²⁴³⁸⁵

Tuesday, 15 July 2003

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: One moment. Yes. We have the witness here, so let's begin by having the witness take the declaration, if he would.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you, Mr. Kljuic. If you'd like to take a seat.

WITNESS: STJEPAN KLJUIC

[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yesterday, towards the end of the day, Mr. Nice informed us that we would be receiving some documents with what he called alleged or, rather, alleged intercepts. However, I have received none of that, and this morning I see two binders placed here on my table. I don't know what they contain, along with the explanation that we were served that last Friday, whereas we were served nothing last Friday.

So as far as I'm concerned, these are completely new documents. And last time, the practice was that when we had a witness here, Mr. Zoran Lilic, that half an hour before the end of the cross-examination prior to that day, on the eve of that day, we received two binders. On that ²⁴³⁸⁶ occasion I succeeded in reading through them all. However, the ones I've been served this morning, there is absolutely no theoretical possibility of my reading through them, and I don't think they could be introduced in similar fashion, and please would you stop this kind of practice. It would be common decency before a witness comes in that I'm given the documents relating to that witness.

JUDGE MAY: The sensible course may be this: That the evidence in chief, direct evidence, should be given; we will then consider the position about cross-examination.

Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think there should be no problem with this witness. As I explained yesterday, the materials were all provided to the accused and his associates last week, I think electronically, which is acceptable to them, and we then -- and that included the transcripts of the intercepts. We then identified yesterday the material that was going to be relied on at a maximum, and therefore, it was open to the accused or his associates simply to find the material from the material that they'd already been provided last week because it was fully identified. I'm happy to tell the Chamber that in the event even of the very reduced binder of exhibits before you, many -- or even in the reduced binder of exhibits before you many exhibits are not going to be produced, so it's going to be smaller in number.

And as to the intercepts, we may seek to play one or two of them, but as the Chamber knows, the intercepts, when produced, really are produced, first of all, subject to later arguments that have to take ²⁴³⁸⁷ place, and they're produced for purposes of authentication because usually, sometimes the odd one will be played on the basis that there will be a more comprehensive exercise in reviewing and analysing the intercepts if and when they're formally admitted at a later stage.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, if you could clarify --

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: -- that all the materials are provided to the accused and his associates last week electronically.

MR. NICE: Yes, CD-ROM.

JUDGE KWON: Is it in files --

MR. NICE: It was provided in a CD, and this is happening on a regular basis that material is provided to them electronically, and they're entirely happy for that. In fact, it's preferable, I think. And it's provided in Word, the language Word, with Zy-find as a search engine.

JUDGE MAY: Is it proposed that this witness should produce this bundle of -- what are there here -- 36 intercepts?

MR. NICE: Produce them in the sense that, as you will have seen or be able to see from the schedule, he can identify the voices on them, and that's something that has to be done at some stage. Produce them in the sense of going through all of them; no, because once they are identified, they can then be put back, for the most part, to the exercise that comes later of authenticating by proving the origins of the intercepts and then dealt with along with all intercepts in a comprehensive exercise of analysis at a later stage.

JUDGE MAY: But will there be a witness who the accused can ²⁴³⁸⁸ cross-examine about them if he wishes?

MR. NICE: Certainly.

JUDGE MAY: As he has done with other tapes.

MR. NICE: Of course. He can cross-examine this witness about these intercepts, if he wishes. He was notified last night which particular ones were going to be relied on and he was provided them, as I say, electronically last week. But, yes, there will be another witness who will give context, we hope, for all intercepts at a later stage.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. The sensible course would be to hear the evidence and see what to do at the end of the evidence in chief. Examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Your full name, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, what I've said is that we will rule at the end. When we've heard what this witness has got to say, we will rule at the end about cross-examination.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. May, I would like -- all I'd like is to state once again that I did not receive the documents in -- or, rather, information in any form, either in paper form or electronically.

Secondly, a moment ago Mr. Nice said that this witness will be called upon to identify voices. I don't know how this witness can identify voices --

JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter. Just wait a moment. We're going to hear it. We're not going to hear it at the moment. We're going to ²⁴³⁸⁹ hear it in the evidence as to how he can. Now, if there's an objection, we'll hear it, but there is no question of dealing with that now. As I've said, if you're in any way prejudiced about cross-examination, we will consider that and we'll consider the right course to take. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I should like to draw your attention to the fact, Mr. May, that here, if nothing else, then at least to the papers given to us yesterday by Mr. Nice, where there is a table and review of some conversations. And take a look at what it says. For example, 8th of June 1991 --

JUDGE MAY: No, I'm not going to. I've explained. We're going to start his evidence. If you have an objection to a part of it, you can do it when we come to it. But in the meanwhile, we're going to hear the evidence, and as I say, if you're prejudiced in cross-examination, we'll consider what to do next.

Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. Full name, please.

A. Stjepan Kljuic.

Q. Mr. Kljuic, as a member of HDZ, which you joined in 1990, did you become president of HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb in September 1990, and at a convention in April 1991, were you re-elected as president, serving thereafter as member of the Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, subsequently the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, from November 1990 until November 1992, and then later from October 1993 and until 1996? ²⁴³⁹⁰

JUDGE MAY: The transcript has that he was a member of Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

MR. NICE: I hope I didn't say that.

JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you'd clarify.

MR. NICE:

Q. Were you elected as a member -- were you subsequent -- were you a member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. Yes. At the first democratic elections in 1990, I was elected with relatively the highest number of votes to the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... Mr. Kljuic, if my analysis of your history is correct, subject to that one correction by the deletion of the word "Serb," if the history is correct, just say so, please.

A. No. In the first sentence, it says that I was elected in Zagreb for president of the HDZ. That's not correct. I was elected on the 7th of September, 1990, in Sarajevo. And on the 23rd of April, 1991, I received the HDZ convention in Mostar. So I wasn't elected in Zagreb but, rather, in Sarajevo.

Q. Yes. Sorry. There was a misprint there. Very well, let's move on to paragraph 6 to 8 very briefly. Were you a member of the Commission for Protection of Constitutional Order?

A. Yes.

Q. Paragraph 8. Did Mrs. Plavsic play a role in this commission?

A. She was the president.

Q. Did you receive bulletins by way of information in your work on ²⁴³⁹¹ that commission?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Mrs. Plavsic also receive those bulletins, but did she, in your judgement, do something to counter the information of one kind or another that was coming in via those bulletins?

A. The lady received the bulletins, and in the first stage of work everything was aboveboard and in order. However, as the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia became more complicated, there was manipulation and abuse of the position of president.

Q. Look at simply one example of the material coming your way, if we may.

MR. NICE: Tab 15 in a binder of exhibits that I would ask be given a single exhibit number.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, Prosecution Exhibit 503.

MR. NICE:

Q. We'll just look at this one tab. In the English version, it's at page 5 of 44, and it has you, Mr. Kljuic, speaking. In the B/C/S version, it is at a page at the top numbered T1/7 and onwards. And there is included in that a passage, first of all, where you're intervening and saying that the press mentions your name a lot, and then in the next entry it says: "It's also in today's newspapers." But then it goes on a little later - and this is on our page 6 - to Alija Delimustafic takes over, and over at our page 7 of 44, which would be in the B/C/S at, I think, your page 10, Mr. Kljuic, you see there is reference, page 7 of 44, to this, it says, "Next -- Skrba," and that is on your page 10, "Kujacic, ²⁴³⁹² Veselinovic, Bata on barricades - the worst four criminals on one side." And then it goes on throughout that next page to deal with crimes and indeed to deal with, as we can see on the top of our page 8 of 44, reference to Arkan's.

Now, we don't want to take the Chamber's time beyond just seeing the generality of what's contained there. Did these reports coming in to the Council of Protection of Constitutional Order contain a review of what was happening on the ground including criminal activity?

A. I said that in the first stage, the reports were very proper, but as the situation became more complicated, there was abuse. Now, when I asked that Mrs. Plavsic and Zepinic distance themselves from the barricades, it was clear that on the one hand they represented members of the state commission for security and that they were deeply involved in the erection of the barricades. It would be very important had they said, "No, we don't need any barricades and we haven't got anything to do with the barricades," but they couldn't say that because they would lose face in the political positions they occupied. So it was impossible to be both a member of the security service for the state while at the same time supporting the creation of the barricades and general chaos in Sarajevo.

MR. NICE: Paragraphs 10 and 11, Your Honours, would lead to production of Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Time is at a premium, I will review the need to put those in when I conclude the rest of the witness's evidence.

Q. I move to paragraph 12. Did you have regular contacts with ex-President Tudjman? ²⁴³⁹³

A. Yes, I did.

Q. The well-known Karadjordjevo meeting, did Tudjman ever tell you or hint anything to you about the content of that meeting?

A. No. Actually, as an HDZ leader for Bosnia-Herzegovina, I was seen as a Bosnian patriot and integralist of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I did not accept the idea on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina at all. However, without the disclosing the source of the conversation, President Tudjman told me on one occasion that he had been given from Mr. Milosevic Cazin Krajina, which is the north-western region of Bosnia-Herzegovina, inhabited mostly by Muslims. And I said, "Mr. President, it's the same as if I were to give you as a gift Sardinia or Sicily, for example, because it doesn't belong to you and it doesn't belong to Mr. Milosevic." Cazin Krajina, that is. Of course, as the ideas about a division for Bosnia-Herzegovina were advocated at different levels and from different protagonists, our mutual clash about this idea, that is to say the division of my homeland, gave rise ultimately to the fact that we severed relations, and if you like my elimination from the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina precisely at the time when I was supposed to be president.

Q. Very well.

JUDGE MAY: Can we clarify the record? The area is Cazin Krajina; is that right?

MR. NICE: It is, yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Or Bihac Krajina, whichever you prefer. ^{24394 BLANK PAGE 24395}

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you. The other point -- now I may have misheard this; that President Tudjman, if we look at the -- if you would look at the line as it's recorded: "President Tudjman had told me on one occasion that he had been given Cazin Krajina, which is inhabited mostly by Muslims." I thought that the witness said, and I may be wrong about this, that it was Mr. Milosevic who had given Tudjman Cazin Krajina.

MR. NICE:

Q. Can you explain the position, please, Mr. Kljuic.

JUDGE MAY: As to what Mr. Tudjman said.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] President Tudjman said that from -- he had been given Cazin Krajina from Mr. Milosevic, and that is why my reaction was that it would be tantamount to being given Sardinia, because it's a territory that doesn't belong to either Mr. Milosevic or Mr. Tudjman.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. In early 1991, did to your knowledge Izetbegovic and Milosevic have talks on the topics of the Muslims staying in the Rump Yugoslavia? If so, to what effect?

A. Of course on several occasions negotiations were conducted between different parties and also between Belgrade and Mr. Izetbegovic by the same token. At that time, Belgrade endeavoured at all cost to attract the Muslims for this Rump Yugoslavia. They claimed, among other things, that they would be the second nation or ethnic group in a state of that kind. And when they weren't successful with Izetbegovic, then a so-called ²⁴³⁹⁶ historical agreement was made up, signed by the other Muslim politician, the one who did not have the support of the people, and his name was Adil Zulfikarpasic.

Now, that historical agreement was supposed to separate the joint struggle of the Croats and Muslims on one side, and they did not want to have it waged through the institutions of the system, that is to say through the Presidency, Assembly, and government as legal bodies, but they wanted to sidestep the system and go beyond it. And with a group of Muslims who did not have any -- the support or enjoyed the respect of the population. In fact, this was a trick, and had it succeeded, the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina would have been faced with a fait accompli or they would be told to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. If they stayed, they would not be equal, an equal ethnic group. If they left, they would get minor territories in Western Herzegovina, which were always mentioned when the question of the Croat secession arose.

Q. In this particular setting, did you speak to Izetbegovic on one particular occasion about this? And if so, tell us what his reply was.

A. First of all, it was improper on Izetbegovic's part for not having told me that he had conducted talks of that kind in the first place. And secondly, when I learnt through my own channels about this, I said quite openly -- actually, they had proposed that he be president of the Assembly of that future Yugoslavia. And then I said to him, "All right. If you stay in Yugoslavia, you will be the number two nation or ethnic group in that community. And who is the second ethnic group in Serbia today?" And his answer was, "The Albanians." So I said, "So they're offering you the ²⁴³⁹⁷ position the Albanians hold there." But Izetbegovic said at the end, "Stjepan, nothing will come of it."

Q. Very well. Let's move on then to early July of 1991 or, actually, June of 1991. Was there a session of the Krajina parliament, as it was known, held in Bosanska Grahovo on the 27th of June of 1991?

A. Yes, there was. That is the day of the uprising -- no. I'm sorry. Did you say June or July? I didn't quite hear.

Q. I said June.

A. June. In those days, the Serbian Krajina had already been formed in Croatia, and the Bosnian Serbs were endeavouring to form their own autonomous regions, SAOs, and to one day unite territories in the Republic of Croatia with territories in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. And at the session of this Krajina parliament, was there a declaration to that effect?

A. Yes, they did issue a declaration on the unification of those two Krajinas as the first stage in the unification of all Serbian lands. However, such a unification meant undermining the sovereignty of the two republics and was contrary to the constitutions of both the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Very well. In your judgement, does that declaration and the policy behind it fit with or explain Karadzic's view on the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina otherwise being pursued?

A. That was certainly part of a global policy of unification of all Serbs, so that they would all live in one state, and that idea was in direct contradiction with the existing situation, and in the final ²⁴³⁹⁸ analysis, it was in contradiction with the Helsinki conference, the decisions of which would later on have a decisive impact on the future of my homeland.

Q. Paragraph 16. In the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, did the SDA propose that the act of unifying the Krajinas constituted a violation of the constitutional order of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia?

A. Yes. And not just the SDA.

Q. The vote on that proposal led to what, so far as the SDS deputies are concerned?

A. Our parliament, at a regular sitting, condemned this act and felt that this was an act destroying the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, the SDS deputies walked out of the parliament sitting, which they often did so as to disavow the Assembly. And -- however, we could always continue working because we had the necessary majority. But in fact, when decisions were taken, we really wanted representatives of the Serb people to be present because the SDS had won the majority of the Serb vote, though there were some Serb representatives from other political parties present.

Q. Paragraph 17. In September of 1991, did you meet President Tudjman in Zagreb where he suggested that you should have talks with the SDS? Did you return to Sarajevo and contact Karadzic the next morning? If so, did he seem surprised by your call or otherwise?

A. I frequently had meetings with President Tudjman, but at a certain point in time during my visit to Zagreb, he insisted that I also negotiate with the SDS. Actually, I had talked to Karadzic, Krajisnik, and Koljevic ²⁴³⁹⁹ earlier on, as well as with Mrs. Plavsic. However, they didn't want Bosnia-Herzegovina under any circumstances. And also, they didn't recognise the Republic of Croatia.

In that context, they kept criticising me and accusing me of being loyal to Izetbegovic. And this was very successful as propaganda.

Q. I know it's temptation, but --

A. It was successful propaganda. However, precisely because of that propaganda, President Tudjman said, "Stjepan, you can't just talk to the Muslims. Have you to talk to the Serbs as well very seriously." And when I reached Sarajevo in the morning, I called Karadzic by phone, however he wasn't surprised. It could be assumed that Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Milosevic had been in touch.

Q. Thank you. Paragraph 18. Later in September 1991, did you and Stanic meet with Krajisnik, Karadzic and Koljevic, and did it seem to you that the Serb representatives wanted to gain Bosnian Croat support?

A. Of course everyone was looking for allies, and they worked in parallel primarily with Izetbegovic because that would mean most of the job done, but obviously there were also suggestions that we should talk amongst ourselves. Stanic and I visited the Serbian delegation consisting of Krajisnik, Karadzic and Koljevic, and that was the time when the war was already raging in Croatia.

As Tudjman insisted that I talk to them, I simply put them to the test and said roughly, "My people would kill me if they knew that I was sitting at the same table as they when Croatia was burning. However, we are politicians, and we have to talk." ²⁴⁴⁰⁰ I said that a gesture on their part would strengthen my political standing and that by doing so, they would confirm the sincerity of their wish for cooperation. I simply asked of them that they recognise the Republic of Croatia within its Avnoj borders.

