¹⁶⁸⁷⁹

Wednesday, 26 February 2003

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Four very short matters of report. First; the witness Vasiljkovic, called last week, made serious allegations about the OTP as the Chamber will recall. He's been repeating them and enlarging them in the press. Quite inappropriate, of course, for the OTP to make any comments on such matters, however, the Court should know that after he left last week and when it was possible to locate him, he was informed not only, of course, that he would no longer be contacted in relation to his evidence but that there would be an inquiry into the allegations that he was making at which he would be invited to take part. That remains the position. The Chamber will be informed of the result of inquiries one way or another in -- of that inquiry one way or the other in due course and we will seek to call the evidence that I spoke of last week. Second, I think we are awaiting a decision in respect of the 92 bis'ing of C-032 in part and respectfully ask that we can hear about that because he's coming up soon. And --

JUDGE MAY: C-032. Is that in the large group that we had?

MR. NICE: I'm afraid I'll need some assistance on that, but --

JUDGE MAY: The legal officer kindly reminds us it's in the last application. We may be able to have a look at that today.

MR. NICE: We'd be very grateful. I'm going to be in and out ¹⁶⁸⁸⁰ today but on procedural matters I or, in this case, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff will come and deal with it, if necessary.

The Vukovar motion will be in today because we know you want to deal with that.

And the fourth and last point is that there is a report on contempt, a further report on contempt by a Montenegrin newspaper that you wanted for us. We've been unable to take the matter any further, and we'll give, as it were, a nil return report in relation to that today or very soon.

Mr. Groome will take the next witness.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. I seem to be having some trouble with my headphones.

Yes.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the Prosecution calls Ambassador Herbert Okun.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if I may, while we're waiting for the witness to be brought in, there are three volumes of exhibits which I will be working with with the ambassador. It will please the Court, I'd ask we assign them exhibit numbers now. The first binder is a group of UN documents as well as some other miscellaneous documents. It's the soft cover blue binder that you have.

The second one is the seven notebooks which together comprise diaries for the Vance mission to Yugoslavia from October 1991 until May of 1992. ¹⁶⁸⁸¹ And binder three are nine notebooks which together comprise Ambassador Okun's diaries for the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia from September of 1992 until May of 1993.

JUDGE MAY: Well, allow the witness to take the declaration and we'll then deal with the exhibits.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take the declaration, Ambassador.

THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

WITNESS: HERBERT OKUN

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Perhaps we could deal with these exhibit numbers.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Volume 1 will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 396, Volume 2 will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 397, and Volume 3 will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 398.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Now, the witness has a limited amount of time in which he can be available; is that right?

MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: By Friday morning.

MR. GROOME: No, by Friday afternoon. He has a class to teach on Monday. He has informed me that, if necessary, he will cancel that class but would prefer not to.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. And we also have another witness to interpose tomorrow. ¹⁶⁸⁸²

MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: So effectively, we've got two days and perhaps a bit.

MR. GROOME: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: So if you'd bear that in mind, of course, when taking the witness in chief. If you can deal with that as expeditiously as possible.

MR. GROOME: In order to expedite the taking of the evidence in chief, there are a number of meetings referred to in the summary which I will not adduce evidence, live testimony. I believe the diary entries are self-explanatory and clear, and I would believe -- I would draw the Chamber's attention to these specific diary entries but I will not be asking the ambassador specific questions regarding them.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. And, Ambassador, if you want to take a break at any time, tell us and we can adjourn.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Before I start, Your Honour, I would also inform the Court that we will be using this Sanction system again. So although the Chamber does have hard copies of all the diary entries, the particular page that I will be referring to with the ambassador will also appear on the computer screen in front of you.

JUDGE MAY: That's called the Sanction system?

MR. GROOME: Sanction II is the name of the computer programme that puts it up on the screen.

Examined by Mr. Groome:

Q. Ambassador Okun, I would like to begin by asking you about your ¹⁶⁸⁸³ background and career as a diplomat. In order to expedite this, I'd ask you to take a look at Prosecution Exhibit 396, tab 1, and it will be displayed on the screen in front you. If you can read it clearly, I'd ask you, do you recognise what is depicted on the screen in front of you? The screen should be placed to "off" for the ambassador.

A. Yes, I see it.

Q. Do you recognise what that is?

A. Yes.

Q. And what is that, Ambassador?

A. It is my biographic entry in Who's Who in America.

Q. Have you read it and is it correct?

A. Yes, it is, with one minor change.

Q. And what is that?

A. It was the entry for the year 2001, and it shows me as a -- correctly as a member of the -- US member of the UN International Narcotics Control Board. My term ended in 2002, so I am no longer a member of the board. Otherwise, it's correct.

Q. Ambassador, I'd ask you to briefly describe -- or perhaps I'll read to you a paragraph regarding some of the more salient parts of your career and ask you to agree or disagree with what I read afterwards. Is it true that you had a long career in international diplomacy, that you served as an officer in the United States Foreign Service from 1955 until 1991?

A. Yes.

Q. In the early 1960s, while serving in the US embassy in Moscow ¹⁶⁸⁸⁴ during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, you were the person responsible for translating the letters from Chairman Kruschev to President Kennedy.

In the late 1970s, you were deputy chairman of the US delegation at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, commonly known as SALT II; is that correct?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. When were you first appointed as an ambassador?

A. In 1980, to the German Democratic Republic.

Q. And how long did you hold that post?

A. I served in Berlin from 1980 to 1983.

Q. I'm just waiting for the translation to catch up. From 1985 to 1989, what post did you hold?

A. I was deputy permanent representative and ambassador of the United States to the United Nations.

Q. From 1991 to 1997, did you serve in the capacity as the special advisor and the deputy to the personal envoy of the UN Secretary-General?

A. Yes.

Q. And on what issues did you work in relation to?

A. From 1991 to 1993, primarily Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 1993 to 1997, we worked primarily, almost exclusively, on the dispute between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Q. From September of 1992 until May of 1993, were you the deputy co-chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia?

A. Yes. ¹⁶⁸⁸⁵

Q. In 1996 to 1997, were you special advisor to the International Commission on Missing Persons in the former Yugoslavia?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Now, Ambassador, in addition to what is in tab 1 of Prosecution Exhibit 396 and what we've discussed here, have you had any teaching positions?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you please describe them for us.

A. During most of the 1990s, I was a visiting lecturer on international law at the Yale Law School in Connecticut in the US, and at present I'm a professorial lecturer on international relations, international law, and international institutions at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C.

Q. Ambassador Okun, I would ask you at this stage, could you please give the Chamber with a little greater detail the role and responsibilities you played in Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

A. Well, Secretary Vance and I were the representatives of the Secretary-General. The initial responsibility began in October of 1991 when there was heavy fighting in Croatia, and we went there initially to see the situation, to find out the facts, and then to determine and recommend to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of the UN a course of action.

In Bosnia, the situation was more complex, more difficult, and the situation there was the matter of a conference, but recommending a course ^{16886 BLANK PAGE 16887} of action and deciding what to do was the same principle. And between Greece and Macedonia, the issue was to avert a conflict between them and, if we could, as we did, reach a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

Q. Prior to the 1990s, had you ever had occasion to be in Yugoslavia or have a job in connection with Yugoslavia?

A. Yes.

Q. Please describe for us.

A. I first visited Yugoslavia in 1957 as a tourist. I travelled throughout the country. In the middle 1970s, specifically 1973, 1974, I was political advisor to the NATO Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, based in Naples, with the specific responsibility of watching and reporting on the situation in Yugoslavia at the time.

Q. Do you know Mr. Milosevic?

A. Yes.

Q. When was the first time that you met him?

A. The first time was December 1990.

Q. And can you describe just briefly the circumstances surrounding your meeting with Mr. Milosevic at that time.

A. Yes. I was travelling with a group of senior American officials and businessmen, including Secretary -- former Secretary of State Vance under the auspices of the Financial Services Volunteer Corps. This is an organisation we had founded, a not-for-profit organisation that worked on bringing free market institutions to former communist countries, and we were there to examine and discuss the political situation in Yugoslavia. ¹⁶⁸⁸⁸

Q. In addition to meeting Mr. Milosevic, did you meet other federal and republican government officials?

A. Yes, I believe we met them all.

Q. Now, your first set of missions to the area as the deputy to the special envoy of the UN Secretary-General, can you describe, just in a summary fashion, when those missions took place.

A. Well, they began in early October of 1991 and extended through June of 1992. The heaviest period of involvement was between October and January when Secretary Vance achieved a cessation of hostilities in Croatia and the entry of a peacekeeping force.

Q. Before we talk about specific meetings in relation to that mission, can you assist us by telling us, what was the culminating act or work product of that series of missions?

A. The culmination was the implementing accord of January 2, 1992, which implemented a previous tentative cease-fire agreement and that effectively ended the war, brought about a cessation of hostilities in Croatia.

Q. After this series of missions, did you then embark on a second series of missions to the region?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you please tell us the times and the mandate of that series of missions.

A. We went back again - that is Secretary Vance and I - at the very beginning of October, the first days of October 1992, when fighting began in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then there was a hiatus, but beginning with ¹⁶⁸⁸⁹ the London conference in August of 1992 which led to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia a week later, in September, we were involved continuously in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and still somewhat marginally on the issues involving the peacekeeping operation in Croatia.

Q. And what was the culminating act or work product of this series of missions?

A. The conference's culminating act, as you describe it, was the development and presentation to the parties of the political settlement for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the so-called Vance-Owen Peace Plan.

Q. Was that peace plan, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, ultimately adopted by all of the parties?

A. No, it was not.

Q. Which party did not, or rejected it?

A. It was accepted by the Bosnian Croats and by the Bosnian Muslims, and it was ultimately rejected by the Bosnian Serbs.

Q. Now, during the course of these two sets of missions, did you keep records regarding the meetings that you had with the principals involved?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you describe what method of record-keeping you employed.

A. I took notes of all the meetings we attended at the time the meetings occurred. The diaries, the notebooks are here at my side. And I did that regularly.

Q. Would it be fair to say that for every mission, there is an ¹⁶⁸⁹⁰ individual notebook that you created to record what you heard?

A. Yes. Yes, it's correct. That is how I organised the work product.

Q. And was every meeting recorded in your diaries?

A. Yes. Every meeting that I attended.

Q. And the notes -- are you the sole author of the material in your diaries?

A. Yes.

Q. And were your notes made contemporaneously with, when the meetings were going on?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the diaries reflect the statements of many of the principal political and military leaders involved in the break-up of Yugoslavia, inter alia, the federal Yugoslav authorities, the presidents of the republics, local Serb leaders in Croatia, Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Serb, and Bosnian Croat leaders as well as Albanian leaders in Kosovo and Albania, Macedonians and Montenegrins? Do your diaries include records of meetings with all of those people?

A. Yes, they do.

Q. Do the diaries also record the times when Secretary Vance and yourself notified these leaders of crimes that were being committed by people on their side or under their control?

A. Yes, frequently.

Q. During these meetings that you had, did some of the other parties also have note-takers? ¹⁶⁸⁹¹

A. Intermittently some of the other parties did. Sometimes yes, sometimes no.

Q. And did your diary notes form the basis of Secretary Vance's reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do with the diaries after you completed your mission?

A. I kept them in my possession.

Q. Have they ever been published or been made the subject of any published work?

A. No.

Q. Are you willing to make them available to the Chamber to use as evidence in this case or any other case before the Tribunal?

A. Yes, indeed.

Q. Now, Ambassador, to assist the Chamber in reading the diaries, did you work with a member of the Prosecution staff to create a glossary of the -- of terms that you used in the diary?

A. Yes, I did.

MR. GROOME: I'd ask that the ambassador be shown Prosecution Exhibit 34 -- 396, tab 2, and I would note for the Chamber that footnote 3 in the witness summary contains some last-minute corrections to typographical errors that Ambassador Okun made late yesterday, after the exhibit was processed. So I'd ask the Chamber to read both the glossary in conjunction with footnote 3 in the witness summary.

Q. Is that the glossary that you worked to create to assist the Chamber in deciphering the diaries? ¹⁶⁸⁹²

A. Yes, it is.

JUDGE KWON: If you could help me to find the witness summary.

