¹⁷⁰⁸⁸

Friday, 28 February 2003

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

WITNESS: HERBERT OKUN [Resumed] Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. [No interpretation]

JUDGE KWON: We are not getting any interpretation.

THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English? Can you hear?

JUDGE KWON: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, we're having some trouble with the interpretation. Can we have the question again, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Okun, can you hear me now? Can you hear the English?

A. Excuse me, Mr. Milosevic. I'm receiving the translation in French.

THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English now?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I can.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yesterday, we started discussing your meeting in my office on the 13th of October, and we noted that I told you that a peaceful solution was the only solution. Isn't that right?

A. Yes, you said that. ¹⁷⁰⁸⁹

Q. And that Croatia and Slovenia had entered into a secessionist undertaking. That's right, isn't it?

A. Yes, that's correct. You stated that.

Q. And furthermore, that in Croatia we saw the resurgence of Nazism and fascism.

A. You stated that, and I answered it in the diary notes.

Q. And I also indicated to you on the occasion that any violent change of borders was illegal, and you told me something along the following lines, if I understood you correctly; that according to the constitution, the republics enjoyed the right to make a decision on some kind of separation on their part, and I asked you to indicate that particular article of the constitution where this right was stated. I don't know whether you can do so now. Can you point out the portion in the constitution?

A. In response to that interchange yesterday, I noted that the arbitration Tribunal of the European Community, when asked to reach a decision on the state in which the former Yugoslavia found itself, reached the decision that the state was in a process of dissolution and that, subsequently, the decision was reached that the -- the states that were seceding had the right to do so, that was their decision, and that is in fact what happened, because the reality is they're all independent states, they're all members of the United Nations today and widely recognised by the international community. That is what ensued, yes.

Q. Yes. And as far as those facts are concerned, that they had truly seceded is not being challenged. I was only asking about what the ¹⁷⁰⁹⁰ constitution said, and that's where the crux of the matter lies, because the international community committed a crime against Yugoslavia thereby. Do you consider that that is so or not?

A. I don't -- I don't think it is within my competence to speculate on whether the international community --

Q. All right, very well.

A. -- committed a crime. But, of course, that was your view at the time. There is no question of that.

Q. And did I state loud and clear to you at the time that Serbia had no territorial pretensions?

A. So you did.

Q. Did I also speak to you at the time about the great crimes and pressure that was being brought to bear against them, the dismissals, the violence against Serbs in Croatia?

A. You did.

Q. And did I draw your attention to the fact that history was repeating itself from World War II when hundreds of thousands of Serbs were killed in Croatia? Isn't that so?

A. So I heard you say.

Q. And did I also clearly indicate to you at the time that the Yugoslav People's Army, as far as I knew, was just separating the warring sides or sides in the conflict and that that was its exclusive role? Isn't that right, Mr. Okun?

A. That was your contention, yes, that is correct. You stated that.

Q. And did I also tell you at the time that the Serbs in Croatia had ¹⁷⁰⁹¹ to have protection and that they had to have a special status accorded them, because according to the constitutions of -- they were one of the constituent peoples of the south Slav peoples, south Slav nations. Do you happen to remember that?

A. Yes, I remember you stated that.

Q. And did I also tell you that according to my information, the Yugoslav People's Army went into action only once it was attacked and under no other conditions except when it was attacked?

A. Yes, you stated that.

Q. And didn't I also say at the time that the army was completely neutral and that it avoided any ethnic clashes and conflicts or, rather, that it endeavoured to prevent them and to separate the parties in conflict regardless of the fact that the Serbs were the victims in the violence that took place at that time in Croatia?

A. So I have heard you say.

Q. You mentioned or, rather, Vance mentioned the role of the army, and I think that on the occasion we cleared up that matter. Did I tell you on that occasion - and when I say "you" I don't mean you personally but yourself and Cyrus Vance together - that we did not wish any kind of Greater Serbia to be created?

A. That was your contention.

Q. Otherwise, you also had meetings with the top military leaders, top military echelon, Veljko Kadijevic, the Federal Secretary for National Defence and the Chief of the General Staff Blagoje Adzic; isn't that right? On that same day, actually; right? ¹⁷⁰⁹²

A. Yes.

Q. Is it true that General Kadijevic clearly indicated the desire of the army to solve the issue peacefully?

A. He so stated.

Q. Did Kadijevic tell you unequivocally and quite resolutely that the army wished to avoid a war?

A. That was the general thrust of his remarks.

Q. And is it true and correct that at that time they indicated to you that there were blockades of the sea, the barracks, the airports, and that they asked you to prevail upon NATO to deblock the garrisons?

A. There was no question that the issue of the blockaded JNA barracks was very high, perhaps uppermost in General Kadijevic's mind. I'm not sure whether he specifically asked that NATO do the unblocking, but he certainly implored Secretary Vance and myself to do everything we could to prevail upon the Croatian civil and military authorities to secure the freedom of the blockaded JNA troops and their families.

Q. Well, he told you precisely all these things, and I'm reading from your own block, that straight away, the barracks were to be deblocked and that the Adriatic ports were to be deblocked, that the airspace be opened. And he also told you that they did not deblock the garrisons but -- deblock the garrisons, but they had in fact blocked two more. And he also told you on that occasion that they had taken control of over 100 garrisons during the cease-fire; isn't that right?

A. Yes. If it's in my diary notes, it's what he said. And I do recall him stating that. ¹⁷⁰⁹³

Q. And is it true that in The Hague, on the 15th of October, Milo Djukanovic, the president -- the Prime Minister of the government of Montenegro with whom you had a meeting also indicated to you the problem of the violation of basic human rights of Serbs living in Croatia? Do you remember that?

A. Yes, he stated that.

Q. If you happen to remember, did he also tell you that the Ustasha movement had come to the fore and was rampant in Croatia again?

A. Could I consult my diary for that?

JUDGE MAY: Please, Mr. Okun, at any time.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. If this is -- poses a difficulty, I'll read it out. "The root of problems in Croatia is the violation of elementary human rights of Serbs." That's what Djukanovic said.

A. I see it now, Mr. President.

Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues]... "in Croatia today. Fascism on rise."

A. Yes, Mr. President, I do so see that on page 93.

Q. Did he tell you on that occasion too that the status of the Serbs had to be guaranteed by the international community, and you have that on the next page. "Special status must be guaranteed by the international institutions" is what you said. "International institutions."

A. Yes, that's correct. It's on page 94.

Q. Not to go further at this point, beyond the 15th of October. I'm going to make a slight digression here and digress from your diaries, ¹⁷⁰⁹⁴ because what I have to ask you about is the 18th of October and the meeting in The Hague, the one that you testified about in your examination-in-chief. I did not see this in your diary, but I would like to ask you several questions in that regard.

Did I understand you correctly, Mr. Okun, to have said here that Milosevic rejected Carrington's paper? And Mr. Groome asked you how you understood this, and you said that you understood it as being a sign that Serbia wanted war and that we demonstratively left the meeting of the conference on Yugoslavia. That's what you said, I believe. Is that right, Mr. Okun?

A. Yes, that's correct. It is noted in the diary on page 100 --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish.

THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct, and it is so noted in the diary Vance mission 1, page 145.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I don't know what was noted in the diary. I don't have that particular page before me. I'll take a look at it later on. But as you were there, were you not, and I'm sure you recall what happened there very well.

So I'm now going to ask you this: First, about the fact that you claim happened, that is to say that we left the hall, the conference hall, and that we had a negative attitude towards the peace conference in general.

Now, my question to you, Mr. Okun, is this: Did you not perhaps mix something up there? ^{17095 BLANK PAGE 17096}

A. I believe not, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. All right. Fine.

A. If I may continue.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: The conference had six -- the entire Yugoslav states. All the republics were there, with the full Presidency, that is to say eight. Those who got up and walked out, that is to say physically left the room - and this is on page 145 - were Mr. Jovic from Serbia, Mr. Bajramovic from Kosovo, and Mr. Kostic from the Vojvodina. They were the ones who physically walked out of the conference. So --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. That's something else again.

A. -- it is not incorrect to say that the Serbian representatives walked out of the conference.

Q. They were not representatives of Serbia. They were members of the Federal Presidency. So I'm now going to jog your memory, and I hope you'll be able to remember when I do, because the vice-president of the Federal Presidency, Branko Kostic, was President of Montenegro prior to that, and later on, he was member of the Yugoslav state Presidency and vice-president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, as you know, I'm sure; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, do you remember something that I would actually call an incident; that the president of the conference, who was Lord Carrington, did not allow Branko Kostic, who was the vice-president of the Yugoslav ¹⁷⁰⁹⁷ state Presidency at the time, to speak, to take the floor at the meeting, at the conference, and that he questioned his right and denied him the right to speak on behalf of the Presidency of the SFRY and that he demanded or, rather, the EEC, the European Community, questioned the legitimacy of what they referred to as the Rump Presidency, considering thereby, and I'm going to quote what they said, "That the legal representative of Yugoslavia was only the source Presidency of a state and not a Rump Presidency." Do you remember that?

A. Yes, it is so noted in my diary on page 144.

Q. Am I right, Mr. Okun, when I say that this kind of position on the part of the EEC was unacceptable, because the highest organ of any state in the world does not have the right to abdicate and leave the country to chaos, and if due to a death, for example --

JUDGE MAY: This sounds like argument. Ambassador, is this something you feel you can deal with? It sounds like comment.

THE WITNESS: I think it's not my -- I think it's not my place, Your Honour, to retrospectively try and read the mind of the EC in October 1991. That was their decision.

JUDGE MAY: Whether it was right or wrong may be an issue in the case. It may be something we'll have to decide. But for the moment, it's not for the witness to comment on things like this. You can ask him what happened, you can ask him about what's in his diary, but these sort of argumentative comments are not for him to deal with.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the witness was a diplomat, a career diplomat for many years, and at the beginning of his testimony, ¹⁷⁰⁹⁸ he himself said that he taught at university - I think you mentioned Georgetown University, in fact - and that the subject he taught was international law. Or perhaps some university in Washington, was it? Is that right? So therefore, it is within his competence to answer the question, in view of his presence at the international conference. He is able to answer questions concerning international law. Therefore --

JUDGE MAY: Let me explain. The reason -- just a moment. The reason he can't answer the question, or won't be allowed to, is that this is a court of law, and in a court of law, the Judges are the deciders as to the law. They decide what the law is, not witnesses, unless they're experts in some particular field, and this doesn't apply in this case. This witness is giving evidence about events which he dealt with. Those you can ask him about. His opinions as an international lawyer are, with respect to him, totally irrelevant to us. It's not a matter for him to answer.

So can you confine yourself not to questions about law or anything of the sort, and politics, but as to what happened.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this won't be a great obstacle for me. When my turn comes, there will be some very prominent experts of international renown to explain to you what all this is about and how that crime was committed from the standpoint of international law. So I don't necessarily need this explanation. I just wanted to hear Mr. Okun's opinion. If you're prohibiting that, I don't mind.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But is it in dispute, Mr. Okun, that a representative of the ¹⁷⁰⁹⁹ Presidency of the SFRY, rather, the vice-president of that Presidency who headed the Presidency of the SFRY at the time, was not allowed to speak and that that is why they walked out, as a sign of protest? Is that true or not? Just say yes or no. We won't dwell on this. I do not wish to argue with you because there are records about all this. Just say yes or no, please. Is it true that he was not allowed to speak and then they -- that they walked out in protest; is that right?

A. After Branko Kostic stated that the terms of the AGS, the general settlement that we've discussed already, after he stated that those terms were not acceptable, Lord Carrington heard him say that, he then went on, and Lord Carrington asked him to stop. This is all in the diary. And then he threatened to walk out. That's the line at the top of page 145. And then the three members of the Presidency from Serbia, that is to say Mr. Jovic, Mr. Bajramovic, and the other Mr. Kostic - there were two Kostics, Your Honour - those three gentlemen walked out of the conference. That was the sequence of events, as recorded in my diary.

Q. Those four representatives. What the European Community called the Rump Presidency, they walked out of the hall after the vice-president of the Presidency was deprived of the right to speak by Lord Carrington; is that right?

A. You're correct, Mr. President, Branko Kostic did walk out; it was four who walked out, not three.

Q. Very well, then. So the incident occurred because he was not given the right to speak and not because they wanted to undermine the peace conference. We're just speaking about facts, only about facts. I ¹⁷¹⁰⁰ hope that it is not in dispute that this proposal that was reviewed, that the most important point was the first chapter, first paragraph of the first article, which envisaged the disappearance of Yugoslavia as a state and as a subject of international law on the basis of a consensus among the leaders of the Yugoslav republics, specifically those that the European Community had invited to The Hague. Is that what that document stipulated?

A. That was the partial area of the document. I don't have it in front of me, but I assume you're reading from it and that it's correct. This is the AGS, Your Honour, that Mr. Milosevic is referring to.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I'd ask that Prosecution Exhibit --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Yes, Mr. Groome.

MR. GROOME: I'd ask that the Prosecution Exhibit 396, tab 5, be placed in front of Mr. Okun so he can refer to this particular chapter.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Just a moment. Let the witness have the document.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There's no dispute whatsoever over that document of Carrington's.

JUDGE MAY: There may not be a dispute, but the witness should have the document in front of him if he's being asked about it. Ambassador, would you remind us what "AGS" is standing for.

THE WITNESS: It stands for Arrangements for General Settlement. It's document number 124.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We have it. ¹⁷¹⁰¹ Yes, Mr. Milosevic. The witness has the document.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Does it appear to you from the standpoint of your profession and on the basis of your considerable international experience that the disappearance of a country by auto destruction is surely an innovation?

JUDGE MAY: No. That's precisely the area which we've ruled you're not to ask him about. You can address us in due course about it, but it's not for the witness to comment. He's here as a witness as to facts, not to give his opinions about things.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Okun, as a person specialising in international law, are you familiar with a single case of a state destroying itself?

