¹⁵⁴²²

Monday, 3 February 2003

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Groome.

WITNESS: CHARLES KIRUDJA [Resumed] Examined by Mr. Groome: [Continued]

MR. GROOME: Just as a reminder to the Chamber, Exhibit 378, tab 5, is on the overhead projector, and that's a summary of some of this portion of Mr. Kirudja's testimony.

Q. Mr. Kirudja, when we concluded your testimony last week, you were describing a report of an incident regarding a large number of people detained in the football stadium in Bosanski Novi on the 6th of June, 1992. Before I move forward from that point, is there any point or detail which you would like to add to what you've told us so far about that incident?

A. Not any that I have presently.

Q. Now, I'd ask that the witness be shown Prosecution 378, tab 7. Mr. Kirudja, as with the other exhibits, I'd ask you to look over it. And I'd ask that the second page of the exhibit be placed on the overhead projector.

I would ask you, Mr. Kirudja, do you recognise Prosecution Exhibit 378, tab 7?

A. Yes. It's a memorandum that I wrote. ¹⁵⁴²³

Q. What is the date of the memorandum?

A. 3 July 1992.

Q. And in this memorandum, is one of the things that you write about the Bosanski Novi football stadium incident?

A. Yes.

Q. Prior to the 3rd of July, were there other memos in which you had referenced this report?

A. Yes. Among other reports of refugees crossing into Sector North.

Q. And would it be fair to say -- or can you tell us, the report of the Bosanski Novi football stadium incident, was that a restricted report or were other members of your office and the UN generally, did they have access to that report as well?

A. As you note, this memorandum carries the word "restricted" at the top right-hand corner, yet if you look at the end of that memorandum, it also indicates to whom the memorandum is addressed. The meaning of "restricted" is that it's restricted to those people to which the memorandum is addressed.

MR. GROOME: And I'd ask that the witness be handed the last page of the exhibit. It doesn't need to be on the overhead. Please leave that page on the overhead.

Q. Mr. Kirudja, can you tell us who this memorandum was sent to?

A. As you can see, it's addressed to Mrs. Yolanda Auger who was the deputy director of civil affairs, and it was also copied to a Mr. Magnusson in Zagreb.

Q. Now, Mr. Kirudja, the first page of this memorandum is on the ¹⁵⁴²⁴ overhead projector. I would ask you to read for us the third paragraph, the paragraph beginning with, "We believe..."

A. "We believe the football field detainees are only a tip of the iceberg involving the concerted action of local Serbian authorities in BH trying to establish a Serbian Republic of BH, free of Muslims. In that process, the mayors, the milicija and TDF of Bosanski Novi, acting in unison with their counterparts, not only in the UNPA (Dvor and Kostajnica), but also with Bosanska Dubica, Banja Luka, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Kljuc. The Serbs appear to be engaged in a determined process of forcefully disarming Muslims where they are clearly a small encircled minority, such as in Bosanski Novi, or besieging their city totally, such as in Bihac. Apparently the football field is the holding ground where Muslim groups are detained while their houses are being 'searched,' the men isolated and transported to concentration camps." End of quote of the paragraph.

Q. I'd ask you to please continue on to the bottom portion where you actually list a number of suspected concentration camps.

A. Continuing, and I quote: "The UNHCR representative and Civil Affairs have pieced together reports from Muslims who recently have taken refuge under UNPROFOR protection in Dvor and Kostajnica. There are reported concentration camps at the following locations. "Keraterm: Located at a railroad station in Prijedor en route to Banja Luka. 100-200 Muslims believed to be here under extremely bad conditions.

"Trnopolje: Also located at a railroad station in Prijedor, ¹⁵⁴²⁵ direction Banja Luka. A refugee camp for women, children, and old men." Do you want me to read the second page?

Q. Yes, please.

A. "Omarska: Located in a purely Serbian village. Reportedly a camp for Muslim men and local Muslim authorities prior to Serbian takeover of control, particularly in Prijedor.

"Manjaca: Outside Banja Luka. A large camp reportedly including Croatian soldiers taken prisoner in the fighting in Kostajnica."

Q. I'd ask you just to finish with the next sentence and conclude your reading there.

A. "The treatment of Muslims and other minorities in the camps is reportedly atrocious, with regular beatings, deprivation of food and water, poor shelter, et cetera."

Q. Mr. Kirudja, I want to ask you a few questions regarding this memo. In the first paragraph, you used the word "milicija." Could you please define that for us.

A. "Milicija" is a term I learned to associate with regular police, those of the military camouflage form in distinction from regular fighting forces in camouflage uniforms. The police wore blue and were regularly referred to as "milicija."

Q. And did the milicija exist post demobilisation?

A. Yes, and in particular in the UNPA post demobilisation, the milicija in the camouflage uniforms became increasingly blended and harder to distinguish one from the other.

Q. Now, you mentioned several locations. Dvor and Kostajnica, what ¹⁵⁴²⁶ country is that in?

A. Dvor and Kostajnica were at that time part of the UNPA inside what is now Croatia.

Q. And Bosanski Dubica, Banja Luka, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Kljuc, where are they located?

A. Those are across the border into what is now Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. Can you briefly describe for us the type of sources that you used to generate this report.

MR. GROOME: I'm sorry -- could I ask the usher to put the previous exhibit on, and we're finished with that one. Thank you. And that's Exhibit 5 -- tab 5.

A. Just a minute. This memorandum we just finished talking about has a paragraph referring to many previous memorandums on the same subject. I take your question to our sources inclusive of those references to other reports of similar kind.

This was as a result of people coming -- this particular memorandum, we used to have people, a stream of refugees, coming into the sector and seeking protection. And as we provided that protection, we would talk to them as to why and where they were coming from and what caused them to flee. So this particular memorandum was done after a number, I forget the exact number of all night refugees coming into the sector, interviewed by my -- by my people plus the civil police, and compiling the summary we have read, where they were fleeing from and why.

Q. Are you able to give us an estimate of the number of primary sources, these refugees, who would have made reports that eventually would ¹⁵⁴²⁷ have ended up in a summary report of this fashion?

A. A clarification: The refugees themselves didn't make the report. Our staff talking to the refugees debriefed them and then they found their way into our concerted report.

Q. Are we talking about dozens of people?

A. Yes, yes, yes.

Q. Can you give us an estimate of approximately how many people would have gone into a summary report of this nature?

A. In this one, I wouldn't be surprised if there would be almost a hundred or so. I'm not sure of the exact number. As I mentioned, we were engaged for almost all day, all night talking to these people.

MR. GROOME: I'd ask now a different exhibit be placed on the overhead, and that is Exhibit 378, tab 8.

Q. While that's being done, Mr. Kirudja, may I ask you, on the 6th of July, 1992, did you receive a letter from someone?

MR. GROOME: I'd ask that the Serbian be placed on the overhead and the English translation given to the witness.

A. Yes. I recognise the letter, and it is -- yes, I did receive it.

MR. GROOME: Okay. I'd ask if the director could zoom out so we could see the entire -- perhaps if it could be shifted on the page. Thank you.

Q. Who is this letter from?

A. It's from Radomir Pasic, the mayor of Bosanski Novi.

Q. And did he sign the letter as the mayor of Bosanski Novi?

A. No. ¹⁵⁴²⁸

Q. And how did he sign the letter?

A. Crisis Committee President.

Q. Could you please describe for us the circumstances under which you received this letter and its contents.

A. He had come to my office in one of two or three meetings. I -- this one may have been received in the second or third meeting in our office where he sought to convince us, and me in particular, of why we should agree with this proposal to transition 5.000 refugees through Sector North.

Q. I would ask you to just look at the original or the facsimile of the document on the overhead projector. Do you recognise the signature and the seal that is affixed to it?

A. There is a signature and a seal, and since it was the first time I had seen it, I wouldn't know whether any more that it -- but it looked official.

Q. Now, does this letter contain the following? Does this letter say that a large number of people want to leave Bosanski Novi, and does it claim they have been issued the necessary paperwork allowing them to leave?

A. I'm looking for the specific part where that language is. I'm sorry, I don't see the specific language that you refer to.

Q. Could I ask you, in your own words, to summarise the content of the letter that you received.

A. This is a -- this letter pretty much summarises what I received verbally and -- from him, the gist of what he explained in greater detail ¹⁵⁴²⁹ when he was talking to us, and that had to do with why he considered that the people were leaving voluntarily from Bosanski Novi and the status of an agreement he had reached with them so that they could leave voluntarily.

Q. And does he identify the bus companies, the names of the bus companies with which he's made arrangements to transport these people?

A. Yes.

Q. And does he also indicate to you what arrangements have been made for an escort for these buses containing these supposed voluntary refugees?

A. Yes.

Q. And who did he make arrangements with regarding that?

A. Companies Kozaraprevoz, Autoprevoz Dvor, and private vehicles and other means of transportation.

Q. And who was to escort these buses?

A. The escorting would be by the "Republic of Serbian Krajina workers."

Q. Does it mention anything about the Ministry of Internal Affairs? I draw your attention to the third to last paragraph.

A. That's the institution providing internal affairs of Republic of Serbian Krajina workers.

MR. GROOME: Thank you. I'm finished with that exhibit. I'd ask that the summary page tab 5 once again be placed on the overhead projector.

Q. On the 10th of July, Mr. Kirudja, did you -- did the deputy mayor ^{15430 BLANK PAGE 15431} of Bosanski Novi and the mayor of Dvor again request that 5.000 Muslims be allowed to leave the area voluntarily?

A. Yes. I believe that's true.

Q. And on the 18th of July, did you receive a directive from your superior regarding your observations of what was going on in Bosnia?

A. Yes. It was a directive from my superiors in Zagreb not to be involved with what was going on in Bosnia.

Q. And how did you respond to that directive?

A. I was rather sad, though the directive was not unexpected. I was disappointed by it because it took -- it took a bureaucratic approach into what we were saying, that we were receiving refugees under -- we were responding to people in dire need not from Bosnia-Herzegovina but from where we were located legitimately by the mission, and yet my headquarters saw that as "involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina." That was extremely disappointing to me, and I made it clear to them that we were not exceeding our concern, we were responding to people in need who were drawn to where we were by the fact that the UN flag was flying above us. As a result, I called my staff and confirmed to them we were not going to stop from reporting and responding to these people as they came to us. We owed it to tell to our headquarters and beyond that these people are coming, under what circumstances, and in what conditions.

Q. And did you in fact continue to report on events in Bosnia as they impacted on your work in Sector North?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Now, I want to draw your attention to the later part of July, the ¹⁵⁴³² 21st of July. Did the government of Croatia in fact agree to accept 4.000 of the Bosanski Novi refugees?

A. Again, that was true, and I must add they agreed after a long period of resisting the idea themselves.

Q. And can you please describe what happened after the Croatian government agreed to allow these people to enter Croatia proper?

A. At that point, all that was left was to see to it that the 4.000 that was requested were treated properly and given all the support that they needed to safely come out of the sector into that part of Croatia that the sector bordered, that is, outside the sector into Croatian official control areas, at Karlovac specifically.

Q. Did 4.000 people in fact leave Bosanski Novi and travel through Sector North on to Croatia?

A. No. It wasn't 4.000; it turned out to be more like 9.000 plus.

Q. What was your position regarding future similar evacuations related to what you believed was ethnic cleansing? Did you support the idea?

A. No. As a matter of fact, as soon as this -- this matter was clearly understood both by my headquarters, UNHCR and ICRC, and following that transit by 9.000, we sought to make it clearer to them that this is the beginning. If you allow it, it is going to be a flood and, therefore, we continuously tried to give them to understand what we knew, and I'm glad to report they did turn around and joined - I mean "they" meaning UNHCR, ICRC - they did turn around to our position that this is an affair we couldn't be involved in. ¹⁵⁴³³

Q. At this time now, Mr. Kirudja, I would ask you to look at Prosecution 378, tab 9. I would ask that the first page be placed on the overhead and that you take the second page. And I'll ask you a few questions regarding the report in general and then about it in particular. I'd ask you just to review the subject, the date, and the author of the memo, and then I'd ask you whether you recognise this memo.

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Please tell us what it is.

A. This is a memorandum prepared and authored by one of my assistants called Mr. Paolo Raffone, a civil affairs officer based in my office and reporting to me, and it is also released under my signature.

Q. Your signature appears on that document as well?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to draw your attention to the first paragraph on the second page, the page you have. I'd ask you to read that to the Chamber.

A. The paragraph reads as follows, and I quote: "A calculated strategy to 'cleanse' the area of Muslims appears to have intensified beginning in May 1992. House burnings, deportations, summary executions, shooting in the houses, et cetera, are a part of the present situation in the towns and villages along the north side of the BH border (Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Kostajnica, and Bosanska Dubica. Reportedly, the milicija does not seem to intervene. Some mayors and other Serbs working in other opstinas have also been reported as trying to help the Muslims to leave their houses safely. In Bosanski Novi, the military police is reported to have its HQ in Hotel Una. There are reports of brutal torture in this ¹⁵⁴³⁴ hotel." End of quote.

Q. Once again, are you able to tell us what would be the source of information of this report?

A. It's the same source of stream of people arriving in the sector and being interviewed before being given safe transit outside.

MR. GROOME: I'm finished with that exhibit. I'd ask that tab 5 once again be placed on the overhead.

Q. Mr. Kirudja, I want to draw your attention now to some other areas, different than Bosanski Novi, and ask you some specific questions about them. And the areas I want to draw your attention to now are Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, Kljuc, Dubica, Sanski Most, and Banja Luka. On the 1st of June 1992, did Mr. Kupresanin, the mayor of Banja Luka, make a report or have a conversation with your office regarding the situation of Muslims in those municipalities?

A. Yes. It was a telephone call received by Mr. Raffone.

Q. Please describe what occurred.

A. This was a telephone call that Raffone took and made note of what he was being told by the mayor of Banja Luka. And the mayor of Banja Luka, the gist of what he told him was to the effect that there were already 15.000 refugees already leaving the area in the towns that you have mentioned, namely Bosanski Novi, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Kljuc, and Bosanski Dubica, and that there would be 15.000 more to follow, and that he pleaded that United Nations, the UNHCR, these people needed assistance from them. That was the gist of his call.

Q. Now, Mr. Kupresanin, do you know what his ethnicity is? ¹⁵⁴³⁵

A. No.

Q. I want to draw your attention to other municipalities, Velika Kladusa and Bosanska Krupa. Are they in Bosnia as well?

A. Yes, Velika Kladusa and Bosanska Dubica?

Q. No, Bosanska Krupa.

A. Yes.

Q. On the 13th of June, did the Serb deputy mayor of Dvor notify you regarding the presence of refugees in the Croatian town of Dvor?

A. On what day?

Q. On the 13th of June, 1992.

A. 13th of June. Yes. My notes do reflect that.

Q. Okay. Now, I want to draw your attention -- I'd actually ask you to open to page, in your notebooks, to this date, the 12th of August, 1992. My question to you is: As the initial group of 9.000 refugees from Bosanski Novi, were there attempts to move additional refugees from that area through Sector North?

A. 12th of August?

Q. The 12th of August, yes.

A. Yes. And confirming our greatest fears that the 9.000 wouldn't be the last ones, the meeting on this date did underscore our greatest fear on this regard.

