²³⁸⁹⁹

Wednesday, 9 July 2003

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: I understand the witness is here.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll have the witness, please, Mr. Lilic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like you to tell me how you plan to have these proceedings as cross-examination take place.

JUDGE MAY: Could you get the witness, please. No need to wait. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You didn't hear me?

JUDGE MAY: No. It's getting the witness in. But what is the question?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, here's my question: I'd like to know how you're going to conduct these proceedings, the cross-examination, because the night before last, which was the earliest possible time that I could do so, because that's when my associate received a binder with the transcripts --

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE MAY: Let Mr. Lilic take a seat. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As I was saying, the night before ²³⁹⁰⁰ last, which was the time that my associate can visit me at 6.00 p.m., prior to yesterday's day and Mr. Riedlmayer's testimony, I received a binder with the transcripts of some sort of telephone conversations, and that's the binder I have here. And yesterday, when you finished work here and I left, I was given another binder, this one here, with several hundred pages to it of different stenograms with a large number of exhibits, which I also had to read through. And I did manage to read through all this, and of course I can conduct the cross-examination of this witness with respect to the material contained in that binder. However, it's quite obvious that I'm going to need --

JUDGE MAY: Let me interrupt you for a moment. We don't know what this is about. We haven't had these documents, and we don't know what the relevance to this witness is.

MR. NICE: I can deal with -- first of all, the stenographic notes, the stenographic notes of the Council for Coordination, which the Chamber will remember were brought in on the last occasion and have yet to be identified by the witness, the Chamber will recall on the last occasion I said I would go to them probably only for a couple of quotations, and that's my intention in re-examination, because by their late production by the authorities - they have been requested for over a year - it seemed to be quite impossible to have a full examination of the notes by the witness beyond the couple of passages I want him to deal with, one of which he's already dealt with, and the notes will have to speak for themselves. So that is the majority of the documents in the large binder that's been provided to the accused. I wasn't aware that he was being ²³⁹⁰¹ provided with the balance of the documents in that binder. There was no need for him to be provided with those. It's really out of an abundance of generosity, because they are actually documents I may refer to in re-examination. So there was no need to refer him to them now and he's had an advantage that he normally wouldn't otherwise have had.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. NICE: So that is what that all amounts to.

JUDGE MAY: So what are you proposing to do this morning? You are going to ask the witness some further questions?

MR. NICE: Only in -- no, in re-examination. It's all re-examination. If the Court remembers, I left over until today, at the Court's instruction, the question of identification of the stenographic notes, and the other documents are documents that would ordinarily arise in the course of re-examination and have, by one route or another, been provided in advance.

JUDGE MAY: Well, are they available for us now?

MR. NICE: They certainly are, yes.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we'll have them, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My comment and objection had to do with the time that can be given me, because I received the documents just before this session. Regardless of the fact that Mr. Nice just said he's going to skim through them, get through them quickly, I have to ask the witness a number of questions related to those documents. Now, you're ²³⁹⁰² giving me one hour, according to Rule 92 bis, whereas I have two large binders here which I was given the night before last and yesterday and --

JUDGE MAY: Let me stop you by saying this: We can -- we can shorten this. In fact, you had half an hour left. But obviously in the light of these new documents, we will consider further time, provided, of course, it's -- it's reasonable. Now, if the Prosecution do not wish to ask any more questions, what we'll do is this: We will go into your cross-examination, you can start asking questions about these documents, we'll see how far we get in half an hour, and then we'll review the position. There's no question, of course, that the original limit would apply if there is new material, which there appears to be. But at the moment, we can't judge precisely how long that time should be. But, of course, we have to bear in mind that the witness has come back especially to continue this evidence and that, therefore, time cannot be endless. But you begin now with your -- your cross-examination. It may be sensible for the witness to have the -- the bundle.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, two points: One, I didn't answer one of Your Honour's earlier points. As to the bundle, I repeat that the majority of the documents are intended for re-examination, may or may not be used, and there's no real need for the witness to have them in advance and there's no particular need for the accused to deal with them in advance, but he's simply been provided with them. The other point you asked me about -- or rather, the accused raised and I didn't deal with was transcripts of intercepts. There were some transcripts of intercepts of phone calls with this witness. For ²³⁹⁰³ example, covering the French airline -- the French pilots and their release, which were provided to the accused out of an abundance of caution and in case they constituted Rule 68 material, and that is why they were provided. So they fall into a different category. But I certainly wouldn't press the witness or the accused to go through the binder of documents at the moment.

JUDGE MAY: Well, the difficulty, Mr. Nice, is this: That the more material you supply, the more material you try and use in the case, the more opportunity there is for cross-examination.

MR. NICE: Absolutely.

JUDGE MAY: And further time. And I think I must ask you to restrict the amount of materials that is now put upon us most carefully, because not only is there the question of time; there's the question of the sheer volume of materials and trying to cope with them.

MR. NICE: All that is very much in my mind. As to the majority of these -- this particular binder, it is, as I say, the stenographic notes. And those are documents that cannot be resisted as documents of value at some stage for consideration but not necessarily with this witness, because of course they -- as the Chamber will recall, they relate to a period of time before he was in office. Indeed, his account is that this particular committee ceased to operate once he came into office. And he gave evidence about simply one passage that he'd read in one of the minutes. There it is.

JUDGE MAY: Well, it would seem sensible if the witness had the binder, in case there are questions to be asked about it. And I see the ²³⁹⁰⁴ first tab seems to be 34. Is it proposed it should be additional to the exhibits which we already have for this witness?

MR. NICE: Yes. And I think 34 is one that I almost certainly won't rely on. It's too substantial and serves a very limited purpose, so I shouldn't trouble too much about that at the moment. But yes, for ease of ordering and recording, they follow along sequentially.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Milosevic, deal if you would with this binder, with those matters on which the witness specifically can deal himself. If there are other matters with which he can't deal, then of course we will allow you to address us on them or to deal with them with some other witness. Yes. Let us begin.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, don't you think that the fact that Mr. Nice calls additional examination or re-examination in view of these new binders in fact represents the second half time of the examination-in-chief?

JUDGE MAY: No. No. Let us see how we get on. We've got these documents. The Prosecution say they're going to rely on them. We'll have to see whether they are admissible or not. And what we need to do is to start the examination now.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

WITNESS: ZORAN LILIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Lilic, would you please take a look -- ²³⁹⁰⁵ actually, I'm going to start with the binder which relates to the so-called intercepted conversations, the intercepts. And I don't say by chance alleged or so-called because there are things in this material which the term "so-called" -- which merit the term "so-called." Now, Slobodan Milosevic, General Perisic, that particular conversation on the 1st of December, 1995, and the number, Mr. Lilic, is 02263006.

MR. KAY: The witness doesn't have this bundle.

JUDGE MAY: What is this? Mr. Kay, can you assist us in this matter?

MR. KAY: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: I really find this amount of material so late confusing.

MR. KAY: This is Rule 68 material that has been served on the amici and the accused by the Prosecution. It comes as a -- a separate bundle that was delivered to us on the 7th of July, and it is this file that the accused is using to cross-examine the witness with.

JUDGE MAY: Have we copies of it?

MR. NICE: I can find some, yes. There's one copy available at the moment.

JUDGE MAY: Well, the witness had better have that.

MR. KAY: Have mine, as we can share.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. 006, those are the last digits, the last three digits of this ERN ²³⁹⁰⁶ number. And it's in the second half of the file of the binder, because the Serbian text is in part 2, 02963006.

A. I've found it.

Q. All right, fine. So the date is the 1st of December, 1995. And for the most part, these conversations relate to the release of the pilots. And I'd like to draw your attention to the fact that "M" is Milosevic and "P" is Perisic. I assume you're able to glean that yourself.

Now, I'm just going to refer to a couple of points. "Milosevic: Mladic promised that day when we were in Dobanovci to implement, him, he personally, the investigation to see what had happened to the pilots."

Is it true -- do you know that Jacques Chirac called me up in Dayton any number of times to insist that I intervene with respect to the authorities of Republika Srpska to have the pilots found? You remember that, I'm sure.

A. Yes, I remember him asking for that in Dayton. It was even stated that France would place an ultimatum on signing the Dayton Agreement with the release of the pilots, and I do know that he did call for that.

Q. We insisted, if you remember, on the fact they should give us an answer as to what had happened to the pilots, and they took -- for a long time they said that they had no information about the pilots, that they didn't know what had happened to them; isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And then I say to Perisic, he promised the day we were in ²³⁹⁰⁷ Dobanovci that he personally would launch an investigation into the whereabouts of the pilots, because he said he didn't know what had happened to them but he said that he would undertake an investigation to find out. That is what Mladic promised.

A. Yes, that's what Mladic said, and the others said that they had no knowledge as to the whereabouts of the pilots.

Q. And then I go on to say that it was -- that we had to do this post haste because the conference was coming up and I meant the conference in Paris where the Dayton Agreement was to be signed. And I said, "We have to know their fate in the next day or two." And Perisic says, "I've already called him up and he says he's working on it and he's grumbling and complaining a lot because he's encountering problems." So these two municipality presidents are calling him up. "They have to come and see you. I'll do what I can again," and so on. And I say, "There's no problem there. I will receive them all as of Monday onwards, but I find this question critical because the French are now organising the conference. They are the protagonists of everything. They're friends. And we have to start negotiating with them, and I can't give them an answer as to what happened to the pilots. It's not serious. And quite simply, it devalues everything we've done so far." I'll read a little more slowly. Yes, thank you to the interpreters, because they don't have the text.

And then I go on to say, "Please tell him -- let him tell you what he knows straight away and do what he can. I want them found dead or alive. He has to find them." And Perisic says, "Very well." And I once ²³⁹⁰⁸ again insist upon this and say that the whole of the public expects it, and we have to be at the conference over there. So the public expects to know."

"What do they need those two pilots for? Let them find them." And then I once again say, "He promised, when he was here five days ago --" and I'm referring to Dobanovci. And he said, "I didn't delve into that personally, I couldn't have cared at the time, but I am going to take it into my own hands and do it now personally." So if he is a man of his word, let him see it through. So that, then, is clear, I think, Mr. Lilic, our insistence, I mean, and the clear observation that up until that time the authorities of Republika Srpska had refused to look into any information as to the whereabouts of the pilots. And we insisted that they should be found at all cost. Is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And then turn the page, please. Milutinovic is calling me up, and he says, "I apologise for having to call, but it seems that they're making fools of us collectively." And I say to him the following: "Say what you want." And he says: "Karadzic has stated or, rather, conveyed the message by Daniel Schiffer to Chirac, that man Chirac, that Karadzic would release those two pilots in return for a better status for Republika Srpska." And I say, "You don't say." And Milutinovic says, "Yes. I can't believe that they're saying things like that." And then he goes on to mention some writings of Le Figaro newspaper, and "I'll check it out." And then I say, "Well, check it out and call him. Is it possible that they're taking hostages in that way and ²³⁹⁰⁹ making a barter arrangement or blackmail?" And now, our reactions, I say once again, "I can't believe that they're going to be so stupid." And then he says, "Well, we appear to be fools," says Milutinovic towards the end. And I say to him, "We're fools because we want peace." And Milan Milutinovic again says, "Well, quite possibly that he mentioned Schiffer." And I say, "Are you listening to me, Milan? Call him up, because it's impossible that he did something like that. Check it out. And then have them deny it. I don't want -- deny it straight away. Don't shame yourself by doing things like that. Anybody that does things like that, we have nothing to say to him any more and we were resigned because of the statement that reached us," and so on and so forth. The conversation goes on, and I end on the next page and say, "Let them deny this straight away so that they can't blackmail us with these people. It's an ugly thing to do that. This is an opportunity. Fisher gave them the opportunity --" I don't see what I meant there, but anyway, I say, "This is a good opportunity and it's not a good idea for them to blackmail people using human people, human persons." And I say, "Can you explain them to them?" And he says, "Yes, I can." So I insist upon this being done, not only not to complicate matters further but to stick to their word. There's nothing to improve or not improve it. This would be blackmail and the taking of hostages again.

Do you remember all that?

A. Yes. When it comes to those two pilots, I was very well informed. I do remember the efforts that were made to have them released. And you know that I personally took part in their release ultimately. ²³⁹¹⁰

Q. Yes, of course. That's why I want to go through all this, where your participation is quite obvious.

Take a look at the next page, please, 008 are the last three digits of that page, and here is what it says: Slobodan Milosevic talking to an unknown person, and that unknown person you will recognise as being yourself; isn't that right?

A. Yes, that's me. I've had a chance to look through this. That is me.

Q. All right. It says, "Good day, Mr. President. Hello, Mr. President." And I say, "And where are you?" And the answer is, "Here I am in Karadjordjevo." And it said, "I'm sorry, what did you want?" "Well, nothing." And you say, "Well, there's no problem there." I wanted us to meet because you were in Karadjordjevo. And I said, "There's no problem. We won't have much time afterwards. Momir and I are here." And I mean Momir Bulatovic. I wanted to see whether anything could be done, finally, to have those pilots released. Can that man go there and see them for him to show them to him. And if he does that, then this man -- meaning Perisic; right?

A. Yes.

Q. And then we can say that Perisic has seen them if he does manage to see them, and then the chief of the general staff of France can come over for negotiations, and that's all. And you say, "Well, I can come in the space -- can I come within the hour?" And I say, "Yes, not later than that." And you say, "I'll call Perisic." And I say, "Well, say that matters are hotting up and tell him to go to Mladic, to show him whether ²³⁹¹¹ he has the pilots or not, because this is an ongoing agony. We haven't had confirmation from him whether he actually has the pilots. If he shows them the pilots, then in the course of the day we'll organise a meeting with the French." And then your answer is, "I'll see to that with him straight away." And when you say "him," you mean Perisic; right?

A. Yes.

Q. And if he can tell us that he has the pilots, you say, "So Perisic can be a guarantee, a guarantor that he has the pilots."

A. Yes.

Q. So I am insisting that you, in view of your function and post, can send Perisic there to establish whether they have the pilots or not. And then Perisic can refer back to us and tell us how things stand. Then I go on to say, "If he believes him, he doesn't have to go, but then he can tell us in writing and sign it that the man has the pilots." And then I go on to say that, "This is the last train out, high time that this were done." And you say, "I'll see to it."

And then you continue the conversation on the next page, with the individual -- that is to say, you. You say, "I found Perisic. He believes he can get what you're asking for," and so on. And then I say, "He should tell him that if he's going to bring in the pilots, the man will come to take them over. So he should give guarantees that there won't be any problems on that score." And your answer was, "All right, fine. I've told him to write -- to put it down in writing first." And so on.

And you say that you can come to Belgrade. And I say, "Well, ²³⁹¹² don't come to Belgrade before you have the letter, so that we can see what the letter says." And then you go on to explain that you're there with your wife, and I say, "My best regards to your wife." And that's all. And now you have on that same page a conversation between you and Perisic, in which you explain the problem to him. His response was, "I can guarantee that to you." And then, "To hell with what happens to me but that our state guarantees for somebody else's risky business." So does that show that Perisic isn't sure he has the pilots?

A. Well, at that point in time, I don't think anybody knew where the pilots were on our side. Their side, of course, did know.

Q. So not even Perisic knew. And you say to him, "They accept everything Momo asked for and Perisic asked "everything?" And you say, "Everything he asked for. They guarantee everything." And Perisic says, "Yes." And then again you say the following: "Let him write it down. Let him put in writing that they have him. Let him come to talk and negotiate and hand the people over," and so on. And then you go on to say, "We'll call the French only once he confirms that they have them. Otherwise, there's no point." And then you threaten them and say that "If they fail to comply, they will have to bear the consequences."

JUDGE MAY: Why is this being -- what has this been disclosed at this stage in the proceedings? I don't -- I simply don't follow.

MR. NICE: Out of an abundance of caution and on the possibility of it being 68 as against this witness, showing his measure of control. And that is all. It's outside the indictment. ²³⁹¹³

JUDGE MAY: Why wasn't it disclosed earlier?

MR. NICE: Where a decision is changed or where a decision is modulated, one has to act accordingly. But the witness is capable of giving a summary account of all this. And any point that the accused wants to be put can be put summary. And there's one point that I will want to raise in re-examination. That's all. But we also only got it very recently, as a matter of fact, from sources that provided it. But it has very limited value. Nevertheless, we have to be so careful with our 68 obligations that if in doubt, we provide.

JUDGE MAY: Well, Mr. Milosevic, will you take this as expeditiously as you can.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will be very expeditious with these transcripts. But I have to say that Mr. Nice's explanation absolutely is not convincing, that this can be harmful to the witness, because the role of the witness in this is a highly positive one.

JUDGE MAY: He didn't say -- he did not say it would be harmful to the witness. But let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. To be more expeditious, I will skip over to page 13. "Milosevic, with an unknown person, X," I assume --

A. That is me.

Q. That's quite obvious. You say, "Mr. President, this is how things stand. I'm chasing this idiot. He was in Sarajevo. From Sarajevo he went to Kalinovik, from Kalinovik to Srbinje. Anyway, he's walking around ²³⁹¹⁴ the hills," et cetera. And then you say, "Perisic is suggesting two things. I don't know why that we go there together to persuade him with regard to the pilots. That is one possibility. And the other is for him to go there alone." And I reply, "Let him go alone, but let him see whether he has the pilots." You've found that place, haven't you?

