¹³⁶¹⁶

Monday, 2 December 2002

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.27 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: We're starting rather late due to some problems, construction problems, apparently, that were taking place at the Detention Unit, and we will ask that in future we start at 9.00. For the rest of the day, we will take the normal breaks, but we'll go on sitting until 2.00, to try and make up time.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, we left off before the weekend break discussing a report by the command of the 9th Corps. I think we can read it out in open session without jeopardising your protective measures for this witness. Because I'm only going to ask him whether what it states in the document is correct or not. I'm not going to go into any other details.

JUDGE MAY: Perhaps I can be reminded where we'll find that. Have we got that? I think there was a report which was being dealt with.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. We started discussing the document just before we broke. It is the 20th of February, 1992 report of the 9th Corps, and it relates to the state of affairs in Krajina, the referendums, and other questions.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's a very long report, but I'm ¹³⁶¹⁷ just going to look at certain passages and quotations for the witness to be able to answer. He can give simple yes or no answers.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll see how we get on, if you would like to start asking questions about it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I'm going to quote from the document. The passage is brief, from page 1 of the report, and it talks about the fact that a referendum was announced for the United Nations Peace Plan, and under point 1, that it should be adopted, along with proposals and recommendations by the government of the Republic of Srpska Krajina, and that it should follow the lines of Vance's plan completely. And then we come to what it states further: The concept of Babic's and Vance's concepts in the leaflet, most of voters who are not fully informed of the developments, brings us into a situation that when we look at the leaflet at first glance, the voters reject the B variation and give full support to the first option. On the other hand, all the citizens of Krajina unconditionally advocate peace and the arrival of the Blue Helmets. So the referendum posters introduce -- baffle the people so that the people no longer know who to believe.

WITNESS: WITNESS MILAN BABIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued].

Q. My question for this witness is as follows: Was that how it was?

A. That is the assessment of the person who wrote the report. The situation was that as of the month of November 1991, and then all through December and January and into February, the stands were published, made ¹³⁶¹⁸ public, the stands of the government and assembly of the RSK, first of all the government, that is to say, and the assembly of the SAO Krajina, what the stand points were and positions with regard to the Cyrus Vance Peace Plan and what requests were made for the plan to be modified. The referendum was planned -- they planned to hold a referendum, but it wasn't put into practice because of the obstructions by the authorities that you yourself established, and the commands of the units of the JNA. The well known example is that of Stojan Spanovic, who was the commander of the brigade, who did not permit that the Cyrus Vance Plan be expounded and explained to the public along with the proposals for its modifications.

JUDGE MAY: Before we go on, the document has been traced. It is Exhibit D59, not yet translated.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The passage I read out states that the leaflets introduce confusion, so that the public no longer knows how to act. So my question is: Is that correct or is what you just said correct, when you said that the army and some kind of authorities from Belgrade did not allow them to state their views?

A. The people didn't have an occasion to discuss this publicly under those conditions, nor to state their views about the plan.

Q. All right. Fine. You said a moment ago that you had the positions of the government and the Assembly. However, in this same report, on page 2, it says the following:

"In Glina, on the 16th of February," that is to say, four days ¹³⁶¹⁹ prior to the publication of this report, "an assembly of the RSK was held under the --" The Presiding Officer was Mile Paspalj. I assume he was president of the Assembly at that time. And it made the decision to release Milan Babic of his duties as president of the Republic and not to give a vote of confidence to the entire government of Krajina, and this took place when the government of Krajina refused to adopt Vance's plan. Isn't that right?

A. The first Assembly to discuss this issue, the government positions with respect to Vance's plan was held on the 8th of December, 1991. It was the Assembly of the SAO Krajina and in Glina, under the presidency chairmanship of Milan Paspalj, part of the assembly met, part of the Assembly of the RSK met on that occasion.

Q. All right. But as it says here, that the meeting was attended by 85 deputies of which 74 were in favour of the decision, 8 against, and 3 deputies refrained from voting. Is that correct or not?

A. There were different reports as to the number of deputies who attended and how the voting went.

Q. So it's not true what this -- what it says in this report; is that what you're saying?

A. There were different -- there was different information as well.

Q. Then it goes on to say that at 1855 hours, over Serb radio in Knin, because it says at 1830 hours the meeting was concluded, so 15 minutes later there was an announcement broadcast over the Serb radio station of Knin and a telephone conversation was conducted with Dr. Milan Babic, in which he states that the meeting in Glina was unlawful and that ¹³⁶²⁰ it was held on the basis of instructions received from Belgrade. Was that how it was?

A. Well, I heard that on the 9th of February, when Kostic, Hadzic were there, and it was proposed that Babic be replaced. And then Branko Kostic said, "Wait for us to leave."

Q. Well, I don't know what that means. I don't know what that means, that they should wait until they leave. I don't suppose they wanted to meddle in your internal affairs. That must be it. But anyway, tell me this: Is this part of the report in keeping with the facts? Because it states afterwards:

"Milan Babic endeavours at all costs to retain power in Krajina. When he saw that he would not gain the support of the Assembly, he took a summary decision to set up new municipalities in those villages in which he has loyal representatives. Especially evident is the fact that some large places in the RSK which, until the reorganisation of the municipalities in the 1960s, were municipal seats, headquarters of the UDBA, the internal -- the UDBA in Kistanje did not receive these municipalities, although most of those places have more inhabitants than there are in the newly established municipal communities. And to convene the Assembly, he relates to Article 87 of the Constitution of the RSK, by which the president has the right to convene an assembly." Was that how it was or not?

A. This is what happened, according to the best of my recollections: It was an assertion of what was called the pink zones, or rather, that was a way for areas which were not incorporated by the Vance Plan to be ¹³⁶²¹ represented in the political structures and for their stands and positions to be heard. So that was the basic political reason for which the municipalities were established in the area of Velika, Petrovo Polje, towards Drnis and at Skradin, and Vrhovine, et cetera. That's how they came into being. It is true that there were discussions about the formation, possible formation, once again, of the Udbina municipality. As far as I know, Babic did endeavour to remain in the realm of politics.

Q. All right. Very well. However, it further states here that cadres policy, which was waged according to the system of placing his loyal men in each of these seats, this is boom ranging back on him, and the best example of this is the example of Mile Paspalj, who, as president of the Assembly after Babic's replacement, and Velibor Matijasevic, came back from anonymity, because Babic thought that everybody would be the subject of his manipulations, but this proved to be incorrect. Is that right or not?

A. Mile Paspalj came to the post of the president of the Assembly of the SAO, being proposed by the regional board of the SDS for Banija and Kordun. Mile Paspalj was the president of the regional board of the Serbian Democratic Party for Banija and Kordun and it was from that post that he took up the position of the president of the assembly of SAO Krajina on the 21st of November 1991. And on the 2nd of February, 1992, with Budimir Kosutic - that was my information anyway - he was under the influence, or rather, my information informed me that he went to Milosevic to change the -- his opinions of the Vance Plan. Because on the 31st of January, at an expanded session of the meeting, and on the 1st of ¹³⁶²² February, he advocated the opinion of the government and of the Assembly of the SAO Krajina, and then on the 2nd of February he changed his opinion. And my information was that this was under the influence of Budimir Kosutic, and my information was that he had a secret meeting with Milosevic to discuss the issue.

Q. And is what it says further on in the report correct. It says: "Milan Martic, through his actions, showed that he remained loyal to the principles with which he set out at the beginning of the Knin events in August 1990, in the interests of the people that he wanted to see the Blue Helmets arrive as soon as possible and for peace to be restored. Therefore, Martic supported the urgent arrival of the United Nations mission and the deployment of the Blue Helmets, or rather, the creation of conditions to bring peace back to the area." Is that correct or not? Please give me a yes or no answer.

A. Milan Martic supported the policies of Slobodan Milosevic.

Q. All right. He supported the policy of having the Vance Plan accepted and the Blue Helmets arrive and peace be established. That's right, isn't it?

Now tell me this: Is it true --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer the question.

A. Martic, in December, or rather, January, the beginning of January, Martic was opposed to the application of the unconditional implementation of Vance's plan, and he advocated the positions of the government of the SAO and the Republic of Srpska Krajina for the plan to be modified. Later on he too accepted as Slobodan Milosevic's endeavours to apply the plan in ^{13623 BLANK PAGE 13624} Krajina unconditionally as Slobodan Milosevic had agreed to in the first place.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. And do you remember your own statement, what you said on the 18th of January, 1992 for Finnish television?

JUDGE MAY: Let's go into private session.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My question to you is as follows: Is it true, as we're in private session - that you endeavoured that by refusing Vance's plan to represent yourself as a victim of some kind, a victim of the regime, and that you believed that you would be able to mobilise popular opinion in Serbia to your own ends, with the assistance of various opposition parties and thereby to destabilise the victims in that position and the relationship towards the problems of Krajina on the part of the authorities in Belgrade? Is that so or not?

A. That I was a victim of your dictatorship, that is correct. However, in that context, the context you're talking about, linked to Vance's plan, the priority was security, the security and the future of the people living in Krajina.

Q. All right. You wrote that famous letter that does not speak about security but speaks about all kinds of political -- very serious political qualifications, criticising me for the fact that I advocated the adoption of the Vance Plan, and I think that you remember that very well. So the ¹³⁶²⁵ weight of that letter did not lie in its security aspect and component but in its political sense; isn't that right?

A. The letter was designed to emphasise our positions, first and foremost, with respect to the engagement and involvement of the UN forces. That was our priority.

Q. All right. I don't want to quote your own letter back to you again. But take a look at it. You said that Boro Rasuo in fact wrote the letter for you, or rather, a draft --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have the letter. My recollection is 92, but I could be wrong about that.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It should be 79, tab 79 of the --

JUDGE MAY: Tab 79. Yes. Let the witness have it.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may be of assistance. They are newspaper articles, and in tab 9 of the letters, or rather, tab 80 contains the letters. And these are excerpts from newspaper articles in which those letters were published, whereas tab 80 contains both these two letters.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let him have 80 too. The point that was made to you, Mr. Witness, was that the letter - and we're looking at tab 80 - that you wrote did not contain an emphasis on security. Perhaps you'd like to comment on that.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In paragraph 3 of this letter that I signed says:

"I want to use this imposed opportunity merely to clarify of use to you and the world public and at the same time disprove your arbitrary ¹³⁶²⁶ allegation that I am against peace, that I am in favour of war, and that my position stems from my alleged love of power and desire for political prestige."

And then I go on to elaborate on the version of the Cyrus plan, Cyrus Vance Plan.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Perhaps you can help us: Where do you deal with the question of security there?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There's reference to the term of six months, and we ask that this period be extended. That is at the end of the fourth paragraph. For any continuation of the use after six months, a new decision by the Security Council is necessary, together, of course, with the approval of the all parties in the conflict. In this specific case, this also includes Croatia.

So that is an expression of our fear that after six months the mandate of the peace forces would not be extended, and as a result our security would be called into question.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is there any other reference to the security aspect on this five-page letter?

A. I go on to explain our positions regarding the confrontation lines, then again about the duration of the UN mandate, then also the possibility, if security were to be in jeopardy and the JNA would get involved, that that would be qualified as aggression.

Q. I'm afraid you won't find it. You can read it again, you can read ¹³⁶²⁷ the whole text once again. This letter was intended to discredit the authorities in Belgrade, or rather, me personally. And you were conducting a major campaign. Let me take you back to this interview with the Finnish television. Gentlemen, in English, it is RO 30-4565. It is dated the 18th of January, Belgrade. "Dr. Milan Babic, president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina [In English] having had a meeting with Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, explaining Babic said that the letter has frozen his relations with us because he thinks that we have a duty to carry out resolutions that he adopts and imposes. Babic added that he did not seek contacts with Milosevic and that he expects Milosevic to apologise for the way he treated me, as a Serb and as a president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. It is up to him to respond first." [Interpretation] Let me leave out some parts. "He also voices his suspicion that the Serbian president has entered [In English] some agreements that are not in our favour." [Interpretation] Into some agreements that are not in our favour. [English] "Slobodan Milosevic appropriated the right to make decisions on behalf of the Serbs from Krajina and to sign agreement to their detriment. We therefore must state clearly that he had no such right," Babic specified. [Interpretation] I assume that you know that I had emphasised --

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it's not an exhibit yet. It's a document presented as a Rule 68 material.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. ¹³⁶²⁸

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are you aware that Cyrus Vance insisted that Serbia agree with this plan and that he did not believe that Serbia was deciding on your behalf but was agreeing in its own name with this plan of his and was putting its political influence behind it, the influence that it had over the citizens of the Republic of Serbian Krajina for the plan to be adopted? Were you aware of that or not?

JUDGE MAY: Before you respond, that -- since the interview was put to you, you can comment on that, if you disagree with anything that has been attributed to you. So perhaps you'd like to deal with that first, and then you can deal with the point which is made about Serbia having to agree. So is there anything you'd like to say about the interview, or do you agree that that's what you said?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A number of assertions were made. I gave a number of interviews, and as far as I can recollect, this could be and is in harmony with what I was saying in those days.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Just a moment. Let the witness deal with the next point which you made about Cyrus Vance's insistence that Serbia agree. Now, you were asked whether you were aware of that or not.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We knew that Milosevic, Tudjman, and Kadijevic had adopted the plan and that we were being forced by Milosevic to accept the plan in the version in which they had accepted it. I remember that about a month or a month and a half of discussions over the plan, Mr. Cyrus Vance declared in New York, over the media, that Babic was Milosevic's problem, which meant that Milosevic should deal with the ¹³⁶²⁹ problem with Babic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As to that statement, that Babic is Milosevic's problem, I think Cyrus Vance was right. Babic was a problem for all the people of Republic of Srpska Krajina and for Serbia, and that by his extremism, he caused a lot of trouble. I assume you will not deny that.

