¹⁵⁵³⁸

Tuesday, 4 February 2003

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

WITNESS: CHARLES KIRUDJA [Resumed] Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kirudja, yesterday we left off discussing a question I had asked you with respect to your knowledge about the presence of the Croatian army on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I'm not sure that I remembered your answer. Did you say you knew about their presence or not, and how far they were there or not?

JUDGE MAY: He didn't know the matters which you put to him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I assume that, apart from the fact that you had your own personal knowledge, that you also took care as to what was being written in the UN Secretary-General reports, what they said. So let me remind you, and I'm quoting, that there's the UN Security Council report, the title: Report by the UN Secretary-General Pursuant to the 749 UN Security Council Resolution, 1992, the 13th of May. The 13th of May, yes, 1992. That's the date. The English version, UN Secretary-General Report Pursuant to the Resolution I've just quoted, and he says in that document, in chapter 2, the following: "2.4 But there is no doubt that certain members of the ¹⁵⁵³⁹ Croatian army with their weapons are deployed in Herzegovina and Bosanska Krupa near Bihac in the north-west, around Bosanski Brod to the north-east and in Eastern Bosnia as well and that they are deployed en masse." Do you recall that? I assume that, as a UN employee, as a UN official, you must have read those reports by the UN Secretary-General which referred to the territory you yourself were working in.

A. Yes. In general, reports of the Secretary-General in the area we were concerned would have information that I would have knowledge of, if not directly -- or, let me say the United Nations Protection Force was deployed in the -- in a number locations in the former Yugoslavia, and the reports of the Secretary-General, as you would appreciate, would encompass sources of information that were reflective of the entire information reaching the Secretary-General from all parts of the nation. Therefore, while in general I would know of those reports, I wouldn't be the person you would want to question on the details contained therein in a given report.

Q. Yes, but in view of the questions related to the JNA, I'm going to quote the next point from this same report. It is point 5 in that same chapter, the one I mentioned, in which he says the following: "Further concern was caused by the decision made by the Belgrade authorities up until the 18th of May to have all members of the JNA pull out of Bosnia-Herzegovina who are not citizens of that republic. This will leave Bosnia-Herzegovina without any effective control, 50.000 Serb forces will be pulled out and their weapons."

Do you remember that portion? ¹⁵⁵⁴⁰

A. Again, Mr. Milosevic, I don't have that report directly in front of me, but I can recognise certain points you have made. For example, the sentence about -- about Belgrade -- by the decision made by the Belgrade authorities up until the 18th of May to have all members of the JNA pull out of Bosnia-Herzegovina who are not citizens of that republic. I have testified directly to knowing that information. Not from the Secretary-General's report only. It's the other way around; from the ground where I was.

Q. Ah, that's very good. That means that you know that from your own personal knowledge. And this report goes on to say on page 10, under chapter 5, it says, "Comments," this is the Comments section. Do you know about this event: "The Muslim forces on the 3rd of May, violating the agreement on safe passage for members of the JNA which were leaving the headquarters in Sarajevo in cold blood killed a certain number of soldiers belonging to the JNA in the persons of high-ranking UNPROFOR officers who were powerless to prevent this massacre."

So the term "massacre" is used, and that was the 3rd of May, while they were withdrawing. In the presence of UNPROFOR. That's when this massacre took place, the massacre of a number of JNA soldiers. Do you happen to recall that?

A. As a matter of fact, my testimony contains reference to General Spiro Nikovic speaking to us, I think a day or two after the reports of that incident were -- had reached our part of the sector. My testimony reflects somewhere in this document that you may have Mr. Spiro -- General Spiro Nikovic knew of that. He apprised us of that, and I recall ¹⁵⁵⁴¹ mentioning it had coloured his mood that day. He was not his jovial self because of the incident. I have testified to that.

Q. Well, you see now, there's also this, a report to the UN Security Council. It says Security Council here. Distribution is general, S/24049 of the 30th of May, the original is in English. And then it goes on to state the following: "The present report is remitted to the secretary -- to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 752, 1992." And then in the first paragraph where it says Background, point 2, it states the following: [In English] [Previous translation continues]... "13th of May 1992 President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina met at Skopje with General Blagojevic, Chief of Staff of JNA, Yugoslav federal army, and acting Federal Secretary of Defence and Mr. Branko Kostic, vice-president of the Federal Presidency in Belgrade, to define the role of JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it's eventual withdrawal. This meeting did not produce a definite agreement. "On May, Vice-President Kostic proposed to President Izetbegovic that the talks be resumed with the participation of the representatives of the Bosnian, Serb and Croat communities. On the same day, authorities of the so-called Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina announced their decision to form their own army which will be composed of units of former JNA based in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and appointed General Ratko Mladic as the commander at that time."

[Interpretation] So I assume that you know that as of that date, which was the 13th of May, 1992, that on that day, the authorities of the Republika Srpska proclaimed their decision to form their own army, which ¹⁵⁵⁴² was not, as you know, under the command of Belgrade or under any kind of instructions from the JNA. Do you know that?

A. No, Mr. Milosevic, I do not know that.

Q. Well, do you know this then, another thing that is written in this report to the UN Security Council. It is point 3, and it states as following: "On the 17th of May, I received a letter from Admiral Miroslav Simic [In English]: requesting assistance of JNA, requesting assistance in the safe withdrawal of JNA troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina and particularly from Sarajevo, Pazaric and Zenica. The letter referred, inter alia, to an agreement signed on May 1992 at the premises of the United Nations Protection Forces in Yugoslavia at Sarajevo by representatives of Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, JNA, the European Community Monitoring Mission and the personal envoy of Lord Carrington, Mr. Leonard Doyle. On 21st May, Vice-President Kostic again wrote to ask me to request President Izetbegovic to order the deblocking of the JNA garrison at Sarajevo. On 25th of May, I received a letter from President Izetbegovic in which, inter alia, he requested that UNPROFOR should supervise the withdrawal of part of JNA personnel and weapons in accordance with agreement of 10th of May, 1992." [Interpretation] So all this was agreed. The JNA was under the -- in the process of withdrawal, and they massacred the JNA soldiers who were in fact withdrawing.

And then in point 5, he goes on to say: "The bulk of the JNA --"

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have the opportunity of dealing with these matters. ¹⁵⁵⁴³ Mr. Kirudja, do you know anything about these matters which are being raised by the accused?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, on the matters that -- he's reading information from the Security Council, documents that contains information that reaches the Secretary-General from other sources, multiple sources, inclusive areas to which I do not have direct information. One of those areas is in the context, the substance raised in the last paragraph about matters going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina between JNA commanders in Sarajevo and what happened in that incident that is referred to as a massacre. Earlier on, when I said directly to Mr. Milosevic I don't know, it was with regard to the substance of what I thought was in the report of the Secretary-General was a conclusion he was drawing from the report of the Secretary-General that -- the text has moved in front of me. I can't recover it again, earlier on, but it was a point on -- that I understood to be a conclusion he was drawing and to which I referred. I don't know the fact of that conclusion or not.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I was just quoting the text. I wasn't making any conclusions or observations from it.

But do you know about this, another thing it says in point 5: "The bulk of the JNA personnel who were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina were citizens [In English] of that republic and were not therefore covered by the Belgrade authorities' decision on withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina." [Interpretation] I assume you also know about that, Mr. Kirudja, that the army of Republika Srpska was established. ¹⁵⁵⁴⁴

A. I have testified, Mr. Milosevic, to that -- to being informed about those soldiers of the JNA that were to withdraw and those which were to remain. I have testified to that, in effect that those who were considered born in the area would be leaving, and those who were outside the area would remain. That I have testified to.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, did you have information of this kind, like the one that was published by the London Independent on the 22nd of August, it was a Saturday, 1992, written by Leonard Doyle of New York, a correspondent of theirs, and he speaks not only about the fact that the forces, the extremist forces under the command of Izetbegovic did what they did, what we've just been talking about, but other crimes against their own population. It says here as follows:

"[In English] United Nations officials and senior Western military officers believe --" [Interpretation] I'll read slower. Yes. Thank you. "[In English] United Nations officials and senior Western military officers believe some of the worst recent killings in Sarajevo, including the massacre of at least 16 people in the bread queue were carried out by the city's mainly Muslim defenders, not Serb besiegers, as a propaganda employ to win war sympathy and military intervention."

JUDGE MAY: This witness has given no evidence about Sarajevo, was not based there, so is not in a position, I would think, to deal with it. But, Mr. Groome, perhaps you can help me with this: Are you intending to call witnesses who will be covering Sarajevo in due course and who may be in a position to deal with these sort of allegations?

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it is the intention of the Prosecution ¹⁵⁵⁴⁵ at this stage to call witnesses to deal with Sarajevo, yes.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Better put those to witnesses who know about Sarajevo. Let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will continue, but this is an essential point in view of the fact that Mr. Kirudja was a high-ranking UN official.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And it says here: "[In English] The view has been expressed in confidential reports --"

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Mr. Kirudja, you're being asked about a report from a correspondent dealing with events in Sarajevo and comments which are said to have been made by a United Nations official in relation to events there. As you've heard, it is the intention of the Prosecution to call witnesses to deal with Sarajevo, but since you're giving evidence, it may be right to ask you. Can you give any evidence about what happened in Sarajevo or in the bread queue or anything like that?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I certainly couldn't speak even to the question of the journalist's stated report of which I don't have a copy or direct knowledge. I can't testify to that.

JUDGE MAY: No. Mr. Milosevic, you can put that to a witness who can deal with it, but there's no point putting it to this witness. He knows nothing about it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I'm not going to put questions about it. But this is an essential point, Mr. May, because ^{15546 BLANK PAGE 15547} information and facts and figures about that were confidential. They were not made public. And the massacre perpetrated by the Muslim forces were taken as a pretext for introducing sanctions, because this was ascribed, this act was ascribed to the Serb forces.

JUDGE MAY: This is the way in which we waste time, your limited time in cross-examining, arguing about matters with which a witness cannot deal. Now, let us move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Let's go back, then, to your own territory. I have here a document which is entitled the UN Security Council Report Pursuant to 721 UN Security Council Resolution. It is general distribution. The date is the 4th of February, 1992. Point 4 speaks about the talks that Goulding had, both in Belgrade and in Zagreb, and so on and so forth, in Knin, and in all three areas under UN protection where it says that meetings with the leaders of the Serb community, under the protection of the UN, the Serb leadership asked that Mr. Goulding give further explanations to local leaders with respect to the UN peace forces' plan and react to the concern expressed by them with respect to that plan. Do you happen to remember that?

A. I don't have readily a copy of that, but both the names, Mr. Goulding is somebody I know about, his presence or visit in the areas we were deployed, I would have some understanding of that. So if you are specific about it, we can -- I can perhaps comment. But I don't have in front of me the report you are referring to. If you get specific on it, we can -- I may perhaps be able to respond. ¹⁵⁵⁴⁸

Q. In this report, it also says the following, that the deblocking was implemented -- this is point 6A, the cease-fire chapter or paragraph, and the deblockade was effected and the JNA units withdrew from Croatia and a satisfactory advancement was reached with regard to the humanitarian aspects, and so on and so forth. Then it is emphasised that the deployment of forces does not mean a change in the status quo and any arrangements with respect to the police would be pursuant to point 19 of the plan, and from this, it emerges that the area under UN protection, as has been the case up till now, would not come under the laws and institutions of the Republic of Croatia in the transitional period until a political solution is found.

Is that so or not, Mr. Kirudja?

A. Essentially, it is. We have discussed the detail of this when we were talking about the Vance Plan, and this is another confirmation of what the Vance Plan required. But you have read the part that required the Croats not to have an influence during the transition period. The Vance Plan also required the Serbs not to institute any new structure in the area, yes. That is part of what we have testified to and discussed earlier.

Q. Well, now that we're discussing this issue, the recognition, the premature recognition both of Croatia and Bosnia and how it affected the deterioration of the situation, from that same report we can see that in Zagreb on the 28th of January, that's when Goulding went there to tour all the -- those who were on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, when he went to see Tudjman, that they could not accept the fundamental aspects ¹⁵⁵⁴⁹ of the plan by which they underline the unconditional acceptance of the plan expressed by my personal envoy and when it was stressed that the UN forces were deployed in the transitional period until a political solution is found or, rather, until political negotiations take place for a general solution, Mr. Tudjman said the following: After international recognition of his republic, there were no outstanding political issues to be discussed. Do you remember that?

A. No. I wasn't party to the meeting. This is obviously something Mr. Goulding himself was discussing, and if it is quoted in the UN report, I take it that it reflects what he was discussing with Mr. Tudjman. I wouldn't personally be testifying to its substance as it's obvious it was a meeting I wasn't participating in.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you can quote from this report, but then you must hand it to the witness so that he can read it. He must have the chance of dealing with it fairly, and merely to answer selective quotations from it is not a fair way of dealing with it. Now, is there anything more you want to ask him about it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May. Unfortunately, I only have these reports in Serbian, so there's no point in me showing it to the witness. But I gave you their numbers, the dates. I said that they were the UN Secretary-General's reports of those dates and that the distribution of the reports was general, general distribution, that's what it came under.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you happen to remember -- ¹⁵⁵⁵⁰

JUDGE MAY: Perhaps the Prosecution can help with those.

MR. GROOME: The Prosecution will seek to obtain those reports, but if I'm not mistaken, Mr. Milosevic read, I believe in English, from the reports, so --

JUDGE MAY: The earlier one. I don't know about this one. Yes. Do you want these reports exhibited, Mr. Milosevic?

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I shall look for them in the original in English and then I will tender them. I will highlight the portions that I consider to be important and to which I wish to hear Mr. Kirudja's responses to.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And, Mr. Kirudja, in the report of the UN Secretary-General of the 28th of September, 1992, which speaks at the very beginning under chapter 1, violations of the truce or cease-fire, that tensions were big in the -- in Sector North, Miljevci, Peruca and so on, where the Croatian army stormed the area on the 21st of June, 1992. Do you happen to remember that? So these are violations of the agreement that I'm talking about, and the storming of the territory under UN protection by the Croatian forces. That's what I'm referring to.

A. This is one instance where the reference to giving me the report and the section would be certainly very helpful. Yes, there were instances of violation by both the Serbs and the Croats. I take it that that report, you're highlighting the part where the Croatian army was also reported to be in violation of the terms of the deployment of the nation ¹⁵⁵⁵¹ in those areas.

Q. Well, this pertains to the Croatian violations of the cease-fire agreement. There is no mention of the Serb army.

A. That's why -- sorry to interrupt you. That's why I couldn't comment on the entirety of that report because I would have wanted to comment on whether it was just limited to a time period where it will focus one subject, or what it was. Right now, I have no way of understanding the -- what the nature of the report took, what the report intended to convey to the Security Council in its entirety.

Q. Well, it precisely relates to violations of the Vance Plan and the aggression of the Croat forces against UN protected areas.

JUDGE MAY: What the witness is entitled to see is what the whole report says. All that we are getting from it is quotations, and it's not satisfactory that the witness cannot deal with it. Now, in future, you should produce these in English, if you have them, so the witness can deal with them.

