²⁴⁸⁶⁴

Thursday, 24 July 2003

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: We have apparently not been able to obtain the Ph.D. dissertation, so we will have to get on without it as best we can.

MR. NICE: We were alerted yesterday that the accused's associates would be able to provide it. I think they then ran into difficulties and were not be able to provide it for some reason that I can't help you with. There may be a website from which we may be able to obtain it. Efforts are in hand to do so.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

WITNESS: AUDREY BUDDING [Resumed]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My associates will get hold of it during the day, in the course of the day, Mr. May, because I would like the Ph.D. dissertation to be exhibited as well through the cross-examination of this witness, and that is undoubtedly an important document.

Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. [Interpretation] Ms. Budding, in looking for the historical roots of Serbian nationalism in the twentieth century, you contemporise the past. You blame Serbian nationalists for using Garasanin's work "Nacertanije" until the First World War to include Muslims into Serbs, and you blame them also for counting the Serbs all who use the Stokavian ²⁴⁸⁶⁵ dialect.

A. In the course of the report I do certainly mention both Vuk Karadzic's views and Garasanin's "Nacertanije," but I endeavour to place them in the context of their own time. With respect, for instance, to Vuk Karadzic's "Srbi Svi i Svuda," "Serbs All and Everywhere," I specifically state that it was understandable as a linguistic approach to the national question in the context of its own time but that it was ultimately untenable because it claimed as Serbs many people who did not see themselves as Serbs.

Q. Does that mean that my impression that when you look for the roots of that Serbian nationalism your approach is not correct?

A. No, I would not say that either. Certainly I think the roots of any nationalism in the twentieth century can be sought in the past, and for most nationalism specifically in the nineteenth century, because that's the age of national awakenings, the age of national romanticism.

Q. Yes, but if we stencil one situation from one century onto another century, do you as an historian believe that this amounts to one of the gravest methodological mistakes in -- for an historian?

JUDGE MAY: What do you mean?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, precisely what I said, Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: No, it's not clear. I don't follow. What do you mean?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The copying of a historical situation from the end of the twentieth century onto the first half of the ²⁴⁸⁶⁶ nineteenth century, does it amount to the phenomenon of copying, a stencilling of a situation? So I'm asking Ms. Budding is it considered to be one of the gravest methodological mistakes in the science of history?

JUDGE MAY: It seems to be absolute nonsense what you're saying. Would you give us -- and explain what you mean by concrete terms. What are you saying that this historian has done which you describe as a grave methodological mistake? What is the mistake, so that we can follow it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I said that the mistake consists in projecting a historical situation from the --

JUDGE MAY: Stop there. Which historical situation are you talking about?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said as an example, Mr. May, that the historian blames Serbian nationalists for using Garasanin's Nacertanije, as she writes in her report, from the Second World War, claiming Muslims, Montenegrins as Serbs or blaming Vuk Karadzic for counting as Serbs everyone who uses the Stokavian dialect. That is a projection of a historical situation onto another period which amounts to the gravest methodological mistake in the science of history. If you don't understand this, I have to move on to my next question.

JUDGE MAY: No, because it's rubbish. I don't know what you're talking about. If you don't make the question clear, the witness can't possibly answer it. I mean, are you saying that -- is this the point: That historians or people at this period are using Vuk Karadzic, for instance, as an example of Serbian nationalism? Are you saying it has no relevance now? What are you saying? ²⁴⁸⁶⁷

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I want to say that the projection of one historical situation from the end of one century to the first half of another century is a methodological mistake in the science of history, and I'm asking an historian about it, she who knows --

JUDGE MAY: Let's try and make sense of this, Dr. Budding. Can you use, I suppose a simpler way of putting it is, can you use a situation that occurred, say, in the nineteenth century when dealing with a situation, say, at the end of the twentieth century? Is it possible to draw parallels between the two, and is it an error if you do?

THE WITNESS: I think that in certain instances it can be valid to draw parallels between different historical eras. I think that such parallels should always be made very specifically, but I don't understand what use Mr. Milosevic believes I am making of the Nacertanije in my report.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, precisely looking for the roots of Serbian nationalism of the twentieth century.

JUDGE MAY: What seems to be put is this, that it is a mistake to look for the roots of what happened at the end of the twentieth century in the nineteenth century. I think that seems to be the point.

THE WITNESS: If I might be allowed to address the question a bit more generally, perhaps I could give my own view of how I believe that Serbian nationalism in the nineteenth century might be related to Serbian nationalism in the twentieth century, if I could be allowed to take three or four minutes to set that out. ²⁴⁸⁶⁸

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Your method is being challenged as basically very wrong, so you must have time to answer it.

THE WITNESS: Well, as I state in the report and in my testimony yesterday, it's the characteristic of all nationalisms to seek to gather the members of the nation however one defines it inside a state, and as I've said repeatedly I don't see this as specificity of Serbian nationalism. It's almost what defines any political nationalism. So in the report, although my focus is certainly the twentieth century and more specifically the second half of the twentieth century, I went back to the nineteenth century in order to discuss how Serbian politicians of the nineteenth century conceived of this project of bringing Serbs into one state, and in this connection I mentioned Garasanin, Ilija Garasanin, this famous Serbian statesman of the mid-nineteenth century, I mentioned his Nacertanije specifically because it's an extremely well-known document although at the time it was a secret one.

My own view of the process of Serbian national unification or aspirations towards it in the nineteenth century is that for most of the nineteenth century it was conceived in relation to the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It was clear to all European observers and certainly very clear to Serbian statesmen that the Ottoman Empire could not indefinitely hold its European possession. So the question was: What would come next? And so Garasanin and others formulated projects for bringing specifically the Serb lands under Ottoman rule in which Garasanin certainly understood the semi-independent state of Serbia as it existed in ²⁴⁸⁶⁹ 1844, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina to be Serbian lands. And I think that this is the predominant form of the Serbian national idea through the end of the nineteenth century. It's the gathering of Serbs under Ottoman rule because the Habsburg Empire at this time is much stronger and a much less possible target with the stipulation I make in the report that Bosnia-Herzegovina remains an object of this Serbian state project. And as far as direct relevance to Serbian nationalism in the twentieth century, I think the most obvious relevance is that many of the same territories are involved, but certainly I would not want to make any claim for an identity of motives between Serbian politicians of the middle or late nineteenth century and Serbian politicians of the late twentieth century. I think that the historical situations are very different and on the whole I would be more comfortable discussing each situation by itself.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Unfortunately we don't have enough time for that, but indubitably in looking for the historical roots of the Serbian nationalism of the twentieth century, you are contemporising the past in your paper aren't you?

A. Yes. I think almost by definition in looking for the roots of any historical phenomenon, one goes into the past.

Q. All right. I am precisely referring to this projection of one situation onto another, and I find it to be a methodological error, but since you don't agree, I'll move on.

Ms. Budding, tell me, you use the terms the first and the first -- ²⁴⁸⁷⁰ the first and the second Yugoslavia in your introduction. Do you know that these do not feature as legitimate terms in any official document? Or more precisely, is it true that by using this terminology you call into question the continuity of the Yugoslav state in the twentieth century when saying the first and the second Yugoslavia?

A. In speaking of the first and second Yugoslavia, I'm following very broadly established historiographical usage which is used by historians within and outside of Yugoslavia. I'm not making any claim about the legal or international continuity of the Yugoslav state.

Q. In the last sentence of your introduction, you use the phrase "broader political and economic trends as they relate to the formation of Serbian national thought." I quoted you precisely. What do you imply under this? What are in fact the broader political and economic trends which have led to the formation of Serbian national thought?

A. Well, just to single out a few, what I meant when I spoke of broader political trends was the broader political development of Yugoslavia. Most importantly from my report, the decentralisation of Titoist Yugoslavia and Serbian reactions to that. And on the subject of economic trends, I certainly give them much less importance, but really, what I view as significant for purposes of the report is the Yugoslav economic crisis of the 1980s and the emergence of competing political programmes in response to that crisis.

Q. Tell me, please, Ms. Budding, what are the criteria that you used in selecting the literature underlying your work on this topic?

A. Well, in general I used what I consider to be the best historical ²⁴⁸⁷¹ sources in languages available to me for each subject. The languages that I was able to use for purposes of this report were Serbian, French, German, and English, and Slovene to a limited extent. Obviously in every case I gave preference to sources that had a more detailed treatment of what I wanted to cover and to sources that were archivally based or based on eyewitness testimony.

Q. Am I properly informed, Ms. Budding, that you speak Serbian very well?

A. I certainly speak it. I read it much better than I speak it, but I do speak it.

Q. Very well. Are you aware that only about the history of Yugoslavia in the Serbian and Yugoslav historiography we have more than 10.000 volumes?

THE WITNESS: If I might request the Court's help with something. I had mentioned earlier to an officer of the Court that I sometimes found Mr. Milosevic difficult to hear since he's seated at some distance for me, so we turned my microphones to be B/C/S so that I might be able to hear him, but today I'm not having difficulty hearing him but I'm now unsure as to when the translation is finished and when I should begin my response, so I wonder if I could turn these back to English.

JUDGE MAY: One answer may be for you to put your headphones on.

THE WITNESS: The difficulty -- I can certainly do that, but then I don't know whether I'm waiting too long to answer because I'm using my screen to tell me when the translation is finished.

JUDGE MAY: Well, if you listen -- one answer may be just to put ²⁴⁸⁷² the headphones and put them around your neck, just hang them, if you like, and you should be able to hear the translation if you put it to one of the other channels. See how that goes for a bit.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: The transcript is rather confusing because of course it's on a different time scale.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: I was not aware of that exact number, but certainly I know that there's a tremendous number of works written specifically in Serbian coming out, I mean, of Belgrade mostly, on former Yugoslavia. And if you look at the sources cited in my report, the great majority of those that are from former Yugoslavia are in fact from Serbia because it was in general Serbian historians who were treating the subjects of my interest in the most detail.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, do you believe as an historian that the historians that you quote such as Noel Malcolm, Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt, Ivo Banac, Hans Reuter, are objective in depicting the Yugoslav reality?

A. I would not necessarily agree with every word that any of the historians you have written -- that you have cited have written. I've used them among others in developing my own arguments, but I certainly view them as extremely good historians following accepted historiographical practice.

If I might add to that, of course those are far from being the ²⁴⁸⁷³ only historians I cite. I cite Branko Petranovic, I cite Stevan Pavlovic, I cite Djordje Brankovic; I cite many historians in the course of the work.

Q. Well, I have just mentioned those you did cite. But tell me another thing, please: When making your report, did you use or consult -- I'll enumerate a few and you will tell me whether you used them, competent and well-known Serbian historians who wrote about the Nacertanije, the Balkan wars, the creation of Yugoslavia, the Second World War, such as academicians Viktor Novak in his book "Magnum Crimen," Zagreb, 1948; Milorad Ekmecic, "The War Objectives of Serbia," 1914, published in Belgrade --

JUDGE MAY: The witness can't answer a great list like that. You must put them one at a time.

Those that have been mentioned so far, Dr. Budding, can you help us with those?

