, we had other meetings, so that this is the reason why the figure is not so precise.

Q. All right. Then I'll skip over a few questions linked to that point. And tell me this, please: On page 3 of your statement, you claim that the Serbian delegation in Rambouillet had a mandate to achieve a political agreement but that it did not have the mandate to negotiate the implementation of that agreement. How do you find that to be logical, that it has the mandate to negotiate about the main issue and does not have the mandate to negotiate a subordinate issue? Is that your way of thinking, your mental construction, or is it based on a fact?

A. Well, that transpired in the course of the very intense -- intensive meetings in Rambouillet. It was very clear and clearly expressed on several occasions by the negotiators.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Ambassador, could you give us an example of that, the lack of capacity to negotiate implementation.

THE WITNESS: Well, under concrete circumstances when we were approaching the issue of implementation, it was expressed very clearly that we cannot do this now, we have to finish the political negotiations and only then we would have to go back, so to speak - literally or via other means of communication - to the president and then ask for the next ⁷²⁵⁴ step to be -- to get agreement to -- for the next step.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And tell me this: The implementation of the political agreement, did that imply the presence of NATO forces on the territory of the FRY? Yes or no.

A. Well, it was very clear that without an international military force, there is not going to be a possibility, a remote possibility to enforce this agreement. And I think, Mr. Milosevic, you know from the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that without the military side, this would not have happened there either. So it was, in my opinion, clear to everybody that a military component in this overall agreement is indeed necessary.

Q. How can you identify Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which there was a civil war as a whole throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the conflict between the forces of the government and terrorists in a sovereign state, in one of the provinces of a sovereign state? How can you equate that? Don't you see any difference between the two?

A. First of all, I -- it is very clear by now that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was, first and foremost, an aggression on a sovereign country, and it indeed had aspects of a civil war inside. And the second point which I would like to make, I think that those whom you consider terrorists, the Albanians, are citizens of your country, and in this way, they also -- this also has aspects of a civil war. ⁷²⁵⁵

Q. But in the territory of a province of that sovereign state and not throughout that sovereign state.

A. The civil war aspects in Bosnia-Herzegovina were confined and were not throughout the territory of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. I'm talking about Yugoslavia.

A. And the same applies to Yugoslavia. It was in a certain part of Yugoslavia; that's correct.

Q. And do you know about the statement made by Christopher Hill, whom you mentioned several times today, given to the BBC, An Untold Story was the name of the programme, in which he claims that the aim of Rambouillet was to bring in NATO troops into Serbia?

A. I am unaware of this statement, and knowing Mr. Hill, I do not believe that this was the only statement that he gave there.

JUDGE MAY: Before you go on, Mr. Milosevic, when was that programme broadcast?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as I know, the witness has answered and said he was acquainted with that, but I can inform you in due course. I don't know exactly now. It was a BBC programme, it's easy to establish.

JUDGE MAY: You know if you're putting these allegations, you have to give us the chapter and verse of when it was that these were said. Yes, go on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. May, I will indeed inform you.

MR. RYNEVELD: Excuse me. ⁷²⁵⁶

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In your book on page 29 --

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.

MR. RYNEVELD: I got the witness's answer to the effect that he was unaware of the statement whereas the accused then summarised to the effect that he said he was acquainted. I just wanted to point that out. If they're at cross-purposes on the issue, I don't want the accused to be suffering under the misapprehension that the witness actually agreed that he was acquainted with it.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In your book "Kosovo-Kosova" on page 296, you claim that 2, 5 and 7, sections 2, 5, and 7 of the Rambouillet agreement were given to the Serbian delegation only at a later stage; is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. However, you do not refer to that in your statement, not in a single part, as a matter of fact. Why not?

A. Let me explain this. I do not want to go too much into the details and technicalities of this, but the 2, 5, 7, these are the so-called implementation chapters of the Rambouillet accords. Police implementation -- civilian implementation, police implementation, and military implementation. And these were, as I tried to explain previously, the technical side which for this reason first you need a political part of the agreement and then, based upon these -- the text and the concreteness of the political agreement, you then in turn put the ⁷²⁵⁷ technical, the implementation paragraphs and chapters.

Q. All right. As for what technical matters are or are not, we will get to that later. But tell me, do you know about the fact that some parts of this so-called agreement were never approved by the Contact Group?

A. Again I have to explain that the military implementation, not the police, not the civilian implementation but the military part, there the Russian position was as follows in the Contact Group which you are referring to: As long as there is no agreement, no positive signal, rather, from Belgrade, we, the Russian Federation, are not support -- or actively engaging in the negotiations and supporting the -- this part. But it was made clear at the same time that the Russian side, of course, is aware of it and that it is also aware of the necessity of a military component in the agreement, again following the Dayton example where the Russian side, only after the end of the negotiations, agreed to the military side of the Dayton Agreement.

Q. You mentioned a meeting with me, and you said that I showed you Koha Ditore, an Albanian newspaper, from the month of February, and that before Rambouillet it carried the entire Rambouillet agreement, and in two instalments at that; very extensively. Tell me, these 83 pages of the military section of the draft, why were they handed over to the Yugoslav side over after the last day of the negotiations in Rambouillet?

A. Because that was the point in time where the necessary prerequisites on the part of the political agreement were negotiated and therefore this was the time to hand over the military part of the ^{7258 BLANK PAGE 7259} agreement.

Q. And do you claim that you handed it to all the parties then or was it only to the Serb party? Did you give it to the other party earlier or did you draft it together with them?

A. That was only given to the Yugoslav side because of the fact that the military agreement, of course, can only -- can only be concluded with a government and not with a group like in the case of the Kosovo Albanians. So for formal reasons, your government or your negotiating team was, in this case, the only interlocutor in concluding this agreement because you have your party, your VJ, your army has to leave and so on and so on. So you were the partner in this and not the Albanian side. That was the reason why it was officially handed over to you, to your negotiators, rather.

Q. Are you trying to say that the Albanians did not even know about this?

A. The Albanian side who protested and wanted to get the text was informed that, yes, there is a military agreement but this needs to be concluded with the Yugoslav side only. And they were informed about the content but were not formally considered a negotiating partner in this.

Q. Well, how come, then, before the Yugoslav side was informed and before the negotiations even started in Rambouillet, how did they manage to publish this in Koha Ditore?

A. Koha Ditore, to the best of my knowledge, published a political agreement and not the military.

Q. All right. You quoted here the letter of the head of the ⁷²⁶⁰ delegation, Ratko Markovic, and you yourself interpreted it. The penultimate paragraph, it says very specifically: [In English] "Agreed to discuss the scope and character of international presence in Kosmet to implement the agreement to be accepted in Rambouillet." "... to discuss scope and character of international presence..." "Scope and character." [Interpretation] When saying "scope and character of international presence," how could you infer on that basis that the Yugoslav side agreed to a military presence? On the basis of what did you infer that?

A. On the basis of the phrase "international presence."

Q. "International presence." That was a fact during Rambouillet itself. There was a delegation, rather, a Verification Mission of 1.400 people in Kosovo. Isn't that an international presence?

A. That's correct. But this is a civilian one, and you did not, in this letter - or Mr. Markovic, rather - did not define this or restrict this to civilian presence, which would have been possible, of course. On purpose it was left open in order to have this negotiating room for the next step, for the military implementation aspects to be discussed.

Q. My question was only on the basis of what did you infer -- from the words that are here in this letter, on the basis of what did you infer that there was consent to a military presence?

JUDGE MAY: I think the witness has already answered that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And the representatives of the Russian delegation, Maiorsky himself included, did they see these parts of the draft agreement, those ⁷²⁶¹ related to the military aspect, before the last day of the negotiations?

A. Formally not; de facto, yes.

Q. All right. Thank you. And is it correct that the representative of the Russian Federation, precisely this Ambassador Maiorsky, refused to sign precisely for that reason?

A. No, that's not correct.

Q. Did he sign?

A. No, he did not sign, the reason being that he wanted to see both sides to sign at the same time. Because as he put it in public there, it needs two to tango.

