²²⁵⁴⁶

Tuesday, 17 June 2003

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, in addition to the normal parties -- parties normally present, there are other representatives here. The Chamber may wish to identify who they are. There's the lawyer for Mr. Lilic himself and there's the representative of the government.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes. If the lawyers would identify themselves, please. Yes.

MR. PANCESKI: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour. My name is Miodrag Panceski. I am first secretary of the Embassy of Serbia-Montenegro in The Hague. Together with me today is my colleague, counsellor in the embassy, Mr. Slavoljub Caric. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes. Yes. Counsel for the witness, I believe is here. Would he introduce himself, please.

MR. SAPONJIC: [Interpretation] My name is Dragan Saponjic. I am legal counsel to Mr. Lilic.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, may the witness be brought in. The Chamber was provided yesterday with a file of papers or a clip of papers. I'm having it recopied so that the lawyers attending this morning for the government and for the witness may have copies themselves. ²²⁵⁴⁷ There's one additional document that was provided last night by Mr. Lilic that I'm also having copied, which should be added to that. Unfortunately, it's in Cyrillic only at the moment. It's a document that identifies the documents that he is being allowed to refer to. So it's a further constraint upon him that was provided to him. When that's available, I'll distribute it without further notice. And perhaps it can form the last two pages of the existing small bundle.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We've read the statement. There does seem to be quite a lot of irrelevant matter in it, which no doubt you'll avoid. Also, the witness's views on the constitution. He's not an expert. Of course he can talk about the practice the way he saw it, but he can't of course give expert evidence upon it, if there's any danger of that.

And the final comment is this, that we have three days available at most for this witness. And of course we must allow for proper time for cross-examination.

MR. NICE: Yes. There's a summary produced. You'll see it's quite extensive. And it only -- it has yet to be completed by the addition of Kosovo. But the Chamber will be heartened to know that it includes simply all the material that the witness has been providing so there can be no question of omitting material that should be Rule 68. It includes material that we won't be leading for various reasons. And I'm hopeful to be able to deal with the evidence comparatively swiftly. And I will review my progress from time to time and if necessary cut material from the latest sections. ²²⁵⁴⁸

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, we'll have the witness, please.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

WITNESS: ZORAN LILIC

[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

THE WITNESS: Thank you. Examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Your full name, please.

A. My name is Zoran Lilic.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, there's a file of exhibits for use with this witness. May it be given an exhibit number.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Prosecution Exhibit Number 469.

MR. NICE:

Q. And if first exhibit -- the first tab of 469 is the relevant curriculum vitae of this witness. I don't propose to go through it in detail. It's available for the Chamber.

Mr. Lilic, were you a member of the SPS [Realtime transcript read in error "SDS"] party from 1990, holding various posts in that party until in 1993 you were elected president or you were made president of the FRY, a post you held until 1997, you replacing Dobrica Cosic?

A. Yes, that is correct. ²²⁵⁴⁹

Q. A vote of no confidence had been passed in respect of your predecessor. We may hear more about that later.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: What is it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is a mistake in the question, and I see that the mistake was repeated in the transcript. Mr. Lilic was not a member of the SDS. He was a member of the SPS.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Sorry, I didn't hear that bit. I'm sorry. Of course the other is right.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lilic, could you not respond at this stage to the accused directly. You're giving evidence to the Court. In any event, that correction is now clarified. Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Following your text as president of the FRY in 1997, were you appointed deputy president of the government and reappointed in 1998, leaving that position or position of deputy prime minister in 1999, August?

A. Yes.

Q. For some time now you have been in contact with the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY. In the course of that time, have you ever sought anything from the Office of the Prosecutor?

A. No.

Q. Has anything been offered or provided to you by way of assistance by the Office of the Prosecutor?

A. No, nothing. ²²⁵⁵⁰

Q. In the course of your negotiations with the Office of the Prosecutor, have you identified with particularity a range of documents that it is considered might be of assistance to the Tribunal in the resolution of its task?

A. Yes.

Q. Some of those documents indeed provide stenographic notes, that is, verbatim notes of things said at important meetings where you yourself were present?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you reinforced efforts made, to your knowledge, by the Office of the Prosecutor to get those documents, reinforce them by personal contacts?

A. Yes.

Q. To your knowledge, has the majority of those documents, and in particular records of the SDC and of one other body to which we will return later, have those -- the majority of those documents not been provided by the authorities, despite well over a year's pressure following your identification of documents?

A. According to the list that I received from the national committee for cooperation with The Hague Tribunal, that is correct. I mean, the list of documents I received, the list of documents that were provided to The Hague Tribunal.

Q. And you are giving evidence subject to a waiver from the government that limits your -- the topics you can give evidence about where you would be at risk of revealing state or military secrets? ²²⁵⁵¹

A. In relation to request 219 that you submitted to the national committee for cooperation with The Hague Tribunal in Belgrade, in which was submitted to me by the national committee for cooperation with The Hague, that is correct.

Q. I turn to paragraph 8 of the summary.

MR. NICE: And the Chamber will recall that it may be worth repeating for those observing the proceedings that I'm going to deal with evidence in the order identified to the government as topics that would be covered by the evidence of this witness, for everybody's convenience. The first topic is the role of the SPS in the legislative process.

Q. Mr. Lilic, is it right that the SPS had the majority in both federal and republic assemblies at the time we start this evidence -- start the account you can give, when the accused was president of Serbia but also president of the party?

A. The SPS from its very inception in 1990 all the way up to 2000 was the leading political party in Serbia. Sometimes it was in a position to form a majority government, sometimes a minority government, and sometimes with coalition partners with whom they found a joint interest. So the answer would be yes, this is correct.

Q. Apart from one period, the accused was president of the party; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you explain how the party featured in the legislative process. What role did it play?

A. The Socialist Party of Serbia, as the leading party in the ²²⁵⁵² political arena in Serbia, particularly drew on the great authority exercised by its president, President Milosevic. It was in a position to set up a republican government and also a federal government, or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the elections, when it had a larger number of seats in parliament that was actually required to set up a majority government, practically all the ministers were from the SPS and from some of the coalition parties. Also, the majority of MPs, either in the republican parliament or in the federal parliament belonged to, if I can use the word, our party, the Socialist Party of Serbia. The Socialist Party of Serbia also exercised influence on the drafting of bills and of course eventually made them passed as laws.

Q. Were the smaller parties in a position to do more than operate as pressure groups? Were they in a position to make laws themselves?

A. The parliamentary life of Serbia, it was possible for all the parliamentary parties to propose bills and to effect the legislative process in the Assembly of Serbia. However, in view of the vast majority we had in 1990 and later on in 1992, after the elections, and then also in 1996, their bills remained bills, and our bills were passed as laws practically.

Q. Looking, please, at tab 8 of Exhibit 469, and at one aspect of law-making at that time, we have the minutes of a Supreme Defence Council meeting held before your Presidency. I'll turn to the reason -- I'll emphasise that later. And maybe if it's possible for the usher to put the English version on the overhead projector, I'd be grateful. We can see that this is the 7th session of the supreme Defence ²²⁵⁵³ Council held on the 10th of February. The date would appear to be wrong. But if we go to the second page of the English, under item 3 -- no, we'll stay on if first page, I'm sorry. The supreme Defence Council approved the agenda, which was the bill on the Yugoslav army and the bill on the defence. What role would the supreme Defence Council, a body to which we'll turn later, have in the legislative process, paragraph 10 of the summary.

MR. CARIC: Your Honour, I'm sorry, because I'm disturbing you. I would like to know -- I would like to know the exactly date of that document, because Mr. Nice didn't tell us.

MR. NICE: According to the --

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: According to the B/C/S version, it's the 10th of February, 1993. The English version is an obvious translation error.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour --

JUDGE MAY: Have the various representatives got these documents? Have you got this binder of documents?

MR. CARIC: We -- we didn't receive anything, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: You should. Very well.

MR. CARIC: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Tapuskovic, you wanted to say something?

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't know if I heard Mr. Nice properly, but he mentioned the date of the 10th of February; isn't that right? In the Serbian version, in the B/C/S version, the date is the 22nd of February, 1993. ²²⁵⁵⁴

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Referring apparently to a meeting on the 10th of February. Yes. Yes.

Yes, Mr. Caric.

MR. CARIC: 1993. In that case -- in that case, we request private session with your permission, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Well, I wonder if at this stage we -- let us simply mark this document for identification and you can return to it in due course.

MR. NICE: I'll ask the question in general terms.

Q. Mr. Lilic, would there be circumstances --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. -- Mr. Caric, what we'll do is we'll -- we'll not stop at the moment. We will leave this document on one side and we can return to it in due course and you can have a private session then. Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Lilic, would the Supreme Defence Council, a body whose --

MR. CARIC: Okay. Thank you, Your Honour.

MR. NICE:

Q. -- We will explore more later, would the Supreme Defence Council have any role in the legislative process?

A. The Supreme Defence Council certainly, when this kind of an important law was concerned, like the law on defence, it was supposed to give its opinion, if that's what you're referring to. As for other legal documents, indeed its role is not all that important. It is more of a consultative nature. ²²⁵⁵⁵

Q. You've referred already to the accused having one period of time when he was not president of the SPS. Can you give the period roughly and explain why he ceased to be president of the party for that period.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters ask to connect the second microphone of Mr. Lilic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1992, when the position of president of the Socialist Party of Serbia was ceded to the member of the Presidency of Yugoslavia until then, Mr. Borislav Jovic. There could have been two reasons for that. One was that Mr. Jovic no longer held a political position at federal level. And the second possibility is that the constitution of the Republic of Serbia, and if I'm not mistaken, it is a particular article that defines carrying out the duties of the president of the Republic of Serbia -- practically the president of the Republic of Serbia cannot be engaged in other public duties. But I believe that the first reason is more important because afterwards, it was only logical, President Milosevic took over this other important political office yet again.

MR. NICE:

Q. In 1995, did the accused's wife found or take part in the founding of a political party called JUL, the Yugoslav United Left?

A. Yes. There is a general belief that towards the end of July 1995 the Yugoslav Left was founded by Mrs. Markovic. Now, whether it was founded by Mrs. Markovic or President Milosevic is a question I cannot really give an answer to.

Q. Following its founding, what influence and control did the SPS and ²²⁵⁵⁶ JUL in combination have?

A. I really wish I could distinguish between the influence of the SPS from the influence exercised by the Yugoslav Left. But in view of the question that was put, I usually say and I would like to repeat it here that the Yugoslavia Left practically took over all important functions in the Republic of Serbia and later on in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well; and in that they relied upon the enormous resources, including human resources, that the SPS had. At any rate, the Yugoslav Left and the SPS were under the domination and the authority of President Milosevic. They certainly controlled all financial flows, the members of the Yugoslav Left did, in the Republic of Serbia, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, also the media. I think that the leading members of JUL practically held all important positions in the Republic of Serbia.

Q. [Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.

MR. NICE: I apologise.

Q. Tab 2 of Exhibit 469.

MR. NICE: I don't know if the Judge's versions have the English-language versions. Mine doesn't.

Q. You can look at them quickly to see what they are. Mr. Lilic, are these charts that record the share of the vote obtained by parties in elections in 1990 and 1993, 1994, 1997, and 2000, first for the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, and one can see the largest segment being the SPS, reducing in size in 1993, enlarging in 1994, and then in 1997 being the SPS and JUL combined, smaller again, and ²²⁵⁵⁷ then much smaller in 2000?

On the second sheet, the Court can see the election results for the FRY Assembly for the 4th of June, 1992, and the following pages deal with 2003, perhaps of less value. Those first two charts show the majorities held by the SPS and by the SPS and JUL in combination; correct?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, earlier Mr. Lilic said that the leading members of JUL practically held all important positions in the Republic of Serbia.

Could you give us one or two examples of that.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course I can. I can give a multitude of examples. But for instance, the Minister of Health, Mrs. Leposava Milicevic; Vice-president of the Republican Government, Mr. Bojic; directors of various funds for health, first Mr. Djordjevic and then Mr. Djokic. In the federal government, Mr. Borisa Vukovic, through him all foreign trade was carried out; then Mr. Matic, Minister of Information; then Mr. Markovic in the federal government, and a great many other names that I could mention. They all held positions that were dominant, especially from the economic point of view and from the media point of view.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. Paragraph 18 of the summary - we turn from the charts - how did decisions in the SPS, as initially formed, come to be made? Where did the decisions start? How did they develop?

A. The SPS was first and foremost one of the most significant if not ²²⁵⁵⁸ the largest party in that part of Europe or that part of the Balkans, relative to the number of members it had, local boards, more than 10.000 of them, virtually in every constituency there was a local board, and a number of prominent members who were first in the SPS and when the coalition was made with the Yugoslav Left their number went down and I must say that the SPS took part in the elections independently for the first time in the year 2000, so that its support was very low as compared to the authority and powers it had. So the decision were mostly taken within a limited circle of people - and I am talking about the period I am familiar with, that is, in the second half of the 1990s - and I think that the decisions were conceived primarily by President Milosevic in his home and then through the narrow circle of associates, those decisions were passed on to the executive board or were immediately made public, even prior to the executive board having met, and that board actually only approved the decisions already taken by President Milosevic and then through loyal cadres, through district and local boards those decisions were actually implemented, so that no decision of any significance could not have been taken without the approval and authority of President Milosevic.

Q. Could you name, please, the inner circle to whom you've referred and which I believe you sometimes refer to as the shadow cabinet.

A. With regard to members of the Socialist Party of Serbia, a certain number of people rotated, but there was a constant group of people that were in the inner circle of President Milosevic. In the first place, Mr. Mirko Marjanovic, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, who ²²⁵⁵⁹ headed that republic for seven years, if I'm not mistaken, who was also general manager of the -- one of the leading foreign trade companies, thanks to state sponsored arrangements.

Q. [Previous interpretation continues] ... so Mirko Marjanovic?

A. Then I should like to mention Mr. Dragan Tomic, president of the republican assembly; Mr. Minic, who was president of the chamber of citizens; later Mr. Milan Milutinovic, then after that Mr. Zivadin Jovanovic, Gorica Gajevic, and a very interesting member of that team is Mr. Uros Suvakovic, and as the need arose other people too.

Q. We know of a man called Sainovic. Did he ever feature in this inner circle or not?

A. Yes. I omitted to mention his name.

Q. Just, please, confirm, because we may deal with the detail in another way later, that Dobrica Cosic was removed on an accusation of violating the constitution because he had a meeting with the chief of the general staff which was a topic not previously discussed at an SPS meeting; is that correct?