JUDGE MAY: No. Mr. Milosevic, time is short, so repeating these questions which are disallowed is simply taking up your time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. As you will not allow him to express his opinion, I will ask him, and I assume that is legitimate, for me to ask him what actually happened at the conference.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. That's precisely what you should ask him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As he was present there and as he followed it very carefully, and as Mr. Okun knows exactly what took place at the conference. So I assume I'm allowed to ask him that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you remember, Mr. Okun, precisely what it says in Article 1, that is that Yugoslavia ceases to exist, that I spoke then. I was not deprived of the floor, and I did not walk out. I will quote myself ^{17102 BLANK PAGE 17103} actually what I said, and you tell me if you remember that, please. Just please tell me whether you remember that and was it as I am saying it was. I said that the proposal could not be accepted because it suspended the valid constitutional order and abolishes Yugoslavia as a state which had been in existence continuously for 70 years.

Is that right, Mr. Okun?

A. You may have said that, Mr. President. I do not recall your saying it at that time, nor do my diary notes show it. The diary, on page 145, reads -- The walkout was at 3.56 p.m. I noted the time in the diary. And the next line reads: "Carrington announces that the Conference on Yugoslavia is adjourning," and that was at 4.00 p.m. So from the time of the walkout until the time of the adjournment was four minutes.

I'm just repeating to you, Mr. President, what's in the diary and what it shows. So whether you spoke or not, I didn't record it. I'm not disputing what you're saying, but I have no recollection of your speaking.

Q. And do you recollect that I said at the time that a decision on the abolition of a state cannot be taken by any international forum, that a decision can only be taken by that subject or entity that had originally created the state and that the mandate to accept such an arrangement was not given to any of the participants in the conference, nor can such a mandate be given to the conference as such. Do you remember that?

A. Yes, Mr. President. It is so recorded in the diary on pages 139 and 140. Those were your earlier remarks, and they are recorded in the diary. ¹⁷¹⁰⁴

Q. That's fine. So I'm not asking you what I said when the conference adjourned, I'm asking what I said at the conference, and you've noted it, I see. So I said not a single participant at this conference has the mandate to accept this, nor can such a conference have such a mandate, the valid constitutional order of the country, which is being ignored by this arrangement. The only exception is being made to the existing federal units and their borders, their administrative borders, and those federal units were formed at the time of and immediately after the Second World War, and their borders were never determined by any legal act which was democratically verified.

I went on to say: By these arrangements, the unilateral act of secession is being legalised and a unilateral secession of republics was the cause of armed conflicts. Avoiding the real causes of the crisis could move us further away from a lasting and stable peace in Yugoslavia, an aim which we all want to achieve. It is clear to all that the crux of the conflict in Yugoslavia is the position of the Serbian people in Croatia which is threatened by extermination for a second time in a century, and there can be no settlement to the Yugoslav crisis without providing protection and national survival of the Serbian people. Those were my words.

Is that right, Mr. Okun?

A. So I've heard you say.

Q. How, then, 12 years later, are you telling us that it became clear to us that Serbia wanted war. So what I was saying was in favour of peace because what happened caused war, because what happened -- ¹⁷¹⁰⁵

JUDGE MAY: Let him answer. You've asked a question. He must be able to answer it.

THE WITNESS: I said that, Your Honour, because of the six Yugoslav republics present at that meeting on October 18, five of the six republics accepted the AGS as drawn. The only republic that did not accept it was Serbia, the representatives of Serbia, to use the phraseology of Mr. Milosevic, and therefore, you had five of the six republics accepting the comprehensive settlement of the problem proposed by Lord Carrington and the conference and one rejecting it. I think that speaks for itself.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Okun, the conference continued. It lasted for some time after that. It went into October and then the next year also. Then there was the London conference, the Geneva conference, and so on. Therefore, this was not the end of it. To this day, I consider that my arguments were right and failure to take them into consideration had led to war, because what we had was a forcible act of secession whereby genocide was committed against a whole people. You don't agree with that, do you?

JUDGE MAY: No. That's not for the witness to answer. All he can deal with is what happened at the time. You can ask him about anything he says about the conference, of course, but his opinions, and particularly his opinions about what happened afterwards, are not relevant.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you remember that in October the conference met for a second time? ¹⁷¹⁰⁶

A. I don't have that in my records, but I imagine it could be the case.

Q. At this plenary session at the level of the presidents of the republics was scheduled for the 25th of October, according to the notes that I have here. And even after that, if you remember, this fresh meeting, Tudjman, who had spoken to me, and his statement can be found in the press of the time, in which he said that Serbia had no territorial claims. The affair around Dubrovnik started at that time, and Tudjman said that I had condemned any kind of violence related to Dubrovnik. Do you recollect that? This was precisely at the following meeting of the conference that was held at the end of October.

A. I was not present at that meeting, Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Vance and I returned to the United States, I believe it was either on the 18th or the 19th of October, after the first mission. It was on the 18th, immediately after the walkout - I see that on page 145 - and we were in New York at the United Nations and doing our work in New York, and we returned -- if I could just give you the timing. We returned on Monday, November 4. So between October 18 and November 4, we were in the United States.

Q. And you didn't follow developments, the course of the conference? You had no insight into that? You attended that one meeting, and after that, you didn't keep track of it. Very well.

Is it also true you that Borisav Jovic, at a meeting you had with him on the 17th of October had drawn attention specifically to the secession of the republics?

A. If I might revert to your previous comment, we of course did ¹⁷¹⁰⁷ follow the conference, and Mr. Jovic, on the 17th, if I might consult my notes -- yes. I found that on page 128 of Vance mission diary number 1. It records Mr. Jovic stating, and I quote from the diary: "I predicted war if secessionists were allowed to carry out their plans. I was correct, but the West would not listen. Now we have violence caused by the secessionists," et cetera. And I noted parenthetically to my comment on his demeanour: "Aggressive tone from the start." Yes. Mr. Jovic did state that the secessionists had caused the war. That was his opinion, and I duly noted it in my diary.

Q. And did he tell you how many people had left Croatia, that the Croatian military operations were the causes of many unfortunate events? Is that right?

A. That was his opinion.

Q. And did Jovic personally draw attention to the fact that the Croatian government was not ready to deblock the garrisons and that it was continuing to attack the army and that, on the other hand, there were orders in the army not to return fire, not to respond to those attacks except in necessary self-defence?

A. That was his view.

Q. Did Jovic tell you at the time that the only important thing was to try to bring influence to bear on the Germans to tell Croatia to stop what it was doing?

A. He said that.

Q. Now let's go back to the conference. You advocated that the Serbs in Croatia must be given special status. Wasn't that right? Both you and ¹⁷¹⁰⁸ Cyrus Vance.

A. That is correct.

Q. And that international institutions should be the guarantors of that status.

A. Through the UN peacekeeping operation, that was our view.

Q. Do you know that at that meeting that I had with Tudjman, that he too was very close to accepting autonomy for the Serbian regions in Croatia? He wanted to accept it.

A. If you -- I wasn't present at that meeting, but if you say so.

Q. And do you know when he turned around and decided not to agree to anything? Do you know that the -- there were no reasons for continuing talks with them after the visit to Germany when the Germans told him that they would recognise him within his administrative borders and that he should forget about the Serbs?

A. I'm listening to you. I hear you say that. I have no knowledge of it.

Q. So you know nothing about that. There will be occasions on some other occasion for this to be demonstrated here. Very well, then. When Jovic said to you that attempts should be made to influence Germany to change its position towards the break-up of Yugoslavia, you remember that, don't you?

A. That was Jovic's position, and it was the general Serb position.

Q. We also had a meeting on the 18th of November. Did I tell you and Cyrus Vance on that occasion very explicitly that it was indispensable to continue the negotiations? ^{17109 BLANK PAGE 17110}

JUDGE MAY: Ambassador, if you find the entry in your diary, if you can, refer to it, of course.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You remember that meeting, don't you?

A. Yes. I'm trying to find --

Q. Mr. Jovanovic was with me.

A. I'm consulting my notes, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. [In English] "Negotiating WO bloodshed."

A. What page would that be on?

JUDGE MAY: Can somebody assist the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. 18th of November, 1991, page 17 of this typed text in English. It's easier for me to use than the photocopies of your original handwriting. I assume it was correctly typed out.

A. I can assume that you are better off with the text, but it does give us different page numbers, so if I might find that quote.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Can the Prosecution assist as to what page that would be.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, Ms. Wee will go up and get the typed copy so the Ambassador will have both. It may take a minute to get that. My apologies.

THE WITNESS: Yes, I found it, Your Honour, the statement of Mr. Milosevic. It followed the initial discussion of the peacekeeping plan by Mr. Vance. He asked for President Milosevic's views, and this has ¹⁷¹¹¹ already been stated, President Milosevic stated: "This is completely suitable for what we have in Yugoslavia," that is to say, the peacekeeping operation. Then the next statement was then: "Back to negotiating without bloodshed."

Yes, that is correct.

JUDGE KWON: So you are referring to page 41.

THE WITNESS: Precisely, page 41. The top of page 41. And then the president went on, we all have the notes in front of us, by stating: "The situation is complicated. There are different kind of troops, commands, national guards, et cetera, on the Croatian side," and then, "Croats began by attacking Serbs living in compact areas in Croatia in the form of military Krajinas of the old Austro-Hungarian empire. Before World War I, there were only two independent states," et cetera, et cetera. And I noted in the diary that - in the brackets, you'll see -- with due respect, Mr. President, I've noted in the diary: "Milosevic's lecture." We had heard it so often -- we had heard it so often from you that we referred to this as your lecture.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I assume that you don't mind, since you lecture as well. You give lectures.

At the beginning, Mr. Okun, you said that you ended your mission in January 1992, that the mission had succeeded in halting the war, that the blue helmets arrived in the areas under protection that were then known as the UN Protected Areas, and you assessed that the mission had ended successfully and returned to the States after January 1992. Isn't ¹⁷¹¹² that right?

Then you came back in October 1992 when the problems started that Cyrus Vance was dealing with once again, this time in Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

A. No, that's not correct, Mr. President. We departed in January after the conclusion of the secession of hostilities in Croatia, and that I refer to as a successful conclusion. We were -- we did not, however, wait until the following October to return. We were back in the former Yugoslavia in March, specifically March 3. So we were in there earlier.

Q. All right. I understood you to have said so. But never mind, it's not an essential point.

But what we discussed, this mission, you came to see me, or rather, Cyrus Vance did together with you, to ask for my assistance and support to the peace plan and the establishment of a peace mission which would not pre-empt a political solution but would prevent the war, stop the war. Isn't that right, Mr. Okun?

A. That was the purpose of the peacekeeping operation, yes, to provide a situation of calm with protection for the Croatian people and the Serb people in Croatia in order to allow the political negotiations being conducted by Lord Carrington to continue.

Q. Now, when we link all this up, you came to see me for me to help, first and foremost, by wielding political influence, and the role that Serbia had, as big as it was, first of all, first and foremost, to prevail upon the leaders in the Krajinas, in the east with Hadzic and in the Knin Krajina with Babic and his associates. Wasn't that how it was? ¹⁷¹¹³

A. Yes.

Q. So you asked me to talk to them; right?

A. In connection with the peacekeeping operation, yes.

Q. Well, I supported the peacekeeping operation just to stop a war, to prevent a war, and to opt for a peaceful solution. Isn't that so, Mr. Okun?

A. Yes. And others did it as well, under your direction and, of course, on the Croatian side.

Q. Well, I hope that you used the expression "under your direction" incorrectly, because I told you at the time as well that my political influence could only be political, public in view of the post I held, and only a political one as far as it was supported by the public, by public opinion, and that I would invest my all to strive for peace. And that is what I did; isn't that right?

A. That is what you told us.

Q. All right. Then tell me this: Apart from the facts that aren't challenged, that is to say the 18th of November, the meeting and the need to go back to the negotiating table, this portion you read out from your diary a moment ago, did I indicate to you that the Croatian extremists were starting to attack the Serbs throughout the territory of Croatia?

A. That was your persistent contention.

Q. And did you know how many refugees there were from Croatia in Serbia already at that time? Did you make a point of finding out about that?

A. We heard numbers from various sources, and we took account of ¹⁷¹¹⁴ that.

Q. Did I reiterate on the occasion that the army had the exclusive role of separating the parties in conflict at that meeting as well? Did I repeat that to you?

A. So you did. I must note, Mr. President, that we saw with our own eyes on repeated occasions that was not in fact the case. And I have testified to that fact.

Q. Well, what happened we shall be able to establish looking at it from all sides, but tell me this, please: Did I tell you on that occasion that we in Serbia would not allow any kind of paramilitary formations?

A. Yes. I've already reported on that.

Q. In your notes, you frequently make mention of the fact that I referred to Serbian paramilitary formations being under the control of Hadzic, or words to that effect. Now, as I never used that expression myself, I hope that that was a misunderstanding, because under Hadzic's or Babic's control, all that could have been under their control was the Serbian Territorial Defence, which were not paramilitary formations but Territorial Defence of Krajina. The Territorial Defence of the Serbian Autonomous Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, and the Territorial Defence of Krajina in the Knin region. So we were talking about the Territorial Defence and not paramilitaries. Isn't that right, Mr. Okun?

A. I would not agree with that. We witnessed, as I've previously testified, Serbian irregulars in Dalj at the corps commander of the JNA's headquarters. We saw numerous highly irregular troops. I wouldn't want ¹⁷¹¹⁵ to characterise them beyond that because any characterisation would be too negative for the Court. But we saw people like that in Vukovar after the fall of the city. So I'm reporting what I saw.

JUDGE MAY: But the question is when the accused was referring to paramilitaries, as you have noted, was he in fact simply referring to the Territorial Defence or was he referring to something else? Could you perhaps clarify that, Ambassador, from your note.

THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes, Your Honour. At the top of page 43, within quotes, I quoted President Milosevic, then President Milosevic, as stated: "We in Serbia did not allow any irregular or paramilitary troops." "In Eastern Krajina, some local Serbs helped the army." He did not say they were Territorial Defence units. He may have meant that, but we could see what kind of troops they were when we visited the battlefront.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You quoted very precisely. I did say we in Serbia do not allow any paramilitaries or irregular or paramilitary troops but in that chaos of conflict and clash that they could appear. However, I say now in connection with the portion you talk -- you mention who is in control of the paramilitaries, and when I talk about Hadzic, I say he was at the head of the Territorial Defence. He was not at the head of any irregulars, irregular Krajina troops, and I hope that is quite clear. Those forces were the regular forces of the Territorial Defence of the SAO Krajina.