Q. Did Mr. -- or did the Serb mayor give you a warning on that day?

A. Yes. He came in this time that they were requesting more refugees, would assist them to do -- to do the same thing as had happened previously with the 9.000. ¹⁵⁴³⁶

Q. And did he make any statement to you what would occur if he was left to have to resolve this matter by himself?

I would draw your attention, during the preparation of your testimony, I asked you to place a green tab next to the portion that I'm interested in at this point.

A. Yes. Yes. And it was kind of a warning to us if we didn't do what they wanted to do.

Q. Could you please read -- do you have a quote?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you record a quote? Could you please read that to us.

A. Yes. I wrote that: "If the Serbian side is not respected, there could be massive deaths on both sides. If we are left to resolve the matter by ourselves, we will resolve the matter very quickly. For example, there are 7.000 Serb refugees from Croatia in Bosanski Novi. The world did not condemn their plight."

Q. And in that passage, the latter part of that passage, he's referring to Serbs in Croatia that were made refugees by events there.

A. And in Bosanski Novi.

Q. Right.

A. Right.

Q. Now, in late June of 1992, did you also receive reports of the expulsion or harassment of Croats by Serb authorities and armed persons within Sector North?

A. Yes, there were.

Q. Where specifically? ¹⁵⁴³⁷

A. In this was a group of five, I believe, five Croats that had been forcibly moved out of their houses somewhere south of Korenica into Sector North, and then we had them housed in a hotel in Slunj.

Q. And on the 21st of July, 1992, did you report to your superiors the existence of 10.000 non-Serb refugees from the area of Bihac in Bosnia?

A. We alluded to reports reaching us of that kind.

Q. On the 12th of August of 1992, did Bosnian Serbs request that the UN evacuate 500 non-Serb refugees from Bosanska Kostajnica?

A. Yes. This was among the numbers in the meeting I just quoted from -- in Bosanski Novi. We had been given a list of possible refugees in a number of places, and that was one of them named, and the figure of 500 given as potential refugees from there.

Q. By the second week in August, did you have an estimate of how many non-Serb refugees sought to flee Bosnia by travelling through Sector North?

A. Yes. When they started looking for the second round of numbers to be evacuated through Sector North, the numbers started at 5.000. By the end of the period you're referring to, the number had swelled to 28.000.

Q. Now, up until this point, all the communications you had regarding the evacuation of these people, it was always with Serb mayors or Serb officials; is that correct?

A. At the bottom end of that process, it started with the Serb officials, but immediately we had to keep the Croatian side involved in the matter because they would have to be taken through the sector into the ¹⁵⁴³⁸ waiting hands of the Croatian side. So we dealt with the bottom of the process with the Serbs, at the end of the process with the Croats, but flipping back and forth between the two groups.

Q. What I'm asking is, up until this point, the meetings and the phone calls and the letters, were they all from Serbs or were they from -- did you ever have a meeting in which Muslims attended, prior to August?

A. Yes. In one meeting that Mr. Pasic and his group had requested of me, he had brought two Muslims in his team to tell us about the nature of this. Other than that, we were -- nobody else was involved.

Q. And was that meeting held on the 19th of August, 1992?

A. Yes.

Q. So prior to the 19th of August, no Muslim had ever come to your office, requesting voluntary removal?

A. No. And not even since. And they came in the company of the Serb group.

Q. And prior to this meeting, you estimate that at least 28.000 had become refugees?

A. No. The 28.000 was the projected figure in an attempt for a second round after the 9.000 had left.

Q. I want to ask you about that meeting. Can you tell us in a little bit more detail who attended that meeting of the 19th of August?

A. On the 19th of August, I had Mr. Vrkes, Vlado Vrkes, who had the title as the president of SDS of Sanski Most; Mr. Majkic, Dragan Majkic, who was the representative of the milicija of Sanski Most; Mr. Islamcevic, Besim Islamcevic, who was a representative of Muslim and Croatian willing ^{15439 BLANK PAGE 15440} to leave Sanski Most, the person I referred to as the only one of two Muslims; Mr. Asanovic, Esad Asanovic, who was the representative of Muslim refugees from Bosanska Krupa, now in Sanski Most. I also, of course, had other -- had the representatives of UNHCR in my office in that meeting.

Q. During the course of this meeting, were you requested to assist in the evacuation of specific numbers of non-Serbs from specific municipalities?

A. Yes.

Q. And I ask you just to tell us the municipality and the number that you were requested to evacuate.

A. The numbers came in two parts. One I was told in total. I was told in total, Sanski Most, they expected 11.000 applicants to leave. Bosanski Krupa, 600 applicants.

Prijedor, 8.000 applicants.

Q. Were you also presented with something at this meeting?

A. Yes. To my surprise, it was a computer list printed in the kind of a -- the old printer, computer printer where you fold one after another, and you folded it - it was about the size of this book - containing lists of names of the applicants themselves and complete details. And now, since I don't have a copy of that report, I'm just working on memory. It was nicely printed but it had more than details of the names. It totalled -- after they left, we went through the names and it totalled somewhere around 7.700 plus of the names.

Q. And this was presented to you as these are the people that we want you to help leave Bosnia? ¹⁵⁴⁴¹

A. Yes.

Q. What was your reaction to having been given that list?

A. A shock. We had already gone through this. We had already told them our incredulity about the claim that people could be voluntarily leaving their homes. It didn't seem to register. And now they seemed to have worked on it very meticulously about who it is. I must say, when I -- I got a little reminder of something that happened in the Second World War, about trying to remove people and going about it meticulously, which is one of the reasons why I mentioned earlier I had to tell my staff we couldn't not tell this story, notwithstanding the directive I had received from my headquarters not to be involved in it. It is in my office we are talking about, inside the UNPA, not in Bosnia.

Q. Did you form an impression regarding the level of organisation between Serbs on both the Croatian -- on the Croatian side of the border and the Bosnian side of the border?

A. Impression?

Q. Impression. When you were presented with this list, did you form an impression whether there was a sophisticated level of organisation between the Serb leaders on the Croatian side and the Serb leaders on the Bosnian side?

A. Actually, it gave me a mixed conflicting understanding. On one side, even if we told them in no uncertain terms how wrong this was, there seemed to be a level, unfortunately I used the word naivete about it, and they didn't seem really to be perturbed, and it didn't look more like ¹⁵⁴⁴² devious, it was just there was a strict naivete about it and not even trying to understand it, a kind of refusal to understand it on the one side. On the other side, they seemed to be pretty determined to pull it through as to prepare all of this, and the persistent nature in which they sought our agreement to do this.

Q. Continuing through September of 1992, was there a steady stream of Bosnian refugees making their way into Sector North?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, before I conclude this portion of your testimony, I want to -- I forgot to ask you a question regarding the letter from the mayor of Bosanski Novi, Mr. Pasic, and I can have the exhibit shown to you again if you require.

Did he sign his name as the mayor of Bosanski Novi?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall how he signed his name?

A. President of the Crisis Committee, I believe it was.

Q. Had you ever heard of that title before?

A. No.

MR. GROOME: I now ask that Prosecution Exhibit 378, tab 10, be placed on the overhead projector. I'd just point out a correction for the Chamber. This is in fact pages 26 and 27 from Prosecution Exhibit 336, the map book, and it's a photocopy. The summary says pages 20 and 21. That's incorrect. It's 26 and 27.

Q. Now, Mr. Kirudja, do you recognise what is depicted on this map?

A. Yes, I do? ¹⁵⁴⁴³

MR. GROOME: I'd ask that the director zoom out a little bit so we can get the two municipalities on the top. A little more. Very good.

Q. Now, Mr. Kirudja, I'd ask you, did you make the markings on this map?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. I'd ask you just to walk us through the markings and just briefly describe what each marking indicates.

A. I draw your attention to the fact that this is the border. This is the international border of Bosnia and the -- this is there, the internationally recognised border. As you'll see, all of these areas that are marked are well -- either at the border or well inside of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We were operating from inside, on the other side of the border, and this stream of the people was going up into the sector through this area here.

Q. Now, Mr. Kirudja, would I be correct in saying that Dvor is the only Croatian municipality that you've circled on this map?

A. Exactly.

Q. Okay. Could you please start from the left-hand side of the map, just identify the location and tell us what your markings indicate.

A. This is the Bihac town, and we have marked around 10.000 estimated refugees in that -- from that area and coming through Bihac. Bosanski Krupa. The 600 estimate was given to me in my office as we have just talked about in that meeting of 19th of August. Then Sanski Most. The 11.000 estimated, again from that meeting in my office. There was some to come from Kljuc, but I don't recall if ¹⁵⁴⁴⁴ there was any particular estimate or the number. Then Banja Luka. This is where the telephone call I referred to taken by my assistant took -- was taken from, where the mayor was warning us and requesting assistance and telling us 15.000 have left and 15.000 may be coming thereafter.

This is Prijedor, where the number of 8.000 was given in my office as potentially coming from that town.

And this is Bosanski Kostajnica. Again this is on the border town with Croatia and we had a presence also on the other side and where the number of 500 was estimated from.

This is again another border town, Bosanski Dubica, where we were also given notice that the refugees would be coming from there. I have circled the small thing. In the memorandum that you made me read a few minutes ago, I mentioned a number of places where we were told that there were refugees, and Omarska was one of them, and that is where I've circled.

Q. Thank you. I'm finished with that exhibit, thank you. Now, Mr. Kirudja, leaving the evacuations related to ethnic cleansing, I want to bring you back to the mayor of Vrginmost, Mr. Obradovic. You've mentioned him earlier in your testimony. Could you tell us what happened to Mr. Obradovic.

A. Mr. Obradovic one morning - I recall that it was Saturday but it was a morning around 9.00 - was killed in a stretch of the road between Vrginmost and Topusko, a wooded area. He was ambushed there and was shot several times from there. ¹⁵⁴⁴⁵

Q. Did you go to the scene of the shooting that day?

A. Yes. Almost an hour or so within that period, I was there. It's a very short distance from where we were located.

Q. Did you yourself personally make attempts to medevac, or evacuate, him by helicopter to a larger hospital?

A. I went from the scene of the crime. He didn't die on the scene. He had been evacuated to a local hospital and they were attempting to save his life when they also requested we give them a medevac on -- to save his life as they were frantically trying to do that.

Q. And can you tell us what happened with respect to those negotiations?

A. Naturally, we told them that it would be easier for us to give him evacuation, but the evacuation, since we were in Topusko, our helicopters would take him to Zagreb, which was actually a short distance away from where we were, but they turned that down.

Q. And what happened to Mr. Obradovic?

A. They turned that down first because their insistence that the medevac be to Belgrade, which was quite a distance from there. And before we could even reach an agreement on that, around 2.00, Mr. Obradovic, unfortunately, died.

Q. Was there an investigation into how -- the circumstances surrounding Mr. -- Mayor Obradovic's death?

A. Yes. Immediately after, even while he was on the hospital, trying to save his life, there were many roadblocks erected immediately, and this was in the operational zone of Kordun. So the military units of Kordun ¹⁵⁴⁴⁶ and Cedo Bulat and the police and Mr. -- the police, Djuro Skaljac, they went into high gear trying to catch who they called Croatian infiltrators. Immediately I was told there were Croatian infiltrators all over the place.

Q. And did you believe that Mr. Obradovic was killed by Croatian infiltrators?

A. Not really. There were many reasons for me to discount any Croatian infiltrators. Not that there weren't any. There had been in the past reasons to suppose there were Croatian infiltrators, but not on this occasion.

Q. Why?

A. On this occasion, there were many, many curious things that happened. I mentioned I was in the hospital with only one or two officials and that the most high ranking official in that hospital was Mile Paspalj. He came wearing a gun for the first time himself. And as I talked to them, it was clear that they were much more worried about something among themselves than something outside.

Q. Who did you believe was responsible for the death of Mr. Obradovic?

A. I wasn't sure, nor was I ever able to find out despite my -- I had pretty good sources of people who advised and gave me an idea of the direction if not the detail of something as magnitude as that, but they all froze. Nobody would even dare to talk to me about that. Secondly, if they really believed in Croatian infiltrators, I would not hear the end of it, not just a week later but thereafter they ¹⁵⁴⁴⁷ would have made clear to the Croatian side. So the story of the Croatian infiltrators rose one day and disappeared immediately. So all in all, it was clear that there was terror among the Serbs themselves in that area about this death.

Q. Can you describe for the Chamber briefly what Mr. Obradovic's political disposition would have been.

A. Mr. Obradovic was a quiet - and I emphasise this - quiet in relative to the other mayors who were given to a lot of speech-making, political kind, about national -- living together in one country. He was a quiet man. He also was given to interpreting the Vance Plan precisely the way it was intended to, and that was it gave the mayor and the chief of police the only authority recognised, and he seemed to play up to that that way.

In short, there was an air of independence, a quiet independence around him, and he got about doing his business that way.

Q. Can you describe for us what was the effect of his death among the other Serb political leaders in the area?

A. Chill, a real chill, a noticeable one. And not long thereafter, several of them did quit and were new mayors, particularly in Dvor itself. And in Vojnic there was a new mayor put in over there. And I believe mostly in those two places. And apart from the chill, there was changes in the mayor personnel.

Q. So mayors were actually replaced.

A. Yes, particularly in those two places, in Dvor and Vojnic.

Q. Now, you described last week for us that the highest level of ^{15448 BLANK PAGE 15449} government, local government, not counting the signatories on the Vance Plan, but the highest level of local government was at the municipality level.

A. Recognised by the Vance Plan.

Q. Recognised by the Vance Plan.

A. Yes.

Q. Did his murder have some change on the role that Knin played with respect to the operation of local governments at the municipality level?

A. I underscore the role of Knin was pronounced not long after we arrived in April or May. He was killed -- I forget the date. It was much later.

The role of Knin now became more pronounced. The difference that mayors gave and police officers gave to Knin became total at that point.

Q. Now, in an unrelated matter --

JUDGE MAY: Before we go on to that, what roughly is the date of the murder of the mayor? Have we got some idea?

MR. GROOME:

Q. Are you able to estimate for us or do you have it in your notebooks?

A. It's somewhere, but it's not present in my mind -- I know it was a Saturday morning, that was clear.

JUDGE MAY: No doubt in due course we can be told.

THE WITNESS: We can tell you that later.

MR. GROOME:

Q. I'd ask you, during one of the breaks, to please review your ¹⁵⁴⁵⁰ notebooks and I will ask you later on.

A. Yes.

Q. In April of 1993, did you become aware of an incursion from Croatia from the army of the Republic of Serb Krajina into Bosnia?

A. April.

Q. April of 1993.

A. You're referring to the one into Bosnia.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. And can you please describe where into Bosnia these troops went.

A. On the border, that international border I referred to a little earlier, there is a stretch of that border running between the town of Velika Kladusa and Bihac. That particular stretch of the border was turbulent, and we had military observers on both sides; in Velika Kladusa and in Bihac.

The Serbs made an incursion across into the area behind Velika Kladusa after three hours of artillery bombing.

Q. I want to now ask you about Mr. Fikret Abdic. Do you know who he is, and did you have occasion to meet with him?

A. Yes. I knew Mr. Abdic and met with him quite frequently, a number of times. He was based in Velika Kladusa, and we had a lot of these military issues and humanitarian issues that affected that.

