¹⁰⁰⁷⁶

Wednesday, 11 September 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, before I continue, I should like to make a procedural demand, a point of order, in fact.

JUDGE MAY: Is there any reason why we can't deal with it after we've finished with the witness or does it relate to the present evidence? We will be, at the end of the witnesses evidence and before we finish today, we will be dealing with administrative matters. Is there any reason we shouldn't deal with it then?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but what I have to say relates to -- that is to say, the point of order, Mr. May, relates to the interview that Mr. Wladimiroff had, one of the friends of the Court --

JUDGE MAY: That doesn't relate to this witness. Let us finish the witness's evidence and then we can deal with these other matters.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. That means that I'll be able to make the point of order and present my request after this witness; is that it?

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, you can deal with that during the administrative matters.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Fine, Mr. May.

WITNESS: PHILIP COO [Resumed] ¹⁰⁰⁷⁷ Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Coo, in my notes, I have jotted down that in answer to my questions, that is my question of whether you studied the activities of the KLA terrorist organisation, that you said that you didn't -- that was not one of your duties. So could you please tell me who defined your duty and assignment.

A. Your Honours, the general guidance I received for my report I received from the Prosecution legal team.

Q. And did it ever occur to you yourself that for an analysis into the conduct of the armed forces of Yugoslavia in Kosovo and Metohija, that it would be -- that you wouldn't be able to sidestep looking into the question of terrorism, you would have to look into that as well? So what I'm asking you in fact is how you were able to exclude that entire matter from your analysis.

A. I think all I can say is that the guidance I received and the scope of the report did not require that sort of analysis.

Q. All right. That means that the Prosecution instructed you not to deal in that subject matter; is that right?

A. Not specifically. It wasn't included in the guidance I was provided.

Q. Well, as it's the 11th of September today, there will be a lot of talk about terrorism. Do you consider it significant that under this roof stands should be made and something said about that same form of terrorism in Serbia?

JUDGE MAY: It's not for the witness what's appropriate. All he ¹⁰⁰⁷⁸ can do is talk about his evidence. You can ask him about his instructions, of course, but it's not for him to say what's appropriate and what isn't.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I've just received an answer as to the guidelines that the witness received, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You analysed, read, and indeed presented here a number of orders and reports from the field by the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs; is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Now, did you happen to note that all the orders, reports relate to terrorism and the aggression of the NATO pact? Is that correct?

A. I don't recall if all of them did, but certainly some contained that sort of content.

Q. All right. As the reports and orders refer to terrorism and aggression, NATO aggression, and as we're mentioning some sort of plan here, as a military analyst, did you conclude that in fact it was us who planned this NATO pact aggression and Albanian terrorism?

A. I'm sorry, Your Honours, I --

JUDGE MAY: Do you want the question clarified?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: Could you clarify the question, Mr. Milosevic? It's not clear what you mean.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Since the orders and the reports that were the subject here of ¹⁰⁰⁷⁹ analysis, the analysis -- analysis by your military analyst, and as they refer to the NATO pact aggression and to terrorism, and as the opposing party over there is trying to link it up with some sort of plan - that's their conduct - my question is the following: Does that mean that we are ourselves planned the NATO aggression and Albanian terrorism? Because that's the only explanation that you would arrive at if you were to join up those two elements. So yes or no.

A. That's not something I looked at, Your Honours, in the documents I reviewed.

Q. All right. If you consider that to be an answer, then we can move on.

Now, did you compare the doctrine of defence of Yugoslavia with the defence doctrines of other countries?

A. No, I didn't.

Q. All right. And as you did study the constitution and laws of Yugoslavia, what was not contained in the constitution and legal acts and provisions of Yugoslavia? What is it that was not in conformity with the legal acts and documents of other modern states in the realm of the country's defence? Did you come across anything that was not in keeping with the usual relationship that a country has towards its own defence and the defence of its own territory?

A. Nothing in the documents I reviewed suggested that.

Q. And in addition to the documents that you were able to look through, did you bear in mind the situation and circumstances in which our country found itself and all its citizens throughout the territory of ¹⁰⁰⁸⁰ Yugoslavia during the NATO aggression and the terrorist activities of the KLA in Kosovo and Metohija and other pressures as well that were brought to bear against Yugoslavia? Did you bear all that in mind as well as a military analyst?

A. I did have some knowledge of what was occurring in Yugoslavia in 1999 and 1998, but I should emphasise that the scope of my report was to outline the structures of the armed organisations and to examine their means of command and how that was implemented.

Q. Very well. As you say, you studied the methods of command, et cetera, means of command. How do you envisage the relationship of subordination to a strategic and operative level in a given situation in the kind of specific situation that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was faced with, faced with the NATO pact aggression and terrorism in Kosovo?

A. I'm not sure if I understand the question fully, but the nature of subordination in the VJ and the other armed organisations is quite clear and it's laid out in the report. There are clear chains of command and those are provided.

Q. All right. In the testimony of General Sir Peter de la Billiere, which had as its groundwork and foundation the documents that you yourself presented, and in this particular case, he put forward his professional opinion as a military expert, and he said that it was advisable and that in the relations of subordination it was customary, indeed, that the command at any level should have knowledge about what is happening and going on two levels below it. That is what he said, if you remember.

A. Yes, I do remember that. ¹⁰⁰⁸¹

Q. So the Supreme Command, by the same token in our particular case, should have had knowledge and information according to the standards put forward by General Sir Peter de la Billiere about what was going on at the army level and at the corps level. So those two levels, two steps below the Supreme Command.

Now, do you yourself have any knowledge about any irregularities in the work of any of those two levels on the basis of the information that you received; orders, reports, documents, or anything else?

A. I haven't seen any specifics regarding irregularities, but I wasn't asked to cover in detail the operations conducted by those organisations at our indictment sites.

Q. Well, all right, then, but I can't understand what you're talking about, then, what you're testifying about. Are you just testifying to the fact that the constitution laws, orders and so on are the documents that you presented here? Is that just it? But you drew conclusions from that. So now I'm asking you quite specifically your view. Did you come across any irregularities at those levels? Or let's go further down from those levels. Not only army, corps, and so on, but brigade. What about the brigade level? Did you note any irregularities on that score?

A. Within the scope of the report, the comments, conclusions, or assessments in my recollection were confined to the documentation concerning the structures and the systems of commanding the organisations. Irregularities concerning what actually happened on the ground were not within the general scope of the report. Where I came across information related to some of our indictment sites, that was put into the report, and ¹⁰⁰⁸² no conclusions were drawn from that by me on whether or not a crime was committed.

The closest, I think, I came to commenting or concluding on anything that might be an irregularity was on the contents of a MUP report from 1998 where they -- it was an operations order where they specified that the attack should make use of Chinese ammunition, which, to me, seemed strange, specifying the ammunition by origin in an operations order.

The only other area where I may have come close to an irregularity comment concerned the -- was in essence a comparison between what I had presented as the disciplinary system in Part I and what I had seen in documentation regarding the promotions and commendations awarded to various people who had disciplinary responsibility.

Q. Well, all right. But didn't we clear that matter up yesterday? Do you -- are you saying that the people who were punished and disciplined were promoted? Is that what you're saying? Or are you saying that the ones who prosecuted them and brought them to task - and there are many examples of these disciplinary measures being taken - should not have been promoted and that they should have been punished, too, in turn? Is that what you're saying?

A. I pointed out in the report that there are examples of disciplinary measures being taken. I noted that the disciplinary measures taken, at least those I was aware of, were -- did not include command responsibility cases. I also noted alongside that the fact that, or the point that all -- if not all, most key positions in the chains of command ¹⁰⁰⁸³ of the MUP and the VJ were promoted and/or retained after the war. And there's no information available to me to show any investigation or disciplinary action into their responsibilities or any connection they may have had to events on the ground.

Q. All right, Mr. Coo. Is anything illogical there to your mind? You say that you know that there were a number, in my opinion a large number, of individuals for which disciplinary action was taken, and these were cases of the individual committance of criminal acts. Are you saying that some of the commanders at a higher level, some of the higher-up commanders, perhaps perpetrated a crime and then disciplinary action and the necessary measures were not taken against him? Do you have any documents on the basis of which you claim that, or any knowledge to that effect?

A. What I did say in the report was that on the basis of the indictment, the scope and the scale of the crimes, I would expect, again based on the regulations and the laws outlined in Part I, that as a minimum, some disciplinary-related activity and investigation would have taken place with regard to command responsibility.

Q. Well, how do you know that investigations were not launched and that the persons who committed crimes were in fact punished or held accountable and the process for this launched and that there is no responsibility for the commander that indicated, pointed out these crimes and these individual cases and brought them under the long arm of the law and the rules and provisions, as a military analyst? If he did so, did he in fact conduct himself professionally, in keeping with his professional ¹⁰⁰⁸⁴ ethics, if he took those steps? Or perhaps you think he didn't.

A. The only thing that I can say is that the documentation I saw provided no information on disciplinary or investigations taking place in relation to those in key command positions. And specifically, the book issued by the Vojska publishing house -- the VJ's publishing house, Vojska, in 2001 which reviewed how the VJ conducted itself with regard to humanitarian law and the international law of war did not provide any examples of such investigations or disciplinary measures, and I would have expected to see such things highlighted in that type of book.

Q. And how is it possible there was no investigation on the application of measures if you yourself state that a number of people were prosecuted for individual crimes that they committed? How can you then draw the conclusion that there were no investigations, that there was no application of measures if that was what happened? Your conclusion must have been quite the opposite, because all this leads to the fact that such measures were taken if a certain number of people were held accountable and if processes and disciplinary action against them was undertaken. Isn't that so, Mr. Coo?

A. Some investigations were conducted. None, to my knowledge, related to command responsibility, and very few with any connection to violations of the laws of war. A lot of the investigations and disciplinary measures taken and covered in the documents I present in the report relate to common crimes.

Q. Of course there are some like that, unintentional ones, but a crime is a crime. There were intentional and unintentional ones that were ^{10085 BLANK PAGE 10086} prosecuted. But let's move on from here.

You are testifying against me. Now, you looked at a variety of documents. As you put it yourself, you looked at that paper that this other side calls the indictment. In it, it says that I committed crimes by way of ordering, commanding, controlling, instructing, et cetera, et cetera, not to enumerate all of that.

With the assistance of this entire apparatus and all the archives that were put at your disposal, did you find a single order, command, instruction? Not only mine but any commander's which contained an order to commit a crime? Did you find any such thing or did you not find any such thing? Do you have something like that or do you not have something like that?

A. Your Honours, I did not come across any such documents.

Q. All right. Tell me, now, since we did not quite clarify matters yesterday with regard to the directive of the Supreme Command, you explained that you did not give it to General de la Billiere because it came in at a later stage, but I assume that at least you read it yourself. Is that right or is that not right?

A. I did read it, yes.

Q. Did you notice that, as opposed to many directives of Supreme Commands of various armies in the world, this particular directive of the Supreme Command contains provisions that pertain to humanitarian law? I would like to remind you that on page 8 of this directive, in chapter 5, Combat Operations, et cetera, it says, and I quote: "Vis-a-vis the enemy, prisoners and the wounded, one should apply treatment in accordance with ¹⁰⁰⁸⁷ the Geneva Conventions according to international humanitarian law and the law of war which is deeply embedded in our national ethos of heroism and fairness."

It is well known that in the Serb tradition it is the greatest possible shame to shoot at a prisoner of war, a civilian, namely a person who is unarmed. And here in the -- in the order issued by the Supreme Command, that obligation is pointed out. Did you have the opportunity of becoming aware of that?

A. I was aware of that passage. I didn't choose to use that report because I have considered very similar reports with similar information, similar references, in my report.

All that I can say with regard to that is that there are three aspects, in my mind, to discipline. And one is -- concerns the issue of orders, which I've pointed out in my report was done, reminding people to abide by the regulations.

The second is that there has to be recognition by those in the chain of command of the regulations, and I've pointed out that there was -- rather than recognition, I should rephrase that and say awareness. There did appear to be awareness within the chain of command. But third is that they have to act in accordance with the regulations. And I pointed out that within the narrow constraints of my expertise and scope of the report, there's at least some elements in the documentation to suggest that acting in accordance with the regulations may not have occurred, and that's in relation to the -- the lack of command responsibility, disciplinary cases. ¹⁰⁰⁸⁸

Q. All right. Can you point out these documents that suggest that at the level of some command, and which level of command that would be, that somebody did not abide by these rules? Do you have any such document that could indicate what you've just been saying?

A. I'm not referring to a specific document. I'm referring to my review of a collection of documents and the linking of them. That collection included the 2001 book issued by Vojska showing the number of orders and instructions relating to adherence to the laws of war. Some documents - for example, one from the 52nd artillery, air defence and artillery brigade in Djakovica - relating to some what I considered minor disciplinary measures taken against soldiers, the review of disciplinary measures in that 2001 book and a comparison of that with the absence command responsibility measures and the promotion of those in key command responsibility positions.