JUDGE MAY: Now, this is very important that we get this correct. The issue which the accused is raising, Ambassador, is whether he ¹⁷¹¹⁶ referred to Hadzic as being in control of paramilitaries.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it was my view then, and it remains my view now, that he was referring to the paramilitaries. Later on in the same dialogue, then President Milosevic said "Babic and Hadzic both political and military leaders," and we understood that to mean that each of these two gentlemen controlled their political situation and controlled all of the armed forces, all of the armed men within their sphere of influence. Whether they were territorials or irregulars, they were under the control of Babic and Hadzic, and that was, I believe, widely understood at the time throughout Croatia and throughout Serbia.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ambassador -- just a minute, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, that's the whole point.

JUDGE KWON: Just a minute, Mr. Milosevic. Excuse me. Were you aware of the existence of the Territorial Defence at that time or the concept of the Territorial Defence or TO?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Were you aware that volunteers from Serbia or the local area were subsumed -- some part of them was subsumed to the organisation of the Territorial Defence?

THE WITNESS: We never checked that out ourselves directly. We didn't interview people, for example, Your Honour, but we were aware that that was said by various people.

JUDGE KWON: So is it possible for you to refer to those -- the volunteers as paramilitaries who were in either the TO or the JNA? ^{17117 BLANK PAGE 17118}

THE WITNESS: Well, the JNA I would certainly not refer to as paramilitaries. The TO is a more complicated situation. It depended, I think in every case, where they were active, what the command structure was.

You see, Your Honour, as we discussed yesterday in the brief interchange concerning the transition from the JNA to the VJ and then from the VJ to the Bosnian Serb army, namely the VRS, during this entire period, names changed and concepts changed, and very often the parties, and it was usually the Yugoslav party in this case, made changes in nomenclature that often concealed rather than elucidated the reality. So it is a murky picture, and we're trying to separate the strands of spaghetti from time to time here.

But I repeat, what we saw with our own eyes on the battlefields in Croatia were not territorial troops, were not TO troops separate from the JNA, in separate units, wearing separate kind of uniforms. The only people who really wore different uniforms were, naturally, on the Serbian side, the Serbian police, who wore police uniforms. The irregulars wore a variety of civilian clothing, actually, often with boots, sometimes with jackets thrown over. We were there in the winter, you'll recall, so they were wearing sweaters and coats. This is the winter of 1991. But they certainly did not indicate any type of military organisation. For example, none of them, to my recollection, wore badges or insignia that would indicate a rank. Now, if you're in an organised military structure, everybody has a rank and wears it and displays it. The Geneva Conventions require it and note it in the Conventions that one of the conditions of ¹⁷¹¹⁹ being in an organised military unit is a badge of rank, that sort of thing. So the paramilitaries didn't wear that kind of stuff, and therefore, I think we were correct in using the terminology "paramilitary" or "irregular."

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. You may proceed.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Than you, Mr. Kwon. That's what I wanted to clear up.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Because you noted -- you made a note of me having said that Babic and Hadzic, both politically -- were both political and military leaders in Krajina, one in the east and the other in the west; is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. Now, do you know that they were nominated and appointed by their governments, elected by their assemblies and appointed commanders of the Territorial Defence in the Serb Autonomous Regions? Do you know that? Are you aware of that?

A. I'm aware of that.

Q. So I told you something that was both de facto and de jure correct; right?

A. It was de facto correct. Whether it was de jure correct is another matter.

Q. All right. But without doubt, they had been nominated and appointed by their Assemblies and by their governments. That's not in dispute. And I assume you are challenging the legality of their Assemblies and governments, but as such, they were appointed by their ¹⁷¹²⁰ Assemblies and by their governments.

So is it then clear that if they were nominated and appointed by their Assemblies and governments, which is something you are familiar with, that the troops then that were subordinated to them were no paramilitary troops but first of all they were the Territorial Defence and then later on --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop this. This sounds like one of your complicated arguments you're trying to run to us. Ambassador, you made the note; what did you understand the situation to be, whatever the accused is arguing now?

THE WITNESS: We understood that Babic and Hadzic were in political and military command of their regions and that they were responsible ultimately, if not directly, for the military activities that took place on their side. We could see that the military activities were being carried out by paramilitary and irregular forces.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you happen to remember, Mr. Okun, that I said to you, I believe -- you mentioned Hadzic, and I said that I believed that 95 per cent of those troops were under control and that they would certainly adhere to the agreement. I assume there could have been 5 per cent, say, of some kind of paramilitaries, paramilitary troops, in all that chaos. But as for the disciplined army that was there, the Territorial Defence troops of Krajina, they adhered to the agreement, and that is not in dispute. Is it being challenged? Are you challenging it or not?

A. Not at all. I so indicated earlier. ¹⁷¹²¹

Q. Just a slight digression from your diaries now. I'm looking at this official statement of yours, the one you gave to this institution here, and I've already asked you something about one of the points there in it, where they wished to emphasise that I was the sole representative of the Serbian side that you negotiated with and then you explained to them how it was. So it's in that same paper, that same document. And you go on to say the following: When Slobodan Milosevic was informed that there was news that the Serb paramilitaries - and you were informing of that - were committing crimes and ethnic cleansing in north-western Bosnia-Herzegovina, he tried -- he appeared to be astonished, or he made it look as if he was surprised. Isn't that right? "Feigned surprise." Is that what you said? And when was that? In November 1991, was it?

A. What meeting are you referring to?

Q. I'm referring to point C on page 1 of your statement. The official statement that you made.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Groome.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I believe it's a meeting --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But to save time, we'll get to that and we'll get to your diary. Let's move on. I am afraid this is -- I'm losing a lot of time over this. We'll back to this question.

JUDGE MAY: You're losing time but we must have these documents. The witness can have a copy of his statement, if that's of assistance.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, there is no statement. Mr. Milosevic ¹⁷¹²² was referring to the witness summary. I only have one with my notes. We're getting a clean copy now, but I will direct that the passage Mr. Milosevic is referring to is on book 3, page 98. It's a meeting of the 21st of November, 1991.

THE WITNESS: Yes, I've found it, Your Honour. Thank you. I have page 98. It reads, briefly, not to take time: It refers to Secretary Vance saying that he's heard disturbing reports of activities by Serb irregulars in Bosnia, and I noted to myself parenthetically, "Then President Milosevic feigned surprise." You pretended to be surprised, yes. In my judgement, you were aware of what was going on and you were pretending not to.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Okun, do you know that I'm surprised now too? Not only then in 1991, but I'm quite surprised now as well. What conflicts were there in Bosnia in 1991? In 1991, in November, in Bosnia-Herzegovina it was completely peaceful, calm and peaceful. There were no paramilitary troops. Nothing was going on in 1991 November in Bosnia. And you yourself speak about the fact that the conflicts began after the breakdown of the Cutileiro plan, and we'll come to establish that. So that was in March 1992. So what kind of conflicts in Bosnia in November? What kind of killings and crimes in November in Bosnia in 1991 at all? And everybody would be surprised today to hear this, that at that time in 1991 there was any kind of violence in Bosnia at all. Quite the contrary. The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina was still operational and functioning. It was composed of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. The organs and ¹⁷¹²³ institutions of the republic were functioning. They believed that an agreement would be reached about an equitable solution for the three national communities, ethnic communities, and Cutileiro's plan came later on.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, there was a question put to the witness, "What conflicts were there in Bosnia in 1991?" I'd ask that he be allowed to answer the question that was put to him.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: If I may answer, we had already heard reports of fighting in November in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I refer you to Vance mission diary number 2 where the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic, discussed that with us. So it was known that there were -- there was fighting in Bosnia.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What was there going on in Bosnia? Where do you have any facts or pieces of information about any kind of clashes or conflicts in Bosnia in 1991? Who was killed in 1991?

A. Prime Minister Markovic told us there was.

Q. Who?

A. Prime Minister Ante Markovic.

Q. Ante Markovic told you that.

A. Yes.

Q. I stand surprised even now that anybody could claim, and that opposing side over there at least has information on Bosnia because it is trying -- has been trying Serbs from Bosnia here for ten years already, so ^{17124 BLANK PAGE 17125} I don't know that anybody was accused of having done anything in 1991.

JUDGE MAY: The witness can only answer what he was told, and that's his answer.

THE ACCUSED: Okay.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Okay. Fine. Tell me, please, at that meeting, the one I said that -- where I said that Serbia would not allow and did not allow any irregular forces - which is true, they never existed in Serbia - did I indicate to you that at that time over 20 Serb villages in Eastern Slavonia had been burnt? Do you remember that?

A. You said that.

Q. And on that occasion, did you hear my assessment and evaluation? And you asked me to assist in this regard, that the Serb side - I'm thinking of the Serb side in Croatia - and the army would accept the International Monitoring Mission or, rather, the UN forces; isn't that so?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. So is that then an expression of my conviction that the Serbs exclusively desired peace and that they wished in a peaceful way to settle the problems they had and, of course, the violence that they were exposed to?

A. We understood your agreement to Secretary Vance's initial proposals for a peacekeeping operation, and we welcomed that, of course. And we knew that with your agreement, the JNA would follow, as they did, that the local Serb leaders would follow, as they did, and of course we welcomed that. The diary is replete with references to that. And I may ¹⁷¹²⁶ say, if I could finish, that we hoped that the imposition of the UN peacekeeping force would lead to a peaceful settlement. The peacekeeping operation was not a peace plan, it was simply an arrangement on the ground to allow the peace settlement to be achieved. Unfortunately, it was not achieved.

Q. Yes. Unfortunately. Precisely for the reasons that I'm indicating. It was precisely for those reasons.

And on the 18th at that time, did you have talks with Kadijevic? Did he indicate the problem about the attack on the garrisons and the deblocking of the barracks and the blockade again? Did he indicate that to you once again, although he had spoken to you about that previously as well? Wasn't that how it was on that particular day?

A. Yes, indeed. The question of the blockaded JNA troops and their families, as I've indicated, was very high if not uppermost in General Kadijevic's mind.

Q. On the 20th of November, you attended a meeting with General Raseta. Is it true and correct that on the occasion it was very precisely in -- the problem of the JNA and the officers was precisely indicated, who had been under siege and in an encirclement for two months, they couldn't see their families, and they were blocked by the Croatian paramilitary troops. Is that how it was or not?

A. Well, you've made three points in that locution, Mr. Milosevic. Let me take them, if I might, one by one.

It is true that on October 20 we spent quite a bit of time in the blockaded Marsal Tito Kaserne in Zagreb with General Raseta and his ¹⁷¹²⁷ troops. The report of that meeting, and it's a full report, because we regarded it as so important for us to meet those troops, is in Vance diary number 3 beginning on page 82 and going through page 85. So yes, we spent a lot of time with the troops, listening to them and their concerns, and they did have concerns.

Your second point, namely that they were blocked by Croatian paramilitaries, I have no knowledge of that. They did not say that. We were taken into the barracks --

Q. Just to ask you then, Mr. Okun, yourself: These Serb forces, you consider them to be paramilitaries. Do you consider the Croatian ones to be legal at that time or paramilitary forces?

JUDGE MAY: Can you answer that, Ambassador? It sounds like a question which we may ultimately have to decide. Did you have a view at the time about it or not?

THE WITNESS: Croatia had an army. It was constituted. It had ranks. The names of the officers were known. General Anton Tus was the Commander-in-Chief. I met with him. Many others did as well, and his officers. I don't think anybody would consider them paramilitaries, no.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Your answer suffices. You consider that in Croatia they did not have any paramilitary forces. That means that the forces that were active in 1990 --

JUDGE MAY: That's not what he said. Just pay attention, if you would, to the answers. The witness was describing what happened when he went into the barracks. He said he didn't consider the people there ¹⁷¹²⁸ paramilitaries.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know anything about Croatian paramilitary formations, Mr. Okun?

A. Yes, I do. I was told that Paraga, a certain man named Paraga, whom I never met, had under his direction a small band of troops that opposed the Croatian government and also fought and I'm sure committed acts. Paraga was the head of the so-called Party of Rights. His troops were referred to -- his party and his group was referred to as the HOS. It was widely reported, but I never witnessed it myself, that they actually wore the Ustasha marking from the Second World War. So that there were reports, widespread reports, of the activities of this group. It was also reported that Paraga opposed President Tudjman and the government of Croatia.

JUDGE MAY: It's time now to adjourn. In fact, it's slightly after the time. Before we do, let me make one announcement about the arrangements in early April. We shall be changing the sitting days as follows: We shall take the rest break rather earlier. We shall not sit on the 4th and the 7th of April, but we will sit on the 11th and 14th. In fact, that will make a more rational break in our sitting pattern. We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes. Will you be back then, please, Ambassador.

--- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you have two hours more with this ¹⁷¹²⁹ witness, whose evidence we must finish today because he's had to hang around in The Hague. So can you tailor your examination to that, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At least then let me use the time for the rest of the day, if I may. This is very limited time for me for this witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So, Mr. Okun, you have absolutely no knowledge except Paraga, that you mentioned, about the arming of Croatian paramilitary units through the ruling HDZ party or about violence committed against Serb civilians, the Serb population all over Croatia, precisely by those paramilitary forces and the regular Croatian police. So you have no knowledge about these things. Did I understand you correctly?

A. Let me take those points in turn. On the question of paramilitaries, I did have knowledge. I was made aware of Paraga and his troops, although, as I mentioned, I never saw them. On your second point, whether the government of Croatia and the HDZ armed them, I have no knowledge.

And on your third point that violence was committed against the Serb people in Croatia, I was previously asked that question, and I said that yes, I did have knowledge of that through statements from you and from other Serb leaders. And as you'll recall, I added that the violence committed against the Croatian people was much larger than that committed against the Serb people in Croatia.