Q. Can you briefly describe for the Chamber who he was.

A. First, on the one hand, he was a politician, a member of the Presidency in Sarajevo, and attempted and lost an election that he made ¹⁵⁴⁵¹ clear, he reminded us many times, that he had won that election. In other words, a politician, a member of the Presidency. On the other hand, he was also a businessman and the head of one of the largest agri-business, known as Agrokomerc, based in Bihac.

Q. Did he ever describe for you an agreement he had reached with Mr. Milosevic?

A. Yes. And again, out of the agenda. We were there to talk about something else, about incursions, some cease-fires between that, and he set aside the agenda on that occasion and started to talk to us about what he called the Belgrade declaration.

Q. And did he tell you when the Belgrade declaration was?

A. I believe it was on the 22nd of October.

Q. I'd ask you to just open up to that page in your notes.

A. Yes. We had met on 26th of October in Maljevac.

Q. And did he describe for you what the substance of this agreement he had made with President Milosevic was?

A. Let me preface my answer in saying we were trying to solve a border incursion between the Serbs on the one side and the Muslims on the other, and once he pulled out the Belgrade declaration, there was a reason for him to put that. He believed it was the formula for ending any and all kinds of conflicts between the Muslims and the Serbs as an example of why we had come there to talk about that specific cease-fire. And he said after the Belgrade declaration, we have created the conditions for solving the Bosanska Bojna, Gradina issue - that is the issue that brought us there that day - we should start the process with a lot of confidence. ¹⁵⁴⁵² Many documents were signed in the past. Unfortunately, none were fulfilled. I'm really ready to fulfil this declaration, meaning the Belgrade declaration.

Q. And did he indicate to you whether Mr. -- that the Belgrade declaration was an actual piece of paper that he signed?

A. At that moment, my notes indicate two things. He was telling us the status of the declaration as of that point, but I also note that I was - and I recall seeing the broad elements of that agreement, but it was not by -- the details were not directly from Fikret but from his assistant, a man by the name Mr. Sajso [phoen]. But Mr. Abdic himself mentioned to me, and I quote from my notes here: "Pretty soon a meeting with Karadzic which I will have and I will host. I talked to Mr. Milosevic today by telephone. He promised to contact Karadzic for this purpose."

Now, from the note of the general parameters I understood of this declaration, it also had the agreement of Mr. Tudjman. So basically, it did illustrate Mr. Fikret Abdic's bigger vision that he claimed and he made clear to us as representatives of the UN. And, generally summarised, was if he, Mr. Abdic, was in charge, he could end these fightings that were between Muslims and Croats and all of that because he could obtain an agreement easily or, rather, relatively easily with Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Karadzic on the Serb side and Mr. Tudjman on the Croatian side and himself as a representative of the Muslims. And to illustrate that, he had created an area called the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia where he could illustrate his vision. ¹⁵⁴⁵³

Q. Now, to make sure that we understand what you've just told us, at the time you're meeting with Mr. Abdic, he's telling you that there is an existing agreement between himself and Mr. Milosevic that has the approval of Mr. Tudjman and that that very day Mr. Milosevic called Fikret Abdic --

A. He would call.

Q. That he would call and arrange for Karadzic to visit Bihac so that he would also participate in this?

A. Come on board on this agreement.

Q. Now, you said that you later learned the details of the agreement between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Abdic from Mr. Abdic's assistant. Are there any details which you have not described so far? If you haven't, I would ask you to tell us any additional details of that agreement.

A. No. I have given you from my notes the framework of how I understood it.

Q. Now, after this time, was there a level of cooperation between Colonel Bulat and Fikret Abdic?

A. There was before then and after, a major, major collaboration between Fikret Abdic and Cedo Bulat on the Kordun side as well as Tarbuk on Banja side. I mentioned earlier the reason the meeting was held was an incursion into Bosanska Bojna by the Serbs, and it caused a major rift. That collaboration was to assist Fikret Abdic, ironically, fight his own Muslim group in Bihac in the form of the 5th Corps of Bihac that he had got into fighting relationship with, and he was getting the military support from Cedo Bulat as well as Tarbuk on that.

Q. Now, in your view, did this agreement amount to a cease-fire of ¹⁵⁴⁵⁴ the fighting that was going on in that area?

A. It was better than a cease-fire. They had agreed on a complete pull-back from that area of Bosnia where the Serbs had gone in.

Q. Now, you've told us it was an agreement between Mr. Milosevic, Abdic, with the approval of -- I want to ask you, there was any mention about a member of the federal government of Yugoslavia, of their involvement in this agreement or their having signed an agreement with Mr. Abdic?

A. Beg your forbearance in misunderstanding you when I was talking about an agreement. It's obvious from your last comment that you are talking about Belgrade declaration. I was not talking about Belgrade declaration, I was talking about a parallel agreement about a pull-back in the region in an area called Bosanska Bojna.

Now, to repeat, that had nothing to do with Belgrade. So could you kindly rephrase your question.

Q. Did the Belgrade declaration that you've referred to, did that result in a cessation of hostilities?

A. I don't look to it itself had a direct role. There was something else that ended the hostilities locally there that had nothing to do with the Belgrade declaration.

Q. And please describe that for us.

A. It was a concerted effort between the UN and the Serb side and Fikret Abdic to locally disengage. The Serbs themselves were -- ended up conceding it was an error and they needed to get out.

Q. Now, back to the Belgrade declaration. Was there ever any mention ¹⁵⁴⁵⁵ of the involvement or role that the federal government of Yugoslavia had to play in this agreement with Abdic?

A. Abdic himself made it clear he just needed their support of his idea of Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. From there on, he made it clear he was capable of taking care of the area himself.

Q. I'm not talking about the federal government of the Bosnian government, I'm talking about of Yugoslavia itself.

A. I understood, and my reply was he made clear that he needed the endorsement from Belgrade of his Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. He needed and got endorsement from Tudjman. He needed and got an endorsement -- or rather, was working to get Karadzic, through Belgrade, to agreed to it.

Q. When did you conclude your duties in Sector North?

A. Towards the end of the two years. It's normal to end the duties around that time, and it was around 1994.

Q. And did there come a time when you were transferred to Belgrade to take up other responsibilities for the United Nations?

A. Yes. I was transferred after a short stint in Zagreb in the capacity of civil affairs Chief of Staff.

Q. And what was your title when you served in Belgrade?

A. The title was the delegate of the special representative of the Secretary-General, who at that time was Mr. Akashi.

Q. And approximately when did you assume your duties there?

A. The date probably is August 1994 or somewhere around that time.

Q. Can you briefly describe what your duties entailed. ^{15456 BLANK PAGE 15457}

A. This was to be -- to have a big component of that responsibility was to help Mr. -- the diplomatic communications between the headquarters of UNPROFOR and Mr. Akashi's headquarters and the government in Belgrade. There was a big diplomatic component in that assignment

Q. Can you describe for the Chamber, what procedure would you follow if there was an issue that Mr. Akashi wanted raised -- wanted you to raise with the Yugoslav authorities. What procedure would you follow, and please tell us how you would come to meet the people you came to meet.

A. It was well-executed procedure that worked pretty well. There was a commission for relationship with UNPROFOR that was part of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At that time there was a Foreign Minister by the name of Jovanovic, and the commission itself had a secretary by the name of Mr. Pesut. If Mr. Akashi or Mr. De Mello or anyone wanted some diplomatic communication, a meeting set, I was requested to inform Mr. Pesut, as the secretary of that commission, that such-and-such meeting was requested for such-and-such a reason, and he would then contact the people requested and the meeting would be set up.

Q. Would Mr. Jovanovic determine who were the people you should meet, depending upon the issues that you needed to raise?

A. Rarely. Although, I had the courtesy and pleasure and the opportunity of meeting with Mr. Jovanovic, I didn't need that. I -- Mr. Pesut alone was enough to communicate the request. And even if it was a request for a meeting with the President of Serbia, at that time Mr. Milosevic. ¹⁵⁴⁵⁸

Q. Approximately how many meetings did you have with Mr. Milosevic?

A. I am guessing around six.

Q. And can you please tell us, just generally, the topics that you would have discussed with him?

A. These meetings were meetings requested by Mr. Akashi, and they covered the full range of the issues that UNPROFOR was engaged in, be it in Bosnia, in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, or those United Nations Protected Areas or issues specifically that were in the territory of the Rump Yugoslavia, meaning Serbia and Montenegro. And those were the issues of the Prevlaka peninsula in Montenegro or Resolution 781 that dealt with the no-fly that was imposed on the former Yugoslavia, and monitors were watching the flights out of Serbian skies, searching in Belgrade.

Q. Can you generally characterise your interaction with Mr. Milosevic during these meetings.

A. It was very professional, and I will take the opportunity to recognise he was always very kind and courteous, and we -- we had his reaction in time as well -- as well as in substance as the -- as Mr. Akashi wished. In other words, at no time was there a request by Mr. Akashi that was turned down.

Q. I want to draw your attention to several of those meetings, and the first one I'd like to draw your attention to is on the 26th of October of 1994 regarding an unofficial meeting with Mr. Milosevic to discuss the FRY's position towards the conflict in BiH. Do you have a clear recollection of that meeting or would you like to refer to your notes?

A. Who else was in that meeting? Was it Mr. Akashi or somebody else? ¹⁵⁴⁵⁹

Q. Mr. De Mello was present at the meeting.

A. Yes. This meeting was really -- yes, I recall it, and essentially it was an informal meeting. Not for the purpose you have mentioned, but it was the time when Mr. De Mello was ending his role in the former Yugoslavia, and it was a courtesy meeting to say farewell to the president at that time.

Q. And did the topic of the FRY's position towards the conflict in Bosnia arise?

A. In that context, and I would like to be clear that it was in that context of two people, Mr. De Mello and Mr. Milosevic, kind of taking back a look at the issues that they had discussed earlier, and they covered a number of topics, including the one you have mentioned.

Q. And did Mr. Milosevic characterise the position of the FRY towards the conflict in Bosnia?

A. Yes. He made it clear that the war solutions were not going to be producing any results, and he did speak at length about his quest for a peaceful outcome rather than a war outcome in the area.

Q. During the course of that meeting, was there also some discussion with Mr. Milosevic regarding nationalists within Serbia and, in particular, Mr. Seselj?

A. Yes. Because he was -- to underscore his point about the option for peace and no option for war, he mentioned so-called hawks and hard-liners in Serbia who he said were waning in influence. Their influence was decreasing. And to give an example, he gave an example of Mr. Seselj at that time in the parliament of Federal Republic of ¹⁵⁴⁶⁰ Yugoslavia and mentioned that his immunity had been withdrawn at that time so he could face some charges.

He also mentioned that Seselj's - how do you say? - supporter or a leader, somebody who was aligned with Seselj in the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Knin, that person also had been removed, and that was Mr. Milosevic's way of underscoring to Mr. De Mello that the forces of peace were winning over the forces of war.

Q. I want to now draw your attention to another meeting approximately a month later, on the 23rd of November, 1994. Did you meet with Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Milan Martic?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you please describe the substance of that meeting.

A. I believe this is the meeting called by Mr. Akashi, and this was in the context of NATO action that had been brought to bear on an airport controlled by the Serbs called Udbina airport.

Q. And can you please tell us what of significance occurred during that meeting.

A. This was rather -- there was a measure of tension in the meeting because the military side of UNPROFOR and others -- and Mr. Martic were talking an issue that of course had resulted in airstrikes, and most of the meeting was taken up with Mr. Martic denying very much that this was something that they caused and kind of turning the tables the other way, that it was an aggression by NATO and that the people of the Serbian Republic were -- I mean, the people of the Republic of Serbian Krajina were very -- were on edge. They took offence on this, and he implied that ¹⁵⁴⁶¹ he was doing his best to prevent these people from attacking UNPROFOR for these actions.

So he spent a lot of time along those lines of complaints, meaning Martic, at the end of which he requested Mr. Akashi to condemn those strikes as a way of getting on the good side of Serb in the -- Serbs in the UNPA. All this time, Mr. Milosevic was listening and the conversation was not with him; it was with Mr. Martic up to a point.

Q. Did at some point in the meeting Mr. Milosevic take a greater role in discussion at the meeting?

A. Yes. After all that kind of point, counterpoint between the military side and the UN and Mr. Martic, Mr. Milosevic did intervene. Generally, if I recall correct, he did two things: He did associate himself with the feeling that the NATO action was uncalled for on the -- a point that Martic was making. On the one side, having conceded to Martic that he, Mr. Milosevic, agreed that NATO action was uncalled for, he also spoke to Martic kind of indirect by telling him what he believed his obligation was and that - Martic's obligation - and that was not to do things that resulted in the war option being exercised in this -- against the Serbs. Consistent with the point Mr. Milosevic had made many times about war and peace.

JUDGE KWON: Just a minute, Mr. Groome. Let me get back to the earlier issue a minute.

MR. GROOME: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kirudja, let's go back to the issue of the removal of Seselj's men in Knin. ¹⁵⁴⁶²

THE WITNESS: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Did Mr. Milosevic say that he had done that himself?

THE WITNESS: He didn't say he had done it himself but he said that in the process, things like were happening - example, there was the removal - without saying whether by himself or by somebody else.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. And one thing more: Could you explain the immunity which was -- had been given to Mr. Seselj. What was it like?

THE WITNESS: As a member of parliament, of the federal republic or parliament, I understood that to mean that you would be -- you have a certain measure of immunity from prosecution as long as you are a member of parliament. And in order to lay charges on him, that immunity was removed.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. GROOME:

Q. I want to now draw your attention to a meeting on the 3rd of May, and the topic of the meeting -- I'm sorry, the 3rd of May, 1995, in which the topic of the meeting was Western Slavonia.

A. Excuse me if you forbear with me on the earlier meeting. I mentioned there was a topic of strikes in Udbina. There was a second topic in which Mr. Milosevic intervened.

Q. I'm sorry. Please continue.

A. The second topic that came up in that meeting was a remark that Martic made about the Serb forces doing their best "to prevent humanitarian help going into Bihac." And that was Martic openly saying we have been trying to prevent humanitarian assistance going into the pocket ¹⁵⁴⁶³ of Bihac. At that point, that illustrated some things we'd been saying all along, that Bihac was besieged and no humanitarian effort was going in.

At that point, at that remark by Martic, Mr. Milosevic did intervene to make clear in no uncertain terms, Mr. Martic, that such an action was not to be contemplated and that humanitarian assistance into the pocket had to be allowed.

Q. Now, there's nothing -- is there anything else you think is of significance from that meeting?

A. Basically, that is what comes to my mind now, but if I look at my notes, we could look at whatever else you want to look at.

Q. Can I draw your attention now to the 3rd of May, 1995, a meeting with Mr. Milosevic during which Western Slavonia was discussed. Do you recall that meeting?

A. Yes. Again it was requested by Mr. Akashi.

Q. And did the topic of a military commission arise in the meeting?

A. Yes. This was again for -- a background quickly: This was on something the Croats had done called Operation West Sector or something like that, where they had taken military action against Sector West, the Serbs in Sector West. And that, of course, was received very traumatically by the rest of the Serbs in other areas because it kind of portended what would come eventually for all areas that the Serbs had occupied in Croatia.