A. Yes.

Q. So even Perisic can still not guarantee that they have the pilots. Then I say, "Well, who can provide guarantees?" And you say, "Perisic." And I say, "Let him write that down." And then you tell me what he told you, that he can't do that in relation to another state but he can provide us guarantees. And I say, "Well, let them provide us with guarantees. Let him write down for you that he has them and that this one will bring them over. And then we'll bring the chief of staff of France for this to be over tomorrow." "Very well, Mr. President." So that is it, as far as that intercept is concerned.

Then he's conditioning things. This is page 14. And you are talking to Perisic, asking, "Is my word and your word and Chirac's word and Slobodan's word, are they enough for him," as obviously he's doubtful. Isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you make arrangements for going there together, and that's on page 15. I won't dwell on that any further. And just let me draw attention to page 16. Again, a transcript of a conversation between Mr. Milosevic and an unknown person, and that is you, isn't it?

A. Yes. Only it keeps says "president of the assembly." There are ²³⁹¹⁵ many errors in this transcript.

Q. Yes, there are many errors. But the gist of the conversation is there.

And then you say, "Fine. I'll go there if you say so. There's no question about it." And then you say that "He should come with us to have guarantees that what we have proposed is for sure, that he has them over there. He doesn't have them 60, he has two of them." And I'm asking again, "Well, will he bring them?" "No, he wants to talk to them and then he says he'll come to Belgrade." And I say, "Well, let him come to Belgrade, but you see those men first. You make sure you see them." And you say, "So we should see them." And then several lines later, "And convince him to bring them so that they can be near at hand for him to be able to hand them over." And then you say, "He claims 100 per cent that he has them. We've talked three times just now." And I say, "Yes, it is important for him to say whether he has them or not and for Perisic to say that he has them." And then you reply, "He says he has them 100 per cent. We spoke three times, and he says that the only problem is the Tribunal, that he promised him that and then what happens?" My answer is, "Nothing. Tell him we promise him that we will not surrender him." Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Anyway, we didn't surrender anyone to this illegal Tribunal anyway.

"And give us the men." The reference is to the pilots. And then you say "let me -- should I give him my word?" I say, "Write it down, that we will not surrender him to the Tribunal if he surrenders the ²³⁹¹⁶ pilots," and you say, "Fine." "And don't let him come here, but let him give you the pilots," et cetera. To save time, I won't go into any details. These are marathon-like conversations between you and Perisic regarding guarantees. Mention is made of Slobodan and Chirac, et cetera, et cetera. I won't dwell on this any longer now. On page 25, or rather, 030 are the last digits, we make arrangements for Perisic to host his French counterpart and remind him once again, I say that, "This man cannot go back without taking those men with him."

And then again, on page 31, a conversation between Perisic and Lilic. You say, "I've passed on to Slobodan the main points. I didn't say what the special terms are so as not to cause problems right out. What is important for me, and I think you agree, is that this chief of staff come tomorrow," and the reference is to the chief of staff of the French general staff.

And then, after that, you did go to Republika Srpska, together with Perisic. I cautioned you that they shouldn't show you any idiots. And your answer is, "Well, surely they must speak the language of the country they come from so that they don't cheat you." Isn't that right? And all the whole story ended fortunately, had a happy ending. The pilots were released, and we can see from this that no one among the people in Yugoslavia until the very last moment knew whether those men were in their hands, whether they were alive at all, whether they could be handed over, et cetera.

In your opinion, was it possible to invest more effort than we did ²³⁹¹⁷ to ensure the success of this operation and for the pilots to be found?

A. You know that I was personally involved in this, and at one point you were against my involvement. You said that it would be better for Perisic to go alone. But then we decided that I should go after all. I think that I never had a more difficult task in my life than to save those two pilots, in view of the overall behaviour of the entire main staff, not General Ratko Mladic, who were concealing their whereabouts. And I think that the intelligence administration of the Army of Yugoslavia did everything possible and used all possible channels to find them, and they couldn't, until General Ratko Mladic himself said that he was holding them at Han Pijesak, and even then he didn't want to show them, he just promised to hand them over. I could describe in detail the whole event and the conditions he set and all the things he demanded in return for the pilots. And among other things, that the whole Supreme Council should sign this document. This happened during the night. I know I came to see you at 1.00 a.m.

In any event, I think that as far as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is concerned, an enormous effort was invested to save those pilots in the first place, to save their lives, and that the chief of staff of the French army - I think his name was Jean Douin - himself caused some problems when talking to Ratko Mladic. He didn't want to talk to a man who was on the list of suspected war criminals. But when all is said and done, I think that it ended happily, and I think that it was a good move prior to the signing of the agreement in Paris. What is also interesting, with regard to those pilots is that I ²³⁹¹⁸ think it was the 11th of December when Radovan Karadzic himself called up and he wanted to get the Russian intelligence service involved in this, and I warned Perisic to take care that they don't spoil the whole arrangement made with Ratko Mladic in that way.

The pilots were handed over to General Douin at the bridge at Zvornik safe and sound, and I think they had even been operated on in the hospital in Han Pijesak in Republika Srpska. That would be the story in very brief.

So it was thanks primarily to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that this was achieved. I did sign that famous paper on which Ratko Mladic insisted that he shouldn't be surrendered to The Hague Tribunal, referring and relying to our constitution.

Q. Absolutely so. And that is not at all at issue. That was our position throughout and continues to be my position today. Now, will you please help me. Will you turn the page, 039. It doesn't relate to you, but it does relate to a phenomenon illustrating the kinds of things that can be found in transcripts of this kind. And what is the purpose of planting such documents. 039.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to ask the audiotape of this conversation to be played so that Mr. Lilic and those listening can see that this allegedly is a conversation between my wife and Rajko Banduk, Mladic's secretary, a low-ranking officer, in which she asks him to explain, and at the very beginning TV France is saying something in three parts. Could --

JUDGE MAY: We'll deal with this. First of all, I need to be ^{23919 BLANK PAGE 23920} pointed to the position in this transcript. Where in the English is this, please?

MR. KAY: It's 11/12/95 is the date on the intercept, so --

MR. NICE: [Previous interpretation continues] ...

MR. KAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 11th of December, 1995. Mr. May, this is just a drop in the sea of untruths that are being published daily against me and my wife.

JUDGE MAY: Don't -- don't make speeches at this stage. Now, what is the point that you want to make with this?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I want to prove that this is a complete falsehood, because my wife never spoke to some sort of secretary of Mladic, asking him whether the pilots were alive. Just imagine. It says -- she talks to Rajko as if they were on good terms. And said, "I don't want to be an obstacle to President Milosevic. And we spent our whole life together" and she says that she doesn't want to stand in my way." A whole lot of nonsense. I'd like the sound to be played. Because Mr. Lilic knows my wife and her voice, and this absolutely cannot be her. This is not just a drop in the ocean of lies published daily against me but also as evidence that false documents are being produced here, unverified documents. This is not the yellow press; it should be least one step above.

JUDGE MAY: If the witness can identify the voice. Mr. Lilic, do you think you can identify the accused's wife's voice? ²³⁹²¹

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I think I could.

JUDGE MAY: I don't know if we can get it played.

MR. NICE: I'm not even sure we have the actual audiotapes. We have the transcripts. These have not been produced by us. They've been provided to the accused under Rule 68 as material coming into our possession. We know that the witness confirms the accuracy of the transcripts that he's reviewed, but there's no part of our case that the other material is going in.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Well, no doubt you'll see if you could find the tapes, if that's been put in evidence.

We haven't got the tape.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Lilic, please look at the transcript itself. Look at the end of the page, please. "I don't wish to be an obstacle to President Milosevic." It's not -- I'm not saying that this is a suspicious conversation. This person is enquiring into the life of the pilots. But this is a fabrication simply that my wife would communicate at all with the secretary of General Mladic.

JUDGE MAY: The witness can answer -- you've made your point. The witness can answer as far as he can.

Mr. Lilic, do you know anything at all about this? You've heard what the accused is -- is putting. Can you say whether -- can you add anything to it? That's his account. Do you know if Mrs. Markovic was in touch with this man? Can you help either way?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether she was in ²³⁹²² touch with him, Mr. May. But if I may, I have read through these transcripts. I said of some of them that they certainly correspond to the time and events I was involved in at the time, but I must admit that I was sincerely astonished when I read this text that Mr. Milosevic is referring to and also the method of communication with Warrant Officer Banduk, surprised by any direct link between them and surprised by the contents of this text, because the day before that I was in Bosnia. I was in Han Pijesak on the 10th of December. So my astonishment was extreme when I saw this, and I said that I wasn't sure that this was possible. If it's possible, then it indicates quite different relationships that I was not aware of.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is anything like this possible at all?

A. I'm really not sure, especially this last conversation where you're calling from your daughter's on a private telephone, talking about such things. I don't know. I must be quite frank. This was -- I was astonished by this text.

Q. And this woman says, "I'm calling from my daughter's apartment." It's absolute nonsense, this. Isn't that clear, at least?

A. The text appears to show that Mrs. Markovic has extremely good relations with Ratko and Tolimir, which was not the case.

Q. She didn't even know who Tolimir was, nor the generals that are mentioned there, and you know that very well.

But I would like to tape to be played for the witness to be able to hear it, and I would like to hear it too. It's really disgraceful that ²³⁹²³ something like this should be tendered.

JUDGE MAY: Have you got any more questions?

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I must repeat: This isn't being tendered as evidence. It's being produced by the accused because material of this kind has to be produced by us to him for him to use. But if he doesn't believe there's any truth in it, then it's a waste of time for him to refer to it, because I'm not going to refer to it.

JUDGE MAY: They're not going to rely on this in evidence. Now, let us move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Very well. Fine.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And now we come to the last conversation from these transcripts, which I would like you to comment on. The page is 042. It says: "Slobodan Milosevic calling from Karadjordjevo with Ljubica, Zoran Lilic, and General Momcilo Perisic, or rather, the other way round. You were in Karadjordjevo with your wife and Perisic and I'm talking to you and Perisic; right? But it doesn't matter. That's just a technical point. First, a few sentences -- I exchange a few words with your wife. I wish her bon voyage, because you were off to China and so on. And then she sends her regards to my wife and she says, "Here's Zoran for you. Goodbye." Milosevic says, "Hello, Zoki." Lilic says, "Here I am with Momcilo and we're discussing something," and Milosevic says, "That's very good. It would be a good idea for him to contact these friends of his because it would be an important thing" - and bear in mind that this is the 16th of December, 1995 - "it would be important for them to assume a ²³⁹²⁴ positive position at the assembly, not with respect to the plan. They have to accept the plan. That is not the problem. And they have accepted it. They have accepted it. But they must realise that the most important thing now is to have good relations with IFOR, to have good relations with these peace forces." Isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So the agreement was accepted. We discussed it in the previous conversation when we were discussing Dayton. And then I go on to say the following: "The only question is: Are they going to confirm the thing that they are allies with the Americans or are they going to leave that to the Muslims? We have traditional relationships of alliance with the Americans," and so on and so forth.

And then I say, "bon voyage," and then I ask to speak to Perisic, who spoke to me in your presence. And then I say the same thing to him, "It would be a good idea if you were to hear -- contact those people of yours across the Drina." And he says, "Yes." "With respect to the assembly." There's just one question, as the plan is no longer contested. There's just one outstanding question that is important for them. Are they going to show from the very beginning that we are in an alliance with the Americans, or is that alliance going to be left to the Muslims?" And Perisic says, "Yes, I understand." We always had traditional allied relationships with them. The Muslims were always at war with them. So now is the best time to assert the traditional alliance and not leave it to the Muslims. And I think that somebody should represent -- should do something along those lines and to represent their army before the ²³⁹²⁵ assembly and speak. So you suggest that to them, please. You put it to them, please."

And then I say again, "What I told you, that Clinton told me in Paris that those Mujahedins would slit his throat first and then the throats of all the Americans." And then I sad, "So the Serb side is expected to behave towards them as towards friends and allies, and they must be able to demonstrate that from day one. That is the basic point. Everything else has been solved. I just don't want them to be led astray by that man over there with all his nonsenses. That's the only important thing."

And then I state again, "Let's see how things will evolve today, because there might be individuals over there. And I ask you that your service take this into account. I say this to Perisic, and see how people are acting, because anybody working against --" and we mean the mission and the implementation of the Dayton Accords -- "anybody working against that," I say, "against the interests of the people and peace, we're going to arrest them all. So do that, please, so we know who is on whose side. See to it." And then I repeat at the end, I say to him, "It's important that the army at the assembly should state this. We were always traditional allies. America is there and we want those relations to be placed in the best possible status urgently. So relations and cooperation are the number-one priority."

Do you remember that conversation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you also remember that we endeavoured at all events that ²³⁹²⁶ after the Dayton Agreements were signed, that we were to -- we wielded all our influence to prevent a single incident from breaking out. And in actual fact, no incidents did come to pass.

Now, I'd like to go on to the next tab -- or rather, not tab but binder.

JUDGE MAY: Let's deal first of all with these tapes. Do you want them exhibited, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, yes, I do, Mr. May, because they indicate quite clearly not only goodwill and maximum efforts on our part but that good faith should be -- should prevail in all these undertakings.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kay, first of all, thank you for the loan. I think I'll return it.

Is there any reason why we shouldn't exhibit them? It would seem sensible to do it.

MR. KAY: No.

JUDGE MAY: The Defence rely on it. It shows -- it shows criticism of the RS leadership, that they weren't working together.

MR. KAY: It's crucial to the accused's case, and it's plainly material that has been introduced through this witness that he's correctly identified in the terms that the accused has put to him, and thereby adopted the material. And plainly it would be admissible. This witness was very much involved with those events that we're dealing with and was able to speak of the accuracy of the content.

JUDGE MAY: We'll get an exhibit number for them, and then I want ²³⁹²⁷ to raise something about the binder.

MR. KAY: They're transcripts, of course, at this stage.

JUDGE MAY: The transcripts of tapes, not the tapes.

MR. KAY: Yes, rather than tapes. We have to wait the originals, if they are available.

THE REGISTRAR: D160.

JUDGE MAY: They will be exhibited, and no doubt copies can be made available for the Bench.

The next matter I want to raise is the status of this binder, which I do not understand why this is arriving now.

MR. NICE: Well, it was a mistake. I wasn't intended to be provided now. It's a sort of bit of good fortune for the accused. That is the exhibits that I would have taken Lilic to -- Mr. Lilic to in re-examination in certain circumstances, almost certainly. It also includes the stenographic notes of the meeting of the Council for Coordination, and those have got to be dealt with because those are left over from last time.

JUDGE MAY: They -- is that right, that they had not been provided at the time?

MR. NICE: Let me remind you of the history: Shortly before the last hearing, there was a concluded 54 bis application with some decisions. These minutes were not the subject of an order, and to our surprise and pleasure they were provided voluntarily on, I think, the morning of the first day that Mr. Lilic gave evidence, is my recollection, something like that. ²³⁹²⁸ We heard about it, and we were able to produce them because they were flown up specially on the day that he last gave evidence on the last occasion. And I had announced that it might be thought convenient simply for him to identify them so that they could be then processed as an identified exhibit. In the event, we ran out of time and the Court thought it better to put back their identification until a later stage. And so that is an independent exercise that needs to be done at some stage today, and that relates to the largest physical part of this binder. Those documents have yet to be translated in full, and I have simply two extracts from them translated that I want to raise with the witness at some stage, one that he's already dealt with in evidence from memory.

So that accounts for a number of these exhibits, and the number that it relates to is in this particular bundle, it's numbers 39 and 40, 41, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

JUDGE MAY: What it -- the remaining documents, have they been exhibited to date, or are you seeking now to put them in?

MR. NICE: No. They're documents that I would be coming to in re-examination. Some of them are new documents that have simply arrived since Mr. Lilic gave evidence, a couple of them, and the others are documents that, in light of the answers he gives, I wish to put to him along with one or two other exhibits already produced. Obviously, typically he would not have seen these in advance of the conclusion of his cross-examination and nor would the accused, so that they come to the accused in a sense by way of the accused's good fortune. But the ²³⁹²⁹ appropriate course would be for him to conclude his cross-examination in lines with his earlier plan, and for the matter to unfold in the usual way.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Except that would mean he wouldn't be able to cross-examine about the new documents you're putting in. So I think it's better today --

MR. NICE: Yes. I can identify those to him in any event, because they weren't available to him before. Let me just find their numbers.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll allow the cross-examination to continue.

Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: Yes. New -- I'm very concerned about new material coming in in re-examination, because it makes it very difficult for the accused to respond in any effective form to it. And it may have -- the evidence itself may have a completely different perspective from his position. We've seen that in a number of cases with documents.

MR. NICE: 37 and 38 are the documents that are -- are simply not available before, but I think - and I'll check this - I think that's the only two that are other than previously available.

MR. MAY: I think it's right that the accused should have the opportunity to cross-examine on the entire binder.

