¹³¹⁶⁹

Thursday, 21 November 2002

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Can I return to the question of how much time should be available for the evidence-in-chief of this witness?

JUDGE MAY: Well, we've heard submissions on this, if I may say, very adequately presented by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. We've had the opportunity of reflecting on the matter and we've made a decision. I'm not sure there's really anything you can add to it.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, first -- two points I'd like to clarify -- three, if I may, and I am only doing it because of my role in charge of the case as a whole and there's one thing I want to say. First of all, in case there's any ambiguity, what we're seeking is six days, not four, that is, two additional days. We hope that was clear. Second, the Prosecution's position is that it would be wrong, frankly wrong, given the quality, the integrity, and the detail of this witness to exclude any of his evidence.

Third, and I think this was not available in detail last night, there is the statistics of the number of witnesses who would be saved having to give evidence, and some analysis of the material that would be lost if it was other than the full six days available for evidence. And the statistics may help the Court, and I hope they will enable you to ¹³¹⁷⁰ review any decision tentatively made or provisionally made other than to grant the two additional days.

Originally, we were allowed 71 witnesses for Croatia. We forecast - obviously these things are not capable of the greatest precision - that the fifth day of evidence of this witness would enable us to save eight witnesses who we otherwise had a settled intention to call; some four experts, two low-level insiders, and two verifiers of a document. The sixth day would enable us to save a further five crime-base witnesses and one journalist witness dealing with crime-base matters. Accordingly, the total potential saving for those two additional days would be some 14 witnesses, which is in the order of 20 per cent of the allocation. And in our respectful submission, it is entirely right that the witness should be heard in full. If he is not heard in full, material that will be left out would include direct contacts between the witness and other members of the joint criminal enterprise plus evidence simply not available elsewhere of the military structures of the areas of the crimes allegedly committed. In our submission, this is material that the Chamber should have, can have in the most economic form from this witness, and that it would be inappropriate or wrong to exclude. Thank you for allowing me to add to the arguments that were, as I entirely accept, fully expressed -- not fully expressed, but expressed before she had an opportunity with the team to do the research last night by my learned colleague.

JUDGE MAY: Well, I must say that I think this part of the case has been going very slowly indeed. In twenty-plus days we've heard about ¹³¹⁷¹ 12 witnesses. And of course, it is a matter of concern as to how you're going to get through your case by the dates which we've allocated, with such adjustment as there must be for illness.

MR. NICE: May I respond? Or maybe Your Honour hasn't completed what you're going to say. The suggestion that the evidence has been going slowly is one that we couldn't accept. The evidence is entirely different in character because it's so much denser in content and we have taken every available procedure to make matters go swiftly. We are, of course, bound by the decisions of the Chamber in relation to matters of 92 bis and so on, but we forecast that the very character of the evidence that is coming in at the beginning of this phase of the trial will in fact enable us to prove our case in, we hope, and realistically expect, the original overall time allocations made by the Chamber.

JUDGE MAY: Well, I think it was the 12th of May. That day stands for the moment. We will make such adjustment as we can and we think proper for illness, but that is the date which you must have in mind, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: We have. And of course I will do, in respect of remaining witnesses, everything that can be done, as the whole team has been doing so far, to make use of procedural steps to abbreviate evidence. But we are bound by the Rules of the Tribunal and the practices of the Chamber. So we press you to say that it is simply inappropriate to restrict this witness's evidence and economic --

JUDGE MAY: Well, it's not the evidence; it's the speed with which it's being taken. It can be taken more expeditiously, in my view. ¹³¹⁷²

MR. NICE: Well, I respectfully differ from that view, and my learned colleague is, of course, master of the detail, as is the witness, and the evidence is necessarily delivered at a speed that is going to be capable of being understood and assimilated. There are other ways evidence can be given. I'm only too happy for that to be dealt with. Statements can be read, pre-read, and a witness can adopt his statement, but those are not practices that this Chamber is yet in a position to accept, and therefore we have the viva voce system of question and answer, and I would reject entirely any suggestion that my learned colleague has not been proceeding with this matter other than at a good speed.

JUDGE MAY: Not my view. Not that -- no criticism, may I say, but -- because counsel, of course, approach things in their own way, and I accept that. And counsel, as we recognise, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff considers the duty which she has to put the matter before us and also the witness on occasion replies at a bit of length.

Well, we'll consider the matter and we'll reflect on it.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, I think I can see your point, but what was the base then when the Prosecution at the outset had said that it expected to conclude this witness in three days and a half and how was it changed?

MR. NICE: You know, until you -- until you do these things, you can never be quite sure, and of course Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff was well aware of the considerable pressure that would be on her from the Chamber to deal with matters at a particular speed. Until you actually do it in court, you can't know. ¹³¹⁷³ Now, this witness -- and again, this is something that we have to take into account. Witnesses are not as we would like them to be; they are as they are. He's a meticulous man who gives evidence in detail, according to the process of his memory and thought processes, and there is a limit to which you can make one witness into a witness of another type.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice --

MR. NICE: Yes. I'm grateful to Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Of course, we have to remind the Chamber, we pressed you to apply the provisions of 92 bis, which would have saved many hours or days, but the Chamber took a different view. We would have preferred all the background material to have been pre-read in a way that we respectfully press on the Chamber is entirely appropriate, safe, and preserving of the accused's rights. But the Chamber took a contrary view, which we have, of course, respected.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'm not saying that I would accede to the request, but it would seem to me that if we were to consider it favourably, we would have to hold you very strictly to the 14 witnesses whom you say you will not call. I would like to see the names of those witnesses.

MR. NICE: I would always hope my word in court is something that will be accepted. As to holding us to account, if that's expressed in the view that my word is accepted, then of course I have absolutely no problem with that as a proposition. I'm in a position to provide the list of the names of those who we at present regard as witnesses we would no longer seek to call. Yes, I can provide you with a list.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll consider the matter. ¹³¹⁷⁴

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honours.

WITNESS: WITNESS MILAN BABIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]

Q. Good morning, Witness.

A. Good morning.

Q. Can you speak into the microphone? The interpreters couldn't hear you.

Witness, yesterday we spoke about the removal of Frenki and Captain Dragan from the region in August, and I would like to ask you in this context about a meeting. I would like to do that in private session.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, I would be grateful if you would remind us in terms of where we are, in which paragraph, from time to time.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. We are now in paragraph 191.

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honours.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, after Frenki had left the region, did you meet Mr. Stanisic in Knin?

A. Could you repeat that question? Who are you referring to? Who did you say?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I didn't get any interpretation.

THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English channel? Can you hear ¹³¹⁷⁵ the English? Yes?

Could you repeat the question, please? Whom were you referring to?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did you meet Mr. Jovica Stanisic, Mr. Martic, and Mr. Orlovic in August 1991 in Knin; and if so, where did you meet and what did you talk about?

A. That's right. We did meet. It was after Frenki's removal and Captain Dragan. Jovica Stanisic arrived in Knin. I was called to come. He was there and Martic was there, in a cafe called Vrelo near Knin, and in my presence, Stanisic criticised Orlovic for the events that had occurred before that. Martic just laughed to himself. He didn't feel that the criticism was addressed to him specifically, and Orlovic as well. He accepted the criticisms that were made, but he didn't feel that they were against him.

Q. During this conversation, did Mr. Stanisic make any reference to Mr. Milosevic?

A. No. Oh, I beg your pardon. Yes. Yes, of course. In the course of that conversation, yes, he did say. He said, "Why are they doing the things the way they're doing?" And he was referring to Knin, what was happening in Knin, so that President Milosevic has to intervene.

Q. Witness, what was Stanisic's role and relationship vis-a-vis Mr. Milosevic?

A. He was the executive official for Mr. Milosevic, and I saw him as the Number Two man in Slobodan Milosevic's regime. So the Number Two man, ¹³¹⁷⁶ second in importance.

Q. Did Mr. Stanisic say anything to this effect to you?

A. Well, there was lots of information, lots of facts pertaining to his relationship with Milosevic. A case in point, an example from Serbia's internal policy. Stanisic, for example, said at one point that Milosevic, the president, is dealing with foreign affairs and I deal internal affairs and I won the elections for him. Then there was another example with respect to involvement in Bosnia around Gorazde, in 1994, in the month of April or towards the end of April, May perhaps. He said, after Milosevic and Karadzic, with representatives of the international community agreed upon a truce, a cease of hostilities around Gorazde in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jovica commented -- Jovica Stanisic commented on that and he said that their special units, the special police units - I think he mentioned Frenki as being at the head of those units - had made the greatest contribution in the fighting over there but that they did this sidestepping Milosevic's orders. That is to say, there weren't any orders and as the president, he did not know about that. But he said it in such a way as to imply -- he wanted actually to conceal Milosevic's role in those events. He was an executor and a protector of Milosevic, in a way.

Q. When did he make this remark of this, or these special units in Gorazde? To which time period did he refer?

A. This referred to the period of March/April 1994, thereabouts.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go back into open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours. ¹³¹⁷⁷

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. We have mentioned several times Mr. Martic. You have also referred to the support that he received from Serbia. Was Mr. Martic loyal to Mr. Milosevic? Can you say?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Mr. Martic acknowledge his loyalty publicly during the election campaign that he held in 1993/1994?

A. Yes, publicly. During the election campaign and after the campaign as well, he said that he would be the provisional president of Krajina, and once -- that he would be only the provisional president and that he would hand over the baton to Slobodan Milosevic, the relay baton, sort of, hand over the office. And people made jokes about that in Knin, saying that he would hand over his police baton to Milosevic.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did you have a discussion with Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Martic in August 1991 in relation to the position of the TO commander in the Krajina?

A. That's right. I did have that conversation in Mr. Milosevic's offices. I was invited to go to Milosevic's offices and I met Martic there. Martic was already at Milosevic's. And without any great introduction, Milosevic said the following: He said, "Let Mile be the commander of the Territorial Defence," and he was thinking about Mile ^{13178 BLANK PAGE 13179} Martic, who was present there, and he repeated that. I think that the conversation went on for about two hours. Milosevic kept repeating that sentence. And I think he repeated it countless times; at least, many, many times, just that sentence.

Q. Did you object against Martic being the TO commander; and if so, why?

A. That's right. I did object, and that is why Milosevic kept repeating that particular sentence, because he felt that I was opposed. I asked for some objective reasons, quite simply. I said, "Well, he's a policeman. He can't -- you can't have a policeman command the Territorial Defence. You would need a general, the rank of general or colonel or somebody who has been trained in the National Defence School and has the rank of general. It's a professional post and he needs to have a staff of at least ten persons." So my objections went along those lines and I objected to his proposal.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness the Exhibit tab 64 in Exhibit 352.

Q. Witness, it's an appointment of Milan Martic to the position of deputy commander of the TO of the SAO Krajina. Why was he appointed into this position, and what competence did go along with this position?

A. He was appointed because he was the Minister of the Interior, and in that way the police in Krajina were incorporated into the new system ¹³¹⁸⁰ and placed under the authority of the government of Krajina.

Q. Witness, yesterday we spoke about a report. It was an exhibit, tab 67, a report on the military activities in the region in August 1991. This report that also went to Frenki. And in this report, there was mentioned a ceasefire, an order that Mile Martic gave regarding a ceasefire. Was a ceasefire actually agreed upon on the 6th of August, 1991?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. Despite the ceasefire, was Kijevo attacked in August 1991?

A. On the 26th of August, it was attacked, yes. And before that, Milan Martic laid down an ultimatum to the police and inhabitants of Kijevo, telling them to leave Kijevo, on the 18th of August, I believe.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness tab 68 from Exhibit 352.

Q. Is that the ceasefire -- the ultimatum that you just mentioned?

A. It is.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. When you got information on this ultimatum, what was your reaction to it? What did you do?

A. I learnt of this ultimatum from the media, and I issued a denial through the media, saying that the armed forces of SAO Krajina would not violate the ceasefire. I think it was the next day after I had heard ¹³¹⁸¹ about the ultimatum on the media, so it was the 19th or the 20th.

Q. And your denial, was it made publicly?

A. Yes, publicly. It was in the press. The press carried it.

Q. And did this -- did your denial, did it cause a reaction by Martic, the JNA, or the Belgrade authorities?

A. No, with the exception of the fact that they were more intolerant towards me personally.

Q. Were you called to go to Belgrade on the 25th of August, 1991?

A. Yes, that's right. I was invited to go to Belgrade and to report to President Milosevic.

Q. What did you talk about on this occasion?

A. About two things: First of all, when I arrived, President Milosevic asked me how things were down there in Knin, and I said that there were problems, that the Croatian police from Sinj had gone there to mistreat the population in the village of Otisic and that there was no JNA there to protect them. And he said, "Hasn't that already been settled?" And I said, "I don't know." After the meeting I heard -- it was reported to me, I was informed that that morning that the JNA and all armed formations under its control had attacked Kijevo and the region. And then he asked me about General Spiro Nikolic. I couldn't say anything for or against that man who was the commander of the Knin Corps. Then he said, "Frenki needs to be down there in Krajina. He needs to go back there. He's a good man, Frenki's good." That was his comment.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go back into open session.