THE WITNESS: Let's see. Specifically I did not have occasion to consult the work of Viktor Novak. My treatment of the Ustasha regime which I of course describe as a genocidal regime is a very brief one, and there are many, many works on the Ustasha that I did not use. I've read Milorad Ekmecic "Ratni Ciljevi Srbije", that is "The Warrings of Serbia." I just don't remember whether I specifically refer to it in the report. On the Nacertanije as far as I recall, my main sources were in fact Serbian historians because they've written about the Nacertanije in the most detail. I refer specifically, for instance, to the views of Radovan Samardzic in regard to Garasanin's reference to Dusan's Empire. ^{24874 BLANK PAGE 24875}

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. And did you have in mind Ekmecic's book "The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1790 to 1918," or Vasilije Krestic, "The History of the Serbs in Croatia, 1848 to 1918," or perhaps Cedomir Popov --

JUDGE MAY: I've stopped your microphone. It's pointless reading out a list to a witness. You know that by now.

Did you get the first one, Dr. Budding?

THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you. Specifically I have consulted Ekmecic's two volume work, "The Creation of Yugoslavia," but I didn't look back at it in the creation of this report, and I am familiar in general with Professor Krestic's work, but again, I did not use it in the preparation of the report.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, I assume that you know that academician Ekmecic is one of the best known living Serbian historians. Isn't that right?

A. I think that's undeniable.

Q. All right. Now, did you bear in mind the books by academician Vasilije Krestic, Cedomir Popov, another academician? I don't want to enumerate all of them. Vladimir Stojancevic, another case in point?

JUDGE MAY: Just a minute. Those three.

THE WITNESS: Specifically it would be much easier for me to address the question of sources if I could do it with some reference to some issue where you feel that I have not presented the issue fairly because I have not included a particular source. I'm finding it hard to answer the questions on this level of generality. Do I know the work of ²⁴⁸⁷⁶ such-and-such, yes, I do know the work of most of the figures you are citing, but I'm not sure how to relate that to the question of why I chose particular sources for particular parts of the report.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, it does have something to do with the question, and let me ask you something quite specific now. It is my impression, and please correct me if I'm wrong, that your selection of literature is highly selective and that it is used as a function to prove the basic thesis of Serbian hegemonism. Is that so or not?

A. It is not so. I did --

Q. Greater Serbian hegemonism?

A. -- look at my report and say that basically this is one of Serbian hegemonism --

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction, Greater Serbian.

A. -- of sources. Branko Petranovic, I mean, he died in 1994, so I can't refer to him as you did to Ekmecic as one of the best known living historians, but he is certainly one of the most eminent Serbian historians of the twentieth century. Professor Stefan Pavlovic whose work I use is likewise one of the most eminent historians. But to return to what I understand to be your central point, I don't believe that there is anything in the report that supports your contention that the thesis of the report is one of Serbian hegemonism.

Q. Very well. Thank you. On page 2 you mention the Serbian state during the times of Tsar Dusan and then Serbian state of the nineteenth century. Now my question to you is this: Why did you skip the history of ²⁴⁸⁷⁷ the establishment of the Nemanjic Serbian state and left out the values of that particular civilisation with respect to culture, legal rights and so on and art? Or to be even more specific, let me put it this way: After mentioning Dusan's Empire, you skip five centuries and go on to the nineteenth century. So why did you avoid saying anything about the onslaught of the Turks in the Balkans, their terror there and so on?

JUDGE MAY: One thing at a time.

THE WITNESS: When this project was first presented to me, I was asked to discuss the political trajectory of Serbian nationalism in the twentieth century and to present an extremely brief discussion of the nineteenth century. As far as I recall, I was actually asked to keep it within 40 to 60 pages including footnotes and obviously it came out somewhat longer. So it simply wasn't possible to discuss the -- the history before the nineteenth, which I obviously cover very, very briefly. My focus is on the twentieth century. I am myself an historian of the twentieth century, and although I could write about the earlier periods, of course making heavy use of other people's work, there's nothing original in my discussion of the nineteenth century. I did not have the space within the scope of this project and I also would not be well qualified to discuss the early modern period.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I just mentioned that, Ms. Budding, because in your expert report, you incorporate a period going back to, as you yourself say, self-appointed Tsar Dusan dating back to the fourteenth century AD. And as you say, he crowned himself as Tsar and then you skip over five whole ²⁴⁸⁷⁸ centuries.

JUDGE MAY: She's just answered that question in terms of what it was the witness was asked to do. Yes. Let's move on. The transcript should reflect that I said she just answered that question. Yes. Let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you consider, since you mentioned Dusan's Empire from the fourteenth century and then skipped over five centuries that for a comprehensive approach it would be of importance to look at the facts and see what the contribution of the Serbs was to the struggle of Christian Europe against the Turks, because you know full well that they participated in all the great marches of Christian Europe for liberation from the Turks from the end of the seventeenth century, the so-called Holy Alliance war and then throughout the eighteenth century. Is that right?

A. I think no one could dispute that. I simply didn't feel that it was germane to the subject matter of the report because my focus was not on the period of the wars against the Ottomans. The reason that I mentioned Tzar Dusan at all, given that I was not dealing with the medieval period, is that I was dealing with the period of national romanticism in the nineteenth century. So the Serbian statesmen of the nineteenth century whom I do discuss, although briefly, referred to Dusan's Empire. For instance, Garasanin in the Nacertanije refers briefly to Dusan's Empire. And that, within the confines of this report was the only reason for mentioning Dusan's Empire. It wasn't -- it wasn't intended to introduce a discussion about the Ottoman conquests or the wars ²⁴⁸⁷⁹ against the Ottomans in which Serbs of course played a very important part.

Q. Well, I thought, Ms. Budding -- I don't want to put words into your mouth, but I gained the impression that looking at this and comparing it all, that this kind of selective analysis of Serbian history that you applied in your report was in the function of some implicit thesis that the Serb nation doesn't have statehood roots and that they are primitive and wild.

JUDGE MAY: You must have something to support this. What part of the -- what part of this document could lead anybody to that conclusion?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The fact that I was referring to, Mr. May, that your expert witness starts out from the fourteenth century and Tsar Dusan and then skips five centuries and catches up with the nineteenth century. I think that I explain that and ask my question in that regard. So this was something that led me to the conclusion I made. Now, if the witness says that that is not correct, we can move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Ms. Budding, on page 2, you look at the important events of Serbian history at the beginning of the nineteenth century, events that took place in 1804 and 1815, and you refer to this as Serb rebellions, Serb revolts, and you also say that the Serbs, with the help of the Russians, won autonomy.

Now, that is the Serbian -- I would say that you are minimising the Serbian movement. Do you know, for example, that in history these were not revolts of any kind but it was the first and second Serbian ²⁴⁸⁸⁰ uprising, very well known terms, and they had the character of national -- of a national and social revolution, in fact, and they were waged because of the untenable Ottoman feudalism and religious stifling and oppression, and they represented part of the world revolution.

JUDGE MAY: You must come to a question. What is the question?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, my question is this, if you had the patience to follow what I was saying, Mr. May:

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know that these were not revolts but that they were in fact the first and second Serbian uprisings, known as such, and they represented part of European evolution? So I said the first and second Serbian uprising that had the character of a national and social revolution which was organised because -- to combat Ottoman feudalism which was becoming unbearable?

JUDGE MAY: This is going on. Insofar as you can, can you answer the question?

THE WITNESS: Well, if the question is do I know that these are known as the first and second Serbian uprisings, yes, of course. If we were to discuss the national and social aspects, I think that for the first rising, there's a strong argument to be made for seeing it in its origins as predominantly a social uprising against janissary misrule which then became a national rising.

Again, this is somewhat outside my own area of specialisation, when we go back to the beginning of the nineteenth century.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ²⁴⁸⁸¹

Q. All right. Now, as I said, and I'm sure you know, that this was part of the European revolution. Do you know that that revolution was one of a series of civilian bourgeois revolutions starting with the French Revolution in 1789 right up until the 1908 Turkish revolution and the great Russian revolution in 1917 and that it rocked Europe and that the Serbian revolution in 1804 to 1815, as a national and social revolution, was part of one of the most significant phenomena of European history of the nineteenth century and that in fact with the Serbian revolution a national revival in south-east Europe came to the fore?

A. I think in many ways that's a fair statement.

Q. Do you know that Leopold Ranke, one of the greatest German historians - I don't have to tell that to you, I'm saying that for the public, I'm sure you know full well who Leopold Ranke is - and an academician too, in 1829 in Hamburg he wrote a work called "The Serbian Revolution." Do you know about the work of Leopold Ranke which was published in 1829 in Hamburg, entitled "The Serbian Revolution and The Uprisings," that is to say the struggle of the Serbian people for liberation --

JUDGE MAY: I've stopped your microphone. You must allow the witness to answer.

Do you know this work of Leopold Ranke?

THE WITNESS: I've read it years and years ago. Yes, of course I know it but I wouldn't at the moment be able to recall much about it.

JUDGE MAY: Is it now regarded as a work which is relied on in modern scholarship? ²⁴⁸⁸²

THE WITNESS: Well, I think that historical scholarship has moved far beyond where it was in the nineteenth century, so I think the primary interest of this work now would be as an example of very outstanding nineteenth century scholarship.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Senior Legal Officer, please. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you remember, although as you say you read the book many years ago - although I can't believe that in view of your age, your years - that the struggle of the Serb people was seen by Ranke as an event of exceptional importance for diplomatic and political history of south-east Europe of those days, and that is to say he considered this to be a historical process and a positive trend of the utmost European political importance, denoting the modernisation of Europe, in fact?

A. I don't remember that, but it seems to me a perfectly reasonable assessment.

Q. Do you consider that he was competent of assessing that at that time when this was happening?

A. Certainly.

Q. On page 2, the first sentence of the second paragraph, you focus on the efforts made by Serbian politicians to revive Dusan's Empire. That is not correct.

A. What I state, if I might be allowed to read both sentences in their entirety, I say: "From the mid nineteenth century to 1918, various Serbian politicians sought opportunities to expand the Serbian state to ²⁴⁸⁸³ include more of these Serbs" -- that is, Serbs under Habsburg and Ottoman rule -- "and in certain variants to acquire some of the territories that had been in Dusan's Empire. This statement is not meant to imply that Serbian politicians envisioned recreating Dusan's Empire in its entirety, but rather that it was one of the sources they drew on in defining their national ideas."

Q. All right. That's what I was saying. But don't you feel that you are reversing the thesis here, because the fact is that the Serb people in the revolution of 1804 to 1815 struggled for liberating themselves from the five century Turkish yoke and not to win over territories of any kind, as you've just said in quoting the passage from your own report.

A. Well, I don't see an opposition between saying expand the Serbian state to include more of these Serbs, and liberate these Serbs. I think there's no question that as the Serbian state expanded that Serbs under Ottoman rule viewed that as a liberation.

I think that in this regard the views of Svetozar Markovic in the later half of the nineteenth century are extremely pertinent because Markovic, in the year 1872, used the expression "Velika Srbija" to describe the project of simply expanding the borders of the Serbian state without at the same time carrying out a process of national and social liberation, so that I could not say that in all of -- in all times in and all respects expanding the state meant -- meant liberation, but I think that in many cases it did.