A. Dobrica Cosic was replaced as president because of the meeting he held in Dobanovci with the senior staff of the general staff headed by Mr. Panic, Zivota Panic.

Q. This was then -- excuse me, this was then taken to the federal assembly by the accused and impeachment proceedings led to his being removed from office; correct? Just let me know if it is roughly correct or correct.

A. Yes. ²²⁵⁶⁰

Q. What happened - paragraph 20 - to SPS members who opposed policies advanced in the way you've described from the family and the inner circle?

A. They would very quickly cease to be members of the SPS, either of their own free will or were excluded from the Socialist Party of Serbia.

Q. You've set out in the summary the details of how you lost office. Much of this will be a matter of public record. In a first round you had by far the largest number of votes, more than Seselj. Eventually you withdrew your candidature and Milutinovic recorded a landslide victory, in your judgement, because their involvement of the accused and his wife in the election in a way that was adverse to you? Just yes or no.

A. These were the elections in 1997 for the post of president of the Republic of Serbia. And from this distance in time, certain members of my own party played a highly dishonourable role. I can say that. And in view of the way in which such instructions were made, there's no doubt that Mr. Milosevic and Mrs. Markovic played a significant role. Certainly I wouldn't have been a candidate at all if they hadn't wanted it in the first place.

Q. That will probably do for these purposes. Thank you, Mr. Lilic. And I'm sorry to have to take things quickly, but you understand the real pressures of time we face, because we -- well, because we do. Let's go to tab 3 of Exhibit 469 to see a little bit more about the programme of the SPS.

MR. NICE: And if the Chamber would look at the top right-hand page numbering, I shall be going first to page 11 in a document that is the programme of the Socialist Party of Serbia, as set out in the first ²²⁵⁶¹ congress on July the 16th, 1990. At page 11 of 13 in the English version, under the headings "The Serbian Diaspora," was the platform of your policy as follows -- platform of your party as follows: "The Socialist Party of Serbia will regularly monitor the living conditions and development of Serbs living in the other republics and abroad and maintain extensive" -- it's right towards the end. I'm sorry, Mr. Lilic. "And maintain intensive relations with their political, cultural, and other organisations, believing it to be only natural for other nations to maintain such relations with their fellow countrymen living in Serbia, she will extend material and moral assistance to them, help improve their living conditions, and preserve their national identity and cultural traditions, and ensure more intensive cultural development." And at the foot of the same page -- at the foot of the page in English and two-thirds of the way down the page in your version, Mr. Lilic, does it say: "The new Yugoslav constitution should allow for the forming of autonomous provinces in Yugoslavia on the basis of the expressed will of the population and national, historical, cultural, and other specificities"? Is that part of the policy of your party?

A. Yes.

Q. At the Second Congress, on the 23rd and 24th of October of 1992 - tab 4, please. Thank you very much. And here if the Court would look at page 31 of 40. And if the usher could take the witness to page 30 of 38. For the witness, page 30, please. I think it may start, actually, on the foot of page 29, 29/30.

At this congress was the following made clear, under the title ²²⁵⁶² "Yugoslav - A Free Federal Republic." Page 31 of the English for the usher.

"The option for Yugoslavia is based on a variety of grounds. It makes a community with the Montenegrin nation possible. By maintaining Yugoslavia, the Serbian nation preserves its homeland, an essential guarantee of the protection of all the remaining parts of the Serbian nation. It enables legitimate concern for the Serbs outside Serbia and creates the institutional possibility for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be joined, in future, by Krajina and the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regardless of all resistance to the recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, from the aspect of international law, its international legal continuity is more difficult to contest than the establishment of the sovereign state of Serbia, therefore in this context too, the reorganisation of Yugoslavia is the optimal solution." Was that the expressed opinion at the Second Congress?

A. Yes. This was when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had already been constituted. And in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this possibility existed and this was one of the important activities of all of us in the SPS, including activities in the area that you referred to a moment ago.

Q. In your judgement, paragraph 32 of the summary, did the accused have any wider political or military strategies with which the SPS policies were or not consistent?

A. I have to admit that I don't quite understand the question. Could you be more specific, please. ²²⁵⁶³

Q. Yes. At that time, did the accused demonstrate by his statements any intention to unite Serbs in a single state?

A. All Serbs in a single state is a thesis that has been put forward for many years, and it was only the SFRY that was the state in which all Serbs were in one state and every effort was made to preserve that territory so that Serbs would remain in such a single state.

Q. Can we look at tab 5 briefly, which is an English version only, I think. The British Broadcasting Corporation report on a speech by the accused. If you'd be good enough to listen to this, in translation if appropriate -- a speech by the accused in 1991 was to this effect, third paragraph: "We hold that each nation has the equal right to decide freely about its destiny. Such a right can be constrained solely by the same, equal right of other nations. As far as the Serbian people are concerned, they want to live in one state. Hence, divisions into several states, which would separate Serbian people and force them to live in different sovereign states is, from our point of view, unacceptable, that is - let me specify - out of the question. The Serbian nation will live in one state and every nation wanting to live with the Serbian people in the same state on an equal basis is welcome. Confederation is not a state." Is that consistent with the views publicly expressed by the accused at the time?

A. Yes. Only as far as we were concerned in the SPS, this applied -- involved the right of a referendum, so that people who wanted to stay could stay and those who wanted to leave could leave. So I assume that this relates to that period, and my answer is yes. ²²⁵⁶⁴

Q. Tab 6, please. The Third SPS Congress held on or about the 2nd of March, 1996, includes speech of -- well, it may be by the accused, and it's about six lines down, the first paragraph in both the English and B/C/S versions, where the accused said this: "Serbia has assisted materially and morally all afflicted Serbs, those at war where a war was waged, those in peace who could not work, those in exile, and those here, and all this while she was under sanctions, which after all has been imposed precisely as a consequence of this moral and material support to Serbs outside Serbia."

Was that part of the general policy advanced by the accused and indeed, I think, repeated at the Fourth Congress, in February 2000?

A. Yes, that is true.

Q. Going back to the question I asked you earlier: These political statements advanced in the setting of the political party, were they consistent with, as you could judge it, the political and military strategies of the accused at the time?

A. As far as extending aid is concerned and everything else regarding the activities within the SPS of Serbia, the answer is yes.

Q. And the next topic to which you've been given leave to give evidence by the government. It's paragraphs 37 and 8 under the general heading "The De Jure Powers of the President of Serbia." I think it's actually probably appropriate to deal with that under the next section, really, which is the de jure powers of the president of the SFRY. Just help us, please, Mr. Lilic. So far as your position as president was concerned, was it an office with real authority? Was it an ²²⁵⁶⁵ office of formality? In a couple of sentences, help us.

A. The position of the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as defined in the constitution by Articles 135 and 136 is a protocol position. It is the chancellor system of government that was established when all powers in the hands of the prime minister, so that as I said, the post of president of FRY was of a purely protocol nature.

Q. Did that position change when the constitution of the FRY was amended in 2000?

A. Yes, to a certain extent it was changed in the year 2000, with the amendments to the articles of the constitution defining the mandate, method of election, and term of office. As according to the previous constitution was indirectly elected in the federal assembly by the majority who had the majority, and in this way the possibility was given to extend the mandate. The term of office used to be four years, and then it was extended to two mandates of four years, and the president was elected directly, which gives him greater legitimacy and greater powers; whereas, at the same time, the powers of the president of the federal government were reduced.

Q. I move, then, more formally to the title "De jure powers of the president of the FRY" with a number of subdivisions in respect to which leave has been given for you to give evidence, even if some points would otherwise be revealed, paragraph 39.

Can you help us please, with just very briefly, the manner of command over the VJ exercised by the president of the FRY, and what was the role of decisions of the Supreme Defence Council in that chain of ²²⁵⁶⁶ command?

A. You have given excessive authority to the president of Yugoslavia when you say that the army was in his hands. That wouldn't be a good thing. If the president were to act in that way. The president of Yugoslavia was one of three equal members of the Supreme Defence Council. When we talk about the president of Yugoslavia, in relation to Article 4 of the law on the Army of Yugoslavia, it can be said that the president was in command of the Army of Yugoslavia in war and peace primarily and exclusively in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Defence Council.

Q. Paragraph 42. To what extent was the president of the FRY able to receive reports from the Serbian DB?

A. The president of FRY was one of the institutions that regularly received reports from the state security. However, if I would be interested in a particular situation, I would receive such reports, but I would regularly receive them from others.

Q. What authority, if any, did the president of the FRY - paragraph 43 of the summary - have in respect of promotion of military officials?

A. There are different interpretations, but as a rule I respected the principle defined by Article 136 of the constitution of FRY and a decree passed by the federal government on the promotion of military personnel, but the president did have the right to promote generals to major general and up rank and also to promote the first group of cadets upon graduation from military academies. But I certainly, I consulted and conferred with the Federal Defence Council, but all such promotions were made on the ²²⁵⁶⁷ proposal of the general staff and the college of the general staff meeting.

Q. Now, the next exhibit, tab 9, is or would be the minutes of the 5th Session of the Supreme Defence Council held on the 9th of June, 1998, after the witness was out of office. I have been notified of no national security concerns in respect of this particular document, but I observe what happened the previous occasion, so it may be that the government representative wishes to say something about it. I don't know?

JUDGE MAY: Do you want to deal with this now? I mean, it may be -- there could be a series of these documents which we could deal with it together.

MR. NICE: I'm happy to deal with it on that basis. I simply don't know whether this is one that was objected to or not.

JUDGE MAY: Okay. Let's just see. Tab 9, yes, Mr. Caric.

MR. CARIC: Yes, that's correct. We -- we haven't any remarks -- any objections concerning that document.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. NICE: Tab 9, then, please, is the minutes. If the witness can have it. And it's the 5th Session of the Supreme Defence Council held on the 9th of June of 1998. I think the Chamber's document may be marked, I'm not sure, on the first page under agenda number 2 is personal issues. If the Chamber would go to the bottom right-hand corner numbering pages 4 of 8. And if the accused -- the witness would go to -- I think it's page -- the top right-hand corner, 01132438 I think is the right place to go. ²²⁵⁶⁸

Q. We see, Mr. Lilic, at this minute of a Supreme Defence Council meeting that the accused asked General Perisic to distribute copies of material with proposals for issues amongst attendees of the session and then to explain the proposals and Perisic notified the attendees that the committee -- the chiefs of the general staff had discussed it and the proposals were brought in consent with the Ministry of Defence or the Federal Ministry of Defence. And then we see reaching a decision on the seizure [as interpreted] of professional military service, Bozidar Babic and Markovic Mihajlo were referred to and so on. And then we see further down promotions to higher ranks.

This document, how does it fit with your understanding of the role of president and of the SDC in promotions of military officers?

A. This is what I was referring to a moment ago, and I assume that list had previously been agreed upon in a certain sense. But in any event, I think that the proposal of the general staff, the chief of the general staff, was respected, and that the Supreme Defence Council fully accepted this proposal, which I think is quite in order.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note: Seizure is a mistranslation.

MR. NICE: I guessed it was, and the word should be ...?

THE INTERPRETER: Cessation.

MR. NICE: I thought so. Thank you very much.

Q. I'm going to move straight on at the moment to paragraph 51 to save time. During your term of office, please, help us with the subordination of MUP to the VJ. In what circumstances did that -- or could that happen? ²²⁵⁶⁹

A. The MUP or, rather, individual units of the police from both republics could be subordinated in the command sense to the Army of Yugoslavia only under certain conditions. In the case of immediate threat of war, and the existence of a threat of war, or a state of war in the whole republic or a part of the republic, and that could be a motive for introducing a state of emergency.

Q. Paragraph 52. Can you help us with the terms with which we are becoming familiar, Supreme Command and Supreme Command Staff. What was the Supreme Command?

A. The Supreme Command exists only in times of war. The Supreme Command Staff is the most qualified body implementing decisions taken by the Supreme Command. The Supreme Command is formed on the basis of the strategy of armed struggle and the doctrine of the defence for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Supreme Command consists of members of the Supreme Defence Council and then, only then, is the president of the Supreme Defence Council at the same time the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, and then the armed forces act together by certain units of the MUP joining them. Which those units are, I cannot talk about them. In addition to permanent members of the Supreme Defence Council, the Supreme Command also includes the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the presidents of both chambers of the Federal Assembly, and the Supreme Command Staff is in fact the general staff that takes over the role of the Supreme Command Staff.

Q. The Federal Minister of Defence --

A. Yes, I forgot to mention him. Of course. The Minister of Defence ²²⁵⁷⁰ of course is a member of the Supreme Command.

Q. The mandate and obligations of the Supreme Command Staff and the Supreme Command, in case we need to research this, are to be found, I think, in two documents. Can you name them?

A. Those two documents are adopted by the Supreme Defence Council, so I assume that as the NATO bombing began on the 24th, that a state of emergency and state of war was introduced that same day, so I assume that by decision of President Milosevic the Supreme Command was set up on the strategy of armed struggle and the military doctrine of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Those are the two documents. And you'll be able to find them in the federal government -- or rather, the Federal Ministry of Defence, the military doctrine and strategy of armed struggle or battle.

Q. Paragraph 56. You may have covered this, but just for clarification or detail, the defence plan when formed is adopted by which body?

A. The plan of the country's defence was adopted by the Supreme Defence Council. It is a document which is highly confidential and is donated with a state secret. And all I can say is that it contains detailed defence plans for the entire territory of the FRY. So a decision to deploy it is made by the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Of course, it can undergo certain changes and amendments, depending on the political and security situation in the region and within the country as a whole.

Q. To your knowledge or understanding, was it changed regularly or ²²⁵⁷¹ only infrequently?

A. The country's defence plan is changed very rarely. That is logical and that's how it should be. And during my term of office, I don't think it was changed at all, even once.

Q. Do you know or have a belief as to whether it changed before the NATO bombing campaign?

A. I don't know. But in view of these specific features and circumstances of the war, it probably did undergo certain changes. But I just can't say which.

Q. Next heading, under "Constitutional framework of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia." Mr. Lilic, were -- we've heard a lot about the various constitutions of these bodies, and you've heard the Chamber say that you're not an expert -- perhaps you hadn't heard it, but you're not an expert on law. But nevertheless this: Were the republic and federal constitutions ever properly brought into line, the ones with the other?

A. Unfortunately, for the most part, or at least in the essential aspects, the republican constitution was adopted in 1990, the federal ones in 1992, and of Montenegro in the autumn of 1992. It is my impression, in addition to the various efforts made, that this did not correspond to either the republican governments or presidents and so the influences of the republic were lost?