Q. All right. Tell me, in addition to this directive that you read, you say, did you read and at the same time did you show General de la Billiere, as the military expert, for example, this order dated the 28th of June, 1998, in which it says that in case of taking some terrorists prisoner, they should be treated in accordance with international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions? That means that in 1998, when there was no war yet and when, in accordance with international law, terrorists do not fall under any Geneva Conventions, we treated them in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Did you bear in mind that order, for example? And did you give that order to General de la Billiere as well? ¹⁰⁰⁸⁹

A. If I remember correctly, that order was a Supreme Command or a General Staff order or instruction. I think it was reissued by the Joint Command in 1998. I can't remember if I did show it to General de la Billiere, but I'm fairly sure that I did. I'd have to double-check that against the list we reviewed yesterday.

But in any event, I just have to reiterate that such an order and similar orders were issued and reviewed in my report. They were issued throughout 1998 and 1999. And I just have to re-emphasise that. There's the aspect of issuing such orders and the other consideration of whether or not they were followed through.

Q. Well, since many people were accused and prosecuted, the assumption is that this was abided by. Isn't that logical, Mr. Coo?

A. No, I don't think you can conclude that, Your Honours.

Q. Oh. So there are orders and there are individuals who were criminally prosecuted. The orders relate to criminal liability. There are those who are held criminally liable, but the conclusion is not that orders were abided by but they were not abided by. So that's your logic. Did you, for example, read the order of the 3rd of April, 1999? And it's number 06692/1, and it says the perpetrators of crime should immediately be brought before a court. Did you bear in mind that order, for example?

A. I don't recall that one specifically. I may have read it. It doesn't sound any different from a large number of similar orders that I read.

Q. All right. I have quite a list of orders here, and I'm not going ¹⁰⁰⁹⁰ to present all of that now because I don't want to spend time doing that. However, it is obvious that everything that you read is in accordance with what I have been quoting. Namely, it is not clear to me how -- well, actually I didn't find this clear even in the explanations that you gave to General de la Billiere and the quotations you gave: How do you link up the functioning of courts of law with command responsibility? This linkage is not clear to me. How did you establish that?

A. I don't think I specifically attempt such a linkage in my report. I can say that commanders, in accordance with the regulations, are responsible for acting on information that suggests that a crime had been committed. Ultimately, those may end up in the military courts or war courts.

Q. Yes. But for example, awhile ago I quoted an order to you in which it says perpetrators of crimes should be brought before the investigative judge of the military court in charge. Do you think that if a military commander establishes within his own unit that somebody had committed a crime, and when somebody arrests that kind of person and hands him over to the investigative judge of the military court in charge, that he finished his task, that it is not for him to deal in the court proceedings that will follow, et cetera? The court proceedings are independent of the chain of command, and the commander cannot follow the court proceedings if he finished his part of the job. He arrested the perpetrator of a crime, handed him over to the investigative judge of the military court in charge. Do you think that it's really his responsibility to further take care of how the military court is going to ¹⁰⁰⁹¹ act? And anyway, what kind of powers can he have over the military court? And what kind of chain of command can have any kind of authority over a military court of law, or any court of law, for that matter? How can you hold accountable in that sense any commander of a company, of a battalion, of a brigade, et cetera, if he actually took care of his part of the duty involved?

JUDGE MAY: Can you answer that, Mr. Coo?

THE WITNESS: I think I can, Your Honour. The scope of my report was not to conclude whether or not proper command responsibility action was taken. That has to be -- the remainder of the evidence presented in this case has to be taken into consideration. But command responsibility does not end at the handing over of a soldier under investigation or the charging after a soldier has been charged and brought before a court. Command responsibility may, if -- if the information is available or if activities support this, may be -- command responsibility can be brought into -- into play if there's reason to believe that the crimes committed were extensive enough or in some way had -- or relate to the responsibilities of a commander. The -- I think I referred directly to this passage in my report yesterday where it states in the regulations that the commander bears responsibility for failing to investigate, for failing to take action if the scale or the scope of the criminal acts are such that they suggest complicity at the command level. So the bringing before a war court or a military court of a single soldier is, in some cases, sufficient. But in other cases, and such a case might be if widespread crimes are being committed by a unit, there's ¹⁰⁰⁹² suggestion that the commander has in some way either lost control or connived with what those subordinates of his are doing.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. That is quite logical, what you've just said, Mr. Coo, but do you have any knowledge whatsoever from the documents that you reviewed that a unit committed, as you had put it here - I can't remember your expect words now - extensive crimes, systematic, et cetera, was out of control, and so on and so forth? Do you have any kind of knowledge to that effect about any particular unit, or any evidence that some unit, a unit in an organised way and under control committed some crimes, and under a command, on orders, that is, as a unit?

A. I don't feel, Your Honours, that that was a conclusion that my expertise or the scope of my report allowed me to reach. Specifically, I did not see any orders to that effect.

Q. All right. And do you have at least any information, then, to the effect that members of the military and the MUP did not obey their superiors or their equals, their peers, or their subordinates and then they committed crimes and then somebody did not hold them accountable because of that? Do you have any specific information about this?

A. All I can say is that the latter part of that, the holding accountable, I point out again that there is in the indictment a -- allegations that a large number of crimes on a widespread basis were committed. And I contrast that in my report with the lack or the absence of command responsibility disciplinary measures. The final conclusion is not mine to make. ¹⁰⁰⁹³

Q. Yes, on the condition that what the indictment says is true; right? That is to say that the military and the police committed crimes, and that is what the indictment says. So on the condition that that is true, then it would be the way you've just put it. Is that right, Mr. Coo?

A. Your Honour, I have to -- I had to operate on the basis of the allegations in the indictment being largely correct.

Q. Well, there we are. That is the point; that you are proving the indictment by giving allegations from the indictment. It's called perpetuum mobile otherwise, everywhere else except here, I guess.

JUDGE MAY: That's not a question, Mr. Milosevic. Now, have you got a question for the witness? That's all comment,

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course I do, Mr. May. Of course I have questions. Well, after all, you do recall -- we're of a similar age, we probably read similar books. You remember the story of Baron Munchausen who got himself and his horse out of the mud by pulling his own hair.

JUDGE MAY: We're not going into the baron now. Let's get on with the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Coo, since I see that you have been following public appearances, et cetera, et cetera, the members of the military and the police - officers, that is - when they appeared in public, notably when they spoke in the media, did they talk against the Albanian people or did they always express an unreserved loyalty to the basic principles of the ¹⁰⁰⁹⁴ military and the MUP towards confidence-building and the protection of all citizens? Did you see in any individual case a phenomenon of this kind of discrimination, an unfair attitude that would be shown through any statement made, anything that you read that came into your hands as a military analyst?

A. I don't recall specifics. The example I put into the report concerns - and I think we touched on this yesterday - concerns a statement, in fact a letter written by General Pavkovic, the 3rd Army commander in 1999, written by him in 1998 to his superiors. And I pointed out that that, in my opinion, showed some of his -- to some degree his mind-set. And to me, that wasn't a completely professional mind-set. It didn't seem to be concerned with what I would expect a military officer to be concerned with.

Q. I haven't got the letter here now and I don't really have time to delve into that, but it is highly doubtful that he did not abide by his professional and moral stand. He probably did. It's probably a question of some kind of misinterpretation.

But tell me something else: Did you ever hear from any official of Yugoslavia, including myself? Did you hear that I said something in public? Is there any document that shows that I would be against the Albanian people or did I ever speak against them, or in the chain of command did anybody ever decide to take action which is not in line with the principles that are incorporated in these documents? Do you have any knowledge about any such thing?

A. All I can say is in my general background reading and including ^{10095 BLANK PAGE 10096} the reading of witness statements, but I can't comment on other witness statements.

Q. Well, when we make a sociological analysis of the witnesses that we are going to see, that they include terrorists, murderers, criminals, employees of this institution, and representatives of NATO. I don't know whether there's any other category involved.

Tell me, now, for example, the 52nd Corps, section 1 of your opinion. That is II A, 1/13. You mentioned the composition of the unit concerned. Tell me one thing only; where did you take the names from? Do you notice anything illogical in the names?

You write here that the names of brigades are the mechanised and infantry brigades. That does not exist in our list. You did not take that -- you could not have taken that, you could not have found that in military doctrine documents or in the combat documents of the 52nd or, rather, the Pristina Corps. Where did you get these names from?

A. I don't know I've found the specific reference in the report, but the documents are -- where I got them from is identified in footnotes. Some of the names of the units, or many of the names of the units in the report are taken directly from orders of the Pristina or the 52nd Corps and other VJ units. Official -- in simple terms, from official documentation. I had to operate on the translation into English, but it's my understanding that the VJ has various types of combat arms units, including mechanised infantry units, motorised infantry units, infantry units, and armoured units.

Q. Mr. Coo, there are no such names in the Yugoslav army, "mechanised ¹⁰⁰⁹⁷ infantry," and "motorised infantry" units. There is no such name. There is a Mechanised Brigade, there is an Infantry Brigade, there is a Motorised Brigade, whereas these compilations do not exist. That's why I ask you where you got these names from, because you could not have found them in our documents. And if you're ascribing that to the translation, then that's the easiest way out, isn't it? So I'm not going to deal with that any longer.

Please, tell me --

JUDGE MAY: Yes, you can certainly answer that, Mr. Coo.

THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I'm looking at page 8 -- Part I, section A, page 8, paragraph 18. The list in paragraph 18 of some units within the Pristina Corps is derived from footnote 31 which mentions the Pristina Corps order of the 20th of April, and that order, or at least the translation of that order and other documents all provide, on a consistent basis, these unit names.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. All right, Mr. Coo. I don't think that's the way it is, but time is too costly, and we really don't want to go into all these details.

In section 4, you talk about the arming of personnel, and you say that, in Kosovo, weapons were given to individuals rather than institutions. Is that right, Mr. Coo?

A. Yes. Based on a 1998 document, I think it's May 1998, and which we covered yesterday, the Pristina organ for defence --

Q. Just say yes or no. We don't have time to go into lengthy ¹⁰⁰⁹⁸ explanations. So what you're suggesting is that the weapons were handed out to individuals and not institutions. Is that right?

A. In some cases, yes.

Q. All right. You quoted here a few documents, and from that we ought to conclude quite the contrary, and that is -- for example, you mention a document, the administration for the defence of Pristina, for example. That is an organ of the federal Defence Ministry and not, as you show it in your diagram, an organ of the army. It is the federal Ministry of Defence that that comes under. And it has its vertical line and writes to the assistant federal minister in charge of the Civil Defence section. And as it is a response to his telex to give an explanation as to what is being required, and he goes on to explain in this document that for the needs of the Civil Defence detachment, he mentions detachments, says that other weapons, not this weaponry, will be exclusively stored in the warehouses of the army for the territory of such-and-such a district in such-and-such a locality, et cetera, and that the means in the warehouses would be organised according to the departments and sections and units and how it will be issued, and so on.

From all this, isn't it clear that the armament, the weapons, were not handed out to individuals ad hoc but that they were in fact sent to institutions? And do you know that up until June 1998, the terrorist forces, to all intents and purposes, were in control of a large part, almost more than half the territory of Kosovo and Metohija? Do you know that?

JUDGE MAY: There are two questions there. The first one you can ¹⁰⁰⁹⁹ deal with, Mr. Coo, is in relation to the weapons being organised according to departments and sections.

THE WITNESS: Your Honours, yes. Weapons were handed out to the Civil Defence departments and sections, and that document demonstrates that. They were handed out under a federal programme. There are two -- at least two documents in my recollection that suggest arming of individuals, one which I alluded to from, I think, May 1998, and it was mentioned yesterday. That discusses what was, at least then, a secret programme and it lists or it mentions that the following groups do not need to be armed in accordance with this instruction because they are armed through their own organisations, and it listed what, to me, was an exhaustive list of all the official armed organisations, federal and republican, leaving the conclusion that - and to my recollection it stated quite emphatically in the document itself - that the arming was of individuals.

Secondly, the letter that General Pavkovic wrote at around that time made reference to his dissatisfaction with the way the arming of the population was being implemented, or for its failure to be -- become fully involved in the conflict.

So those -- at least those two documents demonstrated to me that there was some arming of individuals.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. I'm now going to prove to you, Mr. Coo, the extent to which you looked at these documents in the incompetent manner you did, which is not strange in view of the qualifications. ¹⁰¹⁰⁰ Now do you know that up until June 1998, the terrorist forces practically were in control of most of the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, the largest part of it, at least?

A. I can't say whether -- how much of Kosovo they controlled. I have a general idea that they controlled parts of Kosovo at that time.

Q. All right. Do you know that during that time the mass killings of civilians were prevalent, Serbs, other non-Albanian citizens, but also Albanians too who were peace abiding loyal citizens to the state in which they lived, who did not lend their support to the KLA? Do you know about that? Do you know about this phenomenon, this large-scale phenomenon of killings, let alone the killings of policemen, soldiers and so on? I'm talking about the mass killing of civilians. Do you know about that, with all the kidnappings that went on and all that kind of detail? Do you know about this particular phenomenon?