A. Babic came to the official posts he held by legal means. At the elections, he was elected to those positions, and he performed a public office on the basis of a legal procedure whereby he had been appointed to it. So he enjoyed public support.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish, since what is being put is a serious allegation. What's said is that the witness was a problem for all the people of the Republic of Serb Krajina and for Serbia, by his extremism, caused a lot of trouble.

Now, Witness, what is your answer to that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I think that I was not an extremist but was simply performing my public duties, which implied reflecting public opinion and expressing that public opinion on which my political office depended. I took over that office through the election procedure, after legal elections. As regards my positions regarding the Vance Plan, I won the support of the government and the Assembly of SAO Krajina, and a part of the Assembly of the Republic of Srpska Krajina, and after a three-day session in Belgrade, I was also given the support of the citizens of Knin, 10.000 inhabitants of Knin, who supported my decisions. On the 3rd of February, 1992, there were 5.000 people. I wanted to check ^{13630 BLANK PAGE 13631} out the positions I advocated through the referendum for the public to say whether they agreed with those positions or not. The referendum was not carried out because it was prevented by people over which Milosevic had influence in Krajina. At the elections in 1993, as a presidential candidate, in the first round, according to all reports, or rather, the results of the first round, I got over half of the votes, more than all the other candidates put together. And then the elections were repeated several times. They were delayed unlawfully, so that Milan Martic, Milosevic's favourite, could win the elections.

I believe that I did get support of the public opinion and the voters in Krajina for my positions, and I do not think that these were extremist positions. But from -- in retrospect, I think it was ethnoegoistic and that is why I look upon the period differently today, and with my present-day wisdom and from this distance, I would certainly not advocate the policy that you drew us into and that is a policy of national divisions, separatism, rifts, and interethnic conflicts.

Q. Yes. I drew you all into that during my holidays in Kupari, when all this was going on; is that right?

JUDGE MAY: I don't think we're going to get much further with an exchange of that sort. No need to reply.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Your next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Was it clear to you that, apart from the fact that Serbia had to accept and support the Vance Plan, that the Vance Plan could not possibly be implemented without your agreement? Isn't that right? Were you aware ¹³⁶³² of that, that it couldn't be implemented and that it would not be approved by the Security Council unless you also gave your approval?

A. That is why we made our objections. We were the party that was invited to state our views on the plan, and that is why we voiced our objections and took part in the discussions with the international mediators, and there were chances of the plan being partially modified, and it was partially modified, because we were asked to state our views about it.

Q. Very well. Can we then make it clear and agree that that plan could not be implemented without your approval and that your allegation that I had usurped the right to decide on your behalf is simply not right?

A. I could not decide on your behalf. I could only decide to support the plan and to use my political influence towards you for you to support it as well. You decided in your own name, because you were a party to the conflict. You held the army in territory that should have been demilitarised, and that, I think, was the main reason. And the second was that you wanted to force us to agree with it too.

Q. Mr. MILAN BABIC, Serbia was in the a party to the conflict in Croatia. Croatia was in conflict with the JNA and not with Serbia. Serbia was never a party to the conflict in Croatia. But we'll come to that a little later.

So have we cleared up this point, that it was up to you and that you were fully aware at the time too that you had to decide about it, and that it was only our political influence that suggested you accept that ¹³⁶³³ plan? Is that right?

A. Yes. We had to also state our positions about it, us as well. That is why we were invited. But you were the one who agreed with it at the very outset.

Q. I'm not denying that I supported the Vance Plan and that I did everything I could to bring my influence to bear over you for you to accept it too. I'm not denying that. But as you yourself said that you took part in all this, look at this interview of yours, another one, that was as you were waging a full-fledged campaign at the time. So this is RO 304566, Belgrade, the 20th of January. The heading is: "The UN mission is condemned to failure." "'Without our consent,' [In English] says Milan Babic, president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, [Interpretation] in an interview published in today's edition of Borba. Borba was a leading federal newspaper in Yugoslavia in those days. 'It is certain that the UN Security Council and, above all, the Secretary-General will not set a precedent by sending in his forces to our territory and disarming the armed forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina without obtaining our consent,' Babic says."

So, you see, it was clear to you that without your approval, this could not be. And surely that is why the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and not any people from Belgrade, decided, as it says in this report and as it has been recorded everywhere, that it decided, on the 16th of February, to accept the Vance Plan, and that the acceptance of that plan was carried out by the competent organ in the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Is that right or not? ¹³⁶³⁴

A. After your campaign and pressure, yes.

Q. But my campaign was a political one?

JUDGE MAY: The witness must have a chance to deal with these matters. If you're going to put interviews to him, he should have a chance to deal with them and then deal with any subsidiary questions. You heard what it's alleged was said in the interview. Do you accept that that's correct or not? That's the first question.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I personally was aware that we too had been invited to give our approval to the plan, namely, as the Presidency, the Rump Presidency of SFRY and Slobodan Milosevic were competent, or rather, the command of the armed formations in Krajina were under the command of the JNA, and through those forces they were also in command of the Territorial Defence, and through that they had control over the police in Krajina as well. So the point was that should the JNA withdraw from Krajina, the armed Territorial Defence would remain, and Milosevic would no longer have a command position through the JNA, via the JNA.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I really don't understand what that has to do, these nebulous explanations, which mean nothing, what that has to do with what I've just quoted. So please, let's be more specific. What does it go on to say in this interview.

[In English] "We find the concept of involving UN peace forces unacceptable, according to which the territory of Krajina and Eastern and Western Slavonia are to be under UN protection as Croatian areas. The way ¹³⁶³⁵ Tudjman, Kadijevic, and Milosevic arrived at an agreement amounts to imposing a certain political solution that resembles or is identical to The Hague conference proposal about our special status within Croatia, Babic added."

[Interpretation] Therefore, you were shooting from all weapons. I'm now speaking figuratively, referring to your politics. It was against the interests of Krajina. And here you explain indirectly why you rejected the special status that was offered you at the international conference and why you were waging a campaign in Knin against the authorities in Serbia, headed by me, saying that we were pushing you into this special status. Is that so or not?

A. There are two things here. The first thing is that the essence of the plan was to demilitarise the area, and it was treated as different districts within Croatia. Secondly, the Croatian government and President Tudjman had already announced that with the arrival of the UN force they would establish their authority and had already appointed commissioners for each area in Krajina. So this was in this context that I gave these statements. The consequence of these statements was that the General Secretary of the United Nations acknowledged my objections and remarks, and in his reports that was adopted by the Security Council said that Croatian law would not apply in these territories, but rather, the legislation currently in force would continue.

Q. Those who were drafting this plan were well aware that it was not adopted as it was agreed. But answer this: You personally were given the explanation that the term is defined according to the usual rules of the ¹³⁶³⁶ Security Council, to be extended as required until the issue is resolved. So the term for which the UN forces are deployed, as I explained to you a number of times, believing, of course, the words of Cyrus Vance, who spoke the truth, that it would be extended as long as necessary.

A. There are two things here again. First, in the initial stage, in initial negotiations it was agreed that it would be six months, a term to be extended. However, we expressed our misgivings, saying that it's a short term, and eventually UN forces were deployed for an initial period of one year.

Second, when references began to be made, when talks began about the Vance Plan, the international community had not recognised Croatia by that time. In the month of January, already a great number of countries, and on the 15th of January, all countries of Europe, and after that the United States, recognised Croatia as an independent state, and our fear that Croatia, as a future member of the United Nations, could obstruct the extension of the UN force mandate before the political solution for this area is found.

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt for a moment. Mr. Milosevic, you referred to two documents: One the interview with Finnish television on the 18th of January; second, the interview with Borba on the 20th of January. Do you want those documents exhibited?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, certainly.

JUDGE MAY: Let us do that now. There are translations available, and perhaps the registry would give them numbers, please. Separate numbers, I think. Just a moment. ^{13637 BLANK PAGE 13638}

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the time being --

JUDGE MAY: Just wait for that to be done.

THE REGISTRAR: The document dated January 18th will be D60, and the document dated January 20th will be D61.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the time being, I'm using only the papers that I have received from you. Generally speaking, those interviews and verbal attacks were showered on me, in all the press, in all the media. But let us see what it says in this interview a little down below. [In English] Latest development in relations between the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Serbia, Babic pointed out the fact that there is dissatisfaction and disappointment among a large number of people who think that the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Serbian people have been abandoned by Serbia and the Serbian people in Serbia. It seems to me that the Serbian people's sentiments in Serbia do not correspond with Slobodan Milosevic's letter, Babic said."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Thus, you were trying, in a way, to turn the public opinion, on the basis of people's feeling of solidarity, to manipulate public opinion in order to destabilise authorities in Serbia; isn't that so?

A. Well, it is a fact that you were turning your back on us. It is a fact - at least I saw it that way - that until then, you had been doing everything to keep everything under control, to wage the war, to keep us within Yugoslavia. You stirred up hatred between the Serb and the Croatian peoples. And then you were trying to pull out of this and ¹³⁶³⁹ abandon us. As for the political discussions and the vocabulary used, they were as they were.

Q. So it was not disputable that I insisted that you go to Paris and other places to negotiate for peace. It wasn't disputed that I suggested you accept the decisions of The Hague conference. It was not disputed that I ultimately succeeded in getting the Assembly of Krajina to accept the Vance Plan. And still, I am the one who instigated you and stirred up hatred between Serbs and Croats, I, from Belgrade.

A. You waged the war and you created this hatred.

Q. We'll get to those facts some time later. Tell me this, coming back to the Finnish interview, where you say: "Deceiving the public [In English] there are no disagreements in the government of Krajina, and while answering the question of the support for Milosevic in Krajina, he said that it was negligible..." [Interpretation] Thus, you were trying to persuade the public that you will by all means succeed in rejecting the peace plan. These are only two interviews that you gave at that time. And you keep on asserting that the letter was written by Rasuo, did Rasuo also write these interviews and statements for TV and the press?

A. No.

Q. And how do they differ from this letter which, when you were quoting it some time ago, taking out only one neutral passage, you said: "I wrote it myself." Why are you trying to put a distance between you and the letter, to disassociate yourself from it?

A. I'm not trying to disassociate myself from it. ¹³⁶⁴⁰

Q. Well, then, I don't know if it is still necessary to continue in private session.

JUDGE MAY: We'll go into open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, from these events, let us come back to Jovan Raskovic, president of the SDS and founder of the Serb Democratic Party. I suppose you are not going to dispute that Professor Raskovic was a well-known, renowned psychiatrist; isn't that so?

A. He was. He was a well-known doctor, academician.

Q. And even his research and work as psychiatrist elevated him to the position of member of the academy of sciences, and he was one of the most renowned psychiatrists in our country, well known throughout the world; isn't that so?

A. What's your question?

Q. Well, is it disputed that Professor Jovan Raskovic, in addition to being an honourable man who was trying to resolve everything by peaceful means, was a very well-known, very competent, and very famous psychiatrist?

A. As far as I know, he was well respected as a doctor and academician.

Q. Precisely. And is it true that on several occasions he emphasised having noticed in you a schizophrenic, narcissistic tendency? Is that correct or not? ¹³⁶⁴¹

JUDGE MAY: This is not a proper question, any way, shape, or form. It's merely a comment, and sounds like a pretty cheap one at that. Yes. Next question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is a very appropriate question, in the light of the issues we have been discussing in private session, because only a personality characterised by these features --

JUDGE MAY: No. You're not a psychiatrist. You're supposed to be asking questions. I doubt whether that's -- you could call evidence about it. I doubt it very much, and it's not a proper question, from you or probably anybody else. And as I say, it sounds more like a cheap jibe. Now, you ask some proper questions of the witness, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then, let me be more specific.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you think that these characteristics of yours have some influence --

JUDGE MAY: That is not a proper question. I've just ruled on it. Now, move on to something else.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I suppose that you will not allow this. Could we perhaps in this connection just hear a comment from that intercept? I will remind you, because I don't want to look for it now in this heap, the one where the witness is not going to a meeting, a very important meeting for the interests of the people he was representing, only because --

JUDGE MAY: Private session. ¹³⁶⁴²

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So he's refusing to go abroad to attend a meeting because he is not being treated with enough respect as head of the government, president of the Republic, or whatever he was at the time, and that it is not only a display of vanity, but a complete lack of responsibility towards the people he was representing, because this was a peace conference. And you had been quoting this intercept.

A. What's the question?

Q. Well, the question is whether this was a matter of prestige and treatment that was more important to you than the need for peace negotiations, that it was a matter of prestige and whether you would be treated with the proper respect for head of government or head of state. That was more important to you than the need to make peace?

JUDGE MAY: Before you answer, we'll get a reference for this.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. It's tab 15 of the intercept binder.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes, if you'd like to answer that.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The situation was as follows: My political stance was that the SAO Krajina should be represented on an equal footing as a party involved in the peace conference, and not participate just in the committee for national minorities. So it was not about personal prestige. ¹³⁶⁴³

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Is this claim made by people who then occupied leading positions correct? After the conference in The Hague, he convened a session of the government of Krajina, and most of the people were leaders from Knin. So you convened a session of the government in Krajina, you were furious with me, and you told them, your colleagues in the government of Krajina, that I was forcing you to accept the special status. You told them that all I wanted was to get rid of you and to leave you in Croatia, which you would never accept. Is this claim of your colleagues and members of the leadership and government of Krajina at that time correct? Was it indeed the case?

