⁷⁷⁷¹

Tuesday, 9 July 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

MR. SAXON: Your Honour?

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Saxon.

MR. SAXON: I just have two brief points before the cross-examination begins. The first point, based on something that was raised by the accused at the end of yesterday's session, I checked on what was Prosecution's Exhibit 245, and the original document that was in the possession of the Office of the Prosecutor, the instructions that are part of that exhibit are 13 pages. In other words, we only have the first 13 pages. That is simply all that we have of that document. The second point I would just like to bring to the Court's attention is that I have a long-standing medical appointment later this morning, so I will probably stand up and leave the courtroom at about 10.00, and if there is any re-examination of this witness, Mr. Ryneveld will take control of that.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

WITNESS: SHUKRI ALIU [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Is it true that from your superiors, on the eve of the NATO bombing, you asked to take the first part of your holiday, to ⁷⁷⁷² go off on holiday on the 24th of March, 1999? Is that right?

A. No. I went on sick leave in February. I was using sick leave, and I didn't return to my job.

Q. And the members of the KLA, did they threaten you and say that unless you left the administration for the defence of Pristina that they would kidnap your son Visar, and that they intercepted and threatened your daughters Shpresa, Violeta and Goda, and did you suffer from these threats? Did they threaten you, in fact?

A. These are lies on your part, and you're trying to manipulate things. Nobody was scared of the KLA in Kosova. It was a glorious army that fought for the rights of the people.

JUDGE MAY: No. Mr. Aliu, I know it's difficult being cross-examined, but we don't want, I'm afraid, speeches. We just want an answer. If it's not true, just say no.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic, what's the next question? Next question. No. We will go on to the next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Now, is it true that your request to use your holiday you explained by saying that you had been threatened by members of the KLA?

A. It's not true.

Q. And is this true: That when you went on holiday because of all the pressure exerted upon you and all the explanations that you gave, that you cried in front of your friends and comrades?

JUDGE MAY: No. Mr. Milosevic, you mustn't misrepresent what the ⁷⁷⁷³ witness said. He didn't say he went on holiday, he said he took sick leave. But go on from there.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right, then. Take a look at this decision of the Federal Ministry for Defence in which we can see that on the basis of the rules and regulations to which this decision refers, Aliu Shukri, an employee of the Federal Ministry for Defence of the Republic of Serbia, the administration for the defence of Pristina, terminates his labour relations as of the 12th of April, 1994 because he has not been to work. You know that if you stay away from work for five days or more without permission or without valid reasons given, then you are fired from your job. Is that something that is contested?

A. I don't know what happened or what decision was taken at the Defence Ministry or by Petar Ilic. After February, I didn't go to my workplace any more, and I told you that before. And you yourself can show that I didn't go to work.

Q. Yes. It says here in the administration document that Aliu Shukri used the first part of his holiday for 1999 on the basis of the decision of the 23rd of March, 1999, what I said a moment ago, and that it shall last 13 working days beginning with the 24th up until the 9th of April, 1999. And he has to report to work on the 12th of April, 1999. I assume that was a Monday.

MR. SAXON: Your Honour?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The individual did not report to work on the day specified, and he ⁷⁷⁷⁴ did not --

JUDGE MAY: Hold on, Mr. Milosevic. There was an objection. Yes, go on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As I was saying, the decision -- this document, in fact, describes that as your leave, your holiday, expired, for which you received a decision, you did not report to work for a full month after that, and that on the basis of the law and the rules and regulations, another decision was made, as it says here --

JUDGE MAY: Very well --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. -- that your labour relations were terminated.

JUDGE MAY: One question at a time. Yes, Mr. Saxon.

MR. SAXON: Your Honour, would it be possible for this document to be shown to the witness so that he could review it and see if he's seen it before.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, I was going to finish with the cross-examination on these points and then we're going to see if they were to be exhibited. Have you got an English translation of that, Mr. Milosevic, or not?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, I do not have an English translation, but I can hand this decision over to you and leave it with you as evidence and proof that what I asked the witness is correct and that his answer is not correct. ⁷⁷⁷⁵

JUDGE MAY: We'll put it on the ELMO then.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You can have it. Here you are.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, let's put it on the ELMO and have a look at it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is a two-page document.

JUDGE MAY: Now, look at that, Mr. Aliu, if you would.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we proceed?

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness -- let the witness deal with the document first of all.

Have you seen that document before, Mr. Aliu?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I've never seen it before.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Since it's been put in front of you, help us, what's the date of it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll have a look. I can't make out the date very well, but I have never seen this document, ever.

JUDGE MAY: Is there any comment you would wish to make about it since it's been put to you?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May 1999. No. I have no comment on this document. I've never seen it.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the first time I've ever seen anything of this kind.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Just a moment.

[Trial Chamber confers] ⁷⁷⁷⁶

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Aliu, the document, as I understand it and as I understand Mr. Milosevic to be alleging, that document is saying that as a result of your absence from work for a particular period of time, your labour relations were terminated, which I take it to mean that you were dismissed from your job. What do you have to say about that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have nothing to say. As I said before, after 15th of February, I never went to work. And they could -- they could have dismissed me from my work whenever they pleased. They had no problem about that. But I never turned up to work.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Hand that, if you would, please, to the Prosecution, and then we'll exhibit it.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I should just like to ask you one more thing, Mr. Shukri, with respect to what we were discussing and linked to the document. What you said was that it is a material fact that you didn't appear at work for a long period of time. That's correct, isn't it?

A. I didn't go to work after 15th of February. That's the third time I've said so.

Q. All right. Now, as you spent many years working in the state administration, do you know that if you leave your place of employment without any valid explanation or reason, your employment is terminated?

A. I went on -- didn't go to work on purpose.

Q. Well, all the more so, then. I assume that you were dismissed ⁷⁷⁷⁷ pursuant to the law. Now, whether you yourself consider that that is a procedure determined by law or whether you were dismissed because you were an Albanian perhaps. What do you think?

JUDGE MAY: I don't think we can take this much further. He's given his account of what happened. You've produced the document. Now, it seems to me there's no point arguing any further about it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let's move on to your statement now. You said that in 1987, you were subjected to an investigation with respect to the arming of Kosovo Albanians with firearms and that you were taken before a military court in Nis. That is what it says in paragraph 3 of the beginning of your statement. And you say, "I went before the military court in Nis and was found guilty and sentenced to three months' probation." Now, as you were sentenced, although a very lenient sentence because it was a conditional detention period, do you remember what you were found guilty of and sentenced to for three months' probation? For what? What act did you commit? What did it say in the sentence passed by the military court in Nis which you received when you were proclaimed guilty? What was the verdict?

A. You must ask the military court in Nis about that, whether I was guilty or not. If I had been very guilty, I would no doubt have been sentenced to many years in prison.

Q. That's not what I asked you. As you received the sentence and verdict, what did it say in the sentence and judgement, that you were ^{7778 BLANK PAGE 7779} found guilty for arming Kosovo Albanians, or did it say something else in the document of the sentence of judgement you received?

A. I was almost two years in front of the military court. This was in 1987. And you can say what you want and write what you want, but I, nevertheless, say that I never saw any of the things that you say happened.

Q. And what things do I say happened?

JUDGE MAY: No. Now we're going round and round pointlessly. He has described in his evidence in chief what happened as far as he knows. Now, if you've got something to contradict it with, let's hear it. Otherwise, let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, my question was: What were you found guilty of? Why were you --

JUDGE MAY: He has told us --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. -- sentenced? What was the verdict?

JUDGE MAY: He has told us. Now, let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Tell me, then, who was the commander of the Territorial Defence of Kosovo, the headquarters where you worked at that time, the TO staff?

A. Ali Muhaxhiri, General.

Q. That's right, General Ali Muhaxhiri, an Albanian. Precisely. And he didn't receive you after that verdict. He didn't take you back to work ⁷⁷⁸⁰ at the TO staff, did he?

A. No. I went to the Provincial Defence Secretariat, where Ismet Krasniqi was my boss.

Q. Well, you say in your statement that you were not allowed to return to the territorial headquarters, as far as I was able to understand. Said, "When my profession was finished I was not allowed to return to the territorial headquarters and to take up -- I was not permitted to carry out the duties I previously performed." That's what you say.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. He said he went on to another job.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And after that, you claim that you just read the newspapers in your office. You spent your time reading the newspapers; right?

A. Most of the time I read the newspapers. I had no duties at all.

Q. Well, all right, then. How did you become informed about the questions and issues that you're testifying about here; from the newspapers or in some other way?

A. I was at my workplace in my office at the secretariat, and the information flowed all the time through the secretariat and to the army corpus [as interpreted].

Q. All right. I didn't understand the end of your sentence from the interpretation, but let's move on. You go on to speak about the Albanian demonstrations in 1981, and you say that the Yugoslav leadership in 1981 considered these demonstrations to be contrary to the state, anti-state demonstrations or words to that effect, something along those lines; is ⁷⁷⁸¹ that right?

A. Could you repeat the question, please?

Q. I understood you to be explaining that the Yugoslav government or, rather, the Yugoslav leadership took these demonstrations to be anti-state demonstrations in 1981; is that right? Demonstrations against the state; right?

A. I don't know how the Yugoslav Presidency treated these demonstrations because I wasn't a member of it. I only know that special units of the Interior Ministry came to Kosova in 1981 and operated in Kosova all the time from 1981 until the end of the war. The place where the special units were is called Germija. In 1982, the same unit went to kill Tahir Meha in Prekaz.

Q. So you're talking about the 1980s. Let's make that clear. Not the 1990s. You're not talking about the 1990s, the 1980s; right?

A. I answered you very well. After 1981, the special units of the Yugoslav Interior Ministry stayed in Germija near Prishtina --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Aliu, do not become annoyed. It will not help us. Now, Mr. Milosevic, let's have some relevant questions. Do you want to ask the witness about his statement? In which case, he can have a copy in front of him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course he can have a copy in front of him.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have a copy of his statement.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All these questions arise from his statement, Mr. May. ⁷⁷⁸²

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And furthermore, since you don't know what the government of Yugoslavia considered and you say in your statement, in paragraph 5 -- nevertheless, you say the Yugoslav government took these demonstrations to be subversive or something like that, and then you go on to say the Yugoslav police arrived in Kosovo. That is written in line 3 of that same paragraph. "It was at this time that the Yugoslav police came to Kosovo." And then in the next sentence, you say: "After the Serb police entered Kosovo, a lot of Albanian men were imprisoned and the maltreatment, that is mistreatment, of Albanians really became ubiquitous." Tell me, did the Yugoslav police come to Kosovo or was it the Serbian police? In one sentence you say the Yugoslav police came to Kosovo and then, almost in the same breath, you say the Serbian police. Was it the Yugoslav or the Serbian police?

A. I don't know who translated it, but it was the police of Yugoslavia, and all the republics and provinces contributed to that police force.

Q. All right. That means they came from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia. Is that what you're saying?

A. I gave you my answer, and you should know what the Yugoslav police means.

Q. That's precisely why I'm asking.

A. And I answered.

Q. All right. You say also there were also a lot of murders committed, Albanians -- against Albanian soldiers at the military ⁷⁷⁸³ barracks. What were those murders of Albanian men in military barracks? Please remind me, because although I was in office at the time, I don't remember any murders except for the murder committed by an Albanian man who killed a number of soldiers in military barracks in Paracin. That's the one I remember.

A. Let me explain the matter of the murder of Albanian soldiers in barracks of this degenerate Yugoslav army. There were a number of between 65 and 70 Albanian soldiers killed in the barracks of the Yugoslav army. The case of Aziz Kelmendi was framed. The murder of Aziz Kelmendi in the barracks at Paracin was a scenario prepared by the Yugoslav army. It is impossible for a soldier like Aziz Kelmendi who was on guard in a corridor to reach the arsenal and to -- which was under the command of various officers. A guard in a corridor never had weapons or munitions. You know this very well. You merely wish to stage various --

JUDGE MAY: No. Now, Mr. Aliu, we must keep this evidence within bounds.

Mr. Milosevic, we are not concerned with events in the 1980s, as you know quite well. Now, let's move on to a more relevant period. Have we got the statement?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. I'm going to see if the statements are coming.

