Milosevic Transcript 2003-02-13

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Thursday, 13 February 2003

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we were at approximately paragraph 215, 216, 217.

WITNESS: ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. General Vasiljevic, you'd been telling us yesterday about the meeting you attended on the 1st of June, 1999, and the last topic that we covered was the apparent authority that Sainovic had. Just to develop that particular point, can you remember and tell us the order in which people entered the conference hall in which the meeting was held and how people reacted when Sainovic entered.

A. Yes. I already described the seating arrangement at the table where we were. The last ones to come to this meeting were Mr. Sainovic and Andjelkovic. When they walked into that room, we all got up, and after they sat down at that table, the meeting began.

Q. And the meeting was in a conference room, I think, in a high-rise facility in Pristina, and you were all seated at a conference table, but in other parts of the hall, just to give the Judges a picture, were there other members of the 3rd Army and the Pristina Corps working on maps and ¹⁵⁹⁷¹ doing other sorts of work?

A. Yes.

Q. Leading you to the conclusion that this room was what sort of command post?

A. Yes.

Q. That it was a form of command post?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. The maps had friendly and enemy things marked on them and matters of that sort.

In the course of the meeting, was the previous 24 hours reviewed but nothing in detail outside the previous 24 hours?

A. Yes. This was a brief routine report as to what had been going on over the past 24 hours. First, General Lazarevic gave some brief observations regarding NATO operations, and then General Djordjevic, from the MUP, spoke about MUP operations. There was nothing special going on there that I would remember. It all ended with a brief summary as to what should be done during the following day. For the most part, the general from the MUP said that during the course of the next day, the terrain should be cleaned in the area of Drenica. So that was, briefly, that particular meeting.

Q. And as to MUP activities, did Sainovic have to approve them?

A. That's not the way the meeting went. And the climate was not like that. It's not that a formal conclusion was supposed to be adopted. It was simply stated that everything was all right and everything was evolving according to plan. So I think that I could put it this way: ¹⁵⁹⁷² That it was a rather easy-going atmosphere, the kind in which these people met every day.

Q. Very well.

MR. NICE: I've got a few exhibits, Your Honour. In order to save time, I think Exhibit tab 39 can be skipped certainly at this stage. The next exhibit is an exhibit already produced, Exhibit 320, tab 57, which I'd like the witness very briefly to look at.

Q. As this comes to you, General Vasiljevic, this is a document that I think you're not familiar with. You've been invited to review it while you've been here. If its form appears to you to be regular, what does it suggest to you as to the coordination function of the Joint Command in respect of the VJ and the MUP?

A. This is the work plan of the communications station, and we're talking about radio communications. This station is the code name Pastrik command. And in addition to that, 12 other participants in the network are mentioned, including units from the army of Yugoslavia and units from the MUP.

Q. Very well. We'll have that back, please. Tab 40 of -- tab 40 of Exhibit 387. If we could put the English version on the overhead projector.

General, dated the 17th of April, 1999, from the Supreme Command Staff, addressed as a command post, reading: "Link: Kosovo and Metohija Joint Command order, strictly confidential ....

"Suggestions: Continue comprehensive preparations," and various other points, and it's signed by Ojdanic. ¹⁵⁹⁷³ Your interpretation of this document in respect of what the Joint Command was able to do and instruct the VJ to do, and perhaps more importantly, how do we read Ojdanic's function in all this?

A. This document shows that previously there had been an order issued by the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija in which the way in which the forces were to be used was probably regulated. I assume that the commander of the 3rd Army informed the Chief of General Staff about that. And then suggestions are presented as to what should be corrected in that. I mean, it's interesting that he gives suggestions. He is actually Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. It is not customary for him to give suggestions. It would only be natural for him to give orders as to how the forces should be used. So this shows the position of the Joint Command, and it shows this kind of duality. There is a command for using forces in Kosovo, which is binding upon the commander of the 3rd Army. He is supposed to act accordingly. And then he, on the other hand, has the chief -- has his own superior, and he has this Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, and he gives him suggestions. This is a kind of duality that is not typical for command and control.

Q. Finally, what does it suggest to you as to who had primacy; Pavkovic-Sainovic, or Pavkovic-Ojdanic, if we can put it in those simple terms?

A. I think that Pavkovic, in the most unpleasant situation of all, because practically he had two commanders. He had one who was down there in the field, in Kosovo, and who issues orders, and he also has subordination, according to the vertical line, vis-a-vis the Chief of ¹⁵⁹⁷⁴ General Staff. Now, whether this suggestion had the force of an order issued by the Chief of General Staff, that is something that I don't know. I don't know how they acted upon this, but there is some kind of duality.

Q. With Sainovic having a critical role?

A. Well, I think he did, but I cannot say this with certainty because I was not in a position to see it specifically, but I think so, yes.

Q. Tab 41, please, of Exhibit 387, going back to August, 1998. This document, General. A long document, so we'll only look at it and seek your comment on it.

MR. NICE: First page, please, Usher.

Q. We see that this is a document from the Pristina Corps command forward command post at Djakovica. The decision on the joint engagement of the MUP and VJ, and we see decision, combat disposition, tasks for units. Over the page, reference to --

MR. NICE: Second page, please, Usher.

Q. Reference to fire support, combat support measures, logistical support at the bottom of the page.

MR. NICE: Third page, please, Usher.

Q. Technical support, quartermaster, medical, traffic, fire, gathering confiscated weapons. And then at the foot of the page, command and communications: "Combat operations will be commanded by the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija from forward command post in Djakovica. Organise communications in accordance with the communications plan that will be drawn up by the chief of communications. Readiness of communications ..." ¹⁵⁹⁷⁵ And then the last page, forward reports as follows. Thank you. "Organise coordinated action with MUP forces during preparations and combat operations." Signed by Nebojsa Pavkovic and sent to the Republic of Serbia MUP, PJP command, and various other addressees identified there. General, looking at this document, August 1998, what does it reveal as to the Joint Command's authority over both the VJ and the MUP, and what does it reveal as to whether they were at that time operating within their own chain of command?

A. First of all, this document was drafted in a way which is correct from a military point of view. We see here in the last item, command and communications, that the command is carried out by the Joint Command. The army is practically operating in concert with the MUP forces that are carrying out operations, and this shows that they also give them fire support.

Now, whether the General Staff was informed about this is something that I don't know about. It is my assessment that the Joint Command actually had executive command in terms of engaging forces in Kosovo and Metohija. However, in it there was a military part and probably a part from the MUP that led the MUP units and who was then head of the Joint Command. That was the person that made all the most important decisions.

That is what I can see from the document, because at that time, I was not in service.

Q. Of course. Tab 42, please. Back to a time when you were in service, 29th of May, 1999. From Chief of the Supreme Command Staff, ¹⁵⁹⁷⁶ General Ojdanic, to the commander of the 3rd Army personally and coming from the Supreme Command Staff. This is a reminder to do various things. What does this show you, General Vasiljevic, about the authority that Ojdanic was exercising at this stage and through this document?

A. Perhaps there can be a bit of a dilemma regarding the following: It is not stated here, "I hereby order..." It is said, "I hereby caution..." However, if I were the commander who received this particular paper from the command, I would have taken it as an order. So what it says is what is cautioned, what is supposed to be done, and this is binding upon the commander of the 3rd Army because in the preamble, it says that there is information about operations that could be carried out, and he draws the attention of those concerned to this. So it should have said, "I hereby order," but irrespective of the verb that is actually used here, "I caution," it does have the force of an order.

Q. Thank you very much. Tab 43, the last in this short exercise. This is a document from the 7th of July, 1998, so before your time. Command of the 125th Motorised Brigade. Signed by Dragan Zivanovic.

The heading is "Ban on operations without the knowledge and approval of the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija." It then leads off with being pursuant to the order of the Joint Command at an earlier date, the order prohibits the execution of operations by units and formations without the approval of the Joint Command. That's probably all we need look at on this three-page document. ¹⁵⁹⁷⁷ What does this -- how does this fit with your understanding of the operation of the Joint Command in 1999?

A. Well, again, it has the force of a mini Supreme Command down there that is in charge of the joint operations of the army of Yugoslavia and the MUP in Kosovo and Metohija. Obviously, it can be seen here that there was individual use of certain units and that support was required from the units of the army of Yugoslavia to the MUP, and this was not verified through the Joint Command, and there may have been some improvisations and some problems in that. And in this way, they are trying to put order in the chain of command. Still, the Joint Command is the one that is issuing specific orders regarding operations in Kosovo.

Q. In a way generally appropriate for the engagement of multiple forces?

A. Yes.

Q. Even if at the time there appears to be some, as you say, disorganisation or whatever. Right. Thank you very much.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we then come to a short closed session, with the Court's leave. Paragraphs 219 to 221.

[Private session]

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[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MR. NICE:

Q. Paragraph 224 briefly. Basically --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: ¹⁵⁹⁸⁰

Q. In case it becomes relevant, can you help us, please, with -- very briefly, with military territorial commands? What were they?

A. Military territorial commands did exist within the JNA, and they were commands which carried out mobilisation. They kept military records and also sent out recruits to the army. They were subordinated to the army command.

Q. And in the area with which we are particularly concerned, was there a Pristina Military Territorial Command for Kosovo and a Nis Military Territorial Command for the remainder of Southern Serbia?

A. Yes.

Q. When operational, they would be under the command of VJ brigades?

A. No, not the brigade command, the army command, if you're thinking about the command of the military district.

Q. You have some examples from recollection of detachments of military territorial commands in Istok, Klina, and Djakovica.

A. The military territorial detachments were units which were -- which were within the frameworks of the military departments and under the command of the military districts. So they were units which were, first of all, intended to exert control over the territory in which they were located, however, the territorial -- military territorial detachments could have been deployed and engaged outside the territories on which they were originally located. So that means that was the reserve formation. And there were cases of that kind, for example, with the 7th Infantry Brigade from Krusevac, for example, and the military territorial detachment from Brus, for example, from that particular area. And that ¹⁵⁹⁸¹ was attached to the command and therefore comes under its composition and under its command. I don't think that is anything extraordinary. I think it is the regular procedure.

Q. Very well. Can we look at tab 44, Exhibit 387. This is a document --

MR. NICE: If we can look at the first page, please, Usher.

Q. -- 26 June 1998, so before your re-engagement. "Pursuant to the 3rd Army's Command Strictly Confidential Order... the aggravated political and security situation in Kosovo and Metohija, and in order to defend and protect the citizens from the Siptar... terrorist groups, I --" and the order comes from Pavkovic -- "Order: Organise and carry out technical preparations for distribution of weapons and ammunition to military conscripts assigned to war units of the Pristina Corps, the Pristina Military District and the 202nd Logistics Base." And then halfway down the page, within paragraph 3 at the end of it: "On the basis of the lists, call up military conscripts in small groups to the army barracks and organise distribution and issue of weapons in Serbian and Montenegrin villages. Devote special attention to security measures, secrecy and camouflage discipline in carrying out this task." Paragraph 6: "After completing the distribution, prepare and organise inhabited places for defence."

Over the page. "Military department commanders are responsible for organising this in their zones of responsibility in cooperation with the MUP..."

And then at 8: "I forbid formation and engagement of any ¹⁵⁹⁸² ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹⁵⁹⁸³ volunteer groups except those comprising local village inhabitants." Now, you've seen this document, General. Were you aware, before sight of this document, of this type of village defence preparation?

A. No, I did not know about that.

Q. Looking at the document, and unless you find anything to suggest that it's unreliable, what does this suggest to you about the nature of the plan set out in the document? Was it indeed apparently a secret plan?

