Milosevic Transcript 2002-12-04

¹³⁸⁵²

Wednesday, 4 December 2002

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.24 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We've been delayed, as I understand it, because building works at the Detention Unit have delayed the accused's arrival. We will sit until 2.00 to try and make up some of the time. We'll take the normal breaks at the normal times.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

WITNESS: WITNESS C-[Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do I recollect well that we discussed in public session the fact that the Defence Minister of Serbia, General Simovic, had appointed, or rather, given the proposal for the commander of the Krajina TO, General Djujic? I think this was in public session.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In that case, allow me to put a question without mentioning the witness's name, keeping my promise not to make any such omissions regarding protective measures. I hope you will be able to have this translated. I have been given a statement by fax in handwriting, signed precisely by Lieutenant Colonel General (retired) Ilija Djujic. I will not read it out in ¹³⁸⁵³ extenso. Anyway, it's hard to read his handwriting. But he does say: "During one of my visits to Knin, I was visited in my native house by C-061." He lists his positions, the positions he held, and then he said: "In that family home of mine, C-061 asked me to accept the duty of commander of SAO Krajina and to form the defensive structure," et cetera, et cetera.

I am giving you this statement which clearly shows that this would-be witness is not telling the truth.

JUDGE MAY: It's a question for him. It's not a question about the statement. It's his evidence.

Now, what's alleged, Witness C-061, you've heard what's been read out, it's alleged by this person that Djujic visited you, and you asked him to accept the duty of the commander and form a defensive structure. Did anything like that happen at all?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I correct you?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] From what I have read out, it was not the general, General Djujic, who visited the witness but the witness visited General Djujic in his family home.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So he went to see him to ask him what he asked him.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The following is true: I did know General Djujic even before the appointment, and I would meet with him. Among other things, I did visit the house that he was rebuilding in his ¹³⁸⁵⁴ native village. He also came to visit me in my office, but the appointment of General Djujic as commander of the TO of SAO Krajina occurred in the way I have described.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be exhibited?

JUDGE MAY: No, Mr. Milosevic, for the reasons which have been explained before when you've produced statements or documents from persons outside the courtroom. The only way to get that sort of evidence in is to call the witness himself. It's not evidence; it's merely his statement.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let us clear up one further point before I continue with the questions where I left off yesterday. You said yesterday that you knew nothing about the money collected in the diaspora, amounting 169.417 dollars, and that that was not handed to you. Did I understand you correctly?

A. I said that I never received such a quantity of money in cash myself. There were situations when people from the diaspora would contact the Serbian radio-television through me or in some other ways, and in that way conveying the money, but I absolutely do not remember personally receiving such a sum of money.

Q. Will you please comment, then, on this very brief note. It is a note written by the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and signed by him, Ratko Veselinovic. It is his note in which he says: "At the end of 1994, the Ministry of Finance --"

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I will not read out the ¹³⁸⁵⁵ name, but you will be able to gather yourself.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. "-- to Ratko Veselinovic, a list of our citizens from the diaspora was handed in, people who had collected funds and who wanted to help their people. When handing over this list, the request was made to check whether these funds were deposited in the budget of the Republic of Serbia Krajina or the municipality budget. As these funds were handed in to --" and then the position and name of Witness C-061 is given -- "amounting to 169.417 US dollars, having made checks through the foreign exchange inspector, the Finance Minister established that no such funds were invested into the budget of the Republic of Serbian Krajina or into the budget of the Municipal Assembly of Knin.

"In the foreign exchange inspectorate, proceedings were instituted against --" the name of C-061 is given -- "but in view of the fact that he held the position which he did --" and then that position is defined -- "the proceedings were conducted in secrecy. The proceedings were instituted by the foreign exchange inspectorate, and in charge was Vladimir Velebit who was killed in the Serbian Krajina under mysterious circumstances and that is why this note is being made. Signed Ratko Veselinovic, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Serbian Krajina." As this is no statement of a witness but, rather, a note drafted in connection with the event I have just described, I assume that at least this can be accepted into evidence. If not --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. What is the date of the note, please? Has it got a date on it? ¹³⁸⁵⁶

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am afraid I don't have -- there is no date on this, I'm afraid.

JUDGE MAY: Let us see the document. While that's being collected, perhaps we could be reminded of the exhibit number for the collection, which in the end was exhibited, I think. It's the list. Yes, D63.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We note that this has a fax date on, it's pointed out by the registry, of December 1999. It's got another one on of more recent date, November this year. But in any event, we will admit it subject to the right of the Prosecution to make any objections in due course.

Perhaps the Prosecution could see it now. Perhaps we could have an exhibit number.

THE REGISTRAR: That will be Defence Exhibit 64, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: And perhaps the witness should see it before he comments on it.

If you'd just have a look at that, Witness C-061.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour -- Your Honours, while the witness is reading it, the Prosecution would object against the admissibility of this document, because what it amounts to is actually a statement of a person signing this document, explaining something that happened years ago, and it's actually a written statement about facts of that time, and it's given in 1999, and as we also saw, that same date was on the fax list. The fax list had that same date, and it's actually a ¹³⁸⁵⁷ statement.

JUDGE MAY: Since we don't have it translated, it's difficult for us to judge. What we'll do is we will admit it but subject to oral argument in due course when we have a translation. Yes, Witness C-061. Do you want to make any comment on that document now you've had the chance to read it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know anything about this. I said that I only recollect that some funds were handed over in my apartment to the director of Serbian radio television. I don't exactly remember the sum involved. As for this, I know nothing about it.

JUDGE MAY: Does it represent the truth, as far as you know?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What is written here, no. I do not remember that, absolutely not.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes. Let the document be handed back, unless you want to ask any more questions about it, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I've read out the whole document, and I think it contains sufficient information. I have no further questions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I just didn't understand the answer that you gave that the money was handed over in your apartment, the money from the diaspora, in your apartment, to the director of television. Which television?

A. It's not this money that I'm referring to but a certain sum of -- for the Serbian radio television in Knin.

Q. And what was the name of that director of the Serbian television ¹³⁸⁵⁸ in Knin to whom the money was given?

A. Lazar Macura.

Q. I see. So Lazar Macura, in your apartment, received some money but not this sum that is mentioned in this note.

A. No. On another occasion, not in connection with this.

Q. And what was that first occasion if this was another occasion?

A. He received a donation for the Serbian radio and television. I don't remember exactly.

Q. So you're claiming that you never received money from Serbs in the diaspora intended for aid to the people of Krajina?

A. I did receive 10.000 dollars from a man called Prica in the presence of Rasuo, and Caslav Ocic gave me 5.000 American dollars from Momcilo Djujic, he said, and asked me to sign a note of thanks, and I gave this money to Rasuo and the representative offices in Belgrade. I received support from the diaspora for the elections, for my party, amounting to about 7.000, I think it was Canadian dollars, so -- and I also received from certain people --

Q. And what was Caslav Ocic at that time, at the time when the Vance Plan was under consideration?

A. Caslav Ocic was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Eastern Slavonia.

Q. And do you remember his article in the newspaper in which he wrote that Cyrus Vance had bribed me with -->20 million to accept the Vance Plan? Do you perhaps recollect that?

A. I do not. ¹³⁸⁵⁹

Q. Very well. This is just one of the minor details that I was accused of in those days. But let us move on with regard to the events that, as we have seen, you know very little about, especially in 1990. Did you know anything about the illegal arming of paramilitary formations in Croatia, in the first place the members of the HDZ and all the other formations that I listed yesterday, so I don't have to repeat them today, all their different names.

A. I knew as much as was broadcast by the media, and in the spot or announcement of the information service of the federal Secretariat of National Defence.

Q. And do you know that already on the 11th of November, 1990, the Presidency of Yugoslavia, at a session it held, was informed of a channel for illegal import of weapons to Croatia as early as the 11th of November, 1990?

A. I said that I had heard through the media reports by the Secretariat for National Defence on the illegal arming of the HDZ and other people who were not part of the legal police structure of the government of Croatia.

Q. Do you know, since at that meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY, Stipe Mesic, as a member of the Presidency, was present as well as Ante Markovic as the president of the federal executive council, that through them, the leadership of Croatia was immediately informed that this illegal channel had been unveiled, discovered, and then Spegelj got the message, "Flee abroad, otherwise, you'll be arrested." Are you familiar with this?

A. I don't know about these events in connection with the Presidency. ¹³⁸⁶⁰ What I do know about those events, I just said how I learnt about them.

Q. All right. Tell me this, is the following correct -- I'm just going to ask you whether it's true or not and you can give a yes or no answer. You don't have to talk about matters that I'm not asking you about.

Is it true that after the -- before the general attack on the -- by the Croatian paramilitary formations on the JNA units, the new HDZ authorities in Croatia had quite a number of clashes and conflicts with the Serb people in Krajina? Is that true or not?

A. As far as I remember, there was some sort of order for a complete blockade of the barracks by Croatia, and before that, there were conflicts and clashes between the military formations or, rather, the police forces and the DB forces, state security on the one side, and the Croatian police on the other side. So the DB from Krajina on one side and the police on the other, the Croatian police force. Those clashes took place before that, before the JNA.

Q. All right. Tell me this: Did the first clash take place, regardless of the fact that you don't seem to remember anything from 1990, but did it take place on the 17th of August, 1990, in Kninska Krajina when the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Croatia demanded that the police station in Knin be renamed and called by a different way, with a plaque up in front of the door, and instead of the Yugoslav flag, the Croatian flag should be put out with the chequerboard emblem and that the policemen that made up the police force in that station be replaced by Croatian policemen? Did this first clash take place on the 17th of August, then? ¹³⁸⁶¹

A. Not on the 17th of August but two or three days later, I think. And the clash did not take place in Knin either, and it wasn't a real clash, actually. Or, rather, there was a conflict when the special police force of the Croatian government in Split started out towards Knin and when some people were armed at the barricades in Civljani and they shot, they started firing. The police went back to Vrlika and that was the incident in question.

The next incident that occurred, after the 17th of August, that is to say, round about that time, according to the information that I had received from policemen in Drnis is when Ante Bujas, the chief of the police from Sibenik issued an order, having received instructions from the Internal Affairs Ministry, to disarm the barricades at Klanac between Tepljuh and the other Kosovo area, and that the special police units from Drnis should move towards Knin, whereas the policemen from Knin, the Serbs and Croats, refused to carry out the order and it was never actually implemented. So that's what happened in Knin in the month of August.

Q. All right. Let me remind you: The commander of the police station at that time in Knin, was that Milan Martic? Was he the commander who, with 19 other policemen, referred back to Petar Gracanin, the Internal Affairs Minister, to ask him to stop this violence over the police station in Knin? And as the federal secretariat didn't take any steps to do that, he had to fend for himself and do the best he could. Was that what happened?