MR. GROOME: Yes. There were some typographical errors in the exhibit that the witness has. Those corrections are in footnote 3, and it is on page --

JUDGE KWON: We found it.

MR. GROOME: I'm sorry. The witness summary is marked -- we're asking it be marked for identification as tab 15.

JUDGE MAY: And footnote 3, if you would tell us that.

MR. GROOME: It's on page 4, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Ambassador, did you also work with a member of the Prosecution staff to create a schedule of an index to some of the more important or significant meetings in the diary?

A. Yes.

Q. I'd ask that you take a look at Prosecution Exhibit 396, tab 4 -- no, I'm sorry; tab 3. Is that a -- the index of important meetings that you helped create to assist the Chamber?

A. Yes.

Q. Ambassador, I would like to now ask you about some specific meetings.

MR. GROOME: I would note, for the Chamber, that I will be skipping the first meeting in the summary and proceeding directly to paragraph 13 of the witness summary. ¹⁶⁸⁹³

Q. Ambassador, I'd like to draw your attention to a meeting of the 13th of October, 1991. Did you meet with Mr. Milosevic in his office on that day?

A. Yes.

Q. During your meetings with Mr. Milosevic, what language was used?

A. He normally spoke English. He speaks very good English.

Q. Did Mr. Milosevic -- was there ever a translator used that you can recall?

A. I don't believe so.

Q. And would Mr. Milosevic have been able to see you taking the notes that you took during your meetings with him?

A. Surely.

Q. Ambassador, I'd ask you to summarise what occurred during this first meeting.

A. At that first meeting, which was between a meeting with the Federal Prime Minister, the then Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic, and General Kadijevic, at that meeting, President Milosevic, of course, greeted Secretary Vance courteously and discussed the situation in the country. Secretary Vance had some questions, and President Milosevic answered them. Specifically, he told us that he disclaimed responsibility or control, one might say, over the JNA or over the Rump Presidency, and he spoke at some length about the crimes he described that were being committed against the Serbian people in Croatia.

Q. Did there come a time when Secretary Vance and yourself attempted to verify some of the information that Mr. Milosevic presented to you ^{16894 BLANK PAGE 16895} during this meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. And were you able to verify it as true or false?

A. Well, the -- on the matter of control of the JNA and the Rump Presidency, the fact was that President Milosevic was the controlling factor. He did control the JNA de facto, and also he controlled the Rump Presidency of Yugoslavia, which was then basically Serbia and Montenegro, and he certainly was the man in charge. We never were able to verify the descriptions of the thousands of Serbs being killed. Of course, there were Serbs being killed in Croatia, but the overwhelming number of fatalities were Croatians being killed by the Serbs. So the situation was really the reverse to that he described.

Q. After meeting with Mr. Milosevic, did you meet with General Veljko Kadijevic and General Adzic on the same day?

A. Yes.

MR. GROOME: Your Honours, I will not go -- ask the ambassador specific questions about this, but I would draw the Chamber's attention to the diary entries relevant to that meeting.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. I think in order that we can have it on the record and to help us find our way through, if on each of these occasions you refer to the diary entry so that we have a record of it.

MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: I see, for instance, that the first meeting you referred to, the diary appears to be 397, tab 1.

MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. ¹⁶⁸⁹⁶

JUDGE MAY: Is that right?

MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. And it was page 47, as marked in the diary, not the --

JUDGE MAY: Page 47 of the diary, yes.

MR. GROOME: The first set of diaries were numbered by Ambassador Okun, so you would be correct. It's 397, tab 1, page 47.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

MR. GROOME: The first meeting that I skipped, Your Honour, with respect to Prime Minister Ante Markovic, that would be Prosecution Exhibit 397, tab 1, page 43.

Q. Ambassador, could you assist us: With respect to the meeting you had with Veljko Kadijevic, General Kadijevic, what page in the diary was that meeting noted?

A. I see it begins on diary page 54 and ends on page 63. Pages 54 to 63 of the diary in the Vance mission book number 1.

Q. Ambassador, I'd ask you to take a look at Prosecution Exhibit 396, tab 4. Do you recognise what is depicted in this photograph?

MR. GROOME: And if that could be placed on the overhead projector.

THE WITNESS: Yes, I recognise that picture.

MR. GROOME:

Q. And what is depicted in that picture?

A. It's a picture of President Milosevic and me, talking together.

Q. And where was this picture taken, if you remember?

A. It was taken in his office. ¹⁶⁸⁹⁷

Q. Was it taken during one of the meetings that you had with Mr. Milosevic?

A. Yes. Probably in December 1991.

Q. Thank you. Ambassador, I'd like to now draw your attention to the Carrington Draft Convention on the 18th of October, 1991, an event that you recorded in your diaries, which would be 397, tab 1, page 131. Can you please describe for the Chamber what the Carrington Draft Convention was?

A. The so-called Carrington Draft Convention was the culminating document of the EC-sponsored - that's the European Community's - Conference on Yugoslavia. Throughout conflict in Croatia and the first six months of the conflict in Bosnia, that is from the summer of 1991 until September of 1992, the diplomatic negotiations for a settlement were led by the European Community. The conference that they called, which all Yugoslav parties participated in, was called the Conference on Yugoslavia, although it was given other names by the press. And Lord Carrington, the former British Foreign Secretary, was the chairman of the conference. In October, on the 18th of October, Lord Carrington, after consultation with all the Yugoslav parties, presented a plan for an overall comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav conflict, and that was called the Agreed General Settlement, I believe.

Q. Ambassador, I'm going to show you Prosecution Exhibit 396, tab 5. I'd ask you to take a look at it and ask you whether you recognise what this document is.

A. Yes. That is the document of 18 October 1991 of Lord Carrington. ¹⁶⁸⁹⁸ Excuse me, I was incorrect in its name. It's not the Agreement for General Settlement, it's called Arrangements for General Settlement. Arrangements for General Settlement. It was, in effect, a framework agreement for a peace treaty.

Q. And did the respective parties adopt this arrangement?

MR. GROOME: Thank you, Usher.

THE WITNESS: It was accepted by all of the Yugoslav republics except one.

MR. GROOME:

Q. And which republic rejected it?

A. Serbia.

Q. And what did the Serb delegation do on the 18th of October, 1991?

A. They -- the Serb delegation at the conference walked out. That is, they physically got up out of their seats and left the conference room; a walkout.

Q. Did you yourself form an opinion regarding the significance of what happened on the 18th of October, 1991?

A. I did.

Q. And can you please tell us what that was.

A. I felt and believed at the time that the Serb walkout was a very serious blow to the conference and signalled the fact that Serbia alone among the Yugoslav republics was the one that wished the war to continue.

JUDGE MAY: Where was this conference, Ambassador? Can you remember that?

THE WITNESS: Where was it held? ¹⁶⁸⁹⁹

JUDGE MAY: We have a number of conferences and we're trying to get them into order. We have a number of plans which we're dealing with.

THE WITNESS: Yes. If I may take a moment, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, please.

THE WITNESS: The name of the conference was the Conference on Yugoslavia, but it was often referred to by the city in which it was held. This particular meeting in October 1991 was held in The Hague and was often referred to in the press and by others as The Hague Peace Conference.

The reason it was held in The Hague was that the Dutch government at that time held the rotating presidency of the EC. When the presidency moved on January 1, 1992, to Portugal, the conference then shifted to Brussels. So it became the Brussels Peace Conference, to the press and to the public at large. But it was always and we always referred to it, for ease of reference and accuracy, as the Conference on Yugoslavia, namely, the EC-sponsored conference under Lord Carrington's chair.

JUDGE MAY: We in fact have had evidence about this, but I don't think as clearly as we're getting it now.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Ambassador, are there other conferences that have popular designations because of where they were held that officially were part of this EC initiative named the Conference on Yugoslavia? You've told us about the Hague Peace Conference and the Brussels Peace Conference. Were there any others that fall within the ambit of the Conference on Yugoslavia? ¹⁶⁹⁰⁰

A. Yes.

Q. Please can you tell us those.

A. There were several others. When the conflict broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in March of 1992, Lord Carrington appointed a Portuguese diplomat, a very able Portuguese diplomat, Ambassador Jose Cutilheiro, to head a smaller conference specifically on the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. You will recall that the Conference on Yugoslavia was an overall conference. It concerned all of Yugoslavia. So Lord Carrington asked Ambassador Cutilheiro to work specifically on the conflict in Bosnia. That subconference was often referred to as the Cutilheiro Conference or the Lisbon Conference, depending on where they met, but it was an adjunct to the Carrington Conference on Yugoslavia. It was the Bosnian addendum, if you will.

Q. Were there any other conferences that fall within the ambit of the Conference on Yugoslavia?

A. Well, the final conference was called by the British government in August 1992 when the UK had taken the presidency of the European Community, and that was the final conference of the EC-sponsored effort.

Q. Ambassador, while we're talking on this subject, would it be fair to say that at some point when the Conference on Yugoslavia ended, there was a broader initiative of conferences that involved not just the EC but other nations as well as EC members?

A. Yes, there were, to the degree that the UN became increasingly involved throughout 1992.

Q. What is the name that's attributed to that set of conferences that ¹⁶⁹⁰¹ began after the Conference on Yugoslavia completed its work?

A. Well, as I mentioned, immediately after the London conference of August 1992 -- at the London conference, the decision was made to end the EC effort, the solo effort of the European Community. Out of the London conference came a combined EC-United Nations effort. That was the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia which began its work in September 1992 and continued until about 1995.

Q. Now, unlike the Conference on Yugoslavia, did the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, did that have more or less a base of operations or a location from which it conducted most of its business?

A. Yes. The conference had a headquarters from which it did all its business.

Q. And was this particular conference commonly referred to by its initials I-C-F-Y or ICFY?

A. Yes, that's correct. Incidentally, the headquarters was Geneva.

Q. I want to draw you back now to the 6th of November, 1991. Did you have a meeting with the Federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic?

A. Yes.

Q. I'd ask you to open up your diary to that page. And which mission is this, Ambassador?

A. This was during the second -- our second mission to Yugoslavia.

Q. And that would be Prosecution Exhibit 397, tab 2, page 32. Can I ask you to first briefly summarise what occurred during this meeting with Prime Minister Ante Markovic.

A. Yes. He made some important statements and comments on the ^{16902 BLANK PAGE 16903} situation. At least, we found them important. He told us that the Yugoslav People's Army, the JNA, the federal army, was becoming increasingly Serbianised, as he put it, as an army of Serbia. He also mentioned that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina were acting in a secessionist way and that Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic were planning to divide Bosnia between them, that is between Serbia and Croatia. He mentioned that the European Community still believed the problem could be resolved quickly but that he thought they were quite wrong on that matter, that the problem was more difficult than the EC thought. And I believe he spoke about the JNA arming Serb irregulars and paramilitaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Ambassador, I'm going to draw your attention to the top half of page 32, and I'm going to ask you just to describe some of the nomenclature that you used when you recorded people's statements so that the Chamber can accurately interpret what it was you were recording. There you have "CRV," and it has a line saying, "I worry about Serbia and Croatia." "CRV" stands for who?

A. "CRV" is Secretary Vance. His name is Cyrus Roberts Vance, and I would use the initials.

Q. And incidentally, is it true that Secretary Vance has since died?

A. Yes, unfortunately, that is true.

Q. Now, underneath that, there is the word "Mark," underlined, and then a passage. "Mark" refers to?

A. "Mark" is Prime Minister Markovic.

Q. Some of the passage, beginning with, "They already discussed it, ¹⁶⁹⁰⁴ i.e., dividing of B-H..." some of it appears in quotes. The word "secessionist" appears in quotes. The remainder does not. Can you please describe for the Chamber what is the significance, how should they interpret the text that's not in quotes and how should they interpret the text that is in quotes?

A. Well, throughout the diaries, I was writing them as the individuals were speaking. Throughout the diaries, the text not in quotes is an almost exact quote. It's a very, very close paraphrase of what was said, usually the exact words. When something seemed particularly important and I heard the words, the words were used, I would put it inside quotes, so that everything inside quotes was said, and I heard it and noted it in quotes. So if the word "secessionist" is quoted, it means he used the word "secessionist." But rest of the sentence would be also accurate.

