¹³⁰⁶⁰

Wednesday, 20 November 2002

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. I understand we're in closed session for a matter you wish to raise.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. The Prosecution would like to raise a serious matter in relation to this witness. Through the Outreach Programme of the Tribunal, we have received information that the name of the witness was reported in the VIP Daily News Report. It's a Belgrade-based press agency. And we have prepared the document for everyone to be available.

On page 5 of this Daily News Report, there is the item "The Hague Tribunal and the trial of Milosevic continued after the recess," and it reports about the open parts of the testimony that the witness gave. But then in the third-last paragraph, it says: "Peter Michael Mueller, legal representative of Witness C-036, who is, according to documents of Prosecution, accused himself and is soon to be indicted, is present as Witness MILAN BABIC giving evidence in the courtroom of The Hague Tribunal." And the last paragraph says:

"Former officials of Krajina who are living in Belgrade say that it is possible that under the code of protected Witness MILAN BABIC is Milan Babic, Prime Minister of the SAO Krajina government at the time when these events happened." ¹³⁰⁶¹ First of all, the Prosecution wants to state that there are no documents that the Prosecution is actually accusing this witness. The only documents that exist are the indictment, where the witness is mentioned as a co-perpetrator. And there was also this document, the conviction from the Croatian courts, that was discussed in private session. In addition to that, the status of the witness was also only discussed in private session.

Therefore, the Prosecution is very much concerned and alarmed, because the Prosecution, of course, did not inform anyone outside of the Tribunal about the status of the witness. The Prosecution is not only alarmed but will also try to find out which reporting is actually the basis of the information in the press agency, because there must be a source for this information in the press agency, and we try to find out. But we wanted to put the Trial Chamber on notice of this problem. At the moment, there is only the speculation who the Witness C-036 is, and the Prosecution is determined to keep his identity hidden and would like to proceed in the way that we did before, that is, parts only in open session, and everything that relates to the identity of the witness in private session.

The Prosecution hopes that this event does not discourage the witness to give testimony further on, and hope he's not scared to continue to tell the truth. This is what the Prosecution wanted to inform the Trial Chamber.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Investigation should continue, and when you have further to report, you can do so in closed ¹³⁰⁶² session to us.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: We'll go into open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're now in open session.

WITNESS: WITNESS MILAN BABIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]

Q. Good morning, Witness.

A. Yes.

Q. Yesterday we concluded discussing a meeting, and we spoke about the unification, or the attempts of the unification of the two Krajinas and what was discussed. And just to conclude this, I would like to put two documents to you, and that is Exhibit 352, tab 46 and 47. Tab 46 is the contract on the cooperation concluded between the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina and the municipalities of Bosnian Krajina of the 24th of June, 1991; and tab 47 is the declaration of the unification of the community of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina and the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina of the 27th of June, 1991.

We do not need to discuss this further. It's just -- can you authenticate that these are the documents, underlying documents, to the events that you described?

A. Yes. Both these documents refer to the events that I have testified about, the contract on cooperation from Banja Luka, and a declaration on unification from Bosansko Grahovo. ¹³⁰⁶³

Q. And the unification, the second document, was then not signed, as we can see, by Mr. Kupresanin. Is that due to the intervention of Mr. Karadzic that you spoke about yesterday?

A. Yes, that's right. Karadzic prohibited it. He even asked deputies from the Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina to go back and to vote again against the declaration. However, they refused and they left.

Q. I would like to put a third document to the witness in this context, and it's tab 45 of Exhibit 352, and it is a letter of Radovan Karadzic. And in this letter, it -- I quote:

"Along with the congratulations, accept our assurances that the Bosnia and Herzegovina Serb National Council will always by the spiritual, cultural, political and state unity also mean state unity of the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina and all the other Serb regions with the Serbia mother-country within a free, democratic and federative Yugoslavia, regardless of its site -- size." Sorry, "size."

We do not need to discuss this because it speaks for itself. Can you tell us -- there is no date on this document. Can you tell us when it was sent? Do you know that? Approximately.

A. It was after the 21st of December, 1990.

Q. And how do you know that? Is it because of the congratulation?

A. Yes. On the 21st of December was the date when the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina was proclaimed in 1990.

Q. We have yesterday spoken about the goal "all Serbs in one state," and you have testified about how Mr. Seselj understood it and what was supposed -- what was planned or what was not addressed in relation to the ¹³⁰⁶⁴ non-Serb population in this territory. What did you see happen on the ground to the non-Serb population in the SAOs in Croatia?

A. In August 1991, the Yugoslav People's Army entered into the war with Croatia. The JNA engaged in combat operations in such a way that by moving the front line closer to the opposing party, using heavy artillery, it forced the population and members of the armed forces of the Croatian government and the entire population to withdraw and retreat from those territories. In this way, the JNA, as of August 1991, engaged in a war so that the territories that it captured would be left without any Croatian inhabitants, or very few of them. Houses and buildings were destroyed in the combat operations and subsequently. Property was looted. And in this way, JNA gained control of territory together with other armed formations that were within its ranks.

Q. Which other armed formations do you mean?

A. They were units of the Territorial Defence under the command of the Yugoslav People's Army and the militia or police of Krajina, as well as volunteer units, so-called volunteer units, under the control of a parallel structure of state security and the police of Krajina and units commanded by the state security of Serbia.

Q. Where did you see such activities unfold? Can you give us the names of the location where you saw that happen?

A. I saw that in the area of Kijevo around Vrljika, the area around Drnis, the area around Obrovac, that is Maslinica, around Kostajnica, around Glina, Vidusevac, Petrinja, Slunj, and other places in those areas. ¹³⁰⁶⁵

Q. In the Kostajnica region, were the villages Dubica, Cerovljani, and Bacin attacked in this way?

A. Yes.

Q. In the region close to Plaski, were the villages Saborsko, Poljanak, and Lipovanic attacked in this way?

A. They were.

Q. And in the region near Knin, were Skabrnja, Nadin, and Bruska attacked in this way?

A. They were.

Q. Were these villages that I just mentioned, were these Croatian villages?

A. Yes, Croatian or majority Croatian villages.

Q. Did these villages pose a threat to the JNA or the Serb people in the region?

A. They didn't.

Q. You mentioned that various formations were involved. Did they get involved in a certain pattern so that one formation went first, did something, and then others follow? Can you describe how these forms of attack actually were conducted?

A. As far as I know, there was a rule, and that was that the first to take part in attacks were police units or volunteer units or units under the control of the State Security Service. They would engage in provocations, provocative shootings, individual opening of fire towards Croatian settlements, and then they would open fire with mortars. In other words, they would provoke the other side, upon which the JNA would ¹³⁰⁶⁶ join in with its artillery and all the units under its control.

Q. You mentioned state security. Which state security did you mean was involved?

A. The state security of Serbia.

Q. When the JNA had joined and attacked, what happened afterwards when a village was taken?

A. As a rule, there was looting and torching of property.

Q. Who did this, which formations?

A. This was done also by the JNA, while it held control, especially in Drnis. I know of a case there. And then the JNA would hand over control, or rather, it would leave the area without any control for a certain period of time. The police would not establish its control there and then the looting would become generalised.

Q. Those -- you said that -- what did the Croatian population do when this attack occurred?

A. They fled.

Q. Did anyone stay behind? Did any people stay behind, and if so, what happened to them?

A. Very few people stayed behind, mostly elderly people. After that, there would be individual killings, which in most cases would not be elucidated.

Q. Were people also detained?

A. Yes, there was detention as well.

Q. Detained people, were they mistreated in detention? Do you know?

A. I heard stories that there was mistreatment of people in prison. ¹³⁰⁶⁷

Q. Were prisons actually established in Knin, and do you know whether people were mistreated there?

A. There were two prisons in Knin. One was controlled by the police, and another by the JNA. I heard that there was mistreatment in the prison controlled by the police.

JUDGE KWON: When did you hear that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Towards the end of 1991/the beginning of 1992. I was told this by the Minister of Justice, Risto Matkovic. He was the first to tell me. And then later on, in 1992 and 1993, there was quite a lot of talk about this by ordinary people, and that was the reason why the Minister of Justice, Risto Matkovic, sought for the ministry to take over control of the prisons that were held by the police.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Just clear up something. You said -- see if I can find it - after the population fled, some people stayed behind, mostly elderly. After that you said there would be individual killings, and then this: "... which in most cases would not be elucidated." Now, that's not clear. What did you mean by "elucidated"? It may be a translation problem, but perhaps you could just clarify it, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That an investigation was not conducted to discover the perpetrator of the killing.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, I would like to play now a few intercepts dealing with ¹³⁰⁶⁸ the matter, but I forgot to ask you something. Were people also -- those who stayed behind, these elderly that you said, were they also deported or forcibly transferred to other places outside of the control of this Serbian territory?

A. I heard that there were cases of individual local officials having to shelter these people, to protect them from people in the police or the state security so that they wouldn't kill them, but that this was not sufficient. And I was told of a group that they had to help leave the area under their control so that they could cross over into the territory under the control of the Croatian government. I heard this over the media, that there were large-scale deportations, such as the one in Ilok. I also heard stories that people from Kostajnica, Croats, left the town after the town had been captured by the Serb forces.

Q. You said that local officials had to shelter these people, and you mentioned in this context the police and the state security. They had to shelter them from the police and the state security. Is that the parallel structure again that you mentioned earlier on, around Milan Martic and Frenki Simatovic?

A. Yes, and the people linked to them and under their protection.

Q. Which official --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think, Your Honour, we have to go into private session.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: ¹³⁰⁶⁹

Q. Which official told you that?

A. [redacted] [redacted], told me, after those events, when we arrived in Belgrade. He told me that he had to protect people from people who were under Frenki's protection, [redacted], to put them in a house, where he fed them, so that they wouldn't be killed by people within Frenki's circle, but that this was not sufficient, but that he had to escort them towards [redacted], that is, territory under the control of the Croatian government.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go now into open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We want now to play a part of an intercept, and it's the Exhibit 353, tab 16. And we actually split this intercept into two parts: track 2 and track 3. First we play a part of this. It's track 2.

[Intercept played]

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters apologise, but it is impossible to follow this.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can the transcript be put to the witness, the transcript? The sections played are marked in the transcript, and in the English it is also marked in the translation. Can we try it again?

JUDGE KWON: If you could tell the page number. I don't see any mark.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. The first section that is played is on ¹³⁰⁷⁰ page 2, and it starts with "Where does he ..." and it ends with "You offered them what I would never offer."

JUDGE MAY: So that everybody can follow this, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, I think it may be an idea to put some foundations down. Perhaps you can deal with the witness. He heard the voices. Who do we have speaking on this tape, so that we can --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. I actually wanted to let the witness hear it first. And as it is not possible to translate it, I don't think that it makes any sense to continue playing it.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters apologise, but they can't find the exact section.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's actually marked for you too, but ... Okay.

Q. Witness, who is speaking?

A. I recognise the speakers -- the voice of Radovan Karadzic, but I didn't recognise the other voice. So just one voice: Radovan Karadzic's.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Maybe we can put the English translation on the overhead projector so ...

JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, if I can assist you. You distributed the separate binder for the --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: -- for the intercepts to be played in the Court.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: The order -- the binding order is out -- is not orderly manner, and the first document is that -- I think this is the ¹³⁰⁷¹ first document.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No. It's the second one. We have already played one, and it's actually exactly in the order that they are played. It's now the second document.

JUDGE KWON: First document. So the interpreters may be mistaken with the order. You can check with this.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I believe you. The problem is, I personally do not have this binder, and therefore --

JUDGE MAY: Well, could you get it during the adjournment? Could you get it during the adjournment, and then at least we'll be speaking from the same sheet.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I actually have it here. The interpreter should have that copy.

THE INTERPRETER: We have a copy, but it's unmarked, so we're unable to find the exact portion, and we can't translate from the tape.

JUDGE MAY: I don't think we can waste any further time.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: Will the witness be able to identify the second speaker if more is played, do you anticipate, or does he simply not know who this man is?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Do you know who the second man is? Could you identify the second speaker to speak in addition to Mr. Karadzic?

A. From the conversation that I listened to and from the transcript, this one here, and from the information that the other participant in the ¹³⁰⁷² conversation referred to, it is Vojko Djogo [as interpreted], the president of the Association of the Serbs in Belgrade. Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Belgrade.

Q. And did you know this person?

A. Yes. I met him on several occasions.

Q. I think we simply follow now the transcript on page 2, and you can see it now on the ELMO. There it says:

GOJKO DJOGO: Where does he ... where does he mean to start a war in Sarajevo? Is he a madman?

RADOVAN KARADZIC: He is. I think that they should be beaten if they start the war. They will be ... they will ... well, they will disappear, that is...

GOJKO DJOGO: There will be a lot of blood, but ...

RADOVAN KARADZIC: They will disappear, that people will disappear from the face of the earth if they, if they insist now. Their only chance was to accept what we had offered them. It was too much, we did offer them too much.

To which people is Mr. Karadzic referring, and what does he mean?

A. The Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Muslim people.

Q. And I would like -- I would like to direct you now to the page 6. That's the second marked, the second marked part. If it could be put on the ELMO so that I can read it.

GJOKO DJOGO: Oh, my God, let them cleanse this down there ... let them, just one night ... here, they killed them 8 people, why didn't they ... 8 people, why didn't they attack Dubrovnik after last night, ¹³⁰⁷³ man!?