A. The commander, or komandir, was a man by the name of Vujko. He was a Serb by origin from around Skradin and previously he had served in ¹³⁸⁶² the Serb police force. And there was a letter which was drafted on the 5th of July, I think it was. It was published in the Politika newspaper, and it was signed by most of the policemen in Knin, and this was to organise a petition with all the signatures. This was organised in fact, this petition, by Martic, Nikola Manovic, Zelenbaba, and some others - I can't remember their names - and most of the policemen of the Knin police station. They wrote this letter to Petar Gracanin, saying that they refused to have the new uniforms and insignia prescribed by the Ministry of the Interior of Croatia. Was that your question?

Q. And tell me, then, what was Martic then at that time?

A. Martic was an inspector in the police station in Knin.

Q. All right. Tell me this, then: This conflict, clash, when the new Croatian authorities took this step and the clash was a reaction to this on the part of the policemen in Knin, they reacted by sending a petition to the federal Minister of Internal Affairs. Is that right? Is that what you were saying?

A. I said that they had organised the signing of a petition, and this petition or letter was printed in the Politika newspaper at the beginning of July, and they did not wish to have the police force -- the name of the police force in Knin changed to Redarstvo, they did not accept the new caps with the new insignia and emblems of Croatia, and the uniforms that were prescribed, and they were supposed to be black uniforms.

Q. Do you know the reasons why they refused to accept the chequerboard emblem and those black uniforms?

A. Up until then, the insignias they wore, worn by the policemen in ¹³⁸⁶³ the Socialist Republic of Croatia, was the five-pointed star. The Ministry of the Interior or, rather, the Croatian government, even before the changes that were made to the constitution of Croatia, stipulated that the police should wear the insignia and emblems of the so-called chequerboard which was the old Croatian emblem, the chequerboard emblem. And there were proposals, whether this was formally done or not, at the level of the Croatian government that the name for the police force be the Redarstvo or "Orderly" and later on, the police of Croatia. Now, whether for some time this term, which was Redarstvo, whether it was ever used officially I don't know, but in the common parlance, it was.

Q. Well, why were these people so sensitive to the "sahovic" or the chequerboard coat of arms?

A. In the Socialist Republic of Croatia's coat of arms was the chequerboard emblem, the old Croatian coat of arms, but it was reduced slightly, it was a little smaller. So the emblems of corn, sea, and so on with the five-pointed star was what they wanted to abolish, and introduce the chequerboard coat of arms and emblems without any of the additional symbols. So this was the old Croatian coat of arms. And this was commented by most of the Serbs in Croatia at that time, the political parties as well as the Serbs in the police force in Knin, as symbols which bring to mind the NDH, the Independent State of Croatia during the war. Although I listened to Mr. Seks, he explained this, whether cynically or not, but he said that the Ustasha chequerboard began with a white field in the upper row whereas this one now the new ¹³⁸⁶⁴ chequerboard coat of arms began with the red field, the red square. But this was not really taken seriously.

Q. Well, what about the reactions? Did the people react because these were in fact Ustasha symbols?

A. The interpretation was that they brought to mind and resembled the Ustasha emblems and that it associated people with the Independent State of Croatia, the Ustasha state.

Q. Now, did you have any understanding for that or did it remind you of that as well?

A. We were opposed to a unilateral step of this kind, that is to say that the majority in the Croatian parliament should impose such emblems as state emblems and coats of arms, that is to say the official coat of arms of the Republic of Croatia. We wanted this to be discussed with the representatives of the Serbs living in Croatia, which means that we were opposed to having symbols of this kind introduced without the acquiescence of the Serb people.

Q. All right. I didn't ask you that. What I was asking you was did you personally consider this to be Ustasha symbols?

A. It was laying too great an emphasis on the Ustasha Croatian emblems, because the Ustasha chequerboards in fact had the letter 'U' added to them.

Q. Can I take it, then, that you did not consider that they were Ustasha symbols?

A. Well, this was suggested in a way. It sort of associated us with the Independent State of Croatia, and by overemphasising Croatian national ¹³⁸⁶⁵ symbols, this did resemble and bring to mind the former symbols although these weren't the Ustasha symbols in fact.

Q. So did you consider that it was not an Ustasha symbol?

A. It did not associate me with those.

Q. So are you saying that you were not reminded of the Ustasha symbols? Is that what you're saying now?

A. In our public debates, we called them pro-Ustasha symbols. I can't remember exactly what we called them, but not as an exclusive Ustasha symbol. That's what I considered. Although they did sort of resemble them and remind us of them and so perhaps the word was actually used. I can't quite remember now.

Q. So your answer is perhaps but you can't remember exactly. Let's move on so as not to go on with this question for too long. Do you remember that the MUP of Croatia decided to have an airborne helicopter unit land at Knin and have ground forces from Sibenik, Split and Gospic move on the police station to take control of it, and this operation was led by the Deputy Minister of the Internal Affairs, Perica Juric, who returned to the country as a well-known Ustasha emigre, which he had been up until then, but the operative centre of the RV PVO reacted to prevent bloodshed. The air force and anti-aircraft units wanted to prevent the bloodshed by sending in the forces and thus thwarted the conflict that could have taken place between the police, the Croatian police on the one hand and the Knin police force on the other. Is that correct? Is that true or not?

A. I've already spoken about what I know of those events that took ¹³⁸⁶⁶ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³⁸⁶⁷ place on the 17th of August, 1990, in Knin, and the intimation that Croatian transporters were to arrive in Knin. Later on, I heard that Croatia had three, the Croatian air force had three APCs. One of them had broken down in Kosovo whereas another one was really stopped at Korenica in the Lika region.

Later on, I learnt about the helicopters, that the helicopters had started out but that the JNA had prevented them from actually landing in Knin and they had to return back to Zagreb. Colonel Bajic later on explained this over television. He was the commander of the air force unit in Zagreb, Colonel Bajic was his name.

JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. The transcript, line 23, page 13, has attributed an answer of the witness to me. No doubt that will be corrected. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. To sum up, the police in those beginnings had clashes with the Serbs in Krajina, the newly established Croatian authorities, and the army acted to stop the conflicts and did not take anybody's side. All it did was to prevent the conflict; isn't that right?

A. I heard that the army had indeed prevented the Croatian police from intervening in Knin, which means taking over the police station and preventing the referendum. So the army made it possible for the police station in Knin to remain independent of the control of the Croatian authorities and that the Serb referendum should go forward without impediment.

Q. All right. Do you know that it was the message of the MUP to -- ¹³⁸⁶⁸ MUP of Croatia to all the other regional MUPs to ensure constant supervision of the garrison and for them to be on the ready to act if the orders came? Do you know of that order on the part of the Croatian police force?

A. No, I do not know about that.

Q. Do you know that the MUP of Croatia, on the 7th of December, 1990, issued orders for the activation of 50 per cent of the reserve force?

A. Exactly when this order was pronounced I don't know, but I did know myself that the Croatian MUP did increase its reserve formations.

Q. And do you remember that in the course of 1990, that is to say before any clashes ever took place which could be denoted as such, that over 70 cases were registered of provocation and physical attacks on members of the JNA in Croatia, individual ones, different ones?

A. I don't know of that particular figure. I didn't have that information.

Q. But do you know about those attacks that took place in 1990?

A. In 1990, you say?

Q. Yes. All this was going on in 1990.

A. There were clashes between the Croatian police and citizens in Petrinja who had fled to the Petrinja garrison and there were some clashes around that garrison. Now, what actually happened, I don't know. Whether it was between the police and army, I don't think it was.

Q. So you know nothing about the attacks, not only those by the police but the armed groups of civilians, the extremists, on members of the army, members of the JNA in 1990? You know nothing about that you ¹³⁸⁶⁹ say?

A. As for 1990, I don't remember. Whether I knew anything, I don't really know.

Q. All right. You say you don't know. Now, do you know that the Presidency of the SFRY on the 9th of January, 1991, that is to say at the very beginning of the year, issued an order to disband all armed units which were not within the composition of the united armed forces of the SFRY and that this was to have been completed by the 19th of January, that is to say, within a space of ten days?

A. Yes, I do know about that order.

Q. And do you know that the Yugoslav state Presidency, because of the situation it found itself in, decided at a meeting of the 25th of January to call the president of the federal government and the federal Secretariat for National Defence and that an agreement was reached by which the -- by the 6th of January the reserve force was to be demobilised, of the police force in Croatia, and the units of the JNA be reduced to the peacetime level of readiness. Do you know about that?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you remember that the Presidency of the SFRY, at the insistence of the government of Croatia, extended the time limit, the deadline that it set for the 9th of January, it put it off for 48 hours because they explained that they were not able to implement the order in such a short space of time? So they asked for two more days, and the Presidency did indeed extend the deadline. Do you know about that?

A. Yes, I do. ¹³⁸⁷⁰

Q. And do you remember that on the 22nd of January, the Yugoslav state Presidency took note of the fact that disarmament had not taken place in Croatia and that Croatia was in fact arming itself and that a mobilisation was going on, quite the contrary to what had been agreed upon and promised in order to thwart and prevent the conflicts and for political issues to be settled by political means? Do you know about that?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you remember one specific event that took place at that time when this disbanding was supposed to take place? The leadership of Croatia in fact handed out weapons in Osijek, and between the 19th and 20th of January, 1991, a driver Zdravko Tomsic [phoen] was seized with a supply of arms, and in Eastern Slavonia a similar incident took place, Darda. Do you remember these incidents?

A. Yes, I did hear about that. I heard that the police was handing out weapons to the reservists, and it was rumoured that their weapons were being handed out to the members of the HDZ. Now, I don't remember that specific case with the truck, that you mentioned, and the driver.

Q. All right. And do you remember that on the 5th of May, the Croatian paramilitary units blocked the barracks in Osijek and Gospic and that on the 8th of July, this was followed by an attack on JNA units which were providing security for the 25th of May bridge across the Danube River, Bracka Palanka? Do you remember those occurrences?

A. These incidents, which means the intensive blocking of the barracks, this wave started after the beginning of May, after the incident ¹³⁸⁷¹ in Borovo Selo and Plitvice Lakes, Polaca, Benkovac, between Polaca and Kijevo, near Knin. And other events, the ones in Split, for example. So that was the time that we saw an escalation in the conflict and the protests that were going on, both on the part of Croatian citizens and the beginning of the blockade of the barracks, JNA barracks, and the blockades by members of the police, the guards, and who knows who else.

Q. Do you remember the clash between the police that occurred in Pakrac in early March 1991?

A. I asked you about this conflict. I asked you what was going on there, and you said everything would be all right and I could go to Knin. Later on, I read in the press that there had been a conflict between Serb citizens and the Croatian police, that the JNA had intervened, and the press even said that people had been killed. I think --

Q. Are you saying that you know nothing about these events apart from what you read in the papers?

A. Well, what I heard from the media, that something was going on there, then I called you on the phone. I was in Belgrade at the time. I rang you up. And then I read in the press about these events, and later on there was talk about them. But my knowledge of these events is not direct, it's indirect.

Q. Did you, when you arrived there - in Knin, I mean, when you returned - did you find out whether this was correct, that over 600 policemen from the training centre in Lucko near Zagreb were on their way to Pakrac in three columns?