[Open session] ¹³¹⁸²

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. While you were away from Knin in this conversation that you just had, was it on that exact day Kijevo attacked?

A. That's right. It was attacked on that day, in the morning.

Q. Which forces were involved in this attack?

A. The JNA corps from Knin, units of the Krajina police, and the local TO.

Q. How do you know that? Did you see anything to this effect?

A. The next day, I passed through the area and I saw the commander of the Knin brigade, Colonel Djukic, and officers from his group. And he said that the chief of staff of the corps, Ratko Mladic, was in front of him, going towards Otisic. I saw a tank column of which Djukic was in command, and this was in front of Vrljika. I saw a unit of TO of Cetine on the edges of the village of Cetine, towards Vrljika. And they told me that the police had been there too, Martic and Milenko Zelenbaba. And this was shown on Belgrade television as well.

Q. Did you see that on Belgrade television, Martic in Kijevo?

A. Yes. Belgrade television showed two scenes from Kijevo. One was Martic and Zelenbaba removing the Croatian flag from the police station and embracing each other, and the other was Vesna Jugovic, a reporter of Belgrade television, interviewing a soldier of the JNA on the road through the village of Kijevo. That is, a talk between him and an old man from Kijevo, an old Croat who had stayed behind. And this soldier asked him the following: "Did you kill my grandfather in 1941?" And the man says, ¹³¹⁸³ "I did not."

Q. [Microphone not activated] Let me stop you there. Witness, you said that you came through this region a day later. What did Kijevo look like? Did you see any Croats? Was it intact?

A. The place was deserted. The inhabitants could not be seen. It had been destroyed by artillery fire.

Q. On that day, did you see Mr. Mladic actually in the field? On this day or the next days?

A. In the next day or two, after I was again passing along that road, that is, through Vrljika.

Q. What was he doing when you saw him?

A. He was returning from Otisic. He was accompanying a group of representatives of the Croatian authorities from Sinj and Split. He was accompanying them to Vrljika, which was under his administration.

Q. Mr. Mladic, did he actually participate in fighting activities on the ground? Do you know that?

A. Yes. Yes. He participated and he was in command. The reporters even said that he was in the front lines and that he de-mined obstacles and he appeared on all parts of the front suddenly, on his own, with groups. And I remember that when the new Corps Commander arrived, General Vukovic, and Mladic asked him to report to him where the corps units were deployed. Then Mladic showed on the map that there were small groups of units of the corps on various parts of the front in the area of northern Dalmatia. And then the general said, "Where is the corps?" But that is the way Mladic commanded the corps. ¹³¹⁸⁴

Q. You said that Mladic commanded the corps. Was he the Corps Commander or what was his position?

A. Mladic, from the summer and through the autumn of 1991, he was Chief of Staff of the corps. For a time, that is, in September, when Spiro Nikolic, the previous general, was moved to another position before Vukovic arrived, he was the most senior officer. In 1992, he was for a time the Corps Commander, that is, Mladic.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to go into private session again for the next meeting with Mr. Milosevic.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did you meet Mr. Milosevic in September 1991 in relation to a TO commander for the Krajina?

A. Yes, around the 12th of September, 1991, in connection with the TO staff. Officers for the TO staff of SAO Krajina.

Q. Did you have a proposal to make as to the new TO commander?

A. I did. Borivoj Rasuo and Zoran Kalicanin, a man from the information service of the JNA. They recommended to me Radosav Maksic, a colonel that I met on that occasion, and who had volunteered to go together with ten other officers and form the Main Staff of the TO SAO Krajina. But Maksic wanted me to seek approval from Milosevic for him to be discharged as he was in active service in Belgrade.

Q. And what was Mr. Milosevic's position when you informed him?

A. That he would do what is necessary for them to come. And he was ¹³¹⁸⁵ in a very good mood then. That is when I met Jovica Stanisic, in his offices; not in the same room, but the room next to his. That was when he was in the best mood, compared to all the other encounters I had with him. He even shared his lunch with me.

Q. Does that mean Mr. Milosevic agreed to your proposal to appoint Maksic as the TO commander? What did he say to you?

A. "That's right. They will come -- he'll come."

Q. And you mentioned Mr. Stanisic, that you saw him also on that day. What was his contact -- what was your contact with him? How did that come about and what did you talk about?

A. Before I entered into the study of President Milosevic, the secretary said that the president was having a break, that he was having lunch, and that I should wait in the room next to hers, or the one next to it, towards the corner. And I went inside, and Jovica Stanisic was standing behind the desk, and there was a military map in front of him with the lines drawn in of the deployment of the army. He just showed me with his eyes that I should look at the map. I looked, and then he took me to the next room. This was a semi-oval room on the corner. He closed the door and he said, "This is the room for reporting." And when I went back, the secretary said, "You can go in, the president will receive you." And the president received me, though he hadn't finished his lunch. He shared his lunch with me.

Q. Witness, let me stop you here. What did you see on the map that Mr. Stanisic was dealing with? Do you recall what kind of a map or what kind of a region it dealt with? ¹³¹⁸⁶

A. It was a military topographical map, and the scale, I think, was about 1:50.000 or 1:100.000. And it had a red line drawn on it in the area of Northern Dalmatia. I am familiar with the area, the topography of the area, and I knew that the army was there. And the line indicated the positions of the army, across the Perucac Lake, the Svilaja mountain, Petrova Polje, Cikova, and the surroundings of Benkovac.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did the -- did Colonel Maksic actually arrive, and his ten officers?

A. Some ten days went by and they didn't arrive, and I called President Milosevic's secretary on the phone and I asked for the president, and she said he wasn't there but she would connect me to him. And I asked him, "What about the officers?" And he said, "They're coming tomorrow." They didn't come tomorrow, but they came five or six or seven days later. But not ten officers; Maksic and another two.

Q. Did they arrive, and what position did they take?

A. Colonel Dusan Kasum came as the chief of staff of the TO SAO Krajina; Colonel Vuletic, as the chief of communications; and Colonel Maksic, as the operative chief. They came to Martic's at the Knin fortress, and they called me to come there and I arrived and I saw only three of them, and they just shrugged their shoulders. And I asked, "Is Martic the commander?" And he said, "Call General Simovic." He was the ¹³¹⁸⁷ Minister of Defence of Serbia. And I called him and I asked, "Is Maksic the commander of the TO staff of SAO Krajina?" And he said, "We have designated General Djujic." And he gave an explanation for Martic, an excuse why he couldn't hold that position.

Q. And what was the reason why General Djujic was supposed to take the position?

A. Simovic said that Maksic was an alcoholic.

Q. Did --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher I would like just to put to you the decisions made in this regard. It's tab 69, appointment of General Djujic, Maksic, Kasum and Vuletic; tab 70, appointment Colonel Djujic; tab 71, appointment Maksic; tab 72, order to relieve Djujic; tab 46 -- sorry, 49.6 is a decision to appoint Colonel Tabok; and tab 51.1 and 50.2, decisions to relieve Dusan Starevic from -- and Velibor Matijasevic from their positions.

Q. Are these decisions taken in relation to the TO command and the --

A. Yes.

Q. Did you actually, in the Krajina, make the substantial decisions, or are these just the official documents confirming decisions taken by others?

A. These were formal, legal decisions confirming decisions taken by the competent authorities in Belgrade, in this case, the General Staff and the Secretary of National Defence. These two documents about Matijasevic and Starevic, they are not directly linked to the Main Staff of the TO but rather linked to the obstruction of the Assembly, which was done by a ^{13188 BLANK PAGE 13189} parallel structure with a view to influencing negotiations in The Hague.

Q. Witness, those TO commanders that were then appointed, were they controlled by the politicians in the Krajina? Did they report to the politicians in the Krajina or not?

A. No, they did not. They themselves didn't establish control over the unified TO of SAO Krajina, but it remained subordinated to the competent units of the JNA, according to various regions, and they themselves were subordinated to the JNA command.

Q. I have to put to you just another document in this context, and it's tab 73 of the Exhibit 352. This is an order -- a certificate, actually, by the SFRY Presidency signed by Vice-President Branko Kostic and Colonel Milo Kostic, in relation to promotion of Colonel Kasum to the Chief of Staff of the TO Defence in April 1992; correct?

A. He's promoted to the rank of general, but he was previously appointed to the Chief of Staff of the TO of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Q. Does that mean afterwards - we are talking now about April 1992 - this relationship between the TO --

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. This relationship of the TO staff, the officers there, and the JNA, or VJ, as it later was called, remained the same?

A. It remained the same until August 1995. Virtually, it was Slobodan Milosevic who appointed the commanders of the Serbian army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Q. Witness, in relation to the TO in the Krajina, did you have ¹³¹⁹⁰ opportunity to review, during your conversations here in The Hague, a lot of documents that related to appointments, related to organisation of units? Did you review these documents?

A. I did.

Q. Could you authenticate all these documents? Could you -- did you know them?

A. Yes, that's right.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I do not want to put all these documents to the witness. I just want to read to you, and for the record, which documents the witness reviewed and confirmed as being made by the authorities there. And it's actually all from the Exhibit 352, and it is tabs 114, 115, 117 to 119, 121 to 141, 145, 148, 150, 151. These are the documents that I would like to refer to in this regard. It's all appointments and all formations.

Q. These decisions taken, were they respected by the JNA and the Martic police?

A. Some decisions, yes; some, no. The decisions relating to active-duty officers in their role were respected. A part of the decisions that were passed in July, August, and September of 1991 were not respected.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

JUDGE KWON: For the record, 151 was dropped; yes?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh, yes. Yes, Your Honour. I just got the note from my colleague here. Thank you.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)] ¹³¹⁹¹

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, in relation to the problems that arose between decisions on TO from the local politicians and in relation to the JNA ignoring parts of them, did you have a meeting with General Vukovic and General Djujic in October 1991?

A. I did, around the 10th of October, 1991, in Benkovac.

Q. What did you talk about, and what was the result of these talks?

A. General Djujic initiated the meeting with General Vukovic that we should address the question of competence over the TO; which would be the competent command? Would it be the corps command of the JNA or the staff of the TO by SAO Krajina? General Vukovic said that he was not competent and that, in this connection, General Adzic should be contacted in the General Staff in Belgrade.

Q. And did you do that? Did you contact General Adzic?

A. Yes. I was received by General Adzic, not in the command of the General Staff but in another military institution.

Q. And what did you discuss with him, and what was the result of it?

A. This was one of the main topics: The outcome was that nothing would be changed, that the competence of the command of the JNA remained, that that is how it was envisaged in the system and that is how it would remain. Then there were other things discussed, and I took note of them in my notebook that I took with me, as a memo. The issues that Djujic said I should address with Adzic regarding supplies, the status of the people in the TO, et cetera. ¹³¹⁹²

Q. And what was Mr. Adzic -- General Adzic's position to demands that you made? How did he react to this?

A. To the effect that there would be no problems. He wasn't very specific about it. That things would be resolved, words to that effect.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Open session again.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness the document tab 74 of Exhibit 352.

Q. Witness, what kind of a document is this and who prepared it?

A. This document was compiled in the Main Staff of the TO of SAO Krajina, and it was a report, in fact, on the situation in the SAO TO of the Krajina in 1991, October.

Q. Did you --

A. 10th of October.

Q. For whom was this prepared and to whom was this given?

A. Well, it was prepared for the Prime Minister, first and foremost, and then it was drafted for the General Staff of the JNA, to be handed on to them.

Q. Was it handed to General Adzic?

A. I don't know that exactly, but he did receive information about these issues, as we had discussed them previously.

Q. Those matters raised here, the needs of the TO, were these the matters that were discussed with General Adzic on the occasion that you described? ¹³¹⁹³

A. Yes, they were, briefly.

Q. Witness, I would like now to move on to discussions held about the Carrington plan and the future Yugoslavia. What were the proposals for the Krajina? What were the proposals for the Krajina?

A. In Lord Carrington's general plan, proposals were made for three types of relationships amongst the republics of the former Yugoslavia. For areas inhabited in individual republics with ethnic communities having certain characteristics, it was provided that they should be granted a special territorial status, and this referred to Krajina as well.

Q. What was -- was there stated a certain autonomy within the Croatian context?

A. Yes, that's right. Territorial autonomy within Croatia.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did you take part in several -- actually, in three negotiations with Mr. Wijnaendts, the Dutch ambassador, in relation to the Carrington plan?

A. That's right. Every time before the plenary meetings would take place.

Q. And before you went to these negotiations with Mr. Wijnaendts, did you meet Mr. Milosevic in Belgrade before you went there?