Q. Their reaction to that, in a sentence, please.

A. Dreadful. They said that they would never accept it.

Q. Thank you. And did that lead really to the distancing of you from the Serbs, they being keener on finding another Croat with whom they might cooperate?

A. No. No. They knew that they couldn't make a deal with me against Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, as the situation became more complicated in Bosnia, within the framework of the HDZ there was a pro-Serb lobby with which they started to cooperate. And when the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina took place, that cooperation at times reached optimal levels.

Q. Did you report back to President Tudjman on the reaction of the SDS leadership and its non-acceptance of the Republic of Croatia and its borders?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was President Tudjman's reaction to that?

A. His reaction was also dreadful. Maybe he realised just then that what he was advocating at a higher level had still not even reached the Bosnian Serbs as a piece of information.

Q. Paragraph 20. On the 22nd of January of 1991, had you attended talks in Belgrade? The Bosnian delegation including Izetbegovic, ²⁴⁴⁰¹ Koljevic, and yourself; the Serbian side including the accused, Trifunovic, and a third person whose name is misspelled in the summary, I think. Who was the third person?

A. Unkovic.

Q. Unkovic. I'm not particularly troubled by the meeting itself save to say this: Did the meeting end with -- the formal part of the meeting end, paragraph 21, with an agreement that their future Yugoslavia would be a joint democratic country of equal peoples and republics?

A. I have to say two sentences by way of introduction. Mr. Milosevic, in October 1998 at a Central Committee meeting of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia declared that Serbia was not interested in the territories of other republics, and for us, this was one of the arguments we used at the negotiations held on the 22nd of January, 1991. So in Bosnia, the elections were completed in November, in Serbia in December, and we immediately hastened to meet with the Serbian delegation in order to reinforce the principles of the future Yugoslavia, and those were primarily the equality of the republics. And that is why I was pleased and satisfied with this meeting held on the 22nd of January in Belgrade.

Q. After the meeting and at lunch, did the accused take you aside and have a private conversation with you? Paragraph 22.

A. I have to say that Mr. Milosevic showed a high degree of hospitality towards me and even some friendly feelings, and we got up from the table and he said to me that he understood the wishes of the people of Western Herzegovina to join Croatia. But this was a repeated trick used ²⁴⁴⁰² by the Serbian side whereby a smaller segment of the Croatian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be allowed to unite with Croatia, and for us this had enormous consequences, because unfortunately, that portion of our people believe to this day that they could be attached to Croatia. However, I said to him that we -- there was a misunderstanding between us as to what Western Herzegovina is, and I must admit that with a high degree of precision, Mr. Milosevic said half of Mostar, 70 per cent of Capljina, Ljubuski, Posusje, Grude, Tomislavgrad, Citluk, Siroki Brijeg, 70 per cent of Livno, and with a smile he said the whole of Prozor.

Q. Pausing there --

A. And Prozor was interesting because --

Q. Pausing there, we'll come back to Prozor in a second, but you've remarked on the detail with which he made this offer. Have you represented on a map which will now be produced, Exhibit 34 -- 343, tab 5, now marked by the witness and perhaps can be shown on the overhead projector.

This, Mr. Kljuic, is the map you've marked I think yourself to reflect what it was the --

A. I don't see the map, but there's no problem, I know exactly what I marked.

Q. You see it on the left-hand side. It's not showing up on my screen either. Go back to Prozor and use the pointer just to explain anything you want to. The usher will hand you the pointer.

A. I think there was a rather charming sentence uttered: "We'll give ²⁴⁴⁰³ you the whole of Prozor in Herzegovina too," because you must know that Prozor was a municipality in which there were no Serbs. There was a Serb policeman once for three years. He couldn't find a wife, and he left. So it was a compact community of Muslims and Croats of Bosnia. But I said that we didn't agree as to what Western Herzegovina was.

Q. So your reaction to his proposal -- or do you want to explain more your understanding of what Western Herzegovina was? This was his proposal. What would your understanding of Western Herzegovina have been?

A. I meant a far broader territory, but that isn't important for this case. What is important is that I said to Mr. Milosevic, "So the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be yours, would it?" And he was a charming and charismatic man who smiled a lot. Just then, I used -- I resorted to some Bosnian humour and showed him the Bosnian coat of arms.

Q. That's probably not a detail we need to go into in this court, I think. So we'll go to paragraph 23 instead.

The meeting of the Presidency in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 19th of December, 1991, was one where there were two points on the agenda. The first was re-election of the president, and following various complexities was Izetbegovic re-elected? And I don't want an account of the complexities.

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you.

A. According to the constitution, Izetbegovic was entitled to continue being the president of the Presidency for another year. ²⁴⁴⁰⁴

Q. I'm going to interrupt you. If the accused or the Chamber needs the detail, we can have it, but I think it's sufficient to say that he was re-elected, for our purposes.

So we move on to the second item on the agenda, which had to do with the European Union's request that Bosnia-Herzegovina finalise its request for independence. How did support for that proposal manifest itself on this occasion?

A. At that point in time, it was clear that Yugoslavia could no longer prevail. The horrors of the war in Croatia led Slovenia and Croatia to take the final decision to leave Yugoslavia. They also had declarations of independence and a referendum, and in such a Yugoslavia the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia did not wish to remain. So we --

Q. Time is short. I hope we are over halfway through your evidence-in-chief. Can you just tell us, please, what happened in the Presidency. How were the votes cast on this particular issue on that day?

A. Five members of the Presidency voted in favour of independence and a referendum, whereas Koljevic and Plavsic were against it. And from then on they froze their status, which meant that sometimes they came, sometimes they didn't come to attend, depending on their interests.

Q. And then paragraph 25. The conclusion to seek independence was something that then had to be dealt with by the Assembly. In the Assembly, was Krajisnik and the Serb bloc for or against independence?

A. They left the Assembly meeting. First of all, Krajisnik obstructed the proceedings with various discussions. He tired us out. And at 5.30 -- no, at 3.30 in the morning, he walked out of the Assembly. ^{24405 BLANK PAGE 24406} However, an absolute majority of members of the Assembly remained, among whom there were some Serb deputies from the Communist Party, the reformists, and some other parties.

Q. These votes and the decisions taken, in your judgement, mark the start of the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Would that be right?

A. Yes.

Q. Paragraph 29. I pass over the control of the Assembly simply to this: Did presidents of parliamentary parties have the right to come to Assembly meetings? Did Karadzic do that from time to time, and did he make a speech about the effect of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. The presidents did have that right. The presidents of the parties in power could be given the floor out of order. Karadzic availed himself of this right and made his well-known speech when he said, "If you insist on independence and prevail, there will be no Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Muslim people will disappear."

Q. Tab 8 of Exhibit 503, please. If you'd be good enough just to look at that. To mark their attitude or their separate attitude from that of the rest of the Presidency, did Plavsic and Koljevic write a letter on the 16th of September of 1991 support to the Federal Secretary of National Defence of the army, Vjelko Kadijevic, dealing with the decisions passed by organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina relating to a unified system of defence being passed by outvoting the legitimate representatives of the Serbian people in these bodies. "In this way, the public is being given a distorted image of the attitude of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the army and the defence of the country. ²⁴⁴⁰⁷ "It is, however, true that the entire Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as most patriots and pro-Yugoslavs of other peoples are faithful to the idea of preserving Yugoslavia and the army as the only guarantee of civil peace and safety.

"The presence of the JNA ... is a firm guarantee against the actions of other illegal armed formations." And then ending - I miss out a few passages - "... in the name of the Serbian people and all the peaceful citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we fully support the unified armed forces of Yugoslavia in the execution of their constitutionally defined roles and tasks."

In your judgement, was that letter one that demonstrated the distance between the Serbs and the rest of the Presidency?

A. The letter is authentic. However, the information it contains is false, namely in those days because of the dreadful war in Croatia and the misdeeds committed by reserve units of the JNA in Bosnia, there were fewer and fewer people supporting the army, because in the first place, it had become a single nation army, and in all disputes it always sided with the Serbs. Therefore, the army no longer enjoyed the support of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and many wanted the army to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as possible, even though we in the Presidency had promised long since that the part of the army stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, once we get independence, we would accept them as our own army.

Q. Paragraph 31. Was the army in Bosnia-Herzegovina swelled by troops withdrawing from Slovenia and Croatia along with reservists from ²⁴⁴⁰⁸ Serbia and Montenegro?

A. Yes. In those days Bosnia was the largest barracks in the world, because all the units that had been pulled out from Slovenia and Croatia came to Bosnia, and particularly various corps from Titovo, Uzice, Valjevo, Podgorica and others, from Serbia and Montenegro, even though Serbia and Montenegro were not in jeopardy at all. So Bosnia and Herzegovina had a very high concentration of the military, many of whom belonged to forces outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, or units outside Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Did the Presidency send a delegation to Belgrade to come to an agreement with Kadijevic about the withdrawal of troops from Bosnia and about those that could remain in Bosnia and be supported there?

A. We really had a very clean-cut political position, that in the process of secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina we should take over all the regular troops belonging to Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, we were against the arrival of other JNA units coming. And in those days already, parents would not allow their sons to be recruited to the JNA. So we tried to talk legally, and we sent a high-level delegation to Belgrade, however, except for a few customary phrases, these talks bore no fruit.

Q. On the 24th of December of 1991, was there a meeting between the Presidency and JNA generals led by Kadijevic, all participants except Admiral Brovet being either Serbs or Montenegrins?

A. That's correct. Brovet was an admiral.

Q. At the end of the meeting - and I only want this - did Izetbegovic -- or at some stage in the meeting did Izetbegovic speak to General ²⁴⁴⁰⁹ Kadijevic about paramilitaries who were active in Bosnia; and if so, what did Kadijevic say?

A. Kadijevic clearly took Serb positions and said, "You take care of the political side and I'll take care of the military side." Let me explain what that meant.

What it meant was, you stay in Yugoslavia and then the army will not touch you. However, Izetbegovic, even if he had wanted to, would not have been able to put into practice a policy of this kind. And he did not want to do so, in fact, because the citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the population - and I should like to stress in particular a significant proportion of Serbs living in urban areas especially - were opposed to what the army was doing in Croatia, and that that is true we would see later on, because the percentage of the -- the percentage of the population who voted at the referendum for Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence.

Q. Paragraph 34.

MR. NICE: Just give me one minute, Your Honour.

[Prosecution counsel confer]

MR. NICE:

Q. Paragraph 34. From late 1991, Mr. Kljuic, did you become aware from various reports of military activity around Sarajevo?

A. Yes.

Q. Namely what? What was being reported?

A. You would have to know that at that time, there was democratic power for the first time, civilian power apart from the army. And that ²⁴⁴¹⁰ was different from the communist regime where the army and the party were united. And so we wanted to receive information as to the army's movements on the ground. Although that was our constitutional right, in fact, it took a long time for us to be able to get that information. And the army kept bringing in information, sending in information, saying that they were going to do training in the outskirts of town. However, our observers and the Defence Ministry as well but the citizens too, noticed that what they were in fact doing were making an encirclement around the town and building fortifications.

Q. Thank you. Were barricades erected by both Bosnian Serbs and then by Muslims in March of 1992?

A. As we held a referendum on independence, Karadzic at all cost wanted to prevent international recognition for us, because in his view, numerous preparations had been undertaken in the blockade of Sarajevo itself. He organised the barricades to test and see how far the city was prepared to resist those barricades. And it was especially important in the centre of town, in a place called Pofalici, which allows for the possibility of Sarajevo being divided in two, split into two parts. And when the barricades were erected, it was found that the Serb paramilitary forces could not divide up Sarajevo.

Q. Very well. I think you moved your belongings to the Presidency and lived there; is that correct?

A. Yes. Throughout the war and the aggression, I lived in the Presidency building. But before that, I had to come in there because parts of Sarajevo were blocked, and I live near the airport. And I wasn't ²⁴⁴¹¹ even able to go to work for several days.

Q. And how long did you stay living in the Presidency?

A. I lived in the Presidency until October 1992. And once I was eliminated from the Presidency, I had to move out, move out of my office.

Q. At this time, was the JNA holding itself out as neutral vis-a-vis the international community?

A. No, no. It wanted to be, or, rather, absolutely, but it was deeply involved. It armed the people, gave them logistic support, and when they were in an inferior position, the JNA would come in to set up an alleged buffer zone to separate us.

Q. Were you aware of the presence of a group called White Eagles, or Seselj's men; and if so, what did you see them doing or what did you discover them to be doing?

A. The first time during the barricades in March, the paramilitaries from Serbia turned up too, amongst whom were the most aggressive, Arkan's men and Seselj's men.

A. Seselj's men, Seselj's paramilitaries, had some sort of white band around their heads, and they were well-known by their brutality and also for the looting they did of material goods. And we can say quite frankly that they differed in that respect from the other formations.

Q. Were there forces from Nis of which you were aware? Paragraph 35, I think.

A. Yes. In the former Yugoslavia, the Nis Specials were considered to be the elitist -- elite commandos, and they were in Sarajevo at a number of locations. ²⁴⁴¹²

Q. During the month of May, was there shelling on Sarajevo? If so, was it particularly heavy on certain days? Paragraph 37.

A. The shelling was continuous. However, real hell broke out with the arrival of Ratko Mladic, who organised the strongest shelling. And particularly difficult were the days of the 14th, 27th, and 28th of May, and 29th of May too, 1992.

Q. In that month - paragraph 38 - did you participate in meetings with UNPROFOR?

A. We wanted the army to leave Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina generally. And within the frameworks of cooperation with UNPROFOR, regular meetings were held which had as their goal to determine the conditions under which the army could leave.

Q. The Bosnian negotiators were yourself with Abdic and Doko, Pusina and Siber?

A. Fikret Abdic, Doko, yes. Pusina and Siber.

Q. The Serbian side was represented by?

A. Mrs. Plavsic, General Tolimir, Colonel Cadjo always, and then the others would change and rotate, generals who came from Belgrade, such as Aksentijevic, Stojkovic and Boskovic, and some other officers of a lower rank.

Q. Did the JNA wish to take their weapons with them when they left? Were they allowed to do so?

A. It did want to take the weapons with it, but we didn't agree to that. And then, allegedly to save face for the Serb soldiers, they had to have their own sidearms, carry their own sidearms. However, when the ²⁴⁴¹³ evacuation actually came about, they didn't take anything with them. But beforehand, they had made all the heavy weapons that were in the barracks inoperational.

Q. Tab 18, please. The agreement, or one of the agreements dealing with the removal of commands, units, and institutions from garrisons in Sarajevo. It sets out the parties and sets out in Article 1 how the parties agreed that the JNA would return armaments, ammunitions, mines and so on, which had been entrusted to it. Article 2, within the framework of the withdrawal of the JNA from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, withdrawal of commands, units and institutions with armament, ammunition, mines, and explosives, equipment, removable property which remains after restoring what belongs to the Territorial Defence from certain garrisons. Is this the agreement that was made, Mr. Kljuic?

A. Yes, it is, but it was never put into effect.

Q. You've told us about Pofalici being the critical place for the division of Sarajevo.

A. Yes.

Q. Had the town been split around that point, what would have been the consequences for the old part of Sarajevo? Paragraph 39.

A. Well, it wouldn't have been able to survive the siege as the town of Sarajevo had done for 44 months. It could probably have taken it for 15 or 20 days, but then either the population would have started to -- dying of hunger and thirst, or the aggressor forces who were militarily superior would have entered the town.

Q. Before I conclude this topic, can we divert to intercepts that you ²⁴⁴¹⁴ have reviewed generally. Mr. Kljuic, have you, while here in The Hague, listened to several or indeed really quite a large number of intercepts for the purpose of identifying speakers where you can?

A. Yes.

MR. NICE: Tab 2 of Exhibit 503 is not the draft version provided yesterday but the final version that's been signed by the witness, as the Chamber will see on the last page.