A. Well, I don't think that I could say that a secret plan actually existed on the basis of this. What this is about is the division -- the issuance, actually, of weapons and military materiel to the reserve component of the JNA units or, rather, the army of Yugoslavia as it was at that time. And this was conditioned by the concrete political security situation on the ground in the territory. And those weapons could be issued to the reservists - that wasn't anything strange - that belonged to the war units of the army of Yugoslavia deployed on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

So this is actually a caution for secrecy, this issuance of weapons, and the issuance of weapons could have been carried out on the basis of an official order, because assessments are made for the issuance of weapons, that that was necessary for the units to be established, and not to waste time, the weapons and equipment were issued to the conscripts to have with them. This order came from the command, the army command. All I can assume is that the commander himself did not do it on his own bat but he had probably received instructions of this kind from the General Staff. ¹⁵⁹⁸⁴ Now --

Q. I think that's probably enough, but the position is you weren't aware of it until you saw the document in court or, rather, here.

A. No, I was not.

Q. Thank you. Paragraph 226, please. Did the Supreme Command Staff have two volunteer reception centres for the VJ of which you were aware?

A. Yes.

Q. Regulated and with the stipulation that volunteers should be integrated into the VJ as individuals and there should not be the question of integration of units.

A. Yes. There were strict orders with regard to that procedure.

Q. Paragraph 230. The MUP staff of Kosovo was, I think you've already told us this, headed by General Lukic. And did you infer from this that there was coordination of operations of the MUP as directed by the Joint Command?

A. Yes.

Q. Paragraph 233. Were there some MUP special units engaged in Kosovo?

A. Yes, there were.

Q. We'll deal with one or two of them. Was there an SAJ anti-terrorist unit commanded by Zivko Trajkovic?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Were there intervention brigades of the PJP and detachments of the PJP assigned at the municipality level?

A. I think that -- I don't think there were intervention brigades at ¹⁵⁹⁸⁵ municipal level. These were larger formations, whereas the detachments of special police forces were deployed in the municipalities, yes.

Q. There was an OPG, an operational sweep group, which was a part of the PJP?

A. It wasn't an Operational Group. It was an operational sweep group.

Q. Yes. That's what I said, or intended to say. Did you understand that Colonel Goran Radosavljevic, or Guri, was overall commander of the PJP units in Kosovo?

A. All I can say is something that the security organs in Kosovo reported back to me about the situation. So they had information that these groups were being commanded by a man whose nickname was Guri, and they had his code name for the radio communication system. Now, what his actual name was, I don't know. So this was what the security organs knew about it.

Q. And who did you assess to be the overall commander of PJP units in Serbia at that time?

A. As far as I know, that was General Stevanovic.

Q. An OPG unit was of apparently what size so far as you were informed?

A. From the information that I received from the main security centre when I was in Kosovo, these were smaller groups numbering between 20 and 30 men. They had light weapons, and they were with the local population in the area.

Q. A quick review of Exhibit 319, tab 38, please. Ministry of the ¹⁵⁹⁸⁶ Interior of Serbia, Secretariat of the Interior, Djakovica police station, listing members of the 123rd, possibly intervention brigade, 4th company, 3rd platoon of the Djakovica Secretariat of the Interior for payment of per diems and there's a platoon of 24 men and a further list over the page of 13.

What is this? How does this correspond with what you understood of special MUP units in the area at the time?

A. What we can see is that there was the 123rd Intervention Brigade, that that existed, and that this is a list of the members of the 3rd platoon of the 4th Company. Now, as the Ministry of the Interior is mentioned here, the police station in Djakovica in actual fact, most probably this platoon was from Djakovica and perhaps the whole company was too of the Intervention Brigade which was deployed on the territory of Djakovo municipality.

Q. Thank you very much. The RDB special units, or the special unit the JSO, had what equipment, please, and what uniforms?

A. That was a unit for special operations of the state security service, and it had special equipment, state of the art, the best quality type of special categories. What was characteristic was that they had special camouflage uniforms and they wore red berets, and also they had a specific type of hat. And they could be recognised readily by the Hummer four-wheel drive vehicles, special ones they had to move about in Kosovo. They had different types of weaponry, ranging from an anti-aircraft gun to automatic rifles and so on.

Q. Their name? What was the name of the unit and their commander? ¹⁵⁹⁸⁷

A. Well, the sign and insignia that it carried was known as the Grey Wolves, and the commander was Milorad Ulemek and his nickname was Legija.

Q. Did the members of this unit appear to have previous operational experience?

A. Well, I think that that isn't contested, yes.

Q. And Legija's superior was?

A. Well, his first superior, his immediate superior was Frenki Simatovic, and the unit as such was, in practical terms, under the command of the chief of the state security department, who was Rade Markovic at that time.

Q. We'll hear about a meeting you had with the accused in May of 1999, but just forecasting one element of that, on that occasion, did Rade Markovic acknowledge the use and deployment of the JSO in one Kosovo village?

A. Yes, he did. And it was the village of Jezerce.

MR. NICE: Short closed session, please.

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[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MR. NICE:

Q. Were Arkan's Tigers present in Kosovo?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. Based where, under whose command? ¹⁵⁹⁹⁰

A. According to the information which we had and which was later confirmed at a meeting by Rade Markovic himself, they were in Kosovo Polje. And our information told us that there were about 100 men there. Rade Markovic stated that 100 of them had responded but that he took only 30 as volunteers. And they were deployed in a separate camp, if I can call it that. It was some kind of facility in Kosovo Polje. And according to what Rade Markovic himself said, because on the previous days some -- they had committed some crime, they killed a married couple, an Albanian couple, he ordered them to go back and leave Kosovo.

Q. They were under the command of whom so far as you understood it?

A. The report said, the security report said that they were under the command of some -- of the man whose nickname was Guri.

Q. Thank you. How well known at that time generally was the Arkan reputation and thus the potential for difficulties that Arkan's Tigers would always bring?

A. Well, his reputation was well known, because for a long -- it covered a long period of time and it's a long story. But from that first information as to the formation of the Serbian volunteer guards, in that first nucleus which numbered about 30 people, there was not a single individual who had not already perpetrated crimes and had been found guilty of those crimes and sentenced.

And secondly, they went around in public with their long-barrelled weapons, although the issuance of this kind of weaponry was regulated by separate rules and regulations.

Yes, they did have a reputation. Everybody knew that they had ¹⁵⁹⁹¹ taken part in many evil acts.

Q. Arkan himself, on your information, was he equipped with any official identification papers?

A. Yes, he was. He had these identification papers from the former Yugoslavia, and he never went around without his ID papers. However, the members of his reserve formation had the same kind of IDs.

Q. There are a few more points, please, before we turn to the meeting with the accused. The subordination of the MUP to the VJ during a state of war. Were you aware whether Ojdanic had asked the accused to issue any subordination order?

A. Yes, I was aware of that. He did.

Q. Did the MUP respect it?

A. No, it did not.

Q. And as you understood it from Ojdanic or from other sources, what happened when Ojdanic drew this problem to the accused's attention?

A. Well, according to what he -- General Ojdanic told me - and this was sometime after he had retired - he told him that, all right, that problem would be solved in due course. But we didn't write out the order because of the problems with the MUP of Serbia but so that the MUP of Montenegro should be placed under the control of the army. And General Ojdanic showed me this from his official notes, official working notes. And I remember that this was written down in red ink. So this subordination, to all intents and purposes, never took effect in the field.

Q. Tab 45 of Exhibit 387, please. This is a short document, General, ¹⁵⁹⁹² from Colonel Mile Stanojkovic.

MR. NICE: Just the first page, please, Usher, on the overhead projector, thank you.

Q. This is the 19th of April, 1999, 3rd Army, Supreme Command Staff sector for operations and staff affairs, coming from the command post, and it says: "Pursuant to an order from the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in keeping with Article 17 of the Law on Defence ... I order: Internal affairs units and organs shall be subordinated to you in your zones of responsibility.

"Commanders of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd armies and the navy shall regulate all other issues that emerge from this item 1 with their own orders."

Does this fit with your understanding of efforts to subordinate the MUP?

A. Yes. These were orders that went along the chain of command, and there's no dispute about it. The commands in the ground were informed that they -- that the MUP units are being resubordinated with respect to command over them and their use. The question is only whether this was implemented, and as far as I know, it was not.

Q. Can we look at tab 46, please, of 387. This is, of course, as we're going to see, a document that comes about a week or eight days after your meeting with the accused to which we'll shortly turn, but it's dated the 25th of May of 1999, and comes from General Pavkovic. It relates to the resubordination of units and organs of the Ministry of the Interior to the 3rd Army command, more specifically to the commands of the Pristina ¹⁵⁹⁹³ and Nis Corps and reports officially on the resubordination of MUP forces to the forces of the VJ army. You can read it or scan it quickly. And paragraph 2: "The noncompliance with orders on resubordination has entailed problems concerning joint operations." Paragraph 3: "The security regime in the territory has not taken root in the spirit of the law."

You've reviewed this document. What comments do you have on it?

A. This only confirms what I've already said. The command of the 3rd Army is actually appealing to the Chief of Staff to do something at the level of the Supreme Command for this subordination to start functioning. However, what I find interesting here is another point. There was a Joint Command, and that Joint Command was the body that should have addressed this problem rather than burdening the Chief of Staff with this. The executive command was in the hands of Mr. Sainovic down there, who was there for that purpose, to coordinate the activities of the army and the MUP. And also, it can be seen that the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia has not forwarded, if it received the order - and I assume that it did - it did not do anything to implement it.

Q. See if I follow that correctly. Had there been genuine desire and cooperation of the Joint Command for this subordination to take place in the way evinced in the document, you would have expected this problem to be routed not in the way it was but to be routed back to Sainovic?

A. Yes, because he had competence over MUP organs as well. But the first problem is that the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia did not pass on this order to subordinated units. That's the main problem. ¹⁵⁹⁹⁴ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹⁵⁹⁹⁵

Q. Finally on this stage, tab 47 of 387. It's a long document, and I'm only going to ask your comments on it. We can review it in detail later. It's a document of the 27th of May of 1999, from the Command of the Pristina Corps to the command of the MUP, and it's an order to crush and destroy the SDS in the Prekaze area, and then the order is set out in detail.

The Chamber, rather than wearying the usher, we can see the various headings that are set out.

How does this strike you as to its form; well formed, proper order?

A. Yes, it is, and very well done militarily.

Q. It comes from General Lazarevic and of course goes to the command of the MUP. And indeed this is the MUP's copy, I think. Is that correct, General? And in the absence of any other comments you want to make, we'll move on to another topic.

A. Yes.

Q. Where crimes were committed on the territory, did the VJ have jurisdiction over those crimes? Should they, if aware of crimes, have been investigated, dealt with by a military police and judge system, handed over to civilians at certain stages?

A. While touring security organs in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija and according to information I received and also later on that I had occasion to learn, all uncovered cases of crimes and looting were processed and proceedings were conducted through the military prosecutor's office in the Pristina and Nis Corps. I know of only one case while I was ¹⁵⁹⁹⁶ in Kosovo that there were certain indications about Gornja Klina, that a crime had been committed there, and the reaction to it was not very efficient. The competence for establishing responsibility for crimes depended on the unit that was active in the area, whether it was the MUP or the army of Yugoslavia. If it was the MUP, then it was the competence of civilian judicial bodies or the MUP, and vice versa. If it was in the area of operations of the army of Yugoslavia and consequent to its operations, then the military prosecutor needed to be informed of the same. He would order the military police to carry out an investigation and then the judicial proceedings would be instituted.

Q. A particular crime that you can help us with: Rozaje on the 18th of April, 1999. What did the Serbian MUP unit do there?

A. This was committed by a unit, according to the security organ's reports, under the command of a certain Dragan Stojanovic who, with a number of vehicles, was searching or expelling a group of civilians who had sought shelter in the area of Rozaje, a location called Kaludjerski Las. And when they reached them there, they executed a large number of people. About 10 were wounded, among them a little girl and a woman. And the military police learnt about the event and carried out an urgent investigation. The wounded were transferred to medical institutions, and the competent MUP in Rozaje was informed of the same. What was done after that, I don't know.

MR. NICE: Very short closed session, please.

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[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MR. NICE:

Q. On the 8th of May of 1999, did the deputy head of the UB of the ¹⁵⁹⁹⁸ Pristina Corps meet you in Belgrade, informing you that the security service had become aware of crimes committed against civilians? Did you ask him to write a report on what he told you?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you inform General Farkas of this report at a function that was celebrating VJ day, and did Ojdanic -- I beg your pardon. The report went to Ojdanic by Farkas, and did Ojdanic pass the details to the accused on the 14th of May?