Q. Now, as a result of your early meetings with members or presidents of the respective republics and other military leaders that you met, did Secretary Vance and yourself form an opinion as regarding what you might achieve that would assist the peace process or the peace negotiations that were being conducted under Lord Carrington?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. And can you please describe what it was you believed could assist.

A. Yes. We came to the conclusion fairly early on that the creation and imposition of a peacekeeping force, that is to say the creation of a peacekeeping operation and the subsequent imposition of a peacekeeping force in Croatia could materially assist Lord Carrington in his efforts to ¹⁶⁹⁰⁵ reach a political settlement of the conflict in Croatia.

Q. Did there come a time during one of the missions that -- or -- I'll withdraw that.

Was the purpose of one of the missions to Yugoslavia to go and present these ideas to the respective parties?

A. Yes. That happened in November of 1991.

Q. And who was the first person that you presented these ideas to?

A. The first person was President Milosevic.

Q. I draw your attention to a meeting of the 18th of November, 1991, and that would be in your book 3, or Prosecution Exhibit 397, tab 3, page 40 is where the meeting begins.

Is that the meeting at which these ideas were first presented to Mr. Milosevic?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Ambassador, as I ask you to describe what transpired during that meeting, you'll note that pages 42 and 43 are presented on the monitor for the parties and the Chamber to view. Can you please describe for us what occurred during the course of that meeting.

A. Well, it was an important and lengthy meeting. We met with President Milosevic and Mr. Jovanovic for about two hours, and Secretary Vance, and we outlined the parameters of a possible peacekeeping operation to Mr. Milosevic.

Q. The plan that was presented to Mr. Milosevic, did it differ materially from other UN peacekeeping plans?

A. Yes. ¹⁶⁹⁰⁶

Q. And in what way did it?

A. It differed significantly from all other previous UN peacekeeping operations since it did not involve a mere separation of the parties, a so-called green line across the frontline of a battlefield, but rather it involved what we labelled an inkblot technique. That is the creation of UN peacekeeping force areas that were not contiguous in Croatia and which had the purpose of protecting the Serb population and the Croatian population from the ravages of war, and these became the, and were called, United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia.

Q. And were those areas commonly referred to by their initials, U-N-P-A, or UNPAs?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. Now, during the course of this meeting, was the plan fully explained to Mr. Milosevic?

A. Yes. The outline of the plan was fully explained to him.

Q. And what was his reaction, if any, to the plan?

A. His immediate reaction was to say that the plan was fully acceptable to him and to Yugoslavia. Those words are noted at the bottom of page 40 of the diary, and the quote is: "Completely suitable for what we have in Yugoslavia." That was President Milosevic's immediate reaction.

Q. Was Mr. Milosevic asked what General Veljko Kadijevic's reaction would be to such a proposal?

A. Yes, Mr. Vance asked him that question.

Q. And what was his response? ¹⁶⁹⁰⁷

A. The president responded that General Kadijevic would agree to the peacekeeping operation.

Q. Ambassador, at this point in time, had the plan been presented to General Kadijevic or to anybody who in turn might have presented it to General Kadijevic?

A. No, it had not.

Q. Can you please continue with what occurred during the meeting.

A. Well, President Milosevic, as I indicated, said that General Kadijevic would agree. There was some discussion of whether the full former Yugoslav Presidency of eight members or the Rump Presidency of four members would be the overall authorising force, but that was not really an issue.

President Milosevic continued on by saying that, "We in Serbia did not allow any irregular or paramilitary troops," but he did acknowledge that in the Eastern Krajinas there were, as he put it, "some local Serbs" who were working with the JNA and helping them.

Q. Ambassador, just to take you back, you have, "We in Serbia did not allow any irregular or paramilitary troops," in quotes. So does that indicate that those were the very words Mr. Milosevic used?

A. Yes.

Q. At some point in the meeting was Mr. Milosevic asked about the command structure that existed in the Krajinas?

A. Yes. He was asked about the command structure in the Croatian Krajinas.

Q. Can you please describe what he told you and Secretary Vance. ¹⁶⁹⁰⁸

A. He said that Babic and Goran Hadzic were both the political and military leaders in the Croatian Krajinas. They were the local Serb political and military leaders.

Q. Did he say anything else with respect to those two men?

A. Yes. He discussed their attitude towards the peacekeeping operation.

Q. Can you please be more specific.

A. He said they would represent no problem. He was quite confident on that point, and said, "You can believe me, they will not represent a problem vis-a-vis a proposed peacekeeping operation."

Q. What occurred next during the course of this meeting?

A. He also mentioned at the meeting that 20 Serb villages in Croatia had recently been razed and burned to the ground.

Q. Did Secretary Vance request any additional information regarding these villages?

A. We asked him whether a list of the villages or maps could be provided.

Q. And did he ever provide those maps or a list of village names?

A. He said he would provide the maps, but we never received them.

Q. The Vance -- the plan that you were presenting on this day, did it call for the prompt demilitarisation of these U-N-P-As or UNPAs?

A. Yes. That was an essential feature of the plan, was to demilitarise the UN protected areas.

Q. Was this demilitarisation discussed with Mr. Milosevic?

A. Yes. ¹⁶⁹⁰⁹

Q. And what did he say?

A. He said that the demilitarisation might take longer than we had in mind.

Q. How did you interpret that statement?

A. Well, I interpreted it at the time - and I note here that I put a red star next to it in the diary and underlined it - as indicating possible non-compliance with the terms of the peacekeeping operation.

Q. I would draw your attention to page 48. Towards the end of this meeting, did Mr. Milosevic make a final assertion regarding the position of the Serbian side and the JNA?

A. Yes. At the conclusion of the meeting, President Milosevic said, reiterated, that the Serbian side and the JNA would accept and agree to a UN peacekeeping operation.

Q. And when he used the term "Serbian side," what did you take that to mean? What parties did that include in your mind?

A. Well, in our judgement, it would have included the JNA, as he mentioned explicitly, and the "Serbian side" would have included the Serb irregulars and paramilitaries; Arkan's men, Seselj's men, the White Eagles, those fellows.

Q. Ambassador, would it be fair to say that the successful implementation of what you were proposing would have required the agreement of a -- quite a number of different parties?

A. Well, yes and no.

Q. Please explain.

A. It would have required a number of parties to the degree that ^{16910 BLANK PAGE 16911} there were isolated irregular units fighting the irregulars and the paramilitaries, as they were referred to by all people. Clearly one would need the approval of the Yugoslav government, Serbian government, the Croatian government, the JNA, the Croatian armed forces. But essentially, it boiled down to the approval of Croatia - that is President Tudjman - and Serbia - that is President Milosevic.

Q. By the time this meeting had concluded, did Secretary Vance and yourself believe that Mr. Milosevic had assured you of the agreement of a number of parties other than himself individually?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. Can you please explicitly tell us which parties you believed Mr. Milosevic had committed to this plan.

A. We believed at the time, and I still believe correctly, that the president had committed himself, the Yugoslav government, the JNA, and the paramilitaries and the irregulars, as well as the local Serb leadership, Goran Hadzic and Milan Babic, to the peacekeeping operation.

Q. You've told us that this was a long meeting. Was there any time during the meeting during which there was a break during which Mr. Milosevic would have been able to, perhaps outside of your presence, use a telephone and contact some of these different people or parties?

A. No. I don't think he ever broke up a meeting to telephone somebody or seek advice or anything like that.

Q. Did he at any time express to you the necessity of having to discuss this matter with some of these parties and the need to perhaps get back to you regarding a future course of action? ¹⁶⁹¹²

A. No.

Q. And did he qualify the assurances he gave you with any statement to the effect that it would depend on further negotiations or discussions with these parties?

A. No. I would say to the contrary; he was quite confident in what he said.

Q. Ambassador, after this meeting, who was the next -- what was the very next meeting that you had?

A. The next meeting was with the Defence Minister, General Kadijevic. He was accompanied by Admiral Brovet and Colonel Obradovic.

Q. If I could draw the Chamber's attention to Prosecution Exhibit 397, tab 3, page 50.

Ambassador, could you please describe what occurred during this meeting.

A. Well, we outlined again, for General Kadijevic, the proposed peacekeeping operation, and he responded. He responded very quickly and briefly. He really didn't question any aspect of it. His principal question was how long it would take before the decision to deploy the peacekeepers was made. By that, he meant how long from the acceptance and the composition of the force would it take, and one would have to add the approval of the Security Council, how long it would take for the troops physically to arrive in Croatia. That was his concern.

Q. During the course of this meeting, did the general express any reservations or any limitation upon the people under his control?

A. No. He said the JNA would -- would comply, and he had already ¹⁶⁹¹³ told us that the JNA command structure was complete and functioning, that there were no rogue elements within the JNA. He had made that point to us earlier and repeatedly, so he said it again in discussing the possible peacekeeping operation. And he did make one other point which I considered quite important. He said that the army would be fully cooperative, and I quoted him here on page 54 of diary number 3, that the army would be fully cooperative "within its competence." And I noted in brackets, which was a note to myself and for Secretary Vance, I wrote, "nota bene, possible loophole, watch."

Q. And what was the possible loophole that you believe this statement might be referring to?

A. Well, clearly, to me, it signalled that he was in advance going to disclaim responsibility for any continued action by the Serb paramilitaries and irregular forces.

Q. Now, during the course of this mission, did Secretary Vance and yourself make the decision to go visit Vukovar?

A. Yes.

Q. And can you just briefly describe for us the history or the motivation behind your intending to go see Vukovar.

A. Well, Vukovar, a city of 50.000 or 60.000 people on the Danube, an important city, had been under siege by the JNA since August. There were many reports -- we received them, of course, from the press but also from the principal humanitarian organisations that were active in Croatia. At the time, there were only two that were seriously active, the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC, and UNHCR, the United ¹⁶⁹¹⁴ Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and we were receiving reports from them of heavy destruction and of a very serious situation in Vukovar, and we decided that we had to see for ourselves what was happening.

Q. And how did you go to Vukovar?

A. We went in vehicles of the JNA. They took us in armoured personnel carriers overland to Vukovar.

Q. Can you describe for the Chamber what, if any, observations you made as you went to Vukovar.

JUDGE MAY: Help us with the date, if you would.

MR. GROOME: I'm sorry, Your Honour.

Q. What was date that you visited Vukovar?

A. It was November 19 -- yes, November 19, 1991.

Q. And for reference to the diary, it's recorded on Prosecution Exhibit 397, tab 3, page 60.

Can you please describe your observations.

A. Well, en route to the city, immediately outside the city we could see the JNA gunners on their artillery pieces, the guns that were shelling the city. I should mention the city had fallen to the JNA forces, to the Serb forces the day previously. It fell on November 18. So we were there immediately after its capture.

And then I toured the city. Perhaps I could read from my diary, with the Court's permission. It's only four lines.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Groome, I think, for the record, it's on page 62.

MR. GROOME: I'm sorry, yes, this portion. ¹⁶⁹¹⁵

THE WITNESS: Yes. I wrote, just to describe the scene, I read from the diary here: "Do not see the downtown, but much of the town is seen nonetheless. Almost every building, every structure destroyed or shot at by shell-fire. A few destroyed tanks litter streets. Destruction everywhere."

MR. GROOME:

Q. Prior to going to Vukovar, had General Kadijevic made representations to you as to what was the military objective of the siege on Vukovar?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did he tell you was the military objective?

A. General Kadijevic said the purpose of the attack on Vukovar was to free a blockaded garrison of the JNA inside Vukovar. I must mention here, Counsel, excuse me, but I must mention that General Kadijevic was always exercised about the blockading of the JNA garrisons throughout Croatia, and it was, I would say, without question one of his principal concerns, and he raised it all the time with us.

Q. Because of this, did you ask to be taken to see the garrison that had been blockaded?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. Can you please describe your observations of that garrison.

A. Well, it was a small garrison, a very small garrison. It was practically untouched, and I must say when one compared this small garrison that was almost untouched with the almost total destruction of the city around it, it was a shocking sight. ¹⁶⁹¹⁶

Q. Did there come a time when Secretary Vance tried to get into Vukovar Hospital?

A. Yes. That was one of the principal purposes of the visit, because we had been alerted that a possible tragedy, indeed that a very bad situation was possible with the patients and people who were being held prisoner in the Vukovar Hospital.

