⁷⁶³⁴

Monday, 8 July 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honours. I intimated last day that Ambassador Vollebaek is available today, and I had asked whether perhaps the last witness might be able to -- I think I used the phrase wrapped around this witness. Ambassador Vollebaek is here now, and I would propose, with the Court's permission, to proceed with Ambassador Vollebaek and then continue thereafter with the continuation of the previous witness, if that meets with the Court's approval.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: I think technically you need leave to call Mr. Vollebaek because he wasn't on your original list.

MR. RYNEVELD: Then I seek oral -- this is an oral application to call Ambassador Vollebaek at this time. I do believe that his materials were served quite some time ago.

JUDGE MAY: The statement was disclosed and it was disclosed in B/C/S by the 15th of March.

MR. RYNEVELD: That's correct, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Accordingly, there is no prejudice in calling him now and leave will be given.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. ⁷⁶³⁵

JUDGE MAY: He's only available today, is that right?

MR. RYNEVELD: That was my understanding, however, upon his arrival a little while ago, apparently his flight schedule is not quite as tight. He could continue on until tomorrow, if necessary, but having made arrangements with the last witness, who is now not here, I don't want to waste a moment's court time.

JUDGE MAY: No. We will call this witness and deal with him, if at all possible, today.

MR. RYNEVELD: That would be wonderful. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness with take the declaration.

WITNESS: KNUT VOLLEBAEK

THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat, Mr. Vollebaek.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours. Examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

Q. Now, Ambassador Vollebaek, I understand, sir, that you started your diplomatic service in the Norwegian diplomatic service in 1973?

A. That's correct.

Q. And is it also right, sir, that you became the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1997 and served in that capacity until March of the year 2000?

A. That is also correct.

Q. Now, sir, while you were the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, did you serve in any other office with the OSCE? ⁷⁶³⁶

A. Yes. In the capacity as Norwegian Foreign Minister, I was chairman in office of the OSCE during the year 1999.

Q. And your present function today, sir, is?

A. I am Norway's ambassador to the United States of America.

Q. Now, sir, I'm going to ask -- back you up to the year of 1993. Did you hold any particular office at that time in relation to the international conference of former Yugoslavia?

A. Yes. From the 1st of June, if I recall correctly, until the end of 1993, I was what was called deputy co-chairman of the international conference on former Yugoslavia.

Q. And while engaged in that capacity, sir, did you have any involvement in negotiations between particular governments?

A. Yes. My main responsibility during those months was to negotiate, or try to negotiate, I should rather say, a settlement between the government of the Republic of Croatia and the government of the so-called Republic of Krajina.

Q. And during the course of those negotiations or attempted negotiations, as you phrase it, did you have any dealings with the accused in these proceedings, then President Milosevic?

A. Yes, I did. Not a lot, but we thought that Belgrade had some influence on the Republic of Krajina and so we referred to Belgrade from time to time. Then Foreign Minister Jovanovic I met with on several occasions, and I also met with President Milosevic. At least I remember one meeting with him in connection with -- we tried to set up secret negotiations in Norway between the Serbs and the Croats. I guess we -- at ⁷⁶³⁷ that time we were somewhat inspired by other Norwegian colleagues that had achieved something in the Middle East and we thought we could do something similar in this connection. And at that time I met with President Milosevic for him to put pressure on the Serbs in Knin to go along with my proposal for these negotiations in Norway.

Q. And did Milosevic at that time appear to be willing to assist you in achieving your objective?

A. He did. This was in the early fall, if I recall this correctly. I think the meeting in Norway took place in November, so this must have been -- or maybe October. So this must have been in September, early October. And I went to Belgrade and had a meeting with him, as I said, and at that time, the government of Croatia had battles going on both with the Muslims in Bosnia and at the same time then with the Serbs in Knin, in the Krajina Republic. And I asked for his help, and he said that he would assist me because he felt that it would be difficult for the Croats to fight two fronts at the same time, and according to him, it was more important to fight the Muslims than the Serb -- the Croats should be able to fight the Muslims and in order for the Croats to fight the Muslims, the Serbs should kind of step back and let the Croats fight the Muslims. And his statement, as I still recall very vividly and as I thought of sometimes during 1999 was that the reason why he did this, that we could not have a Muslim republic in Europe.

Q. Perhaps you've already explained it, but what did you understand him to mean when he said something about not having two fronts?

A. Well, he indicated to me that he was impressed, as I understood ⁷⁶³⁸ it, with the Croat military power, but in spite of the fact that the Croats were good fighters, good military, to have two fronts at the same time would be too much for them. And as I understood him, he thought it was important for all of us, I guess he implied, to fight the Muslims. And then in order to -- to let the Croats concentrate, so to say, on the Muslims, he would ask the government in Knin to participate in the talks that we were going to have in Norway and then, for the time being at least, not pursue military activities.

Q. I see. Ambassador Vollebaek, in 1993, what was Milosevic's position? Like, what position did he hold with what government?

A. Well, as far as I can recall, he had the same position as he had in 1999; he was President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. Why did you go to him in order to attempt to persuade other -- other governments or other entities to come to Norway to negotiate?

A. Well, we were under the impression that the government in Knin was heavily supported, strongly supported, by the government in Belgrade and then, in casu, then President Milosevic. We knew that members of the Knin government went to Belgrade very often, and we thought and presumed that President Milosevic had a strong influence on the government in Knin. And since the representatives of the Knin government then went to Norway for these talks, later on I was strengthened in my belief that there was an influence from Belgrade on the government of Knin.

Q. Because they showed up at the --

A. They showed up, yes.

Q. I see. Sir, just to take you to more recent times, we've heard in ⁷⁶³⁹ these proceedings considerable evidence from various individuals about the OSCE, but as I understand it, sir, you were the -- you were the chairman of the OSCE. You were the chief executive officer, as it were, in that capacity, were you, of the OSCE?

A. Yes. We had a secretary-general, or the OSCE has a secretary-general, which is an employee, but the chairman in office is a politically elected function. It changes every year, so it's held by a Foreign Ministry of one of the member countries for one calendar year, and Norway had been selected then to hold this position for the year of 1999. And since I happened to be the foreign minister at that time, it was my task to be the chairman in office of the organisation for that year. There is -- there is a troika system, which means that you start in -- as a member of the troika the year before and you continue the year after. So I started working with the -- with the issues already in 1998. At that time, it was Professor Geremek, the Foreign Minister of Poland, who held the office as chairman.

Q. I see. So you spent a year sort of getting ready to take office the following year?

A. That's correct.

Q. Then you hold office, and then you sort of hold office for a year to assist the newcomer so that there's, I take it --

A. Continuity.

Q. -- continuity in the position. I understand. But during 1999 when you were the chairman, how many member states were there? How many countries were there that made up the OSCE? ^{7640 BLANK PAGE 7641}

A. There are 54 members. I think there still are 54 members of the OSCE. In 1999, Yugoslavia was suspended, so their chair was vacant, so only 53 countries were present in the organisation.

Q. Why was Yugoslavia suspended? Do you know?

A. That happened because of the Balkan conflict and the decision by the organisation to suspend it due to the fact that Yugoslavia did not live up to its obligations as a member of the OSCE.

Q. To your knowledge, have they now been reinstated?

A. They have.

Q. Now, you've already made reference, sir, to the previous chairman, Geremek. Was there, in 1998 while you were already working with Geremek, were you aware of a special mandate with respect to Kosovo?

A. Yes. The OSCE had by itself, so to say, a mandate for the peaceful settlement of conflicts, for democratisation, for human rights in Europe, but in the dealing with the Kosovo conflict, there were, if I recall correctly, two Resolutions by the Security Council. If my memory doesn't fail me, I think it was 1160 and 1199, but anyway, those Resolutions gave or asked the OSCE to take upon themselves to try to find a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo conflict. And in order to fulfil that request by the Security Council, there were negotiations between the government of Yugoslavia and the OSCE, and there was an agreement signed between Foreign Minister Geremek, and I think it was signed by Foreign Minister Jovanovic of Yugoslavia in October 1998 that should then lead up to the presence of OSCE in Yugoslavia and specifically then in Kosovo.

Q. You are aware, I take it, of a document known as the Holbrooke ⁷⁶⁴² agreement? Is this in substitution for or in addition to or totally separate from what has been colloquially referred to as the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement?

A. My understanding is that the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement should be in support of the role of the OSCE and of the peaceful settlement. I didn't always feel it that way, I must admit, when I spoke to Mr. Milosevic about it, because when I -- well, the formal basis for our presence was, of course, the OSCE agreement, and we had a mandate on that basis. But at the same time, it was this additional agreement, as you said, the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, that, I must admit, I've never seen, but it came up in the conversations I had with Mr. Milosevic, and -- but it came up in a way that when I asked for something, when I demanded something of him, he claimed that this was without the agreement he had with Mr. Holbrooke. So -- and I could not verify that.

Q. I see.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Ryneveld, remind me of this: We have the OSCE agreement in evidence, do we?

MR. RYNEVELD: We do, yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you could remind me sometime what the number is.

MR. RYNEVELD: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: I know we have the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement. That I remember. In October 1998.

MR. RYNEVELD: There is a document, and we'll find it in just a moment, that's actually signed by Geremek and that's the document. ⁷⁶⁴³

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Judge Kwon kindly reminds me. It's tab 94. As I remembered, the Milosevic agreement is there.

MR. RYNEVELD: I believe it's in the binder of materials constituting Exhibit 94 that were introduced through General Drewienkiewicz. I just don't know what tab number without reference.

JUDGE MAY: The answer is it's tab 2.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: And the other agreement is tab 1.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. Yes. I thought they would be fairly early in the binder.

Q. Now, just a couple of quick questions, sir. We know that the OSCE was made up of 54 member states, et cetera, et cetera. What function, what particular issues or interests did the OSCE attempt to safeguard during its -- during its mandate?

A. The OSCE was following up, so to say, of the so-called CSE, the conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, and that conference was then made into an organisation, a permanent body, which was the OSCE. The conference was based on the Helsinki treaty of 1975. It was established during the Cold War as an organisation working with disarmament, with the human rights, trying to pursue efforts for democracy, minorities. So there was a whole range, actually, of - what shall I say? - activities in order to seek a peaceful change from a totalitarian system in then eastern and central Europe and into a democratic system for the whole of Europe. And at the same time, as I said, strongly involved in disarmament. ⁷⁶⁴⁴

Q. In 1999, during your chairmanship of the OSCE, did you have any discussions with Mr. Milosevic, among others, about the role that the OSCE might play in the Kosovo conflict? And if so, what kind of reception did you get from Mr. Milosevic?

A. You said 1999, during my year as chairman in office?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes. I had several meetings with him. As I recall it, I think I had three meetings and I had some telephone conversations. Since Kosovo was, as I saw it at that time, the main task of the OSCE - we had a number of other tasks at the same time but the Kosovo conflict had become such a hot issue, a very serious issue - I felt that I had to concentrate a lot of my efforts as chairman in office of the OSCE on precisely Kosovo. And for that reason, I decided to go to Belgrade early, and I think my -- in my term as chairman. And I think my first meeting with then President Milosevic was on the 11th of January in 1999, when we then discussed the work that we were going to do, the various activities that we were going to do.

At that time, if I again recall correctly, some Serbs had been abducted or hijacked, kidnapped by Kosovo Albanians, so that became a very important issue, trying to release those -- and that was maybe my main task during that visit instead of preparing for the ordinary work that the OSCE should be doing.

We had established what was called the Kosovo Verification Mission. I understand that you have had witnesses earlier that dealt with that. And my next meeting was 21st or something of January, and that was ⁷⁶⁴⁵ to discuss the expulsion of Ambassador Walker. Ambassador Walker was the head, as you well know, of the Kosovo Verification Mission, and President Milosevic, and I suppose the government, whatever, had decided to declare Ambassador Walker persona non grata. There was unacceptable to us. It was, as I saw it, a violation of the agreement we had with the government, and I had to try to stop the expulsion, and I -- he was not expelled. And then my last meeting with Mr. Milosevic was on the 1st of March, if I again recall correctly. At that time, the Rambouillet talks, the talks had -- were under way. I think there was a period, a kind of a lapse in the talks, and I went to Belgrade to see if we could try to convince Mr. Milosevic and the government and to pursue the negotiations as we wanted them to pursue.

Q. We'll get into some of those meetings that you've just outlined for us with some more specificity. Maybe I should back you up just for a moment.

Did you also have any meetings with Mr. Milosevic in 1998, prior to taking on the role as chairman personally?

A. Yes, I did. I think the first meeting I had as Norwegian Foreign Minister was in April of 1998, and at that time I knew that I was going to be the chairman of OSCE for the next year so we discussed, obviously, that role and that function and then we discussed the normal -- whatever foreign ministers discuss with the heads of states, and specifically, of course, the very serious situation in Kosovo and in the Balkans in general.

Q. I should ask you, sir, what was Mr. Milosevic's view on the role ⁷⁶⁴⁶ of the KVM? Was he initially eager to have them present?

A. My understanding was that he never liked KVM. I guess he was against an international presence in Kosovo in general. And KVM was supposed to be a larger group than -- you have had something earlier that was called KDOM. I must admit that I'm not very certain about the mandate of that group, but anyway, KVM was going -- it was not an armed group, it was a civilian force, but it -- I think we aimed at having something like 2.000 people so it would be a more -- their presence would be more felt. And it was my understanding that he was not very keen on that, but it was accepted and the first meeting I had with him on the 11th of January, as I said, he accepted the agreement, of course, that was signed between his foreign minister and Foreign Minister Geremek.

Q. All right. Now, without getting into specifics of the meetings that you have had - and we'll get back to those in a moment - I'm going to ask you now to retrospectively look at the collective meetings you've had with President Milosevic, as he then was, and can you tell the Court, if you would, please, what impression you formed about his authority or lack of it.

A. Well, Your Honours, I think Mr. Milosevic had a lot of authority. He -- his presence was very much felt when he was present, and at least I was left with the impression that he was a man in control and in command.

Q. And during some of these meetings, were any of his other senior assistants or officials or ministers present?

A. Yes. In all meetings except for the meeting that you referred to earlier in 1993, I cannot recall to have had any meetings with him alone. ^{7647 BLANK PAGE 7648} I had members of my staff with me, and he had, as I recall it, a number of his officials, other political members, military leaders with him.

Q. When you met with Milosevic and his other senior ministers, were you able to form any impression as to who ultimately made decisions? Did the ministers make decisions or did Milosevic make decisions or could you see who made decisions?

A. Again, Your Honours, this is, of course, based on impression. I was never present in any of the internal discussions that the government of Yugoslavia had, but in -- as I said, in all the meetings I had with him together with other people, he was the one that mainly spoke. He was the one that mainly drew conclusions. And in some of the meetings we had, for instance, in Kosovo with -- I guess his name was Andjelkovic or something like that, his representative in Kosovo, there was no doubt that everything was referred back to Belgrade. I mean, there was nothing that they could decide without having this confirmed. And when we spoke and they spoke about Belgrade, I was, anyway, under the impression that we talked about Mr. Milosevic.

Q. I see. Sir, you made reference a few moments ago to the first of a series of meetings. Perhaps we can talk first about the meeting in January of 1999. I believe the date you gave was the 11th of January. Perhaps -- what -- I'm sorry. The subject matter of the meeting on the 11th of January, I believe you mentioned, referred to some VJ soldiers?

A. That's right. Well, it was supposed to be an ordinary meeting, preparing for the work that we were going to do, but just before I arrived, some -- some VJ soldiers had been abducted by Kosovo Albanians, ⁷⁶⁴⁹ and this made an outcry in Belgrade and this was the issue that was brought up. And we were asked, or maybe even more than asked, demanded to see if we could release -- have them released. So we had a lot of activities with reference to that, trying to get those released, which we succeeded in having. So that became one of the main issues in addition to more the ordinary discussion on how to deal with the role of KVM in Kosovo.

Q. Do I understand you correctly to say that your organisation was involved and successful in assisting in the prisoner exchange or the VJ soldier exchange?

A. That is my belief, yes, that we did so.

Q. All right. Did you have subsequent conversations after the 15th of January, after Racak, with Mr. Milosevic?

A. Yes. On -- when the Racak massacre happened, of course that was a very serious incident which we took very seriously, and based on what Mr. Milosevic found as the inappropriate reaction of Ambassador Walker, he or the government decided to declare Ambassador Walker persona non grata and wanted to expel him.

In that situation, I knew that the whole KVM mission would fall apart. I mean, one could not expel the head of the mission without looking at the whole mission. And for that reason, I had immediately a telephone conversation with the Foreign Minister Jovanovic to discuss it with him, asked for a meeting with President Milosevic, and I was -- I had this meeting on the -- I think it was on the 21st of January, and the -- my objective was to have this decision undone or changed. It was ⁷⁶⁵⁰ unacceptable, and I said it was a violation of the agreement we had. It said in the agreement, if I recall correctly, it states quite clearly that it is up to me, as chairman in office of the OSCE, to appoint or fire the head of the KVM mission. This has nothing to do with the country in which they are serving.

Q. Let me stop you there. And just so that we're clear, you had appointed Ambassador Walker as the head of the KVM; is that correct?