A. I must make some minor corrections in what you've said. General Geza was informed immediately after the first information was received from Kosovo, and he informed General Ojdanic not on the day of the army of Yugoslavia, because that is observed on the 16th of June, but on the day of security. That is the 13th of May, 1999. And on the 14th of May, General Ojdanic informed us that he had informed the now accused about it and that a meeting had been scheduled about the problem of crimes for the 17th of May.

Q. Was General Pavkovic ordered to come to Belgrade to brief General Ojdanic on alleged crimes, and were you also instructed to attend to provide information which your service had or had gathered?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. On the 16th of May, was there a meeting of the General Staff attended by Generals Pavkovic, Farkas, Colonel Gajic, and yourself, where criminal activities were discussed as was the topic of how to present this material to the accused on the following day?

A. Yes. I was present at the meeting as well. ¹⁵⁹⁹⁹

Q. The material provided, did it include details on volunteer groups and problems at volunteer centres?

A. Only one case was mentioned which was problematic, in the reception centre in Grocka where a group of volunteers entered without the usual procedure of training and checkups. But this was just mentioned in passing.

The main issue was reports about crimes committed by members of the army of Yugoslavia.

Q. And did General Pavkovic assert that the MUP were accusing the army of committing crimes where he claimed no crimes had been committed?

A. Yes. He stated -- specifically he made accusations that MUP was making against the army of Yugoslavia regarding some 800 persons but that all the examinations carried out, or investigations carried out by bodies of the 3rd Army had established that this was responsibility for the death and not for crimes committed against 271 people. After this information was passed on to MUP, MUP came out with its own figures according to which they have 326 persons under their responsibility. Then when these two figures are added up, they don't make 800. And I remember that this was discussed on the 16th in the evening.

Q. The meeting with the accused was on the following day. In the same location, the Supreme Command location that the previous meeting had happened?

A. That was, for me, the first meeting of some sort of a staff at the command post. Yes, that's right. That's true.

Q. Who was present at the meeting with the accused? ¹⁶⁰⁰⁰

A. Among the generals there was General Ojdanic, General Nebojsa Pavkovic, General Geza Farkas, myself, and Colonel Gajic. On the other side was Mr. Sainovic and Rade Markovic.

Q. Did you present information - just yes or no - on reports of crimes committed by the VJ and by volunteers in Kosovo?

A. Yes.

Q. Did General Pavkovic give his account which mentioned bodies in Jezerce.

A. Yes, that the army is being accused of those crimes, whereas it had not had any operations in that area at all.

Q. What did Rade Markovic say about that?

A. After the presentations by General Pavkovic, Rade Markovic joined in the discussion. He said that volunteers were a necessary evil that accompany any war, that it is true that he had sent -- or, rather, that he had received an offer from Arkan for 100 of his members from the Tiger unit, that he had taken 30 - I've already said that - and that he was also aware that Boca, whom we have mentioned, had been in Kosovo but that he had been informed by Djordjevic that he had been sent back.

Q. Was there any discussion about the numbers killed in line with the figures you've referred to as being mentioned on the previous day?

A. Yes. General Pavkovic referred to these numbers in his report, as well as to the problems linked to the MUP's accusations against the army, that it had committed crimes and that there were no such cases among them, as he said.

Q. What did the accused say, first of all to Markovic, as to what he ¹⁶⁰⁰¹ should do to sort out the problems with MUP volunteers?

A. He said that he should meet with Minister Vlajkovic and General Djordjevic and resolve this problem of volunteers, those that were specifically referred to, and that they should be told -- that their heads would not roll on that account but that there was no reason to protect them. And secondly, he said that such drastic cases as were mentioned have to be urgently sanctioned and dealt with and that the so-called great Serbs acting in this way and committing crimes were inflicting great damage to everything that Yugoslavia had so far achieved in the war. And then he also said that the borders towards Republika Srpska needed to be secured further, and that care should be taken that no further volunteer units should crop up somewhere in Kosovo, which would cause problems, and that also attention should be paid to the possibility of forces being infiltrated from Albania and Macedonia. And I remember very well that he said, "We must make sure that they don't put up their flags forming some sort of a border for Kosovo." Those were the main points made in his presentation. There were other details but I don't think they're important.

Q. Minister of Internal Affairs Stojiljkovic was not present. Was anything said about him?

A. It was not explained to us, but it was strange. There were five generals from the army of Yugoslavia and not a single general in command of the public security forces in Kosovo. And no explanation was given as to why they were not present there.

Q. I'll come back to some other features of the meeting that may have ¹⁶⁰⁰² struck you as surprising in a second, but we haven't yet heard what Sainovic said if and when he spoke, in summary. Can you help us?

A. Yes. He said that he was hearing for the first time of this centre and the presence of Arkan's men in Kosovo Polje, that he would check out the veracity of that report.

Regarding volunteers, he said that there were people who were purchasing, for large sums, uniforms of either the army or the MUP so as to be able to infiltrate themselves into Kosovo and to loot there. And he suggested that perhaps it wouldn't be a bad idea to send to Kosovo a body, a neutral body from Belgrade to investigate all the allegations made at the meeting.

Q. What was the accused's reaction to that recommendation?

A. In his statement, this recommendation was first mentioned by General Pavkovic, who had suggested that a state commission be formed as a neutral body that would investigate all the allegations being made by the MUP and also by the army and to establish the objective truth as to what was true in all these allegations.

I found it interesting that the accused left this out altogether, as if it hadn't been mentioned, though I believe it would have been a good idea.

Q. Do you remember anything that the accused said at the time that he did not react to recommendations of the kind we've heard about the army and the difference between the army and the MUP?

A. Yes. He said that the supreme level of the army was well defined but that Minister Stojiljkovic, together with General Djordjevic, needed ¹⁶⁰⁰³ to deal with the situation in MUP and put some order there. He also said that through the General Staff, the command of the army's work should be improved in Podgorica. Rather than when catching a group of terrorists from Pec they send them back to Kosovo to be investigated over there instead of that being done in Montenegro itself. Those were some of the comments he made. There are many details. I can't reproduce the whole meeting, and I don't know to what extent it's interesting.

Q. The presence of Arkan's Tigers would have been in contravention on the -- of the policy or law on incorporation of volunteers. When that was -- volunteer units, rather. When that was mentioned, how, if at all, did the accused react?

A. He didn't react at all, as if it hadn't been mentioned.

Q. Did he act surprised or did he ask any questions as to how this might have happened?

A. No. Even Mr. Sainovic expressed doubts that they were in Kosovo, though previously Rade Markovic had unequivocally stated that 30 of them had gone there with his knowledge and permission.

Q. Did the accused himself contribute in any positive way, concrete way, on how the criminal problem or the volunteer problems should be addressed?

A. Except for what I have said already, that drastic cases needed to be addressed, that this Boca had to be handed over to the judicial organs, there was no further discussion about it.

The conclusion was that there were certain problems in cooperation ¹⁶⁰⁰⁴ between organs of the military security and the state security of Serbia, and he instructed that that cooperation needed to be normalised, that a joint meeting needed to be held as soon as possible, at which all these differences and problems between the two needed to be resolved. That is what he said.

And as a consequence of this meeting in the General Staff, I know that General Ojdanic, on the 28th of May, held a meeting with the military judicial organs and --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt you, General Vasiljevic. It's time for a break.

MR. NICE: [Microphone not activated]

JUDGE MAY: And then you'll be finished.

MR. NICE: Yes. After that, there's only one question, with your leave, I might ask, which will probably complete all I want from the meeting, but I'm in your hands.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn now. Twenty minutes

--- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. Concluding your evidence on the meeting of the 17th of May, you've already made certain observations about the reactions of the accused. When the meeting ended, did you all leave or were some bidden to stay behind?

A. We generals left, and the accused said to Rade Markovic that he ¹⁶⁰⁰⁵ should stay on.

Q. Did anybody else stay on?

A. The accused, Mr. Sainovic, and Rade Markovic.

Q. Given the setting of this meeting and its purpose, did that seem to you appropriate or not?

A. The reason for holding this kind of meeting was that it was a normal thing to do. But what was wrong was that not everybody who was the best versed in the situation on the ground were not there. Stevanovic, Lukic. And I certainly think that the Minister of the Interior, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, should have been there as well.

Q. Let's move on. From your visits to the territory and from the reports you received - paragraph 262 - was it your judgement that -- well, when in your judgement were the most intensive operations that were conducted by the VJ, between what dates? Between the VJ and the MUP.

A. I cannot give an exact date, but at any rate, it was sometime in April 1999.

Q. Well, between the 23rd of March and April or what?

A. Then; from the beginning of the conflict with NATO until the end of April.

Q. On your visits to the territory in June, did you notice destruction in rural areas? Did you notice dead animals? Did you make any observation about the number of civilians you found left?

A. Yes. I did not see dead civilians, though. There were less of them in the urban areas. So this rural area, rather, was abandoned, empty. In the urban areas, the situation was normal. ¹⁶⁰⁰⁶ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹⁶⁰⁰⁷

Q. Of reports of crimes brought to your attention by UB units in Kosovo, was there one that involved volunteers commanded by Colonel Slobodan Stosic?

A. Not Colonel Stosic, Lieutenant Colonel Stosic. In his unit, there was a small group of volunteers as well.

Q. And what did you understand that they had done?

A. It was not my understanding, it was specific knowledge that I got. Volunteers nicknamed Dugi and Oto liquidated six or seven Albanian civilians and threw them into a well. That's in the village of Gornja Klina. And then they dug up that well. I found out about that case, and then I ordered that a military police patrol be sent there to carry out an on-site investigation. However, they could not enter the area because it was already under -- this entire area was under control of the Albanian terrorists.

Stosic was tried before a court in Nis.

Q. Short --

A. Military court.

MR. NICE: Short closed session to end the examination-in-chief.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted] ¹⁶⁰⁰⁸ Pages 16008-16015 - redacted - private session

¹⁶⁰¹⁶

[redacted]

[Open session]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Do you want to say something in private session or in open session?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, as you were discussing this in private session because it concerned the witness's safety, may we just clear up whether things are quite clear? As far as I understood the witness --

JUDGE MAY: We'll go back into private session.

[Private session]

[redacted]

[redacted] ¹⁶⁰¹⁷

[redacted]

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're back into open session.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] General, you're testifying openly, are you not, publicly?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ask in any previous procedure or contacts that you had ¹⁶⁰¹⁸ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹⁶⁰¹⁹ with the opposing party over there not to testify in public but to testify secretly?

A. No.

Q. So you never asked to give your testimony in closed session, secretly?

A. No.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I wish to make an objection on that score, Mr. May, because this is the umpteenth time that we have a witness under a code name who in fact did not ask to testify secretly but he is treated as somebody who testifies secretly, and you will recognise that this narrows down the area in which I myself or my associates can go about the business of collecting information with regard to this particular witness. And I should like that practice to be put a stop to.

JUDGE MAY: We take the point. We are not going to go into it now, but we can raise it with the Prosecution in due course. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. When did you become a JNA general?

A. You mean when I was promoted?

Q. Yes. When did you become a general? When were you promoted to the rank of general?

A. On the 22nd of December, 1990.

Q. So that was a time of peace, the time when the SFRY was still in existence, and the times of a regular way for promoting persons to the rank, invoking all the procedures according to the law and the rules and regulations that were upheld in the army; right? ¹⁶⁰²⁰

A. Right.

Q. Does that mean that you had to have completed and graduated from all the military schools?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. To qualify you for that rank and that you did not skip over a single military school, including the school for national defence; right?

A. Yes, right.

Q. Which means that in order to arrive at the rank of general, you had to show sufficient levels of knowledge as to the rules and regulations of the SFRY and particularly those from the constitution to the defence laws regulating the functioning of the armed forces; is that right?

A. Well, not quite. We didn't have a subject that was taught at military school which would mean studying the constitution. That is a general knowledge area for each and everyone.