MR. SAXON: We have copies in English, Your Honour. The statement in B/C/S is on its way as we speak.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. ⁷⁷⁸⁴

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I wouldn't be asking these questions at all if certain statements were not contained in the witness's own witness statement. Since they are untrue --

JUDGE MAY: Let me explain something. Let me explain something. The fact that something appears in a statement, unless the statement is exhibited, does not mean that it's evidence in the case. Now, you have the right to cross-examine about the statement, and you can do so, and you can have it exhibited if you want. But it does not seem to me to help us very much to have these events of so long ago gone into in enormous detail. What, if I may say, you should concentrate on is the evidence which the witness actually gave.

MR. SAXON: We have the statement now in Albania and in Serbian, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Let the Albanian be put before the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you have your statement in the Albanian language, Mr. Shukri?

MR. SAXON: I apologise. There are two statements, both of them in the Serbian language, but the witness reads Serbian, Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Let's move on.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, a photograph of a soldier killed in 1990, Hajrizi from Kuklibeg. I was present at his funeral. One of the cases which you are denying.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Aliu, have you got the statement? Now, have the statement in front of you. ^{7785 BLANK PAGE 7786}

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [No interpretation].

JUDGE MAY: Now, Mr. Milosevic, what do you want to ask?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just asked him what were those murders committed against Albanian men in the army.

JUDGE MAY: He has dealt with that, and I've told you to move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Fine. Then you go on to say in the bottom paragraph of this page 2, which is actually the first page of the statement but it is marked 2, quote: "I found out that Milosevic had formed a committee in Kosovo in the spring of 1998 which was named the combat headquarters or combat staff of Kosovo."

And then you explain this. What was it; a committee or combat headquarters or staff? Could you explain this in greater detail?

A. I didn't say spring, and I don't know who translated it into Serbian, but I said in the summer of 1998, there was a joint command formed from which the war staff of Kosova stemmed.

Q. All right.

A. And you formed this personally. And you commanded it and, through it, you received all the information about what was happening in Kosova. You are -- why are you denying it?

Q. I am not here to answer your questions, Mr. Shukri. I am asking you.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. ⁷⁷⁸⁷

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. On page 3, you enumerate the members of those combat headquarters or the combat staff. As far as I can see, there were 12 of them. First you say politician Milomir Minic, who was the president of the Socio-Political Chamber. Let's not deal with this mistake now although it is a mistake. It was the Chamber of Citizens in the Yugoslav Assembly. Then you mention Nikola Sainovic, Minic's deputy. You say he had been the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia and Serbia. He was actually Deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia. Then you name Zoran Andjelkovic was a member of the headquarters and performed the duties of the president of the government of Kosovo. You actually mean the Executive Council, don't you? Veljko Odalovic was also a member of the headquarters and performed the duties of the Chief of Staff of the district staff of Kosovo. Do you know that he was head of the district in the hierarchy of Serbia's administration? Then you say Vojo Zivkovic was a member of the headquarters, and president of Milosevic's party.

JUDGE MAY: Are you asking a question about Veljko Odalovic? You seem to be.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am quoting his own statement in order to pave the way for asking him this:

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. We are talking here about a member of the parliament, member of the federal government, president of Kosovo's government, president of Kosovo's Executive Council, head of the district, chairman of the party organisation in Kosovo. Then General Pavkovic, member of the staff and ⁷⁷⁸⁸ commander of the so-called army corps of all Serb VJ forces. You enumerate, therefore, people who were all in high public places, high-ranking people and prominent public figures. Is that so?

A. That's why they were part of the staff, and were members of the military staff commanded by you.

Q. All right. I've already heard about this idea. What I'm interested in is the following: How come you are talking about the clandestine activities of public figures such as the president of the federal parliament, vice-president of the government or head of district in Kosovo? Is it their duty to meet from time to time to discuss issues of importance for the society in general, for the citizens, for the economy? Are they occupying such public offices which require them to meet and discuss these things?

A. This staff met every Tuesday at 5.00 in the parliament building of Kosova and sometimes in the -- I say this with total responsibility: This staff was appointed by you and was given orders by you for military operations in Kosova, and it used to meet in the army building, and it used to meet in the provincial committee building.

Q. All right. Tell me then, Mr. Shukri, what you've just said is also written in your statement at the top of page 3. "The group held regular meetings after it was established, and those meetings were held every Tuesday at 700 hours [as interpreted] on the premises of the Executive Council." That's what you say.

Tell me, please, what kind of military or war headquarters is it which meets once a week on Tuesday afternoon at tea time? What kind of ⁷⁷⁸⁹ war staff is that?

JUDGE MAY: That is what -- it's not for him to comment. That is his evidence. That is when they met. Now, whether you say it isn't much of a war staff is a matter for you, but he can't improve on that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Fine.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But is it logical for politicians, high representatives, or should I say the highest representatives, because we're talking about the speaker of the parliament, president of the Executive Council, Prime Ministers, is it logical for them to meet regularly and discuss current issues? Are they forbidden from doing that in the course of performing their public duties?

JUDGE MAY: I don't know if you can comment on that. Of course they're not forbidden. I suppose the question can be put in this way: What was there that was unusual, Mr. Aliu, about this particular group meeting? Was it just a normal meeting between politicians and generals or was there something else to it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's not here a simple question. It's a matter of questions about the military situation in Kosova, and the accused knows this very well. And this staff dealt solely with militaries using Kosova, and in 1998 onwards, this is what they discussed. They weren't there to drink tea in the afternoon, they were here to discuss military issues solely.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Every Tuesday at 5.00 p.m.; right? ⁷⁷⁹⁰

A. Every Tuesday at 5.00 in the afternoon. That was when they met. And if necessary, they also came to the command of the army corps in Prishtina, and were able to sleep in the hotel belonging to the army command.

Q. All right. Many times in your statement, you accuse Milomir Minic, who was the speaker of the federal parliament, who were allegedly issuing some kind of orders. Do you know that he wasn't even speaker of the parliament as a matter of occupation? It wasn't his profession. He was director, manager of the railways, and he was chairman of the Chamber of Citizens in the parliament. Do you know that that was his real position?

A. What kind of post you gave him is your problem, but he was member and president of the war staff of Kosova.

Q. That is precisely my point. How can such a number of civilians form a war staff? Even if they were coordinating some activities, how can they possibly make up a war staff? As a military officer with a military education, how can you put so many civilians on a war staff? Is this true or not?

A. The Civil Defence in Yugoslavia had a lot of civilians in it, not just military people per se.

Q. All right. Do you think that soldiers belong in a Civilian Protection Unit?

A. Soldiers don't normally belong in such a unit, but they are commanded, and they're commanded by you who were head of -- who was head of the Territorial Defence. ⁷⁷⁹¹

Q. I am not quite getting your drift now. I was head of the overall defence and Supreme Commander of the army as President of the Republic. Everybody in Yugoslavia knows that. So I don't really understand what you're saying. Would you please care to explain?

A. Your Honours, can I use an example?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we put that on the projector?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do you have this on your monitor or not?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. What is it, Mr. Aliu, you want to explain?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This the accused can see for himself, the command structure and who was commanding in Kosova.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please be so kind as to give me that paper. I can't see it on the monitor. I don't see very well. I'll put it back on the projector when I'm done.

JUDGE MAY: Let the accused have it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. What we see here is this: Right there on the top is the Presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY, Supreme Commander of the armed forces. Below that, we see the Ministry of Defence, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, in war called Supreme Command. And then it is divided into the war staff and PVO and command of the army district and the army and naval district. So first we have the Supreme Command, the Ministry of Defence, ^{7792 BLANK PAGE 7793} then army, navy, and land forces; then land forces is further divided into divisions, corps, and so on and so forth.

What are you trying to prove with this? You are saying that there is a Supreme Command, that there are armies, navy, air force, brigades. Will you please translate this and look at it yourself to be able to explain what you are trying to say. You are saying the same thing that is written all over the newspapers, and you are trying to present it to us as something new and spectacular.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Your Honour. This document which is my example and which the accused is saying is from a newspaper is from the defence college in Belgrade, and this shows the army military structure in Kosova. This is the main example in which the accused himself can find which unit was under which command.

JUDGE MAY: Where did you get the document from, Mr. Aliu?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is from the faculty, and this is a very important -- this is a very adequate kind of document from the faculty.

JUDGE MAY: And was it given to you?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It's my document.

JUDGE MAY: You say it comes from the faculty. How did it come to you?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I studied there. I studied at the faculty. This is from the subject about the command and structure of the Yugoslav army.

JUDGE MAY: And you got the document when you were studying at the ⁷⁷⁹⁴ faculty; is that right?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, when I was studying at the faculty.

JUDGE MAY: When was that, could you tell us.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1977 to 1981. And this document is, even today, down in the rule book of the Yugoslav armed forces.

JUDGE MAY: If the -- just a moment. If the Prosecution apply to exhibit it, we will have that document exhibited.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No problem.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, please do exhibit it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What's the big deal in saying that the army has its own structure, armed forces, that there is a Supreme Command, that there exists the navy, air force, and land forces, and that the land forces further subdivide by army districts, divisions, brigades? What is so important in that so that you should put it to us here? Who has ever denied the existence of air force, navy, land forces, brigades, corps, and who is disputing that?

JUDGE MAY: This is all a comment. He's produced it now, and he says that sets out what he was given in the faculty. Now, you can comment on it if you want, but not now. Let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let's take one of those documents that you gave us yesterday. For ⁷⁷⁹⁵ instance, a letter --

JUDGE MAY: Let's have that document and it can be exhibited. If the usher would collect it. We will also have an exhibit number, while we're at it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was exhibited yesterday.

JUDGE MAY: No, just a moment. We will deal with these two documents now before we go on to other ones. Give that a Defence number, and the other one. It doesn't matter which it is. Whichever is convenient.

THE REGISTRAR: The letter regarding Mr. Aliu will be Defence Exhibit 22, and the chart will be Defence Exhibit 23.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'd like to ask you regarding this letter. It's a letter which the head of administration for defence, Petar Ilic - you showed us this yesterday - sent to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, sector for civilian protection.

So in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in its government, there is the Federal Ministry of Defence, and then the area organ in the Republic of Serbia belonging to the defence administration with its Pristina office. That's what's written in the heading. And then the head of defence administration writes to the -- to his superior in the ministry. So he communicates along those vertical lines that you describe and -- is this letter written by him and addressed to the sector in the ministry for civilian protection? ⁷⁷⁹⁶

A. Just read who was it sent to.

Q. It says Federal Ministry of Defence, area organ for civilian defence.

A. Personally, who was it written to?

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, which document are you referring to? We've got two. One is numbered 245, the other is 246. They are both dated 28th of July. We could perhaps -- we could perhaps distinguish them by one being longer than the other.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please. This is a one-page document, and I'm talking here about the following, that is to say, I want the witness to explain to me whether they are communicating here, that is to say from the head of department to --

JUDGE MAY: No. I'm not going to go on until I understand which document you're talking about. Now, three documents were put in. Perhaps we can identify them in this way since you're not following the numbers -- no, don't interrupt -- you're not following the numbers. One is described as "Subject: Instructions for the Defence of Inhabited Areas." The next one -- and it's to the defence departments and sections. The next one is to the chiefs of defence departments and head of defence sections. And the third one is described as "Guidelines for the Defence of Inhabited Areas." Now, which of those three is it that you're putting to the witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is what I have in my hands, a paper that is K0004689. That is the number of the document.

JUDGE MAY: Would you hand it in and we'll get it compared with ⁷⁷⁹⁷ the Registry, and we'll see which document it is. We should, in any event, have a record on the transcript of which exhibit you're talking about.

Perhaps the registrar could compare the two and say what the number is, please.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the accused is referring to Exhibit number 248, and it's the last page.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Put that on the ELMO so that the witness can have it too. He can have the original. The accused should have his copy. Yes. Now, what is the question, Mr. Milosevic?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As Mr. Shukri is explaining the organisation, we can see here that the head of the administration, which is an organisational part of the Federal Defence Ministry, is writing to the minister or, rather, to the Ministry of Defence, the sector for civilian defence. Now, I wish to ask you the following: This is the vertical chain of the Federal Defence Ministry; right? Because it goes from the top downwards, from the federal level right down to the local level; right? And we can see here that from the local level --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer. Now, can you deal with that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The example that we had slightly earlier here but doesn't say who -- that Petar Ilic is addressing personally, Geza Farkas, and he is asking for the arming of the Civil Defence Units.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁷⁷⁹⁸

Q. First of all, I wish to clarify one point, and that is the functioning of that organisation that you have been talking about. You showed us a schematic of the army a moment ago. Isn't that right, Mr. Shukri? You showed us that diagram; right?