Q. Just a technical correction: In the translation it said that you said the seventeenth century. I assume you didn't say that. Svetozar ^{24884 BLANK PAGE 24885} Markovic you couldn't have linked up with the second half of the seventeenth century, so I assume that was an interpretation error.

A. It was either an interpretation error or perhaps I misspoke. Certainly what I meant to say is nineteenth century.

Q. Just for correctness' sake, these listening to the interpretation, perhaps it was quite all right in the transcript and maybe you did not misspeak.

But anyway, without a doubt this revolution in 1804 going up to 1815 was a struggle for liberation.

A. Yes, I would agree with that.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, at the end of paragraph 2 on page 2, you say that winning an exit to the Adriatic Sea was the Serbs' major strategic goal. Now, do you know that the natural geographic trade routes and all other routes from Central and Northern Serbia towards the Adriatic Sea led across the south, that is to say Montenegro and Northern Albania? The route couldn't have led through Hungary and Romania; right?

A. Yes. In fact, that's pretty much -- I think that's in a sense what I state, that the aim was to reduce trade dependence on Austria-Hungary on that northern route.

Q. Do you know that with the 38th article of the Berlin agreement the independence of Serbia was conditioned, among other things, with the building up of a railway line, the building of a railway line running from Belgrade-Nis to the Turkish border, which was in the keeping with the then-European trends for Northern and Central Europe to be linked up as soon as possible with the South and south-eastern reaches of the European ²⁴⁸⁸⁶ continent to enable the shortest route for the traffic of goods and European forces to the warm seas, and that led through Montenegro and Albania, that route. Is that right?

A. I wasn't aware of that article but I'm certainly willing to accept it.

Q. On page 3 you say that the weakening of the Ottoman Empire led to political unrest of the Ottoman countries. Wasn't it the reverse, that the rebellions and fighting and revolutions of the Balkan peoples caused the weakening of the Ottoman Empire? Wasn't that how it was?

A. We're now entering into a question that's very controversial within the historiography of the Ottoman Empire and which, of course, I am not an expert, but I know that up until rather recently the predominant view was to focus entirely on internal weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire; for instance, on the janissaries relative independence and their abuses. I believe that in some of the most recent historiography there's been more of a tendency to see the Ottoman Empire as in many ways an internally viable state - at least one that was reforming itself - and therefore to lay greater stress on its military defeats by outside powers and also on the uprising of peoples under Ottoman rule, but I really don't feel qualified to express an opinion on the relative importance of internal and external factors in Ottoman decline as a state.

Q. Very well, but as I say, on page 3 you use the term "Ottoman lands." Wasn't this a territory on which the Balkan peoples lived for centuries? And the natural and historical rights belong to them and the Turks occupied them in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries? ²⁴⁸⁸⁷

A. The passage to which I believe you're referring, if I could read it in English because I don't say actually "Ottoman lands" but I don't know exactly how it was translated. I say near the bottom of page 3: "Winning lands from the Ottomans through the treaty of Berlin in 1878 and the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, Serbia had more than doubled its size and population by the eve of the First World War." In other words, "lands" was used in a purely territorial sense.

Q. Yes, but that's the point. They were territories on which -- which had been inhabited for centuries by the Balkan peoples, and according to their historical and natural right, this land belonged to them and they were occupied by the Turks in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries; isn't that right?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. On page 3, you say that Serbia, after its modern revival, up until the formation of the first Yugoslavia, had considerable success in its projects of winning over territories.

Ms. Budding, I feel that you're reversing the thesis because it wasn't occupying territories, it was liberating territories which, since the inception of the Serb authorities until the fall of the Ottoman Empire, were within the Serb state. And if you recall, and as this is your field of expertise let me just remind you that these areas were returned to Serbia in stages, first of all in 1830 to 1833 after the first and second Hatiserif [phoen] when Serbia was given autonomy and at the time it was the Krajinska, Mojetska, Palencska [phoen], Kursevelska [phoen], Starovlaska and Podrinjska region. And secondly at the Berlin ²⁴⁸⁸⁸ Congress in 1878, Serbia received back Pirotski, Vranjski and Topoliski region. And third, and this is what you conclude with after the Balkan war and the London and Bucharest peace agreement, Kosovo and Metohija was returned to Serbia by the Macedonia and the Novi Pazar region of Sandzak; isn't that right?

A. Yes. If I could return to the point you seem to be raising first. Could you identify for me where the word "osvajanje" is found in the translation? You said on page 3.

Q. On page 3, you say that Serbia, from its modern revival to the founding of the first Yugoslavia had considerable success in its projects of winning over territories or the conquest of territories. "In its project of winning territories inhabited by Serbs," the sentence begins, "during the 80-odd years."

A. I'm still --

JUDGE MAY: We can't find that.

THE INTERPRETER: Page 2, interpreter's note.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance, Your Honours. It is paragraph 1A, the penultimate sentence roughly, with this expression: "It's project of winning territories inhabited by Serbs away from the Ottomans." Paragraph 1A towards the end, the end of the penultimate sentence.

JUDGE MAY: We have it, yes. Page 2. Yes. Dr. Budding do you have comment on that sentence? Perhaps it would be simpler -- Mr. Milosevic, what is the point that you want to make that it wasn't done in one go, it took several goes. Is that the point? ²⁴⁸⁸⁹

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. I'm quoting Ms. Budding as saying that Serbia, since its modern revival, had significant success in its projects of winning territories, and I am claiming that Ms. Budding is making a reversal of thesis, because these were not conquests but liberations of territories, and I indicated three stages of that process.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We have the point. No need to go on. Your time is limited. You're taking it up.

Yes, Ms. Budding, you have heard the point.

THE WITNESS: Now I have found the passage in both versions. What I stated in English was the Serbian state enjoyed considerable success in its project of winning territories inhabited by Serbs away from the Ottomans. Winning in English is a very knew neutral word. It simply means that the Serbian state did obtain these territories from the Ottomans. I see your point with regard to osvajanje. I, of course, did not do the translation. I can't think for the moment whether possibly there could have been a more neutral word that would have expressed exactly -- exactly what I said in English, but certainly I did not -- I did not use a word that had any connotation of the sense that this was an illegitimate conquest and I don't really see that osvajanje does, but in any case, "osvajanje" is the translation. It's not the particular word that I chose.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. You say considerable success in its projects of conquest of territories or winning territories. That's what you refer to yourself. That's why I'm saying that you're reversing the thesis? ²⁴⁸⁹⁰

JUDGE MAY: No. The witness has explained that and made it perfectly clear that she meant.

Now, move on. You are on page 2. Your time is limited. We will consider in the adjournment how much longer you should have, but you've had well over an hour already.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, if you don't consider any of my questions relevant, you will tell me so, but there's no other way I can cross-examine this witness who is an expert but by putting this kind of question to her. Please exclude questions that you consider to be irrelevant, otherwise, what's the point of the cross-examination?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Ms. Budding, on page 5, in the second sentence of the second paragraph you make the allegation that the Serbian state in the Balkan wars won Kosovo, Vardar Macedonia, and a part of Sandzak and that the population of those regions came under its composition who were non-Serbs. Do you know that the Serbian army at the time liberated both the Serb people and the rest of the population in the region from Turkish rule? It didn't conquer them but it liberated them from Turkish rule.

A. I cannot agree with the idea that the non-Serb population of those regions and specifically the Albanian population considered these events as a liberation.

Q. Very well and do you know that the area of Kosovo, Vardar Macedonia and a part of Sandzak constitute a single geographic and historical entity known as the old Serbia which was the central region of the medieval Serbian state which the Turks conquered when arriving in the ²⁴⁸⁹¹ Balkans. They didn't become part of Serbia in 1830 but only after the Balkan wars. Isn't that right?

A. Certainly.

Q. Do you know that in Serbian history a number of works have been published by prominent scholars who refer to Old Serbia, Stara Serbia, as the centre of Serbian statehood? I'm sure you know of Stojan Novakovic, The Balkan Question and Historical Notes on the Balkan Peninsula, 1806, 1905, Jovan Cvijic, The Basis for the Geography and Geology of Macedonia and Old Serbia, 1906 the book was published. Svetislav, Sea of Nature, Old Serbia and the Albanians, Belgrade 1904. I'm sure you are aware of these publications.

A. Certainly I'm aware of Stojan Novakovic, of Jovan Cvijic. Again, I'm not a specialist on the pre-modern period and so certainly I'm familiar with the usage of "Old Serbia" to mean these regions, but their pre-modern history, their medieval history is simply not what I work on.

Q. Let me just correct you: Cvijic is not an historian but a geographer.

And do you know that up until the beginning of the nineteenth century in Western European history the area of Old Serbia - that is Sandzak, Kosmet, the Vardar Macedonia - were described as the central part of Serbia, so that on the map of the well-known geographer, Cornelius, Corso Geographico, in 1692, Serbia stretches to south of Skopje. Serbia is similarly depicted on Austrian maps. Austrian Captain Adam von Wijn --

JUDGE MAY: This is the way we waste time, with you reading out these lists. ²⁴⁸⁹² Dr. Budding, you see the point that there were maps apparently in the sixteenth century, or a map in the sixteenth century which showed Old Serbia? Is there any relevance in any of this? I mean, so what one is tempted to say.

THE WITNESS: I do not myself understand the relevance to the subject matter treated in my report of the existence of Austrian maps using the expression "Old Serbia."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I do see the relevance precisely because you make the assertion, and I quoted it for you - you've probably lost the flow - on page 5, paragraph 2, second sentence, that the Serbian state in the Balkan wars had conquered Kosovo, Vardar Macedonia and part of the Sandzak. And what I am saying now are the facts which show that this territory which you claim was conquered in the Balkan wars by the Serbian state constitute Old Serbia according to all the historians and cartographers from a period far before the time when you say that Serbia conquered those areas. And I quoted the scholars and the maps, including an Austrian and an Italian, et cetera, in support of that. So you can't say that the Serbian state in the Balkan wars conquered Kosovo, Vardar Macedonia and part of the Sandzak because it's indicated on all maps.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.

THE WITNESS: The difficulty I'm having is that you're repeating the word "osvojiti" and I wrote this report in English, and as far as I was concerned, the words that I was using were relatively neutral words simply expressing the fact that the Serbian state, through military means, ²⁴⁸⁹³ took control of these territories from the Ottoman Empire. If we were to discuss -- I've already said that I believe that the Serb population of these areas regarded these events as a liberation and that the non-Serb population in many instances did not, but I can't -- I did not use the specific word "osvojiti" because I was not writing in Serbian.

JUDGE MAY: Let's move on to another point.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes. But let me just remind you before I move on to another point that Old Serbia and the regions that you say could not be considered liberated by the people who were non-Serbs, that these areas were Old Serbia, and Aleksandar Hufilding [phoen] wrote about this in 1859; an Englishman Edmund Spencer in 1850; a German travelogue Hanits [phoen] who also uses the same term "Old Serbia"; an Austrian professor, Theodore Rippen; a professor from Graz, Edward Richter; et cetera. Gaston Gravier [phoen] also in his work on Serbs and Albanians published in Paris in 1911. He talks about the -- discusses the borders of Old Serbia, emphasising that it includes the Kosovo-Metohija, Prizren, the Vardar valley, the Skopje region, et cetera. I assume you're familiar with all these works and publications by historians?