A. Well, you had two different approaches to me and to the representation of our political position at The Hague conference. One was displayed on the 20th of October, when you were forcing us to accept The Hague documents, and later your position changed; it was a bit different. Those four items that you proposed did not fit in well with The Hague documents, the ones that were envisaged for discussion for my third meeting with Wijnaendts. I don't know which one you are referring to now.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've got past the time for a break, so we should adjourn. You can return to this afterwards. We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

THE REGISTRAR: We're resuming in private session, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. ¹³⁶⁴⁴

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. To avoid confusion, the two points around Carrington's plan, the second was my public speech at The Hague conference, when I stood up in opposition to the attempt to have Yugoslavia, and that's what I said on the occasion, be abolished with a stroke of the pen. So I was opposed to the abolition of Yugoslavia, and that has nothing to do with what I've just asked you, which relates to the question of Krajina and special status for it.

So your associates say that he was angry at me, furious at me, that I was forcing him to accept this special status and that I said that I just wanted to get rid of you and to leave you in Croatia, which would never be accepted; is that how it was?

A. Up until the 20th of October, you prevailed upon us to accept special status, according to documents of The Hague conference, as stipulated there, and on the 23rd of October, you told me that we should accept special status on Yugoslav soil.

Q. That's not correct. But never mind. Let's continue with what I was saying.

Your associates at that time, the people around you, said we know that none of us commented on that because we had respect towards me and considered that that was probably a good thing when it came to special status. Therefore, that Babic, on his own, in the name of that government, made the decision to reject the special status. Is that how it was or not?

A. No, that's not how it was. I always consulted the government, or ^{13645 BLANK PAGE 13646} rather, I presented my views to it. And what happened was that I did not reject the special status but it was always noted that we would continue negotiations on that issue.

Q. All right. I'm asking you now about what people claimed, and they're ready to testify here to that effect, and they say the following: "On his own initiative, on behalf of the government, that never met, he proclaimed himself member of the Territorial Defence of the SAO Krajina and Milan Martic, without his knowledge, appointed him deputy commander."

Is that correct or not?

A. No.

Q. Well, we have here a decision signed by you appointing Milan Martic deputy commander of the Territorial Defence.

A. That was on the basis of authorisation from the Prime Minister, pursuant to the law on National Defence of the Republic of Serbia which the government of SAO Krajina, on the 1st of August, 1991, made a decision to apply as a law which was in force on the territory of the SAO Krajina, and of course he agreed with that, with that appointment, I mean.

Q. And is it true that in the autumn of 1991 you forced the command of the TO for Lika, Colonel Pero Trbojevic, to effect mobilisation over night in the Gradacac municipality and Donji Lapac municipality, in the Municipal Assemblies there, and to expel all the Croats, armed and unarmed, from Gracac, towards Gospic, or rather, Medak. Is that true or not?

A. No. I've already spoken about that. I said and explained how ¹³⁶⁴⁷ Colonel Trbojevic arrived -- went to Colonel Vukovic and asked him to assist mobilisation of the 1st Light Brigade or the 1st Territorial TO Brigade, as it was referred to. So what is true is that I launched an appeal for people to respond to mobilisation for that particular brigade.

Q. Well, they say differently. They say that the JNA's intention was to free the Sveti Rok warehouse at Medak, which was a military facility, a military storehouse near Medak, but that the plan almost fell through because of your -- the fact that you were in a hurry, you personally, because people moved towards Gospic who were not trained properly. And what happened was that the Croatian policemen fled and then you yourself, together with your volunteers, most of them criminals, set fire to those villagers and Lovrinac was the largest of them. Is that what happened, and that's how you took Sveti Rok too?

A. No.

Q. And you ascribed this as being a success of yours. Is that right or not?

A. No.

Q. Very well. And is the following correct, what was also claimed: That in order to play up to the Chetnik organisation in Chicago and the Vojvoda Chetnik leader Momcilo Djujic, whom you expected to get money from in 1991, you played up to them and you personally brought in a law to ban the work of the Communist Party.

A. On the 7th of January, 1992, a decree was passed which I myself signed in the capacity of President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, to ban communist parties, organisations, movements, on the territory of ¹³⁶⁴⁸ Srpska Krajina, not in order to play up to Momcilo Djujic, but because this was a political assessment. We thought this was a way to distance ourselves from you and your policies.

Q. All right. So you did distance yourself from Serbia all the time and did what you did. So this is in contradiction, considerable contradiction with what happened to your distancing from the Republic of Serbia and for what you claim happened following orders and instructions from Serbia. However, now you said it wasn't a law but a decree.

A. Yes, it was a decree that was passed --

Q. That's right. That's right. You're quite right. I have here, pursuant to Article 78, "the President of the RSK enacts a law to ban the work," et cetera, et cetera, "and functioning of all communist parties, organisations and meetings on the territory." And then it goes on to say: "Their work is banned and political activities banned, and Article 2 of the law comes into force immediately." So that has only two articles. So you personally passed a law and you even took over powers of legislation.

A. On the basis of a general article of the Constitution of the RSK, it was interpreted by experts that by following this article and by relying on that article, invoking it - it was of a political nature - we could pass such a decree. It had no legal form. It was, rather, a political one.

Q. All right. And is it true that in order to rid yourself of Jovo Raskovic, you proclaimed professor Raskovic to be a traitor who collaborating with Tudjman for the sole purpose -- only because he ¹³⁶⁴⁹ negotiated and talked with Tudjman about a peaceful solution, just for that?

A. No. While Professor Raskovic was negotiating with Tudjman, I was on very good terms with him, and I said that a faction did indeed exist which was opposed to this, and entered into polemics with Professor Raskovic. The first polemics I had with Professor Raskovic was around the 17th of February, 1991, with respect to the way in which the Serbian Democratic Party was being organised, or rather, this was a polemics to do with changes in the statute of the SDS and with respect to the constitution of regional boards. Up until that time, I don't recall having any public polemics with him.

Q. All right. So you say you didn't lead a campaign, wage a campaign, of compromising Professor Raskovic for the meetings he had with President Tudjman; is that what you're saying?

A. There were people who made statements with respect to that. I did not.

Q. All right. Why, then, for what happened in Dubica are you accusing Milan Martic, are you holding him responsible for the Dubica events, when you know full well that the perpetrators were criminals from the SDS, as it says here in the claims made by your then associates?

A. Well, I don't know who carried that out. I said what I knew about the matter.

Q. And do you know that at that time Milan Martic did not even take -- had not taken control of those areas yet and that your main man, the principal man for Dubica in the SDS at that time was Kostar [phoen], ¹³⁶⁵⁰ Mile Misljenovic, Kostar. Is that right or not. He was a postman, Mile Misljenovic, the postman?

A. What event are you referring to?

Q. About the events in Dubica.

A. I said exactly what I knew about those events.

Q. Well, I wouldn't say so, judging by what they claim here. And is it true that before the conflict in Kijevo near Knin you exerted pressure constantly on the command of the corps, that is to say General Spiro Ninkovic, Ratko Mladic, and that it was your village, your native village of Kukor at Vrljika that was blocked and that an attack had to be launched in order to free that area? Is that correct or not?

A. I talked to you about that.

Q. Do you know -- when I asked why that attack -- that they told me, their answer was to me that they had to liberate Kumrovec.

A. When I spoke about the events around Vrljika and Kutusa [phoen]. You said: "Hasn't that been settled already?" And I learnt later on on that particular morning there was indeed an attack on Kijevo.

Q. So you're saying that you learnt what happened, although you were actually there?

A. I was with you on the 26th, one day before, rather, on the very day the attack took place. I arrived in the evening of the previous day. I arrived in Belgrade. I was told to go and see you, and I went to your offices on two occasions and we talked about Frenki, Spiro Nikolic, and about the problems related to Vrljika, and then I left. And you commented on that, and you said, "Hasn't that been settled already?" Just as what ¹³⁶⁵¹ you said about Frenki, that he should be in Krajina because he's a good man. And you asked about Spiro Nikolic, what kind of commander he was, and I said, "Well, his conduct is proper." I had nothing for or against him. So that was on that particular day, when the JNA, with all its units under its command, attacked Kijevo.

Q. And is it true that in that attack on Kijevo, there were no fatalities?

A. I don't know exactly. I don't know the number the people who were killed or wounded or anything like that.

Q. Well, it says here that there were no casualties at Kijevo and the Croatian police had previously killed a young man from the village of Polace, whose name was Vaso Pecer, several days before the attack?

A. Vaso Pecer died around the 2nd of May, 1991, in some incidents that took place there and which were caused by a DB group and police from Golubic, which means at the random shooting at Kijevo, in May 1991, and the JNA attacked Kijevo on the 26th of August, 1991.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, is it possible -- may I read out, in an open session, a denial which was sent in by Marko Dobrijevic, secretary of the Serbian Democratic Party and director of the communal enterprise in Knin during the war and a deputy of the last Assembly, when it convened, the Assembly of Serbian Krajina, which he signed. The denial is signed by him, and underneath he says that he agrees that this statement be made public here in the trial against me. He makes mention of MILAN BABIC. He doesn't mention his name anywhere in text. But I should nonetheless like to ask, and I do believe that it is your ^{13652 BLANK PAGE 13653} wish too, that the proceedings here are public. So I would like to read this out in public, in open session, if I may, so that we may comment.

JUDGE MAY: You can put to the witness what has been given to you in that statement. You can't exhibit it, for the reasons you know about. You must let the witness have the opportunity to respond to the various allegations that are made, no doubt, in it. As for whether it should be in open session, provided it doesn't identify the witness, then it can be in open session. But if at any stage it does, then we must go into private session to do it. But you can begin in open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I have here a statement with respect to the testimony of witness MILAN BABIC, and the statement was sent by Marko Dobrijevic, secretary of the SDS and director of the communal enterprise in Knin during the war and a deputy of the last Assembly of Serbian Krajina. And along with his acquiescence, he has signed the document with his name and surname. He signed it in full and he would like me to make it public. It says here as follows --

JUDGE MAY: Listen, whatever he wants, whether he wants it made public or not, it doesn't matter. All that's relevant is that you can put to the witness something which you say contradicts him. Now, it's his evidence which matters, not what's in the document. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. May, I think that it is in the interests of the truth that this statement be read out, and the ¹³⁶⁵⁴ witness will answer my questions once I have read out the statement, with your permission.

JUDGE MAY: No. You're not going to read the statement out, because it's not evidence. But what you can put is sections of the statement to the witness for his comment. He must be allowed to comment as you go through. You can't simply read the statement out as though it was evidence. Yes. Now, put what's in the statement to the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, in the statement, it states that everything that the witness did was wrong and that now in The Hague he is accusing others. He claims that he never even met some individuals and that he's either putting them in one bag of tricks that existed only in his mind. And this is what he mentions. You mentioned Jovica Stanisic, for whom you've heard only on television. Do you know that Jovica Stanisic has married, from Javrsak, near Knin, and that he's with his in-laws, or he went to visit his in-laws before the war and during the war. Is that so or not?

A. I saw Jovica Stanisic on many occasions, at your office for the first time, in 1990; in January 1991 as well; I also saw him in your offices in March 1991; I saw him in his own office in March 1991, and February too; and I think I saw him on quite a number of other occasions as well. And I said that here in Court, that Jovica Stanisic is married to a woman from Javrsak, he told me that in the Seher restaurant in August 1991 when he introduced me to his wife and when he said that Captain Dragan owed them some money which they had paid out for some DB services, and he went off with that money. ¹³⁶⁵⁵

Q. So he came to his in-laws, to visit them before the war and during the war; is that right or not?

A. I don't know that.

Q. And it says here in your sick imagination, everyone who came from Serbia came there because they were sent by the DB of Serbia.

JUDGE MAY: That's simply an allegation. You needn't bother to answer that.

Yes. Next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. He says as follows: All the structures, Mr. MILAN BABIC, all the structures that you call parallel structures were created precisely by you: The staff in Golubic was created by you. Without anyone's knowledge, on your own initiative you proclaimed a state of war on the 17th of August, 1990. Is that true or not?

A. The staff in Golubic, which functioned for a certain period of time at the end of August until the beginning of September, in 1990? Golubic was formed at a session of the Serbian Democratic Party chaired by Dr. Jovan Raskovic on the 18th of August, 1991. That session was held in Padjene, and the initiator for forming that staff was Maruo Dobrijevic, Jovan Opacic, Dusan Zelenbaba, Branko Peric, and Milan Martic. The state of war was proclaimed in Knin in 1990, in August 1990, as I have already testified here in this court.

Q. Very well. Is it true what he says, that you were seriously criticised by the Federation to conceal your responsibility, you shifted the blame on Snezana Stamatovic, a journalist in Radio Knin? Is that ¹³⁶⁵⁶ true?

A. No, I didn't mention that lady.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we are going now in a lot of details and I think we should be in private session for all these details.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think there's no need to go into private session.

JUDGE MAY: If we are going to approach anything which may identify the witness, we should go into private session. But we'll go on for the moment in open session.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. He says that you were lying by accusing Serbia and the leadership of Serbia for the creation of parallel authorities in Krajina, whereas all the appointments were done personally by you and, unfortunately, arbitrarily. Is that so or not?

A. Regarding parallel structures in Krajina, what their function was and who did it, I've already testified about that here in this courtroom.

Q. As far as I was able to notice when I asked you to list at least a few names from Serbia, you managed to name four people, some of whom could not have been there because they were working in Belgrade.

JUDGE MAY: We've been over that. We've no need to go over it again.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

Q. The parts that may be identifying, we'll avoid reading, not to prompt the other party to ask for a closed session. So I'll refer to that later on in private session. ¹³⁶⁵⁷ He goes on to say here:

"You are claiming that Croats were expelled from Knin, and you know very well that those are lies. The truth is that those people who had responded to Tudjman's invitation to leave Krajina were leaving. My driver was Andrija Butkovic from Knin, who was employed in 1993 when the war was in full swing and he was a Croat. Bosiljka Curko, working in the public utility company in Knin, when she was leaving Knin, at Tudjman's invitation, I personally appealed to her to stay and said if she was afraid, her whole family could stay with my family. And she said that was not the point. 'Others are leaving, so I'm leaving too.' She bid farewell to everyone and brought me a bottle of whiskey and of course we embraced upon parting. Throughout the war, up to 1995, the main water tank was guarded by a Croat, Stipe Gambiroza. Also a Croat delivered food to the kindergarten in Knin throughout the war.