A. You saw very well. Just read carefully who it's addressed to, because you can see the name of that general. Why are you denying it?

Q. I'm not denying it, Mr. Shukri. I'm not denying that Geza Farkas at that point in time was the deputy or --

JUDGE MAY: This is not to turn into an argument. Now, ask the question again and let the witness answer it. Just answer the question. Don't get into an argument, Mr. Shukri.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please. It is immaterial whether the assistant or Deputy Defence Minister for civilian defence is called in one way or another. The important point and what I wish to establish is that the district organ from Pristina communicates with the assistant Minister of Defence in charge of civilian defence. Is that a fact?

JUDGE MAY: Well, we can see who it's written to. Now, what is the point, Mr. Milosevic, of the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, the question is the following: I wish to establish whether this is the vertical chain, the line and chain of the Defence Ministry, from top to bottom, that you are talking about. Is it?

A. I said before that these are the -- this is the vertical chain of command. And you can't deny this. This is merely -- ^{7799 BLANK PAGE 7800}

JUDGE MAY: No. Don't argue with the accused, please. Just answer the questions and we'll get on more quickly. Mr. Milosevic, you've got another ten minutes with this witness. Now, we can see these documents, and we can see --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I haven't even started my cross-examination, Mr. May. Can't you see that the witness has not been answering and cannot in fact answer any question in a proper and correct manner? The witness seems to be quite nervous. Perhaps he ought to calm down first and then proceed to the cross-examination.

JUDGE MAY: No. Don't you make comments either. You've got another ten minutes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, don't I even have the same amount of time that the opposite side had?

JUDGE MAY: You have now had the hour which they had and a bit longer already. Now, you can have -- you can have another quarter of an hour and that will be to -- give you a third more than the Prosecution have had.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, are you counting the time that they had on Friday before the break?

JUDGE MAY: Yes, that's all been counted.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then, it's very difficult for me now to get through all the questions I wish to get through in the time that I have because he explained -- went into many explanations here, the kind of explanations that you can read in any newspaper.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁷⁸⁰¹

Q. But tell me this, Mr. Shukri, explain to me this: If this is the vertical chain which the organ of administration goes and in which you yourself worked, what was the vertical chain, for example, for communication in the army? Does it follow the diagram and schematic you showed us a moment ago or does that chain follow a different pattern?

A. The leadership and command is merely a pattern of the kind that I presented before. This is the general scheme.

Q. All right. Petar Ilic was the head of the defence administration belonging to the Defence Ministry, under the Defence Ministry. Who was in command of the army in Kosovo? Who was the main person in the army in Kosovo at that time in 1998, during the time period that you're talking about? Petar Ilic communicated with the Ministry of Defence. Who did the commander of the army communicate with, the corps commander, for example? Let's take the corps commander, who did he communicate with? Let's hear this. You're an officer, so tell me, who does the corps commander cooperate with -- communicate with?

A. You know the answers to these questions very well. You saw in the plan. The commander of the Prishtina Corps answers to the commander of the Nis army. It's very simple. And you are the -- were the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of Yugoslavia.

Q. So he is responsible to the commander of the army; right? Of course. I'm not asking you because I don't know myself. I wish to establish what you are saying.

And to whom is the commander of the Nis army district responsible to? The 3rd Army, who is he responsible to? ⁷⁸⁰²

A. He is responsible to the chief of the staff of the Yugoslav army.

Q. All right. That means that we have established two chains of command, one via the organs of the Ministry of Defence from bottom to top which we can see from this letter; the second, you have been explaining, goes from the corps command to the army command, the 3rd Army commander, then the General Staff. That's the military chain of command. Now tell me about the police. Who does the chief of police refer back to? For example, the head of the Internal Affairs Secretariat in Pristina.

A. About the police matters, you must ask the police. I didn't show you the scheme for the police. I --

JUDGE MAY: Can you -- it's not the accused that you're answering to, it's the Court. Now, can you help us with the chain of command of the police or not? If you don't know, Mr. Aliu, say so.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I wasn't in the police to know this sort of thing.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes. Next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. But may we dwell for a moment on these two? That means the following: Is it clear to you, Mr. Shukri, then, that if a part of the organisation of the Ministry of Defence has its vertical line right up to the peaks and if the army goes up to the General Staff - we have established that, right? - how then and on the basis of what grounds can you claim that all these forces are being commanded by some sort of joint command for Kosovo? Or is this a method of work which has to do with civilian defence and mutual information? ⁷⁸⁰³

A. Your Honour, let me answer the accused again. I explained very clearly the matter of the military districts and the command of the army corps and the provincial Defence Secretariat. Each had their own responsibility, as I explained yesterday.

You must not manipulate translations into Serbian. You should know very well that in the event of war, the army was commanded by this joint command which you yourself formed.

Q. All right. That means what you said a moment ago that the corps commander, for example, of Pristina, the Pristina Corps command, is not responsible to the commander of the army and the General Staff and myself but that he is responsible to Milomir Minic. Is that what you're saying? So he receives orders in Milomir Minic and not from the army commander or from myself but from Milomir Minic in Pristina. Is that what you're claiming? Is that what you're saying?

A. Why are you confusing things? You saw very well the plan that I showed you. Do not try to evade your responsibility. You were the Supreme Commander --

JUDGE MAY: Now, I'm going to stop this. This witness must answer to the Court and not get into arguments with the accused. Just simply say yes or no. Don't argue with him. Now, I've told you, Mr. Aliu. Yes, Mr. Milosevic, your next question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He didn't give me an answer to my question.

JUDGE MAY: Ask it again shortly.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. ⁷⁸⁰⁴

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The office of command commanding the army, the functions of command, does it go down the chain that you describe from the corps to the army to the Supreme Command and to myself, upwards, or does the command of the army evolve via Milomir Minic? Which is it? Which is what you're claiming here.

A. I'm making no claims. I'm merely telling the truth. And I've answered this question three times already.

Q. All right. If you say so, then it's -- there's no point in continuing along those lines. But is it clear to you that all these documents, all the documents that you have presented here are generally known facts in each local community?

JUDGE MAY: That's a comment. It's not a question. It's not a question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, please. Does it say here in that second document, 4737, on the last page where the tasks of civilian protection, Civil Defence are talked about, units --

JUDGE MAY: Exhibit 245. Yes. Go on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General purpose CZ units, administer first aid, et cetera. We saw how this functions upwards, then we saw how it functions downwards. Civilian defence. It says: "General purpose units administer first aid, rescue people from destroyed buildings, extinguish initial and minor fires, clean up barricades, organise cleaning and washing of ⁷⁸⁰⁵ streets," et cetera.

Specialised units rescue people in structural collapse emergencies, buildings, roads, et cetera, fire-fighting operations, first aid, destruction of unexploded material, cleaning up the terrain, maintaining law and order, et cetera. They take part in constructing shelters, in ensuring that the population has water supplies, et cetera, et cetera. The monitoring of all terrorist activities. And then mention is made of other operations which the Civilian Protection Unit has with regards to terrorist activities. Now, Mr. Shukri, are you aware, do you know, as you worked in the district organ of the Ministry of Defence in Pristina, how much during that year, and I'm talking about 1998, the year you're testifying about, how many people were killed by the KLA, that is to say Serbs and Albanians and soldiers and policemen, and how many terrorist attacks were launched? How much -- how many settlements had been taken control of, for example, from Orahovac right down the line? Do you know that?

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... I'm told that it's in fact 246 we're looking at. At the moment, we're not going to stop to go through that. Whether it's 245 or 246, it matters not. Mr. Aliu, what you're being asked is this: Can you assist the Court by dealing with the number of terrorist attacks, it's said by the KLA, in 1998? If you can help us, say so. If you can't, just say that you can't.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will try to help you. The Court should know. ^{7806 BLANK PAGE 7807} The KLA did not ever undertake terrorist operations in Kosova. I will only mention one murder: Ilir Durmishi and his friend Tale and Maliq were killed in 1990, and it was never explained who killed them. And the Court knows who was in charge in Prishtina. Can I show --

JUDGE MAY: No. We've had much evidence. No, rather than go further.

How would you categorise the KLA operations in Kosovo?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The operations of the KLA were a form of defence against the Serbian occupier and barbarian, and a defence of the population.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Next question. You've got another four minutes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, all right. Regardless of how you categorise it - and that was your question, Mr. May - do you know how many people, Serbs and Albanians alike, soldiers, policemen, et cetera, were killed by the KLA in the course of 1998? Do you know at least that many people were killed during that period of time? Do you know that at least?

A. Many Albanians were killed by members of the Yugoslav army units, by the police, and by the Serbian special forces units. These were stationed in the -- in the Grand Hotel in Prishtina, the Park Hotel, and the Herzegovina Hotel in Kosovo Polje, and on the main road from Klina to Gjakove --

Q. I'm asking you, Mr. Shukri --

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Would you repeat your question, Mr. Milosevic. ⁷⁸⁰⁸

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm not asking you that. Do you disclaim that the KLA in 1998 killed a large number of citizens, Serbs and Albanians, policemen, soldiers, and others? Do you deny that?

A. The KLA did not kill Albanians. On the contrary, it defended Albanians. And the situation in 1998 was a state of war. And you had 50.000 soldiers in Kosova, and we had the right to defend ourselves against colonisation and occupation.

Your Honour, would you like to look at just an example, just to look at it?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Put it on the ELMO quickly. Yes, Mr. Aliu, what is it? This is a report, is it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a statement by the general of the Prishtina army corps who says that there are 150.000 armed men in Kosova, whereas the accused talks of terrorist groups which didn't exist at all, or if they did exist, they were Serbian terrorists. And here we have special units being used.

JUDGE MAY: If the Prosecution want to take that further, they can. If you'll give that document back to the witness, please. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Your last question now.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, give it to the Prosecution.

JUDGE MAY: Give that back to the witness. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, well, it's pointless to cross-examine this witness who, in his statement here, says where the Park Hotel is located and the Grand Hotel, and who claims that Ojdanic was the ⁷⁸⁰⁹ chief of the General Staff, that Pavkovic was the commander of the 3rd Army, that I was the Supreme Commander, and he could see all that on television and hear it over the radio, read it in the papers, and it's no secret. So how can I examine a witness, especially with the help of the other side there who's sitting there triumphantly, pulling out certain documents --

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Very well. Mr. Wladimiroff, have you any questions for this witness?

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Thank you, Your Honour. Questioned by Mr. Wladimiroff:

Q. Witness, you studied military sciences at the faculty, the military faculty, didn't you?

A. The defence faculty at Belgrade.

Q. So I take it that you would know the difference between an official state of war and any armed conflict, would you not?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there an official state of war in Kosovo before the NATO bombing started?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that declared --

A. Let me use this opportunity. On the third day of the Rambouillet agreement, there was a general mobilisation of the Yugoslav forces.

Q. Does that imply an official state of war?

A. Yes.

Q. So am I right in thinking that an official state of war wasn't ⁷⁸¹⁰ declared by the Yugoslav authorities?

A. Yes, a state of war. But it was secret.

Q. What do you mean by a "secret"? Was it not declared in public?

A. It was not published publicly.

Q. And why do you say a secret? How would you know if it was secret?

A. I know because the mobilisation at the Defence Secretariat took place.

Q. Was it in that mobilisation disclosed that there was an official state of war?

A. Yes.

Q. So we can read it if you would have that order, would we not?

A. I don't have an order of this kind because it was a secret order.

Q. But how would you know if you don't have that order?

A. I was working there.

Q. Have you seen that order?

A. I saw how the mobilisation summonses were being prepared.

Q. And have you seen that order?

A. No, not the order.

Q. Again, how would you know that in that order there was secretly announced an official state of war?

A. Because conscripts were called up and also the conscripts in the police units were also mobilised.

Q. Last question: In your testimony, you say that in the event of war, then the army would be commanded by the structure that you gave evidence about. Would you agree that if there was no state of war, that ⁷⁸¹¹ the whole structure would not function and did not function, although it was in place?

A. If -- if there were not war, if it were a state of peace, no doubt it would not operate.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Ryneveld.