A. No, I don't know the specific publications but I don't in any way dispute that the expression "Old Serbia" was widely used for these areas.

Q. Very well. My point was to underline that this was a liberation of Old Serbia, not a conquest of Old Serbia.

On page 3, you mention that the Serbs applied the definition of ^{24894 BLANK PAGE 24895} nationalism given by Ernest Gellner: The aspiration of peoples to rally all their compatriots within one state. Do you know that in accordance with that definition national states were created by many European nations in the nineteenth century? For example, the Germans, the Italians, the Greeks, the Poles, the Romanians, the Bulgarians?

A. Certainly. In fact, the point I was making in citing Gellner, I wasn't saying that the Serbian politicians involved applied Gellner's definition but rather I was applying Gellner's definition to point out the parallels between nineteenth century Serbian nationalism and other European national movements.

Q. So it is the same thesis, that is the same method in which other nations achieved this. This is applicable to all, is it not, those I mentioned; the Greeks, the Romanians, et cetera?

A. Yes, of course every case has its own specificity, but I think that the national movements in Europe of the nineteenth century are in many ways very similar to each other.

Q. Very well. Ms. Budding, on page 4, you claim that the advocates of Yugoslavianism were mostly Croatian intellectuals and some Serb supporters. Which Serb adherents are you referring to?

A. Well, I think we can certainly see the two Svetozars - Svetozar Miletic, Svetozar Markovic - as adherents of broader Yugoslav ideas, for instance.

Q. Do you know that Serb Count Mihajlo Obrenovic, so the prince, was one of the greatest protagonists for the creation of a large community of South Slav peoples in the nineteenth century? And in the twentieth ²⁴⁸⁹⁶ century among the Serbs, the greatest supporter of the Yugoslavism were the well-known geographer that we just mentioned, Jovan Cvijic, and a literary critic Jovan Skerlic, also one of the most reputed Serb intellectuals of his day.

A. I think that certainly the only point that I intended to make with the contrast that I drew between support for Yugoslavism among Croats and among Serbs was that, for Croats, clearly the idea of creating a South Slav unit within the monarchy relied on some kind of broader Yugoslav Serb-Croat cooperation. That was the situation on the ground, so to speak. Whereas for Serbs, the point that I was making was simply that for Serbs in Serbia as opposed to Habsburg Serbs, the Serbian state idea was stronger because the Yugoslav state idea, until very close to the First World War, was a utopian one. And for instance, Stojan Novakovic wrote a piece, I believe it was in 1911, right around then, in which he imagined Belgrade a century from now and he imagined Belgrade as the capital of a Yugoslav state. But he -- he saw that in -- just before the First World War as a utopian project, and that -- that was the point that I was making in respect to Serbian versus Yugoslav state projects.

Q. I'm just -- I'm claiming that that is not true because Prince Mihajlo Obrenovic of Serbia was one of the greatest protagonists of the creation of a large community of South Slav peoples. That is incorrect.

JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered the question. Let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. On page 4, you say that Serb and Croat ideologues were prone to ²⁴⁸⁹⁷ consider Slav Muslims as members of their nation. And do you know that the greatest majority of Muslims, before converting to Islam during the Turkish conquest and Turkish rule, were Serbs? A part of them were Croats, but they accepted Islam to avoid terror and violence by Turkish authorities, save their lives, protect their properties from destruction and plunder.

A. Well, as I've said, I'm not an expert on the Ottoman period, but my understanding of the process of conversion, particularly in Bosnia, is that most experts now believe that most of the converts came from the Bosnian church, which was relatively loosely organised, which simply was not institutionally able to stand up to the Ottoman conquest as well as the Orthodox or Catholic churches, so that your statement that most of the converts were Serbs is not -- it's not one that I would necessarily be prepared to accept, but I'm also not really prepared to contest it because this is not my period and I view the whole argument as in a sense anachronistic. Are we to say that all members of the Serbian church at that time had a Serbian consciousness that all Catholics had a Croatian consciousness in the period before the Ottoman conquest. It just -- it's not something that I can discuss with expert knowledge.

Q. Very well, then. I won't ask you any more questions about that, but you probably know that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was clearly known which families were of Turkish origin, and in fact, they did not even mix with the Bosnian Muslims or the Islamised Christians regardless of whether they were Islamised Serbs or Croats, that is whether they were of Orthodox or Catholic faith but in any way Christians. ²⁴⁸⁹⁸

A. If I understand your basic point, I certainly would agree that there was a distinction made between Slavic converts to Islam and Turkish, ethnically Turkish people, and in fact, as we know, the Slavic Muslims in some cases called themselves Turci, but they still drew a distinction between themselves and the Ottomans whom they called Turkusi.

Q. We agree on that point. But do you know that Ilija Garasanin, in his liberation programme acknowledging the Yugoslav origin and language of the Muslims envisaged close and friendly cooperation with the Bosnian Muslims in the struggle against Turkish rule and offered many concessions even to the detriment of Serb interests on many occasions? And you probably know, as you studied this, that some Muslims families in the 60s of the nineteenth century, famous families cooperated with the Serbs, such as, for instance, the Rizvanbegovic from Herzegovina, the Halilovici from Sarajevo, the Kulanovici, the Filipovici, the Miralamici [phoen], the Azifagici [phoen], Idrizbegovici from the Bosnian Krajina. You probably do know about these things.

A. I'm having trouble following the entire question but to respond to the point about Garasanin, certainly. For instance, in Nacertanije, he speaks of the need to guarantee religious freedom for Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim believers.

Q. On page 4 of your report in footnote 9 you mention an article by Vuk Karadzic, Serbs all and everywhere which, according to you, founded an idea -- established an idea which proved to be a source of future misunderstanding. Do you claim that a nation is based on a communality of language and the Stokavian was the language of Vuk Karadzic? ²⁴⁸⁹⁹

A. Do I personally claim that a nation must be based on a common language? Is that the question?

Q. No. No. The question is: Are you claiming that the idea that a nation is a community of language and the Stokavian is a Serbian language and this is the idea of Vuk Karadzic?

A. Yes, I do maintain that Karadzic said that nations should be defined linguistically.

Q. So you do believe that this was his idea; right?

A. Well, not his personally, of course. It was the general definition of nationhood at the time. I think it would most be associated with Herder.

Q. Very well. But you quoted him, and he founded an idea which proved, according to you, to be a source of misunderstandings in the future. I'm asking you now do you know of the names Johan Kristopher, Adelung who lived in 1732 to 806? He was a grammar and lexicographer expert? Do you know the name of Johan Herder, also a German writer, historian and philosopher?

JUDGE MAY: What is the point? What is the point of this list of names?

THE WITNESS: If I could make a --

JUDGE MAY: No. Let the accused answer. What is the point of this list of names?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The point of the list of names, as you weren't listening, Mr. May, to my previous question which had to do with an allegation in footnote 9, page 4 of the report, an Article by Vuk ²⁴⁹⁰⁰ Karadzic, Serbs all and everywhere, which according to Ms. Budding was the founder of an idea which proved to be a source of future misunderstandings. My question was to her whether she claims that a nation is a community, a linguistic community and that the Stokavian language is a Serbian language was the idea of Vuk Karadzic. And then I asked her a question in this connection, these names, you probably know that name too, Johan Fihte, a German philosopher and all these others.

JUDGE MAY: Just try to ask the question if you want to be allowed to ask the witness it. What is the point of the list of names? Just tell us if you can.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course I can, Mr. May, though it is my turn to ask questions, not you. Do you know that these names, this list that you're not letting me read out and which is lengthy and it consists of the most prestigious European intellectuals, do you know that they as representatives of European rationalism were the creators of the idea of a nation as a community of language, not Karadzic who only took over that idea from them and accepted it?

THE WITNESS: Excuse me, but in my previous response before you asked this question, you asked me do I believe this is Vuk Karadzic's idea, and in my response I said well, of course not his personally. I said it's especially associated with Herder, and then you went on to ask me whether I've heard of Herder.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. It's not just Herder, Adelung, Fihte, Renard [phoen], Matini [phoen], Jernej Kopitar, isn't that so, Ms. Budding? ²⁴⁹⁰¹ Representatives of European nationalism were the creators of this idea of a nation as being based on a community of language; is that right?

A. And if I could cite what I actually say in the report about Karadzic which is extremely brief, on page 3 I say in the context of his time and of his own anti-clerical struggles, Karadzic's insistence that nations must be defined by language and not by religion was quite understandable. By the context of his own time in that sentence, I meant precisely the fact that linguistic definitions of nationhood were at the time dominant in European thought.

Q. Yes. But I understood you to stay in footnote 9 this article, Serbs all and everywhere, you quote it as being something at the basis of an idea which was to prove to be a source of future misunderstandings.

A. Well, I say it actually in the text of the report. The sentence in the top paragraph of page 3. I say nevertheless, his definition of Serbdom proved untenable because it was rejected by many of those whom it claimed to include.

Q. Very well. Are you aware that Adelung that we mentioned a moment ago claimed that the old Slavonic language broke up into three languages; Polish, Serbian, and Russian, and that all South Slav languages were derivatives of the original Serbian language? This is not what Karadzic claims but Adelung.

A. If I can respond to what I understand to be the basic question, Does Vuk Karadzic in his statements of the time reflect broader European concepts of linguistic thought and of how nations are constituted, I think absolutely he does. ²⁴⁹⁰²

Q. Very well. Thank you. And are you aware of the fact that as early as 1849 the Habsburg government took a decision on issuing the Official Gazette in ten provinces of the Empire, among others in the Serbian language, and that the Croats could call it the Croatian or Illyrian language?

A. No, I didn't, not that.

Q. Does it seem to you that this negates the allegation that Karadzic felt that all those speaking Stokavian were Serbs?

A. I don't understand how a decision by the Habsburg government is relevant to establishing what Vuk Karadzic thought.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. It's half past ten. We will adjourn now. Mr. Milosevic, you can have the next session with this witness. You must conclude your cross-examination -- no. We've considered this. You have had a long time already. It's a matter for you how you use your time. If you don't use it effectively, it is your own -- a matter for you, not for anybody else. So you have the next session. Mr. Tapuskovic, do you have any questions?

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would have some questions, depending on the time allotted me.

JUDGE MAY: If you would keep it fairly short. We certainly don't have anything more than half an hour, but if you could do it in quarter of an hour, so much the better. Thank you.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I don't certainly forecast much or any re-examination. I would, however -- I don't forecast much or any re-examination. I would, however, press the Chamber to invite the accused ²⁴⁹⁰³ to deal with the matters that come at the end of the report because it will be --

JUDGE MAY: We've got to 1849.