Q. Did you then know how many refugees there were in Serbia coming from Croatia? ¹⁷¹³⁰

A. The exact number, no, I never knew. It was never made available.

Q. Did you know how many Serbs were killed all over Croatia?

A. I knew what you and others told us, but I don't believe you ever gave figures except on rare occasions, and it was a statement, of course, we took into account.

Q. Very well. Talking about this meeting with Raseta, he told you, within the context of efforts and endeavours to deblock the barracks -- and you have this in your diary, but please, if you need to quote anything, limit yourself to my questions because, as you see, my time is extremely limited. Is it clear that he linked the blockade to what he said, that is that he didn't want anything to be repeated of what had happened in Vukovar? Was this a clear inference to the fact that what happened in Vukovar happened because the barracks were blocked and because there was large scale violence precisely by those Croatian paramilitary forces that we're talking about?

A. In general, that was his contention. Of course, we were able to see for ourselves what happened in Vukovar. I don't want to repeat it, Mr. Milosevic - I agree with you, we shouldn't be repetitive, we need to move on - but I did report rather fully about the complete destruction of Vukovar.

Q. Apart from Paraga, had you heard of Mercep and his criminals who had massacred Serbs in the area of Vukovar? Even representatives of the Croatian government complained about them. That is Marin Vidic, a representative of the government, wrote a letter to the Croatian president about that. Do you know that? And he was the legal head of the forces ^{17131 BLANK PAGE 17132} constituted by the Croatian government. That was this Mercep who had committed crimes. Had you heard anything about him?

A. We heard various reports of that nature.

Q. Very well. You had a meeting with Kadijevic in Belgrade on the 21st of November. At the time, you mentioned Vukovar. Did Kadijevic tell you then what had happened in Vukovar, to the effect that the barracks had been blocked for two months without food or water and that the people had demanded that the army assist Vukovar? Is what -- is that what you took down in your diary, what you wrote down in your diary?

A. That was the general burden of his comment.

Q. You spoke about peace. Is it true that you told me that Kadijevic agreed with a peaceful settlement and that I answered that that was a good thing?

A. Yes. We were pleased that Kadijevic followed your line -- yes. Yes, we were pleased to hear that General Kadijevic --

Q. Is it true that you told me then that he, Kadijevic, had told you that the army would withdraw from Croatia as soon as the garrisons were deblocked? And my response again was, "Excellent."

A. As I've already reported, the unblocking of the garrison was of the highest concern to General Kadijevic, and he did assure us that the fighting would cease, that the JNA would cease its military activities once the garrisons were unblocked. That is correct.

Q. I'm reading, actually, from your diary. Cyrus Vance says: "Kadijevic agreed." Cyrus Vance says: "Kadijevic said the JNA would withdraw from all of Croatia when garrisons unblocked." And then again I ¹⁷¹³³ say: "Excellent." And then you say that I feign surprise in connection with certain Serb irregular forces in Bosnia. And this was a meeting -- now I can't find the exact date of that meeting. I suppose it's precisely the one held in November. Let me see the date of the meeting. I can't see the date, but we can move on.

MR. GROOME: It's the 21st of November.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. 21st of November, 1991. So if what we've just quoted is correct, you informed me what Kadijevic told you and that he had agreed. Where, then, did you come to the conclusion that I had control over Kadijevic and that I had the army under my control? You are informing me or, rather, Cyrus Vance, as you say here, said that Kadijevic agrees, that he will withdraw, and I say fine, and so on.

How, then, did you come to make the conclusion so many years later that I had control over Kadijevic and the army?

A. The conclusion was drawn at the time and not so many years later. Let me recall for the Court the conversation of November 18 where Secretary Vance and I introduced the peacekeeping plan for the first time to then President Milosevic, who said, Yes, this is fine for us -- I'm paraphrasing. You will have no problem, words to that effect. We then went to General Kadijevic who said the same thing, although there was no previous indication to General Kadijevic from our side of what we were going to say.

So when Mr. Vance, three days later, said, as I've recorded, to President Milosevic, Kadijevic has agreed, he was reporting the agreement ¹⁷¹³⁴ of the 18th which followed President Milosevic's earlier agreement. And this was simply in the nature of summing up, because of course we assumed that President Milosevic knew that. Why wouldn't he know that? If we knew it, why wouldn't he know it?

Q. Doesn't this show that in the case of Serbia --

JUDGE MAY: Let him finish. Let him finish.

THE WITNESS: So it was not Mr. Vance informing President Milosevic of General Kadijevic's assent, he was confirming something that we assumed and indeed knew to be the case. It was just by way of introduction.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. If we pursue that logic, Mr. Okun, at the first meeting with Kadijevic, he also told you that the army support a peaceful settlement, that it wanted to avoid war. The position of the army was to avoid war. The position of Serbia too was to avoid war, to resolve problems by peaceful means in Yugoslavia. Therefore, how, then, can you link this up to some sort of control that I allegedly had over the army when both at the federal level and at the level of the Republic of Serbia the people were against the war?

A. The question of words and deeds arises. We always listened carefully. I noted, and you have quoted, the diaries. I don't just report what we say. I reported as faithfully as I could everything that was said to us of importance. However, one naturally had to check that against facts on the ground. Let me give you an example. The garrison at Vukovar. We had been told that that was the ¹⁷¹³⁵ ostensible reason for the JNA siege. In that siege of three months, a city of 50 or 60.000 was reduced to rubble. We then saw the garrison. It was small and hardly touched. And then Mr. Jovic, the former president of the country, reported in his book on the break-up of Yugoslavia that, in fact, he said the garrison had been freed on September 20, 1991. That's what Mr. Jovic wrote in the book. I read it in the book. And if the garrison had been freed on September 1991, then the question arises why the siege and the destruction continued until November 18, for almost two more months, two months.

So I answer simply to illustrate the difference between words and deeds.

Q. Regarding Jovic's book, that can only be a printing error, because it is impossible for him to be able to assert such a thing according to information that I have. And as the army was present there, then surely the most reliable collocutor for you must have been General Kadijevic and not me or Jovic regarding what was going on over there.

A. So I hear you say.

Q. You say in this summary, or whatever it's called, official statement, you speak about the meeting when I mentioned that, as you say, I was the only representative of Serb interests, and you had come to my office, and you say that during that meeting, "Milosevic made the following remarks which point to the fact that he had control over the Serbian police in connection with the political and military situation in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina."

My remarks that I made have been taken here as evidence that I ¹⁷¹³⁶ have control, and those remarks are the following: A -- since you refer to those remarks on the basis of which you infer the conclusion that I have control, according to what is stated here, though you had asked me for my assistance.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you're questioning the witness. This seems to be going on. Are you referring to these charts which we've had in which statements and events are referred to? Is that what you're referring to?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. It has 030404113. That's the page of the translation. And it says "Official statement of Ambassador Herbert Stuart Okun." And there are only a few points, actually five. And it's signed --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Groome, what is being referred to?

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it's a declaration that was submitted as part of the confirmation materials. I have an English copy here for the Chamber and for Ambassador Okun.

JUDGE MAY: Perhaps the Ambassador should have it. Let him see what's being referred to.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Okun, you say under point 3 that I made remarks that are indicative of my control regarding the political and military situation in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then let us look at these remarks. Under A, you say: "In connection with the Serb leaders in Eastern Slavonia, Goran Hadzic, Slobodan Milosevic basically said that he was in ¹⁷¹³⁷ principle in agreement with the establishment of a UN peace mission in Croatia and that Goran Hadzic would not oppose it. When Slobodan Milosevic was asked to provide a map or a list of locations inhabited by Serbs in Croatia, he stated that he would ask Goran Hadzic to provide such a map."

So let me -- so I was -- in order to help you. So why did you need this? If I said that I would ask him to provide you with this map, why would that be any proof that I have control over him if I am assisting you to acquire a map that I don't have and which he could probably provide you with.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters do not have the text. We apologise.

THE WITNESS: Several things indicated your authority over Hadzic. The comment that he would do something that we'd asked you to do was a normal comment, and clearly the President of Serbia has other things to do than to provide maps, so that's the sort of thing one asks a subordinate to do. We understood that.

The other thing, if I might just mention, at the same meeting when Secretary Vance initially asked you about Goran Hadzic, you said that he was a nice young man, and I indicated that in my diary notes. And I think that was an accurate depiction of your attitude towards him, that he was a nice young chap and that he would do what he was told. And there were numerous indications of that state of affairs.

You will recall that at one time, and I've already testified to this effect, you said that we would have no trouble with Hadzic and Babic, ^{17138 BLANK PAGE 17139} "believe me." That indicated control.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. That is exactly what I'm asking you. Do you assume since it is not contested that I had not appointed Babic or Hadzic -- they were elected by their Assemblies, and then of course naturally they had contacts with Serbia, primarily to seek assistance because they were very poor. Would you allow for the possibility that I had asked Hadzic prior to this for his opinion and advocated that this be accepted and then spoke to you about it rather than on the basis of any kind of control or any ordering authority that I may have had over him? How could I have any authority over bodies elected outside Serbia and without me knowing about it? I didn't -- I didn't even know them before they became what they became, leaders of those autonomous regions. Would you allow for the possibility that I had consulted them, talked to then, suggested to them that they accept and that they agreed, and then on the basis of all that, I tell you there will be no trouble because they agree. And that is exactly what you had asked me to do, to assist to ensure his acquiescence. You were explaining this yesterday. I told you I would talk to them, and that is what I did. I talked to them and they agreed. Is that right or not?

JUDGE MAY: We'll get your question now.

THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honour, I didn't hear what you said.

JUDGE MAY: Let's have a question. I was talking to the accused. What's the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ¹⁷¹⁴⁰

Q. Do you allow for the possibility that upon your request I spoke to them and invested my authority in support of the peace plan and that I informed you of this on the basis of the conversation I had with them and not that I had any ability to give them any kind of orders?

A. Our understanding was that both were true: A, that you had spoken with them; B, that your voice was controlling and they followed your instructions.

Q. However, the fact that Babic refused to accept that plan, doesn't it speak for itself, that is that in spite of my efforts, I could not give them any orders? I used exclusively political and public means, writing him a letter in which --

JUDGE MAY: That is the question. That is the question. The fact that Babic refused to accept the plan, doesn't it show that in spite of his efforts, he couldn't give them orders? That was the question.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, Babic subsequently suffered a bad accident, and I draw no conclusion from that, but the result -- the end result, in fact, was that with the unblocking of the garrisons, which did occur at the very end of 1991, the peacekeeping operation via the implementing accord of 2 January 1992 went into effect and the peacekeeping operation went forward.

Might I make a comment on the question of authority and titles for the benefit of the Court?

JUDGE MAY: Briefly.

THE WITNESS: I'll be very brief. And I make this comment with no comparative purposes or disrespect in mind. The comment is the following: ¹⁷¹⁴¹ From 1929 to 1953, Joseph Stalin had no official position in the Soviet Union. He was the general secretary of the Communist Party, that is all. He was not the president of the country, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Now, we all know who ran the Soviet Union between 1929 and 1953; a man who had no official position. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we continue?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did you yourself note down, Mr. Okun, in this conversation - again I'm afraid I can't find the date.

A. The date, Mr. --

Q. 1st to the 9th of December. And then Milosevic/Jovanovic -- December the 2nd. That's right. December the 2nd. I say I will use all influence I have, but I am not their boss. But I am quite sure that they will fulfil their promises. [In English] "I will use my influence but I am not their master. I'm sure they will fulfil whatever is promised." [Interpretation] This is in your diary.

A. So it is, on page 33. And your influence was very, very influential.

Q. According to this, Mr. Okun, Cyrus Vance and you came to see me to ask me for my assistance and support for the Serbian side in Croatia to accept and agree to the peace operations of the UN. I gave you that assistance and support. I invested my whole authority behind it, and now that is my greatest fault, because it is proof that actually I had control over them. ¹⁷¹⁴² So instead of thanking me for the assistance I gave in the establishment of the peace operations, you're accusing me of holding things under my control in Krajina and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is that what you are saying?

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you know that you can't comment. You can ask the witness questions. He's agreed with you that he asked you for your assistance and support. Now, that's as far as you can take it. The rest is comment.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I asked whether that was right. Nothing more than that.

JUDGE MAY: That wasn't the question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. At your request for me to intervene with both authorities in both of the Serbian Autonomous Regions, and I put my whole authority and influence into it to support the peace operations, you draw the conclusion that they are under my control on that basis. Do you consider that to be logical?

A. Is that the question, do I consider it to be logical?

JUDGE MAY: It's not a question. It's another comment.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right, then. Now, do you know, on the 23rd of January, 1992, Jovic, when he indicated how many soldiers had been killed and how many incidents had broken out in Croatia, told you on that occasion and indicated the problem of the leaders of the local Serbs and asked you for assistance to wield your influence on them. Is that right? ¹⁷¹⁴³

A. Excuse me, what date are you referring to?

Q. I'm referring to the 23rd of January, 1992, the president of the Yugoslav state Presidency, Jovic, indicated to you that you ought to prevail upon them because we cannot ourselves achieve the results unless you take an active part and become actively involved in it as well.

A. Yes. On page 43 I see Jovic saying: "We need your help to tell people that a political solution would be found."

Q. Yes. That's right. Now, I have before me here a report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 721 of 1991, and in it he states in point 4 the following, and he's talking about activities of Marrack Goulding -- you'll remember Marrack Goulding, I'm sure, and his role in the preparations for the peace operations, peacekeeping operations. He went to Eastern and to Western Slavonia and also to Knin. And in the UN Secretary-General's report, it says: "Up until the meeting of the leaders of the Serbs in three areas under the protection of the UN, this came about following requests from the federal and Serbian leadership that Mr. Goulding should give additional explanations to the local leaders with respect to the UN peacekeeping forces and plan and to react to the concern that was shown and expressed by them with respect to that plan." Is that right?

A. What is the date of that report by the Secretary-General?

Q. This is the 4th of February, 1992, when the problems arose. And I'm sure you'll remember the difficulties we had. And we had to use all our influence, both the federal leadership and the leadership of Serbia in order to achieve results and to see that the peace operations, ¹⁷¹⁴⁴ peacekeeping operations, were put in place. It was no easy matter; it was a highly complex operation. And this is the UN Secretary-General's report. So of course, this took place earlier because it is the report of the 4th of February. And in point 4, he says Mr. Goulding had talks in Belgrade on the 22nd of January, 1992 and then up until the meeting on the 29th of January, he had further consultations, and so on and so forth. And then he went to attend a meeting in all three areas with the leaders of all the three areas under UN protection. So I assume you're not challenging that.