A. Yes. Of course we knew all about that. We were informed of that, ¹³⁸⁷² but not directly. We did not have direct communication with Pakrac.

Q. Did the JNA intervene in time there with the same aim that they had in Knin to prevent inter-ethnic clashes and bloodshed?

A. I don't know how the conflict broke out there exactly, but later on I heard or read somewhere that Borisav Jovic had said that he had ordered an intervention by the JNA, and after that, he asked for the approval of the Presidency for the way in which the JNA became active in Pakrac.

Q. Do you know that a small unit was sent which prevented a clash and that, later on, teams arrived from the federal Ministry of the Interior to solve the problems that had occurred in Pakrac, to prevent serious consequences?

A. I know about the intervention but not about the details.

Q. But I assume you know that although everything was done to prevent the conflict that was imminent, that it did take place. It did break out, not only between representatives of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior and the Serbian citizens living in these areas but that also fire was opened from one of these armoured personnel carriers belonging to the Croatian police which I mentioned and which fired on JNA soldiers stationed in front of the Pakrac hospital. Are you aware of this event?

A. As I said, I'm not aware of the details of what happened in Pakrac.

Q. Very well, then. Do you know that within the scope of these same efforts and in this same -- in this same context, on the 30th of March, 1991, the Plitvice Lakes were taken by force, on which occasion two men ¹³⁸⁷³ were killed and 20 wounded? Did you know anything about that?

A. Yes, I did. I had personal knowledge of these events in the afternoon of that day. I think it was the last day of March.

Q. Very well.

A. The intervention of the special police of Croatia took place after forces were deployed, forces of the Krajina police, and I don't know who else Martic deployed there. A police station was to be opened in Plitvice, but the Serb forces deployed by Martic were instead deployed in battle formation. After that, the Croatian police intervened, and the first clash occurred, as I heard, behind the bridge over the river Korana at the entrance to Plitvice. The Serbian forces fired a -- fired a rifle grenade, which missed its mark, and then the clash broke out, and a Croatian policeman was killed. I don't know if it was then or a little later, the Serbs retreated from the bridge. Then there was a skirmish. Rifle shots were fired and a Serb was killed in the area of the hotel in Plitvice. And the result of all this was that the Croatian police took over the national park area as far as the hotel or, rather, the memorial home of the 6th Lika Division near Mukinje. The JNA intervened from the north in the direction of Plitvice, and they deployed themselves in the area of Mukinje. I met General Stimac personally who was in charge of this JNA intervention.

Q. So what was the purpose of this intervention? Was it to separate the warring sides? Is this correct or not? Was it not to create a buffer zone between the two hostile parties?

A. The army separated the Krajina police, which was under the control ¹³⁸⁷⁴ of the Serbian DB, and the special police of Croatia, which had taken the area of the hotel. So the army was actually deployed as a buffer in the Mukinje area.

Q. All right. So the army was serving was a buffer. Who was there from the Serbian DB controlling the Krajina police?

A. I can't remember exactly. Before the intervention, before the effort to set up a Krajina SUP police station in Plitvice, there was a man whose name I can't remember now, although I know him, and he knew what was going on. I can't say exactly whether it was he who intervened for Martic to deploy his forces in battle formation rather than trying to set up a police station, but the DB structure did have an influence in this particular instance. The man from the DB of Serbia had all the information, and I suspect that it was he who intervened with Martic and got him to deploy his forces in battle formation rather than simply trying to set up a police station. That is what I know about the functioning of this structure after April.

Q. As far as I can understand, you're constantly drawing conclusions but you have no facts to present. You're simply drawing conclusions on the basis of your assumptions or on the basis of a goal that is to be reached. This is the first time I'm hearing that the DB of Serbia participated in the clash on Plitvice between the forces of the Krajina and the Croatian police.

A. I know that he was well aware of the situation. I don't know what the extent of his influence was, but I do know that instead of opening a police station, Martic deployed his forces in battle formation. ¹³⁸⁷⁵

Q. That explains nothing. Tell me, is it correct that on the 31st of March, Croatian policemen, as they were called at the time, arrived as guests in the national park of Plitvice? They were posing as visitors, and they attempted to ambush the police of Krajina from within.

A. Well, there was talk of this, that some were in there, but I have described the events as I learned about them at the time.

Q. So Croatian policemen came disguised as visitors in order to attack from the inside, and the DB of Serbia knew about this and organised, I can conclude from what you're saying, they influenced the police of the Krajina to organise themselves. Is that what you're saying?

A. I have described very precisely what I know about the outbreak of the clash. And as for the members of the Croatian police in civilian clothes, there was talk of this but I know nothing specific about it. As for the influence of the DB of Serbia, as I said, that was my conclusion. The facts are what I said. I have told you what I heard at the time had happened. And in the afternoon, I arrived there; from then on, I was in Korenica and I was able to find out for myself what was going on.

JUDGE KWON: Just one second. Mr. Witness, could you tell us the difference between deploying the forces in battle formations and the setting up a police station in concrete terms.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, if you're setting up a police station, you have to find a building, you have to put offices in there, the chief of police, criminal inspector, a traffic policeman, administrative staff, and the administrative structure should be put in place as is usually in a police station. ¹³⁸⁷⁶ Battle formation is something different. No police station was opened. Men who were armed, in uniform and not in uniform, were deployed over an area of several kilometres in the area of the national park, and they were deployed on the edges of the national park facing the territory controlled by the Croatian government. That's what the difference is.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. You may proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: Thank you, Mr. Kwon.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. While you have spent quite some time in The Hague now, the policemen you see around here, are they sitting in a police station or are they on the beat? Are they walking the streets and controlling -- or patrolling the area of their responsibility?

JUDGE MAY: That's not a proper question. It's not for the witness to comment on that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As you are constantly mentioning the DB, do you remember that to my question when I asked you to enumerate some names, you managed to enumerate three, and that was a mistake. You mentioned the wife of one of the people involved who was from the area, and probably she came to visit her parents, accompanied by her husband, and she was not on some sort of secret mission. So this influence of the DB of Serbia amounted to occasional visits, private or official, it doesn't matter, by only three persons, so why can't you enumerate at least ten?

A. I enumerated the chiefs of the DB who were in the Krajina and the chiefs who were in Belgrade. As for the operatives in the field and the ¹³⁸⁷⁷ agents, I didn't know about these.

Q. Well, all these chiefs were from the DB of Krajina. Isn't it so?

A. Jovica Stanisic was not from the DB of the Krajina. He was your chief policeman, your associate. You were his immediate superior. His office, up to the summer, was in the old MUP building. He was close to you.

Q. If he was in Belgrade, how could he have been in Knin? I understood that you had had lunch with him and his wife. I assume that he had gone with his wife to visit her parents in Knin.

A. It wasn't lunch; we had coffee in the Seher restaurant in Belgrade, in the Venjak [phoen] area, in the garden of the restaurant, in fact, and he called me over to introduce his wife to me and to have a chat with me. He wanted to establish friendly relations with me. And after your intervention and after you criticised the fact that I had had to call you for Frenki to be withdrawn from the Krajina, that was the reason he wanted to chat with me, and that was in August in Belgrade, in August 1991.

Q. Well, is it correct that in early May, on the eve of the referendum in Croatia, the Serbian referendum in Croatia, the Croatian police caused several incidents and that there was an incident in Borovo Selo on the 2nd of May? Is this correct?

A. On the 2nd of May, I heard about the clash in Borovo Selo from Vojislav Seselj first. He had been in Knin and he told me that two of his men had been killed in Borovo Selo. Later on, I heard from Frenki that his men, that means the DB, had used an anti-aircraft gun to fire on the ¹³⁸⁷⁸ Croatian police in Borovo Selo. Later on, I heard that the commander, the local commander of the defence of Borovo Selo was -- his name was Vukasin Soskocanin, and for reasons that were never explained, he drowned in the river Danube.

Later on, I heard many stories on the Croatian side as to how this clash had occurred: That the Croatian police had set out for Borovo Selo and that there had been resistance to their entry into Borovo Selo and that a large number of men had been killed. The Croatian police had many men killed, and this caused enormous indignation in Croatia. There were funerals of policemen going on for days and days. This was on television, and public opinion in Croatia became very hostile after this event toward Serbia and toward the Serbs and also toward Yugoslavia, towards everything that, in their view, posed a threat to Croatia.

On the 2nd of May, as I said, Vojislav Seselj --

Q. Let's be brief. Let's cut this short, if we may. You have described the event exactly as it was presented by the Croatian press and Croatian propaganda, the propaganda of the time, and that's quite clear.

A. I heard about this event first from Vojislav Seselj, later from Franko Simatovic, and later on from people from Borovo, and also I saw what the Croatian media were reporting.

Q. Is my information correct that the Serbs from Borovo Selo, as a gesture of goodwill in negotiations with the police, had said they would remove the barricades and that they would normalise the situation because they had been promised that no one would be attacked, arrested, or taken away, would go missing, and that they had removed the barricades, that the ¹³⁸⁷⁹ police had arrived in the village at the agreed time but with two buses, with two terrain vehicles and one passenger vehicle full of policemen, and instead of talking to the population about normalising the situation, they opened fire on all sides and that's how the clash occurred. Is this a correct description of the events in Borovo Selo or what you have just explained, which is the version put forward by the Croatian propaganda at the time?

A. I heard from people from Borovo Selo that the Croatian police had arrived in buses. They even laughed because the Croatian police had been so stupid. They were not prepared for battle, they were simply sitting in buses, and they were allowed to enter into the village. They showed me the spot up to which they had allowed them to enter, and then they opened fire on them. That's what people, local people, actually told me. I don't know about anything else.

Q. Very well. Those two buses full of policemen, two terrain vehicles and a passenger vehicle, so five vehicles full of policemen, two of which were buses, were attacked by the locals of Borovo Selo just like that, out of the blue. And what did those busloads of policemen armed to the teeth, what were they looking for in that village? So Borovo Selo attacked the police and not the police, fully armed, attacking the peasants in Borovo Selo?

A. As far as I know, Borovo Selo was not under the control of the Croatian police. What happened there before, I don't know. The Serbs had Borovo Selo under control and not the police. So that is how the conflicts arose. The Croatian police wanted to establish control over ¹³⁸⁸⁰ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³⁸⁸¹ Borovo Selo, and they met with resistance.

Q. Well, certainly resistance was put up. Borovo Selo didn't go to the police but the police, armed to the teeth, came to the village and opened fired on the village, on their houses, on the people, on the children, women, et cetera. Is it true --

JUDGE MAY: He's given his account. He's given his account of what he's heard.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is what we can read in the Croatian press, what he has just told us.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it true that the event in Borovo Selo on Easter, the 2nd of May, 1991 - it was Easter - that there were no JNA units there at the time and that the entire event occurred outside the area of responsibility of any JNA units?