And Mr. Milosevic, of course, was, like others, not supportive of that military action by Croatia, and he spoke along those lines, and in ¹⁵⁴⁶⁴ general in BiH he revived a concept of -- earlier on that had been instituted called commission on disarmament or commission -- I need -- it was a disengagement commission, a military disengagement commission that he wanted revived to deal with issues such as military actions by one side against the other.

MR. GROOME: I'd ask that Prosecution Exhibit 378, tab 11, be placed or given to the witness. I'd ask that the first page be placed on the overhead projector.

Q. Mr. Kirudja, during the course of that meeting, did Mr. Milosevic characterise his relationship with Ratko Mladic?

A. Yes, there is a reference to that.

Q. And how did he characterise his relationship with Mr. Mladic -- or General Mladic?

A. Can I pick up this?

Q. Yes, yes. Pick it up and read it if you need to.

A. Thank you.

Q. Or refer to your diaries as well if that's required.

A. Yes. I make reference in this memo to the fact that the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia had been closed for all males from the RS, and this, I advised -- my interpretation of it was because of the action taken, it would have some implications, and one was reducing the number of refugees that would be coming across; and secondly, it would by initial bolster the relationship with Mr. Mladic by cutting off the rate of desertion from the BSA.

Q. Going back to the 3rd of May meeting, and I'll still be using that ^{15465 BLANK PAGE 15466} exhibit so -- the 3rd of May meeting, did Mr. Milosevic also characterise his view of Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik?

A. Yes. Again in a persistent wane of those he conceded as hard-liners and hawks defeating his strategy of finding a political solution, those two were in that category. He saw them in that category at that stage.

Q. I want to now ask that the second page of that exhibit be placed on the overhead, and, Mr. Kirudja, first let me ask you: This is a report that you had done regarding your meetings or your analysis of meetings with Mr. Milosevic; correct?

A. This was a specific time and period an analysis at that particular specific time.

Q. I'd ask you to read the top paragraph on the second page. "After the 5-hour meeting on 16 May with Frasure, all the top brass of the ruling SPS began to show up at President Milosevic's office in Belgrade, again presumably to be briefed about the negotiations. Among them was Radmilo Bogdanovic, the former Interior Minister and now president of the federal parliament's Committee on Serbian diaspora; Boris Jovic, president of the federal parliament's committee on foreign policy; and Milomir Minic, the Secretary-General of the ruling SPS. The 'recognition' side of the negotiation 'equation' is apparently a done deal. The negotiations still going on have to do with what the US has characterised as the 'road map' for the phased approach to sanctions relief."

Q. Thank you. I'm finished with that exhibit. ¹⁵⁴⁶⁷ Mr. Kirudja, just before the break, could I ask you to briefly describe the general situation of the closure of the border and the incident involving sightings of Yugoslav helicopters crossing the border from Serbia into Bosnia. Can you just give us the background and then we'll pick up the detail after the break.

A. Border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the president of -- President Milosevic at that time did take a decision, the result of which that border was closed to all except humanitarian assistance. That was -- and to monitor that the border was closed to all but humanitarian border, there was a monitoring mission that was outside the mandate of the UN. It was run by the ICFY monitors. And that situation of the closure of the border has also to be seen under Resolution 7801 of the Security Council, prohibiting military flight in the skies outside of Serbia and Montenegro. So in that context, at one date, the UN contingent, the Dutch contingent that was in Srebrenica, did notice and report the sudden appearance of helicopter flights from across the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. Can you gives the approximate time frame you're talking about?

A. Dates?

Q. Yes.

A. Unfortunately, I don't have them right now.

Q. Perhaps after the break.

MR. GROOME: If that's a convenient spot for the Chamber.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m. ¹⁵⁴⁶⁸

--- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Groome.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Mr. Kirudja, just before the break, you were telling us about Dutch UN troops in the Srebrenica area that observed helicopters crossing the border. Did something also occur during this sighting with respect to United Nations military observers that were stationed in a radar control room in Serbia?

A. Yes. Procedurally, before we broke, I was also asked about two other questions. Do you want me to answer them now?

Q. I'm sorry, let's do that. The first one, I think, was the death of Mayor Obradovic. Did you have an opportunity to --

A. Yes.

Q. When was he killed?

A. My notes say early July 1992. And I had a second matter that I also wanted to be clarified. The commission I was struggling to remember was called joint military commission. That was the subject of that meeting that you asked me about.

Q. All right. And --

A. That joint military commission was a commission that Mr. Milosevic wanted revived after the Operation of Flash that ended up taking Sector West. That meeting in that context, after Sector West. And in that joint military commission was made up of the force commander Rupert, Mr. -- the head of the Muslim group, and the head of the Serbian VRS. In that meeting, that's when Mr. Milosevic mentioned the comment ¹⁵⁴⁶⁹ that, "Mladic is a personal friend of mine" but not so with Karadzic and Krajisnik at that point, because he regarded them as promoting the war option, that he was against. That's in that context.

Q. Just a couple matters of clarification. When you say "Rupert," do you mean General Rupert Smith?

A. Yes.

Q. And when you say after Flash, is that the Croatian offensive that resulted in the re-taking of Sector West from Serb-controlled areas?

A. Yes. And that meeting was held in that context.

Q. Now, once again back to the sighting of the helicopters. Could you please describe for us what if anything was unusual with respect to United Nations military observers at the time the sightings were made.

A. Prior to those sightings, we had access to the radar room, meaning United Nations military observers in Belgrade had routine access to the military radar room for the purposes of observing Resolution 781, the no-fly around.

Two or three days before the sightings, we had reports of certain unusual events leading to the military observers claiming they had no access to the room. There were complaints that they were being prevented to have access to that room.

Q. Who denied them access?

A. Well, their counterparts. They always observed with their Serbian counterparts in the room.

Q. Were they -- their counterparts had been members of the Yugoslav army? ¹⁵⁴⁷⁰

A. Right.

Q. And what was the stated reason for members of the Yugoslav army refusing access to the UNMOs when they previously had granted them access to observe the radar screens?

A. The only official reason I can give you is the one that was given to me ex post facto, not before. I got an explanation when I met with Ambassador Cicanovic. That is the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's person in charge of relationship with UNPROFOR, and I had many dealings with him. For example, to get an explanation like that.

Q. Can you summarise --

A. Yes. The explanation -- the explanation was it was a misunderstanding. There were failures in the control room due to missing parts because of the sanctions against Yugoslavia. So basically, it was a misunderstanding on the part of the UN UNMOs, that they thought they were being precluded. They weren't. But this is ex post facto explanation.

Q. Right. I'd ask that you be shown Prosecution Exhibit 378, tab 12, and while that's being shown to you, did you memorialise the response of the FRY government in great detail in a report that you sent to Mr. Akashi?

A. Yes, I did, in a report comprising ten pages of details.

Q. Okay. I'm not going to get you to read any of that report at this stage, I just simply place it in evidence should the Chamber wish to examine more closely the examination.

I ask that you now be shown Prosecution Exhibit 378, tab 13. I'd ask that the second page of that document be placed on the overhead ¹⁵⁴⁷¹ projector. The first line on the second page is "Airfield monitors in FRY." Can I draw your attention to the first paragraph of point 3 and ask you to read from that paragraph.

A. The one beginning "UNMOs..."?

Q. Yes. Just the first paragraph.

A. "UNMOs have been denied access to the flight controls at Surcin airport control room. The consistent explanation has been the requirement for spare parts to repair the screen that had been assigned to the UNMOs. This flight control unit had had the parts scavenged to maintain other controls. UNMOs have been denied access to flight controls not in use and at a minimum to walk around the control room and make observations over the shoulder of the operators."

Q. Please, just the paragraph that begins, number 3, "UNMOs have not been..."

A. "UNMOs have not been permitted to have an independent means of communications in their offices at the airfields or in their vehicles. Suspected violations, therefore, cannot be reported in a timely manner to permit UNPROFOR to react appropriately other than to advise UN New York belatedly. The consistent reason given is that any VHF HF communication systems used at the airfield would interfere with aircraft controlling. This is highly unlikely."

Q. I'd ask you to take a look at the first page. If that could be handed to Mr. Kirudja.

And was this a code cable you received from Mr. Akashi on the 13th of February, 1995? ¹⁵⁴⁷²

A. Yes.

Q. I now ask you that you take a look at Prosecution Exhibit 378, tab 14. While that's being placed in front you, you've used the word "ICFY." Can you tell us what that stands for?

A. International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. That was headquartered in Geneva and chaired by, at the time, by Mr. Stoltenberg on the UN side and Lord Owen on the European Union side.

Q. I'd ask that the entire exhibit be handed to Mr. Kirudja. I'd ask you to look at it and tell us whether you recognise it.

A. Yes.

Q. I'd ask that the third page be placed -- I'm sorry. Can you tell us what it is.

A. This is a report that informs my headquarters that we are -- we were now exchanging reports between ICFY and us. In other words, we were going to share certain information.

Q. I'd ask that the third page of that document be placed on the overhead projector, and Mr. Kirudja, I would draw your attention to the table at the bottom of that page.

A. Yes.

Q. And what is depicted or what does that table represent on the bottom of that report?

A. It's a summary of the confiscations along the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina for the period from 4th August to 31st January, 1995, as observed by ICFY monitors.

Q. So this would be a record of the goods that were confiscated that ^{15473 BLANK PAGE 15474} were being attempted to be brought from Yugoslavia into Bosnia; is that correct?

A. I'm not sure which direction, but in the border. I'm not sure which direction the goods might have been going; maybe both directions.

Q. How much petrol was confiscated?

A. Well, on this it shows 45.368 tonnes of petrol, and 399.513 tonnes of diesel.

Q. Okay. I'd now ask that the last page be placed on the overhead projector.

While that's being done, in your view, how effective was the border closure between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. It's only an opinion that I couldn't back up since that responsibility was not in my hands.

Q. Then I withdraw the question then. On the last page of that document, was there also information regarding a possible pipeline, the existence of a possible pipeline between Serbia into Bosnia under the Drina River? I draw your attention to the very last paragraph of the report.

A. Yes. I would confirm that differently in the sense that I also had one or two representations in my office from people at the other end. I forget the name, but they were also ICFY representatives, seeking our assistance in repair parts for that pipeline.

Q. I'm finished with that exhibit, and I would ask that the witness be shown -- or ask that the witness be shown 378, tab 15, and I'd ask that the entire exhibit be shown to Mr. Kirudja. ¹⁵⁴⁷⁵ And after you've reviewed it, Mr. Kirudja, could you tell us, do you recognise what it is?

A. It's a memorandum that I had sent to Mr. Akashi on 1st of March on the subject of cross-border flights.

Q. I'd ask you to take a quick look through the document, and I ask you, in this report, do you describe some reports you had of involvement of Yugoslav army troops outside the territory of Yugoslavia and in Bosnia?

A. Meaning the entirety of the memo or a specific part of the memo?

Q. Let me draw your attention to the second page of that memo.

A. Yes.

Q. And if you look at the second paragraph and read forward from there. See if that refreshes your recollection.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you please describe what you reported, back on the 1st of March, 1995, to Mr. Akashi.

A. That paragraph opens with the statement: "As mentioned in previous reports, the JA -" meaning Yugoslav army - "'house' in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is caught in a wave of internal turbulence, pitting hard-liners against proponents of the 'peace option' spearheaded by Milosevic. Today word is out that written orders have been issued to all 'officers' or 'professional' soldiers in the Yugoslav army who were born on the other side of the Drina or have parents or families still living there. The order for six-month 'detachment' to either the 'RS' or 'RSK' armies. Refusal to obey the orders will result in summary dismissal. The orders seem to have been accepted without contest and do ¹⁵⁴⁷⁶ not apply to non-Serbs still in the JA even if they originate from BiH."

Q. And do you go on further to talk about an anti-aircraft battery that was reported having crossed into BiH, Bosnia?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you please read that one sentence regarding that.

A. "Two days ago, two anti-aircraft infantry units the size of a brigade plus, reportedly crossed into BiH complete with their two old Soviet-made batteries of missiles of a type they call Volkov and Dina, their destination of intent not yet clear."

Q. And on the 26th -- or did you also report in this particular report that on the 26th of February, 1995, troops from the Yugoslav army had been seen moving toward the borders with Sector East in the vicinity of Sid not far from the Vinkovci-Mirkovci area?

A. Yes.

Q. And during the time that you wrote this report, would it be fair to say that Mr. Milosevic was actively involved in negotiating in the peace process?

A. It is fair to say so.

Q. Thank you. No further questions from that exhibit, or about that exhibit.

I'd now ask that Mr. Kirudja be shown Prosecution Exhibit 378, tab 16.

And this would be the final piece of correspondence regarding the helicopter flights I'd like to ask you about. I'd ask you to look at the entire exhibit and, after you've had a chance to review it, please tell us ¹⁵⁴⁷⁷ if you recognise it.

Do you recognise what that is?

A. Yes.

Q. And what is it?

A. This is a memorandum I addressed to Mr. Akashi again on the subject of the helicopter border crossings that we talked to earlier.

Q. I'd ask that the second page be placed on the overhead projector, and Mr. Kirudja, I would ask you to read the first sentence in the first complete paragraph of the page, the sentence beginning with, "Mr. Kertes..."

A. "Mr. Kertes, explaining that he was speaking on behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia government, protested that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had not been promptly informed of the helicopter flight allegations the same day of their occurrence, and claimed that ICFY had neither the mandate nor the competence to examine such helicopter flight allegations. Of the 26 reported --"

Q. That's sufficient, Mr. Kirudja.

A. Okay.

Q. Prior to this incident, had you ever been aware of Mr. Kertes's involvement in the relationship between the UNMOs and the Yugoslav army in access to the radar sites?

A. No, nor was it my responsibility. This was the responsibility of the EU monitors that reported to me this part.

Q. I've finished with that exhibit. Thank you. Now, I want to move to a different area of inquiry. I want to ask ¹⁵⁴⁷⁸ you, did you at some point become involved in a situation or negotiations regarding UN personnel that had been taken hostage in Bosnia?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Can you please describe in summary fashion what occurred in that incident before I ask you detailed questions?

A. At some point, it was all over the news, international news, that United Nations monitors and other personnel had been taken hostage in the area within the vicinity of Sarajevo, and there occurred -- this occurred while the border had been closed, the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been closed.

In that context, immediate requirement arose for the release of these hostages, first from Sarajevo itself and the commander, General Rupert Smith, and later the matter reached Belgrade, where assistance was being sought in the same exercise.

Q. And who was the person that you negotiated most directly with?

A. Mr. Stanisic.

Q. And can you tell us his entire name? Do you remember his first name?

A. I'm sorry. Right now it doesn't come straight, but --

Q. I'm going to ask that you be shown a report that you drafted, and that is Exhibit 378, tab 17. I'd ask you to review the report and tell us, do you recognise what it is?

A. Yes. This is a memorandum putting on record the circumstances under which I became involved in -- on the side of Belgrade in their assistance to release the hostages through Mr. Jovica Stanisic. ¹⁵⁴⁷⁹

Q. What is the date of that report?

A. 9 June 1995.

Q. What was Mr. Stanisic's position at the time that you were negotiating with him for the release of the hostages in Bosnia?

