⁹⁹⁷⁴

Tuesday, 10 September 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As there was mention yesterday about the OSCE report, Mr. Ryneveld quoted an order, an order which was, he says, sent to me. I don't use the book, but I looked at the OSCE report. The original OSCE mission's report on the 12th of February, 1999, I have it here in its entirety, says that the security forces conducted a joint operation against the KLA in Jeskovo. For the KLA, it was reported that they attacked the area of Zlociste, using mortars and heavy machine-guns. It also states that the Prizren Regional Centre commented this and said that the KLA infiltrated itself into Jeskovo which had been a previously abandoned village, one week previously, and the inhabitants of Hoca Zagradska informed the OSCE of their concern because of this KLA move. And it was told to the KLA that the local security forces viewed their presence in the area as a provocation.

So we can see that the village had been abandoned of the civilians, that they had left, and we can see what had happened. They limited the combat operations on -- at Jeskovo with other villages which were not damaged.

That is the report of the 11th of March. It is several pages long. I can hand it in to you. And another report of the 12th of March, ⁹⁹⁷⁵ which was quoted yesterday by Mr. Ryneveld, it states that during the operation in Jeskovo on the 11th of March, 500 inhabitants of the village of Ljubicevo left and that it was the subject of a search by the army of Yugoslavia, that the police invited the OSCE to visit Jeskovo, with the quotation quoted yesterday by Mr. Ryneveld about the persons killed belonging to the KLA, wearing uniforms and carrying weapons. And the next quotation which he did not quote, the next sentence is that there were mortar weapons found with ammunition, et cetera, and this was in some boxes, and it was assessed that firing came from the mortars recently. And the next paragraph said that the OSCE noticed that the KLA had dug new trenches near Mamusa, et cetera, et cetera.

So those, then, are the reports about their work on the 11th of March and 12th of March in their entirety. You can take them, if you like. And as I mentioned them and quoted them, the first number of these documents is SFR 208/99, and the other document is numbered -- I can't quite find it here now, but it says, as this was provided in Vienna and the subject is the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission report on the activities of the 12th of March. So it applies to the 11th and 12th of March.

These are the reports not from the book "Under Orders" but from the original report which write about what I brought forth here. That's all from me. That's what I wanted to say.

JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to hand them in.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, please. Here they are.

JUDGE MAY: Certainly the second part of the quotation I recognise ⁹⁹⁷⁶ from the book. I don't know about the first.

MR. NICE: I know nothing about the first. All this shows is the desirability of these exhibits being produced for witnesses when they're being cross-examined. We will have a look at the first one, of course, in due course and see if there are any observations we want to make on it.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. And then we'll consider exhibiting it. As far as this witness is concerned, the first point is that there is no need to produce a new copy of the exhibits. We can simply cross out the passages which we've excluded and the report can go in in that way, to save time.

And the second point is that we must finish tomorrow.

MR. NICE: Of course.

JUDGE MAY: So if you would organise your examination-in-chief in order to do that.

MR. NICE: I will be as brief as I can, consistent with making its content not only clear or clearer to Your Honours but also to those following the trial elsewhere.

So far as exhibits are concerned, before I turn to Mr. Coo's exhibits that relate to himself and his report, deal with the previous witness or earlier witness, Sir Peter de la Billiere, and produce through this witness a list of the documents that were served or provided to the witness because that was a matter that was in dispute. So we have a list to be produced, please, of the documents provided.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: It will take only a minute to produce. ⁹⁹⁷⁷

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

WITNESS: PHILIP COO [Resumed] Examined by Mr. Nice [Continued]

Q. And, Mr. Coo, does this document, which we would ask to be exhibited, contain a list of the items provided to Sir Peter de la Billiere on two occasions; the initial occasion and then, overleaf, documents provided for a 2nd of May meeting and one document provided for -- on the 14th of May by mail, together with certain indications of the purposes for which the documents were being provided?

A. I'd need to see a copy of the list, Your Honours.

Q. Sorry.

A. Yes, I recognise this as a list of documents I put together and gave to General Sir Peter de la Billiere to assist him in the drafting of his report.

Q. Turning to your own materials --

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'd ask, actually, that we produce the two reports now and find a way of producing the exhibits compendiously.

Q. Have you prepared two reports, the second of which --

JUDGE MAY: Let me just interrupt. Let us deal with the documents provided to General de la Billiere first and get a number for that.

THE REGISTRAR: This list will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 317.

MR. NICE: Sorry.

Q. The position on reports, Mr. Coo, is that you prepared the first report which was filed on the 16th of May of this year, and then as to the later report, it was prepared in two versions, a first and an amended ⁹⁹⁷⁸ version, the amended version being filed, I think, on the 2nd of July of 2002.

A. Yes, that's correct.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I would ask, so I don't overlook it, that they are each produced subject, of course, to the deletions that were ordered yesterday being dealt with in hand.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Part I of the report will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 318.1, and Part II will be 318.2, with a copy of the transcript attached, signifying the changes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Did you then provide additional supporting materials to your second report, Mr. Coo, on the 11th of July?

A. Yes, I did.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the position is there is a large number of files of exhibits. I'm not sure how many altogether. There's 15 binders altogether, two of which have already been produced through Sir Peter de la Billiere, and I would ask that we find a way of producing them compendiously.

JUDGE MAY: The way we've done it in the past is to have a single exhibit number and then tabs within that number; and they're all tabbed, as I understand it.

MR. NICE: And volume numbered, so if that can be dealt with as a single exhibit.

JUDGE MAY: Rather than get into volume numbers, if we have the exhibits and tabs. As I recollect the copies I've seen, you've got one ^{9979 BLANK PAGE 9980} set of exhibits for Part I and another for Part II. Would it be convenient to have two exhibit numbers and tabs within those exhibit numbers?

MR. NICE: Certainly.

JUDGE MAY: Could we have the two exhibit numbers, please.

THE REGISTRAR: The binders will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 319.

JUDGE MAY: I think it will have to be two exhibit numbers because there's one attached to Part I and there's another attached to Part II.

THE REGISTRAR: And Prosecutor's Exhibit 320.

MR. NICE: In those circumstances, may the additional materials provided to the second expert report, if they're outside the tab -- no. Very well. Nothing.

The witness --

JUDGE MAY: The only one I can think of is the blue book, which I have read, the OSCE blue book, which should be produced probably separately.

MR. NICE: There are going to be half a dozen other separate documents that will be produced right at the end, they having come into our possession very recently. The blue book, then, maybe that could be given a separate exhibit number.

THE REGISTRAR: The blue book will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 321.

MR. NICE: I'd ask that the usher has available, but not to go to the overhead projector immediately, a copy of the first report in the format that the Chamber has it, and from time to time I'll ask her to lay particular pages on the overhead projector so that the passages being ⁹⁹⁸¹ referred to can be read.

Q. And I now turn, Mr. Coo, to the structure of your first report. And I don't ask this to be laid on the overhead projector. It begins with an executive summary. And if you can, in just a couple of sentences, tell us, please, how at the end of the exercise you were able to sum matters up. And it may be for this you'll want one exhibit to look at or to have on the overhead projector, and it's the only one we'll be taking in any sense out of order, and it comes from Annex D1, page 53 of part A.

MR. NICE: And there are complementary copies of the exhibits we are producing for the Chamber, if that will be of assistance.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Do I take it the tab in each number is 53, since that's what we've been working off?

MR. NICE: The tab -- this is Annex 1, the end of Part I, section A, and there is the table showing the organisation of military forces. So the tab reference would be, for this tab -- this is within the report and doesn't have a tab reference, I'm afraid. It's page 53 of A.

JUDGE KWON: Isn't this page 54?

MR. NICE: If the page numbers have changed, it's because Your Honour is reading from the slightly amended version that has the tab references in it that has thrown the numbering out. I'll try and read in the corrected page references. Right.

Q. Mr. Coo, then, in a couple of sentences, your conclusions from the materials you looked at for your first report.

A. Your Honours, I was able to determine from a review of documentation covering Part I of the report that the structure of the ⁹⁹⁸² armed organisations in Kosovo consisted of -- or the structure of the armed organisations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia was comprised of the regular army, or the VJ, the military territorial units which formed military territorial combat units and administered conscription on behalf of the VJ. There were the police forces known by the B/C/S acronym MUP, and what can be termed or grouped under the collective title local defence forces. And local defence forces comprised of the two types of forces I've just mentioned, VJ and military territorial units forming the military, and also the MUP, and a collection of other units which included civilian defence units and civilian protection units, along with armed civilians.

Furthermore, I was able to determine the means of commanding, the official means of commanding these organisations, and some of this is shown on the ELMO at the moment. At the top is the Supreme Defence Council, headed by the president of the FRY, and the report shows with reference to legislation and the constitution, and additionally to VJ doctrinal manuals, that indeed the command of the military is in the hands of the FRY president.

The top of the VJ's chain of command is the VJ General Staff headed by the Chief of the General Staff who, at the time in 1999, was General Ojdanic. Under the General Staff were three armies. Of concern to Kosovo was the VJ 3rd Army headed by, in 1999, General Pavkovic, who had formerly been commander of the Pristina Corps. Subordinate to General Pavkovic, or subordinate to the 3rd Army, were the Pristina Corps commanded, in 1999, by General Lazarevic, and the Pristina Military ⁹⁹⁸³ District. The Pristina Military District represents the military territorial organisation, and that organisation had responsibility covering two areas. One was administering the conscription on behalf of the regular army, the VJ. The other was forming combat units during times of crisis, and those combat units would operate within the chain of command which I'm outlining.

The military district was subdivided into military sectors, of which there were five in Kosovo, and within those military sectors were military departments and military territorial units. Pristina Corps was subdivided into a number of brigades. This number increased during 1999, during the state of war.

Q. The diagram on the overhead projector shows dotted line connections between the Pristina military district and the Pristina Corps and between the military departments and the brigades forming part of the Pristina Corps. Could you explain, please?

A. Yes, Your Honours. The Pristina Military District, during peacetime, according to the documentation, had a formal reporting chain to the 3rd Army and would administer conscription and other aspects of the reserve system on behalf of the 3rd Army. During times of crisis when the Pristina Military District formed combat units, those combat units would be in some cases subordinated to VJ brigades. And when subordinated in this manner, they would report on their activities to the VJ brigade to which they were subordinate.

In addition, I've also seen documentation showing the Pristina Military District reporting to the Pristina Corps, demonstrating that on ⁹⁹⁸⁴ some occasions it was being -- suggesting that on some occasions that the Pristina Military District was responding to the direction of the Pristina Corps.

Q. Thank you. One last question before we move to the first section of your report and look at one or two things in detail. You speak of the combat units formed by the military district. Of what were those combat units themselves formed?

A. The military district combat units were formed from people with obligations for reserve service and conscripts.

Q. Can we turn, then, now to section A of your report, and I think there are some three or four pages we may look at in a little detail of this. We can see on the first page that you have summarised section A, which is about the organisation and command and control of the VJ itself, the army of Yugoslavia. You needn't place page 1 on the overhead projector, but can you, in a sentence, summarise the effect of part A of your report?

A. Part A made use of a large amount of material, including the constitution, the FRY constitution, and the federal laws on defence and the federal law on the VJ. In addition, it relied heavily on a VJ manual known as the Manual on Command and Control, and that manual was intended for the, among other things, the training of senior officers within the VJ.

From the documentation, I was able to determine the official structure of the VJ and its means of command. The structure is relatively simple, and that was covered, I think, in the previous chart. The means ^{9985 BLANK PAGE 9986} of commanding the VJ are well laid out in the constitution, legislation, and the doctrine, and it clearly states that command begins at the level of the FRY president.

Q. Thank you. Can we go to page 14 of the section - that's 14 out of 53 - where you set out Article 48 of the FRY law on defence, which states that the state organs and organisations not cited in this law shall exercise their rights and duties in the field of the defence of the country in accordance with the constitution of the FRY federal law and other federal regulations and carry out the duties stipulated in the country's defence plan and decisions of the federal government on preparations for defence.

That article sustains your conclusion in paragraph 26, namely?

A. Yes. This article shows to me that the defence of the -- of Yugoslavia was a federal responsibility. And in addition to the regular military forces, the VJ, other units were involved and other organs were involved in -- in defence of the country, and these are captured in Article 48, which suggests to me that their involvement came under federal responsibility.

Q. Thank you. You -- in your report, you deal with various topics. We needn't break them down, but by page 23, you're in a sector headed Principles of Command, something upon which I think you focused and on which you have written. And on page 23, you cite Article 3 of the law on the VJ. And explain that -- perhaps you'd read it out for us and then explain its significance in simple terms for those who don't have military backgrounds. ⁹⁹⁸⁷

A. Article 3 from the law on the VJ, the federal law on the VJ, states that: "Command in the army shall be based on the principles of unity of command with respect to the uses of forces and materiel, the single command concept, and the obligation to carry out decisions, commands, and orders of a superior officer."

Two of those principles, the unity of command and the single command concept I've covered in detail in section A. The other principle, that of following the order of -- orders of superior officers is also covered but less directly.