A. As far as I know, the JNA intervened after those events.

Q. And how did it intervene? Again to separate the clashing parties?

A. Yes, between the Serbian forces in Borovo Selo and the Croatian forces outside Borovo Selo.

Q. So again, to act as a buffer and avoid continued conflicts.

A. Yes. It positioned itself between two conflicting parties.

Q. Very well. And do you remember the announcement from the expanded session of the Presidency of the SFRY regarding four principles for resolving the political crisis in the country? The session was held on the 20th of August, 1991, and all members were present in addition to the members of the Presidency, as announced, that is why it was called an ¹³⁸⁸² expanded session. Participating were the presidents of the republics or, rather, the presidents of the Presidencies of the republics, the president of the Assembly of Yugoslavia, the president of the federal government, or Prime Minister, the vice-president of the Assembly, the presidents of the federal chamber of the Assembly, the federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Justice and Administration, the Minister for Development, the Deputy Minister for Defence, and that the session was chaired by the president of the Presidency of the SFRY, Stipe or Stjepan Mesic, the one who testified here and who is now president in Croatia but whereas he should really be in prison.

Do you remember that event?

A. Not in particular.

Q. But that is when the principles were agreed on. So the Presidency in full composition, the presiding officer was that same Stjepan Mesic, and four principles were established. Do you know them? The first was respect of every people or nation to self-determination, including the right to secession and unification. Any change of external and internal borders is unacceptable by unilateral acts and use of force but only and exclusively if such changes do occur, then it must be on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination and through a democratic procedure and by legal means.

That was adopted at that session chaired by Stjepan Mesic, attended by the whole Presidency and all the top leaders of the Yugoslav state, which was in one -- still in one piece at the time. Secondly, respect -- ¹³⁸⁸³

JUDGE MAY: I think, Mr. Milosevic, we must have time for questions. You're supposed to be questioning him, not making speeches. Does that help you? Do you remember that, Witness C-061?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't remember the details.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will adjourn now and you can continue after the break. Twenty minutes, please.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So, is there any dispute that the Yugoslav leadership in full composition gave top priority to things being resolved by peaceful means and on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination in a democratic procedure and by legal means? Doesn't that disprove your explanations of the use of the right of peoples to self-determination?

A. I'm sorry, what is the actual question?

Q. I just read out to you principle number 1, which says that on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination in a democratic procedure and in a legal way, things needed to be resolved.

A. There were two understandings of that principle of self-determination.

Q. I'm not talking to you about understandings.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish what he was going to say. You are putting things to him and then trying to force him into some sort of corner. He must be entitled to reply himself. Yes. ¹³⁸⁸⁴

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were two understandings or interpretations of the realisation of that right. One was that that right is exercised within republics and through the republics. That was the concept upheld by Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina. And the other was your position regarding the right of self-determination, which was that regardless of republican borders, the nations of Yugoslavia, the recognised nations, including the Serb nation, were entitled to decide which state they would live in regardless of republican borders. And through -- not only in their mother republic, that is Serbia, but in other republics too. In other words, that that right to self-determination can ignore the boundaries of republics.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you remember that I read out to you that it was -- that any change of both external and internal boundaries was unacceptable by force of arms? So external boundaries, secession from Yugoslavia by unilateral acts was unacceptable. This is what was established by that same Presidency chaired by Mesic.

A. I told you I was not familiar with the details of that session.

Q. Even if you are not familiar with the details, I am reading you a document which can be easily verified. For example, the third principle says the principle of equality, which implies the equality of all options, refraining from imposing one's will on others, and use of force. Also the principle of legality, which is means that political agreements must be legally sanctioned and a legal procedure established for its implementation. And then you talk about some law of Jovic's. This is the ¹³⁸⁸⁵ position of the Presidency of the SFRY, which says that legal procedures of implementation have to be established of any political agreement which has to be legally sanctioned without coercion and in conformity with the constitution of Yugoslavia.

Is that clear?

A. I told you how those principles were interpreted in those days; in two different ways.

Q. In those days, as far as I can see from this, these principles were interpreted in a uniform manner by representatives and presidents of all the republics and the entire Presidency of the then-SFRY. That is precisely why I'm quoting them to you, because that is in complete contradiction with what you are saying. But let us move on. Is there any dispute that SFRY existed as a sovereign state right up until the establishment of the FRY? That is the 27th of April, 1992, when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established. Before that, there was the SFRY.

A. That was your interpretation. But the international conference, and especially the so-called Badinter Commission of that conference, stated towards the end of autumn 1991 - I think it was in November, to be precise - that the SFRY was in the process of disintegration, and later on it was stated that it had collapsed.

Q. That is quite a different matter. But even in the documents of this illegal prosecution, what I have said is written, that is, until the formation of the FRY, SFRY existed as a state.

JUDGE MAY: What is the question? ¹³⁸⁸⁶

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Was Croatia recognised by the United Nations on the 22nd of May, 1992? Is that right?

A. I think that is the correct date.

Q. And by the European Union on the 15th of January, 1992, by many countries of the European Union.

A. Germany recognised Croatia, I think, on the 23rd of December, 1991.

Q. Very well. The role of Germany, the Vatican, and other powers has been explained here. I'm asking you about recognition by the European Union. So it was on the 15th of January, 1992?

A. I think it was on the 8th of October, 1991, that the three-month moratorium expired regarding the independence of Croatia and Slovenia which was agreed upon at Brioni, and that after that term had expired, Croatia declared that it had become an independent state.

Q. Let us clear up this thing. Is there any dispute that throughout this period and after this recognition of Croatia, the territory of Krajina was a United Nations protected area?

A. I am sorry; could you repeat the question? I can't read out the English.

Q. So Croatia was recognised on the 22nd of May, 1992, by the United Nations, and on the 15th of January by the European Union. Is it true that after that time and throughout, the territory of Krajina was a protected area by the United Nations, according to the Vance Plan? ¹³⁸⁸⁷

A. From February -- from the end of February 1992, the Security Council adopted a resolution deciding that four -- four areas should be formed under UN protection. So Krajina and parts of the territories of Slavonia which were not part of Slavonia and Eastern Slavonia.

Q. Very well. Is it true that all Security Council resolutions, including the one 740 of the 4th of February, 743 of the 21st of February, and 762 of the 30th of June, 1992, and 802 of the 25th of January, 1993, and the Vance Plan, as well as the report of the UN Secretary-General dated the 3rd of February, 1992; 15th of February, 1992; 17th of July, 1992; 10th of February, 1993, that they all speak about UN protected areas and about peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia? Is that right or not?

A. Yes. They speak about it, but the plan according to which that protection was to have been provided, was not complied with.

Q. I'm asking you whether these documents refer to that or not.

A. The protection applied to a state of demilitarisation, a mixed police force, the return of displaced persons. That was what the protection related to.

Q. Is it beyond doubt - and please give me a yes or no answer - that Croatia did not enjoy sovereignty over those territories?

A. First of all, the conference on the former Yugoslavia stated that there could be no change of republican borders.

Q. Again you're giving me an answer to a question I have not put to you.

A. So Croatian laws did not apply to those territories. Croatia did not assert its authority in those areas, if that is your question. ¹³⁸⁸⁸

Q. Yes, that is my question. I will now quote to you from a report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the 4th of February, 1992, on page 5.D, and I will quote the whole of it: "It follows from this that areas under UN protection as hitherto would not be subject to the laws and institutions of the Republic of Croatia in the transitional period up to a political settlement." That is what is stated in the report of the UN Secretary-General.

A. The Secretary-General also stated that in the Security Council, and this was adopted in February 1992, upon which the peace forces were deployed.

Q. Well, is it then clear, and I'm asking you because these false charges speak of some sort of Serbian occupation, is it possible to speak about Serbian occupation?

A. It is possible to speak about the occupation by Serbia. Serbs were living there and Serbia had de facto authority in that area.

Q. Since you insist on that, I will use some quotations from this report of the Secretary-General linked to the course of the negotiating process regarding the Vance Plan, and here is what is stated in that report. As you have been referring to Mark Goulding, Deputy Secretary-General, here is what is stated in the report. And I'm reading the report, report of the UN Secretary-General dated the 4th of February, 1992, and it refers to the Vance Plan:

"In the course of my talks --" in the course of his talks in Belgrade, Mr. Goulding once again was given unconditional assurances by Mr. Branko Kostic, the vice-president of the SFRY; Mr. Borisav Jovic, the ¹³⁸⁸⁹ president of the State Committee for Cooperation with the UN Regarding Peacekeeping; General Blagoje Adzic, acting federal Secretary of Defence of Yugoslavia, and the Chief of Staff of the JNA, that they accept the plan and that they will fully cooperate in its implementation. The President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, also reiterated his full acceptance of the plan.

"Also in Belgrade, Goulding --" this was point 10 that I read out. Now point 11:

"He met with Adzic, the leader of the Serbian community in the region of Eastern Slavonia, who had an objection, but it was removed when Goulding explained that in a future resolution, it would be emphasised that the presence of the peacekeeping forces does not preempt or prejudice the political negotiations. When this had been explained to him, Mr. Adzic confirmed his acceptance of the UN plan." Then mention is made of the visit with Mr. Veljko Dzakula in another area. In fact, that is Western Slavonia, under UN protection, and we know that and that is what is stated here, who also accepted the plan. Point 12 of this report of the Secretary-General says: "Mr. Milan Babic, the leader of the Serbian community in the third proposed UN protected area, with whom Mr. Goulding had a five-hour long talk in Knin on the 27th of January, declared that he and his colleagues in the government --" and here it says, "of the so-called Serbian Krajina" -- "cannot accept the UN plan. He expressed the view that stating in the plan that UN protected areas in Croatia were unacceptable because they prejudiced the political settlement. He believed that ¹³⁸⁹⁰ Goulding's proposal that this be resolved by a Security Council document does not provide sufficient security. He rejected demilitarisation," et cetera.

Let me not continue reading because it is very lengthy. "Babic added that only his government can assume responsibility towards the Security Council on behalf of his community," which is correct. "Goulding refused to make any changes in the plan which had been adopted by the Security Council."

And then I just wish to quote from point 13: "In Zagreb, President Franjo Tudjman and senior officers in his government also declared that they could not accept the fundamental aspect of the plan whereby they withdrew the complete and unconditional support of that plan expressed to my envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, on the 1st of January."

As we can see, it was only Tudjman and one of the leaders, by their refusal, actually delayed the implementation of the Vance Plan and prolonged the agony. And Tudjman declared, and I quote: "After international recognition of his republic, there are no political issues left to be negotiated. Mr. Goulding declared that such withdrawal of support for the plan by Mr. Tudjman would mean depriving the plan of two of its central elements and would undermine the basis for its acceptance by others. However, even after many hours of talks, Mr. Goulding did not manage to overcome this new and unacceptable -- unexpected obstacle to the deployment of international peace forces."