Q. Were you present with him when he attempted to gain access to the hospital?

A. I was.

Q. Can you briefly describe for us what occurred when you tried to gain access to the hospital.

A. He was physically prevented by the JNA major who was in command of the troops, and our escort, and a scene ensued, a very, very angry confrontation between Secretary Vance and this major.

Q. Do you recall the major's name?

A. Yes. It was Major Sljivancanin.

Q. And you said that you were physically prevented from entering the hospital. Can you please describe more specifically how you were physically prevented.

A. Well, Secretary Vance, who, incidentally, is a former US secretary of the army and has had a lot of experience with soldiers and he expected that his wishes would be observed, Sljivancanin physically blocked him; raised his rifle and would not let him pass. This occurred after there was some desultory conversation with Sljivancanin making a series of weak and obviously incorrect statements about mines being laid and the bridge ¹⁶⁹¹⁷ being out, because the hospital lay across a bridge, a small bridge. And these were all total untruths. We could, for example, see the bridge was intact as Major Sljivancanin was telling us it was destroyed.

Q. Now, the Chamber has seen on a number of occasions a rather famous piece of videotape. It's Prosecution Exhibit 342, tab 10, and it depicts Secretary Vance arguing with Major Sljivancanin in Vukovar. Are you familiar with that piece of videotape?

A. I've seen several videos. I think there were probably more than one made. It was a continuous dispute between Secretary Vance and Major Sljivancanin, so I'm not quite sure which particular slice of the argument was shown, but I'm generally familiar with it. I was there at the time, so I know what happened.

Q. While in Vukovar, did you make observations or record observations of Serb paramilitaries in Vukovar?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you please relay to us your observations on that day.

A. This -- I notice this up on the screen. It's immediately below the item we looked at on page 62. If I can read from it. It's brief. It's: "Visit to reception centre." And I wrote, and quote from the diary: "Many affecting scenes of weeping civilians, reunited families, et cetera. Secretary Vance talks to the displaced persons. Many foreign press on scene. The centre is full of JNA and many rough customers, armed irregulars, et al. An air of brooding and imminent menace conveyed by the Chetnik types." These were the irregulars and the paramilitaries who were intermingled with the JNA troops. They were standing, chatting with them, ^{16918 BLANK PAGE 16919} smoking cigarettes.

Q. And were these paramilitary troops, were they armed at the time they were intermingled with the JNA?

A. Oh, sure.

Q. Ambassador Okun, did you return to Belgrade after your visit to Vukovar?

A. We did not return directly. We went to Zagreb first, I notice from the diary, but we did go back to Belgrade two days later, yes. On November 21st we were back in Belgrade, yes.

Q. Now, you told us that you travelled in a JNA vehicle by land to Vukovar; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you return to Serbia by land, if you recall?

A. No. As I mentioned - this is all in the diary so I don't need to take the time of Your Honours - we went to Zagreb and then to Sarajevo, and we flew from Sarajevo to Belgrade.

Q. The time that you travelled from Belgrade to Vukovar, did you pass through a border control on the Serbian border?

A. Yes. One had to do that in order to go from Yugoslavia to Croatia, yes.

Q. Can you describe to the Chamber what, if any, border controls on the Serb side existed at that border control?

A. Yes. It was a heavily patrolled border. There were JNA troops there with checkpoints, also Serb police in their blue uniforms, which are different from the khaki of the JNA so they were immediately ¹⁶⁹²⁰ distinguishable. It was a border with border controls.

Q. And did it appear to you that the border controls, as they existed, did have the ability to effectively control people that were going back and forth across that border?

A. Certainly.

Q. Now, when you returned to Belgrade, did you have a meeting with General Veljko Kadijevic? I draw your attention to page 92 of the diary.

A. Yes, we did.

Q. And what date was that meeting?

A. That was on November 21, 1991, at 2.00 in the afternoon.

Q. And that would be Prosecution Exhibit 397, tab 3, page 92. Can you please summarise what occurred during that meeting.

A. Secretary Vance had several important points he wanted to raise with General Kadijevic at this meeting. The first was the disproportionate damage, the enormous damage done to Vukovar, ostensibly to free the small garrison. The other point that Secretary Vance wanted to raise was our visit to the besieged Marsal Tito Kaserne in Zagreb where many JNA officers and their families were being effectively held hostage by the Croatians. And we had visited them and had a meeting with the officers, and Secretary Vance wanted to recount that to General Kadijevic as well.

Q. Did General Kadijevic discuss with you or tell you about the fact that the Vukovar garrison had run out of food and water?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Did there come a time later when you read an account of these ¹⁶⁹²¹ events that contradicted what General Kadijevic had told you on this day?

A. Yes.

Q. And who was that account by?

A. That was by Borisav Jovic.

Q. And can you describe what Borisav Jovic said on this matter that contradicted what General Kadijevic told you regarding Vukovar.

A. Yes. In his memoir about the dissolution of Yugoslavia, a very bitter memoir, incidentally, Jovic, who had been a member of the Presidency and a very important Serb leader, he mentioned that the Vukovar garrison had been freed by the -- before the end of September, that it ceased being blockaded in September. He wrote that in his memoir.

Q. And by "memoir," are you referring to his book The Last Days of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia?

A. Yes, I think that's the title.

Q. Are you mentioned -- incidentally, are you mentioned and Secretary Vance, are your --

JUDGE MAY: Remind me: Borisav Jovic, who is he?

MR. GROOME: He was the president of the Federal Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

JUDGE MAY: On what dates? About this time.

MR. GROOME: About this time, Your Honour, yes.

Q. In that very same memoir, are some of the negotiations that you and Secretary Vance had, are they recorded from his perspective?

A. Yes.

Q. And have you read them? ¹⁶⁹²²

A. Yes, I read the book.

Q. Are they materially incorrect in any regard?

A. No. I would not say that they were materially incorrect. They were rather nasty. He was bitter when he wrote this book, but he was a man of considerable authority as president of the country for a while and a major leader in Serbia, and he knew the situation. They are correct.

Q. Now, on that same day, the 21st of November, 1991, did you also have a meeting with Mr. Milosevic? I would draw your attention to page 97.

MR. GROOME: For the Chamber, that would be Prosecution 397, tab 3, page 97.

A. Yes, we did.

Q. Can you please summarise that meeting for the Court.

A. Secretary Vance reported to the president on the horrific situation we had found in Vukovar. He was quite upset at the disproportionality of the damage done to the city and to the civilian population in it. He also raised the question of the unblocking of the garrisons with President Milosevic and a few other points as well.

Q. What about President Milosevic say regarding the siege of Vukovar or in response to what you described as your observations of Vukovar?

A. He said the world would understand the destruction.

Q. Did he at some point change subjects to describe a person who was currently incarcerated in Serbia?

A. Well, he discussed Goran Hadzic. I don't know that he was incarcerated. ¹⁶⁹²³

Q. No, I'm not suggesting that he was. Please describe what he said regarding Mr. Hadzic.

A. He said that Hadzic, whom we had already discussed before, was a nice young man, that he was the leader of Eastern Slavonia or the Eastern Krajina, as it was often referred to, and that he would welcome a peacekeeping force and that we wouldn't have any trouble with him.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ambassador Okun, on the same page I noted that Mr. Milosevic referred to the Vukovar case as a "special case." Could you explain that to me.

THE WITNESS: Well, I --

JUDGE KWON: Could you locate the phrase?

THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. I think what he meant, if I may, was that the destruction was unusually heavy. Vukovar was the most destroyed city during the entire fighting in Croatia, and I think that's what he was referring to as a "special case." And he perhaps also was thinking of the fact, which was undoubtedly true, that there were Serb civilians in the city as well. But I think basically he was talking about the disproportionate amount of the destruction compared with the ostensible reason for the destruction.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Ambassador, at this stage, November 1991, had yourself and Secretary Vance received any reports about Serb paramilitary activity in Bosnia?

A. Yes. ¹⁶⁹²⁴

Q. And did Secretary Vance raise that with Mr. Milosevic?

A. Yes, he did. I note that I wrote down regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina: "I have heard disturbing reports of activities there by Serb irregulars." That's on page 98 of the diaries.

Q. I'd ask you to read your entire entry regarding that discussion with Mr. Milosevic, and I would ask you to explain.

A. Yes. Immediately after Mr. Vance said that he had heard these disturbing reports, the diary continues: "Milosevic feigns surprise."

Q. And was that your impression of Mr. Milosevic's reaction to being told this?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. Can you please describe in a little greater detail what you meant when you wrote "feigns surprise."

A. Well, it was clear to me at the time, seemed clear to me at the time, that he knew what was going on - I couldn't imagine he didn't know what was going on - and he was pretending to be surprised at this report from Mr. Vance.

Q. Now, I just wanted to ask you one more question before the morning break. Prior to the end of this meeting, did Mr. Milosevic make one more representation to Secretary Vance and yourself regarding the JNA and Serbian irregulars?

A. Yes. His concluding remarks at the meeting were that after the barracks were unblocked, which was General Kadijevic's principal concern, the release of the JNA troops, that the peacekeeping force could go into effect, and he said that we would have no problem with the JNA or Serbian ¹⁶⁹²⁵ irregulars with respect to keeping the peace.

Q. And was that -- did you record that as a verbatim quote of Mr. Milosevic?

A. It's not within quotes in the diary, but it is written that way and those were the words. "Good. You will have no problem with JNA or Serbian irregulars."

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if that's a convenient place to break for the morning.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, it is. We will adjourn now for half an hour. Ambassador, I must formally tell you, don't speak to anybody about your evidence while you're giving it, please, until it's over, and that does include the members of the Prosecution team. Thank you. Could you be back in half an hour, please.

--- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.09 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Groome.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Ambassador Okun, earlier this morning you told us that the culminating event or act of these initial missions to Yugoslavia was the signing of a cease-fire agreement that effectively ended the hostilities in Croatia; is that correct?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Ambassador, I'm now going to ask that you be shown a document, and it is tab 6 of Prosecution Exhibit 396. It's actually a three-page exhibit. I'm going to show you the last page of that exhibit. And do you ^{16926 BLANK PAGE 16927} recognise what that document that you have in your hands is?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. What is that, Ambassador?

A. That is the Geneva Accord of November 23rd, 1991, which established the conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Croatia. There were four points, as you see; A, B, C, D.

Q. Ambassador, before we go into the specifics of the document and so the record is complete, did you have an opportunity to see the first two pages of that exhibit earlier?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Can you describe what the first two pages of that exhibit are?

A. They're a transmittal note from the Secretary-General to the Security Council.

Q. Providing the Security Council with this signed agreement?

A. Correct, saying, "Here is the agreement of Mr. Vance for your information."

Q. Ambassador, given the importance of this document, I'm actually going to ask you to read it, and I would note for the Chamber and other parties in the court that it is on the screen so that they may see it. So, Ambassador, would you please read the entire document.

A. It reads as follows: "The undersigned --" May I say who signed it first?

Q. Yes.

A. It's signed by President Tudjman, President Milosevic, and General Kadijevic and Secretary Vance, and it says: ¹⁶⁹²⁸ "The following agree that (A) Croatia will, with immediate effect, lift its blockade of all JNA barracks and installations in Croatia; (B) the JNA will with immediate effect begin the withdrawal from Croatia of the personnel, weapons and military equipment in those barracks and installations and complete this process in accordance with the schedules already agreed upon by the parties;

(C) they will immediately instruct all units under their command, control or political influence to observe an unconditional cease-fire with effect from tomorrow, 24 November, and they will make sure that any paramilitary or irregular units not formally under their command, control or political influence also observe the cease-fire from that date; (D) they will facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to persons affected by the recent hostilities.

Lord Carrington will seek to assure that the International Monitoring Mission does everything within its power and mandate to ensure that the cease-fire holds."

Again signed by Presidents Tudjman, Milosevic, General Kadijevic, Cyrus Vance, Geneva, 23 November 1991.

Q. Ambassador this agreement, was it signed by anybody from the Federal Presidency, either the complete 8-person Presidency or the smaller Rump Presidency?