Now, what I'm asking you is this: Were these joint efforts on the part of the federal leadership and the leadership of Serbia to bring all their influence to bear on the leaderships in Krajina, in the Krajinas, to convince them to accept the peacekeeping operations, because we believed, as it said, this does not pre-empt a political solution, but it does ensure a political solution to be found in peace. And that was our main argument and our desire, to find a political solution in conditions of peace.

I hope that's not disputed.

A. No, that's not disputed. If I could come back to the first point, for the Court, that you made about the visit.

You will recall, Your Honours, the implementing accord was dated January 2, 1992. Mr. Vance, myself, the Secretary-General, the council had taken the view that a period of about six weeks would be needed to test the situation on the ground before the council itself would vote a peacekeeping force. As we know from the current situation, if I may put ^{17145 BLANK PAGE 17146} it that way, the situation of the Security Council is a very serious matter. They didn't want to vote a peacekeeping force if the cease-fire didn't hold. The reason for that was the EC, in the fall of 1991, had declared 15 or 20, we lost the count, everybody lost count. They had declared so many cease-fires and they didn't lasted longer than it took for the ink to dry on the paper. Everybody was very sceptical about cease-fires, so we had decided that we would wait about five, six weeks. The UN cease-fire, Secretary Vance's cessation of hostilities worked. It held. And during the period there were, of course, random and occasional acts of violence. That was bound to happen. So we sent out the peacekeeping fellow to check up on the situation and to tell everybody what the requirements for the peacekeeping plan were and how they would work, what a peacekeeping operation was all about. Bear in mind there had never been a peacekeeping operation on the continent of Europe in history. This was the first peacekeeping operation, since the creation of the United Nations, to take place on the European continent. So it was understandable that people didn't know about it. And that is the situation that the Secretary-General was describing in this interim report to the Security Council and that Mr. Milosevic has correctly read from. The date is also important. January 2nd was the Vance cessation of hostilities arranged by Secretary Vance. This was early February, you see, four weeks into the testing period. Seventeen days later, the Security Council acted and adopted Resolution 743. So you see, this was an interim report.

But I repeat, Mr. Milosevic has characterised it correctly. ¹⁷¹⁴⁷

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Fine, Mr. Okun. I don't think there's anything being disputed there. I just wish to ascertain whether it was in dispute how far the federal leadership and the leadership of Serbia and I myself personally had invested in order to implement the plan, to have the plan come into force, to stop the war and to find a political solution under peaceful conditions. I don't suppose that is in dispute.

A. No, it is not in dispute.

Q. Please, then, tell me this -- just let me have a look here. You mention in your summary Dubrovnik. Is it true that on the 1st of December, 1991, Admiral Brovet, General Kadijevic, and Borisav Jovic, the then president, at a meeting give you explanations according to which it was demilitarised 20 years ago and that all this was a matter of provocation? On the part of Croatia, that is.

A. I believe that was their contention.

Q. In this statement of yours, it says the 2nd of December, 1991, Cyrus Vance says: "Can I be assured that there will be no shelling of Dubrovnik?" [In English] Kadijevic: "Dubrovnik has not been attacked." Cyrus Vance: "But surroundings have." Kadijevic: "We demilitarised Dubrovnik 20 years ago. Let Croats do same. Croatian propaganda. They threw a hand grenade onto a facade."

[Interpretation] And he promises that he will check this out, what was going on, et cetera. But in any event, you talked with the federal leadership in Dubrovnik; right? And with the army too.

A. We spoke with both the federal leadership and the leadership of ¹⁷¹⁴⁸ the JNA, but we did not speak with them in Dubrovnik. We met them in Belgrade.

Q. Yes, yes, in Belgrade. Now, on that same day, you came to see me, and with you -- with us was Minister Jovanovic. He was with me. And Vance says the following: He was dissatisfied. He was unhappy that Geneva, 11/23 accords had not been implemented fully. "Milosevic: Me too." Cyrus Vance says: "Good talk with General Kadijevic, had to work things out, will call." I don't know what it says next. It says "Tudj." What "Tudj" is I don't know. I'm sure you might.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness find it.

THE WITNESS: What page are we on?

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, what page are we on? Which day? 2nd of December, it says.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 2nd of December. 2nd of December, 1215 to 1330 hours, meeting at my office and with Jovanovic present.

THE WITNESS: One moment, please.

MR. GROOME: It's page 30 of book 4.

THE WITNESS: Thank you. Yes. Mr. Vance says he had a good talk with General Kadijevic, we have to work things out, and then it says, "Will call Tudjman," meaning I - Vance - will call President Tudjman. "We all have to work hard."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Cyrus Vance then asked me what was going on in Dalmatia. My answer was we had nothing to do with Dalmatia, just as we did not have anything to do with Dalmatia. Is that right? ¹⁷¹⁴⁹

A. That's what the diary indicates you said.

Q. All right. Fine. And then on the 4th of December, once again you had a meeting with Brovet. And he told you that Dubrovnik had been demilitarised as far as the JNA was concerned but that weapons had to be withdrawn from Dubrovnik and for that it was necessary to deblock the barracks. That is what you yourself write in your diary, that you had a conversation with Brovet. So first of all, you had a meeting with Jovic, Kadijevic, and Brovet, you talked to them first, and that same day when you came to see me in my office, you asked me what was going on in Dalmatia and I told you that the Serbs had nothing to do with Dalmatia, and then once again you talked to Brovet and he goes on to explain to you what was going on in Dubrovnik. So you talked about that with the army.

A. Yes. We discussed the matter thoroughly. That was our job to do so. I should also mention in this connection, since we're discussing the very early days of December, that on December 6, Dubrovnik received the heaviest shelling it received during the entire war, two days later. It was the only time that Dubrovnik was shelled not only from land, I believe it was the only time that it was shelled by sea.

Q. Yes, but, sir --

A. So when Admiral Brovet told us a few days earlier that the shelling would cease, it's my duty to recall for the Court that two days later, the shelling increased rather than decreasing, and that the navy was involved. I'm not saying who gave orders to the navy, but we know who shelled Dubrovnik from the sea.

Q. Mr. Okun, all I'm doing is looking at one aspect of this issue. ¹⁷¹⁵⁰ You talked to the federal leadership, you talked to the army, and you discussed with them the issue of Dubrovnik. When you came to see me with Cyrus Vance on that same day, Cyrus Vance asked me whether I knew anything about Dalmatia, and I said that we had nothing to do with Dalmatia, that the Serbs had nothing to do with Dalmatia. And then you continued, of course, to communicate with the army or, rather, with the federal leadership to discuss these issues. So that is quite undisputed. May we move on now, please, because I wish to get through as much as possible and quite obviously I'm not going to have enough time to ask you all the questions I wish to ask you.

On the 1st of December, the 1st of December, therefore, did I in our discussions indicate the great number of refugees from Slavonia and that there was a great problem on the Croatian side, that they wanted to continue the war and that in fact Genscher wished to continue the war. And you made a note of this yourself in your diary. Is that how it was or no? Just give me a yes or no answer, please, and then we can move on.

A. You're talking about the meeting of December 1. My recollection, but I will confirm it, is that you gave the figure of 140.000 Serb refugees from Western Slavonia.

I'm not finding it in my notes.

Q. I'll find it for you. It is at the bottom of the page. This is the translation of it, and it says the following --

A. Are you sure that's December 1?

Q. Let me just check. I'm not quite sure. Was it the 1st -- no. It was the 2nd of December. I do apologise. The 2nd of December. And then ¹⁷¹⁵¹ further down, I don't know what you have in your original diary, but it says: "That's why the Croats continue the world war. Genscher always says, if war continues, recognition will follow. [In English] "That's invitation to keep fighting." [Interpretation] That's an invitation to keep fighting. That's what I told you and that's what you noted down. I'm quoting from your diary.

A. Thank you. I have found your citation. I've found it.

Q. I hope that I've read it out correctly.

A. If I could take the first part, Mr. Milosevic. The -- it's on page 34 of Vance diary number 4, where -- where you say that 140.000 Serb refugees have fled Western Slavonia into "free" Slavonia. "Will get information for you. Talk to Hadzic tomorrow." Yes, that part is in the diaries on page 34.

I should add, for the benefit of the Court, that subsequent to this, Mr. Vance and I checked the population figures of Serbs in Western Slavonia through the opstina figures from the official -- sorry, from the official Yugoslav census, and the population -- the Serb population in Western Slavonia did not exceed 40 or 50.000 at the utmost. So the figure of 140.000 Serb refugees from Western Slavonia was impossible based on our check against the Yugoslav official statistics.

On the question of Genscher and Mr. Milosevic's -- President Milosevic's remarks at the time, I'm not seeing them, but in the interest of speed, I will assume you are correct in reading them. I just don't find them. What I do see is concern over Germany, Italy, and the Vatican on page 35. ¹⁷¹⁵²

MR. GROOME: I would direct the witness's attention to -- it's not working. I will talk louder. The witness's attention to the bottom of page 37 in that diary entry.

THE WITNESS: Yes. Thank you. I found it.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the witness, please. Mr. Okun.

THE WITNESS: Can you hear me?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE INTERPRETER: Yes.

THE WITNESS: On page 35 of the diary it records President Milosevic as saying German attitudes is to give a gift of recognition to Slovenia and Croatia before Christmas, and he expressed concern over Germany, Italy and the Vatican.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. A little further on from there you made the following entry--

A. Yes, I see it. Yes, I see it.

Q. [In English] "That's why Croats continue war. Genscher always says if war continues, recognition will follow. That's an invitation to keep fighting."

A. Well, that was your assertion and I so noted it in my diary.

Q. [Interpretation] Was that true? Is that correct? Was that in fact an invitation to keep fighting? Keep fighting and you'll get recognition. Does that at least throw some light on the role that Germany played in breaking up Yugoslavia?

JUDGE MAY: No. That's not a matter for the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ^{17153 BLANK PAGE 17154}

Q. Well, are we contesting Genscher's statement, "If the war continues, recognition will follow"? That's why I'm saying it. That's an invitation to --

JUDGE MAY: All he has recorded, the witness, I should say, has recorded is what you said, and that's what you said. If it's relevant, you can call some evidence about it or you can give evidence about it yourself, if you want, but right now we're examining the witness. So would you concentrate on that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Fine. Let's move on then.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you remember that I indicated to you, when it came to Bosnia, you asked me about Bosnia, said that was a problem, and I said that the problem was that Izetbegovic bore in mind a purely Islamic republic. That's what he had in mind. And I'm sure you'll recall his declaration that there can be no co-existence, cohabitation between the Islamic -- I can't remember his exact words, the word he used, I've already quoted him and it's been recorded, and of course, his documents are recorded, but anyway, the Islamic and non-Islamic institutions, and the non-Islamic institutions or communities, of course, were more than half of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in fact. And that I told you on that occasion that he was receiving resources from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and that I was surprised how come America and Europe could support something like that. And that is something that you will find once again in that diary of yours. ¹⁷¹⁵⁵

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Ambassador, if you would find that, please.

THE WITNESS: You made that assertion and I so reported it. It's on page 38 of Vance mission diary number 4, the date December 2. You made that assertion.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Did you have any contentions to make in that regard then?

A. Secretary Vance and I did not believe that it was our position on matters like that to get into an argument with you or with anybody. We took on board what you said, we listened carefully, and as you see, I duly noted accurately what you said. Whether we agreed with it or not, it was important to get down the facts that you made the statement. And it was at that meeting that you and Jovanovic suggested we meet Dr. Karadzic, which we did, and which we've already discussed. This is all in the diary.

Q. All right. Then you go on to speak about the meeting, and you speak about the Presidency of Yugoslavia, and we draw your attention to you, Milosevic/Jovanovic. It's a matter for the Federal Presidency, peace and security. That comes under their competence and authority.

A. That was your statement, yes.

Q. All right. I don't assume that we're contesting that. But what I want is to link this up, to link what we discussed then with the facts that came to follow. So please let's move on.

Is it true and correct that at the meeting that we had on the 15th of April, 1992, that I told you loud and clear that Serbs and Muslims can ¹⁷¹⁵⁶ live together and live together in peace and that the continuity of that state was what was called for, but the problem was that Izetbegovic wished to have a separate republic or, rather, he wished to have some kind of Islamic federation. Is that right?

And I have it here. This is it. Milosevic -- this is what you say: "Milo: Came promises [In English] B and H. Very tragic. Nobody can win there. Only death will result. Serbs and Muslims can live together. All citizens in B and H support peace. Need to continue conference on B and H." [Interpretation] That's what I've just been saying, and that's what I said then. The conflicts had started. Have you found that passage? I'm afraid I've got this wrong again, the date wrong. Is it -- yes, the 15th of April. That's right. 15th of September [as interpreted], Belgrade, 1030 hours. And 645. No. That's another meeting. After that, 0645, Milosevic/Jovanovic. And then we come to what I quoted. "The main problem is B and H. Very tragic. Nobody can win there. Only death will result. [In English] Serbs and Muslims can live together. All citizens in B and H support peace. Need to continue conference on B and H."

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if I can be of assistance, Mr. Milosevic is quoting from page 39, and that is a meeting on the 15th of April.

THE WITNESS: Yes, that's on page 39. I see it. And you note we agreed with that. We reported that General Hadzic agreed. This, I have to note for the Court, was a conversation on April 15th. There had already been about five or six weeks of fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the shelling of Sarajevo was about to ¹⁷¹⁵⁷ commence.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I apologise, Mr. Okun. I'm not talking about that now. What I was asking you was this, about your entry here: "And that was our position, that nobody could win and that the results would be death, only death, that they could live together and that all the citizens support peace," and then a few lines down, you go on to say "Ize" -- and I assume that's Izetbegovic, I say, is using typical Islamic fundmentalism. [In English] "Ize is using typical Islamic fundamentalism." [Interpretation] That's the problem.