Therefore, we see that Tudjman's position is in accord with the ¹³⁸⁹¹ position of one of the leaders of one of these UN protected areas. And now I'm asking you: Do you remember -- since Tudjman later on, under pressure, accepted the deployment of these forces, however, in the paragraph regarding his refusal, he says that Croatia has been recognised and that there are no reason for any further negotiations. My question now is: Do you remember that international mediators, including Lord Carrington who chaired the conference, assessed that recognition of Croatia had been premature and that this marked the death toll for the peace conference on Yugoslavia? Do you remember that?

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have time just for a moment. First of all, do you want that document exhibited, Mr. Milosevic, the report of the Secretary-General?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As you wish. I can give it to you. However, this is in Serbian. And it's generally distributed B23451, February 2nd, original English. The title is "Further report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 721 of 1991." You can probably find it in your archives. But I can give you this copy too.

JUDGE MAY: No need to go on. We'll ask the Prosecution if they can produce for us a copy. They should have one in English.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I don't -- we couldn't find anything that we have. We only -- what we have is actually the other document that Mr. Milosevic talked about, that was the Presidency session of the 20th of August. This we would have. But --

JUDGE MAY: Let us have, then, the accused's copy, and we'll exhibit it and get it translated if necessary. ¹³⁸⁹²

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here you are.

JUDGE MAY: Exhibit number for it, please.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be Defence Exhibit 65.

JUDGE MAY: Now, Witness C-061, you can -- you've heard a very extensive document read out. It may be you should have a copy in front of you so you can comment on it, and if you wish, we could go in at any stage to private session if you wish to comment on it.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can comment on the document.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Go into private session.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted] ¹³⁸⁹³ Pages 13893-13898 - redacted - private session

¹³⁸⁹⁹

[redacted]

[Open session]

JUDGE KWON: Do we have the documents, Resolution and report?

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: At the moment, we're searching for the English version in our systems, and I cannot say so, no.

JUDGE KWON: Would you like the documents be exhibited?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think they should be exhibited, the Resolution and the UN Secretary-General report that I've just quoted from. And it would be a good thing if you had the Serbian ¹³⁹⁰⁰ version for you to be able to compare and see that I quoted very precisely. Each word is in its proper place.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Regardless of the fact that the original is in English.

JUDGE MAY: Let us deal with them now. There should be a Resolution and a report. If the registrar has them, they could be given a number.

THE REGISTRAR: Your --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are we in open session?

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the exhibits be given a number.

THE REGISTRAR: Okay. Resolution 802 dated the 25th of January, 1993, will be Defence Exhibit 66. And the Further Report of the Secretary-General dated the 15th of February, 1992, will be Defence Exhibit 67.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. To go back to the meeting in Igalo and the agreement reached there with Lord Carrington about a ceasefire, you had occasion to hear the tape as well of the conversation between General Kadijevic and the Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman, in which Kadijevic insists upon the fact that the agreement reached with Carrington should be respected. You know the subsequent events that took place. Is it true that the Croatian side yet again did not respect the agreement? ¹³⁹⁰¹

A. Can you remind me of the date, please? I didn't take part in the agreement, so --

Q. In Igalo, it took place in November 1991. That was when the meeting was held at which the agreement on a ceasefire was signed and when Kadijevic -- or, as far as I have noted down here, you can -- the date should be checked out. It was the 17th of September, not November. The 17th of September, 1991, was the date.

Is it true that the Croatian side once again did not respect the agreement? You listened to the tape, and you know about the events. So is it correct or not?

A. After the middle of September, according to my information, the Yugoslav People's Army took -- launched an active operation towards Nis. At the beginning of October, it went towards Zadar and Sibenik. Now, what happened on other battlefronts I can't say with any certainty, but after the middle of the September, the intensity of the armed conflict escalated considerably. Now, who violated the agreement, if that was the date that it was reached, I don't know. What I do know was that there were incidents which broke out in the area of Petrovo Polje and -- Petrovo Polje near Drnis and Molvice in Lika.

At Petrovo Polje, what happened was that police groups from Knin started shooting. There was crossfire with the Croatian forces - whether police forces or the guards corps, I don't quite know - but the report said that there was some shooting going on that something was happening down there, I don't know exactly what. And then Frenki's armoured platoon went to Tepljuh and the situation escalated. After that, the Knin Corps ¹³⁹⁰² reacted with its artillery and fired at the Croatian positions and settlements in Petrovo Polje. That was in September 1991, to the best of my knowledge.

Q. I'm asking you very specifically about the cease-fire agreement and not about the events that took place before the cease-fire agreement was reached, and what I asked you specifically was: Is it true that the Croatian side yet again did not respect the agreement, and you heard the telephone conversation between Kadijevic and Tudjman in which Kadijevic is advocating respect for Carrington's agreement and insisting upon the fact that they ceased their attacks on the barracks to enable the barracks to have water and electricity supplies and to abide by the agreement. So I'm asking you: Is it true that, after the agreement was reached, the Croatian side did not respect it once again?

A. According to my knowledge and information, I did hear that there were ten or 15 agreements, cease-fire agreements, in the course of that autumn.

Q. I'm not asking you about the 15 agreements of any kind, I'm asking you about the Carrington agreement that the whole world knew about and that Tudjman signed. It wasn't an agreement between two commanders or anything like that, it was signed by Tudjman himself. That's the agreement that I'm asking you about.

JUDGE MAY: Witness C-061, if you don't know the answer to a question, just say you don't know and we'll get on more quickly. But if you do know, just try and answer it directly, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I try to say what I know about the ¹³⁹⁰³ events of the time. And as for this question, all I can say is I don't know.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you remember that Kadijevic, in his letter to Lord Carrington on the following day - and this was published in the papers - said that in spite of all assurances by Croatian organs that they had ordered a ceasefire, attacks were still continuing with exceptional force and a remorselessness and that, unfortunately, at 12.00 of the 12th when a complete cease-fire was to have taken effect, the Croatian forces not only did not stop but they intensified their attacks on the JNA. It goes on to say that in Zagreb, Sibenik, Varazdin Petrinja, Vukovar Vinkovci, in the area of Sinj, Skradin, Ogulin and other places, attacks had taken place and not a single JNA facility had been unblocked --

JUDGE MAY: Do you know anything about this, Witness?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think I have already said what I know about these events at the time. I said that in September, there was an intensive blockade and also attacks by Croatian forces on barracks in the towns of Croatia. I knew about this from the media, and this was common knowledge. People talked about. And I have already said this. And I tried to add to this what I myself saw.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Do you remember the decisions on the blocking of all JNA barracks in Croatia? This decision was issued in mid-August 1991, while the decision on attacks on the barracks and all JNA units was made ¹³⁹⁰⁴ on the 14th of September, 1991, and Carrington responded immediately in order to prevent this, and a few days later the cease-fire agreement was signed.

A. That is correct, and I knew about this, yes.

Q. Very well, then. The events of the 6th of May in Split and Sibenik, which are well known, up until the 25th of July, do you know that in this period there were 126 incidents recorded in Croatia of force used against persons and facilities of the JNA and 22 armed attacks on JNA units were registered, 11 instances of opening fire and physically imperilling barracks, 36 incidents of overstepping of authority?

A. I've heard of such events but I can't tell you any precise data. This was the second stage of the escalation of conflicts after the events of May 1991.

Q. Very well, then. Is it clear from these facts - and these are facts, not somebody's standpoints - that the then-leadership of Croatia, several days before the meeting with Carrington, issued a decision on an all-out attack and the JNA and that what was agreed in Igalo was not respected a single moment, that is, that the leadership of Croatia never had any intention of complying with it. When all these facts are added up and compared, isn't this clear?

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop these speeches. If you want to comment on what the accused has said, you can do so, Witness C-061, or we'll move on.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. What was the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ¹³⁹⁰⁵

Q. When what you yourself say in your reply that you know about, in connection with the decision on blockading barracks, in connection with the decision on attacks throughout Croatia on barracks, after which there followed an intervention by Lord Carrington and Tudjman signed the agreement on a cease-fire which involved the mobilising reservists of the Croatian National Guard and so on and so forth, that the attacks intensified, which is evident from Kadijevic's letter to Lord Carrington written on the following day, and that not for a single moment did they comply with or have any intention of complying with the agreement they had signed with Lord Carrington.

A. If the agreement was reached in September, on the basis of your question, I can say that from the 26th of August, as far as I know, a large-scale intervention by the JNA began in the direction of the territories controlled by the Croatian government and police. I don't know what you want me to do now, whether you want me to make what I know fit into some conclusion of yours.

Q. Well, let's --

JUDGE MAY: No doubt that's what the accused wants to do, and his conclusions are matters which he can submit to us. They're not matters for the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are you aware of the fact that in 1990 Tudjman, at a meeting with Manovic, Bojkovac and other associates of his, worked out in detail the first stage of the then-concealed covert war against the JNA?

A. No. ¹³⁹⁰⁶

Q. Well, then, I won't put any questions about this, about elements of something you know nothing about.

Do you know that when issuing the decision on a forcible secession, the members of the Croatian leadership had a strategy of -- of a simultaneous attack on the JNA in order to stretch out the forces in all places where the JNA was deployed in Croatia to cover as wide a territory as possible and to engage them in a large number of small tasks while prolonging the institutional crisis in the country and obstructing the functioning of the political, economic, and military system in an attempt to limit the JNA in its ability to -- and to attack it? Do you know what was happening at the time? Do you know about this?

A. What I know about the preparations of the government of Croatia against the JNA, while I think this is the first thing I heard, it was information that came from the federal secretariat for defence, the information service, and this was the first time that these activities of the Croatian government were presented in detail. That was on the 25th of January, 1991. And I have already spoken of what was being said at the time, what people talked about, that the Croatian government was arming the police and the members of the HDZ, and the ruling party and the then-government of Croatia had a model for ordering relations in Yugoslavia. They openly advocated their own political model, and that was quite clear.

I don't know what else you're asking me about.

Q. Very well. Is it correct that after Plitvice, which we have just mentioned, that fresh conflicts broke out, one after another, against ¹³⁹⁰⁷ Serbian villages? For example, in Glina, Brsadin, there were armed clashes between the Croatian police and the Serbian police and attacks on citizens of Serb nationality where there were dead, wounded, imprisoned? Do you remember anything of this?

For example, on the 26th of June, 1991, in Glina and Brsadin?

A. I remember the clash in Glina very well, because after the outbreak of these clashes, I was in the vicinity or, rather, I claim to Glina and I was able to see what was going on there. The special police of the Krajina, Captain Dragan, and armed citizens from Glina were engaged in an armed conflict with the Croatian police and attempting to take over the police station in Glina which until then had been held by the Croatian police. I am well aware of this, but I don't know anything much about the events in Brsadin. What else did you ask me about?

Q. Very well. So you know nothing about this, and you explained that in Glina it was the Serbs who attacked the Croats. Is that correct?

A. No. The Serbs did not attack the Croats, but the special police of the Krajina and Captain Dragan in particular, were attacking the police station held by the Croatian police in Glina, and they took it over after the conflict.

Q. Was an attempt made to take the village of Mirkovci near Vinkovci on the 22nd of July 1991, where there were also dead and wounded?