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Well, yes. And they killed them on Bosnian side.

GJOKO DJOGO: First 8 people in Ravno, man. Well, that's ... that Ravno in Popovo?

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Of course, on Bosnian side, that is in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

GJOKO DJOGO: Well, you know what should be done ... that is good enough reason to raid Dubrovnik tonight.

And Mr. Karadzic said: "Yes." To which Ravno are they referring, and to which killing of eight people? Do you know that?

A. Ravno is a place in Herzegovina, on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina near Dubrovnik, and it was there where there was fighting, and some people were killed, Serbs.

Q. And -- yes. Thank you. And we now go further, to the next section that is marked. It starts on the same page, and it starts with --

A. I beg your pardon. From the text here, they were killed -- eight people were killed, but I can't say exactly who. I know that there was fighting there, but I don't actually know who it was who was killed.

Q. The next -- the next quote:

RADOVAN KARADZIC: There isn't. They, they incite the irresponsible MPs to follow that idea, that they have to get a state. They scared them with Serbs, as if Serbs did any harm to anyone. And then they made the commitment that now ... and then this Milos ... this ¹³⁰⁷⁴ what's-his-name made, Izetbegovic towards Tudjman, and Tudjman towards him, and one encourages the other, you know. Since ... this ... Izetbegovic has promised Tudjman the whole Bosnia, and Tudjman encourages ... and he promises him that the Muslims will rise against the Serbs to fight.

GJOKO DJOGO: You just keep on lying them a little more there, do ... you give them milk and honey until this, up there this job has accumulated until they determine, until they were cleansed this terrain in order to ...

And then Mr. Karadzic says:

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Aha. Well, no. They must know that there are 20.000 armed Serbs around Sarajevo, man. This is not normal, they will, they will disappear! Sarajevo will be a melting pot in which 300.000 Muslims will die. They are not normal. I don't know. I'll have to tell them openly now: people, don't push your fuckin' luck - there are three, four hundred thousand armed Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What do you think? In addition, there is the army, technical equipment and all. What do you think you can do, secede like Croatia did? And they do literally go ... yesterday, they told us during these negotiations, I mean at the Assembly session, that the sovereign Bosnia means independent Bosnia, in case that Yugoslavia ends ...

Can you comment on this?

A. This is a conversation about the positions of Alija Izetbegovic and the SDA party and the Bosnian Muslims and the relationship of Karadzic towards them. ^{13075 BLANK PAGE 13076}

Q. Were there 20.000 armed Serbs around Sarajevo? Do you know that?

A. I don't know exactly how many there were, but I do know that the Serbs armed themselves around Sarajevo.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, Mr. Tapuskovic is standing.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic -- I'm sorry. Mr. Tapuskovic, yes.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think that we've already cleared this point up, that is that the witness is just there to say whether he recognises the voices and not to say what he thinks somebody thought when he said what he said. I don't think that that is the object.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. He can't say what he thinks somebody is thinking. That's for the other person to say. He can, however, give evidence about factual matters about which he knows which arise from what's said on the tape.

Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Let us move on.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. We go to the next marked quote. It's on page 8 in the English, and Mr. Radovan Karadzic says there:

RADOVAN KARADZIC: We will not force them into anything, but they do not have a way to secede. I think this is clear to the army, to everyone. It will be bloodshed. The army will not, well, use 2 planes but will use 20 in every action ...

I go now to another part that is marked. It's on page 10, and there is a reference to Vukovar, and Mr. Djogo says: ¹³⁰⁷⁷

GJOKO DJOGO: That damned Vukovar, it's a stick in the throat, man!

RADOVAN KARADZIC: OK, that is not important. It is under siege. There are just some rats in the holes. However, what is most important is that Bos ... Bosnia is full of soldiers, you know. Was Bosnia at that time full of soldiers, and if so, what kind of soldiers?

A. Yes, the Yugoslav People's Army.

Q. What is said here about Vukovar, does that match with your own knowledge of the events?

A. Yes. I do know that Vukovar was in an encirclement for several months, encircled by the JNA forces and the armed units under its command or working together with the JNA. Up until the 18th of November, that is, 1991.

Q. Then on page 14 there is another section where references are made to territories, and Mr. Djogo says.

GJOKO DJOGO: Sorry, they should say that is strategic, you know - two or three villages, as well as these do here. Hats off to what they have done in, in ... barbarian act, burn everything - the end of story! Certain territory, the one around the border, has to be cleansed. Do you know to which this refers? Actually, there is also a quote before that where they speak about Dubrovnik. Do you know to which part of the conversation this refers to?

A. Well, the area around Dubrovnik.

Q. Who is cleansing what, do you know? ¹³⁰⁷⁸

A. The JNA is taking control of that area.

Q. Mr. Karadzic continues in relation to Dubrovnik. He said:

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Dubrovnik was never ... never Croatian.

GJOKO DJOGO: Eh, to shorten this ... of Dubrovnik ... to end them and exactly there, where they have stopped now, near the little bridge near Cavtat.

And a little further down they speak about the Dubrovacka River and everybody should be killed there, and Mr. Karadzic says:

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes, yes. And Mr. Djogo says:

GJOKO DJOGO: Kill everyone. To whom does this refer? Who should kill everyone, and which region is meant?

JUDGE MAY: I think Mr. Tapuskovic's comment is right there. That's for us to determine from what is said in the conversation. The witness can say what he knows of his own knowledge, but this is just a matter of interpretation of the document.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Who at that time -- where -- who was in Cavtat securing a region up to Cavtat? Do you know that?

A. The enemy side. The enemies to the JNA, that is to say the army of the government of Croatia.

Q. And where was at that time the JNA? We're talking of October 1991.

A. In the area around Dubrovnik. They were deployed there. Cavtat ¹³⁰⁷⁹ is right by Dubrovnik. Dubrovacka Rijeka is to the north of Dubrovnik, so that's it.

Q. This is all in relation to this intercept, and I would like to turn now to the next intercept. We actually had planned to play a part of it, and I wonder if we should give it another try.

JUDGE MAY: Which tab are we on? Which tab?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's tab 30, and the witness should have the B/C/S transcript, and on the overhead projector we should put the marked section.

For the technical booth, it's track 4.

[Intercept played]

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think we can -- we can't hear this properly and should not do it. I'm a little bit surprised because the quality was very well during the --

JUDGE KWON: Mrs. Uertz-Retzlaff, if we cannot hear -- we cannot play the video, how can you confirm the content of the transcript? By the witness?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The witness actually heard this, these intercepts in the preparation for his testimony.

Q. Witness, did you hear this intercept and could you actually listen to it?

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, did you assist the translators providing the transcript of this intercept?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, he listened to the intercept, ¹³⁰⁸⁰ and at the same time had the transcript, the B/C/S transcript, to check whether it is the text that is spoken.

Q. Could you listen to the intercept, or was it also so disturbed? Can you say?

A. The conversation was much clearer, much more discernible, when I listened to it the first time.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. I understand that the booth haven't got the original. Is that right?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: They should have the CD that we actually also had, and it was clear, clearly -- you could hear it clearly, and there was no noise in it like this.

[Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It was actually --

JUDGE MAY: There seems to be a problem with this CD. We cannot waste further time on it now. I suggest that during the adjournment, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, you deal with the booth and see what the problem is, and we can return to it in due course.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. We can play this intercept at a later stage and give it another try.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: You have to also note, the pagination is different between the separate binder and the original binder. The pagination is all different, in a special document also.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Pagination is important in all these bundles. The ¹³⁰⁸¹ Prosecution should have every bundle paginated, or otherwise we are in total confusion.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. We will check in the break. We will check on these matters.

Q. Witness, you have described this pattern of events, and you described the regions in Croatia where you saw this happen. Was this pattern restricted to Croatian territories only or did you see that being repeated elsewhere?

A. I saw, first of all in August 1992, and then later on as well, in the subsequent months and years that followed, that the same thing happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. What did you see when you -- and how -- did you go there, and what did you see?

A. When I passed by that way, I saw that the settlements in which Croats and Muslims had lived before the war were devastated, completely empty and destroyed.

Q. And through which regions did you pass?

A. I passed through Bosanski Novi, Sanski Most, Prijedor, the area around Banja Luka, towards Brcko and Bijeljina, the area around Zvornik, towards Han Pijesak and Pale.

Q. Did Mr. Milosevic know what was happening on the ground? Can you say?

A. He must have known his service was present there, and I met the head of his security service down there.

Q. Witness, we have to go into private session for the next ¹³⁰⁸² question.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, you said you met the head of his security service down there. Whom did you meet, and when?

A. Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic. Jovica Stanisic I met in the area for the first time sometime in May 1991. It was April or May of 1991. And then I met him again in May 1995, together with Franko Simatovic, nicknamed Frenki. Mile Grbic from Bosanski Novi told me that he had firm links and contacts with Jovica Stanisic.

Q. Where did you meet Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic in -- No. I mean, where did you meet Jovica Stanisic in May 1991? What kind of a meeting was it?

A. In Radovan Karadzic's flat. It was a meeting in Radovan Karadzic's flat, and also present were Milan Martic and Velibor Ostojic.

Q. Who is Velibor Ostojic?

A. He was in the Executive Board of the SDS for Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was Minister of Information for a time and a close associate of Karadzic.

Q. What was the purpose of this meeting? What did you discuss there?

A. In fact, the people who led the conversation were Ostojic, Stanisic, and Karadzic, and they were discussing some maps, where the Serbs were in control and areas where they should establish control, or rather, the SDS, Karadzic's SDS party. ¹³⁰⁸³

Q. And why were you and Mr. Martic there? Why were you taking part --

A. Martic told me that Jovica Stanisic had asked us to come. It was my impression that we were just supposed to make "un acte de presence" there in Karadzic's flat. After that, we went to the SDS club in Sarajevo, which means we had dinner, actually. So he just wanted us to be present. That was my impression. We didn't have any great role to play in the conversation at all. We weren't asked, actually, about anything. We weren't asked our opinions. We just passed through Sarajevo and some of the settlements around it.

Q. You also mentioned that you met Mr. Stanisic in May 1995 in Bosnia. What was the -- what were the circumstances?

A. En route to Vukovar, and an Assembly of the Republic of Srpska Krajina was being held there in May 1995. I was invited to stop by in Bijeljina, to go to the municipality there, and from the municipality, they escorted me to the centre of the security service, or whatever it was called, the CBS in Bijeljina, and that was where Jovica Stanisic was, as well as Franko Simatovic, "Frenki", and Radovan Karadzic. Momcilo Krajisnik was also there. And I was accompanied by Rajko Lazajic, president of the Assembly of the RSK. Where he actually entered the hall, the room itself, I can't remember, but I think he went in together with me. And they had asked for me, because Stanisic and Karadzic had an idea, that is to say, through the social accounting service in Vukovar, the branch in Vukovar, to have fictitious payments paid into an account for military materiel and equipment, for weapons and ammunition which the ¹³⁰⁸⁴ Republika Srpska had procured in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. Was it discussed which military materiel were received when?

A. Well, not exactly. They just spoke about weapons and ammunition. I don't know what ones precisely. But it was a large quantity. I can't remember exactly how much, but quite large. According to my assessments at the time and the insight I had into matters of that kind, there was an inflation in May in Serbia, so there was a large money mass that was discussed. As to the type of weapons, I don't remember them specifying what kind of weapons and ammunition.

Q. Was it discussed from where -- you said the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Was it said in which way the weapons were received and from which factories or source?

A. They mentioned Kragujevac or Krusik.

Q. Kragujevac is in -- is it in Serbia?

A. Yes.

Q. Who is in control of the factories in Kragujevac?

A. It was a so-called special purpose plant used for military purposes, and it was controlled by the army, that is, the Ministry of Defence; the army of Yugoslavia and the Ministry of Defence, that is, the government of Yugoslavia.

Q. Witness, why were you asked to get involved and make fictitious payments?

A. At the time, the Prime Minister of Srpska Krajina was Borislav Mikelic, and Stanisic was in the Serbian Security Service, and they had a disagreement about the distribution of oil and of petroleum derivatives, ¹³⁰⁸⁵ and maybe that's why they didn't discuss it with him. He was in charge of such things.

JUDGE MAY: The witness will have to make plain what the plan was, because it's not at all clear.

What was the plan - just explain it to us so we can understand it - that they were discussing.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were discussing -- or rather, they were asking that, through the branch of the public accountancy service in Vukovar on the territory of the Republika Srpska Krajina, a fictitious payment should be made, on paper only, to factories in Serbia producing military equipment, and this equipment was purchased from Serbia by Karadzic, by the authorities of Republika Srpska.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, why couldn't the -- why could Republika Srpska not simply pay for the weapons they had gotten?

A. Because -- well, it couldn't pay because I assume they had no money, and they couldn't make this fictitious payment from Republika Srpska because there were no payments and no transactions between Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia. They had been cut off.

Q. Was there an embargo imposed on Republika Srpska at that time?

A. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia imposed, because of the amounts from the international community, an embargo, but this was only a pretense, and these were ways of actually getting around the embargo.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, we actually have left a little bit the proofing summary, the order of the proofing summary, in relation ¹³⁰⁸⁶ to the limited time that I have. We are now talking about paragraph 272 in the proofing summary, the relationship with the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia Bosnian Serbs.