Q. Many of these are marked, on the exhibit that you've signed, as being between Karadzic and Milosevic. What opportunities did you have to know the voices of those men? Put shortly and in light of the observation that the accused made this morning: How were you able to identify the voices?

A. First of all, I had known Karadzic for 30 years, and I think that even before politics, I had contacts with him. And Mr. Milosevic has a characteristic voice. I listened to him for many years over television, so I can say for sure.

Q. Thank you. Other names are shown in the left-hand column of this exhibit, including such names as Koljevic, Jovic, Branko Kostic, and so on. Were these voices you were able to recognise because you have met the people personally or were they voices you identified because you'd heard them on the television - we see Seselj's name there - or was it sometimes one, sometimes the other, sometimes both?

A. First, let me say that I was able to establish only those things that I was certain of, and I certainly recognised Mandic's, Koljevic, Josic, Kostic, and Karadzic's voices, Milosevic's, the voice of Biljana ^{24415 BLANK PAGE 24416} Plavsic because I had contacts with most of those people. And it's very easy to recognise Kostic because he speaks the Ijkavian dialect with the Montenegrin accent.

Q. The same exhibit has on the right-hand side comments. Sometimes the comment is simply a summary of what's being discussed. For example, number 3 simply speaks of Milan Martic causing them problems. Sometimes the comments go a little further and set the transcript into a context. Are those comments your comments, Mr. Kljuic?

A. Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, if -- you said that this witness listened to these intercepts for the purpose of identifying the voices.

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Then why did he make such extensive comments on each of these intercepts?

MR. NICE: To assist. Possibly it becomes helpful to give evidence about it, but certainly to assist so that the intercepts can immediately be seen in the setting, so that if the accused or anybody else wants to ask about them, they can know what they amount to. I'm certainly going to ask him, as the summary reveals at paragraph 13, whether we should listen to number 35 on the list. I think that might be quite helpful at this particular stage. And what we've done with these intercepts is the same as was done with Dr. Williams a couple of weeks ago, where exhibits were produced and his comments were placed on the right-hand side, it being a helpful way, it seemed to us, to provide material to the Chamber. And provided in ²⁴⁴¹⁷ advance yesterday, I think probably in a longer format yesterday because I've reduced the commentary to make the document shorter. With the Chamber's leave, may we count as produced to the extent consistent with our practice in respect of intercepts, these intercepts because the witness can identify the voices. They are, of course, produced as transcripts in a separate binder, as the Chamber will have seen, but if we can deal with them on that basis, I would be grateful.

JUDGE MAY: Well, we can deal with them on this basis: They can be marked for identification. They cannot yet be admitted because the evidence to admit them has not been given on which such a ruling can be based, but they can be marked for identification. But before we get there, I'm not -- I'm also concerned about the status of these comments. I don't think we can admit the comments in this form.

MR. NICE: In that -- well, first of all, the exhibit generally is being admitted for identification only. That will apply to tab 2 itself. The alternatives are, I suppose, as follows; to leave the comments there but not to count them as in any sense being exhibited, to --

JUDGE MAY: Yes. That might be a sensible solution. If you want to rely on any of them, then of course the evidence had better be given live so it could be challenged.

MR. NICE: Certainly, Your Honour. But I'm very concerned to take as little time as possible, ensuring that the witness has done the exercise that has to be done by someone, which is to identify the voices. But can we therefore certainly just listen to number 35, which ²⁴⁴¹⁸ Ms. Wee is in a position, I think, to play for us straight away once we've found it, or have it played it straight away, once we find it in the binder.

[Audiotape played]?

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Hello? "Good morning."

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we're getting no English. I don't know what the problem is.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that number 35 does not correspond to the tape we were hearing.

JUDGE MAY: Well, I had wondered that all along. I have 35, conversation between Abdic and Mladic. Is that what we're supposed to be hearing?

MR. NICE: Would Your Honour give me a minute. Yes, it does become Mladic later on. If you turn over the page. It's unidentified to begin with. We have to go on a little bit further before we get to Mladic at about page 3 of 6, I think.

JUDGE MAY: Well, why are we playing this one in particular? Can you just tell us.

MR. NICE: Yes. It relates to what the witness has just been saying about the shelling of Sarajevo and the change when Mladic came on the scene.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that they heard a portion related to the airport.

MR. NICE: There is obviously a shortcoming in the presentation of ²⁴⁴¹⁹ that tape. May I come back to that after the break when I've tidied matters up.

Your Honour, I certainly would, in an ideal world, like to take one or two more of these tapes or the transcripts from them, but again, I'll decide on that, if I may, after the break and move on to try and see what else I can cover before the break, I having already been one hour and, I think, ten minutes in evidence.

If we move on to page 11 of the summary, paragraph 43.

Q. In April of 1992, did the Presidency form a delegation to see what had been happening in Bijeljina?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go yourself or did you hear from others of what they found?

A. No, but the Defence Minister, Jerko Doko went, and he told me what he had experienced over there.

Q. And what did he experience, according to what he said?

A. First of all, we have to place Bijeljina within the context of the general situation. The first crime in Bosnia-Herzegovina was committed by the JNA troops in the Croatian village of Ravno. However, neither the public nor the SDA attached sufficient solidarity with the casualties, and the JNA did not wish to allow a state delegation even to conduct an investigation into the crime carried out in Ravno. However, when the crime took -- in Bijeljina took place, then the SDA and the Bosnian public saw this as a shock, and then the delegation, including Mrs. Plavsic, Mr. Abdic, members of the Presidency, and Jerko Doko, the Defence ²⁴⁴²⁰ Minister, went to pay a visit to Bijeljina. And over there, Arkan was in control, and that was already the well-known footage that we saw when Mrs. Plavsic and Arkan are embracing. But in Bijeljina, there were no consequences on Abdic because we later found that Abdic was their player, and he was the contact man. The only repercussions were with respect to the Defence Minister, who was a Croat.

Q. What happened to him and what were they forced to do while they were there?

A. Arkan's forces forced him to lie down. Him and his escorts were disarmed while Abdic walked around triumphantly saying, referring to himself as "Babo," and he said, "Nobody will make me lie down." It was clear that Abdic and Mrs. Plavsic had special treatment, preferential treatment in the area. However, once they returned, in their report, Biljana Plavsic said that some young men, burly young men, not paramilitaries or anybody else, any organised force but sporadic young men out of control had killed some Muslims.

Q. Paragraph 46. Did you monitor Abdic's movements and phone conversations in early 1992, fearing that he would flee and leave the Presidency without lawful authority for lack of numbers?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. After recognition on the 6th of April of 1992, what did Abdic do and what was the effect of that on the Presidency?

A. Abdic was the only person at that time who was able to move around the territories where the Serb forces of the JNA were located, so that he would go to Velika Kladusa and go and come back from Velika Kladusa. But ²⁴⁴²¹ he didn't experience Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state yet. And the story of Abdic's cooperation is a long one, with Belgrade, that is, and Zagreb, his cooperation with them. But later on during the course of events, you'll be able to see this from some of the separate agreements that he reached.

Q. In any event, did he leave the Presidency in April, leaving the Presidency without a quorum?

A. He did leave the Presidency a little later on, when we legally replaced Koljevic and Plavsic with those persons who were on the electoral list after them. But Abdic left Sarajevo soon afterwards, and he was working against the legitimate Presidency for -- throughout the time after that.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, may I ask one more question at this stage and then review the position over the break, see if there's anything else I really wish to ask this witness.

Q. You've spoken on a couple of occasions about the possible separation of Sarajevo, and you've spoken of the shelling of it. As it seemed to you, and you were there, was this likely to have any effect on population movement? If so, how and why?

A. It was calculated that way for many reasons. One of those reasons was that the citizens should bear the brunt of the difficulties they were facing, because the town had no medicines, food, medical supplies. And secondly, there were enormous casualties. On certain days, scores of people were killed and hundreds wounded -- dozens killed and hundreds wounded. ²⁴⁴²² Thirdly, any supply routes were blocked, that is bringing in military materiel and equipment too.

And finally, during that first stage of the aggression, it was very important for them to block the forces of the Territorial Defence, whereby they were prevented from leaving Sarajevo and to assist some nearby towns at the same time, so that they were taken control of in brutal fashion, they were looted, and afterwards ethnic cleansing was carried out.

Q. And had the territorial forces that were blocked been able to move to these other ethnically cleansed towns, might the ethnic cleansing have been reduced or avoided?

A. Had they been able to leave, they would have prevented many small towns -- they would have prevented the arrival of the JNA and Serb troops to many of the small towns and thereby would have protected the population and prevented ethnic cleansing.

Q. And what, if any, population movement within Sarajevo itself would have followed from efforts to divide it or even to take it?

A. First of all, they tried to pull out some of the Serbs from Sarajevo. And after that, sometimes at the intervention of international observers, permission was given for the elderly, women, children, and the infirm to leave. However, that too was a trick because they fought in quite a different way, that is to say the people defending Sarajevo fought in quite a different way if they had their families in town. So if their families had left town, they tried to follow suit and leave Sarajevo as well. ²⁴⁴²³

Q. Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, two matters. Firstly, the binder of intercepts. If you want it produced or marked for identification, it should have a number.

MR. NICE: Two -- number 2 is the document that serves to identify the speakers, because that's the document -- sorry, tab 2 of Exhibit 503 serves to identify the speakers because that's the document that the witness has signed with the references to the speakers and the identifying marks of the intercept concerned. Might it be possible for the binder to become part of tab 2?

JUDGE MAY: I just wonder really whether there's any sense in producing it at this stage. You've produced your identifying material. It seems to me that this witness really isn't in a position to produce the binder himself.

MR. NICE: Not beyond the level of producing for identification purposes, which is applying to all intercepts at the moment.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll consider the best course to follow. More practically, witness statement -- the statement of the witness B-1010, which was passed to me yesterday, is incomplete. I need a complete copy. And we do need -- if you want to call these people, we must have time to deal with it, if you can find time. If you want to call them next week or whatever time you do.

MR. NICE: Very sorry you've been inconvenienced.

JUDGE MAY: It is a matter of time. Mr. Kay, you're here today and tomorrow, I guess. ²⁴⁴²⁴

MR. KAY: Yes. Just on the matter of the intercepts, having listened to the argument, it seems to me that really that schedule in tab 2 is as far as it can be taken at this stage, and the binder itself isn't really incorporated into this witness's evidence.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. And it may be simpler, really, because to try and make it part of tab 2 is going to cause endless problems for those in charge of exhibits. It may be that the right answer is that the witness listens to them, as he has done, and says, "Well, I identify those voices," but that's as far as he can take it.

MR. KAY: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: And that he can't actually produce the intercepts. It may be tidier if that is left to the witness who actually does it.

MR. NICE: Can I review what we've done with other witnesses to make sure there's consistency. Although I think a witness can produce an object that he can recognise, it's not necessary to go into those sort of byways here.

JUDGE MAY: It seems to me the person who made the recording or somebody of that sort is going to be necessary to produce it. Whichever way you intend. We've got intercept witnesses coming.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. I mean, again, not necessarily. If somebody is presented with an object which he or she can recognise, then that in itself can produce the exhibit. So I think it's perfectly possible for a witness to reduce an intercept, to say that, "I've listened to this, it is X and Y speaking," but if we are going to be producing them in any event by another witness, then there is no need to venture down ^{24425 BLANK PAGE 24426} these byways of technical admissibility.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. And also it means that the accused will have the chance of cross-examining somebody else about it rather than what may be a waste of time requiring Mr. Kljuic to come back or something of that sort. Mr. Kljuic, we're going to adjourn now. Twenty minutes. Could you remember, please, not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over, and that includes the members of the Prosecution team.

--- Recess taken at 10.39 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm anxious to get on to cross-examination, and of course time is absolutely of the essence now with every witness. I shan't be, I think at the moment, seeking to produce any more of the documentary exhibits to save time. I shan't seek to replay the audiotape that was either incorrect or wrongly placed. Can I then just return very briefly to tab 2 of Exhibit 503. I would urge the Chamber to admit it as a document inclusive of the comments in the same way as happened with Dr. Williams. The Comments column are exactly the comments of the witness. He signed off on the entire document. They cover various general topics. There's one or two that deal with recognition, but recognition of voices is always resolved in favour of non-recognition. Where he says a voice sounds like Mr. Milosevic but he can't be sure, it's dealt with as Unidentified Male, so that's fine.

He deals with comments on himself in, I think, numbers 1 and 7 ²⁴⁴²⁷ where he says, I think, the comments are okay or accurate. He sometimes simply summarises what is the -- is on the tape and then sometimes he adds some overall commentary. But they are his remarks. To read out that right-hand column on seven pages I calculate would take about 25 to 30 minutes and I don't want to take that amount of time. If in due course these and all other intercepts are -- and other intercepts are admitted, reviewing them in toto at that time would be quite a major exercise and this witness is in a position to be able to comment on these ones because they relate to matters not only by people he recognises but for the most part on topics with which he is intimately acquainted. Especially where it concerns Sarajevo.

So that I ask the Chamber to admit the comments. It may be that the matter won't then be taken further by the accused but it may be that he will, either by reference to the intercepts themselves or by reference to another topic. If he doesn't, then at the end of the trial, any reliance on the comments will of course be subject to the fact that they weren't explored viva voce and that they weren't cross-examined to, but they will nevertheless be available as comments by the witness.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You're saying this was done in relation to Dr. Williams?

MR. NICE: Yes. I haven't got -- Dr. Williams' paper exhibits. There was a schedule produced with --

JUDGE ROBINSON: And with comments?

MR. NICE: Yes, with comments on it, yes. But I really don't -- so that's my invitation to the Chamber. To go through it in detail would ²⁴⁴²⁸ take half an hour, and I'd much rather get on with the cross-examination.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: Yes, Your Honour. This is a very difficult exercise to perform in this way, because in effect we're having comments by the witness put in in a schedule form on material largely with which he was not involved in its creation. Authenticity yet has not been established, and it provides a very great burden on the accused to deal with material in this way. We can just look at the detail of this schedule which may well be open to dispute. It's just this witness's interpretation of recordings that he has heard.

Dr. Williams' case was largely different in that he was providing material from documents in a process that he had been involved in and was able to assert what those documents related to in that form. These are detailed comments on conversations, if we look at them, alleged to be between Radovan Karadzic and the accused and other people. It may well -- as well be something that the accused would address you on directly in relation to this material, because I think there's another schedule that's available. I haven't been able to trace it yet, which was a draft form of it which is by no means as certain as to who is the particular parties that are talking.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We're not able to accede to this method of proceeding, and I'll explain why in a few words.

At the moment, these tapes have not been admitted. It may be in ²⁴⁴²⁹ due course they will be, but that will be a matter for us to rule on. The witness is entitled, as he's done, to listen to the tapes and to identify the voices. Those are pure matters of fact. He's entitled to do that, and he can be cross-examined upon it, although it may be more appropriate, if there's a challenge, for that to be dealt with at a later date. But comment upon a tape which nobody's heard, which we don't have the full transcript in front of us, even if the comment is upon something which the witness knows about, and a great deal of it, with respect to the witness, is a running commentary on them which may or may not be admissible in any event.

We are, in those circumstances, not prepared to admit the comments. We will admit the summary table as voices identified by the witness, the left-hand column, but the right-hand column we are not prepared to admit.

Now, it may be appropriate in due course, once the tapes are admitted and properly proved, if they are properly proved and admitted, it may be proper for Mr. Kljuic to come back and make his comments, but at the moment it would simply not only be untidy, it would be totally incomprehensible to deal with the matter in the way which is proposed. So I think this awaits -- it will await the admission of the tapes. So at this stage we do not admit these tapes. We simply admit the witness's evidence as to the voices which he's heard upon them, and the matter will not be taken any further.

It means that the accused will not have to cross-examine upon the tapes. He won't have to. He won't be able to at this stage, although he ²⁴⁴³⁰ may, of course, cross-examine as to the recognition of voices.