A. Always. That's right. Always before that, there would be a meeting with President Milosevic. ¹³¹⁹⁴

Q. Did you go there to get instructions, or why did you meet?

A. We were invited to go to Belgrade to receive instructions as to what stand to take.

Q. When did you go there for the first time?

A. Around the 13th of October, 12th or 13th. But anyway, before the 14th.

Q. And what instruction did you get?

A. The instructions were that the plan was a good one for us. Not to accept it directly, but the suggestion was that, in general terms, the plan was a good one for us. That was from President Milosevic and a few people that he had called in to his offices to explain the plan to us.

Q. Who explained the plan to you? Were these officials from the Belgrade government?

A. One was an advisor to President Milosevic, Mr. Kutlesic. The others were people with whom President Milosevic associated. They were professors, university professors Smilja Avramov, Ratko Markovic, Kosta Mihajlovic, Vasilije Krestic.

Q. That first time when you had this meeting in Belgrade, did anything happen? Did anything happen in Knin that alerted you?

A. That's right, yes. What happened was that after we started off towards Belgrade -- two things actually happened. Velibor Matijasevic, president of the Assembly of the SAO Krajina, convened an Assembly meeting, asking for a report on the work of the government of SAO Krajina. And the other thing that happened, the second thing - and Ljubica Solaja conveyed this to me - that in the police station in Knin, Frenki was ¹³¹⁹⁵ informing or inciting the Serbs present in the police station that Babic was a traitor. So that was before my departure. During the meeting with Milosevic, I was under this pressure that I had to go to The Hague -- I apologise, to Paris for a meeting with Wijnaendts, and that I was required to give a report to the Assembly. And at one point, I said -- and Milosevic was standing there by the table or walking around the table while we were sitting down, I said, "I can't be in Paris and in Knin at the same time, simultaneously." And he said to me, "I know nothing about that." I said, "Well, Jovica does," and I meant Jovica Stanisic. "He knows about it." And Milosevic left the room, and a little while later I was told that the Assembly had been cancelled, that Matijasevic had in fact cancelled the Assembly meeting.

Q. So you went to Paris, and what position did you take there? Did you accept the plan or speak in favour of the plan?

A. No. I didn't, and neither did the other members of the delegation. They didn't adopt the plan. They didn't come out in favour of the plan. But we expressed our readiness to continue discussing the plan.

Q. After you returned to -- from Paris, did you report about the negotiations to Mr. Milosevic?

A. Milosevic did receive information about the negotiations because we went to see him once again before we left for the 18th, the second meeting. And on that occasion, I remember that he was very energetic in his reactions towards me. He said, "Accept it and let's get this over with. Serbia has the chance of bringing -- having a state, being a state, ¹³¹⁹⁶ and everything else will be engulfed in darkness." But I didn't accept that proposal.

Q. What does that mean? What exactly did he say in relation to Serbia has a chance of having a state, or being a state? What does that relate to?

A. To survive as a state, and all the rest would become chaotic, one general state of chaos, war or whatever. And that of all the Yugoslav republics on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, it had the chance of obtaining status -- the status of a state, that all the rest would be engulfed in darkness and that they would become colonies of the powers that be. Something along those lines, anyway.

Q. Does that refer to Croatia and Slovenia and Bosnia? Did he say anything?

A. He said all that, except Serbia.

Q. And on this second meeting with Wijnaendts, what position did you take there? Did you accept the plan?

JUDGE MAY: I'm not following this story. He's told by Mr. Milosevic to accept the plan. But it now seems he doesn't accept the plan. And I just don't follow what's being said here at all. Perhaps he could explain his position and how this all comes about.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, can you explain Mr. Milosevic's position when you came there for the second time to, as you say, get directives? What was Mr. Milosevic's position in relation to the Carrington plan, and what did you afterwards then do? ¹³¹⁹⁷

A. The position of President Milosevic was that we should accept the plan, the portion relating to us, which means special status within Croatia.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. And were you prepared to do that or not?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were not prepared at that point in time to accept that. We understood that President Milosevic wanted to pull himself out of the war and leave us to the Croats to take their revenge on us.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. While you were in Paris after this second meeting with Wijnaendts, did you make a public statement as to your position?

A. The second meeting took place in The Hague, at the Foreign Ministry in The Hague, and I did make several statements. One was to the effect that I was representing the SAO Krajina and the Autonomous Region of Bosnian Krajina there, which was not quite proper and was not what had been agreed upon at the meeting itself. And we did not accept the plan on that occasion either. The proposal at that time was in fact - that is to say, Ambassador Wijnaendts' - that we look into the status of the Tyrol in Italy and in that way to see whether that could be a possible model for Krajina within Croatia, to follow the Tyrolean model.

Q. And did you meet Mr. Milosevic afterwards, after this second meeting with Wijnaendts? Did you have a conversation with him then again, in October 1991?

A. That's right, yes. On the 20th of October and on the 23rd, I ^{13198 BLANK PAGE 13199} think it was, October. The first time was in his offices and the second time in the Palace of the Federation in New Belgrade.

Q. Let's speak about the meeting on the 20th of October. What was the purpose of the meeting, and what was said?

A. The purpose of the meeting was for him to tell me that I was supposed to go to Banja Luka, to a meeting there with Radovan Karadzic - Karadzic had organised a meeting there - to reject Carrington's plan. That means that the representatives of the Serbs from Bosnia and SAO Krajina, Western Slavonia, should reject the plan, and at the same time -- I don't know whether this was his intention previously, but he did tell me, he swore, Momir Bulatovic, in very explicit terms, said he was a traitor and said he had his people there, a party there, who would replace him and bring him to order, Momir Bulatovic, that is, in Montenegro.

Q. What had Momir Bulatovic done that Mr. Milosevic was angry about?

A. At the second plenary conference in The Hague, Bulatovic accepted Carrington's plan.

Q. Witness, you just told us that Mr. Milosevic had given you, actually, the directive to accept the Carrington plan. Can you explain that?

A. Well, this was quite a different reaction from the previous two times. Whether the cause of that was that the plan looked at the status of Kosovo, as it had in 1974, or whether it was what was criticised, that Milosevic criticised and everybody around him, and that Yugoslavia and the concept of Yugoslavia was being denied in that way, and the preservation of that part of Yugoslavia that he came out in favour of. So these were ¹³²⁰⁰ two things that they put forward in public, publicly, as reasons for rejecting the Carrington plan.

Q. So the proposal at that time was different from the proposal that Mr. Milosevic had asked you to accept?

A. That's right, and that was the same thing on the 23rd, when he proposed that for the upcoming meeting with Wijnaendts this be done, when he put forward four points for our position in the Palace of the Federation, the meeting that we attended together at the Federation Palace building in the New Belgrade district of Belgrade.

Q. This is now the meeting -- you're referring to the meeting on the 23rd of October?

A. That's right, yes.

Q. And who was present during this meeting?

A. Present were many people; representatives of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Serb people from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the SAO Krajina, Western and Eastern Slavonia. Which means Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the Assembly of Serbia; academician Kanazir, president of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences; members of the Presidency, Branko Kostic, Jovic and the rest, Karadzic, his people from Bosnia --

JUDGE MAY: And what was the outcome of that meeting on the 23rd?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The outcome of the meeting was that Branko Kostic, who chaired the meeting, counted that there were more people in Yugoslavia in favour of Yugoslavia. He calculated 10 per cent more and that it was noted that as the majority were in favour of Yugoslavia, that Yugoslavia should remain and that that was the position ¹³²⁰¹ that should be put forward at The Hague conference with respect to Lord Carrington's plan.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did Mr. Milosevic give you a special instruction on that occasion?

A. Yes, he did. He said that Wijnaendts was expecting me in Paris -- I beg your pardon? Yes, in Paris, that's right, for the third time, and he gave me four items, four points to discuss, my positions to be advocated there by me. The first was a special status for the SAO Krajina and the other three points I can't remember now. I wasn't -- I was a bit wary and I asked where special status, and he said on Yugoslav territory, and he gave me this piece of paper. And the paper is -- remained with Borivoje Rasuo, I think. I took the paper from him. And at the conference in Paris, in fact, Ambassador Wijnaendts -- as soon as we began, I didn't expound my position, but he said, "Mr. Babic, we can accept everything." That's what he said, "And we can accept point 1, item 1," and I assumed that Milosevic had already informed them of our so-called positions. Actually, he instructed us in those positions.

Q. This paper that you got from Mr. Milosevic, was it made by him? Was it in handwriting? What kind of a paper was it?

A. It was typed out. Four items typed out, and in hand he had added, "On Yugoslav territory."

Q. Does that mean special status on Yugoslav territory? Is that what he suggested?

A. That's what it meant, although it could have been interpreted ¹³²⁰² otherwise as well. I wasn't quite clear on what it actually meant, and I couldn't take it, and I didn't want to go to Paris. I went to Knin and I said I was ill.

Q. Did you nevertheless go to Paris, and why?

A. He called me up on the telephone again several days later. That was around the 28th or 29th of October. And he said, "What's happening to you? What's up with you?" And I said I was ill and he said, "I don't believe doctors who are ill themselves. Go on, Wijnaendts is waiting for you," he said. And I went.

Q. How did you get there?

A. I went by plane. We flew there. Small planes, first and second occasion, once owned by the federal government, and the second time it was a small military plane and the pilots were soldiers and it left from the military airport of Batajnica.

Q. Witness, did you meet Mr. Milosevic end of November/beginning of December 1991 regarding the Vance plan?

A. That's right, around the 23rd of November, that was.

Q. At that time, was the Vance plan already accepted by Mr. Milosevic, Kadijevic, and Tudjman? Do you know?

A. That's right, yes. It had already been accepted.

Q. What did you talk with Mr. Milosevic about it then?

A. Milosevic set out the basic concepts of the plan that had been accepted and he showed a map and indicated the territories. He showed me a map, and in yellow -- yellow marked the municipalities in Croatia and the territories of the municipalities to which the plan referred. These ¹³²⁰³ areas were marked in in yellow. But parts of the municipalities were not highlighted in yellow. The municipalities, or one of the municipalities which had -- was joined to SAO Krajina in Banija, Lika, and Kordun. And I said that, but he didn't want to discuss this issue, this point, with me. He just said, "Go down there and talk to the international delegation of the United Nations" which was there in the salon adjoined to his offices one floor below, and I found Ratko Jovanovic there and he interpreted for me. He interpreted the conversation I had with the representatives of the Security Council of the United Nations. And they put forward this same concept for the plan that I had heard earlier on from him. And already at that time, I began making some remarks of my own, and the positions that I stood by, and I did this over the next two months or more.

Q. Did Mr. Milosevic ask you to accept the Vance plan when you met him on that day?

A. Yes, he did. He wanted us to say that we accepted it.

Q. And you did -- did you do that?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you request amendments; and if so, which?

A. That's right. I did request amendments. I asked that the JNA remain in Krajina, that the peace forces be deployed along the line of conflict between the two warring sides, the Serbian and Croatian side. It was called the green line, modelled upon the Cyprus model. And I asked that the laws of Croatia not be applied to the SAO Krajina territory and that the Territorial Defence of SAO Krajina not be disbanded.

JUDGE MAY: Just remind us, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Perhaps you can ¹³²⁰⁴ do this through the witness shortly -- the basis of the plan, and then we can find out why the witness took the view which he did.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, what was the main point in relation to the Vance plan? You have already mentioned the territories that were specially marked in a map. What was supposed to become out of these territories?

A. It was a provisional plan through which demilitarisation of those areas was to be conducted, and this was marked as Krajina Sector West and Sector East, and later on they were referred to as Sector East, Sector North, Sector South and Sector West; and the JNA was to withdraw from those areas and that all the units remaining, the armed forces remaining in the area, should be disbanded, including the Territorial Defence units; and that all volunteer units should be withdrawn outside the territory of Krajina, those who had come in from outside into the territory; and that all that should remain of the armed formations in the area in all three, or rather, four areas, sectors, should be the police, with their arms at their waists, that is to say, without any long-barrelled weapons, and that it should be proportionate to the population structure before the conflict - police with sidearms - until a political solution for the area was found. And in item 1, point 1, it was stated that there were nine regions to which the plan referred. They were different areas within Croatia.

Q. Witness --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm sorry to have to ¹³²⁰⁵ interrupt you once again, but I have become very tired reading from the transcript. I was saying, it's very tiring for me to have to read from the transcript what this witness is saying, because I cannot hear the witness at all. He has turned towards that side over there and is speaking into his beard. The interpreters can hear him because he has a special microphone for the interpreters, but he has no microphone for the Serbian language because he has been granted voice distortion. I understand that. But could he please be asked to speak louder? And I believe that Mr. Tapuskovic probably can't hear him either, but he doesn't dare complain. He is reluctant to complain.