A. So I heard you say and so I noted in the diary, yes.

Q. Therefore, it was our position that nobody could win in that war, that all that could ensue was tragedy and that we had to go back to the conference table and support the peace effort. That was quite clear. Now, do you know that all three parties accepted Cutileiro's plan, the plan that was a sort of subconference to Carrington's conference, a runner-up to Carrington's conference?

A. Yes, that's correct. All three parties initially accepted the Cutileiro plan.

Q. Before that, there had been no conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina whatsoever. The conflicts could have just been political and verbal, but no physical conflicts took place. Is that right or not?

A. That is not correct. As we've reported earlier, there was fighting as early as November 1991 and --

Q. You have no evidence of that. You say that Ante Markovic told you ¹⁷¹⁵⁸ that.

A. Well before April 1992, there were authenticated reports of ethnic cleansing. That is -- that is to say, the forced expulsion of Muslims and a few Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Please. I'm not talking about April. The first attacks occurred when the 100 and something Brigade from Croatia - I don't know the number, I spoke about that here already - attacked Bosanski Brod and virtually killed the Serb population of the village of Sijekovac. That was the beginning of the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, by the invasion of Croatian forces into the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that occurred after the Cutileiro plan. Do you remember that or not?

A. I am aware that that was a Serbian contention.

Q. Very well. So you have no information about that. But since you do know that all three sides signed the Cutileiro plan, do you know that after that, being persuaded by your ambassador, Warren Zimmermann, Izetbegovic withdrew his signature from the Cutileiro plan?

A. You've made two points there. First point is correct, that the Bosnian government, President Izetbegovic, withdrew his assent to the Cutileiro plan after he returned to Sarajevo from Western Europe where it had been signed.

The second point, that he did so at the urging of Ambassador Zimmerman, is not for me to comment on except to report that Ambassador Zimmerman has denied that repeatedly, and I believe Ambassador Zimmerman.

Q. I don't know that he denied it. On the contrary, I think even in his book he wrote that he was not very cautious when he said to him, "If ¹⁷¹⁵⁹ you don't like it, why are you signing it?" But I don't have to debate that with you.

JUDGE MAY: No, you don't. It's not for this witness to answer.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. Certainly. I don't have to discuss that matter with this witness. But I always respect solidarity, even when it has nothing to do with the facts.

JUDGE MAY: That was a totally unnecessary comment, as you know.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it true that on the 6th of May, 1992, you had a meeting with me when I told you quite specifically that I supported negotiations between the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that we would like the problems of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be resolved and that it was indispensable for the UN to be present there and to control the situation there. Do you remember that?

A. Yes. It's so noted in the diary that you made that statement in Brussels on May 6. It's on page 141. And the previous page also has some comments of yours concerning the situation in Bosnia.

Q. I said we support BH talks. Whatever you decide is all right with us. Cutileiro says something then. [In English] "We want to finish those talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's not up to us, not our problem." [Interpretation] And I speak about talks in Skopje between Izetbegovic and Adzic. And then there's reference to the UN, and I say if the UN withdraws, it means war will start again. And then I also say that all parties will agree to the talks and that that is the only way out. Now, let us go back for a moment, because you mention here that I ^{17160 BLANK PAGE 17161} said to you that we had nothing to do with Bosnia-Herzegovina as it was another country, and that Izetbegovic and Adzic were having talks in Skopje when Izetbegovic asked that those members of the JNA who are from Bosnia and Herzegovina should remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas members from Bosnia and Herzegovina, members of the army who are situated elsewhere outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, should be sent back to Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was what Izetbegovic requested. And you explained here that the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been transformed into the army of Republika Srpska, and I would like that to be cleared up now.

The JNA, before the break-up of Yugoslavia, before the destruction of Yugoslavia, was present throughout the territory of Yugoslavia, from Vardar, the river Vardar to Mount Triglav.

When Yugoslavia was broken up - let's not discuss with you who was behind it all; I've spoken about that - what happened then was that virtually all the armies that came into being, the Croatian, the Slovenian and the army of Republika Srpska, and the army of the Muslim Federation, and the HVO in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian forces, and the Macedonian army and the army of the FRY came into being and were formed out of the parts of the former JNA. Is that right or not?

A. We've already discussed that. Yes, of course that's correct. Yes.

Q. Therefore, it is not right to speak about the control of the army of Yugoslavia after the army of Republika Srpska had been formed because it had become the army of Republika Srpska and the army of Yugoslavia ¹⁷¹⁶² existed separately, and we've already discussed all this. And all the members of the JNA up until then who were from Serbia would withdraw to the territory of Serbia. They would not stay on in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

You mentioned General Mladic. I agree with you that he was an exceptionally capable general. That is how people saw him.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But do you know --

JUDGE MAY: Rather than rambling, can you come to a question, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know that General Mladic is also from Bosnia and Herzegovina? He was born there, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And that he was appointed commander of the staff the army of Republika Srpska by the Assembly of Republika Srpska.

A. Is that a question?

Q. Yes: Do you know that?

A. Yes. We knew that General Mladic had been born in Bosnia. He told us so himself, and it was a matter of common knowledge. We also knew, and it was a matter of common knowledge, that the Bosnian Serb army received logistic support - gasoline, shells, and payment - from Serbia. I've already reported on that.

Q. Very well. Let us summarise this part of the examination: In your diary, which I have managed to review up to a point, you note a large ¹⁷¹⁶³ number of meetings that you had with representatives of the Yugoslav Federation, with either civilian or military or other leaders, representatives of the army, the General Staff, representatives of federal government and so on. Virtually, you had -- in fact, you had the fewest number of meetings with me in that period of time while you were touring and holding these meetings. After all, by quantitative analysis of these data --

JUDGE MAY: Let us come to a question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is that your impression or not?

A. I haven't done a count of the meetings. This could, of course, be done. I would simply state that we always, Mr. Vance and I, invariably tried to see you first when we were in Belgrade, and it was clear throughout, and I don't think it was disputed by anybody, that you were the most important person to see. So I think one should look at this from the point of view of quality rather than quantity. But of course we tried to see all of the relevant actors. That was our job.

Q. I just wanted to make this clear before we go back to the Vance Plan -- I'm using this customary term though I fully appreciate that is not its official name. Since you participated in these important events, do you recollect that on the 7th of July, 1991, under the auspices of the European Community at Brioni, a meeting was held of members of the SFRY Presidency, that is of Yugoslavia, the leaderships of Croatia and Slovenia, the president of the federal government, that is the Prime ¹⁷¹⁶⁴ Minister, and federal Ministers of Internal Affairs and National Defence. Therefore, Serbia is not there, Bosnia is not there, there's no Montenegro, no Macedonia, just the federal leadership, federal ministers, Federal Presidency, and the federal government. And a joint declaration was adopted on that occasion which came to be known as the Brioni declaration. Do you remember that?

A. Well, I was not present nor was I officially involved in any form with that meeting, but I am aware that various meetings took place during the summer of 1991 with the EC.

Q. So you were not familiar with the events that preceded your activities. I assumed that you inquired about developments before your mission started, and that is why I asked you that question.

A. Yes, we were aware of the previous situations, including the Igalo meeting and the earlier meetings of the Conference on Yugoslavia. Naturally, it was our duty to prepare ourselves for our mission.

Q. Mr. Okun, talking about that, let's cover that question, too, as you produced an exhibit here. Did we agree that the position of the European Community was not to recognise the so-called Rump Presidency, and in that connection, we had that walkout at the conference, what we spoke about this morning, a walkout by Kostic and the others?

A. In the interests of time, Mr. President, since you raised that point, I will be brief. There was constant disagreement about the authority and the legality of the Rump Presidency.

Q. Yes. Fine. You presented here the agreement on a cease-fire signed by Tudjman, myself, Kadijevic, and Vance. Do you remember the ¹⁷¹⁶⁵ conversation we had about this? You say there's no signature of the Federal Presidency, but the Federal Presidency was not recognised in those days. Is that a fact?

A. That depends which Federal Presidency you're talking about. That was the issue; the rump or the full Presidency.

Q. Therefore, it was not invited to sign, otherwise it would have signed it, but you did not recognise it. And the signature of the Presidency was missing because you did not wish to agree to the Presidency signing it. Do you remember that? Because you didn't recognise the Rump Presidency, because you called it a Rump Presidency though it was working on the basis of its own document adopted when it was not a Rump Presidency, according to the provisions of that document during a state of extraordinary conditions. Is that right or not?

A. You make two points. First that the Presidency did not sign the Geneva Accord of November 23, 1991; second, that it was because they were not invited and somehow disrespected by Mr. Vance. The first point is correct; they did not sign. The second point is not correct. The reason -- the reason for that is, as I've testified earlier, it was clearly understood by Mr. Vance and Lord Carrington, who was present, that your signature sufficed.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, that's the time for adjournment. We're going to adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.41 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. ¹⁷¹⁶⁶

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So, Mr. Okun, was the Federal Presidency invited to sign that agreement or not?

A. I don't recall.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. If you don't remember --

A. I don't recall. As I say, it was Secretary Vance's understanding that your signature sufficed. We had also had occasion previously to discuss with you, among others, the question, the controversial question of the Rump Presidency versus the full Presidency, and that was in issue.

Q. But you remember that my position was that that Presidency has legality and that it cannot lose its legal status because some of its members had arbitrarily abandoned the work of the Presidency. Is that right or not, Mr. Okun?

A. It is correct to say that the issue was a controversial one.

Q. Very well. Let's say something now about my signature. Is it contested that I invested my entire political reputation in those days in the acceptance of that plan and the cessation of hostilities?

A. It is correct to say that you and others were instrumental in bringing about the acceptance of the peacekeeping operation, and it would also be correct to say that your influence over the other actors, all of them on the Serbian side, was essential to their acquiescence in Mr. Vance's proposals.

Q. Very well. Therefore, things are slightly different, I would say, ^{17167 BLANK PAGE 17168} Mr. Okun. So let's clear this up, if we can.

If you recollect, I explained that very nicely in those days that I had nothing to sign since Serbia was not a party to the war and has no troops under its command. And then Lord Carrington had the idea, after acknowledging that this was true, he said that both he and Vance, because of my political reputation, the agreement with my signature would have a far greater impact, and then they added this definition which is written in the text. The wording was "Under their political influence." That is the signatories, the parties, commit themselves to the cessation of hostilities by forces under their command. And as there was no one under my command, then this Solomonic solution was found for me to sign it by saying "Or under their political influence." And there is no doubt that I did use all my political influence to have that agreement signed. Wasn't that right? I remember that very clearly, and I think you should too.

A. Of course I do. As I've said, Mr. Vance was of the firm conviction, as was Lord Carrington, I believe, and I know I was, that by your signature was given the assent of the political forces of Serbia, Serbian-controlled political forces, Serbian-influenced political forces. Additionally, we understood your signature to indicate the assent, and this is so recorded in the document, of the paramilitaries and the irregulars. That was Mr. Vance's view, and I believe it turned out to be the correct view.

Q. So you asked me to sign it because of my political reputation to assist peace and not because I had anyone under my command over there. That is quite clear, isn't it, Mr. Okun? ¹⁷¹⁶⁹

A. With all due respect, I would say the opposite is quite clear; namely, that you had control.

Q. I cannot spend any more time on this, but you remember the discussion when I said that I had no one under my command and I couldn't sign it, and then Lord Carrington agreed with me and said, "All right, under political influence then." So I certainly didn't have anyone under my command. And I signed it because I wanted to put my reputation behind it, and this seems to be taken against me now, because I wanted the killing to stop.

But, Mr. Okun, let us go back to what you said a moment ago, that you were aware of developments before you arrived. Do you remember, and I was talking about the Brioni declaration, that a settlement was adopted, a solution was adopted for overcoming the crisis in Yugoslavia, and it was said that only the people's of Yugoslavia could decide about their future, that the negotiations must start immediately, and that all sides must refrain from any unilateral acts and especially from any acts of violence. Do you remember that?

A. That was the general thrust of the EC approach, yes.

Q. And do you remember that on the 9th of July, the European parliament, at a sitting in Strasbourg, adopted a resolution on Yugoslavia whereby it did not support unilateral acts of secession?

A. I don't recall that specifically, but I don't contest your asserting it.

Q. And are you aware of the fact that, shortly after that, on the 12th of July, 1991, the Presidency of SFRY adopted the Brioni declaration ¹⁷¹⁷⁰ and decided that by the 18th of July, all armed formations should be demobilised with the exception of the JNA and regular peacetime police forces, so that the situation be restored to what it was before the 21st of July on the borders of the country and that all barracks be unblocked. This was certainly an important decision which everyone had to be aware of.

A. Well, yes, of course we were aware of the basic documents.

Q. And do you remember, Mr. Okun, that on the 3rd of September, 1991, here in The Hague, for the reasons that you gave as Holland was the chair of the European Community in those days and that is why The Hague was chosen, a declaration on Yugoslavia was adopted whereby a Conference on Yugoslavia was announced to be held here in The Hague on the 7th of December. So the declaration was adopted on the 3rd of September. And the conference was to have adopted a mechanism whereby, by peaceful means, contradictory aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples would be realised on the basis of the following principles. This is the EC declaration on Yugoslavia. First, unilateral change of borders is not allowed by use of force. Second, protection of all in Yugoslavia; and third, full respect of all legitimate interests and aspirations. Do you remember that declaration of the European Community?

A. Yes, I am aware of that declaration. That was the one that established, as we've noted earlier, the Conference on Yugoslavia under Lord Carrington's chairmanship.

Q. So contrary to Strasbourg and contrary to the declaration of the European Community on Yugoslavia, so quite in contradiction to those ¹⁷¹⁷¹ adopted principles, at the Conference on Yugoslavia, and this is something we've already discussed and I won't go back to it, a solution was adopted abolishing Yugoslavia?

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, this sounds like argument again. Now, you can ask the witness about what he saw or what he heard, what he wrote in his diary, but his opinions and the rest of it you cannot ask. So let's move on. You can argue your case in front of us in due course.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I'm just talking about an overnight change of positions, because first Yugoslavia was offered good services, and then the proposal was made to abolish Yugoslavia through its own free will.