This framing of these principles in the law on the VJ captures in legal terms what the VJ recognised in its doctrine and was mandated to practice in its doctrine. The principle of unity of command refers to -- is in essence an efficiency measure, and its purpose is to ensure that all forces operating in defence of the country are operating on command principles, using common systems, and that would include the VJ and the MUP operating jointly on combat operations. The aim of the unity -- principle of unity of command would be to ensure that the -- both the MUP and the VJ and any other forces operating together were using systems with as much commonness as possible.

Q. Turn to paragraph 47, a couple of pages further on, please. And you may want to link this with paragraph 50 in concluding what I want you to say on this particular topic.

Paragraph 47 has you dealing with continuity as a fundamental principle of command. Can you explain that? It's there in writing, but a word of explanation. ⁹⁹⁸⁸

A. Yes. Continuity is fundamental to military operations. A commander has to know at all times what's going on in his area of responsibility; and to do that, there has to be continuity in, among other things, the reporting of events up the chain of command. So units engaged in operations on the ground are obligated to report on their activities up through the chain of command to ensure that commanders are aware of what's happening and can act on that.

Q. And also does this take care of the potential for breakdown in communication if one link in the chain goes, for example, by death or for other reason disappearance of a particular commander?

A. Yes, it does. It ensures that, having awareness of this principle, the VJ would operate, would ensure that it had measures in place to address the possibility of a commander being killed, and they make it clear who is next in line to command should that happen.

Q. Paragraph 50 on page 26, please. You speak here of the dynamic between the FRY president and the Chief of the General Staff. And the footnote refers to the Manual on Command and Control, which we don't need to pull out. Just explain the citation and the significance, please.

A. This -- this extract from the Manual on Command and Control reinforces the constitution and the federal laws on defence and on the VJ in which it is stated that the FRY president commands the VJ and specifically through the Chief of the General Staff. And here it is -- here are the contents of the constitution and the laws encapsulated in a VJ doctrinal manual on command and control, showing that VJ officers who are trained using this manual would be trained in that very -- in those ⁹⁹⁸⁹ very -- in the very constitution and the laws on defence in the VJ.

Q. Let me turn over to the foot of page 50 but in substance to page 51. At the foot of page 50 of sector A, we see you've turned to a topic headed "Promotions, Commendations, and Appointments." The page number may have slipped for those with the slightly amended version. So it will either be -- beg your pardon. It will either be 50 or 51. No. I'm -- I think I have a page out of order, so I think it may be page 49, which makes more sense. If you would go to page 49, please, and to paragraph 100.

JUDGE MAY: Page 50, apparently.

MR. NICE:

Q. Page 50. Paragraph 100, in any event. And this is within -- it makes appropriate sense -- the sector on Regulations on the Application of International Laws of War.

Paragraph 100 picks up some instructions from the Regulations on the Application of the International Laws of War in the Armed Forces of the SFRY. The first passage, the first five lines sets out the personal responsibility of any officer. Can you just amplify that for us, please.

A. Yes. This is an internal regulation in use by the VJ, and it shows that what might colloquially be known as trigger-pullers, while they bear responsibility for the crimes they commit, there's also command responsibility for those crimes if the proper action is not taken, and this extract clearly demonstrates to me what that command responsibility is. And commanders in the VJ would have an obligation to be aware of the contents of this regulation. ⁹⁹⁹⁰

Q. Thank you very much. If we go to page 51 - it may be 52 now - paragraph 105. We see your conclusions on this section, I think probably the longest of the sections in either report. And you set out that the VJ was, in 1998 and 1999, the professional, heavily armed organised military force with a well-established doctrine. We may have had this from someone else. Doctrine, is this something that you find in a book headed "Doctrine" or is doctrine something that can be discovered by considering all the written materials for any given army?

A. Doctrine is encompassed in all the written materials of an army. Academics may produce books called "Doctrine", but doctrine itself is integrated into the manuals and other publications and regulations which militaries have.

Q. Your conclusion goes on, in paragraph 105, to deal with the military territorial organisation to which you've referred, how the VJ and those units operated within a clear constitutional, legal and regulatory framework in which a simple unbroken chain of command was derived, at the top of which command was President Milosevic under whose authority those military forces could operate.

That was your conclusion, was it?

A. Yes, it was, based on documentation.

Q. Paragraph 106, you set out in writing the contents of the chart we first looked at, as with 107.

And 108, you make this comment: "Commanding and controlling a force of that size demanded a functioning chain of command and clear direction. The VJ had and was mandated to employ commonly accepted ^{9991 BLANK PAGE 9992} principles of command, the two most important of which were unity of command and singleness of command."

We've touched on those topics. Does that remain your opinion?

A. Yes, it does, Your Honours.

Q. You then set out the requirement for VJ and military territorial units to operate under precise legal provisions, to obey the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law binding all military personnel; correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Ultimate authority and responsibility for military discipline being vested in the FRY president as commander of the VJ.

A. That's correct.

Q. Can we then turn to sector B, which is about 39 pages. It doesn't have a concluding summary, it has an opening summary on page 1. The topic is the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, its organisation and command. Can you, in a couple of sentences, encapsulate your findings? We're only going to be taking the Chamber to some four references within this sector.

A. Your Honours, from reviewing the documentation, it was -- it became clear to me that the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, or the MUP, was organised, as were the VJ, in a very well-structured manner and had a -- a system of command, a means of command which had a basis in Serbian legislation, and internal regulations of the MUP also reflected that legislative basis.

The organisation of the Serbian MUP was -- in basic terms, was structured along the following lines: It was broken down into two ⁹⁹⁹³ divisions; the state security division responsible for, in very general terms, counter-intelligence. It also had a special arm -- heavily armed uniformed unit called the Special Operations Unit, or the JSO, sometimes known by the unofficial term "Red Berets" or "Frenki's Boys." The other division within the MUP was the public security division, known by the acronym RJB. This contained what might be termed normal police, police responsible for criminal investigations and traffic. But it also contained two special units, the special anti-terrorist unit, or SAJ, and the special police unit, the PJP, both of which were heavily armed. The PJP was much larger than the SAJ and was armed and equipped along the lines of a military light infantry unit. It had, for example, mortars.

The geographical structure of the MUP went along the lines of having Secretariats of Internal Affairs, or SUPs, of which there were seven in Kosovo. Kosovo was a special case, having between the SUP level and the ministry level in Belgrade a headquarters called the MUP staff for Kosovo, and that MUP staff was commanded by General Sreten Lukic. The MUP staff was responsible for coordinating the activities of the seven SUPs, among other things.

Q. Your part B of your report is broken out, dealing with various aspects of organisation, and having just dealt with the SUPs, if we go to about page 10, more materially to page 12. In dealing with the RJB within the SUPs, paragraph 17 you make a particular observation of potential significance in light of the evidence in the case concerning possible transfers. Could you explain, please, the particular significance of ⁹⁹⁹⁴ paragraph 17.

A. I think the notable point with paragraph 17 is the final section of it where it refers to the responsibility over railway security by the Serbian MUP, and this demonstrates to me that there was a connection between -- or there would have been some connection between the use of the railways and the Serbian MUP. And I should also add that, along the principles covered earlier regarding the VJ, specifically the very basic principle that a commander has to know what's going on within his area of responsibility, I would expect that the VJ would also know what use is being made of the railway system during a state of emergency or state of war.

Q. Thank you. Let me move on to page 22 of the same sector, where you're dealing with the MUP staff for Kosovo and Metohija. At paragraph 44, it may now be page 23, you touch on an order of the 15th of May, 1998. Its significance, please?

A. That order provided the mandate at that time for the ministry staff in Kosovo, which I had said earlier had been commanded by General Lukic from that time through the state of war in 1999. And the role from the official mandate is clearly that the MUP staff for Kosovo had responsibility for coordinating the actions of the police activities being run by the SUPs. There's more -- more to the mandate than that, but that's the basis of the mandate.

Q. Thank you very much. If we move on to page 25, possibly 26, in the subparagraphs of paragraph 47, you're dealing with reporting procedures, and you deal with them extensively. So I just want your ⁹⁹⁹⁵ comment or focus on subparagraph 5 of paragraph 47.

A. Paragraph 5, which comes from instructions on reporting procedures within the MUP, demonstrates to me that there was some form of redundancy built into the MUP system of command and specifically into the system of reporting. Specifically, the SUPs in Kosovo were required to report on their activities to both the ministry in Belgrade and to the MUP staff in Kosovo, and should there have been any block at the level of the ministry staff in Kosovo, the reports would nevertheless have still been sent to the ministry staff in Belgrade.

But I should add that I've seen nothing to support any allegation that there was a block at the level of the ministry staff in Kosovo. In fact, I've seen documentation to the contrary.

Q. Finally so far as this sector is concerned, at page 37, or it may now be 38, paragraph 67 comes immediately under the heading "Rules Establishing the Internal Organisation of the Ministry of the Interior." Within paragraph 67, you deal with an inspectorate. We can see it at the first subparagraph and within the middle of the second and the third. Can you just highlight for us the particular powers and significance to you of the inspectorate, please.

A. This MUP inspectorate, the description provided suggests a form of independent oversight within the MUP itself, and of particular interest is shown in the last paragraph of that page.

Q. It may be over the page. It's the paragraph beginning: "It shall study instances..." correct?

A. That's correct. ⁹⁹⁹⁶

Q. The part of that paragraph in which you -- to which you draw your attention.

A. The fourth line in that paragraph, beginning with: "It shall monitor media reports on abuses..." to me, highlights the fact that there was a responsibility to respond to such reports, to media reports on such abuses taking place.

Q. Of course, in all these sectors there's a great deal more detail than the few points that we're taking you to, but it's all been available for reading in a document that has, indeed, I think been filed publicly. So we turn to sector C, please. Here you have the conclusion at page 13 but a summary at page 1. We're going to be troubling the Chamber with some four -- no, five or six references here. Can you give us, in a couple of sentences, what your conclusions were in relation to "The Local Defence Concept in Kosovo," the title of this sector?

A. The local defence concept was a concept that ensured that, in addition to the regular VJ combat units and military territorial units operating in a combat role under the regular VJ, there were provisions for - and these provisions were implemented for - the establishment of defence forces at the local level, within towns and villages in Kosovo. These defence forces at the local level were set up as early as 1998. And during the setting up of these units, there was a programme for arming the units and arming civilians connected with the local defence concept, and that arming programme was a federal programme.

Q. We read on page 13, or it may be 14, paragraph 39, you use the word "saturated," saying that the local defence concept ensured that ^{9997 BLANK PAGE 9998} Kosovo was saturated with armed organisations. In the same paragraph, you conclude that, "The concept involved brought FRY and Serb forces together in composite units acting, ultimately, on the authority of the president." "Saturated"?

A. That term is intended to emphasise that not only in Kosovo was defence a responsibility of the regular army, the VJ, and to a large extent also the combat units of the MUP, but there was also, complementing that and taking away some of the load of defending towns and villages, a well-organised system of local defence, and that system was integrated within the federal system of command which I've described elsewhere in the documentation and alluded to at the beginning.

Q. Perhaps one other aspect of your conclusions, before we look at a couple of pages, can be found in paragraph 41. As to the possibility of illegal armed groups acting without official sanction, what did your analysis of the local defence concept in Kosovo reveal?

A. In analysing the documentation on local defence, it was clear to me that there was a full intention of integrating within a formal system of command all armed groups, and that included armed civilians, armed civilian defence units, and reserve elements of the police. There was no evidence to suggest -- that I was aware of to suggest that any groups were operating outside of official chains of command.

Q. Very well. Looking at a few references in sector C in a little more detail, and I'm grateful to the usher for putting page 13 on the overhead projector, which helped.

If we can now go to page 4 and paragraph 13 in the section of this ⁹⁹⁹⁹ part headed "Civilian Protection and Civilian Defence Units." You draw our attention in paragraph 13 to Civil Defence Units. Your comment, please?

A. My comment on this is simply that there were provisions in federal legislation for the formation of armed groups engaged in local defence capacities. And those groups could have some -- according to the legislation, could be commanded at times by VJ officers, as it says, by VJ officer commanding a battalion or higher.

Q. Thank you. If we can turn over to section 5 of this part or of this section, rather. Paragraph 27, which is probably on page 9. It may start on page 8. Paragraph 27, please. And I think there's an exhibit we can look at it, please. Courtesy copies coming.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, some of these exhibits in the tabbed exhibits of the witness's exhibits have also been produced by other witnesses. Not very many, but some. It may help to have a cross-reference, and we'll provide a complete cross-reference in due course. This exhibit was produced as Exhibit 205 -- 245, I beg your pardon, through a witness called Shukri. It's a large exhibit. There are just courtesy copies available. And if one could be provided to the witness for his comment, please.

Q. First of all paragraph 27, and then the exhibit, Mr. Coo.

A. Paragraph 27 refers to an extract from an instruction issued in 1998 by an organisation known as the Joint Command for Kosovo. The Joint Command was a body tasked with coordinating operations and coordinating events in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. The instruction it issued in July 1998 ¹⁰⁰⁰⁰ formed the basis of the organisation of local defence -- formalised the organisation of local defence as it existed in Kosovo. And that organisation was centred at the municipality level around municipal defence staffs which representation on the municipal defence staffs included municipal politicians, the VJ, military territorial units, the MUP, and civilian defence units.