JUDGE MAY: If Mr. Tapuskovic wanted to complain, he would. No doubt about that.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I did complain on one occasion, but I didn't want to tire you with my complaints. If you remember, the day before yesterday I said that I cannot hear the witness at all, and I complained on the first day. When he is going into explanations in private session, he speaks louder, but when he's explaining matters in open session, it is very difficult to understand what he's saying.

JUDGE KWON: I note Mr. Mueller is on his feet. Yes.

MR. MUELLER: Thank you, Your Honours. I just wanted to inform you that my headphones are absolutely impeccable, means to say that I hear the voice of the witness very clearly, as I do the English translation. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We've got comments all around. I think ¹³²⁰⁶ we're going to adjourn now.

JUDGE KWON: Are we in closed session?

JUDGE MAY: Mr. --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. I'm going to speak to the witness. You hear what's said, Mr. Witness MILAN BABIC. One of the problems is that you're giving a great deal of evidence, and it's important that everybody follows it and understands it and takes it in, and it's rather difficult to do that if there's so much of it, and some of it, as you've been asked, is in some detail. It would help, it may help, if you would speak into the microphone, as you've been doing, keep your voice louder, and also if you would kindly, when you're giving your answers, perhaps face us, the Bench, so that your voice may be heard elsewhere, yes, rather than the Prosecutor.

JUDGE KWON: And I have a comment to make. Mr. Milosevic --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand, yes.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, if you can hear the witness saying in Serbian, why don't you use the headphone? I'm saying this once again. You can follow very easily.

And the second point is that we are going into private session so often, and if you have -- find some difficulty in following the witnesses, why don't you let your associate come in the courtroom and assist you in that aspect? I'm raising these issues while we are in private session, and consider this matter later on. ¹³²⁰⁷

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not understand, Mr. Kwon, how somebody could help me hear better. My associate can't help me hear better if I don't hear something. For example, I just had a technical remark, saying that I can't hear what the witness is saying. Otherwise, let me say that I never mentioned at all that Mr. Mueller couldn't hear, so I do believe that Mr. Mueller can hear very well. I never said that. I was just making the remark that I myself could not hear properly.

JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Let's go into open session for one matter.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, we've considered the application which you and Mr. Nice make. We will grant it. You will have the six days. But we will expect the list of 14 witnesses within seven days.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. We actually have identified the 14 witnesses, and we can provide it, actually, in one day. Tomorrow you will have your list.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you very much. Yes. Do we need to go back into private session?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour. We can stay in open session, and I would like to clarify a few points in relation to the Vance plan, to make it perfectly clear what the provisions were, the suggestions were. ^{13208 BLANK PAGE 13209}

Q. First of all, Witness, did the Vance plan foresee the re-integration of the three SAOs into the Republic of Croatia within certain time periods?

A. The plan didn't address that directly, except in the introduction, which referred to areas that were in Croatia. That is all that it said. The plan did not address the political solution. It explicitly said that a political solution would be found later. "Until a political solution is found." So the plan refers to a period until a political solution is found, except in the first paragraph, which said what I said.

Q. And the provision was demilitarisation of the -- all three SAOs, with only a police force remaining, with the weapons that a police force usually have. Was that what you referred to?

A. That's right. That was the substance of the plan; the demilitarisation of those regions.

Q. Did the plan foresee the arrival of UN troops, and where would the UN troops be?

A. Yes. The plan did envisage, after the demilitarisation, the deployment of peace forces of the United Nations across the territory within the territory of those regions, and those forces would control roads, checkpoints, the entries and exits from the regions. They would check that no weapons were being introduced or carried within those areas.

Q. And --

JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do we have the document among our binders, the Carrington plans and Vance plans? If you assist us later on. Thank you. ¹³²¹⁰

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. I'm not aware of this. I think we don't.

JUDGE MAY: Perhaps we can get a copy. If we can, it would be helpful.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

Q. And if I understood you, your concerns, some of the Serb-controlled areas were not included in this zone that UN troops would supervise.

A. That's right.

Q. And was there a provision also in the Vance plan regarding the return of displaced persons into this territory?

A. Yes. That was one of the objectives of the international mission.

Q. Was there also a provision in the Vance plan regarding joint police forces of Croats and Serbs within that territory?

A. Yes. As I said, it would be in proportion to the ethnic composition of the population prior to the conflict.

Q. Witness, at that time when the Vance plan was discussed, and you said it took almost two months to discuss this, the pros and the cons, did the -- was the RSK, the Republic of Serbian Krajina, established?

A. Yes, on the 19th of December, 1991.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness tab 68 of Exhibit 351, just to have a look at it, sir, not to discuss the details.

Q. Is this the constitution and constitutional law on implementation of the RSK of 19 December 1991? ¹³²¹¹

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Why was the RSK formed at that time? What was the purpose?

A. The international conference in The Hague had stated that it would recognise all the republics of the former Yugoslavia that requested recognition. That virtually meant that the former Yugoslavia had disintegrated, as was stated by the Badinter Commission named by the conference. That was one of the reasons why a part of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, that is, the SAO Krajina, proclaimed itself a republic.

Q. Did the Republic of Serbian Krajina actually request international recognition?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And in this context I would like to put to the witness tab 71.1 and 71.2 of the binder --

A. Yes, it did.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- Exhibit 351.

Q. Are these the two letters to the international officials?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And were you recognised?

A. No.

Q. The territory of the RSK, was that identical with the SAO Krajina territory, or did that include all three SAOs at that time, on the 19th of December?

A. On the 19th of December, the SAO Krajina became the Republic of Serbian Krajina. On that day, the Assembly of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem proclaimed unification with the Republic of Serbian ¹³²¹² Krajina, and two days later, the Assembly of SAO Western Slavonia also proclaimed its unification with Krajina. But until the 26th of February, 1992, they were not united. All three regions on that date united, and that was when the unified Republic of Serbian Krajina was constituted, covering all three regions.

Q. We have talked about the Vance plan and what the provisions were, and in relation to demilitarisation of this region, did you in the Krajina oppose that? I do not mean you personally, but the politicians in the Krajina. Did you oppose the demilitarisation?

A. That's right.

Q. Why did you do that?

A. Because the Vance plan covered a period of six months, upon which there would be a discussion as to whether it should be extended or not, and under those conditions, Krajina would be demilitarised, Croatia would not, and Krajina would have to face the Republic of Croatia imposing a political solution to Krajina by force of arms.

Q. Did you have any -- did you object also against the arrival of the UN troops?

A. To the concept of their arrival. We didn't oppose their coming but the way in which they were to come. The deployment was envisaged according to the so-called green line, based on the Cypriot model.

Q. What does that mean?

A. It meant separation of the warring parties, that is, the Croatian and the Serbian side, and not demilitarisation of the area as a whole. And that is the amendment to the Vance plan that was requested. It was ¹³²¹³ accepted in principle, but this modification was requested regarding certain elements of the plan.

Q. Was there an option? Was that an option, to get a modification of the Vance plan, or was that out of question?

A. As far as I know, there was an option, and some provisions were modified. Regarding the initial deployment for a period of six months, and then it was extended to one year by the Security Council, the Secretary-General of the UN, in his report to the Security Council, made such a proposal, and that was accepted, and that is that Croatian laws should not apply to those territories but the laws in force at the time. There was also a discussion that the Territorial Defence should remain, that the possibility should be given that it should be incorporated into the police without long weapons, long barrels, but this was not resolved. There was just the discussion about it. So some elements were modified.

Q. You mentioned that for about two months the Krajina Serbs opposed the Vance plan, and did all of them oppose the Vance plan, or was there a split within the Krajina politicians?

A. At first they were all opposed, and gradually, more and more politicians accepted the plan fully and unconditionally in the way that President Milosevic had accepted it. And finally, the president of the Republic and the government and part of the Assembly continued to oppose it, requesting modifications of the plan, and a part of the Assembly and the politicians in Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem and part of the Assembly of SAO Krajina and some politicians accepted the plan. And the Assembly, which met in Glina on the 9th of February, 1992, approved the ¹³²¹⁴ plan after the pressure that came from President Milosevic, the Presidency of Yugoslavia, the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia, the media campaign, and the like.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to request private session to go into some details on the meetings in relation to the Vance plan.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, did you attend a meeting with Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Karadzic, and Mr. Koljevic on this issue on the 23rd of December, 1991?

A. Yes, that's right. On that date, when there was an election of the government of Serbia, in the office of President Milosevic.

Q. Without going into many details of this discussion, what was the position taken by you and by Milosevic, Karadzic, and Koljevic?

A. I upheld the same position. That meant the plan, with modifications. Milosevic requested that I accept it fully and unconditionally and that -- make a statement to that effect for the public. Karadzic also emphatically requested that I accept the plan without any changes, as did Koljevic. Finally, Milosevic gave me a piece of paper and a pen and said, "Go to the next room and write out an announcement." I went there and wrote an announcement on one page, presenting all my positions. He took the pen and said, "I won't cross anything out, but I will underline what you need to leave out." And he underlined all the things regarding modifications of the plan, which I should leave out. I expressed my opposition, and he said, "This must go ¹³²¹⁵ to the Assembly meeting. Radovan Bojovic [as interpreted] will be the Prime Minister of the new government, and let him help you." And when he left, Karadzic again started persuading me to accept it. I said, "Come on Radovan, let's talk about Bosnia for a moment." He went silent, and I left and made a public announcement in the way that I had drafted it.

Q. Witness, let me clarify. I find in the transcript a remark that you said Radovan Bojovic will be the Prime Minister of the government. I don't understand the context.

A. Radoman Bozovic, Radoman Bozovic.

Q. What does it have to do with the Vance plan and the discussion that you had with Mr. Milosevic and Karadzic and Koljevic? I don't understand the context. Can you explain?

A. Radoman Bozovic and the members of the new government of Serbia were to be sworn in at the Assembly meeting, and that was the reason why he had to leave his room and cross over to the building of the Serbian Assembly. And as he was leaving --

JUDGE MAY: It's difficult for us to understand the context. What was the point of this remark?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The point -- Your Honour, are you asking me?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The context was the following: After Milosevic having underlined in my statement what I should leave out, he left the meeting because of the reason I just gave. He left the meeting, with me, Karadzic, and Koljevic, to go to the building across the ¹³²¹⁶ road. And he said I should continue discussing it with Karadzic and Koljevic. And the words he uttered were, "Let Radovan help you to draft another statement."

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you. That's understood now.

Q. Did you also discuss the Vance plan with General Adzic, in particular, your concerns for the safety of the Serbs in the Krajina?

A. Yes. I went to see General Adzic, and I asked that the JNA remain in Krajina. He said that the JNA would withdraw but that we shouldn't worry, because it would be deployed on the borders of Bosnia, towards Krajina; that he would professionally employ 10.000 men from Krajina in the JNA, in the territory of Bosnia; and if Croatia were to attack us, they would reach Knin sooner than the Croatian army could reach it. And I said, "General, do you think that Bosnia will remain in Yugoslavia when Bulgaria and Turkey have already declared that they would recognise the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina?" He looked at me with astonishment as to what I was saying, that that was nonsense, so that the army would remain in Bosnia. He felt that the army would certainly remain in Bosnia, although Bulgaria and Turkey had announced that it would recognise the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and even though the Assembly of Bosnia had issued a declaration speaking about the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. If the audiovisual section could turn the -- turn down the volume of Serbian language in the English channel. It's very difficult for me to follow.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, may I be of assistance? That's ¹³²¹⁷ what's happened to me in another day. You can regulate it yourself on your board.

JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. In relation to this dispute about the Vance plan, did you have an exchange of letters? That is, Mr. Milosevic and you. Did you, in January 1992, exchange public letters?

A. Yes, we did exchange public letters, but we also exchanged private letters. On the 8th of January, a letter was sent by President Milosevic to me, and it arrived a couple of days later, by mail as well. And it was also published in the media, in the Politika and other daily newspapers, and on television.

Several days later, I wrote my reply and made it public by fax for the office of President Milosevic, and a copy was made available to the public.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put the Exhibits 79, 80, and 81 to the witness, referring to these letters. And as they're very particular letters, they have to be under seal and we have to discuss it in private session, as we are now. The Exhibit -- the Exhibit 79 is the letter.

JUDGE MAY: Which binder?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's Exhibit 352.

[Prosecution counsel confer]

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: ^{13218 BLANK PAGE 13219}

Q. The Exhibit 79, is this the letter that Mr. Milosevic wrote, and the exhibit tab 80, is it the letter that you -- your answering letter?

JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry. 78, 79, seems to be the Politika article.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes, Your Honour. It's actually the complete -- in this Politika article, the letter is completely published. It's a complete publication of the letter.

JUDGE MAY: 80 seems to be the correspondence between the two, and 79, at least in mine, appears to be the Politika articles.

JUDGE KWON: Yes. 79 is an open letter to this witness from Mr. Milosevic.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The witness actually has -- the problem is I have, for some reason, only the B/C/S version and it's Cyrillic and I can't read it, therefore I could only guess what it was. I'm sorry. This is -- Your Honour, you are correct. 79 is the original letter from Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Witness, do you have the original letters actually with you?

