Milosevic Transcript 2002-11-21

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Thursday, 21 November 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Can I return to the question of how much time should be available for the evidence-in-chief of this witness?

JUDGE MAY: Well, we've heard submissions on this, if I may say, very adequately presented by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. We've had the opportunity of reflecting on the matter and we've made a decision. I'm not sure there's really anything you can add to it.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, first -- two points I'd like to clarify -- three, if I may, and I am only doing it because of my role in charge of the case as a whole and there's one thing I want to say. First of all, in case there's any ambiguity, what we're seeking is six days, not four, that is, two additional days. We hope that was clear. Second, the Prosecution's position is that it would be wrong, frankly wrong, given the quality, the integrity, and the detail of this witness to exclude any of his evidence.

Third, and I think this was not available in detail last night, there is the statistics of the number of witnesses who would be saved having to give evidence, and some analysis of the material that would be lost if it was other than the full six days available for evidence. And the statistics may help the Court, and I hope they will enable you to ¹³¹⁷⁰ review any decision tentatively made or provisionally made other than to grant the two additional days.

Originally, we were allowed 71 witnesses for Croatia. We forecast - obviously these things are not capable of the greatest precision - that the fifth day of evidence of this witness would enable us to save eight witnesses who we otherwise had a settled intention to call; some four experts, two low-level insiders, and two verifiers of a document. The sixth day would enable us to save a further five crime-base witnesses and one journalist witness dealing with crime-base matters. Accordingly, the total potential saving for those two additional days would be some 14 witnesses, which is in the order of 20 per cent of the allocation. And in our respectful submission, it is entirely right that the witness should be heard in full. If he is not heard in full, material that will be left out would include direct contacts between the witness and other members of the joint criminal enterprise plus evidence simply not available elsewhere of the military structures of the areas of the crimes allegedly committed. In our submission, this is material that the Chamber should have, can have in the most economic form from this witness, and that it would be inappropriate or wrong to exclude. Thank you for allowing me to add to the arguments that were, as I entirely accept, fully expressed -- not fully expressed, but expressed before she had an opportunity with the team to do the research last night by my learned colleague.

JUDGE MAY: Well, I must say that I think this part of the case has been going very slowly indeed. In twenty-plus days we've heard about ¹³¹⁷¹ 12 witnesses. And of course, it is a matter of concern as to how you're going to get through your case by the dates which we've allocated, with such adjustment as there must be for illness.

MR. NICE: May I respond? Or maybe Your Honour hasn't completed what you're going to say. The suggestion that the evidence has been going slowly is one that we couldn't accept. The evidence is entirely different in character because it's so much denser in content and we have taken every available procedure to make matters go swiftly. We are, of course, bound by the decisions of the Chamber in relation to matters of 92 bis and so on, but we forecast that the very character of the evidence that is coming in at the beginning of this phase of the trial will in fact enable us to prove our case in, we hope, and realistically expect, the original overall time allocations made by the Chamber.

JUDGE MAY: Well, I think it was the 12th of May. That day stands for the moment. We will make such adjustment as we can and we think proper for illness, but that is the date which you must have in mind, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: We have. And of course I will do, in respect of remaining witnesses, everything that can be done, as the whole team has been doing so far, to make use of procedural steps to abbreviate evidence. But we are bound by the Rules of the Tribunal and the practices of the Chamber. So we press you to say that it is simply inappropriate to restrict this witness's evidence and economic --

JUDGE MAY: Well, it's not the evidence; it's the speed with which it's being taken. It can be taken more expeditiously, in my view. ¹³¹⁷²

MR. NICE: Well, I respectfully differ from that view, and my learned colleague is, of course, master of the detail, as is the witness, and the evidence is necessarily delivered at a speed that is going to be capable of being understood and assimilated. There are other ways evidence can be given. I'm only too happy for that to be dealt with. Statements can be read, pre-read, and a witness can adopt his statement, but those are not practices that this Chamber is yet in a position to accept, and therefore we have the viva voce system of question and answer, and I would reject entirely any suggestion that my learned colleague has not been proceeding with this matter other than at a good speed.

JUDGE MAY: Not my view. Not that -- no criticism, may I say, but -- because counsel, of course, approach things in their own way, and I accept that. And counsel, as we recognise, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff considers the duty which she has to put the matter before us and also the witness on occasion replies at a bit of length.

Well, we'll consider the matter and we'll reflect on it.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, I think I can see your point, but what was the base then when the Prosecution at the outset had said that it expected to conclude this witness in three days and a half and how was it changed?

MR. NICE: You know, until you -- until you do these things, you can never be quite sure, and of course Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff was well aware of the considerable pressure that would be on her from the Chamber to deal with matters at a particular speed. Until you actually do it in court, you can't know. ¹³¹⁷³ Now, this witness -- and again, this is something that we have to take into account. Witnesses are not as we would like them to be; they are as they are. He's a meticulous man who gives evidence in detail, according to the process of his memory and thought processes, and there is a limit to which you can make one witness into a witness of another type.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice --

MR. NICE: Yes. I'm grateful to Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Of course, we have to remind the Chamber, we pressed you to apply the provisions of 92 bis, which would have saved many hours or days, but the Chamber took a different view. We would have preferred all the background material to have been pre-read in a way that we respectfully press on the Chamber is entirely appropriate, safe, and preserving of the accused's rights. But the Chamber took a contrary view, which we have, of course, respected.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'm not saying that I would accede to the request, but it would seem to me that if we were to consider it favourably, we would have to hold you very strictly to the 14 witnesses whom you say you will not call. I would like to see the names of those witnesses.

MR. NICE: I would always hope my word in court is something that will be accepted. As to holding us to account, if that's expressed in the view that my word is accepted, then of course I have absolutely no problem with that as a proposition. I'm in a position to provide the list of the names of those who we at present regard as witnesses we would no longer seek to call. Yes, I can provide you with a list.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll consider the matter. ¹³¹⁷⁴

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honours.

WITNESS: WITNESS C-[Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]

Q. Good morning, Witness.

A. Good morning.

Q. Can you speak into the microphone? The interpreters couldn't hear you.

Witness, yesterday we spoke about the removal of Frenki and Captain Dragan from the region in August, and I would like to ask you in this context about a meeting. I would like to do that in private session.

[Private session]

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[redacted]

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours. ¹³¹⁷⁷

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. We have mentioned several times Mr. Martic. You have also referred to the support that he received from Serbia. Was Mr. Martic loyal to Mr. Milosevic? Can you say?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Mr. Martic acknowledge his loyalty publicly during the election campaign that he held in 1993/1994?

A. Yes, publicly. During the election campaign and after the campaign as well, he said that he would be the provisional president of Krajina, and once -- that he would be only the provisional president and that he would hand over the baton to Slobodan Milosevic, the relay baton, sort of, hand over the office. And people made jokes about that in Knin, saying that he would hand over his police baton to Milosevic.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

[Private session]

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[redacted]

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness the Exhibit tab 64 in Exhibit 352.