MR. KAY: Yes.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I see you -- your headsets ²³⁹³⁰ weren't on. I demand for reasons of principle that the tape of the alleged conversation between my wife and that warrant officer, where she's asking whether the pilots are alive, should be placed for expert analysis to see whether the voice is hers. You have examples of her voice in interviews and in other things. Because I don't think forgeries of this kind ought to be allowed by the other side.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we don't have the tape. I've made it plain twice.

JUDGE MAY: Let me deal with it in this way and explain the position: The tape is not available. The Prosecution do not have it. We will see if it can be obtained.

But you should also understand this, that the Prosecution are not putting this forward as part of their case. It's merely part -- documents that they've disclosed to you. Somebody has passed it to them and they've passed it on to you. They're not going to rely on it. Now, if it becomes relevant, we will try and pursue the matter. But for the moment, it is not evidence at all in the case. So whatever its background, it doesn't really matter.

Now, let's -- let's move on, because time is -- is limited.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm not speaking about the context. The context is positive. She's interested about the lives of the pilots and she speaks about the French interest. But I'm speaking about maliciousness and that a contact of some kind is indicated. And it is relevant because it's just a drop in the ocean of lies that are being put out every day precisely against my wife, myself, and my family. So it ²³⁹³¹ is relevant.

JUDGE MAY: The relevance here is what is evidence in this particular case, and that is what we're concerned with. Now, let's move on. You can ask questions now about this binder. Does the witness have the binder? He has it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I do hope that you have the file too and that you can see that it numbers several hundred pages and was disclosed to me last night -- or rather, yesterday, once you had left the courtroom.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Lilic, first of all, let's just take a look at this. They are stenographic notes from the extended meeting of the Council for dovetailing positions of state policy. It was formed and presided over by the then-president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic. That's right, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. He was a highly respected personage, the greatest living Serb writer. He is the senior of us all. He is the eldest. And his desire was to collect together the representatives of Serbia, Montenegro, Krajina, Republika Srpska, to hold consultations about political issues; isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So to the best of all intentions, to set a unified political approach to questions and issues having to do with Serb national interests; is that right? ²³⁹³²

A. Yes, that can be clearly seen from the stenographic notes themselves.

Q. So is it then clear that the intention was a constructive one on the part of Mr. Cosic and in all respects a good one? And judging by what we're going to go through now, it is obvious that it is oriented towards peace; is that right?

A. Well, this council was never a secret. It was -- it made public for the information media individual positions taken by it, of course, once they had been decided, and it was -- the decision to set it up in the first place was made public too. It was public knowledge.

Q. Yes. I'm just speaking of this good intention and the efforts made of the then-president of the FRY to gather together the leadership and in the function of peaceful solutions and the best possible solutions to hold consultations of this kind. Isn't that right? Now, in these stenographic notes, we have several interventions on my part recorded, and I notice that Mr. Nice has highlighted just one, one of those several interventions. However, the comprehensive nature of the efforts made at that meeting would be distorted were we not to take a look at at least some of the many interventions made at the meeting. And now please turn to page 39. I don't want to give you the ERN number because the stenographic notes are paginated, so it is on page 39.

JUDGE MAY: Which tab? Which tab is it?

MR. NICE: Probably 40, because he's starting there. There are no translations of these. They are not ready yet.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. It is tab 39. It is the ²³⁹³³ meeting of the 21st of January, 1993.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I assist you? It was the 9th of January, 1993.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I have it as being the 21st of January, 1993. They're the stenographic notes from the expanded session, 21st of January, 1993, and the number is 02944123.

A. Yes. I have 3994 as the last digits on my page.

Q. Then it's another number and another document. I don't have the 9th of January document, I fear.

JUDGE MAY: Have you got -- Mr. Lilic, it's tab 39. Perhaps if someone would just assist the witness with the tab numbers.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance, it is tab 40 is the one of the 9th of January, according to my binder. So maybe under tab 40 Mr. Lilic has what is tab 39 in the other binder. So we're talking about these two tabs, 39 and 40.

MR. NICE: No.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness look at tab 39. Look at 39.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've found it, the 21st of January. Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Have you found it?

A. Yes. ²³⁹³⁴

Q. Please, before we consider this page or these pages that I should like to comment on briefly and quote from, I have noticed - and maybe you have the same document - that out of the whole minutes, only one insert has been chosen in English, and it comes before the Serbian stenographic notes. And this abstract is a quotation of Zivota Panic, General Zivota Panic. I assume that Mr. Nice did this to ask you about that, so I will take the opportunity to put a question to you about it because afterwards they won't let me have the floor.

What has been translated into English is to be found in the Serbian language on page 34 of the original stenographic notes. Have you found it, I assume?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. I will not analyse the entire text. It begins with Dobrica Cosic asking, "Who wants the floor? I give the floor to General Panic." Then it says, "Zivota Panic," and he speaks. And then on page 34, in the central large paragraph, he explains that the situation is very bad. He addresses himself to Cosic, saying, "What is happening on the left bank of the Drina around Srebrenica, Bajina Basta, Bratunac, is so bad, and you, Mr. President, should know that it's a disgrace for the Serbian people. They're fleeing. They're abandoning everything. The aid we are giving them in weapons, ammunition is in certain houses in the village. We were not able to pull it out. We are preparing to destroy it. That is what was left behind by the JNA."

And it is the following that I wish to ask you to comment on, because he says, "In personnel, the army -- in terms of personnel, the ²³⁹³⁵ army should not go to alien territory but volunteers should be found, some men who will save that part of the territory," and so on. So my question is: Is it clear that since the founding of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and after the withdrawal of the JNA and the formation of the Army of Yugoslavia, there were no units of the Army of Yugoslavia that could be sent to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Because he himself says, "We cannot send personnel to foreign territory." So the question is: Is it true that whether we're talking of the Republic of Serbia or the Republic of Montenegro, either, that only volunteers went to Bosnia and Krajina?

A. I spoke at some length about this during the previous hearing, and I even underlined that after 1992 not a single armed unit of the Army of Yugoslavia was located in the territory of the Republic of Srpska upon orders of the Supreme Defence Council. And this also applies to the period when Mr. Cosic was president. Not then and not throughout your term of four years. And your term of office ended on the 25th of June, 1997.

Q. So that is two years after the Dayton Agreement and the cessation of the war; is that right? So you're able to testify about the entire period.

Now, please look at page 39. Is this, too, the principled position that I advocated within our leadership in the republic and which I hope you are very familiar with? I'm asking for the floor. This is on page 39. And I say, "I suggest that we try to see in concrete terms what awaits us in Geneva." We are discussing the conference in Geneva. And I ²³⁹³⁶ say that "Momir and Sveta are right." And I'm referring to Momir Bulatovic and Sveta Stojanovic. That is also my opinion. "Our position is that of a principled participant who is advocating a peaceful settlement to the crisis, and we have done our utmost for a principled platform to be defined." Isn't that right? Isn't that our position throughout, Mr. Lilic?

A. Yes.

Q. And then I say, I quote: "Our attitude, that is, that of the delegation of Yugoslavia, is quite different with regards to maps, military agreements, and other specific questions, which on the basis of the principles that we have advocated truly belong to issues that the three parties should negotiate." I mean the Muslim, the Serbian, and Croat, within Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. I quote again: "Our position should be one of principle, in favour of peace and a consensus among the three parties for an equitable protection, an even-handed protection of the interests of all three nations." Is that what it says, Mr. Lilic?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you familiar with my position which I underlined frequently and emphasised that peace in Bosnia would be achieved once the interests of all three nations are treated even-handedly? Wasn't that my position from the very outset?

A. Yes, that is true. And that was repeated umpteen times, not your thesis, but your principled position.

Before you continue with your questions, Mr. May, if I may, I would like to inform you and the Trial Chamber with the following: I did ²³⁹³⁷ see four out of seven of these stenographic notes in 1993 to inform myself with them to the extent that this was necessary in view of the position I took as president of FRY. I was not a participant in all these meetings that were held. I can only analyse them from the position of my knowledge and familiarity with the political situation but not as a participant. So please appreciate that position, if I'm not very precise about it.

JUDGE MAY: We'll -- we'll bear that in mind. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes. But surely you consider yourself quite qualified to assess the political nature and content of certain quotations.

A. Yes. That's what I just said.

Q. So that was the policy that I advocated, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, look at the next paragraph: "Therefore, we support all the three parties, and that they should sit round the table and agree on specific matters, maps, other military, and other matters. That is the principled position of our delegation, which means that we support all three parties and their mutual agreement. Whatever that may be, we will support it." Isn't that right?

And then I go on to say that "We should not interfere into what the three parties should negotiate." On the next page, second paragraph, I say, "I spoke to Vance today and he asked me directly 'what do you think the approach to maps should be?' I told him quite frankly that the maps should be approach with a great deal of patience and as a highly delicate ²³⁹³⁸ matter and that maps were factual matters." And then I mentioned the 1991 census. I say that "We have the 1981 map, and the principle should be that territory taken by force should not be accepted and existing maps indicate what belongs to whom regarding the borders of the provinces." This is all part of the Vance-Owen Plan, when they organised and drew up provinces that were to be set up in Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So you have the censuses. You have everything. We shouldn't -- I don't say that we do not accept but that territory taken by force should not be recognised and that things should be solved in a principled manner. Then I go to point out -- and this is on page 42. I will skip over things. I say in the third paragraph, fourth line from the top, Since there is reference there to the entire Geneva package, including military matters, I say, "I am not a military expert and I don't see -- I don't know what is very important and what is not. We have a principled position, and that is there can be no one-sided disarming. That principled position is something we can defend with a clear conscience." And then I repeat again: "We must respect the principle that territory taken by force cannot be acknowledged, but this applies far more to the Croats than to the Serbs," et cetera. And then I say, "If a military agreement is agreed upon, we've taken an enormous step forward for the shootings to stop and for these things to be done by political means." And then there's a comment as to who is for peace and who is for war. So is it quite clear what, as a matter of principle, Serbia, and I personally as the president of Serbia, were advocating at that Council for ²³⁹³⁹ Coordination of Positions that was being held with the highest representatives listed present?

Will you now look at page 47, please. When I intervene, after it is said that it is contradictory for problems to be solved quickly, I say, "It is in contradiction with the situation. It is normal and logical for them to push the military document in the interest of a cessation of the conflict." So I am saying that it is -- that we should accept as normal their insistence of the military document because it is in the interest of the cessation of hostilities, as soon as possible. And then I cannot remember - and will you please remind me --

MR. NICE: Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: We don't seem to be getting to a question. And can I raise now, just before we break, the general approach the Chamber, and we, and the accused, and the amici may be obliged to take in relation to records of this type. I've referred to it before, and I think the use of this type of record has got to be seen in the history of the production of the records to us and the problems that that has created. But immediately, there doesn't seem to be a question. It just seems to be --

JUDGE MAY: I'm allowing him to read. If he wants to read into the record, he can. He's entitled to rely on this. Yes. Go on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. May. You have surprised me pleasantly.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ^{23940 BLANK PAGE 23941}

Q. Mr. Lilic, Vladimir Vojvodic should be a general; isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Because I know Vladimir Vojvodic who was the head of the military medical academy. I can't remember this one. Was -- what was he?

A. I think that is the one, actually. I'm not sure.

Q. You mean the doctor? Oh, it could be.

A. Because I think he was in Mr. Cosic's team.

Q. Oh, yes. Quite. Perhaps. Now, let's see. He explains on page 51: "Vladimir, Vojvodic, he says, that must be done, because that is a precondition. That is what it says, an agreement on peace. That is the heading." And then Ilija Djukic takes the floor. Ilija Djukic at the time was the Minister for Foreign Affairs?

A. Yes.

Q. "Vlado, but they intimated they would seek a complete cease-fire at midnight Saturday." Vladimir Vojvodic says, "That is something new." Then Slobodan Milosevic, "That should be accepted immediately. It's something that we should even propose, Saturday, midnight, a complete cessation of fire, and we should abide by it and respect it." Is that what it says?

A. Yes, that is what it says.

Q. Then Karadzic: "No, it's better for them to propose because if we make the proposal then they call into question the second part of the plan. It's better to put it forward at private meetings and with ²³⁹⁴² friends." And I say, "Yes, but we should accept straight away a complete cessation of hostilities on Saturday midnight."

Is it possible to insist in more categorical terms than this, "accept immediately what they are suggesting, midnight Saturday? They said something new and I react by saying, "It should be accepted immediately. It should even be our proposal, a complete cessation of fire on Saturday midnight and we should respect it."

A. Yes, that is what it says.

Q. Let me try and finish this. Again on page 54, Slobodan Milosevic: "As there's a great deal of discussion about this, the Assembly of Republika Srpska at Pale has taken a favourable position, and I say, "Let's be specific. Last time a paper of 9 points was put on the table. I believe that that piece of paper with nine points will be verified." And then the next sentence is, "The reply of the Serbian side is yes, because the decision of the assembly is yes." Before that, there are comments about it, but I'm saying that the answer is yes. "It will be a trick that I believe will be resorted to, and that is the question will be asked whether the Serb side has any reservations in that connection," et cetera, "in order to detract from the value of the positive outcome of the Assembly meeting at Pale, because some parties will insist on that, not Vance and Owen, but they will intervene with them to that effect. The answer should be no tricks and no reservations. This nine-point document has been accepted. Therefore, we have opened the way to discussions on other matters; maps, a military agreement, et cetera, so we shouldn't fall into the trap of admitting that there were any kind of reserves there, ²³⁹⁴³ that we are saying, 'Yes, but.' It is not 'Yes, but.' It is not 'Yes, but.' It is 'Yes.' In response to the paper, the document put on the table in Geneva at our plenary meeting that we held on Tuesday. And if they'd note that in plenary --"

JUDGE MAY: We must bring this to a close now. It's time for an adjournment.

Mr. Nice, you wanted to say something.

MR. NICE: Yes. I wanted to explain what I was going to propose as a way of dealing with this type of record.

Self-evidently we've always wanted this material to be available to the Court, because if it's the precise words of the accused, then it's really the best evidence of what he was thinking and saying at the time. That is why we've pursued these documents since we first learnt of their existence from this witness. We've managed to produce for you the Dobanovci documents, which were tab 20 of the Lilic exhibit, and we're still hoping to get for you the rather larger volume of material from the Supreme Defence Council minutes, at which this witness indeed was a chairman and participant. We know there's a -- perhaps a short delay, but they aren't yet with us, and the Chamber will also recall that the witness was not inclined to deal with even the meetings at which he'd been a participant without having a full record before him. But if we get all those documents before you in due course, then there will be a long record of what the accused said in meetings of this kind. Now, it seemed to me that with that quantity of material coming late, through no fault of ours, because we've been trying to get hold of ²³⁹⁴⁴ it one way or another for nearly two years, the better course would probably be for all of us to read the material once it's in translation outside court, if that is a possibility, thus to restrict cross-examination on the material to what -- to that which can be conveniently accommodated within the limited time available to us. Because otherwise -- and I'm not, of course, standing in the way of the material going in; to the contrary, I want it all to go in. And I of course know in general terms what this amounts to, although it isn't available in cross-examination. To allow it to be read in, if it becomes the practice, will be enormously time consuming. So I made some reference to this on the last occasion when I expressed the hope the documents would in due course, as it were, speak for themselves or be capable of being read rather than being read into the record. And that is something I would urge the Chamber to consider because of the real problems of time. Fundamentally, I stick by the position that if this is - I have no reason to doubt it - the precise words of the accused in various meetings, it's obviously valuable material. The question is simply how to handle it.

JUDGE MAY: The question is the fair way in which the deal with it.

How long is this witness here for?

MR. NICE: Well, he's only here for today. I don't know about his availability for tomorrow. But, Your Honour, I mean, thinking, as it were, ahead or back, had we had the material earlier, we might have been able to schedule it and present it through a witness or an expert. But it ²³⁹⁴⁵ simply hasn't -- hasn't arrived until now. That's the problem.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We'll consider the position and we'll consider the time which should be available.

MR. NICE: But I realise you've already ruled against me on this, but it would be my submission that for a witness who has said he's not even prepared to deal with the meetings where he was a participant, say, with a record, there must be a limited value to the answers he can give on meetings at which he wasn't present.

The Chamber will recall that he, apart from the one extract we've looked at in part, which was translated, he -- he was struck by one other entry, which we can see at the beginning of tab 40. He gave an account of that. And this is the -- as it were, the full and corrected version of that. And those are the only two excerpts I'd be relying on.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: We have to balance the various interests in this case in deciding how to progress from here. We have in mind what the Prosecution said about time, of course. At the same time, the accused must be entitled, faced with this vast volume of documents, to make use of them and to cross-examine upon them, on matters he considers relevant. But we also have to take account the interests of the witness who has returned to give evidence, here to assist the Court, who now also finds ²³⁹⁴⁶ himself confronted with a battery of documents, his having agreed to come back for an hour and a half. As against that, we have the general interests of justice.

We've come to this conclusion: Having regard to the matter which the accused has to deal with today and having regard to the fact that the amici, I think, asked for half an hour and the Prosecution half an hour, we shall give them the last session to share between them. This next session we will allow for cross-examination, which means the accused will have had over two and a half hours this morning, which we deem to be sufficient.