Q. The exhibit we're looking at, which is tab 23, alternatively Exhibit 245, on the overhead projector, please.

This is a document dated the 28th of July, 1990 query 8, it would appear, of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Ministry of Defence, Pristina defence administration to defence departments and sections, subject: "Instructions for the Defence of Inhabited Areas." Your comment on the document, Mr. Coo, please.

A. This is a document issued by the federal body responsible for administering and coordinating civilian defence. It's Kosovo headquarters reacting to the instructions issued by the Joint Command on the organisation of local defence, or what it calls defence of inhabited areas. And this document from the federal civilian defence headquarters instructs its sub-units to respond and act in accordance with the Joint Command instruction.

The Joint Command instruction is attached, and the 11 pages, I think it is, of the Joint Command instruction lay out in a quite detailed fashion how local defence is going to be set up at the municipality level. And the details of those 11 pages include the establishment of what they call reserve task forces of the MUP. And those reserve task forces of the ¹⁰⁰⁰¹ MUP it describes as being comprised of military territorial units, civilian defence units, and units tasked with reporting on activities going on in Kosovo. These are all captured by the reserve task forces of the MUP.

Command responsibility for -- for the activities of these reserve task forces of the MUP rests with a MUP officer. The headquarters from which that MUP officer commands these local defence forces are described as municipal defence staffs. And as I mentioned, these staffs include representatives from the politicians at the municipal level, the military territorial representative in the municipality, the VJ, and civilian defence units, along with the MUP.

Q. Thank you very much. If we turn over, in your report, to page 11 -- there is one other document we may look at at this stage. Paragraph 33, I suspect still on page 11. And then we'll look at a document as well, or the document indeed that's referred to. Your general comment, first, on paragraph 33 and then we'll provide an exhibit. Tab 67 of part I, a document also admitted through Shukri. The witness had given Exhibit number 248.

A. Petar Ilic was the --

Q. Just wait for the distribution, I think, of the exhibits.

A. Sorry.

Q. Leave it with your report until such time as you want to put the exhibit on the projector. Tell us, please, about Petar Ilic.

A. In paragraph 33, the reference to Petar Ilic, he was the head of that federal Ministry of Defence headquarters charged with responsibility ¹⁰⁰⁰² for civilian defence units in Kosovo and Civilian Protection Units. In this document, an extract of which is provided in paragraph 33, and if we go to the exhibit itself, the --

Q. It would be the second page of the exhibit and the first substantial paragraph, I think.

A. The second page of the exhibit. At the top of the exhibit, we see that Petar Ilic is addressing his superior in the federal Ministry of Defence, who at that time was General Farkas. In the document, Petar Ilic is responding or appears to be responding to direction that he's received that -- direction concerning the arming of units that fall within the responsibility of that federal Ministry of Defence body, the area organ or Pristina defence administration.

The second paragraph, after the word "Belgrade" in the exhibit, beginning with: "In our communication..." --

Q. And incidentally, we must observe that the translation of the exhibit is different from the -- just different slightly in form from the earlier translation in your report, so we'll read from the exhibit, please.

A. That paragraph beginning: "In our communication..." and strictly confidential number 80-10/3, that's referring to the message member of their communication, "... we request that the command of the 3rd Army secure for us arms and ammunition for all units that are being formed and developed by departments and sections on the territory of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija."

And it's clear from this paragraph that the Pristina defence ^{10003 BLANK PAGE 10004} administration has requested from the VJ 3rd Army the issue of weapons, and a large number of weapons, for its civilian defence units. And interestingly too, it's also requested weapons for civilian protection units. The definition of civilian protection units provided in the law on defence makes no suggestion of them being armed. Civilian defence units, in contrast, are defined as being armed units.

Q. Very well. Thank you very much. That concludes, I think, the matters of detail we wanted to take you through for sector C. So if we go to D, coming towards the end of the first report. D is only in five pages and it has conclusions on page 5 of 5 which the usher might be good enough to lay on the overhead projector, this section being headed "Supreme Command and Joint Command."

Rather simply than reading out the conclusions, which can be viewed by those looking at the overhead projector or the screens, in your own words, please, Mr. Coo -- not in your own words but in today's language, as it were, other than the language of your report, what were your conclusions and summary?

A. My conclusions, Your Honours, were that there was an entity known as the Supreme Command at the very top of the chain of command, responsible for the activities of armed organisations and other organisations in Kosovo, in 1999 in particular, during the state of war declared on the 24th of March.

The documentation shows the Supreme Command to have consisted of at least the General Staff of the VJ. That is the highest level of command, of military command, headed by General Ojdanic. Above him, ¹⁰⁰⁰⁵ within the Supreme Command again, was the civilian command, and at the very top, and at the very top of the whole Supreme Command was the FRY president.

Another body which in essence mirrored the structure of the Supreme Command but at a more local level within Kosovo was an entity known as the Joint Command for Kosovo. Again, that was headed by a politician, and its responsibility covered the coordination of the activities of the VJ and the MUP and, in general, armed organisations in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.

Q. Thank you. That's all I need ask --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Coo, in paragraph 13, you mention some challenges to the legality of the Supreme Command. Could you clarify that a little further.

A. Yes, Your Honour. In preparing this report, I came across media articles reflecting the opinions of, among others, General Perisic, who was the former chief of the General Staff and who had been replaced in November 1998. I don't recall exactly, but either during or after the 1999 war, he commented publicly that the Joint Command -- excuse me, that the Supreme Command or specifically that the title "Supreme Commander" was an illegal title. I've seen nothing in the documentation, specifically in FRY legislation, that describes the Supreme Command and the title "Supreme Commander." But on the other hand, all of the orders issued during the state of war, from what I saw as the top level of military or command of the armed forces, was coming from and had the title block "Supreme Command." Those documents and other documents and press statements ¹⁰⁰⁰⁶ provided by the 3rd Army commander, General Pavkovic, after the war, which I've provided in the report, all state and make reference to the Supreme Command Staff being the command -- being the VJ General Staff, the Supreme Commander being the FRY president, specifically Mr. Milosevic, and the Supreme Command itself being the body charged with the top level of command responsibility for armed organisations. So nothing supported any arguments put forth by the likes of General Perisic, other than the fact that I didn't come across any legislation that specifically identified a Supreme Commander or Supreme Command.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Thank you. As we move beyond section D, there are recognition guides for uniforms, weapons, vehicles, and patches provided. Your Honours, I'm not going to take time with those, they're available.

JUDGE MAY: Do they relate to the various documents that we've exhibited --

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: -- in Exhibit 17, 18, and 20? Because if so, we should at least see that they do fit in. Well, the photographs refer to K2766. That is our Exhibit 18, I think. Yes. The weapons, 2767, which should be our Exhibit 17. No. Well, we've done the uniforms. Let's move on to the vehicles then. I'm going to do the vehicles next.

MR. NICE: The vehicles is 2765.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, 2765, Exhibit 17.

JUDGE KWON: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: And finally, the -- ¹⁰⁰⁰⁷

MR. NICE: Patches.

JUDGE MAY: The patches, which I don't know if we've had exhibited.

MR. NICE: The patches, I think, have not been -- the patches, I think, have not been exhibited, Your Honour. Do you have them in your copies of the reports? If not, there are copies available.

JUDGE MAY: No, I don't think we have.

MR. NICE: The patches coming up. We're somewhat limited in the number of coloured ones available. Perhaps they should be separately exhibited, Your Honour, not having had a number.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be marked Prosecutor's Exhibit 322.

MR. NICE: Reverting to the weapons, I am told - I should have alerted you at the time - it's Exhibit 21.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Your Exhibit, Appendix E, refers to a number of photographs.

MR. NICE: Now, if those haven't been made available to the Judges immediately, I will deal with it after the break and press on with Part II.

JUDGE MAY: We do have the photographs.

MR. NICE: You do have the photographs. Then it's only comment on page -- paragraph 9 that I want the witness to deal with it. There's a photograph --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, we don't have those photos. ¹⁰⁰⁰⁸

MR. NICE: I'll come back to that after the break. It won't take me a minute to deal with it then. Better then rather than wasting time now -- taking time now.

Q. Mr. Coo, we'll move on, please, with the reservation about the photographs, to your second report. Bearing in mind the ruling yesterday, can you just summarise the additional work that you did for the second report, the materials you had, and then very briefly the sorts of conclusions you reached, although we'll go through the sections of the parts of the report individually, highlighting particular points. So the task, the materials, and the conclusions.

A. Your Honours, Part II of the report is intended to demonstrate whether or not the armed organisations and the command structures were implementing or exercising the doctrine and the regulations provided in Part I.

Q. Your conclusions, in short order.

A. Overall, I had to conclude that the armed organisations and their means of command were exercising to some extent the doctrine and the regulations and, additionally, that there was certainly recognition of what the doctrine and the regulations stated. Furthermore, the structures described in Part I, the local defence and the military and MUP structures, were shown to have been used in Kosovo in 1999.

Q. Part A of your second report is in 13 pages or thereabouts. If the usher could have a copy of that available. As it's the amended version, we'll see from time to time amendments, all of which are reflected in the text, whereby paragraphs have been renumbered, and I'd ^{10009 BLANK PAGE 10010} ask you, please, to go straight away within the section "Arming and disarming of Kosovars," to page 12, paragraph 26 that was formerly paragraph 27 before amendment. And here's a document we're going to look at. Tell us about this, please.

A. This document, issued in May 1991, again by that federal Ministry of Defence organ for the civilian defence structures in Kosovo, here in 1998 was issuing a document which to me suggested that not only were the official standing armed organisations being issued arms but also civilians, and primarily ethnic Serb and Montenegrin civilians, were being issued weapons.

Q. A courtesy copy is coming for a document that's within -- this is also within Part I, this exhibit. Yes, I think it's in Part I at tab 21 that you referred to in this second report.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, this one has not been previously exhibited. The original is, accordingly, available.

JUDGE MAY: This document can, as I understand it, stay within the tab number. This is the purpose; it's whichever Part I is, tab 21.

MR. NICE: Correct. Can we look at it on the overhead projector. As I say, the original is available, if sought.

Q. So from the same Petar Ilic, in the document dated the 21st of May, 1998, the parts of it on which you place reliance, please, Mr. Coo.

A. Under the subtitle "Order" within page 1 of that document, paragraph 1, "Chiefs of departments and heads of sections ..." this is a reference to chiefs of civilian defence departments and their sub-units, known as sections. It requires those heads, those chiefs, to liaise with ¹⁰⁰¹¹ municipal leaders, politicians, and this is for the purpose of the arming of parts of the population. And it goes on to say, where it begins: "Take care to ensure that those whose wartime duty station is in the units of the VJ..." and so on, the listing of those units, VJ, military, territorial, and MUP, federal Ministry of -- on to page 2 -- federal Ministry of Defence, that list covers, to my awareness, all armed -- all formal official armed organisations. This order addresses the army of civilians outside that list of official armed organisations.

Q. That is all I think we desire to focus on in this first part of your report. And we come to part B, Command and Control, which is in 21 pages, and you will recall that there had been several deletions from this pursuant to the Court's decision. It's a section that has conclusions at page 20, or possibly now 21. There is one document we're going to look at in a couple of seconds, but the conclusions of paragraph 32 and 33 on the overhead projector, your conclusions modulated by the rulings of the Court, please, as to this sector of your report.

A. In my assessment, the removal of those parts of the report would not affect the conclusions in any way.

Q. So your conclusions were?

A. I concluded that there was a well-structured system of commanding the armed organisations, all armed organisations, in Kosovo. That structure had its basis in the federal regulations and the VJ and MUP internal regulations which I covered in Part I of the report. The issue of whether or not the VJ was subordinated to the MUP in accordance with an article from the law on defence, specifically Article ¹⁰⁰¹² 17, is addressed. Any of the controversy surrounding that issue of subordination was essentially internal to the MUP and the VJ and came out in public debate between commanders of the MUP and the VJ. But for our purposes, the means of commanding those organisations existed and reflected the official doctrinal means of command. And furthermore, the conduct of joint operations, in particular the conduct of joint operations by the VJ and the MUP, combat operations, had a system, and again it was a system based in the doctrine and the laws and the regulations, a system of command. And that system brought in the Joint Command and the chains of command of the VJ and the MUP.

Q. In paragraph 32 and on the fifth line shown on the screen, you used the word "FRY president, as head of the VJ is likely ... therefore, to have had authority over the Serbian MUP." Can you explain your use of the word "likely" and also whether there was any evidence to the contrary effect.

A. Yes. The use of the word "likely" is -- reflects the fact that I have not seen a single document which states specifically -- or which is signed specifically by the FRY president giving orders directly to the MUP, but all of the documentation, and there was a vast amount of it and much of it what I would consider independent, all led to the assessment that clearly the chain of command which the MUP fell into could be traced back to the office of the FRY president. And the tracing back goes either through the VJ or through the Joint Command. In fact, the tracing back would have to go through both chains in some way, but in very simple terms, all of the documentation shows that you can trace back MUP ¹⁰⁰¹³ operations to the office of the federal president.