Q. Yes, but I assume that as a general who reached the rank of general on a regular basis, regular procedure, do you assume that you would have to know provisions related to the armed forces?

A. Yes, in general terms.

Q. Right. Fine. Do you know by definition - and I'm going to quote Article 240 of the constitution of Yugoslavia - article 240, para 2, the armed forces - and I'll skip a bit there related to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia et cetera and so forth - make up a unified whole and are composed of the Yugoslav People's Army as a common armed force for all the nations and nationalities and all the working people and citizens of the country -- yes, I've been asked to slow down a bit. I shall read ¹⁶⁰²¹ slower.

As I was saying, are composed of the Yugoslav People's Army as a joint armed force of all the nations and nationalities and all the working people and citizens of Yugoslavia and the Territorial Defence as the broadest possible form of an organised armed general people's total national defence.

I assume you know about that.

A. Yes. Nothing that I want to challenge there.

Q. Fine. Right. You don't want to challenge anything. So the armed forces are united and uniform and they are composed of the JNA and the Territorial Defence. Fine.

Now let's go on to Article 313, which stipulates the following: The Presidency of the SFRY is the highest level of -- in the country and commands the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I don't suppose that is in dispute?

A. No, it is not.

Q. So it is in command of the armed forces that are made up of the JNA and the Territorial Defence.

The Yugoslav state Presidency determines the plan for the use and deployment of the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in case of war and orders their deployment in times of peace. The Presidency of Yugoslavia can direct matters of control and command and pass them on to the Federal Secretary for National Defence. The Federal Secretary for National Defence is responsible to the Presidency for the duties that have been passed down to him. ¹⁶⁰²² So none of that is being challenged, and I assume that you know about it all.

A. Yes. And you are reading it, so you are well aware of that too.

Q. Yes, I'm well aware of it and that's why I'm asking you the questions, because this relates to the beginning of your testimony in which you put forward assertions which are contrary to these rules and regulations. You were saying that the Territorial Defence was commanded by the president of the republic in the republic, et cetera, which, from the regulations I have quoted, would appear to be incorrect. And I'm going to remind you of the law on total national defence, which I assume you've read in view of the fact that you were a JNA general and you knew the law on total national defence or all people's national defence. That is something you would have to have known, I assume. But not to quote. I don't want to repeat that the armed forces were a unified form of organisation. That is not being questioned at all. In Article 88, it says: In the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, a military council shall be established. The military council in addition to the Federal Secretary for National Defence is composed of the following, the Chief of the General Staff, the deputy of the Federal Secretary, the under-secretary, the assistants, the principal inspector for national defence, the commanders of the armies, the commanders of the Territorial Defence of the republics and the commanders of the Territorial Defences of the autonomous provinces.

Therefore, all of them together. Are you challenging that?

A. No. That should be as it stands. ¹⁶⁰²³

Q. Now in the portion that speaks about control and command of the armed forces, and it is repeated that the Presidency, as the topmost organ, is in command of the armed forces and then it goes on to stipulate all the competencies and authorisations it has, and then it says it appoints and releases of duty, at the proposal of the republican and provisional organs, the commanders of the Territorial Defence of the republic or the commanders of the Territorial Defence of the autonomous province concerned.

So the commanders of the Territorial Defence, as a component part of the armed forces of each republic and every autonomous province, is appointed by the Presidency of the SFRY as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. Is that something that is challenged?

A. No, because they are generals, a decree is written, but the proposals come from the republics themselves.

Q. Article 111 stipulates the following: Control and command in Territorial Defence is effected by the commanders of the Territorial Defence and the senior officers in the Territorial Defence institutions, in keeping with the law, pursuant to the law.

And Article 115 goes on to say that the commanders of the Territorial Defence of the republics and the commanders of the Territorial Defence of the autonomous provinces are responsible, according to Article 130 of this law, and accountable to the Presidency of the SFRY. Is that disputed?

A. No. In normal situations that doesn't come under dispute. It shouldn't do. When the SFRY, the Socialist Federal Republic of ¹⁶⁰²⁴ Yugoslavia, exists in its complete form and the Presidency together with it.

Q. The Federal Secretary for National Defence may issue orders, instructions and other acts to the commanders of the Territorial Defence in implementing the orders of the SFRY from the Articles and pursuant to the Articles mentioned, and the command of the armed forces vested in it by the SFRY.

Therefore, you were trying to move along the lines of the opposing party and explain the implicits of the Territorial Defence and said that the Territorial Defence came under the authority of the president of the republic. As you can see, Territorial Defence was not under the competency and authority of the president of any republic and not even my own at the time as president of the Republic of Serbia. It came under the authority and competence of the armed forces themselves or, rather, the military structures. And you yourself, just to confirm that point, spoke about the fact that the Territorial Defence in the area of responsibility of the military districts was subordinated to the commands of those military districts. Isn't that right?

JUDGE MAY: That was several questions there. The first question was: The Territorial Defence wasn't under the competency of the president of any republic, including that of Serbia, but under the authority of the armed forces or the military structures. General, do you agree with that or not?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, first of all, it is my duty to state one thing: I wish to say that I haven't come here to work ¹⁶⁰²⁵ for any side whatsoever, either the Prosecution or the accused, but to tell the truth to the best of my knowledge. So that was a response to a remark made by the accused a moment ago.

And secondly, everything that was read out from the law relates to a normal situation in which a unified Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in existence and a situation in which the Yugoslav state Presidency exists as the collective commander.

As far as I recall, in the constitution of Serbia, and I think it dates back to 1989 or 1990, that particular constitution - and I'm sure the accused will know that better than me, he has the rules and regulations with him no doubt - there was a provision which stated, and I'm going to paraphrase it now, but the gist of it was the following: If certain decisions are made which are to the detriment of the interests of Serbia and its defence, then the provisions from that constitution will come into force. I said that I'm paraphrasing that particular portion. Now, everything that has been read out refers to a normal situation. However, if I may be permitted to ask the accused a question, if he had no authority vis-a-vis the Territorial Defence. I recall on one occasion that he did a review of troops, a brigade of the Territorial Defence, in fact. He reviewed the troops, I don't know on the basis of what competencies and authority if he indeed had no authority.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. It wasn't a review, it was a training session, and I was invited by the Territorial commander -- Territorial Defence of Serbia to see what it liked like. And as you know full well, that was standard ¹⁶⁰²⁶ practice. The civilian authorities would be invited to attend a training session, some exercises or some other activity along those lines, even of the military units, not only units of the Territorial Defence. But this was not the case in my particular instance.

But I'm very pleased to see that you mentioned this article of the Serbian constitution, and indeed I expected you to bring it up, which is why I have it in front of me here and now, and this is what it states. I'll read slowly. I have been warned by the interpreters, so I'll do my best to read slowly, because it is, of course, true that the Republic of Serbia did enact a uniform constitution and has all the rights and duties emanating from it.

But this is what it says in Article 135: The rights and duties of this republic - and it is the Republic of Serbia - which is within the composition of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and has pursuant to this constitution and which according to the federal constitution are implemented in the federation, shall be implemented in keeping with the federal constitution.

And the Republic of Serbia, as you know - and I hope you're not going to deny this - with its entire behaviour supported Yugoslavia -- supported the federation and in keeping with its constitution in which it says that its rights and duties --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop this. This is just a long speech. What is the question for the witness?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are you aware of the fact that, according to this Serbian ¹⁶⁰²⁷ constitution, the rights and duties which the Republic of Serbia, which is within the composition of the SFRY, and has, according to this constitution that it has, and according to the federal constitution should be realised in the federation, will be realised in keeping with the federal constitution? Did Serbia adhere to that?

A. You mean implemented in the republic or what?

Q. No. Her rights are implemented in keeping with the federal constitution and the ones which are regulated in the federation shall be implemented according to the federal constitution. So this constitution emphasises that everything that is in keeping with the federal constitution and belongs to its rights and duties it cedes to the federal constitution. Is that right or not?

A. Well the question is how was this reflected in practice?

Q. Well, I don't know what examples you have from practice, but did you, on the basis of one of your examples in practice, draw the conclusion, for example, because you used the word "I assume," you kept saying "I assume" when you were asked by Mr. Nice if so-and-so happened, if the members of the Territorial Defence were present, you mentioned from Valjevo, for example, from some other place in Serbia, and you said you assumed --

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did you have to have agreement from the president of the Republic of Serbia? Your answer was, "I assume it was necessary."

A. Yes, that's right. ¹⁶⁰²⁸

Q. Well, this kind of agreement was neither asked for nor was it necessary, according to these provisions, because the armed forces use the Territorial Defence units in their areas of responsibility. Now, were you shown this map at the beginning of your testimony? I think you said it was incorrect because the borders of the military districts were not drawn in as they have been here. You said that they were further to the east, that they were more due east. Now, is it contested that the borders of the military districts in no way followed the republican borders, the areas of responsibility of the military districts? They were not deployed according to state frontiers and republican borders but across Yugoslavia which was divided in three military districts, and they did not look at the republican borders at all. They were just three different sections of the country. Is that so or not?

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer instead of these endless questions.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, what you're saying I'm not challenging. I said the same thing, actually.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Oh, fine. Right. And is this contested, and I made a note of what you said: In an area where the JNA -- where the JNA was, the Territorial Defence was subordinated to the JNA.

A. Yes.

Q. I wrote that down in my notes on the basis of what you said during your testimony. I made a note of that. ¹⁶⁰²⁹ And especially when it comes to combat operations. It must be subordinated -- they must be subordinated to the JNA; is that right?

A. Yes. But I don't know what Territorial Defence you're talking about because I was talking about two types of Territorial Defence, particularly in the case of Slavonia.

Q. Well, I don't know about two types of Territorial Defence. All I know about is the concept of Territorial Defence as a whole, which is established on a given territory in conformity with the law. Now, if you think -- are thinking of a type of Territorial Defence that was formed in Eastern Slavonia, for example, as a separate Territorial Defence, then that's another matter, but then you ought to explain that.

A. Well, I have explained it. Perhaps you ought to explain what other type of Territorial Defence existed.

Q. I assume, since you say there are two types of Territorial Defence, then you should explain it, not me. I'm not aware of two types of Territorial Defence.

A. I was explaining about the Territorial Defence headed by people from your MUP.

Q. We'll come to that. That was not my MUP, it is the MUP of the Republic of Serbia. And there too you made a number of professional errors which are not deigned of a general who was head of the security department.

JUDGE MAY: Don't bother to answer that. That sort of comment, which is a slighting and unnecessary one, must be supported. Don't make a ¹⁶⁰³⁰ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹⁶⁰³¹ general comment of that sort unless you can support it. Now, what you should be doing is asking questions and not making comments of that sort.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am putting questions, Mr. May, with the greatest of pleasure, as this is a very useful witness. Unfortunately, not for the other side, as they believe, because we will bring the truth out to the fore.

JUDGE MAY: Let's get on. Let's get on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's precisely what I'm saying, that such errors should not be allowed to pass.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did you, insisted by -- Mr. Nice insisted. Did you answer that the head of the DB was accountable to the president of the republic? Is that what you said?

A. There was no insistence on his part. I said that the head of the state security, in the period I am aware of, was directly linked to you. That was one point.

And secondly, that when you became president of Yugoslavia, that same head of the SDB was moved from the Republic of Serbia and linked to you, and that is true. And I was not prompted to say this in any sense.

Q. Very well. And now I'm asking you, the state security department, is it one of the departments of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia? At least, in those days was it?

A. Are you talking according to the regulations?

Q. Yes. According to the regulations, the constitution, the law, the law on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and so on. ¹⁶⁰³²

A. That is all true, according to regulations.

Q. Does the head of the state security department have a superior? Is that the Minister of the Interior?

A. That is what it should be.

Q. So the head of the state security department is accountable first to the Minister of the Interior. Isn't that so?

A. That is how it should be.

Q. And is it true that the Minister of the Interior is a member of the government of the Republic of Serbia?

A. Yes.

Q. He implements the laws of the Republic of Serbia and is accountable to the government of Serbia?

A. There is no dispute as to the regulations, just please put the question to me.

Q. My question is: How, then, are you developing a pattern according to which the head of the state security is accountable directly to me and the president of the republic? You have also drawn out a diagram regarding the military structure, with some errors. We'll come back to that. And you indicated the links. As for this diagram, this structure, you made it off the bat and in accordance with what this Prosecution here is claiming.