A. That is to say, they were not brought in line with the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And the best example of this was the intensive desire on a federal level to constitute a united ²²⁵⁷² system of national security in order to tie up all the republics and security systems into one single system and thus have a collection of information. But this was not accepted by any of the parties.

Q. In your judgement, was there one and only one institution that operated on a truly federal level? And if so, what was it?

A. At federal level?

Q. Yes.

A. As far as it was possible, the Army of Yugoslavia functioned and operated.

Q. Thank you very much. I turn now to the next heading, something called the State Council for coordinating positions on state policy, paragraph 58 and following.

Did you become aware through records you were able to read of -- or by other means -- of a body called the State Council for coordinating positions on state policy that was effective during the reign of the -- during the period of your predecessor, Dobrica Cosic?

A. Yes. When I became president, I did have occasion to see all the minutes from the meeting of the council to dovetail the state policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And, as far as I remember, they were strictly confidential or, rather, came under the heading of state secret. So I won't be able to comment on them, in keeping with Rule 90.

Q. Records of that meeting were made how, Mr. Lilic?

A. If you mean the council, if you're referring to the council for coordinating positions on state policy, they were shorthand notes.

Q. Did that mean that there was a verbatim record of what people said ²²⁵⁷³ at those council meetings?

A. For the most part, yes.

Q. And are the records of that body something that has been sought pursuant to the same request for assistance, number 219, to which you've already referred, a request made in June of last year?

A. Yes, they are on list 219. And I personally asked to have insight into the minutes and records that I didn't have a chance to read, but unfortunately I didn't have that opportunity.

Q. Was this body complementary to the Supreme Defence Council, to which we'll turn in detail a little later?

A. What is certain is that that particular body was composed of the most influential and most important officials of the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Montenegro, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And of course also present were members of the Supreme Defence Council, which means that the membership was even broader than just the members of the Supreme Defence Council. Although, that body did not have any de jure authorisations.

Q. Now, this council, in your judgement, was it more or less influential than the SDC itself, the Supreme Defence Council itself?

A. If we look at it de facto, look at the competencies and authorisations of the persons attending the council meeting and who through their authority could make decisions and later on implement the decisions reached at the council, to dovetail state policy, of course looking at it from the aspects of the decisions made, then the council had a much broader importance than the Supreme Defence Council. ²²⁵⁷⁴

Q. The council ceased to exist when you became president, I think.

A. Yes.

Q. Indeed, from that moment on, is the position that the -- there was no political organ capable of dealing with the Republika Srpska or the Republic of Serbian Krajina except for something called the Serbian Ministry for Cooperation with Serbs Outside Serbia?

A. Yes.

Q. So that before your time, there's this wider council which -- which did have representation as needed, I think, of members of the Republika Srpska and the Republika Srpska Krajina?

A. Yes.

Q. It had a wide and extremely influential membership, and there are verbatim notes of what was said at the meetings.

A. I just said that in response to your previous question, that there were shorthand notes that were taken and that the council discussed topics from fields that were important for negotiations to be conducted at that time with the International Community and other subjects too.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Why did it cease to exist when you became president? Was there any particular reason?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Mr. Robinson. The council, according to my knowledge, it was -- this was by decision of the former president, President Dobrica Cosic. He considered the council to be necessary, and that's how it came into being. I considered that we should respect the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the frameworks of his competencies on the constitution and also there were ²²⁵⁷⁵ state institutions that could deal with matters of this kind, such as the Serbian government, the federal government, the prime minister of the Serbian government, and so all the activities that were linked to the negotiating efforts with respect to the International Community were transported from President Milosevic, because his activities were made, legitimised, by Serbs outside the border of Serbia and so on. So quite simply it ceased to exist. It wasn't actually abolished, but it died an actual death. It withered away.

MR. NICE:

Q. And how many --

MR. NICE: I'm so sorry, Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, continue.

MR. NICE:

Q. How many meetings all together, to your knowledge, did this council have?

A. I had an opportunity of reading four shorthand records from the four meetings, the first meetings, because I was interested in them. And so to the best of my knowledge, there were about seven meetings in actual fact of that type. In view of the relatively short period of time during which President Cosic was president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm sorry. I didn't appreciate that the lawyers of the government don't have a copy of the outline. They must certainly have that. And I'm going to invite them to turn their attention to paragraph 61 immediately, on page 17.

While they're doing that, can I remind the Chamber that these ²²⁵⁷⁶ documents were dealt with in certain application, and they're numbers 48 and 49. And the resistance to production of the documents was on the basis of overbroad and unduly onerous, but not on any other grounds. And if the Chamber would be good enough to look to paragraph 61 of the summary. The witness is in a position, I understand it, to help us with what's set out there. And I'm going to ask him to do so in my next question.

But I'm sorry that the officials didn't have the summary in advance. They now do.

JUDGE MAY: It may be you should ask the question -- whether the witness feels he can answer it or not will depend on him and whether there's an objection or not. But at least you can ask the question and we'll see what the response is.

MR. NICE: Yes.

Q. Mr. Lilic, are you in a position to give an account of what you understand to be recorded in those notes, if and when they're produced to us, from the meeting of the 9th of January of something said by the accused in the presence of representatives of the Republic of Serbia, FRY, Montenegro, the Republika Srpska, and Republika Srpska Krajina, touching on de jure and de facto issues? Long question, but the question is susceptible to a yes or no answer. Are you able to give an account of what he said in that setting?

A. I can try and tell you, recount, what it says in a part of that -- those shorthand notes, in view of the fact that it's been quite some time since I've read through them. Of course, linked to 1993. ²²⁵⁷⁷

MR. NICE: In the absence of objection, I'd ask the witness to give his answer, please.

A. What this was about, as far as I recollect, is a specific sentence, actually, which I remembered very well. And later on, out of respect towards Mr. Milosevic, bearing in mind the time that he led this and said -- and I think the sentence would be as follows: You can give up everything for your own people and sacrifice everything except your own people. But it was in the context of saying that by peaceful means he wanted to have de jure things that had already been achieved de facto. He meant negotiations, the unity that had been achieved, political, economic, cultural, with respect to Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Krajina, et cetera. So that would be the gist of it, to the best of my knowledge, that is, to make legitimate what had already existed in the field, on the ground, make it legitimate in the eyes of the International Community.

Q. Thank you. We'll move on to the next topic, the Supreme Defence Council itself, starting at paragraphs 65.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am unable to find the text of what was quoted a moment ago by Mr. Nice. Has it been disclosed to me at all?

JUDGE MAY: Paragraph 61.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Paragraph 61, you say? I can read that, yes, in the summary. However, Mr. Nice mentioned some shorthand notes and records of a council that was set up by the first president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic. However, in all my ²²⁵⁷⁸ documents I don't seem to have come across any shorthand notes and minutes from the council meetings, in all the material that I've received in the past few days.

JUDGE MAY: Well, they haven't been disclosed, so you haven't got them. But you can ask questions about them in due course, when you question the witness, but there aren't any available. Yes, Mr. Nice, go on.

MR. NICE: [Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: My apologies.

Q. Paragraph 65, we've already heard a lot about the Supreme Defence Council. Its composition was the presidents of the FRY, Serbia, and Montenegro. Did those three members have voting rights and were they technically equal in their rights and powers?

A. Yes, all three members of the Supreme Defence Council and the presidents of all three republics were equal in the Supreme Defence Council and also equal with respect to decision-making. The only right that was different was the right enjoyed by the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on the basis of decisions taken by the council to convey them through orders to the Army of Yugoslavia, via the chief of the general staff, of course.

Q. Look, please, at tab 12, which perhaps can conveniently go on the overhead projector -- I beg your pardon, tab 11. Tab 11. Does this in diagramatic form show the council with its component voting members with a chain of authority down to the chief of the general staff and then down to ²²⁵⁷⁹ the armed forces with off to the left Serbia, including Kosovo and Vojvodina, and Montenegro and the FRY marked separately? Is this schematically a fair reflection of how the Supreme Defence Council fitted in and worked?

A. I'm afraid the picture on my monitor isn't a good one. But let me have a look to the side here. All that remains here is the Federal Defence Minister. But otherwise, yes, this schematic or diagram does correspond to the composition of the Supreme Defence Council and its authorisations.

And of course other members could have been added without -- could have been added to inform the council without the right of voting, so they could advise the council but they did not have the right to vote.

Q. The chief of the general staff, can you outline his responsibilities and who he reported to and who he controlled?

A. It is logical that the chief of the general staff reports within the framework of the orders he has received and in keeping with the Supreme Defence Council decisions first of all to the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and also the president by virtue of office is the individual who was to see that the Supreme Defence Council decisions were put into practice, and at a subsequent meeting should inform the other two members of the Supreme Defence Council thereof.

Q. Did he, along with other people, attend the Supreme Defence Council meetings, although they didn't have voting powers?

A. The presence of the chief of the general staff, by virtue of the work that the Supreme Defence Council did was obligatory. So he had to ²²⁵⁸⁰ attend Supreme Defence Council meetings, yes, regardless of the fact that he didn't have any voting rights but he was there to inform them, to report to them, to present them with analyses, and to participate in the council's work.

Q. Typically who else attended Supreme Defence Council meetings?

A. As a rule, they were the three members of the Supreme Defence Council with voting rights, that is, the president of the Republic of Yugoslavia, the president of Serbia, and the president of Montenegro as permanent council members, and always a representative of the federal government of Federal Yugoslavia, the chief of the general staff of the Yugoslav army, Yugoslavia, the Defence Minister, and the Defence Ministries of the FRY, and as needs be there could be another expert present from another field, depending on what the Supreme Defence Council was discussing or what it was interested in. And the reverse solution could also be possible, that one of the members or all the members of the Supreme Defence Council wanted to transfer the knowledge and information to an expanded superior staff of the general staff, the senior staff, and then an expanded session would be held.

Q. Were SDC sessions recorded - paragraph 71 - in two ways, both by a stenographic -- whatever it is, a stenographic record, but also by tape recording?

A. Sessions of the Supreme Defence Council, at the beginning, when it started working - and I have to say here that during my term of office there were a lot of meetings that were held, over 50 in fact - and they were all recorded in two ways, that is quite right. One were the ²²⁵⁸¹ stenographic or shorthand notes, and the other kind was audiotapes. But later on this practice of tapes was no longer -- and an audiotape was also used, but not later on.

Q. Why was the audiotape practice abolished, to your knowledge and understanding?

A. What I know is this: In view of the fact that President Milosevic told me that he considered that it was enough to just have the stenographic shorthand minutes and that we didn't need this additional technology which implied the presence of technicians.

Q. In addition to the stenographic notes, which are extensive record, there are minutes of the meeting in a few or several pages; correct?

A. Yes. But if I may just explain this: The minutes were recorded as excerpts of the most important parts of the meeting, but of course an additional minutes recorded the entire proceedings.

Q. Now, despite efforts to obtain these documents for over a year, in fact for much longer periods of time as far as some of these are concerned, they haven't been available, and in absence of either the stenographic notes or of the minutes and a full record of either, do you feel capable or incapable of dealing with any of these meetings in any detail at all?

A. Absolutely not, and that for two reasons: The issues are too important, so any improvisation would not be proper, either towards the Tribunal, the Court, you, or Mr. Milosevic. And the second very important reason is that these are high -- very confident documents, and these are not on the list for which I have received a waiver of liability. ²²⁵⁸²

Q. That additional list has been copied. It will be distributed in due course. But it does further limit the witness. And it may be appropriate in due course to explore with the authorities what their attitude with regard to that is going to be.

Nevertheless, speaking in general terms - paragraph 68 - was an SDC decision required either to mobilise or demobilise the Army of Yugoslavia?

A. Of course, the Supreme Defence Council had to take part in discussing a decision of that nature; although, I don't know what period you have in mind.

Q. The representatives of the government might like to look, please, to tab 14, which I would turn to in the absence of objection and will otherwise turn to at a later stage compendiously with other such documents.

MR. CARIC: Your Honour, we haven't any objection.

MR. NICE:

Q. Then tab 14 is a record of the 6th Session of the SDC for the 9th of December of 1992. And in line with the evidence you've just given, Mr. Lilic, on the agenda item number 1 is this: Preparation of the Yugoslav army to face the threat of military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, possible aggression by Croatia against the Republic of Serbian Krajina and a possible secessionist Albanian uprising in Kosovo. We needn't look at the detail. That reflects the necessary role of the SDC in these matters; correct?

A. Absolutely, so yes. I have to just ask you this: The minutes are ²²⁵⁸³ not on the list of documents that I am able to comment on. But if I understood what the government representative said, he accepts -- he takes over part of the responsibility for that, he takes it upon himself.

MR. NICE: It would be helpful for the witness if the government representative could make that clear.

MR. CARIC: Your Honour, this document doesn't cover the period from 1993 to 1997, but for any precaution we -- it depends on Trial Chamber to decide concerning that.

JUDGE MAY: Well, it -- it may be convenient if you would have a word with the Prosecution and tell them the pages or the documents that you object to so that they can know in advance, and then we will deal with them all compendiously at some stage later in the proceedings. It may be sensible during the adjournment, Mr. Nice, if you can at least make some progress on that.

MR. NICE: Certainly, I will. I'm very anxious, incidentally, to conclude if I possibly can - it may be a tall order - the evidence by the end of today's session or straying into tomorrow's only to a limited extent. I'll see how I'm doing. I'm not doing too badly so far. I may have to cut certain topics to achieve that objective. If I do achieve that objective, I hope that there will be a -- a reasonable period of time for re-examination, because of course by abbreviating my examination-in-chief I allow more time for issues to be joined by the accused with the witness, the accused being in a position to know fully what the witness would say on various topics from the summary and the statement. ²²⁵⁸⁴

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lilic, we're going to adjourn now for 20 minutes. I must warn you, as we warn all witnesses, not to speak about your evidence until it's over, and that does include speaking to members of the Prosecution team. Could you be back, please, in 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was my understanding a short while ago, from the explanation provided by Mr. Nice, that he wants to shorten to a maximum this examination-in-chief. This is a witness who is testifying about all of ten years, from 1990 until 2000. This is a witness who held the highest political offices in the country and in the party in that period. He spent an entire term of office as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, then also Deputy Prime Minister.

JUDGE MAY: Now, look, it's up to -- it's up to Mr. Nice how long he takes, if he wants to shorten things. When it comes to your turn to cross-examine, of course we'll bear it in mind. If it's been foreshortened, you won't be prejudiced.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wish to add one more thing, that Mr. Nice is introducing through this witness a great many important documents, and I need time to go through all of them. So I ask to be given time that is not somewhat longer than the time Mr. Nice will have but much more time than Mr. Nice will have, because there are a great many questions about which I have to ask Mr. Lilic and these are questions that ²²⁵⁸⁵ he can certainly give me answers to.