MR. RYNEVELD: On reflection, no re-examination. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Aliu, thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give your evidence. You are free to go.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, before we go on, we need to renumber an exhibit, the organigramme schematic, as it was called. It will be renumbered as a Prosecution Exhibit. If the registrar would give us the figure.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, formerly marked Defence Exhibit 23 will now be Prosecutor's Exhibit 249.

JUDGE MAY: And we will need to deal -- I don't think you're dealing with Colonel Crosland, but we need to deal with that, if you would tell Mr. Ryneveld, before we finish today. Perhaps at the end of today we will deal with that.

MR. NICE: I know that the information upon which the application ⁷⁸¹² that I imagine you're referring to is mounted won't actually be arriving in written form until after 2.00.

JUDGE MAY: No, it's the original application under 92 bis. We need to straighten it out.

MR. NICE: Very well.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, let the witness take the declaration.

MR. NICE: In light of his protected status, can he take a seat?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Sit down to take the declaration.

WITNESS: WITNESS K25

[Witness answered through interpreter]

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, this witness has been granted various protective measures. In those circumstances, may he please have this piece of paper. Could you show it to the witness, please. Examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Just look at this piece of paper. Don't read out what is on it, but if the details contained on it are accurate, please say, "Yes."

A. Yes.

MR. NICE: May that piece be paper please be produced and given an exhibit number.

Your Honour, the witness will deal with a number of sites of involvement by the unit with which he was engaged, briefly, and to make his evidence more intelligible to not only the Court but also the public, I will identify the areas by reference to the atlas that we have been ^{7813 BLANK PAGE 7814} using. If a version of that may be available, I will be able to -- I'll point out the pages from time to time. If the usher could help us when I -- it won't be immediately. When I specify a page, if she can simply place it on the overhead projector. He will then be dealing with one area in much greater detail, for which a special map has been prepared.

Q. You will be known throughout these proceedings as Witness K25. I'm going to deal with matters of background shortly, and where possible, if you can answer questions simply with a yes or no, it will save time and make the administration of your evidence that much more compact. K25, are you a Serbian police officer, having had compulsory military service with the JNA in the course of which you trained as a short-range anti-tank self-guided rocket operator as part of a JNA infantry battalion?

A. Yes.

Q. After military service, did you complete studies to the university level, becoming a police reservist and later working for the police, after further training becoming a member of a unit known as the PJP or police special unit, continuing with ordinary police work but performing special assignments for the PJP on certain occasions?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the unit of which you were an occasional member receive instruction from the VJ on specialist weapons?

A. Yes, for training purposes.

Q. Can you give us an example of the specialist weapons on which you were trained by the VJ? ⁷⁸¹⁵

A. During training, we had compulsory training in operating infantry weapons, military equipment, weapons of medium range such, as Zolja and Osa, hand-held rocket launchers, land-mines, basic training in operating special weapons of higher calibre, such as 12.9, et cetera.

Q. Were these weapons then available to your unit as and when required?

A. Yes, because that fell within the framework of training in handling infantry weapons.

Q. I move to paragraph 6. Were you deployed from the place where you were based to Kosovo on several occasions in 1998 and 1999?

A. Yes. On six occasions in 1998 and once in 1999.

Q. I will deal briefly with the occasions in 1998.

MR. NICE: If the usher would be good enough, please, to open the map at map 5, 0-5 on the left-hand corner there, laying that on the overhead projector. Thank you.

Q. This shows west-central Kosovo. And was your first deployment in the Kosovska Mitrovica, Srbica, Josanica and Klina area?

A. Yes.

Q. In a sentence, please, the nature of the operation of the PJP then.

A. The purpose of the operation was to free or liberate roads from Srbica and Klina and Klina to Pec because Albanian terrorists at the time had sealed off roads in this area and carried out constant terrorist operations in those sections of the road and shot at anything that moved.

Q. We can't see Klina, but it's a little further south on the map? ⁷⁸¹⁶

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Nice, please.

MR. NICE: We can't see Klina but it's a little further south on the map. Thank you very much. We can see that.

Q. The date of that deployment, please, Witness K25?

A. Sometime around the 1st of March, I believe, or the 21st. I can't remember exactly. In fact, it was -- it was definitely the 1st of March.

Q. To your knowledge, had there been any earlier deployments of this kind or was this the first of its kind?

A. There had been no previous deployments. Our unit had never gone out into the field to perform such tasks. This was our first anti-terrorist assignment.

Q. The second deployment --

THE INTERPRETER: Mike, please.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

Q. The second deployment, same area, was when and to do what, please?

A. The second time, we went to the same positions, and our task was to ensure that the road was passable. Our presence had the purpose of securing that road.

Q. The date of this second deployment?

A. After the completion of the previous task, we had three or four days' leave and then we came back.

Q. We now go to map page 4, please, the previous page. And the lower part of it, I think. We will see Pec and Decani. Your third deployment, Witness K25, was when, where, and to do what? ⁷⁸¹⁷

A. Our third deployment followed immediately after the second one, after a short break. It was on the road from Pec to Djakovica, where again Albanian terrorists had cut off sections of that road, preventing normal traffic.

Q. We can see on the map, if we look south of Pec and north of Decani - I don't know if it's possible to focus in on the bottom right-hand corner - we can see a couple of villages called Donji Streoci and Gornji Streoci, I think. Did they feature in this, your third deployment?

A. Yes. That means that if we were not on our regular two days' leave, we were at our positions in Gornji Streoci where we were securing communications, that is, roads.

Q. If we move to the fifth -- I beg your pardon, the fourth deployment, where was the fourth deployment?

A. On our fourth assignment, we tried to establish control over Jablanica, which was a stronghold of the terrorists where around 3.000 well-armed terrorists were based. However, at that time we failed to enter the area of Jablanica.

Q. And this is Jablanica in the south of Kosovo, considerable distance away from the previous deployments?

A. Yes.

MR. NICE: Map 15, and the top left-hand corner of it, shows Jablanica, and it is right at the southern end or edge of Kosovo. No. Map 15. I don't think we're looking at the right map there. No. That's not the right map. Page 15. Oh, dear. Top left-hand corner. Let's have a look at it. No. The top left-hand corner. Keep going. The witness ⁷⁸¹⁸ will point it out for you. We can see the borders there of Kosovo and we can see Jablanica right at the top left of the screen at the moment.

Q. How long did this unsuccessful mission last, please?

A. Every field deployment lasted between 25 and 30 days, but this attempt to take Jablanica lasted for about a day or a day and a half.

Q. If you could move to the fifth deployment. I think we're going to want to turn to map --

THE INTERPRETER: Mike, please.

MR. NICE: Thank you, and I apologise.

Q. As we turn to the fifth deployment, I think we're going to be turning to map 9, which is on central -- the far west of Kosovo. And was your fifth deployment, and it's the top of the map, just south of Decan? Thank you. Perfect.

And did your fifth deployment take you to the area of Prilep and Junik, and in particular, to the village of Baboloc, which we can just see towards the right and towards the lower part of the screen?

A. Yes.

Q. What did this deployment involve?

A. Just holding the road, securing the road, the communication line.

Q. And then finally, the sixth deployment, also on map 9, was, I think, on the road between -- no. It was in the area of Junik, which we can see just almost in the centre of the screen, towards the bottom. And what was that sixth deployment all about?

A. We were supposed to take control over that village from which there had been constant terrorist attacks. ⁷⁸¹⁹

MR. NICE: If the usher would be good enough now just to take -- open the map up and to put the left hand -- the right hand part of one page in the -- that's the stuff. Thank you.

Q. In the course of this operation, did you have some assistance from the VJ?

A. Yes. On one occasion we received support from Lake Radonjic on the part of the army of Yugoslavia VJ, because the Albanian terrorists in that area had a very strong base, were very strongly fortified.

Q. And that lake is shown as the blue part of the right-hand map shown on the overhead projector, I think. Thank you.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, we can now move from paragraph 8, for convenience. We'll come back to paragraph 9, but move over to paragraph 15 in order that things can be dealt with sequentially.

Q. And we come to your operation in 1999, the previous ones, giving the pattern of your unit's involvement, albeit in 1998. Did you, in 1999, find yourself deployed to the Velika Krusa/Mala Krusa area?

A. Yes, I did.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, for this and for the witness's observations in relation to this deployment, we have a special map that's been produced in two different sizes, one for placing on the overhead projector and the slightly larger size version for Your Honours, the accused and the amici. May that now be produced and distributed, please. And, Your Honours, if you want, of course, to find these areas on the atlas or to make a cross reference, then Velika Krusa is on map 10, it's map reference K23, but I think having identified it in that way, we ⁷⁸²⁰ can rely on this more detailed map for the balance of the evidence on this topic.

Can the usher put the small version on the overhead projector, and I think the -- if we get it so that it's central to the projector. Thank you very much. Then I think the experts in the booth will be able to focus on what we require.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the pseudonym name sheet will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 250, and this map will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 251.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

Q. Witness K25, the markings on this map, which we will interpret in due course, were they put on at, as it were, your direction, reflecting the things that you were observing and able to tell us about?

A. Yes.

Q. When was this deployment? When did it start?

A. On the 25th of March, in the early morning hours.

MR. NICE: The booth may wish to move to the junction or towards the junction of the two green lines. Thank you very much. That's enough. And at the left hand join of those two green lines, we see the village or town of Zrze.

Q. Was your PJP unit deployed to the area of Zrze on the Djakovica-Prizren road?

A. Yes, that's correct. We arrived there on that day from Baboloc village.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'm going to deal with the identification of units, with the Chamber's leave, at the end of the session in a short ^{7821 BLANK PAGE 7822} private session, and I'll remain anonymous as to units for the time being.

Q. When you arrived there with your unit, what level of equipment did you have, please?

A. We arrived with three 110 trucks, one Pinzgauer, three jeeps, one armoured jeep, three civilian trucks, and our own usual weaponry that is normally in our possession.

Q. Did you have contact or did your unit have contact with a VJ officer? If so, at what time, on what date, and tell us a little about what that encounter led to.

A. Yes. This gentleman from the army of Yugoslavia met us, and instead of directing us to Zrze, he deployed us along the road. And together with our company commander, he established a link along this line of blockade, that is, deployed us there.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask for this microphone to be turned on for us, too, not only for the interpreters, because I almost can't hear the witness. I can't hear what he's saying. I have the impression that this microphone is turned on only for the interpreters' booths. I can hardly hear the witness.

JUDGE KWON: Or if you use this headphone, you can easily -- you can hear them quite loud and clear.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Serbian is not interpreted into Serbian, Mr. Kwon. This witness is not being interpreted into Serbian.

JUDGE MAY: You can hear the Serbian channel. And apparently ⁷⁸²³ there's no other way of improving it.

Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can hear the Serbian channel very well when you are speaking but not when the witness is speaking. I can hear him from the headphones, Mr. Kwon.

JUDGE KWON: Why don't you try once? You can try once.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm telling you that I can hear it from the headphones.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that those microphones should be turned towards the witness, those microphones which are now facing you, not the witness. Then I will be able to hear him.

JUDGE MAY: Those in charge of this will organise it as best they can. There's nothing more that we can do about it. The Registry have heard what you've said, and if there is any improvement that can be made, it will be made. Yes.

MR. NICE: Thank you, Your Honour. The particular nature of the distortion - pity the accused hasn't followed this - means that different microphones have to be used and that's why he can only get it through the headphones, which he declines to use.

Q. Witness K25, would you be good enough, please, to reflect what you've described about --

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Go on.

MR. NICE:

Q. Reflect what you've described about your deployment with reference ⁷⁸²⁴ to the map and to the coloured lines. Use the pointer and just show where you were deployed, please.

A. From the point where the junction is between the railroad and the road, along the main road from Djakovica to Prizren, in Mala Krusa and in this general area.

Q. The VJ -- the VJ officer to whom you've referred, what was your understanding as to his -- the breadth of his authority over the equipment of the various units or the units that were deployed in your area?

A. He was in command only of the armed vehicles that were together alongside us.

Q. What level of communication was there between the units - and you might be able to give us an account of the number of units - the units deployed there, and what level of communication between your unit and the VJ units?

A. Communication between the police forces was conducted through radio communication on the same channel, and with the VJ, we had oral control because they didn't have radio communication stations with the same channels as us. Should the need arise, we would be able to contact the staff, our headquarters, who did have a radio communication with the army if we needed to contact the VJ.