So, Mr. Milosevic, you've got the next session, if you want it, if you require it, to cross-examine the witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So a shortened session, Mr. May. But nonetheless, I'll do my best to get through my main points.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And not to lose time, let me start, Mr. Lilic. Would you please open tab 4 -- no, 40, I'm sorry, tab 40, which is also -- which is also the stenographic notes from an extended session for the council on the dovetailing of positions on state policy, dated the 9th of January, 1993, the Council for Coordination. And as you've taken a look at both these stenographic notes, they actually make up a whole, don't they?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, with the first stenographic notes, Mr. Nice highlighted a portion and had it translated in English, the one we discussed with Zivota Panic and his statement. And we explained that nobody from the army could ²³⁹⁴⁷ go across the Drina River.

Now, with these second lot of minutes, which is -- makes up a whole with the first part, he highlighted another portion, that is to say, a short intervention by me, and had it translated into English, but we'll come to that later on, when the time comes, according to the order of things. There were quite a number of interventions from my part, on my part, and this one instance in the context of all the others is a very good one too.

Now, take a look, please, at the stenographic notes. I'll try and get through them as quickly as possible. But look at page 34, please. Page 34, the penultimate paragraph. And I'm going to start off by reading out the third sentence. We're all speaking round the table, and I assume we all share each other's opinions, and then I go on to quote what I said at the time. "It is our strategic goal that the Serb people in the Balkans should be free and equal. Freedom and equality for the Serb people in the Balkans implies each and every possibility for it to assert fully and realise its interests."

And then I go on to conclude at the end of that paragraph, "For me it is less important through harmony, institutional solutions, and stages that goal is to be reached, and what is much more important for me is how many people are going to die for those goals and whether anybody ought to lay down their lives at all for any of those goals." So was that always our position? We are not seeking anything more than equality. We want to be equal and free. Isn't that right, Mr. Lilic?

A. Yes. Many of us took the same position that you put forward here, ²³⁹⁴⁸ and those were our positions of principle and publicly declared positions. So that's not just something that happened at this meeting.

Q. And I'm sure you'll remember when the declaration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established and when the constitution was enacted the declaration was registered in the United Nations as an official document of our country, by the way, and it stated that "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has no territorial pretensions vis-a-vis the former Yugoslav republics." Do you remember that?

A. Yes. That was the document when the new constitution was enacted.

Q. And I'm sure you'll also remember that I stated publicly at the assembly in Pale, I stressed the goal, the objective which was freedom and equality and not -- nothing more than that, and of course nothing less than that.

And then, take a look at page 35, the next page. I say that "Nobody should lose their lives, regardless of the institutional phases and stages necessary for the negotiations, that one should be persistent in negotiating." And then I go on to conclude, at the top of the page, that "Even one single head less for the realisation of goals, which means if even one man is killed, that is always more than a phase, inter-phase, step, inter-step, in an institutional solution on negotiations being conducted." So what I am saying is that we must insist on negotiations and a peaceful solution regardless of how long those negotiations will last and how many negotiations we have to go through. Was that our position and policy, the policy we pursued?

A. Yes. ²³⁹⁴⁹

Q. Now take a look at page 36, please, where I state the following: I mention the talks with Cyrus Vance and the formula, in inverted commas, because this is taken over from a document prepared by them, "Three constituent nations, peoples." And then we say that "That formula must be asserted in the ten principles, three constituent nations, peoples." And I say - and then he said - "All right. Very well. Let's do it this way. Let's have the first principle read that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a decentralised state composed of three constituent peoples and organised into provinces with a high degree of the exercise of power and authority." So that is what the international mediators agreed to. That was our goal, and that was a function of the fact that the Serb people should be free and equal, never to the detriment of the other two peoples. Was that always our policy?

A. Yes. And in this case, I think it was -- it referred to a preparation of that future, the future constitution should the Vance-Owen Plan be realised. So this term "constituent peoples" is a very important one, "three constituent peoples."

Q. At the end of page 36 there, the last sentence, "If you go with the principle of three constituent peoples and their equality, then I assume those three peoples must arrive at the definition of their constitution." So we strove to have these three constituent peoples define their constitution together themselves.

And then, I'm sure you'll remember, this was another topic of our discussions. I think that after Dayton you signed this with the representatives of Republika Srpska, that is to say, the agreement, ²³⁹⁵⁰ special relations or --

A. Yes, special relations.

Q. This was a topical issue. So I say -- another question that I broached was the decisive exclusion of coming into relationship with others, which Vance took in fairly well and said that that question wasn't to be raised, to enter into a relationship with others, that that could be relativised and improved.

So is it clear that we accept -- we were ready to accept any solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina which showed a respect for the equality of the constituent nations and it implied that Bosnia-Herzegovina was a single state?

A. Yes. But the three sides were to reach an agreement.

Q. Yes. And that with full conscience is the only proper course and principle to take. I hope you'll agree with that.

A. Yes.

Q. Now take a look at page 50, because this also relates to this -- these relationships. Once again, "Slobodan Milosevic: Regional institutions are not excluded at all and I broached the question with Vance." And then I go on to say, "With Serbia, for example. Within the of the former Yugoslavia we had relations with the Northern Rhine area, for example, that is the Westfalia German province of the North Rhine or with an Italian province, for example." As there, we had the Heilongjiang province of China as this relationship and with Russia within the Soviet Union, so there was no restriction for relations of that kind. "Tomorrow, for example, the province of Banja Luka" - which were the provinces as ²³⁹⁵¹ they were drawn up by Vance and Owen in their plans - "will have relationships with the province of Vojvodina, economic and cultural ones, others. They would sign protocols, exchange various matters and so on. Is that what it says?

A. Yes.

Q. So we're focussing on cooperation along those lines. And then I go on to say that "All this can be incorporated into the writing of the constitution." Therefore, it is not something that is being challenged. We're talking about the set-up for Bosnia-Herzegovina, that there are no pretensions on that score.

I should just like us to take a look at Cosic's intervention. He took the floor and came out in favour strongly of continuing the negotiations and that all that should be done is negotiate, on no account to go to war. And Cosic says, "What we must not do" - on page 55, at the bottom - "is to interrupt our negotiations. I'm afraid, Radovan" - and he's addressing Karadzic - "that as the two of us took part in the negotiations in Geneva that with regard to your proposal, which I agree to, we're excluding ourselves from the Geneva negotiations. This should not happen for the reasons well known to us." And then in the next paragraph he goes to on say, "Therefore, I strive and propose that we hold negotiations at all costs. Negotiations must be held at all cost, which means basically to accept the proposals tabled by them and then to fight for its modification -- their modification." Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So Cosic's position is quite clear, and his efforts to negotiate, ²³⁹⁵² that we must negotiate and negotiate until a solution is ultimately found. Now we come to page 69, and that is the portion that Mr. Nice provided for us in English and extracted from the context of the rest. And I say -- it says "Slobodan Milosevic." "Please, I have to interrupt you. Paspalj said" -- I have to stop you. You've got this, Mr. May, in English. It is the only excerpt from the two minutes, and everything I said in my aspirations for peace.

"Paspalj said that we had to have the unity of the Serbian people and de facto we do, because objectively speaking, on all levels, political, military, economic, culture, educational, we have that unity. The problem now is how we could get recognition of this unity, that is, how we could legalise this unity, how we can transform the situation which de facto exists and which could de facto not be threatened, how could we transform it into both de facto and de jure. Therefore, this past, de jure, to get to that, is like --" and then this in inverted commas -- "a small labyrinth." So is that clear that we're referring to negotiations there, Mr. Lilic?

A. Yes. This whole portion relates to negotiations.

Q. Yes, re: negotiations. "But, we will never allow a change in this de facto situation, and we will achieve things through the 'labyrinth', if not in half a year, then in a year; if not in a year, then in two. What will we gain? We will gain a decrease in the deaths and therefore preserve our people. Everything must be sacrificed for the people, except the people."

Therefore, within the context of everything I said when I took the ²³⁹⁵³ floor, is this yet another example that negotiations should be continued and that the situation should be solved through negotiations? And then Dobrica Cosic goes on to say that he is in complete agreement, and we continue.

And then I go on to say - and these are the most important things for me - the last two words or page 69, that is where this is. "If it says in the first principle constituent people, nation, then we have finished our job." A constituent nation. So that is what we wish to assert and nothing more than that. Isn't that right, Mr. Lilic?

A. Yes.

Q. I'll do my best to abridge this next portion. Once again, on page 79, there's a brief intervention on my part, once again with regard to the papers. I say, "They complicate matters too much." And I say, "All they have to do is to change it and put in 'constituent nation' and lighten some of the other things and then that is a good basis for you to sit down and prepare the constitution, the long-term preparations for the constitution." And that is what I had to say that time. On page 82, we go back to cooperation between the provinces, and I asked whether the Banja Luka province can have relationships with Vojvodina. Of course it is logical that it can, logical and normal. And that is the response to the question raised by the Prime Minister of the day, Kontic. Is that right, Mr. Lilic?

A. Yes, that is what it says here in the stenographic notes.

Q. Now, somebody interjects. I don't remember who Zdravko Zecevic was. He says, "What borders? Borders can only be established through ²³⁹⁵⁴ war." Slobodan Milosevic: "No. These borders, with slight adjustments, will be excellent borders. How many -- how much of the percentage of Bosnia-Herzegovina is in these borders? Radovan Karadzic says "40 per cent." Well, this will be increased to 50. There are some 20 that are in dispute at the moment. And Karadzic says, "Posavina and Podrinje are the ones under question." And in Dayton wasn't the agreement 49/51?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, that was the solution, in fact, that ratio. And do you remember that Owen said that the war could have ended two years earlier had they had America's support?

A. I remember that, and I also remember that the essential point here was to accept the Vance-Owen Plan, and the fact that there were certain disagreements on certain small -- other points should be negotiated later on and put right, if possible. So the percentage was the same. It would have perhaps been greater with respect to Republika Srpska.

Q. Now take a look at page 95, whereas this fear is expressed again in the following way: Radovan Karadzic says, it's a quotation: "Provinces are not internationally recognised legal entities." He's quoting from the document. "And they cannot enter into agreement with foreign states or international organisations." And then Slobodan Milosevic says, "Of course they're not internationally recognised. The states of America are not internationally recognised legal entities either."

And then there's mention of Quebec having 700 agreed conventions with France, and I say, "Well, that is excellent. You'll have as many ²³⁹⁵⁵ with Serbia, each province." And this is on page 96. "We have an advantage because Serbia is not an independent state but is within the framework of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, so it will be cooperating also with non-independent states that are part of others." So all these remarks are in the interest of a peaceful solution being found. And then, as during the examination-in-chief, you said that I was the one who negotiated. I don't have my notes exactly how you put it, but that I was the main negotiator with the international community.

A. With the international community.

Q. Yes, that is correct. But do you remember that was always upon their request?

A. That is what I said, and that can surely be seen from the notes. The international community insisted on talking to you. So that is nothing terrible about that. It was accepted by the Serbian side. I even remember very well Mr. Holbrooke's speech in the State Department when he said, "Negotiations in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska should focus on you and that the other parties should be part of the delegation." And I think that is how it was, and it bore fruit, as we know.

Q. My point, Mr. Lilic, is that they insisted upon this and that I endeavoured, as can be seen from these notes, when Yugoslavia was formed that Yugoslavia should take over those things and that we should not interfere.

So look at page 112, please. Cosic says to me, "You have an invitation from Vance and Owen" - this is to go to that meeting - "and ²³⁹⁵⁶ Momir Bulatovic and me." And Bulatovic says, "Jansen has reiterated that invitation, as he was at the time presiding in the European Community." Cosic says, "We didn't say no to Vance and Owen." Milosevic: "The invitation addressed is up to us. They cannot determine the composition of the Yugoslav delegation. They can give you advice regarding the composition, but that is something quite different. The possibility of going there I am reviewing from one standpoint. Should we, because of his explicit request, accept that invitation?" I'm referring to us from the republics, because I'm advocating that Yugoslavia should be the party negotiating. And when we came before the cameras, he said, "On behalf of the European Community, I have invited President Milosevic to participate in the work of the Geneva conference, to make his contribution," et cetera. I didn't give a response. "We need to think it over. And there is the possibility that if I fail to go, they could say that they are refusing to contribute to the success of the Geneva conference. That is all. That is the whole point." And then Vladislav Jovanovic, who was Foreign Minister at the time, said, "Please review that in a positive light." And on the following page, page 113, this is in the context of the point I'm making that it is the international community that insisted on us making a contribution. It was not us pushing our way in there, but on the contrary, because we thought it was Yugoslavia's duty, that of the federal organs.

And on page 113, I say once again, "I will communicate with Vance once again, and if I decide that we shouldn't go, then I will say that a Yugoslav delegation will go without me. I refuse to go three times." ²³⁹⁵⁷ Cosic says, "I understand you, and I would refuse it also in your position."

Yes, I note the interpreter's remarks that we need to slow down. Slobodan Milosevic said, "We are not a party to the conflict in Bosnia. Serbia is not represented at the conference in Geneva. The Yugoslav delegation is there, and it is the responsibility of the Yugoslav federal institutions. Therefore, we as Yugoslavia are represented." But he insisted, "You cannot refuse to make a contribution." And then I say, "I think it would be a good thing if we resolve the problem in a spirit of understanding, that we should not be stubborn about it," et cetera. Is that right, Mr. Lilic?

A. It says everything here in this document, and there's no doubt about the fact that your presence there was extremely significant.

Q. Well, that is why they requested that I go all the time. I don't know how I come to the next page. Oh, yes, tab 41 now. This is a continuation of the session which was held in several parts.

JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. It should be noted for the record that we're dealing with Exhibit 469 and these various tabs come in that. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. It is from this meeting of the council, held also on the 11th of August, and I am suggesting that we send a letter of the following contents. And then I read out a draft of the letter that I wrote. "With reference to the invitation to the 13th Plenary Session of the Conference on Yugoslavia --" ²³⁹⁵⁸

A. I'm sorry, I don't have tab 41 here.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is tab 41, Your Honours.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but Mr. Lilic doesn't have that tab.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you have it now?

A. Yes.

Q. On page 4, I say that we should send them a reply in response to Carrington's invitation to the 13th Plenary Session in Brussels. And I read, "With reference to the invitation to the 13th Plenary of the Conference on Yugoslavia, I wish to remind you that at the last, 12th, Plenary Session in Brussels, we informed the conference that following the proclamation of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the delegations of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro in future will be considered a single unified delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

And then I say that, "This should be sent to Lord Carrington and signed by Bulatovic and myself," because we had received the invitation. And then Milan Panic, who was at the time already federal Prime Minister, an American of Serb extraction, says, "No one has anything against. No one is opposed. And I propose that the text written by Mr. Milosevic be adopted as written."

So we were endeavouring to have Yugoslavia assert itself, and that is what I say on page 10 again. "Our position is that we have done ²³⁹⁵⁹ everything we can to create Yugoslavia and for it to survive. We will be talking about the question of state continuity and all other matters." And then I say in the middle of the next paragraph, "Are we going to respect this state that we have formed or not?" So my efforts were directed towards these -- the authorities being -- the authority for this being taken over by the federal institutions.

Now, look at page 13 now, please. There's just one remark. I join in when Milan Panic was explaining something, and I say, "The responsibility is with the European Community, which has created the war in Bosnia, and we need to be blamed for it. We need to cover up their crime committed in breaking up an independent state." Panic then says, "But we mustn't say that to him because if you say that, then it's pressing the point and everyone is aware of it anyway." Is that right, Mr. Lilic?

A. That is what it says here in the stenographic notes.

Q. And then on page 10, I say: "If I may add, we should show a maximum respect for the political content of the declaration proclaimed by the Federal Assembly when the constitution was proclaimed. This was achieved through a broad-based democratic process. A platform was established for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I don't see that we need to change the approach taken in the declaration. It is obvious from what we are all saying today that the need is being confirmed of asserting the contents of that very declaration. And I would also add that that declaration has met with a positive response of the international community. It was not met with repulsion or rejection. On the contrary, ²³⁹⁶⁰ it was seen as a constructive approach following the formation of Yugoslavia. The world will not start with us around this table. We have a continuity in political behaviour and the platform defined in the declaration."

Cosic then says, "I support and confirm this statement." That was our position and I assume you remember that.

A. Yes. The declaration was registered in the United Nations too.

Q. That's right. This is not directly linked to what we have been saying, but as the situation in Kosovo was referred to, please look at page 88. Slobodan Milosevic: "We have to separate as many Albanians as possible from the separatist movement. The members of the separatist movement and those acting under their pressure will never vote in the elections. Therefore, we must separate the Albanians -- the mass of the Albanians from the separatists. That is the only strategy on which our policies should be based."

And then on page 90, in response to what Milan Panic says, "Make him come not because he likes you but make such a situation that he should come." And Milosevic says: "Milan, if they had voted at the elections two years ago today in the People's Assembly of Serbia, they would have 30 members of parliament." I'm referring to the Albanians. "It's not a question of them not being represented. They would be represented indeed, those 30 deputies could have said what they wanted and they could have made draft bills and laws. That is the line of separation, the separatist movement in Kosovo. And I'm not referring to the Albanians as such. The only aim of the separatist movement is to separate Serbia -- Kosovo from ^{23961 BLANK PAGE 23962} Serbia and join it to Albania."