A. My understanding was that he was chief of Serbian internal -- Interior Ministry and other special security forces. Not in great detail, the title wasn't given to me in great detail, just an understanding that he was chief of -- he was chief of Serbian Interior Ministry.

Q. And approximately how many times did you meet with him in connection with the hostage crisis?

A. Oh, the exact number isn't clear to me, but at least three times.

Q. And where were those meetings held?

A. In his office.

Q. And at the time that you had meetings with him in his office, can you tell us who would have been present?

A. Just myself and one staff member that helped me record what I was being told.

Q. And did Mr. Stanisic have any other members of his staff or other people from other parts of the either Serbian or federal government with him?

A. No.

Q. Where were the hostages that you were specifically negotiating? Do you recall where in Bosnia they were?

A. In fact, that was the subject of the negotiation. There had been a release of a certain number of personnel taken hostage. Some at that ¹⁵⁴⁸⁰ point had been released. I forget how many, but the others were not identifiable as to location or who was holding them, and that was the gist of the meeting.

Q. Just as a general matter before I ask you a specific question about that report, can you describe for the Chamber when it is that you generate these reports with respect to having conducted a meeting.

A. Usually within hours. Certainly at the end of the day or, at most, the next day. Of any matter that we were involved on, it was a requirement that you file a report for that day.

Q. And with respect to the notes in your diaries, you've read a couple of passages from them. When are the -- when did you generate the diary entries with respect to --

A. The same, and for every one of those diaries and what we have read, a report within the same day or at most 24 hours, was sent to headquarters corresponding to the subject discussed and the material details.

Q. I want to ask that the second page of that report be placed on the overhead projector.

Mr. Kirudja, I want to ask you to read from paragraph number 5. If you would read that entire paragraph.

A. Number 5?

Q. Number 5, yes.

A. "Stanisic proposes, if you confirm there is indeed an armed UN group in a situation as described, that he would go to the Bosnian territory while maintaining contact with our office in Belgrade, and set ¹⁵⁴⁸¹ up a means of identifying his forces from those of the Serb captors on the ground. Simultaneously, the blocked UN group would receive coordinating orders leading to a 'cross-over' to Stanisic's forces."

Q. Now, I want to focus on one part of that. Where Mr. Stanisic -- where you write that Mr. Stanisic conveys to you that he will set up a means of identifying his forces, given the context of the entire conversation, did you interpret that to mean that Mr. Stanisic, after this meeting, was going to send in some of his forces into Bosnia for the specific task of locating the hostages, or did you interpret that to mean that his forces were already present in Bosnia and he would simply identify the ones most critical to the hostage situation?

A. My strong understanding is that he had in place already forces in Bosnia which he needed to contact discreetly for this purpose.

MR. GROOME: I'm finished with that exhibit. I'd ask that the witness be shown Prosecution Exhibit number 18 -- tab 18 of 378.

Q. There are -- there are no specific questions I wanted to ask you regarding this document. I want to introduce it for the sake of completeness. Is this another report of a subsequent meeting you had with Mr. Stanisic?

A. Correct.

Q. And what is the date of this report?

A. There's a correction on it, and it should be the one handwritten, 10 June 1995.

Q. Now, just for a matter of clarity, a number of the reports that you have spoken to today have underlining and certain scribbles on them. ^{15482 BLANK PAGE 15483} Did you do any of the underlining or any of the other writing on any of these reports?

A. No, because this was originating from me, and actually, I had never seen them after I sent them until the -- this process brought them to my notice complete with those markings.

MR. GROOME: I would just state for the record that the documents were received in this condition. These marks are not the product of anything the Office of the Prosecutor has done and I would request that the Chamber simply ignore the underlines and handwritten marks contained on the documents.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Kirudja. Now, Mr. Kirudja, I would ask you, in conclusion of your testimony here, can you, based on your experience and your dealings with Mr. Milosevic and other members of the -- both the federal Yugoslav government and the Republic of Serbia government, can you describe for us what opinion, if you have any, of Mr. Milosevic's role and authority vis-a-vis other members of those governments that you dealt with?

A. One of the things that struck me as interesting was Mr. Milosevic's command of detail and knowledge of matters that we sought to see him, and without this normal -- if you meet with government officials at his level, certainly he -- at the level -- summit level like his, usually there is always aides who are the keepers of the details of the issues being discussed.

He struck me as very informed from policy, all the way down to detail. That was a speciality I noted. ¹⁵⁴⁸⁴

Q. During the course of your negotiations, were you ever directed to the then sitting federal president, Mr. Zoran Lilic?

A. It was never an issue. It didn't arise either from Mr. Akashi or from anybody else to request meetings with that -- on that source.

Q. Drawing your attention to a report of the 16th of May, 1995, did you in that report express your concern to your superiors that Mr. Milosevic had too much of a solo role in the negotiations?

A. It wasn't a concern, it was to draw their attention. I want to preface that all these reports were written long before this court or even the idea of this court existed. So there was a reason I wrote those reports, and that was the result to make sure that the people I was reporting to understood in greater detail the risks we learned and the things that we made our mission at risk of fail. One of those is to understand who it is they were dealing with, and therefore, in order to -- in the case of Mr. Milosevic, it was important for them to know he was very well-informed. There's no need to think of big delegations when you meet him or to request a lot of other people. It was sufficient that you met with him and he would be informed.

Q. And did you make this observation in official reports that you --

A. Yes, for that purpose.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I have no further questions. Just as an administerial matter and a way of taking stock, the Prosecution is seeking to tender all of the exhibits used with this witness, Prosecution Exhibit 378, tabs 1 through 18.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We admit the exhibits normally unless there is ¹⁵⁴⁸⁵ any form of objection.

Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [No interpretation]

JUDGE MAY: There is no interpretation. Let's try again.

THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's try again.

THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the interpretation now?

THE WITNESS: I can hear the interpretation now, not prior to this moment.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So it seems to be working now. Mr. Kirudja, when you arrived in Krajina, the Sector North, and the entire area, Krajina, Croatia, Bosnia, everywhere you moved around, you came across a situation there, and was it your impression that the Yugoslav People's Army and other authorities extended full cooperation and support to you in what you considered to be your task and assignment there?

A. Yes -- yes, Mr. Milosevic. It is correct that the Yugoslav national army did extend, as I testified earlier, what I considered full cooperation to the UN mission, at least in the early stages of its deployment.

Q. So may we then take it that with respect to logistical support, the army and the authorities of Yugoslavia demonstrated towards you their readiness to fully cooperate and see that your mission was a success and fulfilled its assignment? Is that right? ¹⁵⁴⁸⁶

A. Again, I stress there was an issue of cooperation as we started our deployment. There were other details of my testimony that point to changes thereafter.

Q. All right. We'll get to those changes and then I should like to ask you for some additional explanations in that regard, but as a conscientious representative of the United Nations with the mandate you were given, I assume that you did not omit to become acquainted, once you arrived in Yugoslavia, with the most important provisions of the constitution of Yugoslavia. Am I right in thinking that?

A. Mr. Milosevic, you are partly right. I was, of course, obligated to understand the mandate of the mission, as we spoke earlier, the Vance Plan being a component of that, plus the subsequent resolutions of the UN that mandated that. With regard to the constitution of Yugoslavia, I regrettably say I can't say I am familiar with that constitution, nor was I required really to become familiar with its contents.

Q. Well, were you acquainted at least with some of the principles, such as the principle mirrored in the constitution which speaks about the inalienable right and duty of the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia, the citizens of Yugoslavia, to protect and defend their independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the constitutional order?

A. As a matter of fact, in one of the meetings that we had with you, if you recall over lunch at the break, I had the pleasure of having you explain me a certain point on that constitution that I still treasure to this day, because you did give me a very impassioned explanation. If you recall, I had asked you to clarify for me an issue that had ¹⁵⁴⁸⁷ become very constant claim by the Serbs who were in Sector North and elsewhere wherein they kept reminding me of a speech given by Mr. Tudjman on one Christmas not long after the declaration of independence that stated that Croatia was a state of Croats, and that, they said to us at the UN, how do you expect us to live in a state where the president tells us it's the state of Croats?

So, Mr. Milosevic, I did ask you to explain to me is the constitution of Yugoslavia different? Does it speak of Yugoslavia -- Serbia as a state of Serbs? And I was pleasantly surprised of your explanation, which you might remember.

Q. Yes, I do remember that, because it was the constitution of Serbia which was enacted in 1990, and Article 1 of that constitution states that the Serbs -- that the state of Serbia is a state of all its citizens.

A. Yes, you did explain to me that.

Q. And as you know, Mr. Kirudja, during the time you spent on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and later on in these past ten years - I assume you'll be able to confirm that - nowhere on the territory of Serbia and the new Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which was formed on the 28th of April, 1992, did you have any ethnic conflicts or acts of discrimination on the part of citizens of other ethnic groups or, rather, 28 nationalities, 28 ethnic groups live in Serbia, and there were no acts of discrimination which you were able to point your finger to or to, indeed, witness. Isn't that so?

A. Mr. Milosevic, if I heard you correctly, you referred to the last ten years. Mr. Milosevic, the testimony I give here is ten years ago, ¹⁵⁴⁸⁸ going back to 1992. Part of that testimony clearly indicates I did leave, I left my role at the UN since then. So I couldn't, obviously, testify for the time I was away. So in order to answer --

Q. Let me put myself right. I wasn't thinking over the past ten years, i was thinking of the past 12 years or 13 years or throughout the time, let's say from 1989 onwards, up to the year 2000. And all these years encompass the period of your sojourn in Yugoslavia. So I used the term ten years, I said ten years more or less symbolically, to symbolise a decade, but of course, starting out from the first day of your presence there and then throughout your stay, that's what I'm referring to.

A. Thank you for your clarification. Of course, if you ask me for the time I was there, unfortunately, much of the testimony you heard today is contrary to that because we are testifying about the events that occurred that point to a concerted effort, at least in the area that I knew, of Serb authorities to force Muslims out. At least in the area that I testified to.

So generally, your statement would, of course, not be correct, at least in those cases that I testified.

Q. I asked you about Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, not about Bosnia, Krajina, Croatia, but about Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro or, rather, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

A. I beg your apologies. I didn't understand that specific reference. In that case, my answer would be not to my knowledge in those particular areas of what constitutes Serbia and Montenegro, I wouldn't have any evidence. ¹⁵⁴⁸⁹

Q. Well, I hope, Mr. Kirudja, that you could have heard just evidence to the contrary, that is to say of a highly tolerant atmosphere and a lot of care and attention on the part of the authorities to see that there was no discrimination.

A. Are you asking me my personal impression?

Q. Yes.

A. I have to answer you in the positive in the sense that my presence in Serbia, I had a complete feel of personal security, no hostility that were ever directed to me, and I did visit wide areas of Serbia in all kinds of circumstances. You are right. I personally didn't feel any discrimination directed to me.

Now, I say that. If you ask me elsewhere, outside, I did elsewhere, but not in that area that you specifically refer to, Serbia and Montenegro, while I was there.

Q. Well, all right. You know that during that time I was president of Serbia, so I'm asking you about the territory which I considered myself to be responsible for.

A. Correct.

Q. Do you know, Mr. Kirudja, as you were speaking here and giving examples and speaking in detail about these examples - we'll come to that later on- but you mentioned refugees, and do you know that we in Serbia at one point had as many as 1 million refugees? Are you aware of that? Coming in from different parts of the former Yugoslavia.

A. Mr. Milosevic, I was the recipient of a number of statements about the presence of refugees in Serbia, and your -- at that time people who ¹⁵⁴⁹⁰ were under you in the humanitarian did make presentations to us about the presence of refugees in Serbia and Montenegro. However, at no time did I hear or retain a figure in millions. I don't know what the figure was, simply.

Q. Well, at one particular point the figure had reached that particular number. But when you were in Yugoslavia yourself, do you happen to recall, for example, the piece of information according to which in Serbia alone there was -- let's take this concrete example: 70.000 Muslim refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, to quote an example, and from the territories engulfed by war?

A. Are you asking me to authenticate the figure of 70.000 or did I hear it? Is that the specific question?

Q. Yes. Did you hear about that figure?

A. No. I did hear there were a lot of refugees of all kinds, and I did meet even Muslims in Serbia. So the fact that there were refugees that were Muslim in Serbia, yes, I can say that I met some. How many there were, the exact numbers, that I couldn't.

Q. Very well. This wasn't your responsibility or duty to deal with things of that kind, but these Muslim refugees that you happened to meet in Serbia that you mentioned, did they complain at all of the treatment they were being given in Serbia which would discriminate against them in any way? So they had arrived in Serbia to take refuge from the war that was going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina, hadn't they? Now, did they live there as citizens on a footing of equality with everybody else, without any special treatment, regime, or any kind of discrimination? Did they live ^{15491 BLANK PAGE 15492} like any other citizen, like all the other citizens, in fact?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I could testify to that that one of my interpreters was a Muslim that was relocated from Serbian -- from Bihac and continued to work peacefully in Belgrade. So at least even directly in my front office, I had an example.

Q. Very well. I'm happy to hear that. But let's go back to the constitution for a moment. Did you know that the defence of the territorial integrity of the country was one of the constitutionally based foremost tasks of the armed forces of Yugoslavia?

A. No. I didn't really have an occasion to delve into that kind of detail. I take your word for it.

Q. I should now like to clear up one particular point, Mr. Kirudja. In your statement where you speak about the 21st of April, 1992, it says, among others, "Among the representatives of the local authorities --" and I'm quoting you on that -- "who came to us in the UN were Colonel Slobodan Tarbuk, the local commander of what started to be called the forces of Territorial Defence," and in brackets you have "TO." So the members of the TO decided to take that name, to be called in that way because they wished to differentiate themselves from the JNA, which was expected, in keeping with the UN mandate, to withdraw from Croatia?

MR. GROOME: Your Honours?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. GROOME: The statement is in excess of 60 pages. It would be very helpful if Mr. Milosevic could provide at least a ballpark reference.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Has the witness got a copy? Do you have a copy, ¹⁵⁴⁹³ Mr. Kirudja, of your statement?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kirudja will, I'm sure, remember that passage, but that's not what I'm basing my question on.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, it's a statement of 60 pages. Let the witness have it. Which page is it, please?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. May, I don't mind giving the witness a chance to look at all of this. I'm quoting from his passage about the 21st of April, 1992.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But my question relates to the following, Mr. Kirudja: Is it clear to you--

MR. GROOME: [Previous translation continues]... page 6, Your Honour--

JUDGE MAY: The witness must be entitled to have the page. So when you quote the statement and the witness has got it, let's have the page number so he can follow. We've got this. Page 6, yes. At some stage the Chamber may need copies but for the moment we will go on without.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters apologise, they do not have a copy of the statement.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know, or rather, did you know at the time, Mr. Kirudja, that the Territorial Defence was not something that was created then and there as a substitute in any way for the Yugoslav People's Army? It was something that had existed beforehand. It was part of the armed forces ¹⁵⁴⁹⁴ pursuant to the constitution, the type of organisation formed at local level throughout the territory of the then Yugoslavia.