Q. The operation on which you were engaged, again looking at the map, using the pointer, and expressing it in straightforward terms, was to achieve what?

A. The object of the operation or, rather, the operation itself took place in various stages. This was the first preparatory stage where the ⁷⁸²⁵ basic goal was from the Bela Crkva access, repel the terrorists towards Malisevo and Milanovici and to pull out the civilian population from the line of fire. Everything was done with a greater goal in mind, and that was that the terrorists had large control over the territory which was very inaccessible. And we feared a NATO descent. And so in order to reduce this and to ensure that we had control over the area, this is the kind of operation we engaged in.

Q. Malisevo is not actually shown on this map. It can be found on map 10, although don't turn to it, and it is simply to the north and east slightly of the area shown on this map. Would that be correct?

A. Yes.

Q. In general, and later we'll come to particulars, but in general, what happened to civilians within this area of operation?

A. I'm not getting the interpretation.

Q. I'll try again. In general, what happened to the civilians in this area of operation?

A. With the start of the operation, the civilians were in the area, and as there was action between us and the KLA, the civilians would -- pulled out of the area of operations towards the communication line and road between Djakovica and Pec. So they were displaced from Mala Krusa, the ultimate point of the operation, for their own safety and security.

Q. And in what direction were they sent?

A. In the direction of Prizren.

Q. And did you --

A. But outside Mala Krusa. ⁷⁸²⁶

Q. And did you ever discover what happened to them after that or was that for others to speak of?

A. I don't know what happened after that.

Q. Now can we deal with the movement of civilians in a little more detail? To whom -- I beg your pardon. Did you involve yourself directly in identifying and moving civilians, and if so, to whom or to what unit did you hand civilians over?

A. As we held the line and the blockades, all the civilian population left from the in-depth positions from the Celine village, where they were directed by our own forces outside the zone of operations towards Mala Krusa and the railway station, and all the civilians were handed over to the local policemen, the local police force, who due to their previous experience in which the KLA would dress in civilian clothing, disguising themselves and hide with the civilian population, we would hand them over to the local MUP, and they would know who the members of the KLA amongst them were.

Q. Roughly how many civilians did you hand over to the local MUP?

A. I can't say exactly. I can't give you an exact figure.

Q. Can you give us an estimate? You have done in the statement, but can you give us an estimate now that you're here in court?

A. About 5.000.

Q. When handed over, were women and children treated in any way differently from the way in which the men were treated?

A. Although it was a very hot day, the women and children were put up in the -- at the railway station in Mala Krusa, and then the Prizren SUP ⁷⁸²⁷ organised transport for them.

Q. As to the men, was transport organised for them or not?

A. No.

Q. Is it right that you and some of your colleagues made provision for some of those people to have water, where otherwise they would not have had water?

A. I don't understand why they wouldn't have had water otherwise. We policemen were there. They were our citizens, and they got water. And we organised ourselves in such a way as to place a policeman up on the road, by the road, and as the military forces crossed this road very quickly because of the operations going on, we positioned a policeman to look after the children while they were running across the road to a building where there was drinking water to be had. And we gave them about 5.000 litres of water, to all of them. We distributed this water amongst them all.

Q. The local MUP, were they deployed in one particular place or were they interspersed along the road?

A. They had their own point up at the junction in Mala Krusa, towards Beli Drim and along the elevation to the right of us.

Q. Was that their only place of deployment, on that road?

A. Well, they also had their positions in the village of Zrze and in the village by the bridge. Its name is -- let me just think. Rogovo.

Q. Did they have checkpoints at these places?

A. Yes. I forgot to say that they had their checkpoint also in Velika and Mala Krusa. ^{7828 BLANK PAGE 7829}

Q. Paragraph 19. What was the role, if any, of local Serb reservists in particular villages in this area?

A. They protected themselves, defended themselves, because there weren't enough police to go around to protect each and every Serb village or, rather, all Serbs in Albanian villages.

Q. Were they armed, and did they have uniforms to reflect their reserve police status?

A. Yes, they did. They were all in the reserve police force. They were all reserve policemen, and they all had both uniforms and weapons.

Q. I turn to cooperation at this exercise or operation between VJ and the MUP. The VJ officer whom you've already spoken of, of what was he in charge, as it appeared to you?

A. For his combat vehicles only.

Q. Was there an involvement by members of your PJP group with his units on a so-many-people-per-armoured-vehicle basis?

A. Yes. We would supply the physical protection of those armoured vehicles.

Q. Did the protection being provided appear to be part of a pre-existing arrangement or plan?

A. No. It was part of an agreement in the field.

Q. Paragraph 21. At what time did the operation begin and on what date?

A. The 25th of March, between 5.00 and 5.30 a.m.

Q. And the deployment was along the road you've spoken of. Was it also along the road from Zrze to Bela Crkva and the wine factory near ⁷⁸³⁰ Orahovac which we can see as the top of the two green lines?

A. Well, that should be it, but I wasn't there so I didn't see it, but our people were supposed to have been there?

MR. NICE: Perhaps now is the time to look at the key on the map, which is at the bottom part of the map, if the usher would be good enough so that we could see what's what.

First let's look at the key, if you can focus on that. A little bit further. A teeny bit further. You can always fold the map in half if it's going to obstruct the lens. If we can just look at the key, please. The green -- the continuous green line is said, on this map which you have -- in the annotation of which you have participated, is said to be the 23 Vojvodina PJP Detachment. The continuous dark blue line is the Prizren MUP. The dotted blue line is the Nis PJP Detachment. The double blue line, now off the map, but don't worry, we'll come to it later, is said to be Frenki's JSO. And then there's another mark simply saying "VJ," and then there's an arrow giving the deportation route, which we can see.

Q. As to the deployment of -- no, I'll ask the question the other way round.

Which of these units did you see yourself --

JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you could start with which unit was his.

MR. NICE: Yes. Very well.

Q. Which unit was yours?

A. My unit, that is to say, we were within the frameworks of the 23rd Detachment, it was the 7th Company, along the communication from Zrze to ⁷⁸³¹ Mala Krusa, on the Djakovica to Prizren road.

Q. And so that deployment was something you knew of personally yourself. Did any of these other deployments that you --

A. I have one correction to make, if I may. The special units or JSO, units for special operations, I did not include in the sense of them taking part in the operations but merely that I saw them during the following operations. And the route taken by the refugees was not one that I drew in, but that was the general direction that they moved in.

Q. Thank you. I'll come to the JSO in a couple of minutes. Going back to where we were on the south part of the markings of the map, the green line, then, running along the road is your own unit. As to the Prizren MUP, to the left or the north-west of that, is that something you saw yourself or simply learnt of?

A. Yes, I saw it.

Q. Then further north of that, the deployment reflected by the next green line marked as the 23rd Vojvodina PJP Detachment and running up to Orahovac, did you see that yourself or simply learn of it?

A. I know they were there. It was a component part of the cooperation.

Q. Thank you. The Nis Detachment, shown by the blue broken line, was that something you saw yourself or something that you learnt of?

A. Once again, part of the cooperation. I knew they were there, but I didn't actually see them.

Q. And then finally, as you've already told us, further north on the map - if the usher would be so good - the double blue line respecting -- ⁷⁸³² reflecting Frenki's JSO, a unit you saw, but later, I think you've told us.

A. Yes, that's right. I just met them.

Q. Now, that's the deployment --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Sorry.

Q. That's the deployment of the various units. Your instruction came from whom and at what level as to what you were to do? Don't specify the person, but give us the rank of the person from whom your instructions came.

A. At the level of the company, instructions were received from the main officer in command, and the information was sent down to the commanders of the companies and the companies would relay them to us.

Q. First sentence of paragraph 25, for the Court. The objective of the operation was to do what to the terrorists, the underlying purpose, as explained to you, being what?

A. To free the communication between Djakovica and Prizren, which is where there were constant attacks by the KLA, and to push back the members of the KLA towards Malisevo, to pull out the civilian population from the zone of operations, which is something that was done in each and every operation. The civilian population would be pulled out from the combat zone. Two groups would see to this. That is to say, the operations were between us and the KLA. And the larger plan was to diminish the territory under KLA control because of the possibility of NATO troop landings.

Q. According to instructions given, what was the estimate of the ⁷⁸³³ number of KLA in the area? What did you think of the number given? Did you have your own estimate, however rough, of how many there may have been there?

A. Well, a basic assessment was 10.000 terrorists. And we considered amongst ourselves that there were far less, perhaps five.

Q. You've dealt with the deployment in general terms. Can you just help us in detail with the deployment of tanks in the area and also the vehicles called BOVs, BOVs.

First of all, tanks. Where were there tanks in this area?

A. One tank was up at the bridge. Another tank was here in this settlement, Velika Krusa, and three tanks were to our right at our ultimate positions in Mala Krusa. And four BOV armoured vehicles were deployed between Mala and Velika Krusa along the road, running between the two.

Q. And it may be obvious, but to which units did tanks and BOVs belong?

A. They belonged to the army of Yugoslavia. The police did not have this kind of equipment.

Q. Paragraph 26. Did you personally see anything of the way in which villagers were moved from their villages or not?

A. As to the movement of villagers or their removal, I didn't see that, and I didn't hear that they went out, that they left Velika and Mala Krusa at all.

Q. Paragraph 28. You've told us already about the system in general for movement of men, women, and children, and the movement via Mala Krusa ⁷⁸³⁴ railway station, I think, but help us with this: Between the 24th and 27th of March, what sort of numbers of people did you see passing through Mala Krusa railway station, and were they just from Mala Krusa or did they come from elsewhere?

A. On the 24th of March, I was not there, so I don't know about that particular date, but when I was there, which is from the 25th onwards, about 5.000 refugees went by, not more, and that's it.

Q. The second part of my question was were they all from Mala Krusa or did they come from other places? And if so, by what routing had they reached this particular railway station?

A. I didn't talk to them as to where they were coming from, but nobody came from Velika or Mala Krusa, they came from the village road from the direction of the village of Celine.

Q. Paragraph 29. Again, you've told us in general terms of how people moved, vehicles for the women and children or on foot for the men, but were there any examples of the men being moved in trucks from the railway station?

A. Yes, there were cases like that. But these were cases when several vehicles were sent on or the vehicles were free, and people were taken that way.

Q. Which body was responsible, as you could judge it, for the transportation, please?

A. The SUP, Prizren.

Q. How did you learn or understand that it was the SUP, the Secretariat for Internal Affairs, that was responsible for this ^{7835 BLANK PAGE 7836} transportation?

A. Nobody expected such large numbers of refugees at that point in time, so we informed the SUP of Prizren of what we were facing, and through radio communication they told us to put them up at the railway station from whence transportation would be organised for them outside the combat zone.

Q. The transports that were provided, were they driven by uniformed or un-uniformed men or women?

A. Mostly uniformed persons, whereas others wore just parts of uniforms.

Q. As to the KLA who were being driven out, was there a route available for them to move along? Was it usual or unusual for such a route to be available for the KLA dealt with in operations of this sort?

A. Yes. Every time there were alternative directions, because usually there were small-scale operations under way within the frameworks of a larger operation, and they were all pushed back to a given territory. And that is why alternative directions were left open and these people were steered towards a desired position.

Q. The PJP company headquarters in the village of Mala Krusa, give us an example, please, of the degree of -- degree to which that headquarters was armed. What equipment did it have?

A. They had small arms, their own personal weapons, plus an armoured vehicle with an M-84 machine-gun, 12.7 millimetres -- 7.9 millimetres.

Q. Did they have any armoured vehicles available to them?

A. No. ⁷⁸³⁷

Q. Please now deal with a couple of particular incidents. On the morning of the 25th, at about 8.00 or 9.00 in the morning, did you witness the capture of some Albanian men in the area of the -- on the Djakovica-Prizren road or in that area?

A. Yes, I did. Members of the KLA.

Q. By whom were they captured? What happened to them initially?

A. They were captured by our company along that road. I don't know exactly how because I didn't see it myself. I don't know where exactly they were caught but they were brought into us. They had visible KLA insignia, and between them they had one rifle made in China. And I handed them over to the local police, which was based 30 metres away from us, because those were the orders we had. So they never entered our headquarters.

Q. Did you see what happened to them after they'd been handed over by you to the local MUP?

A. Yes. Three local policemen took them along the road towards Beli Drim, into some houses.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think - and the witness will confirm this if I'm correct - Beli Drim may not be indexed in your atlases, but it is in fact the blue river, I think, that runs just to the south and west of the green markings on the map.