Q. Witness, it's an appointment of Milan Martic to the position of deputy commander of the TO of the SAO Krajina. Why was he appointed into this position, and what competence did go along with this position?

A. He was appointed because he was the Minister of the Interior, and in that way the police in Krajina were incorporated into the new system ¹³¹⁸⁰ and placed under the authority of the government of Krajina.

Q. Witness, yesterday we spoke about a report. It was an exhibit, tab 67, a report on the military activities in the region in August 1991. This report that also went to Frenki. And in this report, there was mentioned a ceasefire, an order that Mile Martic gave regarding a ceasefire. Was a ceasefire actually agreed upon on the 6th of August, 1991?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. Despite the ceasefire, was Kijevo attacked in August 1991?

A. On the 26th of August, it was attacked, yes. And before that, Milan Martic laid down an ultimatum to the police and inhabitants of Kijevo, telling them to leave Kijevo, on the 18th of August, I believe.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness tab 68 from Exhibit 352.

Q. Is that the ceasefire -- the ultimatum that you just mentioned?

A. It is.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted] ¹³¹⁸¹

[redacted]

[Open session] ¹³¹⁸²

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. While you were away from Knin in this conversation that you just had, was it on that exact day Kijevo attacked?

A. That's right. It was attacked on that day, in the morning.

Q. Which forces were involved in this attack?

A. The JNA corps from Knin, units of the Krajina police, and the local TO.

Q. How do you know that? Did you see anything to this effect?

A. The next day, I passed through the area and I saw the commander of the Knin brigade, Colonel Djukic, and officers from his group. And he said that the chief of staff of the corps, Ratko Mladic, was in front of him, going towards Otisic. I saw a tank column of which Djukic was in command, and this was in front of Vrljika. I saw a unit of TO of Cetine on the edges of the village of Cetine, towards Vrljika. And they told me that the police had been there too, Martic and Milenko Zelenbaba. And this was shown on Belgrade television as well.

Q. Did you see that on Belgrade television, Martic in Kijevo?

A. Yes. Belgrade television showed two scenes from Kijevo. One was Martic and Zelenbaba removing the Croatian flag from the police station and embracing each other, and the other was Vesna Jugovic, a reporter of Belgrade television, interviewing a soldier of the JNA on the road through the village of Kijevo. That is, a talk between him and an old man from Kijevo, an old Croat who had stayed behind. And this soldier asked him the following: "Did you kill my grandfather in 1941?" And the man says, ¹³¹⁸³ "I did not."

Q. [Microphone not activated] Let me stop you there. Witness, you said that you came through this region a day later. What did Kijevo look like? Did you see any Croats? Was it intact?

A. The place was deserted. The inhabitants could not be seen. It had been destroyed by artillery fire.

Q. On that day, did you see Mr. Mladic actually in the field? On this day or the next days?

A. In the next day or two, after I was again passing along that road, that is, through Vrljika.

Q. What was he doing when you saw him?

A. He was returning from Otisic. He was accompanying a group of representatives of the Croatian authorities from Sinj and Split. He was accompanying them to Vrljika, which was under his administration.

Q. Mr. Mladic, did he actually participate in fighting activities on the ground? Do you know that?

A. Yes. Yes. He participated and he was in command. The reporters even said that he was in the front lines and that he de-mined obstacles and he appeared on all parts of the front suddenly, on his own, with groups. And I remember that when the new Corps Commander arrived, General Vukovic, and Mladic asked him to report to him where the corps units were deployed. Then Mladic showed on the map that there were small groups of units of the corps on various parts of the front in the area of northern Dalmatia. And then the general said, "Where is the corps?" But that is the way Mladic commanded the corps. ¹³¹⁸⁴

Q. You said that Mladic commanded the corps. Was he the Corps Commander or what was his position?

A. Mladic, from the summer and through the autumn of 1991, he was Chief of Staff of the corps. For a time, that is, in September, when Spiro Nikolic, the previous general, was moved to another position before Vukovic arrived, he was the most senior officer. In 1992, he was for a time the Corps Commander, that is, Mladic.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to go into private session again for the next meeting with Mr. Milosevic.

[Private session]

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[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did the -- did Colonel Maksic actually arrive, and his ten officers?

A. Some ten days went by and they didn't arrive, and I called President Milosevic's secretary on the phone and I asked for the president, and she said he wasn't there but she would connect me to him. And I asked him, "What about the officers?" And he said, "They're coming tomorrow." They didn't come tomorrow, but they came five or six or seven days later. But not ten officers; Maksic and another two.

Q. Did they arrive, and what position did they take?

A. Colonel Dusan Kasum came as the chief of staff of the TO SAO Krajina; Colonel Vuletic, as the chief of communications; and Colonel Maksic, as the operative chief. They came to Martic's at the Knin fortress, and they called me to come there and I arrived and I saw only three of them, and they just shrugged their shoulders. And I asked, "Is Martic the commander?" And he said, "Call General Simovic." He was the ¹³¹⁸⁷ Minister of Defence of Serbia. And I called him and I asked, "Is Maksic the commander of the TO staff of SAO Krajina?" And he said, "We have designated General Djujic." And he gave an explanation for Martic, an excuse why he couldn't hold that position.

Q. And what was the reason why General Djujic was supposed to take the position?

A. Simovic said that Maksic was an alcoholic.

Q. Did --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher I would like just to put to you the decisions made in this regard. It's tab 69, appointment of General Djujic, Maksic, Kasum and Vuletic; tab 70, appointment Colonel Djujic; tab 71, appointment Maksic; tab 72, order to relieve Djujic; tab 46 -- sorry, 49.6 is a decision to appoint Colonel Tabok; and tab 51.1 and 50.2, decisions to relieve Dusan Starevic from -- and Velibor Matijasevic from their positions.

Q. Are these decisions taken in relation to the TO command and the --

A. Yes.

[redacted]

A. These were formal, legal decisions confirming decisions taken by the competent authorities in Belgrade, in this case, the General Staff and the Secretary of National Defence. These two documents about Matijasevic and Starevic, they are not directly linked to the Main Staff of the TO but rather linked to the obstruction of the Assembly, which was done by a ¹³¹⁸⁸ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³¹⁸⁹ parallel structure with a view to influencing negotiations in The Hague.

Q. Witness, those TO commanders that were then appointed, were they controlled by the politicians in the Krajina? Did they report to the politicians in the Krajina or not?

A. No, they did not. They themselves didn't establish control over the unified TO of SAO Krajina, but it remained subordinated to the competent units of the JNA, according to various regions, and they themselves were subordinated to the JNA command.

Q. I have to put to you just another document in this context, and it's tab 73 of the Exhibit 352. This is an order -- a certificate, actually, by the SFRY Presidency signed by Vice-President Branko Kostic and Colonel Milo Kostic, in relation to promotion of Colonel Kasum to the Chief of Staff of the TO Defence in April 1992; correct?