A. I'm generally aware of killings taking place, but not in the way described.

Q. All right. And do you know this: In view of those events, the -- what was happening, the size of the territory that these hordes were rampant in, that it wasn't possible that all the population threatened could be protected by the police force and that that is why we had to resort to what we call self-organisation of -- and armed protection of settlements, built-up areas, roads, and so on by setting up village watches, patrols, and so on? Do you know about that?

A. That's generally one of my conclusions in the report. I point out that the local defence concept would have taken some of the weight off the ¹⁰¹⁰¹ VJ and the MUP for that responsibility. Not for command.

Q. And now we come to the crux of the question which relates to you yourself, because what you were doing was reading papers, not looking at events. Do you know that it is precisely that possibility, the possibility of a self-organised armed defence, the local defence concept, that that provided -- that that was provided for in the law on defence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? Because you mention having read the law, and that is stipulated in Article 61 of the law, and that along those lines, Yugoslavia in no respect whatsoever found itself in any transgression, transgression of the norms and regulations that prevailed for that particular area and field.

Did you, therefore, read this in the law that you say you have read? Did you happen to read that it provides for that type of local -- of the local defence concept and self-organisation, that that is provided for, in fact, by the law of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? Have you read it or not, Mr. Coo?

A. I have read it, and I state that in my report.

Q. Well, if you've read it, why then in your report is this fact construed in a negative light?

JUDGE MAY: You will have to clarify what you mean by that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, your military expert places in a negative context this notion of self-organisation for the protection of citizens that are exposed to daily terrorist action, killings, kidnappings, et cetera.

JUDGE MAY: You mean that he refers to arming of civilians? Is ¹⁰¹⁰² that what you mean?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, you are using the kind of vocabulary that is found in the indictment. I did not refer to individuals, I was referring to --

JUDGE MAY: You complain that the witness puts it in a negative light. I ask you what you mean by that, to clarify it so the witness can follow. The negative light, as I understand it, is his suggestion that civilians were being armed. Is that right? So we can understand what you're saying.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely that. The negative context. He places it in a negative context.

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... understand what you mean.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all right. If you understand what I mean, then we can move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You're also suggesting --

JUDGE MAY: No. You have to hear what he says about it. You complain it's a negative light. He's entitled to answer.

THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the report, for the most part, lays out, or sets out, or seeks to set out the existence of and the structure and where it fits into the chain of command of armed civilians, armed civilian defence, and other armed groups outside the VJ and the MUP for the purpose of demonstrating that there was more in Kosovo than just the VJ and the MUP and to show where they fit into the chain of command. ¹⁰¹⁰³ The negative connotation, the only one that I can think of is where I make a -- I think it's in the conclusion of the Local Defence part, and I make a comment that -- suggesting that there are risks or dangers inherent in arming one ethnic group and disarming another ethnic group when those ethnic groups are mutually hostile.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you really see village watches in remote villages that are there to protect their own homes from violence, do you really link that up into the chain of command of the army of Yugoslavia? Is that actually what you're claiming, Mr. Coo?

A. In my review of the documents, there are links from local defence into the VJ chain of command. One such example, if I may say, is the 30th of March, 1999 order from the Pec military territorial sector. The order relates to the subordination of, I think it's worded "republican and municipal organs" to the Pec military sector within its area of responsibility. You might recall that the Pec military sector is, I think, shown on the Annex 1 of Part I, section A, as being tied into the VJ chain of command.

Q. All right, Mr. Coo. You said something a moment ago that was even more - how shall I put this? - flagrant; namely, the assertion that it was the Serb population that was armed, whereas the Albanian population was disarmed. What you're in fact doing is suggesting that in Kosovo and Metohija there was a clash between two ethnic groups, the Albanian and the Serbian ethnic group. Are you -- do you realise that that's what you're doing? ¹⁰¹⁰⁴

A. That's not at all what I was doing in the -- in the conclusion I referred to of the -- regarding the arming and disarming of two ethnic groups. I was pointing out that there was a mutual hostility between the Serbian ethnic group and the Albanian, or elements of the Albanian ethnic group, and to arm one and disarm the other had risks.

Q. All right, Mr. Coo. Now, are you aware of the fact that what we were dealing with there was a conflict with a separatist armed uprising and a terrorist onslaught carried out by the KLA on the legal system of Yugoslavia, an onslaught against the civilians, the army, the police, the citizens, their property, cultural and historical monuments? And when I say citizens, I mean both the Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Muslims, Egyptians, Romany; everybody in fact. Do you know that that's what it was all about? It was a separatist armed uprising and terrorism against a state, its system and peace-abiding citizens regardless of their national and ethnic affiliation. Are you aware of that?

A. I am aware of the general nature of what the KLA was doing. Some of the specifics you just mentioned I can't comment on; it wasn't the scope of my report.

Q. I see. And do you remember that with Paddy Ashdown's testimony we were able to conclude that some million pieces of weapons which were pilfered in that chaos in Albania, that they were out in the open market and that an enormous number of those weapons were transported through illegal channels to Kosovo and Metohija and the territory of Yugoslavia and Serbia? Do you know at least about that?

A. Again, the specifics were not within my remit, but I do have a ^{10105 BLANK PAGE 10106} general knowledge of -- from reading media reports, that indeed some weapons were lost during the breakdown in organisation in Albania.

Q. Well, as a military analyst, do you think that it is the task of a state to collect up all that weaponry which can be used and which was in fact used to kill people at random whenever anybody has occasion to do so on the part of these terrorist, bandit, pilfering groups, et cetera? So do you think the state was at fault for having amassed all these weapons from people who were in possession of them illegally? Is that something it shouldn't have done? Is that a criticism on your part?

A. I do agree that there have to be controls on who has weapons. I cannot, because I did not see any information regarding it, comment on where the Albanians in the villages from which weapons were being collected under the programme I noted, where they obtained their weapons from, whether they had those weapons legally or illegally.

Q. Well, Mr. Coo, as you've read the provisions and that's what you base your report on, do you know that no citizen of Yugoslavia, not only in Kosovo and not only an Albanian, but any Yugoslav citizen - in Belgrade, Nis, Pozarevac, Kragujevac, anywhere - they cannot be in possession of an automatic rifle, and there are regulations as to which kinds of weapons a citizen can legally be in possession of. That can be a pistol, if there is reason for him to carry a weapon of that kind and has a permit to do so, that they can have a hunting rifle or weapon, but that nobody, according to the law, can be in possession legally of any of the heavier types of weapons, automatic weapons.

So you cannot question at all, or you cannot question whether it ¹⁰¹⁰⁷ was procured illegally or legally. Is that clear to you? Let alone tops, guns, tanks, heavy machine-guns, et cetera, and how they were illegally procured. Is that something that is clear to you, Mr. Coo?

A. The documentation reviewed with regard to the disarming programme made no reference to the types of weapons or how they were obtained. It merely made reference to weapons and who held them, which ethnic group. I have no awareness -- for the second part of the question, I have no awareness of the legislation surrounding ownership of weapons.

Q. Well, in that case, Mr. Coo, does it seem to you to be feasible, Mr. Coo, that the military weapons taken from the citizens in Albania was not looted by Serbs who went to Albania but that this was done by the Albanians themselves in order to sell them and to equip the terrorist groups in Kosovo, Albanian terrorist groups in Kosovo?

A. Again, Your Honours, I don't feel that I have sufficient knowledge of that -- that incident in Albania to comment on its connection to Kosovo.

Q. All right. We're dealing with a lack of knowledge. That is not something that is contested here. But explain this to me now: Whether you talk intentionally or unintentionally in part of your report on command and the relationships between the army and police, you present a number of inaccuracies in order to demonstrate the subordination of the Ministry of the Interior to the army, allegedly, and we cleared that up. It wasn't the ministry, in fact, it was those in the area. And you refer to Article 16 of the law on defence. Then you quote that particular law. And instead of the term "combat operations," you use ¹⁰¹⁰⁸ the term "combat activities." And on that basis, one ought to conclude that the army was in command of all combat activities and not combat operations, as it is precisely termed in the article quoted. Now, my question for you, Mr. Coo, is as follows: Do you make a difference, do you differentiate between combat operations and combat activities? Because according to military doctrine, which you say you know, those are two very different concepts. So do you differentiate between the two, between combat operations and combat activities?

A. I have no awareness of the distinction.

Q. All right, Mr. Coo.

JUDGE MAY: What is the difference, Mr. Milosevic? You say there's a difference. What is it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just complete the entirety of my question, Mr. May, because it's not me that's doing the answering here, it's the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, in your testimony, for you to be able to refer back to article --

JUDGE MAY: No. If you put a point to a witness that there is a distinction when there is no apparent distinction, you better explain to the witness what it is that you are putting. You can't put confusing questions like that and then think you can get away with it and move on to something else.

Now, will you tell us what the difference is, according to you, between combat operations and combat activities, so the witness can ¹⁰¹⁰⁹ answer.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I just want to ask one more question and then I'll go on to explain. Don't worry about that, I will.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What does military doctrine, Mr. Coo, of the Yugoslav army imply under the concept and term of "combat operations"? Do you know what it means when it uses that term "combat operations"? What is implied?

A. The term "combat operations," to me, means armed operations conducted by an armed group against an opposing armed group, in very basic terms.

Q. Well, you're fairly near it, yes. That is more or less it. Now, what about -- so "combat operations" imply military operations, defence -- attack, defence, and other operations that are being prepared and conducted in certain areas where combat operations take place. So we agree there, do we? So attack, defence, military operations.

Whereas combat activities can imply all sorts of preparations and all the inherent activities linked to waging any kind of defence or attack or anything else which is linked to the activities of an army as an organisation or the police as an organisation. So combat activities also include moving in combat formation, for example, between Pristina and Pec, without engaging in any combat operations. But, for example, a company is moving in military formation with all the security provided, not to be attacked and so on, and no attack takes place. But that is a part of the combat activities without combat operations. Whereas with the police, ¹⁰¹¹⁰ they are resubordinated to the commanders, the military commanders during combat operations, Mr. Coo, and they are not resubordinated to the Ministry of the Interior but the police units find themselves to be there in the terrain during combat operations when combat operations are taking place.

So do you differentiate between the term the "zone of combat operations" or "area of combat operations" and "area of responsibility," Mr. Coo?

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... do you understand? Do you follow the point, the distinction which the accused makes, if there is one? Perhaps you would like to comment on it or not.

THE WITNESS: I do, Your Honours. It sounds like a reasonable distinction to me. The final, I think, point which I interpret as a question, a differentiation between the zone of operations and area of responsibility, I can't say because I haven't seen it in VJ terminology whether they make such a distinction. The area of responsibility is the area, geographic area allocated to a specific unit for which that unit's commander is responsible for the conduct of combat operations. I don't know, because I haven't seen it, what the difference between area of responsibility and area of operations is, but would assess that area of operations simply means the area in which combat operations happened to be taking place within an area of responsibility.

JUDGE MAY: It's now half past ten. We'll adjourn there for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m. ¹⁰¹¹¹

--- On resuming at 10.50 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you have another half hour, we'll give you, which is more time than we said, but we have slightly more time available. But on the other hand, we must leave time to deal with the administrative matters today.

The article that you mentioned is being translated. We should have a translation available at the next adjournment, so we will deal with that after the next adjournment.

One further matter. We are asked by the interpreters to ask you not to put your headphones around the microphone because it creates an interference.

THE ACCUSED: Very well, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Coo, do you know that Article 16 -- I'm continuing where we stopped -- of the law that you quoted pertains to zones of combat operations, not of areas of responsibility or the territory as such? Is that clear to you?

A. Your Honours, I'm not sure if we should be referring to Article 17, which deals with subordination of the MUP. Article 16, to my recollection, of the law on defence concerns the fact that the VJ is responsible for unifying organisations in defence of the country. So I'm not clear which article we're referring to here.

Q. I said quite precisely Article 16 that you quoted. Now, this is my assertion: It pertains to zones of combat operations, not of -- it does not pertain to areas of responsibility or territory as such. Is that ¹⁰¹¹² clear to you?

A. That's not clear to me from Article 16. All that I can derive from Article 16 is that, during periods of armed conflict - and again I'm not sure if I'm remembering the precise wording - but during periods of armed conflict, defence of the country -- during periods of armed conflict, the VJ unifies all armed organisations in defence of the country.

Q. No. Article 16, Article 16 of the law on defence authorises the army of Yugoslavia and commanders of its units to command all forces that take part in operations only until these operations as concrete forms of combat operations are taking place.

I asked you awhile ago whether it is clear to you that the article of the law that you quoted, Article 16, pertains to zones of combat operations, not to areas of responsibility or to territory as such. Is that clear?

A. Again, no, it's not something that I could derive from the article.

Q. All right. And do you know that that is precisely regulated in Article 17 of this law? For reasons only known to you, you did not quote it. That article reads as follows: Those authorities - that is to say the authorities of the MUP - when carrying out combat operations, are subordinated to military commanders who command combat operations. That is what Article 17 says, and I assume that you read the entire law, not only one article.