Q. Would that be correct, Witness K25?

A. Yes.

Q. So taken towards that river, what happened next?

A. No, not towards the river. In the direction of the river. From ⁷⁸³⁸ the road, along the road towards the river, and then they took a left turn about 30 metres away towards -- to a field of some sort.

Q. What happened after that to the men?

A. After that, we heard rifle fire, and we all thought, at the same time, that one of them had tried to escape. But we didn't pay attention that much. Two local policemen returned to the road, and one of them was still gone.

At the same moment, our colleagues brought another three members. I don't know -- I'm not sure about two of them, but one of them I know had KLA insignia. And they handed them over to those two local MUP members. Just then, the third local policeman turned up, and together they took them away to a house which was about six metres away from that checkpoint, and when these policemen again returned several minutes later, we realised that nobody was guarding the captives.

Q. Did you see the captives, either the six or the three, ever again alive?

A. No.

Q. Did you see any of them dead?

A. I can't say precisely whether it was them, but I went to that house where they had been taken, and I saw bodies of men. I didn't count them, and I cannot positively identify them, I can only assume.

Q. Was that to the house where the three had been taken or are you referring to the place where the six had been taken? And how long after the events you've recently described was it that you went and saw the dead bodies? ⁷⁸³⁹

A. I cannot say precisely whether it was on the same day or the following day. I don't know. But it was the place where the six had been taken. I never entered the place where the three had been taken.

Q. Were the bodies distributed in an orderly way on the floor or were they piled up or what?

A. Some were piled one on top of another. One was laying away from the others.

Q. Following your observations of the six men and the three but before you went to the place where the six men had been taken, did you have some concerns for a local family of Kosovo Albanian villagers in Mala Krusa?

A. Yes.

Q. Explain why you became concerned and what you did.

A. Well, after this incident, a doubt arose in my mind that those people might have been killed.

Q. And as to the particular local villagers, tell us about where they were and why you had concerns for them or what you were troubled might happen to them.

A. They were about five metres away from our headquarters. And when we were shielding our vehicles under their awning, they helped us. And we were shielding our vehicles because NATO was targeting military vehicles and other targets.

What else do you want to know?

Q. What did you do so far as this family was concerned, or extended family? I think it was a place in -- it was a compound, wasn't it? ⁷⁸⁴⁰

A. Yes. They lived in a compound behind us. And on one occasion one of the three local policemen I had mentioned before asked us to go inside. In fact, he asked, first of all, whether there was anyone inside. We said no, but he didn't believe us and tried to enter himself. So I went inside with him. He saw all the six houses, and he even talked to some of the male inhabitants in the Albanian language, but from their conversation, I noticed that some threat must have been issued because I saw fear in their eyes and in their overall demeanour.

He asked us to hand over all the men to them, and I refused. There ensued a quarrel between the two of us, whereupon he left.

Q. Perhaps you can give us an idea of the comparative strength of forces. There were three MUP officers but how many men were there deployed together with you at this particular location?

A. According to our positions, there was supposed to be only the headquarters. However, there was this armoured vehicle which had been attached to us. So we were 11 in total. Everybody had their own specific assignment. So at any given moment, we were six or seven on the location.

Q. You told us that anxiety appeared on the face of the residents within that compound following conversation in the Albanian language. Did you speak any Albanian at that time?

A. No, I didn't.

Q. Later that evening and as night fell, what arrangements did you make with your local commander so far as those local residents, and it may be other local residents, were concerned?

A. Since we were concerned for their safety, we suggested -- or, ⁷⁸⁴¹ rather, we agreed that this entire family who lived within this compound including six houses, move to a house close to us so that we could protect them more easily. We were not able to control the entire compound, and it was quite possible for the local policemen to come and enter the compound from a different direction without us seeing them. They accepted this suggestion and moved into the first house closest to us, and we asked them for women and children to move into one room and the men to occupy another room because we couldn't have complete confidence in them after all. And the men were asked, before going to the bathroom, to report to the guard to say that they were going to use the toilet. And that's the way it worked. There were no problems.

Q. Until the following morning when what happened? Deal with it quite briefly, please. Paragraphs 40 and 41.

A. I don't quite understand your question.

Q. The following morning, what happened to the people in this house? What suggestions did you make? What, actually, did they do?

A. They didn't do anything. I don't quite understand what you're referring to.

Q. In the morning, did you speak to the family leaders of the group you've just told us about?

A. Yes, I did. I told them that the situation is what it is and that when we leave, nobody will be left to guarantee their safety. And we had already had a word about the possibility of being transferred away from there, so we suggested that they go to a Catholic village across the Beli Drim river because nobody ever shot from a Catholic village at the police, ^{7842 BLANK PAGE 7843} and consequently, the police never entered a Catholic village. They accepted this, and they asked if they were allowed to take their belongings with them. Of course we told them they could take whatever they liked. And we just warned them that Beli Drim --

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction, it's not a river.

A. -- is very high, so they should go by tractor. One of them asked if he could take his excavator, and we advised him not to because somebody might think he would be using it to dig a bunker or something of that kind. He accepted this advice and did not drive an excavator.

MR. NICE:

Q. How, in the event, did they leave their compound?

A. At the moment when they were ready to go and we were packing too, local policemen started towards Beli Drim too. And we told them they should better wait until the policemen come back, because we cannot guarantee the safety.

When the local policemen returned, they demolished the back wall of the compound and went out into the junction so as not to be seen, and left. And 15 minutes later, we left that place too.

Q. There may be some ambiguity in the form of your answer as interpreted. When you say "they demolished the back wall," are you referring to the local policemen or to the local inhabitants who were leaving the compound?

A. The inhabitants who were leaving their compound, because the policemen didn't know how to drive excavators. ⁷⁸⁴⁴

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, you're moving on to another topic?

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: It being a convenient moment, we will adjourn. Witness K25, we're going to adjourn for 20 minutes. Could you remember in this adjournment and any others there may be in your evidence not to speak to anybody about it until it's over, and that includes members of the Prosecution. Would you be back, please, in 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.38 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we're on paragraph 42. But just before we move on to the few matters of detail.

Q. You've used the phrase mop-up, I think, in relation to this operation. Can you just describe what you mean by that.

A. It's just a phrase in the Serbian language. A mop-up operation is considered to involve pushing back the KLA from a certain territory.

Q. Picking up your narrative, was there an incident of confrontation between your commander and local MUP over the robbing of refugees?

A. Yes. That happened at the intersection in Mala Krusa going towards Beli Drim. On that occasion, three members of the local MUP tried to rob the refugees who were moving in a column. And the company commander, who was held at gunpoint by those three local policemen, was forced to put on his rank insignia. And when we approached and cocked our weapons at them, these three local policemen backed away and eventually did not carry on with their intentions. ⁷⁸⁴⁵

Q. On the 26th of March, were you positioned at the Mala Krusa junction or thereabouts, and what did you see of a flow of refugees on that day? Just tell us, please.

A. They came all the time, in smaller and larger groups. There was a constant, intense flow.

Q. We've -- perhaps I'll come back to paragraph 45 a little later. Can we just deal with uniforms at this stage.

MR. NICE: Can we have Exhibit 18, please. I'm sorry I hadn't asked for it before.

Q. While that's being produced, what uniforms did the 23rd PJP wear at the time of this operation?

A. The PJP wore green camouflage uniforms with visible PJP insignia on their right shoulder.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, this is actually part of paragraph 45.

Q. Can you tell us, please, was there a practice of wearing ribbons, and if so, tell us a little bit about it. First, was there such a practice, and why were ribbons used?

A. Yes. During this operation, four colours were used in the form of ribbons; yellow, red, blue, and white in various combinations. And the reason was that KLA members were known to sometimes wear our uniforms, invite policemen to approach them, and then kill them. Therefore, we wore ribbons in order to be able to recognise one another. And there were code books, changed on a daily basis, so that everyone knew which colour were to be -- which colours were to be worn that day. And members of other units did not have PJP insignia. ⁷⁸⁴⁶

Q. Did you wear ribbons with your PJP green uniform or not?

A. No, I didn't.

Q. Because?

A. Because there were certain emblems of the PJP for the purpose of identification. Everybody knew that our emblems and insignia could not be easily procured, gotten hold of.

Q. At this operation, what uniform was the local MUP wearing and what was the local - if there was a local - PJP wearing? And look at the photograph, if you find help in that.

A. The local MUP wore blue camouflage uniforms, and the local PJP did the same, but in addition, they also had their own PJP vests.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, is it suggested that there was any local PJP members?

MR. NICE:

Q. Can you help us? Was there a local PJP presence here as well as your own from outside?

A. Not during this operation.

Q. But generally in other operations, was there a local PJP presence?

A. Every SUP had their own PJP.

JUDGE KWON: And, Witness K25, when you are referring to local MUP, does it mean the reservist or is it different from those?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All of them were part of the local MUP, both active duty and reserve policemen. And as to what units they belonged to, I don't know. I don't even know whether they were active duty or reserve policemen. ⁷⁸⁴⁷

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. Looking at Exhibit 18 on the overhead projector, does any of these photographs show uniforms of the local MUP or, when in deployment, the local PJP?

A. This would be the local PJP, local uniform, and the PJP uniform.

MR. NICE: Photograph 6, I think, was the one pointed out. And I think that it can be removed.

JUDGE MAY: I thought it was 7 he was pointing out. Could you point again, please, Witness K25, the PJP and also the MUP.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] PJP is this one. Local police and local PJP is this.

MR. NICE: In which case, the first was number 7, the second was number 6.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Although it doesn't necessarily mean that the local PJP is depicted in this picture, because there were moments when we, too, wore blue camouflage uniforms. We didn't on this occasion, but on some previous occasions we did wear such uniforms, together with our own vests.

MR. NICE: Can I, in order to try to deal with things so far as possible chronologically, keep in reserve our return to paragraphs 45, 7, and 8, and just cast ourselves back a little bit to paragraph 9 just to conclude various operations before dealing with general matters. So paragraph 9.

Q. Apart from the operation you've already told us about, were there ⁷⁸⁴⁸ other operations in which you were involved, on which your unit was involved, in particular one in Orahovac in late March, early April of 1999?

A. Yes. We took part, after Mala Krusa, in the next destination, which was in Orahovac towards Milanovici, over the hill. Towards Milanovici across Orahovac.

Q. How did the general scheme of that operation compare with the one you've given us in more detail, Mala Krusa?

A. I don't understand the question. How do you mean how did the scheme compare with?

Q. What was the purpose of the Orahovac operation?

A. The purpose of the operation was to continue the operation in Mala Krusa under the wings of the large-scale cooperation which was aimed at pushing the terrorists back to Milanovici and towards the village of Malisevo.

Q. And we've seen in your marked map for Mala Krusa a box shape of deployments of troops, an open box shape. Do you know one way or another if a similar format was used in the next mission or operation at Orahovac?

A. I don't remember that, no.

Q. One detail about the Orahovac mission or operation: What if any VJ support was provided to your group on that occasion?

A. Yes. The support provided was with mortar fire, 120-millimetre mortar fire, because we were under fire ourselves. And the terrain was highly inaccessible.

Q. We've heard about your -- I'm not going to trouble with paragraph ^{7849 BLANK PAGE 7850} 10. Paragraph 11. We've heard about your detachment. Just give us an idea, please, of its size. Of how many companies was the 23rd Detachment composed?

A. It had ten companies.

Q. Each of how many men?

A. Between 150 and 180 men.

Q. Thank you. I move over from paragraph 12 to paragraph 13. In the operations that you've described for us, how were instructions communicated at the really local -- the sub-unit level?

A. I don't understand the question.

Q. Very well. You were, I think, a sub-unit. How did your commander give you instruction so that you knew where to go and to some degree what to do?

A. Only orally.

Q. Were you given any documentation or maps or anything of that sort?

A. Only cards when operations were under way, so that we knew where our own forces were and that there wouldn't be any crossfire between us, but no other written document.

Q. Those cards, what other units did they identify for the very purpose of avoiding crossfire, typically?

A. All the units which took part in the cooperation.

Q. Would that include the VJ or not?

A. No.

Q. So how did you know where the VJ were? How did you know how to avoid problems of crossfire so far as they were concerned? ⁷⁸⁵¹

A. Because the army of Yugoslavia was deployed along the same positions that we had taken up.

Q. And as you've already explained, you were able to communicate with them orally or via your headquarters as required; is that correct?