Mr. Kirudja, we will get these documents in due course. We will have the opportunity of reading the full reports, and we will allow the Prosecution, when they are exhibited, to draw our attention to other matters which the accused has not referred to. Since he's not able to put them, as he should have done, before you in English, that opportunity should be available.

Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Do you agree, Mr. Kirudja, in view of the fact that ¹⁵⁵⁵² you have been referring to the Vance Plan quite specifically, and also recalling the UN Charter, any plan, including the Vance Plan, has to be in complete accordance with the UN Charter, and the general rules of conduct, including the rules that are in compliance with the plan, have to be in accordance with the UN Charter in general; isn't that right?

A. It is right, Mr. Milosevic, and you didn't even need to raise the point because the Vance Plan was ratified by a general -- a Security Council Resolution. And in order for the general -- for the Security Council Resolution to enable the mission, they would have taken care of the point you have raised. The Resolution, the enabling Resolution of the Security Council would have taken care of that point you are making.

Q. So the overall rules of conduct in the protected areas had to be interpreted in accordance with the UN Charter. So that is right, isn't it? I imagine that that is not being challenged in any way.

A. No, it's not.

Q. All right, then. As the representative of the United Nations, you certainly know that Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter refers to the prohibition of the use of force and threats of use of force and that there are two valid exceptions to that prohibition according to the UN Charter. One are collective military measures that are imposed with -- by the Security Council in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter, and the other one is self-defence envisaged in Article 51 of the Charter. Is that right, Mr. Kirudja?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I would like to ensure that you understand that the various parts of the Charter, it's not something that -- ¹⁵⁵⁵³

JUDGE ROBINSON: Stop, Mr. Kirudja. Stop, Mr. Kirudja. Please stop.

Those are not matters for the witness. Those are legal issues on which the Chamber will have to make a decision.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson, but this has to do with the fact that I referred to yesterday, namely that it is precisely because of these attacks, totally unprovoked, against the UNPAs, the Serbs in that area used this inalienable right of theirs that is envisaged by the UN Charter as well, namely the right to self-defence, because, according to Article 51 of the UN Charter, one is allowed to defend oneself.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we'll hear about this in due course and you can address us on it, on all these matters of law, but at the moment, the witness is giving evidence. You should concentrate on asking him questions, relevant questions at that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, Mr. Kirudja, I presume that you agree that the Vance Plan and the Resolution of the UN establishing UNPROFOR did not refer to a situation whereby the population in UNPAs would have to be compelled to defend themselves. It was taken as a point of departure that --

JUDGE MAY: Let us ask the witness. Your question, as so often, contains an assumption, which it should not. And the witness can help us about it. He may be able to assist us as to what the answer is. What is alleged is that the citizens, the population, as it's put, ¹⁵⁵⁵⁴ in the UNPAs had to defend themselves. Was that a situation that you saw on the ground when you were there, or not, Mr. Kirudja?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. The Vance Plan was designed to avoid that very issue, to avoid in the sense that the source of what would be a problem for the citizens was the armed units that were required to demobilise and have their weapons taken away in storage points, and then the United Nations, in their presence with the military and civil police, will monitor that there will be no return of such sources of threat and law and order would be kept by the own civilian police of the -- from the population, armed sufficiently for law and order and nothing more than that.

So there wouldn't have been a reason for claiming that the population needed to defend itself under the terms of the Vance Plan and deployment of the UN assets in the area.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right, Mr. Kirudja. But when it became evident that UNPROFOR did not carry out its task and did not stop Croat attacks against UNPAs, namely when there was a situation that was not envisaged by the Resolution, do you agree that the Serbs rightfully resorted to self-defence as envisaged by Article 51 of the UN Charter? Is that right or is that not right?

JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter about Article 51. And whether anyone was acting in self-defence may be a matter of law. But perhaps it can be put to the witness in this way: Did it appear to you that the Serb population, no doubt in reclaiming the arms of ^{15555 BLANK PAGE 15556} the Serb authorities, were acting in self-defence? Was this a situation, as it appeared to you, in which it was necessary for them or appeared necessary for them to defend themselves?

THE WITNESS: The circumstances leading to the first time and the last time those weapons were taken out of UN-controlled areas and subsequently were never returned to that, was an incident taken -- taking place in January somewhere in Maslenica. Again, I mentioned yesterday the distance of where that action was taken and the circumstances did not, in my view, justify the kind of repudiation of the status quo. It may have only caused a temporary concern to the local population which, I believe, the United Nations deployed mission was capable of addressing and dealing with in the traditional way we have dealt with matters of restoring the breach of the status quo. We never had a chance even to start repairing that breach. And there is every reason to believe that it was repairable, that breach.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, of course it was repairable. But the breach was committed by the forces that attacked the UN protected areas. Can we, therefore, establish, Mr. Kirudja, that when force was resorted to by the Croat forces, in contravention of the Vance Plan and the UN Resolutions, the Serbs responded, acting in self-defence, which is an inalienable right. Can we say that it is the Croat forces that attacked unlawfully and that the Serbs protected themselves lawfully in accordance with the UN Charter? Is that right or is that not right, Mr. Kirudja?

JUDGE MAY: You have put that question a number of times, and this ¹⁵⁵⁵⁷ is the last time that the witness will be required to answer it, if he feels he can add anything to what's already said.

THE WITNESS: I would rather take the counsel of the court that as to whether or not they had a self-defence was a matter of law.

JUDGE MAY: That is a matter of law. You're absolutely right about it. Perhaps you can help us to this extent: First of all, do you agree with the accused's suggestion that it was the Croats, as it were, who started it, putting it in very simple terms, by being in breach of the agreement and attacking in the -- or making attacks in the protected zones? Is that general picture right or not?

THE WITNESS: Actually, it is. And one report, and I had written in December, just weeks before that attack had occurred, I recall myself telling my headquarters this was going to happen. It's not anywhere in evidence here. It was a situational report that I had put out. I only missed by days when the Croats would take that action. I had even forewarned it. General Nambiar called me about it, and said, "Let's hope you're wrong." Unfortunately, I wasn't.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you -- could you clarify this for me. It has just gone off the screen, but I noted what you said earlier, that the distance in relation to where they -- and I'm paraphrasing -- where the action was taken did not justify the kind of repudiation of the status quo.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you elaborate on that for me.

THE WITNESS: You see, there were three distinct -- four distinct ¹⁵⁵⁵⁸ sectors where UNPROFOR was deployed. The further most from Maslenica was Sector East, close to the border with Serbia, in what is called now Eastern Slavonia. There was Sector West, which is somewhere in the middle as you come from Belgrade, and then Sector North of which I drew the approximate boundary, bordering on Western Bosnia, the Bihac pocket; and then Sector South, which spread all the way to Zadar and parts of Peruca down that you heard referred to, and then Maslenica Bridge an isthmus connecting the Dalmatia north and south.

When the Croats took action in this very small, relatively speaking to the areas deployed, the Serbs took weapons from everywhere, including Sector East. Everywhere. They came out from everywhere almost simultaneously. That's why I mentioned that had it been otherwise, where the Serbs would have lodged a complaint to UNPROFOR and United Nations, this is a violation by Croatia in this particular point, the normal process of repairing that breach is what I'm referring would, in my opinion, have been possible. As it turned out, it wasn't, and the weapons never went back, despite our best efforts to restore that Vance Plan requirement.

JUDGE ROBINSON: There was a mechanism for violations to be lodged?

THE WITNESS: Yes. And not only violations to be lodged, restoration of the breaches between the warring parties. That's what military component of UNPROFOR was all about, trying to repair that. In fact, I may even turn it the other way around: We had many from the Serb side across Bosnia in big ways, but the Bosnian Muslim forces that were ¹⁵⁵⁵⁹ deployed in the Bihac pocket specifically - the 5th Corps commanded there - did not do what the Serbs did, for example, come massively. They lodged a complaint that this was a violation, and we worked months to restore the breach and were successful in doing it. Therefore, there was a mechanism for repairing such breaches.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. May I proceed? I hope that you are going to discount this portion of my time that you are using for your own conferrals.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Kirudja, when aggression is carried out against a particular territory, what about the rest of that territory? Nobody is supposed to care at all; right? So the level of excitement has to be matched exactly to that part of the territory where the aggression took place, and the others should sleep peacefully, although the preconditions set forth in this plan is that peace would be guaranteed. So what guaranteed to the Serbs that there would be no further incursions once the plan was violated?

What you said just now, does that seem logical to you?

A. Mr. Milosevic, what I said certainly does seem logical to me in terms of my explanation. I didn't understand your question, though. Please rephrase it.

Q. It was my understanding that you explained that this was an attack of the Croat forces against the Maslenica Bridge. I also mentioned the attack, the aggression on the Miljevice plateau, and then Western ¹⁵⁵⁶⁰ Slavonia, and then yet again your sector when hundreds of thousands were ethnically cleansed, and so on and so forth.

So these fears on the basis of which the Serbs defended themselves, didn't they prove to be justified, that this was not some kind of isolated --

JUDGE MAY: I'm not following the question. It's not at all clear.

What the witness has said is that the removal of the weapons was not justified in the particular circumstances. Now, you seem to be putting something about later events, as far as I can see, and I don't really see the relevance of it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May. Relevance seems to be a very popular word here, but let's move on because I'm sure that you will drastically restrain my time.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I have the impression that we were not in agreement as concerns the implementation of the plan as it was written. Here's a Resolution of the Security Council, 762/92, on the 27th of July, 1992, related to a report of the Secretary-General, and it meant what UNPROFOR was doing. Then point 4 says: "Another important achievement was the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army (the JNA) from all sectors mentioned in the plan with the exception of one infantry battalion in Sector East that will be withdrawn within the next few days."

That's what it says here in the report of the Secretary-General. So I have quoted a report to you, a specific one with a specific date so ¹⁵⁵⁶¹ you can have a look at it, so can we agree, then, that the Yugoslav side fully complied with the plan, carried out its obligations based on the plan?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I did testify that yes, the JNA did withdraw for the period you have mentioned. The report was in July; correct? I believe it is. And that period of time there was the withdrawal of the JNA in the manner I testified yesterday. But you are also saying that constituted a fully -- a full compliance with the Vance Plan. No, it couldn't. The Vance Plan did not accept -- or it was inconsistent, the events that followed. Once they mobilised the troops who were supposed to stay that way. Weapons withdrawal, they were supposed to stay that way. The numbers for police necessary for law and order, they were never compiled with. What the police for maintaining law and order, as envisaged or designed in the mission, that was never complied with.

So it is not correct to say or to draw the conclusion on the basis of that report at that point in time, in July, that could, the Vance Plan was fully complied with. No, it wouldn't be correct to draw that conclusion.

Q. My question was whether Yugoslavia - so the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been formed - and it withdrew the Yugoslav People's Army or, rather, what belonged to them. Did Yugoslavia fulfil its obligation or not? That was my question.

A. Okay. Your question says "fulfil its obligation." My response has to do with withdrawal of the JNA from that area. I'm not sure the two ¹⁵⁵⁶² equate to each other. While I can accept that they withdrew for the period of time in the manner described, I couldn't also conclude fully full obligations of Yugoslavia. I wouldn't want to go into that because the two are not the same in my reading.

Q. All right. This will have to be discussed with others as well. Of course including some that I quoted yesterday and others who took part in this as well.

Mr. Kirudja, yesterday you spoke about the focus of your activities being on cooperation with the local authorities in the sector that you were in charge of; is that right?

A. Cooperation with the local authorities? Rather, the local authorities were to cooperate with us to fulfil the mandate, and we in turn work with then, yes.

Q. Yes. This morning -- since people are watching this on television very carefully in Yugoslavia, this morning I got a letter or, rather, a statement of Mile Bosnic, president of the municipality of Slunj. So this is a person who in the period from 1991 to 1993 was president of the municipality of Slunj. Mile Bosnic. This is a person that you communicated with. Your communications focused on the presidents of municipalities, as you said to me yesterday, and you considered that to be your task.

I would like to ask you to comment on the following. I am not going to read the entire letter because it will take up too much of my time but I would like you to comment on some of things that this letter says, and I'm going to give it to you anyway. ¹⁵⁵⁶³ This is the way he starts: "It is interesting that all the killings of the Serbs in Slunj were something that you doubted. You wondered who the perpetrators were because you did nothing to have evidence. In Jelov Klanac, five persons were killed, et cetera. People were killed when they went hunting, Gojko Rakinic, and they were imprisoned in Karlovac. Serbs were probably killing themselves, and they probably took themselves to prison in Karlovac. We asked you many times to prevent this because this was your responsibility, and you kept refusing that, and you kept asking for some kind of evidence. When a man were even kidnapped, that was no proof for you. And when 600 persons were prevented from reaching Velika Kladusa, although they were armed, 70 managed to get through and so on and so forth, and they were led by members of the Croat army who originally came from Slunj."

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt you. The witness should have the chance of dealing with these allegations which your correspondent makes.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. Point number 1, yes, I was aware of and I testified yesterday and in my testimony there are references to meetings in Slunj with a mayor. My notes say Bosic. Probably I missed the 'N', Bosnic as mentioned by Mr. Milosevic today. He met with me many times, and we dealt with a wide range of subjects, including humanitarian affairs, claims of refugees, and other matters. The statement I see in front of me, I can only react to it as wild. It looks wild to me. I can't recognise any of these matters. Neither can he say when and where he raised these matters with me. ^{15564 BLANK PAGE 15565} I would rather want him to substantiate these things rather than me respond to them, because I have no recollection of the matters he is raising me refusing to hear or even listen. My testimony includes the issue of the five Croats that came in the municipality of Slunj, which were themselves, these Croats, removed from the south of Slunj in the area of Korenica, which he agreed, if he is the same person that is the mayor that was reported to have met with me, he agreed with his police chief, Mr. Klipa, to protect these people. So my memory of him was rather a memory of a person who wanted to do what was right. He wouldn't have -- I wouldn't have reached an agreement with him about protecting Croats at the expense of the municipality of Slunj. When I was being characterised as the statement being read by Mr. Milosevic, if it were true, he would not have reached a deal with me then.

More specifically, I knew he was worried about that deal because of Mr. Martic. That is a reason I wrote a letter conveyed to Mr. Martic that these people needed protection as a way of allaying the fear of this man so he can do his job, so he can execute his responsibilities. And he did to our satisfaction.

It couldn't be the same kind of person now issuing the kind of statement Mr. Milosevic read, which appeared to me wildly exaggerated.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The letter is signed. I'll let you have it. I received it by fax, so this isn't an original, but you can read it through in its entirety, and I'm sure you'll recall this, he says at the end: "Do you remember who first came to your assistance when you and your associates ¹⁵⁵⁶⁶ had a traffic accident in Vosnjica? We didn't pass by and leave you there. It was Mile Bosnic with his associates." And underneath, we have the signature of Mile Bosnic himself. I'm sure you remember the incident.

A. No, I don't remember an incident of that kind. Parenthesis: I recall yesterday mentioning there were so many speeches given to us by people like mayors of areas like Vojnic and others, and I characterised those speeches as very political, including why we can't live together with known Serbs, why we in the United Nations had to understand this if there was going to be peace. This is in the direction of so many of those wild speeches we had to listen to.