JUDGE MAY: All that we'll have in mind.

MR. NICE: I think the witness has before him tab 14, which we've looked at already, the preparation of the Yugoslav army. And we can move on from that. I can say I've spoken to the representatives of their government. Although Mr. Lilic's presidency fell within the years 1993 to 1997, at the moment they have a general blanket objection to documents that fall in any part of the years 1993 to 1997, and so any such documents we'll deal with compendiously at the end. But other than that, I think they have no objections and they'll notify me -- or the Court, rather, if they do.

Q. If we can go now, please, to paragraph 74. Mr. Lilic, in your time as president, by what method were SDC decisions made, vote or consensus?

A. As a rule, irrespective of the rules of procedure for the Supreme Defence Council, decisions were passed by consensus, although the rules of procedure did provide for the possibility of passing decisions by majority vote.

MR. NICE: Tab 15, please. There are two versions of these rules, I think, slightly unhelpfully in the reverse order. Sorry about that. If the Chamber would go through about four sheets to the rules of the Supreme Defence Council for 1992 and then turn to the second sheet to Article 7. The rule operative at the time of Mr. Lilic's presidency was to the effect that the Supreme Defence Council should conduct its work in sessions and adopt final decisions when the majority of council members are present. ²²⁵⁸⁶ The council may also, when circumstances require, adopt decisions and conclusions on matters within its jurisdiction without holding a session on the basis of consultation amongst council member.

Q. Mr. Lilic, dealing with that last point, what was envisaged as consultation? Was it telephone discussion, matters of that sort?

A. Yes. They could consult through special telephone lines that were protected. They're very rare, these situations. I think that I only had one of them.

Q. I'll come back then to the first part of the document as produced, which is the amended rules. The first sheet of the exhibit, the amendments being effected, I think, in March 1999, after Mr. Lilic's presidency. You can see under Article 3 for this period of time sessions of the Supreme Defence Council -- it's Article 3, second paragraph -- "sessions of the council must be attended by the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army or by persons standing in for them and a session cannot be held without their presence."

And then it say this is under Article 4: "The Supreme Defence Council shall do its work at all sessions; all its decisions shall be taken by consensus and shall only be valid if so taken." Then it goes on to say: "...decides by consensus on appointments, promotions, and the cessation of professional military service for generals and admirals," and sets out more detail of that. Any comment you want to make on those changes to the rules of the Supreme Defence Council beyond what you've already said, Mr. Lilic? ²²⁵⁸⁷

A. Article 4 practically confirms how the previous Supreme Defence Council operated. Although, in Article 7 it did not say that decisions are reached by consensus. The presence of the chief of general staff was obligatory at that time as well. It is a fact that after 1997 the Supreme Defence Council did not reach all its decisions by consensus. So this gave a definition to everything that was actually going on. For example, when President Djukanovic disagreed to the replacement of the chief of general staff. It is interesting that this was adopted only a day before the bombing. It doesn't really have to be of any significance, but it is interesting.

Q. Because the council members had equal voting powers, theoretically any two could -- in your day could outvote the third. Did that ever happen? And in particular, did it ever happen that the accused was outvoted?

A. I do not remember whether something like that ever happened, that Mr. Milosevic was outvoted. As for the first part of your question, I think that Mr. Perisic was replaced by a two-to-one vote. Although, this was the legitimate right of President Milosevic. This kind of an important decision should have been reached by consensus though.

Q. Paragraph 76. What percentage of the FRY's budget was provided by Serbia, as opposed to Montenegro?

JUDGE MAY: Do you want the -- any documents shown, or can the usher return?

MR. NICE: I'm so sorry. Yes, the usher can return.

Q. Mr. Lilic, what percentage of the FRY's budget was provided by ²²⁵⁸⁸ Serbia?

A. Well, during my term of office, from 1993 to 1997, this percentage, that is to say, the share of the Republic of Serbia and the overall budget of Yugoslavia, was about 95 per cent; whereas, Montenegro accounted for about 5 per cent. Of course, these were budget estimates at the time of the adoption of the budget and hardly ever were they actually carried through during the year. I think that at a point Montenegro practically stopped paying even that share, and the entire financing of the state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fell on the shoulders of the Republic of Serbia. I think that this is identical today.

Q. And what effect did that financial contribution have on the realities for outvoting Serbia in the SDC -- or outvoting the accused in the SDC?

A. I've already told you that during my term of office the Supreme Defence Council indeed did not pass a single decision that required outvoting, where there was a two-to-one vote in relation to Montenegro or, anyway. As for the influence of Mr. Milosevic, I think that his influence in the Supreme Defence Council was a major one indeed, not only due to the fact that Serbia financed 95 per cent of the budget but absolutely because of Mr. Milosevic's authority.

Q. In which case let's turn, because we've dealt with paragraph 78, to paragraph 79. How did the accused impose his political will, if he did, on the SDC?

A. It would be hard to talk about imposing will on the SDC. I don't know whether you have any concrete examples. ²²⁵⁸⁹

Q. How, if at all, did the accused influence or how was his influence felt at the SDC?

A. I said a short while ago that at any rate, his influence was dominant, because of the overall strength of the Republic of Serbia and its overall influence, in terms of the budget of the FRY, in terms of financing the Army of Yugoslavia. Of course, there were mutual consultations between the two republics, and it is hard to draw a line in terms of his dominant influence over the SDC or perhaps if agreement was reached on a particular point before a session or at a session itself.

Q. The accused was - it's obvious, I think - a member of the SDC from its beginning to its end, 1992 to the year 2000; correct?

A. From 1992 until the year 2000, from the day the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was constituted.

Q. In the course of your presidency, four years, from 1993 to 1997, is it right that the SDC met on some 53 occasions?

A. I'm not aware of the exact number, but there were certainly tens of sessions that were held. It must have been over 50.

Q. Do you know how many sessions there were in the remaining period of the council under the presidency of the accused between 1997 and 2000?

A. I am not aware of that particular piece of information.

Q. Was it more or less or about the same frequency as with your presidency?

A. Well, I assume less, but it is an assumption merely.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lilic, just a moment. He doesn't know, Mr. Nice. I don't see any point in pursuing it. ²²⁵⁹⁰

MR. NICE: Very well.

Q. And finally, so far as the workings of the SDC are concerned - at paragraph 83 - there came a time when Mr. Djukanovic became the Montenegrin representative on the SDC. Are you able to help us with the relations as you understood them between the accused, Djukanovic and Milutinovic from your position in government at the time?

A. Well, unrelated to the Supreme Defence Council, I think that this is a period of intensively bad relations between the FRY and Montenegro and in terms of Serbia's and Montenegro's participation in the FRY in general. In Montenegro, it was the bad relations between Mr. Djukanovic and Mr. Bulatovic, and of course this was reflected in Serbia, and it was also reflected on relations in the SDC. As far as I knew about the work of the SDC in that period, it was clear that Mr. Djukanovic was opposed to the passing of some very important decisions. I think that later on he attended these meetings of the SDC less and less, if they were held and to the extent to which they were held, which I really don't know.

Q. Can you turn to the next title, "The VRS and SVK Officer Salaries," paragraph 85. Did the FRY provide financial assistance to VRS and SVK officers?

A. The answer is yes. But if possible could I please explain it in a bit more detail?

Q. Yes. I think first of all you can tell us, did you inherit this situation when you became chairman of the SDC? And did you formalise it?

A. Yes.

Q. And you formalised it by the creation of, I think, a couple of ²²⁵⁹¹ bodies. Tell us about those.

A. This was done through a decision passed by the SDC. If I'm not mistaken, it was towards the end of 1993, in November 1993. The order to establish the 30th and 40th so-called personnel centres is one that I signed. Now, how did these centres come into being? I think that this is the core of this matter, why part of the VRS and part of the SVK were financed.

During 1992, as the Yugoslav People's Army was withdrawing from everything that was going on in the territory of the former SFRY - and it is not contested that the SFRY was the only internationally recognised state by the UN - therefore, the Yugoslav People's Army was the armed force of that recognised state. I don't want to go into lengthy explanations of this nature. At any rate, when the JNA was withdrawing, a great many officers of the JNA who originally came from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina wished to remain in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the information that I saw, we are talking about 1800 people, either civilians employed by the JNA or NCOs or commissioned officers of the Yugoslav People's Army. At the same time, the presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the second half of the year, during the second half of 1992, passed a decision that all citizens of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro who are within the Yugoslav People's Army outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be withdrawn to the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and practically this was how the Army of Yugoslavia was created. This was the ²²⁵⁹² base for doing that. However, there were people who remained within the JNA but outside this territory who were not citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or, rather, they were not citizens of the Republic of Montenegro or the Republic of Serbia, and therefore they could not be members of the Army of Yugoslavia, and that was the basic reason why the 30th personnel centre was established, primarily to resolve the existential status of these people who formerly belonged to the JNA and who were outside the territory of the FRY and who were citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The centre was established precisely with that aim in mind, in order to have the documents taken care of properly, to take care of their own needs, to take care of the needs of their families primarily, because most of them were refugees in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. Paragraph 87. From November 1993, what was the approximate expenditure per month - or if you want to deal with it per year - per year on payment of salaries and other benefits to VRS personnel and their families?

A. Of course I will do that. The monthly allocations for the members of the 30th personnel centre amounted to about 1.600.000 Deutschmark or about 800.000 Euros. In the period from 1993 until 1997, there were 4.000 recipients of this aid, a bit over 4.000. The annual allocations were about 8 million Euros. And then after 1997, or to be more precise, on the 28th of March, 2001, Mr. Kostajnica abolished this centre all together. After this, this assistance was received by a remaining 1600 people until ²²⁵⁹³ an annex were to be made, which is -- an agreement were to be made which is an annex to an agreement between Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbia and which is quite like the agreement signed between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the next exhibit would be tab 16. It's outside the presidency of the witness but is 10th of November, 1997. If Mr. Caric confirms that he's like that put on the basis of the previous exhibits, we'll put that aside and come to it later. It would perhaps be better to come to it later, in any event, and give the government time to think about it.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: I'll move on, paragraph 89.

Q. I'm sorry, you may have covered this. Was there a break in the provision of funds to the 30th Personnel Centre at the time of the embargo against the Bosnian Serbs in August 1994?

A. There was a break. The decision was passed on the 4th of August, 1994. This was a decision passed by the federal government. If I can use an expression which was quite a burden on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to practically sanctions were imposed against Republika Srpska. This was an economically motivated decision but it was also political because the leadership of Republika Srpska did not accept the plan of the contact group. It went on for about a year or a bit more, and the allocations amounted to social welfare practically and it did not exceed average salaries in the Republic of Serbia -- or rather, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. So there was a break of about one year or ²²⁵⁹⁴ perhaps a bit more than that.

Q. Next topic, the accused's control over Serbian or Federal MUP, paragraph 93, page 25. The accused's attitude in the time of your presidency to the VJ and to the MUP, did he trust one -- or have confidence in one more than in the other?

A. From the point of view of finance and providing technical resources and all other resources, one may reach the assessment that the VJ was subordinate, in terms of President Milosevic himself and the Republic of Serbia, because it is the police of the Republic of Serbia that was given primacy.

Q. To what extent did his financial -- did the financial steps he took influence the army? How badly was it affected?

A. During all those years, from 1993 until 1997 - I'm talking about the period while I was aware of this information and had access to it - not only due to the wishes of President Milosevic or anybody else from the government of Serbia but because of the overall situation - but let's move along these lines - I don't think that in any single year the army did not get even the allocations that were originally earmarked for it. In 1996, as a matter of fact, all the bank accounts of the Army of Yugoslavia were blocked, so this was quite a move made by the Republic of Serbia -- or rather, its government, namely that the army was not meeting its financial obligations, vis-a-vis the government of Serbia. At that time it was a truly inconceivable thing to do.

Q. Following the appointment of Momcilo Perisic to the position of chief of the general staff of the army in August of 1993, were you able to ²²⁵⁹⁵ effect some change or was there some change effected as to the type of officer appointed to the VJ general staff?

A. In view of the period which in a way followed a period during which most generals who were in top positions then, either in the JNA or the VJ were pensioned off for one reason or the other, the appointment of new generals to the general staff could have been very selective because they were supposed to be professionally capable, and perhaps I can put it that way, they should properly carry out the constitution and laws, everything that meant the preservation of Yugoslavia. So the army was supposed to be this truly cohesive factor that was supposed to safeguard the former Yugoslavia. I'm convinced that such generals were chosen and I'm very glad that that proved to be so at a later stage when they acted the way the rules of service required of them.

Q. Did the accused accept this new cadre or different cadre, as you would say it was, of generals? And if so, in your judgement, why?

A. Well, of course he did, because had he not accepted, they would not have been appointed. I think the reason is a very simple one: He thought that after all, in case there is any misunderstanding in relations with the army, it was all possible to remove these generals. On the other hand, there was a considerable force among the police itself.

Q. To what degree had the police by this sort of time become militarised?

A. I don't know whether the expression "militarised" is a good term, but I think that it was technically very well equipped and that it had very good special units and also that the logistics that was lacking at ^{22596 BLANK PAGE 22604} the request of senior police officers was obtained through the Army of Yugoslavia by a decision of the federal government as the titulary of the property of the Army of Yugoslavia is the federal government, which is a quite a legitimate and legal transfer of weapons and supplies towards the police.

Q. What comment, if any, do you have on the introduction of military ranks into police hierarchy and the appointment of Radovan Stojicic, known as Badza?

A. I personally do not think that when Mr. Milosevic accepted this, he had any last intentions. He wanted to do a service to Mr. Stojicic. At the same time, I can say with responsibility that this decision caused dissatisfaction within the Army of Yugoslavia, in view of these ranks and the level of education and the way in which ranks were acquired in the army, which is far more complicated than it was at the time in the police. So I think he had no ulterior motives in doing this.

Q. Was Stojicic, known as Badza, apparently a man suitable for the high rank he was given?

A. He did acquire that rank. Probably it was assessed that it was a suitable rank. I can give you a comparative qualifications of a colonel general in the army. He had to have a Ph.D.; he had to have graduated from the national military school; he must have had the highest marks during his years of service. And if you compare Mr. Stojicic with an army officer with the identical rank, then my answer would be no.

Q. Paragraph 96. In peacetime, the MUP reported to whom?

A. The MUP, by nature of things, when we're talking about MUP, we ²²⁶⁰⁵ have to make a distinction between its component parts. But in any event, the Minister of the Police is the number-one figure in the Ministry of the Police, and he is accountable to the prime minister. But if I may go back to the previous question, the ranks were introduced only in the public security sector, not in the state security sector, within the MUP of Serbia.