Q. And you conclude your paragraph 32 with the sentences dealing with the Joint Command and the joint operations and your conclusion that "... regular liaison all point to both military and MUP being under the effective control of a single body fulfilling the intentions of a common plan. The scope of what was happening in the FRY and Serbia make the origin of that control and common plan in the office of the FRY president."

Now, is that an opinion of yours expressed on the materials available to you or is that anything different?

A. This is primarily a conclusion reached from a review of documentation. It's not -- it doesn't have a great deal of basis in military expert opinion. Its basis is in the -- the expertise came through the review of military related documentation, and this is a logical conclusion, in my assessment, from the documentation I saw.

Q. Rather than a particular military expert?

A. Yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, there are two documents to look at in this sector. I observe the time.

JUDGE MAY: It will be convenient to deal with them after the adjournment. We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: ¹⁰⁰¹⁴

Q. Within section B, Command and Control of your Part II report, at page 12 paragraph 15, there is one exhibit to look at. The exhibit is tab 19 of Part II - courtesy copies coming up - the first sheet of which is the declaration by the deputy chief of investigations, and so the document itself starts on the second sheet, page number 1. Paragraph 15 of your report, then, first, says, and it's a short passage that I can read, I'm just waiting for the usher who has been busy with lots of things. Thank you very much.

MR. NICE: Paragraph 15 of part B. I'll read it out while it's being found. No, that's not the right one. It's part B, page 12 of the second report. Don't fuss. Don't worry. Take your time. I'll read it out.

Q. You said this, Mr. Coo: "The Joint Command for Kosovo coordinated operations by armed organisations in Kosovo (military, MUP, local defence). Joint Command daily situation reports show this through mention of proposed activities for the military and the MUP."

MR. NICE: Usher, don't worry about this extract for the time being. It's not your fault; mine for not giving you earlier notice. But if we can just put the exhibit on and then Mr. Coo can comment on that. Thank you very much.

Q. Mr. Coo, perhaps you'll deal with the exhibit and I can alert the usher to the fact that we're going to move to part C, and the first reference will be page 17 of part C. No hurry. Plenty of time. Mr. Coo, tell us about this exhibit, please, and its significance.

A. Your Honours, the first page of the exhibit, or the one after the ^{10015 BLANK PAGE 10016} declaration, which -- provides -- has the title Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija, which is the Joint Command I alluded to earlier responsible for coordinating armed organisations in Kosovo. It's titled an operations report which simply, to me, means that it's a report covering operations conducted by the -- or to be conducted by the armed organisations. It begins with and it's structured in accordance with military documents that are familiar to me from my own military experience and military documents that I also came across issued by the VJ because of the fact that it begins with coverage of the -- what we term the enemy, the enemy situation. Here it's called the intelligence and security situation because it's -- probably because it covers slightly broader issues than merely the situation concerning the enemy.

It then goes on in the following pages to cover activities of the units of the Yugoslav army and the MUP. This is broken down into sections, one on page 3 which is an overview of, in my assessment, it's an overview of what activities VJ and MUP units have been engaged in. The next subsection, on page 6 of the exhibit, is titled "Proposal for further engagement," and that, to me, shows some responsibility on the part of the Joint Command, certainly involvement of the Joint Command in what the units of the VJ and the MUP are doing in Kosovo. And I think that's the extent of my assessments on this document.

Q. We can see throughout these detailed paragraphs references to very substantial number of villages and towns, many of which names may now be familiar to the Chamber.

Very well. Let's move from section B to section C, which is ¹⁰⁰¹⁷ "Tactics." It's 14 pages only. It has no paragraph at the front or back headed "Conclusion." We're going to take the Chamber to one page only, bearing in mind the deletions that have also been made from this sector - one deletion - can you tell us, please, what your overall conclusions, if any, on tactics were.

A. I concluded that the -- through 1998 and 1999, fairly routine use was made of tactics common --

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have been following all of this very attentively, everything that the witness has been saying, and as amicus curiae, I think it is my duty to say that the decision of the Court was very clear, that the witness cannot give conclusions of his own. Therefore, I think that I have to object.

JUDGE MAY: We in fact went through the report and deleted those parts which we felt the witness could not give evidence on, and therefore, they have been excluded. But he is entitled to give evidence on the other matters.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I do agree, but Mr. Nice keeps insisting on new conclusions and new comments. That's why I'm saying this. I know what your decision was, and I understand that, but Mr. Nice keeps insisting on new conclusions with regard to other documents, and they are self-explanatory, on the one hand, and on the other hand, it will be for you to assess them at the end.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. I'm sure Mr. Nice will stay within the report and within the spirit of our ruling. ¹⁰⁰¹⁸

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Coo, I return to the question I asked you on tactics, please. You have told us so far through 1998 and 1999 fairly routine use was made of particulars, and then Mr. Tapuskovic addressed us.

A. Yes, Your Honours. The -- to summarise the content of part C and specifically the documentation on which I relied to compile part C, it was apparent to me that the VJ and the MUP were operating together on joint operations, using tactics that appeared to be consistent through 1998 and 1999. And in general terms, the common roles of the VJ and the MUP were that the VJ provided the heavy weapons support to combat operations while the MUP special units, when engaged in joint operations with the VJ, operated as much like an infantry unit and were responsible for moving on to objectives on foot, and those objectives might be villages or KLA strongholds, KLA locations.

Q. Very well. Turning to "Joint Operations," which starts on page 6 of part C and continues through, amongst others, to paragraph 10 on page 7 -- it may be page 8, but I think it's probably still page 7. Paragraph 10, part C.

Mr. Coo, you pick out two operational reports, one from 1998 and one from 1999, that illustrate the conduct of joint VJ/MUP operations, and, as you suggest, do much to corroborate numerous other reports suggesting standard practices, because they were used on different operations conducted weeks or months apart.

Now, both these reports were issued by Battle Group 4, the 125th VJ Motorised Infantry Brigade, and perhaps you'd like to comment on them. ¹⁰⁰¹⁹ Is the first one the one we've looked at already? The first one coming up, please. Volume I, tab 66.

MR. NICE: Usher, if you'd be so good, please. I will help the Chamber, because I'm sure I can finish within half of this session. There are about, I think, about three more, four more exhibits within the report and half a dozen references. We must go back to the first report. There is then additional documents, about six, that have only recently been available and have been served on the accused. I think we're in good shape to finish about halfway through this session.

Q. Very well. Part I, tab 66, dated the 25th of September, 1998, from command combat group 4, or command group 4, to command of the 125th Motorised Brigade. Draw to our attention what supports your conclusions so far.

A. Your Honours, just to explain some of the background to this document, a battle group or combat group is a formation formed from the components of a brigade, and it's slightly larger than a military company in size and includes a mix of unit types and weapons. And battle groups, from the documentation, were a standard way or a standard formation used by the VJ in combat operations.

This document is a report from one such battle group. It's a battle group formed from the 125th Motorised Brigade of the VJ, and that brigade was one of the combat brigades of the Pristina Corps subordinate to 3rd Army.

This report from September 1998, is a review of an operation conducted by that Battle Group 4, and the review is -- to me, is being ¹⁰⁰²⁰ provided for the Battle Group 4's superior command, the command of the 125th Brigade. And in the review, they provide an overview of the operation that they conducted.

The information that I focused on in this report concerned the types of weapons, the composition of the battle group, and in particular the fact that the battle group had made reference to conducting the operation with -- jointly with a unit of the MUP, and that MUP unit was -- is known as a PJP unit, which is, as mentioned earlier, one of the MUP's special units, heavily armed units designed for combat operations.

Q. Well, if we then turn to the second report, the one in early 1999, February of 1999, which is tab 2 of Part II, which is also Exhibit 94, and tab 47 of that exhibit.

Mr. Coo, again, and as shortly as you can, draw the identifying -- I beg your pardon, the significant points and perhaps the similar points from this document that you focused your attention on.

A. Again, Your Honours, this is a document from that same battle group of that same VJ brigade months later, showing that the battle group was still engaged in -- or again engaged in combat operations, and those combat operations were taking place jointly with units of the MUP, specifically the PJP.

One of the details of this order, attack order, is worth noting, in my opinion, is just how detailed the order is. It's a relatively low-level unit, a combat group or battle group, and this is -- this order provides quite an extensive description of the attack which is to take place, and it shows how much planning has to go into organising and ^{10021 BLANK PAGE 10022} conducting an attack, the authority for which would come from more senior commands.

Q. The Chamber can read the detail themselves on several pages. There's no particular item of it, it's the generality of the detail that you rely on, I think.

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Thank you very much. We turn then from part C to part D, which is in 13 pages, 13, possibly 14 by now. Thirteen, I think. It's headed "Operations in Kosovo." It has no expressed conclusion. Can you summarise the effect of this part of your report? And we'll take the Chamber to two passages or perhaps one passage only.

A. This section of the report used various sources to --

Q. Some of which, of course, have now been deleted, and you've got to take account of that.

A. Yes. Concerning the deleted sections, in my assessment, they don't affect the overall scope of part D. They -- they were corroboration of --

Q. Say no more about them, providing they don't assess the conclusion. Your conclusions or the summary of the effect of this part being what, Mr. Coo, please?

A. It was a review of various sources, documentary sources, to show the scale of operations being conducted by armed operations in Kosovo during the period of interest in 1999.

Q. Let's go, then, to one page, page 4, paragraph 2. It runs into page 5. We don't need to look at an exhibit. You quote from something ¹⁰⁰²³ here, and indeed it's General Pavkovic's letter of the 23rd of July to his superiors when commanding the Pristina Corps. Your comment, please.

A. Yes. This is General Pavkovic in his previous appointment as commander of the Pristina Corps, prior to commanding the 3rd Army. The letter is, to me, a demonstration of his disagreement with the way in which the conflict in Kosovo, or specifically the VJ's role in that conflict, was going. And it shows the opinions of a VJ commander in a very key position during 1999. And one of the items in the letter and in the extract provided in paragraph 2 states that -- or makes reference to the arming of the population.

Q. It says in terms, "Despite the arming of the population, that factor in the system against terrorist struggle has not been included."

A. I would just assess from that that the population has been armed, and that is what I covered earlier, the arming of civilian defence units and the civilians themselves, provided for in other documentation, and it that General Pavkovic is -- doesn't feel that this has been -- the employment of these armed civilians has not been fully implemented.

Q. Probably obvious but it perhaps should be stated that your observation at the conclusion of the quotation about the reference to loss of Kosovo and genocide of Serbs is not a military expert conclusion, it's a general conclusion that anybody might or might not adopt, depending on their judgement.

A. That's correct.

Q. So we can move, then, to section E, headed "Crime Site Linkage," being on merely seven sides. Having neither express preamble or ¹⁰⁰²⁴ concluding conclusions, the purpose and effect of this sector -- section of your report, please.

A. Your Honours, the scope of this section is to cover how I as a military analyst and also with my -- with consideration of the documentation that I reviewed and covered in other sections, how I would examine and how I did examine some of the documentation related to either crime sites or attacks in general conducted by armed organisations.

Q. You draw to our attention your paragraph 4 on the foot of page 1 and over to page 2, and you say this: "When a distinction between military and MUP cannot be made easily, it is still possible to demonstrate that the attacking organisation was, nevertheless, an organised armed group, and the possibility that it was a rogue or a regular or paramilitary group operating outside an official chain of command or outside the awareness of such a chain of command can be countered using the following reasoning..." bearing in mind the decision of the Chamber about testimony on which they have to make judgements generally applied, your remaining comment for this paragraph, please.

A. This -- this paragraph reflects the other sections of the report in which I assess that, or I show and documentation shows to me, the scope of the arming of groups and organisations in Kosovo, how widespread that was. It's also how I, as a military analyst, would assess reports concerning the identity of groups engaged in operations, whether those operations concerned one of our indictment sites or any other -- or attacks in general. And there's various indicators or various types of information that I would use in making such assessments. And some of this ¹⁰⁰²⁵ includes the description of uniforms, and I would rely on those descriptions.

Q. Thank you. If we turn over, please, to page 4, you identify the Prizren municipality. And there's an extract from the report. I may not be able to show it on the overhead projector, but the citation is given at footnote 4. You have it. It's coming up your way. Thank you very much. And it's actually from volume I of the exhibits, tab 34, which should be cross-referenced to its other label, which is Exhibit 281. Now, so far as this document is concerned, Mr. Coo, if you have it before you, its significance is what and then take us to the part of the report if you can find it immediately.

A. This is a report from the -- the MUP headquarters, the MUP staff for Kosovo charged with coordinating MUP operations in Kosovo. It shows, among other things, in the header that the MUP staff is reporting to the ministry in Belgrade. And this is during the state of war and specifically 27 March 1999.

The section of interest in Part II E of my report, the passage concerning an attack by the KLA in -- or by terrorists, as mentioned in the report, on the 25th of March in the Prizren municipality shows to me that the VJ and the MUP at that time were engaged in an operation.

Q. That's on page 4 of the exhibit. Just throw it up on the screen. And it's in the middle of that page. The paragraph reading: "In a terrorist attack carried out on the 25th of March ..." Carry on, please, Mr. Coo.

A. This passage simply makes reference to members of both the MUP and ¹⁰⁰²⁶ the VJ being injured in attack in that municipality on that day. And from that, I assess that an operation was being conducted, or at least the VJ and the MUP were in the -- in that -- in those areas on that date.