I shall have to skip over quite a number of questions, because my time is very short.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you remember that on the 9th of November, 1991, the Presidency of SFRY addressed a letter to the UN Security Council, requesting the urgent dispatch of UN peacekeeping forces to Croatia? And in response to this request, Resolution 71 was adopted, of the 7th of November. Of course upon the recommendation of Cyrus Vance, but the request was made by the Presidency of the SFRY and addressed to the UN Security Council. Do you remember that?

A. I remember that was the previous month and we have reported on this in response to questions, that Secretary Vance and I were reaching the conclusion that a UN peacekeeping operation could be of assistance. So that this request that you mentioned was consistent with Mr. Vance's ¹⁷¹⁷² judgement of the situation.

Q. And do you recollect that on the 23rd of November, 1991, so the next day after Cyrus Vance's meeting about the possibilities of sending peacekeeping forces to Croatia, that the largest offensive was launched against Western Slavonia when all JNA units had received orders to cease all activities? And the Croatian paramilitary forces cleansed Podravska Slatina, Orahovica, Slavonska Pozega, and so on, on the 23rd of November, 1991?

A. It was no secret that fighting continued throughout Croatia, despite the best efforts of all parties, until January 2 at the signature of the implementing accord. That was the fact --

Q. I am not talking about any general conflicts, but I'm talking of an attack by the Croatian forces against Western Slavonia. There was no attack by Serbian forces. They were all awaiting peace to be achieved. They did not engage in any kind of offensive activities. They were in their homes and defending those homes. This attack on Western Slavonia was an attack on Serbian areas inhabited by Serbs. Is that right or not, Mr. Okun? Just give me a yes or no answer. If it's not right, say no.

A. It is right to say that Vukovar fell to the JNA on November 18. It is right to say that Dubrovnik was heavily shelled on December 6. It may be right to say that there was fighting in Slavonia. As you know, as I know, as the world knows, fighting continued throughout Croatia.

Q. I was speaking about a meeting that Cyrus Vance had on the 22nd of November, and the next day, on the 23rd of November, after an agreement had been reached to cease all hostilities, an offensive was launched. And ¹⁷¹⁷³ that is different from what you are saying.

Do you remember that in addition to that attack, the Croatian side --

JUDGE MAY: No. He's not accepting there was an attack. All he's accepting is that there was fighting. Now, move on from there.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So Mr. Okun is denying that after the meeting with Vance on the 22nd, already on the 23rd, there was an attack.

JUDGE MAY: He says he doesn't know. Just fighting.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's okay. I don't mind at all.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please, do you remember that in addition to that attack, Croatia carried out 794 attacks on the JNA?

JUDGE MAY: You are not going to get away with misrepresenting the evidence. The attack is not accepted. Now, move on from there.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm talking of the period from the 23rd of November. That is from the meeting that Cyrus Vance had on the 22nd with President Franjo Tudjman and others, that from that date, that is the date following the meeting at question the peacekeeping operations were agreed on, until the 20th of December, within the period of that one month, there were so many attacks on units, barracks, planes, naval vessels, military columns, and so on. Do you know anything about that?

A. As I have been asked and responded, there were attacks on both sides. There were continuing hostilities in Croatia until January 2, ^{17174 BLANK PAGE 17175} 1992. I've already been asked and I've already sought to answer questions about our visit to Osijek on December 2 -- excuse me, December 3, 1991, whether the city was being shelled, while it was being shelled by the JNA. Yes, there was fighting.

Q. And do you recollect the meeting of the 13th of December, 1991, the coordinating bureau of the non-aligned countries, held in New York, to discuss the situation in Yugoslavia and that the conclusions made were that for a lasting political solution to the crisis, they should give up attempts which could lead to the undermining of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international legal subjectivity of Yugoslavia. Do you happen to recall that? There were efforts made in the world along those lines.

A. Well, I wasn't aware that the non-aligned movement had taken this position, but if you say so.

Q. All right. And I hope it's not being contested that Resolution 724 of the 15th of December, 1991, called upon all states to refrain from any actions which would contribute to the heightening of tensions. I assume you remember that.

A. Yes.

Q. And do you remember this: This was the Resolution of the 15th of December, 1991, calling for all states to refrain from all actions which would contribute to a heightening of tensions. And do you recall that on the 17th of December, that is to say two days later, a meeting was held of the Foreign Ministers of the European Community, and in their declaration they state the criteria for recognition of new states and the declaration ¹⁷¹⁷⁶ on Yugoslavia was adopted and that this first document sets the criteria which were to serve as guidelines to the European Community and recognising new states, and I quote: "In keeping with the usual standards of international practice and political reality in each individual case," and so on and so forth.

Therefore, is this act on the part of the ministers of the European Community imposed by Germany, was it contrary to the Resolution, Resolution 724, taken two days previously, calling upon all states to refrain from all actions which would contribute to the increase of tensions?

A. Are you asking for my opinion on that? Is that the question, my view of the relationship between the EC and the United Nations?

Q. Well, is this an obvious attempt to do quite the reverse, the reverse of what Resolution 724 had asked for?

JUDGE MAY: No. That's a comment, not for the witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So it's not up to the witness to assess whether the council of ministers of the EC had in fact violated international law.

JUDGE MAY: No.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, do you know that on 23rd of December, Germany officially recognised the independence and sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia, without waiting for any kind of further political negotiations?

A. I'm aware of that. ¹⁷¹⁷⁷

Q. All right. Tell me this then: What did this step on the part of Germany mean from the aspects of international law and with respect to relations within Yugoslavia?

JUDGE MAY: No. You can ask him what the effect was, if you want, because he might be able to comment on that -- the witness, I should say, might be able to comment on that. But you can't ask him about aspects of international law.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you remember that Tudjman, on the 28th of January, 1992, informed the fact that he withdrew the acceptance of the plan because, as he told Goulding after the recognition, there were no more outstanding political issues to negotiate. Do you know about that or not?

A. Excuse me, I believe you're referring to 28 January 1992. Well, the fact is that President Tudjman accepted the peacekeeping operation. So I think that speaks for itself.

Q. Well, after subsequent pressure. But this is not contested, because that's what it says in UN documents.

And do you know that in the council of Ministers of the European Community, and the European Council as well, organs of the European Community, that they supported the territorial integrity of the SFRY?

JUDGE MAY: Can you answer for the European Community, Ambassador?

THE WITNESS: I cannot, but I can give the Court the gist of the decisions reached by the "Commission d'Arbitrage," the Arbitration Commission set up officially by the European Community to adjudicate these questions. If you are interested, I can give you what they -- tell you ¹⁷¹⁷⁸ what they said. But I don't want to take Mr. Milosevic's time. I want to be sensitive to his concerns about time. It's up to him and to you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I am endeavouring to establish, Mr. Okun, how far such acts were in contradiction to the generally expressed will, both of the citizens of Yugoslavia and the international community, to preserve the integrity of Yugoslavia.

Do you know that the council of ministers of the OSCE or the KEBS, as it was known at the time, at its meeting in Berlin in mid-1991 adopted a resolution which, among other things, expresses support to the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia?

A. As I've said, the answer to your question, Mr. Milosevic, as to whether the EC supported territorial integrity was given to the arbitration commission. The arbitration commission, in December, in an official avis stated its opinion that Yugoslavia was in, and I use the French because it was given in French, "un processus de dissolution," that Yugoslavia was undergoing a process of dissolution. That was the judgement of the EC's arbitration commission, the commission to which they had entrusted the legal question that you're putting to me now. So I think all I can do is report what the position was of the arbitration commission.

Q. Mr. Okun, I'm talking about the fact that we had confidence and trust in the international community at the time, and we believed in the forthrightness of their endeavour to support the integrity of Yugoslavia and that coincides with our own interests. For example, do you know that ¹⁷¹⁷⁹ your State Secretary of the day, the Secretary of State, James Baker, at the end of his visit to Yugoslavia in June 1991, said that the United States supported a democratic and unified Yugoslavia and that he made special emphasis on the fact that the United States would not recognise unilateral acts of secession.

A. Secretary James A. Baker was a very wise man, remains such. There was, it has to be said, without rehearsing the history of the period, there was an evolution of the situation at the time.

Q. Mr. Okun, is it clear that the integrity of Yugoslavia or, rather, as we used to say a great Yugoslavia, the kind that existed up until its destruction and breaking up, that this came about under pressure from Germany and as a function of the politics --

JUDGE MAY: We've heard this case put time and time again. It's of no relevance, as far as I can see, to these charges or to this witness's evidence. You should concentrate on what's in the indictment, Mr. Milosevic. It's that that you're charged with. Yes. Now if you've got any more questions on a different topic to this witness you can ask them, otherwise, we're going to let him go.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have many more questions, and I'm going to skip over some of them, Mr. May, because this witness testified about a great many things.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know that on the 14th of February in Sarajevo, the work of the international conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina started its work and the chairman of the meeting was Cutileiro at the time, under the auspices ¹⁷¹⁸⁰ of the European Community?

A. Yes, I am aware that Ambassador Cutileiro - the name is pronounced Cutileiro, there is no "H" in it, by the way, for the typists, it's C-U-T-I-L-E-I-R-O -- yes, I've previously testified that Lord Carrington asked Ambassador Cutileiro to take over the Bosnian portfolio.

Q. Do you remember that in the resolution of the Security Council by which the UN forces were established, called UNPROFOR, that it was emphasised that in this way they were in no way pre-empting a political solution to the situation in Yugoslavia?

A. Yes, and that is precisely one of the reasons why Secretary Vance and I never refer to it as the Vance Plan or the Vance Peace Plan, because it was not a peace plan. Thank you for quoting that first paragraph. We said explicitly it was an interim solution to keep the peace on the ground. The political solution was in the hands of Lord Carrington and the EC conference on Yugoslavia.

Q. All right, Mr. Okun. At the time, the zones under UN protection were established. I hope that's not contested.

A. Of course not. That was the purpose of the plan. And the plan involved the creation of the four UN protected areas, the UNPAs. Two were contiguous, so occasionally you'll see references to three areas. One was Eastern Slavonia, one was Western Slavonia. The two contiguous ones were in the Krajina, the Vojna Krajina. But while they were contiguous, they were divided into two areas for administrative purposes. So there were four UN protected areas, but if you look at a map, you see three.

Q. That's a well-known thing, Mr. Okun. The zones were established. ¹⁷¹⁸¹ Now, my question to you is this: Do you remember that in addition to the fact that these areas under UN protection were established, several months later or, rather, on the 21st of June, 1992, the Croatian armed forces launched an attack on part of the territory in the areas under UN protection? Just give me a yes or no answer, please, because we have to hurry through this now.

A. I am aware that the Serb forces never demilitarised inside the UNPAs as they were committed to do so under the terms -- I'm sorry, Mr. Milosevic --

Q. Mr. Okun --

A. -- I have the floor. I am aware that the Serb forces never demilitarised, that the JNA gave its equipment to the Serb police. This was a violation, and we dealt with it and were worried, very concerned. We dealt with it throughout that period and were very concerned with it. So it was not surprising that there were acts of random and occasional violence also inside the UN protected areas. There were very few, however. The principal problem for General Nambiar in the UN protected areas was the refusal of the Serbs to demilitarise as they had promised.

Q. I understand your endeavour to minimise this, Mr. Okun, but the UNPAs, the zones under UN protection, the attack on the Miljevac plateau, which is on the map within that ink stain as you called it at the time, under UN protection - I think you referred to them as ink spots or stains on the map - that with the attack on the Miljevac plateau in June 1992, Croatian violated that agreement. Is that so or is it not, Mr. Okun?

A. What is so is that the Serb forces in the UNPAs never ^{17182 BLANK PAGE 17183} demilitarised. What is true is that the JNA did not immediately withdraw from Croatia as they had promised. They did not leave finally until October 1992, when they left the Prevlaka peninsula. The peacekeeping resolution was passed in February 1992, and they agreed to immediate withdrawal. If you wish to, Mr. President, I can give you many other examples of non-compliance by the JNA and the Serb side, but I understand you wish to move along, so I will stop.

Q. The point here is just one, whether the zone under UN protection was attacked or not. If your answer to that is that from the areas under UN protection some Serb forces attacked territories outside the UNPAs, then you would be correct. But that did not happen. What -- it was attacked by the Croatian armed forces, that is to say the UNPAs were attacked by the Croatian armed forces. And my question for you was: Did you consider this a violation of the decision reached, in the areas under protection or not?

A. I'm not aware of any attack by the Croatian forces of any significance on the UNPAs.

Q. Very well. As you say so. If you say you don't know, then I'm not going to pursue the point.

You don't, of course, know that it was the military attache in Washington who was held responsible for that Serb massacre. I'm just going to ask you this: As the Croatian press, on the 3rd of December, it says "Studeni" here, the Croatian term, I'm not sure what month that is but it is a winter month, in 2001, speaks about that. So November. It goes on to enumerate names, not to waste time, and then it ¹⁷¹⁸⁴ says, "Just some of them who could have been responsible for the crimes committed against the Serbs at the Miljevac plateau." So that is --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop you. There's no point reading out to this witness a list of names.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says so in the Croatian press. That's what I'm quoting from. It's not --

JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter. The witness can't deal with it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you remember that on the 25th of June, the presiding officer of the UN Security Council for June, who was the Belgium Ambassador, Paul Notre Dame, sent a sharp warning to Croatia because of the attack launched by the Croatian army on Knin and Drnis? Do you at least know about this sharply worded warning by the Security Council to the Croatian army and do you consider this confirmation of the fact that Croatia did the violating? It wasn't a caution sent out to the Republic of Srpska Krajina and its leadership but to Croatia for the attack on Knin and Drnis.