So this particular -- I also recall a lot of accusations made that we couldn't verify even in our best tries. This is an example of things like that.

Q. All right. I'll hand you the letter. And he also says: "Do you know --"

JUDGE MAY: No, you won't. It's simply a letter sent to you. It's of no probative value, and it's quite unnecessary for the witness to look at it. If you want to put anything else from it you can, but otherwise it is of no relevance.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This isn't a letter sent to me. It is a statement concerning the testimony of Charles Kirudja before The Hague Tribunal which I received by fax.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you fail to produce the important documents, namely the UN Security Council and Secretary-General ones. ¹⁵⁵⁶⁷ Those were admissible, but you failed to produce them. This is totally irrelevant and is totally inadmissible, so the witness simply won't see it. Now, let's move on to something else.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Quite the reverse, Mr. May. I said that I will be giving them to you in English because I have them in Serbian, and I just quoted one which was in English, that is true. And I said that I would like to have them tendered into evidence and that I shall let you have them in due course and that you can compare my quotations with the portions of the statement to see whether I have quoted them correctly or whether I've erroneously interpreted them. I think that will be sufficient.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, never mind. I don't want to go on quoting Bosnic, but is what he says true, that the Serbs in Kordun received 50.000 to 60.000 refugees from Bosanska Krajina at that period of time? Is that true? People who had fled from Bosnia and Krajina. Do you know about that, Mr. Kirudja?

A. Mr. Milosevic, my testimony a little earlier did cast doubt whether the same person claiming to be mayor of Slunj is some fact I cannot even testify to. Given those wild accusations, I'm not even sure who it is that is making that allegation and whether he's really the person that he says to be. I have no way of doing that. Consequently, I'm unable to respond to information that you passed to me from that source.

Q. But I'm asking you about the fact here now, Mr. Kirudja. Do you ¹⁵⁵⁶⁸ know about the number of refugees who fled to Kordun from Bosanska Krajina? Serbs I'm referring to.

A. Serbs who came into the Sector North from Bosanska Krupa.

Q. From Bosanska Krajina, that is to say from the whole Bosanska Krajina region, not just Krupa. Krupa is one municipality, but from the whole area of Bosnian Krajina.

A. The demarcation of that Bosanska Krajina, would that encompass Bosanski Novi, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Kljuc, the areas I referred to yesterday?

Q. Yes, yes, the ones you said bordered on your sector from which the Serbs fled under pressure and terror perpetrated against them by the Muslim forces.

A. Yes, indeed. This is a point that I did not testify directly. The presence of many Serbs in Sector North that had come from that area that we just described. There were cases that I got to know, but importantly, they were never represented to us as refugees. They came there without duress, apparently, settled in many of the evacuated houses that were in the sector, and consequently, they were never raised to us on the Serb side. On the contrary, I had long meetings from the Croatian side, complaining about that, that there were these aliens or, rather, they were considered to be people who had settled in the sector that were not supposed to be there.

So the point you made, Mr. Milosevic, would have only come to my attention and our attention from the Croatian side as a complaint, not from the Serb side as refugees. ¹⁵⁵⁶⁹

Q. So you don't know that that year, for example, there were already 100.000 persons from Croatia who were refugees in Serbia, let alone the other parts. Do you know something about that?

A. I think that's a different question from the one you asked me earlier. In Serbia or in the sector?

Q. No. What I'm saying is that from Croatia, already at that time, at the beginning of 1991, there were 100.000 refugees in Serbia, Serbs from Croatia who had fled under duress, under the pressure of killings, their houses being burnt and mined, et cetera. Do you know anything about that?

A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, in 1991 we hadn't deployed there, and when we arrived, we only heard summaries of people being displaced and being located all over the former Yugoslavia, specifically in Serbia because -- and a lot on the Croatian side of that confrontation on the sector. Yes, we had some reports of displaced people in various locations, but I couldn't testify to the exact numbers prior to the arrival of the mission or even thereafter.

Q. Even thereafter, yes. Right. Now, I'm taking care of the pages. And on page 26, paragraph 4 of your statement, you say the following: "On the 15th of July, at 11.00 in Sisak, I had a meeting with Mr. Ramljak and the mayor of Sisak. The mayor said that in the Sisak area, there were already 15.000 to 20.000 refugees or displaced persons, and recent arrivals of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina were putting further pressure on the local authorities. He stated that 10.000 Serbs had left Croatia for areas controlled by the Serb authorities and that the fate of 1.500 ¹⁵⁵⁷⁰ Croats left behind in the UNPA area are still -- was still unknown." That's how you reported from the meeting, and I'm quoting this from your own statement. Isn't that right?

A. Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. All right, then. What I want to ask you is the following: I assume that you consider yourself to be objective, so when you speak about the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, when you speak about the Muslim inhabitants who were fleeing from the war, you're talking about the displaced persons and persecuted persons and ethnic cleansing. But when you speak about the Serbs who under the most brutal of circumstances were expelled from Croatia, you use the term "they left." You say they left, as if it was a case of just somebody simply moving from one area to another, in this case the Serbs. So do you distinguish, therefore, on ethnic grounds when you're talking about refugees, that some went under pressure and some were the victims of ethnic cleansing whereas others just happened to go, just like that? So they're different verbs that you're using there. You're using the verb to cleanse and the verb to leave. Why do you reserve for the former category the verb to cleanse and for the latter category the verb to leave? Could you explain that to us, please.

A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. First, it's a misreading of my testimony that you have. Clearly, that part of the testimony is reporting what the Croats were -- a representation made to me by the Croats in that meeting that you referred to. This sentence you read is not me saying. It says, "He stated." Somebody else stated that. Therefore, reflection of what I heard from the meeting, not characterising it one way or the other. ¹⁵⁵⁷¹ I'm aware of the sensitivity of the -- from the Serbian side, that their refugees, their victims are understated. That perception that you alluded to in your question. But, sir, you mislead me very, very seriously when you attribute the wording of cleansing and others as me selectively using those words. I invite you to look at that text as you're given to in a more exacting manner.

I take it you are referring to when we were discussing about testimony in Bosanski Novi of representations made to me on the one side and our own assessment of the effect of moving 4.000 people that turned out to be 9.000. That was not reported speech, that was direct assessment of an issue we were involved in.

What you read today is just a reference to a story given to me and given back and reported exactly the way it was heard. I believe the language clearly makes that distinction.

Q. The way it was heard. All right. But on page 28, paragraph 4 -- page 28, paragraph 4, you say that: "Regardless of whether we had a mandate for that or not, we have the moral responsibility of having the world hear the story told to us by numerous people who are fleeing from this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was right across, immediately opposite our post."

This is the Croatian translation of your statement, but that's what you said. So did you have any information as to how many Serbs were expelled from Croatia during your mandate there while you were there or around the time that you were there?

A. Mr. Milosevic, again to illustrate the point I made earlier, on ¹⁵⁵⁷² page 28, your reference to "our moral obligation," it's not in the context of reporting how Serbs were treated or not. That paragraph deals with an issue that was my own reaction to my headquarters telling us not to be involved "in what was going on across the border in Bosnia." It wasn't a reference to the Serbs or Muslims. Once again, it's a mischaracterisation of my testimony in that part.

So I kindly ask you to look at it as carefully as we give it, because we were as sensitive, as you would know, to every side's feelings of victimisation and attempted to report it as accurately as we could, including distinguishing when we are telling a story as we heard it or telling a story as we observed it.

Q. Please. If we may, let's make rational use of our time. I understand you when you say that there is a moral obligation to let the world hear the story, as I quoted from your statement a moment ago. So I assume that you had the feeling of this moral obligation to let world hear the story and about the tens of thousands of Serbs who were expelled from Croatia. And please, even The New York Times, in 1993, wrote about the figure of 10.000 mined Serb houses in Croatia and the enormous number of refugees, and so on and so forth. So it wasn't any Serb propaganda. That's not what it was about. And that Croatia was outside the UNPAs and that it was already ethnically cleansed before that. So were you aware of all those facts? I mean, why, intentionally or unintentionally, do you not deal with the exodus of the Serbs? And a priori, you seem to accept Ramljak's statement that quite simply they had left the area. So the one were expelled, and Ramljak says these people ^{15573 BLANK PAGE 15574} just left, and that's your area of responsibility, in your zone.

JUDGE MAY: I think the witness has already answered all this. He's already dealt with it, so let's move on to something else.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?

JUDGE MAY: Yes, but move on to another topic that we haven't covered.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. On page 33 of your statement, paragraph 2, you talk about a coordination meeting held in Topusko on the 12th of August, 1992, which was attended by the UNHCR, International Red Cross Committee, the EMEZ, UNMO, Danbat - I assume the Danish battalion - and the representative of the UNHCR and Sector South, you discussed the problem of the 28.000 potential refugees from Bosnia which, via your area of responsibility, Sector North, wished to go to Croatia or, from Croatia, further on into Europe. Isn't that right?

A. Yes, I see that.

Q. Now, did you happen to ask yourselves why these Muslim refugees from the northern parts of Bosnia did not wish to find refuge further into Muslim territory, which would have been more logical, would have stood to reason and would have been nearer, if the Serbs were actually trying to ethnically cleanse them, as you say?

A. The more natural question is the one I asked, Mr. Milosevic: Why do people want to leave their own homes where they are secure if they're leaving voluntarily, not where they're going?

Q. Mr. Kirudja, taking this example, is it clear, using that example, ¹⁵⁵⁷⁵ that these people were fleeing from the war and from hunger and also from forcible mobilisation to which they were subjected by these extremist elements and the authorities of Izetbegovic? Is that so or not?

A. My testimony pointed when I asked the question I was given a different answer. It was by mayor -- the Mayor Pasic's own response, it was pressure brought to them by what he called Serbian irregulars. That's in response to my direct question.

Q. All right. And was it precisely this radical fundamentalism and the absence of any kind of desire to live alongside the Serbs and Croats that later led to the inter-Muslim clashes, bloody ones in Cazinska Krajina --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop this. You haven't listened to the answer. The answer was that it was the Serb irregulars who drove them out, not the Muslims. So again, you simply take no notice of the evidence and just read on.

Do you know anything about the inter-Muslim clashes, Mr. Kirudja?

THE WITNESS: Only a specific one.

JUDGE MAY: Well, perhaps you can help with us that.

THE WITNESS: This was much later and in Bihac pocket, when Mr. Fikret Abdic decided to give rise to his Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. The area that up to that point was controlled by one army, the 5th Corps of Bihac, split into two, and there was Muslims facing each other in that area, one side supporting Fikret Abdic and the other side loyal to the government in Sarajevo. That's the one inter-Muslim clash that I was thoroughly familiar with. ¹⁵⁵⁷⁶

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Kirudja, do you know that Abdic received the largest number of votes at the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that his position as president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina he gave to Izetbegovic, saying that Izetbegovic was a politician and that he was a businessman and did not wish to be president. Do you know that he was one of the most popular men among the Muslims at that time and he won the largest number of votes. Is that something that you know about?

A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Abdic himself did tell me a lot of what you've said and he delighted in reminding me and my colleagues about specifically having won the largest amount of votes in Bosnia, and specifically that he had a vision of how to solve the problem. So yes, directly from Mr. Abdic I did hear.

Q. All right. Now, you spoke about the Belgrade declaration. Do you know that Abdic -- this whole territory of Western Bosnia proclaimed to be an autonomous province. That's what he did, and the main objective was peace, that's what he proclaimed, and good neighbourly relations with the Serbs and the Croats. Do you know about that?

A. Generally, I testified yesterday, that was the gist of his vision.

Q. He came to see me. He informed me that he had been to see Tudjman as well and that what he wanted was to establish all kinds of relations - first of all, economic relations and all the other types, cultural, political ties - both with Serbia and with Croatia and with Republika Srpska and with Republika Srpska Krajina, and he asked for my support for this kind of peace-loving policy. Is that something you know about? ¹⁵⁵⁷⁷

A. I have testified to that gist of the Belgrade declaration that Mr. Abdic presented to us.

Q. It was published in the papers. We welcomed it, welcomed the desire of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia along those lines, which was a purely Muslim one at the time, to live in peace, and this desire was also welcomed by the Republika Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska and also by Croatia, as far as I was informed, both by Tudjman and Abdic. And normal economic relations were established. For example, we supplied him from Serbia with food for the production of livestock, for livestock rearing and the other manufactures he needed for the factory and Agrokomerc company. So we sent him assistance in this way, and we were very happy to see that this was taking place and that an area like that existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was completely inhabited by Muslims who had professed their desire to live in peace with everybody. And they were able to move around freely across both borders. They would go to Zagreb and to Belgrade alike, and they could travel around in Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina. Do you know about all that?

A. It's a long statement, Mr. Milosevic. I did know that Mr. Abdic had that capacity. He freely moved his assets, including trucks, as -- between his Bihac pocket, the Krajina, and Croatia, and Zagreb and Karlovac, all the way to Rijeka. I was aware of all of that. And he did it actually without any assistance or need for assistance from us when he was dealing with the part where we are at. He was able to arrange it all by himself.

Q. And do you know what kind of massacre Izetbegovic's forces from ¹⁵⁵⁷⁸ Bihac, that 5th Corps, effected against Muslims, exert -- Muslims who adopted for peace and support to the policy of peace as led by Fikret Abdic?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I had the opportunity of dealing directly with that command of BH 5th Corps in the context of the Serbs' army in the Sector North forcefully crossing the international border and taking a huge chunk of the area that international -- that was across the international border, starting with the first area where the Serbs made an incursion, Blinski Kut [phoen], and then a much bigger incursion in an area Bosanska Bojna.

During that, because the incursion had taken place from Sector North and because of the instability that it caused, there was a threat of retaliation from the 5th Corps into the sector. During that course, I did meet with the commander of that 5th Corps, Rasim Dreskovic, many, many times with the sector commander.

In the course of that period of meetings on both sides, I did hear a lot of claims of atrocities. They were not one-sided. They came from both sides as a result of the -- that attack that came in. So I couldn't tell you how many numbers were involved, but there certainly were casualties as a result. But the -- it became a three-way fight, complicated, because Mr. Abdic enlisted the military support of both the forces of the Serbs located in operational zone Kordun and operational zone Banija. In essence, he would get them to do their heavy fighting without getting the weapons. He would get their active support. Then big 5th Corps command, which was loyal to Sarajevo, then that command ¹⁵⁵⁷⁹ began to fight both the splinter part headed by Mr. Abdic, located in the area of Velika Kladusa, and it fought both that part and the Serbs. Therefore, in that context, the claim that there were massacres has to be understood in that three-way -- three-way conflict.

Q. All right.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, Mr. May, may I have more time for the cross-examination of this witness, or are you going to insist that I conclude my cross-examination now before the break? Because I have quite a number of questions to ask him.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. When we get back, you will have ten minutes more, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: Ten.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, ten. You've had plenty of time.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, just two matters. I have a copy here of a reference book from the library, Yugoslavia Through Documents. It's an English copy of, I think, most of the UN documents. I will make it available to Mr. Milosevic during the break. Any pages that he wishes to seeks to introduce, I will have them photocopied after I receive it back, if that's acceptable to the Court. But this should include the documents that he had in Serbian.