A. Yes. Or it was Professor Geremek as chairman in office, but it was the chairman in office of the OSCE who should appoint him according to the agreement that was signed between Jovanovic and Geremek, and it was also up to the chairman in office to tell the head of the KVM to step down, if he so desired.

Q. So your view was that this was something that was in your mandate, not -- not the mandate of the country that was being observed.

A. That is correct. And more so, I don't think it was only my view but I think it said so in the agreement.

Q. Yes. All right. Was there a further discussion with the accused about Mr. Walker?

A. Yes. We had a number of discussions, I would say, on Mr. Walker, and Mr. Milosevic found -- I mean, he disliked his appearance, to my understanding, a lot, and he found that his reaction after the Racak massacre was inappropriate. His comments had been not in accordance with his position, I think he said, and that was the reason then why he wanted him expelled. And he offered, if I recall correctly, offered to have a Norwegian as the head of the KVM. He asked me, "Why couldn't we have a ⁷⁶⁵¹ Norwegian as the head of the KVM?" And I said this was not up to him to select the head of the KVM.

So we had a long discussion that day, or even into the early night, I would say, about KVM and Ambassador Walker.

Q. Ambassador Vollebaek, I'm going to wait between your questions and -- or your answers to my questions because of translation. Because we both speak the same language, I'm afraid that we haven't been allowing for the translators, so I'll pause.

A. Sorry. I'll try to behave.

Q. No. It's my fault. Now, did you ultimately resolve this apparent conflict concerning Ambassador Walker?

A. Yes. We solved it in the sense that it was decided, according to Mr. Milosevic, by the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to freeze the expulsion. We had a long discussion on different phraseology and conditions, and I could not accept any conditions because there were no -- as I saw it, there were no conditions that were -- he was not entitled to impose any conditions. And at the end of the conversation, he proposed or accepted that there should be a freeze of the expulsion, unconditional freeze, and that was then put forward, as I understood it, to the government of FRY. And I, of course, also had to consult with the members, the troika members of the OSCE and also with the Contact Group members if this was acceptable to them. And it was acceptable to my side, and I was later then called back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, and the foreign minister told me that the government had ⁷⁶⁵² accepted that this -- this freezing of the expulsion should take place.

Q. The result of that was Ambassador --

A. That Ambassador Walker could continue as head of KVM until the withdrawal.

Q. During the course of these negotiations, was there any discussion about forensic -- independent forensic examinations of the bodies found at Racak?

A. Yes. This was an issue that I think primarily was raised by the KVM itself because they had the mandate and the duty to look into these incidents that happened on the ground.

As I recall it, Mr. Milosevic refused. I think they had some local Serb forensic expert to look into it first. Then, in order to make this kind of international, he asked, if I recall correctly, a group from Belarus, but we insisted that there should be someone from the OSCE side accepted that we had chosen.

We had a long discussion on this, and -- but the end was that there was a Finnish group, headed by, if I remember correctly, Dr. Ranta, that was allowed in. But again, if my memory doesn't fail me, they came in almost a week after the massacre happened. So they came in quite late and they complained about that. They said that of course the bodies had been moved, things had happened. So they were criticising that they had not been able to come earlier.

Q. But the result of the negotiation was that the Finnish team was also permitted to come in and participate in this forensic examination although they complained it was much too late. ⁷⁶⁵³

A. That's right, but they did come in and they did make a report.

Q. All right. I just want to back up and just ask a question that I'd forgotten to put to you earlier, sir. You referred earlier to a meeting with someone, and I believe you mentioned the word "Andjelkovic." Is that Zoran Andjelkovic?

A. Yes. My memory may fail me, but as -- I cannot confirm his first name, but as I recall, he was the local representative of the federal government or the government of Belgrade in Pristina. So he was my main interlocutor, a kind of host, when I visited Pristina. And I had meetings with him, some with him in his capacity as representative but also then as head of the council that they had with representatives of various -- kind of an elected body. So he -- as I understood him, he was then appointed by Belgrade as a caretaker governor, whatever, of Kosovo.

Q. Is this the gentleman you said that from time to time would say that he'd have to check with Belgrade?

A. That's correct.

Q. And by that, you understood him to mean Milosevic?

A. I did.

Q. Now --

MR. RYNEVELD: I'm at paragraph 12, Your Honours.

Q. During your meetings with the accused, you said apart from that one meeting, I believe in 1993, he always had other people with him?

A. That is correct.

Q. And including some of the people you've already mentioned, were there any military personnel, generals or anything like that, in his ^{7654 BLANK PAGE 7655} company during your meetings?

A. Yes. As I recall it, I think there were generals or military personnel in all the meetings. Well, I stated I had three meetings with him before -- in 1999 before the military activities of the Kosovo conflict, the bombing started, and as I recall it, there were military personnel present in all these three meetings, yes.

Q. And you've told us earlier that it appeared that it was the accused that made decisions, or at least that was your impression of it. Did that also include discussions concerning matters where the military were present?

A. Certainly, yes.

Q. Did those discussions sometimes involve military matters?

A. Yes, they did, to the extent that we were talking about the presence, the military presence, in Kosovo. We were talking about what we saw as attacks or -- what should I say -- activities against the KVM by the military that we said was unacceptable to us. So -- and there were also then activities along the borderline with Macedonia. So there were several issues without me actually remembering each concrete issue, but military issues and activities were discussed.

Q. Do you know Milan Milutinovic?

A. I cannot say I know him, but I met him in the presence of Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Was he present at some or all of these meetings?

A. My impression is that he was present at all, but I may be wrong. But he was present at some of the meetings, yes. ⁷⁶⁵⁶

Q. And what did you understand his role to be when you met him? What was his title?

A. Well, at that time, he was President of the Serb Republic.

Q. Now, in your meetings, you discussed, I take it, the international observer role in Kosovo; is that correct?

A. Yes, because the main task of the OSCE at that time was the KVM, the Kosovo Verification Mission. We demanded, according to the agreement we had with the government of Yugoslavia, was then to seek a peaceful settlement, to ask or to try to make possible the return of the number of refugees that had left Kosovo. So these -- how to facilitate that return, how to seek or how to start, maybe, negotiations between the government of Belgrade and representatives of the Kosovo Albanian population was, of course, the main task for me and the main topic that we had during our conversations.

Q. During the course of your negotiations or discussions, was an international military presence one of the topics at any stage?

A. Yes. At least in the conversation we had on the 1st of March. Because since we saw that the situation did not improve, it, rather, deteriorated in Kosovo, as I mentioned, KVM was an observer group without any military force and we saw that we could not fulfil the mandate that we had, the only way that we thought that we could pursue our activities was with a military presence. And this was also discussed during the Rambouillet talks and was a part of the Rambouillet proposal. And so I brought up and pressed for Mr. Milosevic's acceptance of a military presence. ⁷⁶⁵⁷

Q. How was that suggestion received?

A. Not very favourably. He was very upset for many reasons. He stated clearly that Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia, as he said, that -- I mean, it was unheard-of that you had international troops, military forces on the soil of a sovereign state. In addition to that, since Yugoslavia was suspended from the OSCE, he -- he saw no reason why OSCE should impose anything like this on him. And he compared, actually, this military presence to the -- to the Soviet invasion of Prague because he said that -- well, he -- as I said, he was rather upset, and he said that he would not accept my proposal. And he said that Yugoslavia had stood up against Stalin, and they had stood up against Breschnev, and they should also stand up against Mr. Vollebaek. So he -- I had a nice comparison there. And I tried to tell him that this wasn't by invitation. I mean, he was still then the president, and it would be under -- I mean, upon invitation. It was nothing compared to either what Stalin did or what the Soviet Union did in Prague in 1968, but that was how he felt it.

Q. I'd ask you if you would explain for the Court, please, what you meant earlier when you indicated that one of the reasons that you discussed an international military presence was because the OSCE was unable to fulfil its mandate. What did you mean by that? What problems did you have as civilians?

A. Well, as -- as I said, I visited Kosovo three times before the war broke out, and I saw, I think specifically my second visit, I saw that there was a great trust in KVM from the population in Kosovo. They had seen improvement in their situation, much more security. Some villagers ⁷⁶⁵⁸ had returned to their villages. I visited, myself, both posts manned by Yugoslav military personnel and KLA personnel and saw that we had a mediating role, we had a role of a buffer, and there was a rather optimistic atmosphere, I would say. This was then in late January of 1999. And the morale among the KVM observers, monitors, was also quite high because they felt they had a role to play.

Then when I came back in early March, that situation was totally changed because there had been a number of incidents. There had been an increased military -- Yugoslav military presence, in violation of the agreement that we had. People had started fleeing again or leaving their homes. You had attacks on members of the KVM. And the local population felt that we didn't do anything for them. I mean, they had lost a lot of confidence in us. And all this resulted in the fact that we could not do what we were supposed to do; starting negotiations, facilitating return of refugees to the country. I mean, new people were leaving. And it became quite clear to me that in order for us to do what we were supposed to do also with respect to democracy building, with respect to the free press, with respect to a number of the activities that we were supposed to do, this could not be done without the military presence that could actually hold the military factions apart from each other. Because you had, as is well known, the KLA, which also had military activities, and with the Yugoslav military activities, the local population was caught in between, and that was impossible for us to do anything or to avoid this because we had -- we were unarmed.

Q. I see. Now, during the course of your discussions, did you hear ⁷⁶⁵⁹ the accused indicate to you about the potential for ethnic makeup of Kosovo, what groups might be able to reside in Kosovo?

A. Yes. He always talked about a multi-ethnic Kosovo, and I guess he charged me and us with being too pro-Albanian and not taking into consideration the Serb population, the Roma population, the various other groups that you had in Kosovo. And he -- so he was very strongly committed then to, as he said, to a multi-ethnic Kosovo. I told him that we also were concerned with the other groups.

I had a number of meetings with representatives of the Serb opposition, for instance, representatives of the Serb groups in Kosovo, and we were discussing their situation. And I gave clear instructions to KVM also to look into whatever incidents where the Serb population and the Roma people were under attack from the Kosovo Albanian side.

Q. In discussions about these ethnic groups, were there any conditions attached to their residents in Kosovo in terms of majority of individuals and respecting decisions of the majority?

A. Could you elaborate a little bit more on that question, sir?

Q. I'll rephrase. I'll rephrase. Did you find out from the accused who he deemed to be the majority ethnic group in Kosovo?

A. Well, I -- I'm not certain that we actually, to my recollection, actually discussed what was the majority as such. He felt very strongly that the Albanians would have to comply with the -- with the Serb rule, so to say, because that was, of course, as he saw it, Kosovo was a part of Serbia, Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia.

Q. Yes. ⁷⁶⁶⁰

A. And he refused -- well, I would not say refused, but he did not want to discuss a great deal autonomy. We were playing with a number of models where Kosovo could have a greater deal of autonomy and referring to earlier constitutions and things like that. But he was very adamant that since Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia, the -- in spite of the fact that at some stage he would accept the Albanian language maybe and some cultural identifications, this was a part of Serbia and as such they would have to accept the Serb overall rule, so to say.

Q. I see. All right. During the course of your discussions, did you raise with the accused the alleged atrocities that you had heard about from your observers, and did you discuss those with Mr. Milosevic?

A. Certainly. This was, of course, issues that we brought up every time, and not least when we had the meeting on the 21st of January. The Racak massacre was a very prominent item, precisely because -- well, it had happened, and the OSCE had made a quite strong statement, I think it was on the 16th of January, condemning the massacre, and we asked for an investigation, and also then since the consequence of this was the attempt to expel Ambassador Walker, this Racak massacre was very much an issue.

Q. Sir, I don't want to spend valuable court time revisiting a number of documents that have already been entered in in tab 94, but are you aware whether or not the OSCE would provide daily reports about their observations and reports about incidents that they had witnessed or their members had witnessed?

A. Certainly. They made -- I would think they made daily reports. At least, they made reports, I think they were on a daily basis, that were ^{7661 BLANK PAGE 7662} sent back to Vienna, to the OSCE headquarters, about whatever happened, and also about the Racak massacre.

Q. Your Honours, we -- we started at 9.30. I'll continue. I thought we were coming up to the break.

You referred, sir, to three meetings earlier in yourself, on the 11th of January, the 21st of January, and the 1st of March. You've discussed those. I'm going to take you now to the 24th of March.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Did you have a telephone conversation with the accused on that date?

A. Yes, I did. At that time, the Paris talks, as I think they were called at that time, had broken up, and it became more and more evident that we were heading towards an armed conflict. And I felt very strongly, as the chairman of the OSCE, that it was in my -- it was my duty to try to do whatever I could to avoid an armed conflict. And I had a conversation with Secretary-General Solana, who was at that time Secretary-General of NATO, and I said to him that I would like to try one more time if I could convince Mr. Milosevic to go along with some talks and allow a military presence and so that we could see if we could avoid the military conflict that we understood was coming.

I did not know -- as you will recall as happened, the bombing started that evening. I did not know at that time, but I knew that it was growing near. And I made a telephone conversation to him, to Mr. Milosevic around early -- or late morning/early afternoon, if I recall correctly, and tried to explain to him the serious situation, and also ⁷⁶⁶³ told him that I was available if I could do something. Of course, he disagreed with my view, he disagreed with my proposal. I explained to him that the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that it was difficult for us to see any solution.

As you may know, the KVM had withdrawn earlier, just some days earlier, again as a result of the breakdown of the negotiations and the security situation that became increasingly deteriorating for the KVM monitors and also the lack of possibility of fulfilling the mandate, as I mentioned earlier. And we saw then a build-up of military personnel in Kosovo after this. There had been an exodus of refugees. A number of refugees had left, there was pressure on the border towards Macedonia and Albania, and we had reports from UNHCR and ICRC after the -- that KVM had left about the situation that was deteriorating.

Q. So you called him.

A. I called.

Q. And perhaps you could outline for us to the best of your recollection the points that you discussed with Mr. Milosevic on that occasion. You've told us that -- did you tell him about seeing the build-up of troops, et cetera?

A. That's right. I had seen this when I was there in March, on the 1st of March. It was -- as I said, it was a different atmosphere on the 1st of March compared to my visit in late January. And I had then seen people leaving with their belongings, and those members of KVM with whom I was travelling, they were quite concerned because they said that this was a new situation, they hadn't seen this lately, so they were very concerned ⁷⁶⁶⁴ about this.

We had -- the military presence was very prevalent, and clearly a build-up compared to what I had seen earlier. We saw also fire. I could not detect exactly what that fire was, but later on that was confirmed by, among others, ICRC and I think also UNHCR, but anyway ICRC and the KVM, for that matter in March before they withdrew, that houses were being set ablaze.

Q. All right. Perhaps I can take some of these points one at a time. In relation to the build-up of military forces, et cetera, did you complain about that?

A. Yes, I did. I said that this was in violation of the agreement. To that, Mr. Milosevic said that they were there to protect me, which I didn't think was necessary, to say it mildly.

Q. You mention, sir, that the reports were that people were fleeing with their belongings. Did you also get reports about whether they were congregating once they fled?

A. Yes. We were in touch, of course, with the -- well, both KVM were following them and seeing what happened to them, but also we were in touch with the government of Macedonia. It was very concerned with the situation because a number of people came into Macedonia. The same happened in Albania but maybe the problem was even greater on the border with Macedonia. But again, when I confronted Mr. Milosevic with that, he said that they were just picnicking, so I shouldn't be concerned. They were just on a trip, having picnic. I think I said that it was strange to have a picnic with all your belongings on a tractor trailer, but that was ⁷⁶⁶⁵ the answer I got.

And the same with the burning houses, actually. He told me that it was nonsense that there were any houses burning. They were only straw that KLA or the Kosovo Albanians put the fire to -- put fire to in order to pretend that houses were burning.

I said that I had seen some of this myself and I had credible reports from international observers that this was happening, and I said that in response to his statement that I was watching too much CNN, because he said that I was fooled by CNN. And I then said that I had seen this myself on some occasion, or one occasion, and then I had also had reports about the same events or incidents.

Q. Did you comment on the way these people were being handled and what -- did you give any advice to the accused as to what he ought to do?

A. Certainly. I -- I told him, as I said, that we had -- he should return to the negotiating table, he should allow military presence in order for us to keep the military groups apart so that the refugees could return, and he had to stop violating the agreement we had and to stop harassing people. So -- but according to him then, nothing wrong was happening, so it was difficult to give him advice because there was -- I mean, according to him, I was wrong and there was no reason for him or his government to change the activities or the behaviour with respect to Kosovo.

Q. Did you hold out any hope for further negotiation?

A. If he complied with my requests, yes. If we could have a military presence, if he was willing to open up again for talks, I said that since ⁷⁶⁶⁶ I had spoken earlier to Secretary-General Solana, I knew that we could stop the NATO activities, and I knew also that I had the full support of the OSCE troika and the Contact Group in this. But -- but he kind of discarded me completely. He put me off and said that I was wrong. So I had -- the only thing I could say at the end of the conversation was that I was sorry that his vision of the world or the conflict was very different from mine and that there was nothing I could do at that stage but that I was there, I was available, so he could call me any time if he changed his mind, which he didn't do.

Q. Did he indicate to you any interest in continued discussions?

A. No, none whatsoever.

Q. I'll back up to something that you referred sort of in passing to in order to explain a previous conversation. You mentioned that -- something to the effect of, "As you know, we withdrew the KVM on an earlier date." Can you tell us approximately when that was and why that was?