Q. Did you actually assist in the way that you were asked to assist, that is, fake payments?

A. First of all, I was not in charge of this, and secondly, I didn't like this. I didn't see any reason why I should be asked to do this. I was the Minister of External Affairs, and Stanisic had complete control over Vukovar. I didn't go into any explanations, but I said it couldn't be done. And Krajisnik said, "Yes, yes, it can be done. I know. I'm an economist." However, I did nothing in this regard. I simply knew that this would be an inflationary move against Serbia and that we would suffer the consequences for it.

Q. You mentioned that there was a disagreement with Mr. Mikelic -- between Mr. Mikelic and Mr. Stanisic in relation to oil. Was the Republika Srpska at that time also supported with oil deliveries?

A. Yes. The State Security Service transported secretly over the River Sava petroleum derivatives for the Republic of Srpska Krajina.

Q. From where to where?

A. I know that in this way, distribution of oil from Mirkovci, Eastern Slavonia, which was then processed in the Pancevo refinery near Belgrade, was transported, and I also heard there had been some illegal purchases going against the embargo, imports of oil into Yugoslavia, and then it was distributed from Yugoslavia.

Q. And what was the problem with Mr. Mikelic in this regard? ¹³⁰⁸⁷

A. In regard to the distribution of quantities, what was for Serbia and what was for Republika Srpska Krajina, because Mikelic was authorised to distribute the oil taken from Mirkovci and processed in the Pancevo refinery.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, there is a mistake in the transcript, obviously. There is a reference to -- there is a reference to Mr. Krajisnik, that he said, "Yes, yes, it can be done." I do not think that the witness actually said that.

Q. Who said -- who confirmed that it could be done, this fake payment?

A. It was Stanisic and Karadzic who asked me to do this. When I said it couldn't be done, Krajisnik said yes. He said he knew it could be done, because he was an economist.

Q. Yes. Thank you. In relation to the matters that you just referred to, that is, the oil deliveries, I would like to put two documents to you.

JUDGE MAY: We're still in private session. Do we need to be in private session?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go now into open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to put to the witness two exhibits from Exhibit 352, tab 93 and tab 94. The first document, tab 93, is a document listed under the title "Ministry of Defence of the RSK," and it's dated the 2nd of August, 1994, to The President of the Republics. In ¹³⁰⁸⁸ this document, there is referred to a dramatic situation in relation to the fuel needed by the army and the limited amount that they actually get.

Q. Witness, this document, looking at the stamp and looking at the signature, is this a -- is that how you remembered the stamp and the letterhead?

A. Yes, yes, and the content as well.

Q. This shortage, who decided, actually, who received the deliveries of oil? Who made this decision about the deliveries of the oil that was provided to the RSK and the RS? Do you know that?

A. Jovica Stanisic, Mihalj Kertes, and Boro Mikelic. They controlled the flow of oil.

Q. How do you know that?

A. I know because Boro Mikelic told me. Radovan Stojicic "Badza" also told me, and so did people from Mirkovci.

Q. And the other document that I would like to put to you, it is a petition in relation -- to the president of the RSK and other officials of the RSK, in relation to the state of affairs in the Krajina Petroleum Refining and Sales Enterprise, seated in Mirkovci, and that is dated the 15th of July, 1994, and it's also again about the distribution of petroleum and petroleum products. Can you comment on this document in relation to the letterhead and the contents?

A. First of all, it says who received this and what the date was and under what number it was registered, and the signatures are those of people from Mirkovci.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we go in private session for one ¹³⁰⁸⁹ question?

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, you are listed here as one of the persons who received this document. Did you receive this document?

A. Yes. And I was also told orally about these requests by people from Mirkovci.

Q. Are these also the people who informed you about the role of Stanisic and Kertes in relation to the oil production there?

A. That's correct. That's correct.

Q. Thank you. Witness, I would like to return now to what we discussed about --

JUDGE MAY: Open session?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes, Your Honour.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. We have -- we did speak about the events that unfolded, and you described the pattern of attacks that occurred and what happened to the non-Serb population in the territories. When you saw the events develop, did you realise what the plan was for the non-Serb population in the regions that were to become part of the joint Serbian state?

A. As for the SAO Krajina, I understood that this was a consequence of the way in which the war was waged rather than part of a plan. ^{13090 BLANK PAGE 13091} However, in my view, this -- it was simply that the manner in which the war was waged was the same in all areas, and those were the things that happened. As for the interests of the Serbian people in the SAO Krajina, this went against the interests of the Serbian people in the SAO Krajina. It was a disaster for the people in the SAO Krajina as much as it was for the Croatian people.

Q. When did you -- when did this pattern start to be -- to become clear to you? Which time period?

A. Up to November 1991.

Q. You said up to November. When did it start?

A. It started in August 1991.

Q. You had --

A. Excuse me. It started even earlier. It started in May 1991.

Q. You had said on the first day of your testimony, you actually had mentioned that you believed in the beginning that the Serbs in Croatia were endangered in their position. At that time in May 1991 and up to November 1991, did you still believe that the Serbs in Croatia were endangered?

A. I personally believed it, up until the moment the JNA joined in the fighting.

Q. The state -- the state for all Serbs that you mentioned to be the goal, was it ever given up until 1995 or was it pursued further?

A. The idea was not given up, but the territory was revised on which the state would be created.

Q. Through which events was it revised? ¹³⁰⁹²

A. There were many events. President Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic changed their plan. The Serb territories in Croatia were to be given over to Croatian authority, and the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be divided between the Serbs and the Croats -- rather, between Croatia and Serbia.

Q. Witness, I would like now to turn to a different issue.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, we have to return to this as soon as we have sorted out the intercept problem, because we have several intercepts related to this situation, but I will now move on.

Q. Witness, you have mentioned that you met Mr. Milosevic on a lot of occasions, but we have no time to go into all these occasions. We have to discuss just a few of these meetings.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: First of all, private session.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. First in general terms, you said you met him, Mr. Milosevic, about 30 -- around 30 times. When you met him, how did you address him, and how did he address you?

A. I addressed him as Mr. President. He addressed me by my name, my first name.

Q. Did that ever change? Did you ever get close?

A. No.

Q. You also saw him together with Mr. Karadzic. How did Mr. Karadzic address Mr. Milosevic, and how did Mr. Milosevic address Mr. Karadzic? ¹³⁰⁹³

A. Karadzic also addressed him as Mr. President. Milosevic addressed him by his name.

Q. First name or last name?

A. He called him Radovan.

Q. When did you meet Mr. Milosevic for the first time and for the last time?

A. The first time I personally met him in October 1990. The last time in August, around the 8th of August, 1995.

Q. When you -- when you saw him for the first time in October 1990, what was the topic of the conversation that you had?

A. I had been given the task by the president of the Serb Democratic Party, Mr. Raskovic, who gave me Milosevic's telephone number, to call him and to go and see him and ask him whether he would oppose the idea of the Serb Democratic Party with its seat in Knin but which is also active on the territory of Serbia, whether he would oppose its participating in the elections that had been scheduled to be held in Serbia.

Q. Does that mean you had to ask him for his consent or what?

A. In a way, I was to test the ground to see whether he would oppose this. So yes, to see whether he would oppose it or not. I was to get from him his non-opposition.

Q. And did you get this non-opposition?

A. Yes, I did. He said, "Well, in Vojvodina where the SBO has some influence, yes, it could participate."

Q. Witness, when you met him on this first occasion and on later occasions, did you speak with him about the situation in Croatia and what ¹³⁰⁹⁴ was happening on the ground?

A. It was the usual topic of conversation during every visit. I told him of my fears and anxieties as to what would happen to us, the Serbs in Croatia and the Krajina.

Q. And what was his reaction to those kind of talks when you told him those things?

A. That we would be protected by the JNA. That's what he kept repeating. "The JNA will protect you." And he said the Serbs had the right to self-determination and to remain in the same state.

Q. You have already mentioned a meeting with Mr. Milosevic in which a financial matter in relation to the screw factory was discussed. When you discussed this with Mr. Milosevic, was someone else present?

A. Djoko Majstorovic, the administrative secretary of the Main Board of the SDS.

Q. We do not have to repeat the financial matter, but on this occasion, was anything else said by Mr. Milosevic, in particular in relation to his position as a party leader?

A. Yes. He said he would have to find someone younger and appoint him president of the SBS. I found this rather funny, because he appointed Borislav Jovic to that position, and he wasn't really young.

Q. Mr. Jovic is older? Do you mean he's older than Mr. Milosevic?

A. Yes. In terms of years, yes.

Q. What was the reason that Mr. Milosevic stepped down as the party president? Do you know that?

A. According to the constitution of Serbia, because he was elected ¹³⁰⁹⁵ president of the Republic, he could not perform any other public functions. Formally, it had to be someone else or, rather, it was really supposed to be someone else, but as far as I could see, it was purely a formality.

Q. Do you mean he actually stayed in power no matter which function?

A. That's correct.

Q. You have already mentioned that you were in Belgrade in January 1991, and did you meet Milosevic in this time period?

A. At least on two occasions.

Q. What was the first -- first of all, why were you in Belgrade at that time?

A. In January, I visited Belgrade several times. There was a crisis around the order issued by the Presidency of Yugoslavia about the disarming of paramilitary units in Croatia. On the first occasion, Borivoj Rasuo told me that the JNA was planning a coup d'etat, and he told me how to act if this happened.

Q. What did he tell you? How --

A. I apologise. Are we in closed session?

Q. Yes.

A. Is it closed session?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, he said I should obey orders, offer no resistance. I asked whether I would be arrested, and he said no. He just told me not to offer any resistance and to be obedient.

On the second occasion, I went there because Mile Grbic and Zika ¹³⁰⁹⁶ Rakic from Bosanski Novi had told me to go to Colonel Djigurski, who was a colonel of the KOS.

JUDGE MAY: I have to interrupt because I'm not following this. Borivoj Rasuo. Now, who is he? How does he fit into this matter? I gather it's he who is telling the witness these things. You will have to explore these things, if you would.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Your Honour, we have actually already spoken about Boro Rasuo and his position. But just to remind Your Honours...

Q. What was Boro's position at that time?

A. Before that, he was an expert advisor in the Marxist Centre of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia while it existed. In late 1990, he left this centre, and then he became the director of the Yugoslav Institute for Journalism. In the meantime, he had some sort of public post, but I don't remember exactly what. He was close to Mihajlo Markovic, the ideologue of the SPS and various political figures, and in 1994 and 1995, I realised he was also close to Jovica Stanisic. At that time, he became a close friend of mine. He originated from Knin. He often visited Knin. He would transmit information from Belgrade to me. We had a similar background, similar education. He became my political advisor.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Since when was he your political advisor? At the time we are talking about now, that is the end of 1990, was he your advisor? ¹³⁰⁹⁷

A. He formally became my advisor later, in the second half of 1991, and a Minister of External Affairs in the government of the SAO Krajina. But at that time, he was informally my advisor.

Q. You said that he was close to Jovica Stanisic. How do you know that?

A. In April 1994, when talks were held about establishing a government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Milan Martic's residence in Belgrade, Jovica Stanisic was present. So was Brana Crncevic and other people; Borislav Mikelic. And my proposal was because I was the president of a party that had a large number of MPs in the parliament, that Borivoj Rasuo should -- well, I apologise. First I proposed Lazar Macura as Minister of Information. Martic opposed this. Then I nominated Borivoj Rasuo. Martic opposed this too. And then Jovica nodded his head and said yes, and then Martic said, "Yes. All right."

Before that, during the election campaign in Mirkovci, when we were in Mirkovci, Rasuo said that he had talked to Stanic and that I should call him, but I didn't. Later on --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt for a moment. I see we've gone beyond the time for an adjournment. No doubt you could look into the tapes and we'll go on then.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. ¹³⁰⁹⁸

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we -- the Prosecution will play the intercepts a little bit later, in a context where they fit better than where we are now. And we are still in private session, and I would like to clarify something with the witness.

Q. Did I understand you correctly: Boro Rasuo told you in January 1991 that a coup was planned and that you should not resist it? What kind of a coup did he speak about, and who planned that?

A. He was saying that the JNA would carry out the coup, and that with respect to Knin and me, as the president of the Knin municipality, he said that they would appoint a governor of the municipality and that I shouldn't resist. So this referred to Croatia. Whether he meant anything more than that, I don't know.

Q. And when he said "a coup," a coup against the Croatian authorities or against whom?

A. Against the authorities. There would be a change of government.

Q. And you also mentioned the persons Mile Grbic and Zika Rakic. What did they tell you, and who were they?

A. They are two Serbs from Bosanski Novi. In 1990, in August, they brought weapons to Martic in Knin, and in 1991, they also supplied with weapons that they had obtained in Serbia through Jovica Stanisic, and distributed those weapons in SAO Krajina. Zika Rakic was later on Minister of the Interior of Republika Srpska.

Q. And how do you know that Stanisic was involved in this weapons transfer? How do you know that? Did any of these two men tell you about it? ¹³⁰⁹⁹

A. Mile Grbic told me that.

Q. What was his relationship with Stanisic? Do you know?

A. They were close, in business and political terms. He mentioned him regularly.

Q. And when you say "he," you refer to Mr. Grbic?

A. That's right.

Q. And in relation to that situation in January 1991, you mentioned the two of them. What did they tell you about the situation?

A. That they had information from the army that the army would intervene in Croatia against the Croatian government, and that I could get more information from Colonel Djigurski, a KOS colonel who was in Zemun.

JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry to interrupt, but, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, I'm concerned about the value of the evidence of this sort. These are reports, at best secondhand. Although we allow hearsay, there must be a limit really to what we can admit and the value of these reports. It may be that there is some particular value that you want to rely on, but given the time, I wonder if we need spend too much more on this.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, what the witness is telling us now explains why he actually ended up in Belgrade and how he met Mr. Milosevic and what Mr. Milosevic then told him.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let's perhaps move on to that.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

Q. You mentioned Mr. Djigurski, a KOS member. Did you meet Mr. Djigurski then in January 1991, and did he tell you something about the coup? ¹³¹⁰⁰

A. That was a meeting that I had with him in January 1991, but he didn't speak to me about a coup. He inquired about relations within the SDS.

Q. Witness, on that occasion in January 1992, did you also meet Mr. Milosevic, and how did that come about?

A. Yes, on two occasions. The first time, somebody told me - I can't remember exactly who in Belgrade - that I should send a request to be received by President Milosevic in connection with the crisis in Croatia and Yugoslavia, and I went. Mile Dakic was with me, the vice-president of the Serbian National Council, and on that occasion we had a conversation. The second time was upon the invitation of President Milosevic, and I came. And he said that he would arrest Martin Spegelj and that I must remain in Belgrade, that I shouldn't be in Knin, so as not to create any problems for the army, that is, the JNA, so that the Croatian government wouldn't arrest me and that would complicate things. And he gave me police protection of the state security and the public security service. So I spent about ten days in Belgrade under that protection, maybe longer.

Q. This second meeting with Mr. Milosevic, when was that that he told you about the arrest of Spegelj and that you should stay for security reasons?

A. This was around the 25th of January, 1991.

Q. And when you met him on that occasion, did you also meet people from the security section and the MUP Serbia?

A. Yes. Milosevic advised me to contact Radmilo Bogdanovic and ¹³¹⁰¹ Jovica Stanisic so that they should provide protection for me.

Q. Where were they? Were they in that same building as Mr. Milosevic, or where were they?

A. In another building, in the Knez Milos Street, in the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia, the building of the Ministry of the Interior.

Q. And Mr. Bogdanovic, what position did he have at that time?

A. He was Minister of Internal Affairs in the government of the Republic of Serbia.

Q. And Mr. Stanisic, what was his position then?

A. One of the officials in the State Security Service of Serbia.

Q. Did they provide security then for you?

A. Yes. Security was provided by the state security, that is, plain-clothes officers, and public security, in the apartment in which I lived, and they also gave me an escort, permanent escort.

Q. You mentioned the arrest of Spegelj. Was that at the same time planned when the Spegelj tape that we talked about earlier was actually shown, broadcast?

A. That's right, at that time, around the 25th of January, 1991.

Q. While you were in Belgrade, you said you were there for ten days. Were you allowed to leave Belgrade or actually did you have to stay?

A. Milosevic told me that I musn't leave Belgrade without his permission. And then, about ten days later, Radmilo Bogdanovic called me and waved his hand and said, "Nothing will come of it. You go back to your people." And that is how I left Belgrade.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we can go into open session ¹³¹⁰² again.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Mr. Radmilo Bogdanovic, was he dismissed at some point in time from his position?

A. Yes, in March 1991, after the demonstrations staged by the opposition in Serbia.

Q. Did Mr. Bogdanovic remain in some functions after that? Do you know?

A. Yes. As far as I can remember, he had several positions in the Commission for Security of the Assembly in the Assembly of Yugoslavia. He became an official of the SBS and a public servant.

Q. Was he close to Mr. Milosevic? Do you know that?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you know that? Do we need to go into private session for this or can you answer it?

A. Yes, private session, please.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, private session.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're now in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

Q. Please, how do you know he was close to Mr. Milosevic?

A. I met him in Mr. Milosevic's office about the 20th of March, ¹³¹⁰³ 1991. Milosevic had called him. And this was during one of my encounters with President Milosevic.

Q. What was this meeting on the 20th of March? How did this meeting come about?

A. It came about because Rastovic, president of the Minicipal Assembly of Donji Lapac and vice-president of the Executive Council of SAO Krajina, wanted us to go to Milosevic - his name was David Rastovic - to see how he would protect us in Krajina. So Rastovic and myself went to see Milosevic.

Q. And what did you ask of him, of Mr. Milosevic?

A. Precisely that; how was he intending to protect us, because he was always saying the JNA would protect us. And there were the events in Pakrac and other events. And he said, "I have already purchased for you in Hungary 20.000 pieces of weapons." And I said I knew nothing about that. And Rastovic also said that he knew nothing about it. Then we called a third person, Janko Cvetan, who was with us but he had remained in the Moscow Hotel in Belgrade. He was an official of SDS and he was close to Bogoljub Popovic of the SDS, and they were always talking about weapons. So we called him to come to Milosevic's and say whether he knew anything about it. Janko Cvetan came and said that he didn't know anything about it either.

Q. Let me interrupt you. When this person, Janko Cvetan, came and spoke about weapons, did he actually openly speak about weapons or did he use other words?

A. Everybody was openly speaking about weapons, Milosevic and ¹³¹⁰⁴ Cvetan. That was the issue, weapons.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And Your Honours, just for your orientation, we are now in paragraphs 124, 125 of the summary. Would have moved a little bit forward.

Q. What was Mr. Milosevic's reaction to this conversation about weapons and that you didn't know anything about the weapons he had purchased?

A. He said something like a swear word, and he said, "These people of mine have cheated me or misled me." And then he left to go to the secretary's office. And not long after that, Radmilo Bogdanovic and Jovica Stanisic came, and he asked them, "What about the weapons?" Radmilo Bogdanovic said, "We have already sent 500 pieces to Banija." I said I knew nothing about it. Bogdanovic said, "You don't have to know everything." And Milosevic added, smilingly, "Yes, yes. Milan should know these things." And then Bogdanovic just made a face to the effect, "What are you saying?" Jovica Stanisic didn't say anything. He just had an angry expression on his face.

Q. And did actually weapons arrive afterwards, or how was this situation solved?

A. The weapons arrived. However, I learnt that the weapons were coming from the warehouses of the Territorial Defence of Serbia.

Q. How did you learn that?

A. Milenko Zelenbaba told me, Martic's assistant in the Krajina police. He took me to the village of Raducic, close to Knin, sometime in May 1991. He showed me the weapons, rifles, mortars, and so on. And he ^{13105 BLANK PAGE 13106} said that Braco, meaning Mihalj Kertes, was kicking open the doors of the TO warehouses in Serbia.

And then in July or the beginning of August in 1991, Mile Grbic told me also that weapons were being brought in from Serbia. He showed me a warehouse with mortars.

Q. Witness, returning to the meeting of the 20th -- of the 20th of March, was anything else discussed except for the weapons? Did you raise other matters in relation to the police?

A. Yes. I complained that I felt that the secretariat of internal affairs of SAO Krajina was not capable of performing these duties, that we needed an expert, somebody -- a professional, somebody who understood these things and who knew how to deal with them, some kind of instructors or legal assistants, and Milosevic said that that would be resolved.

Q. And was that matter resolved, and if so, in which way?

A. Yes, it was resolved, but not in the way that I assumed it would be and expected it would be done.

Q. What had you expected and what actually was done?

A. I had expected legal assistance, professionals who would work on the organisation of the secretariat of internal affairs in SAO Krajina, that would organise the services within the internal affairs sector. However, instead, officials of the state security arrived, headed by Franko Simatovic, who got the nickname "Frenki" in Knin. And they organised a military camp in Golubic and formed their paramilitary formations, paramilitary army. And they exerted control over the secretariat of internal affairs of Krajina. ¹³¹⁰⁷

Q. Witness, I would like to return to the meetings with Mr. Milosevic and later come back to Frenki.

Did you have a meeting with Mr. Milosevic on the 17th of February, 1991, after returning from Geneva?

A. That was before Geneva and also after Geneva. I think there were two meetings, one before and one after Geneva. I remember when he spoke in negative terms about Jovan Raskovic when he said, "Replace him."

Q. Did he tell you to replace Jovan Raskovic or ...

A. Yes, he said that to me. And I said that that was impossible, that Jovan Raskovic cannot be replaced, he was a popular tribune. He was a popular leader, a leader of the people.

Q. You mentioned the -- you mentioned that you saw him twice, once before Geneva and once after. What actually did you do in Geneva, so that the Judges know?

A. I was a representative of the world Serbian community at a meeting of the Commission for Human Rights and the Rights of National Minorities. It was a commission of the United Nations.

Q. Why did you meet Mr. Milosevic before and after? Did -- did he ask for that or why?

A. I can't remember exactly.

Q. And this discussion about Mr. Raskovic, was it before you went?

A. It was in February. I think it was before, but I'm not sure of that.

Q. And why did Mr. Milosevic want Mr. Raskovic to be replaced?

A. Raskovic opposed Milosevic in public. He criticised him on a ¹³¹⁰⁸ number of occasions, on a couple of occasions. I know that he spoke of the impotence of the JNA at a meeting in Lapac. Yes.

Q. Witness, when you -- on this other occasion around this meeting in Geneva, what did Mr. Milosevic talk to you about?

A. The main topic of discussion always was the question of our security and what would happen to the Serbs in SAO Krajina, their destiny. That was always the main issue. And he always said, "The JNA would protect you," he said, and, "You have the right to remain in Yugoslavia."

Q. Witness, did you meet Mr. Milosevic in March 1991 around this -- at a time when demonstrations took place in Belgrade?

A. Yes. Before that, I had a conversation with him, at the beginning of March, in connection with the events in Pakrac.

Q. Yes. What was it about, the conversation?

A. There was an incident in Pakrac, a conflict between Serbs and the Croatian police, when the JNA also intervened.

Q. We know about this event. You do not need to tell us the event as such, but what did you talk with Mr. Milosevic about?

A. I called him up by telephone to ask him what was going on in Pakrac, and he said, "Don't worry. Everything will be okay. You can go to Knin."

Q. Was he informed on what was going on in Pakrac at that time?

A. From what he said, I understood that he was.

Q. But I was actually asking you about contacts with Mr. Milosevic at the time when demonstrations took place. Did you see him then? When did ¹³¹⁰⁹ you see him, and what was it?

A. Yes. During the demonstrations, I was called by Matkovic, a senior official in the SBS, to come to a counter-rally organised by the SBS against the opposition that was demonstrating. I avoided going. Then I was asked to send a letter, a message to the participants in the rally and to come to Belgrade after that, to be in Belgrade, and that was the reason why I came to Belgrade. After several days, I was received by Milosevic.

Q. And what did you talk about with him?

A. I remember that he was very angry. He criticised the opposition as traitor, especially Vuk Draskovic, describing him as a traitor, that they were working against the Serbian national interests and that Draskovic was in cohorts [as interpreted] with Tudjman and Mesic.

Q. But can you explain why you were called to Belgrade to participate in a counter-rally? Why?

A. I represented the Serbs of Krajina, and Milosevic wanted the public to know that the Serbs of Krajina supported him, so that he could restore support for him in Serbia.

Q. After you returned to Knin at that time, did you get a call from Mr. Milosevic?

A. On the 16th of March, between 11.00 and 12.00, at midday, by telephone. And he said, "Support Yugoslavia," and I said, "Fine," and that was it.

Q. Did he say in which way you should support Yugoslavia?

A. Nothing specific, but I understood he meant that we should declare ¹³¹¹⁰ our support for remaining in Yugoslavia.

Q. Why did you understand it this way? Did you discuss that beforehand with him, or where does your understanding come from?

A. Yes. On the basis of the -- of his position. That was his position. That was my understanding of what he advocated, what he stood for, what kind of political idea he upheld.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we can go into open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did you actually then act accordingly in the Krajina to this wish to support Yugoslavia? What did you do? Not you personally, but the Krajina authorities do?

A. The Executive Council of SAO Krajina decided to secede from Croatia, and this proposal was sent for adoption to the Municipal Assembly, and the assemblies and communes undertook to adopt this. So Krajina seceded from Croatia and in that way remained within Yugoslavia.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we have three documents related to this issue, and it's -- they are all three in the -- in Exhibit 351. It's tab 22, tab 64, and tab 65, and they should briefly be put to the witness.

Q. Witness, the first document is a decision of the -- of 18 March 1991 of the Assembly of the Knin Municipality, as part of the SAO Krajina, amending the statute of the SAO Krajina to expunge references to Croatia, in favour of "Federation." ¹³¹¹¹ The second document is a decision dated 18 March 1991, same date, of the Assembly of Knin to secede from Republic of Croatia. And the third document is actually a similar -- is related to the municipalities of Drnis, Sinj, and Sibenik, and it's also on the 18th March 1991. Is that correct?

A. I'm not receiving the interpretation. Yes, it is correct.

Q. Thank you. We don't need to discuss this document further. Witness, we are still in March 1991. Are you aware that Milosevic and Tudjman met in March 1991?

A. Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. How do you know that?

A. Slobodan Milosevic told me, and later on I heard it from others as well.

Q. What did Mr. Milosevic tell you, and when did you meet him in this effect?

A. Towards the end of March 1991, that's when it happened, and he brought in a map on that occasion, a map of the former Yugoslavia, with the republican borders on it. He placed it on the table. He took his thumbnail and drew a line, as if he was separating a portion, breaking away the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, near Bihac, and with this gesture and incision, he said, "Tudjman needs Bihac." And then he added, ¹³¹¹² "He needs a road between Benkovac and Drnis too." And I remained rigid. I didn't react at all.