MR. NICE: Therefore, I won't attempt to ask the witness anything about any of the tapes in those circumstances. Your Honour said that the full transcripts aren't available. If they are required for contextual purposes because of identification issues, they are in fact available in the other binder that we aren't going to produce, but I'm very anxious --

JUDGE MAY: Would it be sensible for us to return these binders.

MR. NICE: Either now or at the end of the exercise, it depends what the accused does.

JUDGE MAY: We'll keep them for the moment, yes. There are some documents you referred to as dropping.

MR. NICE: Can we deal with the binder generally at the end of cross-examination?

JUDGE MAY: Certainly.

MR. NICE: My calculation is that in fact in evidence there was only about an hour and a quarter, I think, for this witness, and I'd ask that to be reflected because it's -- as you know, my -- I'm sort of a clock watcher now professionally. I have been for a year and four months and I think it's going to go on for a bit. Anything we can do to -- that's all I'll ask the witness for the time being.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Now, Mr. Milosevic, you've heard the discussion about the intercepts. Those are not admitted in evidence now. The only relevant part upon which cross-examination will be permissible at this stage is that part dealing with the voices. If you want to cross-examine the witness about how well -- how he can recognise your ²⁴⁴³¹ voice, you can.

If in due course you wish to challenge that the voices are those as alleged, of course you can call evidence about it and we'll consider the position then. It may be at that Mr. Kljuic would have to come back to deal with the matter if there was some dispute. But at the moment you do not have to trouble about that binder that you were complaining about earlier. No evidence was given about it apart from the identification, and that you have notice of in any event. So you should stick to your cross-examination which the Prosecution had an hour and twenty minutes, I would think that that will probably be enough for you too, but in any event, you should stick to the evidence which the witness has given today.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, Mr. May, I don't see how I can cross-examine this witness in one hour twenty minutes. And secondly -- because that is quite impossible.

And secondly, with regard to the intercepts, I wish to repeat my position which hope I made quite clear already on one occasion: That I challenge all the tapes until an expert establishes that they are really authentic conversations. My voice was recorded over a period of 15 years on thousands of occasions, on radio, TV programmes, tape recordings, and any kind of conversation can be fabricated, even a talk with Dali Lama, if you wish. As for the left column and the identification -- every intercept has to be authenticated by an expert that it is really my voice. As for the left column, I will just use the document that we ²⁴⁴³² received yesterday from Mr. Nice, yesterday after we adjourned. It is the only document in which there is a column that says "Voice identified." And it says, "Draft version of intercepts for use with the witness Stjepan Kljuic." And then it says, "ID 0524T." You received it at the same time I did yesterday afternoon. So the first says 8th of July 1991, Speaker 1 Karadzic Radovan, Speaker 2 Milosevic Slobodan. And then it says voice identified Karadzic Radovan, and the other person appears to be either a military or political expert from Belgrade. [In English] "Global situation --"

JUDGE MAY: Look, we haven't got this document. The document that we have and the document that has been admitted is in tab 2 of this new binder which is Exhibit 503. Now, that's the document. The document I think you're referring to is a draft which has not been admitted.

MR. NICE: Just to assist --

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice, please.

MR. NICE: Some items were dropped from that earlier draft between yesterday and today simply because there were some uncertainties about the voices. They were dropped.

JUDGE MAY: So the document to comment on, to concentrate on, is that which was in the binder.

Now, we've heard what you're saying, and you've heard our ruling. We're not going to admit this binder yet. We're not going to admit these intercepts. But the witness is entitled to say, "I've listened to these voices, I know them, and these are the voices I recognise." Now that's as far as it goes at the moment. ²⁴⁴³³ Now, if you want more time to cross-examine, now is the time to start cross-examining because if you waste time - you've heard this witness can't be here beyond this afternoon - your time is limited, so don't take it up with argument for the moment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not wish to waste time, but if you say you don't have this document, the column headed "Voice identified" does not exist in tab 2. And here in this column -- I quoted the first intercepts. The second one says, "Cannot tell who is talking to Karadzic," and it says it's Karadzic and me. And then again I cannot identify the other one, it is not Milosevic --

JUDGE MAY: I don't know what document -- I don't know what document you're referring to. No such --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please have a look at it.

JUDGE MAY: Have you got tab 2? Why don't you look at the binder and look at tab 2.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I received those tabs, Mr. May, this morning.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, have a look at tab 2, because it's that document which is being admitted, not the one that you were given yesterday. That's the point. So these uncertainties that you're pointing out, not unreasonably, these uncertainties have been removed in the new document, the new version.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's obviously quite superfluous for me to waste time on this, but please have a look at the document that I was given yesterday. That's what I received before today's hearing. ²⁴⁴³⁴

JUDGE MAY: If the usher would get it. I think what -- it was the document that we were all given. It's now been removed.

[Trial Chamber confers]

MR. NICE: Can I explain again to assist. The draft document you were provided yesterday came in two parts, slightly differently formatted and it was given in advance in order to assist. It was then put together in a single document in a common format.

JUDGE MAY: It is confusing, and it's not surprising that the accused has been confused by it. There's a description of the other person appearing to be a military expert and all the rest of it. Well, Mr. Milosevic, all I can say is this, that I'll hand this back to you. It is described as a draft, but it is liable to confuse. The document to concentrate on now is document in tab 2, which doesn't have any of those items in, those vague assertions. Yes. Well, let's begin the cross-examination.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kljuic, you were for a long time at the top echelon of political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina, holding high state and party positions; isn't at that right?

A. Yes.

Q. You were a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, president of the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina, member of the Commission for the Constitutional Order and Security, president and member of the Commission for Establishing War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that ²⁴⁴³⁵ so?

A. Among other things, yes.

Q. And you probably held other positions as well. All these important positions that you held, did it require a high level of familiarity with the events that were most turbulent and tragic?

A. In peacetime, they made for being informed, but during times of high tensions prior to the collapse of Yugoslavia and later on, this was no longer possible.

Q. Very well, Mr. Kljuic. We will come back to that then later. I see from your statement that you favoured a peaceful settlement to the Yugoslav crisis in one way or another; isn't that so?

A. Absolutely so.

Q. And tell me, please, in view of the fact that you had congratulated Herzegovina if it manages to join Croatia by peaceful means, did you see that as a peaceful settlement?

A. I never congratulated anyone on the annexation of Herzegovina to Croatia. On the contrary, I was -- I supported the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I thought Herzegovina was a component part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. I have here a document which is a reaction to your congratulatory message. It is B119803. It is your ERN number -- I don't mean yours, I mean the number of the opposing side. And it says: "Sarajevo, the 22nd of January, Socialist Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina sharply criticised the action of member of the Presidency and leader of the HDZ --" "The Socialist Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina today ^{24436 BLANK PAGE 24437} sharply criticised the act of member of the Presidency of BH and the leader of the HDZ in BH, Stjepan Kljuic, who was the first to address congratulations to Herzegovina if it succeeds in peacefully joining Croatia. The SDP considers this to be the latest contribution to the trading with peoples and territories."

And then it says that, "Kljuic also said that Banovina was the borders of Croatian interest in these areas -- marked the borders, and that it was flirting with those who already see Bosnia-Herzegovina finally divided between two state hegemonies."

And then, "This opinion is in accordance with his national headquarters."

Do you now remember that event?

A. You see, the SDP, or the former Communist Party, was highly critical towards me in view of the fact that I was among the rare people who were not members of the party and yet held high-level positions in the country. These are all insinuations, especially that I go to consult Zagreb before taking a position. I did cooperate with Zagreb, but precisely because I had an opinion of my own. My political career, that part of my political career stopped with the break with Zagreb. However, their criticism is not based on a document from which one could clearly see that I said that. This was a campaign by the Communist Party in an endeavour to put all the nationalist parties in the same heap. It is well known, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but far beyond, that I was a consistent supporter of a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina and the equality of all three constituent peoples in ²⁴⁴³⁸ it, and there are several -- many official documents to corroborate this.

Q. Very well, Mr. Kljuic. I have here in the tabs given to me earlier on, one is just an extract from a page but it is number A088292, and in the footnote 2 it says: "Those who considered that BH should be divided already at the end of 1991 started the institutional integration of Herceg-Bosnia within Croatia while on the other side advocating public support for the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina while secretly working for its annexation to Croatia."

Then there is a quotation: "At the level of diplomacy, our political men in Sarajevo can continue pledging their support for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina as we have been saying so far." This is from the minutes of a meeting between Franjo Tudjman and a delegation of the HDZ of BH.

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt you. What is the tab number? Can you give us the tab number, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was disclosure under Rule 68 of documents linked to Stjepan Kljuic.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Perhaps the Prosecution can find it. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And then it goes on to say: "This is confirmed by the testimony of Stjepan Kljuic, who as president of the HDZ was a participant at that meeting." And then you are quoted as saying: "The plan was for us formally to advocate a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas actually they worked quite differently, that is against it, because they didn't want ²⁴⁴³⁹ it."

Was -- is that an authentic quotation?

A. The quotation may be authentic, but it doesn't apply to me under any circumstances. I think that you too know full well that I truly supported a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that is what put me in a position to have to separate from such a policy, and I became a victim of those policies.

Q. As far as that is concerned, you also know what you stated on page #, paragraph 4 of your statement: "Milosevic made up a strategy which Mrs. Plavsic accepted quickly." I don't know why you mention her. "The position of the Serbs was that people of all ethnicities had lived well in Yugoslavia and that that was our homeland and that those who wanted independence were destroying the homeland."

I advocated Yugoslavia. Wasn't that clear?

A. I must say that formally you did advocate Yugoslavia.

Q. What else was I advocating?

A. But in actual fact, in practical terms, you did everything against Yugoslavia. And I can just draw your attention to a few details. First of all, you destroyed the 1974 constitution which was a basis --

Q. I'm not asking you about that. There were many witnesses who have spoken about that.

JUDGE MAY: You must allow him to answer. You've asked what else you were advocating.

Mr. Kljuic, go on. You say that, first of all, the accused destroyed -- let him finish. Let him finish. ²⁴⁴⁴⁰ Mr. Kljuic, if you can very shortly, of course.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very shortly: I think that our tragedy is that Mr. Milosevic formally advocated Yugoslavia, did everything for Yugoslavia to cease, because in those days few people believed that it was possible for certain republics to secede from Yugoslavia. However, with the subsequent course of events, the aggression against Slovenia and Croatia and the instrumentalisation of the Yugoslav People's Army, the population of the western part of Yugoslavia was resolutely against such a Yugoslavia.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right, Mr. Kljuic, let's move on. I was quoting your words, actually, where you say that it was the Serb's position that people of all nationalities live well in Yugoslavia, that that was our homeland, and that those who wanted independence destroyed the homeland. And when you say the Serbs, you mean Serbia.

A. Yes. But just a moment. Circumstances changed from the moment that you took over control of the votes in the Presidency of Yugoslavia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo, and then also when you imposed other rigorous things such as the storming of the financial system. And ultimately when you took over the dominant role and influenced the Yugoslav People's Army, which at that point in time was least of all a common army and least of all a Yugoslav army which the events that followed were to bear out.

Q. Well, I don't want to deal with those marginal things. This storming of the financial system you mentioned --

A. Five billion American dollars. ²⁴⁴⁴¹

Q. Five billion dinars is what the National Bank of Yugoslavia released for the buying up of wheat. And somebody lied to you saying that it was $5 billion. She couldn't have admitted -- the primary issue could not have been $5 billion. But all that was while Yugoslavia existed.

A. That's how we saw it.

Q. And it was for buying up wheat and it was $5 billion dinars released by the National Bank of Yugoslavia for the purchase of wheat, so that that was that dramatic entrance, or storming, as you put it, of the financial system, but let's not dwell on that.

Now in addition to the functions that we enumerate here, in the course of 1991, you were also president of the Security Council of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it also right that this council on the 18th -- I have a note of it here. The 18th of September, 1991, changed its name and became known as the Crisis Staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it also right -- so we're talking about September; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, the 18th of September, 1991, in addition to this decision at the council meeting, and it was still the council, several other conclusions were made and adopted.

A. Let me hear them.

Q. Well, is this true: That one of the conclusions was the following, that the newly appointed Crisis Staff was duty-bound to lead ²⁴⁴⁴² the whole defence system and to ensure the procurement of weapons. That means we're talking about September 1991. Is that correct?

A. Yes. It was to take into account the defence system, but I don't think that it was publicly stated that it should take care of arms and arming, although the people spontaneously began to arm themselves quite seriously based on the experience gained in the Republic of Croatia.

Q. Well, I'll put this document on the ELMO, on the overhead projector, so what you don't believe you can look at, and it is highlighted with a Magic Marker. And it also says to ensure the procurement of weapons; and underneath, it says president of the Crisis Staff, Stjepan Kljuic, and the vice-president, Mate Boban.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness -- let the witness see the document.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The header is the Security Council of the HDZ of BH, and it is on the paper, it is belonging to the organisation, and there is a memorandum at the top.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The document is on the papers -- on the paper of the HDZ, but this was done by the technical service because neither my signature is there nor is Boban's. And that is how it is possible that this was compiled in the fashion it was, roughly. But I don't reject the fact that there were many attempts to procure weapons at that time.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes, but you just denied that. But now it says there the procurement of large-scale arms.

A. This wouldn't have been written officially in this way. It is a ²⁴⁴⁴³ document without any signatures. An official document would be given a different form, lent a different form. But the intent was to secure weapons, and you don't have to doubt that because we had already gained previous experience.

Q. Well, that's all I was asking you, but are you challenging the correctness of what is written in that piece of paper?

A. No, this is just not an original document. It is a technical document without any signatures. But the contents are authentic, yes.

Q. All right. If you say the contents are authentic, then we don't have to confirm it with any signatures.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance, Your Honours. We received this from the OTP, this particular document, and this is just the first page of it. There's just one page. Now, perhaps the OTP could give us an explanation as to why they didn't supply us with the rest of the document, the other pages, which might perhaps have a signature. We just have page 1.

JUDGE MAY: No need for them to do that at this moment. Yes. Next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. And by the by, and I assume you can confirm this, that on the 26th of July of that same year - so you're doing this in September - that decisions were taken to proclaim independence in Croatia and Slovenia. That's right, isn't it?

A. Yes, the declaration on independence, yes. ²⁴⁴⁴⁴

Q. In 1991, declaration on independence? Right. Fine. And is it true and correct that at the time when we establish this document was written, on the 18th of September, 1991, that there was not a single clash or conflict anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina during that period, or any incidents breaking out or any intervention by the JNA or anything of the like as you said during today's testimony. Before this, before this question of armaments and the decisions taken at that Security Council of yours.

A. I'll have to tell you that it would have been too late once the conflict had broken out. The citizens, and especially the functionaries and others followed what was going on at that time in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was the time when large-scale troops of the JNA were coming into BH. Reservists were coming in who occupied certain territory and provoked incidents. So it's not true that there weren't any incidents. If you look at the behaviour of the Podgorica Corps in Western Herzegovina, including Stolac, then you'll be able to see that the population was very much afraid of that army.

Now, the second thing is the development of events in Croatia.

Q. Just a moment, Mr. Kljuic. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, up until that date, the date on that document that we've just looked at and quoted from, had any incidents broken out in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. There were minor ones, but not what happened in the second half of 1991.

Q. I said were there any incidents? Was anybody killed, beaten up? What happened? Were there any incidents of that sort in BH? ²⁴⁴⁴⁵

A. There were. I can't remember the details of some minor incidents, but we were more worried about the grouping of the Yugoslav People's Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. All right, but did the JNA intervene at all in BH at that time?

A. No, but in Ravno it did later on.

Q. You say it didn't. All right, let's move on. Now, are you challenging something that you say in your second statement, page 3, paragraph 7, and I'm quoting you: "We have to remember that that was the time -" and you're talking about October 1991, you can see that from paragraph 6 - "that at the time Bosnia had still not become independent and that the JNA represented a legal armed force of Yugoslavia and Bosnia was technically a part of Yugoslavia. So an armed resistance wasn't a realistic possibility at that point in time." Is that what you said?