MR. NICE: And pages 1 to 9 are a mere introduction leading us to the twentieth century, and it will be a matter of considerable regret if the accused fails to join issue with the historian on the matters that are really relevant, which come in the last 20 pages particularly of the report, given that she's here, as the Chamber recalls, to assist the Chamber at the Chamber's request, and also to assist Mr. Tapuskovic at his request, we having, as you know -- although we're delighted to hear the evidence, which is very interesting -- nevertheless, having made the decision we did.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, please. It is my opinion that is absolutely inappropriate to explain the report and to say whether something in it is relevant or irrelevant. If I have been served with an expert report, the report as such as relevant, and it's not up to Mr. Nice to tell me which part of the report, according to him, is more relevant. The report as such has been filed here. I'm asking again what is the point of cross-examination if I'm not allowed to go through the whole report? I will certainly cover the whole report. That is my intention. But if you limit my time, already the press is writing that the key issue here is the clock and nothing else.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m. ²⁴⁹⁰⁴

--- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So let us continue, Ms. Budding, where we left off. Do you know that Vuk Karadzic took over from Jernej Kopitar the idea about the Stokavian dialect as a definition of Serbian sometime in 1811?

A. Yes, I've read of the influence of Kopitar's ideas on his. I could not speak to the date.

Q. And do you know that Vuk Karadzic was a philologist, not a politician, that he only dealt with linguistic issues and under the term "nation"? He did not imply any political organisation.

A. [Previous translation continues]... linguist rather than a politician. He's one of the most famous Serbian linguists really.

Q. And did you have occasion to learn that he wrote in 1861 a text called "Serbs and Croats" where he presented the following stand: If a nation as a community of language cannot survive, then nothing else can be done, he writes, except for us to divide according to law and religion. He who adheres to the Orthodox law will not renounce his belonging to Serbdom, and he can call himself a Croat whoever wishes.

A. [Previous translation continues]... life and work because, after all, I only give him one sentence. I had to cover the nineteenth century very briefly. The specific point that I was making had to do with was the linguistic definition of nationhood ultimately a tenable one, and so I cited "Srbi Svi i Svuda" in much the same way I cite Garasanin's Nacertanije but I don't in any way dispute that at other times Garasanin ^{24905 BLANK PAGE 24906} put forward state projects which were different from those in the Nacertanije, and I certainly don't dispute that Karadzic at other times put forward views that, you know, are not those expressed in "Serbs All and Everywhere."

Q. And do you know that a Croat, Ljudevit Gaj, in 1830 made a proposal about the unification of Serbs and Croats into one nation and the unification of their religions and churches as an equalisation of their dialects into a common literary language? And there is a historical trace that he repeated the same thing in 1848, talking to a Pole, Bistranovski, when he added that Belgrade should become the capital of the future common state because of its favourable geographical position and the national feeling. You can find that in the book of academician Ekmecic, "History of Yugoslavia" published in 1972. So this reference to Belgrade as a capital is not exactly as you mentioned it, but even a Croat, Ljudevit Gaj, speaks of it in 1830 and 1848 in his conversation with Bistranovski. Are you aware of that?

A. Well, certainly I'm aware that Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian movement in general considered Serbs and Croats to be one people. It's because of that that the Illyrianists make the linguistic choices they did that made possible a unification in a sense of the language. I didn't quite understand the further point of the question.

Q. And the second point is in what he said in his conversation with Pole, Bistranovski when he said that Belgrade should become the capital of the future joint state and he states his reasons for that, and even Ljudevit Gaj, back in 1848 speaks of Belgrade as a common capital. ²⁴⁹⁰⁷

A. I was not aware that Gaj had made that specific proposal but it certainly seems to me in keeping with the rest of his thought.

Q. Since you mentioned -- right now you said you mentioned Vuk Karadzic only once, whereas I had understood that you think of him as one of the founders of Serbian hegemonism. If I'm wrong, then there is no need to discuss it any further?

A. I wonder if you would be willing to define the phrase "Serbian hegemonism" for me because you've used a few times and I'm not sure what you mean by it.

Q. Well, the aspiration for Serbs to achieve prevalence over everyone else.

A. No. I would not in any way link Vuk Karadzic with that idea.

Q. Okay. Are you aware that Ivo Pilar, otherwise a vigorous advocate of Croat Bravo movement and Croat rights movement, Party of Rights, in one book said that Vuk Karadzic is the founder of Serbian imperial hegemonism and that is what Ante Starcevic also says in his book "Serbs in Zagreb in 1931".

A. No, I was not aware of either of those statements made in those books.

Q. All right. You speak in your report about the unclear borders of Serbdom in the first sentence of the second paragraph on page 2. You speak of the unclear borders of Serbdom, boundaries of Serbdom. How did the differing and unclear boundaries of Serbdom enable Serb politicians to continue the dream of unifying all Serbs in one state?

A. I would not say it enabled them to continue, but I would say that ²⁴⁹⁰⁸ it contributed to a lack of clarity in their thoughts between the idea of the unification of all Serbs and the idea of the creation of a South Slavic state more generally. In other words, my contention in the report is that many Serbian politicians in the period prior to the creation of the Yugoslav state did not clearly distinguish in their minds between the creation or the continued extension of a Serbian state and the creation of a South Slav state that Yugoslavia considered as a separate project.

Q. All right. Then tell me what enabled other European nations to dream about their unification, if I can put it that way. Is it again the varying and sometimes blurred boundaries?

A. Well, I think we would have to bring up the case of a particular people to discuss that question usefully. I mean, the Italian unification, I think, is a particularly interesting parallel because many people have estimated that at the time of Italian unification only about 2 per cent of the population spoke what came to be standard Italian, and in fact that if people from Milan were walking down the streets of Naples they could not make themselves understood. So I think that that's, for instance, another case where the boundaries were unclear. Now, if we were to taking the case of France instead, I think that would be an interesting parallel in a different way, because it shows how in a situation where state borders were relatively stable over a long period, it was possible to make peasants into Frenchmen in the title of the famous work that describes the process of national -- the creation of the French nation between 1870 and 1918, but I don't quite know how to address the question generally because I don't think there is one European ²⁴⁹⁰⁹ model of how the creation of nation states came about.

Q. On page 4, in footnote 10, citing literature, particularly Nacertanije, you quote a book of Vasa Cubrilovic and an article of Jelavich from 1848 where he describes it as a great Serbia programme. Do you know that hundreds of books have been written about the Nacertanije or the outline?

A. I'm sure that that's accurate and I would point out that I also cite a book that was published by the Serbian academy, a collection of articles I think simply called "Ilija Garasanin." I cite, for instance, Radovan Samardzic's piece in that. Earlier I believe I cited another author's piece on the Nacertanije.

Yes. In fact, if you will look at footnote 5, that's where I cite Radovan Samardzic's piece from the international conference that was held at SANU in 1987 in commemoration of Garasanin.

Q. Tell me, please, is the reason why Charles Jelavich is considered by you competent on the issues of Nacertanije the fact that he claimed that he -- it was the source of great Serbian hegemonism?

A. Jelavich does not in fact make that claim. The reason that I cited Jelavich's article is that he sets out Frantisek Zach's draft on which, of course, the Nacertanije was based, and he also includes the text of the Nacertanije, and he addresses the specific question of in what respects did Garasanin alter Zach's text. And the specific point that he makes is that Garasanin in many places replaced phrases where Zach had used South Slav, Garasanin put Serbian.

Now, the separate point of whether that makes this a great Serbian ²⁴⁹¹⁰ programme, as I state in the footnote, I think that arguing about the Yugoslav or great Serbian character of the Nacertanije, as so many people have done, is really anachronistic because Garasanin writing in the 1840s was considering what was possible and realistic for the Yugoslav state to do. I've already stated that I think most Serbian politicians including Garasanin saw Yugoslavia a Yugoslav project as a more utopian one, certainly one that would have to be put off for a later time. So my point about Nacertanije is partly that it simply deals with the lands under Ottoman rule but also that Garasanin does not -- does not clearly distinguish in his mind or does not ascribe great importance to the fact that some of the lands he believes should form part of the Serbian state, for instance, Bosnia-Herzegovina, have inhabitants who do not consider themselves Serbs. He is clearly aware of that, as I stated earlier. He speaks of the need for religious tolerance, but I don't think that he in his own mind distinguishes, says to himself, "Well, therefore this would be a creation of a new kind of state, a union of South Slavs rather than a continuation of the Serbian state." And that was really my point with regard to the Nacertanije.

Q. Very well, although I believe it is inappropriate to shorten my questions on the report like yours, I will ask you concisely. Did you have occasion to read many Serbian, Croatian and foreign historians who also wrote about Nacertanije but did not consider it as a great Serbian programme? They considered it, rather, a Yugoslav programme whose objective it was to create a great Yugoslav state; Vasil Popovic, "The Policy in the Balkans," or Dragoslav Stranjakovic at the Yugoslav national ²⁴⁹¹¹ state programme, "Princedom of Serbia, 1844." The book was published in 1931. Or "How Nacertanije Came About," 1939; Slobodan Jovanovic, "Constitution Defenders and Their Government, 1838." It was published in 1953. And even the American historian David McKenzie published a book "Ilija Garasanin, Balkan Bismarck, 1985." You also have Prince Czartoryski and the book of Henry Batovski.

JUDGE MAY: Another list. What's the question?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked a question, Mr. May, but you obviously can't hear what I'm asking.

JUDGE MAY: No, I can't when you read out a list. You begin by saying, "I will ask you concisely," and then you read out a whole long list.

It may be Dr. Budding has got the point generally. Just a moment. Let her answer what you've mentioned so far. No. I'm going to let the witness answer.

THE WITNESS: If I understood the general purpose of the question, it was what were my most important sources in considering the Nacertanije. Besides the --

JUDGE MAY: No. Let the witness finish. Let her deal with the sources and then you can ask your question.

Yes.

THE WITNESS: Well, besides the sources that I've cited in the report, I made use of a book called "Nikar Nacertanije" [phoen]. The author is Rados Ljusic, and it came out in Belgrade perhaps in '96. It concludes an extremely useful historiographical review which summarises ²⁴⁹¹² the views of many of the authors that you've just referred to. So that I think I'm broadly familiar with the development of Yugoslav and foreign historiography about the Nacertanije, but I certainly would not be equipped to state exactly what each author says. I think concretely in general the Nacertanije was interpreted in Yugoslav historiography in the inter-war period as a Yugoslav programme; in the post-war period as a great Serbian one. I've already stated that, in my view, this whole opposition is rather anachronistic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes, but it is indubitable therefore that a great number of authors, both Serbian, Croatian, and foreign considered Nacertanije a Yugoslav programme, not a great Serbian programme. You are aware of that, I suppose, Ms. Budding?

A. I don't know about a great number but I think it's certainly true to say that there have been many interpretations of Nacertanije as a Yugoslav programme.

Q. Very well. Are you aware that especially in Croatia, Germany and Austria in their historiographies, in the '20s and '30s, political propaganda was started, taken over by Charles Jelavich and his followers who took Nacertanije as the source of all evil in the Balkans, taking it as proof of Serbian hegemonism.

A. There's nothing at all like that in the Jelavich article. It's simply a scholarly article that does a textual comparison of Zach's draft of the Nacertanije and Garasanin's Nacertanije.