Q. Zoran Sokolovic, please. Tell us about his role and his relationship to the accused.

A. Sokolovic, I think, was president of the Assembly of Serbia in 1990, if I'm not mistaken, when the constitution of Serbia was being adopted. Later on -- I'm not familiar with his biography. Please forgive me. But I think later on he became minister in the Ministry of Police in the Republic of Serbia, and I could say freely that he was a loyal person to President Milosevic and that until 1997, if I'm not mistaken, he remained Minister of the Police.

Q. In your judgement, did Zoran Sokolovic have any -- exercise any real power?

A. Real power within the Ministry of the Police, no, if we are talking about any powers within that ministry.

Q. Jovica Stanisic next. How influential was he in the Serbia MUP hierarchy?

A. Mr. Stanisic who was head of the state security department until he was replaced in 1998. I think it was in October of that year. I think that he was a man of great authority, a good professional, and that his authority in the MUP of Serbia was among the greatest, especially in the ²²⁶⁰⁶ state security department.

Q. Was he formally obliged to report? Who in fact do you understand he reported to?

A. As I've already said, he certainly should have reported to the Minister of the Police in the first place, and I think he did that during Mr. Sokolovic's term of office. Later on those reports went to the prime minister and the president of the Republic of Serbia. What I do know is that when Mr. Stojiljkovic took over, this practice was changed, and that Mr. Stanisic, as far as I know, upon personal inquiry, I had occasion to see a decision by President Milosevic on the basis of which he reported directly to Mr. Milosevic.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, we've seen Exhibit 277 as recently as yesterday. I don't think there's any need to remind ourselves of it again. I think it was yesterday.

JUDGE MAY: 227, was it?

MR. NICE: 277. I don't think we need look at it again. I think the Chamber will be familiar with it.

JUDGE MAY: We have it, yes. 277.

MR. NICE: So we can move on from that.

Q. Paragraph 99, a word or so about telephone tapping and the like. As of 1993, which service, according to General Dimitrijevic, had the right to deal with telephone tapping?

A. According to information that I had from Mr. Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, general and head of the -- in security administration of the Yugoslav army, the exclusive right to tapping or secret control of ²²⁶⁰⁷ telephone conversations as of 1993 was, according to his words, in the hands of the state security service of the Republic of Serbia. Until then, it was equally shared by the counter-intelligence of the army and the state security service, but this was regulated by adequate decisions by the Office of the Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia. The federal police no longer existed in this sense after 1992, in terms of security. As far as I know, Mr. Kostajnica restored that right to be jointly shared by the Army of Yugoslavia and the state security in 2000.

Q. That's probably outside our period of interest for these purposes. You described the process of the accused favouring the MUP over the VJ - paragraph 100 - did that process reverse? If so, when?

A. In my judgement, and according to information that I received from Mr. Perisic, I think that this process was changed in relation towards the Army of Yugoslavia sometime around 1998.

Q. Next topic, the accused de facto control over the JNA or the VJ in 1995, paragraph 101. Your judgement, Mr. Lilic, does it amount to this, that the accused had some control over senior officers -- some senior officers in the JNA?

A. I don't know whether one could use such a strong word as "control." But certainly Mr. Milosevic had in the Yugoslav army generals who were closer and others who were outside his influence in a sense.

Q. Can you name those who were closer to him?

A. Certainly one could include in that group of generals, for example, Mr. Ojdanic, who signed the capitulation in Kumanovo. That group of generals should certainly also include in a sense General Ivanovic, ²²⁶⁰⁸ maybe General Ojdanic, maybe General Stefanovic. It is difficult to list the names of the generals who were closer to them in relation to a group of generals who saw that cooperation between the president of Serbia and the Army of Yugoslavia differently.

Q. How, if at all, would you rank the relationships of any of the following to the accused: Zivota Panic or Nedeljko Boskovic, Pavkovic and Perisic himself? How would you rank in closeness or otherwise to the accused?

A. Zivota Panic could certainly be ranked in that first group. General Boskovic, I know him barely, so I couldn't be able to say anything with any certainty, but it is a fact that the promotion of generals depended to a high degree on Mr. Milosevic, and some of them saw that if they were closer to him they would make a career more quickly. General Pavkovic is not one of those generals who made such a good career on that basis, but he was certainly very close to Mr. Milosevic.

Q. What was the accused's de facto ability to appoint or dismiss high-ranking officers? Paragraph 103.

A. I don't know whether you're referring to the period of 1993 to 1997 or after 1997, when Mr. Milosevic was president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. 1993 to 1997.

A. I have told you that all decisions regarding retirement, promotions, transfers to other duties within the Supreme Defence Council were made by consensus. There is no doubt that he played a very important role there. But in those days such decisions were taken in the Supreme ²²⁶⁰⁹ Defence Council upon the proposal of the chief of staff -- of the general staff and the senior staff of the general staff, and that was the rule I respected and was guided by.

Q. How significant, if at all, to an officer's promotion would be his membership of the SPS or of JUL?

A. I don't know by name the officers who were explicitly members of the Yugoslav Left or of the SPS, but it was certainly a good reference to move up the ladder more quickly. Some of the generals which also caused dissatisfaction in the top echelons of the Army of Yugoslavia would attend official meetings of the Yugoslav Left in uniform, and this, on the other hand, was considered to be their right, but the army itself felt it was not a good idea to get the army politicised, and every effort was made to keep it out of politics as far as possible.

Q. Were you aware that General Perisic had private meetings or meetings with the accused without your being present?

A. That he met separately outside meetings of the Supreme Defence Council, yes. And I was not informed about it; that is also true.

Q. We're now going to turn to exhibit number -- or tab 18 of Exhibit 469. It's within the period of 1993 to 1997. It's the 7th of December, 1994, but it's within the topics covered by the waiver. And I'm not sure that there's any objection to the production of this document, in which case may we look at it, please.

MR. NICE: English on the overhead projector; B/C/S for the witness.

Q. Dated the 7th of December to the president of the Republic of ²²⁶¹⁰ Serbian Krajina. Mr. Milan Martic, "On the order of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Milosevic, urgently to facilitate the passage of UNPROFOR humanitarian aid for two reasons, because...Mr. Martic had promised this to Mr. Akashi," and "because the decision on UNPROFOR's withdrawing from Bosnia is at stake. Inform UNPROFOR in writing that you will perform this task" and to submit a report to the president of the republics --

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there's no interpretation into the B/C/S.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll have that looked at.

MR. NICE: And we see it's on the authority of the accused, but over the name of also Mr. Perisic.

Q. Your comment on this document, please, Mr. Lilic.

A. This is a highly positive decision by Mr. Perisic, though I'm not familiar with it and I don't know why Mr. Perisic is involved to convey such a message to Mr. Martic. It sounds like an order, though it is a good one. I think this dates back to the period when there was a lot of obstinacy on the part of the leadership of the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina. I don't know why Mr. Perisic was used here as some sort of an envoy.

Q. Paragraph 109. Did you learn of the organisation of a training centre, volunteers from the Republika Srpska and the Republika Srpska Krajina in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, organised by a man known as Dragan?

A. Yes. I think we're talking about the autumn of 1995. I received ²²⁶¹¹ information from the head of the security department, Mr. Dimitrijevic, that within the Army of Yugoslavia volunteers were being trained for the Army of Republika Srpska and that this was happening even under the supervision of our own experts. I asked for additional information from Mr. Perisic, and I think those documents exist. And I've seen them. Mr. Perisic responded that he did so upon instructions from Mr. Milosevic. I was surprised and astonished in view of the fact that we're talking about September or end of September or beginning of October of 1995, after enormous efforts that Mr. Milosevic himself had made above others for the Dayton Agreements to be signed, that this should be done after Srebrenica, when I'm sure -- I'm quite sure that Mr. Milosevic has nothing in common with what happened in Srebrenica, that this was a crime committed by individuals for which they should be certainly held responsible.

Q. Mr. Lilic, I was going to ask you about that later, but can we just focus on what I'm asking you about at the moment. The particular documents to be referred to, tab 18, please.

A. I'm trying to explain why --

Q. Yes. Let's just look at the orders you've got concerning -- I'm sorry, no, we talked about that already.

The training centre established by -- or under the control of the man Dragan, the steps you took in relation to it yourself were what?

A. I was just trying, Mr. Nice, to explain that. This refers to Captain Dragan, who with the agreement of the Army of Yugoslavia set up a camp for the training of volunteers for Republika Srpska. I insisted ²²⁶¹² through my military office, the head of that office, to be quite -- to get detailed information from General Perisic. I first received information from head of the security department, Mr. Dimitrijevic. Mr. Perisic responded that the camp had been organised, formed, established, whatever you like, with the approval and permission of President Milosevic. I was really astonished, as this was the period prior to Dayton. And by my own order, after talking to Mr. Captain Dragan himself, who wanted to come and tell me what it was about, I abolished that centre because I was convinced that that was another provocation to draw the republic -- the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the war, which was a constant wish on the part of Republika Srpska and partially of Krajina too, and this camp was disbanded because I was -- throughout my presidency I felt that members of the army, special forces, volunteers being trained in this way in our camp, I was opposed to them being sent to the Republika Srpska, as they had their own forces and that camp could have been organised on their territory, and this camp was abolished.

Q. Tab 19. My mistake. Four documents. We'll look at them briefly.

MR. NICE: If we can put them on the overhead projector in the English very swiftly, one after the other. The first is, in fact, the order of the witness, Mr. Lilic, dated the 29th of September, prohibiting the receiving and training of persons, including volunteers who are not Yugoslav citizens in the Yugoslav army.

The second document, same date, 29th of September, 1995 to General Perisic, passing to your jurisdiction the order of the president, banning the reception and training of persons. ²²⁶¹³ Third document, a report to you on the training of volunteers, coming from Perisic, where he said that -- notified you that "In order to assist the Army of Republika Srpska and Republic of Serbian Krajina you organised a training of reserve volunteers" and says, "We've decided to do this kind of training because of the request of the Republika Srpska, the Republic of Serbian Krajina, the and the approval of the President of the Republic of Serbia to send them volunteers." He goes on to say, "Since we did not have enough volunteers from the formation of the Yugoslav Army and the response of the reserve formation is also poor, we were obliged, with the help of 'Captain' Dragan to receive volunteers and, under the command of the commanding officers of the Special Units to train and prepare them." And then there's a cover letter containing a report by the chief of the general staff about training volunteers.

Thank you very much.

Q. Can we under the same title -- I'm not going to overlook the matter that you were dealing with earlier, but we'll come back to that in another place in the narrative -- can we under the same title --

MR. NICE: Yes. I'm finished with that document. Thank you very much.

Q. -- deal with the removal of a number of generals in late 1998. As a matter of record, the accused -- I beg your pardon. As a matter of record, the following were removed from office: Generals Perisic, Martinovic, Samardzic, and Dimitrijevic. Why did the accused do that?

A. General Perisic was replaced by a decision of the Supreme Defence Council or President Milosevic in November 1998. According to his ²²⁶¹⁴ allegation, because he insisted on introducing a state of emergency in part of the territory of the Republic of Serbia and because he was allegedly too long in that office. General Dimitrijevic, whom I considered to be an excellent counter-intelligence officer, one of the best the army had, was replaced in March 1999. General Martinovic, who was a career general - he was very young; I think he's 50 only now - also in 1999. And General Samardzic was transferred to another position and then pensioned off. He was commander of the 3rd Army, covering part of the Kosovo and Metohija. General Grahovac was an excellent air force officer. These were people who were not willing, as far as I know them, to deviate in any sense from what is called the use of the Army of Yugoslavia in accordance with the law, the law about the army, the law on defence, and the constitution of the Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. Next title, "The accused and the RS and RSK leadership." We've heard of financial assistance and we've heard of the contribution by Serbia to budgetary matters generally. What control, if any, did the accused have over the leadership of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs? Paragraph 111.

A. I said a moment ago that the word "control" in my opinion is too strong. But he certainly wielded a great deal of influence over them. But it is a fact that that influence was not sufficient for them to do everything required of them, for instance, with respect to peace plans, Cutileiro, the Vance Plan, the contact group plan, right up to Dayton. In any event, the aid coming from the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But when I say "the Federal Republic of ²²⁶¹⁵ Yugoslavia," I really mean mostly the Republic of Serbia was the only way to correct their behaviour, and this proved true in 1994, when sanctions were enforced against the government of the Republika Srpska.

Q. Paragraph 113. Were Bosnian Serb leaders seen in the building of the Serbian presidency? If so, with what regularity?

A. Yes, they could be seen. And I think they would come quite frequently for various consultations prior to travel, prior to negotiations, and so on.

Q. Your assessment of the accused's relationship with Mladic you set out as being in some sense cyclical. Can you just amplify that by a sentence or so?

A. Mladic -- Mladic is a man who I would say is unpredictable, so that in certain situations relationships with President Milosevic and others varied. But in any event, I think that the relationship between President Milosevic and Mladic, up until the refusal to accept the Vance Plan, was correct and good. Later it deteriorated significantly, and after the contact group plan was rejected an attempt was made to improve that relationship so as to bring influence to bear on the relationship between General Mladic and Mr. Karadzic. That is why I said that it had its ups and downs, that is, their relationship.

For instance, Dayton again improved that relationship. The relationship became correct.

Q. Paragraph 115. In your judgement at the time, was there any prospect of Sarajevo not remaining under Muslim control?

A. Do you mean with respect to the Dayton Agreement? ²²⁶¹⁶

Q. Before, yes.

A. I think it was impossible that Sarajevo should not be under Muslim control, were not to be. I don't understand the question, actually. Could you be more specific.

Q. I think that's enough for the purposes of my questioning at the moment.

Paragraph 117, you've touched on this already. After the fall of Srebrenica and when the details of the massacre were discovered, the accused's reaction was, as you've already told us, but just remind us.

A. Yes. I tried to link that up to the constitution of the centres. And one of the fears was, in which I issued an order for this to be stopped, that President Milosevic himself -- actually, I was in a situation in which I could directly at the beginning of August have intensive meetings to discuss other issues and problems within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I know that he was personally very upset and angry, and I think that he was very sincere in his behaviour and conduct, and he even said at one point that that leadership from Pale, that they were mad, if they had actually done that. And I'm quite sure that as far as he is concerned, he could not have issued an order of that kind. I do believe that Srebrenica, unfortunately, is the result of individuals who allowed themselves to perpetrate an act of that kind, and it is my deep conviction that it cannot be placed in the context of any participation on the part of the Yugoslav army at all, and that is why I said that Mr. Milosevic, which was exceptionally angry, his reaction was very strong, and he considered that this kind of behaviour and conduct would ²²⁶¹⁷ worsen our positions with respect to preparations for the Dayton Conference. I think he even said that at one of the meetings. Of course, nobody would take on this great burden on the side of the Bosnian Serbs, that is.