Is this true?

A. I have testified to the best of my knowledge about those events here in this Tribunal.

Q. Very well. At a competition for the best balcony in Knin, three awards were distributed, 300, 200, and 100.000. The first two prizes were won by Croatian women and a third by a Serbian woman. And all this was announced on Radio Knin. What kind of expulsion are you talking about? So I'm asking you the same question.

JUDGE MAY: Do you know anything about the best balcony competition?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember, Your Honour. ¹³⁶⁵⁸

JUDGE MAY: Was it right that there were some Croats who remained in Knin, or not?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, there were. I know them. There was my neighbour, Grandmother Kaja. Let me mention her. There were others too. I don't want to mention names. I spoke of the serious suffering of Croats in Kijevo, when the JNA attacked the village with artillery. I spoke about the terrible, awful expulsion of Croats from Vrpolje in 1993. I spoke about the fact that the Croats in Knin did not feel at ease in an atmosphere of interethnic and political conflict. And I also mentioned the events from April 1991.

JUDGE MAY: No need to go over those events again. It's just that question of whether some remained.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. That's very, very good, because the next quotation from this statement denies precisely what you are saying. He says: "If that had been so, would the Knin Croats, in 1996, that is, after Storm, would they have signed a petition calling on the Serbs to return to Knin? Unfortunately, Mr. Curko, who handed the petition to the Sabor in Zagreb was met and beaten up by HDZ members."

Is that true or not?

A. I don't know of the details, but I do know that many Croats from Knin were sorry that the Serbs had left Knin and that they did express their wish for them to return.

Q. Let me go on. In a location Rupe, in which, according to the ¹³⁶⁵⁹ witness, Croatian civilians were killed, everyone knows that these are fabrications. Those civilians who remained ate together with the army members, the JNA. There's a case of Ivan Tepic, from Rupe, who asked to join his family in Sibenik, which of course he was allowed to do, but after arriving in Sibenik, he said how the Serbs hadn't hurt him but, on the contrary, they had given him food which they themselves were short of, and he was killed by Croats in Sibenik.

I will not go on to read what relates to you in person.

A. But regarding this particular event, I was talking about the trial to the -- of the perpetrators of crimes, and I recall that there was a trial of a group from Zelenik, for an event that took place -- Drvenik, I'm sorry. I think the reason was that one of their men was killed somewhere around Rupe and that they took revenge for this over their neighbour Croats. They killed them, and that is why they were put on trial. So I referred to this in that context.

Q. Probably you mixed something up.

A. No. I'm not quite sure whether the crime evented near Rupe or in Drvenik, Ervenik, and then I corrected myself.

Q. So you don't even remember where your testifying about what happened.

A. I remember they committed a crime against their neighbours and that is why they were put on trial.

Q. He asked: "Why he is not testifying about the 10.000 missing civilians that were withdrawing from the Croatian army together with American instructors who were sowing death on innocent, old men and women, ^{13660 BLANK PAGE 13661} some of whom did not wish and some of whom could not leave their homes."

JUDGE MAY: That's not a question that the witness can deal with. That's a comment by whoever wrote the letter. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. "Dobrijevic says that the SDS was formed near a pit in Lika, where, during the Second World War the Ustasha criminals, with the help of Hitler, were building the statehood of Croatia based on crimes."

JUDGE MAY: Totally irrelevant. Yes, move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is that where the SDS was formed, Mr. MILAN BABIC?

A. On the 27th of January, 1990, Television Belgrade broadcast that Academician Raskovic had announced the formation of a Serb party in Croatia. Later on, from the participants in that meeting in Serb, I heard that there was a ritual performed over the pit, a religious ritual, at the pit Kuk, near Lapac, where the Ustashas in 1941, had killed and thrown the killed Serbs into that pit. A strange ritual took place to mark the beginning of the formation of the Serbian Democratic Party.

Q. Well, can you comment on what Dobrijevic says? "As regards a witness hidden by a screen, I would just ask him where all those fabrications come from. He's testifying about areas on which he never set foot."

JUDGE MAY: That is a worthless comment, completely worthless. Now, let's move on, and relevant questions. Your time is going, Mr. Milosevic. Unless you ask proper questions, it will come to an end. Yes. ¹³⁶⁶²

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In that case, I'll shorten this to a maximum degree. Dobrijevic says here, and there are many explanations here relevant to this witness -- he says: "I'm writing this on behalf of the slaughtered children of the Konevi [phoen] Bridge on behalf of those in Jasenovac --"

JUDGE MAY: No. These are totally improper questions. Whatever he thinks he's doing, it is of no relevance to this Trial Chamber. Now, if there's anything -- you can put anything which is relevant, which contradicts the witness's testimony. What you can't put is abuse from the writer of the letter. It doesn't matter at all.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is not someone. It is one of the closest associates. It is just not anyone, but one of the closest associates of this witness, who has carried out this about-turn, for the reasons that are well known.

JUDGE MAY: You can call the witness in due course. Meanwhile, all you can do is to put anything relevant to him which contradicts his evidence. But facts only, not abuse.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well. I think it is not abuse if we're establishing untruths. But as we're in open session, I will not go into any details that identify the witness.

Q. My next question, therefore, would be, on the basis of what we've been saying here over the past several days and partially on the basis of what I've just read to you, and also on the basis of the explanations you yourself gave to the investigators, it follows that you had one thing on your mind, you did another, and spoke a third, whereas in fact, as you ¹³⁶⁶³ yourself are saying, you advocated peace and life within Croatia. Now, tell me, please: Did you say to me, or anyone in Serbia, what your peaceful efforts were? Because neither I nor anyone else could undermine your peace-seeking efforts when, to this day, neither I nor anyone else in Serbia, and to tell you the truth, in Krajina too, knew nothing about your peace efforts. So tell me, please --

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Witness MILAN BABIC, that was a lengthy comment or question. Perhaps we'll hear -- what is the question, put shortly, please, Mr. Milosevic?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did you tell me, or anyone else in Serbia, or anyone in Krajina -- ever present an idea about any peace efforts of yours whatsoever?

A. The last one was on the 8th of August, 1995, the proposal, that is, my agreement with the Z-4 plan and the other elements of the conversation I had with Mr. Galbraith, and I asked for your support. Before that, I also spoke to you about the Z-4 plan. We also discussed with Borisav Jovic, in August 1990, questions of security and a political settlement for the crisis that was looming. And he supported our propositions on your behalf, because you were influencing him, and you told him to tell us that you would support our political struggle and that the JNA would protect that political struggle. You gave us instructions how to carry out the political referendum, on what legal basis. You said ¹³⁶⁶⁴ that a law was in preparation for the self-determination of nations, that that was a legal model, and this was a model that we supported. That was your model, and we supported that model, believing it to be a legal one that would bring peace to the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Q. Why are you involving the JNA, when there were no conflicts in 1990 and the role of the JNA in those days was not of current interest? Didn't you construe all that solely on the basis of the fact that you established that, by coincidence, there were several people on holiday at the same time? Isn't that evidence of your narcissism, if you're sending me a message for me to receive you and I tell you that someone in the SFRY Presidency should receive you, that you come to the conclusion that I have a military staff meeting to decide who would receive you; that whenever somebody announces that he wants to receive me, that I have to have a top-level conference to make a decision about it?

A. I'm not making any constructions; I'm just conveying what I know.

Q. Well, according to that knowledge, for instance, Hamdija Podzerac was on a holiday at the same time, who was then a member of the Presidency from Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Muslim. Maybe I consulted him too whether I should receive Milan Babic or whether somebody from the Presidency should receive him, and another 3.000 or so other people holidaying there. Who knows how many of them could have been consulted as to whether Milan Babic should be received.

A. I told you what I knew. We went to see you, not the others, not the other 3.000. You didn't come to see me. You went to see Jovic. Through Slobodan Bukatic [phoen], we contacted you. ¹³⁶⁶⁵

Q. We will have occasion to discuss that later. In this paper written by Dobrijevic, which I didn't want to read in open session, it says you personally amassed so many functions upon yourself that people called you "Little Tito," "Little Tito," alluding to our former president. I'm explaining in case you don't understand what it means in our language. And it says statistics experts from that time counted 32 positions that you held, the most important of them being president of the National Council, president of the Republic, head of government, president of the municipality, president of the Serb Democratic Party. Is it true that you held all these positions?

A. I already said in this courtroom about all the positions I held -- maybe not all. I don't know. At various times I held different posts. I was president of the municipality for about four years. I was president of the Municipal Board of the Serbian Democratic Party. I was president of the National Council from the 31st of July, 1990 until the 28th of February of 1991, approximately, when this council ceased to exist. I was president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina from 19 December 1991 until the 16th February 1992. Was there any other position that you asked me about?

Q. Well, judging by all I know, these positions were held by you in succession, not at the same time. If you were four years president of the municipality of Knin, you were also president of the SDS simultaneously.

A. I was president of the Municipal Assembly of Knin for the longest time, and this position coincided with various other functions for a while. I was head of government from the 29th May 1991 until 19th ¹³⁶⁶⁶ December 1991, when this position was held by --

THE INTERPRETER: Vice-president. He was acting in this position.

A. I was president of the Municipal Assembly of Knin and president of the Municipal Board of the Serbian Democratic Party for the longest time.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So head of government until end 1991, then you were president of the Republic, and then you became head of government again, president of the Serbian Democratic Party. A moment ago you were saying that you always followed legal procedure throughout your political career. Is it therefore indisputable that nobody appointed you to these positions from Serbia? Is that at least undisputed?

A. I was elected to my posts by citizens, public positions such as president of the municipality, president of the Executive Council, Prime Minister, president of the Republic. From this position, I was replaced through an intervention from Serbia. Then to my positions in the party I was elected by party organs. I was elected president of the National Council by the members of that council, headed by Jovan Raskovic, who was a member of that council.

THE INTERPRETER: Jovan Raskovic, president of that council.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So you were elected by the electorate, and my pressure only caused you to be replaced from some positions. Or pressure from Belgrade. As you wish. And the reason was your rejection of the peace plans.

A. You used my rejection of the Vance Plan, as you had adopted it, to replace me from that position and put Mihajlo Markovic instead, in 1991. ^{13667 BLANK PAGE 13668} He said he used the Vance Plan to get rid of Babic, and then he suddenly realised what he said.

Q. So the Vance Plan was rejected and the intervention of the UN force was required to replace Babic?

A. Markovic told me that about a year later. The conflict with you was used to replace me from my post.

Q. It was a matter of personal sympathy or antipathy, not any objective reasons, I suppose.

Tell me now, since you were not afraid, you were not in the least frightened by all these radical acts that your associates are talking about, and even in your statement to the investigators you say that you had become an ethnoegotist, that you were overcome by vanity, that you neglected the suffering of others. We have this on tape. Tell me now: How could I, or anyone else, have influenced a man like you, a man overcome by vanity, fear, self-love, desire to please - these are all things you said yourself - rather than striving to resolve the problems of the people you represented?

A. As for fear, I even said, in the beginning of March 1991, that Croats are threatening us, jeopardising us, and instilling fear. After the Spegelj affair, you frightened us with Ustashas, genocide, and you made me believe that self-determination of peoples after secession is a legal way out, a legal path. With your political position and the authority you held - and I believed you - convinced me that it is the right way to go. The right of peoples to self-determination is something I accepted from you, and thus entered this vicious circle, this condition ¹³⁶⁶⁹ of ethnocentrism, which I was unable to shed until 1995.

Q. Are you now questioning the right of peoples to self-determination?

A. At that time, Yugoslavia was made up of peoples who exercised their rights within republics as federal units of Yugoslavia and on the federal level in matters in which republics were supposed to agree on, such as the constitution of Yugoslavia. You explained, and you convinced us, that if somebody wishes to leave Yugoslavia, they have the right to. But administrative borders within Yugoslavia cannot be the borders defining this division. You said that the prevailing authoritative borders were the ones determined by referendums. Borisav Jovic explained that the smallest unit is a municipality, and he said that after a referendum on self-determination of people, the municipalities from a republic which opts for leaving Yugoslavia -- municipalities wishing to stay should remain within Yugoslavia. Borisav Jovic explained that it was your position. And it is precisely this option that led us to war and misfortune for all the peoples of Yugoslavia.

Q. So in your opinion, it was not the violent secession of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia that caused the war, it was the right of people to self-determination; is what you're claiming now? I have to ask you this.

A. The war was caused by your position.

JUDGE MAY: One at a time. Now, let the witness answer.

A. The war was caused by your way. You caused the war, because you wanted, by violent means, through the JNA and other armed formations that you controlled, to take over parts of the territory of other republics ¹³⁶⁷⁰ which you believed should remain within the new state that you were in the process of establishing. The rationale and explanation for this that you put forward was the right of peoples to self-determination. However, you did not respect this right. You waged war even on those territories which were not majority-Serb territories and where people had not declared themselves in favour of Yugoslavia.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I believe that these are questions of vital importance. They do not reveal the identity of the witness, and these things should, I believe, be heard in public session. All of these things that the witness is saying, in the opinion of the amici, are things that should be heard by the public.

JUDGE MAY: The danger is that some form of his identity may be revealed.