A. Mr. Milosevic, the meeting you refer to is on 21st of April, as you pointed out. You may note that it was the first time the force commander had come into the sector and the local authorities who were meeting him and making a presentation to that. Conclusion that is implicit in that meeting is that the terms of the Vance Plan had already been placed in motion. The terms of the Vance Plan that I take it that you are also very familiar with. Under those terms, you must also conclude, the issue to Territorial Defence force was alien to that force, was actually proscribed. There were not to be any forces like that.

Q. I'm talking about something else. I don't know whether we understand each other. It's not that the Territorial Defence was formed as a substitute for the JNA. It had existed previously as a form of direct defence involvement on the part of the citizens throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia. So it existed far before the conflicts broke out. It existed as part of the defence and protection system of Yugoslavia.

A. I wouldn't be able to speak authoritatively, obviously, on what was there before we arrived in a different context and a different purpose. If you say so, Mr. Milosevic, I wouldn't have a way of disputing the point about things which were in the former Yugoslavia before we came in, before the mandate was framed. Of course I wouldn't be able to know that.

Q. All I wish to do is to challenge something, a misunderstanding ¹⁵⁴⁹⁵ probably on your part, according to which you concluded, as far as I was able to gather, that the Territorial Defence was in fact established then as a substitute for the JNA. And all I'm saying is it existed much earlier on and was, in fact, and I'd like -- focused upon and mirrored in the Yugoslav constitution, because the constitution stipulates in Article 240.2 of the constitution, the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia make up a whole and are composed of the Yugoslav People's Army as a joint armed force of all the peoples and nationalities, et cetera, and is also composed of the Territorial Defence as the broadest form of the organisation for the defence forces. Therefore, the Territorial Defence - and this is what I want to ask you whether you understand - was not formed as a substitute for the army but it was in existence as part of the armed forces of Yugoslavia, and this was provided for by the constitution at the time when Yugoslavia was united, one country, and that's when it was in existence.

So are you aware of that fact? It was the existing part of the armed forces. So it wasn't established as a reaction to the Vance Plan. That's what I want to make clear.

A. I will return, may it please the Court, to my statement that the TDF, and my use of that term was in the context of the attempt to demobilise the existing forces as required in the Vance Plan, and that demobilisation was not qualified. It was supposed to be total. There shall be no armed forces with big weapons except police for the purposes of law and order. As soon as we sought to make that a reality, then cropped the issue of Territorial Defence forces and given various reasons ¹⁵⁴⁹⁶ the Serbs give us, like defence of their borders from Croat infiltrators. That is the context in which this explanation is given. I just re-emphasise that. Explanation about the existence of the concept of Territorial Defence force in the constitution of Yugoslavia, as Mr. Milosevic explained, may or may not be true. I couldn't speak to that. I was speaking in the exact context I described.

Q. Very well. Do you know that Croatia, in 1991, started to effect a secession from Yugoslavia?

A. It's my understanding that by the time we arrived, there were recognised by the UN the states of Croatia and other constituents of Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslavia, when we arrived. It is also my understanding that within the State of Croatia -- or, rather, it's not an understanding, it's self-evident, there had been an area carved out of that Croatia where our mission was to help resolve those disputed territories.

When or under what circumstances Croatia seceded from the former Yugoslavia in 1991 I am, unfortunately, not conversant with the details of that in 1991.

Q. You were -- you didn't deal with that, but I'm sure you know that it was emphasised that it was the function of the Vance Plan to achieve peace and to ensure the safety and security of citizens on territories in which there had been conflict. And another important characteristic of it was that the presence of the United Nations forces in areas under UN protection does not -- does not mean that a political solution is implied but that a political solution should be sought through political means. ¹⁵⁴⁹⁷ Isn't that so?

And if you just shake your head, this cannot be recorded. So may we have an audible answer from you, please.

A. I was waiting for you to stop, and I will of course give you an audible answer.

Pretty much everything you have said, with one major difference, if I heard you correctly, where you mentioned that the United Nations' responsibility for maintaining law and order while a political solution was being sought. Mr. Milosevic, you're sure that is not quite correct. The law and order was to be kept by local police and the mayors.

Q. I'm not going into that.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish so that he can give his answer.

THE WITNESS: Thank you. So the law and order, a very crucial part, was left in the local hands, and that was -- the only role the UN had was to monitor that that function was properly executed. Now, as you recall one of my testimonies here, I did allude to that turning into a big loophole in terms of the UN being unable to fulfil that part of the resolution responsibility.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you mean the monitoring?

THE WITNESS: No, not the monitoring. The failure for -- in other words, I did testify that because the Serbs transformed the forces that were essentially military forces into the semblance of a police force for both in strength beyond the requirement of the Vance Plan as well in terms of numbers, as well as in weapons, they became what they called the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina for the purposes of pursuing goals such ¹⁵⁴⁹⁸ as independence for that area.

So if the UN had the responsibility for maintaining law and order, then its own forces, the forces of the UN that were there, would have come in different composition and in different numbers. They had come only to observe maintenance of law and order at the hands of the local police.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes. But we are talking about UN protected areas, not zones that are monitored by the UN, but they are protected by the UN. We are talking about those areas. So I assume that it is legitimate to ask whether the United Nations protected these areas and the population in them. But we'll come to that.

Tell me, Mr. Kirudja, you came for the Vance Plan, and I assume that you familiarised yourself with the events that preceded the adoption of the Vance Plan, that you familiarised yourself with the causes that led to the conflict or, rather, the reasons why the conflict broke out. And after that, the Vance Plan was adopted, and the peacekeeping forces were deployed, or, rather, the UN Protective Forces were deployed. That was the name.

So do you know that the first serious incidents in Krajina took place when the Croat authorities, in the autumn of 1990, started taking away the weapons of the local police and the Territorial Defence in the area --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we need to consider this: The relevance to the witness's evidence. These were events before the witness ¹⁵⁴⁹⁹ came on the scene. He, therefore, can't speak directly about them, and really to rehearse these events with him is not going to take the case any further forward. You can ask him about events, of course, after he arrived, but there's little point in asking him about events before then.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I asked Mr. Kirudja, since he had come to carry out an important task, whether he was familiar with what had preceded the Vance Plan and what the reasons were for the adoption of the Vance Plan to begin with, and was he aware of what the problems were beforehand. If there is a problem, then I will drop it, but does he know how the hostilities actually came to exist, that's a legitimate question.

JUDGE MAY: It seems to be his state of mind, unless you can show its relevance, is not going to take us any further forward.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know, Mr. Kirudja, that Serbs in Krajina did not recognise the secession of Croatia since it was contrary to the constitution of Yugoslavia, the constitution that was then valid in Yugoslavia, as well as contrary to international law? Therefore, there would be a violent degradation in the rights that they enjoyed on a footing of equality with other citizens in the Republic of Croatia and in Yugoslavia as a whole. Are you aware of that?

JUDGE MAY: What is the relevance of that question to the witness's evidence? I know it's your case, which you've put often enough, but it seems to me not to be relevant to the witness's evidence, whether ^{15500 BLANK PAGE 15501} he knew or not.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance, Mr. May, is in the undoubtedly undeniable right of the Serb people which -- and that is a right that cannot be taken away from any people. That is the right to self-defence. The relevance lies in the following: That we should establish that the Serb people were indeed threatened in that territory and that exercising their right to self-defence, they had many things happening that were related to that right, and I'm asking the witness, who was there at the time when all these events took place.

JUDGE MAY: No. That is an issue which we, no doubt, are going to have to determine, because as we've heard before, that is, as I've said before, it is your case that this was a matter of the local Serbs defending themselves.

Now, the witness's view about that, with all respect to him, is totally irrelevant, and rehearsing what happened before he came, as I've said, is not going to advance the case. It's just taking up time unnecessarily. You can do it with other witnesses who deal with that period. What, if I may say, you should concentrate on is the witness's evidence in relation to his time when he was in Croatia and Bosnia.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I'm going to skip a few questions then. Irrespective of your efforts, these issues cannot be sidestepped. But anyway, I shall be quite precise with regard to the questions put to this witness.

JUDGE MAY: That kind of comment is wholly unnecessary and wholly untrue. These are issues which you have raised, and they will be dealt ¹⁵⁵⁰² with in due course, and you must understand that. But meanwhile, what we're discussing is the relevance to this witness's evidence. Now, would you concentrate, in cross-examination, on relevant matter. That's all you're being told to do. Now, let's get on with it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The UNPROFOR command, was it well-informed about the situation in the field?

A. Well, yes and no. At the very beginning, we of course had to keep an open mind and learn as we got to know what was on the ground. So our knowledge - and I speak now collectively since you put it as UNPROFOR - we did learn a lot before and even more during the time we were there.

Q. Precisely. I'm referring to the period that you spent there. So what you say now, does that mean that, not taking into account individual incidents, truly some individual incidents that could have gone by unnoticed irrespective of your presence in the field, but can we establish that not a single more significant event or process could not go unnoticed by members of UNPROFOR? I mean, by your personnel, by other members of UNPROFOR, et cetera. Is that right?

A. Frankly, it's a little more complicated for me to take a blanket situation that everything was noticed by us. We noticed what we have talked about. I wouldn't be surprised if somebody said there was an event XYZ and I didn't notice it. Such is life. We didn't know everything.

Q. I'm talking about more significant events, processes, happenings. So can we assume that more significant events could not go by unnoticed or unregistered by your mission and by UNPROFOR, generally speaking? ¹⁵⁵⁰³

A. You're correct. Much of my testimony has to do with those events we considered were significant. Everything? I'm not sure.

Q. Very well. Does that mean that with regard to all these major events, all these more significant events or, rather, regarding everything that you learned about, did your vertical chain have to be informed accordingly? That is to say, all the people who headed your organisation, UNPROFOR, et cetera. You didn't keep anything to yourself, did you? Everything that you found out on the ground was vertically sent up to the very top, to General Nambiar; is that right?

A. Mr. Milosevic, thank you for giving me that question. A little earlier I did say we went every mile to report what we thought was significant to our headquarters, even inclusive of testimony here, at one point I get the UN telling me, "Don't do this. You are getting too involved." So it wasn't like we were holding back anything.

Q. You sent everything up. You reported on everything; right?

A. To the best of what I knew.

Q. In your statement, you said in several sections that you met with General Nambiar. Tell me, what were your impressions of him? Was this a good, conscientious, able, professional soldier, an honourable man, in every conceivable respect a person who was up to the job that he had?

A. I'm pleased to say yes, I consider him in the category of that, and I got to know him well, and I can say yes, he was a professional, conscientious man who was well-suited for the job he took.

Q. Well, I'm going to read out to you his statement since he spoke about events that took place in Yugoslavia. At that time, he was director ¹⁵⁵⁰⁴ of an institution called United Services Institution of India, and he says that he and his people, while he was in Yugoslavia, that is to say both he and you and everybody else who made up this mission that consisted of several thousands of people, there is quotation: "[In English] [previous translation continues...] witness any genocide beyond killings and massacres on all sides that are typical of such conflict conditions."

A. You said --

Q. Is that right?

A. You read me a statement of General Nambiar. I haven't seen it. If you say it was his statement, the only thing I can say is it is a statement.

Q. Do you doubt that this is his statement?

A. I don't even know what it is. I haven't seen it.

Q. All right. I don't hold it against you, the fact that you did not see it. It is not your duty to follow his statements. I mean --

JUDGE MAY: How could he have seen it? Mr. Groome, is this something which you disclosed to the Defence, one of your statements?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, it's not.

MR. GROOME: It's new to me, Your Honour, and --

JUDGE MAY: All right. There's even less reason that you should have seen it. All right. We'll accept for the moment that it's a statement which you have from the general. I suppose what you can ask the witness is that, having heard that statement, is there any comment that you would like to make about it or not? Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- facilitate matters. Can I just ¹⁵⁵⁰⁵ say something? In order to make it easier for Mr. Kirudja, I'm going to go on with my questions, and during the break, which is coming up, as far as I can see on the clock, I'm going to give your technical booth a tape with this statement of General Nambiar's, and after that, Mr. Kirudja, if he wishes to, may comment on it. That is certainly within his rights. So let's not waste any time now regarding a possible explanation of that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So, he says that violence was on all sides in the situation of that type of conflict. Do you agree, Mr. Kirudja, that when there is that kind of a civil war, an ethnic conflict, that the only thing that can be done is to bring the conflict to a stop, that no small corrections can be made through any partial remedies. The only solution is bringing the conflict to an end and going back to political means. Is that right or is that not right?

A. It's a lengthy question and there are several parts to it. The part that I zero on is the issue of violence which you referred to as existing. That is something I can say, yes, we did see violence in -- from the three groups, but it wasn't of equal magnitude or weight. Second -- in terms of numbers involved, in terms of repercussions, in terms of impact; there were by no means equal.

Secondly, if you ask me whether peaceful solution was the way out, obviously we would agree with you, and we did in the meetings we met with you, because such was the UN nature there is to find a peaceful solution. It goes without saying that is something we would have agreed to.

Q. Well, in your experience throughout your stay there, was there ¹⁵⁵⁰⁶ anything that official Serbia did and that I personally did, was anything going outside the framework of that general objective, to attain peace and a peaceful solution? Do you know of anything that was not done in that direction?

A. I'm afraid the question is of such broad nature that I could only respond to you partially. My testimony here contains what we heard from you, and towards the end of the questioning, you heard me repeat honestly and bluntly that was your preference, that there be a peaceful solution. As regards to anything and everything that happened that may have been contrary to that policy, with due respect, I cannot answer that because I wasn't privy to everything that would be in that domain.

Q. Well, all right. You are talking about what you know. Now, the fact the commander of UNPROFOR says that this is not genocide and that he bears in mind the high quality monitoring system that you established and the system of reporting from the area of Krajina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, can that be considered as a reliable statement, an authentic statement in respect of what I've been asking you?

JUDGE MAY: The witness cannot comment on that. For one thing, genocide is a technical term and one of the issues which we're going to have to determine in this case as the indictment in Bosnia contains such an allegation.

Now, you said you were going to play a tape afterwards. It's now time for the adjournment, so we'll take it now, and perhaps you can set the tape up to be played in the next session.

We'll adjourn for 20 minutes. ¹⁵⁵⁰⁷

--- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I have a tape. On the tape we don't have this particular statement, but he made an identical statement in India in 2001 -- 2001 was when he -- too was when he made this particular statement. He was speaking at the university and made the statement in front of students there, and you'll see on it on the tape.

[Videotape played] "Question: [No interpretation]

"General Nambiar: [Indiscernible] Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of my responsibilities. So these 28.000 troops were spread out in all the parts of the former Yugoslavia except Slovenia. And to answer your question very directly, the other part of your question, as far as commander -- I was commander of UNPROFOR, none of my troops ever gave me any reports of genocide because they were not [indiscernible] genocide. There were allegations by other people from [indiscernible] area, but my troops were not participating in genocide. They never reported any such things to me, and therefore I never reported any -- [indiscernible]."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that was very brief.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is this General Nambiar?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. So can you now comment this statement of his?

A. Yes. I would like to make a brief observation. A statement is ¹⁵⁵⁰⁸ contained in that tape where General Nambiar is saying, if I understood him correctly, "None of my forces reported to me incidents of genocide." I believe that was the word.