A. He's promoted to the rank of general, but he was previously appointed to the Chief of Staff of the TO of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Q. Does that mean afterwards - we are talking now about April 1992 - this relationship between the TO --

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. This relationship of the TO staff, the officers there, and the JNA, or VJ, as it later was called, remained the same?

A. It remained the same until August 1995. Virtually, it was Slobodan Milosevic who appointed the commanders of the Serbian army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Q. Witness, in relation to the TO in the Krajina, did you have ¹³¹⁹⁰ opportunity to review, during your conversations here in The Hague, a lot of documents that related to appointments, related to organisation of units? Did you review these documents?

A. I did.

Q. Could you authenticate all these documents? Could you -- did you know them?

A. Yes, that's right.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I do not want to put all these documents to the witness. I just want to read to you, and for the record, which documents the witness reviewed and confirmed as being made by the authorities there. And it's actually all from the Exhibit 352, and it is tabs 114, 115, 117 to 119, 121 to 141, 145, 148, 150, 151. These are the documents that I would like to refer to in this regard. It's all appointments and all formations.

Q. These decisions taken, were they respected by the JNA and the Martic police?

A. Some decisions, yes; some, no. The decisions relating to active-duty officers in their role were respected. A part of the decisions that were passed in July, August, and September of 1991 were not respected.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

JUDGE KWON: For the record, 151 was dropped; yes?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh, yes. Yes, Your Honour. I just got the note from my colleague here. Thank you.

[Private session] ¹³¹⁹¹ Page 13191 - redacted - private session

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[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness the document tab 74 of Exhibit 352.

Q. Witness, what kind of a document is this and who prepared it?

A. This document was compiled in the Main Staff of the TO of SAO Krajina, and it was a report, in fact, on the situation in the SAO TO of the Krajina in 1991, October.

Q. Did you --

A. 10th of October.

Q. For whom was this prepared and to whom was this given?

A. Well, it was prepared for the Prime Minister, first and foremost, and then it was drafted for the General Staff of the JNA, to be handed on to them.

Q. Was it handed to General Adzic?

A. I don't know that exactly, but he did receive information about these issues, as we had discussed them previously.

Q. Those matters raised here, the needs of the TO, were these the matters that were discussed with General Adzic on the occasion that you described? ¹³¹⁹³

A. Yes, they were, briefly.

Q. Witness, I would like now to move on to discussions held about the Carrington plan and the future Yugoslavia. What were the proposals for the Krajina? What were the proposals for the Krajina?

A. In Lord Carrington's general plan, proposals were made for three types of relationships amongst the republics of the former Yugoslavia. For areas inhabited in individual republics with ethnic communities having certain characteristics, it was provided that they should be granted a special territorial status, and this referred to Krajina as well.

Q. What was -- was there stated a certain autonomy within the Croatian context?

A. Yes, that's right. Territorial autonomy within Croatia.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

[Private session]

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--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Let's go into open session for one matter.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, we've considered the application which you and Mr. Nice make. We will grant it. You will have the six days. But we will expect the list of 14 witnesses within seven days.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. We actually have identified the 14 witnesses, and we can provide it, actually, in one day. Tomorrow you will have your list.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you very much. Yes. Do we need to go back into private session?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour. We can stay in open session, and I would like to clarify a few points in relation to the Vance plan, to make it perfectly clear what the provisions were, the suggestions were. ¹³²⁰⁸ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³²⁰⁹

Q. First of all, Witness, did the Vance plan foresee the re-integration of the three SAOs into the Republic of Croatia within certain time periods?

A. The plan didn't address that directly, except in the introduction, which referred to areas that were in Croatia. That is all that it said. The plan did not address the political solution. It explicitly said that a political solution would be found later. "Until a political solution is found." So the plan refers to a period until a political solution is found, except in the first paragraph, which said what I said.

Q. And the provision was demilitarisation of the -- all three SAOs, with only a police force remaining, with the weapons that a police force usually have. Was that what you referred to?

A. That's right. That was the substance of the plan; the demilitarisation of those regions.

Q. Did the plan foresee the arrival of UN troops, and where would the UN troops be?

A. Yes. The plan did envisage, after the demilitarisation, the deployment of peace forces of the United Nations across the territory within the territory of those regions, and those forces would control roads, checkpoints, the entries and exits from the regions. They would check that no weapons were being introduced or carried within those areas.

Q. And --

JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do we have the document among our binders, the Carrington plans and Vance plans? If you assist us later on. Thank you. ¹³²¹⁰

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. I'm not aware of this. I think we don't.

JUDGE MAY: Perhaps we can get a copy. If we can, it would be helpful.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

Q. And if I understood you, your concerns, some of the Serb-controlled areas were not included in this zone that UN troops would supervise.

A. That's right.

Q. And was there a provision also in the Vance plan regarding the return of displaced persons into this territory?

A. Yes. That was one of the objectives of the international mission.

Q. Was there also a provision in the Vance plan regarding joint police forces of Croats and Serbs within that territory?

A. Yes. As I said, it would be in proportion to the ethnic composition of the population prior to the conflict.

Q. Witness, at that time when the Vance plan was discussed, and you said it took almost two months to discuss this, the pros and the cons, did the -- was the RSK, the Republic of Serbian Krajina, established?

A. Yes, on the 19th of December, 1991.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness tab 68 of Exhibit 351, just to have a look at it, sir, not to discuss the details.

Q. Is this the constitution and constitutional law on implementation of the RSK of 19 December 1991? ¹³²¹¹

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Why was the RSK formed at that time? What was the purpose?

A. The international conference in The Hague had stated that it would recognise all the republics of the former Yugoslavia that requested recognition. That virtually meant that the former Yugoslavia had disintegrated, as was stated by the Badinter Commission named by the conference. That was one of the reasons why a part of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, that is, the SAO Krajina, proclaimed itself a republic.

Q. Did the Republic of Serbian Krajina actually request international recognition?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And in this context I would like to put to the witness tab 71.1 and 71.2 of the binder --

A. Yes, it did.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- Exhibit 351.

Q. Are these the two letters to the international officials?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And were you recognised?

A. No.

Q. The territory of the RSK, was that identical with the SAO Krajina territory, or did that include all three SAOs at that time, on the 19th of December?

A. On the 19th of December, the SAO Krajina became the Republic of Serbian Krajina. On that day, the Assembly of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem proclaimed unification with the Republic of Serbian ¹³²¹² Krajina, and two days later, the Assembly of SAO Western Slavonia also proclaimed its unification with Krajina. But until the 26th of February, 1992, they were not united. All three regions on that date united, and that was when the unified Republic of Serbian Krajina was constituted, covering all three regions.