Mr. Milosevic, are you going to deal with matters now that will reveal the identity of the witness or can we go back into open session?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is the witness who opened the door to an issue which certainly requires a private session. He's putting things upside down here, and he's overestimating his intelligence and his knowledge, which again proves --

JUDGE MAY: Let us not go into it now. We'll remain in private session. Now, your next question, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You say that you feel repentance and shame for your part in all these events. You are saying things diametrically opposite to the things ¹³⁶⁷¹ that you were telling us when we were discussing issues of peace and war?

A. I repent for having become an ethnoegoistic, for accepting your thesis that people of the former Yugoslavia should separate. That kept me convinced for a long time that all that Serbs were doing for self-determination was right. But you yourself soiled even your own thesis. I repent forever accepting that policy, for embracing it, for having liked it. That's true. I am sorry that I was an egotist at the time. I'm sorry because I am now fully convinced that it was the primary cause for all the things that eventually happened, and especially the way in which you did it. It was horrible.

Q. All right. I think this particular question could be asked in public session as well. I'll ask it and leave it to your judgement. Since it is not disputed that you repent, you hold yourself out to be a person who always advocated and worked for peace, why didn't you return to Knin? Because authorities there would meet you with understanding, in view of all your peace efforts. You say that peace was always on your mind, although it was not on your lips.

A. You convinced us that it was necessary to wage war with Croatia. The Croat people suffered, and since they could not take their revenge on you, they would take their revenge on someone else, certainly.

Q. I believe this question could be asked in public session, Mr. May, couldn't it?

JUDGE MAY: Which one?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The one I just asked.

JUDGE MAY: No, I think not. Very well it revealed his identity. ¹³⁶⁷² It was a personal question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, then. Let us move back into open session and refrain from personal questions.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Could we note that you claim that the war in Yugoslavia was not caused by the violent secessions, first of Slovenia, then Croatia, and finally Bosnia and Herzegovina, not even the illegal secessions? It was caused, rather, by an interpretation of the right of peoples to self-determination?

A. As far as I can remember, the war, the armed conflict in Slovenia, began when the Republic of Slovenia assumed control over border crossings --

Q. Let us not talk about Slovenia. I'm just asking you: Was the war caused by the violent secessions of these republics or by the right of peoples to self-determination?

A. The war in Croatia was caused by you, by creating incidents, by involving the Yugoslav People's Army into the conflict, and by commanding the JNA against the Republic of Croatia and inflicting damage upon the Croatian people, as well as the Serbian people, whom you had pushed into war.

Q. This is not going to identify you. You said a moment ago that this happened because of the right of peoples to self-determination. Tell me: Have you read the constitutions of Yugoslavia that existed throughout ¹³⁶⁷³ Yugoslavia's existence? Do you know that it says that the peoples of Yugoslavia had united to create Yugoslavia using their rights to self-determination, peoples, not republics?

A. I believe that's what the constitution says.

Q. So what does it mean, then, to invoke the right of peoples to self-determination, a right that every people in Yugoslavia shares? Why does it mean that this right caused the war rather than the violent secession of other republics who didn't wish to stay?

A. Yugoslavia was made up of republics, as far as I understand, and I am not a lawyer competent or qualified to interpret the constitution. The constitution also said that peoples exercise their rights within republics, and on the Yugoslav federal level, they exercise it through republics.

Q. All right. Since you really aren't an expert in constitutional matters, I don't wish to abuse your lack of knowledge, your ignorance on that score. But you said that it was my thesis to separate the peoples. Anybody who has read any one of my speeches would have concluded right the reverse. I said that I considered that Yugoslavia was the best possible solution for all the Yugoslav peoples, in which they lived together, freely and on a footing of equality. And I advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia. Isn't that true, Mr. MILAN BABIC?

A. You strove for the fact that the Serbs from Croatia and the Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina should enjoy the right to remain within Yugoslavia, that is to say, in the kind of Yugoslavia that you were reorganising. That was your public stance. What you in fact did was that ¹³⁶⁷⁴ in the areas inhabited by the Serbs, not only where they were the majority but where they were the minority as well, you caused incidents to take place and then deployed the Yugoslav People's Army in order to retain those territories by force of violence within that state, sidestepping the decisions of the majority in the territories where they were living, and by creating incidents and waging a war, you fanned the flames and you incited Slovenia and Croatia to step down from the state of Yugoslavia and the state that you were creating. That is how I understood your conceptions of the matter.

Q. Well, others didn't understand it in this way. Now, what your understanding was under the circumstances in which you find yourself today, I'm not wondering about that now. But let's be a little more specific with respect to your accusations and the fabrications and the fact that dangers were conjured up to which the Serb people were exposed to in Croatia.

During your examination-in-chief here, you claimed, and I think that we even saw an excerpt played from the film, the tape, about Spegelj, this film of Spegelj was a fabrication. It was a forgery. And that the Federal Secretariat for National Defence played it. That was what was claimed, that it was played as a sort of propaganda device, in order to incite clashes and conflict. And that it was just propaganda, pure and simple. So please answer me this: Do you know what weapons, if it was indeed a forgery, what weapons were they using to shoot from at that same JNA in Croatia and at the Serbs in Croatia, and whether or not those soldiers and those compatriots of yours that were being killed from some ^{13675 BLANK PAGE 13676} sort of forged or falsified weapons as well that had been conjured up that you saw heard about in this falsified document and tape about Spegelj?

A. Well, I said with respect to the Spegelj tape two facts: First I had heard that Spegelj himself had denied certain statements and observations made in the film; and second, I said, and I can repeat that if you like, that the film itself caused a frightening effect on the Serb people, especially the Serb people in Croatia and in Knin itself, because it was in that film and via that tape that it was stated that the Croatian government, the Croatian authorities, would slaughter the Serbs in Knin, that it would kill the officers of the Yugoslav People's Army, their wives, and that this would be a general slaughterhouse. And this caused great reaction and hostility towards the Croatian government. And the Croatian government, or rather, its special police force, and especially its guard corps, used real weapons against the armed formations and units of the Yugoslav People's Army and all the other units which were under its control and command.

Q. So this was, then, a propaganda campaign, was it, to frighten the Serbs? Or was it a taster of -- by the Federal Ministry of Defence of what was to come, the dangers in store, the dangers that threatened, because of illegal arming and the threats that were being made and the wave of nationalism that was rampant in Croatia and the violent secessions? Is that what you're claiming? That's what you're saying, isn't it?

A. Information put out in this way resulted in the hostility of the Serb people towards the Croatian government. ¹³⁶⁷⁷

Q. All right. In view of the fact that the other side has pulled out of context just one segment, a brief segment of that film, it was a brief excerpt, which wasn't live, but we had a still photograph of it, and just heard the voice. I'm now going to play that same tape which the other side tendered as a piece of evidence. It is a brief excerpt, once again. But other parts of that same tape. And they don't last more than two minutes altogether. So may we have a look at that tape? Let's look at that forgery, then.

JUDGE MAY: When we have the exhibit number.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the Spegelj tape.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, tab 170 from Exhibit 352.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes, we'll have it played.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] That same night in which the previous conversations took place, eight [Indiscernible] trucks intended for the terrorist army of the HDZ on the 20th of October crossed our borders.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters apologise, but they do not have the transcript of this excerpt.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Here you have the illegal introduction of weapons from Hungary. Look at Spegelj live and see what he says here.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters apologise, but they're not able to follow.

"SPEAKER: ...throughout the territory of 5th Military District ¹³⁶⁷⁸ Solvenia, the whole of Croatia and part of Bosnia, we now have armed 800.000 with Kalashnikovs. Let only 10.000 of them get arms. The army has nothing to look for there. We cut down. I have a problem now to protect you, the two of you, not from the army but from others. Fuck you. Each officer is covered by five in Virovitica and they will be cut down at their own homes. I have to give a list. You'll get it tomorrow. I have to quickly state now that this will be Virovitica. There's no question of that. Nobody must leave the barracks alive, nobody. I know that we -- I must now quickly inform those lads in Virovitica who to spare, who not, absolutely not. No one is to be allowed to reach the barracks, no one. One of the two men I know, for example, we make those --"

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] These were brief excerpts. This is the original tape that was filmed as it was explained by the Military Intelligence Service of the day. Spegelj, without a doubt, is the man talking, and he was brought to trial in Zagreb later on. You saw in the first portion there was the illegal introduction of weapons from Hungary, with all the lists and records and documents necessary. And in one of your -- I don't want to identify the conversation you had, because we'll have to go back into private session once again, but you claimed that I armed you with some sort of weapons from Hungary, and the whole of Yugoslavia knows very well who imported weapons from Hungary and who it was that armed themselves from Hungary.

Q. Tell me now: Did you ever receive any kind of weapons from Hungary whatsoever? ¹³⁶⁷⁹

A. About the 20th of April, 1991, you said that you had purchased 20.000 pieces of weaponry in Hungary for us. This was a little strange and a little funny because the public was informed in this way that weapons were bought by the government of Croatia in Hungary, and later on I learnt that this was not so, that you had bought weapons in Hungary, but that you in fact distributed weapons from the warehouses of the Territorial Defence in Yugoslavia.

Q. Well, this would seem to me to be nonsense too, this matter of Serbia purchasing weapons in Hungary. And secondly, have you forgotten what you yourself said earlier on, that you procured weapons from the Territorial Defence warehouses in Krajina, and from the TO warehouses in Western Bosnia and you even mentioned the name of a lieutenant colonel who supplied you with the weapons, that the TO warehouse had somewhere around Bihac or wherever. Have you forgotten about all that?

A. I said that the Serbs in Krajina were armed from two sources. One source was from Serbia, via the DB of Serbia, the state security of Serbia, and the second was by the JNA in the Krajina area.

Q. So you claim that you never said that you got your weapons from the Territorial Defence warehouses in Krajina and in Bosnia; is that what you're saying? But that you were supplied exclusively from Serbia and by the JNA?

A. As far as Bosna and Krajina are concerned, I mentioned the Bihac airport, which is partially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and partially in Croatia, or rather, Krajina. Now, where the Bihac airport base is located in more specific terms, I said I don't know, but I said I know that ¹³⁶⁸⁰ weapons came in through two roads into Krajina, one from Serbia, the Grahovo direction, and the other was from Bosanski Novi.

Q. All right. So you were not supplied from the Territorial Defence warehouse in Krajina, you were not supplied by -- from the Territorial Defence warehouse in the Bihac region, but you were supplied by Serbia and the JNA; is that what you're saying?

A. The JNA supplied us with weapons, that is to say, in concrete terms, the Bihac area, Sveti Rok, and also in part the Knin Corps distributed weapons, I don't know where from.

Q. So did you organise demonstrations in front of the Knin Corps to call for weapons to be distributed to you and the army refused to give you the weapons, supply you with those weapons? Wasn't that how it was?

A. The first demonstrations in front of the Knin Corps took place in January 1991 and with respect to the incidents that were taking place in the Vrljika area, the fact that people were arrested by the Croatian police, the demonstrations were held in front of the Knin Corps building to block the passage between Knin and Cetinje because of the fact that a funeral was taking place to bury a person who had died under strange circumstances. He was killed in Sibenik but was to be buried in Cetinje. Now, what you have in mind when you're referring to --

Q. Well, I'm thinking about the part of the report that we read out in private session --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as I understand, we're in open session now, are we? Is this a public session?

JUDGE MAY: Yes, open session. So stick to what you can deal with ¹³⁶⁸¹ in open session.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am bearing in mind the fact that we're in open session.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As I was saying, part of the report which belongs to the documents supplied by the opposite side, a document I quoted from with respect to your activities, where mention is made of those particular activities, the ones that General Mladic reacted to, and he did so quite rightly and in conformity with the rules of service, and he endeavoured to thwart them. That's what I'm talking about, and that's what it says in the report itself, the report from the Knin Corps.

A. Several reports were quoted here by Mladic. I think that to the second army in Sarajevo that was, in 1992. I don't know what the -- the one you're thinking about.

Q. All right. So avoid going into a closed session again, let's round off this Spegelj matter. Is this a forgery, what you just saw, when Spegelj is talking about the fact that they have 80.000 men who are armed with Kalashnikov rifles and that he goes on to enumerate several more thousand officers of the army of Yugoslavia who should be killed, and that nobody should be allowed to reach the barracks alive, and so on and so forth? You saw several of these excerpts. Are they falsified material? Is it just propaganda on the part of the Federal Defence Secretariat or, as you say, my propaganda? I saw this tape when you did yourself. But quite obviously it was not a forgery of any kind. It wasn't a falsified tape. Do you still claim that it is a forgery? ^{13682 BLANK PAGE 13683}

A. At that time we all believed in it, and I did too. We all believed that it was the truth and that there would be a great pogrom and slaughterhouse of the Serbs slaughtered by the Croatian authorities. I just said that Spegelj himself, publicly, or rather, the Croatian government, denied some of the allegations from this film, this tape. Now, whether it's a forgery or not, and the background of it and how it came into existence, I really can't say. I don't know. I just spoke about the effect it had on the Serbs in Krajina and in Knin specifically.

Q. In the film about Spegelj, there was no mention made of Knin at all. Knin was not mentioned at all, and your assertions, your claims that in the Spegelj film it was rigged to the effect that Spegelj was threatening the Serbs in Knin is not true?

A. Whether Boljkovac or Spegelj was speaking, it was a conversation between Spegelj and Boljkovac. That's what it was.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, what Mr. Milosevic said is not correct. What we played here in the courtroom was actually someone referring to Knin and that the people should be slaughtered there.