Q. Thank you very much. For reasons of time, if we stay on your report, on page 4, and look at Racak on which we've seen a great deal of -- in respect of which we've had a great deal of evidence, you cite a telegram sent by the SUP of Orahovac, reporting details of the incident to the ministry in Belgrade on the 15th of January. Just check that that's on the screen. And then it goes over onto the following page, the citation of the quotation, page 5. "Starting at 0300 hours on the 15th of January, measures were taken to seal off the village of Racak."

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, I'm going to interrupt you just to clarify this. I think this is a report which we've already had exhibited, isn't it?

MR. NICE: It may well be. I'll get the number for it, if we can find it. It's K1599 but I'm afraid I don't have the exhibit number immediately. I will obtain it, if so, and provide it. May I just continue briefly with the quotation?

Q. You also draw to our attention five lines down, the indented passage: "At 630, the village was completely encircled while a part of the PJP, special police units, was advancing right at the entrance into the village." In the concluding subparagraph: "No civilians were hurt during the execution of the operation."

Significance of that, please.

A. This simply shows that the PJP, MUP unit, was involved in the ^{10027 BLANK PAGE 10028} attack on Racak on the 15th of January, and this is the MUP, or the SUP in that area reporting to its superiors on that action.

Q. Just turning up the exhibit number, if we can.

JUDGE MAY: It's in a binder.

MR. NICE: Yes. We'll find it. Can I come back to it and give you the reference in a second.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. On page 7 of this part of your report, Mr. Coo, right at the conclusion in respect of Izbica, you make reference to the Vojska 2001, and to an investigation carried out by the VJ itself in respect of Izbica. And in that book, is there a quotation to the effect that on the basis of the order of the investigating judge in Kosovo Mitrovica, the same team carried out an external examination and identification of 101 bodies in the village of Izbica, Srbica municipality?

A. There is a reference to such an examination conducted by the VJ in 1999 during the state of war.

MR. NICE: Still tracking that other exhibit, Your Honour. May I come back to it? I've marked the page.

Q. Finally, apart from annexes, there's part F of your report on "Discipline." It's in nine pages. It has no particular expressed conclusion. In summary, though, Mr. Coo.

A. In Part I, I set out to show from the documentation how -- what the disciplinary procedures and how the disciplinary system in the armed organisations was supposed to work, was set up, the regulatory basis for ¹⁰⁰²⁹ it. In this section of Part II, I -- I set out to show from the documentation how the disciplinary system was actually implemented in practice.

Q. Is it possible to say anything in summary as to how it was implemented in practice or are we better off just reading the seven pages and looking at two items of them now?

A. Very briefly, Your Honours, the documentation showed a recognition on the part of the armed organisations of the formal systems of discipline. The exercise of those systems is a different question and addressed in this part.

Q. So if we can look first at page 2, paragraph 5. And of course having in mind that the operation of the disciplinary system is largely a matter of fact for the Chamber, save insofar as it might be supported positively or negatively by documentation at the time. We find you in paragraph 5 saying this: "According to all information reviewed in the process of compiling this report, there was in 1999 the required structures and measures for an effective system of discipline over armed organisations of the FRY and Serbia. Commanders at all levels would have been fully aware of the requirements for maintaining discipline. The mere issuance of instructions and orders is insufficient to meet the responsibility which commanders have for discipline." And you then go on. Perhaps you will conclude this paragraph in your own words, please.

A. Yes. Specifically, Your Honours, the -- in the middle of that paragraph, beginning with, "... the mere issuance of instructions is insufficient..." this refers back to Part I where the disciplinary ¹⁰⁰³⁰ regulations are covered in detail for both the MUP and the VJ. And part of those regulations concerns command responsibility. One extract in particular highlights the responsibility of commanders for taking action in the event of violations of the laws of war or humanitarian law or violations of internal regulations related to discipline.

In Kosovo, with the indictment in mind, I reviewed the documentation available to me on the exercise of disciplinary measures and what that documentation showed and the documentation available to me showed was that some disciplinary measures were taken, and these are provided in the report. No disciplinary measures, to my awareness, were taken concerning command responsibility, and some of the basis for this assessment on my part was the fact that all of the -- if not all, most of the commanders in key positions, brigade commanders, corps commander, and higher, and equivalents in the MUP were either promoted or retained -- and/or retained. And similarly, units that they commanded, some of the documentation shows those units receiving commendations.

Q. If we go on, please, to page 7 of this sector, "Clearing Up the Battlefield." This is something that has been touched on quite a lot in evidence one way and another. Just without going through the details, summarise the effect of the regulations you've considered.

A. The regulations and the orders issued concerning clearing up the battlefield suggests to me that they had well-established procedures, and they at least made an effort to exercise those procedures concerning the clearing up of, amongst other things, dead bodies in Kosovo. And this was ¹⁰⁰³¹ -- made it very apparent that it's not part of the doctrine that bodies should merely be left lying around on the battlefield. On the contrary, there's a requirement in cleaning up the battlefield, or clearing up the battlefield, that any bodies that they do come across where there's suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, that there's an obligation on the part of the VJ and other organisations to conduct investigations.

Q. Your annexes to this report start immediately after page 9. We can deal with them very briefly. The first annex is simply key personnel and an annex of reference. These aren't, I think, page numbered. I only have Registry pages to go on, and they may be different from those in the version being considered by the Chamber.

So we then go to annex 2, which I have on Registry page 13787. Just explain annex 2 to us. It begins with Bajgora, Donji Ratis, Gornji Ratis and so on.

A. The contents of annex 2 are extracts from the OSCE's daily reporting on events in Kosovo and their reporting concerns.

Q. It's only very lightly headed so it's hard to find. It comes on the page immediately following footnote 149.

JUDGE MAY: I have it now. Yes. This is the document and we have the exhibit number so it can be referred to. It's Exhibit 321, the Blue Book.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

Q. Annex 3, which starts at what I have as -- well, it's just called Part II, annex 3, pages 1 of 4 is VJ Activity. Could you explain that, if you will, for us, please. ¹⁰⁰³²

A. Annex 3 makes use of various documents available to me which show operations conducted by the VJ during the state of war in 1999. The -- I should stress that this would not -- would most likely not be an exhaustive list of where the VJ was operating and what it was doing on a day-to-day basis.

MR. NICE: And that's been finally reflected in a map. I'm not going to trouble the Court with it. You can see it there, it's at the end of the document.

Returning to the question of the exhibit, Your Honour, it may be that the item referred to is similar to but in fact different from an earlier document. I'm grateful to Ms. Graham and, I think, to the registry for teasing this out. I'm not sure exactly -- and I think the exhibit concerned is 211, one of the documents presented through General Drewienkiewciz. You will see this. It is, in any event, tab -- it's tab 27 of volume II's exhibits. The witness has already dealt with the extract on page 5 of part E of the second report, and one can see it there on that page.

That concludes all I want to ask, if that's convenient, about the second report. There's the photographs to be dealt with and the patches in the first report. If I can take the Chamber back to the first report and to Appendix E. The Chamber will see at Appendix E --

Q. Mr. Coo, if you have your first report - that's Part I of the reports - at section E, you provide there a guide to a number of photographs that the Chamber will be able to find and not all of which I'm going to ask you to deal with. But at paragraph 9 on page 2, you speak of ^{10033 BLANK PAGE 10034} one particular photograph which I'd like to put on the overhead projector.

JUDGE MAY: Where are we going to find those photographs?

MR. NICE: They're at tab 79. Interesting though they are, I think time dictates that I should only show the one of maximum relevance at the moment.

Place this on the overhead projector.

Q. Mr. Coo, it's something we've heard about to some degree in evidence, and if you look at the photograph, your comment on it, please. We're focusing not on the individuals but on their shoulders and what's on their shoulders, are we not?

A. Yes, we are, Your Honours. Well, these are members of the MUP, special unit PJP, as identified by the uniforms and patches, but specifically in the report it focuses on the wearing of ribbons, ribbons on the shoulders. And there is documentation and references made to that document to show that this was indeed a practice used, adopted by the MUP. The document is a table for one month in 1999, I think, or perhaps 1998, I can't recall exactly, but nevertheless, a table showing what colour arrangement of ribbons should be worn and on which shoulder each day during that month.

Q. Here comes the table, which is volume I of the exhibits, tab 80. If we put the version which is, of course, the English version - the original is available - on the overhead projector. You can see this is detailed instructions to the police for wearing identification bands in May of 1999 with the words "SUP" written in hand on the top on the original. And then day by day, starting on the 1st of May, with the 24 ¹⁰⁰³⁵ hour appropriate timespan, there is the indication of what is to be worn on the right shoulder epaulette, blue and red, then blue and yellow, and so on.

Perhaps we can just look at one more --

JUDGE MAY: Before you do, it may be obvious, but what was the purpose, as you would understand it, of wearing these ribbons and when would they have worn them? Mr. Coo, can you help us with that?

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. The purpose, in my assessment, was, and it's partially based on what's in the title, where it says "For identification," or they call them identification bands, I think. The purpose is for identification, and the identification to prevent or help prevent MUP from either shooting themselves because they don't recognise their own units in the heat of battle, or to ensure that the KLA, in case -- in the event that they wear police uniforms - and I'm not aware of any documentation showing that - but should the enemy wear uniforms of friendly forces, the friendly forces would at least -- in this case the MUP, would at least have a system for recognising their own.

MR. NICE:

Q. Just have another look at the photograph briefly. On the overhead projector. You will also see a balaclava there. Do you see a balaclava on the bottom right? Is that a common feature of these photographs or not don't you know?

A. I don't recall whether it's a common feature of the photos provided. It's a common feature of other photographs that I've seen and adopted by special units of both the VJ and the MUP. ¹⁰⁰³⁶

Q. One more photograph: 56304 on page 3 of this section, paragraph 13. Your report suggests that this photograph shows the MUP, probably the PJP, in the field with some variations in dress, the association of all of these men with the MUP coming from the use of the ribbons and the commonness of the MUP blue camouflage uniform with the insignia, probably "Milicija" or "Policija" on the left shoulder, common automatic weapons and MUP vehicles in the background. You're ascribing them to an illegal, as you describe it, paramilitary group coming from what, please, Mr. Coo?

A. In my work, I read a large number of our witness statements --

Q. Well, it may be if that comes from evidence it's not appropriate for you to express that opinion, and I don't press it. The earlier points about the ribbons are matters you are able to express an opinion on.

A. Yes. I can add that, in general terms, from reading the media and listening to people without military experience, it is sometimes difficult to identify a military unit. It's sometimes difficult to identify the difference, for them to show that they know the difference between a tank and an armoured personnel carrier, and the use of this photograph is to -- the aim of this photograph is to show that on not all occasions would organised units dress in what might look like clean, parade standard uniforms. These are units engaged in combat; they're dirty. Sometimes military organisations of some countries have insufficient uniforms to properly equip everyone, especially when they've conscripted people, and this may be an occasion where that has taken place.

Q. Thank you very much. I pass from your reports to the five documents recently received which will, I think, require separate exhibit ¹⁰⁰³⁷ numbers.

MR. NICE: They have been provided to the accused and the amici. They have been translated. It would indeed save time if they could be given a single exhibit number, if that's acceptable to the Court.

JUDGE MAY: Is it in one file or how is it --

MR. NICE: It's not actually in a file, I think they've just been clipped together at the moment.

JUDGE MAY: I think it may be -- let me just have a look.

MR. NICE: It has an index at the front.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. If we give them one exhibit number, the individual items can be referred to by the numbers.

MR. NICE: In that case, if those can go -- I have this morning, for reasons of speed, not been pursuing my normal policy of putting B/C/S or Cyrillic B/C/S originals on the overhead projector. I hope that's not --

JUDGE MAY: Exhibit number.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 323.

MR. NICE:

Q. Right. If we can look at the first of these in English, dated the 7th of April of 1999, from the Supreme Command Staff. And it's, of course, the Supreme Command that may feature on these documents that's of interest. "Military secret, strictly confidential and coded." I think there are a number of paragraphs here that you want to draw to our attention. Can you explain the significance of this order to your general ¹⁰⁰³⁸ conclusions, please. It comes from General Ojdanic.

A. Your Honours, this is an order from the Supreme Command Staff, which is covered in detail in my report, and that was the VJ General Staff operating within the Supreme Command, at the top of the chain of command during the state of war. It's concerning the number of volunteers attempting to join the VJ at that time. And this document establishes procedures to -- to be instated, to be practised when accepting volunteers into VJ units.

Q. If we go to page 2 of the document, the second bullet point as an example, and the third, we see reference to neuropsychiatric examinations and the suitability of volunteers from a security point of view.

A. Those two bullet points show evidence to me of concern about the quality of the volunteers.

Q. If we go to the third page and to paragraph 10 where the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command prohibits the admission of members of paramilitary groups -- "units, groups, and individuals already present in the zones of responsibility to VJ commands as volunteers without prior completion of procedures regulated by this order." The significance of that, in your judgement?

A. This to me seems to be an effort on the part of the Supreme Command to ensure that what may be groups operating outside formal chains of command are integrated into formal chains of command in compliance with procedures outlined in this order.