Q. We have talked about the Vance plan and what the provisions were, and in relation to demilitarisation of this region, did you in the Krajina oppose that? I do not mean you personally, but the politicians in the Krajina. Did you oppose the demilitarisation?

A. That's right.

Q. Why did you do that?

A. Because the Vance plan covered a period of six months, upon which there would be a discussion as to whether it should be extended or not, and under those conditions, Krajina would be demilitarised, Croatia would not, and Krajina would have to face the Republic of Croatia imposing a political solution to Krajina by force of arms.

Q. Did you have any -- did you object also against the arrival of the UN troops?

A. To the concept of their arrival. We didn't oppose their coming but the way in which they were to come. The deployment was envisaged according to the so-called green line, based on the Cypriot model.

Q. What does that mean?

A. It meant separation of the warring parties, that is, the Croatian and the Serbian side, and not demilitarisation of the area as a whole. And that is the amendment to the Vance plan that was requested. It was ¹³²¹³ accepted in principle, but this modification was requested regarding certain elements of the plan.

Q. Was there an option? Was that an option, to get a modification of the Vance plan, or was that out of question?

A. As far as I know, there was an option, and some provisions were modified. Regarding the initial deployment for a period of six months, and then it was extended to one year by the Security Council, the Secretary-General of the UN, in his report to the Security Council, made such a proposal, and that was accepted, and that is that Croatian laws should not apply to those territories but the laws in force at the time. There was also a discussion that the Territorial Defence should remain, that the possibility should be given that it should be incorporated into the police without long weapons, long barrels, but this was not resolved. There was just the discussion about it. So some elements were modified.

Q. You mentioned that for about two months the Krajina Serbs opposed the Vance plan, and did all of them oppose the Vance plan, or was there a split within the Krajina politicians?

A. At first they were all opposed, and gradually, more and more politicians accepted the plan fully and unconditionally in the way that President Milosevic had accepted it. And finally, the president of the Republic and the government and part of the Assembly continued to oppose it, requesting modifications of the plan, and a part of the Assembly and the politicians in Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem and part of the Assembly of SAO Krajina and some politicians accepted the plan. And the Assembly, which met in Glina on the 9th of February, 1992, approved the ¹³²¹⁴ plan after the pressure that came from President Milosevic, the Presidency of Yugoslavia, the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia, the media campaign, and the like.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to request private session to go into some details on the meetings in relation to the Vance plan.

[Private session]

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[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. While Mr. Paspalj authorised -- accepted the Vance plan in the Krajina, the politicians in the Krajina who opposed it, did they continue to oppose it and even call for a referendum on the matter within the Krajina?

A. Yes, that's right. Part of the Assembly and the politicians who were opposed called a referendum for the people to state their views about the plan. And the two questions of the referendum were: Were they in favour of the plan completely and unconditionally as the plan had been accepted by Kadijevic, Milosevic and Jovic -- no, I beg your pardon, Tudjman was the third one -- or whether they were in favour of a modified ¹³²²⁴ plan, following the lines of the Krajina government draft.

Q. Witness, you have already mentioned the Assembly session in Glina on the 9th. And this Assembly session, was it an official Assembly session called by the president of the Assembly? Did all Assembly members take part in it?

A. No, not all of them did. My information told me that it was a minority, in fact, which participated. But the delegation from Belgrade did take part.

Q. You mentioned the delegation from Belgrade did take part. Who took part from Belgrade in this meeting?

A. The members of the Presidency of the SFRY, Branko Kostic and Yugoslav Kostic; the head of the General Staff, Adzic; and several other generals and their escorts and the people who accompanied them; the ministers and people from Serbia. Actually, it was a very numerous delegation.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, we have prepared tab 88 of the Exhibit 352, and it is a video. A part, a small speech given on this Glina session by the president of the Presidency, Kostic, or rather, vice-president, and the translation of what is said you actually have under this tab. It will only be -- you have actually the speech, the entire speech, but we will only play the section page 35, the last paragraph, to page 36, the middle of the page.

And when you are ready in the technical booth, we could do that now. Thank you.

[Videotape played] ¹³²²⁵

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Is this the Belgrade delegation arriving, sir?

A. Yes, it is; Branko Kostic, Adzic, and his escorts.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters apologise but they do not have the text of this tape.

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] Mr. Kostic, good day to you. Welcome to Glina. You have come here to attend the Krajina Assembly. What do you expect of the meeting?

Well, we have come and there are quite a lot of us here, and after a rather extensive discussion held in the Yugoslav state Presidency to take part in the work of the Assembly of Srpska Krajina and on the one hand to reject all the accusations, refute all the accusations that have been unfoundedly spread among these people, that we are leaving those people in the lunch. Also to tell the Assemblymen of the Serbian Krajina Assembly, as well as to all the people, that that is a crude lie, flagrant lies, that we have been and are remaining by the side of these people. In addition, to help inasmuch as we can, for reason to prevail, and that these people, as well as the Assemblymen, realise that that which has been gained through war until now can be defended by peace in the best possible way from now on, with the assurances of the Security Council, a world organisation, and the engagement of the Blue Helmets. Thank you very much on behalf of the Novi Sad television. Thank you too.

Mr. Kostic, what is your message to the people of Glina and Krajina? ¹³²²⁶ That we have stood by and are going to stand by these people. However, choosing between the peace option and the war option, the time has come to defend peace, what these people have gained by war, not by continuation of a long and precarious war that might be spread out to the hinterland and Bosnia and sweep over the entire Yugoslavia or even wider in the Balkans. That can obviously finally result in the loss of everything that these people have gained by war so far. Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can stop here. We can stop here. Thank you.

Your Honours, as you can see from the transcript, there is following a speaker of the RSK Assembly on the conference giving a small speech, listing all the people that are present there from Belgrade. That's actually following in that next chapter on page 36, and I don't think we need to play it on the video. You can read it and Mr. Milosevic can read it also, and the amici.

Q. You already mentioned another Assembly session in Glina. Was there an Assembly session in Glina on the 16th of February, 1992, and was the then Prime Minister dismissed?

A. That's right. The Prime Minister of Srpska Krajina was dismissed.

THE INTERPRETER: The president of the Republic of Srpska Krajina. Interpreter's correction.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. And in the subsequent meeting on the 26th of February, 1992, was Goran Hadzic elected the next president of the RSK? ¹³²²⁷

A. That's right, yes.

Q. Did any officials from Belgrade attend this session? Do you know?

A. I heard that will Budimir Kosutic was there. I don't know about anybody else. They said that some people were there, but as I wasn't there myself, I can't say.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness tab 74 of the binder Exhibit 351, and it is actually the decision of the RSK Assembly, dated the 26th of February, 1992, in which the SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem and the SAO Western Slavonia join the RSK officially.

Q. Is that correct?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. We do not need to go into details of this decision.