A. That's correct. That's my understanding of Article 17, and I did ¹⁰¹¹³ read the entire law.

Q. All right. Is it clear to you, then, that your assertion is wrong because you're dealing with activities, combat activities, not combat operations?

A. I don't think I've made the distinction in my report between combat activities and combat operations. I've used the term "combat operations" because it's used in the documentation I've reviewed. In general terms, what the documentation showed to me was how the system of commanding the armed organisations in Kosovo was set up and functioned, to some degree. That system was described in the report as consisting of the internal chains of the VJ and the MUP and other armed organisations, and I also covered the issue of the role and function of the Joint Command and the Supreme Command.

The specificity of whether -- or of how those chains of command related to joint operations that were combat operations doesn't come out, isn't addressed specifically in the report. What I do say is that the documentation shows that in 1999, and in 1998 but we're dealing with 1999, the chains of command of the MUP and the other armed organisations outside the VJ were connected in some way to the VJ's chain of command. And that appeared to be the case not just for combat operations but for activities outside combat operations, one of the more important of which is the planning activity for combat operations. In other words, the various chains of command, internal chains of command, are brought together for the planning of combat operations, among other operations.

Q. All right. Is it clear to you, then, that neither the MUP nor all ¹⁰¹¹⁴ the elements of the system of defence on the ground could have or could they have been constantly subordinated to military commanders but only for the duration of certain combat operations in a certain area? Let me be quite clear. I'm talking about the system of observation, reporting, the system of territorial control, the Civil Defence, the military territorial authorities, that is to say the civilian authorities like the secretariats of national defence. Is it clear that these authorities cannot automatically be subordinated to the army of Yugoslavia but only on strict orders by the superior command and only for the duration of the combat operations? Is that clear to you?

A. That wasn't strictly the case. The -- some of the orders issued concerning subordination, orders issued by the VJ directing that, for instance, its brigades subordinate the MUP to command of the brigades do specify that the subordination relates to combat operations, and they make reference to Article 17 in the law on defence.

There are other broader orders and instructions and information in various documents showing that the scope of the VJ's authority extended beyond combat operations. And again, I can refer to a good example and that's the 30th of March Pec military sector order which states that republic and municipal authorities in its zone will subordinate themselves to the Pec military sector. It made no reference to that subordination being solely for combat operations.

Q. That is not an argument, that is not an explanation, because you did not interpret this properly. But let us deal with another question now that has to do with reporting. ^{10115 BLANK PAGE 10116} Did you study, through the documents that were made available to you, how the reporting process goes through the chain of command, from the smallest units up to their higher commands and further on?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Was it your conclusion that this reporting chain worked its way up the chain of command just like commands, orders move down the chain of command?

A. Yes. The reports I saw showed reporting up the chain of command.

Q. All right. Let's take an example now, one that we saw here -- rather, heard here. This is a witness who was an officer of the army of Yugoslavia, an Albanian, who claimed that some civilians were killed by the military, not by NATO because it's well known how many were killed by NATO in the village of Meja and in the zone beyond. He said here that over his -- over a shoulder, he saw how a report was being typed, that is to say a report, this lowest level from this unit of his to the commander of the brigade, and then this report was sent further up by the brigade command, where it said what he said, that civilians were killed and that 60 terrorists were killed. In response to my questions, of course, he answered that he did not make any objections to the person who was writing the report, but he says that this was an inaccurate report because he says it was not 60 terrorists who were killed but it was civilians who were killed. And he saw that the NCO who was typing the report was typing it out that way.

Now, if you have this chain of reporting and if from the lowest level a report arrives, and in view of professionalism, discipline, et ¹⁰¹¹⁷ cetera, nobody has reason to believe that it is inaccurate -- I also believe it is truthful. I believe that what he is saying is inaccurate, but that doesn't matter.

Let's take a theoretical assumption that the report is inaccurate. How, then, in this chain of reporting that works its way up, if on site an inaccurate report was made, on the basis of what can a higher command come to the conclusion that that report is inaccurate except if they assume that the lower level is providing reports that are not truthful? As a military analyst, I hope that this is quite clear to you.

JUDGE MAY: Now, Mr. Milosevic, you have now been talking for two minutes, and the time has come to bring an end to this. This is not, as you've been told, the occasion for argument or discussion or to make points. It is to ask questions. Now, if you have a question arising from this, you must ask it. We cannot allow you to waste time by this talk. Now, what is the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My question is whether the higher command should proceed from the assumption that the report it receives from the ground is incorrect or should it go without saying that in accordance with the rules of service and the carrying out of this service in a proper army, that that report is precise and accurate?

A. The higher command, the recipients of the report, would have to consider the reports they receive in relation to any other reporting they're receiving, including what they're hearing through the media, and that's really all that I can say on that subject. ¹⁰¹¹⁸

Q. Well, if it is said, then, that in the media there is assertion by the representative of the Ministry of Defence of the United States that 100.000 Albanians were killed in Kosovo and if that is not true, are then they supposed to compare that to such claims made by propaganda which was evolving along parallel lines, parallel to the aggression against Yugoslavia, or should they believe what they see with their very own eyes in the field?

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. No. I'm going to get the witness to answer what you've put to him.

What are they supposed to take out of the media, Mr. Coo?

THE WITNESS: All I can really say, Your Honour, is that commanders have a responsibility to consider all reporting made available to them and assess it as they may.

And I can also point out that -- for instance, the Vojska book from 2001 does show that investigations or -- that investigations and more generally there was awareness that mass graves had been found, that crimes had been committed, and investigate -- in some cases investigations were conducted. The end result of those investigations I've alluded to in my report with reference to command responsibility, disciplinary measures. But it's simply the commanders in the chains of command I've outlined have a responsibility to consider more than just reports that they're receiving from subordinate units.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. On the basis of what do you conclude, then, that commanders did not use all the knowledge they acquire? Why do you think ¹⁰¹¹⁹ they only stick by the reports that they receive? You're an intelligence officer. You said that yourself. So the assumption is that commanders have all kinds of information that they can get under objective circumstances. On the basis of what do you assume that they do not avail themselves of all the knowledge they acquire? Why do you think that they only stick to the reports they get?

A. I don't think I've assumed that, but I don't have information to show in great detail exactly what reports commanders were relying upon, but I certainly wouldn't assume that they were relying merely on reports from subordinate units.

Q. All right. But in the documentation that you found, you did not establish that an omission or a mistake was made somewhere or - how should I put this? - that some kind of a false report was sent, one that would not correspond to the situation on the ground. Did you have something like that in your hands or not?

A. That wasn't mine to establish, or that could not be established from the documents I reviewed.

Q. All right. Let us then move on to another subject. It has to do with some of the assertions you made as a military analyst. As a military analyst, do you make any difference between a staff organ and an organ that is engaged in commanding?

A. Yes. The commander is the individual with command responsibility. The staff organ is the staff of officers supporting the commander in the exercise of his command responsibility, but they themselves do not have command responsibility. ¹⁰¹²⁰

Q. Well, then, why did you write in a part of your report, the summary of section 1, the General Staff of Yugoslavia is said to have been the highest level of commanding the army of Yugoslavia? The General Staff is the highest professional and staff organ, and so on and so forth. That's what Article 5 of the law on defence says; right? So why did you write something else?

A. The -- if I -- the General Staff of the VJ, in my interpretation of the documentation, is a slightly different case from the staffs of headquarters at the army corps and brigade levels where the chiefs of staff do not have command authority. The General Staff of the VJ, and if I recollect correctly, there is a definition in Part I given from, I think, the VJ Manual on Command and Control, which states that the chief of the General Staff commands the army on behalf of the -- or pursuant to the FRY president's direction and that the chief of the General Staff issues -- does this through documents such as orders, directives, and instructions.

Some specific examples on the chief of the General Staff's command authority come out in the Supreme Command Staff documents that we reviewed yesterday. The signature block on these is the chief of the General Staffs, General Ojdanic. He's not signing on behalf of somebody else. In the case of chiefs of staff at the army brigade, corps levels, the chief of staff may sign an order, but he's signing on the authority and the signature block of the commander of that unit.

So in this case, the General Staff and the chief of the General Staff is regarded, in my interpretation, as something slightly different ¹⁰¹²¹ than the staffs at other levels.

Q. All right. Please. You wrote in item 8, the Supreme Command, you said that the civilian leadership and the General Staff became the Supreme Command once a state of war was proclaimed. Do you know that a Supreme Command exists in times of war and peace and that that assertion of yours is wrong?

A. I made that assertion on the documentation again. I saw no references to the Supreme Command or Supreme Command Staff prior to the state of war. Once a state of war began on the 24th of March, the documentation for the most part refers to the Supreme Command and the Supreme Command Staff.

Q. In a state of war, Mr. Coo, do you know about this: The General Staff grows into the staff of the Supreme Command. It grows into the Supreme Command Staff. So it's no longer called the General Staff but the Supreme Command Staff. But the Supreme Command exists in war and peace. What does this term "Joined Supreme Command" mean for you? Does it mean that there is a civilian command and -- that there is a civilian command and a military command in times of peace and that in times of war only are they brought together?

A. No. All I can say again is that the references to the term "Supreme Command" and "Supreme Commander," and "Supreme Command Staff" all appear in a state of war documentation. The -- prior to the state of war, the civilian leadership appears in documentation as the -- what is known as the Supreme Defence Council headed by the president of the FRY. And as you said, and I agree with that, the General Staff is known as the General ¹⁰¹²² Staff during peacetime and becomes, during time of war, the Supreme Command Staff.

Q. All right. Did you read in the constitution that the president of the republic commands the army in times of war and peace? Did you read that in the constitution?

A. Yes, I did. That's in the report.

Q. And did you read in the constitution that the president commands in war and peace on the basis of decisions of the Supreme Defence Council? That's what the constitution also says.

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Why, then, in section I, do you say that the Supreme Command -- in item 7, you say that the Supreme Command rely -- why do you rely on an interview, actually, of General Pavkovic, which perhaps was not even carried the way it was said because General Pavkovic certainly knows how things are organised.

In that interview, as you observed, General Pavkovic says that the Supreme Defence Council is an advisory body. That is your conclusion. And the constitution and the law on defence and the army spell out the role of the Supreme Defence Council quite differently. You have Article 4 of the law on the army and Article 135 of the constitution. Why, then, Mr. Coo, did you take this probably free interpretation of General Pavkovic to be more meaningful than the letter of the law and constitution? Didn't it seem to you that, as a military analyst, you had no right to do that?

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Coo, before you answer, do you have the passage in ¹⁰¹²³ the report to which the accused is referring?

THE WITNESS: No, I don't, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: What is the passage that you are referring to, item 7? Is it paragraph 7 in part I?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Coo knows where he wrote this. He also refers to the interview.

JUDGE MAY: No. We can't deal with this in a vacuum. We have to know what is being referred to.

Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: I think it's section D, page 5.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. NICE: I think it's section D, page 2 of 5, paragraph 7.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, that appears to be it. Have you got that, Mr. Coo?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I have, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Would you like to explain the paragraph?

THE WITNESS: This is General Pavkovic who, at that time, was the chief of the General Staff but commanded the 3rd Army in the war. This is General Pavkovic in an interview, commenting on the public discussions regarding the legitimacy of the title "Supreme Commander." And I think he's responding to allegations by former Chief of General Staff Perisic that there was no such title in the law.

The legislation and the constitution all refers to the Supreme Defence Council and defines the president's role with respect to that, stating that he commands the army pursuant to decisions of the Supreme ¹⁰¹²⁴ Defence Council.

During a state of war, the top level of command was known as the Supreme Command, of which the VJ General Staff was the Supreme Command Staff. The civilian membership of that, I haven't seen documentation to set it out in detail, but the documentation does state that the Supreme Command is headed by the Supreme Commander, the FRY president. I don't know if that addresses the question of Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right, Mr. Coo. I understand your difficulties. But please, you've just partially given some explanations. In the diagram, and it's this one here, the diagram that you showed yesterday, the organisation of the FRY military forces. According to that diagram of yours, the General Staff is outside the supreme --

JUDGE MAY: 54. Part I, section A, 54. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. According to your diagram, the General Staff is outside the Supreme Command and is depicted as being one command instance between the Supreme Command and the 3rd Army interposed. It could be the 2nd Army or the 3rd Army, it doesn't matter. Or the RVO or PVO or navy or whatever. You took one strategic group - and I don't mind that, I'm not criticising that - but you placed the General Staff outside the Supreme Command and have depicted it to be a command instance between the Supreme Command and the strategic group, in this case the 3rd Army.

Do you know that that is not correct, that the General Staff, as ^{10125 BLANK PAGE 10126} you and I together established a moment ago, its part, it is within the composition of the Supreme Command as its staff body? So the Supreme Command Staff organ is part of the Supreme Command and not an instance in between, interposed between the Supreme Command and the strategic group of the army.