Q. You realise, of course, that these are matters of fact ultimately for the Judges, but I'm not going to of course stand in the way of your expressing that opinion.

You participated with Bosnian Serb leadership at two meetings, on the 25th and 29th of August, 1995, in Dobanovci?

A. Yes.

Q. You can answer further questions about that if asked. I don't propose, in light of time constraints, to take you through it at the moment in detail.

You -- paragraph 119, where at Dayton Sarajevo was -- were given up, do you regard that as a reflection of the accused's influence over Mladic?

A. No.

Q. Very well.

MR. NICE: Can we have a look at tab 20, please. Except that I think this is -- sorry.

[Prosecution counsel confer]

MR. NICE: [Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: I'll have to come back to this one later. I gather there's some problem with the tab numbering. I'll deal with it later. It ²²⁶¹⁸ may also be a document which the government will take some exception. So I'll deal with it after the break.

Q. Paragraph 120 -- or 121. The replacement of Milan Celeketic as chief of the general staff of the SVK in May of 1995 by Mile Mrksic, what's your view on the involvement or approval or whatever of the accused for that?

A. May 1995 is highly specific for the Republic of Srpska Krajina, especially that beginning part of May, the start of May, because Western Slavonia, due to a mistake, it fell, and the Belgrade-Zagreb motorway was closed and we saw the first stages of the Vance-Owen Plan implementation. This error was ascribed to General Celeketic. However, as far as I knew, it was Mr. Martic who ordered the road closed. But anyway, it brought into question the Republic of Srpska Krajina. And General Mrksic, who was otherwise a pensioned general of the JNA and was born in the area, he knew the area very well, and as far as we thought had very good military qualifications for the post. So he was brought in. And I think that the proposal did come from President Milosevic personally. I'm not quite sure, but I think that that might have been the case.

Q. [Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Sorry.

Q. Next heading, "Relations between the VJ and the VRS and the role of the accused," starting at paragraph 122. Did the general staff of the VJ brief presidents of the FRY and of Serbia and of Montenegro about the position in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia on a regular basis? ²²⁶¹⁹

A. The general staff of the Army of Yugoslavia did provide briefings of that kind.

Q. In fact, was this the only source of information those presidents, including yourself, would have received, or were there other lines of communication that would have kept the accused and the president of Montenegro informed of what was happening in those other territories?

A. I assume, that is to say, certainly there were other lines of communication, yes.

Q. Paragraph 125. Were VJ officers serving in the VRS and the SVK?

A. The officers of the Army of Yugoslavia, on the principle of volunteerism, could have been on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, as volunteers in the Republic of Srpska Krajina and therefore in both armies, and they were first and foremost officers who had stayed on, who he remained when the Yugoslav People's Army had disintegrated or, rather, withdrawn. And there were volunteers from the Army of Yugoslavia as well, yes.

Q. Paragraph 126, a matter of detail. Fikret Abdic, did you see him in Belgrade? Or was he to be seen in Belgrade?

A. I myself did not have a chance of meeting Mr. Abdic in Belgrade. I didn't meet him. But I do know that he did attend some meetings in Belgrade, yes.

Q. With whom?

A. He would come to see President Milosevic.

Q. Logistical support, paragraph 130. Do you allow of the possibility of support being given to the SVK or the VRS on -- on orders ²²⁶²⁰ or instructions of the accused?

A. What I can say is that the Supreme Defence Council of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia never passed a decision of that kind. Now, whether there was some other way in which that equipment was brought in, it's difficult for me to say.

Q. Very well. Next heading, "Financial control of the RS and RSK leadership by the accused," paragraph 134 and following. I think you've already covered paragraph 135. Let's move to paragraph -- sorry, 134. Let's move to paragraph 137. So far as the economy is concerned, what role did the accused take in appointing people to, for example, state-owned companies and what role did the party or the parties, the JUL and SPS, have in all that? You've probably covered it already, and don't, I hope, be irritated if you have, because it's convenient to take it at this time.

A. Well, there's no reason for me to be irritated. At all events in the large economic systems and economies, the role of the SPS or JUL, if you like, in those recent years, particularly JUL, was highly important, so the general managers were appointed in conformity and agreement from President Milosevic. And what is incontestible is that at the head of the largest so-called public companies, where you had the most intensive financial transactions and flows of money taking place, were indeed representatives of the Yugoslav Left. So people were appointed who could in one way or another be cooperative.

Q. One man we may have heard of already, Jovan Zebic, held the position of Minister of Finance both in Serbia and at the federal level ²²⁶²¹ and was therefore responsible for putting together budgets. What was his relationship to or his loyalty towards the accused?

A. Mr. Jovan Zebic, first of all, is a good financial expert, and they say he's a good budget man. That's an unwieldy term, but that's what it is. And a specific situation which can illustrate his relationship towards President Milosevic referred to 1999, for example, that particular year, when the federal government was supposed to state its views about the Kumanovo Agreement, which was -- by which the capitulation of the federal Yugoslavia in relation to the NATO pact was signed. I was the sole person to vote against the agreement. Mr. Zebic protested and said there's nothing that should not be done if it was something that was stated and put forward by President Milosevic. And I think that his statements exists in the records. I didn't understand him at the time, and I don't think he actually knew why I voted against.

Q. What influence did the accused have over --

A. I think he respected President Milosevic.

Q. What influence did the accused have over the National Bank of Yugoslavia?

A. Well, the National Bank of Yugoslavia was an independent autonomous institution. And the governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia was the individual in charge of monetary policy, the quantity of moneys, the flow of moneys, and so on. However, our situation was highly specific at that time, especially in 1992 and 1993, with the level of inflation which came to hundreds of millions of percentages, so that I assume that in view of the fact that the governor of the national bank was ²²⁶²² always the individual that had to inform either the prime minister or President Milosevic about how things stood, his influence was not small. It was no small influence that he wielded. I don't know what sense you have in mind when you say "influence."

Q. Mr. Lilic, when we, for example, recognise, as we've been told, that there was financing by the issue of money, by the printing of money, would that be something that the accused would be involved in, in your judgement?

A. Well, the sole source of financing, in view of the sanctions that were introduced in 1992, or one of the rare sources of financing, was the primary issue, as it was called, in view of the large number of people who were left without a job and became social cases. So quite certainly President Milosevic did have to wield influence on decisions of that kind.

Q. Mihalj Kertes. Tell us about him. He held what position?

A. Mihalj Kertes, as far as our party leadership was concerned, unless I'm mistaken, he was a member of the main board. I think that for a time he was a member of the executive board too, but I'm not quite sure about that. He was of course a member of the regional board. He was a deputy in the National Assembly of Serbia. I'm not quite sure whether he was a deputy in the Federal Assembly. And he occupied the post longest of the director general of the federal customs department.

Q. And did that give him control over customs revenues?

A. Absolutely so, yes.

Q. Was he a close associate of the accused?

A. Yes. ²²⁶²³

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I see the time, but I'm hopeful we can get to the end of this section.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: Which would leave us with only Kosovo by the time you break, if that's convenient to the Chamber.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: Paragraph -- I'm not going to trouble with the annual accounts. They're available for consideration and inspection. We don't need them for the time being.

And if I trickle into tomorrow with this witness, because of the speed at which I've gone today, there may be a few topics to tidy up which I'll review overnight, but that's all.

Q. Paragraph 147 we've covered. Paragraph 149: Did budgets need to be approved by the FRY assembly where the SPS had a majority?

A. The budgets did have to be adopted in the Federal Assembly, just as the financial accounts of the budget for the previous year had to be adopted and approved. If it was not approved in the Federal Assembly, it wasn't viable.

Q. And of course the government was an SPS majority government.

A. Well, either a member of the SPS or a member of JUL or JUL and SPS or some other coalition partners.

Q. What, if anything, do you know or understand about diversion of revenues, for example, customs revenues, to particular purposes?

A. What I know is this: I know that there were a lot of stories going round and a lot was written about it, but from that period of time I ²²⁶²⁴ do know that the federal government was very angry because all the customs revenues were not registered through the federal government, and that certain state commissions were set up by President Kontic in order to ascertain the exact quantity of resources that should be paid into the budget because in the way this was to the detriment of the army and other federal institutions. And it's no longer difficult to say whether these resources were diverted or not because there are -- is personal recognition that that was done on the part of Mr. Kertes.

Q. Very well. I'll move finally, then, to paragraph 154 and 153, under the heading of "Control of foreign policy of the FRY." We're finally at this part of the hearing.

Were foreign ministers or ministers for foreign affairs all from Serbia?

A. From the day the Ministries of the Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia was abolished - and this was a good step to align the constitution of Serbia with that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - as far as I know, yes, all the federal ministers of foreign affairs were from the Republic of Serbia and the deputies were for the most part from Montenegro.

Q. What influence did this give the accused over foreign affairs?

A. Well, in view of the fact - and here we're going back to the essence and substance of his overall authority and the force that Mr. Milosevic had, not only his personal authority, but it was the deputy majority and the ministers who belonged to one of the parties who were subordinated to him, so they wielded great influence on his appointment ²²⁶²⁵ and vice versa. And I think that the foreign minister was the sole person from the federal administration who was -- who attended most of Mr. Milosevic's talks with representatives of the International Community. So the conclusion is quite clear from that, that his influence was dominant.

Q. I think at meetings was there somebody else present called Goran Milinovic sometimes?

A. Goran Milinovic was the Chef de Cabinet of President Milosevic. And quite logically highway attended all the meetings even when there were no ministers, perhaps even narrower meetings with smaller circles of people taking part.

Q. Did he make notes, Goran Milinovic?

A. I assume he did, and that's why his presence was required.

Q. Paragraph 153. Did these international negotiators ever ask to deal with you, Mr. Lilic?

A. As most of the international negotiations had to do with Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina and that critical area, not counting what happened later on in Kosovo and Metohija, all international relations were linked to those areas therefore. So from the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for a time, while he occupied that post, Dobrica Cosic had that privilege, if I can put it that way. Later on, everything that was linked to international negotiations to all intents and purposes was in the hands of Mr. Milosevic and the International Community accepted that, so that the federal institutions except for the ministries of foreign affairs, as far as I know, in the majority of cases ²²⁶²⁶ were not included in negotiations of that type. But there were foreign delegations, of course, who would come to see the president of Yugoslavia at his invitation, such as presidents or heads of state, protocol meetings, and the president of the Republic of Serbia was duty-bound by virtue of office to receive them. But as to these international negotiations, no, I was not included.

Q. And finally, perhaps before we break, if this is convenient to the Chamber, were you used to some extent as a conveyor of the accused's instructions or as a communicator to the accused?

A. Well, probably. There were a lot of messages that I conveyed to him and many things he told me and passed on to me. But in the context of what was said in court, this was the protocol role of the president of the FRY who by virtue of the constitution - and this was his daily right and duty - was to attend to receiving and sending out messages of congratulations. So that would be it. That's probably what you have in mind. And this was done by -- presented by Mr. Lazarevic here in this courtroom, but that is not correct.

MR. NICE: Kosovo next, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Paragraph 156, we'll turn to Kosovo. Was the accused informed of developing problems in Kosovo? And if so, by what sources and to what effect? ²²⁶²⁷

A. I believe that he was informed. He could have been informed from several sources. He could have been informed by the state security, by the public security. He could have been informed from sources close to the civilian authorities and certainly sources that are sources of the Army of Yugoslavia.

Q. Were there reports to your knowledge of looting and the seizing of property in Kosovo? And if so, by whom were these operations being conducted?

A. The first time I heard that piece of information was during my tour of Kosovo in Djakovica when there was a meeting of the head of state security who was there in his capacity as head of state security and he was in charge of some of the anti-terrorist actions that were underway. And at this meeting that was said inter alia, that some members of the reserve police force are seizing the property of Albanians, if I can use that expression, and that they should be treated very seriously and that they should be criminally prosecuted and arrested.

Q. Well, then let's move to the paragraph 157. And towards your fact-finding missions and all under the title of missions to Kosovo, in respect of which your waiver has been granted.

You began your involvement, I think, your particular detailed involvement, after you had given up your role as president in May of 1998, when with various other politicians and officials you were concerned about the information flow; is that right?

A. My term as president of Yugoslavia expired on the 25th of June, 1997. In July, President Milosevic was appointed to that office. In ²²⁶²⁸ 1998, I as deputy prime minister of the federal government, since I wanted to help as much as possible, I accepted that position. As a matter of fact, I made a suggestion to President Milosevic that I should hold that position. And twice when I went on tours of critical areas in Kosovo, Metohija, that is to say, practically all towns, the border areas, the few villages, everything that the Army of Yugoslavia thought should be toured at that point in time.

Q. By whom were you asked to go and conduct this fact-finding mission?

A. The initial proposal was the proposal of General Perisic, who was then chief of staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, of General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic as well, and certainly Mr. Kontic was informed about that too, whereas immediate consent was given by President Milosevic. So the proposal came from the Army of Yugoslavia.

Q. And was there a desire at that stage to legalise the use of the army in Kosovo?

A. Well, according to the words of General Perisic, and some requests that he had made allegedly in April to introduce a state of emergency, he did have a great deal of problems then because he was asked that the Army of Yugoslavia take part in all the activities in which the MUP of the Republic of Serbia took part in. And I don't think that's a problem. It's not the use of the army that's a problem, but the way in which it should have been used, that's the problem.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... your missions I think on the 17th, and either between that date or on the 27th -- on the 27th of May, ²²⁶²⁹ 1998; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. In your judgement on that first mission, was there a state of emergency, even if not technically declared, or not?

A. According to what could be heard, since in all the towns I toured I met with the local authorities and the local political leaderships and these meetings were attended also by the members of the police from that particular town, the situation in Kosovo had already had quite literally all the characteristics of a state of emergency and the only thing that was missing was declaring it so formally.

Q. On the second fact-finding mission or the second day, whichever it is, on the 27th of May, that's when you visited Djakovica; is that right?