JUDGE MAY: I don't recollect that, but no doubt you can refer us to the passage.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Now, do you consider that the events at the Miljevacki Plateau and Maslenica Bridge in Rani Koperi [phoen], in Peruca, Zemunik, Borovo Selo, the Medak pocket, Gospic, Pakrac, Petrinja, Vukovar, and then the Storm and Flash Operations, were they forgeries too, or, as you are ¹³⁶⁸⁴ saying, for the most part --

JUDGE MAY: No. That's not a sensible question. How can they be forgeries? It's no good running together a series of events and then trying to ask a question about them. Rephrase that in relation to one particular matter. What do you want to ask the witness? And then we'll adjourn.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, I want to ask him how he can claim that the Serbs in Croatia were disturbed through propaganda put out from Belgrade and not by the actual events that took place, the arrests that took place, the killings that took place, the discrimination, the dismissal from jobs, the pressures exerted on the them, and everything that happened to them under the impact of the new Croatian authorities from the moment they came on the scene, and even before that, in that wave of nationalism that engulfed Croatia.

A. The Serbs were afraid. They were afraid of the intentions of the Croatian government and the intentions, as you yourself represented them as being. Secondly, because of the incidents that you implemented and the counterreaction on the part of the Croatian government to those events and the war that you waged, and the fear for reprisals.

JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now. It's after a quarter past.

Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Just a small administrative matter. The witness lists served last week has had to be changed to a limited degree because of ¹³⁶⁸⁵ witnesses not being available, so there will be a further letter available for the accused by the close of this morning's session. It's going to be very helpful to us to know whether there's going to be any time for witnesses on Friday, and the earlier we can know that, the better we can plan to ensure that your time is fully used.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes. We'll adjourn now, 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.41 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume we are in open session, Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In your interview with the investigators, you emphasised several times that you were making your own free interpretations. I was able to see this from the tapes that were played. Is that right?

A. I was answering questions.

Q. Well, when you say you are making free interpretations, does that mean that you don't remember everything with precision? Because you were testifying about events that took place 12 years ago.

A. I was saying things that I remembered with precision, and also my views of events in retrospect, from a distance. But I was expected primarily to speak about things I remember from those days.

Q. Very well. You claim that I was in command of the Yugoslav ¹³⁶⁸⁶ People's Army, and do you know who was the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav People's Army in 1990 and 1991? And then we'll move on.

A. In formal and legal terms, it -- the supreme commander should have been the Presidency of the SFRY. However, I understood that as of July 1991, you took over the Supreme Command over the Yugoslav People's Army and that you were in command of it through the Presidency, the Rump Presidency of Yugoslavia, and I had information that you had direct contacts with the General Staff, the Generals Kadijevic and Jovic.

Q. You mentioned Generals Kadijevic and Jovic?

A. I beg your pardon. I meant Adzic, Kadijevic and Adzic.

Q. Very well. Do you know that before I took over my post there was a command staff of the army which reached these high ranks of generals and colonels and who constituted this top leadership of the army?

A. And what is the question?

Q. This entire structure that you are referring to was established before I came into office.

A. As far as I know, General Kadijevic, in 1990, was the Federal Secretary for National Defence, and in 1991, I know that General Adzic was Chief of Staff of the JNA. The President of the Presidency, Borisav Jovic, he was in office until May 1991. Cedo Bajramovic, I think, was elected --

Q. Very well. We don't have to be so specific about those dates.

A. Branko Kostic was elected to the Presidency at the end of May 1991. So those were the men who, as of May 1991, that is, Branko Kostic, Borisav Jovic, Nedo Bajramovic, and Jugoslav Kostic were members of the ¹³⁶⁸⁷ Presidency of Yugoslavia. And as of October 1991, they became the Rump Presidency because certain members did not take part in the work of the Presidency. Members of the Presidency from other republics did not take part. So together with you, that was the Supreme Command of the JNA.

Q. Do you know that when those military districts were formed in Yugoslavia, there was a total of four strategic groups, or army districts, the commanders in three of them were Croats: General Spegelj, General Lukasic [phoen], General Grubesic, and only in one was General Avramovic a Serb, and the air force and anti-aircraft defence was also headed by a Croat, Tus. Do you remember that?

A. I remember the people I spoke about here. Who was in those positions before that, I don't know all of them. I met General Raseta the commander of the Zagreb Corps, of the Knin Corps. I know that in the Knin Corps, the commander was a Macedonian, the Chief of Staff was a Slovene, the head of artillery was a Croat. But in the course of the summer of 1991, Serbs took over all those positions.

Q. Do you know that from the moment of the armed secession in Slovenia and Croatia, the commander of the military district in Zagreb, whose area of responsibility covered Slovenia and most of Croatia and part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the general in charge was Konrad Kolsek?

A. I know from the media that that was his position. But I know of General Raseta, who I don't know whether he was a deputy or was in the staff.

Q. I'm asking you about the command of the military district. At the same time, command of the 1st Military District in Belgrade, the largest ¹³⁶⁸⁸ military district, was headed by a Macedonian, Aleksandar Spirkovski?

A. I know that General Spekovski was commander in Knin for a while, and later he took up duty in Belgrade. Which, I don't know.

Q. And do you know that the commander of the air force and the anti-aircraft defence after General Tus, another Croat took over, Colonel Zvonko Jurjevic?

A. I heard of those two generals from the media. I don't know the exact time periods when they were in office.

Q. Do you know that Kadijevic, Brovet and Adzic, and the others that you listed, were not cadres from Serbia?

A. I know from stories that General Kadijevic came -- was a native of Imotski, and General Adzic from Herzegovina.

Q. Is it then logical and normal to conclude that I was not the one who was appointing these people to leading positions of the Yugoslav People's Army, as it was still at the time?

A. You asked me in July 1991 where you should deploy the army. You asked me where you should deploy it. So you were speaking as if you were the commander of the army.

Q. That is not true.

A. That is true.

Q. You can say that whatever you like as being the truth, but I'm saying that that is not true. And there are a whole series of positions in the army held by people who took over those positions before I was elected.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to stop you. The witness has ^{13689 BLANK PAGE 13690} given his evidence. You contradict it. You claim that it's not right. Now, there's no point going over the evidence to try and establish your point. You can call evidence in due course, but it will be for the Trial Chamber to determine where the truth lies. There's little point arguing whether he's telling the truth or not.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Is it true that as early as 1990 -- is it true that as early as 1990, the president of the Presidency was a Slovene, Janez Drnovsek?

A. Until the 15th of May, 1990, I think it was Drnovsek who was president of the Presidency. I know from the media reports.

Q. And in 1990 and 1991, when you say I was in command of the army, there was a presidency headed, in addition to Drnovsek, for a time by Stipe Mesic?

A. From May 1990 until the end of May - I don't know the exact date, whether it was May or June 1991 - the president of the Presidency was Borisav Jovic, and after the crisis over the election of the president of the Presidency, it was Stipe Mesic, until the autumn. I don't know exactly until when, the autumn of 1991, when he ceased to be that, or rather, when Croatia became independent.

Q. Very well then, do you know that there was a Federal Secretary for National Defence who was Veljko Kadijevic in that period, who was also a cadre from Croatia in the top army leadership at the time?

A. Yes, I do know that. I met him personally, at the end of November, maybe December, in 1991, when he said that the JNA, in ¹³⁶⁹¹ connection with Vance's plan regarding withdrawal from Croatia, that the JNA would comply with the political decision.

Q. So he told you what was right. And do you know that in the course of the whole of 1991, they were major provocations and mistreatment of individuals, units, and facilities of the JNA in Croatia? So I'm not talking exclusively about Krajina. I'm talking about the whole of Croatia now.

A. The crisis started in January 1991, after the SFRY Presidency had taken a decision on the disarming of paramilitary units in Croatia and after the Spegelj affair was revealed and broadcast by the media, arrests started. The JNA, or rather, the institutions, the competent institutions of the JNA, would issue indictments and start proceedings against individual officials of the government of Croatia. I think two of them were put on trial, but Spegelj was not accessible. And from that moment on, demonstrations started in Croatia against the JNA. Later on there were blockages of barracks, and in August an open war started between the JNA and armed formations of the Croatian government.

Q. And are you aware of the attempts of the Presidency of SFRY to halt the escalation, for example, at a meeting on the 22nd of July, that was also attended by Tudjman, the demand was made to cease all hostilities?

A. I know that a cessation of hostilities had been agreed on, that a commission was formed, headed by Branko Kostic, and that commission, and members of that commission would go to Croatia, to Krajina, and to Slovenia to insist on respect for the truth. ¹³⁶⁹²

Q. Do you know that the first serious conflict between JNA units and National Guards occurred in Dalj on the 1st of August, 1991?

A. I know that there was fighting in Dalj. Exactly who was there, I don't know.

Q. The National Guards, were they a paramilitary unit?

A. The National Guards Corps, the ZNG, were an armed formation of the Republic of Croatia.

Q. And do you know that Vladimir Seks, president of the Crisis Staff for Eastern Slavonia and Baranja in August 1991 informed the public that units of the JNA would no longer be supplied with electricity, water, food, et cetera?

A. I am aware of those events. And it wasn't just Seks who spoke about that, but others as well. Others were saying that too, from the Croatian authorities, and that is what they did.

Q. And is it true that military facilities and units were constantly exposed to armed provocations and attacks?

A. First there was a blockade, and I'm not aware of the situation with all the facilities, but I do know that the JNA facilities were blocked in Sibenik, Zadar, Sinj, Split. There were media reports about the events in Varazdin, Bjelovar, then also there were television reports over demonstrations and blockades of the barracks in Zagreb.

Q. You just mentioned a series of towns all over Croatia, and was it obvious that the suspension of supplies for barracks and other military facilities and constant attacks called in question the very physical survival of members of the JNA? ¹³⁶⁹³

A. There was a blockade. What the exact situation was inside the barracks, I don't know, but I do know that they were blocked.

Q. Do you believe that JNA units were forced to break through, to get out of that blockade, and to respond to such attacks?

A. As far as I know, some JNA units undertook to deblock those garrisons, as in Zadar, for example. The deblocking of the garrison in Sibenik, and the JNA would announce those actions taken against the Croatian guards, and they were explained by the need to deblock those barracks. But I don't know exactly what happened.

Q. Do you believe that the explanation that it was essential to deblock the garrisons that were blocked was a correct explanation, or was it a fabricated one?

A. That was the explanation of the JNA.

Q. And do you know that finally in November 1991, when all those barracks all over Croatia were blocked, and when clashes broke out, an agreement was signed in Igalo on the cessation of hostilities and on the need for all sides to cease all armed actions of all kinds for people to be able to sit around a table and find a peaceful solution, in the presence of Lord Carrington, in November 1991, in Igalo?

A. As far as I know, there were many agreements on the cessation of hostilities. The last, I suppose, was agreed in Sarajevo, and you took part in some of those, I think the agreement in Geneva, which was mentioned in those days, and your approval of the Vance Plan. That also implied a cessation of hostilities.

Q. But the agreement in November occurred prior to these questions ¹³⁶⁹⁴ that we have discussed the link to the Vance Plan. I should now like to play an audio cassette which you call an intercepted conversation, simply for you to see to what extent it confirms how correct what I am saying is. It is in the technical booth. Could it be played please. It is a conversation between the then Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and the Federal Secretary for National Defence, General Kadijevic.

[Intercept played]

THE INTERPRETER: I'm afraid the interpreters do not have a text and the sound is very bad.

[Voiceover] They're always looking for a way of blaming others for what he has done. Can peace be established or not? If it can be stopped until 10 hours, and secondly, if the military barracks can be deblocked and everything else by 12.00, if that is done, then after that we can continue what we have started. If that cannot be done, then the two of us will no longer hear one another. We'll not be in contact any more. You know what we should perhaps do? Maybe we should try that -- before we get together by fax to confirm, because of Croatia, a written truce, which means an agreement that would deal with the army in the way that suits the sovereign Croatian authorities and it's also in the interest of the army. Does that mean, Franjo, that you put what is second in first place and vice versa? No. We have agreed with Carrington on the order of things. If we haven't let stop -- discontinue any further conversation. What if we are unable to achieve that? What do you mean if we're not able to achieve that? If in Sibenik things worsen. I can guarantee that not a single bullet will be fired. We have the deadline up to 10.00, 1000 ¹³⁶⁹⁵ hours. Let fire be ceased, deblocking by 12.00. We will continue this conversation tomorrow. A solution must be found. If you agree. If you are not capable of doing that, say so. It's up to you. Then everyone will go back to his own positions and we'll see what will happen. Then there will be a disaster. Of course there will. I'm doing this for the last time, for the last time, with the great responsibility that I bear, and you also have that responsibility. The worst should be avoided. You can avoid it by fulfilling each of these points. Today is the turning point. I will do as much as I can. Stop these developments in Sibenik. Cease fire everywhere and let the troops get water and food and everything they need, and tomorrow we can sit at a table and talk openly about everything. Otherwise we'll go back to hostilities. I think that is a disaster. But I'm sure a solution can be found. If I didn't believe that, I wouldn't be talking to you in this way. And I believe that you are doing the same. Let's try. That would be disastrous. Stop the fire in Sibenik by 1000 hours. Order a ceasefire. If you're not capable of doing that -- if Letica is working over there, he's worse than that Spegelj. You must do something about it. We'll see. I didn't mention Grubesic as well. It's Grubesic, not Letica. Grubesic is not Letica. He -- when he left, I knew that he wouldn't come back. That is up to him. You conclude from that that this is generalised -- these feelings are generalised. Well, if that is so, then go to war. I'm just asking for a ceasefire, nothing more. What we have already signed, that's all. I'm going to act along those lines. But you think of whether there's a way of getting out of this hell. There must be an absolute ceasefire by 1000 ^{13696 BLANK PAGE 13697} hours, absolute ceasefire, so that people can live. You must -- they must be given water. They have to live. Would you let them die in that way? And this thing that Anto Markovic is preparing, it's very dangerous, this business. He's a son of a bitch that you know well. I've told you that many times. Get hold of these two and then we've solved everything. Because he wasn't there when the signature was required, because no one is -- has any respect for him anyway. Okay. Goodbye.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Just a moment, Mr. Milosevic. First of all, our thanks to the interpreters for managing. Very difficult.