A. No. The only signatures are those that appear on the document.

Q. I'm going to ask you to go through each of the signatories and tell us, beginning with President Tudjman, what was his -- what people was his signature intended to commit and what was it intended to commit those ¹⁶⁹²⁹ people to?

A. President Tudjman, the president of Croatia, of the Republic of Croatia, committed the republic, by his signature, to the unblocking of the JNA garrisons and to the continued delivery of humanitarian assistance, paragraphs (A) and (D) of the document.

Q. General Kadijevic, who was his signature intended to commit and what were they intended to be committed to?

A. Essentially General Kadijevic was committing to paragraph (B) and to a lesser degree (C), principally (B) concerning the JNA withdrawal from the country.

Q. And Mr. Milosevic, who was his signature intended to commit and what was it intended that they be committed to?

A. President Milosevic's signature committed himself and the Yugoslav side to paragraphs (B), (C), and (D), namely the withdrawal of the JNA, the instructing of all political and military units, irregulars, and paramilitaries, in paragraph (C), to observe the cease-fire, and subparagraph (D), the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Q. And was this discussed with Mr. Milosevic prior to his signing this agreement?

A. Surely.

Q. Now, Ambassador, I'm going to ask you --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ambassador, was that your interpretation or did Mr. Milosevic say something to that effect at the time?

THE WITNESS: It was not an interpretation. It was Secretary Vance's and mine certain knowledge that he understood the terms of the ¹⁶⁹³⁰ Geneva Accord. Meetings took place in Geneva over a number of hours, and it is a brief and I think clear document.

JUDGE KWON: I was referring to your comment that Mr. Milosevic committed himself to the agreement (B), for example. Did he say that at that time?

THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honour, (D) or (E) did you say?

JUDGE KWON: (B), the JNA's withdrawal.

THE WITNESS: He had said it to us on repeated occasions, and it was understood that the signatures, particularly those of President Milosevic and President Tudjman, were controlling. They were the chiefs of state of their respective countries, and that was clear to all concerned.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Ambassador, were you actually present during the signing of this document?

A. I was present before and after. At this point, I think I was overseeing the reproduction of the document. I'm not sure whether I was present or not.

Q. And are you able today to identify to the Chamber which of these signatures belongs to Mr. Milosevic?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you please describe it for us. Where is it located?

A. Well, it's the middle signature of the three across the top line, above the word "Cyrus Vance." Cyrus Vance appears below President ¹⁶⁹³¹ Tudjman's signature.

Q. Now, I want to draw your attention to a meeting with Mr. Milosevic on the 2nd of December, 1991. I'd ask you to take a look at your diaries. I believe it's in book 4. I would ask you to confirm whether or not you had a meeting with Mr. Milosevic.

MR. GROOME: If I might direct the Chamber's attention to Prosecution Exhibit 397, tab 4, page 30.

A. Yes, we did meet on December 2, for more than three hours.

Q. And can you characterise the purpose of this meeting.

A. Yes, I can. We returned to -- we returned to New York to report to the Secretary-General and the Security Council after the signature of the Geneva Accord on November 23rd and were back in Yugoslavia a week later, on December 1, and arrived and saw President Milosevic immediately upon our return, and the purpose was to discuss the situation on the ground in Croatia. Fighting was continuing, and we needed to continue serious talks on that situation and others.

Q. Did Mr. Milosevic indicate to you that he had contacted someone the day after the signing -- the day after he signed this Geneva Accord?

A. Yes. He said that the day after the signing of the Geneva Accord that he had been in touch with Hadzic and Babic, and he went on to say that they would respect the accord and that he had secured their consent. His words were, "I promised and I did," meaning, "I promised you, Mr. Vance, that I would secure their consent and I have done so."

Q. Did there come a time during the meeting with Mr. Milosevic that Secretary Vance raised the topic of the Dalmatian coast? ¹⁶⁹³²

A. Yes, that's correct, he did. He asked the president what was happening because there was fighting along the Dalmatian coast, particularly around Dubrovnik, Zadar, and other Croatian cities.

Q. And what did Mr. Milosevic say to Secretary Vance?

A. He said that the Serbs had no links with Dalmatia and that, after the JNA barracks were unblocked in Croatia, that the army would leave Dubrovnik alone.

Q. At that time did Secretary Vance raise with President Milosevic reports of Serb paramilitary activity in the Krajina?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. And what, if anything, did President Milosevic say?

A. He changed the subject.

Q. He changed the subject to what?

A. He told us that sometime earlier that Croatian troops had entered Pakrac - that's a town in Western Slavonia - that they had been wearing JNA uniforms and that they killed the people in Pakrac and generally committed mayhem.

Q. Now, did there come a time when Secretary Vance discussed with President Milosevic the possibility of continued violence from armed Serbs, meaning JNA paramilitary or local forces? Did there come a time when he discussed that?

A. Yes. That happened and Secretary Vance was particularly concerned about the paramilitaries and the irregular Serb forces.

Q. Can you please read the relevant portions of your diary entry on this subject. ^{16933 BLANK PAGE 16934}

A. On page 32, after that question was raised, President Milosevic said that with respect to the paramilitaries and the irregular forces, that the problem of control would not exist after a peacekeeping operation went into effect, that Goran Hadzic and Milan Babic would respect the commitments undertaken. Secretary Vance said that he trusted the president and that he looked to him to deliver them. That is to say he looked to President Milosevic to make sure that Babic and Hadzic would comply with the terms of the peacekeeping operation, and President Milosevic replied, "I will use my influence. I am not their master, but I am sure they will fulfil what they promise." And that -- and Secretary Vance, after that, re-read the section from the Geneva Accord that concerned the paramilitaries, because he knew that Mr. Milosevic was in control of and responsible for the paramilitaries. And you will note on page 93, next to the phrase, "CRV reads from Geneva accord."

JUDGE KWON: 33, Mr. Ambassador.

THE WITNESS: Pardon?

JUDGE KWON: 33.

THE WITNESS: Oh, excuse me, I'm sorry. Forgive me. Page 33. Vance, in parentheses, "reads from Geneva Accord regarding paramilitaries," et cetera, et cetera. And that was to get on the record and to reiterate his knowledge to President Milosevic as to who controlled the paramilitaries.

MR. GROOME:

Q. And what did Mr. Milosevic say when or after Secretary Vance read that portion of the Geneva Accord? ¹⁶⁹³⁵

A. President Milosevic said that they are -- he claimed that they were observing the cease-fire and that one small group, a harmless group, had made a statement opposing the cease-fire. He also went on to say that nobody was attacking Osijek, and he stated that Serbs had been slaughtered in Vukovar and that mass graves or, as he called them, collective graves had just been found. That's on page 33.

Q. Did Mr. Milosevic ever indicate specifically where these collective graves containing these Serb victims was specifically located?

A. No, he did not to us.

Q. Ambassador, I want to draw your attention to -- I'm sorry. Did Mr. Milosevic go on to make some statement regarding Hadzic's control over paramilitaries?

A. Yes. He said that Hadzic had them under control.

Q. And did he give a percentage of the paramilitaries that were under the control of Hadzic?

A. He said that with respect to the paramilitaries and territorials, that 95 per cent of them were local territorials, that they were well organised, but that Hadzic had them under his control.

Q. During the course of this meeting, did the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina arise?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. And who initiated the change of subject to Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A. At this meeting, the subject of Bosnia and Herzegovina was begun by President Milosevic.

Q. And can you please describe what it was he said about Bosnia and ¹⁶⁹³⁶ Herzegovina.

A. Yes. He said that with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina, that it was unfair to listen only to President Izetbegovic and that it was important, in order to be successful with respect to the problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- and here, parenthetically, one has to recall that at this time there was, as yet, no fighting in Bosnia. He said that to be successful, one had to talk to all sides. And Mr. Vance asked him for help in meeting the other side, the Bosnian Serbs, obviously. And that was the initial exchange on Bosnia.

Q. And did Mr. Milosevic name a particular person who he suggested he needed to speak to?

A. Yes, he did. He said that it was important to talk to the Serb leaders, and this was Dr. Radovan Karadzic.

Q. Was that the first time you had heard the name Radovan Karadzic?

A. I believe so.

Q. Did you -- did you ask --

A. Excuse me. I must amend that. It was not the first time I had heard the name. I had never written it down myself. I hadn't written it, but I had heard the name, yes. In October of 1991, two months earlier, I was in Sarajevo during a meeting of the parliament and when the Bosnian Serbs left the parliament, and Karadzic's name was mentioned.

Q. In addition to Secretary Vance, President Milosevic, and yourself, was there anybody else present during this meeting?

A. Yes. President Milosevic had with him a Mr. Jovanovic, the Foreign Minister of Serbia. ¹⁶⁹³⁷

Q. And did somebody actually write the name Karadzic into your diaries here?

A. Yes. I see it on page 40. "Mr. Karadzic" is written in Latin script. Not by me.

Q. Do you recall who wrote it?

A. Well, it was either Jovanovic or President Milosevic. Probably Jovanovic.

Q. Now, did Mr. Milosevic agree to set up a meeting between Secretary Vance, yourself, and Mr. Karadzic?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. And did he in fact set up such a meeting?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. How long did it take to arrange this meeting?

A. Well, it was -- took practically no time at all. We finished our meeting with President Milosevic and Jovanovic at lunch, a pleasant lunch, at 3.30 p.m., and at 5.00, we met with Karadzic. So it was almost immediate. A couple of hours at the most.

Q. Where did you meet Mr. Karadzic?

A. We met him in a house in a suburb of Belgrade.

Q. And do you recall how you got to that house?

A. We were taken there, as I recollect, in a government car.

Q. Now, I'm going to ask you about this portion or this meeting with Dr. Karadzic.

MR. GROOME: And I refer the Chamber to Prosecution Exhibit 397, tab 4, page 44. ¹⁶⁹³⁸

Q. Can I ask you to please summarise what occurred during this meeting with Dr. Karadzic.

A. Well, this was our first meeting with Radovan Karadzic, and we wanted to hear him, probe his views on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, size him up because it was our first face-to-face meeting, and in general, we also wanted to explain to him the possible peacekeeping operation that was planned for Croatia. Again, I repeat, there was no fighting at this time in Bosnia.

Q. Did the topic of Slovenia arise during the meeting?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. When in the meeting did the topic of Slovenia arise?

A. Right at the beginning. It was practically the first thing that Karadzic raised with us was the issue of recognition of Slovenia.

Q. What did he say with respect to the recognition of Slovenia?

A. He said he thought it was a good idea. He didn't care about Slovenia leaving Yugoslavia.

Q. Did he allude to any specific action he was going to take in that regard?

A. Yes. He said that he was going to put forward the idea in the Serb parliament - by that he meant the Bosnian Serb parliament - to recognise Slovenia.

Q. Ambassador, I want to leave this meeting now and ask you, on the 3rd of December, 1991, did you and Secretary Vance make a visit to Osijek?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. Can you describe where you went on that journey. ¹⁶⁹³⁹

A. We again went via the JNA military facilities, on land, through Novi Sad. We crossed the Danube River into Croatia, and we reached Dalj, which was JNA headquarters in Croatia for that region. It was where the corps commander was who was in charge of the JNA troops that surrounded Osijek and were attacking the city. The command was in Dalj.

Q. Prior to embarking on this trip, had you been given reports from the JNA and other Serb authorities regarding the condition or activities in Dalj?

A. Yes. We had been told that the Croatians had destroyed Dalj and that it was in terrible shape.

Q. What were your observations of the condition of the city?

A. Well, it wasn't true at all. It had hardly been touched. It was in quite normal condition.

Q. Did you leave Dalj and go on to Osijek?

A. Yes. We went through the frontlines by agreement of the two armies. We had to cross across the frontline, and we reached the point where the JNA handed us over to the Croatians, and we -- an incident occurred at the -- during the crossover, but we went between the two contending armies on land, and by foot, I may say.

Q. Ambassador, I've omitted to ask you a question: Before leaving Dalj, did you have a conversation with the JNA commander there regarding who was shelling Osijek?

A. Yes. He gave us a, I would say a thorough briefing - it lasted almost an hour - on the military situation, and he said that there was no JNA artillery shelling and that there had not been any since the ¹⁶⁹⁴⁰ cease-fire agreement of November 23. He did say, since the city was obviously being shelled, that territorials, Serb territorials from the Baranja, that is from the Serb side of the Danube, were shelling -- were shelling Osijek.