A. Yes, but Mr. Milosevic, do you really consider that we as citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina would have to support the illegal behaviour and conduct of the JNA, which had already become highly compromised by that time precisely because it implemented violence over the Croats and Muslims, the population.

In October 1992, we gain a very clear picture after the -- what happened in Ravno that the army was an uni-national army, and this was evident later on when top level army delegation came to Sarajevo on the 24th of December for a meeting, and that's why the population feared the army and resisted sending their children to an army of that kind.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly be asked to slow down and pause between question and answer. Thank you. ^{24446 BLANK PAGE 24447}

JUDGE MAY: You are both being asked to slow down for the interpreters, and to pause between question and answer.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As you have just mentioned Ravno, in point 3 of your statement, the statement of the 20th, 24th of August, et cetera --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have a copy of both of his statements, please.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Which was the passage again? Point 3 of the statement of the 20th of August.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Point 3 of the statement, and it is a statement given on the 20th, 24th, and 26th of August, Mr. Kljuic's statement.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You say: "In July and October 1999 I testified under subpoena in open session for the Prosecution in the trial against Dario Kordic." I'm reading that from your statement. It says it was in open session. "During the course of my testimony the Defence did not raise with me either of the issues related to JNA convoys in Central Bosnia, Sarajevo in 1991, or the response of the government to the JNA attack on Ravno. The JNA convoy near Busovaca in 1991 must be viewed in the context of a similar event as it was the stopping of 166 tanks from the 7th to 9th of May 1991 in the village of Prolog near Mostar."

Tell me this now, please, Mr. Kljuic: What attack on Ravno are you talking about? What JNA attack on Ravno? When did that JNA attack take place? What attack was it that you are referring to? ²⁴⁴⁴⁸

A. The crime perpetrated by the Yugoslav People's Army against Ravno was in the autumn of 1991, and it was the first major incident caused by the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, Ravno is a small Croatian town near Trebinje, and at one point it was on the railway line running from Mostar to Dubrovnik, and the Yugoslav People's Army entered Ravno and killed about ten elderly men and women. And we set up a state commission, a BH state commission in which we had Mr. Ganic, member of the Presidency; government member Mr. Lasic - they were members - and several police, high-ranking officers who were supposed to conduct an investigation into what actually happened in Ravno.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. I think that's sufficient for the moment. Just -- can you give us the date, please, Mr. Kljuic, if you remember.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember the exact date. I have it noted down at home, however.

JUDGE MAY: Is it October of 1992? Is that the rough date?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not 1992, 1991.

JUDGE MAY: 1991. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As you have the statement in front of you, Mr. Kljuic, you say later on in paragraph 4, you talk about the convoys, JNA convoys in May and October 1991, and in paragraph 5 you draw the conclusion that during that time, at that time Gojko Susak of Croatia was trying to provoke a conflict with the JNA in Bosnia to divert the JNA away from Croatia in order to give Croatia time to prepare for the inevitable conflict with the ²⁴⁴⁴⁹ JNA. And then you go on to say that the JNA was already looking for justification to use force against civilians on Bosnian territory. Is that right?

A. The Yugoslav People's Army implemented a programme to take control of the territories which belonged -- which came under the framework of your Ram operation.

Q. Mr. Kljuic, let's leave the Ram operation alone. It didn't exist at all. It was a code name to move to protected conversations, encrypted conversations. So I don't know where you get this Ram, R-A-M, from, but we'll come to that in the course of our cross-examination or, rather during the examination, but you know nothing about that.

A. Well, I even listened to you speaking about it to Karadzic.

Q. Well, whether you heard me talking about that or something else, let's leave that alone.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I clarify and make matters simpler? The army was supposed to take the lines, take up positions along the lines to which Belgrade had territorial pretensions, along that line.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Kljuic, you know full well that Belgrade didn't have any territorial pretensions whatsoever. I told you that, I told Izetbegovic that when we attended a meeting.

You testified here that the conclusion of our meeting was --

JUDGE MAY: Did -- did the accused -- he's making these assertions and you should have a chance to answer them. Did he say to you at a ²⁴⁴⁵⁰ meeting with Izetbegovic, apparently, that Belgrade had no territorial pretensions? Did he say that to you?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I said that already in October 1998, [as interpreted] at the central committee meeting of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia he made a statement to that effect, that the 22nd of January, 1991, he confirmed that statement in talking to a delegation from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this -- we were all very happy to hear it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, let's move on, Mr. Kljuic, with what you were saying, that Susak endeavoured to provoke a conflict and you did your best to avoid a conflict.

And then in paragraph 6 you go on to say that in October 1991, there was another issue involving a convoy, and Zoran Maric, the then-president of Busovaca municipality, spoke to you very briefly, and you said that the JNA would retaliate by sending troops and what would we do then? Or, rather, you asked that they not be blocked. Now, these events, do they not confirm that the JNA never entered into a conflict with the people anywhere, and where bare-handed people stand up to stop the column, you went to intervene there on a number of occasions, and the JNA never resorted to force against people who were blocking the road, although it was able to pass had it used force; isn't that right?

A. Well, first of all, the JNA went to those areas -- their going there was unjustified and they had reinforced their formations and this -- ²⁴⁴⁵¹ the reaction of the population was one of revolt.

Q. Well, we're not entering into that. That was up to the JNA. But isn't it clear that the JNA did not use force against these citizens for them to pass through but, as you say in paragraph 4, they spent three days negotiating to have them be given free passage, because they moved around freely, as you yourself confirm, as the sole legal legitimate armed force in Yugoslavia at that time. It was moving around its own territory. Isn't that right?

A. Well, we can debate point as to whether it was their territory or not and what the role of the JNA was during that period of time. It is true that in the field, on the ground, there were lower-level structures who thought that they could stand up to the Yugoslav army. I personally, and we, all of us together, did not wish to see an incident break out. However, when the units of the Yugoslav People's Army started moving towards all the strategic points which would enable them one day in the future to occupy us, then the people, the populace, was revolted to see this happening. And when 166 tanks moved towards Kupres, advanced towards Kupres, the people spontaneously got together to stop them because the people were afraid of those tanks.

And it was my wish to prevent an incident from breaking out, because at that point in time, I myself had been arrested and taken to the air force base in Jasenica where I was told that the JNA had to pass through. And I said how is it going to pass through going across -- through the people? And this resulted in long-winded negotiations and talks, and three days later the tanks were allowed to go through, and I'm ²⁴⁴⁵² very proud to have prevented casualties in an incident.

Q. Well, that and October 1995 where you're talking to Maric, doesn't that precisely deny all assertions that the JNA engaged in violence there? So you spent three days negotiating to let 166 tanks through which did not want to pass through using force. That's quite clear. So that's what you say in your statement. You negotiated for three days.

A. Of course, yes, but the citizens did not trust the tanks. They knew it was very strategically important for them for them to park themselves on the elevations above Kupres.

Q. All right. I won't belabour the point and waste time on it. All I wanted to establish was that they did not use force. They did not resort to force and you spent three days negotiating to allow the JNA units pass through peacefully.

A. Yes. And Mr. Milosevic, you know that the army acted outside the agreements of the legal authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time.

Q. No, I don't know that. I don't know that they took steps outside any agreement reached by the legal authorities there or anywhere else, because, Mr. Kljuic, as you say yourself, that army was the sole legal armed force during the time, and it was moving around --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. I'm just making sure there's a pause between question and answer. Also, something seems to have gone wrong with the transcript.

Apparently it's simply these monitors that have gone wrong and the transcript is running. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Perhaps you could just repeat the question briefly and we'll take the matter up. ²⁴⁴⁵³

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm moving on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Kljuic, we really have to hurry, because my time will be interrupted. Is it beyond dispute that the HDZ on the 19th of August, 1990, had a rally in the Sarajevo Skenderija - this is August 1990 - and that the president of the initiating committee, Davor Perinovic, whom you succeeded, isn't that right, addressed the people gathered with the following words: "The enemies of Croats and Muslims are never at rest but our message to them is we won't give Bosnia." The enemies of Croats and Muslims. Is that so?

A. Yes, quite. It was an HDZ convention, and you must be aware of the atmosphere. For the first time after 45 years, the Croatian peoples hymn was played, the Croatian flags were flown. There were many people from abroad present, too. The speech of the president of the initiating committee is not valid, because after all, he was a political amateur in those days, and after we had rid ourselves of the yoke of the communist regime, people gave themselves freedom to express their emotions far more powerfully than was to be expected.

Q. But isn't it unquestionable that they said the enemies of the Croats and Muslims are never addressed? He never mentions the Serbs, does he? And not only that, but he obviously denotes them as some sort of a common enemy. And this was in August 1990.

A. You cannot consider his words as being relevant. Let's not enter into his origins. You know that very well, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. But, Mr. Kljuic, this was an HDZ convention. Wasn't the message ²⁴⁴⁵⁴ quite clear to the Muslims and the Serbs, one being treated as enemies and the others as friends. And this was in 1990. It is an HDZ rally for Bosnia.

A. Yes. It was the first free event, and there was an eruption of emotions.

Q. You mean anti-Serb emotions?

A. No, not anti-Serb, anti-communist. However, in this particular statement, that can be said to be true too.

Q. I'm glad you say so. As an intellectual, you respect arguments, there's no doubt about that.

So already in 1990, the Serbs were marked as some sort of a common enemy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A. I wouldn't agree with that.

Q. Very well. Also in the examination-in-chief and on page 5, paragraph 4 of your statement, you say that it was clear that the real intention of the Serbian Democratic Party and the Serbs - you probably mean the Serbs of Serbia - to unite Serbia with the Serbian Krajina. You were speaking here about the unification of the Cazin Krajina and SAO Krajina; isn't that right?

A. Yes, SAO Krajina, and the Knin Krajina.

Q. The SAO Krajina, but which one?

A. Glamoc, Drvar.

Q. So you're talking about the Krajina in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A. Yes.

Q. And do you remember, Mr. Kljuic, that the official position of ²⁴⁴⁵⁵ Serbia then was that this was illegal, that it wasn't serious, and it was unacceptable?

A. Correct. I remember that you condemned it but I don't know whether you did so sincerely. They took a step before expectations. That was an amateur step.

Q. But you remember that that never happened.

A. It was impossible in those days.

Q. So when you say that this was some kind of a policy, on the other hand you also are aware of the fact that this was a step that met with a negative response. You yourself say that we condemned such a step.

A. Yes, but you must allow, Mr. Milosevic, that it may have been premature. It was due to come later.

Q. Yes, but those are your assumptions. On page 5, paragraph 5, you say that in July 1991 you were in Zagreb at a meeting with Tudjman who proposed to you that you have talks with the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party. Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. And upon return to Sarajevo, you called up Karadzic and he told you that he had expected your call.

A. Correct.

Q. You then drew the conclusion, because as you say Tudjman and I had a permanent telephone contact between us, that's what you say, so you drew the conclusion that Tudjman told me and I told Karadzic that you would call him.

A. That was my initial impression, but later, reading Sarinic's book ^{24456 BLANK PAGE 24457} about meetings with you, I learnt that you were in contact.

Q. Let us not delve into Sarinic's book now. Sarinic will be coming to testify about his book. But did President Tudjman give you any guidelines or suggestions regarding that meeting with representatives of the Serbian Democratic Party?

A. He did not.

Q. Well, wasn't it logical for him to give you such guidelines if you assume that -- if your assumption about our mutual agreement is correct?

A. No. I'll tell you why: Because the whole campaign against me - I was obviously in the way of certain elements - was to represent me as a person who had been bought up by the Muslims. Because how come I was not supporting a single Serb position in parliament?

Q. But please, as you speak about this, please look at the minutes from a working meeting in the presidential palace. This was a response to Mesic's testimony. I will give you the entire minutes to look at. I will open it on the page which is relevant for this discussion. The president says, President Tudjman: "Everything boils down to the fact that I met with Milosevic 48 times over the division of Bosnia." And then on the next page, it says: "And later on, he admitted that I met him at his proposal. I had two meetings with Milosevic, once with Alija Izetbegovic present. And we said in Geneva or somewhere, we said this together, because these things were being repeated, that we were dividing up Bosnia at that meeting. What we said was that we never discussed the division of Bosnia, but we did talk to Alija in spring 1992. The war in Croatia was stopped, but Alija wanted to remain in Yugoslavia," et cetera. ²⁴⁴⁵⁸ So please look at these minutes. Tudjman is talking to his own associates. These are stenographic notes.

JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Wait a moment. Now, what is the point here? The witness wasn't there. This is some meeting he will know -- he wasn't present at. Now, what are you trying to achieve, Mr. Milosevic?

A. I wish to challenge the assertion of Mr. Kljuic's, mentioned many times, that apparently Tudjman and I were dividing Bosnia at some sort of a meeting in Karadjordjevo. Tudjman himself denies this among his own associates in 1997.

JUDGE MAY: You will be able to bring evidence, if you have any, to that effect. The witness can only say what he saw and heard himself, and that's what he says Tudjman told him. Now, Tudjman may have been saying else to somebody else. We don't know that, we'll have to find out. But the witness can't comment on what occurred at some other meeting. Yes, Mr. Kljuic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour. Your Honour, very briefly. First of all, I never said that President Tudjman said he was in Karadjordjevo with Mr. Milosevic. I said that on one occasion he just told me such-and-such a thing about the Cazin Krajina. Secondly, I didn't say I was sure that Milosevic and Tudjman were in touch permanently, but I was surprised by the fact that Karadzic knew I would call him, and he said he was expecting my call. So that was my logical conclusion.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Wait a minute. I'm sorry if I interrupted you, if there's ²⁴⁴⁵⁹ something important you wish to add, but I wish to draw your attention to paragraph 10 of your statement. You say that in May 1992 -- this is paragraph 10 of your statement: "In May 1992, Boban had a secret meeting with Karadzic in Graz." What have I got to do with a secret meeting between Karadzic and Boban in Graz?

A. Let me tell you first that I never claimed this but there was talk about it and Sarinic confirmed this in his book, but let that be a topic to be addressed on another occasion. However, you could have a lot to do with Bosnian Serbs having talks with Croatian representatives. First of all, Mr. Koljevic was with Boras and Manolic, then Mr. Koljevic was in Zagreb seeing Tudjman. They talked about Shakespeare throughout lunch. And this axis Boban-Karadzic was meeting not only when the aggression on Bosnia started but it will be a contact that lasted for a very long time at the expense of my own people, the Serbian people, and at the expense of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. I think to the detriment of the whole of Yugoslavia.

A. Absolutely so. I agree with you.

Q. And then you go on to say that Tudjman told you - which I really don't believe you can remember that, I don't think you're making this up intentionally - that you -- I gave him the Cazin Krajina and you responded it would be the same as if he had given you Sicily or Sardinia, and I quite agree with you. How could I give anyone Cazin Krajina as a present? Don't you remember that one of the leitmotifs that was circulated continuously that Croatia was territorially untenable because it has this crescent form and certain corrections needed to be made in the ²⁴⁴⁶⁰ reconstruction of a future Yugoslavia. That was Zagreb's position, wasn't it?

A. I can't say that it was always the official position, but that such ideas were present in Croatia's policy is beyond dispute.

Q. Thank you. On page 6, paragraph 5, you say --

JUDGE MAY: If you're moving on to something else, we'll stop. But, Mr. Kljuic, let's make sure in case this is challenged. This is what the accused told you about Cazin Krajina; is that right? As I understood your evidence, you had a conversation with him about that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. He says that Tudjman told him that.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On one occasion President Tudjman said this to me.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. You've clarified it. We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, it's quite apparent we can't deal with the 92 bis application today. We'll try and deal with it tomorrow, but since it's your application and your witnesses, you will have to make some time for it. What we can do is deal with it first thing tomorrow morning and try and deal with it orally.

MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases. I take it from that you were going to allow cross-examination to exhaust today, subject to whatever other examination from the amicus. ²⁴⁴⁶¹

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, we have in mind 55 minutes for you, the balance of the afternoon. I'm afraid the amici and re-examination will have to be short accordingly. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I absolutely cannot get through the cross-examination of this witness over the next 55 minutes, and could you please bear that in mind.