Q. And are two required for an agreement, Mr. Petritsch, in your opinion?

A. That's correct. This was the reason -- if I may, Your Honours, this was the reason why the Contact Group foreign Ministers appealed to the Yugoslav side, then to use the next hours after the 18th of March to reconsider and to sign. That was the reason why we came on the 22nd of March to Belgrade.

Q. I'm going to remind you what it says here in section 8. [In English] "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including associated air space and territorial waters. This shall include but not be limited to the right of bivouacs, manouevres, and utilisation of any areas or facilities as required," [Interpretation] et cetera, et cetera. [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... use of airports, ⁷²⁶² roads, rails, and ports," et cetera.

[Interpretation] Et cetera. That is to say that the entire territory of Yugoslavia, the territorial waters, the air space, and under item 15, even a whole spectre of electromagnetic frequencies, communications, et cetera.

So is all of that correct, all of what I read out to you?

A. If -- to my best knowledge, it is correct what you have read out to me, if I remember correctly. However, in order to understand this, one has to explain that this text was basically taken from the Dayton Accords, which is, of course, well known to you since you signed it, and already in the Dayton Accords, you signed the same, also applying to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

SFOR, which is the stabilisation international force NATO, plus in Bosnia-Herzegovina has even today and since the Dayton Accords the right to use exactly what you have described here in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. By the way, also Croatia, because that was the agreement. And what has happened is for this military agreement, basically the text and the rest was taken from the Dayton Accords and then transferred and applied and made more concrete in regard to the Rambouillet accord.

Q. That means, according to the Dayton Accords, the occupation of all of Yugoslavia was supposed to be carried out in order to implement some kind of an agreement about Kosovo which had not ultimately even be reached.

A. This is your interpretation. I consider this not correct. It is not to talk about an occupation. It is a mutual agreement, the Dayton ⁷²⁶³ Accords, which you signed up on your free will. And of course it is not about occupation, it is about using, in case it is necessary for transport reasons, logistical reasons, also the territory air space, sea, and so on from the neighbouring countries in order to get into Bosnia-Herzegovina or, in the case of Kosovo, in order to get into Kosovo which, as you know, is a landlocked country or part of your country.

Q. And who actually negotiated with whom in Rambouillet? The Yugoslav delegation with the Albanian delegation or with somebody else?

A. That was, in the case of the military agreement, as I tried to point out, this is the sole responsibility between a sovereign country, your country, and the international community. In this respect, the Kosovo Albanians did not play a formal role. Did not have a formal role.

Q. I am not talking about this aspect. I am talking about the so-called or, rather, purported negotiations in Rambouillet, where the negotiating party, that is to say the Serb party and the Albanian party, never met. They never had a single meeting. Is that right or is that not right?

A. That's not correct. There was one single meeting under the auspices of Secretary of State Albright between the heads of the two delegations. But in substance, you are right. There was never a formal meeting. Therefore -- therefore, these negotiations were conducted by mediators to mediate between the two delegations who were not able and, above all, not ready to sit down together and to negotiate. This is part of the problem there. This is why, the very reason why the international community had to assume a mediating role in this conflict. ⁷²⁶⁴

Q. My question was: Did the delegations negotiate, Mr. Petritsch? Did they have mutual negotiations?

JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered the question, he's explained how it came about.

THE WITNESS: May I add, Your Honours, if you permit, that at the outset it was even difficult to arrange the opening session with president Chirac at Rambouillet where the Yugoslav side protested that terrorists are in the same room and they would not be -- want to be in the same room. This position was, however, changed on the part of the Yugoslav side and so the opening ceremony took place in the presence of both delegations in the same room. And later on, the Yugoslav delegation tried to initiate direct talks with the Kosovo Albanian side. However, the Kosovo Albanian side refused to -- to agree to direct talks, with the exception that I just mentioned before, and insisted on the continuation of the mediation role of the international community.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right, you've explained. There were no direct meetings because the Kosovo Albanians would not accept them. Did I understand you properly?

A. This is the -- these are the well-known facts.

Q. Do you know that Professor Ratko Markovic, as head of the delegation, three times at various meetings of the working group asked Hill whether in addition to the documents or, rather, proposals there were some others that were not tabled at all? Do you know about that?

A. No, I don't. ⁷²⁶⁵

Q. Do you know anything about why Hill evaded giving an answer to these questions?

A. I don't know about this. I cannot testify to the fact that he -- that he evaded this. But I know from my contacts with your delegation that of course from the outset everybody was aware of the whole realm of the -- of the proposed agreement, including the military side.

Q. On page 3, paragraph 8 of your statement, you claim that the Serb delegation did not only disagree to a military presence, but they also opposed the presence of foreign military and police forces. Is that correct?

A. I'm sorry. Could you again refer to what -- to what you just quoted? Could you repeat this, please?

Q. I'm quoting from your statement.

JUDGE MAY: Have you got the statement, Mr. Petritsch?

THE WITNESS: Which statement are you referring to now?

JUDGE MAY: You're referring to the witness statement; is that right?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.

THE WITNESS: Yes. And, Mr. Milosevic, you said paragraph 3?

JUDGE MAY: Page 3, paragraph 8, he said.

THE WITNESS: Page 3.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Paragraph 8.

A. Unfortunately, I have to count the paragraphs because there's no -- ⁷²⁶⁶

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in the English version, it's on page 4, actually. It's on page 4 in the English version, the actual section that's being referred to.

MR. RYNEVELD: I don't want to disagree, but in my copy it's at the bottom of page 3.

JUDGE MAY: And we don't have a copy. Yes. Let's try and get on with this as best we can.

THE WITNESS: Well, what that basically means is of course what you referred to prior with 2, 5, and 7. All the implementation aspects were something that the delegation felt not to have the mandate to negotiate. But on the other hand, that was of course also a clear distinction between the political part and the implementation part, as I have referred previously to.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. So an agreement was about to be reached regarding the political part of the agreement but not the presence of NATO forces on the territory of a sovereign state. Is that right or is that not right?

A. That's not correct. The first part of the negotiations was dedicated to the political agreement, to the political system, to clearly define the Contact Group framework, which means what is substantive autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. That was the political part, so to speak. How to implement once this political part is agreed upon, as it appeared to be at the end, on the 23rd of February, that is the implementation part.

Q. On page 4, paragraph 4, you say: "The Serbian delegation really ⁷²⁶⁷ worked, and we made considerable progress and reached a compromise regarding the political and legal system in Kosovo." Is that correct?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Now, after this compromise, the Serb party was supposed to agree to the occupation of Kosovo as well, and the occupation of Yugoslavia by NATO forces. My question is: Wasn't this the core of the matter? Wasn't this the core of the matter, the core of the demands put forth in Rambouillet?

A. No. There was no occupation envisioned. There was an agreement envisioned between the international community, between the Contact Group, to be more precise, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in regard to the implementation of the Rambouillet accords, more specifically, the international military presence.

Q. Well, I wouldn't quote other parts of the agreement to you now. As you know, since you've read it properly, you know that this agreement envisages the commander of the forces to be the main arbiter. You know that he is the only one who decides about everything regarding the agreement. You know, therefore, that they have the right to use the land, the air, the water, the frequencies, and every conceivable thing in Yugoslavia. So you do not consider that to be occupation. Do you consider the occupation of Kosovo, at least, to be an occupation, with the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, et cetera, and also with the full occupation of the territory by NATO forces? Do you consider that to be occupation at least?

A. No. It's not an occupation either, and it was never envisioned an ⁷²⁶⁸ occupation in Rambouillet as this was not the case in Dayton which you signed up to. It was the Dayton model that -- what the -- where the Contact Group - United States, European countries, and the Russian Federation - agreed upon, to follow, basically, the Dayton model. And that, of course, was not an occupation, but there was a mutual agreement signed by you on behalf of Yugoslavia, by Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Izetbegovic for Bosnia-Herzegovina. So this is not an occupation. And this was the same -- the same model and the same idea was behind Rambouillet.

Q. Mr. Petritsch, what does Dayton have to do with Rambouillet? Isn't it clear to you that as far as the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, this took place through the abuse of Dayton, not in accordance with the letter of Dayton?