A. It happened between the 19th and the 20th, if I recall correctly, of March. I think it started -- the decision was taken on the 19th of March and I think it started early morning of the 20th of March. As I said, the situation for KVM had deteriorated very much. We felt that there was a threat to the security of the monitors, and at the same time, they could not fulfil their tasks and their mandate. I had been under some pressure for some time to withdraw KVM, partly, I think, because of the threatened security for the various monitors, that some countries felt that their citizens were not protected ⁷⁶⁶⁷ well enough and this became political issues in some of the countries, as I understood it. And also that the mandate was not fulfilled. People started asking, "Why are you there?"

We had very much Srebrenica in mind, and I think we felt very strongly that we could not be in a position where we repeated a situation where you had an international presence standing by, idly watching atrocities happening. This was very much in our mind when we were discussing and seeing what we could do in Kosovo. At the same time, I also thought that the situation for the civilians would deteriorate if we withdrew. I wanted them to be there as long as possible, that I could in any way defend having them there, because still I thought and hoped that they could do something. And as long as the negotiations in Paris went on, I thought that there still was hope that we could change the attitude of Mr. Milosevic, his government, and might have then an agreement on which we could base our activities. So I would not -- I wouldn't like to withdraw before I really had to. But when the negotiations in Paris broke down and the -- we had some incidents that involved KVM people, that they were attacked by Serb military groups or Serb paramilitary groups maybe, but anyway, they were under -- we had reports that they were attacked or harassed might be the right English word, and I knew, after having been to Kosovo myself, that the trust of KVM was in danger because we could not fulfil the mandate. Then after then consultation with the troika members of the OSCE, and I think I consulted with all the members of the Contact Group, at least some of the major members of the Contact Group, I decided to pull out. It was ^{7668 BLANK PAGE 7669} also on advice of Ambassador Walker, who was head, as you know, of the KVM. And we had had this discussion before. Ambassador Walker might have wanted to withdraw even a little bit earlier, but when he then stated very clearly that he could not guarantee the security of the members of the monitoring group any longer, I could not, sitting in Oslo, take the responsibility of keeping people in place. So that was the reason why we decided that they should withdraw, and the withdrawal then took place on the 20th of March.

Q. Now, sir, immediately after the KVM withdrawal on the 19th, 20th of March, 1999, did you personally witness large movements of refugees out of Kosovo?

A. That was a little bit later. This was after the bombing had started. I do not recall the dates, but it must have been early April or -- yes, after the bombing had started. I visited Albania and Macedonia, and we had set up -- the OSCE was then in Macedonia, and we provided the UNHCR and some of the other organisations with material, cars to help them handling the refugees. And I visited a couple of refugee camps and had discussions with the Macedonian government on the handling of refugees in Macedonia.

In Albania, I was standing at the border crossing when the refugees came, and I must admit, Your Honours, that I have never seen so many tractors in my whole life as I saw that morning. There were an endless line of tractors with whole families on them. And it was, I think, one of the most moving movements in my life when you stand at the border crossing and meet people that have been fleeing for -- well, some ⁷⁶⁷⁰ for hours because they didn't come that far away but some for some days, and telling stories about how they -- well, of how they had to flee because their house had been taken over by people that came to their apartments or houses and said that they should -- they should leave, or they came back from -- some people said they came back from their evening stroll and their house was occupied. And others then had been more evicted from their houses forcibly, but there were all kinds of very strong stories. I don't speak Serbian, I don't speak Albanian, but I had interpreters who told me this.

And then seeing also the situation with the help that was given. The system of assistance was very important. And one of the things that we did was to take down the names and addresses. We had -- we were the third checkpoint, so to say. The first was a bottle of water, the second was a piece of bread, and the third was to take down the names and addresses. Because one of the last things, apparently, that the Serb authorities did before they left Kosovo was to take away all their pieces of identity, even the number, the licence plates on the tractors were cut or clipped off or -- so that they should have no evidence of where they belonged. And so we saw it as our main task to make sure that we knew where these people were, where did they come from, so that they could tell that immediately and we could take that down.

And I was, I will admit, being then, in addition to being chairman of the OSCE, I was also foreign minister of a NATO country, as you recall, Your Honours, NATO was responsible for the bombing, of course, and I was somewhat nervous that these people would charge me with being at least one ⁷⁶⁷¹ of the culprits. And none of them said anything about -- blamed NATO for the bombing of the country. And they said they did not flee because of the bombs - that was not a problem for them - but fled because their houses were taken over by Serbs, military or non-military groups, and that they had been told to leave, and they were forced to leave. So there was absolutely no complaining.

And I think personally that, in spite of the fact that we had, of course, a number of discussions about the withdrawal of KVM when we did withdraw, the fact that we did not stand idly by and watch atrocities happening made the population trust us so that we could move in very soon after the conflict, after the war. And I visited also Kosovo after the war and met with people that cheered and greeted us, both as a member of NATO but also then as chairman of the OSCE because we had taken such a very clear stand on the atrocities that we saw coming.

Q. One further question about your visit. Did you later return to Kosovo and notice what had happened to various houses or villages or -- are you able to give the Court a firsthand -- what you saw firsthand about what had happened to the Albanian villages?

A. Yes, I did. I think I visited Kosovo twice after the war, and we were very concerned with the situation at that time also for the Serb minority. So during my first visit, I had a meeting with Patriarch Pavle in Pec, which was the head of the Serbian Orthodox church, and I had also decided that I would like to go to Decani, which is a very famous Orthodox monastery, and stay over night as a kind of symbol of solidarity with whoever was citizen of Kosovo, and I did that. ⁷⁶⁷² On the way to Decani -- well, in several places you saw the results, but on the way to Decani, I still remember that there was a whole village where all the roofs were off, and it was obvious that this was not due to bombing but it was fire or -- I'm not an expert on explosives but it was obvious that this came from the ground and not from the air because the interior of the house was being burned off or destroyed. And all the evidence that I received was that this had happened to Kosovo Albanian houses by Serbs, military or paramilitary or whatever, during that period. I also visited with one of the Orthodox bishops a mass grave where there were about, if I recall correctly, 18 bodies. This -- that grave had not been opened yet, so -- but there was one lady that came and thought that her relatives were buried there, and we had -- she was looking then for identification, and there was a process of opening that grave, and we had a discussion with the bishop about the responsibility of the Serbs and how we could now bridge gaps and ask for forgiveness and things that become important in a process of reconciliation.

Q. I want to move to a totally different topic now, if I may, Ambassador, if you've had an opportunity to fully answer the questions earlier.

During the course of your chairmanship, did you have meetings with people other than the accused? Did you meet, for example, with leaders of the Kosovar Albanians or the KLA or did you participate in any liaison meetings between the accused and some of these representatives?

A. In my period there was no meeting between Mr. Milosevic and Kosovo Albanians that I was present in, but I had a number of meetings with ⁷⁶⁷³ Kosovo Albanian leaders. I met with Mr. Rugova who was then one of the more prominent leaders already at that time of the Kosovo Albanian community. I met with him on several occasions. I -- I met also with a number of others. I must admit, Your Honours, that I do not recall all the names. I met with Mr. Sosa in Albania, and I met with what I guess we thought was the head of the KLA, Mr. Hashim Thaci, but that was in Oslo in June, I think it must have been, so it was after the war had started. June of 1999.

Q. June of 1999.

A. Yes. I met with him when we were talking about what should happen after the war and how also KLA would have to participate in a peaceful settlement.

Q. So this would be after the conflict --

A. That's right.

Q. -- had been completed. Yes.

A. As I recall, I had no meeting with the KLA before 24th of March, 1999. We thought that some of the political leaders we met with had links to KLA, but they were not, as I knew then, in any way formal members or representatives of KLA.

Q. Did you liaise in any way between Mr. Rugova, who you mentioned, and the accused on other issues at any time or was there a meeting or did you sort of hold independent meetings with each to liaise on topics or --

A. It was independent meetings. As I said, there was no meeting where they were both present.

Q. I see. ⁷⁶⁷⁴

A. But I -- since our mandate then was to try to find a peaceful settlement, we were preoccupied with or had to look into the situation of the Kosovo Albanian population in Kosovo. And I was discussing with Mr. Rugova what would be his conditions, what would be his desires, what would be the objectives that they wanted fulfilled in order to be able to live within the borders of Yugoslavia under the Yugoslav authority in a peaceful way, and these demands or requests I presented to Mr. Milosevic and vice versa his replies I also did refer to when I spoke to Mr. Rugova.

Q. All right.

MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, I just want to deal with 21, 22, and 23 in an encapsulated form.

Q. Sir, during your dealings with the accused in these proceedings and your discussions of the Kosovo conflict in the dealings with respect to the Albanians, did you form any impressions about the accused's position in regard to what was most significant to him in these negotiations?

A. Well, I -- I think Kosovo, to him, was very important because he looked upon it, and he may still look upon it, as the cradle of the Serb culture. There was very little willingness to discuss any kind of autonomy or any kind of -- to go further on any kind of possibility of some kind of self-determination for the Kosovo Albanian people. I did not want, at that time, any new borders in Europe, but I said as chairman in office of the OSCE, I agreed and it was very important for me to say that we should not draw any new borders and I did not want an independent Kosovo. But it was obvious to me that the Kosovo Albanian ^{7675 BLANK PAGE 7676} population had to be given much more autonomy when it came to language, culture, et cetera. And this was very difficult for Mr. Milosevic, as I understood, because he felt that that would open up for a secession of Kosovo, and that was totally unacceptable for him. He was very adamant that Kosovo had to be a part of Serbia since that was the cradle of Serb culture and language.

Q. All right. Now, did you form any impression, quite apart from the one you've just mentioned, about any personal motivation?

A. Well, I think that this is part of what I also maybe felt in 1993 when I met with Mr. Milosevic at that time, that it is a question of power, but in addition to, as I said, the Kosovo situation, which I think he felt was different from Bosnia and Croatia because of the sentimental feelings attached to Kosovo, I personally saw much of his behaviour as part of his desire for personal power and that he needed a power basis, and he -- that was -- that was part of his -- well, it was -- what shall I say? The reason for his behaviour but also maybe his -- he needed this for his personal power.

MR. RYNEVELD: I note the time. I believe those are my questions in chief. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now for half an hour. Ambassador, I must give you the standard warning we have to give to all witnesses: Don't speak to anybody, please, about your evidence until it's over, and that does include the members of the Prosecution team. Would you be back, please, at half past.

--- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m. ⁷⁶⁷⁷

--- On resuming at 11.33 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you tell me how much time I'm going to have, Mr. May, so I'm not surprised by a subsequent decision of yours?

JUDGE MAY: We will consult.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Two hours.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That seems to me to be too little, but in view of your practice hitherto, this is nothing new to me. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vollebaek, do you consider, in view of the decision to withdraw the Verification Mission which you yourself took, that you are one of the few people who bear the burden of personal responsibility for the beginning of the war against Yugoslavia?

A. No, Mr. Milosevic, I do not consider that. As I have told you -- and with Your Honours' agreement, I would like to address Mr. Milosevic directly. Because as I told you, Mr. Milosevic, on numerous occasions, that you are responsible. I did that on the 24th of March but I also did it on the 1st of March when we met. You knew what was coming in view of what we had told you. I was in a position that I, for some time, saw the Kosovo Verification Mission having a role, because I saw that it improved the conditions of the population in Kosovo. Then I saw that you had an escalation of military power in Kosovo, which meant that we were faced with a number of incidents, atrocities, that we could not hinder, avoid. ⁷⁶⁷⁸ And we also had a security risk for our monitors. And in view of that, I had to make the decision to withdraw. But I resisted as long as I could because I first wanted to see if we could avoid a conflict, and also to give you, Mr. Milosevic, a chance to change your mind and cooperate with us.

Q. All right. Let's remain within the realm of questions. So do you in fact consider, as it is not in dispute that you yourself personally took the decision, at least in formal sense, do you consider that that decision of yours in fact in the moral and ethical sense is the most weighty because, as you said, you took the personal decision as being the co-chairman for the international conference of the former Yugoslavia and cooperation, the purpose of which was peace. Yes or no.

A. Your Honours, I'm not sure I understand the question.

JUDGE MAY: The witness has dealt with that, I think. Unless there's a new point. If so, perhaps you'd tell us what it is.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the point is that individually, in view of his position as chairman of the Organisation for European Security and Cooperation, that is to say an organisation the purpose of which is European security precisely, which means peace, that in the moral and ethical sense this personal decision is the most difficult. Isn't that so?

JUDGE MAY: Was it a difficult decision?

THE WITNESS: Your Honours, yes, it was a very difficult decision. It was one of the most difficult decisions I made. But I -- if this implies that I am in any way responsible for the war in Kosovo, I would ⁷⁶⁷⁹ flatly reject it, Mr. Milosevic, because as, Your Honours, I've told you earlier, we could not perform and fulfil the mandate we were given because Mr. Milosevic's army and paramilitary troops, whatever, did not fulfil their side of the obligation. They had their side of the agreement and were roaming around, making atrocities that we could not stop. And we could not be watching this.

So as I see it, the conflict would have -- there was a conflict already. The withdrawal did not start the war. The war was there already when I decided to withdraw.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. But I hope you were conscious of the fact that that decision would enable the greatest military machinery that the world has known thus far would be deployed and used against a small country which in nurtured good neighbourly relations with all states surrounding it and which did not jeopardise or threaten any of those countries. Is that correct or not?

A. Your Honours, I think the accused is making statements more than asking questions, but that is nothing new. We have had these type of conversations before, Mr. Milosevic and I. And I think that this is -- it is my view that this is not correct.

You will remember, Mr. Milosevic, that the Security Council had passed two Security Council Resolutions, 1160 and 1199. They had been referenced to what is called the Chapter VII language of the UN treaty. And you will know that there had been precedent statements in the Security Council precisely dealing with the risk of regional conflict. It is ⁷⁶⁸⁰ positively wrong when you say that your attitude, your actions, your behaviour did not threaten the regional stability. We saw that with respect to Macedonia, we saw it with respect to Albania, and we had seen it earlier with respect to the other states in the former Yugoslavia. This had been repeated on and on again.

And even though I agree with you that what happened in Kosovo was an internal matter to the sense -- in the sense that what happened inside the borders was an internal matter, it was still a breach of any kind of human rights agreements and, in addition, the OSCE agreement that was the formal basis for the KVM and my responsibility.

Q. And are you saying, in fact, that Yugoslavia jeopardised Macedonia or Albanian perhaps?

A. I am saying that a long time before the 24th of March there were refugees leaving Kosovo in order to avoid the atrocities that were committed by you.

Q. Tell me, did Yugoslavia jeopardise any neighbouring country when you took the decision to withdraw the mission and to enable NATO to unleash the war against Yugoslavia?

JUDGE MAY: The witness hadn't said that that happened at all. That wasn't the reason, as you heard.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Tell me this, then, sir, Mr. Vollebaek: As a Norwegian originating from a country of the Vikings, valiant warriors, does it seem to be a form of warrior behaviour that a force such as NATO ⁷⁶⁸¹ should attack a country with 11 million inhabitants?

JUDGE MAY: This is a matter of comment, not a proper question. Ask your next question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you consider that by withdrawing the mission upon orders from NATO, you in fact --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. That contains an assertion which the witness should deal with.

Was the mission withdrawn on the orders of NATO?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the answer to that question is no. It was -- well, first of all, it was my formal decision. As chairman in office, I had to take the formal decision. It was taken upon an advice by Ambassador Walker, who was the responsible head of the mission, and he told me that he could not any longer take responsibility for the security and safety of the monitors, which I had to take very seriously. Secondly, it was taken in consultation with the other members of the troika of the OSCE, meaning that -- well, Poland was one, and I guess Romania was the other. And in addition to that, in contacts with the members of the Contact Group. But the decision was mine, and there was absolutely no imposition by NATO.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. You claim that you did not withdraw the mission following orders from NATO to enable the bombing to take place, and now to that you add that NATO didn't even exert any pressure upon you or ^{7682 BLANK PAGE 7683} influence you in any way and that you didn't consult NATO at all with respect to the withdrawal of the mission.

A. Your Honours, as I told when the Prosecutor was asking me, I consulted the secretary-general of NATO with respect to if I should try another time to avoid a military conflict. But that was on the 24th of March, after the withdrawal. But the reason for the withdrawal, as I have stated several times, Your Honours, was that we could not fulfil the mission, and we could not have a situation as we had had in Srebrenica where the international community was standing idle, watching atrocities happening. And we saw atrocities happening, and we saw a building up of military force, and that was the situation I was faced with. And this, Your Honours, as I understand this, is the fault of Mr. Milosevic. He was in breach with the agreement. He was told that, and he did not want to comply with the agreement. So in my understanding, he must be responsible for the withdrawal and not anyone else.

Q. All right. Very well. That means that you did not withdraw the mission upon NATO's suggestions. I'm now going to read out what was said here by the president of the military NATO committee, General Naumann, a few days ago. He says: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... concerned about the security of the OSCE observers and invited the OSCE to consider NATO's recommendation to withdraw them since we saw that the bombing was imminent."