A. Rather, note is taken that they have united into the territory of Serbian Krajina.

Q. Thank you. Goran Hadzic, what was his position before the war?

A. Goran Hadzic, from the summer of 1990, was the president of the municipal board of the SDS in Vukovar. Later on, he was elected as president of the Serbian National Council of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. And then, subsequently, at the beginning of the autumn or at the end of summer of 1991, he was elected Prime Minister of the government of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.

Q. What was his profession before the war?

A. I didn't hear that from him personally, but everybody said that he was a warehouse clerk, or rather, an official, a clerk, a worker, in some ¹³²²⁸ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³²²⁹ warehouse, something to that effect.

Q. Did you have opportunity to see him during meetings?

A. Yes, quite a few times.

Q. Did he have the political skills and intellectual level to fulfil the position of the President of the RSK? You observed him. Can you comment on this?

A. It's a little difficult for me to speak about somebody's qualifications for a particular job, the job that he did anyway, but what I can say is that he wasn't particularly eloquent, and his political appearances did not correspond to the model we have, the image we have, of a politician. But people from Eastern Slavonia told me that he had been elected to these posts because he was brave and courageous in standing up to the Croatian police in Vukovar and that he first jumped up onto a tractor and thus became a well-known personality.

Q. Was he actually the dominant political authority in the RSK, or someone else?

A. Well, in the RSK, no. The authority, the power -- he had power and authority. Milan Martic and his structures had power and authority, parallel structures, in fact, and they were the powers that be in that part of Krajina. Goran Hadzic, for the most part, spent his time living in Novi Sad. I don't know how far he was influential in Eastern Slavonia. He would come to Knin from time to time.

Q. And when you speak about the parallel structure around Milan Martic, is that the same parallel structure with Frenki that you mentioned before, during the year 1991? ¹³²³⁰

A. That's right, except at that time it was the official, formal authorities in power in the RSK.

Q. Do you know -- you have already mentioned the person Stojicic Badza. What was his relationship or position in the SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem?

A. He was the commander of Territorial Defence in the area.

Q. Did he have an influence on Mr. Hadzic? Do you know?

A. As far as I know, Hadzic made frequent mention of him, Badza, and a certain man named Jajo, as the main people that he cooperated with.

Q. What was Mr. Hadzic's relationship with Mr. Milosevic? Can you -- did you make any observations to this effect?

A. Complete obeyance. Hadzic completely obeyed Milosevic. He was in -- he completely obeyed Milosevic.

Q. What was Mr. Hadzic's relationship, if any, to Mr. Stanisic?

A. Very close. I know that Stanisic would accompany him sometimes to the Presidency of Serbia, and people even said that he stayed in Stanisic's apartment, that he slept there when he came to Belgrade and that he was under Stanisic's complete control. At one time he was even said to wear a camouflage uniform in Belgrade when he went to meetings with Milosevic.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness the exhibit -- tab number 84 of Exhibit 352. It's a photo. Can we put it on the ELMO, please.

Q. And looking at it, can you say where these photos were made and can you point out to us Mr. Hadzic, if he is on these photos, of course. ¹³²³¹

A. This photograph was taken on the 31st of January, 1992. It is the expanded meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY.

Q. And is Mr. Hadzic on any of these photos; and if so, can you point him out to us?

A. These are members of his government.

Q. Can you move it?

A. Members of his government here. You can't see him on the photograph. But he looked like this man here, although this is Rado Leskovac, I believe, but they looked similar.

Q. Thank you very much, then. He's not on the photos. Thank you.

A. No, he isn't; at least, I can't see him.

Q. Witness, we can --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Usher, we can put that away. Thank you.

Q. Witness, you have told us the provisions of the Vance plan, and I would like to know from you now whether this Vance plan was actually -- if it was actually executed within the Krajina or the RSK. Was it implemented?

A. No, it was not.

Q. Were the territories demilitarised?

A. No, they were not.

Q. Why not?

A. Because the weapons and military equipment and materiel was not taken away from the area completely, and most of the equipment was hidden, and through the Krajina police force, which was in possession of those weapons still, the military units and formations remained armed in the ¹³²³² area. And also, later on, from the beginning of 1993, in fact, the heavy weapons were taken from the warehouses which were held by the peace forces, and from the beginning of 1993 onwards, the armed formation existed under the name of the Serb army of the RSK, although it existed from May 1992 in actual fact, this Serbian army with part of the weaponry.

Q. Were multi-ethnic police forces, police units, established? That is, Croats and Serbs?

A. No.

Q. Was the return of Croats to their villages implemented?

A. No, it was not.

Q. Why not?

A. They were not allowed to return, by the authorities in Krajina.

Q. When you say "the authorities in Krajina," whom do you mean? In which way were they prevented to return?

A. The police prevented them, Martic did, and the political position taken was that they shouldn't return. This position was taken up by the government.

Q. Was Mr. Milosevic in any way involved in these reactions to the Vance plan?

A. Could you explain what you mean, please, and repeat the question?

Q. You mentioned that the Krajina authorities did not implement the Vance plan, and I was asking you whether Mr. Milosevic did in any way get involved in this action or influence the authorities in Krajina not to do that.

A. Yes, Milosevic did perform militarisation, or rather, he held the ¹³²³³ position that demilitarisation shouldn't be put into effect. Then he supported militarisation, or rather, the creation of military formations and the creation of an army, another army in Krajina, the Serbian army of the RSK. He appointed commanders, financed them, gave logistics support, right up until 1995, August 1995, in fact.

Q. You mentioned that the JNA left the RSK. When did they start leaving the RSK, and when was the withdrawal completed?

A. The withdrawal from Croatia across Krajina began in the month of October 1991. Garrisons, Zagreb, Zadar, Sibenik, Sinj, and other parts through the maritime coastal route, which I didn't see, but I heard about them, and the withdrawal from Krajina itself, or that portion of Krajina, was completed in May 1992.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness now two exhibits: Tab 75 and tab 76 of Exhibit 351.

Q. Tab 75 is a decision of the RSK Assembly dated the 18th May 1992, amending the RSK constitution and law on defence to establish a Serbian army of the RSK; and the other one is from 1993, a decision of the RSK Assembly, dated the 20th of April, 1993, amending the RSK constitution to change the structure of the Serbian army of the RSK and its command. Is this the army that you referred to just a minute ago?

A. Yes, that's it.

Q. Yes. Thank you. I only want to refer to the document from 1992, and there is the Article 1, where it says: "The Republic of Serbian Krajina shall have a Serbian army in peacetime. The Serbian army shall comprise TO units in the event of the imminent threat of war, and during ¹³²³⁴ wartime, special purpose police units shall join the Serbian army." Which special police forces are referred to in this article? What does that mean?

A. They were the special police forces that existed since -- were in existence since 1991, and we've already discussed that issue here, talked about them. The ones that began to be established in April 1991.

Q. Yes. Witness, this Serbian army of the Krajina, did they take over the property of the JNA and the weapons that were left behind?