A. I disagree with you.

Q. All right. Do you agree with a quotation that I'm going to read out to you? Agreement is quoted. [In English] "Not negotiated settlement but an ultimatum for unconditional surrender, a dictate that spelled death of Yugoslavia and could not be accepted by Belgrade."

JUDGE MAY: Who are you quoting from?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm quoting John Pichler from the New Statesman, May 1999. This is how it reads: [In English] "Anyone scrutinising the Rambouillet document is left in little doubt that the excuses given for the subsequent bombing were fabricated."

JUDGE MAY: You know, Mr. Milosevic, this is of limited use to us in the Tribunal. This is the view of a journalist writing in a British paper in 1999. Now, we are going to have to determine these facts, not ^{7269 BLANK PAGE 7270} the views of journalists.

However, since you've put to the witness that this wasn't a negotiated settlement, we'll take it as a question which is being put, but an ultimatum for unconditional surrender.

THE WITNESS: That was not --

JUDGE MAY: You hear that that suggestion is made. Would you characterise the agreement in that way?

THE WITNESS: The agreement was -- or let me put it this way: Rambouillet was the attempt to find a peaceful agreement. It was conducted in the most transparent way. It was based upon month-long negotiations on the ground, the so-called period of the shuttle diplomacy. There were clear principles established and fully supported on the part of the Contact Group. So to talk about an ultimatum, to talk about a dictate, is utterly wrong.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Since you won't let me quote here and since you won't let me treat this as a question of mine, you can treat them as questions that I am putting myself. I am given the direct quotation out of respect for the person who originally said this, but this is my own view as well. Do you agree with this: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... stage managed and the Serbs were told, 'Surrender and be occupied or don't surrender and be destroyed.'"

A. I can attest to it that this was not the case in Rambouillet and Paris.

Q. [Interpretation] All right. And is it correct that -- this was ⁷²⁷¹ John Pichler in the New Statesman. What about Ronald Hashman [phoen], what he writes in his book "War to War"? He says the following: [In English] [Previous translation continues]... "an ambush. Ronald Hashman sums it up well. It was a declaration of war disguised as a peace agreement." [Interpretation] Is that right or not? It is --

A. This is not.

Q. And do you know, Mr. Petritsch, that George Kenney, an American diplomat who, in the State Department, was the Yugoslav desk officer, wrote in the Nation on the 14th of June 1999 - that is to say an authentic piece of writing - that the United States, and I quote him literally [In English] "set the bar higher than the Serbs could accept."

JUDGE MAY: That's just the opinion of that writer. And if you want, Mr. Milosevic, you can call him as part of your case. But it's of no assistance to us what his views are.

Yes. Did you set the bar higher than they could possibly reach?

THE WITNESS: That's not correct and can be proven by the simple fact that definitely the Russian Federation would have never agreed to this in the Contact Group. I want to stress the fact that all the preparations for Rambouillet and throughout Rambouillet, the Russian side was fully engaged and fully informed about this. It would not have been possible otherwise. And this in itself is, in my opinion, ample proof that there was no scam, no dictate, no ultimatum, but difficult negotiations which went for quite some time, quite positive, and unfortunately, after the 23rd of February collapsed, to the dismay and disappointment of many, including some in the Yugoslav delegation. ⁷²⁷²

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, I suppose it's clear to you that the Yugoslav delegation went there with the best intentions in the world and the conviction that a peaceful solution would be reached. Yes or no.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. --

THE WITNESS: I would assume so.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And can that clearly be seen from the letter from Ratko Markovic that you quoted and which is very precise and says: "We would especially like to emphasise the fact, as the Contact Group has indeed done, that there can be no independence of Kosovo and Metohija or a third republic." And before that, he says: "Definition of self-determination for Kosovo and Metohija respectful of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia." So those are the limits within which the Yugoslav delegation -- the frameworks, within these frameworks was sovereignty and territorial integrity and substantial self-government, that those were the frameworks for the negotiations. Is that clear? Yes or no.

A. That is correct, and I would like to reiterate that the Contact Group and the negotiators took specific care of this sensitivity in regard to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. And it was stressed, to the best of my knowledge, or written into the Rambouillet accords on three different occasions, so to speak, in order to make sure that this is clear beyond any doubt.

Q. Well, now I'd like to draw your attention to the third paragraph ⁷²⁷³ of Ratko Markovic's letter, which in establishing all that, says: "Therefore, all elements of self-government --" "All elements of self-government at the time of defining the agreement have to be known and clearly defined."

That means the agreement must be such that all elements be known and clearly defined. And in further work, this should be adequately addressed and consistently resolved. In that sense, we're ready to participate in the next meeting, et cetera, et cetera. And then he proposes another meeting of the two delegations, but all that was, of course, in vain.

Now, in view of that position, does this position seem to you to be logical, that the delegation of the Republic of Serbia should ask that all elements of that self-government should be known and regulated when the agreement was drawn up? Is that an unrealistic demand?

A. Absolutely not. And all elements of self-government, of course, and I'm referring to what I was quoting in regard to the political side of the agreement, that was, of course, on the table at the time and they were clearly defined and known to the Yugoslav delegation. However, I also see the point that it is from the Yugoslav viewpoint and the delegation's viewpoint clear such an important point to underline in such a letter in order to make it sure beyond any doubt, and that, of course, was the case. I repeat, all elements of the self-government were defined and known, well known, to both sides.

Q. Right. Now, as you yourself have said that we don't exist -- agree with respect to the occupation, let's not enter into a discussion ⁷²⁷⁴ and debate about occupation which is obvious from the agreement and also from reactions throughout the world, but let's get back to what we've just been discussing. I'm going to quote point 3. It is part of the amendment of comprehensive assessments and final clauses, and it is point 3 of that document.

[In English] "After the entry into force of this agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each party's effort regarding implementation of this agreement, and the Helsinki final act to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this agreement and to consider proposal by any party for additional measures." [Interpretation] Do you think that with this, when it says three years afterwards that the will of the people should be tested, as it says here, and that a final ultimate agreement be reached, do you not think that this is such a transparent schematic, first of all with respect to occupation and then the Albanian national minority, let's proclaim that a nation with the right to self-determination, and then let's go on to legalising this with Yugoslavia's signature, with the signature of Serbia, the legalisation of snatching away Kosovo which represents otherwise an integral part of Serbia. And is that in keeping with what you said a moment ago, that it is very pertinent, the delegation's request, to pertinently ask for clearly defined elements and known elements of each particular part of the agreement?

A. I believe that you have touched upon a very relevant and very ⁷²⁷⁵ important point now in this agreement, and you have read this out, and I think by reading this out you have proven to the contrary what you have actually -- what you are insinuating. This is a clear, albeit rather long language, where this -- where it is spelled out that a final settlement has to be based on the will of the people, which is of course democracy, with all the elements of democracy, not just the Albanian, of course, Albanian community as well, the Serb community as well. Secondly, that each party, therefore, is being taken into consideration, which is how much are both sides contributing to building a peaceful Kosovo. And both -- I --

Q. Well, I've read all that, Mr. Petritsch.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish and explain.

THE WITNESS: Both parties, both sides, Mr. Milosevic, have to agree. So if one side wants independence and the other side is against it, it is not possible. And the last very important point, you mentioned the Helsinki final act, which we put into this agreement on purpose. And you know the Helsinki final act means no changes of existing borders. So this was, in fact, the guarantee for Yugoslavia to keep Kosovo inside Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, this was misrepresented in the propaganda in your own country and did not achieve the desired effect. No change of this interim agreement without the agreement of both sides would have been possible.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you really think that you're being convincing when you say that nothing without the agreement of both sides would have been possible when ⁷²⁷⁶ a moment ago, with Rambouillet, when speaking of Rambouillet, both sides did not agree, and then what happened was the bombing. How come that now you're able to say that this meant that there should be agreement of both sides whereas, on the other hand, where the two sides were unable to agree, the result was the bombing? Does that seem to you, Mr. Petritsch, to be logical? Do you really think that anybody can believe what you're saying here now?