A. I do appreciate that, and it's evident in my report, I think. I -- this diagram is intended to -- is an attempt to show the chain of command during times of peace and war. During times of peace, according to the legislation, it's the Supreme Defence Council that's the civilian leadership, and the -- my interpretation is that the General Staff of the VJ is not incorporated within the Supreme Defence Council. During times of war, yes, the Supreme Command does incorporate the General Staff of the VJ.

Perhaps a better diagram for this purpose, specifically for the state of war, was the one shown during the opening statement, and I seem to recall a dotted line drawn around the civilian staff and the General Staff of the VJ and the collective title "Supreme Command" assigned to that.

Q. Please. Let's clear up one point. The General Staff and the staff of the Supreme Command is not part of the Supreme Defence Council, but like any other command, the Supreme Command too has its commander and its staff, and this, taken as a whole, represents the Supreme Command. In point 52, the commands and instances of information, Part I, 29/58 [as interpreted] in that first sentence, you state the following: At every level of command from the General Staff down to each and every ¹⁰¹²⁷ brigade, there is a command which acts according to instructions from the Chief of Staff. That is what you yourself wrote, Mr. Coo. My question to you is as follows: Do you know that the command does not act according to instructions from the Chief of Staff but according to instructions and orders from the commander? Or, rather, do you know that the Chief of Staff organises the work of the staff, that the assistant commanders for the individual departments are responsible for the work of their own departments but the command does not follow the instructions of the Chief of Staff but the orders of the commander. So we're talking about each separate level, and you're talking about each separate level precisely in the passage and section that I quoted from. Is that clear to you, Mr. Coo?

A. Yes, the intention of that first sentence, to elaborate, is to show that in general terms, the -- these levels in the chain of command, the army corps and brigades, have staffs to assist the commander, and those staffs are operating on the basis of direction received from the top. And it does go on to say that those command staffs support the unit commander by turning his intent into detailed direction in the form of commands.

So, yes, those staffs respond directly to their own immediate commanders.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you have gone over the time by another ten minutes, so you really must bring this to a close. You can ask one or two questions more.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How much time -- one or two ¹⁰¹²⁸ questions you say; right?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, the application of international war law, you interpret bans on attacks on civilian targets, et cetera. There were a lot of orders here which I intended to quote, but I will have time in due course, although you do allow for the possibility that civilians could be acted against if they are in military facilities, that this can be a legitimate method if civilians are found in those localities. Do you know that there existed a ban of opening fire when it was quite obvious even that they were dealing with terrorists if there was the danger that civilians would be harmed during that action, and that that's what many terrorists did; they infiltrated them into groups of civilians, and the police did not open fire either on the terrorists who were clearly distinguished from the civilians, although they took off their uniforms and were left in their underclothes, precisely not to harm the civilians? So were you able to find this in the documents you studied, Mr. Coo? Did you come across situations of that kind?

A. I am aware of the orders concerning how to handle civilians and members of the KLA. I'm not aware in detail of the implementation of those orders.

Q. Yes. All right. But let's ask a hypothetical: If an army were to attack civilian targets and it knew at the same time that those targets were just being used for civilian purposes, would that be a war crime? So it knows it's attacking civilian targets, it knows that civilians are ¹⁰¹²⁹ located there, and it knows that the facilities are used for civilian purposes. Would that be a war crime? Yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. All right. So when NATO attacks Yugoslavia and destroys civilian --

JUDGE MAY: You're going well beyond the witness's evidence now. Have the amicus have any questions?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection to make, Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: If it's about the time, you've had well over the time that we allowed you to ask questions, and you must organise your time to use it efficiently.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, it is not my intention to discuss time with you, but I do have an objection to make, the participation of Mr. Wladimiroff, because with the interview that he granted, he has disqualified himself in so doing.

JUDGE MAY: We are going to rule on that matter or, rather, we're going to look at the article that you've complained of when we've had it translated.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Wladimiroff.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: I think, Your Honours, that the accused covered all the topics I had selected. Let me check to be sure. Except for one. Yes.

Usher, would you mind showing this to the witness, please. ¹⁰¹³⁰ What I have given to the witness, Your Honours, is a chart which has been used by the Prosecution during opening statement, and I'm going to ask the witness if he recognises that chart.

Questioned by Mr. Wladimiroff:

A. Yes, I recognise it, Your Honours.

Q. Do you know who made that chart? Have you drawn it up?

A. I produced that chart.

Q. Right.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: That's all I have to ask. I tender that chart.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Any re-examination?

MR. NICE: Yes, Your Honour, there are a few matters. Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. As to the chart that we were looking at very briefly, Mr. Coo, is there any comment you want to make about it? Is it still a chart you adopt?

A. Yes. I still agree with the contents of that chart.

Q. While we're on the topic of charts, may the witness have this one, please, and everybody else.

Only if this is the chart you were referring to earlier as a chart shown in the opening that you thought was a more accurate depiction of the state of affairs. Is this the chart you had in mind, Mr. Coo?

A. Yes, it is, Your Honour.

MR. NICE: Perhaps it could be placed on the overhead projector, and two points really.

Q. First of all, here we see a line, horizontal line, between the ¹⁰¹³¹ Supreme Command and the Supreme Command Staff which you've dealt with differently in the other chart, I think by an oblique line. Any comment you want to make on that?

A. Again, it's an attempt to represent in the best way I thought possible the structure of the highest body commanding armed organisations in Kosovo and to show that it was a Supreme Command comprising civilian leadership and the Supreme Command Staff, which, as explained, was a military General Staff.

Q. Now dealing with the dotted line and the point you were making in answer to the accused about this being a more useful document. Please explain.

A. Can I just ask if you're referring to the dashed line from MUP to VJ or the dotted line around --

Q. Both or whichever one was significant in the answer you were giving to the accused.

A. The dotted line, the large box, shows -- attempts to show the organisation's levels of command in Kosovo. And I should also highlight the fact that this is a simplified chain of command. It doesn't show every unit.

The position of the Joint Command as shown is -- shows a connection to the Supreme Command, and the documentation suggests that the Joint Command was the Supreme Command's representation in the theatre of -- or the most important theatre of operations. The whole of the -- the whole of Serbia was a theatre of operations at that time, but this is Kosovo. ¹⁰¹³² The two separate chains of command, internal chains of command, of the MUP, Serbian MUP, and the VJ are shown. And the oval around the MUP, VJ, and local defence units is meant to represent the role of the Joint Command in coordinating the operations of those units. The units had to retain their own internal chains of command, because once they receive direction from the Joint Command or the Supreme Command, they have to enact that direction and that requires the issue of orders down through their own chains of command.

I think that's about all I have to say on that.

Q. Thank you very much.

MR. NICE: May that perhaps be given a separate exhibit number.

THE REGISTRAR: This will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 325.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Coo, just going through the questions starting yesterday, we needn't look at it, but you made clear that Annex 1 to your first report sets out the promotions that were achieved by the participants; is that correct?

A. That's correct, Your Honours.

Q. And widespread promotion is what is suggested within your report as the consequence of participation; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. You were asked questions about the Joint Command and the existence or otherwise of Joint Command documents beyond those that you've already spoken of or referred to. Is it the case that the Office of the Prosecutor has sought Joint Command documents from the relevant ¹⁰¹³³ authorities?

A. Yes, it has.

Q. With or without any proper response?

A. With none received. No response.

Q. You made the observation that there was, you thought, command implications from the VJ doctrine so far as the Joint Command was concerned, and you made that observation when the accused was suggesting Joint Command was coordination rather than command. Can you amplify further, if I've recorded your answer correctly, what it was in the VJ doctrine that had command implications for the Joint Command?

A. VJ doctrine, the -- specifically the Manual on Command and Control from 1997, defines various command terms, and two of those terms are "coordination" and "cooperation." And it states that, to my recollection, the difference or at least the significance difference between "coordination" and "cooperation" is that coordination has command implications. Cooperation is merely simply as it says, cooperating, but there's no command relationship.

The other -- the remainder of the explanation I used in response to that question was to refer to at least two of the Joint Command related documents, showing that the Joint Command was -- or at least I referred to two documents in which references to Joint Command orders were made, and I stated that orders are executive documents. And again, that's defined in the VJ Manual on Command and Control.

Finally, the very name "Joint Command" has to suggest its function: One, a function of command; and the other, a joint aspect of ¹⁰¹³⁴ that command. All of the reporting from the Joint Command, or the reporting I've seen, does cover operations of the VJ and the MUP, suggesting a joint aspect.

Q. Thank you. You've been shown by the accused a few documents. My recollection is the two documents from the OSCE to which we are still awaiting translations, Your Honour, and therefore can't deal with further. But comment is made by him in questions about the materials you had to work on. Have you reviewed, so far as you can, all the appropriate documents held by the Office of the Prosecutor?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Were further documents to come to light, whether provided pursuant to requests by the Office of the Prosecutor or provided by the accused, would you be able to review them and consider whether your report needed any adjustment?

A. Yes, I would.

Q. Would you perhaps take this as one document. It's D36, marked for identification, produced to, I think, Mr. Zdrilic by the accused.

MR. NICE: Perhaps you would just lay it on the overhead projector, please. It came from the accused's possession. I'd like to see the bottom of it as well as the top, please.

Q. This is a document slightly shorter in size than A4, and it's been cut off at the bottom. Would you just have a look at it, Mr. Coo. Take it, and you can see at the bottom, right at the bottom that it's been cut of and indeed a fax sending line can just be seen, showing where the document came from, which has been concealed. ^{10135 BLANK PAGE 10136} If you look at the front page of this document, we can see, again if the projectionist can show it, that the addressee has been blanked out.

A. Yes, I see that.

Q. But nevertheless and although we're still waiting for a translation, it would appear to be a command document or an order, and the date of it is within the period of interest, and it came from the accused. Is this the sort of document that you would wish to review were they available to you?

A. Yes, it definitely is, Your Honours.

Q. Thank you.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we remain unable, in respect of that document, to say more than I've effectively said through the witness already.

Q. There was, amongst questions of a similar type - or I should perhaps suggest comments of a similar type - the suggestion that you had not made reference to Article 17, and then this observation, "for some reason known only to you," you then revealing that of course you'd read Article 17 in full.

In the selection of Articles from which you have quoted, what has been your guiding principle, please?

A. The guiding principle was the direction provided to me by the Prosecution legal team on what the scope of my report should be, and that scope was the organisation and the means of commanding and to some degree the implementation of the command and control means of the Armed Forces of the FRY and Serbia. ¹⁰¹³⁷

Q. Thank you. You've been asked a number of questions about facts on the ground, events, for the most part, that you said you only had really everyday knowledge of through press reports and so on. Apart from the degree to which your second report still covers any reported evidence of witnesses, did you have as any part of your responsibility consideration of the facts as evidence other than so far as that covered the organisation of the army?

A. No, I did not, Your Honours.

Q. I think you dealt with this, but just to cover the area once more, you were asked a hypothetical question about the possibilities for knowledge further up the reporting chain of reporting that was inaccurate when it started, and it was suggested to you that you'd assumed some kind of restriction of reporting to that which was in writing, and you said you hadn't done so. Can you just amplify that, please, and explain what, from the materials you've read, are the reporting mechanisms that should apply?

A. The reporting mechanisms in the VJ and the MUP cover written form and oral form. So orders can be issued orally as well as in written form.

Q. We know that, of course, your material was some of the material considered by General Sir Peter de la Billiere and that in a perfect world his report would have come -- his evidence would have come second in time to yours. Do you now recall what he said about the consequences of certain findings - that is the possible findings of widespread commission of crimes - and oral instructions being given? If you don't, say you don't.

A. I'm sorry, I don't remember that. ¹⁰¹³⁸

Q. The Pavkovic interview, we can see how it's set out. Can you recall now whether that is a transcript directly from a tape or a broadcast?

A. There is -- there are two Pavkovic interviews, at least that I can recall in the report, or two statements. I think the one we dealt with most recently was a transcript of a broadcast, a television broadcast.

Q. So that will have been, so far as the words used by Mr. Pavkovic are concerned, word-for-word translation of a transcript?

A. That's correct, Your Honours.

Q. And the words "free translation" being used, it being unclear to me whether that was relating to the report of the broadcast or the understanding of the general.

MR. NICE: Nothing else from me for this witness. Thank you. Questioned by the Court:

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Coo, you mentioned about the MUP staff for Kosovo, which was headed, as I understand, by Mr. Sreten Lukic.

A. That's correct, Your Honours.

JUDGE KWON: I wonder if you could tell us as to who else was involved in that organisation and during what period it existed.

A. The names of the other members of that organisation I can't recall off the top of my head. The document -- there's two documents from May 1998, one of which names the members of the staff, the other lays out the mandate.

I remember that the head of the staff was named as General Sreten Lukic. I think another name may have been Radoslav Djinovic, but I can't ¹⁰¹³⁹ recall for certain. I also recall that the mandate of the staff, or perhaps the document naming members, made reference to the fact that the heads or chiefs of the seven Kosovo police districts or SUPs would be -- would also be members in some form.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I think it's helpful. And as to the Joint Command in Kosovo, it comprised of political, VJ, and MUP elements, and according to this diagram you just mentioned, it seems that it was headed by Mr. Sainovic; is that correct?