A. Yes, that's right. Part of the weapons were hidden when the JNA withdrew, and in 1993 it was taken from the warehouses which were guarded by the UN peace keepers.

Q. Was it an independent army? We have already spoken about financial dependence. Was it an independent army?

A. No. It was part of the military structures of Yugoslavia.

Q. What was the basis of -- in which way were they dependent, a dependent part of the structure of Yugoslavia?

A. Well, most of the commanding cadre, commanding staff, were active officers of the JNA who were on the JNA payroll. They were paid by the General Staff of the Yugoslav army and appointed to those positions by the personnel department of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army. The commanders of the army were appointed by the president of Serbia and later the president of Yugoslavia - president of Serbia up until 1995, Slobodan Milosevic - and it was financed, logistics support was given from Yugoslavia. As far as personnel were concerned, Krajina supplied the men for the army and the regulations and provisions for it to be able to ¹³²³⁵ function.

Q. Witness, I would like to move now a little bit further in relation to meetings with Mr. Milosevic, and I would like to know if, in 1994, RSK officials took part in negotiations with the Croatian authorities. Do you know that?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. When they went to meetings with the Croatian authorities, did they have contacts with Mr. Milosevic beforehand?

A. That's right, yes. His approval was sought, and the contents of the conversations, the discussions themselves, were determined by him. He would also follow the discussions as they proceeded and was informed of the process.

Q. Did you have to ask approval before committing to any agreements?

A. That's right, yes. It was a form of consultation. But actually, he determined whether something would be accepted or not, and what would be accepted.

Q. What would happen if anyone would not -- would take an isolated action without consulting Mr. Milosevic first? Do you know?

A. Well, it couldn't have been done, because those people would have been sanctioned and borne the consequences. There were even instances of physical jeopardy. People were put in prison who had independently made agreements with Croatia. The Daruvar agreement is a case in point, where people from Western Slavonia drew up an agreement with Croatia, and the Dzakula example as well.

Q. Did the officials from the Krajina ever make an agreement with the ¹³²³⁶ Croats without an approval, beforehand consultation?

A. I think that the Daruvar one could have been a case in point, but I'm not quite sure. What I do know is that the plan Z-4 was accepted through Ambassador Albright. Not directly, without Milosevic's approval beforehand, or prior to asking approval from Milosevic.

Q. Which negotiations took place in 1994? What kind of negotiations were held with the Croats? Were they related to a political solution or were they just on economical issues?

A. From mid-1994 until the beginning of 1995, there were -- they were agreements about economic relations with Croatia: The oil pipeline, supply of electricity, the water supply, the opening of the highway, the railway transport system.

Q. And did Mr. Milosevic allow you to agree to such economical relations?

A. Yes. Yes. And he took a very active part in the drafting of the agreement itself, even with regard to the name of a mixed oil company that had been established.

Q. Witness, I would like to go now to a meeting on the 5th of September, 1994.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I have to ask for private session for this meeting.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted] ¹³²³⁷ Page 13237 - redacted - private session

¹³²³⁸ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³²³⁹

[redacted]

[Open session] ¹³²⁴⁰

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, you mentioned the Z-4 plan. What were the main points of the Z-4 plan?

A. The main point, or the gist of the plan, was that the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which had earlier been known as the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina and which was now known as Sector North and Sector South under the protection of the United Nations, should be given political, territorial autonomy within the Republic of Croatia. It would have a parliament, a government, institutions, a currency that would be special in appearance but it would be printed by the National Bank of Croatia, competence over the regional police and the courts, which would imply a high level of autonomy.

Q. Who made this suggestion of the Z-4 plan? Was it an international proposal?

A. The Z-4 was given that name because it was proposed by four ambassadors in Zagreb, that is, by the international community.

Q. In the transcript earlier on, it was said that -- it is actually on page 61 of the transcript, line 14, it says that Ambassador Albright accepted the Z-4 plan. Is that correct, Ambassador Albright?

A. Ambassador Galbraith, the ambassador of the United States in Croatia, Peter Galbraith. He was the main creator and proponent of that plan.

Q. This plan, did that actually mean the reintegration of the three regions of the RSK, that is, Krajina, Western Slavonia, Eastern Slavonia, ¹³²⁴¹ into the Croatian Republic?

A. That's right. Only the Western Slavonia would be settled immediately, whereas Eastern Slavonia, within a period of five years, and the territory of SAO Krajina would have a high degree of political and territorial autonomy in Croatia.

Q. Were the politicians of the Krajina in a position -- did they accept this Z-4 plan, you in the RSK?

A. At the beginning of March/end of February, the politicians in Krajina rejected the plan. The plan was accepted only by the last Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in August 1995.

Q. And when you said March and February, which year? Is it also 1995?

A. That's right, 1995.

Q. Who opposed the Z-4 plan?

A. The President of the Republic of Serbia, according to what Milan Martic said, the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and he said half an hour prior to the beginning of the meeting with the international community that President Milosevic had said that the plan should not be even considered.

Q. When did Mr. Milan Martic consult with Mr. Milosevic, and of what time period are you speaking when you say -- when you refer to a meeting with the international community?

A. It was that week. I think it was the end of February/beginning of March. So the beginning of the week, Martic went to Belgrade for consultations. Whether it was Monday or Tuesday. And then on Thursday, ¹³²⁴² an announcement was issued of the supreme defence council of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, in negative terms, about the plan, and then I think it was the following Monday when there was the meeting with representatives of the international community at which Martic said half an hour prior to the meeting that Milosevic had said that the plan should not even be taken into consideration. And at the meeting with representatives of the international community, Ambassador Farista Djijan [phoen] handed it to him. He wouldn't even take it into his hands.

Q. On that occasion, then, did the Krajina authorities reject the plan, in that meeting then with the internationals?

A. Actually, it was not even taken into consideration, so it was not accepted.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We would need to go into private session for a meeting of the witness.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted] ¹³²⁴³

[redacted]

--- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. ¹³²⁴⁴

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honours. And Your Honours, for your orientation, we are at the moment at paragraph 280 of the proofing summary, but I will also address paragraph 312, because it fits into the context and would speed up matters.

Q. Witness, Martic or RSK force participation in Bosnia, did Milan Martic and RSK forces participate in the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina already as early as summer 1992?

A. That's right, in the so-called corridor in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Is that the Posavina corridor?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. What is the importance of the Posavina corridor for Bosnia and for -- for the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the Serbs in the Krajina region? What was the importance of this corridor?

A. It is the corridor linking Bosnian Krajina and the Republic of Serbian Krajina with Serbia, or rather, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. And in which time period did RSK forces, with Milan Martic, participate in the fighting in 1992?

A. At the beginning of the summer of 1992. In June already they were there, at the end of June.

Q. And who was in charge, in overall charge of the operations in the Posavina corridor?

A. The army of Republika Srpska and General Mladic.

Q. You have mentioned the fighting in 1994, 1995, in the region of Livno in Herzegovina, and my question was before the break: Did forces ¹³²⁴⁵ from the RSK also participate in the fighting around Bihac?