General Nambiar, I said earlier, had a wonderful sense of propriety, integrity, and being extremely careful and precise with his words. Notice he said, "None of my forces." I want to put on record that there is a memo that I read out here listing out a number of places where I used the word, "We were told there are concentration camps," starting with Keraterm and ending, I believe, the Omarska or somewhere. Several number of places.

I recall clearly when General Nambiar got a hold of that copy. He was the only one in my headquarters - not my boss Cedric, not anybody else- who called me about it. He was very concerned about whether this was true. And being a gentleman he was, and I underscore he was very polite and nice, we remained in touch even after he left UNPROFOR, directly with me. He sought to caution me over the use of the word "concentration camp" that appears in the memo, and true to his caution, he called me, "Charles, did you really say this is so?" I said, "Yes. This was being reported. But if you don't like --" I remember that conversation -- "concentration camp, what would you like to call them?" I asked him, and he said, "Maybe detention camps." I said, "No, the situation was worse on that." And as the photographs came later, you all recall subsequently, there are photographs coming from that area, we weren't exaggerating rating it.

Now, notice that statement now, he said, "None of my forces." I ^{15509 BLANK PAGE 15510} wasn't one of his forces. So he may be accurate in what he said, but I wasn't one of his forces, and I certainly didn't report to him. He called me back about it.

Q. Yes, but without a doubt he was informed of all the reports, including your own reports, the reports you sent.

A. Yes. My point was that he might be correct technically to say none of his forces but factually not complete because he didn't regard me. I certainly was not one of his forces.

Q. All right. Let's move on. In your statement, you state the following: "Up until the beginning of April, many countries, including the European Union, recognised the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this speeded up the deterioration of the situation that we noted in Bosnia and had a great influence on our work in Sector North." Now, could you explain to us this negative effect that the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina had, in fact?

A. Mr. Milosevic, do you have the page number again? Do you have the page number you quoted me from, please?

Q. I'm sorry, but I do not, but I assume you can recognise your position.

A. I do recognise the paragraph. It would just be more exact if you gave me the quote source itself.

Nevertheless, since I recognise --

JUDGE MAY: Well, Mr. Milosevic, let's find this. If you're going to cross-examine witnesses on statements, they need to be referred to the particular paragraph, because it's only fair that they should have that in ¹⁵⁵¹¹ front of them when they answer so they have the context. What we'll do, Mr. Milosevic, is we'll go on, and we'll get this paragraph found, but let's not waste any more time at this stage on it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, do you happen to know, Mr. Kirudja, that before the beginning of the war in Bosnia - on the 17th of March, 1992, in fact - the leaders of the three national communities in Bosnia signed a declaration on the principles for the new constitutional order of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was what was known as the Cutilheiro plan, according to which Bosnia would be one single state within its present borders with three constituent national units or ethnic groups, and that plan could have preserved peace. However, Izetbegovic, following suggestions from the then ambassador of the United States of America to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, withdrew his signature. Do you know about that?

A. Mr. Milosevic, the term Cutilheiro rings a bell but no more than that, neither the date when it was dated. I do not have recollections.

Q. And you don't remember the event and the facts that I've just mentioned linked to the plan?

A. I don't recall it being something that we were involved on or sufficient for me to know its content.

Q. I shall read out what in April 1999 General Nambiar said in his capacity as head of the -- this institution, the Indian institution that I quoted a moment ago.

MR. GROOME: Objection, Your Honour. Objection. The witness has ¹⁵⁵¹² stated he has no recollection, nothing to offer the Chamber on this. This appears to be an attempt to have Nambiar's views on it put in through this witness, which is inappropriate. Certainly the Prosecution, if Mr. Milosevic seeks to call Mr. Nambiar, the Prosecution wouldn't object to it. If Mr. Milosevic wants to supply us with copies of these statements, we will review them, and maybe by stipulation introduce the statements of Nambiar, but I think using this witness to bring these statements in is improper.

JUDGE MAY: Well, the witness -- the accused can ask what is in the statement, provided it's relevant, and the witness can deal with it. He can put the statement to the witness. He's entitled to do that provided, as I say, it's relevant, and the witness can answer. Of course, the fact that a statement is put to a witness, as we have said before, does not make it evidence.

Now, Mr. Milosevic, is this about the Cutilheiro plan and -- what you've been just asking about?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It relates to peace in Bosnia, the conclusion of peace in Bosnia, and the obstacles to it, and we felt it in particular, those of us who wanted to have peace achieved, Mr. May. And I don't want to insist upon the fact that Mr. Kirudja should respond to the question if he does not wish to do so. All I would like to have are his comments in view of the fact that he was the official UN representative.

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt you. We will have -- we will have the quotation. We will hear whether Mr. Kirudja can deal with it. Let us hear the beginning of it anyway, of what you want to put. ¹⁵⁵¹³

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, the quotation, it's fairly brief. I'm just going to ask him to answer and tell us whether this coincides with what he saw. This is General Nambiar's statement, and he says: "It is ironic that the Dayton Agreement of Bosnia was not fundamentally different from the Lisbon plan drawn by Portuguese Foreign Minister Cutilheiro and British representative Lord Carrington, [In English] to which all three sides had agreed before any killings had taken place -- before any killings had taken place or even the Vance-Owen Plan which Karadzic was willing to sign. One of the main problems was that there was unwillingness on the part of the American administration to consider Serbs had legitimate grievance --"

JUDGE MAY: Well, I think we're getting beyond the scope of this witness's evidence.

One quotation has been put to you, which was this, that the Dayton Agreement was not fundamentally different from the Cutilheiro plan and the Carrington Plan. Again, do you feel you can comment on that usefully, Mr. Kirudja?

THE WITNESS: I think only to place it in context on why I couldn't comment on it, and that is that the Cutilheiro-Carrington reference is to the heads of ICFY. Prior to the mission being instituted in former Yugoslavia and the Dayton agreement which he is comparing it to is well after my departure from that area. So both events place me outside of direct knowledge of this matter.

JUDGE MAY: You were next going to be asked about the American administration and their position about the Serbs. Is that something you ¹⁵⁵¹⁴ could comment at all on or not?

THE WITNESS: No, I couldn't, because the context is not there for me to do so.

JUDGE MAY: Now, Mr. Milosevic, let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, let me just ask Mr. Kirudja this: Do you remember when he says, "In connection with that --" as General Nambiar says -- "I recall State Department official George --"

JUDGE MAY: No. We've ruled that the witness cannot deal with that. Now, unless it's something directly related to him, he cannot deal with the American administration. It's not for him to answer about that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But this doesn't only relate to that issue. General Nambiar says that as George Kenney had this same position and attitude, he said, "I offered to give him an escort and to go see for himself that --"

JUDGE MAY: Who did he offer? Who offered to give who an escort?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Satish Nambiar offered the diplomat George Kenney to give Kenney an escort to go and see for himself what he was claiming, or some of what he was claiming. And he goes on to say: "He accepted my offer, and thereafter he made a radical turnaround."

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to -- I'm going to rule against this. It's not something the witness can deal with. If you want to call General Nambiar, you can, in due course in your case, but you can't ask this witness about something he can't deal with. It's neither fair to him nor is it proper use of the procedure. ¹⁵⁵¹⁵

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have absolutely no intention of not being fair towards Mr. Kirudja. I thought he was in a position to comment on these issues. But if you consider he is not, then we needn't pursue the matter.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Tell me, please, do you consider that recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina speeded up the deterioration of the situation in that area?

A. I have testified here that when the mission UNPROFOR was set up, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a relatively peaceful place, completely peaceful when we arrived there, to the extent that the mission structure was done recognising this and hoping the peaceful situation would continue to the extent that the headquarters of the mission was supposed to be Sarajevo, and we had two battalions, logistic battalions, based in Banja Luka. That estimation by the UN turned out to be incorrect, and in the time line mentioned by Mr. Milosevic is the only association I can see. Not cost relationship, just time line association. That soon after that recognition about the time we were there, we watched the entire Bosnia get involved in a conflagration and the headquarters of the UNPROFOR was moved out of there.

Q. And do you know that some highly respected politicians, such as Francois Mitterrand or Lord Peter Carrington, and some others too, claimed that the early recognition of Croatia was a mistake too and that it made the peace process impossible? Are you aware of that in view of the fact that these were things that you dealt with at the time? ¹⁵⁵¹⁶

JUDGE MAY: It's not for this witness who is -- who was an official at the UN at the time, to comment on what either President Mitterrand or Lord Carrington said. Now, if you want to call evidence about that, as I say, you can do so. But not only is it not fair to this witness, his views about it, with respect, are irrelevant.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May, fine. Then I'll go back to some very specific and concrete questions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yesterday you testified, and I saw some statements to that effect in your statement -- I'm very happy, actually, to see that -- we're talking about Lazarevic. Yesterday you mentioned Lazarevic. That's right, isn't it?

A. Yes, I did, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Well, I'm very happy to see that you confirm what I had thought too, that Lazarevic was a rogue. That was your conclusion, was it not?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I didn't use the word "rogue," if you recall, but I did testify to my being extremely cautious and wary of him.

Q. You said that he did a lot of harm. Isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. That he organised the arrest of the interpreter.

A. Yes.

Q. And that he probably did so for his own personal gain.

JUDGE MAY: Well, that was not his evidence. Mr. Lazarevic's evidence was that he was acting under instructions and with a purpose to instruct. So to that extent, it must be said that this witness's ^{15517 BLANK PAGE 15518} information, evidence, rather, confirms what Mr. Lazarevic said.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I think, Mr. May, quite the reverse is true. The testimony of this witness proves that Lazarevic did a lot of harm and that Lazarevic misled his own compatriots as well, because if he translates a conversation wrongly, for example, between Mr. Spanovic and Mr. Kirudja, then he's not doing a service to his side let alone to Mr. Kirudja's side itself.

JUDGE MAY: That will be a matter for us to judge in due course, but let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You said that, "During the mission, I learnt not to accept any information he gave me without checking it out, and that from independent sources." So you concluded that he was prone to lie.

A. Yes. I -- he gave me a distinct feeling that I was being hassled by him.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I be of assistance. This is on page 5 of the English version of the statement given by Mr. Kirudja to the investigators.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did the officials in Krajina, then, tell you that behind this rigged arrest of Mrs. Indira Kulenovic, that behind it all was Lazarevic?

A. Yes. That was at the meeting following immediately my initial complaint meeting with Mr. Mile Paspalj, Mr. Toso Paic hurriedly came to a second meeting where he sought to put a distance between what my complaints were and explaining that it was caused by Lazarevic, if that's ¹⁵⁵¹⁹ what you mean. But I didn't say I believed completely what he said. I just said that's what he told me. And --

Q. Yes. And did I understand you correctly when explaining his position? As far as I understood it, he was an interpreter and Bulat was the liaison officer. Is that how it was?

A. Correct. Correct.

Q. So what I have just been claiming, that he was an ordinary interpreter, and he said that he was a liaison officer, whereas Bulat was the liaison officer and he was the interpreter.

A. Correction, Mr. Milosevic: Bulat was not the liaison officer. Bulat was the boss. Bulat was the commander. Lazarevic was the liaison.

Q. Very well.

A. Mr. Milosevic, did you get the idea that when he said Lazarevic did it, we had reason to believe he wasn't alone on that?

Q. Well, I consider that probably for his own gain he did what he did. Perhaps he wanted to take up the job of this interpreter, replace him. I don't know what your conclusions are.

JUDGE MAY: We have to have regard to what the evidence was, and really, it's not for this witness. I mean, Mr. Lazarevic's evidence was that this was a deliberate plan to obstruct. He was an agent of KOS. He was part of the military intelligence and he was put in that position as liaison officer in order to obstruct the UN and other missions, and that's what he set about doing.

But you can ask the witness, I suppose, this: Was there anything which Mr. Lazarevic said or anything from the circumstances which enabled ¹⁵⁵²⁰ you to understand why he was doing this, what his motives were? Was there any suggestion that he was doing it for personal gain or advancement or anything like that?

THE WITNESS: There were indications to me that whatever he was doing had those components in it, both personal and official. Both components were in it.

On the personal side, it was the part I mentioned to you how I met him, how he presented himself and comes through as a hustler, trying to gain a role for himself. That's on the personal side. On the effects of interference with our work, with the evidence of the arrest of the interpreter, with the misinterpretation in the meeting in which Colonel Spanovic was there, that could not have been personal, because we did tell Bulat about it, we did tell Toso Paic, as the record shows. Djuro Skaljac executed the attempt at arrest. If they differed with him, they would have dismissed him quickly and immediately. They did the contrary; Bulat insisted he interpreted him, even after we told him so, and we told Bulat, in that case, when you speak, let Lazarevic interpret you. When we speak, when any of us speaks, somebody else will interpret. That was not personal.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A short while ago, you said, Mr. May, that Lazarevic worked for the KOS. The only correct thing to say is that that was his assertion. When a true officer of the service, an ethnic Muslim, testified afterwards, you managed to find out that when Lazarevic claimed to have been a member of KOS, there was no KOS. There was a security service within the army, that's all. ¹⁵⁵²¹

JUDGE MAY: It was KOG. We can debate all this in due course, but let's not waste any time about it with this witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You say about Lazarevic, the following. I'm quoting you now. This is the portion that the amicus referred to. You said that: "A day or two later, I remember that after he announced his retirement, he went to Bihac to convey a message to him from the Kordun command which may have been conveyed by Lazarevic. And also there was a warning there if he were to set foot in Kordun. I felt duty-bound to relay that message because I felt that this threat was not in vain. He appreciated the warning." So although -- so it was not only that he threatened your interpreter and said that your interpreter would be arrested but he also threatened a JNA general; is that right, Mr. Kirudja?

A. Correction, Mr. Milosevic. He conveyed not his idea that General Spiro Nikovic, who had been retired from command a day or so earlier, would be arrested if he set foot in the territory of Kordun. He wasn't. He was a liaison officer, and my understanding was that he was communicating to me, an official, something backed by his superiors. He wasn't saying, "I'm going to arrest him myself."

Q. All right. But you say that when you first saw him, now I'm quoting you: "It is already then that I got the impression that he's the type of person who could be a good mercenary." Is that right?

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Mr. Kirudja, this is page 13, paragraph 1, of the English version that you have. So it is ¹⁵⁵²² page 13 -- page 13, paragraph 1. In the middle.

THE WITNESS: Correct.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes. Now, can this also mean, since you had the impression that he could be a good mercenary, that Lazarevic, while lying to you and to the local Serb authorities and with this kind of meddling, he was actually working for a third party, not for the local Serb authorities or for UNPROFOR? Do you reject that possibility altogether or not?

A. My exact language in the English language includes the quote: "He was the stuff of which would-be mercenaries are made." That is not to say he was a mercenary, it is to say he exhibited all the qualities. In other words, somebody who did things for hire by somebody else. That's all it meant.

Q. All right. So am I right -- I mean, I'm not going to quote everything you said here because you devoted a large portion of this to Lazarevic, because you say: "After awhile, I found out from our interpreters that he interprets differently from what the speakers actually said, that he allegedly interpreted for us," et cetera, and so on and so forth. There are two pages in your statement that have to do with Lazarevic.