A. Yes. Or through radio communication. But once again, only orally.

Q. Very well, then. If we can just conclude by --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: My apologies.

Q. If we can conclude by going back to the end of the summary, page 9, paragraphs 45, 46, and 47.

You've shown us on the marked map which has now left the screen - perhaps it can go back - but you've shown us how Frenki's JSO were seen by you and I think you said at a later stage north of the immediate area of operation surrounding Mala Krusa. Do you actually know where they were deployed at the time of the Mala Krusa operation itself or not?

A. I don't know, no. All I know is that we met them at one point, but I don't know either where they were deployed or whether they took part in the operation.

Q. And how many days after the operation itself was it, approximately, that you saw them in the area indicated?

A. I didn't see them in the area of Velika and Mala Krusa, if you mean the operation there; I didn't see them there. I saw them by Orahovac behind Vrana Stijena. We just met, and for about ten minutes I saw them for that length of time, but other than that I didn't have any contact ⁷⁸⁵² with them.

Q. But how many days after the operation did you see them there?

A. If you consider Velika and Mala Krusa to be the operation, then two days after the operation.

Q. Paragraph 46. By -- by whom and from where were MUP units in Kosovo commanded so far as you could judge?

A. The command structure of MUP is something that I'm not acquainted with exactly, but we did know quite simply that there was a Crisis Staff of MUP in Pristina.

Q. As to coordination with the VJ, you've touched on this to some degree already, but in operations where the VJ were involved, what can you say or from what can you infer the level of coordination for VJ operations or for operations in which the VJ were involved?

A. I can't make any conclusions as to that, but I knew, though, that the army was a territorial area, and it did not coincide with the SUP areas so that military representatives had to be present when an operation was decided upon.

Q. Yes. When, in your experience, MUP and VJ were involved together, was there a lead organisation? If so, which was the lead?

A. The army of Yugoslavia just offered its support, whereas we undertook anti-terrorist operations.

Q. Did you ever attend or even just see operational planning sessions? If so, what representation was there, if any, by VJ at such sessions?

A. I did not attend. ⁷⁸⁵³

MR. NICE: Your Honour, just private session for the last matters, if we may, on the last page.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] ⁷⁸⁵⁴

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[Open session]

MR. NICE: That concludes my examination of this witness.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] You work in the police force as deputy police chief of a large town in our country; that's right, isn't it?

A. Well, it's not such a large town, it's a medium-sized town.

Q. What were you by rank during these events that you have testified about?

A. I was a sergeant -- corporal, beg your pardon.

Q. And when did you receive your promotions?

A. I got a higher rank from you or, rather, from the minister of the internal affairs at that time, and this was a promotion for exceptional efforts and commendation towards the homeland and the police force. And later on, I was appointed sergeant and then captain. Lieutenant and captain. ⁷⁸⁵⁵

Q. And all this happened after I was brought to The Hague, isn't that right? And you mentioned commendation and, as far as I know, the commendation you received was for bravery, for courage, isn't that right, during the war, during the NATO aggression; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. You went to Kosovo for the first time in March 1998. That's right, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time --

JUDGE KWON: Witness 25, could you put a pause between the answer and question so that the interpreters could follow. You understand?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I will.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So March 1998, you went to Kosovo for the first time.

A. Yes.

Q. There was an operation under way at the time because the Albanian terrorists had cut off the roads between Srbica and Klina and between Pristina and Klina; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Is this correct too: That the police at that time was waging anti-terrorist operations in Kosovo which were caused by the fact, triggered off by the fact that terrorist attacks had been launched on everything that moved along the roads, on everything and anything moving along roads? Is that correct?

A. As far as I know, yes, that's what we did, anti-terrorist work. ^{7856 BLANK PAGE 7857}

Q. In the area you were in yourself, there were terrorist bases there in Gornje Prekaze and Donje Prekaze and Ovcarevo; isn't at that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. At the time, the zone in which the police forces were operating was within that triangle exclusively. That is to say within the triangle where the terrorist bases were located; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And when you got there, you were told to hold those positions or to protect and defend a certain road, the Klina to Srbica road, in fact, and that the Albanian terrorists would probably shoot at you; isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So that was what your first assignment in Kosovo consisted of by and large?

A. Yes.

Q. Now I'm asking you something with respect to the entire operation, from the first day to your last day in Kosovo. According to you and the assessment of your comrades from the unit, did you perform that assignment well?

A. Yes.

Q. Now was there any kind of jeopardy involved over the civilian population exerted by the police, any violence at all?

A. No.

Q. And when you were in Kosovo, did you hear of any violence of the police against the civilian population? ⁷⁸⁵⁸

A. No.

Q. Now let's move to the next time you went to Kosovo. And this took place between March and the second half of August 1998. That's right, isn't it?

A. Yes. You mean all the five assignments?

Q. Yes, all your assignments. After that, you were deployed and took control of the village of Gornji Streoci, Donji Streoci and you enabled communication along those lines; is that right?

A. No, we didn't take control of the villages. We ensured free communication and had checkpoints in the villages.

Q. Yes, that's right. The point of my question was that you enabled communication to take place and that you held checkpoints along the communication lines; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, these villages, were they at some point in time in the hands of the terrorists who made it impossible for normal communication to be established and the normal use of those roads and communication lines?

A. Yes. We were constantly under fire.

Q. You were deployed at that time, together with your fellow policemen, to free the road passage from Decani to Pec?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, this road running from Pec to Decani, is that one of the main communication lines or main roads in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was an operation in which large KLA forces, terrorist ⁷⁸⁵⁹ forces of the KLA were engaged to cut off and close off an important communication line of that type?

A. Yes.

Q. You were successful in opening up those lines of communication and life was deblocked in that part of Metohija which had otherwise been blocked with the blocking of the roads; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now tell me this: When I say "you," I'm not referring to you personally. I'm thinking of the police force and the units you took part in. Did you, in that sense, on that occasion do anything whatsoever which in your opinion could have been a crime in professionally carrying out your legal assignment? Did you do that exclusively in the struggle against terrorism? Perhaps those were two questions in one, but I hope you understand.

A. I just conducted my professional duties in conformity with the law, pursuant to the rules and regulations.

Q. So there was no violence against the civilians, and you are not aware of any kind of crimes perpetrated against the civilians; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Otherwise, you describe an attempt on the part of your unit to attack Jablanica, which was being held by the KLA terrorists, but that you were not successful, that it was an abortive attempt because the terrorists had, as far as I'm able to learn, about 1.000 men in each shift there, up there; is that right? ⁷⁸⁶⁰

A. Yes.

Q. Now, when you went to Kosovo again the next time, your assignment was to deblock the entire length of road at the junction between Prilep and Junik, those crossroads, and the road leading to the village of Baboloc; is that right?

A. Yes. That crossroads was the most threatened juncture along the whole road.

Q. Yes. Now, is it true that that road was being held and blocked by the terrorists?

A. Yes. And six or seven times, at that.

Q. So you had to deblock the road several times. And what you did was, in fact, a reaction to the fact that the roads had been blocked; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. When you describe the operations that took place at the end of 1998, was the object and purpose of those operations the taking over of Malisevo?

A. Could you repeat that question, please?

Q. In describing the operations that took place at the end of 1998, the purpose and object of those operations was to take hold of Malisevo.

A. Not in 1998.

Q. When, then?

A. In 1999.

Q. Ah. I see in 1999. Now, is it true that Malisevo was to -- should have been taken control of because the terrorists were coming ⁷⁸⁶¹ precisely from that area? And also in Malisevo they had their stronghold and base; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. You personally took part in those operations, didn't you? Because I see that you describe the operation that took place to take control in the Kraljani area. Is it true that this was an operation undertaken because the Albanian terrorists had taken control of the television and communication relay station, and after that, they knocked it down, they knocked the relay station down. Is that right?

A. That wasn't at Kraljani. The TV repetitive station was at Budakovo in Suva Reka. And that's where they took control of it, and this took place at the beginning of May 1999, thereabouts.

Q. Did you take part in that operation, in the operation that had as its goal to drive them out of the area?

A. Yes.

Q. To push them away from that area?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the main reason for the operation taking control of the area in which these relay stations and repetitive stations were located -- repeater locations were located?

A. Yes.

Q. As far as I can see, at the time, you were helping the Nis special units because there were casualties in that particular unit; is that right?

A. Yes. ⁷⁸⁶²

Q. And the entire road from Suva Reka to Pristina was cut off. It had been cut off by the terrorists. And your task was, as far as I understand it, was exclusively to push them away from that road so that you could take control of the area. Is that right or not?

A. Yes.

Q. Now tell me this: In view of the flow of that operation, was there any violence against civilians during that operation? That is to say on the part of our police force.

A. No.

Q. Now, you go on to explain the operations undertaken at Mala Krusa, and I'm going to ask you several questions in that regard because you took part in the operation and the other side, the opposing side, is maintaining that the participants in Mala Krusa perpetrated war crimes. So here goes: Is it true that the plan of that operation was to push the terrorists back towards Malisevo where their headquarters and stronghold were located?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. As we hear mentioned daily here of some kind of cleansing, tell me, is it true that when the term "cleansing" or "mop-up" is mentioned and when a mop-up operation is mentioned that that implies and always means, without exception, repelling the terrorist KLA organisation? Is that so or not?

A. Yes.

Q. And it never meant or implied anything that would jeopardise the security and safety of the civilians, the citizens themselves; right? ^{7863 BLANK PAGE 7864}

A. That's right. No, it didn't.

Q. Now, as you were a member of the PJP yourself, do you happen to know -- or, rather, did you have that kind of practice? Was it customary for the police to have an order not to open fire, even against the KLA, if this could jeopardise and threaten the lives of civilians?

A. Yes, that's right, we did have orders of that kind.

Q. Were there incidents that you are aware of where groups of civilians included members of the KLA who were easily identifiable because they would take off the upper parts of their uniform, and still the police did not take action even against them in order not to hurt the civilians? Do you know of any examples of that kind?

A. Yes.

Q. Speaking of this operation regarding Malisevo and repelling them towards Malisevo, I understood you as saying this morning when you were giving us your explanations that it was a part of a larger operation intended to diminish the territory controlled by the KLA in order to prevent or minimise the possible landing ground for the NATO; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So in a broader sense, this operation was intended to establish by all means control over the territory and not leave any part of the territory open to NATO attack and landing; is that correct?

A. Yes. But also to repel them from the roads which was also -- from the roads which were blocked by the KLA.

Q. I wish to ask you now in general terms about the relationship or, ⁷⁸⁶⁵ rather, the attitude of the police towards the civilians, the way they treated the civilians. Is it true that apart from repelling and neutralising the KLA or - in other words, your anti-terrorist actions - your next assignment was to collect the civilian population and extract it from the zone of combat operations for their own security? Is that so? Is that correct or not?

A. Yes. That was always our objective in all operations.

Q. Therefore, every time the police carried out an operation against the KLA in any area, there were always civilians involved and it was always necessary to extract them from the combat zone to protect them?

A. Yes.

Q. So this part of your activity was exclusively geared at protecting civilians; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it correct that you - and when I say "you," I mean not you personally but the police - never expelled or took civilians outside of Kosovo?

A. To the best of my knowledge, none of the men from my company did anything of the kind.

Q. And do you know of anyone from the police who expelled or took people away from their home in order to drive them out of Kosovo?

A. No, I don't. And I had no contact with anyone outside the 23rd detachment.

Q. Do you know that the KLA very often infiltrated groups of civilians who were pulled out of combat zones? ⁷⁸⁶⁶

A. Yes. They did that often.

Q. And more specifically, as far as I understood, you had orders to keep local police posted on the roads to prevent infiltration of KLA among the civilians.

A. Yes.

Q. Was it primarily the task of the local MUP to take care of the civilians?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it true that after civilians were taken out of the zone of operations, there were instances when KLA infiltrated groups of civilians and, together with them, moved towards Albania and Macedonia? Do you know of any instances of that?

A. No.

Q. Generally speaking, when you describe the operation in Krusa, you didn't use any heavy weaponry, mortars, artillery or anything like that?

A. We didn't.

Q. Regarding command, you were a corporal in a company. Is it customary to effect command within a company in direct contact?