A. They did.

Q. Who -- what were the forces on both sides? Who was fighting whom in Bihac?

A. On one side, there was the 5th Corps of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was defending its territory, and it was being attacked by the forces of the army of Republika Srpska and the forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, consisting of the Serbian army, the police, and the state security service of Serbia.

Q. Who --

A. And - sorry - the forces of Fikret Abdic.

Q. The forces of the police forces of the state security service of Serbia that participated, who led them? Who commanded them in this fighting?

A. I was told it was Frenki, that he was in command, or rather, the DB from Petrova Gora.

Q. And who told you that?

A. People from Kordun, from the region, members of the government of Krajina.

Q. This participation of the RSK forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, did this cause problems for the position of the RSK towards the international community and the Croatian authorities?

A. Yes. In 1994 in particular, and in 1995, this compromised the position of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in relation to the international community, because the area of Bihac was a protected area by ¹³²⁴⁶ the international community.

Q. Did it increase the danger of an all-out attack on the RSK by the Croatian forces?

A. Yes. That was the reason why the Croatian army and the HVO from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina launched an offensive to deblock Bihac. That was what was publicly announced by the authorities in Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it meant cutting off the Republic of Serbian Krajina from Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia.

Q. Did the RSK authorities and the Republika Srpska authorities actually have a military agreement on assisting each other in that time period?

A. I know there was an agreement between Martic and Karadzic, that is, between the authorities of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and that agreement referred to brigades of the army of Republika Srpska that would assist the army of the RSK. As for other parts of the agreement, I'm not sure about that.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to show the witness the Exhibit tab 96 of Exhibit 352.

Q. Witness, this is a document of the 30th of July, 1995, referring to a visit by Mr. Akashi, the special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and other persons, in relation to an agreement, a proposed agreement. The proposed agreement referred to, is that the Z-4 plan?

A. No. This was -- this should have been a component part of the Z-4 plan, or rather, a precondition for the implementation of the Z-4 plan. ¹³²⁴⁷ So this was an agreement on the disengagement of the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in the Bihac pocket; or, to be more precise, this was not an agreement, it's an announcement on agreement, announcement of approving the proposals made by Mr. Akashi to the leadership of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Q. And the proposal was that no troops or individual soldiers of the RSK would get engaged in the Bihac pocket, and refrain from any cross-border activities; is that what is proposed here?

A. That's right.

Q. The person -- there is a handwritten note on it saying the 20th of September -- or sorry. No. Thank you. I withdraw my question. This proposal to disengage in the RSK, was that actually implemented?

A. No.

Q. What did happen? What was instead done?

A. Combat continued. [Realtime transcript read in error "Maksic"] Mrksic nor Milan Novakovic, who was in command there, nor Martic nor the police nor the MUP of Serbia were they withdrawn from the fighting in that region.

Q. In the transcript, it says Maksic. Is that correct or -- in the document as such it says General Mrksic.

A. That's right. Mile Mrksic, General Mile Mrksic, the commander of the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Q. Yes. Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can take this away. ¹³²⁴⁸ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³²⁴⁹

Q. Witness, in 1994, did the Minister of Interior of the RSK have a problem to get control over the police in the territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Why did he --

A. The Minister of the Interior; is that what you said?

Q. Yes. Yes. Who was the Minister of Interior in 1994?

A. Until the end of 1994, it was Ilija Prijic, who was replaced in that capacity, and the Assembly nominated, appointed, Mr. Perisic, but he didn't take up his post either in Eastern Slavonia or in the rest of the RSK either. So from the end of 1994 until August 1995, the RSK did not have a Minister for the Interior. One of the deputies was the acting minister.

Q. Did a delegation from the RSK then meet Mr. Milosevic to consult him in this problem?

A. Yes, that's right. In 1995, April, around the 26th of April, in fact.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I have to apologise, but we need to go into private session for this.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted] ¹³²⁵⁰

[redacted]

[Open session] ¹³²⁵¹

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put a document to the witness, and it is tab 97 of Exhibit 352.

Q. Witness, this is a document referring to Minister Peric and his position, and it is also referring to people and their affiliation to certain police forces. Who prepared this document?

JUDGE KWON: Are we now in open session?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

A. I learnt about this document from Slobodan Peric. I got it from him.

Q. In this document, actually, at the -- the last paragraph, it says: "At all the meetings, Milosevic agrees that Peric should take over the MUP, while Stanisic immediately after that agrees with Martic that it should be prevented."

Was the situation as described in this paragraph?

A. Specifically, I know what I have described. That was the situation. But yes, although I didn't hear that Milosevic had agreed, in fact.

Q. Was there a problem in May 1995 in relation to the commander of the armed forces of the RSK after the Operation Flash?

A. Yes, that's right.

JUDGE KWON: You have something to say, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't find this document, because in tab 97, the one I have, I have an announcement for Tanjug by the president of the Republic of Srpska Krajina, and not the document that ¹³²⁵² you're talking about. So I have taken this out very carefully from tab 97.

JUDGE MAY: Coming up. Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I have no explanation for this situation.

JUDGE MAY: He's got a copy now.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh, okay. Good. Tab 97. I don't think I need to repeat this now.

JUDGE MAY: No.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No.

Q. Just one more question in relation to tab 97. Did you provide this document when you had your conversations with the Prosecutor in The Hague?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you have not yet answered my question whether there was a problem arising in relation to the commander of the armed forces of the RSK after Operation Flash. Who was the commander of the armed forces of the RSK during the Operation Flash?

A. General Celeketic.

Q. Was he dismissed after the Croatian forces took Western Slavonia in their Operation Flash?

A. That's right, yes, around the 9th of May, 1995.

Q. Did you, in the Supreme Defence Council in the Krajina - I don't mean you personally, but the Supreme Defence Council of the RSK - agree ¹³²⁵³ about a new candidate, Mile Novakovic?

A. I have to explain that the Prime Minister of the RSK, as member of the supreme council, Defence Council, proposed General Mile Novakovic for the new commander. However, Slobodan Milosevic refused, and he appointed General Mile Mrksic for the new commander of the Serb army of the RSK.

Q. Witness, did the Supreme Defence Council of the RSK agree? Did the authorities in the Krajina agree on Mr. Novakovic?

A. It agreed with the decision that it be General Mile Mrksic, and this was formalised. It was officially stated.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I have to ask for private session, to clarify a matter.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted] ¹³²⁵⁴

[redacted]

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did the RSK government then approve the appointment -- or the decision by an official appointment of General Mile Mrksic? ¹³²⁵⁵

A. It followed the regular procedure via the Supreme Council of Defence for the RSK and the Assembly of the RSK as well, and that's how it was decided that Mrksic -- or rather, they adopted the proposal and verified it legally, that Mile Mrksic should be the commander.