Q. Turn to the next document, number 2 of this exhibit, dated the 9th of April, some days later. Again from the same General Ojdanic to the ^{10039 BLANK PAGE 10040} commander of the 3rd Army personally. And then it's the penultimate paragraph that I think draws your attention and on which I'd like your comment, as on the distribution of the document generally.

A. This -- the penultimate paragraph is a demonstration to me of the involvement of the Supreme Commander in the conduct of commanding units subordinate to the Supreme Command Staff and the Supreme Command.

Q. Because it says: "The report on the proposal for a decision will be submitted on the 11th of April at the Supreme Command Staff in the presence of the Supreme Commander."

The proposal itself is the proposal set out for a decision on preventing aggression, with certain variations?

A. Yes, and this is entitled a "Preparatory Order for the Commander of the 3rd Army Personally," and by "personally," I interpret that to mean that they want to limit the distribution of this for operational security reasons to ensure that the -- that a future operation's details aren't compromised. Preparatory orders are issued, exist in the doctrine I reviewed of the VJ, and they also exist in my own military experience where they're called warning orders, and they allow and they're used to provide commanders with opportunities to begin planning procedures before the more detailed order and instruction is issued.

Q. Document number 3, please. 17th of April. From the Supreme Command Staff to the 3rd Army command, to the commander personally, from General Ojdanic. And underneath that heading, "Link: Kosovo and Metohija Joint Command ..." Significance, please.

A. To me, the significance of the phrase after the word "link," the ¹⁰⁰⁴¹ reference to the Joint Command for Kosovo order is simply that. It's a reference to the Joint Command having issued an order, and the order implies, to me, executive authority, in this case in relation to combat operations on the part of the Joint Command. It also shows a -- some form of relationship between the Supreme Command, the 3rd Army, and the Joint Command.

Q. The Joint Command having, as I think you've explained in your report, a political component to it on your understanding?

A. That's correct, Your Honour.

Q. Fourth document, 18th of April, again from General Ojdanic. It may be the heading, "Pursuant to the Order of the President" that may be the point of significance on which you would rely.

A. Yes. To me, this is -- this shows the Supreme Command Staff issuing orders on behalf or pursuant to, as it's worded here, an order issued by the federal president. Specifically, it's in relation to Article 17 of the law on defence, which is addressed in my report, and simply covers the provision for subordinating the MUP to the VJ for combat operations.

Q. And then finally, the fifth document, 10th of May, from General Ojdanic, an order marked "Keep permanently" with an annex which starts on page 3 in the English version. Paragraph 3 of this order directs, "Commanders, unit commanders and other superior officers to undertake necessary measures to prevent violations of the principles, rules, and regulations of the international laws of war..." and goes on to deal with personal responsibility. ¹⁰⁰⁴² The significance of this document, in your opinion?

A. This demonstrates to me the Supreme Command exercising during the state of war what exists, and what's referred to in my report, in documentation.

Q. Any other particular points on this last document you want to draw to our attention?

A. None other than it's -- I think it's simply an emphasis, a reiteration of the responsibility of commanders and others in the chains of command.

MR. NICE: That concludes all I want to ask this witness. Thank you, Mr. Coo.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we're going to take the adjournment now before cross-examination. We will go on with your cross-examination after it.

We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.00 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.22 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Tell me, Mr. May, what is the total amount of time I will have for cross-examining this witness?

JUDGE MAY: Well, we have to finish tomorrow. We need -- I don't know if the amici have any questions.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: We may have, but that may depend on cross-examination.

JUDGE MAY: Obviously not lengthy. ¹⁰⁰⁴³

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Absolutely not.

JUDGE MAY: There are some administrative matters which have to be dealt with tomorrow.

MR. NICE: And I would expect that by the time they're ventilated they're likely take an hour and it may be sensible to allow a session, but certainly an hour.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We think three hours should be sufficient. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Coo, you said yesterday that for ten years you worked in the Canadian army on intelligence matters and that during that military career of yours, you obtained the rank of captain; is that right?

A. That's correct, Your Honour.

Q. Before joining the Canadian army, did you work on any other matters?

A. I'm not sure if I understand the question, Your Honour. Matters concerning what?

Q. Were you employed in any capacity in any other institution before joining the Canadian military, that is to say, before those ten years you spent in the Canadian army?

A. Before I -- before I joined the intelligence branch in 1988, I was at university. During my university years, I was a reservist in the naval reserve.

Q. So practically, you were not employed anywhere, gainfully ¹⁰⁰⁴⁴ employed, before you started working for the Canadian army?

A. Not to my recollection, no, Your Honours.

Q. Which schools have you finished, Mr. Coo?

A. I completed a degree, a Bachelor of Science, at the University of Calgary.

Q. What was your major, actually? I didn't quite understand this.

A. I majored in psychology.

Q. So you're a psychologist by training.

A. I wouldn't -- I certainly wouldn't describe myself as a psychologist on the basis of having a Bachelor degree.

Q. All right. Did you have any other type of education in addition to these studies in psychology? And I said that in terms of your education you were trained to be a psychologist, I did not say that you are a psychologist.

A. Beginning in 1997, when I left the Canadian Forces, I took a number of other university courses. I didn't complete a degree. Those courses were in science.

Q. All right. Can I infer on the basis of these answers you've given, quite briefly, that you do not really have any kind of military training or education?

A. I strongly disagree with that inference. I think my military training is covered in detail in my curriculum vitae.

Q. Well, a part of -- apart from that which is described in your curriculum vitae, could you please explain what is the education you received in the military field? ^{10045 BLANK PAGE 10046}

A. All of my military education was provided for me in the military during my military career, either as a naval reservist or, more importantly, during my career as an intelligence officer. My education in university is not a military education.

Q. All right. I assume that you distinguish between education and experience. You gained some experience by working in the military. However, on the basis of what you have said so far, this was not preceded by any kind of military education, that is to say, you did not complete any kind of military school, military academy, et cetera, something that would be required, for example, for the rank of captain in the army.

A. In the Canadian system, we don't have what I think exists in Yugoslavia and that is military schools. We have a Royal Military College which offers university-level degrees. Some officers enter the military through military college. Those officers might take degrees such as engineering or strategic studies or a variety of other degrees found at civilian universities. So there's two entry schemes for officers in the Canadian Forces; one through the military college scheme and another through civilian universities. And I should add, in addition, some officers, at least at the time I joined, did not have to have any university degree.

Q. All right. But can I understand it this way, Mr. Coo: As far as the military profession is concerned, then, what is required is a military education. As regards a generally usable profession like that of a physician or a lawyer or a psychologist, then they can get a commission in the army because they got a university degree, but they are practising ¹⁰⁰⁴⁷ their own profession. For example, somebody who has a degree from the school of medicine can become an officer, but he treats soldiers, but he's not involved in the military line of work. So it's different, isn't it? Is that right or not?

A. I would disagree. The Canadian military operates on a system of accepting officers from a variety of educational backgrounds. They don't always require a -- they don't always specify a specific degree. It depends on the component of the military into which you're entering, but, for example, an officer entering the military as an infantry officer does not require a specific degree. An officer entering as a medical officer or an engineering officer does require a specific degree; an engineering or a medical degree. The Canadian Forces makes provisions for not, in some instances, requesting specific degrees. The system has within it a means of providing professional education for its officers, ensuring that they meet the standards, the required standards.

Q. All right. Tell me, during your military career - and you say it lasted ten years - did you command a military unit?

A. I did not command a unit that's on the establishment of the Canadian Forces. I had command over a number of soldiers and non-commissioned officers as an officer in a subsection or sub-unit within an establishment unit, or within a number of establishment units. I was not what is officially described as a commanding officer. With the position of commanding officers come a number of capabilities. I can't really phrase it any other way, but commanding officers, for instance, have specific responsibilities towards discipline and specific authorities ¹⁰⁰⁴⁸ regarding discipline. I had some but not to the extent that a commanding officer would.

Q. All right, Mr. Coo. So you reached the rank of captain. You did not command any unit; not a platoon, not a company, not a squad. You do not have a military education. You got a degree in psychology. Is that what we have established so far now that we're dealing with your qualifications?

A. I would have to disagree quite strongly with that. I did reach the rank of captain. I was not a commanding officer, but I did command units within the Canadian Forces, and I did command soldiers and non-commissioned officers. I was at one point, for example, as provided for in my CV, the officer commanding an intelligence collection and analysis section, a platoon within an intelligence company. I held other similar types of positions.

My military education, as I've pointed out, was provided when I was in the military. The skills I gained during my civilian studies were skills that were valued by the Canadian Forces. Otherwise, they wouldn't, I suppose, specify that entering officers have those qualifications.

Q. All right. Now we've come to the point that you say that you commanded a military unit that was not actually a military unit but it was a unit for intelligence collection, if I understood it correctly, right?

A. In the example I gave, that's partially correct. It was not a military unit on the establishment of the Canadian Forces books. That unit was, in the example I gave, the First Canadian Division Intelligence Company, and that unit was commanded by a commanding officer, and there's ¹⁰⁰⁴⁹ very specific descriptions of what a commanding officer is and his powers of punishment. A commanding officer has more powers of punishment than an officer commanding. I was an officer commanding of a component of that establishment unit.

Q. All right. You were an officer within that intelligence company. All right, Mr. Coo. We have partly clarified your qualifications. Do you personally think that the experience of an officer who is responsible for a group, a platoon-size group, and who did not complete any military school qualifies you to appear here as a military expert regarding matters concerning an army that had, in wartime, 350.000 persons involved. And also, for all questions of various relations like between the Supreme Command and all types of units - military units, police units, the civilian structure, et cetera - do you believe that this experience of yours qualifies you and that your education qualifies you to appear in this role?

A. I think I do for the following reasons, Your Honours: Again, as laid out in my CV, I had -- I filled more positions than the intelligence company. Those positions covered the strategic level of analysis at the national defence headquarters, all the way down to being an intelligence officer in a brigade headquarters, and included in which was experience in a brigade on an operation in Bosnia. The -- both the training provided at the beginning of my career covers strategic analysis. At the time I was in, we were required to understand and we learned about the structures and how forces of the Warsaw Pact were commanded. This training was practised during my career in the various positions I've identified. I was required ¹⁰⁰⁵⁰ to provide intelligence support to commanders at various levels, including the deputy chief of the defence staff to whom, in one of my appointments, I briefed on a daily basis about strategic issues. So overall, I think that I've had experience and training in military analysis. I don't pretend to bring with me experience of commanding large formations and, consequently, the report hasn't pretended to introduce any such experience, but I have engaged in analysing the structures and the command of large military forces.

Q. All right. You say that you studied the organisation of the Warsaw Pact forces. Are you aware of the fact that Yugoslavia was not a member of the Warsaw Pact and that, as concerns organisation of its military, that it did not coincide with the organisation of the forces belonging to the Warsaw Pact?

A. I am aware that the former Yugoslavia was not a Warsaw Pact country. It was not a military that I studied in detail at the time. Some of its organisation conforms to what I remember studying in Warsaw Pact armies. Whether or not it matches precisely the organisation of a Warsaw Pact army is, in my assessment, of no consequence for the report that I wrote. I examined the structure of the Yugoslav army and other armed organisations based on documentation, and any -- any results, any resulting assessments drawn from that documentation clearly has its basis in the documentation. The -- in some cases, supplemented by my military experience.

Q. All right. You studied documentation, as far as I could see here. Let me start from the constitution of Yugoslavia, the law on defence, the ¹⁰⁰⁵¹ law on the army. You studied orders of commanders in the field and so on. Do you believe that your experience and knowledge makes it possible for you to draw conclusions that have to do with the constitution, laws, orders, command levels, the Supreme Command, corps, brigades, et cetera? Just give me a yes or no answer.

A. I -- with respect, Your Honours, I can't give a simple yes or no. I can say yes within certain constraints which I adopted and followed in my analysis. I -- I fully admit that I'm no expert on the law. I can interpret the contents of the law on the VJ, for example, and assess its relevance with respect to other documentation that I've seen. I could not engage in a legal debate about the validity of that law with respect to the constitution and FRY legal practices in general, but within the constraints of my analysis, I think I was qualified to do that.

Q. All right. You say that you're not an expert for law. Do you consider yourself to be an expert for military matters in view of what we have concluded so far, notably for the army of Yugoslavia?

A. Again yes, with the explanation that my expertise is very specific and has been outlined. It's in military analysis. I have experiences of operating in militaries and I am familiar with the jargon and the practices, the doctrine of both my own military and a number of other militaries.

Q. All right. From what you have been saying, it is my understanding that you base your testimony on this series of documents that you mention. You exhibited some of them here, on the one hand, and on the other hand, on the knowledge that you have concerning certain activities of the ¹⁰⁰⁵² military and the police. Did I understand you correctly?

A. The contents of my report were almost entirely based on what appeared in the documents mentioned in the report. Some of my military experience was used to interpret -- offer interpretations of the relevance of some of the documentation, but primarily what's in the report is a compilation of military-related documents, the bringing together of those to, in effect, paint a picture of the way things were in the period of interest to us.