Q. Why were you rigid? What did it mean for you?

A. I was stunned because it meant everything -- it meant quite the opposite to what he had been saying up until then, that the SAO Krajina had the right to remain in Yugoslavia and that the JNA would protect it. And in this way, it was -- having said this, it was quite obvious that it would be Croatian territory, together with Bihac. Bihac is between SAO Krajina and the other parts of Yugoslavia, towards Belgrade.

Q. Witness, you --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness the Exhibit 326, tab 11. That's actually the map that you yourself provided.

Q. And could you show us which sections Mr. Milosevic actually cut out with his thumbnail, as you said? Can you show this on the map to us with the pointer?

A. May I proceed?

Q. Yes, please.

A. He made an incision with his thumbnail along this direction. Bihac is up there. So this is the Bihac region and Cazinska Krajina. And this is what he did, a very sharp movement downwards, and then he pointed to the area above with his finger.

Q. Yes. Can you show it?

A. He needed a road between Benkovac and Drnis.

Q. Yes. Thank you. Witness, did Mr. Milosevic react in any way to ¹³¹¹³ your rigid reaction?

A. I don't remember. I really couldn't say.

Q. Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, we have already heard from other witnesses of the Plitvice events, and we would not need to go into much detail. But can you tell us what was planned in -- whether there was a police station, a Serb police station, planned in the Plitvice region at that time? Do you know that?

A. Yes.

Q. Who made this decision?

A. The decision was made by the authorities in Krajina.

Q. And why did you make this decision?

A. The Croatian government had announced that in the Plitvice area it would set up a separate municipality, so that Plitvice would be set aside from the Korenica municipality. And it was an area of the Plitvice Lakes National Park, which was very important to the Krajina region.

Q. And was actually -- who was given the task to establish the police station, and was it really established?

A. The secretary of the SUP of SAO Krajina, Milan Martic, did not set up the police station, but armed persons were deployed there, members of the police force and others, in different ways, but not through the ¹³¹¹⁴ establishment of a police station.

Q. Is that again the so-called parallel structure that you mentioned? Was it active there then?

A. That's right, yes.

Q. Did this structure then clash with the Croatian police?

A. It was an armed conflict, and people were killed in it. After that, the Croatian police force took control of Plitvice.

Q. Did the JNA intervene?

A. The JNA did intervene, yes, several hours after the Croatian police forces had taken control of Plitvice, and they deployed between the Plitvice area and the municipality and the village of Korenica.

Q. Did the JNA then stay in control of the region?

A. It held the zone there, that area, up until August. At the end of August, it expelled the Croatian police and took control of the area.

Q. And when you say "August," August which year?

A. 1991.

Q. Was MUP Serbia personnel involved in this event in Plitvice? Do you know?

A. They knew about these preparations. Now, how far they themselves took part in it and organised it, I really can't say. I don't know.

Q. When you say they knew about these preparations, what do you mean "they"? Who is "they"?

A. The people from the DB, the State Security Service of Serbia.

Q. And which person precisely?

A. At that point in time, I don't know who was actually there, but a ¹³¹¹⁵ man from the group that was there permanently or, rather, at that time.

Q. Witness, with the help of the usher, I would like to put to you two documents that reflect also what happened at that time, and it's Exhibit 352, tab 36 and 35. It is the decision -- the decision of the Executive Council of the SAO Krajina, dated the 1st of April, 1991, on the joining of the SAO Krajina to the Republic of Serbia, and actually the Official Gazette publishing this decision; is that correct?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. Who drafted the declaration, and whose idea was it? And if needed, then we can go into private session. I'm not sure now.

A. The draft was made by Borivoj Rasuo, as far as I know.

Q. Was it also his initiative to do that, and if so, why?

A. It was his initiative, yes, to provoke Serbia, to intervene.

Q. To intervene in what? In which way, and for what reason?

A. To become involved in the protection of the region and to see that it remained in Yugoslavia, outside Croatia.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did it provoke a reaction from Belgrade? Did Mr. Milosevic, in particular, react?

A. There was very sharp reaction on Mr. Milosevic's part, and he telephoned through the military base in Bihac, and he called me up in my flat and asked me to deny all this and to have the decision rescinded. ¹³¹¹⁶

Q. Did he give you -- did he give you a reason why he was opposing it? What did he say?

A. He said that we have to come out in favour of Yugoslavia, declare ourselves in favour of Yugoslavia and not in favour of Serbia.

Q. Did he tell you why, why it was so important?

A. At that time and later on -- no, he didn't say clearly why. He just said Yugoslavia. He kept saying Yugoslavia. But the reason was quite clear to me.

Q. What was the reason?

A. So that his direct links and links with Serbia would not be seen, links to what was happening in Krajina.

Q. Why do you come to this conclusion? What is the basis of this?

A. Well, from the many conversations and from much of what he said and from his concept of how to realise his political goal, and that concept was quite simply to make it appear that other people were stepping down from Yugoslavia, whereas that part of Yugoslavia which he envisaged to remain in a newly organised state should appear to have remained there in a passive way and not by taking action. And he said the Serbs have the right to remain in Yugoslavia. The JNA will protect those areas. Peoples have a right to self-determination. Let the Croats leave. Let them go.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, did -- actually, did the authorities in the Krajina ¹³¹¹⁷ reverse their decision then and change it into remaining in Yugoslavia after this intervention?

A. After later interventions, they did do so, yes. After the interventions were repeated.

Q. Repeated by whom? Who intervened?

A. The president of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. I would like to put to you now another document, and it's also related to the 1st of April, 1991, and it's Exhibit 352, tab 38. Witness, it is a request or, rather, it's an order, a mobilisation order, and this mobilisation order of the 1st of April, 1991, there is a conclusion in this order saying the following:

"We request from the Government of the Republic of Serbia that the forces of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia provide technical and personnel support to the SUP of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina."

Is that related to what you called to provoke Serbia?

A. This was a call to realise the promises of Serbia.

Q. Was the situation so severe at that time in Plitvice that you -- that you in the Krajina felt it necessary to mobilise and to do these actions?

A. Yes. The situation was highly dramatic, to such an extent that it appeared that the Croatian government would take control of the entire region of Krajina.

Q. Yes. You mentioned that MUP Serbia staff was already on the ground. You mentioned in Plitvice there was a person, and you mentioned ¹³¹¹⁸ that staff came, additional staff came. Who did come to the SAO Krajina in April 1991?

A. Let me just say before I answer that there was one man I saw in Knin and not at Plitvice, before the events of Plitvice took place. And he came to Knin. That is to say Jovica Stanisic came to Knin. Franko Simatovic came, Fica, Captain Dragan, and several others. I don't remember their names.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. When did you meet Frenki Simatovic for the first time and what were the circumstances?

A. At the beginning of April 1991. Jovica Stanisic brought him to my flat and introduced him to me as somebody who was an expert in different areas.

Q. What was -- was there a subordinate relationship between the two of them? Was one of them the superior of the other or were they equal?

A. I understood that Stanisic was the senior of the two.

Q. What did they want from you? Why did they meet you?

A. To see where I lived. And I had moved to a new apartment at the time. They said that they wanted to check and see whether my flat was being tapped by the army, among other things.

Q. Why by the army? And which army; the Croatian army or the JNA?

A. They meant the JNA. At least, that's what I thought. ¹³¹¹⁹

Q. Why would they suspect the army to do things like this?

A. Well, I assume because the army had services of this kind and monitored what citizens were doing, especially public persons.

Q. And when did you meet Captain Dragan for the first time?

A. In April 1991 in the Golubic youth centre, which later became a camp of the police.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session, Your Honour.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. When did it become a camp, and what kind of a camp?

A. It was a training camp, a camp used for training of the DB, the state security, and the Krajina police force. And they trained the armed formations there and armed units were formed as a result. They were organised as a Special Police Unit and the volunteer detachments.

Q. Those people trained there. First of all, how many people were trained there at a time?

A. The training took place in a short space of time, perhaps ten days. At least, that's what I was told. And the groups numbered up to a hundred persons, approximately.

Q. And in which time period did this camp function; from when to when?

A. From April 1991 until August 1991. In August, there was another training centre at Vukovic near Benkovac, as far as I know, and I heard that something similar existed at Samarica, but I didn't see that third ^{13120 BLANK PAGE 13121} one myself.

Q. Who was in charge in this training camp in Golubic?

A. Franko Simatovic was.

Q. How do you know that?

A. From him personally.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. When did he tell you that, that he was in charge there?

A. In the first half of May, 1991. I was called to -- I was invited to go to the centre, and he was the host there, and he showed me around. He showed me what they were doing in the centre, in and around the centre.

Q. Did they have a shooting range?

A. Yes, they did. They had a shooting range between Golubic and Strmica, on the right side of the road.

Q. Did Mr. Simatovic show you this shooting range, and did he explain something about the equipment there?

A. That's right. When he showed me round the centre in the youth settlement of Golubic, he took me to the shooting range. And I didn't see the actual targets that were usually shot at, but there was a gun or a machine-gun of some sort, an anti-aircraft gun, multiple-barrelled. And he showed me this device and said that they had used it to shoot at the Croatian policemen in Borovo Selo on the 2nd of May, 1991.

Q. When you visited this Golubic camp, what was the state in -- in ¹³¹²² May 1991? What was the state of organisation? Did they have files on people they trained? How -- what was the grade of, degree of organisation there? Was it run professionally?

A. Yes, that's right. Nikola Manovic, who was the assistant to secretary Martic, showed me the records and files for each municipality and for all the recruits at the centre, the trainees. I asked him whether there were any people from Knin, and he said, "Yes, of course," and he opened a separate drawer and showed me all the files. I took a brief look, but I didn't recognise the names, and I didn't go into that any more. And there were people there in uniforms, with long-barrelled weapons. They were well-disciplined, their hair was neatly cut, and so on.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, does that mean that people from all municipalities were trained there, all municipalities from the SAO?

A. That's right, yes.

Q. Were these people also equipped there with weapons and uniform and other equipment?

A. Uniforms and long-barrelled weapons, yes, as far as I know.

Q. Those people trained there, did they later become members of the police or the TO, or both?

A. They became members of the special police force, or "milicija," ¹³¹²³ and members of the so-called volunteer detachments, whose name was changed later on, and they became known as units of the Territorial Defence later on, but in structure they remained the same.

Q. You said that Mr. Simatovic was in charge of the camp. What role did Captain Dragan have?

A. He was a training instructor to begin with, and later on he commanded one of the units of the special police forces.

Q. Was he the only trainer or were there also other trainers?

A. There were others.

Q. Who was his deputy, if he had any?

A. He had several deputies, or "komandirs," in his units. I don't know that he actually had a deputy, but he had subordinates, commanding officers, in his unit under him.

Q. Was there a certain Ciga Simic, a trainer there and sort of commander of a unit?

A. As far as I know, he was a commander. I don't know whether he was an instructor.

Q. What was the relationship between Frenki Simatovic and Captain Dragan? Was Captain Dragan a subordinate of Frenki?

A. He was a subordinate, but as far as I know, their relations are comradely. In terms of hierarchy, however, he was subordinate.

Q. And Milan Martic, how was he -- what was his subordination situation, if any?

A. He was actually subordinate, or under the influence of people from the State Security Service of Serbia, and Slobodan Milosevic personally. ¹³¹²⁴

Q. How do you know -- to whom was -- you said he was actually subordinated or under the influence. To whom was he subordinated?

A. Ultimately, it was Slobodan Milosevic.

Q. How do you know that?

A. From the way Milosevic treated him. I had personal insight into this.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. When did you have opportunity to see Mr. Milosevic treat Mr. Martic? How often did you see them together, and how did he treat him then?

A. The first time I saw them together was in August, between the 9th and 10th of August, and the 15th or 16th of August, 1991, in President Milosevic's office in Belgrade. On other occasions later, I saw them in 1995, 1994.

Q. And when you saw them, how did he treat Mr. Martic?

A. As a person who was expected to obey him, as someone who was his man.

Q. Did, for instance, Mr. Milosevic give him instructions or even orders?

A. I know that in August he asked to become the commander of the Territorial Defence of the SAO Krajina. Later on, I know -- I heard from Martic that he instructed him not to accept the Z-4 plan for the ¹³¹²⁵ resolution of the political status of the Krajina which had been offered by the international community. I know, because Milosevic personally told me, that he gave him orders concerning military activities in the area of Livanjsko Polje on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. When did Mr. Milosevic tell you that? What was the occasion?

A. About Livanjsko Polje, in early April 1995.

Q. How did it come that Mr. Milosevic talked to you about it?

A. I asked a meeting with Milosevic, as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of the Republic of Krajina. I wanted his opinion about the Z-4 plan and I wanted to complain to him that the Croatian army, the HVO from Bosnia and Herzegovina, was threatening Knin across the Dinara mountain chain. And I took with me a sketch, a map, to show him what this was all about.

Q. Yes. And how, then, did these talks end up with Milan Martic?

A. Milosevic said -- this was a conversation with Milosevic in April, and it was about Martic and General Mladic. Milosevic took the map I had brought. He showed the territory, the wedge that had been made by the Croatian forces on Livanjsko Polje, and he said, "I have already told Mladic and Martic to cut this off." And then he indicated a direction from Glamoc to Dinara. He showed the line where he had told them to cut it off.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to show the witness the map again, tab 11, tab 11 of the Exhibit 326.