A. Please don't keep linking me to the Prosecution as if we were in cahoots. I have come here to testify, neither against you nor in your favour. I have come here to tell the truth to extent I know it. Specifically in response to what you're saying now, I am familiar ¹⁶⁰³³ with all those regulations, and there's no dispute about that. But the situation is different when it comes to the reality. You cannot deny that the head of the state security was appointed according to your own choice. So I'm talking now about the year 1991 or, rather, 1990 when I joined the security administration.

Q. And who was the head of the state security when you joined it?

A. Zoran Janackovic. That is a man who, as far as I know, was --

Q. Wasn't Tosic before him? Or maybe he'd left when you joined.

A. No. I was absent at the time.

Q. I see. So it was Zoran Janackovic?

JUDGE MAY: Let's go back to Mr. Janackovic. General, you were interrupted. You said: "Zoran Janackovic. That is a man who, as far as I know, was ..." Did you want to add something to that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was interrupted with this flood of words, so I cannot finish what I was saying.

Zoran Janackovic was not a person employed in the state security service. He had no experience with the internal affairs department, and he was appointed to a professional position, obviously on the basis of a recommendation and liking of the accused, because I know that they were close friends.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I just wanted to clear up this question with respect to the regulations and whether things functioned accordingly. But if it didn't, how do you know that it didn't?

A. I can give you a partial answer to that straight away. At a ¹⁶⁰³⁴ meeting held on the 17th of May, 1999, which was not attended by the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, you tasked the head of the state security department to pass on to the minister what you are saying, as if he was of higher rank than the minister.

Q. Do you know that that head of the state security department was the assistant of that minister, and as the minister was not present, his assistant was present. Isn't it only logical for the assistant who is present, because the minister is not present, to convey to him what happened at the meeting, just as you would pass on to your superior whatever needed to be passed on if he was absent? What is more logical than that? He represents the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of Serbia. He's the assistant minister, a post he was appointed to by the government. And at -- every morning at meetings of the government, each head reports on the activities of his department.

JUDGE MAY: I'm stopping you because this is going well beyond the original question.

General, can you answer what's being put by the accused here? Would you wish him to clarify the question?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I recognise the point of the question. Let me say straight away it is not normal for a junior to be told what he should tell a senior. I was there not only because I was in the army. Any conclusions that may have been reached, I would pass on to my immediate subordinate. So we seem to not be hearing one another. The head of the state security is allegedly said to be subordinate to the minister, and the president is asking him to pass it on to the ¹⁶⁰³⁵ minister.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. How do you know that I did not invite him to the meeting? And do you know, for instance, General --

JUDGE MAY: Wait. There was a question. "How do you know that I did not invite him to the meeting?" That was the question.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that no general from the MUP was present, nor was the Minister of the Interior, if we're talking about the meeting on the 17th of May. Now, whether after that you passed on this information, I don't know. I assume you did. I just said what you told Rade Markovic, that he should pass on to the minister what was discussed at the meeting.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And you find that that is not logical, that he should brief the minister about everything said at the meeting? You don't find that logical?

A. For me, it was not logical for five leading generals to attend the meeting from the army without anyone from at least approximate rank from the MUP, who are familiar with the situation on the ground, to attend that meeting. I find that illogical.

Q. General, you don't know, for instance, but we'll come to that meeting because that came at the end of your testimony, so we'll come to it in due course, but do you happen to know that the minister was supposed to come, and only an hour prior to the meeting he apologised because he had a high temperature and he said, "But Rade's there, and he will inform ¹⁶⁰³⁶ me about everything," which is quite customary, and there's no drama, no big deal that someone didn't attend the meeting. This was no secret meeting for the Minister of the Interior or for any of you from the army.

A. Let me tell you now. On the contrary, it shouldn't be any secret. But first of all, you didn't tell us why those responsible people from the public security were not present. If he was ill, surely another three generals did not have a temperature.

Q. So I needed to justify myself to you why someone was not attending a meeting.

A. It's not a question of justification, it's a question of regular politeness.

Q. But we'll come that meeting. But maybe you'll feel embarrassed when you see some things linked to that meeting, embarrassed on account of the things you said here.

JUDGE MAY: No. Mr. Milosevic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There's no problem.

JUDGE MAY: These are not proper comments. If you've got some questions, you can ask them, not commenting like this.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Therefore, if we take into consideration the regulations that I've read out to you, the method in which the army functioned, as well as the armed forces of Yugoslavia, tell me, please, was it logical for you to say that the commander of the Territorial Defence of Vojvodina, General Mandaric in those days, was at the command post of General Panic, the ¹⁶⁰³⁷ commander of the 1st Army? Was that logical?

A. Yes. I mentioned this as a positive case; where units of the defence of Vojvodina were active, that their commander should be present.

Q. So that is fully in compliance with the rules.

A. Yes, absolutely so.

Q. So we've made that clear. In that context, you said that I said that Serbia was not at war. What's so bad about that?

A. Of course Serbia was not at war.

Q. We did support Yugoslavia, and we supported the JNA in its functions, but Serbia was not at war. Or do you consider that Serbia was at war?

A. Can I answer now?

Q. That's why I'm asking you.

A. As to the remark that Serbia was not at war, and then you go on to say that Serbia supported the JNA, why, then, was there no reaction to the failure of thousands of military reservists to respond to the call-up? I think about 12.000 of them for whom criminal charges were filed because of avoidance to serve.

Q. That's a question that the army should have dealt with and not the bodies of the Republic of Serbia. You know that well.

A. No. The army addresses a request to the MUP to find such people and bring them to the army.

Q. That's a rather unimportant question regarding your testimony, so we'll move on. There are several things that you mentioned here as some kind of facts. I will follow the order in which you spoke, and probably, ¹⁶⁰³⁸ according to the concept of Mr. Nice, he goes to some less important things and then the most important things, and he goes back and forth, so it's rather confusing, this order of his, but you say, for instance, speaking about the arming, you say that paramilitary units in Eastern Slavonia had some trophy rifles, automatic Thompson rifles, which you assumed had been taken from the warehouses of the Territorial Defence of Serbia.

A. That's not what I said. I said that I knew that such weapons existed within the Territorial Defence of Serbia. I know that for certain. And then I assume that from those depots they were distributed in that area.

Q. So you assume that from those depots these weapons were given to Eastern Slavonia. That is your assumption.

A. I have some more precise information which I didn't mention, and that is specifically that it came from one particular warehouse of the TO in the environs of Belgrade on the road leading to Valjevo. So from that warehouse, some weapons went to Slavonia.

Q. You mentioned here various persons who took part in the distribution of weapons, certain colonels, certain other officers and so on. And as far as I was able to gather, this did not happen on the basis of instructions from higher-level structures of the JNA who were the owners of these warehouses. But this went according to some friendly connections, people wanting to help somebody without any specific orders coming along the chain of command, "Deliver those weapons. Arm those people." Is that right or not? ¹⁶⁰³⁹

A. Yes, it is.

Q. So let's make this quite clear: Then you took as an example a request which you yourself called a megalomaniac, and it was shown here as an exhibit where somewhere in Bosnia the leadership is addressed and asked that the army provide for the needs of the police helicopters, armoured vehicles, anti-aircraft guns, weapons, communications devices, and you yourself said it was a megalomaniac as a request addressed to the army. That's what you said, isn't it?

A. Yes. But this happened in different time periods. These -- this individual distribution of weapons, a couple of pieces, maybe more, this occurred sometime in the first half of 1991. And as for these requests that you are referring to now, came in 1992. So that is in the period when the forces of the TO and the MUP in Krajina were preparing to constitute themselves as units which would later come under international control.

So these are two different time periods.

Q. Yes. But we're talking here about Bosnia, not Croatia at all.

A. You didn't say Bosnia or Croatia.

Q. But you said it was Bosnia, and you showed a document relating to Bosnia. The document was shown here listing a request needed for -- materials needed in Bosnia.

A. I will explain. Those were units that were also asking for weapons because they were close to Krajina. This is the centre in Banja Luka.

Q. But my question is the following, General: Was that request ¹⁶⁰⁴⁰ complied with?

A. No.

Q. Well, what, then, does such a request prove, a request addressed by a local leadership to the army which the army did not comply with? What does that prove, then?

A. It doesn't prove anything. I said it was a megalomaniac request that was not met.

Q. You didn't say that it was not met. You just said it was megalomaniac and so on. But it was not met?

A. As far as I know, it was not complied with.

Q. Very well, then. We are going to pause between question and answer because of the interpreters. You said that in the autumn of 1990 in Krajina, there were some high officials of the MUP of Serbia.

A. Yes.

Q. When Babic testified here, he managed to mention three of them who were there at different points in time. How many can you enumerate, those who were in Krajina in 1990? And Krajina is also in Yugoslavia, in Croatia, in Europe, and so on and so forth. Citizens of Yugoslavia were, therefore, in Krajina. So how many of them were there there?

A. As for that period that you are referring to, I know of one only.

Q. Oh. So one MUP high official in 1990 was in Krajina.

A. That's the part that I know about. Perhaps there were more of them, but I know of one.

Q. All right. And then on the basis of that, that this one official, who perhaps may have been from that area originally, and as you know full ¹⁶⁰⁴¹ well the one that we are mentioning does come from that area so he simply came to his native region. So does that provide for the statement that we heard here from the opposing side that the officials of the MUP of Serbia were staying in Krajina in 1990?

A. I was staying in Dubrovnik in 1990, in 1991, in 1989. So --

JUDGE MAY: It does not matter what the Prosecution said. You are referring to a statement, as you call it, from the other side. I take that to be a reference to the Prosecution. It's not for the witness to answer questions about what they said. All he can give evidence about is what he himself saw or heard, or indeed his evidence.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Then as far as your personal knowledge is concerned, you are not contesting anything. You just know of one person who worked in the MUP of Serbia and who was in Krajina in 1990; is that right?

A. First of all, this is a high official of the MUP of Serbia, not any official. That is one thing.

Secondly, he was not there on a private visit in Krajina and in Knin. He came with very specific assignments, and we had statements about that that we gathered towards the end of 1990 when we worked on documenting illegal armament both by the Serbs in Croatia too.

Q. Let's not mention any names because that bothers you. This man, does he originally come from Krajina?

A. I'm not aware of his origins. Judging by his name and surname, he may be from there.

Q. All right. Then I can tell you that originally he does come from ¹⁶⁰⁴² ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹⁶⁰⁴³ Krajina.

There is another thing that I'm going to challenge, but did you claim that Captain Dragan was a man of the DB, the state security, and that they brought him from Australia?

A. As far as the information that we received went, yes, that's right.

Q. Fine. Thank you. You said that around Sid some paramilitary formations appeared and that no one knew who was sending them. Is that the way you put it?

A. Yes, specifically concerning the camp where training was carried out.

Q. Please, did anybody send them or were they volunteers?

A. Specifically I can mention a case that you are aware of, when Mr. Seselj had a rally, either at the square of the republic or by the trade unions building, and he was sending volunteers to the theatre of war. And this was on television.

Q. General, you know full well that all opposition parties had many rallies, and I could not recall each and every rally, and I was not really all that interested either, but isn't it correct that all opposition parties had many rallies at that time? Is that right or is that not right?

A. That is not a problem. That is not an answer to what I said to you.

Q. I'm asking you the following now: Since you mentioned Dusan Silni, Mirko Jovic and then the Serb guard of the SPO and the Serb Radical ¹⁶⁰⁴⁴ Party, practically all major opposition parties set up some kind of volunteer detachments. Is that right?

A. At that time, they were trying to outdo each other in proving their Serbdom, and they were proud of that.

Q. But is this being challenged, that these were exclusively opposition parties in Serbia that were doing that at the time?