Q. All right. Out of which documents did you gain knowledge about activities? Because you say that from regulations, orders, et cetera, you drew certain knowledge as to how the military functioned. What about the activities? From which documents did you draw your knowledge about that?

A. A number of documents, and I think the list is too long to name them all, but they included some that we referred to earlier this morning; the review of operations conducted by a battle group, articles from the VJ's own journal, Vojska magazine, highlighting what various brigades did in Kosovo, comments made by -- in open source materials by various commanders within both the MUP and the VJ, and a number of other documents.

Q. All right, Mr. Coo. Let's leave aside now the scarcity or, rather, the constrained nature of such an approach. Even though you had this approach with regard to documents, did you have the same kind of constrained approach when you were looking into the terrorist organisation of the KLA? Did you look at documents that were relevant to their activity, and did you look at information that has to do with their ¹⁰⁰⁵³ activity, data related to that? Because nowhere here have I seen anything about that.

A. I was not asked to examine the operations conducted by the KLA. Furthermore, I was not asked to examine in detail at the crime site activities by armed organisation of the FRY and Serbia.

Q. All right. On the basis of what did you establish that crimes were committed? On the basis of what are you testifying about crimes?

A. I haven't established or sought to establish that crimes were committed. It's not a conclusion within the scope of my report or my expertise.

Q. But just awhile ago, you mentioned crimes. So you take as your point of departure crimes. On the basis of what did you establish that crimes had been committed?

A. Again, I haven't tried to establish that. The reference to crimes is a reference to the allegations in the indictment. I have provided some material in the report which is connected to specific indictment sites, but I did not attempt to go beyond the presentation of that material to reach any conclusion about whether or not a crime had been committed.

Q. All right. Since your task was not to compile information or documents about the terrorist forces, is that also in keeping with your own line of work? Namely, yesterday when you were speaking about yourself in response to Mr. Nice's questions as to what your line of work was, you said to collect information and to inform the commander as to what was happening in the field. And then when he asked you whether that pertained to all the enemy forces, your own forces, the allied forces, et cetera, ¹⁰⁰⁵⁴ your answer was this information pertains to enemy forces. So you were involved in dealing with enemy forces only.

From that position, did you treat the army of Yugoslavia and the police of Yugoslavia as enemy forces? Were you given the assignment to collect information and to analyse documents and the activities of the army of Yugoslavia as an enemy force, as the enemy side? Is that right, Mr. Coo?

A. I wouldn't encourage the use of the term "enemy" in this instance because it's a bit of a loaded term, but the process of my analysis of the VJ was the process that I would use to analyse any military force I'd analysed in my military career.

Q. All right. All right.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, may I just remind you, yesterday in your explanation, you said that regardless of his employment, et cetera - you quoted a judgement - that an expert can be allowed to testify, and I wrote it down under quotation marks, "if he is an expert in what he is testifying about."

On the basis of these elements that we've just heard, is that your conclusion, that the witness is an expert, able to testify about the army of Yugoslavia, the command, organisation, the constitution, et cetera? And then quoting that judgement, is that how you reached your decision that he can testify?

JUDGE MAY: The answer is yes. As a military analyst, he is an expert. What weight we give to the evidence, of course, is a matter for us. ¹⁰⁰⁵⁵

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let me start off with this question. It is one that has to do with the beginning of the examination-in-chief pertaining to your second report. As far as I was able to gather, you, in response to a question put to you by Mr. May, said that the procedure and conduct in the army and the armed forces were in keeping with the regulations, the rules and regulations; is that right?

A. I think I have to elaborate on the answer. In Part I, I laid out from the documentation what the doctrine, what the regulations were in the VJ and what it was required to operate in compliance with. In Part II, I looked at documentation, some of which related to whether or not they exercised and practised those regulations.

Some of the documentation I viewed shows recognition that those regulations existed. For example, the large number of orders issued urging VJ units to comply with the laws of war and humanitarian law, to me, demonstrate recognition of the -- of the legislation and the internal regulations of the VJ which are outlined in Part I. I did not conclude from the documentation reviewed for Part II that the compliance with the doctrine and the legislation and the regulations was either comprehensive or 100 percent or complete. There was just insufficient documentation to reach such a conclusion or assessment. There were elements of recognition on the part of the VJ of their own internal regulations.

Q. Well, all right, then. Did you come by any documents or gain any ^{10056 BLANK PAGE 10057} information on the basis of which you were able to conclude that, contrary to those regulations, that something was done illegally, contrary to those regulations, any criminal acts or anything of that nature? And if so, could you indicate those documents to me, please.

A. I don't recall any documentation from the VJ, the MUP, or the other organisations relating specifically to the commission of criminal acts other than references to, and these are in Part II of the report on -- section on discipline. There are references to violations of regulations - in some cases the Criminal Code - where they point out that they've conducted investigations and brought disciplinary measures against a number of soldiers. I haven't seen sufficient documentation -- sorry. That's my answer, Your Honours.

Q. All right. As you've already brought that up and as you're here now, you say you saw documents on the basis of which one can -- could establish that precisely in keeping with the regulations of the Yugoslav army, the army and the police prosecuted the perpetrators of criminal acts which were established. However, as far as I recall, in answer to a question put to you, you said that you do not have any information or data about commanders being punished in any way. And my question to you is this: Why should the commanders be punished if their conduct was in keeping and compliance with the rules and regulations and if they brought individuals to accountability, individuals who had perpetrated certain criminal acts? Why should they be then held responsible themselves? And there are many individuals who were brought to task and prosecuted. So why do you think the commanders ought to be punished if they did so in ¹⁰⁰⁵⁸ conformity with their duty and the laws governing the army?

A. I think it's the role of -- or it's certainly not my role to reach conclusions about whether or not the punishment of commanders was sufficient in light of the crimes we allege in the indictment. I merely point out in the report when the crimes in the indictment are considered against the acts of discipline being taken, as I saw in the documentation, I thought it worthwhile to point out that - for the consideration of the Trial Chamber - that the commanders in the VJ and the MUP in the key positions were all either promoted or retained after and during the war.

Q. All right. But what you're saying now is that you're comparing that to the alleged crimes stipulated in the indictment. Now, is it clear to you as an employee of the OTP that what is alleged in the indictment and set forth there can be fabricated, incorrect, or quite simply launched in order to --

JUDGE MAY: We've been through this with another witness. That's not a matter for the witness. He merely has to go on what's in the document. It's a matter for us to determine whether what you suggest might be true.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the witness is drawing conclusions the whole time, although that is your job, or, rather, it ought to be the job of every legal Trial Chamber to draw its own conclusions and not to allow the witness to do that. And the witness is using the allegations made in the false indictment to draw his own conclusions. So the fact of the matter is, I would say, quite clear, and that is why I asked him the question. ¹⁰⁰⁵⁹

JUDGE MAY: Ask him another question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. When Mr. Nice asked you a question, he mentioned a joint plan. Could you tell us what joint plan this was, what it's all about, and where is it? What document do you -- what document do you in fact talk about when you talk about this joint plan? What is it?

JUDGE MAY: I don't remember a joint plan. A joint command there was talk of, but no joint plan.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, there is a reference. I think it's in section E. I'm not sure it's a concluding section.

JUDGE MAY: Refer it to us.

MR. NICE: I think it is. Mr. Coo will correct me if I'm wrong. I think he probably is referring to what can be found in Part II -- part B of Part II, and the concluding lines of paragraph 32, which I have on page 21. It's not joint, it's "common plan."

JUDGE MAY: "The scope of what was happening in the FRY and Serbia make the origin of that control and common plan in the office of the FRY president."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, would you explain to me, please, on the basis of which you make that observation about this common plan?

A. The basis is in -- again in the documentation I've reviewed and some expert opinion. The -- the documentation from 1998 through 1999 that I reviewed shows the MUP and the VJ operating on a regular basis in combat ¹⁰⁰⁶⁰ operations in Kosovo, the number of the units, of such units, the fact that it was the -- at least a corps level responsible for Kosovo engaged in such operations and all of the MUP units in Kosovo, to me, demonstrate the scale of the operations. The scale of the operations, as I've just said, covering all of Kosovo or encompassing all of the units in Kosovo has to, on the principles that I provide in Part I of the report, the principles of command and the means of commanding the armed forces. And also I provided an extract of the VJ Manual of Command and Control in Part I describing just how complex military operations are and the nature of commanding them, and from that make the assessment that for units to be engaged on this scale in Kosovo required that they be operating under a common plan. Operations have to be coordinated.

Q. All right, Mr. Coo. You have just uncovered the fact that in Kosovo the police corps was in existence. That is no secret. The Pristina Corps did exist, does exist, and its area of responsibility was the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. What's that got to do with your observation, the one you made just now? So what if the Pristina Corps exists? And even if secretariats of internal affairs exist and the police force exists. Of course the police force exists. What then? What are you trying to say? What's it all about? The Pristina Corps does exist. The police force does exist. So what?

A. Among other components of the chain of command, the Pristina Corps is a regular -- makes regular appearances in documentation such as orders, orders concerning activities in Kosovo. It also issues orders, and such orders are provided in some of the references in my report. ¹⁰⁰⁶¹ Similarly, the MUP staff in Kosovo appears in operational-related documentation including one we saw of the -- or the MUP in general appears in the Joint Command's documentation.

The fact that these organisations, these structures at these two levels, both of which, the MUP staff and the Pristina Corps, have areas of responsibility matching the boundaries in Kosovo, the fact that these two organisations are appearing in such documentation, operational orders included, shows that the scope of the operations in Kosovo involved those two levels of command. And to involve those two levels of command in joint operations, or in operations conducted individually by the VJ and the MUP - but in this case we're discussing a common plan - requires that those operations, those joint operations, be coordinated, and coordination has to come at a high level for those units or command structures at those two levels.

Q. Very well, Mr. Coo. I hope you followed the testimony here of General Sir Peter de la Billiere. Yes or no.

A. Yes, I did, Your Honours.

Q. Well, do you remember, then, that he indicated the importance of mutual cooperation in the field between the military authorities, the civilian authorities, the police, in this case, and he mentioned that in a positive sense, said that that kind of cooperation was indispensable. A representative of the federal government, the government of Serbia, the whole government of the province of Kosovo itself in which, by the way, the Serbs were a minority and was composed of all the ethnic groups, the police, the army, and what you call a Joint Command, in fact represents ¹⁰⁰⁶² their mutual cooperation and communication amongst themselves and no kind of command within a chain of command.

And to refresh your memory, let me remind you with respect to that assertion that you yourself, I think in paragraph 18, in fact, talk about this when you refer to their coordination. And you say that this command responsibility did not replace the responsibility and authorisation within the chain of command of the army and the Ministry of the Interior. Is that right or is it not?

A. Your Honours, there's a lot to comment on in that. I can begin with I do recall General Sir Peter de la Billiere commenting that -- specifically he used the term, if I my recollection is correct, "coordination" rather than "cooperation" is important between armed organisations. In the VJ doctrine, coordination and cooperation are distinguished by, one, having a command -- involving a command relationship, and that is coordination.

The existence, the comment in paragraph 18, I don't recall where in the report, but referring to the Joint Command not supplanting the internal chains of command of the VJ and the MUP, is consistent with the remainder of my report and I think with General de la Billiere's testimony, but that comment refers to the fact that, from my review of what documentation relates to the joint command, it had a coordination role. It also had executive authority because, as I've mentioned, it issued commands which the VJ was bound to abide by, as one document, again in my report, a 1998 125th Brigade document refers to -- orders its sub-units to abide by a Joint Command order. There are other references ¹⁰⁰⁶³ to Joint Command orders and, therefore, executive authority. But in the case of the MUP and the VJ retaining their internal chains of command, I think that's only common sense. It doesn't mean that those chains of command operated independently of one another. It means that the VJ retained its own mechanisms for reporting along its chain of command to its various commanders at the various levels, all the way up, as did the MUP. The Joint Command brought these two chains of commands together and was responsible for ensuring that they operated in conjunction with one another in a coordinated fashion.

Q. Well, that's precisely what I'm talking about. It is not in the chain of command, it is a form of coordination of civilian, police, and other authorities which, within that coordination, cannot step outside the framework of their own competencies within the frame of their own chain of command. All they can do is exchange information and coordinate, dovetail their activities in order to avoid any unfortunate events taking place, such as being killed by their own crossfire, et cetera. But they nonetheless remain within their own foreseen chains of command. Is that clear or is it not?

And I quoted the passage from your report in order to assert that particular viewpoint, because you, too, you yourself found, even if this was done in a fairly amateurish way, that they did retain their own internal chains of command. Is that so, Mr. Coo?

A. They did, as I said, retain their own internal chains of command and means of functioning, but they --

Q. All right. Let's not -- ¹⁰⁰⁶⁴

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish. You put a long question to him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He's just repeating what he's already stated, Mr. May, and you're clipping my time.

JUDGE MAY: Let him finish. You repeat often enough. Yes.

THE WITNESS: Those two chains of command were quite clearly integrated in some fashion with the Joint Command, and the Joint Command, as I said, had executive authority and it was acting on, or it had links -- it certainly had links to the Supreme Command.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you have any order by the Joint Command that was signed? Is there a commander of this Joint Command? If there is a command, then you must have a commander of that command. So did you come across any document at all which would indicate that this was not a form of cooperation and coordination but that it was in fact the issuance of an order signed by a commander of a Joint Command and, therefore, the existence of a commander of such a Joint Command? Did you ever come across anything like that?