Q. Is it on this map, or ...? Witness, is this part on the map, or would you need another one to show us? ¹³¹²⁶

A. It can be found on this map, but it's not very visible. It can't really be seen well.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can use, actually, this municipality map, and it is -- I have here a smaller version that fits on the ELMO, and it is actually Exhibit 333. It's a small version. You should have that as well.

Q. Can you show us what Mr. Milosevic showed you on the map? Can you tell us which municipalities there are? Because we can only see the municipalities.

A. This is the municipality of Livno and Bosanski Grahovo on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatian forces, starting in November and December 1994, had broken through Livanjsko Polje, in the direction of Grahovo, and taken a wedge-shaped area here, and Milosevic indicated that he had told Mladic and Martic to cut it off in this direction here.

Q. In the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A. That's correct.

Q. Were Mladic and Martic at that time cooperating there and involved in military actions together?

A. Military operations were being conducted there by the army and militia of Republika Srpska. I don't know to what extent the forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina took part in that.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. We can go back into open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're back into open session. ¹³¹²⁷

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, you mentioned a certain Fica as well. Was he also a person from the Serbian MUP, or who was he?

A. I heard from him personally that he was from the personal bodyguard of President Milosevic.

Q. What role did he have in the SAO Krajina?

A. He was one of the instructors from the State Security Services of Serbia.

Q. In the Golubic camp, or where?

A. In Golubic, as far as I know.

Q. And you mentioned that later on other camps, similar camps, were organised. Who was in charge in the camp in the Benkovac area?

A. I know about Captain Dragan, that he was.

Q. Was there also such a place in Kistanje?

A. Not in the same way.

Q. What was in Kistanje?

A. I can say that it was Frenki's private base, not a military base.

Q. What was there that made it Frenki's private base? Who was there?

A. Frenki had an assistant who had some connections with Kistanje. His name was Goran Starcevic. I think this was one of the places where he stayed around Kistanje.

Q. Was there a police formation there, or what do you consider a base?

A. His place of residence, his and that of his assistants. It wasn't ¹³¹²⁸ a military or a police base. It was where he lived. That's how I understood this.

Q. And during the conflict in Croatia, that is, summer 1990 to winter 1991, was Frenki actually constantly in the SAO Krajina?

A. Frenki was in the SAO Krajina, as far as I know, on two -- two times. The first time was from around the 8th of August, 1991, and then from September and throughout 1991.

Q. Let me clarify something. You said earlier on that you actually saw Frenki in April 1991. Now you say from around the 8th of August, 1991, you saw him. Is there a mistake in the year? Let us just clarify. When did he come to the -- when did he come to stay in the SAO Krajina?

A. In April 1991. That's when he came.

Q. And you mentioned the 8th of August. What date does that mean, or is that a mistake?

A. 1991. 1991. That was when he was supposed to leave the Krajina. I assumed that he had left as of that date.

Q. And when did he return?

A. As far as I know, in September 1991. He was there again.

Q. And did the same apply to Captain Dragan, the same periods?

A. Yes. Captain Dragan left in early August, on the 7th or 8th of August, 1991, and came back again sometime in November.

JUDGE MAY: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, if that's a convenient moment, we will adjourn.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now for 20 minutes. ¹³¹²⁹

--- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.38 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

Q. Witness, we have mentioned now several armed formations outside of the army, the JNA, police, special police, TO, MUP, Serbian MUP. Was there a clearly defined command structure linking all these groups? Was there a clearly -- clearly a command structure, how these all fit together?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. What was the command structure from the top down to the municipality level?

A. There were two lines of command or chains of command. One line went through the Presidency of Yugoslavia, the JNA, and the Territorial Defence units directly under its command. The other line went through the State Security Service of Serbia, that is the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, and through a parallel structure, the milicija or police of the Krajina and special volunteer units and the regular police and the groups belonging to the state security service. At the top of both lines was Slobodan Milosevic, or they coordinated and subordinated themselves on the ground while engaging in operations, however, these two lines were quite clear.

Q. Joint actions, were there any joint actions between these two command structures, that is the military JNA structure and the police and volunteer structure? Did they conduct joint actions, and if so, who was ¹³¹³⁰ then in command in the field?

A. For the most part, they engaged in joint operations. I know from August 1991 onwards, it was the JNA that played a command role in these operations.

Q. You mentioned that already the police structure and on top of it you mentioned Mr. Milosevic, and you explained why you got to this, why you thought so and what your facts are to this effect. What -- why is Mr. Milosevic, as the President of Serbia, why is he on top of the JNA military structure? Did you get information to this effect, that he had this position in relation to the JNA?

A. He was the main political figure, the most influential person, the most powerful person who had the political initiative, and he subordinated all other structures to his political initiative, that of Yugoslavia, including the JNA.

Q. Do you know --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Sorry. I just wanted to ask the witness. Are you familiar with the concept of a Commander-in-Chief?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you saying that Mr. Milosevic was Commander-in-Chief of the JNA?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Formally this was the Presidency of the SFRY, but de facto it was Milosevic.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. When -- how did Mr. Milosevic actually control or command the JNA, then, when he's not the formal commander? What -- how did he command the ¹³¹³¹ JNA?

A. He -- he ran part of the Presidency of the SFRY, the so-called Rump Presidency of the SFRY. He controlled them from the summer of 1991 onwards. He had influence over General Kadijevic, the federal Secretary for National Defence, and General Adzic who was the Chief of Staff of the JNA, as far as I know.

Q. What is the basis of your knowledge? How do you know that? Did you actually see them together, the generals and Milosevic?

A. I know they were together. Milosevic told me, and so did members of the Presidency of Yugoslavia.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

JUDGE KWON: Before that, I would like to ask one question. Mr. Witness, you said that Mr. Milosevic controlled the Presidency of the SFRY and some generals. If you are going to say some person is controlling over some persons, it should be different from that. They are -- from the fact that they are of the same opinion. Am I right? The Presidency of the Federal Republic are of the same opinion as the -- as Mr. Milosevic. How is it different? And if Milosevic is to control them, what are the whips and carrots? What are the consequences if they don't follow? Can you assist us with these questions?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From what I know, some members of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, especially Jugoslav Kostic, told me that Milosevic was his chief. From the behaviour of Borisav Jovic, the president of the Presidency and later its member, he had the same attitude to Milosevic. He saw Milosevic as his superior, as someone in authority. ¹³¹³² Branko Kostic and Sejdo Bajramovic behaved in the same way. Milosevic himself said in July -- I think I've already spoken about this; he said to me and Karadzic, "Where should I deploy the army?" He behaved like a man who was able to deploy the army, to control it. I heard these words from him.

In July, 1991, on another occasion, Milosevic invited me to his office, and when I arrived, his secretary said that the president was busy right then, that the generals were there. And then Milosevic came out and said he was meeting the generals. I can't remember now whether it was Adzic or Kadijevic I saw, whether he told me they were there, but that was the impression I gained, that the two of them were with him on that occasion.

On the 26th of August, 1991, on another visit to Milosevic, when I visited him, he asked me about Spiro Nikolic, a general and commander of the Knin Corps.

These are things that spring to mind right now, but I found out so many things. It wasn't just that they were of the same opinion, as His Honour said, but within that group, Milosevic was the leading authority. He was a sort of chief. He also had party mechanisms to influence people, like, say, Dobajramovic, Jugoslav Kostic, and Borislav Jovic. He could appoint them or replace them from their posts. And I also know from the events in October 1991 that he exerted influence in Montenegro through Branko Kostic. He influenced the leadership of Montenegro, Bulatovic and Djukanovic, and I don't know whether I can remember any other specific events at this moment. ¹³¹³³

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: There's no need to go into private session now. It's actually ...

Q. Witness, returning back to Frenki Simatovic and to the SAO Krajina, I would like to put to you an exhibit, and it is tab 67 in Exhibit 352, and it's a report from the 5th or 6th August 1991 of the Serbian Autonomous District Krajina, 6th August 1991, report submitted by -- can you tell us who submits the report and to whom?

A. I can't say exactly who submitted it. One of the men belonging to this structure, the staff of the Territorial Defence, which was in the process of formation. It was submitted to the Prime Minister of Krajina, the secretary of the police of Krajina, the state security of Krajina, the command of the Territorial Defence, and to Frenki. The reference is to Franko Simatovic.

Q. And looking at the letterhead and the stamp, are they of the kind used at that time?

A. Yes. It is the stamp that was used for this purpose, until the 30th of September, 1991, and the letterhead as well.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. The supreme commander of the SAO Krajina TO that is here the first in the line of addressees, this is you?

A. As the Prime Minister, according to the law that was implemented ¹³¹³⁴ on the 1st of August, 1991, that should have been me.

Q. And did you receive this report and any other kinds of reports -- that kind of reports?

A. Yes, up to perhaps the 9th of August. Later there was some disruption.

Q. And Frenki Simatovic also received such reports? Are you aware of this?

A. Yes, they were sent to him. Now, whether he received them ...

Q. You have already mentioned that the police and the parallel structure was financed through Serbia. You have explained that already. How about the costs for the training camps that we just mentioned? Who paid for the cost of the training camps and the arms, the weapons that were then distributed there?

A. It all came from the MUP of Serbia, that is, from Serbia, through the state security service. Some uniforms were made by a local factory.

Q. You have mentioned, in regard of the weapons, that this came through a man called Braco Mihalj Kertes. How often did you meet this person, and how familiar are you with him and his voice?

A. Several times, five or six times perhaps. Five or six times. He has a specific tone of voice and his accent is rather like Vojvodina. It's not a typical Batva [phoen] accent, but it's rather like that.

Q. Did you ever meet him in his office, and if so, where was it situated?

A. I did meet him, on the 4th of January, 1992. The office was above the office of President Milosevic. And I would also meet him in President ^{13135 BLANK PAGE 13136} Milosevic's offices, in the secretary's office one floor down.

Q. What position did Mr. Kertes have and what was he doing in President Milosevic's office?

A. I don't know exactly the formal position that he held at the time. Earlier on, he was a member of the Presidency of Serbia. In 1991 and 1992, I don't know what actual position he held.

Q. When you met him, what did you talk with him about? What subject did you have with him?

A. In his office, the topic was -- somebody called me from the Presidency building - I think it was Jovica Stanisic - to tell me to come to the building, or one of them called me, on the 4th or 5th of January, in the afternoon.

Q. Which year?

A. In 1992. And when I arrived at the Presidency building, that is, the Presidency of Serbia, they told me at the entrance that I should go to Kertes's office, above Milosevic's offices. And I found Jovica Stanisic there; the chief of the counter-intelligence service of the State Security Service of Serbia, a man whose name I've forgotten, a large, heavily built man that looks like Frenki, but it's not Frenki. And Kertes accused me, in the presence of the other two, why we were opposed to the Vance plan and why we were disgracing President Milosevic, that we musn't do that.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to try it again with an intercept, and it is -- and I would rather ask you not to use this extra-small bundle of documents, because I think it's more confusing matters than adding -- helping and assisting you. I would therefore ¹³¹³⁷ suggest you -- we can go into open session. I forgot to say that. I suggest you could simply use the intercept binder. It's actually tab 29 of 353. And for the technical booth, it's track 6.

[Open session]

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And we are actually playing the full intercept, and you can easily follow the English script, and the witness should have the B/C/S version. And maybe you can put it on the ELMO. Yes.

[Intercept played]

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Hello?

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: Good day.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Is Braco there? Radovan Karadzic speaking.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: Yes. One moment.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: How are you? All right?

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: Good. I saw you. You had your hair cut a bit.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Ha ha. Well, they were preparing items ... have they shown ...

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: Yes. The whole of it.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: How much of this did they show?

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: I watched it also on Yutel, and they showed a lot of it. That was the first time you emerged, as I would say, 'you've emerged from the holster.'

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Uh-huh.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: Ha ha. Here you are. ¹³¹³⁸

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Thank you. Hello.

BRACO: And the same to you a thousand times over.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: How are you?

BRACO: Well, I'm busy.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see. Tell me, do you have a lot of work to do?

BRACO: I have, a lot.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: A lot of work, haven't you?

BRACO: This morning, I can say after Samarang it's much better.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Is it?

BRACO: I didn't have time down there, because those from Montenegro had been there, the first and second ones.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Uh-huh.

BRACO: I left. I didn't have time, but ...

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I can see it's been busy ...

BRACO: But I discussed matters with these ...

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Uh-huh.

BRACO: With those with 'stars.'

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Oh, did you?

BRACO: Yes. I sent them to fucking hell.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: What do you mean? Go to fucking hell?

BRACO: Well, I told them everything.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see, I see.

BRACO: I told them everything, that there would be convoys and convoys now. ¹³¹³⁹

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I badly needed that, that ...

BRACO: Yes. Yes. I passed all of that to them. Now, I've rung a friend, a countryman from the federal --

RADOVAN KARADZIC: This is where I need it, in this metropolis. Because if you don't take business premises in the metropole, and you don't open a shop in a metropolis ...

BRACO: Yes. There must be flour, there should also be salt, there also must ...

RADOVAN KARADZIC: There should be high-quality goods, this and that.

BRACO: It should be well supplied, like a supermarket.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: If you lose a metropolis in terms of trade, if you don't corner it ...

BRACO: Of course. Of course.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: That is where the main battle is fought, and if you don't succeed there ...