[Interpretation] Full stop there. And the next sentence: [In English] "The OSCE then took the decision to withdraw them I think on the 20th of March." ⁷⁶⁸⁴

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be placed on the overhead projector. It's taken from the transcript, the LiveNote from this trial.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Put it on the ELMO.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And the chairman of the military committee of NATO says that they called upon the OSCE and recommended to withdraw them "since we saw that the bombing was imminent."

JUDGE MAY: Ambassador, you heard it, but perhaps you'd like to have a look and see what the witness said. If you can assist us with it, say so. If not, tell us that.

Can you put it on the ELMO, please. It should come up on your screen. If you can read it.

THE WITNESS: Hardly, I'm afraid, but I can.

JUDGE MAY: Normally, witnesses are not asked to comment on what other witnesses have said, but if you can assist with that since the accused has raised it, perhaps you would.

THE WITNESS: I -- Your Honour, I don't think that this is in contravention or contradicting what I've said. Of course we were in close touch with NATO, a number of NATO countries, and also NATO as such in the situation that we were having, because NATO was also going to have a role if there would have been a military presence in Kosovo. And we were discussing the military pressure or -- that we were having. This was a part of the discussion before the -- both before the withdrawal but also, of course, before the bombing.

As I stated in my replies to the questions asked to me by the ⁷⁶⁸⁵ Prosecutor, I was under -- I wouldn't call it pressure, but I was asked on repeated occasions to withdraw when it became obvious that we could not fulfil our mandate and when there was a security risk to the members of the monitoring mission. So this -- but I held out as long as I thought that we could do something useful.

I think, Your Honours, that the accused is putting this upside-down, actually. The bombing of NATO, or to put it differently, the withdrawal did not facilitate the bombing of NATO -- by NATO. But the bombing by NATO was a consequence of the military actions and the lack of cooperation by Mr. Milosevic and his government. And in a sequence of things that were results of his activities, there was also the withdrawal because we could not do whatever we were supposed to do. So I can honestly state that I was not under any kind of pressure. I knew that if he did not cooperate, the -- there would be bombing because that was public knowledge. And also as the minister of foreign affairs and in a NATO country, I discussed this with other members of NATO, but to my knowledge, there was no fixed date. I could say that it was drawing near, but there was no fixed date. As I stated earlier today, I did not know that the bombing was coming on the 24th of March when I called Mr. Milosevic, but I knew it was evident that it would be coming. So to kind of present the withdrawal as the reasoning or the facilitation of the bombing is to put everything upside-down, Your Honours.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You, therefore, claim that NATO would have started the bombing ⁷⁶⁸⁶ even if your mission had stayed in Kosovo; is that it?

A. Your Honours, if I -- if I may answer this question in a slightly different way.

Mr. Milosevic, you would know even better than I that the greatest damage done to Kosovo is not the NATO bombing. You seem to imply here that NATO caused a lot of damage. Yes, there was some damage. Of course in a war, there is some damage. But I've stated earlier today that I've seen much more damage done by your people in Kosovo during the war situation. But what is more important is that you, your government, your military forces, started forcing people to leave Kosovo a long time before there was a discussion of NATO bombing. No one wanted -- on the 1st of January, when I took over as chairman in office of the OSCE, you will recall at the first meeting we had - even the meeting before in 1998 - that I was aiming at having Yugoslavia back into the OSCE. I thought that I should achieve that in cooperation with you. I reckoned that you would cooperate with the OSCE on the basis of the agreement that was signed between your foreign minister and Professor Geremek in October of 1999 -- 1998, excuse me. And this was the basis. And then we saw that you did not fulfil your obligations, and your people forced the population to leave and created a situation that we could not be responsible for. We cannot have a situation where you have international communities standing idle in various places and watching atrocities happen. But I think - with Your Honours' permission - that this is what you wanted, Mr. Milosevic. You wanted a small war, a little conflict that was burning on and on, and you were willing to give in a little bit each ⁷⁶⁸⁷ time we met so that this conflict could be continuing on a kind of back-burner or a small whatever you say in English, a small flame, and you could stay in power. And you were surprised that this was not possible any longer.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the transcript be removed from the ELMO and given back to the accused.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And are you aware of the fact that most of the sources, including your own, during that period of time noted that most of the violations of the cease-fire, the attacks that were going on and the crimes that were going on were perpetrated in fact by the KLA and that the army and police of Yugoslavia reacted to the attacks launched by the KLA? Are you aware of that?

A. No, Your Honours, I am not aware that most of them were perpetrated by KLA.

JUDGE MAY: If that is the case, if the sources, as is alleged, support that, that's one of the matters which this Trial Chamber is going to have to determine.

Yes. I interrupted you, Mr. Vollebaek.

THE WITNESS: That's okay, Your Honour. What I was going to say is actually that this came up in the various conversations I had with Mr. Milosevic, and I am afraid I do not have access to my different papers and reports. I have some of them here, so if you would like, I can go through some of them. But I do recall that in one of the meetings, I think that must have been on the 11th of January, already, or maybe it was ⁷⁶⁸⁸ later in January, Mr. Milosevic and foreign minister Jovanovic came up with a long list of acts that they thought were committed by the KLA, but I had an equal list. I don't know which one was the longest one, but I had also a lengthy list of atrocities and incidents committed by the Yugoslav forces.

But I do recall that in each conversation, Mr. Milosevic stated what he just stated, but it is possible for Your Honours to go back and look into the various OSCE reports. And if you would like to count every incident, you might do that, but I do not think this is -- as I see it -- I agree that it's up to Your Honours to make a decision, but as I saw it at that time, this was not the point. The point was that the people in Kosovo didn't feel safe. The people in Kosovo experienced atrocities. And the people in Kosovo was forced to leave.

And since Mr. Milosevic was the president at that time, his people were in charge, he was also responsible for the lack of safety for his own people.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right, then. Are you aware of the atrocities committed by the KLA from which the Serbs and Albanians suffered and also members of other ethnic groups in Kosovo throughout 1998 and the beginning of 1999, and the intensification of those atrocities - attacks, killings, kidnappings and so on and so forth - by the KLA throughout that period of time? Did you know about that or not?

A. Mr. Milosevic, when you say "those atrocities," I think that is not very specific, but I know of some incidents and these incidents were ^{7689 BLANK PAGE 7690} taken up by KVM, by OSCE, with the Kosovo Albanians, and it was also then condemned.

You seem to imply, Mr. Milosevic, that we were one-sided. I will object to that. I was absolutely not one-sided. We wanted to create or continue to have a multi-ethnic Kosovo. And you will recall that I repeatedly stated that I did not want an independent Kosovo. It was not my aim to create a new country in Europe. But we were faced with a situation where people were actually persecuted, I would call it, by what was supposed to be the government, and that was unacceptable to us.

Q. All right, Mr. Vollebaek. You have said this morning in response to the questions in chief that I worked for Kosovo as a multi-ethnic community, that it was I who worked for that myself. Is that correct or not?

A. Your Honours, I don't think I said you worked for it, but you stated it. I think that is the big difference, Your Honours. You had -- you were never for war, as I recall it, you were always talking about peace. You were always talking about ethnicity, Mr. Milosevic. But that doesn't mean that you worked for it because your actions and acts, as I repeatedly told you, and you will recall that, was contrary to peace and to multi-ethnicity because one part of the population of Kosovo were leaving in majority.

I think by the -- I don't recall the number, but you had several hundred thousands of Kosovo Albanians that fled Kosovo. So this was not -- this is not a question of what you said, but it's a question of what you did, and that is a big difference to me. ⁷⁶⁹¹

Q. Yes. But I hope we will at least agree that this wave of refugees from Kosovo started after the bombing, Mr. Vollebaek. Is that so or not?

A. It's not so, Mr. Milosevic. There was a number of refugees, a great number of refugees that left a long time before the bombing started. And as I stated earlier this morning, none of the refugees I met on the border between Kosovo and Albania said that they were fleeing because of the bombing. They all said that they were fleeing because their houses and property were taken over by Serbs, military and non-military, that -- some of them claimed that their exodus was organised. I cannot verify that but that was said. But anyway, as I stated earlier today, no one blamed it on the bombing, but all blamed it on Serb actions in Kosovo.

Q. All right. We all know what they said. But if I say something, that may not be true; but if they say something, that must be true. Is that what you're implying, Mr. Vollebaek?

JUDGE MAY: That is simply a comment.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please. Those refugees you refer to, you said yourself this morning that you had seen refugees after the beginning of the bombing, both on the Macedonian and on the Albanian border. Is that right?

A. That is right.

Q. Now, please tell me, when you talk about internally displaced persons who had to be displaced, who left their homes in order to avoid the clashes between our army and the police on the one hand and the KLA on the other, is that in a way reflected in what you said this morning? And you said - I noted it down - "The local population was caught in crossfire ⁷⁶⁹² between the two forces, the army and the KLA." Is that right? Isn't it logical, then, that in places where the KLA initiates and provokes an attack which is responded to by the army and the police, the civilian population flees in order to avoid the consequences of those clashes?

A. Your Honours, I feel that this is -- these questions are rather repetitive, but, yes, there were occasions when there were clashes between KLA and the -- as I know, I was told or it was reported to me, I was not on the ground, but I received reports from KVM about clashes between KLA and the Serb military or police and that the civilians had to flee or leave their houses or villages due to that. But this was not the case during the bombing.

And if Your Honours permit me to divert a little bit, because I feel that the accused seems to imply that the refugees were not telling the truth when they met with me and when they left. Maybe in order to create a better impression.

I happened to visit Cechnya late, very late in 1999. I was close to Grozny, and I was surrounded by Russian military --

Q. Please, Mr. Vollebaek. We don't have time --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness explain. He's going to explain something. Let him do that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My time is limited, Mr. May. You limited it yourself.

JUDGE MAY: I know. We have that in mind. Let the witness explain. ⁷⁶⁹³

THE WITNESS: I shall be as brief as possible. To tell us a little bit about the situation, I was surrounded by Russian military, and there were refugees coming out from Grozny. They knew that there were Russian military around but they were furious against the Russians. They were really angry and told about how this safe corridor was not safe, how they had been attacked and how they were suffering. If NATO bombings had been the reason for these refugees fleeing, why couldn't they have addressed me in the same way and told me face-to-face that you are responsible? They had nothing to gain. They had lost everything, and they had absolutely nothing to gain from pleasing me. So I think it is very important, Mr. Milosevic, that you don't try to undermine the witness that these refugees give, because they all gave the same witness about how they had had to flee due to your actions in Kosovo and not NATO.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And how many refugees did you talk to that day, Mr. Vollebaek?

A. I have absolutely no number to tell you, Mr. Milosevic. I think that is not important at all. I saw thousands of them, and I could pick anyone. I could be there as long as I wanted, there was no one hindering me in talking to anyone. But I spoke to enough to be convinced that they told the truth.

Q. I asked you how many refugees you talked to in order to determine such a major fact out of those hundreds of thousands -- dozens of thousands, sorry, you saw that day, as you claim.

A. I didn't say dozens of thousands, I said several thousands, first ⁷⁶⁹⁴ of all. And secondly, in addition to those I spoke to, a number of other people spoke to. We had the OSCE people there, talking to every single one. I didn't speak to them personally. But as I told earlier today, we took down the data, we took down the names and addresses and licence plates that you had actually removed in order for them to lose their identity. We gave them back their identity. So the OSCE representative spoke to everyone that passed through that border post.

Q. All right. I won't waste more time. I just want to tell you that I had just quoted notes from official meetings, such as one with Robin Cook in London in spring 1999, at which it was claimed clearly and decidedly that most of the incidents were initiated by the KLA. And there are other sources except the British ones who state the same thing. Are you aware of that or not?

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... says about this, and really, too, we're asking him about -- questions about meetings at which he was not present is not going to help. He's given his evidence about what he knew about the KLA.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. You wrote in your statement -- let me read it to you: "There was no doubt that President Milosevic thought it extremely important for Kosovo to stay within Serbia. We felt that the whole time." And so on and so forth. You said I gave you presents of books about Kosovo to prove how Kosovo belonged in Serbia, and churches in Kosovo, about Kosovo being the cradle of Serbian culture. "I thought that that was his personal belief, and he felt very strongly about it." You said a ⁷⁶⁹⁵ moment ago that I spoke about Kosovo needing to be multi-ethnic or not. Now, tell me, do you believe that Kosovo is or isn't a part of Serbia? I'm not quite clear on what you're saying here.

A. Your Honours, I'm not certain if this question is relevant.

JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you can help us by repeating to us what your view was at the time when you were negotiating with Mr. Milosevic.

THE WITNESS: You will know that -- Your Honours, that Kosovo had had different status over the years, different status with respect to autonomy. There was no doubt in my mind that we should aim at having Kosovo as a part of Yugoslavia, but the constitution of Kosovo had changed several times over the last years or decades, and there was a disagreement between the government in Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian leaders whether Kosovo was actually a part of Serbia as such. As you know, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was made up of several republics. I found at that time that it was important for me to state that I didn't want to divide the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I didn't want an independent state of Kosovo. But the role of Kosovo without -- within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia I left somewhat open. And I understood and thought that it might be given some more autonomy than what it had at that time.

I guess that one would say -- I must admit that I have not studied the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Serbia lately, but my understanding was that the latest constitution implied that Kosovo was a part of Serbia, but that was then disputed by Kosovo Albanian leaders. ^{7696 BLANK PAGE 7697}

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you know, Mr. Vollebaek, that under all constitutions since the autonomous province was in existence, that is since the Second World War until today's constitution, Kosovo has always been a part of Serbia. And certainly before the Second World War too, Kosovo was part of Serbia. Are you aware of that?

A. Your Honours, I'm not certain what this implies. Even if, Your Honours, one should admit that Serbia was an integral -- that Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia, Mr. Milosevic was under -- or there were a number of international agreements that entitled the population to use the language, to be able to continue having cultural activities and to have schools, universities, and these things were taken away from them. Even if a province is an integral part of your country, that doesn't entitle the president to make atrocities against the population in that part of the country.

Q. And you believe that at a certain stage the Albanians at Kosovo were deprived of the right to use their language, to promote their culture, publish their newspapers, et cetera.

Could you please tell me, at what stage did that happen? When were they deprived of that right and were they deprived of it?

JUDGE MAY: We are now getting far from the witness's evidence. He deals with 1999. Also, there's a meeting with you in 1993 if you want to ask him about that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will ask him about anything and everything within the strict limits that you have imposed on me. All of ⁷⁶⁹⁸ these are important issues, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So since you are saying that they were deprived of something, did it ever happen from World War II until 1999, or at the time when you were involved in Yugoslav issues, did it ever happen that Albanians in Kosovo were deprived of the right to use their languages, have their own institutions, have their own newspapers, cultural societies and so on and so forth, and to use their own language in all official communications?

A. Your Honours, if I may, then, refer to my period, if I may call it that, 1999. There was no doubt that this was the main reason for the conflict. The Kosovo Albanians felt that they were deprived of the right to use the language, they were deprived of their right to -- to have their own educational system. This was one of the main issues that I was discussing with Mr. Rugova. And there is no doubt, Your Honours, that there was a radicalisation on the Kosovo Albanian side, precisely because of the attitude taken by Mr. Milosevic.

I -- the first time I met with Mr. Rugova, I think, was in April 1998 when I at the same time more or less had a first meeting with Mr. Milosevic when I was foreign minister, and there was quite a development, as I saw it, in Mr. Rugova's attitude from that time and when I met him again in 1999 because of the deterioration of the situation and the pressure he was under. He was not able to be as forthcoming, as open, as - what shall I say? - moderate as he was in 1998 when I met him again in 1999 precisely because of the activities taken by Mr. Milosevic and his government. ⁷⁶⁹⁹

Q. All right. Tell me, then, since it is obvious that we have no time to establish that kind of facts, after such a precedent that was made making NATO in charge of the OSCE, is it possible at all for this organisation to have any kind of credibility?

JUDGE MAY: There's no need to answer the question generally, but what is being suggested is that NATO was in charge of the OSCE.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, with all due respect, this is nonsense. I mean, I happened to be a foreign minister of a NATO country, but I dealt with all the 53 members of the OSCE, and we -- as you know, the OSCE is an organisation that works on the basis of consensus. And we had to agree on whatever action we took and whatever attitude we had. And one of my closest allies or - what shall I say? - advisors in this period was the foreign minister of Russia, Igor Ivanov, with whom I dealt with a lot because we knew, or hoped, that Russia had an influence in Belgrade. Maybe they didn't have as much as we hoped for and thought, but anyway, we were working closely with them. So to imply that NATO was in charge of the OSCE is, as I said, Your Honour, with all due respect, nonsense.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. And what about ideas -- and let us now divert from the area of management in the strict sense. Did the ideas of European -- could the ideas of European security and cooperation be more compromised than they actually were compromised by virtue of the fact that this organisation played a role in the bombing of a part of European territory and was party to a crime committed against a European country?