A. I do. They are with my attorney, who is here present.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I wonder whether we would need the original letters. If you would like to have a look at it or if we could deal with these copies as they are.

JUDGE MAY: Unless there's any dispute about it, it seems to me for the moment we can go on with the copies which we have.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. I think so too. Actually, I don't want to go into the details of these letters because they speak for themselves.

Q. What I only would like to know from you, Witness: Did you ¹³²²⁰ understand these letters to be a threat, or include any threats for your dismissal from your position you had at that time?

A. Yes. It is stated in the letter of Slobodan Milosevic that I should be replaced, and others elected, or rather, it is stated in a particular manner.

Q. Yes. And what was your --

A. In the last sentence, it is stated.

Q. And the last -- where do you find this remark? Can you please read it.

A. Last sentence in the letter.

Q. Yes. Please read the sentence that you understand to be a request for your dismissal.

A. It says in the letter: "The assistance of Serbia to the people of Krajina will not be called in question in peace even, but the citizens of Krajina need to know that, by their actions, they have lost all our confidence and that in the future, for relations with the authorities in the republics of Serbia, they must delegate people for whom the national interests will be above personal political prestige."

Q. And what was your response to this in your own letter?

A. In my letter, I said that I considered that to be a call for my replacement or dismissal.

Q. We do not need to go into more details because the letters actually speak for themselves.

Witness, did you also then take part in the extended Presidency session on the 31st of January, 1992? ¹³²²¹

A. Yes, for three days, and on the 1st and 2nd of February.

Q. We have already heard from another witness details on this meeting, but I still would like to speak about a few points with you as well. You said it lasted for three days. Were you able to leave the meeting as you wished, or were you not allowed to do so?

A. No. Everyone could leave it except me. I had to stay at the meeting until I stated that I favoured the complete and unconditional acceptance of the Vance plan.

Q. Who said that to you, or in which way were you forced to stay on until you changed your mind?

A. Branko Kostic and Borisav Jovic were chairing the meeting that was attended by the members of the Presidency, the General Staff, and other participants. The meeting was conducted in such a way that the session continued, and it was telecast directly with two cameras, and the public was aware of the session going on. During the meeting, somebody said to me that Milosevic had ordered that I shouldn't leave the meeting, that I may not leave the meeting until I agree to the Vance plan. And it was conducted in such a way that it went on and on. There were just two breaks for members of the government to come, the presidents of municipalities. The second break -- in the second break, I was allowed to go and call in presidents of the municipalities, and actually, I didn't come back. That is when I walked out. In fact, I fled from the meeting on the third day.

Q. Witness, you mentioned that someone told you that Mr. Milosevic had said you are not supposed to leave. Who said that to you? ¹³²²²

A. I think it was either Radoman Bozovic, the Prime Minister of Serbia, or somebody said that Radoman Bozovic had said that. Anyway, the information came through Radoman Bozovic. Jovica Stanisic told me later on, when we met in 1993, that Milosevic had given him orders to arrest me if I left.

Q. What was the occasion that Mr. Stanisic told you that?

A. In 1993, at a celebration of the day of the police, in a restaurant.

Q. During the meeting, or during the breaks of the meeting, were you intimidated, pressured, or threatened in any way?

A. Borislav Jovic said that they could replace me and that they could do all kinds of things to me. And I said, "You can, but I have my position and I'm going to abide by it." General Adzic even wanted physically to attack a member of the government, calling him nasty names. This also applied to other people from Krajina, giving them names. And I was told this by participants, because I was outside the meeting hall, making an announcement for the public. Adzic was very angry. He couldn't wait for me. He asked that the meeting continue without me. However, Jovic and Kostic didn't want to do that. He was so irritated that he wanted to physically attack people from Krajina.

Q. Did you oppose the Vance plan throughout or did you change your mind at any point in time?

A. I abided by my position up to the end, but in February I amended my suggestion and asked that we introduce complete protectorate of the United Nations, that is, that Krajina should be given provisional ¹³²²³ protection by the United Nations until its status was settled. I'm sorry; at the beginning of March, in 1992.

Q. The Vance plan meeting that you discussed, you said you left it, you finally fled it. When you were gone, did someone from the Krajina government agree to the Vance plan instead of you?

A. Yes. Mile Paspalj, president of the Assembly of Krajina, agreed, and he made a statement to the effect that in the absence of the president of the Republic, he had the authority to take over the function of president of the Republic, and in that capacity he said yes, the plan had been accepted.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again, Your Honours.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. While Mr. Paspalj authorised -- accepted the Vance plan in the Krajina, the politicians in the Krajina who opposed it, did they continue to oppose it and even call for a referendum on the matter within the Krajina?

A. Yes, that's right. Part of the Assembly and the politicians who were opposed called a referendum for the people to state their views about the plan. And the two questions of the referendum were: Were they in favour of the plan completely and unconditionally as the plan had been accepted by Kadijevic, Milosevic and Jovic -- no, I beg your pardon, Tudjman was the third one -- or whether they were in favour of a modified ¹³²²⁴ plan, following the lines of the Krajina government draft.

Q. Witness, you have already mentioned the Assembly session in Glina on the 9th. And this Assembly session, was it an official Assembly session called by the president of the Assembly? Did all Assembly members take part in it?

A. No, not all of them did. My information told me that it was a minority, in fact, which participated. But the delegation from Belgrade did take part.

Q. You mentioned the delegation from Belgrade did take part. Who took part from Belgrade in this meeting?

A. The members of the Presidency of the SFRY, Branko Kostic and Yugoslav Kostic; the head of the General Staff, Adzic; and several other generals and their escorts and the people who accompanied them; the ministers and people from Serbia. Actually, it was a very numerous delegation.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, we have prepared tab 88 of the Exhibit 352, and it is a video. A part, a small speech given on this Glina session by the president of the Presidency, Kostic, or rather, vice-president, and the translation of what is said you actually have under this tab. It will only be -- you have actually the speech, the entire speech, but we will only play the section page 35, the last paragraph, to page 36, the middle of the page.

And when you are ready in the technical booth, we could do that now. Thank you.

[Videotape played] ¹³²²⁵

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Is this the Belgrade delegation arriving, sir?

A. Yes, it is; Branko Kostic, Adzic, and his escorts.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters apologise but they do not have the text of this tape.

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] Mr. Kostic, good day to you. Welcome to Glina. You have come here to attend the Krajina Assembly. What do you expect of the meeting?

Well, we have come and there are quite a lot of us here, and after a rather extensive discussion held in the Yugoslav state Presidency to take part in the work of the Assembly of Srpska Krajina and on the one hand to reject all the accusations, refute all the accusations that have been unfoundedly spread among these people, that we are leaving those people in the lunch. Also to tell the Assemblymen of the Serbian Krajina Assembly, as well as to all the people, that that is a crude lie, flagrant lies, that we have been and are remaining by the side of these people. In addition, to help inasmuch as we can, for reason to prevail, and that these people, as well as the Assemblymen, realise that that which has been gained through war until now can be defended by peace in the best possible way from now on, with the assurances of the Security Council, a world organisation, and the engagement of the Blue Helmets. Thank you very much on behalf of the Novi Sad television. Thank you too.

Mr. Kostic, what is your message to the people of Glina and Krajina? ¹³²²⁶ That we have stood by and are going to stand by these people. However, choosing between the peace option and the war option, the time has come to defend peace, what these people have gained by war, not by continuation of a long and precarious war that might be spread out to the hinterland and Bosnia and sweep over the entire Yugoslavia or even wider in the Balkans. That can obviously finally result in the loss of everything that these people have gained by war so far. Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can stop here. We can stop here. Thank you.

Your Honours, as you can see from the transcript, there is following a speaker of the RSK Assembly on the conference giving a small speech, listing all the people that are present there from Belgrade. That's actually following in that next chapter on page 36, and I don't think we need to play it on the video. You can read it and Mr. Milosevic can read it also, and the amici.

Q. You already mentioned another Assembly session in Glina. Was there an Assembly session in Glina on the 16th of February, 1992, and was the then Prime Minister dismissed?

A. That's right. The Prime Minister of Srpska Krajina was dismissed.

THE INTERPRETER: The president of the Republic of Srpska Krajina. Interpreter's correction.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. And in the subsequent meeting on the 26th of February, 1992, was Goran Hadzic elected the next president of the RSK? ¹³²²⁷

A. That's right, yes.

Q. Did any officials from Belgrade attend this session? Do you know?

A. I heard that will Budimir Kosutic was there. I don't know about anybody else. They said that some people were there, but as I wasn't there myself, I can't say.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness tab 74 of the binder Exhibit 351, and it is actually the decision of the RSK Assembly, dated the 26th of February, 1992, in which the SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem and the SAO Western Slavonia join the RSK officially.

Q. Is that correct?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. We do not need to go into details of this decision.

A. Rather, note is taken that they have united into the territory of Serbian Krajina.

Q. Thank you. Goran Hadzic, what was his position before the war?

A. Goran Hadzic, from the summer of 1990, was the president of the municipal board of the SDS in Vukovar. Later on, he was elected as president of the Serbian National Council of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. And then, subsequently, at the beginning of the autumn or at the end of summer of 1991, he was elected Prime Minister of the government of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.

Q. What was his profession before the war?

A. I didn't hear that from him personally, but everybody said that he was a warehouse clerk, or rather, an official, a clerk, a worker, in some ^{13228 BLANK PAGE 13229} warehouse, something to that effect.

Q. Did you have opportunity to see him during meetings?

A. Yes, quite a few times.

Q. Did he have the political skills and intellectual level to fulfil the position of the President of the RSK? You observed him. Can you comment on this?

A. It's a little difficult for me to speak about somebody's qualifications for a particular job, the job that he did anyway, but what I can say is that he wasn't particularly eloquent, and his political appearances did not correspond to the model we have, the image we have, of a politician. But people from Eastern Slavonia told me that he had been elected to these posts because he was brave and courageous in standing up to the Croatian police in Vukovar and that he first jumped up onto a tractor and thus became a well-known personality.

Q. Was he actually the dominant political authority in the RSK, or someone else?

A. Well, in the RSK, no. The authority, the power -- he had power and authority. Milan Martic and his structures had power and authority, parallel structures, in fact, and they were the powers that be in that part of Krajina. Goran Hadzic, for the most part, spent his time living in Novi Sad. I don't know how far he was influential in Eastern Slavonia. He would come to Knin from time to time.

Q. And when you speak about the parallel structure around Milan Martic, is that the same parallel structure with Frenki that you mentioned before, during the year 1991? ¹³²³⁰

A. That's right, except at that time it was the official, formal authorities in power in the RSK.

Q. Do you know -- you have already mentioned the person Stojicic Badza. What was his relationship or position in the SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem?

A. He was the commander of Territorial Defence in the area.

Q. Did he have an influence on Mr. Hadzic? Do you know?

A. As far as I know, Hadzic made frequent mention of him, Badza, and a certain man named Jajo, as the main people that he cooperated with.

Q. What was Mr. Hadzic's relationship with Mr. Milosevic? Can you -- did you make any observations to this effect?

A. Complete obeyance. Hadzic completely obeyed Milosevic. He was in -- he completely obeyed Milosevic.

Q. What was Mr. Hadzic's relationship, if any, to Mr. Stanisic?

A. Very close. I know that Stanisic would accompany him sometimes to the Presidency of Serbia, and people even said that he stayed in Stanisic's apartment, that he slept there when he came to Belgrade and that he was under Stanisic's complete control. At one time he was even said to wear a camouflage uniform in Belgrade when he went to meetings with Milosevic.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness the exhibit -- tab number 84 of Exhibit 352. It's a photo. Can we put it on the ELMO, please.

Q. And looking at it, can you say where these photos were made and can you point out to us Mr. Hadzic, if he is on these photos, of course. ¹³²³¹

A. This photograph was taken on the 31st of January, 1992. It is the expanded meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY.

Q. And is Mr. Hadzic on any of these photos; and if so, can you point him out to us?

A. These are members of his government.

Q. Can you move it?

A. Members of his government here. You can't see him on the photograph. But he looked like this man here, although this is Rado Leskovac, I believe, but they looked similar.

Q. Thank you very much, then. He's not on the photos. Thank you.

A. No, he isn't; at least, I can't see him.

Q. Witness, we can --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Usher, we can put that away. Thank you.

Q. Witness, you have told us the provisions of the Vance plan, and I would like to know from you now whether this Vance plan was actually -- if it was actually executed within the Krajina or the RSK. Was it implemented?

A. No, it was not.

Q. Were the territories demilitarised?

A. No, they were not.

Q. Why not?

A. Because the weapons and military equipment and materiel was not taken away from the area completely, and most of the equipment was hidden, and through the Krajina police force, which was in possession of those weapons still, the military units and formations remained armed in the ¹³²³² area. And also, later on, from the beginning of 1993, in fact, the heavy weapons were taken from the warehouses which were held by the peace forces, and from the beginning of 1993 onwards, the armed formation existed under the name of the Serb army of the RSK, although it existed from May 1992 in actual fact, this Serbian army with part of the weaponry.