Q. Well, it is the opinion of a great number of historians that ²⁴⁹¹³ misunderstandings of scholars about Nacertanije started when the German political ideology after 1930 started to accuse Serbia that it was to blame for the war in 1914, linking that to its national policy. It seems to me that you should know very well that this thesis was launched by the Austrian General Stefan Sarkosic in his book "Banja Luka Process," 1933, and it was continued by other historians. "Hotel Lambert and Croats" is one of the books, 1942-1943, that is during the Second World War. Then Petar Simunic, "Nacertanije, A Secret List of Serb National --"

JUDGE MAY: I'm stopping you now. There is a question at the beginning which has then gone off into a list, Dr. Budding, if you have it, about the Germans accusing Serbia.

THE WITNESS: Well, I think that, broadly speaking, that's true. I couldn't speak to all the sources that have been cited. I think that many people have made tendentious interpretations of the Nacertanije, and that's why I specifically state in my footnote to the report that, in my view, the whole discussion of whether the Nacertanije is great Serbian or is Yugoslav is in many respects an anachronistic one. I think it's like any other historical document, it should be understood in the context of its own time, which is the 1840s.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Precisely in 1844. And do you know that Nacertanije was not the fruit of great Serbian hegemony but the idea of British and French governments who played a key role in defining Nacertanije because they had advised the Serbian Prince Milos Obrenovic to conduct a policy that would ²⁴⁹¹⁴ separate him from Russian protectorate and therefore propose the creation of a great Slav federation which would include not only Serbia but Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and others? They were afraid that the government in Serbia, after the fall of Milos in 1839, would abandon the idea of Yugoslav unification and turn to Russia. So the idea is British. It was framed by the French and Adam Czartoryski, a Pole, was an intermediary. You can find all that in Ekmecic's book "Creation of Yugoslavia," 1918. Have you had occasion to see that?

A. When you refer to Zach's role, that's exactly what I was just discussing; the differences between Zach's text and Garasanin's text. I would not agree with the contention that it was the initiative of the British and French governments, although I think it is fair to say that they were, broadly speaking at this time, receptive to such an idea. It does come very specifically from the Polish emigres circles around Prince Adam Czartoryski. After all, Zach was his envoy to Garasanin. And I would agree with the point as regards Russia. In fact, to me -- I mean, since we seem to be talking about Garasanin, to me what makes Garasanin stand out from other Serbian statesmen of the nineteenth century is precisely his great degree of caution and even suspicion toward Russia and its intentions in the Balkans.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, there's about an hour of cross-examination by the accused left. I realise the Chamber has decided it's a matter for him how he uses his time, but the report was, of course, responsive to the needs of the Chamber and indeed to the Chamber's interest in modern rather than earlier periods of time, and it might help the accused if, through ²⁴⁹¹⁵ the Chamber, I make it clear that if the parts of this report, the majority of the report which deals not just with the twentieth century but with the matters really in hand, including, of course, in detail with the memorandum and with the accused himself, if those parts aren't challenged in cross-examination, it will be open to the Prosecution in its closing address to this court to say that they stand unchallenged, and that will be what we will obliged, and indeed happy, to do. I can do no more than make that point in an effort to encourage, through the Chamber, the accused not to waste his time but use it to value.

JUDGE MAY: He knows the time which he has available. He knows entirely if he chooses to spend his time in the nineteenth as opposed to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, that's a matter for him. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May -- Mr. May, I can only interpret this as violence, because cross-examination makes absolutely no sense if I am not able to go through the entire report. I will not abbreviate my cross-examination. You can turn off my microphone whenever you want. And the fact that Mr. Nice wants to note that I didn't challenge something because you didn't give me enough time is the way you work. I have already said generally that all this is intended to rewrite history. You brought an expert on history here, and you are not allowing me to cross-examine her precisely on the issues which matter.

JUDGE MAY: It's a matter for us to say, but if you choose, as I've said, with the one historian that we have here, to dwell on events long past as opposed to events that are more recent and relevant, we're ^{24916 BLANK PAGE 24917} not going to stop you, but your time is being limited. And if you challenge the conclusions, particularly those involving yourself, then you should do so in the hour that remains. That's the only point that's being made.

Dr. Budding, you're feeling all right, are you? You don't want a break? If you do want one, just say.

THE WITNESS: Thank you. I'm fine.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course, of course I challenge this, but I will come to that when I reach that part of the report, and I don't think you should cut short my cross-examination simply because you are using the clock as the criterion rather than something else.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know, Ms. Budding, who is David Urkvart? He used to be a British diplomat, the secretary of the embassy in Istanbul.

A. I don't know that name.

THE INTERPRETER: Constantinople; correction.

Q. Do you know that it was precisely Urkvart? I'm saying this because you said a moment ago that it was not the British idea that 1832 and 1833 he presented on behalf of the British government the Serbian Prince Milos Obrenovic with the idea of Nacertanije. Just tell me yes or no.

A. I don't think I understand the question. You're claiming that in the 1830s someone suggested creating the document that then appeared in 1844 as Nacertanije? ²⁴⁹¹⁸

Q. Yes. This Urkvart, on his visit to Serbia in 1832 and 1833 presented Milos Obrenovic on behalf of the British government with the idea on the creation of Nacertanije. Do you know that? Yes or no?

A. This isn't making sense to me. I mean Nacertanije is, of course, prepared under a Karadjordjevic King. I simply don't know what you mean when you say that 15 years before the document was created and I think there's no doubt at all that it was created on the basis of Zach's draft coming from Polish emigre circles. I don't understand what you mean when you that much earlier someone suggested creating it to a king from a different dynasty.

Q. Yes. It was precisely Urkvart, and I think you're making a mistake here --

JUDGE MAY: This is the last question on this topic. We've spent a long time on it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, do you know that Urkvart in the magazine of the foreign office called Portfolio in 1843, when the Obrenovic dynasty ruled, what was the year of Nacertanije? So what is it Karadjordjevic or Obrenovic?

A. [Previous translation continues]...

Q. That's not true. 1844.

JUDGE MAY: One at a time. One at a time. Let's move away from this. Let's get on to something else.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Do you know that in 1844, Urkvart published the first version of Nacertanije called the project memoir of the Serbian ²⁴⁹¹⁹ government, that is a year before Garasanin compiled the text which is taken as an example of great Serbian hegemony. And the sources for this are in the legacy of Urkvart in the Balliol College in Oxford?

A. If I could address one part of that question, you have used the expression "Great Serbian hegemonism" repeatedly, but I have never used either in this report or anywhere else so I don't understand how you can say that I present Nacertanije as a document of great Serbian hegemonism. I've also stated specifically several times now that I view the whole debate about the Nacertanije's great Serbian or Yugoslav character as fundamentally an anachronistic one.

JUDGE MAY: Move on to another topic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You say that Bosnia-Herzegovina was in the focus of Serb ambitions after in 1878 having moved from Turkish administration to Austrian administration. Do you know that the Berlin Congress gave Austria the mandate to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the Serb prince and former King Milan Obrenovic so it was still the Obrenovic dynasty and unfortunately made a mistake there and a slip and his successor Aleksandar had no aspirations towards Bosnia-Herzegovina because they waged an Austrophilic policy and this was particularly true of Milan Obrenovic? Are you aware of that?

A. I think that's entirely true that the later Obrenovics follow an Austrophile policy and by that token are not seeking to appropriate lands under Austrian rule. When I spoke of Serbian aspirations at that point, I really meant if in a broader sense, that clearly Serbian intellectuals ²⁴⁹²⁰ still considered Bosnia and Herzegovina to be Serbian lands. If we were to jump forward a little bit to 1911 and the statute of the organisation unification or death they refer to Bosnia-Herzegovina among others as Serbian lands, but I do not dispute your point with reference to the foreign policy of the later Obrenovic Kings.

Q. On that same page on page 5 speaking about the ethnic and religious picture of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you don't give us any concrete specific data. Do you know that according to the results of the population census of Bosnia-Herzegovina of the 10th of October, 1910, which was composed by the statistical institution of the government of BH, on the territory of Bosnia, not to read all the figures but just the percentages, 43.9 per cent were Serbs, Orthodox, 32.25 per cent were Muslims, and 22.17 per cent were Roman Catholics, and according to the census in 1921, that percentage was as follows 43.9 Serbs, 31. --

JUDGE MAY: Let's deal with one at a time. 1910 census. Are those figures roughly correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes. And as I state in the report, even at the time of the first post-1878 census Serbs were the largest single -- or to be precise, because the census was done on a religious basis, Orthodox believers were the largest single religious group in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. And do you know that that proportion, the ratio of the relative Serbian majority persevered until the 1960s?

A. Broadly speaking I would agree. I think the initial post-war censuses are a bit hard to interpret because of the point we brought ²⁴⁹²¹ yesterday, the very different options made available to Muslims in consecutive censuses to in what way they could declare themselves.

Q. In the first sentence of paragraph 2 on page 5, you mention Serbia as a potential Piedmont of the South Slavs. Do you know what that means figuratively, Piedmont? Do you know that it means the centre of the movement for liberation and unification according to same movement in Italy?

A. I don't see it as figurative because after all that's literally the role that was played in Italy, but yes that's exactly the point I'm making that people, you know, both in Serbia and among the Habsburg Slavs were seeing in Serbia that potential.

Q. And tell me why the liberation of Serbs is equated by you -- well, never mind. I'm not going to ask you that. You explained that it was translation, a question of translation.

When you speak of Kosmet, you always leave out the concept of the whole, Kosmet and Metohija. Why?

A. I guess for the same reason that typically I've said Bosnia rather than Bosnia-Herzegovina because it's common usage to use the first part of the name to include the whole.

Q. So you always mean the term as a whole. On page 8, footnote 19 and 21 and before that in footnote 16 and in the text itself, you quote "Kosovo, a short history" by British publicist Noel Malcolm. So I'd like to ask you this now: Do you know that the historical institute of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences organised a round table meeting to discuss the values and worth of the book? And I don't suppose you're ²⁴⁹²² challenging this but taking part were very leading academicians, Djordje Bodozem [phoen], Lubov Dimic [phoen], Mila Bjelajac, and all the rest of them and that they challenged the worth of the book and were highly critical towards that work and stressed that it wasn't a scientific book but quite simply a forgery and warmongering and a pamphlet, political pamphlet. And on the basis of the discussions they had, the debate, there was a response to Noel Malcolm's book, "Kosovo, a short history." And have you had a chance to see that work?

A. Yes, I have and I thought that the contributions of Mila Bjelajac and of Slubica Dimic [phoen] were particularly, as I recall there may have been others, but I think that they made some quite valid points. I would not be prepared to stand by Malcolm's book as a whole, but I did use it and I used in the same way secondary literature by Miranda Vickers because I don't read Albanian myself and so I wanted to use in addition to the Serbian sources which are much more accessible to me. I of course wanted to use the work of historians who do read Albanian.

Q. On page 8 you claim that after the Berlin Congress right up until 1912, there was sporadic acts of violence against the Slavs in Kosovo. And whenever you speak about Kosmet, you mention the Slavs. Who were these Slavs? Were they Russians, Czech, Polish people, Bulgarians, Slovenes? Why don't you say that they were in fact Serbs and Montenegrins?

A. Well, I suppose I used Slavs to avoid constantly saying Serbs and Montenegrins. In my testimony yesterday you suggested that in using the term "Serbs and Montenegrins," when I used that phrase that I was somehow denigrating Montenegrin nationhood. When I use the phrase "the Slav ²⁴⁹²³ population," I did specifically mean Serbs and Montenegrins.