A. That's correct, Your Honour.

JUDGE KWON: Then could you tell us who represented each element and -- each element, the VJ and the MUP element? The MUP should be MUP staff. So --

A. That's an assessment I had to make, Your Honour, on the basis of the documentation. The documentation available to me did not name specifically the VJ and MUP members. The assessment I made was that that membership could be expected to include the commander of the Pristina Corps, which is based in Kosovo and responsible for Kosovo, General Lazarevic, and the head of the MUP staff which is the mirror organisation on the MUP side of the Pristina Corps.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. And the period the Joint Command existed, could you tell us about that?

A. Again, I know that it existed as early as July 1998. To my recollection, that's the first document I came across referring to the Joint Command, but I came across nothing to tell me when precisely it was established. ¹⁰¹⁴⁰ I think -- I don't think I answered your MUP staff question completely, Your Honour. The MUP staff was established as early as 1996, to my recollection. There was a reference to it in 1996. It appeared that the heads of the MUP staff and perhaps the other members of the staff would be appointed on a rotating basis, and General Lukic was appointed in May 1998.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. And my last question is a somewhat minor one. We've heard about the Civil Protection Unit and also about the Civil Defence Unit. Could you tell us what the difference between them is?

A. Yes, Your Honour. In the law, the definition of civil protection is that it's -- there's no reference to it being armed. It seems to be a unit tasked with the -- with assisting civilian members of the population, helping them -- extracting them from rubble, applying first aid, assisting in the maintenance and running of the infrastructure during periods of crisis.

The civilian defence units, as defined in the law, are armed organisations tasked with defence on a local level, so they're citizens conscripted or tasked with defence at a local level, and they're armed. This is FRY federal law that I'm referring to.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: There has been evidence about the Joint Command and its membership from one of the witnesses. I forget which military witness it was, but I certainly recollect that evidence. Perhaps someone could find it out during the break with a reference to it.

MR. NICE: Certainly. ¹⁰¹⁴¹

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Coo, thank you for your evidence. You're free to go.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

[The witness withdrew]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

JUDGE MAY: We're not getting any --

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear.

JUDGE MAY: Put your microphone on, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice referred to various papers awhile ago. I wish to object to the fact that, due to time constraints, I did not have the opportunity of making comments with regard to any one of these papers that I had selected, as a matter of fact, and that were served yesterday. And you heard yourselves how many binders were taken out or, rather, how many binders were produced through this so-called expert, this employee of the OTP. So I didn't really have any time to comment on any of this.

JUDGE MAY: If you've got any comments, you can make them. If you want to put any documents in, you can do so.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, they have already been put in because Mr. Nice did that with the assistance of this witness. But then that comes also with 15 binders. I did not have any opportunity to question the witness about any one of these papers because they went through them with such speed that there has been no time for me to put questions with regard to that. And all of these papers are actually in favour of what I have been saying rather than what that other side has ¹⁰¹⁴² been claiming.

JUDGE MAY: You may draw our attention to those exhibits in due course when you come to address us, those that are in favour, as you say, of your case.

I've just been handed two documents.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, if I --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. I've just been handed two documents which the accused apparently put in.

Mr. Milosevic, you handed two documents in, I guess yesterday. I don't know what they are because they're in B/C/S. Do you want us to -- do you want to have these exhibited or do you want them back?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, exhibited. And those two documents, Mr. May, are reports of the Verification Mission of the OSCE for two days, the two days referring to the activities of the KLA and the army of Yugoslavia that were verified by the OSCE, and they were linked to my questions put to your investigator Zdrilic as to why he did not question his false witness in line with the findings of the Verification Mission of the OSCE.

JUDGE MAY: Marked for identification in the usual way.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, before we part from Mr. Coo's evidence, two points. One, of course, the point I was making about documents -- I'm so sorry.

THE REGISTRAR: The document dated the 12th of March will be Defence Exhibit D38. The document dated 15th of March will be D39. Marked for identification, Your Honours. ¹⁰¹⁴³

MR. NICE: The point I was making about documents is not only in respect of documents that have been available for a long time to the accused to use in cross-examination but other documents that were available to him. And available to Mr. Coo.

We have prepared, or to be precise, Ms. Graham and her colleagues have prepared two charts that will, I hope, enable people to navigate their way around the Coo documents better and to make the links between the Philip Coo documents as produced in his binders and as separately exhibited. Can I make those available now? They are self-explanatory. One for volume I and one for volume II. They contain --

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: As far as this document is concerned, if you look at volume I, or Part I, item 13, you can see the way the document may exist. Bold entries highlight and take our attention to exhibits previously exhibited and give, in the second column, the number. So under 13, it's also Exhibit 223. The same format, of course, for the second index. I'm not sure if the Chamber was minded to adjourn now.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, we are.

MR. NICE: I have a list - at least I hope I have a list - of topics, which is being provided. There are one or two others as well.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Wladimiroff, we've been given a translation of this article which the accused has raised. I don't know if you've got it so you know what we're working from. The accused also should have a copy of it since he's raised it, and we will have to deal with it after the adjournment. So perhaps you would read what's the English version. ¹⁰¹⁴⁴

MR. WLADIMIROFF: I have been down during the break, because I was not aware of this article. There seems to be a second version of it as well on the Internet, which I have been given. On the face of it, just quickly looking at it, it looks different to me. So perhaps you should consider the Internet one as well.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you. We'll see if we can get that. Yes. Have you got the list of topics so we can consider them?

MR. NICE: Some of them will be self-explanatory, others may need a word or so from me. It's just a guide to what I'm going to be asking you to deal with.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.34 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: There are three matters we have to deal with. First of all, the outstanding issues; secondly, the interview to which we've been referred. We still do not have a complete copy of the translation of that. We are waiting for it and it will come to us in court, it's anticipated. It may be sensible, therefore, to start on the Prosecution outstanding issues. And finally, we will deal with any other issues of an administrative nature which anybody wants to raise but bearing in mind, of course, that we have to adjourn in an hour and ten minutes. We've got the outstanding issues.

MR. NICE: In addition to those there are a couple others, one of which will take a little time and will be subject to the request that we go into closed session, but before I come to that, could I help with a few ^{10145 BLANK PAGE 10146} short points.

First, the opening on a fortnight tomorrow is an opening that I intend, for the Prosecution, to be short and functional.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. I should say and make it plain that this case will adjourn today. There will be two weeks for preparation, and the case will restart on Thursday, the 27th, I think it will be, of September. I could be wrong about that. 26th. Thursday, the 26th of September.

MR. NICE: Sorry, to come back, I hope, and things may change, but I hope to make a short opening which will be entirely functional and a route map --

JUDGE MAY: My recollection is the limits are three hours on both sides.

MR. NICE: I will be considerably less than that. And accordingly, the accused must be ready to start on the Thursday. There's no expectation that he's just going to have until the Friday to start. I'm hoping that we will be on to evidence on the Friday. Also, having in mind the manner of the accused's opening address which we did not in any sense or way interrupt, we would at this stage of the trial and in light of the experience, be pressing the Chamber to ensure that the accused confines his opening to appropriate material and doesn't allow it to be used simply as an opportunity to address a wider audience.

The second point that I can make is one that's off the list. It's a procedural thing. Throughout the Kosovo section of the trial, we've been serving the accused a second time with statements that he's already ¹⁰¹⁴⁷ had because he said he couldn't find them. It happens that the first series of witnesses are mostly those for whom there's only ten days' provision in any event, so he will only be getting them now for preparation for the witnesses, but generally it would help us to know if the accused is being

obliged, as we'd invite you to say he should be, to use the materials that he's got and indeed on which he's no doubt been working over the summer and that it shouldn't be necessary for us to serve him again with statements in addition to all the other materials we serve him, but we'd like clarification of that, if the Chamber would be able to assist us. At some stage. I don't mean immediately, obviously.

JUDGE MAY: You want us to put on notice the accused that statements of the first witnesses -- has a list been served of the first witnesses?

MR. NICE: Yes, there's been a list.

JUDGE MAY: And the statements of most of them will be coming; is that right?

MR. NICE: It happens that the -- those early witnesses are mostly subject to a ten-day limit and so they will be coming to him, but thereafter, when witnesses are witnesses of the type he's had in advance, we would ask that he be required to find them himself in the usual way.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. He's to be on notice of that.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we also have it in mind to assist the accused by provision of a more comprehensive schedule of exhibits which we hope will assist him and everybody else. It's the type of document we've ¹⁰¹⁴⁸ been preparing ourselves and so it will come with him and enable him to navigate his way - and everybody else to navigate their way - around the exhibits.

Can I then turn to the itemised items on our list of 15. I can deal with most of these quickly.

We've mentioned the expert evidence of Morten Torkildsen simply because at one stage there was the suggestion that the admissibility of this financial report would have been dealt with before, I think, even the summer break. The matter's been fully briefed on both sides. It may be we've overlooked an application by us to postpone its consideration until the Croatia/Bosnia section, and in any event, that might be a sensible course. But we respectfully remind the Court that it would appear on the record that resolution of the admissibility is an outstanding issue.

JUDGE MAY: It hasn't been dealt with. We have it in mind. We had assumed that it was being left until the second part of the case and it may be better to leave it until then to hear oral argument, if need be.

MR. NICE: Thank you. The linked issue is item 2, the Rule 92 bis statements of the three Cyprus bank officials. They, of course, relate to the financial evidence and the expert report of Mr. Torkildsen. It may be the Chamber will be able to rule separately from deciding on the expert report. Alternatively, that could be put back. But, of course, if they required to attend and required to attend, for example, at the same time as Morten Torkildsen gives his evidence, if that's what happens, it will be convenient to know in advance. So that appears to be outstanding. Item 3, there appear to be two witnesses for whom we were given ¹⁰¹⁴⁹ leave, subject to cross-examination, to call, and just for purposes of good order, we make it clear that we are not intending to call those two witnesses.

JUDGE MAY: There was a third with a difficult name to pronounce. I remember our ruling on it.

MR. NICE: I'll see if I can find that.

JUDGE MAY: But may we take it you don't intend to call him.

MR. NICE: Same decision applies. Can I come back to 4 because 4 and one other topic would require closed session, and perhaps 5 as well. The Chamber is respectfully reminded that, so far as Braddock Scott and other witnesses designated as Rule 70, even if they relate only to the Kosovo section of the trial, or predominantly to the Kosovo section, applications to call them must necessarily be deferred until resolution of the Rule 70 issue generally.

JUDGE MAY: May we ask you to provide us with a list of those witnesses who relate to Kosovo, purely to Kosovo, who you have either had leave to call after the close of the Kosovo case or for whom you will be asking for leave. It would be helpful to have the list so we know. It would also be helpful if the Prosecution could organise those witnesses in a single batch. I just have in mind the consideration.

MR. NICE: Of course, yes. As to Rule 70 witnesses and in light of the construction put upon the Rule by the provider, I can't even deal with that ex parte.

JUDGE MAY: No.

MR. NICE: That part, the answer is yes. It may indeed be they're ¹⁰¹⁵⁰ effectively provided by item 9, but I'll just check on that and we'll provide that in writing subject to the Rule 70 point. Item 7, Helena Ranta. It's a point for -- not a small point. It's a point that we ought to have in mind for fear that the accused will proceed on an unsatisfactory basis in months to come when he makes his closing arguments.

Helena Ranta is the person performing forensic scientific work in respect of mass graves, and her then-documentation was relied upon by the accused in opening, transcript pages 226 to -7, for example, and also 353, and was relied on extensively in the cross-examination of General Drewienkiewicz and also in General Naumann.

That perhaps, or other stimuli, drew from Ms. Ranta answers in press interviews that go to clarify her position on Racak and go to clarify it in a way that would make it inappropriate for the accused to rely on interpretations of her report favourable to him. We have no present intention of calling her, but what I propose to do is to serve on the accused and the amici and, because her reports have been referred to to the Chamber, on the Chamber the newspaper report together with what she has said in a letter as to its accuracy to us, because had this cross-examination, had this opening address been made when this material was to hand, we would have sought to introduce it as countering the propositions being advanced by the accused.

In short, the material may show that she is now satisfied that the scene was in no sense a fake, and that's the general topic. It will put the accused on notice in relation to this witness if he does call her, ¹⁰¹⁵¹ there is material to counter the thesis he may wish to advance or otherwise to help him, but what we cannot allow for is her report suddenly being brought out at the close of the proceedings as material to show doubt on the Racak evidence in some particular when there is in fact contrary written material from her.

Item 8. We are obviously in the hands of the Court as to how, or to be precise, by whom the Louise Arbour correspondence should be produced.

JUDGE MAY: Well, we noticed the name of the Deputy Prosecutor on it. It may be he would be an appropriate witness since Louise Arbour is no longer here.