A. Unfortunately, if there would have been a Yugoslavia signature on this Rambouillet accord, this paragraph, the final paragraph which you just quoted, would have come into force, and then the Helsinki final acts -- final act would have been the basis for any final solution. Unfortunately, your side did not sign, and, therefore, you had to bear the consequences.

Q. All right. And as this lack of -- I leave this lack of logic to be decided upon those who are attending this. Do you consider the present occupation of Kosovo and the crimes against the non-Albanian population there including over 360.000 Serbs and other non-Serb inhabitants who were expelled from Kosovo --

JUDGE MAY: Before we go into this tendentious argument, what is the relevance of this?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance of this, Mr. May, lies in the crime that was committed against my country and which you are endeavouring here and now to cover up with justifications --

JUDGE MAY: What is the relevance for this indictment to the question you want the witness to answer? ⁷²⁷⁷

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, precisely the fact that we were dealing with topsy-turvy issues, a reversal of theses, and I spoke about that at the beginning. You who proclaim criminal those who defended their country and those who perpetrated aggressions against that country and perpetrated crimes against peace and a series of other crimes, you are trying to justify that with these kinds of explanations that are given here in this courtroom and a series of false testimony --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you're off the point. Now, have you got any relevant questions for this witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a relevant, very relevant issue, and I'm asking Mr. Petritsch, who was otherwise the occupational chief of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether he understands that the present occupation of Kosovo and the crimes perpetrated against the Serbs --

JUDGE MAY: You're not going to use abuse against the witness. We're going to adjourn now. It's almost ten past. We will adjourn for twenty minutes and then go on.

MR. NICE: Just before you do, I was alerted to the timetable allowed for the cross-examination. I think there will be no witness available to fill the balance of the morning because of the various difficulties that have arisen over witnesses coming and going over the last few weeks.

The only conceivable witness would be one in respect of whom you have yet to make a decision about 92 bis.

JUDGE MAY: If it's Ms. Sandra Mitchell, the answer is we admit that under 92 bis, and if she's ready, at least she can make a start. ⁷²⁷⁸

MR. NICE: Unfortunately, then, she hasn't yet been bis'd and I don't think it will be possible between now and then. If there are any other matters I can be help with, I'll hold myself in readiness.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, have you got another witness or not?

MR. NICE: The witness Sandra Mitchell is coming to the building. Her statement hasn't yet been subject to the provisions of 92 bis, but were the Chamber to arise -- assuming she arrives in the next ten minutes, and were the Chamber feel able to rise for a few minutes, that process could be gone through right here and now and then she would be ready for a summary and cross-examination.

JUDGE MAY: I suspect it's going to be a bit tight. We'll see how we get on. But it would be helpful if we could have witnesses here normally, ready to go.

MR. NICE: As Your Honour knows, we've had witnesses stored in hotels for weeks, and I'm afraid the unforeseen circumstances made it quite impossible to get more witnesses here than the ones we have for this week.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Milosevic, we'll give you a bit longer in the circumstances. You've got another 40 minutes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With what we were talking about -- with regard to the Sandra Mitchell issue, this morning I said -- I told ⁷²⁷⁹ you here when I enumerated the statements we have not received, we haven't received Sandra Mitchell's statement. The opposite side told me that Sandra Mitchell's statement had been distributed on the 27th of June. I have not received it. I did not receive it on the 27th of June when they claim it was distributed, nor has my associate received it, who is here in town and in the building. He has not received the statement either.

JUDGE MAY: We will have that looked into. Now, let's finish the cross-examination.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. A moment ago, Mr. Petritsch, you said that because we didn't sign the agreement, that's why we were bombed. That's why you felt the brunt and consequences of that. That's what you were saying a moment ago.

A. What I was saying is that we know now in retrospect what happened after the collapse of the negotiations. I did not refer to the bombing. I just said that our part, the negotiators' part, had come to an end, thanks and because of the non-cooperation on your part.

Q. Well, does that confirm precisely what I said, that it was ultimatum in fact? It was, "Either sign or you're going to be bombed." Which is what actually occurred; right? A sovereign state did not accept the occupation and that's why it was occupied. It did not accept the ultimatum and that is why it was bombed; is that so or not?

A. You are aware of the fact that NATO had already, back in October of 1998, if I recall correctly, issued their act 1 statement, which was then further elaborated. So it was clear to everybody that if the negotiations fail, there is going to -- another actor on the scene, so to ^{7280 BLANK PAGE 7281} speak. And I've also clearly indicated that we, the negotiators, had tried, and went the extra mile, to Belgrade, in order to rescue the whole situation, in order to continue the negotiations. Unfortunately, we met deaf ears at Beli Dvor.

Q. And didn't you observe a moment ago that there were, in fact, no negotiations between the Albanian and Serb delegations?

A. I'm referring to the facts on the ground, the facts that occurred after Rambouillet and Paris, when the Contact Group and the three negotiators were making a last-ditch effort in regards to settling the conflict in a peaceful way.

Q. And this peaceful means, peaceful way, by that you mean NATO troops, the NATO troop presence in Yugoslavia; is that it?

A. That is not correct. I was throughout the negotiations referring to a peaceful settlement, and I was referring to the necessity to include a component, a military component, in order to implement the agreement. Otherwise, this agreement would have merely remained on paper and the conflict, the armed conflict in Kosovo, would have continued.

Q. And have you heard of the statement by a member of the Albanian delegation, Veton Surroi, whom I'm sure you've met, the statement he made for the BBC and the programme entitled "Moral Combat"? He explains Albright and Thaci, and says: "You sign, the Serbs don't sign, and we bomb. You sign, the Serbs sign, and you have NATO on your territory. It depends on you. Unless you sign -- if you don't sign and the Serbs don't sign, then we'll forget about this." In her talks with Thaci, are you aware of her having said that? ⁷²⁸²

A. No, I'm not aware of that.

Q. All right. Let me just diverge for a moment. During the break, I got the statement by Vladimir Stambuk, although this is a very marginal issue, but as you did quote him, he said -- this is the statement: "Under full material -- moral responsibility, I say that the statement given was incorrect during the meeting in Rambouillet."

THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please slow down when reading.

JUDGE MAY: Could you slow down, please, Mr. Milosevic. Could you slow down for the interpreters.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. "If there should be an attack on Yugoslavia by NATO and the bombing, the Albanians in Kosovo will suffer too." So he was quoting, and it is written down in black letters, "If there should be an attack on Yugoslavia, the NATO bombing will result in Albanian victims in Kosovo as well." And the statement is given for these purposes here. You can have it, but let's move on.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer that. What is being suggested is that -- he simply said that there would be casualties among the Albanians. Would that be right?

A. I stick to my original statement.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And have you heard of the book by a compatriot of yours, the Austrian historian Hofbauer who also quoted George Kenney, a competent US diplomat, when he said: "We deliberately set the bar higher so that the Serbs could not accept it"? ⁷²⁸³

JUDGE MAY: We've been through that, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is just an explanation of my question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. On page 219 of his book, he adds the following: That you have great responsibility for that. Are you aware of that, Mr. Petritsch? Hofbauer is your own fellow Austrian. Do you consider yourself to be responsible?

A. I know Mr. Hofbauer and I know the book and I know his position, which I fully disagree with.

Q. All right. Let's move on, then. You claim that the Serb delegation consulted Belgrade with respect to the details of the agreement and that in the political sense, a compromise was struck. Do you consider that with respect to that compromise that they consulted me as the head of state?

A. This is my assumption.

Q. All right. Now answer me this: What -- what do we do with this? Isn't it logical that the delegation of a state should consult the president of that same state when it comes to questions which are of great importance, paramount importance, for that state?

A. Which in turn means that my assumption is right, that you took the final decision on the fate of the Rambouillet peace talks.

Q. But a moment ago, you responded by saying that you considered that a political compromise had been reached and that you considered that, with respect to that political compromise, that they consulted me; right? ⁷²⁸⁴

A. In regard to the political part of the agreement, yes. As well as I assume that the military implementation part was also decided by you.