And then I explain to Panic that, "In spite of the boycott on the elections, we do have several Albanians in parliament from among the ranks of those that did not boycott the elections."

So please look at tab 43 very briefly. My criticism of Panic, in connection with the London conference, at which he agreed -- and this is on page 15, page 15. Have you found page 15? At the bottom of the page: Slobodan Milosevic speaking, "That interventions should cease across the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina".

"We are not intervening over there. If we had discussed that document, we would have to disprove that." And then he goes on to explain things. I say, "Simply one should write down the truth." That is what is said on page 16. And one can see how many people were sitting round that table at the time.

Then there's reference to the assertion of the results of the London conference. Cosic and Panic speak about that. I have not managed last night to read through the entire binder, but I will devote the rest of my time to questions which were left over, had it not been for these binders, that I wanted to address to Mr. Lilic. Mr. Lilic, tell me, please, since you were involved in politics from the beginning, president of the party, president of the Assembly of Serbia, and later president of FRY, vice-premier, et cetera, when did you hear for the first time of the expression "ethnic cleansing"? Was this in connection with the situation in Kosovo?

A. I must admit that if you mean in our country, in the territory of ²³⁹⁶³ the Republic of Serbia -- because I heard the expression long since in some other situations.

Q. Yes, of course in Yugoslavia.

A. I think, as far as I know, at least, it was linked directly to the beginning of terrorist activities, or to be more precise, the beginning of the NATO air raids.

Q. Very well. Do you remember that in Serbia this was an expression used to denote a crime, the worst crime?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. And when there was reference to this in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, or anywhere else, when ethnic cleansing was referred to --

A. That is why I'm asking you whether you meant in the territory of the Republic of Serbia.

Q. No, I'm talking about the broader context of the former Yugoslavia.

A. Then it is certainly linked to the early 1990s, the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia and Croatia.

Q. My precise question is the following: Was this an expression used by us in Serbia to denote a crime, the worst crime?

A. Yes.

Q. During all those crises - that is, from the beginning of the conflict in the early 1990s until the end - did the authorities in Serbia and Yugoslavia and I personally seek to protect our entire population, regardless of their ethnicity and on a non-discriminatory basis?

A. In answer to one of the questions during the last hearing, I said ²³⁹⁶⁴ that the ethnic composition of the Republic of Serbia was reminiscent in many ways of the ethnic composition of the former SFRY. Therefore, all those living on the territory of the Republic of Serbia and also the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were given all the necessary care and they were represented in all our legal documents and had -- were able to use those rights.

You mentioned a moment ago the failure of the Albanians to utilise their right to vote, which they refused to do. Therefore, throughout the events of the 1990s, Serbia had an almost identical ethnic composition, up until the moment when the Serbs were expelled, upon which the composition changed; there were far more Serbs living in Serbia than before.

Q. All right. Tell me, please: Throughout the time that you spent in political life, which means this whole time coincides with the duration of the conflict, were the Croats and Muslims persecuted during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in Serbia at that time?

A. No. Quite the reverse. And this is easy to prove, not using our own documents but United Nations sources, that thousands of Albanians, yes, and thousands of Muslims crossed into the territory of the Republic of Serbia. There's the case of the brigade, but there are many more drastic cases where people crossed over from Bosnia-Herzegovina to find protection in Serbia. And there are similar examples with members of the Croatian ethnic group. And what I considered to be the highest quality of life living on the territory of the Republic of Serbia is that there were no excesses, no excessive behaviour on an ethnic basis or religious, confessional, national composition. There weren't cases of that kind. ²³⁹⁶⁵ Take the example of Vojvodina, for example, which could serve as a standard for Europe as a whole, not only for the Republic of Serbia, Vojvodina province.

Q. Now, you mentioned the Muslim refugees too. I had information, facts and figures at that time, which I assumed that you as the president of the Serbian assembly are disposed of too. And they told us that we had when the war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in that first year, 70.000 Muslim refugees coming in to Serbia from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A. Yes, quite correct. I think that actually the figure was far greater later on and 200.000 is the figure mentioned. But this is statistical data. But your figure was quite correct, but as I say, I think there were actually more than 100.000.

Q. Therefore, those people, the Muslims who were fleeing from Bosnia and taking refuge in Serbia, I assume that they did not consider that they were going there to take refuge with the aggressor side. Isn't that right, Mr. Lilic?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. And tell me, do you know whether any religious sites were damaged at all -- desecrated at all in Serbia during the duration of these conflicts?

A. During the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, no. According to my information, no, they weren't. I think later on there was a mosque in Novi Pazar which was destroyed, but I think that was during the bombing and that we reconstructed it. I think it has been rebuilt with the participation of the government of the Republic of Serbia. ²³⁹⁶⁶

Q. All right. Fine. Now, let me go on to another matter, something I didn't have a chance to look into because of the short time I had at my disposal. I wasn't able to ask American Ambassador Galbraith, who testified in the meantime between your first testimony here and today. And he presented a report here, dated 1992. August was the month. I don't want to burden you with the report itself. But what I do want to do is to ask you this: I want to ask you this question, and it is entitled "Camps in Serbia." It comes under the heading of "Camps in Serbia." And here is what he writes on page 37, what page 37 of the report says: "A list of concentration camps. [In English] Prisons at the territory -- at the territory of Serbia and Montenegro in which the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are captive." [Interpretation] And then there are nine enumerated ones in Serbia, two in Montenegro. And I'm going to read out the list. This is what it says: [In English] "Loznica, sport recreation centre." [Interpretation] Sports recreation centre in Loznica, therefore. And the number of detainees, 1.880. And then it says, "Belgrade, the Batajnica airport, 2.200 prisoners there." Then it says, "Belgrade, the barracks, the 4th of July Barracks, 2 and a half thousand detainees." Then Nis comes next, the military centre, military camp, it says, 1 thousand - it's rather small print, so let me have a look, not to make a mistake - 1.540 is the figure there. Then we come to Subotica, and it says, "Assembly point, 5.000 detainees." Then "Aleksinac, closed mine, 4.000 detainees." Sabac is next, 1.440 there. Then Mokra Gora, near Uzice, with 3.000. Then Prijepolje, 480.

There you have it. I don't want to go into the second part of ²³⁹⁶⁷ that report, but the year is 1992. And this was written -- it was written by, I assume Mr. Galbraith. Yes, it says "Galbraith," and "Michael Miner" the two of them compiled that report.

Now, please, is there any truth whatsoever, and could you comment, please, about a piece of information like this.

A. First of all, I listened to what you read out carefully, and I'm astounded by what you read out. I don't know where Mr. Galbraith got that data from. I assume that they were people -- if these, all these centres existed at all, that they were people who had fled from the territory of Bosnia and Croatia and happened to be there -- to be listed there. I don't know that concentration camps exist in Serbia, and I think that this is offensive for all the Serb people and for all of us who lived in Serbia, this kind of observation presented by Mr. Galbraith. I say that for this reason: Anybody who knows the history of the Serb people well, and you know full well that we were never a genocidal people, nor did we ever enter into any campaigns and conquests which this is trying to show. Anyway, briefly speaking, I don't know that on the territory of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia there ever existed, not only in 1992, but in all the other years, any camps.

Q. Well, you would have to have known had they existed; right?

A. Yes, I would have had to have known had they existed, especially in these military facilities that are mentioned here. So they are military facilities that you read out, Batajnica, the 4th of July barracks, and so on.

Q. Tell me, please: Do you happen to remember, in view of the fact ²³⁹⁶⁸ that we cooperated closely, that in the beginning several delegations who came to see me on different -- with respect to different questions raised the question about camps in Serbia. And I hope you'll agree -- you'll remember my answer, and that that answer was, "I don't want to convince you of any absurdities. You have a helicopter at your disposal. Fly around. Once you get into the helicopter, put your finger on the map. Go to that place, and see for yourselves whether any camps exist or not." Do you remember me saying that?

A. Yes, I remember that they wanted to convince themselves, to see for themselves, and that you placed these resources at their disposal.

Q. And just one delegation went off, and they said, "We'll avail ourselves of your offer," and they went to this mine, this closed mine in Aleksinac; right?

A. Right.

Q. And what they found there was a guard, a watchman, who was a watchman for the whole complex there, looking after the mining equipment, and nobody else. And they did fly out in a helicopter directly to the site to see what they would find. Of course, I offered them this helicopter, and they took me up on the offer. I'm sure you'll remember that.

A. Yes, I do remember that. And I wish to repeat that in Yugoslavia and Serbia throughout that time, almost all the nine years, there were never any incidents on an ethnic basis, on a nationalist basis, nor was there any possibility for setting up anything of the kind. And I think that the public knows, generally speaking, and the press informed us, that ²³⁹⁶⁹ even some people that were of different ethnic groups and did commit crimes and were supposed to be prosecuted, we let them off, because we didn't want anybody to think that there were incidents of that kind. We allowed people to go back to Raska without any passports, although Sulejman Ugnjelic [phoen], the case in point, who had left --

Q. He was an extremist; right?

A. Yes. Upon his return from Turkey he was to have been arrested, but allowed him to enter the country and deal in politics, regardless of what was happening behind this political arena, the political stage.

Q. One more question, please: With respect to the arming and paramilitary formations, I would just like to remind you, as this was an exhibit here, the minutes from a meeting in 1992 of the Supreme Defence Council. You at the time were not the president, but I'm sure you had a look at the documents. And it is to be found on page 2, last paragraph of point 1, in which it says the following: "Through energetic measures to make individual support to the offices of the Yugoslavian MUP, to prevent all jeopardy to the property, safety of citizens and to prevent any fanning of the flames of national ethnic hostility." And before that, the document stated that, "The state borders towards Bosnia should be controlled, of the -- municipality, and prevent the workings of armed paramilitaries and any other -- and prevent the passage of any armed vehicles that have not been announced."

Is it true that when we're talking about paramilitary formations, in general, that those paramilitary formations were organised by individual opposition parties in Serbia; right? ²³⁹⁷⁰

A. Yes.

Q. Did the socialist party ever organise any armed formations of any kind whatsoever?

A. No. And I think I said that last time I was here.

Q. Is it clear from this that it was established that, as it says here, there are -- there was personal support on the part of individual officers of the army and MUP and that efforts were taken to prevent that?

A. Yes. And some high-ranking officers of the JNA, as far as I remember it, were replaced and retired. They were pensioned off. And may I just add something, if I may? One more sentence: There was a decision by the Supreme Defence Council from the beginning of 1993 that all paramilitary units should be extinguished, and that kind of order was issued as well.

Q. Tell me, please: Did it ever happen that in the leadership of Serbia, in any of the organs and bodies of the leadership, at any position or post, with an open or closed meeting, did anybody ever of our officials, politicians, or at any level - so I'm not limiting you to any level; my level, your level, any level - did they ever strive for an ideal and an idea called Greater Serbia? Did they ever advocate that?

A. If I remember correctly, that question or a similar one was one that was raised during my last testimony. And my answer was that it was our position of principle - when I say "ours," the Socialist Party of Serbia - was to preserve Yugoslavia. And many of us joined the party to preserve Yugoslavia. Why? Now, I will repeat the sentence I uttered then: Because that was the only Yugoslavia which was a state in which all ²³⁹⁷¹ Serbs really did live in one country, on the territory they lived in. So I think that was a synonym used by someone else, in fact, where it was our goal, our aim, including my own aim, to preserve the territory occupied by the former Yugoslavia, and all those who wished to leave could leave by peaceful means on the basis of a referendum but the same right should be accorded to people who wished to say, that is to say the Serbs principally, they could stay and live on the territory they had occupied for centuries, so to enjoy the same rights as others. And as far as I am concerned, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whatever it was called later on, that would be the sole real form for having the Serbs live in one state, in a single state.

Q. All right. May I now go on to the next topic. You were the president of the FRY for a full four-year term, the president of the Supreme Defence Council as well. You were in command of the army in wartime and in peace, by virtue of your office as president. Tell me now, please: Did I ever interfere in commanding the army throughout your term of office, throughout your mandate?

A. Let me say again that that was another question you asked me last time, or a similar one.

Q. Well, if it was similar, I do apologise, but it's very important. It's an important question.

A. The question was similar. The fact is, and the rule is, that the president of the Supreme Defence Council is in command of the Army of Yugoslavia in conformity with the decisions taken by the Supreme Defence Council. So I think that the answer is quite clear. The exclusive right ²³⁹⁷² is vested in the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. And did I ever interfere? Did I ever meddle and ask you to make any decisions?

A. No, nothing that would go beyond the decisions made by the Supreme Defence Council. If there was any outstanding issue, then the Supreme Defence Council would hold a session, and there were 53 meetings in all.

Q. Did any of the generals or colonels being promoted to rank of general, were they promoted at a request from me at those Supreme Defence Council meetings, following a request from myself?

A. Well, a good answer to that question would be that we dovetailed and coordinated all these positions, with Momir Bulatovic, with you. It was always a concerted effort and they were always good officers, but to satisfy the interests of one and all.

Q. Yes, that is understandable. But can you quote a single example where I had a protege of my own, where I wanted to have somebody promoted or where I wanted to have someone dismissed and replaced perhaps?

A. Well, it's difficult for me to remember any case in point to give you a name. Quite certainly - and this is something I said last time - all decisions were arrived at through consensus. So while I was the president of the Supreme Defence Council, there were no outstanding issues with regard to the appointment of generals, promotion of generals or their pensioning off, at least during my term of office.

Q. All right, fine. Now, I would like to ask you just a few more questions which have to do with Resolution 1244, linked to Kosovo. And I'm going to quote some excerpts from that resolution. I have them here. ²³⁹⁷³ On page 1, the 10th of June, 1999 is the date. Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party.

A. I didn't hear the interpretation of that. But I have the original text here.

Q. Condemning is what it says. It condemns, condemning all acts of violence.

And then it goes on to say, "Welcoming the general principles on a political solution [In English] to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6th of May annexed here to this resolution."

[Interpretation] Annex 1: [In English] "And welcoming also the acceptance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade" [Interpretation] on the 2nd of June, 1999.

That is Annex 2 to the resolution, and it says: [In English] "Reaffirming the commitment, all member states --" [Interpretation] the reference is member states of the United Nations -- "to the sovereignty and territorial integrity [In English] of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other states of the region as set out in the Helsinki final act and Annex 2."

[Interpretation] And this is reference to the final act of Helsinki. And then it is said that, "It is decided that a political solution will be based on general principles contained in Annex 1," so the decision is taken to that effect. And then it says in point 3, "Deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be ²³⁹⁷⁴ synchronised."

And then in point 6, it says that, "A special representative will closely coordinate with the international security presence [In English] to ensure that both presence operate towards the same goal and in a mutually supportive manner."

[Interpretation] So this is what the resolution says, and I assume you remember that.

Then in point 9, under "B" it says: [In English] "The Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups, as required in paragraph 15 below." [Interpretation] Now, tell me, please, was the KLA and other groups demilitarised?

A. No, never.

Q. Was the sovereignty and territorial integrity guaranteed by this resolution?

A. Yes, that is what the resolution says.

Q. Then under C, point 9, it says, "Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety." And then it talks about humanitarian aid to be delivered. And then in D: [In English] "Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task."

[Interpretation] At the end of point 10, it says, "[In English] To ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo."

[Interpretation] So that was the obligation taken upon itself by ²³⁹⁷⁵ the international forces, the conditions for a peaceful and a normal life of all the citizens of Kosovo. Is it true that that was not achieved or fulfilled but that, rather, under the auspices of the United Nations, more than 250.000 Serbs were expelled from Kosovo after the forces arrived, which according to this resolution, were meant to protect everyone? Is that right?

A. Yes. What the Resolution 1244 says is correct. De jure, that is what it was. But the de facto situation in Kosovo was quite different. Not only were 250.000 people expelled, but last time I mentioned something which I would like to repeat. It is a fact that Pristina there are only 200 Serbs remaining. There were more than 40.000 before. They are all living in one apartment block. And after the last act signed by Mr. Steiner, I think it will be hard for anyone to return to Kosovo and Metohija.

Q. But let us clear this up. The international community pledged that it would create conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all the inhabitants of Kosovo, whereas under its auspices, 350.000 people were expelled of which 250.000 were Serbs and 100.000 other non-Albanians. Is that right?

A. Yes. And about another 300.000 Albanians have resettled there, have settled there, coming from different European countries.

Q. So that is correct. It says in point 15: [In English] "The KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirement for demilitarisation as laid down by the head of international ²³⁹⁷⁶ security presence in consultation with a special representative of the Secretary-General." [Interpretation] That hasn't been done either, has it?

A. Yes, none of that is in dispute. Only I think we differ on one point. I think you and I could have done all that before the international community arrived. We could have made a census of the population. You know that I even asked you and spoke to His Holiness, the Patriarch of Serbia, Mr. Pavle, to see what is the church property in Kosovo and Metohija. I think we would have been much more effective. What you are saying is quite correct, but I think the Serbs have nothing -- gained nothing from that.