MR. NICE: Very well, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Perhaps it could be added to the Kosovo list.

MR. NICE: Certainly. And that conveniently brings us to item 9. This is certainly a list of the, as it were, Kosovo-only or predominantly Kosovo witnesses to be called later, if they are to be called. Vlassi, who we discussed at some length earlier, K37, K39, and K10.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Vlassi we've ruled against and is not to give evidence. We've ruled on it.

MR. NICE: My recollection is that there was a tentative, that we withdrew the application and said that if we were seeking to call him again, we would apply afresh in the latter part of the trial.

JUDGE MAY: That was on the basis that he would give evidence about something else.

MR. NICE: That's right. ¹⁰¹⁵²

JUDGE MAY: Purely on Kosovo, no.

MR. NICE: Very well. Then these three are the ones that don't appear in Croatia, Bosnia witness indices and that we may seek to call in the later part of the trial, but, Your Honour, I will complete the list if there are any other names that we've overlooked. Item 10 is one example of a number of exhibits that are, to some degree, being left or have been left, not in limbo but left pending further decision. For example, the document we looked at in re-examination this morning which we can only leave for identification purposes. That was D36. D37, which is spending translation. I beg your pardon, D37 is a tape. It's not pending translation. It was pending translation, and I now have a transcript or a summary, rather. We have no objection to the production of this particular videotape. The accused produced it without playing it, and the Court asked us to look at it. It contains various things. I don't need to go into them nor do I have the time, but we don't object to its production.

JUDGE MAY: D37.

MR. NICE: We are very grateful to the registry who, I think, have been keeping a list of outstanding exhibits that need resolution. Of those tendered by the accused, I think D11A, 258 and -9 may be -- may have been referred to as requiring authentication by the accused. D10 may have been marked similarly but we have no objection to its production. It's a Novo Demokracija document which we have also obtained and, therefore, since we have it, we don't object to the production of it by the accused. Marked for identification is D23 to 28, I think, D30, 35, and 36. ¹⁰¹⁵³

JUDGE MAY: We will ask the registry to provide us a full report upon the state of the exhibits so far and make any necessary rulings.

MR. NICE: Very well. Insofar as there are outstanding CLSS final translations of documents, we are obtaining them and providing them as soon as we can, and we have also, in accordance with the Chamber's ruling, been providing the registry with the most original version of items we tender in all cases, with the exception perhaps being in the crime-base binders where it may be that the original documents or the best originals have not yet been provided. We have provided colour copies of some of those items, and the exercise of collating all original documents for the binders will be a substantial exercise. We're in the Chamber's hands. It may be that there being no challenge specifically raised with the authenticity of those particular documents, that that exercise could be properly and safely avoided on this occasion, but that's a matter for the Chamber, of course.

Patrick Ball's report. He discovered that there were some, I think, adjustments he had to make to the materials properly available to him. There may have been some deletions because of Rule 70 material, but whichever way it is, he is preparing an addendum or a supplement making sure that what goes or is available to the Court is corrected where correction was judged appropriate. I believe that will be with us by the end of October.

Item 12. The document we've provided certainly once in draft form, which we call a fill box document because it's a document where it breaks down the indictment into the various component parts and has boxes ¹⁰¹⁵⁴ then to be filled by reference to or summaries of evidence, is due for a further provision. We'll provide another draft today. I know the amici found it helpful. I don't know whether the accused did. But we will make such a document available today or possibly tomorrow. Before passing from documents or materials that may be useful in closing, we have it in mind to provide the Chamber, the accused, and the amici, should it be thought by the Chamber to be helpful, with electronic material on CDs of the witnesses, witness by witness, where you'll have, if this is what the Chamber would like, a photograph of the witness to remind us what he or she looked like, the summaries that have been provided, transcripts, and statements where statements have been produced as exhibits. And of course it will then all be electronically searchable on a witness-by-witness basis. We don't know if this would be simply duplication of something that the Chamber has already done, in which case we won't complete the exercise, but in case it might be helpful to everyone, we're going to prepare some sample -- a sample CD with a couple of witnesses on it for your consideration, and we will respond if it's thought to be something that would help the Chamber and others. I've dealt, actually, already with 14, save only to say perhaps this: The only problem we've encountered at this stage of the trial -- sorry, in the first part of the trial, with service on the accused has been where we've been sought to serve change of witness lists late in the afternoon. Sometimes this is simply unavoidable, and we've been providing up-to-date witness lists whenever we can. It hasn't, I know, been possible for the associates to be more involved with us - they don't have ¹⁰¹⁵⁵ Page blanche insérée aux fins d'assurer la correspondance entre la pagination anglaise et la pagination française.

¹⁰¹⁵⁶ instructions to do so - but it would obviously be in the accused's interest if he can authorise his associates to receive information, whether from the Registry or from us, in a way that enables speedy communication. If not, then we are simply dependent on the good services of the Registry, who I know do all that they can, but there do come occasions where, at 4.00 or 5.00 in the afternoon, it's important to be able to communicate.

JUDGE MAY: And the accused will have heard that.

MR. NICE: The next disclosure, that's essentially the Rule 68 disclosure report, will be coming in a couple of weeks or so, and it's important for us, but we would respectfully invite others associated to reflect what we have to do, it's important for us to review the parameters of search now that we've moved to another stage of the trial and to take the necessary time to think about whether different parameters are required.

I will get Mr. Saxon, who is dealing with Rule 68 disclosure generally, to make an offer to the amici for their attendance at a meeting, and of course, I will make the same opportunity available to the accused's associates. They were unable, for want of instructions, to turn up on the previous occasion, but it must be recognised that this is the best method of ensuring that there is no slip in Rule 68 provision. Your Honour, can I turn then to matters that in a second will require, or in respect of which I will ask for, a closed session. The first is not on this list and relates to difficulties that we are encountering with the authorities in respect of provision of materials and ¹⁰¹⁵⁷ in respect of waivers for witnesses.

Notwithstanding the law on cooperation passed in the spring of this year, and notwithstanding cooperation that has been effective in certain areas, particularly, perhaps, in making witnesses available, there are serious impediments in our way, and it may well be that they, unhappily, reflect a failure fully to cooperate with the Tribunal. The most immediate problem we face is in respect of waivers, waivers in respect of those who may be speaking of matter that could be described as secret or otherwise entitled to some protection from public gaze. As the Chamber knows, the mechanism is in place for waivers to be granted, and waivers have been granted for some witnesses. However, for some witnesses, and one particularly important one, there appears to be a refusal to provide waivers particularly in respect of Croatia and Bosnia. It may be that this is being linked by the authorities with the provision of documents. That seems to us inappropriate because it's been made quite plain by this Chamber in a way that's evenhanded as between governments of all types that it is respectful of and will ensure respect for matters that require a confidential approach for whatever reason. And of course where we're coming to deal with Croatia and Bosnia and where there are witnesses who can assist because of their position within or close to government, it is vital if cooperation provided for by the law and effectively promised, it is vital that that is forthcoming to enable this type of witness to help. I say in telling you this that I have alerted the authorities to the fact that I would be raising it because it is -- time is passing too ¹⁰¹⁵⁸ swiftly.

The other way in which provision has been distinctly problematic, as we will see if the Chamber grants us closed session for a short time, is in respect of the provision of documents. Proper requests in respect of documents provided are now substantially outstanding. The Chamber has seen from both the evidence of in particular Sir Peter de la Billiere and the last witness that they identify a limitation of documents. It doesn't necessarily affect their opinion at all, although in each case, of course, they would prefer to work on more. And if documents of the type that are plainly in existence and are of relevance to this trial are not made available to the Chamber, why, then, the Chamber's task in forming a good judgement is made substantially more difficult.

Your Honour, in order to amplify that, I would ask we go into closed session briefly, when we can also deal with the one other topic which would require closed session, which is the issue of contempts.

[Private session]

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(redacted) ¹⁰¹⁵⁹ Pages 10159 to 10163 redacted, private session

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[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, you wished to raise a matter about comments by Mr. Wladimiroff. We now have the document with an English translation, apparently one obtained from the Internet, but we -- it appears that it's the same as the original article in the Haagsche Courant.

Yes. What do you want to say about it?

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters cannot hear the accused.

JUDGE MAY: Microphone. Microphone.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to raise some questions that have to do with what you were saying awhile ago and what Mr. Nice was talking about. Actually, on the basis of what you have said, I draw the conclusion that you are making a 14-day break and that on the 26th we shall have a continuation of this activity with regard to these so-called indictments for Croatia and Bosnia.

I have a question for you in relation to that. That means that now, during the cross-examination over these past days, weeks and months in relation to Kosovo, I got a total of 115.000 pages, 600 video cassettes, 230 audio cassettes with regard to the indictment which I call here as well a top absurdity because I was not president of Croatia or Bosnia, so I simply wonder whether you, Mr. May, Mr. Robinson, Mr. Kwon, believe that these two weeks are a reasonable amount of time within which I should get informed, at least in the roughest possible terms, about these 150.000 pages, 600 video cassettes, and 230 audio cassettes, and in ^{10165 BLANK PAGE 10166} the meantime, of course, to hear some information that has to do with the substance involved, and that certainly doubles the figures I've mentioned. So if your answer is that you consider this amount of time to be reasonable, I would like to hear that answer. But I do not believe that anybody could consider this to be a reasonable amount of time for all of this that I've been provided with.

JUDGE MAY: We will shorten this. We hear the point you make. Are you asking us for more time? Are you applying for more time?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm not asking you for anything. I'm asking you --

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Then in that case I will give you the answer, if you're not asking. The answer is this: That as you were told before the recess, you were given a month's recess, you were given these extra two weeks - a total of six weeks in all - to prepare. We acknowledge that there is an amount of material for you to get through, but as was explained to you before the recess, you should have a list now of the witnesses who are to be called. We will require the Prosecution to serve on you the exhibits which they are going to refer to. You have the pre-trial brief. You have the indictment. And you should prepare those matters.

Now, we have considered that before. We made our ruling which we told you about. You don't have any applications? That is the position, that we start in two weeks.

Now -- wait a moment. Now, do you want to say anything about this matter which you raised earlier? Do you want to raise a matter about this ^{10167 BLANK PAGE 10168} interview or not? If you don't, we shall ask Mr. Wladimiroff if he has any comments, and we shall pass on to deal with any other business.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have got something to say, but I haven't completed this, Mr. May. Are you claiming that --

JUDGE MAY: I have ruled on that matter. You're making no application, and I've told you what the answer is. So we're moving on. You must understand this, Mr. Milosevic: In a court, business has to be dealt with in an orderly fashion. People are not allowed to speak whatever is in their mind at any time.

Now, do you wish to make any -- I have invited you to make an observation about the matter which you raised, this interview. If you choose not to, it's a matter for you. If you don't want to make any observation, all well and good, we shall simply ask Mr. Wladimiroff about it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do have a comment, but I have a question that precedes that, Mr. May. Last week, invoking some new facts that we saw from the statement of Mr. Kevin Curtis, I required that you schedule a hearing devoted to habeas corpus and all relevant international covenants and conventions that pertain to that. You did not schedule such a hearing. You did not give an answer. And I wish to hear your answer with regard to that, Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: It's not for you to hear an answer. The position is this: That we have ruled upon the question of the lawfulness of arrest. You will find it in our decision of November last year. You can read it again. ¹⁰¹⁶⁹ If you say that there is some new matter which arises which makes it right that in the middle of the trial we should consider the question of your arrest, which, as I've said, does not seem to be relevant at this stage, but if there is some new matter, why, then, you must raise it in due course in front us and it may be that you can put it briefly into writing.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, Mr. May. Could you give me an answer? My rights that are guaranteed by international covenants and conventions, do they depend on the way I address you?

JUDGE MAY: I've given you the answer. It's a matter for you whether you take it up or not.

Now, do you want to deal with this interview?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to say something about the interview, but I have some other questions that Mr. Nice spent far more time on, far more than I did. I asked you whether my rights depend on whether I address you in writing or orally, and are these rights not applicable if I address you orally?

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Right, Mr. Milosevic. You have ten minutes to deal with something new. We are not going to deal with the habeas corpus point. We have dealt with that, we have ruled on it, I'm not going back to it. You can read our ruling, I suggest the one in November, and that will thoroughly cover the matter.

Now, in your ten minutes you can deal with any matters which ¹⁰¹⁷⁰ Mr. Nice raised, since there were matters, but you must also deal with any matters concerning Mr. Wladimiroff's interview. We will then give Mr. Wladimiroff the opportunity to respond.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] These ten minutes pertain to both Mr. Wladimiroff and Mr. Nice; is that right?

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice's matters were all concerned with administrative matters concerning the Prosecution. They had virtually nothing to do with you and nothing you could take objection to. But if you wish to address us on some relevant matter, you can, but time is going. We only have the court, as you know, for a limited time, and we're rising at quarter to.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to make it clear here: As far as I understood it, since you finished this Kosovo stage, it is your conclusion that some witnesses should be called in retrograde, so to speak. You do whatever you please anyway, but I wish to tell you that K31 and K39 are persons that we know nothing about. We have no idea who this is, nor did I get ever any kind of statement, any kind of information with regard to these witnesses who are quite new for me. That is what I wanted to say about the review.