Osijek lies on the western bank of the Danube River, which forms the border between Serbia and Croatia at that point. It's a large city, the capital of Eastern Slavonia. So it was easily targetable from the Serb side. It was just across the river.

Q. So the record is clear, when you're using the term "Serb side," did you take it that the JNA commander was referring to shelling coming from the territory of the Republic of Serbia?

A. Yes. He made that clear. He used the term "the Baranja," and there was no doubt in his mind or ours what he was telling us.

Q. I interrupted you when you were referring to an incident that occurred on your way to Osijek. Could I ask you to please tell us what incident you were referring to.

A. We were --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish the answer.

THE WITNESS: Well, we were being taken, as I said, between the sides. We were actually driving, being driven in a -- in a -- at that point in an ECMM vehicle, that is the European Community monitors. We had a Danish driver and an Italian observer, and we were sitting in the back seat of what was basically a minivan and going very slowly down the road. And the fellow in the second seat yelled out, "Stop," and the driver ^{16941 BLANK PAGE 16942} stopped the van, and stretched across the road was a very thin wire attached to a mine. Somebody had mined the road. We never found out who. We got out of the van, inspected. I went up to the wire, which was a sort of thin wire, and one of the EC monitors, I don't remember whether it was the Dane or the Italian, destroyed it, not by clipping it, because he thought that would set the mine off because he had inspected the side of the road and there was indeed a mine there, on both sides, but he burned the wire with his cigarette lighter in order not to create any vibration, and then he removed the wire and we walked the rest of the way, which was less than a mile at this point, into Osijek, to be safe. And it was, of course, an interesting moment.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Ambassador, on this day --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic had a point.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I wish to assist Mr. Okun in relation to the geography mentioned. Actually, Baranja is not in Serbia. The gentleman from the other side asked him whether this was on the Serbian side. Baranja is not in Serbia. If you remember, he showed us that Maslenica was on the island of Solta. It would be a good idea if you'd have a look at the map, if you'd see where Osijek is, on which river, who could have shelled it, and what the JNA officer could have said. I think that Mr. Groome is actually misleading --

JUDGE MAY: He's not. He's not. He's not, and we have a map so we can look at it.

Yes, Mr. Groome, go on with the examination. ¹⁶⁹⁴³

MR. GROOME: I'll have the map brought out so the ambassador can indicate precisely where he's referring to.

Q. Ambassador, on this day did you have occasion to see a person who you came to know as, or came to learn his identity was Arkan?

A. Yes, we saw him.

Q. And can you describe the circumstances under which you saw him.

A. Yes. As we were leaving the briefing by the JNA corps commander in Dalj, we left his headquarters, which were actually in a church, and in the churchyard, milling around, were journalists and troops, and one of the Western journalists came up to me and said that Arkan was standing a dozen or so feet away, about as near as you and I are standing, and would Mr. Vance and I like to meet him. And we respectfully declined that invitation to meet Arkan, but we saw him and his troops.

Q. Can you describe whether or not they were armed.

A. Yes. They were carrying sidearms and long weapons, and they were intermingled with the JNA troops. They were standing about, talking with each other, smoking. You know, just generally fraternising.

Q. Were they dressed differently than the JNA troops?

A. They were in uniforms, as I recall, most of them, but they were not turned out smartly.

Q. Ambassador, I'm going to ask you to take a look at Prosecution Exhibit 336, page 23. It's simply a map of the area. I'm going to ask that be placed on the overhead. I'm then going to ask you to take a pointer and indicate to the Chamber -- first of all, I'd ask you to indicate Dalj, if it is on that map. If you look to your left, ¹⁶⁹⁴⁴ Ambassador, the original is on the overhead projector.

A. Yes. Dalj, as you see, is on the river to the south-east of Osijek.

Q. And can you point to Osijek.

A. Osijek is a few miles down the road.

Q. When the JNA commander in Dalj indicated to you that the shelling of Osijek was coming from the Serb side, can you indicate where on this map you understood him to be referring to.

A. Well, you see the line of the Danube where I'm moving the pointer; that's the border. You see the town of Apotin on the Serb side. You see directly to the east of Osijek, between Dalj and Osijek, a town called Sarvas. That's where we crossed the frontline. That's noted in my diary that we crossed the frontline. I believe it's in the diary. And this is -- Osijek itself is physically on the Drava. So this is a very small area, and that is the area that we're talking about.

Q. And can you indicate where it was the JNA commander indicated that shelling -- the shelling of Osijek was coming from.

A. He said it was coming from the territorials. Now, they could have been based at Darda or Belija [phoen], north of the city. I was never there, I didn't see it. They also could have been just across the other side of the Danube. The distance is -- it's about 10 or 11 kilometres from Osijek to the border. That's six miles. But six miles is within artillery range, so they could have been north of the city, or they could have been south or east. The distances are all very small.

Q. Ambassador -- ¹⁶⁹⁴⁵

A. In any case, we saw the JNA artillery. Speaking of artillery, we saw and I noted in my diary, if I may, at the bottom of 52 -- not to belabour the point on artillery but if I could just draw your attention to the very bottom of page 52 where I noted in the diary, and I quote: "The road --" this is where we go through the frontlines just west of Sarvas. "Road goes through flat, cornbelt terrain, stalks withering in fields. A few farmhouses here and there. A fair amount of JNA artillery batteries sitting in the cornfields. At one point a trench meanders away from the road, a la World War I." So there was artillery all around the city.

Q. During your visit to Osijek, did you go visit the hospital there?

A. Yes. We made a thorough tour. I did. I think Secretary Vance at one point stayed behind, but we both went to the hospital and I made a complete tour of the city, at my request.

Q. Can I ask you, in a sentence or two, to describe the general condition of the hospital in Osijek.

A. The hospital was in very bad shape. It was next to the river. It had been shelled heavily. It was a modern hospital, about five or six stories high, and every story above ground had been completely shattered. It was not used at all. I mean, there was glass and rubble everywhere. The hospital, however, had underground facilities. Two or three stories underground were completely equipped because it had been built to withstand an attack in case, you know, Yugoslavia were ever invaded from the northeast by the Soviet army, through Hungary. And so the hospital had underground facilities, and they were functioning. Indeed, we visited the maternity ward where children, babies had been born recently, but the ¹⁶⁹⁴⁶ hospital above the ground was completely destroyed.

Q. Ambassador, I'd like to now draw your attention to the 31st of December, 1991. Did you have a meeting with President Milosevic and Foreign Minister Jovanovic on that day? And I would refer you to your book number 5.

MR. GROOME: For the Chamber, this would be Prosecution Exhibit 397, tab 5, page 61.

THE WITNESS: On the 31st. Yes. We met in the morning for two hours.

MR. GROOME:

Q. And where did you meet?

A. We would have met in President Milosevic's office.

Q. Can you please summarise that meeting for us.

A. Well, the meeting began with the president himself summarising the situation with respect to the possible creation of the peacekeeping operation, and he said that all representatives, that is all Serbian representatives, including Babic, would agree in writing to the peacekeeping plan, which by this point we had formalised and written down for the parties, that is for the Croats and for the Serbs. And he went on to say that the announcement by the state committee, which was headed by Borisav Jovic, the state committee for peacekeeping, would be made today accepting the -- Secretary Vance's suggestion for a UN peacekeeping operation.

When we asked him what would happen if another Babic appeared, that is to say if suddenly some paramilitary suddenly emerged to oppose ¹⁶⁹⁴⁷ the UN, President Milosevic said it would not happen. He assured Mr. Vance that no such person would appear.

JUDGE KWON: I have to indicate, for the record again, it's on page 59 instead of 61.

MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I'm very sorry. I think I have to put on my glasses.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Ambassador, would it be fair to say that after the signing of the Geneva Accord, the cessation of hostilities, the primary efforts of Secretary Vance and yourself were to come up with a detailed plan of the peacekeeping force and then to work towards its implementation?

A. That was -- yes. That was one of two major efforts. The other major effort which was, I have to say, more difficult, was to gain Croatian acceptance to the final and definitive unblocking of the JNA barracks throughout Croatia. So those were the two principal efforts post November 23, 1991. On the one side, secure cooperation and agreement to the peacekeeping plan; on the other side, secure Croatian agreement to unblocking the JNA barracks.

Q. Would it be fair to say that prior to the actual implementation of the UN peacekeepers, Secretary Vance and yourself were monitoring whether the cease-fire signed on the 23rd of November, whether that was holding, whether the parties were still willing to observe the agreement that President Tudjman, President Milosevic, and General Kadijevic signed?

A. Yes. ^{16948 BLANK PAGE 16949}

Q. Who was the primary person who you sought to confirm that -- the parties representing the Serb side, who was the person that you sought or spoke to to confirm whether they were still willing to observe their obligations under the cease-fire agreement?

A. President Milosevic.

Q. Returning to this meeting of the 31st of December, did there come a time during this meeting when President Milosevic once again raised the subject of minority rights as described in the original Carrington Draft Convention, the one of October 1991?

A. Yes. That was in connection with a discussion of the problems of Kosovo.

Q. Can you please summarise the discussion between President Milosevic and Secretary Vance on that subject.

A. It was a lengthy discussion, as I noted in my diary, and the essence of the discussion, which was not the first time it had been discussed, was the treatment of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The position taken by Secretary Vance, by Lord Carrington, and others was that if in the second chapter of Carrington's AGS, that is the document of October 18, the settlement for the former Yugoslavia, that if in that document the Serb people were given special status in Croatia, that in fairness, Serbia should grant the same status to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

President Milosevic differed and pointed out that the Serbian people were a constituent people, not a minority, and that the Yugoslav constitution and historical practice in the former Yugoslav space gave ¹⁶⁹⁵⁰ special rights to the constituent peoples who could not be considered minorities.

I should add he was correct in that statement, because the constituent peoples did have particular rights under the 1974 constitution. That, however, did not mean that other peoples were not to be treated in a humane fashion.

Q. Ambassador, I draw your attention now to the 2nd of January, 1992. What occurred on that day?

A. On that day, the accord implementing the cease-fire, the implementing accord, was signed in Sarajevo, and that brought about a cessation of hostilities in Croatia.

Q. Ambassador, a number of witnesses have appeared before the Tribunal and referred to the Vance Plan. Would I be correct in saying that it's a bit of a misnomer that there is a single document that one can look at and say, "This is the Vance Plan"?

A. Yes, that is a misnomer.

Q. Can you please describe for the Chamber the documents that together comprise what people commonly refer to as the Vance Plan.

A. It is a complicated subject, but let me be brief. People mean by the Vance Plan the peacekeeping operation in Croatia. The four documents that established what they called the Vance Plan but what Secretary Vance himself never did, nor did I, were four. The cessation -- the cease-fire agreement -- the cease-fire agreement of November 23, 1991, and its implementing accord of January 2, 1992. Those were the two documents that determined the situation on the ground, the cessation of hostilities. ¹⁶⁹⁵¹ The other two documents were the concept paper for the peacekeeping operation, the technical details of the operation, where the UNPAs would be, that sort of thing, how they would be policed. That was the concept paper of December 3. And the final document was the Security Council Resolution that established the peacekeeping operation, Resolution 743 of February 21.

So you have November 23, January 1, the cessation of hostilities agreement. December 3, peacekeeping operation details. February 21, 1992, Security Council Resolution establishing it. Those four documents taken together were the Vance Plan.

Q. Ambassador, you've already identified the cessation of hostilities or the Geneva accord for us. I'm now going to ask that you be shown three other documents. Perhaps to save time, if the usher is willing to carry all three to the witness box, I'd ask that you first be shown tab 7 of Prosecution Exhibit 396. I'd ask you to take a look at it and identify it if you can.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have only five tabs. I did not have the sixth one, and now the seventh one is being referred to, so I really don't know. It was my understanding that this is 396 and then tabs 7 and 8.

JUDGE MAY: The registrar is coming to have a look.

MR. GROOME: And I will provide my copies, Your Honour, in the interim.

Your Honour, we're providing Mr. Milosevic with another set of the ¹⁶⁹⁵² documents now.

JUDGE MAY: This is 396.