Q. Yes, but my question is: Is it true that they did not fulfil what they promised through this resolution?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Under J it even says, "Protecting and promoting human rights." What human rights of Serbs can be even referred to over there?

A. There are no Serbs there. And of course the very few that are left have no rights at all.

Q. And then it says that it decides that an international civil and security presence are established -- [In English] Are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise."

[Interpretation] And then there's Annex 1, in which there's reference again to demilitarisation of the terrorist organisation the KLA. Then there's Annex 2, which in point 5 again says: [In English] " -- a ²³⁹⁷⁷ normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo." [Interpretation] And then in point 6 it says, of this Annex 2: "After withdrawal a agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return [In English] To perform the following functions: Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence, making clearing minefields, maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites, maintaining a presence at key border crossings."

[Interpretation] Therefore, all these things envisaged by the UN resolution has not been fulfilled; isn't that right, Mr. Lilic?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Neither the military nor the military personnel were not allowed to return and we have a situation of occupation rather than the situation proclaimed by this UN resolution.

And again, in point 8 of this Annex 2, it says -- it refers to the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. And again, the demilitarisation of the KLA and again negotiations between the two parties. None of this was carried out; isn't that right?

A. Yes, it is. I said, as far as the sovereignty over Kosovo and Metohija is concerned, that is, the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia over that area, there's not the letter "S" left of sovereignty, even though it is prescribed by the resolution.

Q. Isn't it true that even when this UN resolution has been trampled upon what would have happened with any other kind of agreement that doesn't have that weight? Is there any higher authority than the UN?

JUDGE MAY: That is pure speculation. ²³⁹⁷⁸

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In that case, I should like to remind you, for the reasons that you confirmed a moment ago, of just a part of a speech at a congress. I will not quote from the one I've already quoted from for these reasons - and I say: "This shameful mission of the so-called international community in Kosmet, which has experienced a fiasco in every respect should be brought to an end as soon as possible and that the authorities of our country should take over full competence over our own territory. Unlike them, we are quite capable, without anyone's assistance, to ensure peace and security for all citizens on a footing of equality."

And then - and I hope you will remember this, but that transcript was served on us by the opposing side - I say that "Despite all the blows that Serbia has received from the world through sanctions and turning a deaf eye to the suffering of a small and peace-loving people, to the expectations that things, over the evil hovering above it, will be resolved of its own, in some miraculous way, that the tyrants will get tired of choking one and the same victim and look around for another one somewhere.

"So despite all those blows, Serbia and we over here do not wish anyone ill. We would not like to retaliate for this bloody payback, this bloody debt. We are still inclined to act in a Christian or leftist way - who knows which - and to believe in the victory of good and justice, but our experience, as well as the experience of other nations, has taught us that good and justice do not come of their own accord, that enormous ²³⁹⁷⁹ and, with time, organised efforts are required to defeat evil, hatred, and violence among peoples." Do you remember that, Mr. Lilic?

A. That is a speech delivered at a congress, at our congress.

Q. Yes. And do you recall, as at the time you were still the vice-premier, apart from all the things that are not in dispute from the UN resolution, as the fact that none of it was fulfilled is not in dispute, that the day Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin came to Belgrade a meeting was held, a plenary meeting, of a Yugoslav and Russian delegation?

A. I know there was a meeting, but I really don't know the composition of the participants.

Q. But that can easily be verified. Everyone was present. Milan Milutinovic, the president of the Serbia, Zivadin Jovanovic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, some other officials who participated --

A. At the time, I was nowhere near being involved.

Q. Yes. But our generals attended the meeting as well. In fact, there were too many people present at that meeting for anything to be presented falsely, and there was Chernomyrdin heading the Russian delegation and Russian generals. I'm sure you remember the report about that meeting.

A. Yes, I know General Ivasa [phoen] well from that group.

Q. Yes, all of them were there. Did you know that Chernomyrdin, on behalf of President Yeltsin and on behalf of Russia, formally guaranteed that Russia would not agree to a resolution being adopted on the basis of chapter 7 and if such a resolution is adopted pursuant to chapter 7, Russia would veto it? ²³⁹⁸⁰

A. Yes, I know that.

Q. So even this resolution was, after all, adopted pursuant to chapter 7, and even as such it was not respected. The only question is who is to blame for this, Chernomyrdin or the international community.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, this is a very long way from what the witness can give evidence about. And your time is now up. We'll adjourn now. Twenty minutes. And then the amicus when we come back.

--- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just finish my last question? You interrupted me as I was halfway through.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. It was not a matter which the witness could deal with. He wasn't at the meeting. All he could say was he'd read a report about it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But you didn't let me finish the question.

JUDGE MAY: No, I know I didn't, because it wasn't something he could deal with. It was well away from his time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When I finish my question, you will see that he's able to answer it. It will only take 30 seconds.

JUDGE MAY: Well, we'll see if he can. But less than 30 seconds. Yes. ²³⁹⁸¹

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Less than 30 seconds. I promise.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Lilic, I'm not talking about the Russian delegation, which certainly was acting in good faith, but I'm talking about violence that was applied to us and them and the UN in the crime committed against our people. Is that right or not?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Tapuskovic, you've got half an hour, up to half an hour.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll do my best, Your Honours, to finish even before then, but I will simply not have time to refer to the documents we received in the last two days, even though there would be many questions to be asked. But I would like to ask Mr. Lilic if he could tell me in general terms, if he could look at that big binder and say that in the tabs from 35 to 39 mainly contain decisions of the military authorities during the period when he was Supreme Commander. Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

Q. [Interpretation] If you could just look through them very quickly because I have very little time. So I'm talking about tabs 35 to 39. Those were decisions taken by the military authorities at a time when you were the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia. From 35 to 39. Just look quickly at the dates, please. They are decisions.

A. I see this for the first time too, so I'm afraid I can't answer so quickly. ^{23982 BLANK PAGE 23983}

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I should just like to draw your attention, Your Honours, to this. You can check this. These were decisions taken during the period -- during the term of office of Mr. Lilic as president of the state.

I would also like to draw your attention to something which I consider to be of significance; that all the tabs from 40 through to the end were compiled when the president of the country was Dobrica Cosic.

Q. And what I would like to ask you, Mr. Lilic, if you can give me a brief answer - I won't be suggestive at all or leading - do you know what happened in Hrcovci [phoen] in Vojvodina, at a point in time in the initial period of all these events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia?

A. I know stories about it linked to the Croats living there.

Q. Yes. That was the incident I'm referring to. Could you explain to Their Honours what happened and what the authorities in Serbia undertook in that connection.

A. It is difficult for me with any certainty to comment on that event.

Q. Very well. I won't insist. But then when you were asked about camps that may have existed in the territory of Serbia, do you remember that immediately after Vukovar a number of captured Croatian citizens were in Sremska Mitrovica and at Stajicevo?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that the only case you know of that people from another republic were in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, and do you know ²³⁹⁸⁴ that later on they were more or less all exchanged for captured Serbs in Croatia?

A. Yes, I do know that.

Q. Thank you. You were the Supreme Commander of the Army of Yugoslavia for four years as the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, from 1993 to 1997, so for exactly half of the crisis period of 1991 to 1999.

A. Yes, I was president of the Supreme Defence Council for four years.

Q. The Army of Yugoslavia, which you were the Supreme Commander, ex officio, came into being in 1992, after Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were internationally recognised; is that right?

A. Yes. I think I explained that.

Q. Yes, you did say that. I will ask you something else in that connection. In terms of personnel and materiel, it came into existence, it emerged out of the Yugoslav People's Army.

A. Yes.

Q. And during conflicts in the territory of the ex-Yugoslavia already in June -- no, no, but let me -- I apologise. Let me ask you something else first. Is it true that the Territorial Defences in the republics up until June 1992 were under the command of the JNA and that both the weapons and the equipment were the property of the JNA?

A. Yes.

Q. And in that connection, is it true that the Territorial Defence of ²³⁹⁸⁵ Slovenia already in June grew into a Slovenian army and that, in terms of personnel and materiel, it was formed out of the personnel and equipment of the JNA?

A. Yes, that is true. And the identical situation applied in Croatia.

Q. Yes. But the first army that developed out of the former JNA was the Slovenian army. And the Supreme Commander was Mr. Milan Kucan as the president of the Republic of Slovenia. I didn't have time to ask him that question.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know how many men the Army of Yugoslavia numbered at the time?

A. I do not have the precise figure.

Q. So the same happened in Croatia. I don't have to go into that with you. Is it true that the Army of Yugoslavia -- that no fire was opened at in Macedonia, that it withdrew without firing a single shot?

A. Let me correct you: The Yugoslav People's Army, not the Army of Yugoslavia.

Q. Yes, that is the only place where fire was not opened against the JNA and the JNA withdrew without a single shot being fired.

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. The next thing I'd like to ask you to explain to Their Honours has to do with the relationship between the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the Supreme Commander, towards the general staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, as you were the Supreme Commander. ²³⁹⁸⁶

A. Yes.

Q. Was there anybody else, except for you, who was Supreme Commander -- who was able to issue any kind of order, oral or in writing, to the general staff or, rather, the chief of the general staff?

A. Generally speaking, the Army of Yugoslavia, in conformity with the Supreme Defence Council's decisions, and president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was at the head, so nobody could issue a written or oral order to the chief of the general staff.

Q. And is the best example for that - and here I have to go back to tab 19 of 469, Exhibit 469, an example quoted here - where General Momcilo Perisic, as the chief of the general staff, addresses you, and he writes a letter to you in which he states that he has received a request from the president of the republic with respect to some volunteers. Do you remember that?

A. Yes. That was in September 1995.

Q. Yes. And your answer was - and this is also in that same tab - you issued an order of the 29th of September, 1995; right?

A. Yes. I remember it very well.

Q. And this is what you say in that order: "We prohibit reception and training in the Army of Yugoslavia of all persons, including volunteers," under point 1; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And under point 2, "Reception and training from -- the reception and training of the persons from item 1 of this order, in the Yugoslav army, can be carried out only with my approval, given on the basis of the ²³⁹⁸⁷ Supreme Defence Council"; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. So was that the principle which was used in the relationship between the general staff and the Supreme Command?

A. That was the only principle that met with the law and the command of the Yugoslav army with respect to singleness of command and all the rest of it.

Q. And was that how it was between the 15th of June, 1992 and the 1st of June, 1995, when the president of Yugoslavia was Dobrica Cosic?

A. That is how it should have been. It's difficult for me to answer whether it actually was.

Q. Yes. But that was the principle.

A. That was the law.

Q. And was the same thing true while the presidency of the SFRY was still in existence? But let me not dwell on that. There was a sole member examined here, Mr. Stipe Mesic, who was a member of the Yugoslav State Presidency. He testified here. But at that time too, did this principle hold true that orders to the general staff and to General Kadijevic could have been issued only --

A. By the president of the Yugoslav state presidency.

Q. You mean as the collective presidency?

A. Yes, as the collective Supreme Commander.

Q. I see. Thank you. Now could you please be given tab 20 of 469. And this brings us to the point where you yourself were the participant in the ²³⁹⁸⁸ decision-making process and the signing of the agreement. I'm referring to a meeting by the representatives of the top leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, which was held on the 29th of August, 1995 in Dobanovci; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. We already discussed the matter here. The Court has heard about it at length. But I'd like to dwell on one particular fragment which I feel to be significant for Their Honours's decision-making process later on.

You see at the end that mention is made of the fact that the meeting was attended by the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Mr. Pavle, and Bishop Irinej Bulovic; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, if you take a look at page 7. There we have what the Bishop Irinej said. And this is what he said: "We must, however, accept the clear fact that the international community will not negotiate with the leaders of Republika Srpska but with President Milosevic. But President Milosevic will not negotiate alone, himself, but wishes to include into the delegation representatives of Republika Srpska too." Do you remember that, that that was said?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. Now I'd like to ask you to take a look at page 12 -- page 12, when the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church asked to be given the floor and he said the following: "It is much more important what is being signed rather than who is doing the signing." And he repeated the ²³⁹⁸⁹ church's appeal to agreement, unity. Do you remember that?

A. Yes.

Q. And when the agreement had already been prepared for signing and when you were all due to sign, as it says here on page 15, everything was already prepared and ready for signing, and when it came to the signing of the document offered up, the leadership of Republika Srpska demanded that the assembly at Pale state their views. And this was taken has an attempt of the united approach before the international community to be put off indefinitely. Is that right?

A. Yes. We had already had some bad experience with that kind of behaviour, and that is why we insisted upon having it signed straight away.

Q. And at one point there was the danger of complete divergence between the two leaderships. And Patriarch Pavle cautioned that he would not leave the room until there was agreement and unity on the part of the Serbian leaders and that they would -- he could only be taken out by force, and he hoped that that wouldn't be the case. Is that right?

A. Yes, that's right. And may I just add in quotation marks that our side, meaning the FRY side, signed the document without the signature of the representatives of Republika Srpska.

Q. Yes. But President Karadzic asked for a new break, a pause, and it was only after that break that the document was signed. So was the Patriarch's influence the overruling one?

A. Yes, it was. He prevailed upon the leadership of Republika Srpska. So his presence was the decisive -- it was very important. Yes. ²³⁹⁹⁰

Q. Now I'd like to ask you one more thing: Today we looked at transcripts or, rather, exhibits linked to the telephone conversations. Now, from all this, does the following emerge, what we heard from you today, that neither you nor Perisic nor the president of Serbia were able to issue orders to the leadership of Republika Srpska about any matter at all? Is that -- would that be right?

A. Well, if we take into account all the peace plans that fell through because of, if I can use the word, their understanding of the case, then we could draw that conclusion the way you put it just now.

Q. Now, I'd like to move on to the last part of my questioning. And in order to do so, I'd like you to have tab 3 in front of you, tabs 3 and 4, although I'm not going to dwell on tab 4 for any length of time. It is Exhibit 469 once again.

You responded to questions asked in the examination-in-chief, although you weren't asked a lot. Several extracts from this document. It is a programme, a party programme, a programme of the party to which you belonged; is that right?

A. Yes.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] And Your Honours, on page 10 of that document, last paragraph of the English translation, says the following:

Q. That your party considers, believes, that the autonomous provinces in Serbia cannot be states but can only be a form of territorial autonomy for which the constitution establishes and guarantees the autonomous rights which saw an expression of the specific national, historic, and ²³⁹⁹¹ cultural specificities of the regions in question. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, does that mean, to all intents and purposes, that in keeping with that programme that the amendments to the constitution of the Republic of Serbia took place, which in practical terms means that the sole thing that was abolished was the right to use the veto, the right of veto which existed within Serbia?

A. Well, I'm going to be quite clear. This attribute of state-hood was abolished. All the other rights remained.

Q. And up until that point in time, Serbia was not able to have a united front towards the rest of the country, and within the republic everybody could use the right of veto. And Serbia was not able to have any question prevail which was of general importance for all the people in Serbia. Would that be right?

A. Yes, it would. That's right.

Q. Now, if you remember - and you were a businessman at the time, but as of 1990 you were a politician - do you happen to recall that this right of veto was most often used when the budget was determined for the Yugoslav People's Army?

A. To be quite frank, I don't know.

Q. Oh, you don't know that. Right. If you don't know that, do you know this, that the right of veto was used very frequently at a point in time where decisions were called upon to be made with regard to assistance to the underdeveloped areas?

A. Yes, I do know about that. ²³⁹⁹²

Q. Now, I don't want to dwell on former times, but in 1990 in particular the right of veto was used by Slovenia and Croatia with respect to that issue, and that there were areas that previously could always count on receiving aid and assistance and that it was representatives from Croatia and Slovenia that started to curtail that right. Would that be right?

A. Yes. And there is evidence of that.

Q. Now, I'd like to dwell on something else with respect to this document, and that is page 11, paragraph 5 of the chapter on national equality and federalism, in the English version, page 11, national equality and federalism; and the B/C/S version is on page 10. And this is what it says: "With the new Yugoslav constitution, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was still in existence, the new Yugoslav constitution allow for the forming of Autonomous Provinces in Yugoslavia --" isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. That's all that was discussed, exclusively that question. And that is what it says in this second programme too. As to the other parts where the Serbs lived, all it says is that they should continue to receive aid and assistance as had previously been done in the times when the country helped its underdeveloped regions. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And I still have another few points with respect to Kosovo to clear up, looking at the period when you yourself were president, of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is. ²³⁹⁹³ Now, do you know about this, are you aware of this as a generally known fact, and it relates to events taking place between the 1980s and 1990s, although you weren't a politician at the time: But do you know that the demands for a republic, Kosovo Republic, and independence in Kosovo, began as early on as 1981? There were armed conflicts that broke out, and this question was always supported from some other parts of Yugoslavia too; is that right?

A. Yes, I am aware of that.

Q. Now, are you aware of the fact that during that period of time another thing that happened was this,: Very often the Serbs left Kosovo but there were a lot of emigrants from Albania coming in at the same time?

A. Unfortunately, that is correct.

Q. And are they figures that are quite substantial?

A. Yes. A large number of Albanians coming into the area were -- received assignments. And there are precise data that the JNA has that they were secret agents and that they had their agendas to populate Kosovo.