JUDGE MAY: We have already dealt fully with this, and this is not ⁷⁷⁰⁰ the place, as you know quite well, for political speeches. Now, what is your next question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Since you now live in the United States where you are the Norwegian ambassador, did you perhaps have occasion to acquaint yourself with the position of a very renowned American which says -- who says: [In English] "Constituents --"

JUDGE MAY: If we are going to have the views of various journalists, I think there's little point going into it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is not views of various journalists. This is the position of Walter J. Rockler, expressed and published, and this man was a Prosecutor in Nuremberg, a famous American humanist and lawyer.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. It's not the view of a journalist, it's the view of a Prosecutor from Nuremberg. With due respect, it is equally irrelevant.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I would like to hear the answer of Mr. Vollebaek --

JUDGE MAY: His opinion, too, on the opinion of the Prosecutor would be equally irrelevant. Now, ask some other questions about his evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But this has a direct impact on the essence of his testimony about the role of the NATO, and I don't know why you are against it if it would take only a few seconds.

JUDGE MAY: If you want to put something about the role of NATO, ⁷⁷⁰¹ you can. But you're not going to ask him about the views of other people, which are simply that, views.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'll assume that as my own view and then I'll ask him if he agrees with my opinion.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The attack on Yugoslavia constitutes the most brazen international aggression [In English] attack to --

JUDGE MAY: No. This is irrelevant. As you know quite well, Mr. Milosevic, this is the issue which the Trial Chamber are going to have to determine, and this witness's views as to the views of Mr. Rockler are totally irrelevant.

Now, have you questions about the evidence or not? If not, we'll bring this cross-examination to a close.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have very many questions, as you very well know, Mr. May, and I will continue with my cross-examination. But you are not interested in the views of others. I can see that. I don't know if you are interested at all in the opinion of the people of Norway, of young people or citizens of democratic countries who do not share at all --

JUDGE MAY: The views of young people are equally irrelevant. Now, let us get down to the questions about this witness's evidence. He gave evidence about meetings with you, and if you've got some questions about it, you should ask. Particularly if you want to challenge his account; you should put it into him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, allow me, please, to put ⁷⁷⁰² the questions that I believe appropriate, and of course I will contest a lot of what has been said here. And I am not in doubt that he will easily convince you, but he cannot convince even the people of his own country as to the role of NATO.

JUDGE MAY: Now, if you have a question, ask it and stop making speeches.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let us follow up on this briefly. Since you were trying to convince me to continue negotiations and to enable some sort of international presence, did you understand that to mean exclusively the presence of military forces led by NATO and commanded by NATO? Did you imply only that when you used the term "international presence"? Is that right or not?

A. I -- we were discussing, for instance, with Russia to participate in the military presence. As you will know, Your Honours, Russia also participated in the Rambouillet talks, and the basis for the -- for the military presence would be the Rambouillet agreement.

Q. Please. I am not asking you about somebody's symbolic involvement. I'm asking you very directly: When you said "international presence," did you mean exclusively military forces commanded and led by NATO? Yes or no.

A. Your Honour, it is difficult to answer Mr. Milosevic. That is nothing new to me because he -- Mr. Milosevic, this is what we have been doing time and again when we were talking together. I clearly said I ⁷⁷⁰³ meant more than just NATO presence. You heard me say that. And you then imply your twist or whatever or interpret what I'm saying. And, well, I said yes, I meant more than NATO.

Q. So some force under the command of the UN or OSCE not commanded by NATO. Is that what you're saying now?

A. Mr. Milosevic, due to the fact that you behaved the way you did, we never came to the point where we could discuss how we should organise this. If you had been willing to participate in the negotiations, this could have been dealt with and we would have avoided a major war and a lot of suffering of people.

We were -- we wanted whatever action to be taken under the umbrella of the United Nations, of the OSCE, but we knew that, for instance, the OSCE did not have enough -- or this is not a military organisation so we had to call on others to assist us in order for us to do whatever we were going to do. And this military assistance would have probably to have been a strong NATO component but not exclusively NATO.

Q. And it would not have been under the command of NATO, and it would not have been led by NATO; is that what you're saying?

A. Your Honours, I think it's irrelevant to discuss whatever would have been. We are discussing, to my knowledge -- or I'm giving witness what happened, not what would have happened if other things had happened.

JUDGE MAY: Just so we can understand the position, when you were discussing the use of a military presence with the accused, did you make it plain that it was more than NATO that you had in mind?

THE WITNESS: What I do recall -- I must admit, Your Honour, that ⁷⁷⁰⁴ I do not recall details of the conversation. First of all, I had several and also sometimes I got little bit carried away because I got, I must admit, angry, so I do not recall everything I said. But what I do recall very strongly was that I said and insisted that this military presence should be on the invitation by the government of Yugoslavia. It was -- Mr. Milosevic would have a role to play in this. He could look at whoever was part of it if he would have been willing to participate and discuss this with us. But there was never a discussion, because he said there was no question of any foreign military presence. He didn't refer to NATO, he referred to foreign military presence. I never thought -- I don't think I had an opportunity to discuss whether it should be NATO or non-NATO because the mere fact of a military presence was unacceptable to him.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please. Are you aware of the fact, for instance, that on the 28th of February the Russian agency ITAR-Tass was reporting from Rambouillet, that the Contact Group may offer, as a compromise, an option under which the UN, the OSCE, and so on, and it also mentions flags other than NATO, and that France press agency said that the Serbian delegation insisted on that very day that the issue of peacekeepers should be resolved in such a way that peacekeepers be responsible to a body such as the OSCE or the United Nations? Are you aware of that?

A. No. I do not recall that ITAR-Tass report.

Q. All right. Very well, then. Now, as all this was contained in documents and cannot be contested, do you happen to remember in this regard the statement made by Madeleine Albright on the very next day, and ^{7705 BLANK PAGE 7706} she said the following: [In English] "We accept nothing less than complete, including NATO-led forces. The United States' position is that it has to be a NATO-led force. That is the basis of our participation in it."

[Interpretation] That is her statement. And then two days later, she repeated that position at a press conference, and I'm going to quote: [In English] "It was asked earlier when we were all together whether the force would be anything different than a NATO-led force. I can just tell you point blank from the perspective of the United States, absolutely not. It must be NATO-led forces."

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. What is the relevance of any of this to the witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance lies in the fact that what is talked about here is some sort of peace operations, alleged ones, whereas in fact what is being spoken of is the NATO occupation of Kosovo.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And judging by the agreement on implementation, this would have meant in fact NATO's occupation of Yugoslavia as a whole. Is that correct or not?

A. Your Honours, I think this is irrelevant, but I -- of course there was no question of an occupation. I -- as I have stated earlier, I insisted that this should be and had to be on the invitation of the government of Belgrade, because we could not have a military presence there on the ground without the consent of the government of Belgrade. So this is -- but I feel, Your Honours, that the accused is trying ⁷⁷⁰⁷ to make a kind of new case here. And with all due respect, I must say I feel that this is beyond what I have stated in my written witness.

JUDGE MAY: Would you let us be the judges of that.

THE WITNESS: I will. I will ask you for your advice then, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: We will decide what's relevant and what isn't. As you appreciate, this accused is representing himself, and therefore he has to have some leeway.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Now, have you got any other questions which do relate to this witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know why you keep asking me that question. You've given me two hours, so I will use that time, those two short hours, Mr. May, to ask my questions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know -- are you aware as you've been -- Norway was a member of NATO from the very beginning. Although you tried to endeavour to play a neutral role, you weren't able to do that. Are you aware of the defence planning guidance, 1994 to 1999, Pentagon's --

JUDGE MAY: No. No. I think we've really heard enough on this topic of NATO's role, and I'm going to stop any more questions about it. The witness has been answering questions about this for an hour and more. Now, you have not yet asked him questions about the meetings which you had, and in the next hour which you have, I suggest you do, because that's what his evidence was about.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Vollebaek, Mr. May, is here -- ⁷⁷⁰⁸ actually, in his testimony here, he said that as the foreign minister, he was included and involved in the activities of NATO, of which Norway is a member. And I think I do have the right --

JUDGE MAY: You have -- what you have is the right to ask the witness questions, as you have done, for an hour on this topic. But what you don't have the right to do is to abuse the time of the Court and the process by continually going over the same topic over and over again and trying to score points.

Now, your cross-examination should from now on go on to other topics, that is, other than NATO.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, there is just one topic here and that is the crime committed against Yugoslavia and the attempt to cover up that crime with an evasive --

JUDGE MAY: You are here to ask the witness questions and not to make these speeches. Now, then, unless you have any more questions, this cross-examination will be brought to an end.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask a question now, please, Mr. May?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As Minister, as I was saying, were you aware of -- did you know about this position, the position that said therefore, it is of fundamental importance [In English] to preserve NATO as primary --

JUDGE MAY: I have ruled that as irrelevant and time-wasting. Now, you are to move on from NATO. You've spent an hour on NATO. ⁷⁷⁰⁹

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And, Mr. Vollebaek, do you know about this, something that was written by George Kenney, who was --

JUDGE MAY: No. Who was Mr. Kenney? I forget. We've had him before. I think he's a journalist, but I may be wrong.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He was an American diplomat.

JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry. Quite right. He was an American diplomat. But I'm not going to allow you to put these questions in which you ask witnesses about the opinions of various people. These opinions are totally irrelevant to the Trial Chamber, and therefore the witness's answer to them would equally be irrelevant.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, what I'm dealing with is facts, this particular fact which indicates the nature of those simulated negotiations, so-called negotiations at Rambouillet, because this official from America says the following: "We intentionally set the bar too high for the Serbs to comply."

JUDGE MAY: One matter is this before we go into it: Do you --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And this was confirmed and borne out --

JUDGE MAY: Did you have any connection with the negotiations at Rambouillet?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, as chairman in office then of the OSCE, I participated at some of the meetings as an observer. It was dealt with, as you may know, by the Contact Group, but in my capacity then I was invited in. So I did participate in two or three meetings, if I recall ⁷⁷¹⁰ correctly, a couple of meetings in Rambouillet and then one when it was moved after the break.

But, Your Honours, since Mr. Milosevic referred to this as something that was imposed on him, I think I would like to state, with your permission, that up to the break the Serb delegation actively participated in the negotiations and actually were part of whatever agreement was reached. So it is again wrong to pretend that this was imposed on them. They later changed their mind and they later said they would not go along with it, but in my meeting with Mr. Milosevic, I guess it was then on the 1st of March, in this break, we were discussing the Rambouillet agreement, and he did what he seems to do now, kind of distance himself from it. And I had to remind him that his delegation had been actively participating in the negotiations.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. That's precisely what I'm saying, I'm claiming, and participated with goodwill at that, Mr. Vollebaek, in the negotiations, and accepted a political solution, but not the occupation of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vollebaek. Are you aware of that? Do you know if that was so or not?

JUDGE MAY: No need to answer that unless you want to.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, again I'm a little bit uncertain, but yes, the Serb delegation participated in the negotiations. I felt there was a change in their attitude when this break came up. And all along it was very important for us from the OSCE side to make sure that there was a military presence precisely because of the activities beforehand of Mr. Milosevic. I realised that I could not be responsible for a new ⁷⁷¹¹ civilian mission without -- without the military presence to support this mission.

And to put this bluntly, Your Honours, this was because I didn't trust Mr. Milosevic. I didn't trust that he would comply. He did not comply with the agreement we had signed in October 1998, so why should he comply with a new agreement? And I could not be responsible for putting civilians there that I had seen could not do what they were supposed to do in a new situation. That would be ridiculous, first of all, and then -- well, not first of all. I guess first of all, it would not help the people, and secondly it would be ridiculous. And that's why --

THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Vollebaek, please slow down a little.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. And that is why we wanted the military presence, to assist us in the functions that we were going to fulfil from the OSCE side.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Vollebaek, as you are referring to the reports of your mission and the assessments made by the people from the Verification Mission, do you know about an assessment made by the -- an ambassador, your colleague, French Ambassador Gabriel Keller, who was the Deputy Head of Mission and in which he says the following. I'm going to read it out. Several of his statements. Their authenticity can be checked out, of course. And tell me once I've read it whether that coincides with what you yourself say as to the opinions of the mission's members. This is your colleague the French ambassador, Deputy Head of Mission. He says the following: [In English] "The even-handedness of the mission was questioned from the very ^{7712 BLANK PAGE 7713} beginning. We never managed to clear this impression. After some weeks of our presence, the global image of OSCE/KVM was to be anti-Serb, pro-Albanian, and pro-NATO," et cetera. "Nothing was done to correct this image."

[Interpretation] That's what he says. Then he goes on to say the following: [In English] "The KLA never really tried as a whole to participate in the improvement of the situation on the ground. Every pull back by the Yugoslav army or the Serbian police was followed by a movement forward by its force which the other side, of course, considered as a violation of the cease-fire. OSCE presence compelled the state forces to a certain restraint, at least at the beginning of our mission, and KLA took advantage of this to consolidate its position everywhere, continuing smuggling arms from Albania, abducting and killing people, both civilians and militaries, Albanians and Serbs as well."

[Interpretation] Are you aware of that, Mr. Vollebaek, these opinions here? So they're not opinions of any journalists or any outsiders or anything of that kind but at the top echelon of the insiders. Now, does this assessment mean anything to you?

A. Your Honours, I do not recall that statement, but I have, of course, no reason to not trust that this is correctly referred to by Mr. Milosevic. I beg to disagree with Ambassador Keller. I don't think we were one-sided. I was chairman in office of the OSCE, not Ambassador Keller. He was deputy head of the KVM mission, which was a body under the OSCE, and I took every effort, I really made an effort to be even-handed. And I repeatedly also - you will recall that, Mr. Milosevic, if you are ⁷⁷¹⁴ honest - that I stated several times that we wanted to cooperate with you, we wanted Yugoslavia included in OSCE, we did not want to -- to exclude you or target neither Yugoslavia nor the Serb population. And when issues came up and you referred to issues -- atrocities, incidents that had happened by KLA or there were reports about that, we dealt with that. We did not accept it. That there were things going on on the ground that might be perfect, I am certain that that's the case. But again, this is not the point here, Your Honour, if I may. Actually, the greatest exodus of the population and the greatest atrocities against the population happened, Mr. Milosevic, after the withdrawal of the KVM. So then you could have really showed that you were a proper leader and cooperated with the people. You had all the chances. You were in command. But you did not do that. You then fulfilled whatever we thought you were aiming at and the reason why we had to react.

Q. So that means -- actually, are you aware of the contradiction that you state in just one single sentence, that the atrocities, that means the events during the war, occurred after the withdrawal of the KVM? That means that once the war had began and the conflicts began and the KLA had launched operations, once it had proclaimed mobilisation over a broad front against the Yugoslav forces, so all that happened precisely at that time, and you, because of the activities of the KLA, came across counter reaction by the Yugoslav side, you are blaming the Yugoslav government and me, or, rather, me personally for it all.

A. Mr. Milosevic, you heard me saying time and again today that this conflict was -- had happened or had gone on for a long time. I did not ⁷⁷¹⁵ state that the atrocities only happened after the withdrawal of the KVM, but I said that the largest majority or the large majority of the people were expelled, driven out of their homes during that period. But there was a build-up for several months and weeks, and you know that. We discussed this every time we met, and I referred to examples, reports that I had. And at that time, I had them in front of me and I had names and I had dates and I had places, and if the court so desire, of course it's possible to find these reports.

So this is -- I mean, you are making a -- I mean, your statement has nothing to do with the situation on the ground, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Mr. Vollebaek, well, I assume you understand that all the reports that were published by the Verification Mission, that that is implied that they were sent to us too and that to a certain extent that they are public documents. So why, then, would there be any dispute about what it says in the reports?

Now, as far as your own mandate was concerned, your incoming mandate as the president of the OSCE in 1999, at the meeting in 1998 it is true that we talked about the fact that Yugoslavia should ultimately be given its seat in the OSCE which was illegally taken away from it. I'm sure you will recall myself as having said -- and of course it wasn't withheld and withdrawn in 1999 but at the beginning of the 1990s to enable the disruption of Yugoslavia -- that the OSCE, which was functioning, as you yourself state, on the principle of consensus, took the decision bypassing this principle of consensus, that is to say without Yugoslavia's acquiescence, to suspend the membership of Yugoslavia in the OSCE. I'm ⁷⁷¹⁶ sure you'll remember that.

A. Your Honours, I'm not certain I have to ask -- or answer this question. Again, I stated -- that's correctly stated or said by Mr. Milosevic that I wanted Yugoslavia back into -- into the OSCE. What happened long time before I became chairman of the OSCE, I don't think, is my responsibility. I worked towards the aim of having them back, that they should comply with the prerequisites. And this was an issue in April 1998, but it was also an issue when we met the first time in January 1999. So that was -- I was aiming at that. But there was, as I saw it, Your Honours, no cooperation from the side of Mr. Milosevic to comply with the prerequisites for such a membership.

Q. All right. Well, the membership was taken away from it illegally. Let's not go into discussions about the fulfilment of conditions for Yugoslavia's membership. Yugoslavia was one of the founding states of the OSCE anyway.

Now, you have -- that is to say you're talking about some crimes here, the crimes that you discussed with me. Now, I should like to remind you that on page 7 of your statement, in the Serbian version, that is, and I suppose the person that took this statement made the titles, and it says: "Discussions with Slobodan Milosevic about war crimes in Kosovo." That is the subtitle. And then we come to what you say. "I don't remember that that issue was a topic that we discussed." That's what you say and that is with respect to the questions posed to you by the investigator on talks with Milosevic on these things in Kosovo. You say that you don't know remember that that was a topic of discussion. That's ⁷⁷¹⁷ what it says in your statement. "I cannot remember that this question was an issue that we brought up," that's what you say. But let me ask you this, Mr. Vollebaek: Do you feel that there is far too much of these matters that you don't seem to remember and unclear explanations in your statement? Look at that same page. The subtitle is "Paramilitary formations --" "Paramilitaries."