A. I know that there were battles in the vicinity of Mirkovci and that the inhabitants, and especially the TO of the village of Mirkovci, were involved and this was well known in public. This was made public ¹³⁹⁰⁸ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³⁹⁰⁹ that they fought there in persistent defend -- effort to defend Mirkovci. And a young girl, I remember, was very popular among the Serbs, she fought on the Serbian side. I don't recall her name now.

Q. Well, since you have just spoken of how the police of the Krajina actually attacked the Croats in Glina --

A. I did not say that it attacked the Croats. I said it attacked the police station in Glina.

Q. Very well, the police station. Glina is in Banija, isn't that correct, and there are other places there. [redacted]

[redacted]

JUDGE MAY: Private session.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted] ¹³⁹¹⁰ Pages 13910-13934 - redacted - private session

¹³⁹³⁵

[redacted]

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In that part of the open session -- when we were in open session, ¹³⁹³⁶ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³⁹³⁷ we talked about some issues from the letter of the retired General -- Lieutenant General Djujic. So I want to put just one question in connection with this. Is what I'm going to read now correct, what he says in his letter? We have already explained how he was appointed, what he wrote about this, and then he goes on to say:

"I have been performing this duty from the 1st of October, 1991 --" he's referring to the duty of commander of the TO -- "until the 25th of November, 1991. I was dismissed from this post on the 25th of November, 1991, through the decision of the president of the government of the SAO Krajina, Milan Babic."

Is this correct?

A. General Ilija Djujic, as far as I know, resigned. His resignation was accepted, and he received the appropriate decision in the appropriate form.

Q. Very well. You are not answering my question directly, but I understand your answer.

Tell me now, please, is it correct what he says here, that the reason for his dismissal was twofold, first of all --

JUDGE MAY: No. No, the witness didn't say, and you mustn't misrepresent what a witness says. What he said was that the man resigned. You can put, if you want, what was the reason for his resignation. You can put that, but you can't put that it was a dismissal, because the witness doesn't agree with you.

THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

JUDGE MAY: We're not getting any translation. ¹³⁹³⁸

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters apologise.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I am not claiming anything myself, I am simply reading from what he says.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Can you put to the witness what you want to put, but don't misrepresent what he says.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Very well, Mr. May. I am only quoting from the statement of General Djujic and asking the witness whether it is correct, because the reasons the witness says he was not dismissed but that he resigned -- he himself says he was dismissed, but the witness says he resigned.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Were the reasons that he enumerates correct? And he lists two reasons: "First because Babic did not agree with me, and the standpoint of the General Staff of the JNA, that the manoeuvring units of the Territorial Defence should be resubordinated to the JNA commands in this area." That's number one. And number two: "Because Babic asked of me that the Territorial Defence on its own initiative attack and take over Skradin, and this is something I did not agree with, among other reasons because Skradin is inhabited by a majority Croatian population." Is this correct, what General Ilija Djujic wrote?

A. It is not correct.

Q. Very well.

A. He told me that he had resigned because of his illness, as far as I can remember.

Q. Well, I've told you what he says the reasons were. ¹³⁹³⁹

A. That's not correct.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness deal with this, but we'll go into private session first.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted] ¹³⁹⁴⁰ Page 13940 - redacted - private session

¹³⁹⁴¹

[redacted]

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue, Mr. May?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You say, then, that he was not dismissed but that he resigned. Kruschev also resigned because of old age and illness.

JUDGE MAY: That's a comment by you. You should look at Exhibit 352, 72 -- tab 72.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us proceed.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know that in late September 1990, in only two days in Petrinja, over a hundred innocent Serbs were arrested and mistreated. After this, about 400 women and children of Serb ethnicity hid, because ¹³⁹⁴² they were afraid, in the barracks of the Petrinja garrison.

A. The information on the arrest of the Serbs in Petrinja and their taking refuge in the garrison in early October 1990 was told me by Miss Milena Tanjga during a meeting when the delegation from Croatia and from the federal government was staying in Knin, and Mrs. Tanjga insisted that the representatives of the SAO Krajina -- I apologise, of the municipality of Knin who took part in the negotiations, should not continue the talks until, as she said, "the hostages were released." That's what she called the arrested Serbs in Petrinja. And the president of the Knin municipality said this to the Croatian and the federal delegations.

Q. As you are now introducing Mrs. Milena Tanjga, can you just explain to us what she was doing and what post she held at the time. Was she also a member of your government or what was she?

A. In 1990, Ms. Milena Tanjga was a journalist, a correspondent of Nova Macedonija from Zagreb. Then she went to Knin. She was the wife of a military officer and -- a colonel, and he was on good terms with -- with Mikelic.

Q. Very well. Now that we are referring to this arrest of hundreds of innocent Serbs in Petrinja and the women and children fleeing and taking refuge in the garrison, are you aware that this action by the Croatian forces gave rise to real panic among the Serbs, who started to flee from their homes?

A. I don't know any details, but I do know that not only in the area of Petrinja but also in the area of Dvor na Uni, Glina and the entire area, there were clashes between armed Serbs and the Croatian police. Who ¹³⁹⁴³ armed these Serbs I don't know exactly, but it's true that there were clashes, that there was a lot of confusion, that there were demonstrations, and that people did take refuge in the Petrinja garrison.

Q. Is this fact familiar to you, because it was common knowledge at the time and many people talked about it, that the Serbs in that area had no weapons whatsoever apart from several hunting rifles and licensed pistols?

A. In March in your cabinet, I heard from the outgoing Minister of the Interior, Radmilo Bogdanovic, that before March 1991 he had sent 500 pieces of weapons to Banija. When exactly he sent them, I don't know.

Q. You couldn't have heard this from Radmilo Bogdanovic, but we shall be able to clarify where you got such ideas from. But as we are now talking about the arrests and people fleeing and taking refuge in the barracks and so on and so forth, on the basis of what are you saying that Martic, the Serbian DB, the JNA, or the Belgrade media had anything at all to do with these events? Anyone, apart from the local people, the SDS activists who were appointed to leading positions in the manner that we attempted to clarify in private session?

A. As for the events and incidents in 1990, especially in October, I have said everything I know about the events in Northern Dalmatia, Lika, the area of Knin and Banija, and what I know is what I have said here.

Q. Is it correct that the events in the area of Banija and Petrinja were reported to the federal government and the federal Ministry of the Interior and the Presidency of the SFRY by Borislav Mikelic, the then president of the Socialist Party of Croatia which was Yugoslav oriented? ¹³⁹⁴⁴

A. I don't know exactly what he reported, but I know that Borislav Mikelic held a rally in Banski Grabovac in Banija at the time.

Q. Do you know that on the occasion of these events in the areas of Petrinja and Banija, a special delegation of the Yugoslav government arrived, headed by the vice-president or, rather, the Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Mikelic?

A. This delegation visited all the Serbian municipalities and all the municipalities in which there had been incidents in Northern Dalmatia and Banija, and this happened around the 6th of October 1990.

Q. And later on, Vasil Tupurkovski, a member of the Presidency of the SFRY, came to the area. He was a representative of Macedonia in the Presidency.

A. I don't know whether Vasil Tupurkovski visited Banija, but I know that he did come to Knin and he talked to the president of the municipality.

Q. And did he take action to calm down the situation? What was his position?

A. He did try to calm down the situation, but he was told by the President of the municipality of Knin that the president of the municipality of Knin had no influence on the armed incidents taking place in the area of Knin and that he was unable to control them.

Q. Well, did you do anything to calm the situation in Banija? Did you appear in the area? Did you go there? Did you hold any one of these speeches that nobody has ever heard about about peace?

A. At that time, I didn't go to Banija. No, I wasn't in Banija at ¹³⁹⁴⁵ that time.

Q. Tell me, do you wish to assert that some sort of representatives from Belgrade were spreading fear in the area of Banija and Kordun?

A. What I know about the events in Banija and Kordun I have already said. What I know about the influence of Belgrade and you and Jovica Stanisic in those days, as well as the media in Belgrade, I've already testified about that.

Q. You mentioned several times what the Belgrade media published. Among other things, they reported on the Assembly session of Krajina that we have mentioned. Also the events that really took place. Do you have any examples of the Belgrade media making up events, the events that they wrote about, especially regarding the suffering of the population over there? Did they make things up? Do you have an example of a fabrication that was published so that we can look into that too?

A. The Belgrade media exaggerated things, especially around Pakrac. I have already mentioned here in this courtroom the name of Savo Bosanac and some other people who were killed in Pakrac at the beginning of March 1991. Later on, it was established that this was not true. The Belgrade media constantly, in their features, referred to events from the Second World War and linked them and the new Croatian authorities to the Ustasha crimes.

Allow me to answer. Allow me to answer. Through the parallel structure, you manufactured incidents which provoked reaction and fear among the Serb population and intensified intervention by the Croatian police, and this went, spiralled up into intolerance, violence, and ¹³⁹⁴⁶ eventually war.

Q. Very well. On the 15th of February, 1990, by physical force of policemen, the rally of Serbs in Karlovac was prevented, and the rally was against the Ustasha movement and for Yugoslavia. This was prior to the formation of the SDS.

A. I heard from people who were organising that rally in Karlovac that they were not allowed to hold it.

Q. And what has Belgrade got to do with that?

A. I was not familiar with any details regarding those events.

Q. And do you know that on the 4th of March, 1990, a rally was held, a large rally, at Petrova Gora. Among other speakers were Milka Korfrun [phoen], a well-known anti-fascist and a Croat by ethnicity, a Croatian politician at the time.

A. Yes, I do know. I was a participant at that rally.

Q. So why such a reaction to the resurrection of the Ustasha movement, the ghosts from the Second World War as early as March 1990? How come there was this rally in Petrova Gora? Was that manufactured by the media in Serbia and the parallel structures?

A. What you have just said was the description of the media in Serbia of the all-Serb rally in Zagreb in the Lisinski hall [phoen].

Q. And do you know that on the 17th of March in Topusko, a group of intellectuals independently formed the Sabomirka [phoen] Cultural Society and the first magazine in the Cyrillic script after 30 years?

A. Not after 30 years. I know about it. Before that there was Prosjet that was published, a journal of the Serbian Cultural Society, ¹³⁹⁴⁷ Prosjet, based in Zagreb. So up to '71. In 1971, this journal stopped being published in Cyrillic. So if that was 30 years, yes. Twenty years.

Q. So it was twenty years. Fine, then, after 20 years. And why did Prosjet stop being published in Cyrillic?

A. Because the work of the Serbian Cultural Society Prosjet in Zagreb was frozen after the events of 1971, that is, the clashes when the Croatian Matica, a literary association, became a political organisation and the Cultural Society Prosjet also became a political organisation. And then the authorities reacted both towards Matica Hrvatska and towards the Serbian Cultural Society Prosjet.

Q. Let's leave that now. Let's put it aside. Do you know that in 1990, in the territory of Slunj municipality, there were about 400 registered Ustashas living there and that, after a short training course, they were given weapons and uniforms of the National Guards Corps?