Now, that's not a tape which has been produced so far, I take it.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, would you like that tape exhibited? You've had it played. Very well. The next number, and we will order a transcript for it.

THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. That will be Defence Exhibit 62.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. There is no doubt that the conversation was conducted after a meeting and the signing of an agreement on a cessation of hostilities with Lord Carrington. There is also no doubt, this is indisputable, isn't it, Mr. MILAN BABIC?

A. I did not take part in that agreement.

Q. Very well, then. Is it also clear that the conversation is being conducted in connection with the generalised blockade of JNA barracks in ¹³⁶⁹⁸ Croatia and that it relates to relationships between Croatia and the JNA?

A. From the conversation, one could conclude that they were referring to the blockade of barracks, specifically, the one in Sibenik.

Q. They were also talking about other barracks, about the blocking of barracks, about the fact that they are being cut off by refusing them water and other supplies, and the request, as you can see, was made by General Kadijevic only to respect the agreement made with the old, wise Lord Carrington, as he put it; isn't that right?

A. Well, that was the contents of the conversation we heard.

Q. Is it then clear from this that General Kadijevic insists that any solution is wiser than war, insisting that his barracks be deblocked? Did you hear him say that?

A. Yes, I heard Kadijevic say so on the tape, something to that effect.

Q. Did you hear Kadijevic guarantee that not a single bullet would be fired if they would only stop shooting at the army? Did you hear him say that?

A. Yes, I heard it on the tape.

Q. Did you hear him say: Once you stop, once we sign a ceasefire, we'll sit around a table? Did you hear that?

A. I did.

Q. So who is working for a cessation of hostilities and for peace there?

A. I know specifically about events related to the lifting of the blockade of the barracks in Zadar from General Vukovic. I heard from him ¹³⁶⁹⁹ about the way he accomplished that and his signing of an agreement with the authorities in Zadar and the pulling out of troops from that barracks.

Q. Did you hear anything about the number of times that troops were being shot at while being pulled out of their barracks?

A. No.

Q. You never heard of Sarajevo, Tuzla, about any other place in Bosnia, when troops leaving in an orderly fashion their barracks, being shot at?

A. I heard two things in media reports. One concerned a blockade of a convoy of military equipment that was blocked by Croatian authorities, and I heard about events in Sarajevo, when the staff of the 2nd Army was leaving. I was told that by General Kukanjac, who spoke about that on television.

Q. Let's talk about these other events, from the times which you mention, calling it testimony. Is it true that in that period, in 1990 and 1991, the president -- or rather, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia was Ante Markovic, a Croat?

A. I know that.

Q. And that Veljko Kadijevic, whom we heard on tape, was Minister of Defence in his government?

A. Veljko Kadijevic was Federal Secretary of Defence.

Q. Do you know that in 1992 the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established, was Milan Panic, my opponent?

A. There was talk in the media and in the public that you appointed ¹³⁷⁰⁰ him to that position.

Q. Well, you know, he was my political opponent, that he was supported by the then president of the SFRY, that he was also my rival at elections for the president of Serbia in 1993?

A. According to statements one could hear at the time, he was advocating peace, and that was the point of conflict between you and him.

Q. Let us then stick to what you say.

A. I heard about that at that time in the media and from rumours. I have no personal, direct knowledge.

Q. I don't see how anyone can talk about something that they have no personal knowledge about. I'm now asking you about various positions held within the Yugoslav government: Minister of Defence, Prime Minister, et cetera. What is the connection, then, of Serbia with the military legislation, with rules of procedure, with transfers of people from one place to another? You even brought here, as some kind of document, a paper referring to a woman from your bureau being allocated for temporary employment in a military-medical section, probably to keep records about refugees, the wounded from Krajina. What has that got to do with decision-making in Serbia, the transfer of some woman from your bureau to the military medical academy, an army medical institution, and God knows what else you brought here among those papers?

A. Two things I want to say, beginning with July 1991. I realised, and you told me, that you are the Supreme Command of the JNA, and the staff of the Supreme Command consisted of the General Staff and the Defence Secretary. And you were also member of the supreme military ¹³⁷⁰¹ council of the FRY and the de facto leader of that council. In addition to Zoran Lilic, who was your yes-man. I don't know how long Bulatovic was a figure there.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters couldn't hear the accused.

A. I don't know when you replaced him.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know when Lilic became president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

A. After you replaced Dobrica Cosic.

Q. And do you know that it was in 1993 that he assumed this position?

A. That's when you replaced Dobrica Cosic.

Q. I'm not talking about the replacement of Dobrica Cosic. I'm telling you that Lilic became president of the FRY in 1993 and that his term of office was until midsummer 1997, for four years.

A. That is correct.

Q. So Dobrica Cosic was president until mid-1993, this yes-man of mine that you mentioned. All these events that you're testifying to happened before 1993, wherein I am the commander of the army, as you put it.

A. You asked me a question from the period when the SFRY existed and some questions about FRY.

Q. I was asking you about things from 1990, 1991, until 1993. When was I commander?

A. You commanded from July 1991, using your personal clout over the General Staff -- ¹³⁷⁰²

Q. Judging by what you say, it was I who explained to you that I have influence over the General Staff. Is that what you're saying?

A. You asked several questions. In fact, you noted several things first, one of them being: Until July 1991, although it was also in 1990, that you were saying that you would protect us, that JNA would protect our right to stay within Yugoslavia and guarantee that right of ours. In July 1991, you came forward with a question: Where should you deploy the army? That means that from that moment on, you showed that you were able to command the army and that you were commanding it, as of that moment. As for the Presidency of Yugoslavia, it was partly disabled, that is, the Presidency was normally made up of eight members, and starting with October there were only four left. The JNA got involved in military actions, or rather, started the war in Croatia, in October, and until then, on orders from the Presidency, or even only on the initiative of Borisav Jovic, because he said the JNA, as decided by him, got involved in Pakrac. Anyway, as of July, together with Kostic, Cedo Bajramovic, you were the commander of the JNA, and Veljko Kadijevic and Adzic were the men whom you controlled in the General Staff of the Supreme Command.

Q. MILAN BABIC, you know for how long this Presidency was disabled, precisely because four members voted always against the other four members, and they were never able to make a decision.

A. That Presidency made a decision to introduce a state of immediate threat of war. I don't know how many members were active at that time, but it was made in October 1991. And that decision was followed by adoption of some new rules that enabled the remaining four members to ^{13703 BLANK PAGE 13704} command the army in the absence of the other four, and you were the boss of the remaining four.

Q. You know that it was a time when Yugoslavia was being exhausted and tortured under the pressure of great powers, and as for your claim that I commanded the army, I wish I had. We would have been able to avoid the war.

A. You were the one deploying the JNA troops as of October 1991.

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to intervene to say this: We've been over this point really for some time. The witness has explained why he has come to the conclusion which he did, and it will be for us to determine on the evidence. Now, I don't think we should spend more time going over the same point.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] All right. All right.

Q. I think that your explanations, judging from the tape of your interviews with investigators and the lady on the opposite side, explanations related to the appointment of General Mrksic, as commander of the Serbian army of Krajina, these explanations would very graphically show how riddled with contradictions they are with your own personal statements and with other facts as well.

JUDGE MAY: If you want to put a specific point, you can. It sounds as though it's a point which should be put in private session. But you can't make generalisations of the sort so far that you are making. If you want to make a specific point about this, it sounds as though we should go into private session.

We'll go into private session. ¹³⁷⁰⁵

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

JUDGE MAY: What's the point that you want to make to the witness? Because so far it's so generalised, it's not to be worth very much.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, are we in private session now?

JUDGE MAY: We're in private session, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here, during examination-in-chief, the witness told us one version of the alleged meeting he had with me, related to his request for a new commander of the Serbian army of Krajina. You will now see the first version, which is brief, and you will then see the second version, also his, and we'll see how it actually happened, and then I'll ask him some questions.

I would kindly ask you to play that tape. It is your own tape from the interview with MILAN BABIC, when he speaks of a meeting with me, when Prime Minister Mikelic attended, he and Minister of Foreign Affairs, none of them being competent to discuss the issues at hand, and he came to me to request a new commander of the Serbian army of Krajina, and you will see what it looked like.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can we please have the date of the tape so that we can find the transcript?

JUDGE MAY: Let's see if we can --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 19th February.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let us have the passage played. ¹³⁷⁰⁶

[Videotape played] "MILAN BABIC ... took place. I have no assertions concerning this. I would like to give this my free interpretation. So Mikelic had prepared an information on the situation. He prepared a speech. Then he read out this lengthy speech, study. I don't know -- I cannot remember exactly what he read out, because he was always very lengthy, went into great detail. Nor do I remember exactly what he concretely said in that speech of his. But what I do remember is the following scene: At a certain point, Milosevic said, "Wait a minute, please," and he moved to the other room, where his desk is, and to the inner office. And he stayed there a short time, I believe, probably a minute, a couple of minutes. So he went out and he was absent a few minutes. And he came back and he said, more or less, 'The new commander will be Mile Mrksic.' Now, some two or three years ago I talked about this event with [redacted]. "MR. HARDIN: Before you go into that, let's finish first with what was said in the meeting.

"MILAN BABIC: Well, this is in connection with the meeting, but ...

"MR. HARDIN: I know, but I mean within the meeting itself. What else was said in the meeting?

"MILAN BABIC: I don't remember anything in particular. So I remember that when we were going out, exiting, there was Goran Hadzic, and I think he was there at that meeting. And I think it was on that occasion, because there was no other such occasion that I could have witnessed it. He said, 'Mr.. President, can I remain with you, the two of ¹³⁷⁰⁷ us alone, for a short while?' Then we went out in the hall. He stayed there a short time and then he came out after us. That is what I remember of that scene and that meeting.

"MR. HARDIN: Okay. Do you know if Milosevic mentioned during the meeting -- had he talked to anybody about the selection of Mrksic? "MILAN BABIC: This is what I wanted to say.

"MR. HARDIN: Okay. Just a minute. Okay. Okay. Just a minute.

"MILAN BABIC: I don't remember whether he said it. "MR. HARDIN: Okay. Subsequent to the meeting, did Mile Mrksic become the commander?

"MILAN BABIC: Yes. The Assembly approved his appointment at the end of May of that year. I don't remember what the exact proceeding, procedure was, but he did become the commander.

"MR. HARDIN: Okay. Go ahead. "MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Let me ask: Why were you there? You are not involved with military. Why were you there?

"MILAN BABIC: No. I was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mikelic formed the delegation.

"MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you run the delegation when you were there? Did you have your own proposal who you wanted to be the commander? "MILAN BABIC: Personally, no, but -- and I don't remember that any one of us spoke about that.

"MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you -- did any of you, when Mr. Milosevic said he, this guy Mile Mrksic, is the commander, did anyone ¹³⁷⁰⁸ respond to that? Did you say either say, 'Well, great,' or did you oppose it? [Inaudible].

"MILAN BABIC: I don't remember. Probably no. I don't know. I can't remember when and where, but it was after this meeting that somewhere Martic told me. It was after this meeting. I was in some company, with people. I can't remember [inaudible] that Jovica Stanisic went and had a talk with General Celeketic. I remember that I heard this. Somebody conveyed it to me. This was a piece of information which remains something interesting to me, and that's why I remember it, but I cannot remember under what circumstances I heard that.

"MR. HARDIN: When you guys went to the meeting with Mikelic, did he make a proposal for someone to be the commander? "MILAN BABIC: I couldn't -- I cannot remember.

"MR. HARDIN: You don't recall if any names were discussed? "MILAN BABIC: No, I don't think that any names were being discussed. Well ...

"THE INTERPRETER: Could you ask him to repeat that? "MR. HARDIN: Yes. You need to repeat.

"MILAN BABIC: Yes. [redacted] [redacted], about this event, he mentioned that the Supreme Defence -- that Milosevic mentioned that the Supreme Defence Council has -- had chosen, had appointed this man. And he probably thought of the Supreme Defence Council of Yugoslavia, that he was there, that it was agreed that Mrksic become the commander, but I personally do not recall that. ¹³⁷⁰⁹ "MR. HARDIN: Okay.

"MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Is Mrksic from the Krajina? "MILAN BABIC: It was said that he was -- he had his roots in Kordun. Whether he was born in Kordun or whether his -- the previous generations came from Kordun --"

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can go on. You have the tape, and I don't think it's necessary.

JUDGE MAY: We need to finish the topic. [Videotape played].

MILAN BABIC: Yes. That is what was said, that he's a member of the JNA. I cannot remember whether that was being said then or later.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The army of the Krajina, didn't they have any candidate that could fulfil this position?

MILAN BABIC: I don't know.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And this --

MILAN BABIC: Well, the Supreme Council of Defence of Krajina could probably discuss that, but whether they discussed it or not, I do not know, and I was not a member of this body.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And this General Celeketic, was he also a member of the Yugoslav army?

JUDGE MAY: That seems to be moving on to another topic. We'll finish it. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll come back to this topic, but I think that the questions which I am able to ask this witness in connection to the tape can be asked in open session, because they -- the audience ¹³⁷¹⁰ can't see the tape. So can I ask my questions in open session?

JUDGE MAY: It depends whether you can ask them without referring to the tape, since the tape has been played in private session, any reference to it or anything referring to his responses, possibly need playing. Let me consider that.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. On reflection, there's no secrecy about the fact that there was an interview, as I recollect. The only matter which is secret is the identity of the witness, and therefore, that was the reason that the tapes were played in private session.

Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, that's right, isn't it? There's no reason why the questions about the content of the interview can't be asked in open session, provided they don't identify the witness?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And what also should not be identified is that it was a suspect interview, because that was discussed in private session, that it was a suspect interview.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, it can be referred to as an interview with the Office of the Prosecutor.

Mr. Milosevic, you get that? So no reference to -- which might identify him, and it can only be referred to as an interview with the Prosecution.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to refer back to it.

JUDGE MAY: No, but just refer to it as an interview. Don't describe it any more fully. So that what you can't say is that it was a suspect interview. That's the point. ^{13711 BLANK PAGE 13712} Yes. Let's go into open session.

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it clear from the tape that has been played, from this interview, that the delegation, or rather, the members of the delegation, its structure, was not in conformity with the alleged subject that you were alluding to?

A. The Prime Minister was a member of the supreme council of defence of Krajina, and you couldn't see this on the tape, but he had his own proposal as to the command of the Serbian army of the RSK, Milan Novakovic was mentioned, but very briefly.

Q. That's not what I'm asking you now. Please answer my questions and we'll get to that. We'll come to that part of the tape in due course to see the contradictions that you stated in respect of what you're saying.

Did you happen to note, to notice, that you yourself speak about a long speech made by your head of delegation, which was made up in the way it was? Isn't that right? There was a long address made by him.

A. Yes.

Q. And you said that you couldn't remember to what it referred, to what it was all about, but that you assumed that he touched upon many vital issues for the economic, political, public life of Krajina, and cooperation with Serbia, and so on and so forth?

A. At that point in time, the priorities discussed were the events in ¹³⁷¹³ Western Slavonia, the Croatian Flash operation, the exodus of the population, the question of the army, of the RSK, to stand up to the Croatian army. So at that time, those were the main topics discussed.

Q. All right. You said a moment ago that you can't remember at all what was said in, as you termed it, the very long speech made by the head of your delegation.

A. I said what the priorities were of the discussions at that time.

Q. So you consider those to be priorities indirectly?

A. Yes, because that was the only specific topic discussed at the meeting.

Q. All right. Very well. Now, is it clear from the interview that you asked me a question, and that question was whether I knew anything about the newly appointed commander of the Serbian army of Krajina?

A. I don't understand your question.

Q. Well, you asked whether I knew who was going to be appointed, because it didn't come under your competency. I assume it was the competency of the President of the Republic, or rather, your Supreme Defence Council and the president of your republic. Isn't that correct?

A. As far as I know, linked to that event, in his presentation, the Prime Minister mentioned one name, and that was the name of General Mile Novakovic.

Q. Wait a minute. I'm asking you about your own interview. In the whole of your interview, you never said that. You never stated that. What you said was that I told you to wait and that I went into my office to speak over the telephone, which means I went to ask, I went to inquire ¹³⁷¹⁴ of somebody who was supposed to know about those matters.

A. I said what my knowledge was in concrete terms about the event.

Q. Well, I told you to wait. I went into my office to ask and inquire, because you had asked me something that I wasn't able to answer myself at that point, so I went to inquire.

A. You had determined that General Mile Mrksic should be the new commander of the RSK army.

Q. All right. If you drew that conclusion yourself, your interview speaks otherwise. But let's move on to the next question. In the interview, did you happen to notice that you were first asked by the lady sitting opposite whether you had a proposal to make of any kind? Isn't that right? And your answer was that you did not.

A. Well, I didn't remember everything on that occasion and all the details at that particular point.

Q. All right. I'm just talking about what we all had occasion to see a moment ago. Then the investigator went on to ask you whether you had discussed any of the proposals before the meeting, and your answer there again was no, that you did not, that you had not. And then once again the lady opposite went on to ask you: Did you not have in Krajina somebody who could be put forward as a candidate? And your answer to that question too was no; no, you did not.

A. I don't know.

Q. Yes. You said you didn't know. So you were asked three times in the course of the interview whether you had a candidate, whether you discussed a candidate, whether any names were mentioned; and your answer ¹³⁷¹⁵ to all three questions was that you did not remember, that you do not know, and that no names were mentioned, that you don't know if there was a candidate or not, et cetera.

A. I remembered the names subsequently.

Q. We'll come to that. We'll come that part of the tape where you remembered and the circumstances under which you remembered, but that's another matter for the moment.

Then you go on to say that you heard from - I don't want to identify the person. I suppose that is not allowed either - that this took place at the Supreme Defence Council for the defence of Yugoslavia. Well, all right. At that Supreme Defence Council meeting, in view of the fact that I'm a member of the Supreme Defence Council, would we be able to assume that I know about that and that I don't have to go and tell you: Wait a moment, for me to go and ring somebody up and inquire and then come back to you and give you an answer as to what it was.

JUDGE MAY: That was what the witness said happened. Now, explanations you can give in due course, if you want. But assist us with this: In that part of the interview, there was no mention of Novakovic; rather, you said there wasn't a candidate. Now, if you want to give an explanation of why you said that, you should be able to do so.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He will have an opportunity of -- Mr. May, to save time, I'm going to --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to show you a part of the tape on which you will see how this actually happened. So I do have an ¹³⁷¹⁶ answer for you, on the basis of what he said.

JUDGE MAY: Let him give his explanation now. The matter is being put to him. He should be entitled to answer.

Yes. Can you give us -- if you want to, give a brief explanation.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that moment when I was asked, I didn't remember all the details. I just remembered the main event.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are we able to conclude, therefore, that in that interview you were asked three times: Twice by the lady sitting opposite and once by the investigator, whether you had a proposal, whether any proposal was discussed, whether it was possible that there was no solution in Krajina itself, suitable solution, but that you had to go to Belgrade; and to all those questions your answer was negative: No, no, and I don't remember?

Q. Isn't that so?

A. I wasn't in the structures that decided on issues at that time, at that stage.

Q. You weren't afterwards either?

A. Not in that stage.

Q. You don't even know whether Mrksic was from Krajina. You said that he might have been born there.

A. People said that he was born in Kordun, that his origins were in Kordun. What that meant -- whether he was born there or his parents were born there, I don't know what that means. ¹³⁷¹⁷

Q. Well, I originated from Pozarevac, which means I was born in Pozarevac, and not that some of my people were born in Pozarevac. I am a native of Pozarevac, which means I was born there. Now, do you know that he was born in Vrginmost, or rather, the Vrginmost municipality, that he completed elementary school there and indeed secondary school as well, on that territory, and that he only left the Republic of Croatia when he enrolled in the military academy, like anybody else who enrolls in the military academy, because the academy is located in Belgrade? At least it was in Yugoslavia, in the Yugoslavia of the day, the one in which Mrksic lived. So not only was he a native of the area, but he lived there right up until the time when he left to attend his higher education at the military academy, and that was the profession he had chosen. He was a man from Krajina.

A. He didn't know about those details.

Q. Well, fine. You didn't know those details, but you do know the other details that you cannot recollect.

Now, the second part of this same conversation held on the same day, but I do wish to draw your attention to the fact that you will see at the very beginning that a different story is being told now, after a break for lunch and after the witness was warned that he hadn't done his homework properly and now he has to tell a different story. So we'll now hear that different story after the instructor gave him instructions as to how he should tell that story. So please play that second excerpt.

JUDGE MAY: We'll certainly do that. We'll come back to any allegations that you are making and explore what they are. ^{13718 BLANK PAGE 13719}

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. And I would like to object against this way that he actually indicates there was an instructor telling him what he has to tell.

JUDGE MAY: No. He can put it to the witness in due course. Yes, a matter for the witness.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Judge May, please.

JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry. Let's play the tape. The witness, in due course -- private session. The witness, in due course, can deal with these allegations that are being made.

[Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

THE REGISTRAR: Okay. We're in private session.

[Videotape played] "MR. HARDIN: The time is approximately 1422 --"

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please -- I apologise for the interruption. Will you stop, please. I asked you to start this second clip from 1249, 12 hours, 49 minutes, please, and not 1422 minutes, as it says on the tape. You have the time indicated in the top left-hand corner. From 1249, please.

It is indicative of what I am saying and claiming, and it takes very little time, because in the meantime there was a lunch break.

[Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't understand why this is taking so long. It was just a minute prior to what was played a moment ago.

[Videotape played] ¹³⁷²⁰ "MR. HARDIN: The time right now is approximately 1422, on the 19th of February. We just had a lunch break. And Mr. Babic, I need to remind you of your warnings again. Do you have any questions about your warnings?

"MILAN BABIC: No. "MR. HARDIN: Okay. All right. I will move on to the area of Western Slavonia.

"MR. MUELLER: Let him make a short remark, please, he's going to make a short remark.

"MR. HARDIN: Apparently you wanted to say something, according to Mr. Mueller.

"MR. MUELLER: But short, but short, please. "MILAN BABIC: Yes, in reference to our previous talks concerning my meetings with Mr. Milosevic. And when I spoke of that meeting in May 1995 with Milosevic, I remembered, in connection with one of your questions, whether the people from -- the members of the delegation from Krajina, whether they have any proposals, names for a new commander of the army of Serbian Krajina, I remember, I recollect, and I can answer yes, there was this proposal. Borislav Mikelic asked that the newly appointed commander be Mile Novakovic, General Mile Novakovic. Then Milosevic made a negative comment in connection with this person and stopped this discussion.

Secondly, what I would like to add --"

THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

JUDGE MAY: Yes, we'll stop the playing. ¹³⁷²¹ Yes, Mr. Milosevic. You've got a minute or two more, and then if you're going to suggest that this witness has been instructed in some way, you must do so.

And we'll go back into open session. We are in open --

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In this interview, do we see that there was a lunch break after a certain period of time and that after that lunch break the investigator asks his collocutor, in this case Witness Croat MILAN BABIC, whether he has anything to add, and he says that he hasn't? And then we see his representative, attorney, telling him - his legal representative - that he has something to say, that he has forgotten to say something. I don't want to mention the name of his legal representative, as this is the only witness we have had so far with an attorney sitting in the courtroom while he's testifying. And then he makes a statement that he has remembered. So during the lunch break he remembered something that he answered three times in the negative, that he didn't know and that couldn't remember, that he suddenly remembered.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've just seen all of this. Why don't you come to the point?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The point is that those two statements are in complete contradiction with one another, Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: The question is: How did the witness come to make the ¹³⁷²² second statement? That's the question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume, and I'm asking him: Did that happen because in the meantime he was advised and cautioned that he hadn't said what had been planned for him to say and that he hadn't answered three questions - two put by the lady opposite and one by the investigator - that he had answered no, but really he should have said yes, and he should have offered, proffered, a name which now his legal representative had to remind him to give that name after the lunch break. So he is correcting himself because suddenly his memory has been refreshed, so he now has a completely different story.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer the question. Let the witness answer what's being put to him.

You've heard what's being suggested now, Witness, and you can answer the question.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, the investigator asked me whether I had anything to add regarding the rights that were read to me. It was in that connection. That is one thing. Secondly, the answer that I had something to add in addition to what was previously discussed was correct. Because my first reaction was a visual picture of the incident. I have a very good visual memory, and I recounted on the basis of that visual memory. Then I thought about the event and remembered some other details in connection with it, and that is what I added after the break. There was no pressure, there was no suggestions as to what I should say; only what I really remembered.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as this tape is concerned, ¹³⁷²³ and there are any number of tapes of this kind, that they could be used as evidence for false testimony on the part of not only this witness but obviously --

JUDGE MAY: You've heard the answer. There's no question of that. You've heard his answer. It's something he remembered. Now, time has come for us to adjourn.

Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, if the accused wishes, arrangements should be made for those extracts, at least to be exhibited so the Court has them before it. We seem to have them already.

Mr. Milosevic, do you want us to have these extracts?

[Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

JUDGE MAY: I'm being told it's D57. The only point that I make about that - and you may want to consider this - is D57 is a particular exhibit relating to a particular date, whether it would be more sensible to go on to D57A perhaps for this one. Yes, we'll make that D57A.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly, Mr. May. But I would also like to request from you that you institute proceedings --

JUDGE MAY: No.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- as there are grounds to believe that this is false testimony.

JUDGE MAY: No. We hear what you say, but you've heard what the witness has said. He's given his explanation. Now, it will be a matter for us to determine whether the explanation holds water or not. Certainly no question of any proceedings or anything of that sort. Thank you very much. We've now got this passage exhibited, D57A, ¹³⁷²⁴ under seal.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And Your Honour, just to add: It's only the first part, because the second part we just heard, and we supply tomorrow.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. That part can be added to D57A, since it's all the same interview.

We are, as I say, going to adjourn now. Before we do, one or two administrative matters.

Mr. Tapuskovic, if you have any questions -- I don't know if -- do you have any questions of this witness?

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I had intended to raise that matter tomorrow morning and to tell you that this time I would really like to ask to have time -- of course, it is up to you to decide, but it seems to me that in this case I should not be put in a position - even though I do my very best to select only the matters of professional importance - that I be spared of being rushed. I don't know exactly how much time I would need, but I think I need at least one-third of one day, of one working day.

JUDGE MAY: So we're talking about an hour and a quarter, something of that sort; is that right? Seventy-five minutes.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I would do my best to complete it within that time limit, but I really do think that in view of the significance of this testimony, I should be allowed that much time, maybe a couple of minutes more.

JUDGE MAY: We'll consider that in due course. ^{13725 BLANK PAGE 13726} Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, we think the Prosecution should have another witness available for Friday. We would ask you, too, to bear in mind, having regard to the length of this witness's evidence, the length of your re-examination, and keep it, if you would, to the bearest minimum.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I will do so, and I think at the moment it will not be longer than half an hour, probably less.

JUDGE MAY: That's the sort of time which we had in mind. Thank you.

Very well. We'll adjourn now.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.07 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 3rd day of

December, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.