BRACO: Well, of course. And you know what? The most important thing is that the locations are attractive.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes, that's true. A pedestrian zone, where people ...

BRACO: Well, of course. And when it's painted, it should be clear what is yellow, what is white, and slowly --

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Exactly! Excellent! That's good. Apart from that? So you're in a better mood today, aren't you?

BRACO: I am. However, on Saturday I wanted to kill myself. ¹³¹⁴⁰

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Oh, my. Was it then?

BRACO: Well, I have been having a hard time, guys. You have no idea how hard.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes, yes.

BRACO: I know. I mean, I've been having a truly hard time.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Yes.

BRACO: I can see the needs, I can see everything. There's grain, flour, everything in Vojvodina ...

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes.

BRACO: It's been left there lying around in stock.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Yes. And nothing --

BRACO: Well, it's expensive since it's in bloody stock.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Yes. Of course. Yeah, the storage itself is expensive!

BRACO: Yes.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: They've risen the costs of storage just like that.

BRACO: Yes.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: And mice ...

BRACO: Have you spoken to the manager?

RADOVAN KARADZIC: No, I haven't.

BRACO: Of commodity reserves? You haven't?

RADOVAN KARADZIC: No, I haven't. He was busy, er ...

BRACO: Er, you just carry on insisting and insisting ... Understand? ¹³¹⁴¹

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Yes. And on restocking the commodity reserves, so ...

BRACO: Yes.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: They should give us everything that is near its best-before date straight away.

BRACO: Right.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: And they should ... this for themselves, uh-huh ...

BRACO: That's right.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Fresh food to their storehouse.

BRACO: Yes, that's right.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I think that our reputation will rise amongst people with this.

BRACO: Well, you know, when people are not hungry and thirsty, then it's ...

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Less difficult.

BRACO: Uh-huh. Political situation is less difficult.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. And they can see that the party is doing something.

BRACO: That's right.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Concerning those everyday matters. That's ...

BRACO: True ...

RADOVAN KARADZIC: And ...

BRACO: That should be, and newspapers, there should be ...

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Right. ¹³¹⁴²

BRACO: Everything.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Tell me what the political situation is like. Do you know anything?

BRACO: Well, let me tell you, it's weird. Weird quietness.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Well, yes. They really want to go ...

BRACO: I believe so. I've had some information this morning that every house will get a battery, which is very interesting. That means they will try with the blackout.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Uh-huh, their house, is it?

BRACO: Yes. Yes.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: And nobody is going to attack them, for fuck's sake.

BRACO: No. No.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Where? In Slovenia or Slavonija?

BRACO: I'm talking about Croatia.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Oh, Croatia?!

BRACO: Yes.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: So theirs ..., to get, to distribute batteries.

BRACO: The HDZ will give everyone a battery.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: How come they have so many batteries? Bloody hell.

BRACO: I haven't got a clue.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Well, who is going to attack them? Are they mad? ¹³¹⁴³

BRACO: Well, no. I think that they, that everyone, that is left in a cinema -- and they are attacking, and it's easier with batteries than without them!

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Oh, I see. Yes. So they would attack ... anyway?

BRACO: They have, they have a safe plan. Everything has been worked out. You see, when you do that and see what you've done, then you will need a battery.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: And when, when would, er, you expect that?

BRACO: On Vidovdan, the latest.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Fucking bastards.

BRACO: I think Vidovdan, because Serbs will relax then.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see. I see.

BRACO: And so on. I've been trumpeting that everywhere and ...

RADOVAN KARADZIC: It should be given to newspapers. It should be given to newspapers.

BRACO: And I've been sending all kinds of messages. Serbs on Vidovdan, in a dignified manner, but do not detach yourselves from everything.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Right. Right.

BRACO: From the families and so on.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Fuck. That's disheartening, but this with food is heartening now.

BRACO: Are you, are you at work, in your office?

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I'm at work, but I will take two or three days' ¹³¹⁴⁴ leave.

BRACO: You'll take a leave?

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I'll take few days' leave, because I have political -- I have to calm down a bit. Krajina, er, wants to secede and join the other Krajina.

BRACO: Oh, God, oh, God. That's ...

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I have to calm the fools down, and ...

BRACO: Well, that's ...

RADOVAN KARADZIC: They make some decisions, but they can't carry this one out now and in that way.

BRACO: Oh, fucking bastards, are they crazy?

RADOVAN KARADZIC: That's only in case somebody is seceding from Yugoslavia and ...

BRACO: Well, it's clear. And the moment they secede, it's clear.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: It is clear.

BRACO: And then we mustn't wait.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Right. No.

BRACO: Then we mustn't.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: We, we'll then secede from Yugoslavia and that's it.

BRACO: That's how it was ... rump Yugoslavia.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: No matter how big it is. It would be better if it were big, but ...

BRACO: Well, we are fighting for a big one, for the current one, ¹³¹⁴⁵ whatever the outcome.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. There will be a small one at least and ...

BRACO: That's right.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: So it has started well, hasn't it?

BRACO: Yes.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see. You haven't seen the manager of the commodity reserves, so you will, er ...

BRACO: Yes. Yes. Don't worry. I'll go to the manager of the commodity reserves. Just to see, you know?

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Yes.

BRACO: So that he hurries the responsible officers about the request.

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Understand the gravity. Because if starvation sets in, you won't be able to do anything about it.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Stop. I have one question to the translation booth. I think there is a word, and a quite significant word, missing. Can we replay that short sequence where Mr. Radovan Karadzic says: "I see. You haven't seen the manager of the commodity reserves..."? And I think you missed a word there.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are reading from the script.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But we can stop with intercept playing here at this point in time. ¹³¹⁴⁶

Q. Witness, did you hear -- did you listen to this intercept before during -- during your conversations here in The Hague?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did you -- do you know the voices of the people speaking?

A. I recognised the voice of Radovan Karadzic and Braco Kertes.

JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Mrs. Uertz-Retzlaff. I need some kind of clarification from the interpreter. I understand that they said the interpreters are reading from the script, not interpreting from the voice or the Serbian version. They just read it.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, they just read it.

JUDGE KWON: Okay.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I understood they would check it with the voices or the B/C/S version.

You don't do that?

THE INTERPRETER: The sound is so bad it's simply impossible. I'm sorry.

JUDGE MAY: We're going to have these tapes properly checked at some stage by some independent body such as our own translation services.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, you will have these intercepts. Actually, they are part of the exhibit. And when you listen in to them personally, you will see that the quality is much better when you play it on a normal machine with that same CD. The witness has already mentioned it several times. But the witness, I think, would be able to clarify that matter that I wanted to raise.

JUDGE MAY: No. But the point that I'm making is that we will ¹³¹⁴⁷ need this checked by our own translation services in due course.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. We will take care of this.

Q. But, Witness, let me ask you a question in relation to the contents of the tape. These two persons that you recognised speaking, they speak about food. They speak about supermarket. They speak about batteries. Is that what was really traded and shifted at that time from Vojvodina to other places within Yugoslavia? Do you know that? Do you have any information?

A. I don't know. This, for me, is an intercept, though there was flour and sugar so it was -- but that is not what they were referring of. They -- they were speaking figuratively. I would say it would be a mildly coded conversation.

Q. What are they talking about?

A. They're talking about weapons, what Kertes was -- that was his field.

MR. KAY: Your Honour, we've come to the same problem we've come to throughout in dealing with these intercepts, of interpretation by the witness.

JUDGE MAY: If a foundation can be laid for his opinion, then he can give it for what it's worth. If he has a similar experience or something of that sort. If it's merely an opinion, then of course it's purely worthless.

MR. KAY: We haven't got there yet to say whether it is a proper foundation. ¹³¹⁴⁸

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, you get the point. It's merely for this witness to say they're thinking about something else -- talking about something else. It's merely his opinion unless he's got something to base it on.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the witness had actually already explained that he was shown weapons by a certain person, and we spoke about that in private session, and he said that this person mentioned that these weapons were received through Braco, and he also said that Braco --

JUDGE MAY: I think this is all a matter of argument. You can certainly --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

Q. Witness --

JUDGE MAY: You can certainly put that to us. We will have to consider it. But I don't think we can hear the witness's opinion on this any more.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, Mr. Karadzic says in relation to the manager of the commodity reserves -- do you recall that you discussed this and you heard this before in the Prosecution's office when you heard, did you find a mistake in the translation when we discussed it? What does Mr. -- when you --

JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Can we have a look at the B/C/S -- ¹³¹⁴⁹

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How can such a question be put as to whether he found an error in the translation?

JUDGE MAY: He can say if he found it. We'll have it checked. He can say what his opinion is --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. He can say, "I listened to this and this is what I heard." What it's worth, of course, is a totally different matter.

Yes. Briefly, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you.

Q. Witness, Mr. Karadzic makes a remark in relation to the manager of the commodity reserves, and in the B/C/S version:

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see. You haven't seen the manager of the commodity reserves...

Can you find this, please? And can we put it on the -- do you have this? And Braco actually then says:

BRACO: Yes. Yes. Don't worry. I'll go to the manager of the commodity reserves. Just to see, you know?

It's rather at the end of the conversation.

A. Yes, I remember that. It said that it wasn't the chief of the commodity reserves but Slobodan Milosevic, if that's what you're referring to.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is page 3 of the Serbian ^{13150 BLANK PAGE 13151} version, Your Honours.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Mr. Tapuskovic, the telephone --

JUDGE MAY: Don't correct him.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry. Your Honours, there are actually twice mentioning of the manager. It's first on page 3, but then also at the end of the conversation. It should be on the second to last page.

JUDGE MAY: Have you got a copy to give to the witness with it highlighted?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes. He's actually -- yes. And can you give the witness ...

Q. Witness, do you have this section where Mr. Radovan Karadzic says:

RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see. You haven't seen the manager of the commodity reserves...

Can you please read this? It is marked. It's marked.

JUDGE MAY: Just put it in front of the witness. Let us not waste any more time. Put the marked passage in front of the witness.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've found it. I've found it.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can you please read the two sentences in your language, and can we have the translation?

A. RADOVAN KARADZIC: Uh-huh. Fine. Down there to the chief of the commodities, you haven't been there. So you will.

BRACO: Yes. Yes. Don't worry. I'm going to see the chief of the commodity reserves to see only, you understand?

RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. ¹³¹⁵²

Q. Stop there.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, as you can see, the word "down there" is missing in the English version that we have, and it was just translated.

JUDGE MAY: As I say, we'll have this matter properly translated. Yes. Let's move on.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you.

Q. You can put this away now. I would like to put two documents to you in relation to this matter. The first one is Exhibit 352, tab 40, and it's a request by Milan Martic to Jovica Stanisic and Milan Tepavcevic at the state security department of the MUP to determine expenditure. And just to look at the stamp and the signature. Is that -- and the header. Is that what was used, and is it Mr. Martic's signature?

A. Yes, the letterhead and the stamp, but the signature is not Martic's, though his name is indicated. It says "For Martic," so somebody signed on his behalf. It says, "For the Minister, Milan Martic." So somebody else signed it.

Q. And the other document is tab 41 in that same exhibit, and it's a letter by Nebojsa Pavkovic to Radomir Stojicic of the 22nd of March, 1995, in relation to training centres. And again I would like just to -- you to speak about the letterhead, the stamp, and the signature. Is that what was used at that time?

A. Yes, that's right. Pavkovic was the deputy, but I can't recognise the signature. I don't remember what his signature was like. But everything else fits, so probably that too. ¹³¹⁵³

Q. And this letter is addressed to the Ministry of Interior, MUP, Mr. Radovan Stojicic, and it's about the help in relation to Sabotage Squad training. Do you know, was such a cooperation between the MUP Serbia and the MUP of the SAO still ongoing at that time?

A. Yes, there was. I heard about it. I don't know specifically which men were involved.

Q. Thank you. Thank you. Witness, I would like to return with you now to meetings with Mr. Milosevic, and we have already touched on referenda that were conducted in 1991. Did the Assembly of the SAO also hold a referendum in May 1991?

A. That's right, yes.

Q. What was put to the voters?

A. For the SAO Krajina to be joined to the Republic of Serbia and to remain with Serbia and Montenegro within Yugoslavia and others who want to remain in there. It was first decided that they should vote on being conjoined to Serbia, but then it was changed. The question was changed upon the intervention of Mr. Milosevic.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. What do you mean by the "intervention of Mr. Milosevic"? What kind of an intervention was that?

A. He asked that we state our views and vote for Yugoslavia and not for Serbia. And he was angry because of the referendum. He was also ¹³¹⁵⁴ angry because we had said we'd be sending a commission to inform the Assembly of Serbia about the results of the voting at the referendum.

Q. Did you personally speak with Mr. Milosevic on this occasion, and if so, where was that?

A. Yes, I did. At the beginning of May, in his office.

Q. What did he want you to do, and did you actually then react to his wishes?

A. To come out in favour of Yugoslavia, to say yes to Yugoslavia. And he said that some academicians had told him that I should be killed because I was so stubborn, a troublemaker, and I was constantly upsetting matters. However, I left him saying the opposite, or, rather, saying what had already been established, determined. And later on - I can't remember now - some other people insisted that we supplement this question and that's what was, in fact, done.