A. That is what I was talking about in that section of my statement.

Q. And perhaps the Socialist Party of Serbia, as the ruling party, did they set up some kind of volunteer units of their own or were all these detachments that you referred to established by various opposition parties?

A. I mentioned what was said in the TV programme made by the BBC, The Death of Yugoslavia, where Mr. Seselj stated that he armed and sent his own volunteers on -- according to the assignment issued to him by Jovica Stanisic.

Q. General, General, does that mean you are testifying here on the basis of having watched the BBC?

A. No; on the basis of what I heard Mr. Seselj say publicly. And partly he talked about that when he showed up in Vukovar.

Q. All right. If we have time, I'm going to ask you what else you saw on the BBC, but this is what you said that you saw on the BBC. All right.

Is it being contested that opposition parties set up these paramilitary formations?

A. Well, it shouldn't be contested. ¹⁶⁰⁴⁵

Q. Oh, so it's not being contested.

A. But it's not only them.

Q. What do you mean? Did the Socialist Party of Serbia perhaps establish some volunteer units?

A. You are reducing it to parties now.

Q. You said that opposition parties set up some kind of volunteer detachments.

A. Yes, but in addition to that, the people from the MUP.

Q. Ah, we're getting to that now, but just let me ask you one thing: Is it being contested that these opposition parties, precisely those that established these units, tried to topple me and the existing regime in Serbia on the 9th of March, 1991, and throughout the period of ten years, is that being contested? But let's --

JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Wait a moment. You've asked a question. Let the witness answer.

You are being asked, General, about the 9th of March, 1991, a specific question. Can you answer that, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So I can answer that in Serbia, going from one party to another, the attitude of these parties varied towards the president. There was a right -- there was a right wing position that was taken and then there were others who went into coalitions with the SPS, the Socialist Party of Serbia.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Perhaps we can go further on. If these opposition parties that established these detachments were organised -- I mean, these detachments ¹⁶⁰⁴⁶ were organised by the police, and you claim that I controlled the police, if that is correct, then the police worked against me. And if the police did not work against me, then what you have been saying cannot be true. Is that right or is that not right, General?

A. No, that's not right.

Q. So the police organised paramilitary formations of opposition parties that were working against the existing government, the existing president, and so on, the police of that same existing government?

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer that to clarify it, and then we'll adjourn.

Yes, General. Can you answer that question or would you wish the accused to clarify it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's clear. First of all, I did not claim that these paramilitary groups of the parties were organised by the people from the MUP.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Oh, so you are not claiming --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, let the witness finish. It's impossible if you keep interrupting.

Now, continue, General.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, but it was my understanding that that was his assertion. If that's not his assertion, then he can finish straight away.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here's my answer: Even where they knew about this, they did not take measures according to the law. They ¹⁶⁰⁴⁷ tolerated it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, can I ask you something? Do you know how many extremists, Muslim extremists from the territory of Serbia, from Sandzak fought as volunteers in the army of Alija Izetbegovic? Was it a large number?

A. I don't know.

JUDGE MAY: We're now going off on a totally different tangent. A totally different tangent, and we're going to adjourn. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So I put a question to you: Do you know how many volunteers, Muslim extremists from Sandzak went to fight in the army of Alija Izetbegovic? That means from Serbia. And your answer was that you do not know; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Wasn't it your job, since you headed the security administration of the JNA, to know about things like that precisely?

A. No. That is precisely what the state security of Serbia was supposed to be doing, because these are citizens of the Republic of Serbia. They are not military personnel.

Q. However, if the state security did not prevent those extremists from going to fight in Alija Izetbegovic's army, can you infer on that ¹⁶⁰⁴⁸ basis that the state security sent them to fight there?

A. That's not what I said.

Q. But why do you infer that the state security sent these volunteer units of these opposition parties that you mentioned?

A. I didn't say that they sent them.

Q. What did you say, that they didn't prevent them from doing that?

A. I said that they could have prevented them had they had some information about that, and they did have some knowledge about that.

Q. How did they not prevent these people from going from Sandzak? According to the same logic, they should have had that kind of knowledge.

A. I don't know whether they had that kind of knowledge.

Q. Oh, you don't know.

A. Now you are resorted to inverted logic.

Q. Oh, never mind. You said that you had information about a high official in Krajina who came from the MUP. Does that mean that you as the JNA security administration processed this official and that's how you had this information?

A. No. Had we processed him, we would have had a lot more information.

Q. Do you have operative information or do you not?

A. There is this operative information that he was staying in Krajina and that he had a pseudonym, that he introduced himself as being someone else rather than who he was, and that, in contact with Martic, he was involved in the organisation of Serbs, volunteers, who later entered the camp in Golubici. ¹⁶⁰⁴⁹

Q. All right. Tell me, since you had this particular information about one official of the police from Serbia who is a citizen of Yugoslavia and, therefore, he was staying in the territory of Yugoslavia, and you find that to be suspicious, did you have any information about some representatives of the police or similar services of foreign countries who were in the area at that time or around that time, if you had this particular piece of information about this one official from Serbia?

A. Again you are obfuscating the issue. I can talk about that information as well. I can talk about paramilitary formations and what the MUP of Croatia was doing precisely in that area.

Q. Oh, all right. The MUP of Croatia. But some other foreign countries, did you have information about that?

A. No. In the region of Krajina, no.

Q. What about the area of Croatia? Did you have that kind of information for Croatia as a whole?

A. There was one case around Opatovac, I believe, where bodies were found with IDs coming from foreign countries. But you should know at least that the security service of the JNA was not an almighty service controlling every single person. They had their own line of work and something that would come in as information that came in along with other kinds of information was also forwarded further on, but it was not our task to follow everything that was going on in Yugoslavia.

Q. All right. But if you claim that the security service of the army of Yugoslavia was not almighty, and of course I respect that, doesn't the ¹⁶⁰⁵⁰ same thing go to -- for the state security service, that they were not almighty either?

A. I'm not talking about them being almighty in the sense of that they cannot obtain information. I am trying to say that they are not supposed to compile information that does not fall within their own line of work. Also, the state security cannot know what the situation is in the army because they are not in charge. However, they are in charge of and responsible for knowing what the situation is amongst the citizens.

Q. As much as possible.

A. Yes, as much as possible.

Q. Have we clarified this, then, that it is not correct that the police of Serbia stood behind these paramilitary formations that you mentioned?

A. Which formations specifically?

Q. Well, you mentioned Dusan Silni, Mirko Jovic, SPO, SRS, practically all of them opposition parties.

A. So we can discuss this individually. I have no information that the state security service was behind the Dusan Silni detachment. However, the fact remains that this detachment from the territory of Serbia came there. And there is also the fact that two days after having given this information about the crime in Lovas to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, that I forwarded this information to the MUP of Serbia as well, believing that they are in charge of these persons who, from the territory of Serbia, came practically to the territory of Croatia. ¹⁶⁰⁵¹ I am not aware of any reaction of theirs in spite of the fact that a crime had been committed. I gave information about specifically 12 persons whom we had identified, and one of them was a Greek, judging by his last name.

So I think that everything is quite clear.

Q. Well, that is precisely what is not clear, because you say that the police of Serbia, according to what you've said, were supposed to operate in the territory of Croatia in order to throw light on a crime that was committed in Croatia. Wasn't that within the powers of the army under whose control that area was?

A. No. As far as the army is concerned, the military prosecutor was informed from the following aspect; that two military persons, the commander and the deputy commander of the detachment from Valjevo, partly participated in this event. However, the security service and the MUP of Serbia received information about 12 persons from that detachment who actually forced the Croats to be a human shield.

Q. All right. Did you come to know that the police of Serbia did not do anything about persons who were citizens of Serbia who had committed some crimes?

A. That's not what I said. Don't put words in my mouth.

Q. Don't you know that as early as the beginning of 1993 persons were tried in Serbia for having committed crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina because it was established that they were our citizens?

A. I'm not aware of that. I only know of the case of the Yellow Wasps, Zuta Osa, and I think that this trial was held in Loznica. I don't ¹⁶⁰⁵² know about any other cases.

Q. You do not know that measures were taken against perpetrators of crimes?

A. As far as I can see now in Belgrade, it is only now that some persons are standing trial, and these were persons that were brought into custody before by the MUP of Serbia and then they were sent off to Republika Srpska because it was said that they were under their jurisdiction and that's where they were actually set free.

Q. Is that the responsibility of Republic of Serbia?

A. Now these very same persons are being tried in Belgrade.

Q. So what is your explanation?

A. I think that what I've said is quite clear, that at that time that was tolerated. A modus operandi had been found. When somebody was supposed to be brought to justice, then they would be extradited and handed over, allegedly, to another area where they were supposed to be accountable.

Q. Oh, and they were citizens of Serbia?

A. Yes.

Q. I'm not aware of this information, but I wish you'd give it to me.

A. I know. Specifically I know about Lukic. He is a citizen of Serbia.

Q. Lukic who?

A. This group that took part in liquidations around Visegrad.

Q. Isn't that a citizen of Republika Srpska, rather, Bosnia-Herzegovina? ¹⁶⁰⁵³

A. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Q. I've heard of the name, but as far as I know, this is a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina or, rather, Republika Srpska. You mentioned a unit, or perhaps I didn't write it down properly, a unit called Crnogorac. Is that the way you put it?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that you do not know who was in that unit.

A. I don't know specifically.

Q. But you know who commanded the unit?

A. I did have information about that.

Q. Who commanded the unit? I mean, if this is something that does not jeopardise your safety and security, please give an answer. So you don't have to answer anything that would jeopardise you in any way.

A. I think that I mentioned that name in private session.

Q. Let's not mention any names then. Did he go there as a volunteer or did somebody send him?

A. I don't know about that.

Q. Oh, you don't know about that. All right. You said that as for the presence of some officials, Colonel Petrovic informed you about that, and he was a security organ somewhere there in Eastern Slavonia; right?

A. Colonel Petkovic, not Petrovic.

Q. Oh, Petkovic, then.

A. And there were other officers too.

Q. And you said that some officials of the MUP came to the area of Sid to visit General Arandjelovic or Andjelkovic, commander of the ¹⁶⁰⁵⁴ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹⁶⁰⁵⁵ division; is that right?

A. Arandjelovic.

Q. Arandjelovic, commander of the division.

A. Yes.

Q. And you said that this Colonel Petkovic of yours was sent away from these meetings.

A. Yes.

Q. Does that mean that he would come to meetings with them and then the commander would send him away or did they simply come to pay a visit to the commander of the division and talk to him, ask him about the situation, collect information, et cetera?

A. No. He saw them coming to see the commander, and he wanted to be present but then he was told that there was no need for him to be there.

Q. That means that they weren't discussing security issues. Perhaps they had come privately.

A. Well, I don't know why they would keep coming on a private basis to visit the most responsible commanders.

Q. All right, tell me this, then --

MR. NICE: Your Honours, this was all covered in private session. I don't know whether the witness has given thought to it.

JUDGE MAY: General, if you want to go into private session, just say so.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as we've started talking about this particular area and if he's going to continue along those lines, we can stay in open session. ¹⁶⁰⁵⁶

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So we established the fact that your security organ, that is to say Colonel Petkovic, did not attend those talks but that he informed you as to the content of those talks. So how could he inform you if he didn't attend the talks themselves?

A. Well, don't put words into my mouth and say things I didn't state. I didn't say that he informed me as to the discussions that had been held.

Q. So you don't know what they talked about.

A. Just a moment, please. Take it slowly. I want to explain what I mean.

It was unnatural that the organs of internal affairs should come to visit the commanders, and they were probably coming officially, paying official visits. And it wasn't natural -- just a moment, please -- that a security organ was not present, because if the problems -- problems of security were being discussed, then they would be the competent organ.

Q. Did you use the word a moment ago "probably officially"? What if they hadn't come officially? You assumed they come officially and you say probably. That is your assumption.