A. I think we've already established that random and occasional violence continued.

Q. All right, then. And do you remember that on the 13th of June, 1992, the UN Security Council - so I'm talking about the UN Security Council in its Resolution 762 - called for the government of Croatia to withdraw its army from the positions it had assumed to what they were before the offensive on the 22nd and to cease all hostile enemy activities ¹⁷¹⁸⁵ in the UNPAs or areas close to them? And they reiterated that the peace plan did not have the objective of pre-empting a political solution. So the fact that, as you say, you have no knowledge about that, we see here in Resolution 762 of the UN Security Council --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I did not say I had no knowledge. You are referring now to an event in June 1992, and your previous question, as I see on the screen, concerns the attack on the Srpska Krajina and the attack on Knin and Drnis. Well, again to explain for the Court, what Mr. Milosevic is referring to are the areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina adjacent to the UNPAs which were in Croatia. All of the UN protected areas in Croatia abutted Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were on the border, all of them. The ones on the west, in the Knin area of the Vojna Krajina, were particularly sensitive areas because they were occupied, inhabited by Serbs, and the fighting just across the border in Bosnia spilled over and all were concerned with that. And that is why the Security Council Resolution, which President Milosevic has just cited correctly, specifically mentioned "areas adjacent." That was the diplomatic way of referring to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Likewise, Western Slavonia abuts the border, the posavina, and Eastern Slavonia.

So the situation in the UN protected areas in Croatia was naturally affected by the fighting next door in Bosnia, and that's what Mr. Milosevic is alluding to, I believe.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ¹⁷¹⁸⁶

Q. I'm not alluding to anything, Mr. Okun. I was very precise in quoting the fact that in Resolution 762, the UN Security Council was calling upon the Croatian government to withdraw its army from the positions that it had assumed and to cease all hostile activities in the UNPAs. I didn't mention Bosnia-Herzegovina at all, nor has that anything to do with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A. As I've explained, the expression "in the neighbouring areas," was the Security Council's locution for the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. All right. If we're not understanding each other, then it's very difficult to understand about anything else, because that's what Resolution 762 states.

Now, as the UN Secretary-General secretary report [as interpreted], to 24.600 Croatian forces on the 21st of August, that is to say the last week of August, and the 13th of September killed Serb civilians and violated the cease-fire. Were you aware of that? Did you have any knowledge about that? And I'm quoting UN documents to you, Mr. Okun.

A. If it's in a UN document, I assume that it happened.

Q. And is this contested, that Croatia during that period did not have sovereignty over the territory because they were under UN authority and responsibility, and at that time, the representatives of the UN called upon Krajina to take steps to establish a legal, viable legal system. So they were areas under UN protection. They were not under the authority of Croatia. And the representatives of the United Nations asked that the representatives of Krajina set up a viable legal system there. ¹⁷¹⁸⁷

A. Excuse me, what period are you talking about? What period does this refer to?

Q. I'll tell you in just a moment. The 14th of September 1992.

A. May I answer?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes, the 14th of September, 1992.

A. No. That statement you just made was comprehensively incorrect at every point. Let me take them point by point. You say that Croatia was being occupied, and it was the -- the UNPAs were not in effect on Croatia territory. That's wrong. They were on Croatian territory, and from the very outset it was recognised by us - by me, by Mr. Vance, others - that the UNPAs were in Croatia. If you read the peacekeeping plan - I won't take to the time to do it - but if you look at the concept document, you look at all of the other UN documents, they always talk about the UNPAs in Croatia. They don't say they're in the Krajina, they don't say they're in Western Slavonia. They're in Croatia.

On the second point you make, namely that Croatia was some -- was not an entity, let me remind the Court that Croatia was accepted and admitted into the United Nations as a member state in April 1992. So it's perfectly obvious that Croatia was a sovereign state.

Q. Well, I'm quoting the conclusions of the subcommission of General Nambiar, precisely that, of that date, the 11th of September, 1992, whereby the Serbs should establish a viable, legal system in the area, and that's why I put it to you. So that shouldn't be in dispute. But let's ¹⁷¹⁸⁸ move on.

At the same time, Mr. Okun - and do you know about this - although all these resolutions and agreements testified to no pre-emption of a political solution, nonetheless the Secretary-General suddenly on the 28th of September, 1992, explains in his report that the object and goal of a joint commission to establish -- established by Resolution 762, the establishment of Croatian power and authority in the pink zones. Now, can you explain to me how we get this approach if Resolution 762 said there was no pre-empting of a political solution, how do we get this development then?

A. That's quite simple to explain, if I may. As I've already testified, the Conference on Yugoslavia ended its existence in August 1992. After that, there was no attempt to resolve or to seek a comprehensive settlement for all of the former Yugoslavia. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, under the co-chairmanship of Secretary Vance and Lord Owen, was not concerned with a comprehensive settlement. It was over.

Therefore, local arrangements had to be made of a military nature, at the military technical level, in and around the UN protected areas in Croatia, and that's what Mr. Milosevic is referring to when he talks about people setting up courts and movement in and out of the pink zones, that sort of thing. These were local arrangements.

Q. Very well. Do you remember that on the 30th of September, 1992, under the auspices and in the presence of the co-chairmen of the Conference on Yugoslavia, Vance and Owen, the president of Yugoslavia, ^{17189 BLANK PAGE 17190} Dobrica Cosic, and the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, in Geneva signed a joint declaration dated the 6th of October, 1992, and the Security Council adopted a Resolution 779, welcoming the joint declaration signed by FRY and Croatia on the 30th of September?

A. And the question is do I recall the joint declaration? Yes, I do.

Q. However, a couple of months after that -- several months, not a couple. On the 22nd of January, 1993, Croatia attacked the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in the so-called pink zones under the control of the UN. That, I assume, is not disputed. I am asking you, with reference to this attack, whether you remember, the attack on the 22nd of January, that after a closed session of the UN Security Council, the president of the Security Council, Japanese Ambassador Yoshia Katana [phoen], declared for the press that the Security Council, and I quote, "condemns the attack of Croatian armed formations and demands that the offensive be halted immediately, and that Croatian forces withdrew to their initial positions," and that the Secretary-General, in those days, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, expressed regret, and I quote, "Because of the unilateral act on the part of the Croatian authorities which represented a blow to the peace efforts of the United Nations." Do you remember these reactions to what I am saying that was going on? So it cannot be disputed that these things were happening --

JUDGE MAY: I'm stopping you. This -- this question has gone on long enough, insofar as it's a question.

Now, Ambassador, there are, I think, three questions wrapped up there. Was there an attack on 22nd of January, as alleged, on the Serbian ¹⁷¹⁹¹ Krajina? Perhaps you could deal with that first and then, if you can, with the alleged reactions from the Security Council.

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. We've discussed the pink zones. I must refer to them briefly in an introductory fashion. The pink zones, so-called, were a bone of contention because the UN civil command never succeeded in establishing its effective control as it should have inside the UN protected areas in Croatia. Part of the peacekeeping plan, the so-called Vance Plan, went into effect. Part was never achieved. Another part that was not achieved was the return of Croatian civilians who had been expelled from those areas into the -- into the zones.

So there was fighting in the zones and, therefore, there was fighting by the Croatian army as well.

So with that by way of introduction, I would agree that the Croatian army probably did launch this offensive or took this action, and I hear the statement read by the then president of the Security Council and I accept that I've heard it and I accept he made it in good faith. As we've said repeatedly, there were numerous acts of random and occasional violence in and around the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia, mostly but not exclusively related to the heavy fighting next door in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. These questions, Mr. Okun, have nothing to do with Bosnia and Herzegovina. I mentioned the presidential statement, the statement of the Secretary-General, and do you remember that a couple of days later, the UN ¹⁷¹⁹² Security Council adopted Resolution 802 -- because none of this helped, 802 was adopted in which the military attack by Croatian armed forces on areas under UN protection is sharply denounced, and the demand made for immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of formations, et cetera, et cetera. Do you remember Resolution 802?

A. Yes, I remember it somewhat vaguely because it was a continuation of this tit-for-tat fighting in and around the UNPAs, yes.

Q. And do you remember that on the 27th of January, at a closed session of the Security Council, a presidential announcement was adopted saying that the Security Council is extremely concerned because Croatian forces, in spite of sharp warnings given previously, are continuing the offensive, and demands all parties to cease hostilities immediately and to urgently comply with all commitments under Resolution 802?

A. I imagine they did make that statement.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kay, in order to try and finish this witness's evidence, since he's been here for some time, I don't know whether you'd be prepared to forego any cross-examination.

MR. KAY: I've got Mr. Groome's problem. No. My voice is generally loud enough to be heard wherever I speak. I think it's far more preferable for the accused to have any time that I should have. I did have certain important questions or observations to ask of the witness. What I would propose is that I wrote them down and, citing the sources from the diaries, and submitted them to the Trial Chamber so that they could see the points that I would have been making from the diaries.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. ¹⁷¹⁹³

MR. KAY: If that's with the approval of the Trial Chamber.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We have to be out at 1.45. Mr. Groome, it also affects you.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I have about five questions, I think about five minutes' worth, and I think it would be important for me to ask.

JUDGE MAY: Well, I don't want to keep the witness here or have him come back from America, and the accused is entitled to another five minutes.

Speaking for myself, I'd be prepared to entertain some written observations. We could always send them to the witness for his written answers it may be.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if I might be of assistance on that. It is planned that Ambassador Okun will be testifying at another trial in the summer, June or July. So that that would be another possibility, to conclude the remaining 15 or so minutes when he returns on that occasion.

JUDGE MAY: Let's see how we get on. The accused can have the last six minutes and then we'll consider the position.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you remember, Mr. Okun, that on the 30th of March, 1993 the Security Council adopted the Resolution 815, prolonging the mandate of UNPROFOR, and on the 6th of April, several days after that, delegations of the Republic of Croatia and of the Serbian Krajina met in Geneva, signed an agreement on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 802, ¹⁷¹⁹⁴ envisaging a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia to the line of separation prior to the outbreak of hostilities on the 22nd and the right of all persons to use the Maslenica bridge the airport, Zemunik, the Peruca dam and the surrounding roads for peaceful purposes?

A. And what was the day of that agreement in Geneva, approximately?

Q. 6th of April, 1993.

A. Yes, I have it in my diary, for the benefit of the -- of all present in the court. This is a meeting -- meetings on Tuesday, April 6, 1993, including a meeting of one hour with the Krajina Serbs, Goran Hadzic, Slobodan Jarcevic, and Misa Milosevic - I believe no relationship - and Dragana Milj. Yes. We met with them, and we had previously met with the Croatians.

What is the question?

Q. Do you remember that finally some sort of normalisation started, some signs of normalisation set in in relations between Knin and Zagreb, though there was aggressive activities exclusively by the Croatian side throughout, that the Serbs showed extreme restraint. Do you know that? Are you aware of that, Mr. Okun?

A. Well, I am aware that meetings were held. I'm certainly aware, they're in the diary, that I was present. Indeed, I recall in that period going to Croatia myself to chair several meetings between the Serbian and Croatian sides in connection with the continued fighting around the UN protected areas. I can only report what I've said earlier, was that there was fighting from both sides, primarily from the Serb side, because they ¹⁷¹⁹⁵ rejected, for example, a proposal that the Croatian Defence Minister Susak made to -- for all sides to withdrawal artillery. That sort of thing occurred. There was ongoing fighting, there was ongoing negotiating, and we can, of course, pick out individual moments, but it's rather like trying to paint a moving train. So I think it's better if we try to understand this as part of a continuum rather than isolated individual acts.

Q. Here, as I have quoted to you, there was a whole series of violations of the regime prevalent in UN protected areas. Do you remember that after this there was, in Geneva, the so-called Erdut agreement again between the same parties?

A. As I've said, there was continuous fighting on both sides.

Q. And do you remember that instead of complying with all those warnings of the Secretary-General of the UN, the president of the Security Council, the relevant resolutions and their provisions, again on the 9th of September, 1993, the Croatian army again attacked areas under protection and captured the Serbian villages of Divoselo, Citluk, Pocitelj and Gospic. This was on the 9th of September. And on the 10th of September, Thorwald Stoltenberg called on the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, publicly to order his forces to halt attacks against territories inhabited by Serbs and for them to withdraw from these three villages that they had captured in Lika? Do you remember this appeal by Stoltenberg, who actually succeeded Vance?

A. By that time, I was involved in -- primarily in Macedonia and the Greek issue, but I repeat that I was aware then and now of the continued ¹⁷¹⁹⁶ fighting in and around the UN protected areas.

Q. And do you remember that on the 7th of October, 1993, the UN demanded that the Croatian government provide an explanation for the massacre of Serb civilians carried out by the Croatian army in the Medak pocket when 70 civilians were killed and 48 went missing? They were also probably killed.

A. There were violations of international humanitarian law throughout the conflict.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Your last question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you remember --

JUDGE MAY: Your last question, Mr. Milosevic. We've gone past the time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm very sorry, Mr. May. I have at least another 50 questions for this witness.

JUDGE MAY: Well, just pick one.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, if it's just one, let me just ask you this: You said that I had meetings with Cyrus Vance that you did not attend. I can -- I could even say many meetings with Cyrus Vance that you did not attend. Do you know what Cyrus Vance and I discussed at those meetings?

A. Secretary Vance would normally tell me what you and he discussed at those meetings.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So I can't ask any more questions, Mr. May; is that right? ^{17197 BLANK PAGE 17198}

JUDGE MAY: You can ask one more if you want to ask something arising from that answer, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. One thing: If he says he knows everything, then surely he couldn't testify about anything that would be contrary to the aims of achieving peace and the efforts that Serbia and I personally invested to achieve peace in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. So did Cyrus Vance ever give you any indication that would deny what I have just said, that would run counter to what I have just said?

A. He frequently gave me more than indications, but his view: That you were sometimes helpful, frequently unhelpful in the peace effort, and always in charge.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Ambassador, that concludes your evidence for today. If it's right that you are going to be coming back to the Tribunal in the summer, then it may be convenient, if you would, to come to this trial and allow counsel for the amicus and for the Prosecution to ask questions which I trust will take not much more than 20 minutes. If you would be so good as to do that.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much. We will adjourn now until Monday morning.

THE WITNESS: Judge, may I have a word? May I thank you all for allowing me to be of service, and may I say that I stand at your disposal if at any time in the future I can be of further assistance.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. ¹⁷¹⁹⁹

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday, the 3rd day of March, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.