Q. All right. What you assume is your own affair. But tell me this: Do you know who the Albanian delegation consulted, the Albanian delegation at the Rambouillet talks?

A. I do not have a full knowledge, but I know that Thaci once travelled to Ljubljana in order to consult with Mr. Demaci.

Q. And are you aware of the fact that, along with them, there was Morten Abramovic as a consultant and link with the US administration?

A. Morten Abramovic was, to the best of my knowledge, an advisor, independent advisor to the Kosovo Albanian delegation, and as such he was in Rambouillet.

Q. So he was an independent advisor, was he, to the Kosovo delegation, as far as you knew. And who did you consult during the Rambouillet negotiations, Mr. Petritsch?

A. I consulted with the European Union presidency; at the time, Germany.

Q. And tell me how often during the Rambouillet negotiations did Albright, Vedrine and Cook spend there? How many times were they there and for how long?

A. Messrs. Vedrine and Cook were the co-chairs of the Rambouillet conference, and Paris of course included, and they were, on an average, every other day in Rambouillet. Ms. Albright, Secretary of State Albright, I do not recall, but she was also there on several occasions.

Q. And was not the attack by the NATO alliance on Yugoslavia ⁷²⁸⁵ precisely proof of the fact that a political compromise, which you yourself claim had been reached, was not in fact the aim of the international community at the negotiations but that it was precisely the stationing of NATO forces on the territory of the FRY and in Kosovo. Yes or no.

A. It was first and foremost very clear that in order to implement the political compromise that you referred to, a military component was necessary. And the second point is that after the 23rd of February, the Yugoslav side started to backtrack on the political compromise.

Q. On page 280 of his -- of your book "Kosovo," you, in characterising the nature of the proposal made by the Contact Group, you say - and I'm quoting you, Mr. Petritsch - the following: "The agreement was characterised by a strong influence from the international community. Kosovo de facto would have become a protectorate provisionally. The provisions of the agreement consciously were formulated in two ways to provide -- equivocally to provide broad possibilities for review." For review of what, Mr. Petritsch? For review or for abuse; which is it?

A. Definitely not for abuse but for review. And it was de facto a provisional protectorate. That was in order to explain to an interested public, through this book, what this in practical terms would have meant. As you referred to prior, there would have been an international final authority in Kosovo as this is the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Again, the Dayton model which served as a model for Kosovo for the set-up of the international presence in Kosovo.

Q. And what about the following quotation from your book, is that ⁷²⁸⁶ correct: "Although they were provided for during the negotiations, there was not a single direct talk between the delegations and their boards." Full stop. "Several attempts through mediators, the mediation of Maiorsky, to prompt the Yugoslavia side to do so and to set up a forum for negotiation were aborted because of the resistance on the part of the Albanians." End of quotation. Is that correct? Was that true?

A. I believe, Mr. Milosevic, I have already explained this, and this is correct.

Q. And what about this: Is it correct that the Serb side, precisely via Hill, on several occasions insisted on having a joint meeting but that this was always met with rejection by the Albanian side?

A. The Serb side originally, as I have already pointed out, refused to be -- to sit even in the same room for the ceremonial opening but then reconsidered and then later on changed its tactic and was asking for direct meetings, which we tried to facilitate. Unfortunately, in spite of several attempts, it was not agreed to by the Albanian side, as I have already pointed out. So the Albanian side insisted on continuing with mediation.

Q. Was a single expert meeting held between the two delegations?

A. Not to my knowledge. There was the one meeting which I referred to which was organised by Secretary Albright, but that was an attempt to break the ice, so to speak, but there was no follow-up to it.

Q. And is it correct that on the 10th of February, 1999, you insisted on a meeting with the Yugoslav delegation in Rambouillet in order to convince them to give up on the ten principle requests among which was the ⁷²⁸⁷ one on the unchangeability of the state border of the FRY and also that the Kosovo Albanians should give up on the independence of Kosovo?

A. No, that's not correct. Again, Your Honours, a bit of a longer explanation is necessary. These ten basic principles that Mr. Milosevic is referring to, as I have already pointed out, these were included in the invitation and were a precondition, non-negotiable, had to be accepted by both delegations.

In the course of the Rambouillet negotiations, the Yugoslav side tried to arrange a signing of the general principles, the so-called ten principles, which was considered unnecessary because they were already accepted by the mere fact that the Yugoslavs came to Rambouillet. It was a precondition to accept this, and so therefore, a signing was considered not necessary.

Q. So the ten principled requests, do you remember that as for the system to be imposed in Kosovo the key request of the Serb side was that there should be a bicameral parliament, a chamber of citizens elected according to the principle one man, one vote, and also another chamber of the ethnic communities that would be constituted on a parity basis consisting of all the ethnic communities in Kosovo? Do you remember that? Yes or no.

A. Yes, I remember this. And it --

Q. Do you think that it is right to espouse the principle of having all the ethnic communities in Kosovo be equal regardless of their size?

A. That was one of our guiding principles. It was even more so we wanted the ethnic communities in Kosovo to be even reinforced in their ⁷²⁸⁸ status, and this is the reason why the Rambouillet accords, according to scholars who have analysed it, would have provided for the Serbs and the other ethnic communities, non-Albanian ethnic communities, about 40 per cent of the political power and 60 per cent to the Kosovo Albanians. And you know that the demographic and ethnic break-up is quite a different one. We wanted to strengthen the ethnic communities there. And as we know, the other non-Albanian ethnic communities are traditionally on the Serb side. This was the reason to come up with a fair and balanced and strong position for the non-Albanians in order to create a viable situation for the non-Albanians in Kosovo.

Now, if -- if -- okay. I'm sorry.

Q. Well, then, why was the Serb proposal not accepted that there should be a chamber of ethnic communities in which each ethnic community would be represented on a parity basis, if the principle was that they should all be equal and equitable?

A. Let me answer this in no uncertain terms: There was indeed a situation when the Yugoslavia side advanced the idea of a bicameral system which was accepted by the mediators and which already was accepted by the Kosovo Albanian side. However, once the Yugoslav side saw the details, they decided actually to give -- to again give it up, to not insist on it. But we -- I personally would have been in favour of such a mechanism. And I can tell you in Bosnia-Herzegovina, just a few weeks ago, I managed to introduce a bicameral system in Republika Srpska. So you can believe me that I very much support a full equality and a strengthening of minority ethnic groups in any part of ex-Yugoslavia. ⁷²⁸⁹

Q. You did not answer my question. Why was this key request of the Serb side not accepted, then, that the Assembly should have this chamber of ethnic communities where all the ethnic communities would be represented on a basis of parity?

A. Because the Yugoslav delegation gave up on this idea. And in order to guarantee the equality, it was included in the one cameral system.

Q. Do you know that the delegation of Serbia or, rather, this delegation that negotiated, the one that was headed by Ratko Markovic, consisted of the representatives of all the ethnic communities living in Kosovo, including the representatives of the Albanian party?

A. Yes, I was aware of it and I was in contact also with the representatives of the other ethnic communities which represent -- which were part of your delegation.

Q. Well, why, then, did you not accept this multi-ethnic principle of equality rather than letting the Albanian majority prevail in Kosovo? Didn't it seem fairer to you that this multi-ethnic principle of equality of ethnic communities be favoured rather than having the Albanians prevail over everybody?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I already tried to explain that this was exactly what we were trying, and this is, of course, what is included still now in the draft for -- of the Rambouillet accords, which was, unfortunately, only signed by the Kosovo Albanian side.

Q. But you said, when speaking about the Albanian side, that the Albanian side was very heterogenous and that it consisted of a serious of ⁷²⁹⁰ different groups ranging from Rugova to Thaci; independent, moderate, extremist, et cetera. Is that right or is that not right?

A. That is basically right, yes.

Q. Well, tell me, now, how many of them signed the agreement?

A. As it was agreed, there was an internal structure, as in your delegation, with the head of delegation and the negotiating -- a smaller negotiating team. The same -- or this was the case with the Kosovo Albanian delegation, and therefore, it was only, if I remember correctly, then the agreement signed by Rugova, Thaci, and Surroi. Rugova representing one part of this rather heterogenous group, Thaci representing another part, basically the KLA, and Veton Surroi representing the so-called independents, Blerim Shala and himself and hopefully many more people with the same attitude.