A. I don't have any detailed information about Ustashas, and I don't know about that case in Slunj.

Q. You know nothing about it?

A. About those 100 Ustashas from Slunj, I do not.

Q. And do you know that in mixed environments in which there was no hostility, such as Cetingrad, Rakovica, Liganj [phoen], there was so-called stations of the ZNG set up, and their ranks consisted mostly of good-for-nothings and criminals and idlers and Ustashas and the like?

A. That members of the National Guards Corps of Croatia as an armed formation of Croatia were in Slunj and Cetingrad in November 1991 is ¹³⁹⁴⁸ something I do know. I was told about that by people from Kordun. And against those formations and against the Croatian population, Cedo Bulat intervened, captured the town of Slunj, and I know there was fighting around Cetingrad, and the area was taken control of, and there were very few members of the guards there or Croats, for that matter.

Q. And did the Serbs in Kordun organise themselves in view of these events simply to save their lives or did they make up these dangers that were threatening them?

A. The Serbs organised themselves to protect their areas in the ways I have already described, and I also explained who organised them to do that.

Q. Very well. And do you know that precisely when these so-called outposts were formed in these mixed environments that I have listed, that then Serbs with hunting weapons, out of fear of a repetition of 1941 when several thousand Serbs were killed by the Ustashas in their homes, organised village guards so that these bandits couldn't enter Serb villages?

A. I do know that hunting weapons, and particularly carbines manufactured in the Zastava factory in Kragujevac, were sold through the company Loris in Belgrade. They were on sale in Northern Dalmatia and Lika in 1990 and people purchased those weapons. How they bought hunting weapons in the area around Slunj, I don't know exactly, in 1990. But I do know that in 1992, that is as from August, I have information that to that area weapons were delivered via Jovica Stanisic, the DB, and from Serbia through Bosanski Novi. ¹³⁹⁴⁹

Q. And who told you that?

A. Mile Grbic from Bosanski Novi.

Q. Very well. And do you know that at the time in Kordun there wasn't even a branch of the SDS, but the Serbs mostly voted for the SDP as an Independent Yugoslav Democratic Party?

A. Those are events from April and May of 1990. The Serbian Democratic Party was poorly organised in Kordun, and the Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party was organised there, headed by Mile Dakic, and also the League of Communists of Croatia, that is the Party of Democratic Change. They were most successful at the elections held in Croatia in April and May 1990.

Q. Very well. When we're talking about the fears of the people in Kordun and the formation of the National Guards Corps in these mixed settlements, those village guards that were organised, were they perhaps also organised under some influence from Belgrade?

A. The Croatians started forming the guards corps as early as 1991. I don't know exactly when they started, but it was the formation of the army of the republic of Croatia within the competence of the Ministry of Defence. Village guards guard duty was held even before the referendum of Serb autonomy in 1990.

Q. But did anyone from Belgrade take part perhaps?

A. In organising the village guards before the 11th of August, I don't know whether anyone from Belgrade took part. Belgrade took a very active part as from the 11th or 12th of August, encouraging the Serbs, representatives of the Serbs in Croatia, to persevere with respect to ¹³⁹⁵⁰ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³⁹⁵¹ their political demands, with the promise that the Yugoslav People's Army would protect their political struggle.

Q. Very well. Tell me, as you keep repeating one and the same sentence, you don't need to repeat it every single time you're giving an answer.

Do you -- let us take it that you've already said it. Is it known that upon the initiative of the Muslim Bosniak organisation from Velika Kladusa --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, what are you talking about? What are you criticising the witness for for repetition, or is it evidence you don't approve of; is that the problem? In that last response, I don't see any repetition.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, he keeps repeating, with respect to everything he has to say, that it was some sort of a parallel structure that he made up, even when that has nothing to do with the question, and he simply --

JUDGE MAY: Let me interrupt before you go on. You asked him: "Did anyone from Belgrade take part perhaps?" And his answer was: "I don't know whether anyone took part, but it took an active part, Belgrade, from the 11th or 12th of August, encouraging the Serbs, the representatives of Serbs in Croatia, to persevere with respect to their political demands, with the promise that the Yugoslav People's Army would protect their political struggle."

That's his answer. And to criticise him because it's a repetition, it seems to me, is wholly wrong. ¹³⁹⁵² Now, if you would simply restrict your questions to questions, we would all get on better and you would have more time, instead of delivering, as you do, a running commentary on what the witness says.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, through a number of questions, we have addressed the position of the Yugoslav People's Army which was separating the opposing parties and which were seeking to calm the situation.

JUDGE MAY: So you say, Mr. Milosevic. We will in due course hear your arguments about it and we'll look at the rest of the evidence. Then we'll decide. But for you to issue a running commentary, as you do, upon the witness's evidence, frequently turning it, or trying to turn it in your own favour, isn't going to assist.

Now, you've got two hours, 40 minutes left, so let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should like to ask you to check the time, please, and to compare the time used by the examination-in-chief. I think it was a little longer than you said. But you have the information, and you can check it out.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So my question is: Do you know that upon the initiative of the Muslim Bosniak organisation from Velika Kladusa, Sead Kajtezovic, and the Serbian Democratic Party from Vojnici and Slunj headed by Mile Bosnic, because of the danger of the outbreak of conflicts, negotiations were conducted between the political leaderships of these parties which were later joined by the SDA and the HDZ from the municipalities of Slunj, Velika Kladusa, and Vojnici and Vrginmost. Do you know about that? Are ¹³⁹⁵³ you aware of these efforts of various parties to cooperate amongst themselves, including the SDS, the HDZ, the SDA, and the Bosniak Muslim organisation from Velika Kladusa, and the others that I have mentioned from the municipalities of Slunj, Velika Kladusa, Vojnici and Vrginmost, the aim being to maintain peace in the area?

A. In later years I heard from someone that there were such talks, but I am not aware of any details. I do know that Mile Bosnic used to work in Velika Kladusa in the combine that was led by Fikret Abdic. That is Agrokomerc, which was managed by Fikret Abdic, and I know that he knew him. He was part of his board of management in his factory and that he knew some people there. He told me later. Now, whether he took part in those negotiations with the Muslim Bosniak organisation and the others that you have listed, I don't know about that. Bosnic did not talk to me about that.

Q. And do you know that those talks and their mutual contacts, the aim of which was not to have any disturbances or conflicts, were interrupted by the activities of the Croatian police when they beat up precisely the participants, that is Momir Lazic, Lazo Dragicevic, Janko Jerkovic, Mile Bosnic, and another two priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church?

A. I don't know what the role of Mile Bosnic, Momir Lazic, Dragicevic, and the priests had in connection with talks with people from the parties of Zazine Krajina, but I do know during the events in Plitvice, that is the 31st of March, 1991, these three men set off from Vojnici towards Plitvice via Slunj and that they were arrested there by ¹³⁹⁵⁴ the Croatian police and detained and that they were physically mistreated and moved to the prison in Karlovac, that they were beaten in Slunj, and then they were moved to the prison in Karlovac where they were more leniently treated and, after that, released.

Q. Fine. They beat them with boots and rifle butts, and they congratulated their Easter.

A. Yes. They were treated very brutally. I heard from Bosnic and Lazic, and I wondered how he survived, because he's a weak and thin man. Lazic was larger. So I even joked, because I said he was fatter so he managed to survive.

Q. Is it true that up to then the Serbs hadn't made a single incident until these people were mistreated and beaten in this way, what you yourself have exceptionally on this occasion confirmed?

A. These were events of the 31st of March, 1991. There were many events that preceded this, so I don't know what exactly you're referring to.

Q. I was saying that there were no incidents up to then. I'm talking about the municipalities of Slunj, Vojnici, Velika Kladusa and Vrginmost, where all the parties, Muslim, Croatian and Serbian, sought all together to maintain stability, peace, and tolerance and avoid anything from happening.

A. That was a rather complicated question, so I don't really know what your concrete question is.

Q. Is it true that the Serbs, until then, had not caused any incidents? ¹³⁹⁵⁵

A. I spoke about the incidents in 1990, those at the beginning of 1991. I don't know which particular incidents you're referring to. I'm not talking only about Glina and Plitvice but about Slunj, Velika Kladusa, Vojnici.

A. As far as Vojnici is concerned, Vrginmost, I don't recollect any particular incidents, namely the president of the municipality of Vojnic, Mile Vuckovic, pursued a tactical policy, if I can call it that. He recognised and was even a member of the Assembly of SAO Krajina, and at the same time, the police in Vojnici was receiving salaries from the MUP of Croatia. So he managed to balance things out until the events in Plitvice. And then he protested resolutely and wrote a letter of protest regarding the Bosnic and Lazic and Dragicevic case and the case involving those priests as well.

Q. All right. And do you know that very soon after that, one of the negotiators on the part of the HDZ became casualty, a Croat and member of the government of the ruling party, who was beaten up at the Assembly meeting in Slunj, and he had to leave Slunj after that. Do you know about that?

A. No, I don't.

Q. And do you know that that was when a witch-hunt was started of the Serbs that were starting to flee and that the first casualties fell? And I'll mention Janko Jerkovic from Vaganjci who was stabbed, Cedo Biga from Grabovac. Then there was Kotur. And then Basnija Niksic [phoen] from Slunj, two other young men, Slobodan Devic and Popovic, were killed on the spot and thrown on a rubbish heap. Nino Vidojevic was another one. They ¹³⁹⁵⁶ extinguished cigarettes on his body.

Do you know that there was this general witch hunt? First of all caused by the beatings and then by the reprisals on both Serbs and Croats who had taken part in the negotiations in the interests of finding a peaceful settlement, and that all this was done by the Croatian police? Do you know about that?

A. I said I didn't know about these negotiation or who took part in them or how they evolved.

Q. All right. What about the civilians who had taken up arms to defend their own homes and establish this Serb army of Krajina? Did they come from Belgrade as the occupiers and creators of a Greater Serbia or were they from the villages of Krajina, regardless of which villages?

A. What are you talking about now? Are you talking about the negotiations with the Muslims, the events in 1990 and 1991? What are you thinking of quite specifically?

Q. Mr. Croatia-061, I'm talking about a general reign of terror that was rampant in the area, and as we've passed through a series of examples, I'm asking you whether the civilians who had taken up arms to defend their own homes and later on organise the Serbian army of Krajina, did they come from Belgrade as occupiers? Is that what you're saying? Or were they from the Krajina villages and took up arms to defend themselves, your formations, the ones that you're mentioning?

JUDGE MAY: There are a series of assertions there. The first assertion is that there was a reign of terror. Do you agree with that or not? ¹³⁹⁵⁷

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the month of October, the incidents that took place were interpreted as being terror on the part of the Croatian authorities by the media. Now, what happened in actual fact in October 1990, I have already explained.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was the Serb army. Well, the Serb army of Krajina was established, institutionally speaking, in May 1992. It's very difficult to answer that question, Your Honours, because the events of 1990 and 1991 and the creation of the Serb army in 1992, all this -- well, actually, I really would like to answer the question but it's a very complex question.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Wait a moment. The next point that was made was that the civilians took up arms to defend their own homes and later to organise the Serbian army of Krajina. Do you agree that that is what's happened or not?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1990, what happened was that the civilians bought hunting weapons, and I've already talked about that. In 1991, the weapons were handed out and so-called volunteer units were organised by the DB of Serbia, the Serbian state security, and I talked about that too. The Serbian army of the RSK institutionally speaking was constituted by the Assembly of the RSK itself on the 18th of May, 1992.