Q. All right. I'm glad we've clarified that at least. In footnote 19, page 8, you state that the figures of Serb emigres from Kosovo are questionable and you quote Stevan Pavlovic's information of 150.000 and Malcolm who quotes 60.000, the figures; 150.000 and 60.000. Now, was the reasons for their exodus of a political nature due to terror and crimes committed by the Albanians that they were forced to leave?

A. Broadly speaking I think that's true. It has to be understood in the context of the overall breakdown of political order in the European parts of the Ottoman Empire and as I state in the report, I think that events in Kosovo after 1878 also have to be understood in the context of a great worsening of inter-communal relations with the arrival of Muslim refugees from the areas newly taken over by Serbia.

Q. Yes, but as I mentioned, the figures that you use, Pavlovic, 150.000 and Malcolm 60.000, and you say that this is disputable because there are vast differences and you can see, does it mean anything to you, something that I am sure you know, by a respected anthropologist, a Slovene, Niko Zupancic, and an historian, a Czech, Konstantin Jiriczek, in 1913 presented at the University of Vienna the figures that from Kosovo from 1886 to 1912 150.000 Serbs were expelled?

A. I did not know that particular work. I think that all the numbers in relation to Kosovo are extremely hard to establish, and in fact it's true for the twentieth century as well. The censuses there are viewed as particularly unreliable. I mean, in general, it's not an area with a strong government, in some cases it's not an area with any functioning ²⁴⁹²⁴ government, and because of that I think it's extremely difficult to make statements with any precision about the exact number of refugees at any given period, but I certainly do not dispute the fact that there were at this time very substantial numbers of Slavs driven out by the general worsening of the situation and by violence directed against them.

Q. Well, I'm precisely talking about 1886 to 1912 when 150.000 Serbs were expelled, and that was presented in Vienna by Jiriczek and Zupancic. And do you know that a large number of reports which were sent by foreigners during those years from Kosovo, sending out from Kosovo, spoke about the great terror of Albanians against the Serbs? For example, the Manchester Guardian, on the 1st of September, 1883, in fact, wrote that in Kosovo, on a daily basis, there were the killings of Christians by Albanians, and that is quite literally what it says in the Manchester Guardian. In Kosovo, the daily presence of killings of Christians by Albanians. And English archaeologist Arthur Evans, a renowned archaeologist, on the 16th of September, 1885, in that same newspaper wrote after having visited Kosovo that tyranny is ruling there, is reigning there by the Mohammedan terrorists, and that's what Arthur Evans wrote in 1885.

A. I was not aware of those specific sources but in the report I make the point that I think you are making, that there was violence directed against the Slavic population and that it worsened in this period.

Q. Well, all right. That tyranny is present to the present day. Now, it is -- because 250.000 Serbs from Kosovo were expelled under the auspices of the UN. ^{24925 BLANK PAGE 24926}

JUDGE MAY: No. We're dealing with history now. Let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, do you know about information and figures by diplomatic -- by British diplomats, British diplomatic documents published in London in 1904 about Albanian terrorism against the Serbs? For example, the British ambassador in Belgrade, Sir George Bonham, on the 7th of May, 1901, wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that 40 Serb families had fled into Serbia under the threat of Albanian terrorism, and another consul in 1901 wrote to the minister that Old Serbia - and I quote him, "Old Serbia," that is to say Kosmet - was still a region of unrest because of racial hatred on the part of the Albanians and Serbs are continuing to be expulsed; and in December 1901 said that a further 250 families had to flee to Serbia under the pressure of Albanian terrorism. Have you seen those facts and figures, perhaps? Because it was diplomatic -- British diplomatic documents that testify to it.

A. No, I haven't seen those sources but I think they're fully consistent with the statements I make in the report.

Q. And do you know that the government of the Kingdom of Serbia published diplomatic documents of crimes in Kosovo between 1899 and onwards for the conference in The Hague in 1899? Did you have occasion to see that document?

A. No, I didn't. As you're aware, this is an area that's covered in two sentences in the report which does not deal in any depth with the nineteenth century, so I haven't consulted any of these sources. ²⁴⁹²⁷

Q. All right. On page 8 you say, and I'm quoting you, that "this sequence of events did not promise anything good in the position of Albanians in the newly established state, which is quite apart from their anomalous position as non-Slavs in a professly South Slav state." So where do you see this unnatural position of the Albanians, or anomalous position? It didn't incorporate Bulgarians who are South Slavs, for example.

A. If I could, I'd like to read the sentence in English, because I -- sometimes there can be a shade of difference. I'm not making any complaint about the translation, but I don't feel able to defend the specific words as expressed in Serbian because they're not the particular words I chose.

What I state in English: "This sequence of events did not bode well for Albanians' position within the new state quite apart from their anomalous position as non-Slavs in a professedly South Slav state." This is near the bottom of page 5. The word "anomalous" I think does not carry quite the same connotation as "unnatural." It simply refers to an exception. Yugoslavia was created as state of the South Slavs. Even under its original name of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, it's clear that the state idea, even before the name was taken in 1929, was a South Slav idea, and it's because of that that I refer to the Albanians' anomalous or exceptional position as obviously non-Slavs.

Q. And do you know that the new state, which you mention, in 1918 took over international responsibilities guaranteeing the legal status of national minorities, including the Albanians by the same token? ²⁴⁹²⁸

A. Yes, it did. This was the common pattern in Eastern Europe between the two world wars, that many guarantees of minority rights were -- were taken on as legal obligations by the new states, the successor states.

Q. Yes, but not only rhetorically and nominally as legal obligations. Do you know that with the efforts of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, that state which brought in laws linked to that particular subject matter in regions inhabited by Albanians in Kosovo after 1920, 1.400 schools were in fact opened and 480 buildings erected for schools, 2.000 teachers employed. So all that in conformity with those legal obligations and that in the languages of the minorities. Did you have access to those -- that information and figures?

A. I could not speak to the numbers of schools or the numbers of teachers. My basic understanding is that the state made an effort to provide specifically Bosnian Muslim teachers to teach in Serbia and that, other than that, the main form of schooling for the Albanian population was in the Turkish language schools.

If I understood the broader point about the position of Albanians in the inter-war state, I think that what's perhaps most important in considering the Yugoslav government's attitude toward its Albanian minority is its concerted efforts to change the demographic composition of that region both by encouraging or colonising the region with Serb and Montenegrin settlers and by seeking agreements with the government of Turkey for the transfer of populations; in other words, for large numbers of Albanians to be sent from Yugoslavia to Turkey. ²⁴⁹²⁹

Q. Very well. I won't quote to you how many pupils there were. 14.415, for example, is the figure for pupils of the non-Serb inhabitants in 1924 and 1925. Otherwise, between 1931 to 1934, in addition to what I've quoted, 451 Muslim schools were opened with a lot of muftis and 500 imams working. And 73 private Madresas where the Albanians were educated. I'm sure I know those figures.

A. I don't know those figures but it's consistent with what I've said about the use of, you know, Muslim teachers and also the use of Turkish language religious schools essentially.

Q. All right. I'm going to leave that topic behind, then, to speed up matters.

You say that most of the Serbs knew -- didn't know much about the South Slav peoples, relatively little, and therefore were not well prepared for life in a multinational Yugoslavia. Could you explain to me on the basis of what you claim that? The Slovenes and Croats, did they know something more about the Serbs perhaps?

A. I'm just trying to find the passage.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Which page is that on?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 9: "The vast majority knew relatively little."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did the Slovenes and Croats know more about the Serbs then?

A. No. In fact, I make that point in the report, that I say that the Serbs -- I can't seem to find the passage just at the moment, but as far as I recall, I say the Serbs in common with other peoples now in ²⁴⁹³⁰ Yugoslavia knew relatively little about the others. So certainly my implication was --

JUDGE KWON: Page 6, the first paragraph. Last sentence.

THE WITNESS: Thank you. I stated: "The great majority of Serbs, in common with the other future peoples of Yugoslavia, knew relatively little of other South Slav peoples and in that sense were unprepared to live in a multinational Yugoslavia."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Now, the Sicilians, during the creation of Italy, were they prepared to live in the mixed region of the Apennines or the Bavarians for the Prussian concept of German unification, for example?

JUDGE MAY: I don't think that will help us. We're trying to deal with concrete matters here. Yes. Let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You mentioned the Nis declaration of Nikola Pasic in 1914 and Regent Aleksandar's statement in 1916, once again within the context of the Greater Serbian idea. Now, could you explain to us what there was that was Greater Serbian in those texts by them. Was it perhaps that they advocated a strong Serbia in order to create a strong Yugoslavia?

A. My specific point in relation to their texts was that they make no distinction between the idea of Velika Srbija and the idea of Yugoslavia, that in the Nis declaration the great endeavour of the Serbian state is seen as a continuation of what the Serbian state has been doing in uniting all Serbs. In Prince Aleksandar's statement, the statement "So that we can make Serbia great so that it will include all Serbs and Yugoslavs so ²⁴⁹³¹ that we can make it a strong and powerful Yugoslavia," it seems to me extremely clear that in his mind Great Serbia, Velika Srbija, is a synonym with Yugoslavia.

And I would note also - because it's in the footnote - that my source for that quote is a book which itself is called "Velika Srbija," "Great Serbia" published in Belgrade in the 1920s by a Bosnian Serb historian, Curovic, from Mostar. And I use that book as an example not only because it contains this passage but because it was twice published in Belgrade in the 1920s, actually, once under the title "Velika Srbija," "Great Serbia," and once under the title "Ujedinjenje," "Unification," and in that book the events of 1918 are very explicitly presented as the culmination of the process going on through the nineteenth century, the gathering of Serbs into one state. In other words, the Yugoslav state is not conceived as something fundamentally new. I'm not in any claiming that no Serbs were able to make the distinction between Serbia and Yugoslavia. If we look specifically at some of the Belgrade University intellectuals involved with the creation of Yugoslavia, some of them envisioned a federal state. They very clearly understood that there was a difference. My argument is simply that the dominant political current at the time was not one that clearly understood the difference between Velika Srbija - Great Serbia - and Yugoslavia.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the nature of this cross-examination is such that the witness has to give lengthy answers, and so I really would like to ask you to rethink your decision to restrict my time in the manner that you have done. ²⁴⁹³²

JUDGE MAY: We will consider it, of course, but speaking for myself, you have spent the best part of three hours arguing with the witness mainly on, as far as I can see, totally irrelevant matter, or certainly matter of very little relevance to the events today. You've chosen to do that, you've taken up your time doing it. Now, let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I don't expect you to learn Serb history in the course of one session here, one sitting, but I do expect you to bring your attention to bear on the very important facts, for example, which have to do with the notorious truths that Serbia did not occupy Kosovo but that for centuries Kosovo was a part of Serbia, and a series of other matters which you consider to be important. Now, as we are otherwise here for the most part redrawing the map of history, then I consider this to be important.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Ms. Budding, as you say -- actually, you mentioned the Nis declaration yourself. It is in the Nis declaration that it says that the First World War should end with the unification of the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenia people into a united Yugoslav state. So you can't call that Greater Serbian. It was precisely in the 1914 Nis declaration that the unification of the Serb Croats -- Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was mentioned. Isn't that right? Just give me a yes or no answer, please, not to waste time.