Q. And was this during the terrorist actions that took place?

A. Yes.

Q. Now I'd like to look at the time after 1990.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please slow down.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it true that --

JUDGE MAY: You're asked to slow down.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, I'm trying to get through ²³⁹⁹⁴ as much material as possible in the time I have, but I will slow down.

Q. From 1990 onwards, up until 1999, the Albanians, to a large extent, did not use their right to vote. They didn't go to the polls and they didn't take part in parliamentary life at all.

A. Some smaller parties did, but they were individual cases. Speaking in general terms, the Albanians did not, and I think that that was a great mistake, despite the fact that the government of the Republic of Serbia and its authorities tried to prevail upon them.

Q. All right. Thank you. Now, is it true that from 1990 onwards, the Albanians did not want to negotiate anything else except their independence? That was the only topic they wanted to discuss. And all they wanted to discuss was the way in which they could step down from Serbia, or rather, leave the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

A. Yes. They were the publicly proclaimed demands by their leaders and political parties.

Q. And after 1990, did they leave -- did the Serbs continue their exodus out of Kosovo?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. And was there stepped-up terrorist activity at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. Now I'm interested in the relationship between the Yugoslav army and its actions and the police during those times. You yourself were the Supreme Commander of the Army of Yugoslavia. Now, when we come to crimes being committed, including acts of terrorism, their uncovering and prevention belongs to the -- comes under the jurisdiction of the police, ²³⁹⁹⁵ right, and not the army?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And the army didn't involve itself in that, and you know that because you were at the head of the army.

A. Yes.

Q. So terrorism increased. Now, was it indispensable during that period of time for the army to become strengthened, reinforced, to protect itself and even procure some APCs, armoured personnel carriers, for example, because it was under threat?

A. Do you mean the Army of Yugoslavia?

Q. No, I mean the police.

A. Yes, the police.

Q. So you didn't involve yourself.

A. You used the word "army," that is why I'm asking you.

Q. I do apologise. Now, do you know that terrorism was stepped up especially in 1995. It became stronger in 1995. Or rather, when did you yourself learn of the existence of the KLA?

A. Well, the KLA existed in 1995 and 1996. It officially appeared then in far larger numbers, but terrorist units were there all the time and had mistreated equally Serbs and Albanians, who did not accept their way of thinking.

Q. Is it true that the Army of Yugoslavia in absolute terms did not have the need to involve itself up until the time when these actions and operations on the part of the KLA took on an armed rebellion effect? Is that right? ²³⁹⁹⁶

A. Yes. The period that you have in mind does refer to 1998 and 1999; that is to say, after my term of office had expired.

Q. Right. Up until that time, could you tell me this, please: While the SFRY existed and the Yugoslav People's Army and then later on after the Army of Yugoslavia had been established, did the Army of Yugoslavia or, rather, the Yugoslav People's Army throughout that time have complete control over the territory of Kosovo, the borders and, generally speaking, control of the territory, everything that that implies?

A. Well, I have my own opinion, but generally speaking we did control the borders, yes, we did. We could have controlled them better, but yes, we did control the borders.

Q. At one point the borders weren't under complete control, and then that was regulated too.

A. Yes.

Q. And a truce was signed, a cease-fire. The army withdrew, and what should have happened was that a cease-fire take place, take effect. Did the Yugoslav army comply?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you know that the KLA did not comply and that it continued to arm itself and to return to the territory that the army had left?

A. The KLA armed itself in a specific way. I don't think that throughout all those years they ever ceased buying and procuring better and more sophisticated weapons.

Q. Now, tell me whether you know anything about the events that took place in Racak. Did you have any information with respect to Racak? ²³⁹⁹⁷

JUDGE MAY: I really think, Mr. Tapuskovic, this isn't a matter for you, with respect.

Now, the accused has mounted a considerable defence on this topic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I agree. If I could just ask Mr. Lilic one more thing. I think he does have information about that and ought to know. And he did speak about it during the examination-in-chief, and that is this:

Q. Rambouillet, the negotiations at Rambouillet. Do you know, for example, that the Yugoslav side, or the Serb side, whatever you like to call it - because I'm afraid that whenever I say Serb side I might be cautioned - that on the 16th of February for the first time they agreed to the presence of international military forces on Yugoslav territory and proposed a solution for Kosovo and that it be implemented by a strengthened mission with five or six observers that could even be armed, that that was the offer that was presented? Or don't you know? If you don't, say so.

A. Generally speaking, when it comes to Rambouillet and everything that went on there, I know about that from the press, actually, from the media. I wasn't included in that whole process. But I know what you're talking about and asking about.

Q. Do you know what requirements were made for an agreement? Was there an ultimatum or not? Do you know?

A. First of all, I think that agreement was never achieved. That is my opinion. There wasn't any proper negotiating between two sides that should have negotiated. For an agreement to exist, there must have been ²³⁹⁹⁸ two sides. And something that is one-sided means that there was no agreement.

Q. Do you know which were the preconditions in the agreement to avoid the NATO shelling?

A. I do know very well --

THE INTERPRETER: No, for the shelling to stop. I'm sorry.

Q. The Kumanovo agreement for NATO to come to Kosovo and Metohija, or rather, representatives of the international community. What did Ahtisaari say if that did not happen?

A. I know that from some other sources, that Belgrade would be razed to the ground or something to that effect.

Q. One more point --

A. But I was not involved. I learned this from others.

Q. Let me ask you just one more thing. It was referred to a moment ago. Everything that was being done by the Army of Yugoslavia and the police was designed to stop terrorism, to prevent the KLA from its activities and to prevent the suffering of the civilian population regardless of ethnicity. Wasn't that the gist of all those activities?

A. That is how it should have been, and that is how it must have been. I have no reason to believe that it wasn't so.

Q. But that was the aim, was it not?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. Now, my last question: According to the last report of several days ago, the authorities of the -- the authorities in Belgrade now, is it true that since the arrival of international forces on the territory of ²³⁹⁹⁹ Kosovo, 1.194 persons were killed?

A. Yes. I saw that figure. I assume it is correct.

JUDGE MAY: This is not relevant to our case. Now, let us go into re-examination. Yes.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I've finished. Thank you.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the tape that the accused would like to have is one we'll apply for. And if we can get it, we'll make it available to him, the tape of his wife or the person who's reported as being his wife.

Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Mr. Lilic, let's deal with the airline pilots and Mladic. You'll recall that on the last occasion you told us that Mladic's name was associated early with Srebrenica, that you spoke to him yourself but you never asked him about his involvement in it. If we look at the account given in the intercepts, is this the position - help me if I've got it wrong - that a deal was proposed whereby for the airline pilots, the French airline pilots, being surrendered, Mladic would be free from being handed over to this Tribunal for the 7.000 deaths in Srebrenica? Is that what was being proposed?

A. I cannot give you a yes or no answer to that question. Allow me to tell you what I spoke about with Mladic. In principle, the answer is no, linked to Srebrenica and the 7.000 dead.

Q. Was there a proposal that he should not be handed over to this Tribunal described in his question, you'll recall, by the accused as an illegal Tribunal? ²⁴⁰⁰⁰

A. Without me entering into this second part of your question, General Ratko Mladic, speaking to me by telephone, as can be seen from the intercepts which we haven't commented on, but you can see them, and especially during our conversation at Han Pijesak, when General Ratko Mladic and the whole main staff of the Army of Republika Srpska were present, one of the questions - and if Mr. May and Their Honours require it, I can leave this document that I signed with Ratko Mladic - and the demand was that no one, not just Ratko Mladic, that no one from Republika Srpska would be surrendered to The Hague Tribunal. So that is true, Mr. Nice.

Q. And at the time that that was proposed, did both you and the accused support that proposal?

A. At the time this was proposed - and this was December 1995 - just prior to the signing of the Dayton Accords in Paris, our primary goal and the reason for talking to Ratko Mladic in those days was the signing of the Dayton Accords in Paris. And it is true that we supported him. And from the intercepts, it can be seen that even Mr. Chirac supported him in a way and that such a promise should be given to Ratko Mladic for the pilots to be released.

Q. Whatever may have been the disagreements with the Republika Srpska, eventually Mladic was prevailed upon to hand over the pilots; is that correct?

A. Mladic insisted with regard to the takeover of the pilots, and it was at great pains that we managed to achieve their release, but without his own goodwill this couldn't have been possible. That is quite certain ²⁴⁰⁰¹ too.

Q. The Judges will be able to read the intercepts in full if they judge it appropriate. Do you say - just help us with this - that the accused was giving you instructions as president of the Federal Republic or that you were giving him instructions in this matter?

A. With regard to this matter, the fear was that the Dayton Accords would not be signed, and President Milosevic insisted that I, with General Perisic -- or rather, that I should issue an order to General Perisic that he try to establish the location of the pilots, because we had some indications that they were in Republika Srpska. Therefore, I wasn't giving instructions to President Milosevic, but he obviously used his right through me and on the basis of my own competencies to bring some influence to bear on the Army of Yugoslavia.

Q. To conclude with Mladic --

A. Even -- I apologise -- he was against me going to Republika Srpska. It was I who insisted on going.

Q. And just to conclude with Mladic. He left Republika Srpska in the end of 1996. Did he come to Serbia?

A. I don't know whether he left Republika Srpska altogether, but he certainly did come to the Republic of Serbia too.

Q. [Previous interpretation continues] ... Ever institute an inquiry into his well-known alleged involvement in Srebrenica?

A. As far as I know, no such investigation was instituted.

Q. He spoke and you spoke in the course of your cross-examination about discipline, control, and about promotions. Will you go, please, to ²⁴⁰⁰² tab 35 of Exhibit 469.

JUDGE MAY: Now, is this a new exhibit, Mr. Nice?

MR. NICE: This is a new exhibit, yes.

JUDGE MAY: Well, I'm concerned about the propriety of introducing new exhibits at this stage. There's a limit to which you can cross-examine your own witness. And if you've got some material which contradicts him, I'm not sure it's right for you to put to him.

MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, can we -- I'll come to it in another way. And it's not contradiction, in any event, I should think.

Q. What I want you to help us with is this, please, Mr. Lilic, as you've been telling us about promotions and the way they were organised, and about the need for discipline: A man called Pandurevic --

JUDGE MAY: Well, Mr. Kay, could you assist me. I am troubled, as you hear, about the propriety of this method of continuing. But it may be that I'm wrong.

MR. KAY: Your Honour, it's very difficult for us to anticipate what's going to happen. And like the Court, I've been faced with a volume of exhibits at a late stage that we've had to go through and try to work out their relevance.

I don't know how my learned friend is going to approach this, but it certainly is not right that new material be introduced in re-examination, because the accused then would have every right to request that he came back. The Prosecution have had a considerable amount of time with Mr. Lilic. They've introduced a vast number of exhibits through him. And it is only adding further to the materials before this -- this Court. ²⁴⁰⁰³ In many respects, if it wasn't done in direct examination, it should not be introduced in re-examination.

JUDGE MAY: I must say that that is my feeling. There should be no more evidence as a matter of principle during re-examination. The sole purpose of re-examination is to -- is to clarify issues.

MR. NICE: Can I assist? I've made it clear that there are certain witnesses whose evidence will have to be viewed cautiously, and it's appropriate to call them whatever view we may take overall as to the accuracy of what they say. Such witnesses are witnesses from whom the Chamber will be assisted by hearing evidence on particular documents or particular events. This particular event is the promotion of someone post-Srebrenica who has indeed been indicted by this Tribunal in respect of it. The witness has explained a great deal about promotions and about the need for discipline at the invitation of the accused. And I simply wish from him his observations on how this particular promotion occurred.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We shall exclude this document. The reason is this: That there has to be a termination in the production of evidence. If we allow this sort of evidence in, then the accused must be given the opportunity to cross-examine, which means we never finish. The Prosecution must produce their evidence during the direct or evidence-in-chief. Thereafter, there will be only in the most exceptional circumstances - and this isn't one - in which additional material is allowed. I suggest that we return these files. We'll consider it in a moment. Most of it is untranslated of the new material -- ^{24004 BLANK PAGE 24005}

MR. NICE: Well, that is all -- I explained, we haven't had it --

JUDGE MAY: I know. But I'm just dealing with the position as it is at the moment. I think the new material is, if you look at the index, is 37 -- as I understand it, 37 to 46 is the material of notes and the like?

MR. NICE: No, it's 39, I think you'll find.

JUDGE MAY: 39. Yes, quite right.

MR. NICE: 46 is the new material. 34 to 38 -- sorry, is the new material that's the form of stenographic notes or meeting notes. And the other material is -- is all new.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: So I'll proceed on that basis. And if I wish to seek to persuade you to the contrary in respect of an individual exhibit, I will. But I can cover the matter without looking at the exhibits, in any event.

Q. In light of what you've told us about discipline and promotions and -- no, I'll move on to another topic. It's probably easier. I've got plenty to cover.

Intelligence; you've told us a great deal about the intelligence you received and in fact received for Kosovo, and the accused received. Did you have intelligence sources available to you throughout your presidency, Mr. Lilic?

A. I don't know which specific service you're referring to. If you're talking about military intelligence services, the security administration, or the second administration of the Army of Yugoslavia, ²⁴⁰⁰⁶ depending on the event, yes; the answer is yes. Not reports from the state security service of the Republic of Serbia.

Q. In your judgement and knowledge, were you kept as informed of all matters as the accused, or did he have access to more intelligence or less intelligence than you?

A. He certainly had more and better information, certainly more detailed information.

Q. Did your intelligence include in his reporting back from embassies around the world?

A. Yes, that information mainly gathered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a service which is also of an intelligence nature; it's called a service for information and documentation. And most of that information certainly reached the federal authorities. I don't believe that all of them were accessible. That certainly depended on the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was the one who could select information and reports.

Q. Despite this range of information, is this right: You didn't receive any intelligence on Srebrenica, on what actually happened at the massacre? Is that right?

A. That's right.

Q. And you've denied, at the request of -- or the question of the accused, the existence of any of the detention camps spoken of by Ambassador Galbraith and indeed subject of others, NGOs we know coming to you. Did you visit the areas said to be detention camps yourself or not?

A. I didn't visit them. And according to my information, no such camps existed. I can't visit something that our services claim did not ²⁴⁰⁰⁷ exist.

Q. Do you allow of the possibility that you may have been kept from information of this kind or not, or don't you know?

A. First of all, I absolutely do not believe that there were any camps in the territory of the Republic of Serbia.

Q. You said that the accused had more intelligence or information than yourself.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, you're pretty close to cross-examining just then. Be careful.

MR. NICE:

Q. I'll just turn to another topic. And we can now look at an existing exhibit, which is 469, tab 20, but the other part of tab 20 from that that we've been looking at before. It's the meeting on the 25th of August of 1995. We looked at it before. It's the Dobanovci meeting. And in the English version, it's page 11; and in the -- let's find it. In the B/C/S version, Mr. Lilic, I think it comes on page -- I think it comes on page 14 at the top right.

At the conclusion of a reported intervention by Bishop Irinej, we see this passage: "He agreed with" - this is the bishop - "President Milosevic's view according to which solutions not recognising Republika Srpska will be refused. That is why he supports the views already stated in favour of one generally binding decision to serve the interest of the entire Serbian people. That is why we must overcome all of difficulties, get the most favourable solution for the position of the Serbian people. Bishop Irinej advocated the tacit lifting of the Drina River blockade. ²⁴⁰⁰⁸ President Milosevic responded that the blockade was merely a formality and that aid flows daily." Would that recall the reality of the blockade, Mr. Lilic?

A. The border was never hermetically tight. There are daily reports of the federal customs administration about the minimum quantities that were sent there to satisfy the needs of the population in terms of food and so on. So such a report can be found at the customs service. So it was never closed tight, the border.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, on this --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The customs, of course, controlled what was crossing the border.

MR. NICE: Your Honour --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may, Mr. Nice, I think that such a report exists among the documents, a report by Mr. Kertes, a daily report of this kind.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, on this one, in light of what the accused was specifically putting to the witness about the blockade, I would have invited the Court to consider a clip of an interview, a statement by the accused himself, but I'm in your hands as to whether -- it would be very short -- as to whether that would be an exception to the approach you've taken.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: No. We think not.

MR. NICE: I'll move on to something else.

JUDGE MAY: I'm not able to find that last passage. ²⁴⁰⁰⁹

MR. NICE: I'm so sorry. It's on --

JUDGE MAY: Tab 20 --

MR. NICE: Tab 20. It's the 25th of August. There are two parts to tab 20. And it's on your page 11, and it's not under the quotation of the accused. It's under the quotation of Bishop Irinej from the previous page, and it's about just under halfway down.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. I have it. Thank you.

MR. NICE: I'm sorry not to have made that clear.

Q. Can we look at one part of the latest document -- two parts, actually, that have been produced by the accused. And before I forget to deal with them, one's in Exhibit 41, if the Court would be so good, and that is the small passage that had already been translated of these stenographic notes of the meetings of the Council for Harmonisation. Now, this is from the 9th of January of 1993, Mr. Lilic. Just remind us, if you can - and we can help you with frontline maps if you would like - but what percentage of Bosnia was held by Serbs at the end of 1992, beginning of 1993?