Now, my question is: Am I right if I, on the basis of what you said, and both what I quoted from your statement and what you know yourself that you said in your statement, if one could conclude, since he could be a good mercenary is not someone who could really be respected? He is a person who is prone to lying, cheating, and you even testified to ¹⁵⁵²³ that if you say that he misinterpreted what was being said. Can one conclude that Lazarevic is a person with low moral qualities, a person that is not trustworthy?

A. It's a long statement and there are many parts to it. Before I answer that, look at the date of this testimony. It is 29 September 1999, long before, if I understand correctly, the reference to testimony by Mr. Lazarevic was ever come. I was unaware of that. So what I said at this time was what I knew directly, without reference to whatever testimony you are discussing that Lazarevic gave.

The conclusion you're asking me to make, you can make that if you so wish. My point here was to register the very fact that I regarded him as an unstabilising factor in the sector, a misleading factor in the sector, and someone who was quite capable of doing somebody else's bidding. That's what the reference to "would-be mercenaries" is intended to. I didn't know exactly who it was he was doing things for, I just referred to clear signs he was acting that way and that I treated him that way.

Q. All right. I asked you whether one may conclude then that Lazarevic is then a person who is of low moral fibre and who cannot be trusted.

JUDGE MAY: No. It's not for the witness to say that. He's given his evidence about how he found Lazarevic and that's as far as he can take it. Whether we accept or don't accept what the witness says and what Lazarevic said, that's going to be a matter for us, and you can address us on it, but you cannot take the witness's evidence any further than he ¹⁵⁵²⁴ already has. He's told us what happened. He's told us his opinion. Now, there's no point repeating the question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, Mr. Kirudja devotes a considerable part of your -- of his statement to him. I believe that there is not a single individual to whom he devoted more attention, and therefore, we can hear his opinion now. Perhaps he can change it after his testimony, but --

JUDGE MAY: He has given his opinion as far as he can, and his opinion is only based on what his experience of what Mr. Lazarevic did and said during the time that they were in Sector North together. Now, he's given his answer to your question about his character, Lazarevic's character. He said that he regarded him as a destabilising and misleading factor, capable of doing anybody's bidding. But whose bidding it was, he didn't know. It will be a matter for us to decide that. Now, let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Then we are now going to deal with this witness of yours.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You say that the Krajina Serbs justified the keeping of part of the armed forces in contravention of the Vance Plan and in contravention of the will of official Belgrade. You say the local Serbs justified the fact that these armed forces were being detained by the so-called inability of UNPROFOR to protect the borders of the RSK from the Croatian army on the north and the Muslim forces along the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina. You said that you got a similar explanation from ¹⁵⁵²⁵ Paspalj on the 13th of May, 1992, and you said that Paspalj said that the RSK cannot be fully demilitarised because the UN is not sufficiently prepared to protect the population from a possible attack. You said the protection of the local population can only be guaranteed if UNPROFOR brings in more troops.

Now, my question is the following: These objections of the Krajina Serbs, were they correct altogether? Was UNPROFOR truly not in a position to prevent them?

A. Your question contains paraphrasing of a good part of my testimony. Much of that paraphrasing is correct. Some of it is a little different from the statement itself. However, in general, the bottom question is your -- are these objections of the Krajina Serbs correct altogether? I think that's the bottom line of your question. My answer to that is to refer to elsewhere in the testimony where it is stated that the Serbs failed to execute the Vance Plan and used part of it as a loophole to defeat it, to defeat the Vance Plan. Yes, you're correct that the UN forces on the ground, I have stated here, were not designed to do the protecting that you referred to. They were only designed to let the Vance Plan work with the local control and maintain the peace while a solution was being found elsewhere in the context of the ICFY.

So your long question cannot be reduced to an answer of yes or no that the Serbs were correct altogether in making that. It had to be broken in part and responded, each one of them, and if you do that, you end up back in my testimony paragraph by paragraph, which is there, ^{15526 BLANK PAGE 15527} self-evident.

Q. All right. In your statement - let's be more precise - you mentioned some of the attacks of the Croat forces against the UN protected area, Maslenica Most, Medecki Jep [phoen], et cetera. Can you recall all the large-scale actions of the Croat forces against the population there and against Krajina or, rather, the UN protected area?

A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. In general, I can recall because there were major events that occurred in the sector.

Q. Well, is it correct that the UN forces during those attacks did not protect the Krajina Serbs who were ultimately ethnically cleansed from that area? Does that mean that their fears and premonitions were true, and also their objections to the effect that you could not protect them? Weren't they right to believe that?

A. Mr. Milosevic, again my testimony points to a sequence of events and counter-events. At certain points, both sides, the Serbs and the Croats, got us into a hopeless situation of who started what, and what was the cause and what was the reaction? So if you mention those major events, yes, I testified, for example, in January or thereabouts that Croatians took action at Maslenica Bridge, attacking that, but the Croats also pointed to us that bridge in Maslenica was being held by the Serbs from a previous occasion. So every one of the events that you mentioned end up being a counterpoint from somebody else's point of view. Now, to come to the bottom line of your question, you claim the UN failed to protect. I come back to the same point again: The nature of the mission was for everyone, inclusive of the Serbs, to demobilise, lay ¹⁵⁵²⁸ back, and let the UN observe civilian police keep law and order while there was a political solution being found. We know that didn't happen.

Q. There's another question here, Mr. Kirudja. Since you say that some thought one thing or did one thing and others thought or did the other thing, is it being contested that these attacks of the Croat forces were against areas that were protected by the UN?

A. Correct. The attack on Sector West that we referred to was an area under the UN protection; correct. The eventual attack that ended up with the occupation of all those sectors, you're correct; it was undertaken by the Croatian authorities.

Q. Now, let's go back to what you said in court yesterday. Truth to tell, some of it is in your written statement as well. Is it correct, because you mentioned that the Serbs did carry out the Vance Plan, and in accordance with this plan, they did indeed put all their heavy weapons under double lock, as you had put it yourself. That is to say, under their own control and UN control together. Is that right?

A. Yes. My testimony was up to a period of time that happened, and later on, the weapons were retrieved from the UN custody.

Q. Now, let us see what the reasons for that were, Mr. Kirudja. The weapons were put under control, the plan was carried out, and the weapons were taken after these attacks when they established that you could not protect them, that they had to protect themselves. Is that right or is that not right?

A. The conclusion itself, the sequence of the facts is correct. The ¹⁵⁵²⁹ fact that the attacks -- the conclusion that the attacks, when they established that the UN could not protect them, meaning could not protect the Serbs, that is not correct, because as I said, there were obligations on the Serb side not to militarise that situation. If you look at the evidence itself, they went there and took all that weapons as soon as an action as far as away as Maslenica, if you look at where Maslenica is, it's way down from Sector North. The Serbs went in in Sector North and took out all the weapons out of Sector North, far away from the where the action had taken place.

Now, you may be right partially that they did fear that something would happen. That I concede. But with the presence of the UN, one would have expected, like every other disturbance that took place, we came into negotiation and had a pull-back. We have shown testimony after testimony where the Serbs themselves incurred way into Bosnia-Herzegovina, like in Bosanska Bojna. The Bosnian army didn't invade the sector. We worked until we had a solution and the Serbs pulled back. There was no reason why this wouldn't have been done after the initial attack in Maslenica. The UN didn't get a chance.

Q. All right. That's an assumption, Mr. Kirudja, but now let's look at the facts. You said yourself that they put this under control, under double lock, and it was only taken in January 1993 as a result of the action that the Croat forces had taken. Is that right or is that not right?

A. Yes.

Q. So that means that this is a UNPA. They handed in their weapons. ¹⁵⁵³⁰ The weapons were under double lock. The Croat forces attacked, and they opened these arms depots in order to take the weapons and protect themselves. Do you believe that this is a logical type of behaviour on the part of persons who are in jeopardy?

A. Not really, Mr. Milosevic, because as I mentioned, the action that was the reason for breaking into the UN control of those weapons took place far away. It was Maslenica.

Yes, I also conceded to you that, yes, while that may have cause for some future fear, it was not a reason for immediate running down of those weapons.

Q. All right. But then -- I mean, whether it was a reason or not, it is a question of assessment at a given point in time. Now, you say further on that in April 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was peaceful, and that in May 1992 there had already been problems. Is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. But do you know how the first clashes started in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. First in -- Mr. Milosevic, in what sense first? What time line are you speaking about?

Q. Well, I'm talking about the beginning of 1992.

A. Yes. In --

Q. I'm saying that there was the Cutilheiro plan, and before the Cutilheiro plan, there had been no clashes. There had been no bloodshed. All three ethnic communities believed that there would be a political ¹⁵⁵³¹ solution that would peaceful, and you claim that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was peaceful.

JUDGE MAY: We have been over the Cutilheiro plan. The witness has not been able to answer any questions. So I don't think there's any point going back again over this old ground. If you want to ask about the protected zones, of course you can do so.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know, Mr. Kirudja, that the Croat formations from the territory of Croatia broke in in March 1992? I'll give you the exact date. I haven't got the exact figures here now, but I can give it to you eventually. Perhaps you may recall yourself. They broke into the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the area of the municipality of Bosanski Brod, and they then killed a large number of Serb families in the village of Sijekovac, and that that was the first armed act of violence and crime in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina committed precisely then by the forces that had crossed the river into the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you remember that?

A. There were many reports I heard, not always -- and that one being away from my sector and the refugees themselves not coming through the sector, I'm afraid, Mr. Milosevic, the details of that are not known to me.

Q. So you don't know anything about this, how the first clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina --

JUDGE MAY: No. No. The witness has said he doesn't.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. ¹⁵⁵³²

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let us go back to the testimony itself, then. You talk about your discussion with General Spiro Nikovic in Topusko, and you say that he informed you that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been established, that from then onwards, the JNA would have no influence whatsoever in Bosnia, and that officers and soldiers who were not from Bosnia or Croatia would return to Yugoslavia. Did that actually happen?

A. The meeting with Nikovic where this was discussed?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, the meeting did take place.

Q. Now, tell me, was this actually carried through, then, that the JNA withdrew to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

A. As I testified here, General Nikovic gave his counterpart, General Bamaiyi, a complete schedule of what and when JNA -- of when JNA units would be withdrawn. He was himself -- his command was terminated. In a few weeks, that command was finished, but he did -- the control of the parts of the sector that comprised Kordun, Banija, and Plaski did come under the control of officers of the kind he described, those who were born there.

Q. Well, all right. So does that mean that, in your assessment, people spoke to you openly, that you were given correct figures? You even mentioned that you were taken to command posts, that you had the opportunity of going wherever you wished, and that their behaviour towards you was fair and correct and that they actually carried out the tasks that they promised they would carry out. Is that right or is that not right? ¹⁵⁵³³

A. It's right that we were permitted to meet without restrictions. Wherever the meetings were supposed to be, we went out restriction. You are correct that their behaviour towards us as UN forces was correct and helpful in trying to achieve. The results themselves, it's your assessment to make, they are as described. The outcome is as described. Specifically, JNA disappeared in name. There was no name JNA. The command -- since you know the area, more specifically, Kordun remained under the control of Cedo Bulat, which it was before we arrived, and which it remained after the JNA. It was still under the control of Colonel Bulat.

Banija remained under the control, or shifted several times before it finally came under the control of Colonel Tarbuk beginning with Rakovic, Letic, and a few others who were in command for a very short time, and I assume or was explained, rather, for example, Rakovic, was from Montenegro, so he too left. So Banija also ended up being under the control of Colonel Tarbuk. But Colonel Tarbuk was there when we arrived, and the JNA. As a matter of fact, he has reported in my notes underneath the first meeting when General Nambiar arrived. So we have them commanding the same military structure but with the name Banija Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and so forth.

So while the JNA disappeared, the command structure was basically the same, stayed the same.

Q. I'm just waiting for the interpreter to finish interpreting what you had just said.

But tell me, please, Mr. Kirudja, what was the conclusion that you ^{15534 BLANK PAGE 15535} drew from that? Or let me be more precise: During the time of the former Yugoslavia, the only army was the Yugoslav People's Army; is that right? That is something that is not being contested.

When the civil war broke out and the violent secession of Slovenia first and then Croatia in these premature recognitions and so on and so forth, practically all the armies that were established - that which was in the FRY and that which was in Croatia, in Croatia and in Krajina, in Slovenia and in Bosnia, both in Izetbegovic's Bosnia and in Republika Srpska - all of them in a way were former parts of the former Yugoslav People's Army. Is that right or is that not right?

A. Indeed. They were a former part of the Yugoslav army structure.

Q. So what is strange about that? Namely, that part of the members of the former Yugoslav People's Army who were from that area established the armed forces of the Republic of the Serb Krajina, or the police of the Republic of Serb Krajina, just as, for example, the officers and the armed forces of the former JNA from the territory of Croatia established the Croatian forces, or Izetbegovic's army where the officers and the troops that were part of the JNA established their own forces. However, they also included Mujahedin terrorists and many others. And this did not happen anywhere else but there.

Is that the process that was taking place there or was it something else?

A. I'm surprised, Mr. Milosevic, you ask me that question because there lies the rub, because you know the Vance Plan required there be no forces in that area, and you know the details of it. It also required ¹⁵⁵³⁶ that only police be in the UNPA. Thirdly, it was required there be no such thing as the Republic of Srpska Krajina as a government. You know that. That's the problem.

Q. That's the point: Didn't you come to the conclusion yourself that it was the police that remained ultimately, with reinforcements, in all fairness. But whoever was there until January 1993, until the attack; namely, weapons were handed in to the UN, the Vance Plan was carried out, and it was only the police that was there on the ground. Is that right or is that not right, Mr. Kirudja? Everything that was -- I mean, everything and everybody that was on the ground was the police; right?

A. See, that's what I belaboured to be accurate about. We expected not just they stay there from August to January of 1993, and you know that the Vance Plan expected them to be there as long as there was no political solution found under ICFY. So that itself was a violation of the Vance Plan, the act you so accurately describe.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic -- Mr. Milosevic, I wonder if there's much point arguing more with the witness about this matter. He has given his account. We have heard what you say happened, and no doubt we shall have to make our minds up in due course as to where the truth lies, but the witness has given his evidence that, as far as he was concerned, this behaviour amounted to a violation of the plan. You claim there was an explanation for it. We will have to consider that. But whether we're going to benefit any more from lengthy argument with the witness about it, I rather doubt.

Now, the time has in fact come where we're going to have to ¹⁵⁵³⁷ adjourn. So perhaps you can go on to another topic tomorrow morning. I should say that we've considered the time that you should have available, and you will have an equality with the Prosecution, which means that you have one and a half hours left tomorrow morning to conclude your cross-examination of this witness, should you require it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm not sure, Mr. May, that that one and a half hours will be sufficient for me. There are many documents that were provided in relation to Mr. Kirudja's testimony.

JUDGE MAY: You know, Mr. Milosevic, throughout this trial that there are time limits which will be imposed, and when you organise your cross-examination, you should have that in mind. Partly that is why you're being told that you have an hour and a half left and you can organise your cross-examination accordingly. But one of the lessons you should draw from it is not to argue with the witness and not to try and ask him about things which he knows nothing about. Thereby, you'll use your time more usefully.

We will adjourn now. Nine o'clock tomorrow morning.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 4th day of

February, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.