Q. So out of the 17 members of the Albanian delegation, they were the ones who signed.

A. That's correct.

Q. And how many intermediaries signed the agreement?

A. It was Mr. Hill and myself.

Q. So here, out of the 17 members of the Albanian side, those that you mentioned signed. Out of the mediators - and you have been invoking their consensus - only you and Hill actually signed up. Maiorsky did not sign it, and that was sufficient to be grounds for the bombing of not only Kosovo but all of Yugoslavia. Is that right, Mr. Petritsch?

A. That is wrong, an incorrect conclusion. First, particularly when it comes to the conclusion, but first the facts. The Kosovo Albanian ^{7291 BLANK PAGE 7292} decision to sign was taken collectively, and the ones who signed, there was unanimous agreement inside the Kosovo Albanian delegation that these are the three who should sign.

On the part of the three mediators, the decision, as I've already explained previously, was on the part of Mr. Maiorsky to attend the signing ceremony but not to sign there and sign then once the other party, meaning your delegation, would be ready to sign.

Q. So out of you three mediators, there was one signature that was missing. You thought that that signature could be ignored. Is that the same like when NATO ignored the fact that it violated the UN charter by carrying out an aggression against Yugoslavia and --

JUDGE MAY: You're getting a long way from the point with these polemics. Have you got another question, a relevant question, for the witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it correct, because I quoted to you that conversation between Thaci and Albright and the motives that can be seen on the basis of this conversation, can you give an answer to who convinced Thaci to sign the agreement in Rambouillet? Do you know about that?

A. The agreement in Rambouillet on the part of -- of the Albanians, was signed by Veton Surroi and only in Paris at the Kleber Centre, it was Thaci who, after consultations, met in Kosovo and then decided to also sign.

Q. Let me just take a look at some other statements that you made. ⁷²⁹³ Mr. Petritsch, you explained that on the day of the bombing, you left Belgrade, judging by what you said here, because Ambassador Bugarcic advised you to leave the country because your safety and security could not be guaranteed. Since this seems highly incredible to me, is it possible that you got this somewhat wrong? Because you were ambassador in Belgrade, and the question of your security could not be brought under a question mark in any conceivable way.

Are you trying to give an explanation here that actually Bugarcic said to you that you would have to flee in order to survive?

A. That is your interpretation. It's not, by far, not as traumatic. But I was not only the Austrian ambassador there, but when the first -- in October, prior to your agreement with Holbrooke, when most of the ambassadors were leaving, I remained there. But this time, I was not just the Austrian ambassador but the negotiator who, unfortunately, by many people, through propaganda, was conceived as having contributed to the imminent military operation, which of course was an incorrect assumption. But based upon this, Mr. Bugarcic gave me, so to speak, the friendly advice to, rather, leave the country. That was not by me considered as fleeing the country; on the contrary, it was basically a situation where everybody involved knew that war is imminent.

Q. All right. But, for example, do you know how many diplomats stayed behind in Belgrade during the war?

A. I don't know how many, but several did, but they were not negotiators in Rambouillet.

Q. And was any diplomat ever jeopardised in Belgrade in any way? ⁷²⁹⁴

A. I don't know. Not to my knowledge. I was always very well-received and I returned even after the NATO intervention and was well-received both by the wider public, by my friends and acquaintances there as well as by Patrijarh Pavle and your then Foreign Minister Jovanovic.

Q. All right. So your conclusion was that you should leave Belgrade because it was your assumption that unjustifiably you were considered to be responsible for the coming bombing and for what you did in Rambouillet; is that right?

A. That is an interpretation in retrospective, because at the time I did not know and I would not have wished the bombing to happen. It was simply a decision out of security reasons taken by -- by my Foreign Ministry in Vienna, who called me back, and my staff, to return to Vienna.

Q. All right. Did you leave in accordance with the instructions given by your ministry for reasons of security that you've mentioned just now, or did you leave because of this friendly advice, as you had put it, that Bugarcic had given you?

A. If -- if the -- this conversation would have gone differently, meaning to encourage me to remain and to continue the search for a peaceful solution, I would, of course, have remained there. However, you need to take into consideration, Your Honours, that I was already the last of the three negotiators left in Belgrade. So there was only a very, very slim and dim chance that there would have been a resumption of the negotiations. Once the Russian negotiator had left, it became all too clear to us that we have reached the end of the avenue. ⁷²⁹⁵

Q. You said that you cooperated with Bugarcic the most and that it was thanks to that cooperation that you managed to ensure that an invitation be sent to the Finnish forensic team. This morning during your testimony, you said that months went by until this actually took place, and in your written statement you said weeks. So is it months that elapsed or weeks? What are you actually trying to explain in this way? I did not understand the point at all, the point of this particular statement of yours, or, rather, that part of your statement. Of course the point your entire statement is no secret whatsoever.

A. You can choose either to say weeks or months. It was a few months since the summer and the decision by you was taken, if I recall correctly, in October. So you could say, I don't know, 12 weeks or three months or so.

Q. Please, could you comment on this particular part of your statement where you speak about the release of the hostages or, rather, the prisoners, as you put it in your statement, when the soldiers were actually released. It says here in your statement: "However, the Yugoslav side agreed to release these Albanians ten days after the KLA would release the soldiers of the army of Yugoslavia. On the 14th of January, I met with Sainovic, and I said that my credibility depended on whether the Serbs would observe their part of the agreement because, after, the KLA would release the Yugoslav army soldiers. Then, on the 15th of January, the massacre in Racak took place and then the press carried the conversation between Sainovic and Lukic. I don't know about that. However, I was concerned as to whether the KLA soldiers would be ⁷²⁹⁶ released after that. However, as agreed, the Serbs did release the imprisoned KLA members ten days after the imprisoned soldiers had been released. When this happened, Sainovic said this was the president's decision and he was actually referring to Milosevic. Sainovic told me this when we were in a tête-à-tête. This is yet another proof that things happened when Milosevic wanted them to happen."

What does this entire story mean? This entire story that the Serb side kept its word. You mediated, as you put it here, in the release of the soldiers. And since you were promised that ten days later the Albanians would be released, was there any problem in the fact that the Serb side had kept its word and released these Albanians? What's the problem?

A. There is no problem. This is just yet another example that it was President Milosevic who took the decisions. And even under difficult circumstances, like in this case where, as you know, on the 15th of January, this Racak happened, and of course everybody thought at the time that now thinks -- everybody realised at the time that this is a new negative quality in this conflict. And so I personally was very concerned that -- that your side would not stick to this gentlemen's agreement, because that was, of course, one in secret and since your side did not want an exchange to be officially on record, so to speak, and whereas the Albanian side released immediately, we had promised them that your side - and this was my word that was at stake - relieve -- release the KLA prisoners after ten days in order to make -- to make it not so visible and obvious that this was an exchange. ⁷²⁹⁷ However, when Racak happened, of course, which changed totally the situation in this conflict, I simply was afraid that your side would not stick to this gentlemen's agreement. However, you did. And when asking Mr. Sainovic, he said, "That's the president," and this was you. That's basically just to explain who called the shots in Yugoslavia.

Q. Yes. Yes. But that is precisely why I'm asking you this. I haven't got it in Serbian because I got this summary of your statement this morning in English only, but it is paragraph number 3 where you say, this is your observation, that I am in charge of everything, and you say: "Milosevic was the one and only person [In English] controlling everything in every way and had de facto control of all decisions and government institutions."