MR. GROOME: 396. Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Have a look at the documents you were just given, Mr. Milosevic. 396, tab 7.

What we're looking at is the concept; is that right?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. I only got the first part, with five tabs, and these start with tab 6 and then go on to 7, 8.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Groome, this is the concept.

MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, this is the concept plan for the peacekeeping operation.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Ambassador, I'd ask you to take a look at tab 8. Can you identify that document for us?

A. Yes, tab 8, number 147 on the document, under numbers 147, dated Sarajevo, 2 January 1992 is the text of the implementing accord.

Q. And finally, could you please take a look at tab 9 of Prosecution Exhibit 396.

A. Yes, tab 9 is Resolution 743 of the Security Council, dated 21 February 1992.

Q. Ambassador, to save some time, I'd like to jump ahead to a meeting you had on the 15th of April, 1992. I believe it is in book 7 of your diaries, and I would draw the Court's attention to 397, tab 7, page 39. It's the 15th of April, on page 39. ¹⁶⁹⁵³ Did you have a meeting with Mr. Milosevic on that day?

A. Yes, I see we did. Mr. Vance and myself met with President Milosevic and Jovanovic for about -- almost three hours.

Q. And can you please summarise what transpired during that meeting.

A. Well, by this time the conflict had spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fighting had begun there in March, after the referendum was held, and we were very concerned about that. The situation was worsening on the ground. Lord Carrington's Conference on Yugoslavia was continuing to struggle, as it turned out unsuccessfully, to reach an agreement, and Secretary Vance was very concerned with the reports that we had received about the activity of Serbian paramilitaries and irregulars in Bosnia on the eastern -- along the eastern border of the Drina, separating Bosnia from Serbia.

Q. And was that discussed in detail with President Milosevic?

A. Yes. Secretary Vance raised the question and asked, and one sees this on page 41, "What about Arkan on the Drina? General Adzic says he's there." Meaning what about Arkan on the Bosnian side of the Drina.

Q. And what did President Milosevic say?

A. He said that was not the case. He said no, that perhaps somebody else was there but that it was completely prohibited to go out of Serbia and that Arkan was advertising himself on TV that he had been privately, privately, in Bijeljina, in the north-eastern part of Bosnia.

Q. Ambassador, in this statement, did you take this as an admission by President Milosevic that he was aware of Arkan's presence in the Bosnian municipality of Bijeljina? ¹⁶⁹⁵⁴

A. Yes. He said so.

Q. What did you understand him to mean when he said that Arkan was there privately?

A. Well, I think we understood the common sense of that, namely that he had gone there on his own hook, under his own authority, and that nobody except Arkan was responsible for it.

Q. Can you please continue from that portion in the diary with what occurred next.

A. Well, it's clear from the diary that Secretary Vance did not believe that, because his next words were: "No. That won't wash." That was what Vance said to the president. And then President Milosevic responded: "Only at the beginning -" meaning that Arkan was there only at the beginning of the fighting - "the rest of the time he was in Belgrade." And Vance, it's clear from the diary, and this is recording the interchange as it occurred, did not enjoy hearing that answer because he says: "Let me be frank: People I trust have seen Arkan and other Serbian types with heavy equipment," meaning along the Drina in Bosnia. "Why is this happening?" That's what the diary records. And President Milosevic replied to that: "Only some individuals not in control of the Serbian authorities. We forbid paramilitaries," and President Milosevic went on to say: "Arkan was only in Bijeljina at the beginning." Vance shows his disbelief of that assertion by saying: "To be perfectly frank, you and Serbia are being hurt. If this continues, it will have a very negative effect on Serbian recognition and derecognition," that is to say on the recognition by the United Nations and the world of Serbia, and ¹⁶⁹⁵⁵ derecognising -- unrecognising them, that is, declaring them an outlaw state. And President Milosevic agrees. He says: "I agree we are being hurt." And then he pleads for understanding, by saying: "We cannot check on every Serb." And Secretary Vance continues this difficult discussion by saying: "You have a real problem. You have to clean it up." And you'll notice, Your Honours, that I wrote in capital letters in the diary, "Clean it up." And then Secretary Vance, who was a gentleman, said to the president, "I speak as a friend."

Q. Ambassador, I'd ask you to continue on the next page of your diary and relay the remainder of that conversation between Secretary Vance and Mr. Milosevic.

A. Well, the secretary says to the president that: "You have got to push through..." that is to say, implement the April 12th Cutilheiro agreement. This is on page 43. "... and see that it is implemented in letter and spirit." As I mentioned earlier, Ambassador Cutilheiro was working on a Bosnian peace plan under the direction of Lord Carrington. So that's what he means by the Cutilheiro agreement. There was an actual peace plan.

President Milosevic reiterated that: "No one is in Bosnia and Herzegovina from Serbia." And Secretary Vance, reading from his prepared talking points that we had worked on before the meeting, tells Mr. Milosevic: "Serbia cannot hope to win a military victory in Bosnia either directly or surreptitiously." That is to say, they cannot win it directly via the JNA or surreptitiously via the paramilitaries and the irregulars. You see, Secretary Vance was thoroughly aware of the use of ¹⁶⁹⁵⁶ the paramilitaries and the irregulars in tandem but covertly under control. And President Milosevic agreed and says: "That's right." And asks rhetorically of us: "Do you think I want a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?" And Secretary Vance responds: "It looks that way." And President Milosevic responds that the Croatian army started the fighting in Bosnia. You see "CA" for Croatian army, started by invading over the bridge into Bosanski Brod, written "Bos Brod," Bosanski Brod. And he reiterated his point that nobody could push the Serbs into, as he called it, "that mess."

Vance responded that: "Everyone knows that Arkan was there." And President Milosevic admitted this and said: "Yes. But others are in Bosnia as well."

Q. Ambassador, I'd like to now draw your attention to the next day, the 16th of April, 1992. Did you have a meeting with Radovan Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic during which the subject of Sarajevo arose?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. Can you -- and I'm referring to Prosecution Exhibit 397, tab 7, page 69. Can I ask you to briefly summarise in a sentence or two what was said in terms of Sarajevo in that meeting.

A. Yes. Koljevic, Nikola Koljevic, said that just that day, April 16, 1992, he and Karadzic had agreed that we should divide Sarajevo, meaning we, the Bosnian Serbs, should divide Sarajevo into a Serb area and a Muslim area.

Q. So Koljevic was saying that on that very day, the 16th of April, the decision was taken between him and Karadzic to divide Sarajevo? ¹⁶⁹⁵⁷

A. Yes.

Q. I want to draw your attention now to the 6th of May, 1992. Did you have a meeting with Mr. Milosevic and Bulatovic? And this would be Prosecution Exhibit 397, tab 7, page 140.

A. Yes. We met with the president and President Bulatovic from Montenegro. They were accompanied by their foreign ministers, Jovanovic and Samardzic.

Q. During that meeting, did Lord Carrington confront President Milosevic with reports about Serb activity in Bosnia?

A. Yes, he did. And not only Bosnia but also the Krajina, that is in Croatia, in Kosovo and the Vojvodina province of Serbia. That's on page 140 of my diary.

Q. And can you tell us, did you record Mr. Milosevic's response to Lord Carrington's query?

A. Yes. President Milosevic responded by saying that all Serbs and the JNA would be out of Bosnia-Herzegovina within two weeks and that Bosnia was not within the competence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that he, President Milosevic, supported the talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina. That would be the talks being conducted by Cutilheiro.

Q. Now, when Mr. Milosevic used the term "all Serbs and the JNA," who did you understand him to be referring to?

A. Clearly he was talking about the paramilitaries and the irregulars.

Q. Did there come --

A. Otherwise, he would have just said "the JNA." I mean, he wasn't ^{16958 BLANK PAGE 16959} talking about Serb civilians or tourists. There was no question that, you know, the hundreds of thousands of Serbs were not going to leave Bosnia. So he was talking about the irregulars.

Q. Did Mr. Cutilheiro go on to describe to Mr. Milosevic specific reports of paramilitary activity in the Bosnian municipality of Foca?

A. Yes, he did. Cutilheiro said that, in Foca, Serb irregulars had committed terrible acts.

Q. And what was Mr. Milosevic's response?

A. He said it wasn't up to us. You know, he said, "We just want to finish the talks." I regarded that as a routine disclaimer and so note it in the diary, on page 141. "We --"

JUDGE KWON: Ambassador -- please go on.

THE WITNESS: "We want to finish talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's not up to us. (Routine disclaimer)."

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ambassador, on page 140, I noted a phrase said by Mr. Milosevic: "We are one delegation. It's a fact." Could you make an observation on that comment.

THE WITNESS: Yes. He was referring to the fact that he was present with the president of Montenegro, which was a republic, but he was -- wanted to make the point that they should be seen as one delegation, one country, not two. That, incidentally, was also our understanding, that Serbia and Montenegro were one delegation.

The reason for that, Your Honour, is that only about ten days earlier, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the SFRY, Tito's Yugoslavia, had officially gone out of existence, and the Federative ¹⁶⁹⁶⁰ Republic of Yugoslavia, the FRY, had come into existence. The FRY consisted of Serbia and Montenegro, and President Milosevic was recording that fact for us.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Ambassador, would I be correct in saying that around this period of time, your work on the Vance missions was winding down and your work on the ICFY missions was beginning to start up?

A. Yes, because the war in Bosnia had started.

Q. I want to draw your attention to a few diary entries in your ICFY journals or diaries, and the first one I'd like to draw your attention to would be a meeting on the 9th of October, 1992, and this would be Prosecution Exhibit 398, tab 1.

MR. GROOME: And, Your Honours, the -- Ambassador Okun did not number the pages in the ICFY journals as he did in the Vance mission, so the reference will be the date and the time. I would direct your attention to the 9th of October, 1992, at 5.10 p.m.

Q. My question to you, Ambassador, is did you have a meeting with Radovan Karadzic on that day?

A. Excuse me, what day are you referring to?

Q. October -- I'm sorry, Ambassador, I'm getting reversed with that, the American system and the European system. September 10, 1992. My apologies.

A. September 10, 1992. Yes, we did meet with Karadzic and a Bosnian Serb colonel, Zarkovic, and I note he had with him a note-taker, Karadzic, ¹⁶⁹⁶¹ yes. October -- excuse me. September 10, 1992.

Q. Was the topic of Sarajevo discussed in detail during this meeting?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. Did Radovan Karadzic explain to yourself and Secretary Vance his rationale for what was going on in Sarajevo at that time?

A. Excuse me, when you say "what was going on," you mean the shelling of the city?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Can you please describe that interchange for us.

A. Well, he said quite a lot about Sarajevo. He said, among other things, that it was the biggest concentration camp in all of Bosnia, that 60.000, 80.000 Serbs were being held hostage there. He typically ranted and raved, if I may say, on that subject with great frequency. And he also gave us his account of what we considered - what I considered, at any rate - his personal reasons for the shelling of the city. He stated it directly.

Q. And did you record that in the diary?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Can you please tell us what he said now.

A. He said, yes, that -- again -- he said that Sarajevo was the biggest camp, meaning concentration camp, and I believe he said -- yes, here it is. He actually said that "They" - meaning the Bosnian government - "started the war by expelling me from my apartment in Sarajevo," and that they tortured 80.000 Serbs. I quote from the diary: "They started ¹⁶⁹⁶² the war by expelling me from my apartment in Sarajevo. Tortured 80.000 Serbs."

Q. And did Lord Owen respond to him at that point?

A. Yes. Lord Owen shut him up.

Q. And did he then give his rationale for the situation or his understanding of the military situation in Sarajevo?

A. Yes. He said very seriously, he said: "Look, we --" meaning the Bosnian Serbs -- "we are 35 per cent," meaning 35 per cent of the population of Bosnia. "They are 65 per cent. We have the weapons. They have the men. If we give up weapons and they don't give up men, we are doomed." Those were his words. And it indicated to us that he had no intention of giving up the weapons nor any intention of stopping the shelling of the city, and unfortunately, that proved to be the case until, by force, they were stopped.

Q. Ambassador, would I be correct in saying that a fair amount of your time working on the ICFY meetings and discussions, that Sarajevo formed the basis of many of those meetings?