A. Yes.

Q. I'm asking this question because the opposite side had asked you if you had received any written orders. Would it be normal within one company which sticks together for anyone to issue written orders? Has that ever been the practice?

A. No.

Q. Since you had appropriate training, do you know that this is the ⁷⁸⁶⁷ practice in any unit of the police or the army as far as communications within the company are concerned?

A. No.

Q. So you had either live communication or through police radio; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. From what I can see, and I don't know if my conclusions are correct, your contacts, that is contacts of the police with superiors in the army of Yugoslavia, your impressions from the ground were that there was no relationship of hierarchy between the MUP and the army. Each had their own command.

A. That is correct. They only interacted with us, and they had their own command.

Q. You have explained something about this Velika Krusa operation. Is that true, that it was a stronghold of the KLA?

A. Yes. They had cut off the road, as we said, from Djakovica to Prizren.

Q. In your view, was it a difficult operation?

A. Compared to the other operations, it was of medium difficulty.

Q. Earlier today, in response to questions in chief, you said that the official assessment - by your superiors, I suppose - was that there were about 10.000 KLA members there and that amongst yourselves you privately believed that there were less of them, about 5.000?

A. Yes, but these assessments related to the entire territory, the broader operation. We believed, that's true, that there were less. But ⁷⁸⁶⁸ that was our individual opinion.

Q. But it was your opinion there were 5.000 of them; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And the purpose of the operation was to push them back to the north; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. They asked you earlier today whether some sort of alternative road was left to them which they could use for escape. Do you remember that question?

A. I do.

Q. Could you please explain whether that was done on all occasions.

A. Every time we carried out such an action, beginning with 1998, an alternative route was always left for channeling both the terrorist organisation but also for extracting the refugees and civilians.

Q. So the MUP's assignment was to push back the terrorists towards the north, and that was one of the activities of your own unit; is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. It was also your objective to establish communications in general, to normalise life?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that before this operation, civilians had been displaced, but I understood you to mean that civilians had been displaced or moved out only for their protection.

A. Yes. It was our objective precisely to move the civilian ⁷⁸⁶⁹ population out of the zone of operations.

Q. The civilians were not moved out in order to displace them or drive them out, just in order to take them out of the zone of combat operations; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. According to your own assessment, they needed to be protected precisely because they would have been in the danger of finding themselves in crossfire between the KLA on the one hand and the MUP and the army on the other side; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Let us dwell on this issue for a while. Mop-up operations, when we use this term, that implies solely neutralising the KLA, and by no means does it mean expelling civilians from a certain segment of the territory.

A. Yes, of course. It implies only that.

Q. Do you know that any member of the police ever drove civilians out within the framework of your testimony, what you have seen yourself?

A. I never saw anything of that kind.

Q. Did you comment upon or at least did you have any knowledge about the influence on the movement of civilians out of Kosovo of the fact that the KLA infiltrated groups of civilians and sometimes moved together with them?

A. It may have crossed my mind, but I'm not sure now.

Q. Is it true that the so-called forced displacements of civilians from certain territories is something you heard only from Albanians? ^{7870 BLANK PAGE 7871}

A. Yes, that's true, but they told all kinds of things.

Q. You spoke specifically about an incident which, as I noted down during your examination-in-chief, took place in the morning of the 23rd of March where several men were captured. Six men, more specifically, and all were members of the KLA.

Was it visible and completely obvious that they were KLA members?

A. Yes. All of them had emblems and insignia of the KLA.

Q. You didn't see the arrest itself; you only saw them when they were already brought and captured.

A. Yes.

Q. You say that they had only one rifle of Chinese production. Did you see that when they were brought or does it mean that all of them had only one rifle between them?

A. I can't say exactly because I didn't see the arrest. I only know that one of them had a weapon. I don't know if the rest had weapons and had thrown them away before being brought.

Q. Do you know that it was usual practice that when they were arrested they would throw away all their weapons into nearby bushes, shrubbery, wherever, before they would surrender?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood you to say that they never entered your headquarters. Instead, members of your unit handed them over to a group of local policemen who took them away to a house near a river. Is that correct?

A. Although not near a river but 30 metres away from our position, towards the river as the crow flies. ⁷⁸⁷²

Q. Did any of those local policemen who took them over -- how many were they?

A. Three.

Q. So in your area, there were only three policemen from the local MUP?

A. They changed all the time. To the right of us, at an elevation, they had their own position which they held. Then they took turns. And there was always somebody from the local police at the intersection.

Q. At the intersection?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it their job to guard this intersection or to hold an observation point or what?

A. They had their own security checkpoint there, as in all other settlements behind the lines, towards which we would send men, women, and children for identification.

Q. You heard somebody shooting. Did you hear the shooting inside the house where they took those six men or did you simply see -- sorry, hear shooting nearby?

A. I saw with my own eyes where they were taken, but I didn't hear shooting from that house, only from that direction.

Q. I don't know if I noted this down correctly because the opposite side had asked you when you went to that house. I understood you as saying that it might have been the following day. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So you went to that house the following day? ⁷⁸⁷³

A. I can't say precisely whether it was on the same or on the following day.

Q. In the vicinity of that house, was there any local police at the time?

A. No. There was no one either in the vicinity of the house or at the intersection.

Q. What did you see when you entered the house? You said you saw several dead bodies. How many were they?

A. I didn't count.

Q. Can you assert that it was there that the captives had been killed? Were you able to recognise or identify those same people that you had seen the previous day or earlier the same day?

A. I didn't look long enough to be able to say with certainty that those were the same men.

Q. You were also asked about the care you took of the family of this local Albanian man you mentioned. You had your doubts as to the intentions of the local police. You thought that they might hurt them, and so you protected them. Is that so?

A. Not exactly. Our vehicles were sheltered in their yard, and that's the reason why we were staying with them. They had a yard large enough to hide the vehicles so as not to be visible from the air.

Q. If I understand your explanation, since NATO was flying overhead, you were trying to preserve your combat vehicles. Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the attitude of your unit towards those people? How did ⁷⁸⁷⁴ you treat them?

A. We treated them completely normally. We knocked on their door and explained the situation, and they allowed us to put our vehicles in their yard.

Q. So you asked them permission to use their yard?

A. Yes.

Q. You didn't force the gates? You didn't mistreat them in any way?

A. No, we didn't.

Q. Please describe this event. What was it like when this local policeman came and talked to them in the Albanian language?

A. Since they were at a distance from us, about 20 metres at that intersection, they came to see us and asked if there was anyone inside that house. I said no, there wasn't. The man didn't believe me and wanted to go inside himself and have a look. I didn't let him go on his own. I went with him and took him around all of the six houses, each of which was inhabited by one family.

With all the men, all the Albanian men, he talked in Albanian and I could see from their eyes that he was threatening them. He also asked me personally to hand over to him all the Albanian men, which I refused.

Q. And after that, he left?

A. Yes. We had a verbal duel, and after that, he left.

Q. And when that man came, there were three in total.

A. Yes -- or, rather, no. Two of them came to see us, and one of them wanted to go inside.

Q. All right. You advised them in the morning to move to the ⁷⁸⁷⁵ Catholic village from which there was no KLA shooting and where they would be safe; is that correct?

A. There was no action ever from Catholic villages against the police, so we never took any action against Catholic villages. That's the reason why I advised them to go to a Catholic village, because there had never been any conflict there.

Q. All right. Did you have any suspicions that those captured KLA members had been killed by the police?

A. Yes. I suspected that.

Q. Did you inform your company commander thereof?

A. I think I did.

Q. Do you know if he took any action?

A. He certainly did. But the tempo of our operation was such that I don't know what happened afterwards. We didn't have a moment to ourselves. We had no time to go back to that and discuss it.

Q. I can understand that. But since you were a part of special units, were you familiar with the order and do you know any examples of the execution of that order to the effect that all perpetrators of crimes should be arrested regardless of whether they were civilians, policemen, soldiers, or anyone else?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. And do you know how many individuals who had perpetrated some sort of criminal offence during the war in the ranks of our army or the police were actually arrested?

A. Would you please repeat that question? ⁷⁸⁷⁶

Q. Do you know how many perpetrators of criminal offences during the war were arrested by our army and the police?

A. Yes, I know that, but I don't know the exact number.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, the time is coming when we must adjourn. Are you going to be many more minutes with this witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I certainly will, Mr. May. I reckon that I have the right to use at least as much time as Mr. Nice had, if not more.

JUDGE MAY: Well, we'll consider that. We will adjourn now until tomorrow.

Could you be back at 9.00 tomorrow morning, Witness K25. Just one matter we've got to deal with, one administrative matter. Now, the next witness, the colonel -- your microphone won't work for the minute -- we're going to have to consider how much of his statement, if any, should be taken under Rule 92 bis, and of course, the question of his availability after tomorrow.

MR. NICE: There are three problems, three witnesses. There's how much longer this witness should be, and there's no rule of thumb that says you have to go through the same amount of time in cross-examination as in examination-in-chief. There's Crosland, how much should be bis'd. The more he will be bis'd, the less time he will take. The third witness is the witness following him is a female witness who is in open session, who is fully bis'd. She's been here now -- this is her third visit. And of course, the visits have been caused by the -- the failure to give evidence has been caused by circumstances outside of ⁷⁸⁷⁷ her control. She is here in order that we can be sure of filling your time.

JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry. Let us consider, first of all, how much more we should give in cross-examination.

MR. NICE: Yes. I make no objection to the questions that the accused is asking, but they are within the scope of the evidence, and it's doubtful whether there's much more to be covered, in a sense.

JUDGE MAY: Well, we can't guess that. We will just consider that for a moment.

MR. NICE: But if necessary, and whatever Colonel Crosland's difficulties, I might have to reverse the order of the witnesses to ensure that the woman is completed, and through Your Honours, I give notice to the accused to that effect so that there may be no complaint tomorrow morning. And I can't decide until tomorrow morning.

JUDGE MAY: Which is she?

MR. NICE: It's Shyhrete Berisha, and it's on the latest list. I have haven't got a number. She's a survivor of Suva Reka.

JUDGE MAY: Shyhrete Berisha.

MR. NICE: Correct.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: There's no rule, of course, that the accused has to have the same time as the Prosecution, but in general terms, where appropriate. In this case, we think it is appropriate. Although he has covered most of the examination-in-chief, there may be other matters he wants. He can have up to another hour in cross-examination. It would ⁷⁸⁷⁸ then seem sensible to call the female witness in order to finish her. As for Colonel Crosland, there are areas of his statement which really haven't been covered, in particular about the cooperation between the VJ and the MUP and meetings with the VJ hierarchy which he had which wouldn't appear to be suitable for bis, wouldn't be suitable to be dealt with in the shortened form by way of a statement. But obviously we'll have to consider that when we hear from -- how it's proposed to deal with it. And of course, we must hear from the accused on it.

MR. NICE: I'm grateful. I will put all that in hand. Can I invite the Chamber, if it has the opportunity and time, to express a view tomorrow about the position of Mr. Coo's report and Peter de la Billiere's report.

JUDGE MAY: One moment.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We've had a chance of looking at those matters. As far as Mr. Coo is concerned, his report is very substantial. It has only just or it may be not even yet been translated fully into B/C/S. We, therefore, do not think it right that he should be called before the adjournment because the Prosecution will -- the accused will not have had the time to consider it fully. It's important evidence. In relation to General de la Billiere, different considerations apply in his case. The report is much shorter, and secondly, it has been disclosed in English and in B/C/S, and the accused will have had time to have read it. So he can be called.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the only -- thank you very much for that. ⁷⁸⁷⁹ The only two points possibly arising: One is, I think Sir Peter de la Billiere's report will be disclosed in B/C/S tomorrow, in fact. The 10th of July. The second thing is, of course it had been our intention to call his evidence after Mr. Coo's because of the way one, in a sense, built on the other, but it may be -- we'll review that this afternoon. It may be that we can accommodate that by taking the conclusions of the larger report for the limited purposes of the general's report, recognising that of course they'll have to be proved in due course. So they can come in as hypothetical.

JUDGE MAY: Speaking merely for myself and thinking aloud, what may be possible is to call Mr. Coo in chief, thereby reserving cross-examination and then cross-examination after the recess and call the general anyway.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, thank you very much.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll -- that's something we can think about. It was simply a suggestion.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. Nine o'clock tomorrow.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.55 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 10th day of July, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.