Q. Were multi-ethnic police forces, police units, established? That is, Croats and Serbs?

A. No.

Q. Was the return of Croats to their villages implemented?

A. No, it was not.

Q. Why not?

A. They were not allowed to return, by the authorities in Krajina.

Q. When you say "the authorities in Krajina," whom do you mean? In which way were they prevented to return?

A. The police prevented them, Martic did, and the political position taken was that they shouldn't return. This position was taken up by the government.

Q. Was Mr. Milosevic in any way involved in these reactions to the Vance plan?

A. Could you explain what you mean, please, and repeat the question?

Q. You mentioned that the Krajina authorities did not implement the Vance plan, and I was asking you whether Mr. Milosevic did in any way get involved in this action or influence the authorities in Krajina not to do that.

A. Yes, Milosevic did perform militarisation, or rather, he held the ¹³²³³ position that demilitarisation shouldn't be put into effect. Then he supported militarisation, or rather, the creation of military formations and the creation of an army, another army in Krajina, the Serbian army of the RSK. He appointed commanders, financed them, gave logistics support, right up until 1995, August 1995, in fact.

Q. You mentioned that the JNA left the RSK. When did they start leaving the RSK, and when was the withdrawal completed?

A. The withdrawal from Croatia across Krajina began in the month of October 1991. Garrisons, Zagreb, Zadar, Sibenik, Sinj, and other parts through the maritime coastal route, which I didn't see, but I heard about them, and the withdrawal from Krajina itself, or that portion of Krajina, was completed in May 1992.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness now two exhibits: Tab 75 and tab 76 of Exhibit 351.

Q. Tab 75 is a decision of the RSK Assembly dated the 18th May 1992, amending the RSK constitution and law on defence to establish a Serbian army of the RSK; and the other one is from 1993, a decision of the RSK Assembly, dated the 20th of April, 1993, amending the RSK constitution to change the structure of the Serbian army of the RSK and its command. Is this the army that you referred to just a minute ago?

A. Yes, that's it.

Q. Yes. Thank you. I only want to refer to the document from 1992, and there is the Article 1, where it says: "The Republic of Serbian Krajina shall have a Serbian army in peacetime. The Serbian army shall comprise TO units in the event of the imminent threat of war, and during ¹³²³⁴ wartime, special purpose police units shall join the Serbian army." Which special police forces are referred to in this article? What does that mean?

A. They were the special police forces that existed since -- were in existence since 1991, and we've already discussed that issue here, talked about them. The ones that began to be established in April 1991.

Q. Yes. Witness, this Serbian army of the Krajina, did they take over the property of the JNA and the weapons that were left behind?

A. Yes, that's right. Part of the weapons were hidden when the JNA withdrew, and in 1993 it was taken from the warehouses which were guarded by the UN peace keepers.

Q. Was it an independent army? We have already spoken about financial dependence. Was it an independent army?

A. No. It was part of the military structures of Yugoslavia.

Q. What was the basis of -- in which way were they dependent, a dependent part of the structure of Yugoslavia?

A. Well, most of the commanding cadre, commanding staff, were active officers of the JNA who were on the JNA payroll. They were paid by the General Staff of the Yugoslav army and appointed to those positions by the personnel department of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army. The commanders of the army were appointed by the president of Serbia and later the president of Yugoslavia - president of Serbia up until 1995, Slobodan Milosevic - and it was financed, logistics support was given from Yugoslavia. As far as personnel were concerned, Krajina supplied the men for the army and the regulations and provisions for it to be able to ¹³²³⁵ function.

Q. Witness, I would like to move now a little bit further in relation to meetings with Mr. Milosevic, and I would like to know if, in 1994, RSK officials took part in negotiations with the Croatian authorities. Do you know that?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. When they went to meetings with the Croatian authorities, did they have contacts with Mr. Milosevic beforehand?

A. That's right, yes. His approval was sought, and the contents of the conversations, the discussions themselves, were determined by him. He would also follow the discussions as they proceeded and was informed of the process.

Q. Did you have to ask approval before committing to any agreements?

A. That's right, yes. It was a form of consultation. But actually, he determined whether something would be accepted or not, and what would be accepted.

Q. What would happen if anyone would not -- would take an isolated action without consulting Mr. Milosevic first? Do you know?

A. Well, it couldn't have been done, because those people would have been sanctioned and borne the consequences. There were even instances of physical jeopardy. People were put in prison who had independently made agreements with Croatia. The Daruvar agreement is a case in point, where people from Western Slavonia drew up an agrement with Croatia, and the Dzakula example as well.

Q. Did the officials from the Krajina ever make an agreement with the ¹³²³⁶ Croats without an approval, beforehand consultation?

A. I think that the Daruvar one could have been a case in point, but I'm not quite sure. What I do know is that the plan Z-4 was accepted through Ambassador Albright. Not directly, without Milosevic's approval beforehand, or prior to asking approval from Milosevic.

Q. Which negotiations took place in 1994? What kind of negotiations were held with the Croats? Were they related to a political solution or were they just on economical issues?

A. From mid-1994 until the beginning of 1995, there were -- they were agreements about economic relations with Croatia: The oil pipeline, supply of electricity, the water supply, the opening of the highway, the railway transport system.

Q. And did Mr. Milosevic allow you to agree to such economical relations?

A. Yes. Yes. And he took a very active part in the drafting of the agreement itself, even with regard to the name of a mixed oil company that had been established.

Q. Witness, I would like to go now to a meeting on the 5th of September, 1994.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I have to ask for private session for this meeting.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, did you participate in a meeting in September 1994, ¹³²³⁷ together with Milan Martic and Mr. Mikelic; and if so, what was discussed on that day?

A. I was at that meeting. Jovica Stanisic, I think, was there. We were in Milosevic's offices, and he offered a luncheon in the same building, in a room adjoining his offices. In a strange, dark room. At the meeting, he criticised Martic because Martic had declared his support for Radovan Karadzic regarding the plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. Let me clarify a matter. Who criticised Mr. Martic; Mr. Stanisic or Mr. Milosevic?

A. Mr. Milosevic. He said to Martic, "I don't want to make a second Karadzic out of you." And he smiled. He smiled timidly. And he says -- he said, "Well, Babic is in cohorts [as interpreted] with the clergy," meaning in the political sense. And to that I retorted, "That is the spiritual dimension. That is my personal choice." I've just been reminded of that.

Q. Witness, you said that Mr. Milosevic criticised Martic because he had declared his support to Radovan -- for Radovan Karadzic. Report in relation to what -- support in relation to what?

A. Milosevic was exerting pressure on Karadzic and the Assembly of Republika Srpska to accept the international plan for a peaceful settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in August, since Karadzic and the Assembly of Republika Srpska rejected the plan, he imposed a blockade, formally, on Republika Srpska. Milosevic did this.

Q. And in which way had Martic supported Mr. Karadzic? What had he said or done publicly? ^{13238 BLANK PAGE 13239}

A. He publicly supported Karadzic in rejecting the plan. He even went to vote, because there was a referendum after that. He went to Drvar, within the territory of Republika Srpska, though he was not a voter from the area.

Q. You said that formally Milosevic did not support -- or impose, sorry. Sorry. He imposed a blockade formally, you said. And did anything happen informally?

A. I do know that informally there was supply of oil derivatives and that the army of Republika Srpska was assisted by Milosevic.

Q. And how do you know that?

A. I know on the basis of a meeting at Bijeljina that I've already referred to, when Stanisic and Karadzic asked me to make the payments.

Q. Sir, let me stop you. You do not need to repeat anything. Do you have anything in addition to that? Do you have any information in addition to that, that he continued to support?

A. I heard, after arriving in Belgrade in 1995, that around Srebrenica, the army of Yugoslavia had been involved in the wartime events around Srebrenica. The army of Yugoslavia from the territory of Yugoslavia, across the Drina River.

Q. Who told you that?

A. People from Perucac, along the Drina, in Serbia, a place on the opposite bank.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again, Your Honour.

[Open session] ¹³²⁴⁰

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, you mentioned the Z-4 plan. What were the main points of the Z-4 plan?

A. The main point, or the gist of the plan, was that the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which had earlier been known as the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina and which was now known as Sector North and Sector South under the protection of the United Nations, should be given political, territorial autonomy within the Republic of Croatia. It would have a parliament, a government, institutions, a currency that would be special in appearance but it would be printed by the National Bank of Croatia, competence over the regional police and the courts, which would imply a high level of autonomy.

Q. Who made this suggestion of the Z-4 plan? Was it an international proposal?

A. The Z-4 was given that name because it was proposed by four ambassadors in Zagreb, that is, by the international community.

Q. In the transcript earlier on, it was said that -- it is actually on page 61 of the transcript, line 14, it says that Ambassador Albright accepted the Z-4 plan. Is that correct, Ambassador Albright?

A. Ambassador Galbraith, the ambassador of the United States in Croatia, Peter Galbraith. He was the main creator and proponent of that plan.

Q. This plan, did that actually mean the reintegration of the three regions of the RSK, that is, Krajina, Western Slavonia, Eastern Slavonia, ¹³²⁴¹ into the Croatian Republic?

A. That's right. Only the Western Slavonia would be settled immediately, whereas Eastern Slavonia, within a period of five years, and the territory of SAO Krajina would have a high degree of political and territorial autonomy in Croatia.

Q. Were the politicians of the Krajina in a position -- did they accept this Z-4 plan, you in the RSK?

A. At the beginning of March/end of February, the politicians in Krajina rejected the plan. The plan was accepted only by the last Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in August 1995.

Q. And when you said March and February, which year? Is it also 1995?

A. That's right, 1995.

Q. Who opposed the Z-4 plan?

A. The President of the Republic of Serbia, according to what Milan Martic said, the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and he said half an hour prior to the beginning of the meeting with the international community that President Milosevic had said that the plan should not be even considered.

Q. When did Mr. Milan Martic consult with Mr. Milosevic, and of what time period are you speaking when you say -- when you refer to a meeting with the international community?

A. It was that week. I think it was the end of February/beginning of March. So the beginning of the week, Martic went to Belgrade for consultations. Whether it was Monday or Tuesday. And then on Thursday, ¹³²⁴² an announcement was issued of the supreme defence council of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, in negative terms, about the plan, and then I think it was the following Monday when there was the meeting with representatives of the international community at which Martic said half an hour prior to the meeting that Milosevic had said that the plan should not even be taken into consideration. And at the meeting with representatives of the international community, Ambassador Farista Djijan [phoen] handed it to him. He wouldn't even take it into his hands.

Q. On that occasion, then, did the Krajina authorities reject the plan, in that meeting then with the internationals?

A. Actually, it was not even taken into consideration, so it was not accepted.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We would need to go into private session for a meeting of the witness.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did you speak with Mr. Milosevic yourself about the Z-4 plan?

A. I did, at the beginning of April 1995.

Q. What did you discuss?

A. He was the first to mention the fact that the plan Z-4 was a good one but that the territory of the municipality of Slunj should have been divided lengthwise. He didn't give any explanations for this. And then we actually discussed the events in Livanjsko Polje and the hinterland of Knin, the aggression of the HVO towards Knin. I've already spoken about ¹³²⁴³ that. And then he also said that there weren't 300.000 people of Krajina towards 4 million Croats but that there was the whole logistics of Serbia behind us, and that was that meeting.

Q. Witness, you said that Mr. Milosevic was in favour of the Z-4 plan when you spoke to him; is that understood? He had only some remark in relation to Slunj.

A. It appeared that way, yes. However, one never knew with him for certain whether he really stood behind what he said; at least, I was not always sure.

Q. You have already mentioned this meeting in relation to the fighting that took place at the same time in Bosnia with participation of Milan Martic and his forces, and you mentioned the region of Livno and this gash and the line that Mr. Milosevic showed you to this effect. Was there also fighting at that time in the Bihac region, with participation of RSK forces?

A. Yes. That was --

JUDGE MAY: I see the time. In fact, it's after a quarter past. Can we go back, when we come back, into open session?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. ¹³²⁴⁴

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honours. And Your Honours, for your orientation, we are at the moment at paragraph 280 of the proofing summary, but I will also address paragraph 312, because it fits into the context and would speed up matters.

Q. Witness, Martic or RSK force participation in Bosnia, did Milan Martic and RSK forces participate in the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina already as early as summer 1992?

A. That's right, in the so-called corridor in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Is that the Posavina corridor?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. What is the importance of the Posavina corridor for Bosnia and for -- for the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the Serbs in the Krajina region? What was the importance of this corridor?

A. It is the corridor linking Bosnian Krajina and the Republic of Serbian Krajina with Serbia, or rather, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. And in which time period did RSK forces, with Milan Martic, participate in the fighting in 1992?