JUDGE MAY: And the third point that was made was this, or the third question: Did they -- these come from Belgrade? Did people come from Belgrade as occupiers or was it a local effort? ¹³⁹⁵⁸

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have spoken about this. As of August, I said which people came in, how they came, what their assignment was, and what they did when they got there. So specifically speaking, from April 1991, they came in to organise a Serbian paramilitary, a paramilitary army in Krajina.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So you're saying that they started coming in April, some people over there came in to help you. And what were you doing until April? What happened until April 1991?

A. Well, I've been speaking about that in great detail for days now.

Q. All right. As you've been speaking about that specifically and in detail, let's move on. Just give me a very precise, concrete answer. This is a concrete question, we don't need a speech to answer it. Did one single Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Police, the commander of the Main Staff, were any one of these who were people born outside Krajina, throughout the whole time, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, any of these people, any of these leading officials, were they born outside Krajina, a single one of them?

A. The Minister of the Interior, the Ministers of the Interior -- well, I have to think about this. It's a long period of time you're asking me about and many people, so I have to recall each one separately. You asked me about a whole series of people, a large number of people, so I have to do my best to recollect each one of them. The ministers. Let's see, the Ministers of the Interior. Who were they in the SAO Krajina and the RSK? Yes, they were born in the ¹³⁹⁵⁹ Krajina area.

What else did you say? The Defence Ministers you mentioned. Let's see about them. The Defence Minister Tarbuk, Milan Tarbuk, he was the minister from November 1991. I assume, I'm not quite sure but I assume he was born in Kordun or he originated from Kordun. And the other Defence Minister - what was his name? - of the RSK, in Hadzic's RSK? He was an admiral. I don't know where he was from exactly. What was his name? It's just slipped my mind. The Defence Minister later on was Rade Tanjga, and I think he was born in Ocestovo village, close to Knin. Then there was Minister Milan Suput. I think he was born in the Lika region. So that's as far as the Ministers of Defence are concerned. Then you asked about the commanders. There was General Torbica, the commander of -- he was the commander as of May. Who the corps commander was before that of the JNA, I'm not quite sure, but he was a Serb from Lika. I assume he was born there, his origins were there. Then there was a commander General Milan Celeketic. He was from Western Slavonia. Well, at least, I'm not quite sure but he lived in Western Slavonia. Whether he was actually born there I'm not sure. Then there was General Mile Mrksic, and he was a native of Kordun. I've already said that. Now, whether he was actually born there or whether his antecedents were from Kordun, I'm not sure.

What else did you ask me? Was there anything else?

Q. All right. Can we get a collective answer, can you summarise -- would it be right to say that none of them were born outside Krajina? Of all the ones you've mentioned, you seem to have picked your brains and ¹³⁹⁶⁰ recollected all these individuals. Is that so?

A. I have told you what I know about them.

Q. Fine, very well. Let's move on to your other assertions with respect to Kijevo and the fighting that took place in 1991. Why do you say that in the struggles and battles around Kijevo and for Kijevo, units of the JNA were engaged when you personally, you yourself in your statement - I don't want to go back into private session so I won't quote the exact date the paper this appeared in and all the rest - but you said that no forces whatsoever from Yugoslavia took part in the fighting to liberate Kijevo, Vrlika, and so on, and some other things as well which I don't want to mention because I would prefer to stay in open session.

A. I said what I knew. Now, in the context I did that, I cannot repeat here and now, but I said what I knew, and I have told this Tribunal what I know, and I can repeat that. So in the battles for Kijevo, to the best of my knowledge, the Knin Corps of the JNA took part with the use of the artillery and infantry as well as the participation of a separate brigade commanded by Colonel Djukic. The units were also commanded by the Chief of Staff General Mladic. At that time, the commander of the staff was Spiro Nikolic. What his command role was I assume down the chain of command, but he did have a command function. So we're talking about the JNA. What did you ask me? What was your question?

Q. Let's not waste time. I didn't ask you who at the time when this was going on was the commander and Chief of Staff and all the rest of it. All that is written down in the documents. I'm asking you why you're ¹³⁹⁶¹ saying that units of the JNA took part in that fighting when you made quite the opposite statement at one point, that you said that it was not true that they had taken part. That's what you said previously.

A. Well, I might have misspoken. I might have made a slip of the tongue, but I didn't say something I didn't think. I -- the JNA units did participate. The 9th Knin Corps did participate, and I know the commanders that took part in the fighting; General Mladic and Colonel Djukic. I personally saw the units of the corps deployed in the area and I personally saw the commanders the following day, after the battles had been concluded after Kijevo.

JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment; there's an objection.

MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. I think when the witness is -- said -- is pointed out to contradiction with a former statement, it should be put to him properly. He should be given a --

JUDGE MAY: Of course. Of course. We were waiting to go into private session in due course. We don't want to go on going in and out. Yes, Mr. Milosevic, you can refer to this document before we adjourn today or when we come back on Friday. You can refer to the document you're relying on to say that --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll go back to the document in private session.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't want to deprive myself of asking the remaining questions that I have for today. ¹³⁹⁶²

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it true that this place, this place Kijevo, is ten or 11 kilometres to the east of Knin along the Knin-Vrlika-Slunj road, and in March 1991, were there forces of the MUP of Croatia in Kijevo?

A. Yes, it is along the Knin -- it's not along the Knin-Vrlika-Slunj road, it's along the Knin-Vrlika-Sinj road.

Q. Yes, Sinj, I made a slip of the tongue and said Slunj instead of Sinj. Yes, and in Kijevo, in that month of March, were the MUP forces of Croatia present?

A. The police station was set up, I believe, in April 1991, perhaps in March, the MUP station. I think it was March or perhaps April 1991.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, up until that time, the inhabitants of Kijevo, mostly Croats - that is not in dispute - did they in any way -- were they in any way jeopardised by the Serbs, threatened by the Serbs who lived in the surrounding parts? Yes or no.

A. No.

Q. And is it also true that in Kijevo and -- the HDZ organisation was functioning, was operational, and that this served the Croatian authorities a purpose, that is to say at all costs they provoked some sort of inter-ethnic clash there although the Serbs did not jeopardise in any way whatsoever, as you said a moment ago, the Croat inhabitants of Kijevo?

A. The constituency of Kijevo had its deputy, its MP in the Knin Municipal Assembly, and he was a member of the HDZ party. I think his name was Mate Maloca. I might be wrong there but Mate was his first name. So as they had an MP, a deputy in the Municipal Assembly of Knin to ¹³⁹⁶³ represent the HDZ, the HDZ took part in the elections in April and May for the Municipal Assembly seats, I therefore assume on that basis and conclude that they did have an HDZ organisation in Kijevo.

Q. All right. Fine. And in the first half of 1991, is it true that it was precisely this isolated, shall we say, village, without any great importance, happened to be visited by members of the Main Board and government, Milas and Seks, to call upon the inhabitants of Kijevo to stand up to the authorities in Knin and the Yugoslav People's Army? Is that what happened? Are you aware of that? Do you know about that?

A. I know that in the month of March, that is to say when the MUP police station of Croatia was set up, the JNA for the first time in the region of Suvo Polje -- Suho Polje, that is to say around Kijevo, they were there and I know that Seks came to Kijevo by helicopter. I don't know who accompanied him. And they held speeches there, lending their support to the inhabitants of Kijevo and the police station in Kijevo, and the helicopter was shot at from the Serb side, and people even said that it had been hit but that the helicopter managed to pull itself out, to extricate itself from the situation.

Q. All right. You said a moment ago that the Serbs who lived in the surrounding parts of Kijevo did not jeopardise the Croats in any way. Now, is it clear, at least from what we have just taken note of, that pressure was brought to bear over the inhabitants of Kijevo to create an incident and to clash with the authorities and the JNA?

A. I first said that the inhabitants of Kijevo were not jeopardised by the surrounding Serbs who lived in the surrounding parts, but they were ¹³⁹⁶⁴ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹³⁹⁶⁵ under jeopardy by a group from Golubic, that is to say a DB and police group from Golubic. And this group already at the end of April and certainly from the beginning of May did some sporadic shooting. There was sporadic shooting from Golubic towards Kijevo and the police station there, or the Kijevo settlement, and in one of these drives a native of Polaca was killed. Vaso Pecer was his name. And that was in May.

Q. Who was an inhabitant of Polaca?

A. Vaso Pecer. Around the 2nd of May, 1991.

Q. Was he a Serb?

A. When he was killed, people rumoured that he was killed by the Croats from Kijevo or, rather, the Croatian policemen from Kijevo. But later I learnt some more details about this incident, and I would rather not speak about the dead, because of his family, but I was told that in fact he had taken part in a group of policemen from Golubic who did this sporadic shooting from the Kozjak positions, that is to say from the slopes of Mount Kozjak towards targeting the village of Kijevo and that is in fact how he lost his life, how he was killed.

Q. He was killed that way, was he?

A. Well, it was never established who actually killed him. There was this shooting, Kijevo was being targeted, and there was shooting back from Kijevo, so he was killed in this crossfire. But it was never ascertained as to who killed him. There was speculations.

Q. All right. All right. So you say he killed himself?

A. No, I didn't say he killed himself.

Q. This place Polaca, is that the same place where the Ustashas from ¹³⁹⁶⁶ Kijevo in 1941 in just one night killed several dozen Serbs? Is that the same Polaca place?

JUDGE MAY: We're not going to go into that because the time has come up, but what the relevance of that can have for events 50 years later, I don't understand.

Now, we'll adjourn -- we will adjourn now, and the UN holiday tomorrow means that we can't sit, but we'll sit on Friday at 9.00.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How much time, Mr. May, do I have left, according to your arithmetic?

JUDGE MAY: Two hours and a quarter you have.

MR. NICE: Your Honour --

JUDGE MAY: And then Mr. Tapuskovic. Yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, assuming that the accused and Mr. Tapuskovic take the time allotted - and I understand that the accused will and Mr. Tapuskovic has told me he will - that will leave a limited, at most, amount of time for the next witness. As Your Honour knows, I have competing duties in relation to this case on Friday. It may well be that the next witness will not be reached at all, but if time is available for him to be reached, if this is acceptable to the Chamber, I'll make arrangements for one of my colleagues to take him in chief, if that's acceptable to the institution generally, but I think it's a witness of a kind I ought to be available for for cross-examination, for obvious reasons.

JUDGE MAY: I think it's highly unlikely we're going to reach another witness. ¹³⁹⁶⁷

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.00 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 6th day of December, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.