JUDGE MAY: If you're going to put things, particularly like that, to the witness, he should have a copy of the statement.

MR. RYNEVELD: I agree, Your Honour. Not only that, but there are two statements, and I don't know which of those two. But I have a copy of both of Ambassador Vollebaek's statements available, and with the Court's permission, I propose the usher give him access to both statements.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. And if you would --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm talking about the long statement, the long one.

JUDGE MAY: And if you would pass one to the Court, please.

MR. RYNEVELD: Mr. Usher, copies for the Court, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it will take up too much of our time, Mr. May. I hope that you will take that into account and extend the time you have allotted me.

JUDGE MAY: If you're going to ask questions about a statement, the witness must be able to see it, see what you're asking. Now, we need copies to follow too.

MR. RYNEVELD: When Mr. Milosevic says the long statement, is he referring to the 16-page statement taken on the 8th of January, 2002? ⁷⁷¹⁸

JUDGE MAY: I guess so, because the other one is eight pages.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, the one that's 16 pages long.

THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honours, but could you tell me on which page it would be in the English version?

JUDGE MAY: We may have to find that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Serbian version, it is on page 7. I don't know about the English version, whether it's on a different page, I haven't got my English text in front of me.

MR. RYNEVELD: If I may assist. About halfway of page 6 there is something in italics right in the middle that says: "Slobodan Milosevic's view of the conflict in Kosovo." Is that what --

JUDGE MAY: Let's see what the --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no, no. It says here: "Discussions with Slobodan Milosevic about war crimes in Kosovo." That is on page 7. That is the subtitle. Before that, it says: "Meetings with Milutinovic and Sainovic."

MR. RYNEVELD: Oh, I see it. It's the bottom line on page 7, the very last line, above the signatures. It's a title without a paragraph following it.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So "Discussions with Milosevic about war crimes in Kosovo." The answer is the following, and I'm reading the sentence: "I cannot remember that this question was an issue that we brought up." Is that right or ^{7719 BLANK PAGE 7720} not?

A. That is correct, Your Honours. I did not bring up the issue of war crimes as such in my conversations with Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Very well. And now tell me this: How -- or, rather, before that, there are two subtitles. One is "Paramilitaries," paramilitary formations, paramilitaries. And then in that paragraph, you say: "I don't think that paramilitary groups were mentioned in the conversations I had with Slobodan Milosevic..." "I don't think that paramilitary groups were mentioned in the conversations I had with Slobodan Milosevic, but we were aware of their existence, and I believe that we also discussed the issue with him as well..."

Now, what am I to deduce from that when you, in one sentence say that you don't think you discussed paramilitary groups with me and then you say that you think you do. You believe we did discuss the issue. And as far as you remember, "this was nothing that he claimed to be using." What is this all about, Mr. Vollebaek?

A. Your Honour, the accused will know that there were a number of groups in Kosovo that were active in addition to the -- to the ordinary army. But when we raised these issues to the extent that this was raised, they were mainly raised by the KVM and not by me because they were local incidents. But it was, to my knowledge, never accepted as a notion, connotation, that there were paramilitary groups present or in activity. According to the reports I received from KVM, they considered activities, atrocities, incidents that had happened, that they had been committed by paramilitary groups. That means, as I understood it, not the ⁷⁷²¹ ordinary military force. But since Mr. Milosevic never admitted that there were paramilitary groups, this is not an issue that we discussed in the meetings that I had with him, to my recollection. I could be wrong, but I cannot recall that that was mentioned per se.

Q. I'm only referring to the contradictions and lack of logic, Mr. Vollebaek. If we're talking about paramilitary groups, were you at least later on able to come by any information or knowledge of any kind about the fact that there was an order issued by our Supreme Command that paramilitary units were to be arrested and disarmed? Are you aware of that? Did you receive that information? Because, of course, they could always crop up. But did you have an awareness of that?

A. Your Honours, I'm not certain that I fully understand the question, but what I referred to was reports that I received from KVM about activities against the civilian population in Kosovo. Some of these actions were clearly done, committed by the military, some were not. And this is the reports that I had. And in addition, whatever then, as I said, the refugees told me when I met with them outside of Kosovo after the war or during that part of the war.

Q. All right. We'll have to move faster. You say here, when you say that you met me, that you consider that the first meeting we had, apart from in 1993, was with respect to Walker. It doesn't matter whether it was in fact our first meeting or second meeting, but you came after the events in Racak, on the 21st of January, to Belgrade in order to convince the Yugoslav authorities to change their decision with respect to proclaiming Walker persona non grata; is that right? ⁷⁷²²

A. That is correct.

Q. Now, since you were working in that capacity, you were also aware of the fact that you could withdraw the KVM; right? That's not being contested.

A. Yes. I had power to do that.

Q. Now, do you remember that in the meeting with me and with other representatives of the Yugoslav authorities - you had separate meetings with the foreign minister, for example, and I don't know who else - you said that you would withdraw the KVM if Walker was proclaimed a persona non grata on the territory of Yugoslavia; isn't that so?

A. Well, I have to admit, Mr. Milosevic, that I am not certain that I can remember exactly what I said, but I do remember that the question of withdrawal was an issue both in our conversation but also in our own deliberations. You, as I mentioned earlier, suggested that we could change the head of the KVM. You said that you would prefer a Norwegian. And I said that this was not up to you to decide, it was up to me. And I don't think I threatened with the withdrawal, but I think I said that the expulsion of Ambassador Walker would lead to the withdrawal. But we were not, to be very frank with you, Mr. Milosevic, we were not -- we were not certain that it was a threat to withdraw the KVM, actually, at that time. So we did not want to play into your hands that we would withdraw. So this was a little bit of a difficult issue for us, because we thought that you might welcome any withdrawal so that it wouldn't be a threat but actually, rather, the opposite. So to -- as far as I can recall, I was rather cautious in talking ⁷⁷²³ about the withdrawal from KVM, but I said that the consequence of expulsion would be -- would be that KVM could not continue. We could not change it. It was not to you but up to me.

JUDGE MAY: We must adjourn. It is now a minute or so past 1.00. We will adjourn until half past two. Mr. Vollebaek, if you'd be back then, please.

--- Luncheon recess taken at 1.02 p.m. ⁷⁷²⁴

--- On resuming at 2.32 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So, Mr. Vollebaek, I maintain that the only reason why we agreed to freeze the decision on the proclamation of Mr. Walker as persona non grata was precisely the threat that the entire Verification Mission would be withdrawn. Is that correct or not?

A. Your Honour, I suppose it's not up to me to decide what was the intention or the assessment of Mr. Milosevic. My understanding of the conversation we had at that time was that all taken into consideration, he accepted to keep Ambassador Walker as head of the KVM because an expulsion would be in violation of the agreement that we had signed with him, the OSCE had signed with the government of Belgrade in 1998. And I was satisfied with that decision because this was early in 1999 and I still had a hope that we could fulfil the mandate. So I accepted what I then saw as an unconditional freeze so that we could continue in accordance with the agreement that was signed.

Q. All right. I should like to ask you to be more brief in your answers, because you know my time is very limited. Do you know that in this agreement signed by Mr. Jovanovic and Mr. Geremek about the establishment of the Verification Mission, it said, among other things, that the Vienna Convention should apply? Just yes or no, please.

A. Your Honour, I do not have the -- well, I do have the agreement among my papers but I do not have it in front of me and I'm not certain ⁷⁷²⁵ whether I should look into it. But my understanding is that we were going to apply, as I recall it, the Vienna Convention was part of the agreement.

Q. All right. Since the Vienna Convention was an integral part of the agreement, I suppose you can't claim that Mr. Walker could not be proclaimed persona non grata and that doing so was a breach of the agreement if the Vienna Convention was part of that agreement, as we agreed.

A. The agreement, Mr. Milosevic, said that the OSCE and the government in Belgrade were going to cooperate on the Kosovo Verification Mission. Within this -- and it also said that this mission was established by the OSCE, and it said that the OSCE should then appoint a head of the mission. And this was my main point, that you could not decide who should be the head of the mission. That was up to me.

Q. Of course that we could not decide who it would be, but in any event, in keeping with the Vienna Convention, we had the right to proclaim somebody persona non grata. I hope you don't dispute that, Mr. Vollebaek.

A. My point again was that this position of yours was a violation of the agreement. In addition to that, I saw no point in your declaration of Mr. Walker persona non grata.

Q. Mr. Vollebaek, you are saying that it was your right to appoint the head of the mission. By the same token, it is the right of the head of state to appoint ambassadors. That's the way you were appointed by your government. However, does -- that does not rule out the right of the head of state to proclaim somebody persona non grata if you make a move ^{7726 BLANK PAGE 7727} which is not strictly in keeping with your mandate or break a rule.

JUDGE MAY: The witness has dealt with this. Is there anything you want to add to your previous answers, Ambassador?

THE WITNESS: I don't think so, Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Okay. Just a few days after Mr. Walker was proclaimed persona non grata, Madeleine Albright stated that in case he is withdrawn, the mission would be withdrawn in its entirety. Since you were then chairman of the OSCE and were authorised to appoint the head of the mission, could you please tell me, what were the powers of Mrs. Albright then which gave her the right to make such a statement?

A. Mrs. Albright had no right to give such a statement. I suppose this was her personal opinion or assessment.

Q. All right. Could you please answer, then, why was it so important to the OSCE or perhaps the then-administration of the US to insist on Mr. Walker so much?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I am not here to respond for the American administration. I have no information whatsoever about that. But I can answer for myself, and I saw your decision on declaring Ambassador Walker persona non grata as your first intent with respect to KVM to erode its basis, to weaken it and to cripple us in the activities that we were going to do. And I felt very strongly that if I was going to give in to this, you would then have new demands the day after or a couple of days later that I would have to answer to.

I would also like to remind you, Mr. Milosevic, that one of my ⁷⁷²⁸ points was that you had not taken this -- your complaint with respect to Ambassador Walker's behaviour in connection with the Racak massacre up with me. You just made this decision on your own. I was chairman in office of the OSCE. If you had something to complain about with respect to Ambassador Walker's attitude, behaviour, statements, you should have talked to me about it, and you didn't do that. This was something you did on your own without consulting with me at all.

Q. All right. Do you remember, Mr. Vollebaek, that I insisted precisely during that discussion that you should reinforce your mission to the envisaged numbers? At that time, it had only one-third of the total of envisaged staff, 1.300 as opposed to the planned 2.000?

A. Yes, that is quite correct. I do also remember that. And we tried to do that.

Q. Therefore, I was asking you, as chairman of the OSCE when you were talking to me, to reinforce your mission with an additional 700 people. Second, you said yourself that I suggested -- of course I had no right to instruct you, but I suggested that you appoint a new Head of Mission who would be even-handed and objective, and Mr. Walker had proven himself to be less than objective and I suggested that you appoint somebody else more suited for the job.

So based on those two facts, or in view of those two facts, how can you now claim that it was in our interest to diminish the importance of your mission? Don't these facts prove quite the contrary, that we were quite anxious to have this mission on the ground working in an unbiased manner? ⁷⁷²⁹

A. Mr. Milosevic, I think you might have liked to have a mission that worked according to your own will and your own desire. I do not doubt that. But every time there was an issue that was brought up that you disagreed with or a complaint we had or an issue that showed that you were not even-handed in treating the people of Kosovo, you made a complaint or you made a protest.

And you have to remember that your suggestion of having a new head of KVM and strengthening the KVM mission did not come as a result of a conversation that you and I had talking about how can we make this more efficient? How can we improve the working conditions for the KVM? This came up in a long discussion. I think it lasted about three and a half hours, if I don't remember wrongly, during a late night where I had to rush down to Belgrade in order to safeguard the whole mission because you one-sidedly, single-handedly, had decided to declare the head of the mission persona non grata.

Q. All right. But you are well aware that just shortly before that, NATO generals had visited me and asked me to withdraw that decision, and we accepted that. And we accepted it precisely at your insistence because of the understanding of the importance of your mission that we had. We did consider it important. Is that correct or not?

A. Well, I'm grateful for your statement now, Mr. Milosevic. I was not left with the impression that time that you saw the mission very important and you were very forthcoming. As I recall our conversation at that time, and I had a number of people along with me, it was a rather difficult conversation. You tried all along to put on certain conditions ⁷⁷³⁰ for the continued work that Mr. Walker should be doing.

Q. So not the mission but Mr. Walker in person; is that right?

A. Mr. Milosevic, as I have stated earlier, Mr. Walker was not anybody. He was head of the KVM mission. He was, as I have stated before, appointed by the OSCE, and you had, without consulting with us, without presenting any complaints to us, decided to expel him.

Q. I understand enough, Mr. Vollebaek. Is it true that Mr. Walker was personally chosen for the job by Madeleine Albright?

A. I have no idea, Mr. Milosevic, how the process in the United States works for selecting representatives for international organisations. The American administration came forward with Ambassador Walker as a proposal in consultations with members of the OSCE. His candidacy was accepted.

Q. All right. We have seen here a tape on which Holbrooke is making a statement, saying that Madeleine Albright personally chose Mr. Walker as head of the mission. So it's --

JUDGE MAY: The witness knows nothing about it. Now, let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The day before your arrival to Belgrade, you came on the 21st and we had this meeting you mentioned, do you remember that Die Welt published the following: "Walker was seeking ground for military intervention." And a lot of other European press wrote about it and disputed his story about Racak, his version of Racak. Do you remember that? ⁷⁷³¹

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I've said earlier in this cross-examination that these are the opinions of journalists, and they are totally irrelevant to these proceedings.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Those are not opinions. This is information published in many newspapers in the West, Mr. May. If you are not allowing me to mention what the papers wrote about it, I will remind you of what Gabriel Keller said, and he said the following in his statement -- he was Ambassador Walker's deputy: "The political dimension of the mission was too small. [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... mission members choose from the beginning to adopt a very aggressive behaviour with the official authorities. The potential benefits of diplomacy were deliberately sacrificed. We never tried at the upper level of the mission to associate the Yugoslavs to our work. In the regional committees, such work was done, sometimes very successfully, which proves it was not an impossible challenge. A growing number of the mission members, national OSCE countries not belonging to NATO who did not approve this behaviour felt more and more uncomfortable in a mission which did not reflect the sensitivity of their countries." [Interpretation] And then there is a very clear definition.

JUDGE MAY: Before you go on, let the witness answer. You've heard what it's alleged that Mr. Keller said about the attitude of the mission and the attitude of some of its members. Is that a matter on which you can comment?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it's difficult for me to comment very precisely on attitudes. As I said, I was head of the mission in the sense ⁷⁷³² that I was chairman of the OSCE. I visited the mission three times, and I gave instructions to Ambassador Walker as the head of the mission. My instructions were always that we should work with the Yugoslav authorities to the large -- as much as possible. I made a point of that when I came to Pristina, that I also saw the representatives of the Yugoslav authorities, precisely to underline that the mission was there as in agreement with the Yugoslav authorities, that we did not foresee Kosovo breaking away from Yugoslavia. But I think it is fair to say that our reports as we received them later on or as time went on, the reports became more and more desperate and negative because there was a feeling on the KVM side that there was no reciprocity in this attempt at cooperation. But if you allow me, Your Honour, to revert to the beginning of Mr. Milosevic's question, I'm not certain how this actually interlinks, but --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes. But, Mr. Vollebaek, if your answers continue to be so long, Mr. May will completely bring my cross-examination to an end and I won't have time to ask my next ten questions.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know, Mr. May. I wonder if you can extend my time a little. We've had two statements from Mr. Vollebaek, more than two hours of his explanations, and you gave me just two hours for cross-examination. This is not 92 bis, this is cross-examination of a live witness.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, it is, but the witness has not taken an undue amount of time in explaining his answers, in my judgement. ^{7733 BLANK PAGE 7734} You, on the other hand, have asked fairly lengthy questions, which you should bear in mind. Having regard to the timing, you can have another quarter of an hour.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, could I then comment on the Racak massacre?

JUDGE MAY: If you would do it briefly, please.

THE WITNESS: Yes, I do, but I think it is important because it seems to me that Mr. Milosevic --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please. I didn't ask you this.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I didn't ask this question, not yet at least. How can he --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. My understanding was that Mr. Milosevic related what he seems to think is a negative attitude from the KVM side to the reports on the Racak massacre as he started out referring to Die Welt.

I based myself on the report that we got from the Finnish forensic team, which was quite, in my view, clear. And even though, Your Honour, I'm not supposed to ask the accused questions, if I had been allowed to ask questions, I would ask him why he then didn't -- if he was so sure what happened in Racak, why didn't he immediately allow us to have a forensic mission in? Why did he delay this so long?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you. ⁷⁷³⁵ Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I will answer. We didn't stall, first of all. And secondly, the forensic team from Finland did not, at the end of the day, issue a report any different from the reports of the Belarussian forensics. And it was not to be expected that a forensic report could delete, erase a wound or something. The only possibility was that something would be added. And there were no controversial issues or discrepancies between the reports of one and the other forensic team.