A. At the beginning of the summer of 1992. In June already they were there, at the end of June.

Q. And who was in charge, in overall charge of the operations in the Posavina corridor?

A. The army of Republika Srpska and General Mladic.

Q. You have mentioned the fighting in 1994, 1995, in the region of Livno in Herzegovina, and my question was before the break: Did forces ¹³²⁴⁵ from the RSK also participate in the fighting around Bihac?

A. They did.

Q. Who -- what were the forces on both sides? Who was fighting whom in Bihac?

A. On one side, there was the 5th Corps of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was defending its territory, and it was being attacked by the forces of the army of Republika Srpska and the forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, consisting of the Serbian army, the police, and the state security service of Serbia.

Q. Who --

A. And - sorry - the forces of Fikret Abdic.

Q. The forces of the police forces of the state security service of Serbia that participated, who led them? Who commanded them in this fighting?

A. I was told it was Frenki, that he was in command, or rather, the DB from Petrova Gora.

Q. And who told you that?

A. People from Kordun, from the region, members of the government of Krajina.

Q. This participation of the RSK forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, did this cause problems for the position of the RSK towards the international community and the Croatian authorities?

A. Yes. In 1994 in particular, and in 1995, this compromised the position of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in relation to the international community, because the area of Bihac was a protected area by ¹³²⁴⁶ the international community.

Q. Did it increase the danger of an all-out attack on the RSK by the Croatian forces?

A. Yes. That was the reason why the Croatian army and the HVO from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina launched an offensive to deblock Bihac. That was what was publicly announced by the authorities in Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it meant cutting off the Republic of Serbian Krajina from Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia.

Q. Did the RSK authorities and the Republika Srpska authorities actually have a military agreement on assisting each other in that time period?

A. I know there was an agreement between Martic and Karadzic, that is, between the authorities of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and that agreement referred to brigades of the army of Republika Srpska that would assist the army of the RSK. As for other parts of the agreement, I'm not sure about that.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to show the witness the Exhibit tab 96 of Exhibit 352.

Q. Witness, this is a document of the 30th of July, 1995, referring to a visit by Mr. Akashi, the special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and other persons, in relation to an agreement, a proposed agreement. The proposed agreement referred to, is that the Z-4 plan?

A. No. This was -- this should have been a component part of the Z-4 plan, or rather, a precondition for the implementation of the Z-4 plan. ¹³²⁴⁷ So this was an agreement on the disengagement of the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in the Bihac pocket; or, to be more precise, this was not an agreement, it's an announcement on agreement, announcement of approving the proposals made by Mr. Akashi to the leadership of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Q. And the proposal was that no troops or individual soldiers of the RSK would get engaged in the Bihac pocket, and refrain from any cross-border activities; is that what is proposed here?

A. That's right.

Q. The person -- there is a handwritten note on it saying the 20th of September -- or sorry. No. Thank you. I withdraw my question. This proposal to disengage in the RSK, was that actually implemented?

A. No.

Q. What did happen? What was instead done?

A. Combat continued. [Realtime transcript read in error "Maksic"] Mrksic nor Milan Novakovic, who was in command there, nor Martic nor the police nor the MUP of Serbia were they withdrawn from the fighting in that region.

Q. In the transcript, it says Maksic. Is that correct or -- in the document as such it says General Mrksic.

A. That's right. Mile Mrksic, General Mile Mrksic, the commander of the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Q. Yes. Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can take this away. ^{13248 BLANK PAGE 13249}

Q. Witness, in 1994, did the Minister of Interior of the RSK have a problem to get control over the police in the territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Why did he --

A. The Minister of the Interior; is that what you said?

Q. Yes. Yes. Who was the Minister of Interior in 1994?

A. Until the end of 1994, it was Ilija Prijic, who was replaced in that capacity, and the Assembly nominated, appointed, Mr. Perisic, but he didn't take up his post either in Eastern Slavonia or in the rest of the RSK either. So from the end of 1994 until August 1995, the RSK did not have a Minister for the Interior. One of the deputies was the acting minister.

Q. Did a delegation from the RSK then meet Mr. Milosevic to consult him in this problem?

A. Yes, that's right. In 1995, April, around the 26th of April, in fact.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I have to apologise, but we need to go into private session for this.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Were you part of this delegation?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Who else was present? Who else was present from both sides? ¹³²⁵⁰

A. The delegation was led by -- yes, Borislav Mikelic, Uros Funduk, Slobodan Milosevic, Jovica Stanisic, as far as I remember. Whether there was anybody else, I can't quite remember now.

Q. What did you ask of Mr. Milosevic, if anything?

A. We asked that Milosevic allow Slobodan Perisic to be appointed, or rather, that Slobodan Perisic, who was elected the Minister of the Interior for RSK, should take over that function as Minister of the Interior of RSK.

Q. And what was Mr. Milosevic's reaction to this? What happened at the meeting?

A. First of all, Jovica Stanisic commented this request, and he said -- Jovica Stanisic, that is, "We have invested too much in all that," and he was thinking of MUP Krajina, "for us to relinquish it to somebody else now." And to that, Slobodan Milosevic reacted and said the following: He told the delegation of the RSK, that is, to us, "You must understand that we must assist you in this way, via the state security service, because it works in a specific clandestine way, and that's why we can't help you, assist you, through the public security service." In that way, he lent his support to Jovica Stanisic and his position on the issue.

Q. Was that situation solved on the day of this meeting? Was the -- could Mr. Milosevic help you in relation to the Minister of Interior?

A. No. The RSK was left without a Minister of the Interior.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again, Your Honour.

[Open session] ¹³²⁵¹

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put a document to the witness, and it is tab 97 of Exhibit 352.

Q. Witness, this is a document referring to Minister Peric and his position, and it is also referring to people and their affiliation to certain police forces. Who prepared this document?

JUDGE KWON: Are we now in open session?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

A. I learnt about this document from Slobodan Peric. I got it from him.

Q. In this document, actually, at the -- the last paragraph, it says: "At all the meetings, Milosevic agrees that Peric should take over the MUP, while Stanisic immediately after that agrees with Martic that it should be prevented."

Was the situation as described in this paragraph?

A. Specifically, I know what I have described. That was the situation. But yes, although I didn't hear that Milosevic had agreed, in fact.

Q. Was there a problem in May 1995 in relation to the commander of the armed forces of the RSK after the Operation Flash?

A. Yes, that's right.

JUDGE KWON: You have something to say, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't find this document, because in tab 97, the one I have, I have an announcement for Tanjug by the president of the Republic of Srpska Krajina, and not the document that ¹³²⁵² you're talking about. So I have taken this out very carefully from tab 97.

JUDGE MAY: Coming up. Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I have no explanation for this situation.

JUDGE MAY: He's got a copy now.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh, okay. Good. Tab 97. I don't think I need to repeat this now.

JUDGE MAY: No.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No.

Q. Just one more question in relation to tab 97. Did you provide this document when you had your conversations with the Prosecutor in The Hague?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you have not yet answered my question whether there was a problem arising in relation to the commander of the armed forces of the RSK after Operation Flash. Who was the commander of the armed forces of the RSK during the Operation Flash?

A. General Celeketic.

Q. Was he dismissed after the Croatian forces took Western Slavonia in their Operation Flash?

A. That's right, yes, around the 9th of May, 1995.

Q. Did you, in the Supreme Defence Council in the Krajina - I don't mean you personally, but the Supreme Defence Council of the RSK - agree ¹³²⁵³ about a new candidate, Mile Novakovic?

A. I have to explain that the Prime Minister of the RSK, as member of the supreme council, Defence Council, proposed General Mile Novakovic for the new commander. However, Slobodan Milosevic refused, and he appointed General Mile Mrksic for the new commander of the Serb army of the RSK.

Q. Witness, did the Supreme Defence Council of the RSK agree? Did the authorities in the Krajina agree on Mr. Novakovic?

A. It agreed with the decision that it be General Mile Mrksic, and this was formalised. It was officially stated.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I have to ask for private session, to clarify a matter.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, did you see Mr. Milosevic in relation to the TO commander, the new TO commander, together with the delegation; and if so, when?

A. Yes, I did, about the 9th of May, or perhaps on the 9th of May, 1995, in the offices of President Milosevic.

Q. When you went there with the delegation, who accompanied you?

A. The delegation was led by the Prime Minister, Borislav Mikelic. I don't remember whether there was anybody else. Yes, there was [redacted] [redacted].

Q. Did Mr. Mikelic make a proposal to Mr. Milosevic as to who should be the new commander? ¹³²⁵⁴

A. He proposed General Mile Novakovic, who, on one occasion, was the commander, in 1993. He was the commander of the Serbian army of Krajina at that time.

Q. Did Mr. Milosevic reject this proposal, or how did he -- did it -- how did it happen that suddenly it was Mr. Mrksic?

A. He rejected it, yes, and he gave some sort of reason. And he also said it's been decided that it should be General Mile Mrksic.

Q. Do you know who made this decision that Mile Mrksic -- when you say he said it had been decided that it should be General Mile Mrksic, do you know who he meant who decided it?

A. I heard that Milosevic said that. He interrupted the meeting, left the room, and came back after a short period and said, "The new commander will be Mile Mrksic." Some people who were present heard mention of the Supreme Defence Council, but I don't remember that. I heard that Milosevic had said that Mile Mrksic was the new commander and that he had been appointed by Milosevic; at least, that's how I understood it at the meeting. When I said the Supreme Defence Council, the Supreme Defence Council of Yugoslavia was mentioned by some people.

Q. Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Open session again. Thank you.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did the RSK government then approve the appointment -- or the decision by an official appointment of General Mile Mrksic? ¹³²⁵⁵

A. It followed the regular procedure via the Supreme Council of Defence for the RSK and the Assembly of the RSK as well, and that's how it was decided that Mrksic -- or rather, they adopted the proposal and verified it legally, that Mile Mrksic should be the commander.

Q. When did Mile Mrksic arrive in the RSK as commander?

A. He was seen on the 16th of May, 1995. The Assembly appointed him between the 18th and 20th of May, 1995.

Q. What position did he have before he came to the RSK? Do you know that?

A. He was the commander of the Guards Brigade of the JNA in Belgrade, and he was in command of it during the attack on Vukovar. And before that, he was something in the General Staff, held some post, but I don't know what exactly.

Q. When he arrived in the RSK, did he officially become an employee of the RSK forces, or did he remain to be employed as a VJ officer?

A. He was an officer of the army of Yugoslavia.

Q. And the previous two commanders that you mentioned, Mile Novakovic and Celeketic, were they also members of the VJ throughout their time in the RSK?

A. Yes.

Q. During your conversation with the Prosecution in The Hague, did you review several orders signed by Milan Martic related to the appointment, promotions, and release of General Celeketic? Do you recall that?

A. Yes. ¹³²⁵⁶

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I don't think we need to put it all to the witness. It's tabs 98, 99, 100, and 101 of Exhibit 352. They all deal with General Celeketic, his promotion and his release.

Q. But I would like to put to you tab 102, and it's 102 of that same exhibit, 352. And that is actually a document by Dusan Zoric, the military post 1740 -- 90, Belgrade, from 21st December, 1994, regarding the promotion of Colonel Milan Celeketic to the rank of Major General. Can you tell us who this person Dusan Zoric is, what position did he have?

A. He was head of the personnel department of the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia, or was the acting head.

Q. Yes. Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we have to go into private session, and I'm dealing now with paragraph 293 and the following two in the proofing summary.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, did you have a conversation with Mr. Milosevic on the Z-4 plan in August 1995?

A. Yes, a telephone conversation.

Q. At that time, had you discussed the Z-4 plan with Mr. Galbraith?

A. Yes, with Ambassador Peter Galbraith, on several occasions, several times before that.

Q. And immediately before you had this telephone conversation, what was the option given to you by Mr. Galbraith? ¹³²⁵⁷

A. He offered that we should accept and adopt the Z-4 plan and the disengagement of the armed forces of Krajina in the Bihac pocket. He said that we should accept a new mandate for the UN peacekeepers, which was known as the UNCRO mandate, United Nations Croatia, and that communications and roads be opened in Croatia.

Q. At that time, were you the president of the RSK?

A. I was the Prime Minister of the government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Martic was the president, in fact.

Q. Why did you not simply accept it?

A. I accepted in my capacity as Prime Minister, but I informed Ambassador Galbraith that this could not be put into practice without the will and acquiescence of President Milosevic.

Q. How -- and did you then -- you said you had a telephone conversation with Mr. Milosevic on the 3rd of August, 1995. How did you reach him? Did anyone help you?

A. Yes. Jovica Stanisic did, from Jovica Stanisic's cabinet or offices.

Q. Did you go to his office, and where was it?

A. I did go to see Stanisic in his office, which was located in the building of the Federal Internal Affairs Ministry.

Q. Who was present? Who else was present when you saw him?

A. Radovan Stojicic, nicknamed Badza was there, and so was the head of the counter-intelligence service of State Security of Serbia, a man whose name I don't remember, but he resembled Frenki.