JUDGE MAY: He may find it difficult, quite honestly, in 20 minutes to do that. I wonder if the Court could have that document, that book, and make the photocopies. Anyway, let us consider it during the break. ¹⁵⁵⁸⁰

MR. GROOME: And just one matter --

JUDGE MAY: One thing before we move on. I don't want to lose this. It's important that we get the documents now and we know what documents they are. Yes. We'll consider it during the break.

MR. GROOME: And just one matter in the interests of saving time. I would ask Mr. Kirudja, over the break, to review his notes of the 5th of May and the 27th of May. I will be asking him a couple of questions regarding those two meetings. That's the 5th and 27th of May.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will adjourn now.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Kirudja, in your letter which was provided here under tab 11, you said certain things which are not correct. So I would like to challenge that.

You say, "Following the secret meeting --" First of all, there was no secret meeting. The FRY-BiH border, we never met at a border. [In English] border was allegedly closed for all males from RS aged from 18 to 65 without the special permission from RS military Rade Mladic.

JUDGE KWON: Let the witness have the document first. It's tab 11 of this exhibit binder.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Then you say: "His" - meaning my - "relationship with General Mladic by cutting off the rate of desertion from the BSA." ¹⁵⁵⁸¹ Do you know that this very painful measure that we took, namely, the blockade of the border towards Republika Srpska, was taken in 1993, after the Assembly of Republika Srpska refused to accept the Vance-Owen Plan that Karadzic had signed in Athens, however, the Assembly in Pale refused it, in spite the efforts made by myself and the then president of the FRY Cosic and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis. So this was a painful measure of pressure upon the leadership of Republika Srpska to accept the Vance-Owen Plan and it had nothing to do whatsoever with the age group of men from the ages of 18 to 60. It meant a total blockade. After that, even the European Union asked --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you're supposed to be asking questions. It's simpler if it's done one by one. Just a moment. Let the witness deal with it.

The first point is it was a measure to put pressure upon the leadership of Republika Srpska.

THE WITNESS: Sir, the document that is in front of me is dated May 1995. I could mention that I did report on the painful decision Mr. Milosevic referred to, though I didn't characterise it as painful. I did characterise that it resulted into strained relationship with those who opposed that decision, specifically Karadzic and others. I did report separately of the painful decision that you refer to.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, you didn't call it that, but it was painful for us. But is it undeniable that this measure was introduced in 1993, not in 1995? It has nothing to do with 1995. And this is the first time that I hear that ^{15582 BLANK PAGE 15583} Mladic had some problems with desertion. Problems of desertion in the army of Republika Srpska, even if they did exist, were marginal. I had never heard of them. How did you come up with that?

A. As you see, my role was to coordinate all the sources of information from the military observers, from our civil affairs, from the other information reaching us and piece together what they meant. So this -- these reports, these and other reports that have been put there are a reflection of multiple sources that were reaching our force -- our offices.

I draw your attention that it is also carefully worded to say allegedly, because we couldn't verify all pieces of information. The word "alleged" or "reportedly" is peppered around this where we couldn't completely verify the information.

Thirdly, I'd like the record to be understood when these reports were done was for different purposes than they are being used today. They were not intended to be court documents or others. This was supposed to alert, forewarn in the direction so we would restrict them because we couldn't verify everything. So this was restricted information intended for different purposes, not in the strict evidentiary rules that you would want to apply to them now. That was the purpose with which they were being written. Those who were the sources, collective sources of the UN that we put together in our sit room, in our briefings, and putting together and drawing conclusions.

Q. You draw the wrong conclusion, because you should know that even the European Union asked to place a monitoring mission at the border, and ¹⁵⁵⁸⁴ we agreed with that because we had nothing to hide. This mission was headed by Bo Pellnas, a Swedish general. Do you remember that?

A. Yes, Mr. Pellnas and I are well-known and we frequently -- he was one of the people where we would cross-check information reaching us. Yes.

Q. Did Pellnas report to you about anything that had to do with any kind of violations that his mission established as concerns that blockade?

A. He had no reporting role to me. We were just collocated and parallel responsibilities, but knowing each other from our UNPROFOR engagement, we had a very cordial relationship, so I did get the benefit of his advice and insight.

Q. Did he ever tell you, although there was no subordination between the two of you, there was coordination, rather, did he ever tell you that there were problems and that the regimen that we had established was being violated in any way? Did he ever say that to you?

A. Whatever I was able to say with regard to that would be what is on record itself, what I have said and what has been shown on the record. If you're referring to any specific part of what I have said coming from -- information coming from the monitoring mission that was shared between Bo Pellnas's office and mine, whatever I discerned from that, that's what I knew and that's what is on the record.

Q. Well, you could not draw these conclusions then from his formulations. You had to draw these conclusions then from some other information, because we never got any objections from him with regard to that particular regimen. ¹⁵⁵⁸⁵ All right. Can we move on now? I have another question or, rather, I have a few more questions, but let's clarify one thing: You mentioned the freeing of hostages, several hundred members of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know how many efforts we made, political efforts, media efforts, all other kinds of efforts, in order to have these hostages released and to have each and every one of them returned to their families so that no families would be in mourning because of everything that had happened there?

A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. I was well aware of your effort, as conveyed to me very clearly by Mr. Stanisic, and I reported at length of the importance you placed on the safe release of these hostages.

Q. But I have the impression, Mr. Kirudja - I don't know if you will agree with that - that the other side tried to abuse even this enormous effort we made to have these people --

JUDGE MAY: No, Mr. Milosevic. That's not a matter for the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please. They put a question to you: Did Stanisic have forces in Bosnia? And you said that he had forces in Bosnia. Stanisic had no forces in Bosnia. Do you know that or do you not know that?

A. The question to me was some remark he had made and how I interpreted it. It was in the context of Stanisic requesting certain information from UNPROFOR so that he could use it through his contacts in ¹⁵⁵⁸⁶ Bosnia to do just what you said, secure the safe release of those hostages.

The question put to me was was it my understanding that he was taking forces with me in the announced journey that he was going inside Bosnia to do -- to help in that release. My response yesterday was it was my understanding he was going to meet them there already. That's how I characterised it. Not that he had forces, not in the characterisation you made. I made that it was my understanding he was going to meet already on location operatives loyal to him to secure those hostages.

Q. Please. You know full well that these hostages were scattered all around -- all over Republika Srpska.

If you can call that forces, Stanisic had only a few bodyguards of his own, his personal security, and also ways and means of establishing where the hostages were. In some places there were ten of them, in others 15, et cetera, but we did manage to establish that.

JUDGE MAY: We are wasting time here. The witness has answered your question in what -- by explaining and clarifying what he meant. Now, your time is now up, but you can ask two more questions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. I have a few more questions. I'll be very rational with my time.

Is it clear to you that this was not a military or police operation? This was a political move done by political means and under great media pressure to have your hostages released and that actually everything that was done was done in a peaceful way, without any kind of ¹⁵⁵⁸⁷ fighting there or any kind of conflict, and they were all returned.

A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic, I am aware that it ended up peacefully, and I was at Novi Sad when the last group of hostages were released unharmed.

Q. All right. Just a few more questions. Please, is it correct that the Muslim representative Muhad Safric [phoen] said to you that Muslims were leaving the area of the Bihac pocket primarily because of the poor economic situation, explaining to you extensively what he feared, and as you say, carefully trying not to accuse the Serbs? This is page 33.

A. Yes, I am aware of that testimony, Mr. Milosevic. Indeed, that underlined he was very careful not to offend the Serbs in how he characterised the situation. Yes, it is my testimony.

Q. Since you were a representative of the UN, he did not have to be careful not to blame the Serbs in front of you if it was the Serbs who were really to be blamed for their leaving. Is that right or is that not right, Mr. Kirudja?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I would draw a different conclusion for why he was careful. Even if he was in front of us, it was in a territory controlled by the Serbs, and he had to be careful not only for the moment he was in front of us but for the moment later when the meeting would end and be on his own.

Q. All right. Since we haven't got much time, I'm just going to deal with a few questions.

JUDGE MAY: No. You've got one more question. You're way over your time. You can ask one more.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May. ¹⁵⁵⁸⁸

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. At the meeting on the 13th of May, you were there, Neilson, General Bamaiyi. You were cautioned that there was information that the Croatian forces are going to conduct diversionary actions in the territory of the Republic of Krajina. Do you remember that and do you remember the protest that was lodged because of the liquidation of five civilians on the 15th of May at 1500 hours at Jelov Klanac by this same terrorist group consisting of Mile Gasparevic [phoen], Sabla Stijepan [phoen], Gracan Ivan, a certain Mladen, all of them from the village of Sabjetci [phoen], and on that occasion, the following persons were killed: Djordje Trbojevic, Ilija Trbojevic --

JUDGE MAY: We don't need a list read out.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. This was your mandate, Mr. Kirudja, your mandate.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer. Let the witness answer.

THE WITNESS: You mentioned about allegations and certain casualties, and then you ask it was our mandate. I'm not sure what you meant it was our mandate with regard to what you prepositioned that with, the report that there were incidents. What mandate are you referring to?

JUDGE MAY: Well, can you help us at all, without going into that, about this particular incident?

THE WITNESS: I don't understand the question in what capacity he refers to our mandate.

JUDGE MAY: I don't think it matters --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please. ¹⁵⁵⁸⁹

JUDGE MAY: He's making an allegation about the liquidation of five civilians on the 15th of May by some terrorist group. Do you know anything about that?

THE WITNESS: I would have to check my notes more carefully, because this was a repeated allegation from meeting to meeting. This specific meeting there could, but I need to check it carefully.

JUDGE MAY: If you would, please, Mr. Kirudja.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let me just explain this. When I say that this belongs to Mr. Kirudja's mandate, that means that these are crimes that were committed in a territory that was within the zone that was covered by Mr. Kirudja. That is the way in which I use the word "mandate."

A. That was what I was afraid of. I'm not even sure crimes were committed in our territory. You go to a meeting and you receive such-and-such happened, without investigation of where it happened and who caused it. It wouldn't be accurate to say it occurred in the sector where we were -- we had a mandate. It certainly wouldn't have been correct.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you very much.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just put one more question?

JUDGE MAY: No, Mr. Milosevic. We've really gone well over the time.

Now, Mr. Tapuskovic, have you any questions of this witness?

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do have questions, and I'll try to be as efficient as possible. I'll really try to be as efficient as possible. ¹⁵⁵⁹⁰ Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kirudja, I'm just going to ask you about what you wrote down yourself, about what you testified about, nothing but that, of course in order to assist the Trial Chamber so that they could view matters as fully as possible.

I would like to begin, if I can put it that way, from paragraph 2 on page 59 of your statement. It's the second paragraph in the English version.

A. It's the one about the flights?

Q. Yes. You spoke about that, and I would like to remind you of what you stated to the investigators. Perhaps you can confirm this to me or explain what happened. This is what you said: "I surmised that the flights from the FRY to the RS were real and served as a warning by Yugoslav army generals to Milosevic that he could not and should not force the JA down a path with which they disagreed so strongly." And then you added: "Namely, many in the Yugoslav army were opposed to Milosevic's decision to close the border between the FRY and RS and his consideration of a possible recognition of Croatia and Bosnia in order to have sanctions against the FRY lifted. They viewed such steps as abandonment of the Serbs in the RSK and RS."

Is that right? That's what you stated; right?

A. Correct.

Q. Did you then add what you established, namely: "Indeed, three days prior to the aforementioned flights into Srebrenica, 80 generals and colonels of the Yugoslav army publicly warned Milosevic that if he ^{15591 BLANK PAGE 15592} recognised Croatia and BiH, thereby disowning the RSK and the RS, they would disobey the Supreme Defence Council and the JNA commander and join the military forces of the RSK and RS." Is that correct?

A. [Previous translation continues]... my report.

Q. Thank you. I would also like to remind you of the statement that you made on the 26th of the -- of October, where De Mello was present, and you were there too. This is the meeting with Milosevic that you refer to on page 49, paragraph 2, of the English version. You stated there, and this is probably contained in your notes as well: "Milosevic also stated that problems in Croatia and the RSK could only be solved in Zagreb in a three-phase process involving a cease-fire, normalisation of day-to-day life, and political negotiations." Is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. You also added the following: "He also stated --" no, that's a bit further down. It's the last paragraph on that page. "No other approach would be good." That that is what Slobodan Milosevic said.

A. Right.

Q. Finally in relation to this subject, I would like to ask you about Jovica Stanisic. Before this procedure involving the refugee rescue operation, did you ever see Stanisic before that? Did you ever talk to him?

A. No, not until I met him for the purpose of that hostage release.

Q. Did you ever hear of Stanisic in 1992, 1993, 1994 when you were carrying out your official duties on behalf of the United Nations in the area where you were? ¹⁵⁵⁹³

A. We were very far removed from -- in 1992 and 1993, I was in Topusko.

Q. Thank you. On page 14, paragraph 3, of the English version, in that statement of yours you refer to the meeting that you had on the 13th of May, 1992, with Paspalj.

A. Page 14?

Q. Page 14.

A. Yes.

Q. On that 13th of May, did Paspalj say to you, and he continually repeated that: "We don't have an army. The people are our army and cannot withdraw from here." This had to do with the demilitarisation of that zone. Is that what he said to you?

A. Correct.

Q. After that, did you also say to the investigators by way of your own conclusion: "Indeed, almost all men and some women between the ages of 16 and 55, and some who were younger and older than that, had a uniform and a weapon." Is that what you noted yourself, what you noticed yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the situation similar among the Muslims and the Croats? Did you notice that?

A. You have to be more exact on that. Muslims and Croats in the sector where we were or across the border? Where did you want me to make that observation, that similar observation that I made about the Serbs? I understand did I notice it among the Muslims and Croats. Where would I ¹⁵⁵⁹⁴ notice that?

Q. I'm going to ask you later, Mr. Kirudja, about borders, but I wonder about that area. Irrespective of borders, did you notice the same thing that you noticed in the case of the Serbs, that there were armed civilians and people in uniforms, or was that not the case?

A. The reason I sought clarification from you, it is where the Muslims and the Croats would be. For example, I didn't notice that among Croats I met in Zagreb or Karlovac. If you're not specific enough where the Croats you want me to comment are, it wouldn't be helpful. Similarly, I didn't notice that among the Muslims that I met at the early stages in Bihac and Velika Kladusa, for example, but -- so --

Q. Mr. Kirudja, I'm interested in the following: This is what I would like to ask you: You did not witness the events that took place in 1991; is that right? You did not witness what happened all the way up to April 1992.

A. Correct.

Q. Of course you cannot know what happened at that time. However, I would take the liberty of asking you the following: Can you say something about whether, at those points in time, there were some signs that there were conflicts akin to a civil war at the time?

A. Of course, plenty of them. When you arrive in that sector, there were burnt houses, unoccupied, mines, scenes of war, smoking tanks. The evidence of conflict was unmistakable.