A. No, I didn't say probably officially.

Q. You did use the word "probably officially."

A. Well, yes, it was probably officially, but did they come privately? You know why they came.

Q. I don't even know that they went. But you were explaining, let's take another example, that in 1989, as early on as then, while you were the division commander in Sarajevo, when you would go to visit a general, ¹⁶⁰⁵⁷ one of your colleagues who held a higher rank, you came across there somebody who was a later high official of the state security. So do you assume that they knew each other on a private basis and liked to have a chat and visit each other?

A. The command and headquarters is not a place where you go to see someone privately.

Q. Do you wish to say that nobody ever visited you privately at your workplace?

A. While I was in the security administration, if I did have a private visit, then it did not take place in my office; I had to go to the room for visitors. When I was a general as well, that applied then too.

Q. So you're talking about the General Staff, are you?

A. The other commands as well. The rules are the same; the room for visitors is where you go for private visits.

Q. So the commander of an army, for example, if somebody's coming to see him privately, is not allowed to receive that private visitor in his working office but has to go to the visitor's room; is that what you are saying?

A. Well, commanders can do anything they like, but I'm talking about rules and regulations. And here, quite obviously, these were not official visits and that it was building up relationships which would later come to their finale. The final act would come later.

Q. So this is your assumption, that somebody in 1989 was in fact building up relations with somebody -- or, rather, the state security was building up relations with someone in the army in 1989, and you exclude ¹⁶⁰⁵⁸ any private friendships, socialising on a private basis, and things of that kind?

A. I think I have said enough on that subject, and the people who are called upon to draw their own conclusions will be able to do so.

Q. Well, those conclusions are not that deep that they cannot be drawn.

I'm not quite sure whether this next question was discussed in private session. I haven't noted that down, but let me just mention what I'm talking about. The 28th of June, 1992, when General Panic issued an order of some kind. Was that discussed in private session? You were asked. That was the question that you were asked.

A. I can't remember that, the 28th of June, 1992.

JUDGE MAY: Just ask your question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, my question is, as I have noted it down, the following: That the commander of the Territorial Defence, Panic, ordered -- so Panic, who was in command in that area. Do you remember that?

A. Yes, but it wasn't the 28th of June, it was the 28th of January, 1992.

Q. Well, then I read it out wrongly. Yes, I noted down the 28th of January. Did we discuss that in private session?

A. Well, I can talk about it in open session too.

Q. In open session too. Right. So he asked the commander of the Territorial Defence that Arkan's unit be sent away from the territory, from that area, and somebody told you, you said, that Radovan Stojicic at ¹⁶⁰⁵⁹ that time said that there wouldn't be any problems on that score because it would be within the frameworks of a brigade to be established by the MUP of Serbia. Is that what you said?

A. I didn't mention the commander of the Territorial Defence. You probably misspoke on that score. But an order did come out to disband and disarm the paramilitary formations.

Q. And that order was quite in order; right?

A. Yes. On the 10th of December. Of the Presidency. And according to that order, these formations and units were --

Q. Were to be disbanded?

A. Well, they hadn't been disbanded yet, and then General Panic issued an order to General Petkovic to come into contact with Stojicic and to caution him about that, and I said what he answered.

Q. All right. But you say that Stojicic on that occasion said there'd be no problems because they'd come under the formation of the guards formed by the MUP of Serbia. That's what you said.

A. Yes.

Q. Well, did the MUP of Serbia actually form a brigade in Eastern Slavonia? Do you happen to know that there was any kind of MUP of Serbia brigade in Eastern Slavonia?

A. Well, I'm just saying what this man answered, not what he did subsequently.

Q. No. You're telling us what somebody told you he had been told and not what he had answered.

A. No, no, no. That wasn't any wives' tale. ¹⁶⁰⁶⁰

Q. I'm asking you about a material fact. To the best of your knowledge, was any kind of brigade of the MUP of Serbia formed on the territory of Eastern Slavonia? That's my question, please.

A. Well, I'd have to go back and remember as to whether I received information of that kind, but I did have information that it was in a unit of this kind, in a brigade of this kind, that some of the people from the formations I mentioned earlier on did form part of that new formation.

Q. Well, don't you find something illogical there? Was it not a question of the formation of units which was affected by the authorities of Krajina in the area? I don't know that any Serbian MUP Brigade existed in the area. Do you know about that? Do you have knowledge about its existence? That's what I'm asking you; was there, to your knowledge, a brigade by the MUP of Serbia established in Eastern Slavonia?

A. Well, that question contains something I would like to ask you: Why did General Zivota Panic tell Colonel Petkovic that for Arkan's units he was to caution Stojicic Badza that they should be disbanded? What would have to do with that? That's the question.

Q. Well, what you said was that part of those people or some of those people were citizens of Serbia, and therefore, he was drawing attention to the fact that citizens of Serbia, volunteers who had come there, should be sent away from the area. So what other explanation could you have? That's the logical explanation. Do you have a different explanation?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Well, tell us then.

A. My explanation is that Arkan's units at that time was under the ¹⁶⁰⁶¹ absolute control of the people from the MUP of Serbia.

Q. How do you base that assertion? What do you base that assertion on that Arkan's volunteer guards were under the control of the MUP of Serbia? I'm hearing that for the first time.

A. And did you hear that they had official identification cards of the state security of Serbia?

Q. I heard that Arkan had an ID card issued by the federal MUP and state security or, rather, the Federal Secretariat for the Interior at the time the secretariat was headed by Stane Dolanc. He was the federal secretary of the day. That's what I heard, and I'm sure you know all about that better than me.

A. Well, those identification cards were changed.

Q. I don't know whether they were changed but is what I'm telling you correct, this piece of information, that he did have documents issued by the federal SUP to him during the SFRY when Stane Dolanc, a Slovene, a leading Slovenian politician, was at the head of the state secretariat?

A. Well, that was at that early period of time.

Q. So that's correct, is it?

A. Well, I assume it is.

Q. We, let's leave behind that farce about Arkan and the MUP of Serbia if it's quite clear that it was the federal SUP from the one time Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

A. Don't put words into my mouth, please, and say things I didn't say.

Q. You mentioned, and you can decide for yourself whether this ¹⁶⁰⁶² jeopardises your safety and whether we need to go into private session to discuss it further, the meeting on the 25th of February, 1992, in Vukovar, where you said -- you told us the people who attended the meeting, and you said that they decided to place a commander for the Territorial Defence in Vukovar. Do you need a private session?

A. Well, if we don't name names, I don't need to go into private session.

Q. All right, then. May I quote one name which is not a threat to you? And the name is Goran Hadzic, who was at that time the president of Eastern Slavonia, the president of the Assembly, or the Prime Minister, whichever you like, of the autonomous province of Eastern Slavonia; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Well, was it under his competence and authority to appoint a commander of the Territorial Defence?

A. Well, what came under his competence and authority, if you were to read the rules and regulations and laws you read out to begin with, then it would appear that this was some sort of improvisation following along from that. However, it is not the aim of my discussion to address those issues but that two men from the MUP of Serbia were appointed to be the commander and the Chief of Staff of the Territorial Defence.

Q. All right. Tell me this, then: Those two men for whom you say were from the MUP of Serbia, I don't know, I don't know the names so I can't say for sure myself, but were they, at the time, working in the MUP of Serbia or had they come as volunteers because they originated from the ¹⁶⁰⁶³ area?

A. Well, I can't quite understand how an active duty officer can become a volunteer.

Q. Why not, if he leaves his work post and goes off somewhere to be a volunteer?

A. Well, he would have had to leave his work post first.

Q. How do you know he didn't?

A. Well, because I said the two men came from the MUP of Serbia.

Q. Well, they couldn't work in the MUP of Serbia and be in the Territorial Defence over there. That's impossible. They might have had some job to do in the MUP of Serbia and weren't able to continue doing that job if they went over there.

A. All I said was that they were from the MUP of Serbia and were appointed to that post; and second, that Badza Stojicic was also an official of the MUP of Serbia.

Q. Well, when he did that he wasn't an official of the MUP of Serbia.

A. I don't know that.

Q. Who could he carry on his work and function in the MUP of Serbia if he was over there on a volunteer basis to help with the defence in Eastern Slavonia, for example?

A. Well, we would have to go into private session if you want me to respond to that.

Q. This is a logical question. It doesn't call for a private session at all.

JUDGE MAY: If the witness feels more comfortable in a private ¹⁶⁰⁶⁴ session, we'll go into private session.

[Private session]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. You said that somebody had been appointed, quite obviously by the competent organs over there, to head the Territorial Defence, and you also said at the same time and parallelly speaking about other matters, that active officers were appointed at the head of TO Krajina, active officials of the JNA, officers of the JNA. Is that what you said?

A. They were sent to take up posts in the Ministry of Defence of Krajina.

Q. Active officers?

A. Yes, they were active, and on the basis of procedure, they were sent there. Before that, they had been active officers.

Q. Now, does that confirm that the Territorial Defence was under the control of the JNA?

A. In that area, yes.

Q. Fine. Right. I have something to ask you now related to the financing that you talked about. You said that Yugoslavia, the army of ¹⁶⁰⁶⁷ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹⁶⁰⁶⁸ Yugoslavia financed or gave financial assistance to the army of Republika Srpska and the army of Srpska Krajina from Serbia, and it is not disputed that it did give financial assistance. So please tell me this: Answer a very simple question now, please. Did the army of Yugoslavia -- because you linked this up, did it have any functions with respect to issuing orders to combat activity of the army of Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina? Did it do that?

A. I don't have any knowledge about that because I was outside active duty service at that time.

Q. Well, then, is it clear that these were separate armies, separate institutions, separate states, and from this materially it has to be separated because it is not in dispute? Is that right or not?

A. Why would one army send requests to another army to send soldiers who dodged the call-up?

Q. I didn't quite understand what you said.

A. Why was there correspondence addressed by one army to another army, asking officers to be sent to them which refused to respond to the call-up if these were two separate armies in absolute terms?

Q. First of all, is it clear that while the SFRY still existed, these were all officers of one and the same army called the Yugoslav People's Army?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear speak about the meeting between Branko Kostic and Veljko Kadijevic and Alija Izetbegovic when they agreed that members of the JNA originating from Bosnia-Herzegovina should return to Bosnia and ¹⁶⁰⁶⁹ Herzegovina? Did you mention that meeting?

A. Yes, I did. But it wasn't General Kadijevic but Blagoje Adzic.

Q. Yes, yes. I'm sorry. I made a mistake. So Branko Kostic, the vice-president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, and Blagoje Adzic, when he had replaced Kadijevic, anyway the number one man, number one general in the army, had a meeting with Alija Izetbegovic at which Izetbegovic requested that members of the JNA originating from Bosnia-Herzegovina should all return to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. And that they should leave the JNA and come to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A. He was implying the Bosniaks in the first place, but he also requested that citizens who are not from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and are members of the JNA should leave Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Very well. And did the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, when it was formed on the 28th of April, 1992, withdrew all citizens born in Serbia and Montenegro - that is the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Is that right or not?

A. A little later. There was some delay, but yes.

Q. But the dynamics was determined by logistic and technical problems but certainly not by any hesitation to do that; isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Why is it strange then if the authorities of the Republic of Serbian Krajina ask -- make the same request as Izetbegovic made from ¹⁶⁰⁷⁰ Hadzic and Kostic to allow officers coming from their area, born there, to return and join the army of the Republika Srpska Krajina?

A. These were active-duty officers of the army of Yugoslavia.

Q. But when we were talking about Izetbegovic, they were also active officers.

A. But I'm not talking about Izetbegovic.

Q. Yes, but I am. Wasn't he referring to active duty officers to return?

A. Those who wanted.

Q. Wasn't it in this case too those who wanted?

A. Those who wanted could remain in the army of Yugoslavia. But contrary to their wish, another army was asked to extradite them, to put it very crudely, to an army in another state, and this was a request made to the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff.

Q. I have a very clear-cut piece of information in that connection, but let us clear this up first: Did anyone among the citizens of Krajina or Republika Srpska, was anyone sent by force to the army of Republika Srpska and the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina by the JNA, or were they officers from that area who wanted to go there and assist in the defence of those areas?