Q. Is that the same man you mentioned earlier on to have seen in ^{13258 BLANK PAGE 13259} another meeting with Kertes?

A. That's right. That's the man, on the 4th of January, 1992.

Q. Did you explain to these three gentlemen that you wanted to accept the Z-4 plan and discuss it with Mr. Milosevic?

A. That's right. I said that I had accepted this with Galbraith, and they looked at each other in a slightly hostile fashion. They were a little hostile. But they did put me in touch with Milosevic.

Q. And what did Mr. Milosevic say to you in relation to the Z-4 plan?

A. He repeated -- or rather, he mumbled something. To give an example, it's as if he was speaking out of a dream. He just said, "Yes. Yes. Just slowly, slowly, everything should be conducted calmly." Those were his words over the phone. And he said, "Contact Vlatko Jovanovic. Consult him."

Q. And did you do that?

A. Yes, I did. I met Minister -- Foreign Affairs Minister Vlatko Jovanovic. He was the SFRY minister in the ministry building.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a technical correction. The witness says that I answered him calmly, and here it says, it's been translated as, "Yes. Yes. Just slowly..." So there's a difference between "slowly" and "calmly," especially when we're talking about war and peace. There's a big difference between the two words. So the witness said "mirno," and it was translated as "slowly."

JUDGE MAY: Yes. That's to be noted.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: ¹³²⁶⁰

Q. Witness, what were the exact words that Mr. Milosevic said to you? Just to clarify this matter. What exactly did he say to you?

A. "Yes. Yes. Everything should be done calmly, or peacefully," "mirno."

Q. Witness, did you actually at that time have time to do it slowly or calmly, or was there an urgency? What had Mr. Galbraith told you how much time would you have to make up your mind?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the witness didn't use the word "slowly" at all.

JUDGE MAY: We heard. Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, was there an urgency, a special urgency on the 3rd of August, 1995?

A. Yes. Reactions were to come the following day. I was to give a statement, and this was to be implemented, what I had accepted and what I was to make public by way of a statement.

Q. Did you actually have an ultimatum from Mr. Galbraith to accept the plan right now, otherwise consequences would happen?

A. He said what we could expect if we didn't accept, which meant a Croatian aggression, and that we could fare the same as Western Slavonia.

Q. And did you accept it publicly, and could prevent this aggression?

A. Yes, I did. I made a statement to that effect, that I accepted.

Q. Was the RSK then attacked?

A. Yes, it was, the next day, in the morning.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to ¹³²⁶¹ show the witness the Exhibit tab 103 of Exhibit 352, and it relates to minutes of the first session of the RSK government from July 1995, referring to the international negotiations. And there is no need to discuss it. It speaks for itself.

And in addition to that, I would like to put to the witness tab 104 of that same exhibit, 352. It is a coded cable dated 3rd August 1995.

Q. And I would like to quote from this document. First of all the question: Have you been shown this document and been translated part of it during your conversation with the Prosecutor?

A. Yes, orally it was shown to me.

JUDGE MAY: We need to know what this is, where it comes from.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it's a code cable from the UK embassy in Zagreb, regarding a conversation between Ambassador Galbraith and the Prime Minister of the RSK.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm afraid I have a record from the first session of the government under this tab.

JUDGE MAY: Make sure the accused gets the right document.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I'm just checking the transcript. 104.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, when I read this quote, we need to go into private session, because I just saw that it is necessary.

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh, yes. Thank you.

Q. The quote is: "RSK Prime Minister tells my American colleague that to avoid war he is ready to meet Tudjman's conditions and will ¹³²⁶² announce this today. Unclear whether he has other RSK leadership on board. Milosevic being briefed by Americans on Galbraith's discussions with Babic, need to get Belgrade backing to lend credibility." Witness, was this the situation at that time, and is this quote correct as to your discussions with Mr. Galbraith?

A. Yes, with the exception of the fact that I don't know about any briefing of Milosevic by international factors. All I know is that a member of the French embassy in Belgrade had told me that Milosevic did not support us.

JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, if you look at the paragraph 9 of the same document, it says: "Galbraith assured us that he had the full support of state department." What is -- who are "us" here?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: "Us" is the UK embassy. It's actually a report of the US - sorry - the UK embassy, referring to a discussion of Mr. Galbraith with the witness and their further discussions on the matter and the considerations of Mr. Galbraith.

JUDGE KWON: Yes. I was mistaken. Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did you see Mr. Milosevic after the attack, the so-called Operation Storm, on the 8th of August, 1995?

A. Yes, around the 8th of August, 1995, in the Boticeva Street, a villa in Boticeva Street.

Q. The villa in Boticeva Street, what is it? What kind of a building is it? Is it an official building?

A. It is the residence of the government of Serbia. ¹³²⁶³

Q. Did you ask for this meeting with Mr. Milosevic?

A. The initiative first came from Buba Morina, the commissioner for refugees of the Republic of Serbia in Banja Luka, saying that I should go to Belgrade to see where the refugees from Krajina would be accommodated. So I went to Belgrade. I reported to the Prime Minister, Mirko Marjanovic, who asked me for a statement. After I had given that statement, he linked me with President Milosevic and he made the appointment for meeting Mr. Milosevic.

Q. What kind of a statement asked he of you to make?

A. Mirko Marjanovic asked me to make a statement to the effect that Yugoslavia was not to blame for the exodus of the Serbian people from Krajina. He even had a prepared text of a few sentences, and he also indicated what I should write down.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put the tab 105 of Exhibit 352 to the witness.

Q. Is this the statement that you made on request of Mr. Marjanovic?

A. Yes.

Q. We do not need to comment on this further. Witness, and when you then saw Mr. Milosevic, what did he -- what did you ask of him, or what did you discuss with him?

A. I came to see him. This was on the eve of his departure for Moscow for a meeting with Yeltsin. First of all, the security would not let me in and then he came out and let me in, and we spoke in the room next to the entrance because in the conference hall there were other officials from Yugoslavia and the army. I could see this from the ¹³²⁶⁴ registration plates of the cars. This was a brief meeting that I had with him. I asked where the people would be accommodated, the people from Krajina who had fled.

Q. What was his answer to this?

A. He said, "In Kosovo." I asked, "How many people can fit into Kosovo? It's overpopulated, and there was ethnic tension." He said, "100.000, and many can also go to Republika Srpska and in Republika Srpska." And I asked him whether we could go to Eastern Slavonia. He said, "No, not for the time being." Then I asked him, "And where will the government go, the government of Krajina?" And he said, "Let it stay in Belgrade. If necessary, for negotiations. And you personally," he said, "you can apply to Mirko Marjanovic regarding your own personal needs."

Q. Did the --

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session, Your Honour.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Did the refugees from the RSK actually end up in Kosovo or in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or where did they go?

A. At first, that same day, as soon as the refugees started coming from Krajina, Ratko Mladic, the commander of the army of Republika Srpska, blocked the bridge across the Vrbas, and he wouldn't let refugees go any further. I went to see him.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We should go into private session for this meeting. ¹³²⁶⁵

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. You said you went to see Mr. Mladic. Where did you meet him, and why did you want to see him?

A. In Banja Luka, because Mladic had blocked the way and prevented people from moving any further. And the refugees had formed two columns: One going from Bosanski Novi and Prijedor towards Banja Luka, and another one from Bosanski Petrovac, Mrkonjic Grad, via Manjaca, towards Banja Luka. So there was a block, and the situation was really difficult. Many had relatives in Vojvodina, in Belgrade, in other places, and they couldn't stay there on the road. And as far as I heard from the authorities of Republika Srpska, they intended to put up the refugees at the camp at Manjaca.

And I went to see Mladic to appeal to him to deblock the road, and I went to see him in a building in Banja Luka. He said that he would lift the blockade but after Derventa. He said they should stay here in Republika Srpska. This is our land. And he did deblock the passage across the Vrbas, but then he blocked the way at the crossings into Serbia on the Drina and the Sava Rivers, where all adult males, able-bodied males were separated from their families and made to stay in Republika Srpska and the rest of their families crossed into the Republic of Serbia.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session. ¹³²⁶⁶

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Q. Witness, you said that able-bodied males were separated from their families. For what reason? What were they supposed to do?

A. They were integrated into the army of Republika Srpska, and those who had crossed into Serbia, they were arrested and taken to Eastern Slavonia, to a camp under Arkan or to the front line, the so-called front lines.

Q. Does that mean they were forcefully recruited into the VRS and into the army -- into Arkan's unit?

A. That's right.

Q. Where did those who reached Serbia, where did they settle?

A. They were accommodated in two ways: First, people who had relatives, close relatives, the first generation, could stay with their families. All the others were transported by the police to certain centres all over Serbia, including Kosovo, in columns of tractors or cars or in trains. I heard the stories of many people when they arrived by train in Pristina and other towns in Kosovo. They were flabbergasted and they took the first chance to flee from there.

Q. Witness, did refugees from the Krajina arrive in Vojvodina?

A. Yes.

Q. Were Croatian inhabitants then driven out of Vojvodina? Do you know that?

A. There was some incursion into Croatian homes and throwing the inhabitants out; however, the Serbian police intervened and prevented people moving into Croatian homes. ¹³²⁶⁷

Q. Witness, I would like to go now into an entirely different chapter, and that refers to Milan Martic. Was he arrested at some point in time in Bosnia?

A. Yes, in September 1991.

Q. Was there an arrest warrant against him?

A. Yes, issued by the Croatian government.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to put to the witness tab 111A.

Q. Witness, is this the arrest warrant, or rather, the decree, in relation to Milan Martic?

A. That is what it says here, but I know from the media that it existed.

Q. Were you shown this document during your conversation with the Prosecutor?

A. Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, for your information, the Prosecution office received this document from the government of the Republic of Croatia in a submission in May 2002. With the help of the usher, I would like to put now to the witness tab 111B of that same exhibit, 352, and that's also a document that was received from the Croatian government, attached to the arrest warrant.

Q. Witness, it is a decree in relation to an investigation conducted into activities of Milan Martic and others. And did you have time to read this document? Did you read it during your conversation with the Prosecutor? ^{13268 BLANK PAGE 13269}

A. I did.

Q. In this document, there is referred to the Council of Peoples Resistance that you have already mentioned as being the source of provocations, and there is listed a lot of events from October 1990 through to April 1991, referring to attacks on the police, the Croatian police; the shooting on civilians, the destruction of shops, houses, and vehicles with explosive devices; and the attacks on railroad tracks. When you reviewed this document, did you find it to be correct? Those facts given in the document, were they correct?

A. They are correct, yes.

Q. Those people, or those properties that were destroyed, or people that were harmed, were they Croats or, as you mentioned also earlier, public property?

A. Yes. These were all Croats and public property, and Albanians.

Q. Yes. Thank you.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That should be enough for this document.

Q. When Mr. Martic was arrested in Bosnia, what was he doing there, and together with whom was he arrested?

A. He was passing through Otoka, a village inhabited by Muslims next to Bosanska Krupa. Also with him was his escort and people from the JNA, officers of the JNA.

Q. Do you know what they were doing in Bosnia?

A. I don't know exactly.

Q. Where they were apprehended, was that a route used for the transfer of weapons and equipment for the military forces in the Krajina? ¹³²⁷⁰

A. Yes.

Q. At that time, was that the only route that was open, or were there various routes?

A. There were two routes.

Q. Which routes were taken for the transport of weapons?

A. Through Bosanski Novi and through -- via Grahovo.

Q. The weapons, where did they come from?

A. The weapons came from two sources: One was Serbia, and the other was from JNA warehouses in the territory of Krajina.

Q. Was there also a military warehouse, or sort of, in Bihac, where you would receive weapons from?

A. Yes. Zeljava.

Q. Is that near the Bihac airport?

A. Yes. It's actually the base of the Bihac airport.

Q. To receive -- to receive weapons from the Bihac airport, to whom would the authorities in the Krajina have to turn? Who would facilitate this?

A. I know of Colonel Smiljanic.

Q. Who was he?

A. Chief of security of the JNA Zagreb Corps, when I met him.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I just see that it's time.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, it is time. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, contrary to what was said earlier, we seem to have made good progress today.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour, but there is one problem for tomorrow, actually, upcoming. It's not a problem, but it's a ¹³²⁷¹ time-consuming exercise for tomorrow, because tomorrow we will go into the details of the Martic arrest and we will also go into a lot of intercepts. Today I skipped the intercepts to just make progress, but we have to come to the intercepts tomorrow, and I intend to do that in a group, because I think it's more expeditious to do that.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We've been warned. We'll adjourn now. Could you be back, please, Witness MILAN BABIC, 9.00 tomorrow.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 22nd day of November 2002, at 9.00 a.m.