Otherwise, in the meantime, during the break I was given back this piece of paper relating to the conclusions that we commented on, Mr. Kljuic and I, with regards to the procurement of weapons, and I should like this to be exhibited.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let it be produced. We'll give it the next exhibit number.

THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 163, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Kljuic, could you please give me short answers for us to save time, because as you can see, my time is extremely limited.

A. I'll do my best.

Q. On page 6, paragraph 5 of your statement you said that the key to the beginning of all the problems in BH was the president's meeting held on the 19th of December, 1991; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it also true that the question of the agenda for the Assembly was the demand by the international community that Bosnia-Herzegovina ²⁴⁴⁶² finalise its calls for independence?

A. Yes.

Q. So I don't suppose you would deny that you were asked to demand independence.

A. No, because that's what we wanted ourselves.

Q. When you say "we," do you mean the representatives of just two peoples?

A. I mean the enormous number of the population which would be borne out by the referendum.

Q. Is it true that Plavsic and Koljevic disagreed with that and left the session?

A. Yes.

Q. And after that, they froze their participation in the Presidency meetings.

A. Yes. But that act was counter to the constitution. They could either tender in their resignation or be part of the Presidency. They thought up something that was not constitutional, because pursuant to our constitution, if any member of the Presidency should table their resignation, then he would be replaced by the next person on the list, the electoral list.

Q. All right. Now, they did not tender their resignation. And you say on page 7 that it was Plavsic and Koljevic's task to block the Presidency meetings; is that right?

A. Absolutely correct.

Q. The interpreters are cautioning me to speak slower because they ²⁴⁴⁶³ can't follow at this speed.

Now, tell me, how can you speak of their blockade when they froze their positions and work in the Presidency? Didn't they take part at all so how could they have blocked its work?

A. In official terms, formally they could not because we had the majority. But as we wanted to arrive at a consensus for the final outcome, it was questionable whether we should respect the elected presidents -- representatives of the Serb people. We wanted them to take part in the work of the Presidency.

Q. So you exclude that generally known principle which held true for Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to which decisions must be passed on the basis of a consensus by the representatives of all three ethnic groups.

A. I'm not excluding that. But if BH had an equal treatment with the rest of the Yugoslav republics and if that was offered to all the other republics, and you know about the Badinter Commission, a case in point, and that Montenegro at one point, had it accepted that, then to curtail the rights to BH for independence would have been precisely an infringement of the interests of the citizens of that particular republic.

Q. All right. And that's why you go on to say that Krajisnik left the Assembly meeting, and you went on to describe that the meeting lasted until 3.30 a.m.

A. 3.30 a.m., yes.

Q. Right. As I didn't attend the Presidency meeting and you did, could you please confirm or refute the information that I have that Krajisnik, in view of the fact that time was getting on, he said he was ²⁴⁴⁶⁴ interrupting the meeting and that they would continue their deliberations in the morning. Is that how it was?

A. I don't know if that's what he said, but quite obviously the representatives of the SDS did not want the meeting to come to a conclusion, and as everything was limited by dates and the issues were ones of capital importance, then with the fact that these two people left, they obstructed the calls for independence.

Q. Now, the fact that this session went on until the early hours of the morning, that is to say from one morning to 3.30 a.m. the next morning -- is that right?

A. Yes, with some breaks and interruptions.

Q. Yes. And is it true that Krajisnik said that as they had been debating for quite a long time and as time was passing, doesn't it seem to be logical to you that he said they would continue the next morning?

A. Yes, but there is the senior staff meeting that took the decision. I don't think he promised not to come back. There was no reason not to wait for a few more hours. Quite obviously they had different plans.

Q. Yes. But wait a moment. You that it became clear through that action that they were not in favour of BH's independence.

A. Absolutely so.

Q. And did you not say yourself that they had told you that themselves quite unequivocally? So why did you need to have this sequence of events to understand that, to come to understand that, that they were not in favour of independence for BH? ²⁴⁴⁶⁵

A. Well, this became evident after the lengthy discussions.

Q. But they themselves told you that they didn't want independence.

A. Yes, but if they said they were not in favour of independence, does that mean that all of us should not call for an independent BH? Should give up our stances?

Q. Well, I'm not telling you what the alternative should be. All I'm saying is that all of you, up until that point in time, and you personally, you who advocated - how shall I put this? - a multi-ethnic principle and approach were in favour of having decisions made by consensus on the part of all three ethnic groups.

A. Of course. But the frameworks of the dependence or independence of BH was normal if you compare it to other republics.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, on page 8, paragraph 1, you say that the basic propaganda of the Serb leadership in BH was that the Muslims and Croats should become armed and that a large number of Mujahedin were ready to come to BH and attack the Serbs there. Is that what you said?

A. Yes.

Q. And is that how it was? Is that what actually happened? Except that they didn't only attack the Serbs, they attacked the Croats too, isn't that right, Mr. Kljuic?

A. Well, it wasn't that the Mujahedin at that time were in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I have to say that the arming of both the Croats and Muslims was child's play compared to what the Serbs had and the JNA with then, which systematically armed the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. ^{24466 BLANK PAGE 24467}

Q. All right. Now, we provided a document with respect to armaments, and it dates back to September 1991, and we also have documents testifying to the armament of Muslims also in 1991. So all three parties, all three sides procured weapons. I don't suppose we're challenging that.

A. Yes, but in a conversation you had with Karadzic, you once said, when he was raising tensions and saying everybody's arming themselves in Bosnia, you said that won't help them. So you, as opposed to Karadzic, were conscious of the fact that all this arming on the part of the Croats and the Muslims, the Bosniaks, was amateurish compared to the military potential of the Yugoslav People's Army and Yugoslavia itself.

Q. All right. And you said that there were no Mujahedin. Well, I have here a document, 01099141 is its number, and it provides a list of the Mujahedin -- it is in English -- a list of the Mujahedins imprisoned by the HVO. And then it goes on to list them. There are 11 of them from Algeria, from Tunisia, Pakistan, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey.

A. Possibly, but that was later on, in the later period.

Q. That was in April 1993.

A. Well, that is far removed from the period of time we're discussing now and when your propaganda spoke about mass arming on the part of the Croats and Muslims.

Q. Well, these Mujahedin, did they come because of Serb propaganda or for some other reason?

A. I can't say anything about that period of time because I wasn't a member of the Presidency at that time. I ceased to be it from October ²⁴⁴⁶⁸ 1992 -- or, rather, from 1992 to 1993, October. And that is where that piece of information falls in.

Q. I'm talking about April 1993.

A. Precisely.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be exhibited, please?

JUDGE MAY: No. There's no relevance for it at the moment. The witness has said what he was able to.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, then. Now, I have been given by the opposite side over there, Mr. Nice, Mr. May, a -- the transcript -- transcript between Andrew Hogg and Abdul Aziz, a conversation between the two men. It is a translation that I have here, and your ERN number is 03019700, and it speaks about -- or, rather, Hogg is asking him, Can you tell us about the soldiers, the Mujahedin who have come here? And he is asking him whether they are people with combat experience. And he says, Yes; and he says, Where did they get their military experience? And he said, Most of them from Afghanistan but there are some from other countries, and for some of them this is the first time they have been a part of the jihad, and so on and so forth. I don't want to dwell on that.

Once again, Aziz responds, and I'm quoting his answer: "The Mujahedin methods, the methods of the jihad are either victory or death to Islam -- death for Islam," which means shadar [phoen], we refer to it as shadar or -- so it's either victory or defeat. Shadar means that we are laying down our lives in the struggle for Islam, and then he asks how ²⁴⁴⁶⁹ shadar is written and he spells shadar for him.

JUDGE MAY: I'm not going to stop you but time is limited and there is a limit to what this witness can answer in relation to an intercepted conversation between two other people. Now, he has agreed with you that later on there may have been Mujahedin present. There is no point, it seems to me, to labouring the matter any further. No doubt there are other witnesses or you can call evidence about their presence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Among other things, he says that there are many of them. I cannot count them because there are so many of them from every country, and that is what Aziz says, among other things. So this is a document which I was disclosed by Mr. Nice's side, and I'd like to exhibit it.

JUDGE MAY: No. There's no reason at the moment to exhibit it. All you can do is to ask the witness what his experience, if any, of the Mujahedin was. You can ask the witness about that, but he can't give general evidence about it.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, with the intercepts, however produced, there may be the same problems with authentication. We simply provide the material we have.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think they are intercepts. This is isn't an intercept, it's an interview between Andrew Hogg, a journalist, and Abdul Aziz. Perhaps Mr. Kljuic can take a look at it and perhaps he has seen this conversation. Perhaps it was published ²⁴⁴⁷⁰ somewhere.

A. No, I don't know about it. I'm not aware of it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, do you know how many thousands of Mujahedin there were in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. The Mujahedins appeared in 1993, and they inflicted enormous damage to the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. All right. Let's speed the process up. For a time you were president of the Commission for the Establishment of War Crimes in the BH area; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, do you have then, and here before the entire public - and I'm talking about the Croatian public in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, and in Croatia - do you have evidence and information about the crimes and manner in which they were committed and the perpetrators of those crimes? For example, against the Croatian people, for example, in Central Bosnia?

A. I have to say that I was president of the commission as a political figure, and the commission was otherwise composed of the leading lawyers of the day, and it was a multinational one, multi-ethnic in composition, and very talented young people who spoke English well and were able to work with computers. The formula as to conducting the work of this kind of commission was given to us by Simon Weisenthal, and the team worked very diligently, objectively, and it recorded each and every event that came to our notice, attended by all the necessary documents if they had them, such as photographic material, videotapes, and the ²⁴⁴⁷¹ statements of the victims as well, victims to those events. Now, two important inspections were conducted by Mr. Mazowiecki and by Professor Cherif Bassiouni, professor of international law from the University of Illinois in Chicago. They came to inspect our work and they congratulated us on our objectivity and high degree of professionalism on the work of the team, the commission. Unfortunately, once I was eliminated from the Presidency in the fall of 1992 or, rather, October, at the beginning of 1993, I was replaced from my duties there, and I heard that one day over the local radio station. And after me, leading lawyers of all nations as well as the professor of international law stepped down from the commission too, and the most the young experts working on the project. Unfortunately, the commission very soon after that became a one-party and one-nationality, one single ethnic commission.

Q. All right. So you can't tell me even about the crimes committed against the Croats to the best of your knowledge and information.

A. I can't, because the conflict between the Bosniak Muslims and Bosniak Croats became intensified in 1993, and at that time I myself was no longer in the commission, a member of the commission. But quite certainly the commission does have certain knowledge about those events too.

Q. All right, Mr. Kljuic. Now do you know who Stjepan Siber is?

A. Yes.

Q. He was the deputy commander of the corps, wasn't he?

A. Yes. Not the corps but the Territorial Defence to begin with, and later the army of BH. ²⁴⁴⁷²

Q. Right. The army of BH. Well, I have a letter here from him and it is titled to the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in person, and the commander of the staff of the Supreme Command of the BH army in person. Addressed to them in person, and among other things, the letter says as follows: It says on the 8th of June, 35 Croats were executed in the village of Bikos and four witnesses were wounded but are still living. And then he says on the 22nd of June, members of the commission for the release of detainees learnt that the Mujahedin one day prior to that near the village of Mehurici shot about 50 civilians under Mount Vlasic, and then mentions 30 more Croats who were shot on the 10th of June, 1993, and then it goes on to say --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to ask you about this. What's the relevance of this? As far as this indictment is concerned, what relevance does it have?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is relevant --

JUDGE MAY: Is it that the Bosnian Serbs who are responsible for these crimes against the Croats?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. On the contrary; the Mujahedin are responsible.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. And what is the relevance as far as this indictment is concerned?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is relevant for the truth, Mr. May. I've told you.

JUDGE MAY: That's not an answer. Now, what is the relevance to the indictment, to the events which are covered? ²⁴⁴⁷³

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have already said that the indictment is false, and this only corroborates what I'm saying, Mr. May. For you, this is obviously not relevant, so I will not insist on it any further. Namely, I gathered from your questions that you didn't understand what the Cazin Krajina is. It is the north-western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, mostly populated by Muslims, so that you should bear that in mind as we mentioned it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. That's right, isn't it, Mr. Kljuic?

A. Yes.

JUDGE MAY: That was explained it was Bihac. That was of considerable assistance. Yes. Move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is the north-western part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a pocket there.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it true, Mr. Kljuic, or, rather, do you know that the intelligence service of the HVO collected data about several thousand Mujahedin with very precise particulars, passport numbers, their countries of origin, and those who acquired citizenship in the BH and that they forwarded them on to the State Department and the CIA? Have you had occasion to see that list?

A. No, I haven't. I didn't know that the intelligence service of Croatia had those records, but it is to be assumed that most of the people came to Bosnia via Croatia.

Q. And was fear of the Mujahedin not only a real fear but subsequent ²⁴⁴⁷⁴ events made those fears true?

A. Yes, absolutely. The arrival of the Mujahedins spoiled the multi-ethnic composition of the Bosnian forces, and it did the greatest damage to them.

Q. Very well. In your statement you mentioned in several places that the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a completely independent party which, as a sister, had the HDZ of Croatia.

A. While I was president, that is how it was.

Q. I just wish to draw your attention to what was said about this by the president of Croatia, Stjepan Mesic, testifying in The Hague in other case. And he says: "Formally I must say for the sake of the truth that the HDZ in Croatia was separate from the HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Formally. But in actual fact, all decisions were taken in Zagreb, and I believe that there's no doubt about that. I think there's no point in asking whether the HDZ in Bosnia was an independent party. Formally it was, but in reality, it was not."

So is Mesic telling the truth or is what you are saying right?

A. No. I must say that I was the first Croat who formulated the interests of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the fall of communism. The gist of my doctrine was a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later on it would become an independent country, and the equality of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which over a period of many years of royalist and communist Yugoslavia, it was not the case. The Croats were not equal, in other words.

Q. Very well, Mr. Kljuic. So Mesic is not telling the truth. ²⁴⁴⁷⁵ I see from your statement that you were a great supporter of a united and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.

JUDGE MAY: Before you get away with that comment, and it's a pure comment, "Mesic is not telling the truth," that's not what the witness said. He merely gave his own account, and Mr. Mesic no doubt was giving his. Insofar as there is any difference between it, it will be a matter for the Trial Chamber to determine whether there's any significance in it or not.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, allow me to say that what Mr. Milosevic said about Mesic's statement is his view.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Of course.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mine or Mesic's? But I was quoting Mesic.

A. Yes, but you're now making a general assessment on the basis of a small fragment.

JUDGE MAY: Let's not get into this argument. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Let's move on to something else.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You were a supporter of a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. You have confirmed that; haven't you?

A. Yes.

Q. That is what you're claiming. However, during talks among the leaders of the Yugoslav republics regarding the future of the federal state, on behalf of the Bosnian Croats, you asked Tudjman to represent your interests as well. ^{24476 BLANK PAGE 24477}

A. I have to describe the background. Karadzic officially gave you the right - and there is a written document about that - that you should represent at the federal level the interests of the Bosnian Serbs. Of course, Zagreb demanded the same from me. I didn't provide that in a document, but at meetings at which Bosnian Croats were not represented, this was implied.

Q. So you didn't trust Alija Izetbegovic as the president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that right?

A. Regarding the points on which we had agreed prior to those meetings - and that was frequently the case - it was his duty to say that those were the positions upheld by the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well.

Q. Well, isn't it a little strange, Mr. Kljuic? You fought so much for a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina and yet you don't trust the president of the Presidency of that state?

A. I trusted what had been agreed on, but I wouldn't give anyone a carte blanche to speak in my name and the name of the Bosnian Croats in our absence if we didn't know what the subject of discussion was.