Q. Thank you. You arrived in 1992, in the month of April; is that right? ¹⁵⁵⁹⁵

A. Right.

Q. Do you know that Croatia, BiH, and Slovenia became members of the United Nations on the 22nd of May, 1992, at the plenary session of the General Assembly of the UN after you arrived? You came in April, and they were internationally recognised on the 22nd of May, 1992; is that right?

A. I wouldn't doubt that date if you -- I myself didn't know the exact date, but fact that their flag was flying at the UN was unmistakable.

Q. Can we agree, Mr. Kirudja, since until the 22nd of May there was not full international recognition of the newly created states, that at the moment when you arrived in the area, there were no internationally specified borders there?

A. Again your question carries a legal implication, "internationally recognised." I wouldn't be able to speak to that legal concept of internationally recognised. What I can say was that there were borders which were clearly observed and known, and that is the borders that corresponded to the republics that were constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia. That is like, in my sector, the border I traced on the southern side of the sector separating the sector from Bihac pocket. That was clear.

Q. Mr. Kirudja, Mr. Kirudja, I wouldn't ask you this if on page 36, in paragraph 1, the last sentence -- could you please find that, actually.

A. Page 36.

Q. Page 36, paragraph 1. The last sentence. ¹⁵⁵⁹⁶

A. Last sentence? Yes.

Q. Yes. You said there: "It was thus nothing more than a nominal international border." What did you mean by that when you said that?

A. Thank you for that clarification. A point I sought, again to explain my headquarters, that this -- although this was an internationally recognised border, and I meant the border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Western Bosnia, Bihac pocket, and Sector North, that border, we, for operational purposes, divided it into two parts. The part where the population on the Bosnian side was predominantly Muslim, that is running right through Bihac, Velika Kladusa, and close to Bosanska Krupa or somewhere -- rather, Bosanska -- a little east of Velika Kladusa. That was truly a border where people were controlled. They couldn't freely cross from one side or the other. The Serb -- they would meet the Serbs if they're coming from Bosnia, and the Serbs will meet Muslims if they're coming from this sector.

Beyond that, in the border separating the opstinas of Dvor and Kostajnica, that's the part I characterised as nominal border, meaning it was controlled on both sides by the Serb authorities and ordinary citizens who were Serbs freely crossed that border without reference to humanitarian crisis, people being arrested, all that. That's the meaning of that.

Q. Thank you. Could you, Mr. Kirudja, tell me this, please: The situation surrounding the borders, you know that at that time there weren't any borders of that kind for almost 80 years, and now suddenly these borders were being introduced. So the introduction of these borders ¹⁵⁵⁹⁷ at that particular point in time, was it of any significance with respect to the moving around of the population and that the establishment of those borders had perhaps triggered off the exodus of the population in certain directions?

A. Sir, I just finished explaining the significance to us operationally. It was where ordinary people met resistance or hazard crossing the border depending on their ethnicity, and the borders I described just a few minutes ago, put strain on both Serbs and Croats if they wanted to cross that border within the limits I described. There were no such limits, there were no such stress, there was no such harassment if they were Serbs crossing in the other part of the border.

Q. Thank you. Yes. Could you now focus on what you said on page 30 of your statement, the last paragraph on page 30, in fact. In the middle of the paragraph, you state the following: "At the same time, the Serbs who wished to flee from the area of Cazin or -- known as the Bihac pocket, which was under the Muslim control, the border between the UNPA zone and Bosnia was considered to be theoretical."

What I want to ask you is this: The Serbs, did they flee from the Bihac pocket? Did they leave the Bihac pocket?

A. I believe I responded to that question yesterday or maybe today, this morning. I forget when. There were Serbs who had relocated from across the border into Sector North. Once again, I also mentioned if they had done so, it was with the full assistance or cooperation of the Serb authorities in the sector where they did not raise a request for assistance or protection by UNHCR, because once they arrived into the ¹⁵⁵⁹⁸ sector, they would be settled in one of the empty houses that were in the sector.

So we wouldn't receive a lot of focus on those who were Serbs and were in this sector. And I explained this, I believe, in an attempt to say that we were not ignoring them. It is because they were not being raised, the issue was not being raised.

Q. Thank you, yes. A moment ago, you spoke about nominal borders. Were there conflicts -- whether there were conflicts in the various areas, you've already talked about that. Now, what I'm interested in is this: Did the conflicts break out in the locations which did not follow the nominal borders?

A. There were conflicts, and I have -- I have described them where the Serbs were facing the 5th Corps of Bihac pocket. There were conflicts, yes.

Q. Thank you. Everything I've asked you so far I asked you because I wish to quote something that you yourself said from your notes and which is to be found on page 34 of your statement, paragraph 3. And in that paragraph, you speak of the following: There was a meeting at which the representatives of Serbs and Muslims and all the other communities living in the area took part, and the Muslim representative then added: "We fear reprisals each time Serbs are killed at the confrontation line. So far, the Serbian authorities have managed to prevent such reprisals. Today's movement should not be considered ethnic cleansing, it should be considered in the context of a life-threatening situation." That's what the Muslim representative said. ¹⁵⁵⁹⁹

A. You are correct, and that's what I reflected. I reflected that's what his representation was.

Q. And did you also record the statement by another Muslim representative on page 35, paragraph 4, of your statement, and that particular Muslim representative from Bosanska Krupa said that he was disappointed with UNHCR's position. He claimed that applications for resettlement by many of those now wishing to leave had been submitted to UNHCR over a month ago. However, they had still not received a response from UNHCR. He stressed that 80 per cent of those wanting to leave had guarantees of accommodation and jobs elsewhere. He mentioned economic reasons, therefore. He said that winter was coming and people feared a worsening of conditions. That's what he said too.

A. Yes.

Q. And then on the very next page, that is to say page 36 -- no, 37, paragraph 2, you speak about the time when the -- there was an incursion for ten or 15 kilometres into the Serbian Krajina region to protect the Serb population there; right?

A. What page is this?

Q. It is page 36, second paragraph. Page 36, paragraph 2.

A. Go ahead, please.

Q. You took note of this, and then after the negotiations: "Following negotiations conducted by the sector commander on both sides of the border, the Krajina TDF withdrew from this area and several hundred families arrived in the sector as refugees. They seem to have been resettled mostly in the Banija region of the sector." ^{15600 BLANK PAGE 15601} Now, how many people this was and how -- how many people, actually, how many families?

A. That's a good example of what I said earlier, that the Serbs would come with the assistance of the local people without a lot of fanfare and they would be settled and I wouldn't even know the numbers because they did not involve us. You're illustrating the point I made earlier.

Q. I agree, yes. That's precisely why I'm asking you. So these several hundred families - I don't know how many people that actually was, because every family has a different number of family members - where did they go and what ethnic group did they belong to?

A. I'm answering you by saying because of known involvement by the local authorities of us, we didn't have the details you seek.

Q. But you confirm here that several hundred families left, dislocated. So how many families? How many people, if you can tell us. If you can't, I don't mind.

JUDGE MAY: The witness has said he doesn't know.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. And then in continuation, you say: "Then, on the 24th of August, 1992, a military formation involving some 600 Muslims and Croats infiltrated the UNPA at Kamenica." What did that lead to?

A. This was one of those very troubling flashpoints where there was an attempt to cross over in the area of Plaski, by Muslims to the Croatian-controlled side of the sector. That paragraph continues to explain that the infiltration provoked serious political and military reactions among local authorities within the UNPA. It's a fairly ¹⁵⁶⁰² destabilising incident.

Q. Mr. Kirudja, the 21st of September incident that you discuss on page 37 of your statement, paragraph 3, could we hear your comments? It was a conflict between Muslim and Serb elements erupted in the Bosnian villages of Poljana and Glinica, and then you state that tension grew and that it looked as if the Serbs were peacefully evacuated from the area and resettled in Prijedor. Do you know how many people those were?

A. That's the third paragraph?

Q. As tensions mounted. Yes.

A. This is the incident I have elsewhere referred to as the Bosanska Bojna pocket. The same applies when Serbs moved their own people. They did so with their own means, and then we would only hear subsequently that so many people moved. We were not ourselves being asked to get involved. On the contrary, if the Croats were complaining about Croats in the sector, it is us who went to look for them because the Croatian authorities were not in a position to do so. And if there were Muslims in the sector, the same thing would apply.

So you will see more details when other ethnic groups are involved and we are actively involved as opposed to when there are displaced Serbs and the Serbs were taking them to safety from one area to the other. It's a material distinction I come back to for -- to explain the absence of too many details about that.

Q. Mr. Kirudja, I have to hurry up, so may I ask for shorter answers, please. I know that you need quite a lot of time sometimes, but could we have shorter answers now, please, to my next questions. ¹⁵⁶⁰³ A moment ago, you spoke about the movement of 10.000 Serbs after the meeting and talks with Ramljak.

A. That, I believe --

Q. You've already spoken about that.

A. Yes.

Q. What I want to ask you is this: You, of course, tried to prevent the movement of the Muslim population, prevented people from leaving their homes, but in cases where there was this movement on the part of other ethnic groups, did you also hold joint meetings to prevent that from happening?

A. Sir, precisely. I have said over and over again on that issue, it is reported to us that the Serbs were moved. We were not being asked to assist moving the Serbs. It's materially different from the other case you referred to where we are being asked to do so. In the case of Muslims.

Q. And just two more points that I wish to clarify, and both of them are contained on page 39, paragraph 4, of the English version of your statement, where you speak about an operation near Glina, and you say that at the end of that particular operation, five of the most wanted violent criminals were arrested and taken to a prison in Knin. "The local militia also verbally informed me that one person had been arrested in connection with the brutal murder of three Croats several months before. A written protest had been sent to the local authorities about the murders and the matter was raised periodically with the authorities." Is that correct? Was that how it happened? ¹⁵⁶⁰⁴

A. Yes.

Q. But in 1993, you learnt, as you say a little lower down, about the terrible abuse perpetrated by the Croats in the Medak pocket. Did you write to the Croatian local authorities along those lines too? Did you write similar letters, asking them to find the perpetrators, the perpetrators of the crimes that you had -- your attention had been brought to?

A. I believe so, but the reason you don't see that Medak pocket in this story is because it was in Sector South, and all the communications and the UN action regarding Sector South were dealt with by somebody else. And to answer your question directly, the Medak operation did become a major concern by the Security Council on the action taken by the Croatians, but it won't appear in my testimony because it was in Sector South.

Q. Mr. Kirudja, just one more point: With respect to evidence in tab 7, exhibits in tab 7, you spoke at length about that, and you used the term "concentration camp," and you compared that to what was going on -- what -- the events that took place in World War II; isn't that right?

A. I believe in a certain exchange when I was talking about my exchange with Nambiar, General Nambiar, about it, I did make reference to it, or some other context, yes, where he differed with the use of the word "concentration camp."

Q. You also mentioned this somewhere in your statement, but I don't have time to go back to that, but you used these terms about testifying to the locations here. You said, "we think," "we feel," "we are doing," "it ¹⁵⁶⁰⁵ seems," "allegedly," and so on, terms of that kind. Now, from your mission, your mandate, you didn't make any direct checks on site, on-site investigation and checking.

A. That's a generalisation that obviously my testimony would be contrary to. There are references in many places where we are definitive in what we say.

Q. And my last question: Did you ever deal in establishing such locations or, rather, people in a closed area? Did you go and see whether this was being done elsewhere, where Croats were being kept in prison or Serbs detained in places of that kind? Did you receive reports that things of that kind were going on elsewhere, and if so, did you go and investigate, check those reports out?

A. Again your question is broadly worded, and yes, there were incidents, depending on what incident you are talking about, where I myself was directly involved. I had been in prison in Glina, looking at people being held there. I was at the site of crimes when -- rather, in the site of where something happened. I was there. So your generalisation I don't understand. We were present in the sector.

Q. All I'm interested in is this: Something that was established - concentration camps - on the basis of the reports of others, did you ever ascertain that there were similar camps where Croats and Muslims were being detained?

A. You're asking this in the context of the list of the concentration camps I mentioned, and in that category, we just reported the information we were collecting from the people running away from that place. ¹⁵⁶⁰⁶

Q. In other words, in none of these cases did you go on site anywhere in any case, whether it was a case of Muslims, Croats, or Serbs, to establish whether those places and locations where these people were kept, were being detained, had the features of concentration camps. Did you ever go to check it out and see whether the characteristics of these places were conducive to the term "concentration camp," that they could be characterised as being concentration camps, or did you just rely on the stories that were told and descriptions given?

A. Your question is very broad. I'll answer it specifically only. In terms of those areas we were talking about, we didn't say we went there. We said there was a stream of people, well into hundreds, that were coming from there, and they sought safety first and then anonymity in what they were telling us, and we recorded the events they were describing. That's the extent I will go with your question.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Kirudja.

MR. GROOME: I'd ask that Mr. Kirudja be shown three -- Prosecution Exhibit 336, the map book, open to page 30 and 31. I'd ask that be placed on the overhead projector.

Re-examined by Mr. Groome:

Q. While that's being down, Mr. Kirudja, there has been some discussion about Maslenica and where it is located. I'd ask you to look at what's being placed on the overhead. I've taken the liberty of placing a green tag there next to a village. Can you see the village there?

A. Yes.

Q. I'd ask you to take the pointer. Is that the village of ¹⁵⁶⁰⁷ Maslenica --

A. Yes.

Q. -- that you were referring to in your testimony?

A. Yes.

Q. And this would be in the area of Split?

A. Yes. Just south of Split.

Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, Mr. Milosevic put to you a number of Security Council reports and resolutions --

JUDGE MAY: What is it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I saw the map of Split here. That's in Central Dalmatia. That's not Maslenica at all. This is the island of Solta. It's got nothing to do with this. This is Split, Trogir, Central Dalmatia.

JUDGE MAY: Where should we be looking for the village that you have in mind?

THE WITNESS: The bridge. The bridge.

JUDGE MAY: Maslenica.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] They would have to go up north, if they want to look at the map. What's Split got to do with it? Just take a look at the map yourselves and you'll see for yourselves.

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... atlas with that name. Obviously, it's a matter we'll have to check out.

MR. GROOME: And not being well versed with the geography of Croatia, I looked in the map index, and I invite everybody to look in --

JUDGE MAY: It appears -- ¹⁵⁶⁰⁸

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know.

JUDGE MAY: -- in the evidence too that it's dealing with somewhere else. No doubt we can get someone who knows about Croatia to deal with it.

Mr. Kirudja, don't bother to look any more. We'll get somebody who knows the geography of the area to deal with Maslenica.

MR. GROOME:

Q. One of the Resolutions that Mr. Milosevic put to you, or one of the reports, was dated the 28th of September, 1992. We now have copies of that report here in the Chamber.

MR. GROOME: I note for the Chamber that we are in the process of locating the other reports and we should have them either later today or tomorrow morning.

Q. I would ask that you take a look at this report that Mr. Milosevic asked you about, and he was referring you to the first chapter, the violations of the cease-fire. I would direct your attention to paragraph 4 of that report. It's on the second page.

JUDGE MAY: We will exhibit this formally tomorrow, but let us have a look at it.

MR. GROOME:

Q. I'd ask you to briefly review paragraph 4 on the second page and ask you whether that is a report of what you've referred to as the loophole, where special police essentially became a militia.