I would like to ask you something different. Do you agree with this: "European diplomats working with the OSCE claim that it was betrayed -- [In English] [Microphone not activated]. American agents have immediately helped to train the Kosovo Liberation Army before NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. The disclosure angered some European diplomats who said this had undermined moves for a political solution to the conflict between Serbs and Albanians," et cetera.

JUDGE MAY: Who are you quoting now? Is that Ambassador Keller?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am now quoting Sunday Times, dated 12th --

JUDGE MAY: No. This is -- this is the opinion of a newspaper. We are not going to have that. There is no need for the witness to comment on what the newspaper says. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Do you remember, to cut a long story short, do you remember how you assessed Walker's statement with regard to Racak at the ⁷⁷³⁶ time? Do you remember that on the 22nd of January, the day after your discussions with me, you stated that Walker's statement was hasty rather than rational? That was reported by France press from Pristina on the 22nd of January as your words. Is that true?

A. Not exactly, Mr. Milosevic. I said that they were emotional, and I think I also said that in his capacity as head of the KVM, ideally he should probably not have made such hasty statements. But I would also like to underline, Mr. Milosevic, that I added that it was only human, and I would say almost sympathetic that you made strong statements being faced with the massacre like the one we saw in Racak. And I said, as far as I recall, that I would not exclude myself having made such statements in a similar situation.

Q. All right. But at that time, were you at least partially aware of the fact that a number of KLA members were killed in Racak on the occasion? Then, on the 22nd or 21st of January. Did you know it then, that a certain number of KLA members were killed in Racak?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I adhere to the report that I got from the Finnish forensic mission. I did not make judgements or statements until after that. I was told that those who were being killed in what has become to be known as the Racak massacre were civilians.

Q. Mr. Vollebaek, since you were chief of the OSCE, do you know that in the report of the Verification Mission of the OSCE of the 16th of January, the day after Racak, it said that eight KLA members were killed in Racak? Do you know that this is written in the report of the OSCE Verification Mission of the 16th of January? ⁷⁷³⁷

JUDGE MAY: What's the relevance of this to the witness's evidence?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance is this: If something like that is written in the report of the next day, the report of the OSCE Verification Mission itself, this at least brings into doubt the claim that there was some kind of execution of civilians. And secondly, it also puts into question the claim that it was not a clash between the KLA and the police but arbitrary killing of Albanian civilians. This piece of information at least brings it into doubt.

JUDGE MAY: The witness has given his evidence about this. He was not responsible for any statements. You've cross-examined extensively a number of witnesses, including Mr. Walker, upon them. There seems little point going over old ground again.

Now, you've got five minutes left with this witness if you have any other topics you wish to ask him about.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Five minutes, Mr. May? You gave me two hours to begin with and then a further 15 minutes. If I have used up one and a half hours until the break and half an hour after the break now, that leaves me at least the 15 minutes that you allotted me a moment ago.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, please, did you then believe that old people, women, and children were executed there?

JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. I'm going to confer. ⁷⁷³⁸

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll go on from Racak. Now, you've got another ten minutes if you've got any more questions.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have many more questions, Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: All right. You've got ten minutes to put them in.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You said --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May. I've got used to this kind of treatment.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You said in your statement, among other things, that you could not allow the fact that in the presence of the international forces, something take place that would constitute a crime and which the international forces would stand and watch taking place impotently.

A. That's right, Mr. Milosevic. I don't think I used the word "forces" because they were monitors, observers.

Q. All right. Tell me, then, how come, from the aspects of your position in 1999 as chairman of the OSCE and your position as foreign minister do you explain and interpret the fact that in the presence of the international forces from June until the end of 1999, over 360.000 non-Albanians were expelled from Kosovo and that tens of thousands of Serb houses were burnt down, and that several thousand people were kidnapped and killed before KFOR's very eyes and that 107 Serbian churches were destroyed all during that time and before the very eyes of the -- ⁷⁷³⁹

JUDGE MAY: Now, there must be a question here, but first of all, we will have to ask the ambassador if he can help with this, the position from June 1999 until the -- June 1999 until the end of the year. Can you help us with that, what happened in Kosovo then?

THE WITNESS: Well, from June 1999 until the end of the year, we moved back in, so to say. I mean the international community moved back in, the OSCE moved back in, and we tried to start all over again. We started -- we tried -- the OSCE had, at that time, as its main responsibility, democracy building. We were trying to help in creating various democratic institutions; press, media, the police. That was our task. But it was a very difficult task.

We started the police training school. Of course there was absolutely nothing more we wanted than to have everyone moving back to their places, but this was very difficult. And there is no doubt that there were wrongdoings, incidents, criminal acts from the Kosovo Albanian side that we reacted to and protested against. And it was very much against our will that the Serb population were faced with difficulties.

As I said, the first thing I did was to go to a Serb monastery, to stay overnight to try to show that we wanted them to stay and that they should be protected. And as you will know, Your Honour, that there still are KFOR soldiers protecting the Serb population. But I -- if I understand Mr. Milosevic correctly, he seems to imply that these wrongdoings undo his own wrongdoings, and I would strongly protest that. And I would again repeat, as I said earlier, that ^{7740 BLANK PAGE 7741} if there had been more forthcoming cooperation from Mr. Milosevic's side earlier in that year, all this could have been avoided.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you mean to say that we accepted the occupation of Kosovo and Yugoslavia in order to avoid having a war break out between NATO and Yugoslavia? Is that what you want to say?

A. Mr. Milosevic, this reminds me of the 1st of March, 1999. We never talked about an occupation. I talked about a military presence upon your invitation.

Q. On the basis of my invitation? Well, you asked me to invite you, Yugoslavia to invite you to occupy Yugoslavia? Does that seem to you to be logical, that anybody could do anything like that?

A. Your Honour, I think I stated several times that I did not mean an occupation.

Q. All right. You call that by a different name. I don't know how to organise my time when I have just a few more minutes left, but at the start of your statement, you said that in 1993, you came to see me, to ask me to use my influence with the Srpska Krajina and the leadership of Srpska Krajina to support your proposal for negotiations to take place in Norway and that those negotiations did in fact take place; isn't that right?

A. That is correct.

Q. Now, do you have any knowledge of any international or internal initiative for achieving peace which Serbia and I personally did not support throughout all those years? ⁷⁷⁴²

A. Your Honour, I don't think I'm in a position to answer that question.

Q. All right. Very well. Now, in addition to the explanations you gave, you explained one point that seems to me to be absolutely fantastic, to hear it and to comment on it, and it is this: It would appear that we supported those peace efforts - and let me say that we supported all peace efforts and peace was the only issue we dealt with when it came to Croatia and Bosnia - in order that Croatia could not go to war on two fronts and not in order to achieve peace between Republika Srpska and Republic of Srpska Krajina. And you even said that Serbia -- the Serbs should cease their military operations against Croatia.

Now, as you were in Zagreb at the time, do you know that in 1993, for example, and even much before that, there were no military operations on the part of Serbs against Croatia but that they banned access to their territory, the territory in which they had been living for several centuries and that that operation of theirs was called at the time colloquially "the log revolution." As you know, logs are not of an offensive means. So do you know that there were no military operations by the Serbs against Croatia at that time when you were in Zagreb? Are you aware of that? Do you know that that was so?

A. Your Honour, I am prepared to answer questions relating to the meeting I had with Mr. Milosevic in 1993, but I find it difficult to answer this question.

I did not, Mr. Milosevic, go into any kind of definition of military action between the government of Croatia and the Krajina Republic ⁷⁷⁴³ in 1993 because this was not the question I was asked when I answered the question about the meeting you and I had. The question I was asked was whether I had met you before I met you as a foreign minister, and I told about that.

What I felt was important for this process that you now deal with, namely the Kosovo crisis, was your attitude toward Muslims, because I vividly remember, maybe because I still have bad conscience for not strongly protesting what you said, that you said that we -- you would assist me. There were -- probably we cannot call it a war then if that's according to your wish, we can drop that terminology, but there were military activities that made the government of Croatia busy in trying to fend off the Serbs in Krajina at the same time as there was fighting going on with the Muslims in Bosnia. And I very well remember that you said that you would tell the -- or advise the Serbs in Knin to go to Norway to go on with the negotiations precisely because you thought it was proper for the Croats to fight the Muslims. And as I said earlier today, you told me that -- and your words -- I'm still quite sure that the words were, "Mr. Vollebaek, you have to agree with me we cannot have a Muslim republic in Europe." And of course I should have stopped you there. I did not. So I did not accept your statement but I did not protest strongly either, which I suppose I should have done.

Q. Mr. Vollebaek -- Mr. Vollebaek, as you know very well, the number of Muslims living in Yugoslavia, and as you know full well that not a single one of them all time during those crises and wars were mistreated, expelled, killed or arrested in Serbia, and as you know full well that we ⁷⁷⁴⁴ cooperated and had over 70.000 Muslim refugees in Serbia from Bosnia-Herzegovina, that we cooperated with different Muslim enclaves such as the one in Bihac region to which we sent flour and corn and food generally, the one that got the most number of votes for the president of Bosnia, Fikret Avdic, that's where he came from, as you know all this --

JUDGE MAY: What is the question? The witness -- the witness says that is what you said. So any argument is not to the point.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. It is precisely unbelievable and impossible, because we never spoke about a Muslim state, rather, the endeavours that were being made to create a Muslim extremist state. And if you recall, I mentioned to you on the occasion exclusively Muslim extremists. I spoke about Muslim extremists and not Muslims, because the vast large portion of Serbian inhabitants are Muslims. And I quoted Izetbegovic's declaration - and I don't have to quote it, it has been published in book form - in which Izetbegovic says that among the Muslim religion and non-Muslim societies and institutions, there cannot be peaceful coexistence. I spoke to you about the danger of Islamic fundamentalism, and that has been proven to be true, because over 6.000 Mujahedin --

JUDGE MAY: Just stop for a moment. Let the witness answer. What is being put, Mr. Vollebaek, is that what the accused spoke to you about was Muslim extremism and Muslim fundamentalism. Do you agree with that or not?

THE WITNESS: I do not recall that the word "extremist" or ⁷⁷⁴⁵ "fundamentalist" was used. I know the word "Muslim republic" was used but I do not recall that the word "extremist" was used.

JUDGE ROBINSON: More specifically, Ambassador, I understand Mr. Milosevic to be saying that he did not say to you that, "We cannot have a Muslim state in Europe."

THE WITNESS: I hear him saying that also. My recollection from that conversation, and I have gone over that several times in my memory, is that he said "a Muslim republic in Europe."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. May --

JUDGE MAY: One more question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's difficult for me, Mr. May, to ask just one more question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But do you not think that today - and I'm asking you, Mr. Vollebaek - in especially in light of Clinton's statement prior to the bombing of Yugoslavia, which justifies -- which he justifies by the alleged massacres in Racak and mentions the civilians, women, children, and so on and so forth, and you know that none of that is true, that this was a fabrication in a very dirty way, a reason for war, a pretext for war and aggression which NATO launched against a European country, in this case against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and created -- which led to very serious consequences?

So do you not think that this is a fabrication, especially as throughout the world it has been assessed that this event in Racak was abused for those purposes? And what Clinton stated on that occasion has ⁷⁷⁴⁶ been seen not to be true now and was in fact a pretext. Is that so or not?

A. Your Honour, I'm not certain what I'm going to say.

JUDGE MAY: Was Racak used as a pretext for the NATO bombing and, as it's alleged, aggression?

THE WITNESS: To my knowledge, not. Racak took place on the 15th or 16th of January, 15th of January. The bombing started on the 21st of March. We had a number of incidents that took place afterwards. And Racak took place. I suppose that I have not heard anyone, Mr. Milosevic, to kind of pretend that this was a kind of setup, that someone put people there to be killed in order to have a NATO bombing. That's the first time I hear that.

JUDGE MAY: No.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Allow me just to quote, please, just Clinton's words.

JUDGE MAY: No. We've been over this. Now, Mr. Wladimiroff, have you any questions of the witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, please. I should like to quote --

JUDGE MAY: No, Mr. Milosevic. You've had your time. You have had rather more than you have. Much of it has been spent arguing. Now, let us move on.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Thank you, Your Honour. Questioned by Mr. Wladimiroff:

Q. Ambassador, in your testimony, you told the Court about your ^{7747 BLANK PAGE 7748} meetings with the accused, and when you were asked about the role of the accused when military affairs were discussed, you told the Court that military or generals were present on the Yugoslav side. You also testified that the accused discussed these issues and made decisions. Do you remember that?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the military not participate in these discussions? And I mean the military on the Yugoslav side. Or did they participate?

A. I do not recall that they participated actively. They -- I -- on my side, I normally spoke, and on Mr. Milosevic's side, it was normally he that spoke. We had at least, as I recall, on the 21st of January there was a -- an intermission or it was a break, and the Yugoslav side withdrew, I suppose for consultations. But in my presence, as I recall it, they rarely spoke. Maybe they answered precise questions about something, but I remember that my conversation was with Mr. Milosevic.

Q. All right. Were there military on your part?

A. Yes. I do not recall everyone that was participating. I think normally we had only civilians, but there might have been some military advisors. I do not recall that.

Q. Did they participate in the conversation or was it you who did the discussing?

A. I did the talking with Mr. Milosevic. As I said, it was more or less he and I. I might also ask for some clarification, probably, but the direct conversation was between Mr. Milosevic and myself.

Q. Do you consider yourself an expert on military affairs or were ⁷⁷⁴⁹ these conversations on a more superficial level that didn't need any specific military knowledge so you could do it yourself, Milosevic could do it himself?

A. I am absolutely no military expert, and we had mainly, I would say, political discussions. But some of the political issues were based, then, on what were kind of military issues since there were incidents that happened. But I think that most of these issues could be dealt with without having a lot of military knowledge.

Q. Thank you. I come back to the telephone conversation of the 24th of March, 1999. You told the Court that the Rambouillet talks had broken up, and you were heading off society with having an armed conflict. You told the Court you had a conversation with Solana, the Secretary-General of NATO. You did not tell the Court what this conversation was about. Can you tell the Court what Solana told you?

A. Well, I do not recall the conversation as such, but I, in this period, after the withdrawal of the KVM, I saw things deteriorating, and as the NATO foreign minister, I was informed about the discussions in NATO about a possible armed intervention from the NATO side. I felt it was my duty to try to avoid this in my capacity as chairman of the OSCE, and I had a number of discussions with my advisors, with the troika, if there was anything that we could do.

Q. But that's not what I asked you.

A. No, but I --

Q. What I'm asking you is do you remember what Solana told you?

A. I asked him if it was okay for me to call Mr. Milosevic and tell ⁷⁷⁵⁰ him that there was another chance, if NATO would agree to start over again if Mr. Milosevic would agree to do so. And his answer was yes, he supported the conversation I had with Mr. Milosevic.

Q. And in your call with Mr. Milosevic, you passed this message from Solana to Milosevic?

A. I don't think I passed a message from Solana, but this was a message from the chairman of the OSCE to Mr. Milosevic. But I suppose that I also told him that I could make my influence in NATO so that I could go back to NATO and say I had this conversation with Milosevic, he was willing to talk to us, he was willing to cooperate, and that would have an impact in Brussels.

Q. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A technical question. May I ask the witness a technical question?

JUDGE MAY: No.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I wanted to ask him whether he's sure he talked to me on the 24th.

MR. RYNEVELD: Nothing re-arising. Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: We will ask the question which was put at the end. Questioned by the Court:

JUDGE MAY: Are you sure that you spoke to Mr. Milosevic on the 24th?

A. Well, when you are on a telephone conversation, I suppose there are certain limits to what you can be assured sure of. But I recognised his voice, and I was told that I was put through to Mr. Milosevic, and I ⁷⁷⁵¹ had people in my office witnessing the conversation. There's even a report in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the conversation. Well, I assumed. I assumed up until today that I spoke to him on the 24th of March, yes.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. No. We've taken this as far as we can. Ambassador, thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give your evidence. It's now concluded. I'm sorry. Judge Robinson had a question.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Ambassador, earlier you, in commenting on the statement that you attributed to Mr. Milosevic, that he said that, "We cannot have a Muslim republic in Europe," you say that you regretted not having answered him immediately. Would you explain that regret.

A. I thought that this was a statement that violated my sense of human rights because it was made, as I understood it at that time, as a statement against one group of people in general, and specifically in Europe. And that was the reason why I thought that I should have protested or told him that I disagreed with him. However, at that time, I didn't feel that it was the place for such a discussion of principle because we were in a hurry to avoid a conflict in another part of the former Yugoslavia, and I needed him to put pressure on the Serbs in Knin. So that's why I did not at that time do what I otherwise would have done, namely said that I disagreed with his attitude.

JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you, Ambassador. You're free to go.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours. ⁷⁷⁵²

[The witness withdrew]

MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, while we're waiting for --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Ryneveld.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. Your Honours, while we're waiting for the next witness to resume - I understand that Mr. Saxon will resume - I wonder if I might raise one issue concerning Mr. Crosland, who is on our witness list to testify on Wednesday, circumstances and timing permitting. My note is that on the 29th of May, we applied and indicated that we wanted to have Mr. Crosland bis'd in part, and that statement was provided to the Chamber on the 29th. In view of the fact that he will be testifying in a day or two, I wonder whether the Court might review that and give me an indication at your convenience so that I know whether to prepare him for a live witness or for a 92 bis. I have a summary now for a live one, but I would have to change the summary to a bis witness. That's the only thing I want to raise as soon as possible.