[Interpretation] Let's be quite clear, Mr. Petritsch: Of course I am not questioning at all the fact that my position with regard to the occupation of my country was that occupation could not be accepted. I am not bringing that into question at all, this fact. But I'm asking you because you were ambassador to that country, because you live in a neighbouring country, why do you represent Serbia and Yugoslavia as some kind of savages where there is no parliament, no government, no --

JUDGE MAY: Now, this is pure polemics again. The witness has done no such thing. Now, you can ask one more question because your time is now up. What is the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you think, Mr. Petritsch, that a crime was committed against Yugoslavia? Do you think that this crime goes on until the present day? ⁷²⁹⁸ And does it affect you in any way the fact that yesterday, finally, a legal International Criminal Court started working yesterday and that some day this crime would --

JUDGE MAY: This is totally irrelevant. Mr. Tapuskovic, have you any questions for the witness?

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Petritsch, today as well as in your written statement, you said that between the 10th and 14th of February, or round about, 1999, the Serb delegation achieved great strides forward in the negotiation and that a compromise was reached with respect to political and legal aspects regarding Kosovo, that a certain amount of agreement was achieved, in fact. Is that correct? Is that so?

A. That's correct.

Q. Now, is it also correct that the only problem outstanding was how to implement this?

A. That was substantively about the only, but of course big, problem.

Q. And when it comes to implementation, the point on implementation for the agreement, did it also say the following: "The participation of the OSCE and other international bodies if this is indispensable." So no mention is made there of NATO or the armed forces. It says: "The participation of the OSCE and other international bodies, if that is indispensable." Is that what was stipulated in the agreement?

A. Mr. Tapuskovic, you know that this is exactly the case. The -- you're quoting now from -- from the basic elements, and in -- under ⁷²⁹⁹ "Implementation," there's a point saying --

Q. Yes.

A. -- of OSCE and other international bodies as necessary. Other international bodies, of course, assumes UN, NATO, whatever, is agreed upon and necessary for the implementation.

Q. Well, is it first and foremost the UN? Once the UN decides, then they should move forward, or was the order of that somewhat different?

A. That was not in the framework of the UN. That was in the framework of the Contact Group which steered and conducted and supervised these negotiations.

Q. All right. And did the Yugoslav side, on the 16th February, as you were there, accept stepping up the OSCE mission to have 5.000 or 6.000 observers and they should be lightly armed? So this was the first time that it accepted the military presence of 5.000 or 6.000 military observers lightly armed? Is it true that the Yugoslav side offered that as a solution?

A. That was once discussed but never pursued, neither by the Yugoslav side nor by the international community side.

Q. In fact, already on the next day, if that is true, you were there, did in fact the Yugoslav side offer that the implementation or, rather, for the implementation to go through, that a joint staff be set up of NATO and Yugoslavia? Was that on the agenda and is that one of the offerings made by the Yugoslav side?

A. I do not recall this.

Q. All right. Thank you. And the very next day, the 19th of ⁷³⁰⁰ February, after the Yugoslav side presented, tabled this offer, that Annex B came into being. We've already discussed it today and I don't want to repeat it. You were there so you know.

A. Annex B was, at the time, presented. It was, of course, elaborated on and worked on prior to this, and it was then presented to the Yugoslav delegation, that's correct.

Q. Mr. Petritsch, I'm interested in the following: Did you have direct contacts with the representatives of the KLA, you personally, alone?

A. You're referring to the -- to Kosovo or in the framework of the Rambouillet talks?

Q. I am asking you about the Rambouillet issue. I don't want to expand the topic. We haven't time for that. But did you have direct contacts with the leaders of the KLA with respect and in Rambouillet?

A. I had direct contacts with the delegation of Kosovo Albanians including the KLA members of the Kosovo Albanian delegation, in particular with Mr. Thaci. Mr. Thaci speaks German and that made it easier also to communicate directly with him. And since he was the head of the delegation, of course it served a very substantive purpose.

Q. Now I'm interested in three meetings and three talks that you had with Mr. Thaci; and you write about them in your book. The first was in the night between the 19th and 20th of February. Was that a telephone conversation and did you, on the night between the 19th and 20th of February, indeed have a telephone conversation with Mr. Thaci?

A. I assume you're referring to the direct conversation, meeting with ⁷³⁰¹ Mr. Thaci in Rambouillet, on the premises of the negotiations.

Q. In your book it says as follows, on page 301 of your book: "After a night conversation between Petritsch and Thaci, Thaci was convinced of the need to accept the agreement in principle." That's what it says in your book.

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Next, also in your book, the following: "On the 5th of March," it says, you, together with Ambassador Christian Bos [phoen], the German ambassador, on the rebel territory you met the head of the General Staff of the KLA. On March the 5th. Is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. And is it also correct what it says in your book, that on the occasion you received the answer from Hashim Thaci to the effect that he would sign the agreement offered up in Paris?

A. Mr. Thaci, to my recollection, was not present there, but he called and gave me the assurance that they are nearing the decision to -- to sign. Basically, he said that he's confident that he will be able to sign.

Q. And did the negotiator representing Russia know about all these talks, the talks that you had with Thaci and with the leaders of the KLA?

A. Mr. Maiorsky was, as a matter of rule by me, fully informed about my activities as was the case of Mr. Maiorsky when it came to his activities. And so in Rambouillet, he immediately knew -- he himself ^{7302 BLANK PAGE 7303} spoke, of course, on several occasions with Thaci and the other Albanians, and in the interim period between Rambouillet and Paris, Mr. Maiorsky was, to my recollection, in Moscow and could, therefore, not participate in these talks. But Ambassador Powers [phoen] from the European Union presidency was present, as you have correctly, so rightly, so mentioned.

Q. Today in this courtroom you said, and we all heard it, that the Yugoslav side did not wish to accept the presence of NATO forces in Kosovo but that the KLA only wanted that kind of solution, that is to say, the presence of NATO forces in Kosovo. Did you discuss that with Thaci and the leaders of the KLA? Did you say anything about that and were there any promises? Were any promises made along those lines?

A. Well, it was very clear that the main task of this 5th of March meeting in Kosovo was to send a clear message to the Kosovars, to the Kosovo leadership there as well as to the KLA in particular, that their term has come to an end, that by signing up to the Rambouillet accords, their organisation, their military organisation, will have to be disbanded. That was the difficulty, of course, in dealing with this March 5 meeting, because these were active rebels or military or paramilitary or terrorists, whatever you call them, and for them, it was clear that they would have to hand over their weapons and their uniform. So for this reason, we wanted to make it clear beyond any doubt that by signing up to this, this means the end of KLA as a military organisation. That made it so difficult there to convey this message. But this was a very clear thing and necessary in order to -- to provide for the next step, which is -- which was the Paris negotiations. ⁷³⁰⁴

Q. And just one more question on that topic. Was the KLA disarmed, and what did this protection Kosovo corps mean? Who was this corps protecting if NATO was already in the field, in the territory?

A. The Rambouillet accords did not include -- now we have to distinguish between the Rambouillet accords and the present solution, which of course is, from a Belgrade viewpoint, a less favourable one. After the war, unfortunately, I would add in my private capacity, personal opinion, at the time of the Rambouillet accords, of course, there would have been a clear decision implemented by the international forces to fully disband the KLA, and on the other hand, Yugoslavia border forces would have been allowed to enforce the sovereignty also in Kosovo. This is in the Rambouillet accords written, close to 2.000 personnel. That, of course, is not any longer now, after the war, included in this. But at the time, the solution that was offered was crystal clear that the KLA will have to disband fully.

Q. Thank you. In the statement you gave to the investigators of the Tribunal --

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, that is the last page of the statement.

Q. -- which in paragraph 3 from the top, refers to a problem, and you state, Mr. Petritsch, that it appeared as if Milosevic did not expect NATO to Serbia. On the basis of what were you able to make that assertion or assessment?

A. Well, I mean, again this is something which is based on my practical experience and my intimate engagement and involvement in this ⁷³⁰⁵ issue. That was the opinion that was not only held by me but that was an opinion which was shared by many.

Q. You also say in the very next sentence the following: "He probably gambled that NATO would bomb for two or three days, then back down and go back to the negotiating table." And that too was your free assessment, was it?

A. That was, again, a widely held opinion, opinion which in -- now in retrospect, of course, has been proven incorrect.

Q. And did you know anything about the plans that NATO had? If they started to bomb, how long the bombing would go on for? Did you know anything about that or not?