A. I haven't seen an order signed by a commander of the Joint Command, but that doesn't mean they don't exist. What I have seen is documentation referring to orders issued by the Joint Command. And two that I can recollect are one document from the Supreme Command that was mentioned at -- that was exhibited, I think, at the end of this morning, during the state of war, had at the top the word "link" and a reference to a Joint Command order issued shortly before that Supreme Command order. ¹⁰⁰⁶⁵ Also, again I mentioned this minutes ago, in 1998, July - and this is in my document where I cover the joint command - the 125th Brigade of the VJ ordered its sub-units not to act without the order of the Joint Command. And that, to me, shows executive authority over operations of the VJ and the MUP by the Joint Command.

Q. Quite the contrary. What I'm doing and what -- and I precisely consider that because you are not competent to make these assessments, that you were drawing the wrong conclusions from papers which are fairly correct. Let me just find the order that you have just highlighted. Mr. Nice said he has some new pages. I have a new set of documents where that is to be found. Just one moment. Let me just find it.

JUDGE MAY: Maybe it's 245.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I found it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As you can see, the head of staff of the Supreme Command refers to the commander of the 3rd Army and not any kind of Joint Command. And he is --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have it. We can't go on without the witness having it and the Court having it. Wait a moment. Exhibit 323, I think he must have in mind.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't see the number 323, but it is K022-8659. That is the number of the page. K022-8659.

JUDGE KWON: If you could read the title of the document.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At the top it says, "The staff of the Supreme Command, the Sector for Operational Staff Matters, the ¹⁰⁰⁶⁶ Operational Department," and then 17th of April, 1999 is the command post. And it says, "To the command of the 3rd Army, to the commander in person."

JUDGE KWON: I think it's Prosecution Exhibit 323, tab 3. Right. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, is it clear to you, Mr. Coo, that the staff of the Supreme Command communicates down the vertical line towards a step -- one step lower down? That is to say, the command of the 3rd Army or, rather, it communicates with the commander of the 3rd Army and not with any imaginary commander who doesn't exist, some imaginary Joint Command commander. Now, is it logical to you that the head of staff of the Supreme Command relates to the most superior officer in the area in that terrain and not somebody who is not the most senior? So he is looking at the vertical chain of command and is addressing himself to the commander of the 3rd army. So is it clear to you that this precisely confirms that what they call Joint Command in fact represents a form of coordination and not commanding in the chain of command? Had it been the command within the chain of command, then the head of staff of the Supreme Command would probably have written an objection and remark, the type that is expressed in this letter, and he would have addressed it to the commander of a Joint Command. But as in the absence of that, as that person does not exist, he couldn't have sent a letter in that way but what he is doing is referring himself to his most superior, that is to say, the commander. When I say that, I mean the Supreme Commander who is the superior officer, most superior officer up the next step in the chain of command. Is that clear ¹⁰⁰⁶⁷ to you?

And what he is doing is he is suggesting --

JUDGE MAY: No. We're going to have a question after this. You've been going for two minutes without any form of question. I'm going to interrupt you. It's the witness giving evidence, not you. Mr. Coo, what is suggested so far is that this shows a vertical chain of command. Do you agree with that assessment or not?

THE WITNESS: Your Honours, this does show the exercise of the VJ's vertical chain of command. On top of that, or in addition to that, it shows the relationship between the VJ's vertical chain of command and the entity known as the Joint Command. And as I stressed, the reference is to a Joint Command order and orders are executive documents. And the VJ Manual on Command and Control and my own military experience, it's evident that orders are executive documents, and I can only conclude on the basis of that information that the Joint Command issued an executive document. And I -- I interpret this communication from the Supreme Command Staff to the 3rd Army command as having a basis in something that the 3rd Army had provided to -- or something that the Joint Command had provided to the 3rd Army, or some reaction on the part of the 3rd Army to the Joint Command. And that reaction seems to have been a plan. And this, to me, looks like the Supreme Command commenting on offering its views on the 3rd Army's plan and making some recommendations on adjustments to that plan. But I think, in the end, it shows a link between the Joint Command, the Supreme Command Staff, and the 3rd Army, with some executive authority at specific levels in that link. ¹⁰⁰⁶⁸

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Coo, is it clear that this is crystal clear communication between the Supreme Command and the next level down, that is to say, the command of the 3rd Army?

A. Yes, it is, on the basis of a Joint Command document.

Q. Not on the basis of but related to some conclusion that can be called an order mistakenly here. However, since you have the opportunity of getting all documents from the current authorities, why don't you look at that too? Then you will see that this is no executive order, this is a form of coordination. Why did you not ask to have a look at those documents? Because here, this is obviously some kind of activity that is supposed to destroy some forces that are under blockade, and it says here such a deployment of forces that are under blockade it is hard to achieve, et cetera, et cetera, and then there is also an objection to the fact that the forces are under blockade, and this has nothing to do whatsoever with an executive order, because an executive order can go from the Supreme Command to the command of the army to the command of the corps, and so on and so forth, and further down the vertical line, which was not disrupted anywhere. Did you see anywhere - you've had a look at so many documents - that the chain of command was disrupted anywhere?

A. Your Honours, I've seen no evidence of disruption of the chains of command I've described in the report. I -- I think the cover --

Q. All right. Let's go on, in order to save time.

A. I think I should finish my answer, Your Honour, with a statement to the effect of from the documentation that I reviewed, the Joint Command ¹⁰⁰⁶⁹ had a coordination role. "Coordination" in VJ doctrine has command implications. Furthermore, to become involved in the types of things that the Joint Command was involved in - VJ and MUP operations - and to issue the types of documents that it was issuing, namely orders, among others, it would have to have a degree of authority, and my assessment is it would have some degree of command authority, and I've shown its relationship in the report to the Supreme Command.

Q. All right. That is your assumption. But it would be very useful if you would have at least one document, one order, that would confirm that assumption of yours.

As for coordination, you heard from General de la Billiere what it means and how useful and necessary it is to have coordination between civilian authorities and also the military and police authorities in a given area. That is to say, all authorities in a given area. Did you bear in mind, when making this analysis, that the entire functioning that refers to coordination, orders, operations, that it is all linked to the obligation of the army of Yugoslavia and the police, that is to say the armed forces, and you have read the constitution, with their constitutional obligation and duty to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence of the country, as the armed forces in any other country would, and that this was a case of mass terrorism and, at the same time, an aggression launched by NATO against the territory of the entire country? Did you bear that in mind when presenting this view of yours? Did you bear in mind these circumstances which I also believe are quite relevant, Mr. Coo? ¹⁰⁰⁷⁰

A. In very general terms, that was not within the scope of my report. In one of my conclusions or one of my sections with -- entitled "Conclusions," I stated that in relation to the subordination issue of VJ to MUP that perhaps the vigour with which the VJ seemed to be pursuing subordination of the MUP to the VJ in a different manner in which it existed already, that perhaps the VJ was doing that because of the NATO threat, and the reason why the VJ would want the subordination adjusted is perhaps because the tempo of operations and the scope of operations with a NATO ground attack would change significantly and the VJ wanted greater control over MUP units in combat operations. That was by no means a statement that the VJ-MUP relationship was an independent one and that there wasn't a command relationship.

Q. All right. But if we are going to dwell on that, I should think that you do assume that this resubordination in the zone of combat operations does not mean resubordinating the Ministry of the Interior to the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia. Some authorities and units during a certain combat assignment, combat task, in the zone of combat operations are resubordinated to military commanders precisely in order to avoid accidents or mistakes or any deviation from the single effort to react to terrorist forces and so on. So there is a series of activities undertaken by the Ministry of the Interior that has nothing to do with the military, and there are so many things that are done by the military that have nothing to do with the police. And in this case, the police forces are resubordinated to the military commanders in the zone of combat operations while combat operations are taking place. ¹⁰⁰⁷¹

JUDGE MAY: You can't go on in this way. Now, what is the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Is that logical, Mr. Coo?

A. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, according to the legislation and doctrine, would not be in its entirety subordinated to the VJ. Subordination, as outlined in Article 17 of the law on defence, is for combat operations. But you should also look at that in relation to, as the preceding Article, Article 16, which states that the VJ -- and I can't remember the exact wording but it's along the lines of the VJ unifies all armed organisations in defence of the country. And an element of that, at least one element, or more, in fact, are presented in my report in relation to the local defence concept, the imposition of VJ command over local defence during a state of war. And that came out of a Pec military sector document from 30 March 1999.

So in short, no, there isn't a blanket subordination of internal affairs to the VJ. But I would suggest that, with respect, the two articles in particular of the law on defence are looked at on the subject of subordination.

Q. Well, that's precisely what I've been indicating, Mr. Coo. I think that at least that has been made clear now. Tell me, please, among the documents that you examined, did you have the directive for the engagement of the army of Yugoslavia in defence from NATO aggression which I assume that you, as a military expert of that side across the well, would have to have had, because I got that directive ¹⁰⁰⁷² from them. "Directive for the Engagement of the Army of Yugoslavia on Defence from NATO Aggression" which contains 12 pages and which was sent on the 9th of April, 1999, to the commands of the strategic groups. Did you also study that directive as another very important document, because the Supreme Command addresses the strategic groups through a directive, that is to say the armies, the air force, the anti-aircraft defence, the navy, and gives them combat tasks. Did you study that directive?

A. I think I've seen that directive. It sounds very familiar. I think it was in a batch of documents given to us recently. I did not choose to comment on it or include it in my report because I don't think it falls within the scope of the report.

Q. All right. Explain the following to me: Mr. Coo, what is the logic? I'm looking at this list now, this list of documents that were given to General Sir Peter de la Billiere, and then it says pre-trial brief, number 1. First document, the main document, that is to say the indictment. Then instructions to the 4th Corps command, and so on and so forth. And then attack order, brigades, then an analysis of combat operations, of combat groups, that is to say, a few of these lower-ranking orders. And then the Yugoslav law on the army of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav law on defence. The army of Yugoslavia, the command control manual, and so on.

How, then -- on the basis of what did you conclude that it was more important to give such documents rather than this document which is called the Directive of the Supreme Command and that contains a great deal ¹⁰⁰⁷³ of information for drawing conclusions concerning matters that you would like to draw conclusions on?

A. If I'm thinking of the same 9th of April document, it wasn't available at the time that General de la Billiere wrote his report. As to having given it to him for -- during his testimony, that wouldn't be my decision, that would be the decision of the legal people.

MR. NICE: We have the document available if the Chamber wants it to be produced, or if the accused does.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My question is different. Who decided that the Directive of the Supreme Command - how should I put this? - be selected in such a way that it does not belong to the things that you do analyse, whereas these other things that are of far lesser importance are considered to be relevant and significant? You say that you were not the one who decided about that. Who did?

A. Again, this document came to us after my report was written and submitted.

JUDGE MAY: Since we haven't heard about it before, perhaps you could just briefly introduce it, Mr. Coo.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I explain the position? These were documents that arrived very recently, translated extremely recently. This was one of a number that were provided to the accused post haste, as I said the other day, under Rule 68.

JUDGE MAY: Since it's been referred to, let's deal with it now and we can have it exhibited. Yes. ¹⁰⁰⁷⁴

THE WITNESS: Your Honours, looking at this, it's -- again it's issued by the Supreme Command Staff on the 9th of April to, and that section is not filled in. I can't say why. Perhaps this copy wasn't --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. No. My question is not who issued it and when. That is all written on the document itself. It's not necessary to --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment, Mr. Milosevic. You have introduced this document. It's right, if you want us to consider it, that we should look at it, and I asked the witness -- I have asked the witness to introduce it briefly. That is all he's doing.

Yes, Mr. Coo.

THE WITNESS: If I go to the last page of the document to see who it was addressed to, it shows that it was addressed to the three armies within the VJ and the air defence forces. And I don't know what "RM Command" is.

The contents of the document, in a quick review, seems to -- it seems to be -- it's a directive for how the addressees should engage themselves in general terms against the expected threat, and part of that threat is NATO. And they list in -- I think they're listing, in sub-heading 2, aggression against the FRY, what precisely what that aggression is comprised of.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We will give it the next Prosecution exhibit number so they can stay together.

THE REGISTRAR: This will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 324.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ¹⁰⁰⁷⁵

Q. My question was not who the document was addressed to, because that's what is written on it. It's addressed to the strategic groups. And this "RM" that you do not know what it means, means the navy, "Ratna Mornarica." So it was sent to the air force and to the army and also to the navy. So it is also addressed to the three armies. If do you not know, Mr. Coo, these three armies and the navy and the air force are strategic groups within the army of Yugoslavia, and the Supreme Command gives them tasks through this directive. After all, that's what we discussed with General de la Billiere.

My question was why such an important document, why such an important document was not given to your military expert, General de la Billiere, in order for him to have a look at it?

JUDGE MAY: He's given an answer. He's answered the question. He said it wasn't available.

Now, we'll adjourn now because it's the time, and resume tomorrow morning, 9.00.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 11th day of

September, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.