A. That was the time when negotiations were underway on the Vance-Owen Plan. And I think the percentage was about between 76 and 80 per cent, but certainly over 75 per cent.

Q. So that what we see the accused saying here is that what was then held de facto should be obtained by de jure, and he's suggested to you that "small labyrinth" meant by negotiations, and you accepted that, do you?

A. I tried to explain that the last time, I think, that this de jure ²⁴⁰¹⁰ confirms what existed once the Vance-Owen Plan is accepted, because otherwise it would lead to a new war. The attempt to retain 76 per cent of the total territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly could not lead to peace. It is the quickest way to a new war in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

JUDGE MAY: No. Mr. Milosevic, you've already had your chance to examine.

MR. NICE: Let me come back to Exhibit 39, please, which is --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection to the question, not the answer of the witness. I'm sorry, Mr. Nice -- I object to Mr. Nice's question, not the answer of the witness.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Well, we've passed on. Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Exhibit 39 is the other January 1993 extract which was read, but it was only read in part by the accused. I make no complaint. He just didn't turn the page, at least in the English version. And if the witness can just have that in front of him, he'll see the extracted passage in the English translation. We saw that Zivota Panic was saying - this is the foot of your page 1 of the English translation - "we help as much as we can regarding manpower. The army shouldn't be going into foreign territory, but we should find volunteers, people who would save that part of the territory, that is, prevent the linking with Sandzak and via Rudo and all the underlying elements referred to here." And then over the page in the English version: "That is where ²⁴⁰¹¹ you should do everything possible. Bring in the army, which is to be highly disciplined in their assignments. I will not go into the problems, but it must be done, even if the price is execution."

JUDGE KWON: I think that is page 33 to 34 in the Serbian version.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes, it is. And I think it's been separately extracted for -- if not, I'm very sorry, Mr. Lilic.

JUDGE KWON: I note he's looking for it.

MR. NICE: Yes, I'm so sorry.

THE WITNESS: Thank you. Thank you very much.

MR. NICE:

Q. Now, in light of all you said about the army not going in - and you've agreed with the accused on all of that - can you help us with that part of the quotation that the accused didn't take you to?

A. I don't know exactly which part of the quotation you're referring to, Mr. Nice.

Q. [Previous interpretation continues] ... The army going in, which is to be highly disciplined of -- "this is where you should do everything; bring in the army which is to be highly disciplined in their assignments. I will not go into the problems, but it must be done, even if the price is execution." I wonder if you could help us with that part of General Panic's quotation.

A. It is difficult to explain him in the way it is stated here. Does he refer to troops in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which have to be very disciplined? And who is he addressing at this point in time, Mr. Zivota Panic? Is he addressing somebody from the FRY or ²⁴⁰¹² somebody else from Republika Srpska, which is for me the key issue.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours -- Your Honours, Witness Lilic has been explaining so far to the effect that that is what the note says. Up to now he hasn't interpreted anybody's quotations. I think he shouldn't be asked to interpret what is said. Up to now, he has just been confirming that what is written here is correct, or rather, that that is what is written here.

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... by interpretation, he can be asked, if he can assist.

MR. NICE: We'll have to take it as stated for the time being.

Q. Staying with the army, Mr. Lilic, before I forget, the accused, and indeed Mr. Tapuskovic, asked you a number of questions about how you were the commander-in-chief. Now, of course you understand - and we can't look at the evidence for various reasons - that allegations may be made out here by the Judges in due course that the army was involved. For the period of your presidency, please help us: Who was in a position to control or influence the army so that it might be involved in Bosnia?

A. I have answered that question several times, and I continue to claim that there was a never decision of the Supreme Defence Council for regular units of the Army of Yugoslavia to join in combat operations in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly no larger units. I explained how volunteers took part. Now, whether anyone else gave orders of that kind, that could have only come from General Perisic, and I really am not aware of that, so I continue to claim that no such decision existed, no such order. Should Perisic have accepted such an order and ²⁴⁰¹³ implemented, it could have come from President Milosevic. It would have been completely unlawful. It could have come from President Bulatovic. That would have also been unlawful. So the only person who could issue orders with respect to the Army of Yugoslavia is the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and only in accordance with the Federal Defence Council, which meant that the other two presidents would be aware of it.

Q. We've heard about the Red Berets. Can you help us. Were they military, paramilitary, or police?

A. The Red Berets were not within the Army of Yugoslavia. They were officially formed in 1996. You see that in the document on their formation, in Kula. But they are a typically military formation, as they had all the weapons required for intensive anti-terrorist combat, and they were within the Department of State Security.

Q. Because -- if you remember, you may help the Judges with this: You deny that there was any militarisation of the police and yet you're saying that the Red Berets were really within the State Security and you've described them as military equipment.

A. No, Mr. Nice, I didn't deny that there was militarisation of the police. I said that within the frameworks of the police there were two specific units from the first day of their inception. So they weren't formed after I had come. They had -- they were already in existence in the police. The SJO and the SAJ, so both of them were anti-terrorist.

Q. And it's right, isn't it, that you've seen the videotape of the celebration at Kula in May 1997? ²⁴⁰¹⁴

A. Yes, I have seen it.

Q. You weren't present. Were you even invited?

A. No, I wasn't invited in May -- I wasn't in Kula in May 1997.

Q. On paramilitaries, you say very recently to the accused that there was an order to stop them at the end of 1993. Is that right?

A. Yes, that is a decision of the Supreme Defence Council, and an order issued on the basis of that to General Perisic, that all paramilitary units be recorded, lists made of them, and practically done away with, however you'd like to put it.

Q. No -- was there no earlier order to impede the paramilitaries before the end of 1993?

A. We are talking about 1993, Mr. Nice. This is 1993.

Q. There was an earlier order than that order that came at the end of 1993?

A. I don't remember one.

Q. Well, can you help us: Were paramilitaries - because you've been asked about this - were paramilitaries being tolerated then until then?

A. Well, you can use that type of qualification, but in principle they were volunteer units which were not on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at all.

Q. Last question on the Red Berets: Who was the political commander of the Red Berets?

A. Ah, the head of state security administration was Mr. Stanisic, within whose department that unit was, if that is what you mean. If you mean subordination with respect to the chain of command and responsibility ²⁴⁰¹⁵ at the level of the police, and indirectly, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. The --

A. In view of the constitutional rights vested as president of Serbia, the command of the armed forces in peacetime and wartime, which is not sufficiently clear when it comes to the federal constitution, but that is what the constitution of Serbia states.

Q. You were asked about the condemnation of the bombing of Sarajevo in 1995. Who was doing the bombing?

A. You mean airstrikes or artillery?

Q. Yes.

A. Airstrikes were conducted by the NATO pact forces, including Serb positions. Whereas, artillery fire was opened from the Serb positions at Sarajevo.

Q. As to the Serb side attacks, had they been condemned before that date or not?

A. On our side, they were constantly condemned; that is to say, the attacks on Sarajevo. But you can see the pressure there was because after the meeting on the 13th and the 29th of August, on the 30th of August Serb positions were intensely bombed and so were towns in the Sarajevo municipalities as well. And despite that, the leadership of Republika Srpska did not agree to pull out the forces, and later on it did under the impact of the NATO bombings.

Q. The Supreme Defence Council minutes are documents we hope in due course to see, Mr. Lilic. You said that everything was done by consensus. Can you help us just with the position of somebody called Boro Ivanovic. ²⁴⁰¹⁶ Do you remember any dealings with him?

A. Boro Jovanovic, you mean?

Q. Yes, in the SDC.

A. Probably Bora Ivanovic. Bora Ivanovic was a general in the Army of Yugoslavia who was commander of the Novi Sad Corps. You mean him?

Q. Was his promotion dealt with within the SDC? And if so, was that dealt with by consensus or not? Dismissal, I'm sorry, not promotion. Dismissal.

A. Boro Ivanovic, at the request of the personnel and chief of the general staff was -- a request was sent to the Supreme Defence Council and the Supreme Defence Council discussed the matter. As it said in the report by the senior officers of the general staff, unlawful handling of stockpiles of weapons of the Army of Yugoslavia, or rather, giving them over to Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina in part. And in the second half, for some criminal offences, criminal acts. And there was more to support the latter. So the request by the general staff was that Bore Ivanovic should be brought up before a military disciplinary court and disciplinary proceedings taken against him for General Ivanovic to be replaced as commander of the Novi Sad Corps. The Supreme Defence Council did discuss the issue. There were different views put forward. Mr. Milosevic thought that he ought to remain in place. I personally went to the corps and talked to the officers of the Novi Sad Corps. They were opposed to having General Ivanovic returned to his post. My proposal was that he should not be returned to his post, and then a different solution was found, that is, that Mr. Ivanovic should not return to take up his ²⁴⁰¹⁷ post as commander of the Novi Sad Corps but that he shouldn't be taken to court either, which was the proposal that came from Mr. Milosevic, so that I used my right pursuant to the law with respect to acquitting him of any guilt. But there were different opinions put forward, yes.

MR. NICE: Again, the Chamber will have that --

A. But General Jovanovic [as interpreted] was pensioned off later on, and this -- the lawsuit was interrupted.

Q. A matter of detail that may help us on the notes and coordination that we've got. We've got some of them in stenographic form and two of them we've got in minute form only. Just answer this question, please, yes or no: Are you aware as to whether they are all, in fact, in existence in stenographic form?

A. Whether all of them? You mean all the minutes from the Supreme Defence Council meetings? Is that what you mean, Mr. Nice?

Q. Not the Supreme Defence Council, the coordination council meetings. Sorry, I came back to that. It's unhelpful of me to have swapped topics but I meant to ask you this earlier. The minutes, we have minutes only, not stenographic notes, for two of the meetings.

A. The state council.

Q. Yes.

A. I can't say with certainty, but the stenographic notes should be in existence with respect to their importance and all the rest of it. I'm sure they do exist.

Q. Just answer this yes or no: Insofar as there's any shortfall in the provision of stenographic notes of any of them, as opposed to minute ²⁴⁰¹⁸ notes, are you in a position to assist identifying where any of them may be found? Just yes or no. Or if you don't want to answer, say you don't want to answer.

A. Well, it's difficult. I don't think I can be of assistance to you in finding them. I don't know how you mean, actually.

Q. One last question.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I see the time.

Q. It's an existing exhibit, and it's Exhibit 389, tab 46.

JUDGE KWON: 387?

MR. NICE: Sorry, 387.

Q. You've answered several questions about the performance of police and army in Kosovo. And here is a document dated the 25th of May of 1999. If you go down to paragraph 3, in a document that comes from General Pavkovic, you see the following passages set out. The Chamber will probably find its memory revived by reading them. Line 3 of paragraph 3, Mr. Lilic: "... where there are frequent altercations because MUP members condone or openly permit evident criminal activities and plunder committed by their fellow MUP members as well as civilians resulting in the misappropriation of a vast amount of motor vehicles, technical goods and other resources from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija." Then in paragraph 4: "It has been established beyond doubt, and we have already reported on it in regular combat and other reports, that due to the non-compliance with the resubordination orders, some MUP members and to a considerable extent entire smaller units, which 'operate' independently on the ground are committing serious crimes against the ²⁴⁰¹⁹ Siptar civilian population in settlements or refugee shelters - murder, rape, plunder, robbery, aggravated theft --" sorry, "aggravated robbery, theft, et cetera, and then purposefully attribute or plan to attribute these crimes to units and individuals in the VJ." And then at the foot of the document, under "Measures Proposed:" "In light of the above-said, and particularly the consequences already in evidence, which could, however, become much more important, the Supreme Command should take urgent measures falling within its jurisdiction to resubordinate the units and organs of the MUP..." Does that account of the crimes being committed accord with your experience and understanding?

A. This report is one which Mr. Pavkovic wrote during the war. May 1999 is the date. I can only assume that after this a series of steps were taken. If they weren't, then this is -- he should be held accountable in another fashion. I don't know about these things, as after 1998 I had nothing much to do with Kosovo and Metohija. But this all took place during the war, so I assume that the Supreme Command did take certain steps and measures. I don't know what effect these cautions had, but they come under his jurisdiction and I'm sure he took steps himself, because during the the war the Army of Yugoslavia -- it was the police unit that was practically to all intents and purposes in command.

THE INTERPRETER: The army commanded the police units. Interpreter's correction.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But at any rate, these events should be condemned and criminal liability should follow. If not, then the ²⁴⁰²⁰ responsibility lies on the people who knew about it and failed to take action.

MR. NICE:

Q. Have you any reason to doubt Mr. -- Or General Pavkovic's account?

A. No, absolutely not.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I see the time. There's one more exhibited I wanted to put to the witness, a previous exhibit. I haven't yet identified it correctly. I've lost my note.

JUDGE MAY: We have five minutes left, no more.

MR. NICE: Just give me one minute, Your Honour. If I can't find it, I can't find it. Oh, yes. I have found it.

Q. Tab 4 -- Exhibit 427, tab 54, please. This is an exhibit you've seen before. And again, I think all I need do is revive your memories of it.

Just to help you, Mr. Lilic, it's Mladic speaking at the 50th national assembly held on 16th of April, 1995 in Sanski Most. And in the English version, it's at page 17 right at the bottom. In the B/C/S version, it is, I think, on page 42. I'll ask for my colleagues to confirm that. And it may be a speech with which you are yourself familiar.

And the question is this, really, Mr. Lilic: You've spoken about whether there was direct support provided by the republic to Bosnia and given a number of answers about that. If we look at this quoted part of Mladic's speech. I'm picking it up from a place that says, "Ever since FRY imposed the blockade on RS on the 4th of August, 1994." - I don't know ²⁴⁰²¹ if you can find that - "needs of the RS army for fuel and ammunition could hardly be met".

Then the next paragraph, "Even though the government has issued guidelines which regulate imports of goods for the army, there have been cases where procedure was ignored."

The next paragraph begins like this, "As an illustration, Mladic gave the following consumption review from the beginning of the war until the 31st of December, 1994. 9.000-odd tonnes of infantry ammunition consumed, 1.49 per cent of which was self-produced, 42 per cent from supplies the VRS inherited and found within in the former JNA barracks. 47.2 per cent provided by the Yugoslav army.

Then two lines down: "As for artillery ammunition, summarising it, 34 per cent provided by the Yugoslav army.

"As for anti-aircraft ammunition," two lines down, "52 per cent provided by the Yugoslav army." And then further on, "115.644 tonnes have been consumed out of which 23 per cent was provided by Yugoslavia." Does that reflect the reality of the support that was being given to General Mladic?

A. I really don't know on the basis of which General Mladic compiled this report. The quantities presented here are so large that I personally don't believe that the percentage written here as to the assistance of the Yugoslav army on the basis of what it was given. General Mladic is a little bit of a sensationalist and perhaps wanted to make a bigger impression over there.

On the other hand, if we take into account the fact that, for ²⁴⁰²² example, just for 79 days of NATO campaign 20.000 tonnes of bombs were thrown, then these 9.000 tonnes of ammunition for four years of war doesn't seem to be a very large figure. But I said in explaining these figures that I see here that the overall resources that were left from the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina are considerably greater than the figures presented here by General Mladic. Now, how far they are correct, I really can't say. I still maintain that this quantity of weapons, military materiel, and ammunition had no reason to leave the warehouses of the Army of Yugoslavia in respect of the effectives and resources they had in the BH and were in the depots of the Territorial Defence, which actually came over to the Republika Srpska and the other side got its weapons from other sources. So I don't need -- you don't need me to tell you about them here.

Q. My last question -- literally my last question is this: If it is in due course found that there was provision of those materials, whether in those proportions or quantities precisely or not, by the Army of Yugoslavia, who's responsible? Who bears the responsibility for authorising that provision? Is it you as the commander-in-chief or was it anybody else?

A. This amount, this quantity of weapons and military materiel, I have no reason to doubt this report by General Mladic. The responsibility had to be on the part of the federal government. Not even the Supreme Defence Council could have made a decision of this kind, because these -- this is materiel owned by the Army of Yugoslavia. And as the federal government owns that, then it is the Defence Ministry in this ^{24023 BLANK PAGE 24024} case. That would be better put that way.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll deal with the exhibits now. Exhibit 469, we will admit tabs 39 to 46. We will exclude the remainder of these bundles, tabs 34 to 50. And I'm going to hand them back, since they're untranslated and documents which will not assist us. Could you -- if the registry would kindly take them back, please.

MR. NICE: We've obviously given what priority we can to the translation department --

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: -- To get those documents produced. We'll certainly notify you when they're available.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, you can provide them. I'm going to deal -- before I've thanked the witness, I'm just going to deal with one other ruling and that is for the statements of witnesses C-1050, 1129, and 1194. We've been considering their admissibility under Rule 92 bis. We're satisfied they're cumulative, not concerned with the acts and conduct of the accused. They will be admitted under the rule, but they do relate to a live issue concerning the nature of the activities of the JNA and other paramilitary groups, and therefore those witnesses must attend for cross-examination. Mr. Lilic, that does conclude your evidence. Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give it. You are free to go.

[The witness withdrew]

JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn until tomorrow morning.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned ²⁴⁰²⁵ at 2.05 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

the 10th day of July, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.