A. Yes. That was certainly the case.

Q. Did you yourself keep track of reports of the shelling of Sarajevo?

A. Yes, because, while we were in Geneva, I received on a daily basis the shell count from the UN observers who were posted in and around Sarajevo. That is to say, the incoming shells from the Serb artillery onto the city and the outgoing fire from the Muslim side in the city.

Q. And how did you record these daily reports that you received of ¹⁶⁹⁶³ these shelling counts?

A. I kept a graph on the wall of my office in Geneva.

Q. Can you summarise the picture that developed over the time that you kept these records regarding the ratio of outgoing shells from Sarajevo as opposed to incoming shells.

A. The average daily incoming shell-fire, that is from the Serb artillery being rained into the city, was between 4 and 5.000 shells per day. The response fire from the Bosnian government was 300 or 400, of much smaller calibre, it has to be noted. So it was a ratio of about 10 to 1.

Q. During the course of your discussions with the various parties on the subject of Sarajevo, did you form an impression of the objectives of the Serb side regarding the siege of Sarajevo?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Can you please briefly summarise that for the Chamber.

A. I thought the Bosnian Serbs had three major objectives with regard to the shelling of Sarajevo: First, to tie down the Bosnian government army in the defence of their capital; second, to carry out the Bosnian Serb plan to physically divide the city by, so to speak, by a wall of fire that would divide the population via the shell-fire; and third, to frighten the Bosnian government, which of course was resident in the city, to frighten them and so to discourage them that they would sign a peace term on Bosnian Serb terms.

Q. Ambassador, a few minutes ago you made reference to Radovan Karadzic beginning to discuss 80.000 tortured Serbs. Was one of the ¹⁶⁹⁶⁴ ostensible goals articulated by the Bosnian Serb leadership regarding Sarajevo, was one of the ostensible goals to protect Serbs living in Sarajevo, in the besieged city?

A. Yes. That was a constant theme of Karadzic, Koljevic, and when we saw him, Krajisnik as well.

Q. And did you and Secretary Vance attempt to verify, by talking to humanitarian organisations, the state or the condition of Serbs living or having remained within the city?

A. Yes, and we also were in Sarajevo ourselves. We visited the city.

Q. Can you please describe what you learnt about the condition of Serbs living in Sarajevo at that time.

A. Well, they were no worse off than anybody else. Everybody in Sarajevo was living under constant shell-fire, gunfire. It was a terribly difficult situation. The world knew that; it was heavily reported in the press and on television. But there was no mass mistreatment of the Serb population.

Q. Ambassador, I'd like to now draw your attention to a meeting on September 17, 1992, with Radovan Karadzic.

MR. GROOME: And I would draw the Chamber's attention to Prosecution Exhibit 398, and I will give the Chamber the evidence record number. That probably is the best way to reference it now. I would draw your attention to R0163952.

Q. Ambassador, I want to draw your attention to a portion of that meeting. Did Secretary Vance discuss with Radovan Karadzic Serb -- Bosnian Serb irregulars? ¹⁶⁹⁶⁵

JUDGE KWON: Was that in Geneva?

MR. GROOME:

Q. Sorry. Ambassador, could you please tell us, where was this meeting held?

A. Yes, this meeting was in Geneva on September 17th. It began at 9 -- 10.00 p.m. and ended at 10.05 p.m. It was in the evening, in Geneva.

Q. Could you please tell us what if anything was said on the subject of paramilitaries.

A. Yes. Secretary Vance raised the question and asked: "What about your irregular troops? Who controls them?" And Karadzic replied that perhaps 5 per cent were not under control but that he controlled the rest, meaning he controlled 95 per cent of the Bosnian Serb irregulars. And he went on to say, and I quoted him in the diary, and I read: "We can do anything. Army has unified command. I have full power." That's what Radovan Karadzic said.

Q. Did he go on later in the meeting to suggest to you and Secretary Vance what was necessary to end the conflict in all of the former Yugoslavia?

A. Yes. He said that the war would not end, that it could not be stopped until the other sides, by which he meant the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, were pressured into stopping fighting. He said that what were needed were sanctions against the Bosnian Croats and that it was necessary to derecognise the Muslims, because by this time, as we all know, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had formally received international recognition. So this was Dr. Karadzic in effect ^{16966 BLANK PAGE 16967} demanding that the international community unrecognise the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Clearly an impossibility, if I may say so.

Q. Did he make reference to the parties that you needed to gather around the table that were necessary to resolve the conflict, end the conflict?

A. Yes. He said that Mr. Vance and Lord Owen could end the war, that if they brought around one table and on one side of the table President Milosevic and Hadzic and he were sitting together, that is to say President Milosevic, Hadzic of Croatia, and Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, if they were on one side of the table, and on the other side of the table sat President Tudjman of Croatia and Mate Boban, the leader of the Bosnian Croats, that they together could solve the problem.

Q. Was there a notable omission to the people that he suggested be gathered around the table?

A. There were no Muslims.

Q. Ambassador, in order to save time, I'm going to skip over a number of other meetings, but I would like to draw the Chamber's attention to them, and I believe that they will be self-explanatory if read by the Chamber. They would be a meeting on the 2nd of October, 1992, a meeting with Radovan Karadzic; a meeting on the 11th of October, 1992, also with Mr. Karadzic; and again a meeting on the 6th of January, 1993, with Mr. Milosevic. And I will provide the evidence record number as soon as possible with respect to those specific entries. I want to now draw your attention to a meeting you had with Momcilo Krajisnik on the 11th of January, 1993. I'd ask you to open your ¹⁶⁹⁶⁸ diary to that meeting.

This would be Prosecution Exhibit 398, and the diary entry 11 of January, 1993.

A. Yes.

Q. During the course of that meeting with Mr. Krajisnik, did he articulate three major features that any plan would have to contain in order to be acceptable to the Bosnian Serb leadership?

A. Yes, he did. And may I add that Karadzic and General Mladic were also present at this meeting.

Q. Can you please tell us, what were the three conditions that he articulated?

A. Yes. He said that first, Bosnia-Herzegovina had to be a composite state, that is a state with separate entities, made up of separate units, separate entities, that that was necessary. It could not be a unitary state.

Second, he stated that it was important for the Bosnian Serbs, that is to say the Bosnian Serb entity, to have relations with other states, and of course he and we understood that meant principally Serbia. And his third point was that the Bosnian Serb entity, Bosnian Serb state within a state, had to have territorial continuity, that is it could not be chopped up into smaller bits. It had to be one coherent territorial state.

Those were his three conditions.

Q. In addition to this conversation with Mr. Krajisnik, did, over the course of your negotiations with Bosnian Serb leaders, these and other ¹⁶⁹⁶⁹ conditions or aims emerge as primary and essential aims from their point of view to stop the conflict?

A. Yes. The Bosnian Serbs had six war aims, several in addition to these, that they were consistent with these, but they had basically six war aims which were known, stated privately to us, but were known publicly to those who followed events closely.

Q. Can you please go through each of those six and explain each one to us.

A. Yes. The six Bosnian Serb war aims were as follows: First, the creation of Republika Srpska; that is to say, a separate Bosnian Serb entity which they called Republika Srpska, the Serbian Republic. Second, that Republika Srpska have a continuous geographical integrity, as we just mentioned, that it be a coherently geographic state. Third, that it be pure Serb. Almost exclusively Serb ethnic, and that, of course, was what explained the ethnic cleansing. The fourth point was that the Bosnian Serb state, Republika Srpska, had to have a special relationship with Serbia, as Mr. Krajisnik mentioned explicitly at that meeting. And by a special relationship it was understood to be that they could trade and even recognise each other. This was sometimes referred to by Western diplomats as a parallel relationship, which was not an incorrect term, and it -- what it implied was that their relationship, this special or parallel relationship would be independent of the relationship that the central government in Sarajevo could have with countries around the world, independent. The fifth point was that the Bosnian Serbs wanted a veto power ¹⁶⁹⁷⁰ over any important decisions made by a residual central government in Sarajevo, because they knew there would be a central government, some nominal central government in Sarajevo.

And the sixth and last point was to divide Sarajevo.

Q. Now, Ambassador, these aims that you've just described for us, would it be fair to say that they emerged during the context of trying to develop the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia?

A. Yes. They emerged during the course of the conference. They were known previously during the Cutilheiro time, during Lord Carrington's time, but they became explicitly clear to Lord Owen and Secretary Vance as they sought to develop a peaceful settlement for the conflict.

Q. Did the -- your work in ICFY culminate with the presentation to the parties of a Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia?

A. Yes. It was presented to the parties formally at a conference in Geneva over a series of days in January 1993.

Q. Did that peace plan grant the Bosnian Serbs any of the aims that you've articulated for us here?

A. Actually, no. It rejected all six Bosnian Serb demands explicitly.

Q. And can you please briefly describe for the Chamber the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and what ultimately happened to the plan.

A. The plan called for a single Bosnian state internationally recognised within its borders, organised on a decentralised basis. It had ten provinces in the country. There was no Republika Srpska. It called for the total demilitarisation of the country. It called for the highest ¹⁶⁹⁷¹ standards of human rights within the country and set up a court system overseen by non-Bosnian judges to make the final decision on human rights, and then a whole series of military measures as well. The provinces were consciously not drawn on an ethnic basis. Of the ten provinces, six had no ethnic majority whatsoever. Of course, the negotiators were dealing with a real country. They weren't drawing lines on the moon, and so some provinces had more Serbs and some had more Muslims and some had more Croats, but the point was to maintain as much as possible of an ethnic balance. Indeed, one of the principal Bosnian Serb objections, one of the points that they were furious about, was that most of the Bosnian Serbs under the Vance-Owen Peace Plan would have resided outside of provinces in which Bosnian Serbs were a majority. This, I must say, was a very big sticking point for them.

With respect to the acceptance of the plan, the Bosnian Croats accepted the plan immediately on its presentation. The Bosnian Muslim side accepted it a bit later, after some changes were made in the map and in the arrangements for an interim administration between the adoption of the plan and the time that it entered into effect. They wanted to make sure they stayed in control of the central government, which Vance and Owen agreed to.

The Bosnian Serbs never accepted the plan, except that, under very heavy pressure, Karadzic did sign the plan in May 1993 at a meeting in Athens. He signed it subject to, as he put it, approval by the Bosnian Serb parliament. But when he returned to Bosnia a few weeks later, the Bosnian Serb parliament, as expected, rejected the plan. ^{16972 BLANK PAGE 16973} So in sum, it was accepted by the Bosnian Croats, accepted by the Bosnian Muslims, and rejected by the Bosnian Serbs.

Q. What was President Milosevic's --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to have to bring this to a close. We have to be out sharply at quarter to.

Could you give us, Mr. Groome, an exhibit number, when we next return, for the Vance-Owen Plan. I think we have it exhibited in here.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour it's tab 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Prosecution Exhibit 396. I'm sorry. I'm thinking of the Vance --

JUDGE MAY: I think it's been exhibited, but --

MR. GROOME: It's tab 10, Your Honour, in 396.

JUDGE MAY: Tab 10. Thank you.

MR. GROOME: I have the evidence record numbers of the meetings I was referring the Chamber to. If the Chamber wishes, I can just give it to the registrar.

JUDGE MAY: If you would. Thank you very much. Now, the position tomorrow, we're expecting General Mangan; is that right?

MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. And then on Friday I have approximately a half hour of questions for the ambassador to conclude my examination of him.

JUDGE MAY: Is the other witness going to take all day tomorrow or can we ask this witness to come back later in the morning and try to finish more of his evidence?

MR. NICE: It's unclear but I think the best thing is to have the witness available so he may be telephoned before the last of the two ¹⁶⁹⁷⁴ breaks and come in then if it seems appropriate. It would be desirable to take the other half hour of examination-in-chief tomorrow if at all possible.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, well clearly that would be helpful in order to try to finish the witness on Friday.

MR. NICE: Of course, it has to be noted I think Friday is a slightly longer session than today but it's only limited.

JUDGE MAY: Ambassador, you heard that exchange. If you would be available tomorrow morning on the end of a telephone, at least. We'll see how we get on with the other witness, and if we can, we'll continue with your evidence tomorrow.

We will adjourn now until 9.00 tomorrow.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.46 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 27th day of

February, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.