Q. When did Mile Mrksic arrive in the RSK as commander?

A. He was seen on the 16th of May, 1995. The Assembly appointed him between the 18th and 20th of May, 1995.

Q. What position did he have before he came to the RSK? Do you know that?

A. He was the commander of the Guards Brigade of the JNA in Belgrade, and he was in command of it during the attack on Vukovar. And before that, he was something in the General Staff, held some post, but I don't know what exactly.

Q. When he arrived in the RSK, did he officially become an employee of the RSK forces, or did he remain to be employed as a VJ officer?

A. He was an officer of the army of Yugoslavia.

Q. And the previous two commanders that you mentioned, Mile Novakovic and Celeketic, were they also members of the VJ throughout their time in the RSK?

A. Yes.

Q. During your conversation with the Prosecution in The Hague, did you review several orders signed by Milan Martic related to the appointment, promotions, and release of General Celeketic? Do you recall that?

A. Yes. ¹³²⁵⁶

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I don't think we need to put it all to the witness. It's tabs 98, 99, 100, and 101 of Exhibit 352. They all deal with General Celeketic, his promotion and his release.

Q. But I would like to put to you tab 102, and it's 102 of that same exhibit, 352. And that is actually a document by Dusan Zoric, the military post 1740 -- 90, Belgrade, from 21st December, 1994, regarding the promotion of Colonel Milan Celeketic to the rank of Major General. Can you tell us who this person Dusan Zoric is, what position did he have?

A. He was head of the personnel department of the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia, or was the acting head.

Q. Yes. Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we have to go into private session, and I'm dealing now with paragraph 293 and the following two in the proofing summary.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted] ¹³²⁵⁷ Pages 13257-13263 - redacted - private session

¹³²⁶⁴

[redacted]

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did the refugees from the RSK actually end up in Kosovo or in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or where did they go?

A. At first, that same day, as soon as the refugees started coming from Krajina, Ratko Mladic, the commander of the army of Republika Srpska, blocked the bridge across the Vrbas, and he wouldn't let refugees go any further. [redacted].

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We should go into private session for this meeting. ¹³²⁶⁵

[Private session]

[redacted]

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session. ¹³²⁶⁶

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, you said that able-bodied males were separated from their families. For what reason? What were they supposed to do?

A. They were integrated into the army of Republika Srpska, and those who had crossed into Serbia, they were arrested and taken to Eastern Slavonia, to a camp under Arkan or to the front line, the so-called front lines.

Q. Does that mean they were forcefully recruited into the VRS and into the army -- into Arkan's unit?

A. That's right.

Q. Where did those who reached Serbia, where did they settle?

A. They were accommodated in two ways: First, people who had relatives, close relatives, the first generation, could stay with their families. All the others were transported by the police to certain centres all over Serbia, including Kosovo, in columns of tractors or cars or in trains. I heard the stories of many people when they arrived by train in Pristina and other towns in Kosovo. They were flabbergasted and they took the first chance to flee from there.

Q. Witness, did refugees from the Krajina arrive in Vojvodina?

A. Yes.

Q. Were Croatian inhabitants then driven out of Vojvodina? Do you know that?

A. There was some incursion into Croatian homes and throwing the inhabitants out; however, the Serbian police intervened and prevented people moving into Croatian homes. ¹³²⁶⁷

Q. Witness, I would like to go now into an entirely different chapter, and that refers to Milan Martic. Was he arrested at some point in time in Bosnia?

A. Yes, in September 1991.

Q. Was there an arrest warrant against him?

A. Yes, issued by the Croatian government.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness tab 111A.

Q. Witness, is this the arrest warrant, or rather, the decree, in relation to Milan Martic?

A. That is what it says here, but I know from the media that it existed.

Q. Were you shown this document during your conversation with the Prosecutor?

A. Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, for your information, the Prosecution office received this document from the government of the Republic of Croatia in a submission in May 2002. With the help of the usher, I would like to put now to the witness tab 111B of that same exhibit, 352, and that's also a document that was received from the Croatian government, attached to the arrest warrant.

Q. Witness, it is a decree in relation to an investigation conducted into activities of Milan Martic and others. And did you have time to read this document? Did you read it during your conversation with the Prosecutor? ¹³²⁶⁸ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³²⁶⁹

A. I did.

Q. In this document, there is referred to the Council of Peoples Resistance that you have already mentioned as being the source of provocations, and there is listed a lot of events from October 1990 through to April 1991, referring to attacks on the police, the Croatian police; the shooting on civilians, the destruction of shops, houses, and vehicles with explosive devices; and the attacks on railroad tracks. When you reviewed this document, did you find it to be correct? Those facts given in the document, were they correct?

A. They are correct, yes.

Q. Those people, or those properties that were destroyed, or people that were harmed, were they Croats or, as you mentioned also earlier, public property?

A. Yes. These were all Croats and public property, and Albanians.

Q. Yes. Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That should be enough for this document.

Q. When Mr. Martic was arrested in Bosnia, what was he doing there, and together with whom was he arrested?

A. He was passing through Otoka, a village inhabited by Muslims next to Bosanska Krupa. Also with him was his escort and people from the JNA, officers of the JNA.

Q. Do you know what they were doing in Bosnia?

A. I don't know exactly.

Q. Where they were apprehended, was that a route used for the transfer of weapons and equipment for the military forces in the Krajina? ¹³²⁷⁰

A. Yes.

Q. At that time, was that the only route that was open, or were there various routes?

A. There were two routes.

Q. Which routes were taken for the transport of weapons?

A. Through Bosanski Novi and through -- via Grahovo.

Q. The weapons, where did they come from?

A. The weapons came from two sources: One was Serbia, and the other was from JNA warehouses in the territory of Krajina.

Q. Was there also a military warehouse, or sort of, in Bihac, where you would receive weapons from?

A. Yes. Zeljava.

Q. Is that near the Bihac airport?

A. Yes. It's actually the base of the Bihac airport.

Q. To receive -- to receive weapons from the Bihac airport, to whom would the authorities in the Krajina have to turn? Who would facilitate this?

A. I know of Colonel Smiljanic.

Q. Who was he?

A. Chief of security of the JNA Zagreb Corps, when I met him.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I just see that it's time.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, it is time. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, contrary to what was said earlier, we seem to have made good progress today.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour, but there is one problem for tomorrow, actually, upcoming. It's not a problem, but it's a ¹³²⁷¹ time-consuming exercise for tomorrow, because tomorrow we will go into the details of the Martic arrest and we will also go into a lot of intercepts. Today I skipped the intercepts to just make progress, but we have to come to the intercepts tomorrow, and I intend to do that in a group, because I think it's more expeditious to do that.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We've been warned. We'll adjourn now. Could you be back, please, Witness C-061, 9.00 tomorrow.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 22nd day of November 2002, at 9.00 a.m.