Q. So what was, at the end, the question to put to the voters?

A. "Are you in favour of joining up with Serbia and remain in Yugoslavia with the others who wish to remain in Yugoslavia?" So the question asked of the voters was expanded. To join up with Serbia and remain in Yugoslavia.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're back into open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. I would like to put actually the documents dealing with the referendum to the witness just briefly. It's tab 30. It's all in the ¹³¹⁵⁵ binder 351. It's tab 30, tab 32, tab 33, and tab 35, all dealing with the referendum, the decision to conduct it, the report on the referendum, the list of municipalities who voted, and a decision of the SAO Krajina electing a deputy group to present results of the referendum to the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.

Witness, we do not need to discuss this document. It's just for you to just see.

That's all correct?

A. That's right, yes.

Q. Was this delegation that was mentioned in the last document, was it actually received by the National Assembly of Serbia?

A. No, it was received by the vice-president of the Assembly, Borivoj Petrovic, in private, and took them out to dinner.

Q. What was the result of -- what was the result, and what happened after the referendum?

A. After the referendum, what happened was that the Assembly of the SAO Krajina proclaimed the results of the voting at the referendum, and after that, the SAO Krajina constituted itself again anew as a federal territory of Yugoslavia.

Q. We have discussed the police situation in the Krajina, and the military situation, and I would -- I would like to go into private session for the next sequence.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: ¹³¹⁵⁶

Q. Did you -- did the government of the SAO Krajina ever have any control over Martic and any police force within the SAO Krajina?

A. No, never.

Q. Did you try to change that in April -- in spring 1991, and if so, what did you do?

A. I did try at the end of May 1991, and instead of the Minister of the Interior, that Martic should be replaced and be the Minister of Defence and that both these men be responsible to the government of the SAO Krajina. And the Assembly did in fact elect Martic as Defence Minister, but he didn't want to hand over his militia -- hand over the militia, police force. And on the 27th of June, 1991, he forced the issue, and he was given that post again. That is to say he was re-elected to the post that he continued to hold, in fact, throughout that time. And according to what people from the police force told me, he did this with the help of Frenki and the people around Frenki.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're back into open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I would like to -- I would like to put to the witness now the document tab 54 -- 54, yes, in Exhibit 352. It's a decision on the formation of a Special Purpose Unit of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina to be called the Krajina Police, and to be under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. The task of the -- according to Article 2:

"The task of the Krajina Police shall be to defend the ¹³¹⁵⁷ territory ... of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, secure vital facilities, the Region's institutions and other tasks within the domain of internal affairs."

According to this task, is that actually a regular police task?

A. It should have been the territorial police force, a sort of gendarmerie. That's what it should have been.

Q. So that was the plan.

A. That's right.

Q. And -- it's in here in this decision. It's actually said that the Ministry of Defence should be in charge of this. And I have here as the next document the exhibit -- tab 55, Exhibit 352, and it's actually the decision to appoint Mr. Milan Martic in this position that you just mentioned.

And the next exhibit is tab 55 of that same --

A. That's right.

Q. -- 56 of that same document, and it is the election of -- a decision on the election of the Minister of Interior, and it's Dusan Vjestica.

A. That's right, yes.

Q. And did Mr. Martic agree to this while this decision was made on the 29th of May, 1991?

A. That day he did agree and took the oath of office as Defence Minister, but the very next day he didn't want to.

Q. And who told you that this was according to an influence of Frenki Simatovic? Who told you that, and how did you hear of it? ¹³¹⁵⁸

A. People from the police force, the police station in Knin.

Q. And I would like to put to you --

A. And Martic told me, too, himself. He said, "I don't want to."

Q. Witness, did Mr. Vjestica, did he try to take over his function?

A. He did try, yes, to take over his function, and he appointed some people. The head of the police station in Knin, that was a new man, and a deputy for him. However, as far as I heard, people from the police force said that Martic and the others, that people tore up the documents and laughed, and he didn't try and do it again.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I don't think that I actually need to put the two witnesses -- exhibits to the witness. It's actually what he said already. It's the confirmation of appointing on the 27th of June, 1991, Dusan Vjestica to be the Minister of Urban Planning, Housing, and Public. And the Minister of Interior of the Serbian Autonomous Region is then appointed, Mr. Milan Martic.

Q. Did the politicians in the Krajina try to get control over the police in August 1991?

A. Yes, through the organisation of Territorial Defence of the SAO Krajina.

Q. What was done?

A. Martic was appointed deputy commander of the Territorial Defence, and he applied the law according to which the police force should be subjected -- subjugated to the Territorial Defence, the command of the Territorial Defence.

Q. Witness, that was actually not my question, and I think I will put ¹³¹⁵⁹ to you a document, and that is the tab 62 from Exhibit 352, and it is a decision of the government of the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina of the 1st of August, 1991, to abolish the state security service on the territory of the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina. Can you tell us what the background of this decision was?

A. The background was the following: To exempt the influence of the State Security Service of Serbia and the DB in Krajina, which was part of the State Security Service of Serbia, and to gain control and influence over the internal affairs department, the police force, in Krajina. That meant that the Ministry of the Interior should be under the control, placed under the control, of the government. That was an attempt that was made.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. At that time, was Mr. Stanisic in Knin, and did you discuss this step with him?

A. Yes. On that day, Stanisic was in Knin, and I met him there. He asked me what happened, and I said that the government would set up an agency for national security of its own. He just sort of grinned. He was mocking me sarcastically.

Q. Did you at the same time also try to establish control over the armed groups that were not part of the police? Did you try to establish a TO controlled by the SAO authorities? ¹³¹⁶⁰

A. That's right, yes. The Territorial Defence was under the competency of the municipal staffs of Territorial Defence under the JNA. The JNA had the keys to its weapons, and I wanted to combine the Territorial Defence of SAO Krajina to set up a Main Staff, main headquarters, and that the Territorial Defence should come under the Prime Minister and government of SAO Krajina as the executive personage.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again, and I would like to put a decree to the witness. It's tab 63 of Exhibit 352.

[Open session]

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Is this decision a decree on the insignia worn by member of the armed forces, Territorial Defence, and Special Purpose Units of the SAO Krajina? Is that related to the matter that you just mentioned?

A. That's right.

Q. Did the TO actually succeed in becoming an independent institution controlled by the SAO government?

A. No, it did not.

Q. What happened? Who resisted it?

A. Slobodan Milosevic helped set up a Main Staff of the Territorial Defence, but it was subordinate to the Yugoslav People's Army.

Q. At that time, did you also have a clash with --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Would have to go into private session, sorry.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session. ¹³¹⁶¹

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. At that time, did you have a clash also with Frenki Simatovic and Captain Dragan, and if so, what happened?

A. That's right. At the beginning of August - I think it was around about the 8th or 9th of August - after these legal provisions had been adopted on Territorial Defence and after this decree, this document that was passed, he sent a man by the name of Djoko Majstorovic to take the insignia of the Territorial Defence to a club that was set up at the Knin fortress where the wartime staff of the Territorial Defence of Knin was to be lodged, and at that time it was the seat of Captain Dragan, Milan Martic, Frenki, and the men around them.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise if I'm wrong, but as I can't hear the witness at all and I'm looking at the transcript, what he's saying, I understand that it is tab 63 that we're -- tab 63 is a decree of Milan Babic about insignia worn by members of the armed forces of the Territorial Defence, what the flag looks like, and the crossed swords on it, and I didn't understand that that was the subject upon which the explanation was given. Is that my mistake or not?

JUDGE MAY: He's moved on, and he's describing a clash with Simatovic.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And it's actually -- this clash is actually related to this exhibit, because it's about the flag and the insignia and the establishment --

JUDGE MAY: Yes. ¹³¹⁶²

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So it is that exhibit, is it?

JUDGE MAY: Yes, it's related to that exhibit.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Witness, go on.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Yes. Please continue.

A. I apologise. Are we in closed session?

Q. Yes.

A. I went to that on the -- at the Knin fortress which is where Captain Dragan, Frenki were, to see what was going on, because Captain Dragan told the man carrying the insignia that while he was there, Babic wouldn't be setting them up. And I went to see what was happening. When I arrived, the people there from the municipal headquarters of the Territorial Defence were dispersing. They said that Captain Dragan had let them go. They were there providing security for the area otherwise. And I arrived up there. I went into the meeting hall, the conference hall. I was told that Captain Dragan was there. Captain Dragan was in a meeting. He was having a conference with his unit, the unit, the special unit he was in command of. I went into the meeting room and sat next to him, and somebody said later on, told me that when I went in and sat down, Frenki got up and left the room. Nobody addressed me. Captain Dragan held a speech, continued to deliver his speech to his men, to his people. He said that it was -- that the politicians were to blame for everything and that he was leaving, he was going to leave Knin, and that he was going to leave ¹³¹⁶³ his men to Frenki and that everything would be resolved.

Q. Were you threatened on that day by anyone?

A. Yes, I was. Captain Dragan's men followed me to the centre in Golubic or part of Golubic, which is where the civilian structures of the Knin municipality were supposed to be deployed in case of war, and I had gone there to tell the men not to disperse, but I was followed there by Captain Dragan's men. They blocked the whole area and shouted, "Where's the man that has to be killed? Where is he?" And then I escaped from that locality and went to the neighbouring village. And in the morning, I called up President Milosevic.

Q. Why did you call him? What did you want from him?

A. To tell him that those men around Frenki are idiots. They're mad. They don't know what they're doing. I was very much afraid, and I wanted to ask him to withdraw them from Krajina, and he promised that he would do so.

Q. What did --

A. Frenki. I'm sorry. I asked Frenki, that Frenki be withdrawn, quite specifically.

Q. What did you tell him? You said you told him that they were mad and what they were doing. What exactly did you tell him what they were doing?

A. I don't remember that I explained this over the phone to him on that occasion. I didn't go into all the details on that occasion. I just gave a general assessment of them.

Q. And why did you ask for the removal of Frenki and not of ¹³¹⁶⁴ Captain Dragan?

A. Frenki was the boss up there. He was in charge of those men.

Q. And you said Mr. Milosevic promised to -- that he would do that, and did he do that? Did Frenki --

A. I didn't see Frenki around up there any more. I assume he did. I wasn't quite sure, but Frenki, on the 26th of August, 1991, was removed, and Milosevic said that Frenki should go back to Krajina again. And I assume that in this interim he had actually left Krajina. I mean Frenki.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, can we finish that sequence?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

Q. You said that he later -- you said Mr. Milosevic then said that Frenki should go back to the Krajina again. When did he say that? What were the circumstances of this?

A. On the 26th of August, 1991, in his cabinet, when somebody conveyed a message to me from him that I should come to see him to a meeting there. And when I arrived, that was it. That was when he told me.

Q. And did Frenki then return to the Krajina?

A. He did return, yes. I met him and heard about him in September 1991.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, that finishes this sequence.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we'll adjourn. Before we do so, I should say, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, by my calculation you've got four and three-quarter hours left. ^{13165 BLANK PAGE 13166} Are we in open session? Let's go back into open session so people can hear.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.

JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn. Before we do, I should say, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, you have four and three-quarter hours left with this witness and should plan accordingly.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, may I raise this issue of time today or do you want me to start with this tomorrow? Because I want to make a request.

JUDGE MAY: You want to?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I want to make a request for more time.

JUDGE MAY: How long more are you asking for?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I'm asking for two more days.

JUDGE MAY: Two more days. That's another eight hours.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: Well, we'll think about it.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, shall I explain myself? Because this witness is of a very special type of witness, and for the Croatia section of the case, he is the only one of this type. And if we hear his entire evidence that he has to give, we can definitely drop other -- other lower-level insiders who can give us little pieces of the evidence that this witness can give us as a whole, and we could simply -- I'm not in a position at the moment to say who exactly would we drop. I can only say that people will be dropped. And actually, the Prosecution ¹³¹⁶⁷ team is at the moment checking and already filtering out who can be dropped of the next lower-level insider witnesses.

JUDGE MAY: Just give us some idea so we know what the position is as to how many witnesses you're talking about.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I can give you this idea tomorrow morning.

JUDGE MAY: If you would.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But it will definitely be five or six people, at least.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll think about that. Meanwhile, let me deal with one other general matter concerning sittings or hearings this term and into next.

The first matter is this: that it seems there may be some rearrangement of the dates of the Plenary. It was fixed for the 10th to the 12th. Now, I don't know whether there will be or not, but fairly definitely we'll be sitting on what was the first day, the 10th. I think it's the 10th. It was the first day. I'm told it's the -- there seems to be some doubt about it.

MR. NICE: I think it's the 11th is the first day of the Plenary. Our last sitting day was Tuesday the 10th.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, it's the 11th. We will definitely be sitting the 11th. It may be that we will look to sit the other days too.

MR. NICE: Thank you. That's very helpful to know.

JUDGE MAY: And dropping another day as a result of the rearrangement. But that is yet to be confirmed. It may not take place, but definitely the 11th. ¹³¹⁶⁸ I suggest that we use the 19th, which is an odd day -- 18th of December, rather, the Wednesday. If necessary, of course, we'll finish a witness, but it may be sensible to use that for the administrative and other legal arguments, Mr. Torkildsen's evidence, for instance, and the various submissions we've had about the conduct of the trial. Again, closer to the time, we can arrange that.

Finally, advance notice of January's sittings: The first break in January sittings will be between the 22nd and the 24th of January. I think the 24th of January may be a court maintenance day. I can't remember that definitely, but anyway, we will be breaking in that period.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: And we will let you have a calendar, let everybody have a calendar for the next term, as it were, as soon as we can. Very well. Tomorrow morning, please.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.52 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 21st day of

November, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.