And the 56 witnesses whose lists you have provided for the beginning of this continuation that you've announced, I did not get anything for 16 of them, and some I got in the English language. And thirdly, if I understand things correctly, Defence attorneys in this institution of yours get materials one month in advance. You've given me a deadline of ten days in advance. Because you proclaimed my ¹⁰¹⁷¹ right to defend myself, I assume that I should get more time rather than less time let alone three times less than what Defence attorneys get. That is what I have to say on that subject.

Now, as for the interview of Mr. Wladimiroff, you can see this in colour here, a facsimile, so you can see the authentic form. First I'm going to say a few words about what you proscribe yourself in your Rules, because in this interview, Mr. Wladimiroff says -- or, rather, explains that there is already sufficient evidence for me to be found guilty, et cetera. And according to Article 20 of the Professional Code of Conduct for Defence counsel who appear before the Court, it is considered to be contempt of court if they act in a way which would not make it possible to have justice done before the court. That is your own Article 20. Pre-empting a court's decision by the friends of the court - that is to say, your friend, one that you're paying - before the Defence case has even started, so that is to say the first third of the Prosecutor's part of the game and before the case for Bosnia and Croatia, is certainly something that hampers justice, which according to your Article 77, constitutes contempt of court and that is acting in violation of the court.

And on the 11th of January, 2002, you ruled about the friends, and it says that the amici should help the Trial Chamber, and pre-empting a decision now is not one that would be helpful to the Court because, according to Article 21 of your own Statute, an accused person is considered innocent before proven guilty. That is in accordance with your Statute. ¹⁰¹⁷² So in this case, the friend of the court appears in the role of promoter of the media picture with regard to this failed indictment, trying to get things to be better. So he should be sitting on the Prosecution bench, that other bench over there, not over here. It is my opinion, along with these norms of yours that are obviously not even being observed by your employee who you appointed friend of the court, I think that the fiasco of this indictment should not make it possible to support it in the media so unethically. I'm not even referring to professional treatment, I'm talking ethics. After all, there you can see the true role of the mentioned friend of the court; to support the false indictment.

In all fairness, in this interview he does explain that he is going to leave this job altogether because he will no longer be paid, as was originally said, and that's not paid enough, that he's paid very little, et cetera, et cetera. But at any rate, before he leaves, because he is unsatisfied with his salary, he wants to meet the obligation that he took upon himself, namely to support this false indictment, which in my opinion is not only impermissible but also scandalous from the point of view of the behaviour of any individual who aspires to deal with the law or any kind of ethical matters.

That is what I wish to say in relation to this interview. Please go ahead and read it. Please. You have three different versions of the translation, so here it is in colour, in the Dutch language, with a picture of Mr. Wladimiroff. According to what I have here in front of me, he is even entering polemics with American media [In English] "[Previous ¹⁰¹⁷³ translation continues]... now is enough to convict Milosevic, he says. The trial would only be on Kosovo. There is enough proof. There is a clear link proven between the army, police, slaughters in Kosovo and Milosevic. The Dutch lawyer does not agree with American colleagues that the witness from the former inner circle has to come forward saying that Milosevic actually commanded the murders to make conviction possible. There is no smoking gun found, but it is very naive to think that people from Milosevic regime will testify against him since this would lead to prosecution in their own country as well. The written proof has been destroyed evidently ..." [Interpretation] and so on. He is asserting things that he can truly know nothing about. And this is the blackest possible accusation, even blacker than what we've heard from Mr. Nice, Mrs. Del Ponte and others that we've heard on behalf of this false and failed indictment.

Regrettably, through this kind of media gesture, he's trying to revive it and bring it back onto the scene. Of course, with the assistance of the media that are under the control of these quisling authorities in Belgrade now. They immediately took the bait and already last night they said, "Well, here --"

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you're going beyond what is proper.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Very well, Mr. May. I think that I have made this point.

JUDGE MAY: Let me deal, first of all, with the earlier complaint you made about the amount of time you received.

The 16 statements -- Mr. Nice, can you help us with the 16 ¹⁰¹⁷⁴ statements the accused says he hasn't got. Would you review that and make sure that he has. It may be that there are statements which have been held back under the Rules.

MR. NICE: I think so. And Your Honour, I will also have to advise him and the Chamber of a revised order of witnesses. It's inevitably had to be revised because of the problems we've had with our first one or two witnesses for reasons I've already advanced. I have the list here. I'll make sure it gets to him and to you today.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. The other point is the ten days. The order we made that in certain sensitive witnesses there was only ten days' notice to be given, it was an order of the Trial Chamber. But let me move on to the other matter.

We will hear from Mr. Wladimiroff in a moment, but I make it plain at the outset, Mr. Milosevic, that this is a Trial Chamber of professional Judges. Much is written about this trial, we know, but it is totally ignored by the Trial Chamber. The only matter with which we are concerned is the evidence which is produced in this court and the arguments which we hear in this court. Those are the only matters with which we are concerned and on which we form our judgement. Comment of any sort outside is completely irrelevant and is ignored. But nonetheless, we will take up the matter which you raise.

Mr. Wladimiroff, you should deal, if you would, with this interview.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Yes, Your Honour. The quotes in the article are a misrepresentation of what I have said, let me start to say this. And I ¹⁰¹⁷⁵ can very well understand that the accused is upset reading the first part of these quotes and repetition of that quote further on in the article. The publication has not been authorised, and I regret it has been published. During the break, I went down, because then I learned about the article, asked for a copy, and I got a copy. I read it for the first time.

Let me explain that I have seen representatives of the media before. So far, they all well understood my position, and if necessary, I clarified that, and no one has ever published anything I felt uncomfortable with in terms of not being authorised. And I regret again that this time someone simply published things that I did not approve. But I should clarify myself about the quotes that upset the accused. Let me say this: I have certainly not said there is sufficient evidence to convict the accused. What I have said, or words to that effect, is that at this stage of the trial, on the face of what has been said during the Prosecution case, there is a kind of relation between the accused and the events in Kosovo. Perhaps not all events, but if it would be half of it, it would be a relevant factor for the Trial Chamber, and that's a matter for the Court. That is what I have said, or words to that effect. I remember that very well.

Let me say that there were further quotes which are of minor detail. If necessary, I will comment on that, but these are more or less very pertinent words which I do not recognise as to be mine. And if I had it in front of me to authorise, I would have corrected it. But nevertheless, it has been printed. ¹⁰¹⁷⁶ Let me finally say this: I'm not very happy with this situation. This is not good for the trial, it's not good for the accused, it's not good for me, and not good for the amici. Really, I distance myself from things that were distorted, and I regret that it happened.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Wladimiroff, I have read the article, and I have identified three passages that could call into question your qualification to continue as amicus. The first one you have referred to, but what I have here is slightly different from what you read. It says: "If this trial were only about Kosovo and one had to draw up the balance now, Milosevic would certainly be convicted."

MR. WLADIMIROFF: I've seen that as well, Your Honour, and as I've said, that's a misrepresentation of what I really have said. It's not my words, and I deny the extent of it. It's not what I said.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What you're saying you said was something to the effect that there was evidence?

MR. WLADIMIROFF: No. What I've said is that we have seen during the Prosecution case, at least on the face of it, there is a link between the offence in Kosovo and the accused. That may be not for all events, but even if it were half of it, it is a relevant factor for the Trial Chamber when reaching a verdict. Something of that extent.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The second passage is this, it says: "The aim of this trial is to show that Milosevic is responsible for the horrible things that happened in his country."

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Yes. In my version here, I have written there -- I am convinced I have not phrased it in this way. If I have said ¹⁰¹⁷⁷ something to that extent, I'm confident I have said "to examine," not "to show." It's a very unfortunate way to phrase it, and I'm sure I have not said it in that way. At least were that pass shown to me before it was printed, I would have corrected it as being untrue; it is to examine.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I could see how a mistake like that could be made.

The third one is the last page, and you're dealing here with the forthcoming evidence in relation to Bosnia and Croatia, and what is in quotation is as follows: "They had more time to prepare and are more familiar with the issues at hand. It should not be a problem to knit a circle of evidence around Milosevic."

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Again, Your Honour, I certainly have not said that. It would be stupid to say. I can't remember having said anything to that extent, really. We had spoken of what is coming up, and I remember something to the extent of they have a different task here because they were prepared, they had more time to do so. So I think I may have said something like it should not be a problem to present the evidence in a more organised way, something like to that, because that fits together with what I've said before. But really, I'm sure I've not said this. And once again, if the article had been presented to me, I would either have struck it out or altered it because that's not a fair representation of what was the discussion about.

JUDGE ROBINSON: These are important matters that the Chamber will have to consider, particularly in light of the functions that were assigned to the amicus, one of which is to make any submissions or ¹⁰¹⁷⁸ objections to evidence properly open to the accused during the trial proceedings. I mean, I will have to be -- to be sure that I'm confident that you would be in a position to make such submissions. So this is a matter which, as I said, the Chamber will have to look at very, very carefully.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: I understand, Your Honour. Once again, I regret it happened. This is the first time that something has been published without authorisation in my experience. It may have been passed without me knowing, but what I am aware of, and once again it's unfortunate it happened, but it's not really something I can avoid, let's put it that way. Normally it's always given back to me for authorisation. This time they failed.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You can avoid it by not giving the interview.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: You're right, Your Honour. In hindsight, you're absolutely right.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Wladimiroff, could you put in writing about your position in --

MR. WLADIMIROFF: No problem at all. Sure.

JUDGE KWON: That would be helpful.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: Yes.

MR. NICE: May I make two points which I feel I must make? One is -- three points.

First point: Textbook example of why counsel involved in cases should never talk to the press.

Second point: There was an earlier occasion when I'm afraid ¹⁰¹⁷⁹ Mr. Wladimiroff had to apologise to the Prosecutor because he was misreported.

Third point: This report does also refer to closed sessions, which is unfortunate, and I have to draw that to your attention. May I say two other things in 30 seconds. I was going --

JUDGE MAY: Let me say this: That the Trial Chamber, Mr. Wladimiroff, if you'd let us have your observations within seven days, if you please, we will then consider the position.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I don't know if I made adequately the suggestion that we might have a mid-break hearing to deal with administrative matters so as not to imperil the start. I had wondered about a week today, which might have been convenient, but I think perhaps possibly Monday week. It may be that nothing will happen, but I can easily see that issues, practical issues, may have arisen. And the final point I would make is that, in answer to Your Honour's question about the testimony on the Joint Command, it was Radomir Markovic who referred to it. And the reason I think Your Honour had trouble immediately identifying it was because he actually went through various terminological changes before the words "Joint Command" were reached. But I think there did come a time when those words were used.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you.

MR. WLADIMIROFF: A very short remark, Your Honour, responding to what the Prosecutor said about counsel being appropriate to make comment or speak to the press. Main I remind the court that the trial is a different one than a domestic trial and one of the aims of the Tribunal is ¹⁰¹⁸⁰ to address the public, and consequently, this Tribunal has a press office. Counsel and amici are not a part of that system. They have their own responsibility, and we try to fill that as conscientiously as we can.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I should just like to ask for you indulgence one more minute longer and it has to do with something Mr. Nice spoke about linked to what is under point 9, that is, that we would have to hear three more witnesses. But if I understood Mr. Nice correctly, he allows for the possibility of calling some other witnesses after the completion of the Kosovo part of the trial, to come here and give their testimony. That's my first point. I think that this would be something that goes against the grain of the Rules and Regulations because otherwise the Kosovo case would not have been completed.

And secondly, when you come to deliberate, Patrick Ball can now change his report in one way and then submit it later on. It's up to you to decide, but I think that what has already taken place, and something that has already been given form and content should not be changed, But of course it's up to you to pass a ruling. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you, Mr. Tapuskovic. The answer is that any added report or any addendum to the report would require the leave of the Trial Chamber before it would be admitted. That is the first point. Likewise, any further witnesses to be called can only be called subject to leave. So an application will have to be made in each case for leave to call them. Without that leave, they won't be called. ¹⁰¹⁸¹ Mr. Nice, yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I stood up because --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: I'd simply stood up because I thought you were addressing the court. I have nothing further to add.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May --

JUDGE MAY: It's the last day, as I understand it, of the Albanian booth, the last day that we will have the Albanian translation. It would be wrong for us to part with their services without thanking them very much for their assistance in this case.

Likewise, I understand Mr. Ryneveld is leaving us, and again we're grateful for his assistance in the matter.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic. What is your final comment?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no final comment. All I would like to do is to -- for you to enable me to hold a press conference as well. The Prosecutors are constantly giving statements to the press. I can see now that the amicus are making statements to the press. It would be logical to allow me to hold a press conference likewise.

JUDGE MAY: The usual Rules of Detention apply to you. We will adjourn now until the 26th.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 26th day

of September, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.