A. Yes. Among the other towns, I visited Djakovica too, yes.

Q. On this occasion, who was with you?

A. On this occasion, General Dusan Samardzic was with me, commander of the 3rd Army of the Army of Yugoslavia. Then there was also Mr. Nikola Sainovic. Also there was Mr. Nebojsa Pavkovic, who was then commander of the Pristina Corps. There was a group of leaders from the province itself, from the executive, and also from the political side. And there were also a few colonels of the Army of Yugoslavia. I don't recall their names -- from the Pristina Corps, certainly.

Q. Very well. Did you judge there was a lack of coordination in what was happening down there between the DB and another body?

A. Well, this second visit was supposed to give an answer to that question in particular. Although, this was sort of hanging in the air. ²²⁶³⁰ Mr. Jovica Stanisic actually did report on this in Djakovica. He said what was going on really in the struggle in Kosovo and Metohija and what kind of actions were underway and that there is a lack of unity of command between the state security and the Ministry of Police and that the Army of Yugoslavia is not offering the kind of logistics support that they may be needing. It seemed impossible to him to carry out the assignments that he was entrusted to carry out by the Republic of Serbia -- rather, by the government of Serbia. So there was a lack of general synchronisation between the state security, the public security, and the Army of Yugoslavia.

Q. Did that have any effect on the drive to have the army involved or on the momentum to have the army involved?

A. That became obvious only later, at a second meeting, that that was the objective, to have the Army of Yugoslavia involved in overall operations in Kosovo and Metohija. At that time, Mr. Stanisic only referred to that as a problem, that there was a lack of overall coordination between these three segments of the armed forces.

Q. This second meeting or the second visit had been done with the approval of the accused; is that right?

A. Yes, by all means, the first one and the second one.

Q. Between the first and second meetings, when you reported to the accused - paragraph 165 - did the accused express concern about Kosovo SPS members?

A. In view of the fact that at this meeting that was held then in Pejic with the presence of most of the presidents of the municipalities ²²⁶³¹ from that part of Kosovo and Metohija, great dissatisfaction was expressed over the overall situation in Kosovo and Metohija from a security, political, and economic point of view. I think that this did cause concern with President Milosevic, precisely because of this general mood of the political leaders.

Q. At that stage, were people being killed in Kosovo on a regular basis?

A. At that time, there were intensive activities of the terrorist units of the Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija. Certainly there were adequate responses of the anti-terrorist forces from the MUP of Serbia. At that time, there were two such units there. Had they acted in concert, they certainly would have resolved these problems differently, these problems that later culminated in Kosovo and Metohija. Obviously the greatest problem there was that the terrorist activities of the Albanian terrorists would turn into an armed rebellion of the entire Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohija and that would yet lead to a new problem. So there were quite a few killings and this happened with great frequency. The Army of Yugoslavia, the police, police facilities were attacked often but also there were responses too.

Q. And must the accused have been aware of this level of killing that was going on?

A. Well, I believe that he did know, because there were daily reports about the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, unless somebody wrote them in a different way.

Q. If you'd just have a look at tab 33 of Exhibit 469, please. ²²⁶³²

MR. NICE: It's just been distributed to add to the Chamber's exhibit bundle.

Q. And we can see from the front page of this a document dated the 25th of May, 1998 that Milan Vlajkovic is submitting a report on the activities of the army in Kosovo to the deputy prime minister, Your Honours. And on the second page - you don't have to read all of it, but we can see a summary of Albanian forces against the SRY, as it's described, intensified observation of the FRY territory continues from observation posts. The observation is done by persons and then it's described.

These activities coincided - last sentence - with the activities of Siptar terrorists which points to the fact that they are coordinated with terrorist activities in KiM.

Ask then in detail. Terrorists opened automatic fire and detail set out there, an attack on security organs, a unit returning from the Morina border post set out after that with VJ units returning fire. The capture of five terrorists, attack on the broader area of Ponosevac village, a soldier in hospital, no information about losses sustained by terrorists, unit fired on, and then an ambush group referred to on the following page, no losses of their units and the losses of Siptars not known.

Was that the sort of report that was available to you but also to other SDC members -- not to other but also to SDC members? Because you were no longer a member of the SDC.

A. Yes, I was no longer a member of the Supreme Defence Council, so I ²²⁶³³ could not receive reports that were coming in to President Milosevic, President Milutinovic, and I assume to the third member of the SDC as well. This is a report that was sent to me first and foremost upon instructions of General Perisic, chief of general staff, in order to give a clear illustration of what the arguments were for the letter that he was practically preparing by then, the letter he addressed to President Milosevic, and it also has to do with the general situation in Kosovo and Metohija, irrespective of the letter. Obviously the terrorists in Kosovo had excellent logistics, in terms of support from the Republic of Albania, also from some international missions and also regrettably - this we found out at a meeting much later - within our own security organs. And the report itself shows that actions had culminated by then and that there were many, many attacks. This was a few days before my second visit to Kosovo and Metohija.

Q. Paragraph 169. At this stage, did the accused favour considerate response or in your judgement did he still favour a more controlled response, or limited response?

A. You mean by way of reaction to terrorist activities?

Q. And did he -- did he favour use of the police or the army or what, or don't you know?

A. Well, this is the time that unfortunately Mr. Stanisic, who was later replaced as chief of state security, warned against that there was no coordination between the public security, state security, and the Army of Yugoslavia and Kosovo. So it was hard to say what the right decision would have been, because there was this lack of coordination. I ²²⁶³⁴ personally think that what was preferred was use of police force, as probably with some logistics support of the Army of Yugoslavia.

Q. In reality, was Kosovo within or outside the control of the accused at this time, or don't you know?

A. I don't know whether you mean from a political point of view or from a security point of view.

Q. From a political point of view.

A. Well, that's the time when in Kosovo and Metohija there was a great deal of dissatisfaction from the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija. And I personally believe that the political influence of Belgrade was considerably weakened and that it would be difficult to say that Kosovo and Metohija was under the political control of Belgrade from that point of view then.

Q. So we turn to paragraph 172, where you had a meeting with the accused after your second visit. What was the nature of your report to the accused? What was the substance of it?

A. I conveyed to him in great detail my own impressions from Kosovo and Metohija, also my impressions from the briefing of Mr. Jovica Stanisic about the security situation. I also said what I thought should be done from the point of view of this joint command between the state security and the public security, but I also conveyed positions regarding the bad behaviour of the reservists from -- some reservists from the public security of Serbia. It so turned out that the activities of the Army of Yugoslavia should be institutionalised and also other activities should be undertaken at political level in order to stabilise that area. ²²⁶³⁵ At any rate, the report showed precisely what General Perisic was trying to prove, that the situation in Kosovo was one of emergency, that communications were practically severed. It was very difficult to move on land in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, practically that it was known that Jablanica, Drenica, Smonica, and the mountains were centres of terrorist activity. And I even told President Milosevic then -- or rather, I gave him a map with very precisely marked locations of terrorist centres, and I think that this called for different activity on our part and we discussed that. President Milosevic told me that I should convey this --

Q. Sorry. Sorry to have interrupted you. And perhaps you better finish what you were going to say about what the accused said.

A. President Milosevic listened to me carefully. Of course I told him what happened at this political meeting too, that was apart from the security aspect. And he told me that as for all these impressions of mine and all the information I obtained, I should convey this at a meeting that would be chaired by Mr. Milan Milutinovic, who was then president of the Republic of Serbia. This meeting was supposed to be one of coordination, since Milutinovic in a way coordinated the activity of all three staffs from Kosovo and Metohija, the military staff, the staff of the public security, and also of this state security or, if you wish, of their leading echelons, and also this was supposed to be done at the level of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.

Q. In the event, did the accused do what you advised him to do in relation to these particular centres of terrorism, as they were being ²²⁶³⁶ described or whatever?

A. No. These centres - and I don't know the reason for this - these centres were never attacked and never eliminated from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

Q. And indeed had Stanisic made a recommendation about focussing on terrorists? Did you convey that?

A. Stanisic did present this information at the meeting in Djakovica. His idea was - and not only his idea, but this was the idea of a number of generals of the Army of Yugoslavia, and I personally agreed with this too - that the attack against terrorist centres should be intensified, that anti-terrorist struggle should be intensified as such, but what should be borne in mind is that civilian targets should be taken care of and that political negotiation should also be conducted, and this is what I later conveyed in Belgrade too.

Q. Did you make reference to the possibility of confidence-building measure, economic programmes, and the like?

A. Yes. I forgot. Djakovica is a very interesting town, from the point of view of its significance for Kosovo and Metohija. I think that most of the top Albanian people from Kosovo come from that area, from that town. It has an interesting structure, and I suggested to President Milosevic that perhaps we should tap these potentials, to start the production process in Djakovica so that we would show Albanians from Djakovica too that Serbia was taking care of them, and through influential Serbs in Kosovo who were originally from Kosovo we should work on this confidence building. ²²⁶³⁷ President Milosevic accepted that, and I think that it was precisely Mr. Dusko Matkovic from Sartrid [phoen] who was charged with this and then he was supposed to set up this kind of process from the Republic of Serbia.

Q. And then did anything come of these suggestions?

A. Unfortunately, no.

Q. Did the accused suggest that your report should be relayed to a meeting held on the 13th of June, coordinated by Mr. Milutinovic?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have a view as to what that achieved for the accused by way of distribution of responsibility?

A. I personally think that the fact that Milutinovic was president of Serbia meant that in accordance with his constitutional powers he was supposed to use them, and for everything to evolve quite differently in Kosovo from what was actually going on. It is hard for me to say whose influence was decisive there and to the extent to which Milosevic's influence was decisive there. At any rate, it was Milutinovic who was chairing these meetings.

My impression was, because my presence at the meeting was only on that occasion - that was the first and last time I was there - this was probably supposed to prevent the dismissal of Mr. Stanisic in that period. So in a way I was there to support the positions of Mr. Stanisic at that meeting. So if that was the objective, the objective was attained.

Q. Now, the third fact-finding mission was in November of 1998. Did you have a meeting with the accused after it? ²²⁶³⁸

A. In November 1998, I had a meeting before the visit. After the visit, I sent a detailed analysis to Mr. Milosevic, to provide him with information. The analysis was made on the basis of a great deal of intelligence data, both from the Yugoslav services and services outside the territory of the FRY, which showed the seriousness of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija and also the great problems that Serbia and Yugoslavia would have if the question of growing terrorism is not dealt with and also if the question of relations with the International Community are not dealt with and also the relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, at least from a preliminary point of view.

Q. At tab 31 - it's a long letter, we shan't go through all of it - but if you can identify this as the letter, please. Is this the letter you spoke of?

A. Yes, that's the letter I sent to President Milosevic. It shows what was going on at the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It shows the accumulation of troops of NATO and also what was going on in terms of the leading Albanians from either Albania or Kosovo and Metohija and also the intensive arming of the Siptar terrorists.

Q. And it sets out towards the end your proposal for urgent measures, reinforcing borders, combatting terrorism, intensify efforts at the international level. And for want of time, if you identify the letter as yours, it's available to be read in detail later. Thank you very much. Did you receive at the same general time a letter from General Perisic, tab 32? Have a look at that.

MR. NICE: And again to save time, I'm not intending to go through ²²⁶³⁹ the documents exhaustively, but they're here for record purposes. This is a document addressed to the prime minister, and it comes from General Perisic, and it's dated the 19th of June, 1998.

Q. So far as you know, would the accused have received a copy of this letter?

A. I really don't know. It's hard for me to say. It doesn't say that a copy was sent to him here.

Q. Have you spoken --

A. This has to do with the financing of the Army of Yugoslavia.

Q. Have a look at the third as well, if we may. And perhaps you can help us with that. This says from Perisic. "Dear Zoki," who's that?

A. That's a letter addressed to me.

Q. "I am sending you two versions of the arguments for introducing a state of emergency in part of Kosovo and Metohija. These are sufficiently well reasoned and provide a basis for legal revision." Now, have you spoken to General Perisic about this? Do you know where copies of this argument went?

A. Yes. General Perisic came to see me and we discussed this. I told him that it would be best if he could inform President Milosevic about this, being the president of the Supreme Defence Council. And I must point out that according to the constitution of the Republic of Serbia, the president of the republic is allowed to do that even without the Supreme Defence Council. And you have a detailed explanation of the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija from which it is obvious that it was absolutely indispensable to -- and unavoidable to introduce a state of ²²⁶⁴⁰ emergency. As far as I know, General Perisic did send that letter to Mr. Milosevic. Now, whether he actually did or not, all I have to go by is his assurances.

Q. If we go to the attachment at the back of this exhibit. In the English, it's bottom of the page, number 2. And in the Cyrillic, it's not got a page number that's visible. There's a paragraph that reads: "Since MUP organs cannot ensure protection of the population, there are more and more requests by both citizens and the authorities that this role should be assumed by the Yugoslav army."

MR. NICE: Thank you very much. It's the penultimate page I think of the -- no, it's the last page, top of the last page in the Cyrillic.

Q. And then further down, thank you very much, it says: "We propose the following: That the supreme military council prepare a state of emergency (measures) in certain areas of Kosovo and Metohija pursuant to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." And number 3: "That the Yugoslav Army be charged with implementing the decision of the Supreme Defence Council, and that the MUP forces and other factors be engaged in carrying out the tasks of the Supreme Defence Council." Thank you very much. So that's the argument that he's -- he supported his position with.

Can we also look at tab 9, please, if there's no objection to this one. Tab 9 is, Your Honour, one we looked at earlier. We withdrew it at that stage because of concerns by the government representatives. But they've now clarified their position. And I'm not sure whether there's any remaining objections to this document. I think not. They've narrowed ²²⁶⁴¹ the dates about which they have concern to the 2nd of June of 1993 and to the 12th of June of 1997. So a Supreme Council of Defence document dated the 2nd of June, 1998, falls outside that period and they don't desire any protection for it.

If we see that the agenda refers to personnel issues. And on the agenda was the interpretation of the military and political situation in the region and the situation of the state board of the Republic of Albania. And if we go over in the English to page 2, towards the bottom, and in the Cyrillic it's page -- top right-hand corner 2445, just over halfway down the page, we see a reference to the chief of the general staff speaking about the engagement of the army in accordance with its peacetime purpose exclusively in a border zone between 2.5 and 3 kilometres.

And then if the Chamber would be good enough to go over one more page to page 3 of 8, the witness going to the foot of page numbered 2446 at the top, predictions of the general staff in case of an outcome of political talks with --

Q. Mr. Lilic, if you can find it. It's at page 446 at the top, but it's at the foot of that page. And it sets out the predictions of the general staff and --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have that page.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, may I assist the witness? In the Serbian text, they are not -- the Serbian text is not marked in the same way. The minutes begin with 2436 and ends with 2442, so probably the ²²⁶⁴² numbering has changed in Mr. Nice's document. So with reference to General Perisic, that is on page 2437 in the Serbian version. The predictions of the general staff are on the same page.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

Q. "Predictions of the General Staff: In case of a positive outcome of the political talks with siptar representatives the tension in Kosovo and Metohija will weaken. If the outcome of the talks should not be positive, then there are two possibilities.