Q. Very well. You've answered that question. Now, tell me, please, since you were speaking about the re-election of Izetbegovic, you say that Karadzic had proposed that since one term had expired for Izetbegovic and that he was a Muslim, that the next in order should be a Croat, and he had proposed you to be elected president of the Presidency. Wasn't it logical for people to rotate every year, that is, that the representatives of all three nations? ²⁴⁴⁷⁸

A. It was logical, but the constitution allowed for one year plus another year.

Q. But you say that Karadzic made this proposal because such a solution suited him as a Croat in that position would not have the support of Zagreb. Is that what you said?

A. He may have not had the support of Zagreb, but he also wouldn't have institutional authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. Why not if he were to be elected president of the Presidency? Does that mean that this position was reserved for a Muslim representative?

A. No. In a normal situation, had it not been for the war in Croatia and the break-up of Yugoslavia, had it not been for the instrumentalisation of the Yugoslav People's Army, which already then had occupied Bosnia, this rotation could have been done simply, even a year before the constitution allowed Izetbegovic to retain that position. However, with such a backdrop and without having any real impact, I could have been a figurehead in the Presidency for a certain period of time. I could have made press briefings, held press briefings for foreign reporters, but I'm not sure I could have had full support in the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. Does your explanation mean that official Croatia did not want a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina because, as president, would you have had to fight for what you had promised your voters and that is a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A. Official Croatia changed from time to time the forms of its ²⁴⁴⁷⁹ political activity vis-a-vis Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I, in my communications, always stressed the necessity of an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. And even during meetings when opposite views were aired.

Q. Very well. And do you believe that the Serbs, since Karadzic on behalf of the Serb side had proposed to you that it was a Croat's turn and that you should be the one as you got more votes than the other two Croats in the Presidency, would then you have remained within a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina? That proposal surely meant that, that this rotation should begin, which would be evidence of the equality of all three peoples.

A. No. Karadzic's intentions were quite different.

Q. Yes, but later on it was Karadzic himself who signed, together with representatives of the Croats and Alija Izetbegovic, the Cutileiro plan which spoke of a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Izetbegovic withdrew his signature. Isn't that so?

A. I know about that from the media, because in those days, I was very sick, and during the Lisbon negotiations I was in a Sarajevo hospital in intensive care.

Q. Yes, but you're aware of the event. That's why I'm asking you.

A. Yes, I do know of the event and the withdrawal of the signature, which was explained by withdrawal of agreement for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Very well. But in the same paragraph, when you talk about your election, you say that you rejected Karadzic's proposal because you knew that the war would come. How is that possible? ²⁴⁴⁸⁰

A. Mr. Milosevic, any normal person in those days knew that you and the Yugoslav People's Army would not renounce force, and we were constantly exposed to JNA threats, and under those conditions we were required to negotiate.

Q. Very well. So, Mr. Kljuic, it means you were arming yourselves, the Muslims were arming themselves, and you for a whole five months prior to the outbreak of the war knew that the war would come.

A. That was quite -- it was quite normal to expect it after everything that had happened in Slovenia, like an operetta. And in Croatia as the greatest tragedy.

Q. Very well, Mr. Kljuic. I won't belabour the point any further because it is quite obvious that a process was ongoing conducive to war. But from the basis of the break-up of Yugoslavia. Surely you can agree with that.

A. You must know that on the 19th of December, 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia were outside Yugoslavia, and that vast military troops were present in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and our aim was that we mustn't remain within the Rump Yugoslavia.

As for Bosnian policies, it was -- they were the most flexible, and you know that for a time there was an initiative by Gligorov and Izetbegovic for the Yugoslav confederation to be construed in a highly flexible manner.

Q. Do you remember that that very initiative by Izetbegovic and Gligorov was presented at a meeting of six presidents of republics held in Sarajevo? ²⁴⁴⁸¹

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember that I, on behalf of Serbia, accepted this construction by Izetbegovic and Gligorov?

A. Yes, but the others didn't.

Q. Who are those others, then? Izetbegovic and Gligorov are making a proposal. Serbia accepts. I see; Slovenia and Croatia. So Slovenia and Croatia refused such a flexible structure too.

A. Yes, but you must know the context. There had already been a lot of destruction in Croatia, the casualties were enormous, and the Croatian people in Croatia, et cetera --

Q. Yes. But you're not testifying about Croatia now so let's not waste any more time on that. But is it true that on page 4, paragraph 5 you said that propaganda told the Serbs that they mustn't allow the same to happen to them as had happened during the Second World War? Is that what you said?

A. This need not be attributed just to me. This was a daily -- repeated daily in the papers, on radio and television.

Q. I see. Very well. So that's not at issue. Tell me, what happened to the Serbs in the Second World War, Mr. Kljuic?

JUDGE MAY: Well, no, we don't want this. No. Please. Please do not go into it.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Your next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Mr. Kljuic, tell me, since you spoke of the reasons ²⁴⁴⁸² why you clashed with the Serbs, tell me, how did the clash between the Muslims and the Croats break out?

JUDGE MAY: I think again that we're not concerned with this. Unless there is some particular point concerning yourself that you want to put, Mr. Milosevic, you can, but it doesn't seem to me that it bears any relevance to this particular indictment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it is highly relevant due to the fact that Croatian and Muslim forces were linked by the idea to break up Yugoslavia, and later on they clashed because they couldn't agree in coordinating their mutual interests.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am not the competent person to answer this question because I already -- I was no longer a leader of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. You said that the JNA was the only recognised armed force in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout 1991, which means it was at home in 1991.

A. Yes, while it behaved in conformity with the constitution.

Q. Now, tell me, please, did official units of the Croatian army, were they involved in the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not just in 1992 but in 1993, 1994, et cetera? Is that true or not?

A. I don't have information about that, but it is highly probable that they were present, that is, units were present. But I have to tell you that they were always composed of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the Croats from other parts of the area were not too willing to ²⁴⁴⁸³ wage war for the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. Please, Mr. Kljuic, I have here a letter, since I'm asking you about it, a letter which Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed and addressed to Klaus Kinkel and Peter Kooijmans. "Gentlemen," et cetera. And then in the third paragraph it says, in the second: "The term a Muslim offensive is inappropriate because though in the army of BH Muslims are dominant, it is not a Muslim army, nor, therefore, is it a Muslim offensive. Then the term Croatian towns is inappropriate because these are towns with mixed populations with a minimum majority of Croats. Those towns are in central Bosnia and have now been ethnically cleansed of Muslims." And then in the fourth paragraph, it says: "Croatia already has six brigades engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina through special purpose units, tanks, helicopters, artillery, and officers of the Croatian army have been appointed to command positions in the HVO. For example, Ante Roso has been appointed main commander of the HVO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he complains of this."

JUDGE MAY: What is the date -- what was the date of the letter?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Ah, now that's something that I wanted to ask you most particularly, Mr. May, because without a doubt this is an original letter. I recognise the signature of Alija Izetbegovic. I was provided it by Mr. Nice's side, and the number is 01826430, but quite obviously it has been copied in such a way that the date does not exist, and disclosed to me by the opposite side.

So please would you have this exhibited with respect to the things ²⁴⁴⁸⁴ it says and in order to ascertain and establish why the opposite side is redacting documents in such a way as the date is obliterated.

JUDGE MAY: First of all -- we'll deal with it in this way: First of all, Mr. Kljuic, do you know anything about the matter that the accused has been reading out? It's an undated letter, apparently.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can only assume that the letter was dated -- dates to 1993 when I held no political position. But the relationships between the Croats and the Muslims - today the Bosniaks - must be viewed within the context of numerous secret meetings and decisions that they had between themselves, between the president of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and the presiding person of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. Only when you have an insight into their documents -- or if I had an insight into those documents would I be able to assess the global situation.

JUDGE MAY: We will consider this document at the end of the evidence. We will not take up time with it now, decide whether we should exhibit it or not. And we'll hear from the Prosecution about it.

MR. NICE: Can we see it so we can see if we can dig it out?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Pass it to the Prosecution, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right, tell me now, please, Mr. Kljuic - and this was during your time, 1992 - who first shelled Serb villages in Bosanska Posavina and from which vantage point? Was it the Croatian army across the River Sava?

A. I don't know about that.

Q. So you know nothing about that act of aggression across the Sava ²⁴⁴⁸⁵ River or from across the Sava River?

A. Are you talking about 1992?

Q. Yes.

A. All I know is that in 1991, from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina - and we had no control over it - there was shooting onto the Republic of Croatia from BH territory.

Q. And is what I read out correct, what Izetbegovic says in his letter, that individual towns in Central Bosnia had been ethnically cleansed by the army of Republic of Croatia?

A. I don't know about it in that form but that there was ethnic cleansing on the Croatian side, that cannot be denied.

Q. Just a minute. Is it true and correct that it was precisely these Mujahedin, the ones that I mentioned but as you say you don't know about them, that the army, the Muslim army, ethnically cleansed Central Bosnia of its Croatian citizens?

A. It is true that the Mujahedin were used only against the Croatian forces.

Q. All right. Now, please, do you know, for example, about or know of -- actually, take a look at these two documents, please. Sarajevo the 29th of May, 1992 is the date, and these documents speak about the specifications or the requirements for Bosnia-Herzegovina prepared by Azim Karamehmedovic and approved by President Alija Izetbegovic, and the signature is -- with his signature. And then it testifies to 2 million bullets, rifles, et cetera, et cetera, the specifications and positions are listed. And that is May 1992. ^{24486 BLANK PAGE 24487} Are these then -- just give us your opinion: Are these authentic documents --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see the documents.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. -- that via Slovenia they are asking for the following?

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see the documents.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Izetbegovic is in fact requesting equipment from Slovenia. And it's the letter which refers to Jansa [phoen].

A. This is not unnatural in anyway. You don't suppose, I assume, that we waited, stood around waiting to be killed by the JNA without looking for a way out in the form of procuring weapons.

JUDGE MAY: Let him finish and don't interrupt him. You're putting these serious matters to him. He should have a chance to deal with them. Yes. Go on. Go on, Mr. Kljuic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I personally, had I had the chance of asking the devil for weapons, I would have asked him to give me them to defend myself.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Fine. So when it comes to a question of Croats and Muslims, then your defence is -- well, during the war between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who was defending themselves from whom, from the Serbs, or were you defending yourselves from the Muslims, you Croats, I mean?

A. Well, you're asking me about something that was the most difficult ²⁴⁴⁸⁸ times for Bosnia-Herzegovina, that war between the Croats and the Muslims, and that was mostly made use of, benefited your ideas. And on the 18th of March, 1994, I was -- I saw the truce being signed.

Q. Your answer is quite different. It's not what I asked you. So as a member of the Presidency, you knew about this procurement, did you?

A. No, I did not know about it because it wasn't decided at the level of the Presidency. And above all, because Alija Izetbegovic went against the constitution, the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, violated it. And in practical terms, he disposed of the money and weapons.

Q. All right, Mr. Kljuic. Is it true that you, for your part, you personally, and although you mention somebody here as being an HDZ extremist, you appointed Mate Boban for Herzegovina and Iko Stanic for Posavina, when it came to this organisation and all the rest of it, everything that was to follow?

A. Well, of course. I was the political leader of the HDZ party, and I didn't deal with these practical matters. Now, as we had two set regions with a concentrated Croatian population, that it was quite normal that Iko Stanic should see to those operational matters in Posavina and Mate Boban should do the same in Herzegovina.

Q. All right. Does that mean without a doubt that as this took place when the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had already been established, that throughout that time during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there we saw the existence of two armies, actually, within that Bosnia and Herzegovina? We had the Croatian side and the Muslim side; is that right?

A. There were armed forces of -- what did exist was the armed forces ²⁴⁴⁸⁹ of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was the official title for all the formations that stood up to the aggression.

Q. All right. And the HVO. Was the HVO within the frameworks of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. It was within the armed forces, which meant all units of Bosnia-Herzegovina defending the country. The HVO, HOS, and the Territorial Defence who grew to become the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. When the HVO had the clash and conflict and when it defended Croatian settlements from a Muslim attack, it was also within the composition of the BH army then too.

A. Well, in formal terms, yes, but a conflict broke out. There was a clash.

Q. So it was a clash within one army, according to what you're saying, a clash within a single army?

A. Well, you could put it that way, but from time to time they had quite different relationships. For example, in 1995, they would act together again, pool their efforts again.

Q. Yes. But this came under outside pressure, under the effects of outside pressure.

A. I don't know because I wasn't in Geneva, London or Dayton. You didn't see me there because I was a Bosnian Herzegovinian integralist and I was opposed to many people and thus eliminated from the negotiating teams.

Q. All right. Tell me this now, please: Did you, as a leader of the Bosnian Croats, did you do anything to prevent the conflict from breaking ²⁴⁴⁹⁰ out at all or is it quite clear that the conflict came into being because of pressure exerted by Islamic fundamentalism and the large great crimes committed against the Croats at that period?

A. The conflict was quite -- there was no understanding for the conflict, and although I did not have a single official post to play, I did what I could in a Sarajevo under siege. I did what I could to lessen the tensions. Unfortunately, I was not successful in doing that.

Q. All right. And you claim that from positions of president of the HDZ you were replaced because of the lack of extremism in your positions when it came to the fate of the Croatian people in the BH.

A. Well, you could put it that way too, yes.

Q. I have here a statement by you given -- actually, it's a newspaper statement, one to the press. It is 01819856 is the ERN number, and it is your interview, in fact. And you say: "Izetbegovic did not inform me that the SDA in July 1991 had set up a council for the defence. Muslim nationalists still claim today that I advocated a division of Bosnia." And then you say: "I had to recognise Herceg-Bosna for its advocates to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina." Is that right, Mr. Kljuic?

A. Your Honour, I have to explain that, what I mean -- meant by that statement. The statement is a concise one but with enormous consequences. Yes, it is true that Izetbegovic did not inform me that he had set up some kind of a military council. A part from the extremist Muslim political leaders kept accusing me of dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas on the 18th of November, 1991, without my approval and permission and without my presence, in fact, Herceg-Bosna was established as a ²⁴⁴⁹¹ counterbalance to the already-formed Serb autonomous Krajinas at the time. Quite simply, the Croats, especially in Herzegovina where they were the strongest, wanted to have what the Serbs had, and so they found the same formula for doing that. However, we represented that organisation as being one without any military characteristics, as an association catering to the life of the population in the area.

Q. That's not what I'm asking you. I'm talking about the secret Muslim organisation, because from the transcript of the testimony here, it says -- we can see that the lawyer -- I don't know the man but I can see from the report with respect to your testimony -- that lawyer Naumovski went back to the arming of Bosnia-Herzegovina and asked Kljuic whether he knew that the Muslims, on the 10th of June 1991, established a Muslim defence council. And Kljuic's answer was that he did not know about its establishment, and the lawyer put forward a document of the SDA party which confirmed his words, and this document was signed by Hasan Cengic. The council noted that this was the first secret military organisation on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is that right, Mr. Kljuic?

A. May I explain what this was all about? I was interrupted on how I recognised Herceg-Bosna in order for them to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina. As this organisation, this association at the time did not have any secessionist character with respect to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I as the president and behind whose back all this was done, said the following: "If you are creating that within Bosnia-Herzegovina, then I can approve your organisation," and I was being told that everything was being done within Bosnia-Herzegovina. ²⁴⁴⁹² As far as the documents that Mr. Milosevic is mentioning, I really didn't know about that organisation, no, and I don't think that that's a crime on my part.

Q. All right. Of course it's not a sin or crime on your part for not having known that, Mr. Kljuic. I'm trying to establish the facts and not to accuse you of anything, accuse you for not knowing things. Now, judging from the documents I've been disclosed here, this is a portion of some stenographic notes from a Presidency meeting of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It says Stjepan Kljuic, and the number, Mr. May, is 018243838. Paragraph 2. The opposite side just provides us with some excerpts, but quite evidently, this has been extracted from the original stenographic notes. It says Stjepan Kljuic, in paragraph 2, where he says: "Doko told me --" and Doko is the Defence Minister, right?