A. No. I had no knowledge whatsoever of this.

Q. Page 3, referring to Mr. Stambuk and that he told you that if NATO bombs fall, there will be a massacre in Kosovo. We've heard that already. But in the first sentence after that, you say: "He did not qualify this statement." So he didn't explain his statement at all. He didn't tell you anything resolutely, but you concluded what you told us here today. And then you said that he was not referring to the fact that NATO bombs would lead to large-scale deaths in Kosovo. So on the basis of what do you say what you stated here in court today?

A. I think it is very clear that I had the impression that what he said meant a massacre by the Yugoslav or Serbian forces and MUP on the Kosovo Albanians. However, in order to be fair, and this is one of my personal guiding principles in -- here in my statement and in my testimony, I added that Mr. Stambuk did not qualify the statement. I ⁷³⁰⁶ think this is a fair -- to be fair vis-à-vis Mr. Stambuk.

Q. Yes. But you know full well he used the word "massacre." You laid special emphasis on that. I'm not going to qualify any of what happened in Kosovo by using any terms like that, but you know very well that the Kosovo Albanian refugee columns on the 14th of April in Djakovica was hit by NATO bombs. This was recognised by NATO and there were 70 casualties, 70 dead.

JUDGE MAY: I don't think it's going to assist us further to go into that. It's nothing to do with this witness's evidence.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, we have to deal with it. We have to deal with NATO bombs, Judge.

JUDGE MAY: No, we don't.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] One more question.

JUDGE MAY: Well, one more question.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] And that is what I wish to do to assist, to allow the Trial Chamber to look at all this. I'm sorry that you have limited me to one more question, but I respect your judgement.

Q. Now, one more question linked to the refugees -- or not linked to the refugees. Mr. Naumann confirmed that. Yes, people did flee Kosovo after the NATO bombing. They left Kosovo, they did leave Kosovo. But do you know from the whole of Serbia - Vojvodina, Belgrade, Serbia - that people left; they were either in the basements, in their cellars, or they left to neighbouring countries because they were fleeing from the bombing and that this created a problem in these third countries? Were you aware of that or not? ⁷³⁰⁷

A. Yes, I was aware of that. I was also aware of the fact that Kosovars to an overwhelming degree were fleeing because of the Serb forces on the ground. I travelled during the NATO intervention, the refugee camps in -- near and around Skopje and other places, and I can tell you that there was a very clear opinion expressed why the Kosovar Albanians had left the -- their country, their homeland, and how it all came about. I think there is no doubt that the absolute responsibility rests with the Serbian and Yugoslav forces who -- which were at the time in -- on the territory of Kosovo.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, he hasn't answered my question. Please.

JUDGE MAY: He's dealt with the matter as thoroughly as possible and as far as it's relevant to his evidence. His evidence wasn't about any of this.

Now, Mr. Ryneveld, do you have any questions?

MR. RYNEVELD: Nothing arising in re-examination. Thank you, Your Honour. I do have two other matters.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. RYNEVELD: With respect to --

JUDGE MAY: Let's deal with the witness first. Have you finished?

MR. RYNEVELD: I've finished with the witness except for one thing. I'm wondering whether, since there's been extensive cross-examination on his statement by both the accused and Mr. Tapuskovic, whether Your Honours want the statement marked as an exhibit.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, we will exhibit it. May we have a number, ⁷³⁰⁸ please.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 236.

MR. RYNEVELD: Then those are all the matters with respect to this witness at this time. Thank you.

JUDGE KWON: If the statement is to be exhibited, could you clarify the letter attached to the statements. It gives some brief explanations, some letter to the president.

MR. RYNEVELD: Excuse me just one moment. I'm not sure that -- that was the speech, I think, that was referred to by the witness in evidence about the speech he gave in 1997 to Milosevic at the time of that ceremonial -- at the time he delivered the message. I believe that's what it is, but --

JUDGE KWON: So this is the recollection of Mr. -- Ambassador Petritsch.

MR. RYNEVELD: I'm not sure it's a recollection or whether it's actually his printed speech that he had prepared. It looks to me as if he's addressing: "Mr. President, Your Excellency, it's a great honour to be able to present to you --" it looks to me as if this is -- but perhaps I would be allowed one question about that?

Re-examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

Q. Mr. Petritsch, this letter that is attached to your statement, is that in fact your speech?

A. I would have to see this because I have not seen the speech now for a while.

Q. I believe it's both in original and in English -- original German ⁷³⁰⁹ and in the English version?

A. Yes.

Q. That's it?

A. Yes, that's it.

MR. RYNEVELD: That answers Your Honour's question. I don't know whether you wish that attached to the statement or just the statement. That's up to Your Honours. It's tendered in its whole capacity.

JUDGE MAY: We will have just the statement not the speech too. Yes. Do we have an exhibit number for it?

THE REGISTRAR: 236, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Ambassador, thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give your evidence. It's now concluded. You are free to go.

[The witness withdrew]

JUDGE MAY: If the Registrar and legal officer would come up, one matter.

[Trial Chamber, legal officer and registrar confer]

JUDGE MAY: I was just raising the date which appears on the LiveNote. It should in fact be day 70.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, Your Honour. Just one brief housekeeping matter. As you can appreciate, there's been some lapse of time because we haven't sat, and I would have done this earlier, but it occurs to me that on the 26th of April, during the evidence of Aferdita Hajrizi, there was evidence given towards the end of her testimony that she could identify certain people who she claimed were responsible for the death of her husband, mother, son, mother-in-law, and she indicated to the Court, I ⁷³¹⁰ believe under cross-examination, that those people had been prosecuted for those crimes. I believe His Honour Judge Kwon requested that the Prosecution obtain a copy of the court file. We have now done that, and we would propose to provide that to the Court in accordance with your request. The court file referred to.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll have that exhibited.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Is there a convenient number in -- together with her testimony or not? If somebody hasn't got it.

MR. RYNEVELD: I believe our case manager will be able to suggest a convenient number fairly quickly because she has access to the commuter here.

I believe Mr. Nice has some other matters to address perhaps while we're looking for a number. 115A.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. That will be exhibited, then, 115A. Perhaps you'd like to hand it in.

MR. RYNEVELD: We don't have an usher, but... The top copy is the original and then we have a number of copies.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, could you make sure that the accused -- I'm sorry to place the burden on you, but could you make sure he's got a copy of Sandra Mitchell's statements.

MR. NICE: Yes. Our understanding was that service on him via the Registry, which is the way we've always had to deal with it, was effected on the day set out in --

JUDGE MAY: It may have been. ⁷³¹¹

MR. NICE: If we could hand him another copy directly today

JUDGE MAY: If you could hand him one now and then he's got it and he can prepare.

MR. NICE: Yes. Subject to her being through -- going through the 92 bis procedure, then she'll be ready to give evidence tomorrow or Thursday, as originally listed.

Your Honour, can I mention two other matters in open court and one very briefly in closed court? The two matters for open session are these: The Rule 68 procedures that we are going through are assisted by cooperation both of the amici and by those associates of the accused if he is instructing them or allowing them to cooperate. So far, they have not come to us with any indication that they are being so instructed. If he can find it in himself to cooperate to that extent, it will help and it will help him. We would be grateful for that. If he feels he really can't, then we will simply have to make the best decisions we can with the assistance of the amici, but of course, that decision won't have the advantage of the accused's input.

On a similar topic, the Court will recall that last week I reminded the Court of a process being gone through in another trial to speed up translations into English, namely the process whereby the University of Novi Sad is used. It's not really a matter for the accused in a sense whether he cooperates with that or not or agrees to it, I simply announce, following on the indications of the Court last week, that we will be having documents translated in that general way wherever we can in order to speed up the process and we imagine, from silence, that the ⁷³¹² accused has no objections to it. I am obviously not inviting him to speak today. He can remind himself of what is in the transcript of last week's hearing and make observations if he chooses, but we're going ahead with that.

May I have one minute for closed session, seeing the time?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Have we got the copies of the statement I asked for?

MR. NICE: It's coming now.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, private session

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--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 3rd day of July, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.