A. Yes, indeed. This paragraph does succinctly capture the point we were making in the testimony. ^{15609 BLANK PAGE 15610}

Q. And was it reported to the Security Council that the estimate of the size of this force was now 16.000 armed men?

A. Yes, in all the sectors combined.

Q. And I would draw your attention now to paragraph 6 of this report, and I would ask you to simply read the first two sentences of that report.

A. Paragraph 6?

Q. Yes, on the next page.

A. "UNPROFOR has increased its efforts to protect the known Serb populations from ethnic cleansing by the paramilitary units. As described in paragraphs 10 to 18 below, they engage in acts of terrorism against minorities, especially in Sector East and to a lesser extent in Sector South, and appear to enjoy complete impunity."

Q. Thank you. Now, in the course of Mr. Milosevic's cross-examination of you, he put to you a number of statements allegedly made by General Nambiar. At the time you made your observations about what was going on in Northern Bosnia, did General Nambiar have any UNPROFOR troops in those municipalities?

A. Northern Bosnia?

Q. Yes. At the time you made your observations regarding the Northern Bosnian municipalities, was there an UNPROFOR presence in those Bosnian municipalities?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Now, the next question, if you can answer it yes or no should suffice: Mr. Milosevic suggested, or in a quote of General Nambiar, said the following: "Any genocide and killings or massacres on ¹⁵⁶¹¹ all sides that are typical of such conflict conditions." Yes or no if you can answer this question: Do you agree with that statement that killings and massacres were an inevitable result of the conflict conditions as you observed them?

A. It's too difficult a question for me to answer yes or no.

Q. Please give us your answer.

A. Many -- one of the reasons I say it was difficult was the -- there was a lot of reasons why both -- all sides exaggerated what they were telling us. So there was immediate difficulty at all times of verifying claims and counterclaims of existence of massacres, particularly those which were allegedly taking place before we arrived, and we were confronted with that reality time and time again and not being able to ascertain to ourselves where the facts lay in terms of who committed what massacres prior to our arrival.

But during the present, when we were there in terms of the sectors themselves and within the sectors, if anyone alleged there was atrocities committed in a minority group, as Croats would allege that Croats in the sector were being subjected to that kind of pressure or misuse, we would ascertain for ourselves. We had the resources and the means to check. But not in Bosnia, on the other hand, where we were not deployed. But we were receiving, so to speak, the effect of the actions claimed to be happening, and that is a stream of human beings seeking refuge where we are and saying why they were leaving or trying to escape from their homes.

Q. My final question to you is the following: Mr. Milosevic suggested to you that the situation in Bosnia deteriorated significantly ¹⁵⁶¹² upon the international community's recognition of Bosnia. You've testified here that the mass movement of Muslims into Sector North began, and you received this information from your discussions with Serb mayors, that this mass exodus began when these Muslims refused to offer allegiance to the newly created Serb republic of BiH; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, my question to you is: On the 27th of May of 1992, did you ask Mayor Pasic when was this new Serb Republic of BiH created?

A. I specifically asked him when was the BS Republic created as it was the first time that I ever heard of the name, and yes, he proceeded to give me an answer.

Q. And what was his answer?

A. The answer was he wasn't sure when it began but -- let me quote it directly. This was in a meeting on the 27th of May. I'm sorry I am taking a little longer to ply through my notes. I know it's written somewhere. But to the effect that it was -- I'm sorry. I'm taking --

Q. Do you have a recollection of what he said in substance?

A. Yes. It was before -- before the recognition of Bosnia. I'm missing that part, whether it was recognition of Bosnia or prior to our arrival in the area.

Q. Okay.

A. I'm very tired and now I miss giving all the details.

Q. But do you have a clear memory that when you asked Mr. Pasic when was the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina formed, he said it was formed ¹⁵⁶¹³ before the recognition -- the international recognition of Bosnia?

A. That's what I'm doubting. That's what I'm trying to recall, whether it was before our arrival or before the recognition of Bosnia. I know there was language to that effect that I noted down, and for some reason I am unable to locate it in my notes right now. But it was prior to the recognition of Bosnia, if I was to guess.

Q. Are you clear in your memory of that, that he said it was before the international recognition of Bosnia?

A. Subject to confirmation that I can't give you now.

MR. GROOME: I have no further questions, Your Honour.

THE WITNESS: Yes, I found it, I'm sorry, just before you sat.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Please, could you read from your diary.

A. It says, Can't say -- and I quote, when I asked him: "Can't say when the government was formed but was before the international recognition of BH."

Q. So if we accept Mr. Pasic's assertion that you recorded there, then the events precipitating this mass exodus of Muslims from Northern Bosnia into Sector North occurred or began prior to the international recognition of Bosnia; is that correct?

A. That would be a valid inference to make out of that.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Kirudja.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you've asked plenty of questions, and the time has come to allow this witness to go.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do have an objection to make to ¹⁵⁶¹⁴ you, Mr. May, and the question raised by the Prosecutor or, rather, the alleged Prosecutor.

Questions of this type, when I ask them, you qualified them as being legal ones, legal matters, and you said that the witness wasn't competent enough to answer legal questions, and you can't look at legal questions without looking at the facts. So you put the facts down on one side and the legal questions on the other, parallel. And I wish to remind you that I asked the witness yesterday about the aggression on the part of the Croatian forces from the territory of the Republic of Croatia onto the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the region of the Bosanski Brod municipality on the 26th of March, 1992, when the massacre was performed of the whole village of Srpski Sijekovac, which was when the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out. Up until that time, it was peaceful in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So legal issues of this type --

JUDGE MAY: What is all this? He wasn't being asked to make any kind of legal finding there. Now, we really must allow this witness to go. No. We're not going to go on arguing about this. Mr. Kirudja, thank you for coming to the International Tribunal. You are now free to go.

[The witness withdrew]

MR. NICE: Your Honour --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have his diaries back. Unless you want them for any reason, he should have them back.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the next witness is Dr. Bosanac. I'm very anxious that she may be concluded today. She's a paediatrician, and I ¹⁵⁶¹⁵ think still the director of a hospital. She was here for, I think, five or more days, waiting to give evidence when the accused was last unwell. Her evidence is in -- in chief, her evidence is substantially given by former testimony in another trial, which the Chamber has admitted. I'm in the Chamber's hands as to precisely how we should deal with that. My proposal would be that we can, simply by headline and in order to give context to her evidence overall, identify in the summary provided the paragraphs that are dealt with in prior testimony, if that would be acceptable to you.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, I'm afraid that I doubt we're going to finish her evidence today, given the time now. We have to be out at quarter to because there is another case coming in, quarter to two. We can't sit any longer than that.

The sensible course may be to give the transcript an exhibit number. We have had the opportunity of reading it, so it can be taken very shortly, but I have to say the evidence took an hour and a half, at least, in the previous hearing, because there was a break towards the end of it, and therefore, I would anticipate that cross-examination will have to be of about the same length. So I'm afraid we're not going to finish her evidence today however desirable it would be. But in terms of the evidence in chief, you can take it that we've read it and you can take it quickly.

MR. NICE: Yes. I imagine the witness is being called for at the moment, so I'm not wasting time in explaining what we're doing. Also, it's hoped that the remainder of the evidence relating to ¹⁵⁶¹⁶ Vukovar, of which this witness speaks, or much of it, may be produced by provisions of 92 bis, and accordingly, although I know Your Honour has, I think, probably considerable knowledge of the overall circumstances of Vukovar, I'm going to produce through this witness some maps and a video which will give context or better context for the other evidence that will or may come in writing.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I believe that all of this and everything I got before is absolutely impossible for a cross-examination that would take place only an hour and a half. I will remind you that last time I said that, you said that you would bear it in mind if the cross-examination has to pertain to the transcript --

JUDGE MAY: No, no. We haven't ruled on the time. I was merely dealing with it in context of finishing the evidence today, and I said an hour and a half in terms of the transcript. Now, it may be that there will be further evidence and further time will be allowed to you.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness take the declaration, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

WITNESS: VESNA BOSANAC

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Nice: ¹⁵⁶¹⁷

Q. Is your full name Vesna Bosanac?

A. Yes.

Q. A Croat by nationality, born in 1949 in Subotica in Serbia, you qualify as a doctor specialising in paediatrics and becoming the director of the Vukovar General Hospital on the 25th of July of 1991?

A. Yes.

Q. Just to ensure that those viewing elsewhere fully understand how the evidence is being given, you gave evidence in a former trial, in an earlier trial at this Tribunal, and the transcript of that evidence has been allowed to be, in part, your evidence-in-chief. And may it now be convenient to give it an exhibit number, remembering perhaps to reserve one exhibit number from the document to be produced for the previous witness and to be produced overnight, if I understood the Chamber correctly.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, I'm not sure I've got that. Which is the document outstanding?

MR. NICE: I thought you said in relation to one of the documents --

JUDGE MAY: No. They're Defence exhibits.

MR. NICE: They're Defence exhibits, very well. My mistake.

THE REGISTRAR: The transcript, Your Honour, will be marked Prosecutor's Exhibit 379.

MR. NICE:

Q. And I'm going to summarise, really, by headlines, Doctor, matters that have been covered in the evidence you gave to the Tribunal on an ^{15618 BLANK PAGE 15619} earlier occasion.

You dealt with the ethnic composition of Vukovar; 43 per cent Croats, 37 per cent Serbs, 19 other minorities.

Paragraph 3. During the war with which we are concerned, how many people, roughly, remained in Vukovar?

A. In Vukovar, in total blockade after the 15th of August, there were about 15.000 people.

Q. The area under Croat control was approximately what size?

A. It was the centre of town, Borovo Naselje, and that is approximately 10 kilometres by 3 kilometres, along the right bank of the Danube River.

Q. Were those 15.000, approximately, people of various ethnicities, and so far as you're concerned, did the two major ethnic groups, the Croats and the Serbs, suffer equally in the attack upon Vukovar?

A. Yes. They certainly suffered equally. Actually, both Serbs and Croats remained, along with many other ethnic groups.

Q. And indeed was Vukovar encircled so that it was impossible for goods or people to get in or out?

A. Yes.

MR. NICE: The Chamber will know, of course, that Vukovar can be seen on page 23 of its atlas, an area it would have been looking at regularly. For possible use by way of detail, we're going to add three exhibits to the map file. First, Exhibit 326, tab 15. If we can hand that in. Lay it on the overhead projector. It's an aerial photograph so it's a bit odd, but it's designed to give the geographical position in a ¹⁵⁶²⁰ little more detail.

This shows the Danube, and we can see Vukovar Hospital on, of course, the west bank but north of the town centre. We can see the JNA barracks marked further to the south.

So may that become 326, tab 15, with the following map 326, tab 16.

This gives a more detailed view of the oblong shape of the Vukovar Hospital, located where we saw in the previous map. We'll come back to details of the hospital in photographs later.

Thank you very much. Exhibit 326, tab 17. This shows the area of the Vukovar Hospital ringed, the river to the north and east, and a route which becomes significant later leading out to the south-west from the hospital.

Q. Are those maps, Doctor, so far as you can understand, all accurate?

A. Yes.

Q. In your previous testimony, paragraphs 4 and subsequent, did you deal with how Vukovar Hospital was first shelled on the 15th of August of 1991 with artillery shells coming from Borovo Selo? Did you deal with how, on the 24th of August, a JNA car hit a land-mine so that soldiers were injured who were brought to your hospital for treatment, two of them being, I think, in such condition that they couldn't really be moved but subsequently they were taken away by soldiers at the insistence of the JNA? Is that correct? Just yes or no.

A. Yes. ¹⁵⁶²¹

Q. The day after those soldiers were taken away, paragraph 6, did the JNA bomb the hospital for the first time, despite its being marked with a large red cross on the roof and another one in linen on the cross in the courtyard?

A. Yes.

Q. You could tell that the shelling came from positions held by the JNA on the other side of the Danube, and also from Negoslavci and Borovo Selo, the JNA planes flying over the hospital almost daily from the 14th of September to the 17th of November?

A. Yes.

Q. Included in the bombs was the one that exploded at the second floor and one that crashed right through several floors but didn't actually explode, these being substantial bombs weighing 400 to 450 kilogrammes each?

A. Yes.

Q. Obviously a terrible situation in Vukovar. Cluster bombs and bombs with phosphorous were used and your hospital was receiving up to 90 wounded persons a day?

A. Yes.

Q. The hospital was undefended. There were wounded soldiers there but no fighting men, and weapons were removed from people when they came into the hospital; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. By November 1991, Croatian soldiers brought three wounded JNA soldiers to the hospital. You spoke to General Raseta on the telephone, ¹⁵⁶²² asking him to stop shelling the hospital, and one of those soldiers got on the phone with the general to tell him that the hospital was being shelled. Raseta said that he'd try to do something about it but nothing happened.

A. Yes.

Q. You couldn't get supplies of medicines because of the forces surrounding the city. There were inevitable food shortages. Doctor, did you protest to the outside world about what was happening at Vukovar?

A. Yes, every day. I sent appeals and protests, asking for deblockade, for help, for having the shelling of the hospital stop.

Q. Did you make those protests to the JNA, as we've already heard, and to an aide of the JNA Chief of Staff?

A. Yes.

Q. As well as to General Raseta, the JNA commander in Zagreb?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you able still to make telephone and fax communication with the outside world?

A. Well, until the 15th of November, I could send faxes. I could make telephones all the way up to the very end, until I was taken prisoner on the 20th.

Q. Included -- included in the range of people to whom you made communication, was there Lord Carrington, Mr. Genscher, and Mr. van den Broek?

A. I sent my appeals and requests for help to the European Monitoring ¹⁵⁶²³ Mission in Zagreb, and I asked the politicians who had the -- who had major influence over war and peace in Yugoslavia then, to receive copies of those faxes. I asked the mission to forward the faxes to them.

Q. There's a book been now published, copies available for the Chamber and translation provided of all those letters that haven't already been translated or written in English.

There's a book, isn't there, Doctor, containing the appeals that you sent out during that time?

A. Yes.

Q. And this is to become -- I'm sorry. I have the wrong document.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecutor's Exhibit 380.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much. Your Honour, I don't know if you have -- could we just lay the actual hard copy of the book, if we've got one?

JUDGE MAY: I just see the time. Are you going to be many minutes with this?

MR. NICE: I'm not going to be very many minutes with it, no.

JUDGE MAY: It may be a convenient time.

MR. NICE: Indeed, it may be convenient, if the Court will indulge me in the interests of saving time, if the court, over the short break, would find an opportunity to glance at the book just for its general format and I can take you to a couple of pages after the break.

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. Dr. Bosanac, we're going to adjourn for 20 minutes. Could you please remember in this and any other adjournments not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over, ¹⁵⁶²⁴ and that does include the members of the Prosecution team. We will adjourn.

--- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.43 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. The registrar has to correct some numbers.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, with regards to the maps Exhibit 326, tab 15 which is a map depicting the Vukovar area with marked sites of Vukovar Hospital and JNA barracks should be tab 16. The tab previously marked tab 16 should be tab 17, and previously marked tab 17 should be tab 18. Thank you.