"First, to increase the intensity actions, having in mind the fact that some communications are already endangered. This applies above all to the municipalities of --" and then there are a number listed -- "part of Djakovica.

"Second, if the talks turn out to be positive, then the danger of an escalation of the conflicts to other areas decreases." Skipping the next two paragraphs: "In the conclusion of his interpretation General Perisic underlined that everything had to be done to prevent a negative course of events --"

THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel slow down, please.

MR. NICE: Yes. I will slow down. I apologise for having gone too fast.

Q. "In case we don't succeed, then we have to engage our military forces according to the escalation of the conflict. In case of an external danger, we have to mobilise the military forces, whereas the Supreme Council of Defence and other federal organs have to bring that decision." ²²⁶⁴³ Skip a paragraph: "Regarding this item of the agenda, President Milosevic proposed and the council unanimously adopted the following conclusions:

"First, the interpretation of the chief of general staff has been accepted;.

"Second, if terrorist activities of the Albanian separatist movement escalate, the army will intervene;

"Third, the army will be ready to oppose any kind of external intervention that could endanger sovereignty and territorial integrity." Now, personnel issues then followed, but I think we've covered those in the documents now available for the Chamber to look at them and I don't need to return to them tomorrow morning.

Does this part of this session of the SDC as recorded reflect your understanding of the position at the time, Mr. Lilic?

A. This excerpt from the minutes of the 5th Session, I don't know everything that was covered except for the brief summary given by the chief of staff, and I don't know whether that coincides with what he said when the two of us met. But in any event, this was the generally accepted position, if an escalation of terrorist activities should occur, the army would be used. But this would imply certain decisions regarding the use of the army, and I assume that the Supreme Council discussed that. And the third position was generally accepted position in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the time.

Q. At tab 23, please.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we're slowing down a little because of the ²²⁶⁴⁴ exhibits, but there are not so very many more to be dealt with, and I'm happy that I'll be finished early tomorrow morning.

Q. This is a letter to the accused of the 23rd of July of 1998. Mr. Lilic, it's in the Cyrillic in - one, two, three - five pages. On the first page of that and the first page of the English version we see that the author, General Perisic, is reporting to the accused. There's negative facts:

1. Constant tendency to use the VJ outside the institutions of the system;.

2. Separating VJ units from the Yugoslav army;. 3. Attempt to command VJ units by unauthorised persons;. 4. Bypassing levels of command in official talks with VJ members; 5. Conducting personnel policies of an illegitimate basis;. 6. Supplying material extra-legally.

Any comment you want to make on that part of this letter?

A. I think there's no need. I had occasion to see this letter by General Perisic. I myself was surprised by its contents. There's no need for any comments, except that it shows that it was probably written out of a revolt to some extent because there was persistent insistence on a state of emergency so that the Army of Yugoslavia should settle accounts with the terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija and the only possibility at the time was for units of the police to be subordinated to the Army of Yugoslavia. To comment on each of these paragraphs here I don't think is required of me, is necessary for me to do.

Q. Well, as you know from the summary - you've gone through these ²²⁶⁴⁵ before - we're at paragraph 185, the comments of the -- or anticipated comments or forecast comments of the witness on this area. It goes on to say, just looking at the letter again itself, "Specific examples of the facts: 1. Tendency to use VJ outside the institutions of the system." And then towards the bottom of that subparagraph A: "Since this was not send by you - the situation has escalated and so representatives of the MUP and you too sought the use of the VJ, some smaller units were used directly and indirectly - which is from a legal aspect against the law."

And B: "So that the relevant and professional conclusions of the session of the VSO, Supreme Defence Council, on the 9th of June might be implemented, we requested the FRY government to assure us (by proclaiming one of these states: of emergency, immediate threat of war, or war) legitimate material and financial resources. This has not, to date, been done, which means that any engagement of the VJ in combat operations outside the border zone and beyond is still illegal." And then it says: "Further use of the VJ in this way is untenable for three reasons, at least: Not being utilised the effectively - the results are minor; utilisation does not ensure attainment of legal goals - so they accuse us of --"

THE INTERPRETER: Slow down, please.

MR. NICE:

Q. "Such utilisation does not go unnoticed by observers and might cause reprisals by the International Community and NATO." That's what he wrote, and we've got your comments on it. ²²⁶⁴⁶ Let's look at the second passage, please, paragraph 86 -- 186 of the summary. In his letter, General Perisic refers to separating units from the VJ and said that "The Guards Brigade was separated from the VJ by your decision. See attachment 3. Such a decision has no basis in law, no necessity, and no logic." It goes on to explain that the accused commanded in keeping with the decision of the Supreme Defence Council. Now, the brigade of guards, what was its mandate? How well was it staffed?

A. The Guards Brigade is one of the elite units of the Army of Yugoslavia. It was used for ceremonial purposes but was also composed of highly qualified and good elite troops. But what Mr. Perisic is saying is quite correct, that is, that Mr. Milosevic had no right to separate the Guards Brigade out of the Army of Yugoslavia. I think you made a slip when you said that he was in command of the decisions of the Supreme Command Council. It should say that it should be command, because such a decision is not in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Defence Council.

Q. It's not open -- I understand you to be saying it was not open to the accused to give commands to this unit in the way suggested as having been given by General Perisic.

A. Yes, because it violates the principle of subordination or the principle of a unity of command that exists in all armies in the world, the singleness of command, and therefore in the Army of Yugoslavia as well.

Q. Back to paragraph 3 of the letter. "Attempt to command the VJ by ²²⁶⁴⁷ unauthorised persons." The letter reads: "The constant desire of members of the MUP that we subordinate a VJ unit to them causes disputes if it is not permitted them, if one is granted them then it is used purposelessly and unprofessionally, which proves counterproductive. The best example is Decani and Orahovac.

"The attempt by the civilian part of the Staff to command the Corps," and then it goes on to deal with that in detail. "In practice, the commander of the Pristina Corps plans what he has been ordered to, and this is at the request of Sainovic and Minic and the MUP, and so turns into something like a service of theirs for planning an execution. Since it is his wish and that of all of us that the plan be realised, if others cannot or will not, he executes it with the Pristina units, which leads to an illegitimate, unsystematic, and inadequate utilisation of VJ units." Now, what do you say about this? Were you aware of there being any request by the MUP for VJ units to assist?

A. MUP was constantly requesting assistance from units of the Army of Yugoslavia, but we were in a situation to keep discussing how, whether it should be done legitimately through a state of emergency and through the Supreme Defence Council or in the way here described by Mr. Perisic, which is quite unlawful and non-military, to say the least.

Q. Identification of Sainovic leads us to something we will come to a little later. But what body is being referred to there?

A. This was the time when this so-called coordinating team for Kosovo was formed, if that is what you're referring to, consisting of Sainovic, Minic, Andjelkovic, and Matkovic. Their coordination was intended to be ²²⁶⁴⁸ of a political nature. I don't think that they were qualified for any kind of security assessments or activities in this sense. If they did engage in those activities, then it was to the detriment of -- and at the expense of everything that happened in Kosovo. Obviously that is what they wanted to do, since Mr. Perisic refers to this in his letter.

Q. Let's move on to the next section of the letter. "Bypassing levels of command," it's number 4. "Bypassing levels of command in conducting official talks and distributing assignments. "By the Rules of Service of the VJ you have the right to conduct official conversations with all members of the VJ. However, sometimes" -- this is addressed to the accused -- "you do this without the knowledge of the NGS, which is contrary to military subordination and the unity of command." NGS being ...?

Mr. Lilic, NGS being, for these purposes ...? Chief of the general staff, isn't it?

A. It is the abbreviation for the chief of the general staff. In this case, it was Mr. Perisic.

Q. So what do you have to say about this beyond what it says itself?

A. That is why I said what I said at the beginning of the document. The part you're referring to now follows on to what was said before. Had there been subordination and singleness of command, there wouldn't have been any excesses in the sense of the army acting together with the police and people being in command who are not qualified or called upon in a situation that was not legally proclaimed a state of emergency. So someone else is responsible, not the institution that should have been ²²⁶⁴⁹ proclaimed a state of emergency.

Q. Item 5 of the letter: "Conducting personnel policies without legal basis and without criteria or decree. Generals and colonels are frequently promoted, within and without the VSO, without a law or a decree or criteria, which has far-reaching negative consequences within the army. "Laws, decrees, and criteria for promotion must be respected, and especially the opinion and proposal by the chief of staff...and he is responsible for the situation within the VJ and the behaviour of the generals and Article 46 of the Law of the army states these precisely." The nature of the complaint here, your understanding of it, its significance?

A. Obviously, General Perisic was displeased because one of the generals had been promoted to a higher rank without him knowing about it or being consulted about it, which was quite natural in view of the previous way in which decisions were taken at the Supreme Defence Council. And I can speak from the point of view of the practice applied while I was a member of the Supreme Defence Council, and I don't know how Mr. Milosevic did that afterwards.

Q. Finally -- or nearly finally, the -- number 6, "Supplying materials without regard to regulations.

"You frequently order me," says General Perisic, "to provide movable and immovable property for the needs of the MUP. "Under the provisions of the FRY law and property, you are not authorised to give me orders in relation to supplying materials outside the VJ, nor am I authorised to execute such an order." ²²⁶⁵⁰ The suggestion here being that the VJ has been asked to give military support of that kind. Proper or improper, Mr. Lilic?

A. Mr. Perisic's commentary is proper, as the owner of the property of the VJ is the federal government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Of course, it does happen that sometimes those supplies are exchanged with the police when necessary, but I think the principle referred to in this letter had to be respected.

Q. The letter ends with the following paragraphs, which I extract, highlighted at the foot of -- towards the foot of page 4 of the English: "Thus I have the obligation, the right, and moral human officers in general strength and honour to point out to you in your capacity as president of the FRY and of the Supreme Defence Council with regard to the army, people, and state in this decisive moment the need for you to respect the institution of the VJ and its functional principles and to behave towards it in a manner determined by the constitution, the law, and the regulations. If not, then you will transform this, the only functioning high-level Yugoslav institution into a non-functioning and disunited amorphous mass." And his last paragraph reads: "While I am in the Yugoslav army, in the interest os the state and the people I will be compromising and continue to build and strengthen and build up the VJ and I shall not permit it to dismantled, the wrecking of principles on which it and its unity is based."

We've looked at the letter in some detail and your comments on it, but paragraphs 181, 182, and 183 of the summary. Your general observations on what General Perisic was doing by this letter. First of ²²⁶⁵¹ all, what was the inevitability for him of his writing this letter?

A. Personally I believe that he wanted to draw attention to the seriousness of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija. He wanted to underline the misuse, significant misuse of the Army of Yugoslavia, and he wanted things that were happening to change in the way he described. It is a fact indeed that the Army of Yugoslavia was the only cohesive factor of the common state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Any undermining of it in this way would weaken its position further. So I think that I fully understand the revolt felt by Mr. Perisic and the way in which he wrote this letter. However, as far as I know, several months after this letter, he was replaced from the position of chief of staff of the Army of Yugoslavia.

JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. Was there any reason, Mr. Lilic, that you could see why the accused didn't follow the recommendations to set up or establish a state of emergency or follow the recommendations which are set out in this letter?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my opinion, there are several reasons. One of the more significant ones is certainly that in that case all the -- the full seriousness of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija had to be recognised. And I think Milosevic didn't want to accept this because of his relationship to the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. A second, maybe even more significant reason, is the fact that in the event of a state of emergency, units of the police are united, attached to the Army of Yugoslavia, and get involved in the overall activities of the anti-terrorist struggle which is under the command of ²²⁶⁵² the Army of Yugoslavia. And it is quite possible that Mr. Milosevic had in mind this foreign policy dimension, because he thought that if he introduced a state of emergency, the negotiations he was conducting would be affected. But I think that a state of emergency was absolutely indispensable to improve the quality of the anti-terrorist activities in Kosovo and Metohija.

So those are at least three reasons, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Just before we leave this letter, we've already had a copy of it exhibited elsewhere, as I recollect, from -- a copy which was taken from a book. We'll not stop now, but perhaps you --

MR. NICE: I'll get the cross-reference for you, and then we can either delete this one and -- withdraw this one and leave the other one. It's in a book.

JUDGE MAY: Or vice versa. I should think this one seems to be a better exhibit, a better copy.

MR. NICE:

Q. Before we turn from this letter, if everything or even substantial things in this letter were in fact false, the accusations of misuse made by General Perisic, to what sanction might the general have been vulnerable? Paragraph 183 of the summary.

A. In any event, I believe that he would at least be replaced or transferred to some other position. I don't believe that the statements contained in this letter were inaccurate.

Q. Did you yourself raise this letter with the accused from time to ²²⁶⁵³ time in conversation and with a particular purpose?

A. This letter?

Q. Yes.

A. I really don't remember whether Mr. Milosevic and I discussed this letter.

Q. Very well.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you said, Mr. Lilic, that General Perisic was replaced within -- within six months. Do you know exactly how long after this letter he was replaced?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He was replaced, Your Honour Judge Robinson, in November 1998, which means four months later. I don't know the exact date, but it's quite certainly it was in November.

JUDGE ROBINSON: In view of the -- the character and tone of the letter, would you have considered that a short time or a long time for the replacement?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In view of the letter itself, I think one could say that the replacement took place quite late, in relation to the tone of the letter, on condition that what is written in the letter is not true.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. NICE: [Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Nice, please.

MR. NICE: I was going to turn to another exhibit, or not as the case may be, I expect.

JUDGE MAY: How much longer do you think you might be in the ²²⁶⁵⁴ morning?

MR. NICE: I suspect I'll be able to abbreviate what follows and sweep up, probably an hour.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. There is still the matter to be dealt with in private session too, which we -- we must not overlook, unless they've already been resolved by --

MR. NICE: Well, we certainly have resolved one. We may have resolved nearly all. But there may be one outstanding matter.

JUDGE MAY: Well, if we can resolve it, so much the better, without necessity of a private session.

Yes. We'll adjourn now.

[Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

JUDGE MAY: The Registry, with commendable efficiency, have found the number. It's number 150. Perhaps you might like to look at that. Perhaps you'd like to withdraw that one, rather than the other way around.

MR. NICE: Very well.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lilic, would you be back, please, at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday,

the 18th day of June, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.