A. I do not know that they were taken there by force, but I do know that those who didn't want to go suffered certain consequences with respect to the status they enjoyed at the time, and I mentioned examples, the example of a Macedonian who happened to be born in Sarajevo, and on whom pressure was brought to bear that he would have to go to Sarajevo ¹⁶⁰⁷¹ again to join the army of Republika Srpska.

Q. That was a problem in the army and that is meaningless, just by the place of birth. It has nothing to do with that. It was just a bureaucratic problem.

A. Yes, and you intervened.

Q. If I hadn't intervened, it would have probably been solved differently. But didn't you say a moment ago that no one was forced to join the army of Republika Srpska or the Republic of Serbian Krajina even though they were citizens of those republics and not of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

A. But I said something else which you're not mentioning.

Q. Which?

A. That there was a pressure on them with regard to the status they had in the service. I might also add that all those persons didn't have the usual ID of a citizen of Yugoslavia but, rather, they had a marking on their ID with the letter "T" or "Transit," meaning that they had served in the army of Yugoslavia, and for many years they could not acquire Yugoslav citizenship. So this process of granting citizenship to members of the army of Yugoslavia was accelerated only after the changes of the 5th of October.

Q. Which members of the army of Yugoslavia? Who were from that other region?

A. Yes. They couldn't get citizenship for years. It was not possible to resolve their status.

Q. And they were officers of the army of Yugoslavia? ¹⁶⁰⁷²

A. Yes, they were officers. And they submitted a request to that effect, but for years this was tabled in the ministry.

Q. But you know very well that the question of citizenship was resolved in the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs and not the MUP of Serbia. You should be familiar with those regulations. Yes, but let me ask you, is this true -- in view of your testimony, I have here a completely different information or version, so please would you comment on it and tell me whether it is correct or not. "All officers who, as volunteers, went to Krajina and Bosnia were called up as a result of requests from Krajina and the Republika Srpska." Is that right or not?

A. I don't know. I'm afraid I'm unable to give you a clear-cut answer. I don't know.

Q. Very well. But if we're talking about active-duty officers of the JNA, and they were called up and this question was raised in the JNA, you, for instance, are from Krajina, and you are asked by the leadership of Krajina to assist them in the defence, you're an active-duty officer of the JNA, and you have to raise the issue with your superiors in your unit; right?

A. Yes. Allow me to answer. I did respond to such questions by saying that he could go there, but that he should first be demobilised from the JNA, that he should terminate his service in the JNA, after which he can go where he wants to. That's what happened. You're probably referring to the army of Yugoslavia, but you mentioned the JNA.

Q. No. I meant the army of Yugoslavia. Discussions were organised ¹⁶⁰⁷³ with those officers, or interviews, who at the request of people from Krajina or from Republika Srpska were required to go back there, and at those meetings, they would state whether they want to go to their native area or not. And here is the information I have: At those meetings, about 80 per cent of those who were requested to go back there refused to go. I don't know whether this figure is accurate. I thought until now that if a larger number accepted to go -- but those who refused to go, no one sent there on the part of the army of Yugoslavia because they had no right to do so in view of the fact that there was fighting in another state. Therefore, those who refused to go were not ordered to go, either to Bosnia or to Krajina. Is that right or not?

A. It is true that meetings were held with those officers.

Q. And then they discussed with them whether they wanted to go or not.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is also true that those discussions did have the effect of a certain psychological pressure. This was just not mere voluntariness. I would not have been asked in one particular case to intervene so that that officer would not go there. So I think if it had been absolute voluntariness, a man would say he didn't want to go and nothing would happen.

As far as I know, there were two distinct periods, the period of 1993, when there was clear pressure brought on such officers.

Q. On the part of whom?

A. On the part of officers in responsible positions, that he had to ¹⁶⁰⁷⁴ go to serve in Bijeljina. I have the specific case of one of my deputies.

Q. Was he from Bijeljina?

A. He was from Bijeljina. Either he would be pensioned off or he would go to Bijeljina. And I had to intervene to keep him in active service. This was in 1993.

In 1992 -- that is the second half of 1992 and the beginning of 1993. Later on, this was -- the pressure was reduced.

Q. But in the second half of 1992 and beginning of 1993, weren't you already retired?

A. I'm talking to you globally about this period.

Q. Yes, but you're saying second half of 1992 and 1993. You were a pensioner at the time. What assistant are you talking about?

A. Allow me to answer your question. I cannot give you an answer if you keep interrupting me.

So this particular case I'm talking about happened in April 1992, the specific example I'm mentioning, when a man had to retire or go over there. But I'm speaking about the situation globally, from mid-1992 to 1993. I can tell you who was pensioned off in that period and why the climate afterwards changed.

You mentioned the meetings that were held when people were persuaded to go. That's a different situation in relation to 1992 and 1993. And this was also used for a kind of ethnic cleansing of the army of those who were not born in Serbia and Montenegro.

Q. What are you talking about? Cleansing from Serbs who were not born in Serbia, is that what you're saying? ¹⁶⁰⁷⁵

A. Not just that. Let me tell you that I was asked by a high-ranking general to remove from service all those who were not Serbs and Montenegrins, and even a Croat who had been discovered, a very important case in Croatia that is public knowledge, and I refused to do that.

Q. General, you were quite right in doing that, but do you know, General, that that never was the policy of Yugoslavia nor the policy of the political leadership of Yugoslavia or Serbia, to remove anyone on the basis of their ethnicity from the army of Yugoslavia? After all, in 1999, your immediate superior, the chief of the security administration in the army of Yugoslavia, was a Hungarian. And there were generals who were Muslims and Albanians and people of all ethnicities in the army of Yugoslavia. Only in Serbia and Montenegro. And in Serbia, while I was the president, no one was discriminated against on the basis of ethnicity. Are you aware of that?

A. I will give you an answer. First of all, when we spoke on the 5th of March, 1992, about why my deputy had been replaced, General Tumanov, who was a Macedonian, you literally gave me the following answer: "When in the Macedonian army they appoint a Serb as deputy chief of their service, security service, then we will appoint Tumanov here for the chief." So that is one example.

Q. But Tumanov wasn't replaced then for that reason.

A. I'm not going into the reasons for his replacement. But that's out of the question. There were questions given to us as to whether we were married to Muslims, and you received such information even in the year 2000. ¹⁶⁰⁷⁶

Q. That is not true, but let's move on.

A. What I am saying is true. And secondly, when you're talking about Geza, there's no dispute that he's Hungarian, a citizen of Yugoslavia, though. I don't know whether you know that when your Minister of Internal Affairs, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, came to see General Ojdanic for a meeting and asked whether General Ojdanic was alone, when his adjutant said that Geza was inside - I feel embarrassed in saying this but I have to say it - he said, "Are you still keeping that Hungarian here?" If I'm embarrassed to say that, I've still decided to say it, I'm not making it up. I'm talking about the climate that was in evidence. There is no dispute that there were generals who were Albanian and those who were Hungarian and Muslim. There's no dispute over that. But I do know that many other honourable men, among them numerous pilots, Slovenes, Croats, who did something that maybe a Serb would not have done in those days also had to leave their positions. That is how the commander of the air force was removed and all others.

Q. Which commander of the air force was removed?

A. Zvonko Jurjevic.

Q. And did you perhaps follow when I showed a tape here or played a tape of a conversation between Kadijevic and Tudjman after the signing of the cease-fire in Igalo, in the presence of Lord Carrington, when Tudjman says to Kadijevic, "Very well, even Jurjevic has not returned to you," and Kadijevic tells him, "I know why he didn't return. It's up to him." So he wasn't replaced, but he stayed on when he went to Zagreb for a weekend and never returned. So he said it's to his credit. ¹⁶⁰⁷⁷ Why are you saying that when it's not true, when we have material fact that he abandoned the service?

JUDGE MAY: Wait a minute. Let the witness deal with the conversation which was alleged to have been on the tape. Can you help us at all about that particular case, General?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can. So you've made a mistake. It is not Zvonko Jurjevic, it is probably General Tus.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Tus went before him and he became the Chief of General Staff in Croatia. Isn't that right?

JUDGE MAY: Let him finish. Let him finish.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Jurjevic was retired. I believe on the 8th or 9th of February, 1992. He still lives in Belgrade. He hasn't gone anywhere. And he was persecuted. I know that. I know that personally. He was chased with a knife and with a pistol in the streets of Belgrade because he was proclaimed to be a traitor. And he's a greater Yugoslav than I am.

Let me tell you one more thing. As far as Tus is concerned, he did not escape or run away. He was pensioned off according to normal procedure, and he went to live where his family was, namely in Zagreb. So he did not desert the JNA. He was pensioned off, and he went to Zagreb.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. When was he pensioned off?

A. He was pensioned off in June 1991.

Q. All right. Is that at the time when you yourself say that I did ¹⁶⁰⁷⁸ not have any influence on the top military leadership?

A. Well, the top military leadership that I was in, these are the closest --

Q. Well, there's one top military leadership, not a hundred of them.

JUDGE MAY: One at a time, please. Let the witness finish. Don't interrupt his train of thought.

You were dealing with the top military leadership, General.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So this is a rather indefinite term. Who are actually the generals in the top military leadership? I consider as the top military leadership the federal secretary, the Chief of General Staff, and their closest associates who make up the top staff of the federal secretary. And there are other high-ranking generals who were in the General Staff, but they did not belong to what I call the top military leadership.

To the best of my knowledge, in that stage you did not have considerable influence over that top military leadership.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I did not have any influence.

A. I'm saying that there were some generals, and I gave examples of who you directly talked to.

Q. Who did I talk to directly?

A. That was in closed session.

Q. This is not under wraps in any way. Who was it that I talked to, and why do you infer on that basis that I have influence over the military leadership? ¹⁶⁰⁷⁹

A. I'm just saying now that it is unusual for the president of a republic, any republic, to communicate without the knowledge of his superior of any -- with any general, and that is what you did then.

Q. Please, wait a minute. I don't see that this is a question for a closed session. I hope you will agree with that. Is that right?

A. All right. What is it that we should discuss?

Q. Please. You say that I spoke on the telephone with Zivota Panic. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Zivota Panic commander of the 1st Army then?

A. No, he wasn't.

Q. What was he?

A. He was deputy Chief of General Staff for the ground forces.

Q. All right. For the ground forces. So at any rate, he was in charge of the ground forces.

Do you know, first of all, as for General Panic, I knew him only superficially. I had only a few contacts with him. Do you know that at that time when I was looking for him I actually answered his telephone call because they connected me because he had called me before that. And do you know why he called me? Now, that is again a question that has to do again with your own internal procedure, not mine, because I am a well-brought up person and I respond to calls that are made to me. He called me because the police --

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, paragraphs 118 and 119 -- ¹⁶⁰⁸⁰ ^{BLANK PAGE} ¹⁶⁰⁸¹

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.

MR. NICE: Paragraphs 118 and 119, the witness may be really being pushed into a position of going into open session where he has little chance but to agree to the accused's proposals.

JUDGE MAY: Let's go into private session then.

[Private session]

[redacted]

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¹⁶⁰⁸³ Page 16083 - redacted - private session

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[redacted]

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume that I'll be given Monday and Tuesday of next week for my examination of this witness, because I started my cross-examination in the latter half of today. So could you please tell me. I don't want to get any surprises and shortenings which would upset my cross-examination, so could you tell me now how much time. He began the week before last to testify, in fact.

JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. Let us work that out.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: On a rough calculation, it seems you've got 7 hours, 45 minutes. But that's a rough calculation. So that, I think, will take care of tomorrow and Monday. But work on that basis.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. But that would then be less ¹⁶⁰⁸⁵ than two and a half days, Mr. May, whereas he testified for three days. Tomorrow is the second day, Monday the third day, and examination-in-chief took longer than three days.

JUDGE MAY: We've worked it out on an hourly basis, not on a daily basis.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then, work it out on an hourly basis, it comes to the same.

JUDGE MAY: That's the ruling for the moment. We will adjourn and sit again tomorrow morning, 9.00.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 14th day of

February, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.