A. Yes.

Q. And he's the man who was in Bijeljina.

A. Right.

Q. And you say: "Doko told me about his conversation with Arkan. He does not recognise either Milosevic or Karadzic, but in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say the western part where Tomislavgrad, Kupres and all the other places, I think these people are still subordinated to the party leaders." And then you go on to say: "Whether we wish to acknowledge this or not, we must talk to Arkan because he holds the power in his hands."

So therefore, quite clearly you were informed that Serbia had nothing at all to do with what was going on over there. ²⁴⁴⁹³

A. Well, I would accept that if you were to convince me that Arkan was not acting under your command or the command of some military formation or other in the then-Yugoslavia.

Q. Well, you yourself have just said it. And then on that same -- in those same stenographic notes, Plavsic makes a comment and asks who is commanding the TO. Izetbegovic says Vukosavljevic is the commander of the TO. And then Ejub Ganic takes the floor, and there's some sort of map where the weapons were provided and Vucurevic has everything in Krajina. The Muslims feel that the Serbs have used up their quota whereas the others have not. And Nikola's idea is a good one, to take it back. Nikola Koljevic, they mean. Nikola Koljevic at that meeting is proposing that the weapons be withdrawn from all three sides, all three parties. If some quota had been provided them from the Territorial Defence stockpiles.

A. You must know that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was engulfed by great misfortune, the fact that their communists had agreed to having the weapons belonging to the Territorial Defence handed over to the JNA. And, Your Honours, you will see within the concepts of Yugoslavia's security that there existed official Yugoslav troops, Yugoslav JNA troops on the one hand and the weapons which the citizens had procured and purchased for themselves to use it when the time came, first and foremost should there be an aggression against Yugoslavia. However, apart from a decision on the reorganisation of the army when Sarajevo was no longer an army region, the greatest handicap was that vast quantities of weapons of the Territorial Defence were ceded to the ²⁴⁴⁹⁴ Yugoslav People's Army.

As tensions heightened and as incidents multiplied, the army took advantage of the situation to selectively distribute mostly to the Serbs part of the Territorial Defence, allegedly to return it to them. Of course, they didn't do the same to -- with respect to the Croats and the Muslims and this further endangered peace in our area.

Q. Very well, Mr. Kljuic. Since you say that these volunteers from Serbia were under somebody's supervision, although you yourself say what Doko told you, I have here in a binder disclosed to me, but unfortunately there's no number here though I received it from the side opposite. It is the Presidency of the HDZ for the republic Crisis Staff, the 8th of October, 1991. And among other things, in the Conclusions, point 10, it says in municipalities with volunteers lists of volunteers must be made and provided to the Republican Crisis Staff to be sent to crisis areas. So you're organising the dispatch of volunteered to Croatia, aren't you?

A. No. This wasn't a matter of policy. Volunteers from Bosnia-Herzegovina went to Croatia in very large numbers. There was no need to mobilise them.

Q. Well, question -- doesn't that also apply to Serbia, that it wasn't a matter of policy, but that volunteers were volunteers.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have here, Mr. May, I didn't notice 005700593, and this is on the next page of that same document.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, let me just ask you a few more things, Mr. Kljuic. There really is no marking here. It talks about command responsibility. It's ²⁴⁴⁹⁵ an article in these binders, I'm sure you will remember. "The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Durakovic, Mirko Mijatovic [phoen], Ivo Komsic, and Stjepan Kljuic signed an announcement warning of the instrumentalisation of religion for political purposes and the Islamisation of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Did you sign this announcement, together with the other members of the Presidency protesting against the Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Then there's no need to dwell on that any further. Let me just ask you also, Mr. Kljuic, what do you know about camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina? That is in the territory under Muslim control and for a time also under your and Muslim combined control?

A. As far as camps are concerned, I can only talk about Sarajevo. There were cases of forcible mobilisation of people to perform physical work, manual work, and there were also certain groups that would occasionally unlawfully arrest certain citizens. Such a practice was continued in particular during 1993. And one of my pre-conditions for rejoining the Presidency in October 1993 was that all those armed groups who were not acting as part of a system of the army be arrested, or which --

Q. Wait a minute, Mr. Kljuic. I'm asking you about something else. I have here stenographic notes of a meeting of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina that you attended. I didn't get it from the side opposite so I will give it to you to identify. Your presence is visible. There's nothing that you say that I wish to challenge, but your presence ^{24496 BLANK PAGE 24497} is evident. These are transcripts from a meeting of the Presidency held on the 26th of April, 1994, when there is a reference to the detention of people. And because my time is short, I will give you the entire stenographic notes to be read and admitted into evidence, because you were present at that meeting.

Alija Izetbegovic, the president, says, "I am not sure that it is their fault." He's talking about people who had been unlawfully arrested. Pazaric, Konjic, Tarcin, Hrasnica. All these things were mentioned at a meeting of the Presidency, and these were all camps held by the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And he says, "I'm not sure that they're guilty in the legal sense of the word. Those in Tarcin, they were kept there as a countermeasure to those in Hadzici." And in Hadzici there was a Serb-held prison, wasn't there?

A. Yes.

Q. So that this is actually a concentration camp or a collection camp. So they're in a different form. They're not guilty in the legal sense. It's a measure. It's a measure for a measure, as they say. Measure for measure. You have no way of liberating those people. So is it clear from this that at a meeting of the Presidency this was discussed, which means that they were aware of it. There's mention made of some people being held up to two years without having been put on trial at all. The president says Hrasnica, Konjic, Tarcin, and others are mentioned, and if we release those men, they will not release those others from Kule. Actually, those people are outside the law, et cetera. And then he says this is virtually a concentration came, whereas in fact it's a collection ²⁴⁴⁹⁸ centre. So do you know what was discussed, though it wasn't the most important issue? The first agenda item was the appointment of ambassadors.

JUDGE MAY: Let us now stop for a moment. Let the witness see the copy of the notes at least to identify them.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] They are tape recordings, transcripts of tape recordings. I would just keep the last portion from these stenographic notes and then I'll hand the rest over to you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, Your Honour, I wish to finish what I was saying before I was interrupted. My return to the Presidency was conditioned by me by the elimination of irregular troops which engaged in arrests of people, of citizens. I have to tell you that this was done at the time. This was the first time in these parts for the legal authorities to react to groups which acted contrary to the law. Even today, I do not believe that the scope of these measures was appropriate, but what was done in Sarajevo at the time restored faith in the security and safety of citizens.

As regards the stenographic notes offered by Mr. Milosevic, the date is April 1994 when it was already becoming clear to me in particular, because this was a period several months into my renewed membership in the Presidency, when we were receiving information from various sides that there were camps or prisons, which is quite irrelevant and unimportant how you call those facilities, but facilities in which Serbs were held, and not just captured soldiers, Serb citizens. So there's no doubt that I and most of the members of the Presidency were against this. ²⁴⁴⁹⁹

JUDGE MAY: I suspect the purpose is to get the notes in front of us, but thank you for making plain your position. Now, Mr. Milosevic, have you got anything else you want to ask the witness? You've had rather longer than the time that we allotted.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand your generosity, Mr. May, but I really do have more questions for this witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Kljuic, do you remember that at that same meeting - and this is the final part of the stenographic notes that I wish to tender - mention was made of Sefer Halilovic and his rank. He was first at the head of the army, then he was released because of some conflict with Izetbegovic, then there was some discussion as to a high rank that he should be awarded. Do you remember that was also discussed at that meeting?

A. There was a problem as to how to maintain the dignity of that particular individual who had virtually been replaced from a position of leadership. But that wasn't a general issue. It was a question of the relationship between Halilovic and Izetbegovic.

Q. I would just read a small quotation from Izetbegovic for you to confirm the content, as he also spoke about, as he puts it, arguments in favour and against the appointment. He says: "However, because of that first period of time when he did quite a lot for the army, and particularly before the war in organising the army, I at least know him at least six months prior to the war, at least from October prior to the war as one of the leading people who then organised the resistance in 1991." ²⁴⁵⁰⁰ This is something that I could confirm. There are some printing errors, of course, in the grammar, but it's clear.

He worked in the army up until May 1993, et cetera, et cetera. So Izetbegovic himself is confirming that six months prior to the outbreak of the war, the army was organised, and he attributes great merit for this to Sefer Halilovic as an argument in favour of him having to be given an appropriate status or treatment, et cetera.

So my question -- the point of my question is: Is this without doubt -- does this show without doubt that six months prior to the outbreak of the war the Muslim army in Bosnia-Herzegovina was organised?

A. Believe me, Izetbegovic was bragging. There was no army. If only there had been, then Sarajevo would have been defended better, there would have been less casualties. You know what people are like. When it was said that military years of service would be recognised, there were people who applied claiming that they had fought from I don't know when. But this was not relevant when talking about the overall strength of our military forces as compared to the JNA in Yugoslavia.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I think this must be your last question because we have to be out of here before 2.00. So you could certainly ask one more question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You spoke about a letter which Koljevic and Mrs. Plavsic, as members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, addressed to the Federal Secretary for National Defence and in which they voice their position regarding the need to preserve Yugoslavia. ²⁴⁵⁰¹

A. Yes.

Q. Unfortunately, I was not given that letter, and I can't quote from it any other parts except those quoted by Mr. Nice when he was examining you. Are you familiar with that letter?

A. Yes. That letter was published in the newspapers. Simply in a sense they were bringing pressure to bear on General Kadijevic for the army to act with more resoluteness because it is supported by all Yugoslav-minded people, which was not the truth, because at least with regard to the three western republics, there weren't many Yugoslav-minded citizens except most of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which considered the Yugoslav army to be their own.

Q. So that Yugoslav oriented citizens did not support the JNA?

A. No. I'm saying that they did but they were fewer and fewer in number. You must know when this was happening. This was at the time when it became clear to everyone that Yugoslavia, in the way that you were leading it, could not be preserved.

Q. After this letter that you say was written in September, which is probably true though I don't have it, said that on the 24th of December, 1991, you went to a meeting or, rather, they came to a meeting with you in Sarajevo - that is the military leadership, the army leadership - and they discussed some common problems with the top leaders of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Isn't that right?

A. There were two questions addressed: First what Yugoslavia would look like because Slovenia and Croatia had still not seceded. This happened on the 15th of January, 1992. ²⁴⁵⁰² Secondly, there was a debate as to how Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state would relate to the army belonging to it, because you must know that as a state we wanted to accept all the units which, according to establishment, belonged to Bosnia and Herzegovina. We were just against detachments of the army coming from other parts of Yugoslavia but those that were stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina during normal deployment of the army, we accepted them as our army.

Q. Yes, but Mr. Kljuic, you're saying three western republics. Somewhere in the statement you will remember - I can't waste time to find the exact spot - you said that those three western republics took positions that they felt that they were damaged economically in the former Yugoslavia.

A. That was true.

Q. How can you claim that of Bosnia-Herzegovina when it is well known that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a republic as a whole, was treated as an underdeveloped region and received the lion's share of the federal fund for aid to the underdeveloped regions?

A. That is true.

Q. Half of it was used to finance it.

JUDGE MAY: This is the last question and last answer. Yes, Mr. Kljuic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have to explain, Your Honours, that this was in the context of a socialist planned economy. Bosnia and Herzegovina had the largest military purpose industry, wartime industry, which it did not export itself, but it exported those products through the ²⁴⁵⁰³ Defence Ministry of Yugoslavia, the SSNO. We manufactured tanks for a small sum of money and they sold them for a much bigger sum to the non-aligned countries. We had energy resources and timber, and those prices were reduced because of internal relationships within Yugoslavia. To all intents and purposes, Bosnia and Herzegovina already then could have lived independently, but conscious of the fact that the prices of Bosnian products were intentionally depressed, such as timber, coal, energy, and military products, the Yugoslav federation, through the fund for underdeveloped republics and provinces compensated Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is quite true.

Q. How can you say that those prices were down because of any Serbian policy when half of the electric energy in Yugoslavia was manufactured in Serbia?

A. I didn't say because of Serbian policy. It was the Yugoslav state policy.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. I think we'll have to call that a day and we'll consider the position.

Mr. Nice, the witness can't come back tomorrow, is that --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let me just find out.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice. Microphone.

MR. NICE: I shan't be here tomorrow, that's not critical, not necessarily, but the witness, I know, wishes to get back tomorrow and is expecting to go back tomorrow, he has duties to perform. There is a sort of fundamental problem as well about the time that witnesses take. Now, I ²⁴⁵⁰⁴ know that this is a sensitive issue for the Trial Chamber, but as you will appreciate, we are now -- we're having to axe basically by half our witness list in order to finish in time. We're making selections. Now, this witness has already -- and I took this witness very shortly. In the event, I produced very few exhibits, and I took him for a limited number of purposes. His cross-examination, I think, is now almost getting on for twice as much as the examination-in-chief, and can I just explain the problem that we're having --

JUDGE MAY: No. I'm not sure this is the right moment.

MR. NICE: But I --

JUDGE MAY: I have no doubt there is a problem. Let us just deal with this witness.

MR. NICE: Certainly.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, I'm afraid we can't permit, for reasons of time, any examination.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Two minutes, Your Honours.

JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry. Not even two minutes.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is something very important. I need two minutes.

JUDGE MAY: I'm sure it is. But we don't have the time. We have other matters we have to attend to.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there's just one question I want to ask him about one particular meeting, whether he knows or not about it. One question, Your Honours. ²⁴⁵⁰⁵

JUDGE MAY: No.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. There are some documents --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just give these documents in?

JUDGE MAY: There are documents which need to be put in, and we will deal with that. I think you have three documents. Let the registrar tell us what she has. There's the undated document at the beginning. Mr. Nice, you saw that undated document.

MR. NICE: I may have done.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, you saw it.

MR. NICE: It went back. Yes.

JUDGE MAY: It was something disclosed by you.

MR. NICE: Something disclosed and I think we have yet to track it down with the number on it.

JUDGE MAY: We'll mark it for identification.

THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 164 marked for identification.

JUDGE MAY: And the other documents were -- the other documents were, and of course they're in B/C/S so I can't now identify them. There was the letter from Alija Izetbegovic. Yes, I do remember that. There was -- or referring to Alija Izetbegovic. Mark it for identification.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, Defence Exhibit 165 marked for identification.

JUDGE MAY: And finally, there were the stenographic notes which can be exhibited. ^{24506 BLANK PAGE 24507}

MR. NICE: And I should identify the tabs that were exhibited in the Prosecution's bundle.

JUDGE MAY: Let's have the final Defence number.

MR. NICE: I'm so sorry.

THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 165, Your Honour -- Defence Exhibit 166, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: And Mr. Nice, if you would do the same.

MR. NICE: Yes. I would ask that you allow, although I didn't formally produce it, the summary background, the history of the witness, that's number 1, for the ones that have been produced, the number 2, tab 2, 8, 15, 18, and 20; so I'd ask that number 1 be added to those. The map. No. Quite right. There is no 20, the map had its own separate number. I should have known that.

JUDGE MAY: So the only ones to be produced are 1, 2, 8, 15, 18. The map's already been produced.

MR. NICE: Correct.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I would just like to attach the rest of these stenographic notes as Mr. Kljuic confirmed that they too became clear that -- that it became clear to them too that Serbian civilians were being held in camps.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will do that. And tomorrow morning, we will begin with the 92 bis statements, the motion for application to let them ²⁴⁵⁰⁸ in, and we'll then continue with the evidence. And in due course, you can address us on the question of time.

MR. NICE: One sentence, and it will make sense immediately and it's this: The sort of problems with quantities of cross-examination for witnesses like this are inevitably inclining us in our selection against more interesting witnesses, and that's the problem we face. And it's very difficult because we regularly, on a daily basis almost, are trying to hack away at the list, and both predictability and time taken -- predictability of time to be taken and problems with this type of witness are causing us great difficulties. I just thought I'd mention it.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Kljuic, I'm sorry you've been kept waiting during that debate, but the fact is your evidence is now concluded. Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give it, and you are free to go.

And we're going to adjourn too. We'll return the big binders.

[The witness withdrew]

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.08 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 16th day of July, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.