JUDGE MAY: Who is going to give evidence next after this witness? Who is coming?

MR. RYNEVELD: Witness K25. Mr. Nice will be handling it.

JUDGE MAY: Well, we'll certainly look at the evidence of Mr. Crosland.

MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

[Trial Chamber confers]

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Aliu, thank you for coming back. Your evidence, of course, is subject to the same declaration that you made on Friday. ⁷⁷⁵³

WITNESS: SHUKRI ALIU [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Saxon: [Continued]

Q. Mr. Aliu, on Friday before we broke, we were discussing the creation of what you refer to as the joint staff or joint command for Kosovo which met in Pristina on a weekly basis starting in 1998. And you also told the Trial Chamber about the formation of similar municipal staffs in the various different municipalities around Kosovo. I'd like to show you some documents, if I may, and we'll start with what is referred to as the OTP Exhibit number -- reference number K1280 if I could ask the usher's assistance, please, to distribute copies around the courtroom and place one on the ELMO.

MR. SAXON: Perhaps if the -- perhaps if a copy of the English version could be placed on the ELMO so that everyone watching can follow along.

Q. And, Mr. Aliu, if I could direct your attention, please, to the first page of the Serbian version. Can you find that, please?

A. I don't have the Serbian copy. Thank you.

Q. This is a document. It says: "To Defence Departments/Sections," in large letters. It's dated apparently 28th of July, it looks to be 1998.

A. 1998, yes.

Q. And first of all, I'd like to draw your attention to the bottom of that page that you're looking at. Do you see a signature at the bottom of that page, Mr. Aliu? ^{7754 BLANK PAGE 7755}

A. Yes. Yes, there's a signature at the foot of the page.

Q. Do you recognise that signature?

A. Yes, I recognise it.

Q. And whose signature is that?

A. It's the signature of the chief of the defence secretariat, Petar Ilic.

Q. This was the man who was your supervisor for a number of years during the 1990s; is that right?

A. Yes. Yes. This was the man who was my chief.

Q. And if we can just take a look at the text on this page. It starts out -- it says: "Subject: Instructions for the defence of inhabited areas." And then the first paragraph begins: "The joint command for Kosovo and Metohija has issued instructions for the defence of inhabited areas from the activities of Siptar terrorists which also prescribe the obligations of the SMO and its organisational units: the defence administration, departments and sections." This joint command that is being referred to in this document, is this the same joint command for Kosovo that you talked to us about on Friday?

A. Yes, it's that command.

Q. And then further down on the same page, it says the following: "We would point out that the joint command for Kosovo and Metohija has determined a new composition of municipal defence staffs and in addition to representatives of local self-governed units, the MUP, the SO, the IO, and the VJ, chiefs of defence departments and heads of defence sections ⁷⁷⁵⁶ have also become members of these staffs."

Can you explain to the Court which are the municipal defence staffs that are being discussed here?

A. This is about the commands of the staffs or sections in the municipalities of Kosova, and there are 28 of them. In these commands of the municipal staffs, leaders of the sections or the municipal secretariats were supposed to join up as members.

Q. All right. And just as on Friday you described -- you told the Trial Chamber of a number of persons who were members of the joint staff for the province of Kosovo. According to this document, would representatives of similar institutions and organisations be members of the joint staff -- joint staffs - excuse me - at the municipal level?

A. No. These were not members of the joint -- members of the joint staff. The members of the joint staff were only those people I listed on Friday.

Q. I'm sorry. I think my question wasn't clear. The people who you listed on Friday were, according to your testimony, members of the joint staff for the province of Kosovo that met in Pristina. In this document, we see Petar Ilic talking about or pointing out, to use Petar Ilic's language, that the joint command for Kosovo and Metohija has determined a new composition of municipal defence staffs. And then Petar Ilic goes on to explain which institutions those members might represent. My question simply is: From this document, are you able to tell whether the composition of the municipal defence staffs, in terms of the different institutions that were represented on the municipal defence ⁷⁷⁵⁷ staffs, were roughly similar to the different institutions represented on the joint command for Kosovo as a whole?

A. These staffs were merely for the municipalities, and these joint staff were appointed by municipal assemblies, and these municipal assemblies were made up besides the municipal staff like the municipal chairman, people like the chairman of the secretariat or the defence section.

Q. All right. And who would these municipal staffs respond to?

A. These responded to the municipal assemblies and the chairmen of the municipalities.

Q. I'd like to ask you to turn the page, please.

MR. SAXON: And maybe I can impose on the usher again. I'm sorry. Perhaps you could remain at the ELMO again for a moment.

Q. If you could turn to the very next page. If you could look at it on the ELMO as well. The very next page says, at the top, "Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija," and then it says, "Instructions for the Defence of Inhabited Places." And then we see the word "(Temporary)," and then in the middle of the page, it says, "July 1998." Do you see that language?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you explain to the Trial Chamber why that word "Temporary" is there?

A. It's temporary because the units that operated in the zones mentioned knew that they would -- later they would be sent back to where they worked before.

Q. So -- and at what point would these individuals be sent back to ⁷⁷⁵⁸ where they were before? What was going on at the time that required the issuance of temporary instructions?

A. These temporary instructions were issued to all the secretariats and defence departments to carrying out -- from carrying out their military duties.

Q. So were instructions such as these issued during times of war or crisis?

A. In times of war and in times of crisis.

Q. All right. If you could turn the page again to what is on page 3 of the English version. I'm not sure which page it is on your version. But you'll see the number 2 followed by a small "a". Do you see that subsection, Mr. Aliu? Section 2a. Do you see that? That section is entitled, "The Composition and Tasks of the Civil Protection and Systems for Monitoring and Reporting." Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. If you -- if we go to the next page, on the English version page 4, there is the number 1 in the middle of page 4 and the following text appears: "General purpose CZ," which I believe stands for Civilian Protection Units, "administer first aid, rescue people from ruins, extinguish initial and smaller fires, clear barricades, organise the washing of streets, etc."

Is this a fair description of the activities of Civilian Protection Units during times of war and crisis in Kosovo?

A. Excuse me. These are Civil Protection Units whose duties were, in fact, first aid, saving people from ruins and from fire. And in times of ⁷⁷⁵⁹ war -- or in 1990, they later -- they were armed, although they were forbidden to carry arms under the Geneva Conventions.

Q. All right. Let's turn the page again. On page 5 of the English version we see, about halfway down the page, the number 3, and we see a line that says, in capital letters: "The Task and Grouping of Forces." And if we scan down that section to the -- to the fifth paragraph in that section, there is a phrase at the very end of that paragraph that I want to ask you about.

You see a phrase there that says "and continuity of commanding." Do you see that phrase, Mr. Aliu?

A. On the fifth page? I can't --

Q. It may be on the 6th page.

A. Which one?

Q. Of your -- the fifth paragraph after the number 3. At the end of the paragraph, we see the words "and continuity of commanding."

A. Paragraph 3. Please, can you ask the question again?

Q. All right. Do you see these words "continuity of commanding"?

JUDGE KWON: I think it's fifth paragraph on page 6. Page 6 of the Serbian version.

MR. SAXON: That's correct.

Q. If you look at page 6, the fifth paragraph down, the last words in that paragraph say, in English, "continuity of commanding." Do you see that? "Neprekidnost komandovanja." I apologise for my horrible Serbian. Do you see those words, Mr. Aliu?

A. Those words that you mention are not here. ⁷⁷⁶⁰

Q. Well, if you look at page 6 and you look at this paragraph - and perhaps the usher can help me - look at the last two words in that paragraph. Do you see those words?

A. Yes. Yes, the last two words.

Q. Can you tell us, please, what does principle or idea of continuity of commanding means?

A. It means continuing all the operations, all the duties, and keeping them going until they are completely performed, until all these military duties have been performed.

Q. And would military units be able to function in wartime without continuity of command?

A. No, they would not.

Q. If you could, please, take a look at the very last paragraph on the same page, Mr. Aliu, where the text says the following: "The forces for operations inside the town are primarily determined by demographic composition. In ethnically clean Serbian settlements and zones, the organisation of defence is easier, while in mixed ones it is complex and has to be organised by apartment blocks. If that is not possible, then citizens should be evacuated into the ethnically clean zones." Do you see what I've just read to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us, please, when this passage talks about citizens being evacuated into ethnically clean zones, which citizens is it talking about, if you know?

A. This is only about evacuating Serbian citizens, who were very few ^{7761 BLANK PAGE 7762} in number. And they had to be evacuated into areas with a mainly Serbian population, whereas in Serbian populated areas, they were totally secure and there was no need for any evacuation.

Q. All right. And if you could also, please, turn to -- I believe it's on the next page. You'll see the letter 5, and you'll see the word "Commanding" in large letters. And in the second paragraph on that page, we see the following: "The staff functionally ties together and unites all the defence structures (the VJ reserve, the MUP, the CZ --" or the civilian protection -- "enterprises and citizens) as 'the MUP reserve.'" Can we take from this passage that the joint staff for Kosovo or for each municipality ties together and unites all the different defence structures and units that would be mobilised during wartime?

A. Yes. Yes, of course.

Q. All right.

MR. SAXON: I would now tender, Your Honours, that document into evidence. That document could be removed now from the ELMO and from the witness's table.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 245.

MR. SAXON: I will have to depend once again on Mr. Usher for another document. This is a document that has OTP reference number K1282. And again if the Serbian version could be handed to the witness and the English version placed on the ELMO, I would be very grateful.

Q. This is a document of which the date is unclear, at least in the English translation. 28 July nineteen nine something, from the Pristina defence administration. ⁷⁷⁶³

A. This is from 1998.

Q. From 1998. Thank you. It's addressed to the chiefs of --

A. It's not very clear.

Q. All right. We'll look at it. First of all, can you take a look at the signature again, Mr. Aliu? It's on the document. You might have to turn the page. Can you recognise that signature?

A. Yes.

Q. Whose signature is it?

A. It's Petar Ilic's signature.

Q. So if we go back to the first page, the document is addressed to the chiefs of defence departments and heads of defence sections. And below that, from 1 to 29. And then in the first paragraph, it says: "Pursuant to the Instructions on the Defence of Inhabited Areas issued by the joint command for Kosovo and Metohija, and with the objective of the engagement of Civilian Protection and Monitoring and Reporting Service personnel and performance of their tasks, I hereby issue the following." And then we see the word "Order" and a series of paragraphs after that. My question for you is if you can just briefly explain, who is Petar Ilic providing orders to, and based on what?

A. On the basis of this document, the head of the provincial defence secretariat, Petar Ilic, is giving orders to all the communal staff, all the municipal staffs in all the territory of Kosova. And he also gives an order to the monitoring and reporting service.

Q. And it says in the very first line: "Pursuant to the Instructions on the Defence of Inhabited Areas issued by the Joint Command." Are those ⁷⁷⁶⁴ orders pursuant to the instructions that we looked at a few minutes ago?

A. This is about the orders that we were looking at a short time ago and the tasks facing the municipal staffs.

MR. SAXON: I would now offer this document into evidence, please, and I would ask Ms. Graham if she would help me with --

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 246.

MR. SAXON: The next document has OTP reference number K1283.

Q. Mr. Aliu, if you could take a look at this document, please. It's dated the 30th of July, 1998, Pristina. Do you recognise the signature at the end of this document? Take a look at the back page, please.

A. Yes.

Q. The very back page. Take a look at the signature.

A. Yes.

Q. Whose signature is that?

A. This signature is the same person. It's Petar Ilic, the head of the defence secretariat.

Q. If you would go back to the first page, please. The document is addressed to "Regional Organ of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Cekic personally, Belgrade." And below that, it says, "Guidelines for the defence of inhabited areas issued by the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija." Below that, we see extract from the guidelines referring to the obligations of the Federal Ministry of Defence. Who is Petar Ilic sending this information to?

A. He's sending this information to the Serbian defence authorities ⁷⁷⁶⁵ in Belgrade and refers once again to the guidelines of the Defence of inhabited areas and states that it's been issued by the joint command.

Q. Now --

A. It was brought -- this is about the orders being issued by the joint command.

Q. All right. And just a quick question.

A. Excuse me. This document is encoded and is very urgent.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Aliu. Just to move more quickly, the Federal Ministry of Defence that received this message from Mr. Ilic, was this office the superior of Mr. Ilic?

A. Yes. It was Mr. Ilic's superior authority.

MR. SAXON: I would now offer this document into evidence, please.

THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 247.

MR. SAXON: I have one more document I'd like to show the witness. This document has OTP reference number K2685.

Q. Mr. Aliu, you might want to turn the page and look actually at the second page of the document. This document is dated 2 November 1998. It is also signed by Mr. Petar Ilic on the last page. On page 2, we see it's directed to the Federal Ministry of Defence, sector for civilian defence, to Lieutenant General Geza Farkas personally, Belgrade. And then it says in the first and second paragraphs: "... we would like to inform you of the following: "- in our communication strictly confidential no. 80-10/3, we requested the Command of the 3rd Army to secure for us arms and ammunition for all the units that are being formed and developed by the departments ⁷⁷⁶⁶ and sections on the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija as follows: civil defence detachments - for 1.665 military conscripts, communications units - 423, Monitoring and Reporting - 1.179, civilian protection - 3.365 members, or a total of 6.632." Mr. Aliu, during 1998, while you were still working in the Civilian Protection Unit, did members of that unit receive arms?

A. I will tell you a detail.

Q. I would like you to answer my question, Mr. Aliu.

A. Very quickly, yes. Yes. They received weapons, and I myself saw members of the Civilian Protection Units being armed by members of the army. And you can see here very clearly that the Civilian Protection Units here are armed.

Q. Mr. Aliu, did all of the members of the Civilian Protection Units receive arms?

A. All the ranks of the Civil Protection Units received weapons. And in the municipal assemblies and the municipal secretariats, they all received weapons. And that's what I said on the first day.

Q. Mr. Aliu, did Serbs and Albanians receive weapons?

A. No. The Albanians never received weapons. And indeed, they were all disarmed in 1987 and had to pay large sums in compensation. And these were only levelled against the Albanian population.

Q. Mr. 1998, did you ever see weapons brought to Kosovo and distributed? Yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. And where was that? ⁷⁷⁶⁷

A. This was in the defence secretariat, in the command of the Army Corps, and the arms were submitted by a man named Delibasic.

Q. And how were the weapons brought there?

A. They were brought in trucks to the command and then they were distributed from the command, it seems to me, in small chests.

Q. Who did these trucks belong to?

A. The trucks belonged to the Yugoslav army.

Q. Did you see the weapons being unloaded and distributed?

A. Yes.

Q. What kinds of weapons were distributed?

A. Automatic rifles and semi-automatics.

Q. Who were these weapons distributed to?

A. Only to the Serbs.

MR. SAXON: I would now tender this document into evidence, Your Honours.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 248.

MR. SAXON: And my last question for this witness -- my last two questions.

Q. Mr. Aliu, did your boss, Petar Ilic, ever tell you what might happen to the Albanian population in Kosovo if attacks by Albanian terrorists escalated there?

A. If the number of attacks by Albanians increased -- they weren't terrorist attacks, I must say, they were merely protecting their own homes -- if they happened, all the Albanians would have to go to Albania across the Accursed Mountains. ^{7768 BLANK PAGE 7769}

MR. SAXON: Your Honour, at this time I have nothing further for this witness. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now.

MR. NICE: I was told that there was a matter of concern about a protected witness, K32.

JUDGE MAY: No, not that I know of. If there is, we will deal with it tomorrow.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. Mr. Aliu, could you be back, please, at 9.00 tomorrow morning. I think I'm right. I will be informed by the registrar if that's the time.

THE REGISTRAR: Nine o'clock, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Nine o'clock tomorrow morning. Yes, Mr. Milosevic, very quickly.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just some technical questions, Mr. May. You needn't worry.

The instructions for the defence of settlements, there's no end to that. Now, is that a mistake? In my copy, the copy I have received -- or doesn't it have an end to it? Because these other documents, the other papers, I see that they were interviewed and they had signatures. I'm talking about this thickest document. There's no end to it. It ends with page 13, the copy I have, without a signature. Now, I'm just asking whether you can provide me with the complete document. That's my first question.

And secondly, are there any changes in the order of witnesses? ⁷⁷⁷⁰

JUDGE MAY: Let's deal with --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is to say, the schedule and list that I have received, the latest one.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Saxon, can you deal with the document?

MR. SAXON: I'll try, Your Honour. To the best of my knowledge, Your Honour, this is the complete document or it is the most complete version in the possession of the Office of the Prosecutor, but I will check just to make sure that no mistake has been made.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. And Mr. Nice, you said the next witness would be K25?

MR. NICE: K25.

JUDGE MAY: And then following him?

MR. NICE: Crosland.

JUDGE MAY: Crosland.

MR. NICE: And I think, with the short day, that's all we've got time.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We've got, what, two days left. I think they're normal short days, 9.00 until quarter to two.

MR. NICE: I hope the evidence will fill the time and I'm not sure that we can have a reserve, but I'll just check on that.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Very well. We will adjourn now.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.07 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 9th day of July, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.