MR. NICE: Grateful. My error in naming them in the first place.

Q. Doctor, we return to the communications you had with the outside world. The Court now has the exhibit numbered --

JUDGE MAY: I think we have a number 380, have we not?

MR. NICE: 380. If the Chamber has had an opportunity to look at it over the break, you will see it is a composition.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: I hold up the original. We have a couple of copies available. If you want to see the originals...

JUDGE MAY: It would be helpful to have the originals.

MR. NICE: Hand that in. The reason we're producing it not as originals is (a) there are a limited number of the originals, and (b), not every page was translated into one of the languages of the Tribunal. So maybe that can be part of the exhibit, although note that it's not absolutely complete. ¹⁵⁶²⁵

JUDGE MAY: The registry can have this one in a moment.

MR. NICE:

Q. Doctor, we can see from this book that's produced that you were writing letters of complaint and concern and requests for help, or they were being written on your behalf, from October -- 20th of October certainly, right the way through to the end, I think, November of 1991.

MR. NICE: I flagged one entry for showing on the overhead projector, please. If you could do that. First of all show the original Croatian version on the overhead projector so we can see what we're looking at. And the Chamber will note -- it's about half, two-thirds of the way through, and it's ERN number is 72539 at the top. What we can see is that on this letter there is some handwriting and apparent signatures before we reach the foot of the page. If you could hand that copy, please, to the doctor and then put on the overhead projector the following page in English. We can see that.

Q. And this, dated the 7th of November, to the European mission in Zagreb, sets out the position in the hospital. Tanks shells from the garrison. Third paragraph, endangering of newborn babies, and so on. Fourth paragraph: "I asked for urgent cease-fire and the withdrawal of JNA from the region of the municipality of Vukovar and outside of heavy artillery range."

"For the verification of truthfulness for Mr. Raseta and all others that are responsible for this massacre on the hospital, I ask the wounded JNA soldiers to confirm with their signatures." And the writing we saw on the other page was indeed the writing of a JNA soldier from Nis, ¹⁵⁶²⁶ Mikovic Srdjan, and a JNA soldier from Belgrade, Jovan Sasa, and a JNA reserve from Sombor, Teofanic Pavle. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they sign this letter because of the position in which you and they found themselves?

A. Yes.

Q. Very well. Let's move just to have a look at how the -- how the hospital appears at least nowadays.

MR. NICE: Photographs of the hospital the next exhibit, please. And -- this needs a new exhibit number, doesn't it?

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecutor's Exhibit 381.

MR. NICE:

Q. There are three photographs. I think if you just look at the first one first on the overhead projector. Does this show the hospital - we've already seen its oblong shape - as reconstructed after the war?

A. Yes.

Q. On the left-hand side, a little difficult to see on this photograph, is there a driveway, an in and out for the hospital?

A. Yes.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... later. Just look at the next photograph, please, which shows that same driveway from one position and then the last photograph shows it from another. So that shows the view from the back and we can now see the driveway on the right. And then the third photograph. That actually shows the driveway itself, looking out. As I say, we will see the significance of that later. ^{15627 BLANK PAGE 15628}

MR. NICE: Would the video booth now be good enough, please, to play us the video of the hospital. This also needs a new exhibit number, I think. And there's no transcript but perhaps the witness can tell us the odd thing about it as we go through it, and I'll ask her some questions to stimulate that narrative.

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE:

Q. Tell us, Doctor, what we're looking at as we're seeing it, please.

A. We are actually looking at the evacuation of wounded persons in an ambulance. This is the entrance into the hospital. This is the corridor underneath the anti-atomic shelter on the right-hand side, and the door that leads to the anti-atomic shelter can be seen. This is the anti-atomic shelter where the most serious patients were after surgery.

We see here the corridor again, the one in front of the shelter where the wounded persons were.

This is what the building of the hospital looked like in 1991 before it was reconstructed.

Q. Can you give a precise date for the taking of this video or not? It doesn't matter if you can't.

A. It can be seen here when this bomb exploded on the second floor where surgery is. So it was after the 5th of October, but I cannot give you the exact date.

This is the interior of the hospital building on that particular ¹⁵⁶²⁹ floor, after the bomb fell.

This is the hall in the basement, which is also big. Here the crater can be seen, the one that went through all five floors of the hospital. This is the big bomb that weighed 450 -- 450 kilogrammes, but it did not explode. It fell on a bed in which a patient was lying.

Some of the doctors can be seen here at one of our staff meetings. This is the interior of the hospital. The date can be seen here, that is, the 17th of October -- or, rather, the 5th of October. The 5th of October. That is the exact date when that bomb fell. It can be seen here exactly how it fell and how it broke that bed. The hole can be seen in the ceiling now, that it fell through.

Q. We see a British journalist. And we -- what do we see here then with the British journalist now around?

A. These are some nurses and staff members who are getting the patients ready for evacuation. At that time, I was no longer at the hospital, but I saw these video clips.

We see here how some patients and some civilians are setting out, how the evacuation is starting. Most of them are women, actually. Women and children.

Q. As you say, this was after, as we're going to discover, you had been taken away and imprisoned.

A. This happened on the 20th, Wednesday, in the morning, when I was taken from hospital.

Q. From the presence of the man in the white suit, Martin Bell, we ¹⁵⁶³⁰ can see that journalists were being allowed some view of what was going on by this stage.

JUDGE MAY: 20th of November.

MR. NICE: 20th of November, Your Honour, yes.

Q. And here? Can you help us with this?

A. These are corpses of the persons who were killed over the past days, that is, those who were not buried yet in that period. But they were killed during the occupation. I can see that because of this child. This is the red cross that was in the hospital yard.

Q. Thank you very much.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, returning to the summary, returning indeed to the former testimony and putting matters in a little more context.

Q. Doctor, on the 17th of November, did the JNA hospital shelling the hospital, as you said in your previous testimony, and in November were there some 250 wounded persons and more than a hundred old and sick people in the hospital at that time, along with mothers and their newly born babies and so on?

A. Yes.

Q. You arranged an evacuation and, by telephone with the Croatian Ministry of Health's Dr. Hebrang, did you arrange for an evacuation to start on the 18th of November, you being informed that terms of evacuation had been agreed?

MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, that agreement is the only annex to the testimony in the prior hearing and can be found at the last page of Exhibit 379, or the last page but one. And again, as it's part of the ¹⁵⁶³¹ prior testimony, I don't need to go into it in detail.

Q. Doctor, a specific route and specific terms were agreed for the evacuation. That's correct, isn't it?

A. That agreement was signed in Zagreb at the European Monitoring Mission. The --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the name of the person who did not sign the agreement.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the side of the Yugoslav army, it was Andrea Raseta, General Andrija Raseta, and on behalf of the Croatian government, it was Minister Andrija Hebrang. The hospital should have become neutral on the basis of that agreement on the 18th of November in the morning at 8.00 a.m., but three teams were supposed to come, of the International Red Cross.

MR. NICE:

Q. And their position and again, because it's in your previous testimony we can deal with it briefly: The teams didn't come, you contacted General Raseta again, he advised you to talk to a Colonel Mrksic. You were told that the ICRC representatives and the JNA were at a bridge close to the hospital. You went to that bridge to try and lead the relevant people to the hospital, but when you got to the bridge you saw, instead, JNA soldiers and people you describe as Chetniks, forcing other people out of their homes and loading them onto the trucks that were available, and a local JNA commander knew nothing of the location of the ECMM or ICRC people who would be organising the evacuation. So you returned to the hospital, as your prior testimony reveals, when a jeep ¹⁵⁶³² showed up, asking you to go to Negoslavci, which the Chamber can find on page 23 of its atlas, a few kilometres south of Vukovar, due south. You went to that town or village to a private house where you saw Colonel Mile Mrksic, whom you -- with whom you discussed the problem. Eventually, he agreed to an evacuation.

You returned from there to the hospital to wait for that evacuation to happen. On the way, you saw a white van belonging to the ECMM, and you were taken back to the hospital.

When you got back to the hospital, you sent someone to look for your parents-in-law. They were found and brought to the hospital, although your father was subsequently taken prisoner and his was one of the bodies found in the mass grave at Ovcara, to which we will turn briefly later.

Of course, everyone in the hospital was by now scared because of numerous soldiers now present and there being no ICRC people around, the hospital being guarded by the JNA.

In your hospital, were representatives of the local Red Cross. You visited all floors. There was panic. You went down to calm people, and you met a man called Major Sljivancanin, and this was, I think, the first time you'd seen him. And you saw civilians being taken out of the hospital, loaded onto a truck. You asked Sljivancanin what was happening, he said the plan was to evacuate first the wounded and then the civilians, saying that they were being taken to Velepromet. You protested because the ICRC and the ECMM were not present, but Sljivancanin took no notice of your protests. ¹⁵⁶³³ That's all covered in your prior testimony, and is it correct?

A. Yes.

Q. At about 7.00 in the evening, Sljivancanin came to your office with a man from the ICRC, apparently called Mr. Nikolas, Sljivancanin asking for a list of the wounded, of which he was given copies, as was Mr. Nikolas who said he'd come back the next day.

Were you taken by the same JNA officer again to Negoslavci that evening, and when you got there did you see Sljivancanin who said that Colonel Mrksic was not there because he was on another assignment, there was somebody else there in authority - there was an exchange you can deal with - where Sljivancanin asked you how much President Tudjman would pay for you. You were taken to a school building and held prisoner overnight. On the 20th of November, you were taken back to the hospital. By now you were not allowed to use your telephone because there was a JNA officer there with a rifle.

Sljivancanin came in at 7.00 in the morning, ordered you to call a meeting of medical personnel whom he then addressed, you complying despite saying you wanted to wait for the ICRC representative. That same soldier who had taken you to Negoslavci came in, saying that he had orders to take you and Marin Vidic for negotiations with the ICRC, although this turned out to be entirely untrue. And as you were led out from the hospital, we saw how the driveway in and out comes from one side to the other of the hospital, as you went out one way, what did you see happening -- what was happening at the other side of that runway or driveway? ¹⁵⁶³⁴

A. What I saw was a large number of hospital staff. They were waiting there, preparing for the evacuation. A nurse asked me where they were taking me, and I said to the negotiations and that I would be back quickly, but I left, never to return. They didn't allow me to go back.

Q. You were taken, as a result of the misleading information you'd been given, not for negotiations but to the JNA barracks that we've already seen indicated on a map in the southern part of the town, I think, where you were kept in a room for the whole day. So you were unable to see what was going on at the hospital or to complain or object. And then at 6.00 in the evening, you were told that there had been some changes and that the ICRC had already done the evacuation.

You were held overnight and the following morning you were taken to Sremska Mitrovica. Is that all correct?

A. Yes, it is. During the night, that's when they took us away.

Q. We now see an existing exhibit, which is short. We've seen it once before. It's Exhibit 342, tab 10, the video of Vukovar bridge showing Sljivancanin. The Chamber may want to remind itself at some stage from its maps that there are two bridges, the one visible from another, and Sljivancanin has his back to a bridge. He's standing on one bridge, he has his back to another bridge at which the ICRC man is pointing, and the evidence will show that at the time of this discussion, the convoy of those being taken from hospital was passing by on the other bridge. If we can have a look at it again. There is also one point at which I may stop the video to draw to your attention a particular soldier in a helmet. His identification will be provided by the next witness I am to call, but if I ¹⁵⁶³⁵ show -- identify who it is now, it won't be necessary to play the whole video the next time.

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE: Can we have some sound track for this, please? And, Your Honour, there should be a transcript with the original exhibit which I hope has come to you. If not, there's further copies coming your way.

[Please refer to Exhibit 342, tab 10]

MR. NICE: Freeze frame, please. The person I'm going to invite the Chamber to focus on is the person who can be seen in the bottom left-hand corner of the screen at the moment and who we'll have in a slightly better profile and slightly fuller face a little later. Thank you. Please continue.

JUDGE MAY: I think we've got the wrong transcript.

MR. NICE: The correct one coming up.

[Videotape played]

[Please refer to Exhibit 383 - video]

MR. NICE: That's enough of that video. It's been seen before.

Q. Doctor, is the tall man with the moustache, talking, Sljivancanin who you've seen on a couple of occasions in circumstances described in your prior testimony?

A. Yes.

Q. And was I right in what I suggested to the Judges at the beginning, that the view to the left, the view that would have been available to the man from the ICRC, was of another bridge, the bridge upon ^{15636 BLANK PAGE 15637} which, as we understand it, the people from the hospital were taken when they were taken away?

A. Yes.

MR. NICE: May we now look, please, at the next video to be given a new exhibit number.

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE: You, of course --

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "We teach and train all of our soldiers and our superiors that it represents great humanity and great honour to help every man and every nation. All in all, sir, this is about a dirty war which has not been conducted like this in history before. The Yugoslav People's Army -- the Yugoslav People's Army has emerged from the people's army which fought alongside the allies against the fascists in World War II.

"The men that were in here, they go home to their families

[indiscernible] "No. Our soldiers are all together on their positions. They participated together only in action in liberation of the town of Vukovar. "[Indiscernible]

"Can we make arrangements with people in northern command to go and see the hospital? I think that right now I cannot provide that. "Maybe somebody else can.

"That can be solved, because in that part where there is a crossing across the Vuka river between us and the Operational Group North there are minefields, and we're not sure we're leading you where it is not ¹⁵⁶³⁸ safe for you. And we have not done the demining of those minefields yet. "We're not going to take you there.

"Well, let me talk to my colleague [indiscernible] Let's first go downtown and --

"After he visited the army barracks, he spent some time in Negoslavci. Here he talked to the commander of the Operational Group, Colonel Mileta Mrksic and members of his staff.

"This is the village of Negoslavci. Three kilometres south of Vukovar.

"I see."

MR. NICE:

Q. Now, Doctor, at the time that those events were filmed -- you've been able to put things together, of course, since in your mind and work it out. At the time those events were filmed, were you already detained?

A. Yes.

Q. Sljivancanin, of course, is the same man we've seen before. The Mrksic who was having the discussion with Cyrus Vance, is that the same man you'd seen in discussions when you'd been taken twice to Negoslavci? He was there, I think, once.

A. Yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, subsequent witness will be able --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Once.

JUDGE MAY: Have you got an exhibit number for that video?

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the video of the hospital with no sound is Prosecutor's Exhibit 382. This video of the encounter of the ¹⁵⁶³⁹ Vukovar bridge is Prosecutor's Exhibit 383 -- no, excuse me, video of the evacuation is Prosecutor's Exhibit 383.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, could you tell me the date of Mr. Vance's visit?

MR. NICE: I think it's the 19th of November, but the doctor can probably, from her recollection, tell us with more authority.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 20th.

MR. NICE: The 20th. Yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Wednesday the 20th, at around 10.00.

MR. NICE: As I say, we have a later witness who was a party to some of those negotiations who will be able to assist us. Not negotiations; talks, meetings.

Paragraph 31 of the summary.

Q. Doctor, you were held a prisoner in Sremska Mitrovica and also in Belgrade; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. For how many weeks were you detained?

A. Three weeks.

Q. In the course of your detention, what did you observe of the questioning treatment and appearance following interrogation of fellow prisoners?

A. On the first day, I was in a solitary confinement cell, and then with -- in another room with 60 other women from Vukovar, and the last days I was at the military investigation prison in Belgrade for two days. Then they took me off for questioning, and when they were bringing me back ¹⁵⁶⁴⁰ from questioning, I saw people who had been beaten up, and I heard cries and screams and lots of beatings going on during the night.

Q. Your husband was also held in prison camps in Serbia, including at Sremska Kamenica and Stajicevo?

A. Yes.

Q. And how was he treated, as you understood it?

A. He was very brutally treated. He had a lot of fractures to the ribs, and bruises, and he was beaten over the head, and he was in a coma the whole day. And he is suffering serious repercussions from the Kamenica period, and Stajicevo.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to speak up.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My husband and I visited Lord Carrington in -- we insisted -- we prevailed upon him --

JUDGE MAY: Could you speak up, you're asked by the interpreters, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My husband went with me to see Lord Carrington, and I insisted for -- that -- that he ask Mr. Milosevic to allow Vukovar to go free. My -- we learnt that our relatives had been killed at Ovcara.

MR. NICE:

Q. I'll come to that --

A. So that Lord Carrington knew about the camp at Stajicevo, but unfortunately, they didn't release the people. Those who survived were released in the spring and summer of 1992, not before then. And many people were killed. And 400 persons from Vukovar are still listed ¹⁵⁶⁴¹ missing. We don't know where they are. 396, in fact.

Q. The movement of the people who were known to have been killed at the Ovcara farm is shown, Doctor, is it not, on two plans and some photographs that we've produced, and with your assistance.

MR. NICE: If these two plans could be produced in order. The first one -- if this could be given a number, put on the overhead projector, subject to a brief comment.

THE REGISTRAR: That's Prosecutor's Exhibit 326, tab 19.

MR. NICE:

Q. As you understand it, the route from the hospital for those taken to the Ovcara farm and killed goes through the JNA --

MR. NICE: Sorry. We're not looking at the right one. The other one first, please. The hospital first, just so that we -- can this one have that first number for logical or is that too difficult? This shows the route from the hospital, across the bridge where Sljivancanin was standing on the other bridge, parallel to it, and then down to the JNA barracks. And then the other plan which we looked at first, if we can put that one on now, shows the route from the barracks down to the Ovcara hangar and eventually, for those who were killed, to the gravesite. Perhaps both plans could have the same number. Would that be convenient? No. Right. I'll leave the registry to sort that out.

THE REGISTRAR: The map showing the route will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 326, tab 20.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, you will see that there are numbers, identification numbers given at various points along that route. ¹⁵⁶⁴² The next exhibit is an album of photographs. Go through this very quickly. I'm not inviting the Chamber to do it now but you can connect the numbers on the bottom right-hand corner of those photographs with the places on those maps in case it becomes material to know how these people were taken.

It starts off, photograph number 1, with the hospital. The photograph number 2 is on the way to the bridge. Photograph number 3 is again on the way to the bridge. Photograph number 4 is really at the bridge. We can see the bridge railings on the right. Photograph number 5 is a little bit south of the bridge on the way -- I beg your pardon. Photograph number 5 is also the bridge, as is photograph 6, showing how one bridge would give a view to another. And photograph 7. Photograph number 8 shows part of the route south of the bridge towards the barracks. Photograph number 9 the same. And photograph 10 and 11.

And then we come -- after that one, please. Next photograph, please. And the next one. Here we are now at the barracks where people, as you understand it, Doctor, were held for some time. Similarly, the next photograph and the one after that. Then we come -- next photograph, please. And the next.

This is the route from the barracks down towards the farm. The other chart now relates, and we can follow a route - next photograph, please - across the countryside. Next photograph, please. Next photograph. Next photograph.

We're now at the first sightings of the Ovcara hangar. Next ¹⁵⁶⁴³ photograph, please. Closer view of the hangar. Next photograph. And the next. This is the hangar where people were held, now with agricultural equipment in it. Next photograph, please. And the next.

Q. And then the last photograph shows the route from the hangar which - last photograph, please - shows the route from the hangar, top left, down the photograph, turning to the right along to one of the gravesites that, as you understand it, Doctor, was the scene of some of the burials of those killed at Ovcara farm. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Just to remind the Judges, is it a question of all those who were taken away being found in that grave or are there a large number completely unaccounted for?

A. A large number was taken away in six buses, six busloads, in fact. All those people were taken away. But in the grave, 200 dead bodies were found of which only 186 have so far been identified.

MR. NICE: Last exhibit, please, which is an annex --

JUDGE MAY: Have we got a number for the photographs, please.

THE REGISTRAR: The photographs, Your Honour, will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 384.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the last exhibit, which I forecast may become Exhibit 385, is pages 44 to 50 --

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: The last exhibit is pages 44 to 50 of the Croatian indictment, but now highlighted in blue, yellow, and green. ¹⁵⁶⁴⁴

Q. You've marked this list of names, Doctor, or had it marked at your direction. What's the meaning of blue?

A. The ones marked in blue were the employees of the then-medical centre Vukovar. Most of them were drivers or handymen and they were taken away that morning too in those buses, together with some wounded, and they were identified at Ovcara.

Q. Nineteen of them. Did you identify any of them yourself or are you dependent for your evidence on the identification of others?

A. Those people, the ones who were killed at Ovcara in 1995 were identified in the mass grave in 1996. They were taken for -- to the medical faculty in Zagreb for forensic examination, and the family members were called there too. They were looking for their nearest and dearest, looking for their family members.

Q. The nineteen blue employees marked by the witness. Turning to yellow, these are children under the age of 18. One, two, three, four of those. And the green are your family members, and we can see two of those.

Explain, please, about your family members who were killed there. You already mentioned your father-in-law.

A. Yes, my father-in-law was waiting to be evacuated from the hospital, together with my mother-in-law and my mother. He was old and infirm, and it was difficult for him to sit around the whole night. A soldier of the Yugoslav army passed by the hospital and said that all those who were able to walk should go outside. He went outside to stroll around and see when the evacuation would take place, and when he left the ^{15645 BLANK PAGE 15646} building, he was sent off into one of the buses, and he never returned until we identified him. He was killed at Ovcara. As for the other relation of ours, Tomislav Bosanac, he was a civilian, and he was accompanying his wife, who was seriously wounded. She was a nurse and barely managed to survive. I asked Major Sljivancanin whether I could take my family members out together with the wounded hospital staff and all the other wounded persons, and he said that I could. He allowed me -- he said I could, but this relation of ours was also taken off and killed at Ovcara.

Q. Thank you, Dr. Bosanac. Thank you for permitting me to take the evidence swiftly. You will be asked some further questions.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Before we see what really happened in Vukovar, tell me, is it correct that members of the National Guards Corps of the Croatian army and police were staying at the hospital in larger numbers and firing at the JNA from there?

A. No.

Q. However, your colleagues, doctors who were with you in the hospital at that time, say otherwise.

JUDGE MAY: Well, the witness can't deal with that. The witness doesn't know what other people say. You will have to deal with her evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am dealing with her evidence, but I want her to comment upon something that his -- her colleague stated. ¹⁵⁶⁴⁷ For example, I have it here, Mr. May, in the court record of a witness hearing that I believe should be shown to this particular witness here so that she could perhaps remember whether what she has been saying was correct or not.

For example, Mladen Ivankovic, your colleague, head of surgery, who was heard as a witness before a court said that from the moment when five wounded Serbs came who were guarded by members of the Croatian MUP, that is to say from the beginning of May 1991 until these events that you were speaking about, all the time there were members of the National Guards Corps and the MUP at the hospital.

A. That is not correct. I was director of that hospital, and I know exactly what was going on.

Q. He says: "They did not go out until the liberation of the hospital on the 19th of November, 1991."

Also, he says that in hospital there were between 100 and 150 armed men. In the hospital --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness deal with that. Let the witness deal with that suggestion.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, absolutely. That is absolutely incorrect. The medical staff were at the hospital, including Dr. Ivankovic. Also there were wounded persons, patients, and other assistants. There were two men from the police. One was Tomislav Hegedus, who was recording the dead, and the other one was Branko Lukinda whose task was that when wounded Croatian soldiers came in, he would take their weapons and carry them to the building of the police. ¹⁵⁶⁴⁸ So in the hospital, there were absolutely no weapons or armed Croatian soldiers.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. You claim that this is incorrect, that there were between 100 and 150 armed soldiers in the hospital.

A. That is not correct.

Q. I'm going to exhibit this court record later, but I have a few questions related to that in the meantime.

JUDGE MAY: We will have to consider that. This Dr. Ivankovic, what ethnicity is he?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He was a Serb, actually from Eastern Herzegovina.

JUDGE MAY: And was he at the hospital throughout this siege?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Actually, he tried to run away and then he was wounded, and then they returned him again, wounded. I asked my staff not to leave the hospital because it was very dangerous. Hundreds of shells were falling on the hospital every day, and I asked that nobody go out.

Five staff members from the hospital were killed before the occupation, by shells. Nineteen were killed at Ovcara. Three are still missing. And we also have information that five civilians and nurses were killed after the occupation. Among the 300 persons who were killed after the occupation of Vukovar or, rather, 300 non-Serbs and Croats who were killed.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ¹⁵⁶⁴⁹

Q. All right. Do you know anything about -- well, let's bear in mind the fact that as a witness before the court, he was duty-bound before the law to speak the truth, that guards members came during the night armed, they had sniper rifles. They went up to the roof of the hospital. They returned from the roof during the night. Sometimes it was in the morning when a bomb fell on the hospital. He said: "We were informed that before that somebody was shooting at aircraft from the roof of the hospital." Is that correct?

A. That is not correct. That is absolutely not true. Dr. Ivankovic worked as a surgeon, and he was in the basement of the shelter all the time. And I claim with full responsibility that armed soldiers never went up to the roof of the hospital.

Q. All right. In addition to the roof that he refers to, he says in the front of the hospital from the park and from the yard of Electro Slavonija near the hospital, members of the ZNG were targeting JNA positions, engaging their gunfire -- their guns. Then shells fell and some hit the hospital as well. Is that correct, what he says?

A. It is not correct. From the surroundings of the hospital, there was not a single gun, a single cannon of the Croatian army or the ZNG that was firing. That is correct. But what is correct is that every day hundreds of shells and aircraft bombs were falling on the hospital itself or on its immediate surroundings. One shell hit the room where these soldiers of the Yugoslav army were. And every day, over 70 or 80 shells fell on the hospital itself.

Q. Tell me, do you remember when Dr. Kust [phoen], an ethnic Croat, ¹⁵⁶⁵⁰ is that right, an anaesthesiologist who came from Zagreb, he asked you to prohibit people from shooting from the hospital roof?

A. That's not true.

Q. There's a record of that as well.

A. That's not true. You can or, rather, the Court can, if they wish, call Dr. Kust. That is not correct, because nobody ever shot from the roof of the hospital.

Q. This Dr. Ivankovic - I'm moving on to Dr. Ivankovic again now after referring to Dr. Kust, because he speaks about that in his own statement - did he ask you to do something about this, to stop that, to stop people from firing from the hospital? And you kept saying that only a few more days should be taken or, rather, three more days and then everything would be resolved. Is that correct?

A. No, that's not correct. Dr. Ivankovic asked me to do something, to call the barracks in order to stop the firing at the hospital. I did call the barracks of the Yugoslav army, like many other evidence that has been presented here, but no one ever shot from the hospital itself.

Q. All right. Your colleague Dr. Vladimir Emedi [phoen], so this is also a non-Serb, and he also worked at the hospital at that time, he said that you allowed for weapons to be brought into the hospital. And in connection with that, he also cautioned you against that. I have his statement too that was given to investigative authorities. He says: "As the director of the institution, she allowed weapons to be brought into the hospital. After being cautioned by colleagues that weapons should be taken away, she did not do a thing." ^{15651 BLANK PAGE 15652}

A. That is not correct. I said that wounded soldiers had their weapons taken away. And Dr. Emedi, like many other doctors who were non-Serbs, was arrested and he was staying at the prison in Nis. I don't know what he said there under duress and what kind of pressure was exerted against him, but he works at the hospital now, and if necessary, he can make a statement to this Court.

Q. He also says that people with weapons were climbing up on the roof of the hospital and targeting aircraft from there and they were killing people as snipers.

A. That's not true.

Q. Do you remember that a rocket targeted an aircraft from your hospital and it was after that that the aircraft targeted that roof?

A. That is absolutely not true. That is absolutely not true. The aeroplane targeted the Vukovar Hospital on the 25th of August for the first time, the Vukovar Hospital. And there were no weapons whatsoever at the hospital. You can get many testimonies to that effect. The ones that you have are obviously tendentious and incorrect.

Q. These are official documents, Mrs. Bosanac. I'm reading from them --

JUDGE MAY: What you are putting, Mr. Milosevic, is some statement made by a witness to a totally different court. It's another statement which you have.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. This statement was given by Dr. Vladimir Emedi on the 29th of November to the investigative Judge of the military court, Major Zvonko Pavlovic. ¹⁵⁶⁵³

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As a prisoner.

JUDGE MAY: Was he a prisoner? Do you know that, Dr. Bosanac?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I know that, because he and his father were released together with me on the 10th of December. They were in a camp in Nis.

JUDGE MAY: He was being subjected to interrogation, is that right, as you would understand it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The name of Borislav Kucan, does that mean anything to you? Thirteen days before Vukovar fell, he left town. He was there.

A. No. No.

Q. He is one of the snipers who was shooting at people from the roof of the hospital.

A. No. Absolutely incorrect. And you could not leave town 13 days beforehand because nobody could leave town, but he certainly did not shoot from the roof of the hospital. That name is quite unknown to me.

Q. Quite unknown to you.

A. Yes.

Q. Dr. Emedi says the few times three trucks came with Red Cross signs, the usual size, they were driven by --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. They told us that they brought ammunition, weapons, and on one occasion -- oh, I should read slower. Right, yes. ¹⁵⁶⁵⁴ So the truck with the sign of the Red Cross, regular size, that was driven by Dr. Josip Husar [phoen], Obradovic Zupa [phoen], and Josip whose heel had been injured, they told us that when they came in, they brought ammunition, weapons, and on one occasion, even cannons. According to their statement --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we're in fact going beyond time. Do you know anything about what is being said here, Dr. Bosanac?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Until the end of September, Dr. Josip Husar would come to evacuate wounded persons in a Red Cross truck. These were big trucks that could take in 12 to 16 wounded persons. They came to the hospital, we would prepare the wounded, and they would take the wounded out of Vukovar.

I don't know what they brought in. I didn't see that. And that is how they kept coming until the end of September. After that, Vukovar was completely occupied and nobody could come in or go out.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll have to call it a day there since the Court is required.

Mr. Milosevic, we've considered the time you should have. We will give you two hours, up to two hours more for cross-examination tomorrow. Dr. Bosanac, I'm sorry we haven't been able to finish your evidence today. Could you be back tomorrow to conclude it at 9.00, please.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 5th day of

February, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.