A. I think that's fair. In the Nis declaration what I was trying to convey was that the Serbian state idea was used as a synonym with the ²⁴⁹³³ incorporation of Yugoslav peoples, but I would agree that it's different from what I just cited, for instance, in Prince Aleksandar's statement.

Q. All right. I cannot waste any more time to clarify this thoroughly, but tell me just one thing: Why didn't you mention the Corfu declaration from 1917 and the stand of the Slovene and Croat politicians gathered around the Yugoslav committee who wanted to create a common state together with the Serbs in order to avoid the fate of defeated nations after the fall of the axis because their nations had fought on the side of Austria and Germany against the British, French, Russians, and Serbs who were on the same side, allied? Why did you skip the Corfu declaration?

A. Well, because I wasn't writing a history of what led to the unification of Yugoslavia during the First World War. I mean, if -- obviously the Corfu declaration is extremely important, if I had been, but I was trying to treat the whole period before the creation of the first Yugoslav state as concisely as possible.

Q. All right. You were trying to be concise and that must be the explanation.

You say on the bottom of page 10 that with the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes the Serb issue was resolved because all Serbs ended up in one state. Didn't the same principle apply to Croats and Slovenes who also resolved their national issues because they all found themselves united within one state? Is that true or not?

A. Well, I wasn't addressing that point, but it really isn't true because after all, large parts of the Adriatic coast in Istria at that point were still with Italy. And as for the Slovenes, a significant ²⁴⁹³⁴ number were left in Italy in and Austria. So I wouldn't agree that the creation of the Yugoslav state meant including all of those peoples in one state, the creation of the first Yugoslav state.

Q. Well, Serbs also remained outside that state, in Hungary, Romania, for instance, and you must know that. But I will now have to skip a certain part because of these restrictions which I really believe to be violence. On page 11 you say that during the Second World War on the territory of Yugoslavia about a million people were killed. This figure is not correct, Ms. Budding. The official figure published after the war is 1.706.000 killed. Do you know that?

A. It's certainly true that that was the official figure presented after the war for the purpose of claiming German reparations, but it's well established in the more recent scholarship that that figure included demographic losses, that it in fact was not the number killed during the war but it included people who were not born because of the war.

Q. All right. So you questioned this. On page 15 you say that the Ustasha extremist emigration was a marginal group in the Croatian people in politics. If this is true, how it is possible that such a marginalised group ruled for four years the Independent State of Croatia and managed to organise and carry out a genocidal campaign against the Serbs who amounted to one-third of the population of Croatia, according to your own recognition, and killed 700.000 Serbs? You call it "hundreds of thousands."

A. Before I address the broader question, I have a translation question. You -- the translation that has appeared on my screen says, ^{24935 BLANK PAGE 24936} "You call it hundreds of thousands," which is correct, I call it hundreds of thousands. But I thought that I heard you say I call it stotinu [phoen], in other words, 100.000. Could we clarify that? Because I did not call it 100.000.

Q. What did you call it?

A. I said hundreds of thousands. I think in the footnote I may have given the estimate of approximately 300.000. The numbers remain to be fully ascertained for reasons we could go into.

May I address the broader question about how did this marginalised group managed to rule for four years?

JUDGE MAY: Yes, if you would, please.

THE WITNESS: They couldn't have if the Germans had not put them in place. I think that's very clear. When we say they managed to rule, in what sense? I mean, they managed to rule a so-called independent state which was divided between the German area and the Italian area, and even with that immense help, they obviously were not able to maintain any kind of control over large parts of the territory.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, why were you silent about the methods of genocide of the Ustasha rule over the Serbs and their attempts to exterminate Serbs? It was precisely a Croat who wrote about this, Viktor Novak in his book "Magnum Crimen" and he emphasised the role of the Catholic church whose priests advocated and even were involved in the crimes against Serbs. Is that in dispute?

A. I think I see two questions. Why did I not discuss the questions ²⁴⁹³⁷ of Ustasha genocide, and I of course use the phrase -- I say that the Ustasha committed genocide, and in my view, that is not in any way debatable. I didn't have a reason in the context of the report, and again trying to be brief, to talk about all the various methods that they used. And as far as the role of the Catholic church, I think that undeniably there were priests who participated in the persecution, the killing, and also in the forced conversion of many Serbs.

Q. Well, you maybe read the book of John Cornwall, "Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII," published in 1998.

A. No, I haven't read that. I wasn't writing a report about the role of the Vatican.

Q. Somebody will have to write a report on that too. But tell me, since a moment ago you largely minimised the number of Serbs killed during that genocide, in my opinion --

JUDGE MAY: That is not a fair characterisation of the response. Let us move on. What is the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, if that is not true, I want to ask this: Do you know, and I'm not now going to read out from encyclopaedias, lexicons and other books, for instance, in the encyclopaedia "Holocaust" published in Jerusalem, the figure is quoted on Jasenovac of 600.000, 600.000 killed only in Jasenovac. This is the encyclopaedia on Holocaust. Are you questioning that figure?

A. I don't believe that 600.000 people died in Jasenovac. I don't think that in saying that I in any way minimise the evil that occurred ²⁴⁹³⁸ there. I've already said that I used the word genocide for what the Ustasha regime attempted against its Serb population, and I don't believe that any other word would be appropriate.

With regard to the exact figures, I've relied on the views of two historians or demographers whose work last been the most respected, the most accepted in the 1980s and whose work is fully consistent with the figures we have for demographic and other losses. Nobody knows exactly how many Serbs died in the independent state of Croatia. We can approximate the total number who died. Nobody is able on the basis of current knowledge to give an exact breakdown, how many were killed in Jasenovac, how many were killed in villages, herded into churches and burned, how many were killed in Jamaj at the pits. I don't myself see that this alters the nature of what the Ustasha did, this dispute over figures and exactly how many died at Jasenovac.

Q. Well, I think it does amount to disputing if you minimise the figure, although genocide is also something you recognise. But on page 16 you say that during the Second World War, tens of thousands of Serbs were expelled from Kosovo, whereas we have research to the effect that from the Italian occupation zone, over 40.000 Serbs were expelled from Kosovo, and German authorities in Pristina were asked to approve the expelling of another 70.000 Serbs, and this is written about by Pavle Dzeletovic in his book, "The Balistic Movement." He quotes the figure of 93.330 expellees from Kosovo. Do you also take that into account?

A. Again, I think that in discussing any of these figures we have to recognise that we're dealing with incomplete sources. I think that the ²⁴⁹³⁹ estimate of the German regime in Belgrade I believe in 1944 that about 40.000 Serbs had been expelled up to that point is likely to be Serbs and Montenegrins, is likely to be an accurate one because the Germans in general were keeping track of this kind of thing. They were very greatly concerned about the chaos created in their, you know, occupation of Serbia by the arrival of great numbers of refugees both from the Ustasha state and from Italian-controlled Kosovo.

THE ACCUSED: All right. Mr. May, you are not going to extend my time, are you?

JUDGE MAY: No.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, do you dispute the fact confirmed in her -- in their book on Kosovo and Metohija by a group of authors that over 10.000 Serbs were killed in addition to those 70.000 and 93.000? Some figures go up to 200.000 were killed by these Albanian Balisti.

A. I would guess that the figure of about 10.000 death is probably reasonably accurate. Again, the numbers here are very difficult to get a handle on on the basis of the available data. I mentioned before that I have relied primarily for wartime losses on the works of Zerjavic and Kocevic, and for most regions of former Yugoslavia, they arrive at figures for real losses which are within a few percentage points of each other but for Kosovo they offer very different figures. Part of the reason for that is that the censuses in that area are particularly unreliable. So that I'm reluctant to commit myself to specific numbers, but 10.000 seems about right to me. Whether they were all killed by the Balistis as opposed to ²⁴⁹⁴⁰ other groups, I think that's harder to say.

Q. All right. I obviously have to hurry up, but even so, I won't manage to ask you a lot.

On page 48, you say that Serbs were particularly suspicious of Yugoslavism. Why do you say that, because in previous texts you said that Serbs in Yugoslavia had completely united. In other words, wasn't Yugoslavia the realisation of their dream to unite in one state?

A. Where do I say that Serbs were particularly suspicious of Yugoslavism? I'm looking at page 48. I can't imagine I would have said such a thing, and I also can't find it.

MR. NICE: If the accused tells us he is using the B/C/S version, and he tells us as much, we can make that available immediately for the witness.

THE WITNESS: I have it. I'm just - thank you - trying to find --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I said it's on page 48. But let us go on. We don't have any more time. If you didn't say that.

On page 56 and 57, you speak of philosopher Mihajlo Djuric and you say that his speech about the injustice of internal boundaries caused tragedy in the beginning of the 1990s. What was the scientific method used by you in order to make such a claim? Do you know very soon after that Mihajlo Djuric became a professor of the university in Vienna and member of the European Academy of Sciences?

A. When I speak about Mihajlo Djuric's speech, I don't say anything about the 1990s, so I'm not clear what statement you're referring to. ²⁴⁹⁴¹ Could you quote me my words?

Q. I cannot. I don't have time. On page 88, you say that Slobodan Milosevic radically reduced the autonomy of the provinces. Tell me, what was this reduction of autonomy all about? How was it displayed? But please answer quickly. I don't have much time left?

A. Again, what I was referring to were the constitutional amendments passed in the spring of 1989. The main purpose of those amendments being to remove the guarantee contained in the constitution of 1974 that the republican constitution could not be changed without the consent of the parliaments of the autonomous provinces. And then the new Serbian constitution passed in September of 1990.

Q. Yes. But all this happened within Serbia and did not hurt the rights of any other republic in Yugoslavia. It must be clear to you, isn't it?

A. Well, I would not agree that it did not affect the rights of other republics in Yugoslavia, because of course since the provinces were constituent elements of the Federation and since that did not change when the amendments subordinated the provinces to Serbia, there were substantial effects on the federal level, specifically that the Kosovo and Vojvodina representatives on the Presidency on the Federal Presidency could now be considered as under Serbian control, that we might say that Serbia by virtue of the change in the province's status now had three votes on the Federal Presidency while other republics had one.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we will give you -- we will give you -- ²⁴⁹⁴² you were asking for more time. We will give you an extra ten minutes until twenty-five past. You can have an extra ten minutes beyond the time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. On page 87, you say that it was not only the Serbian nationalism that was responsible for the collapse of Yugoslavia but also Slovene and Croatian nationalism, but the Serbian one is to blame the most. Ms. Budding, by selecting historical facts and lopsided conclusions, throughout your report you emphasise the thesis that Serbs are to blame for everything.

JUDGE MAY: No, Mr. Milosevic. You can't cross-examine in this way. First of all, you refer to page 87. That presumably means 57. You'll have to point to a passage which you say is lopsided. If you can do that, of course you can ask about it. But to make general allegations of that sort is not a proper way to cross-examine. It's not fair to the witness. It's not fair at all.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right. I really have no time to look through the books themselves.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you believe that the Serbs are to blame because they wanted equal rights in Yugoslavia as everyone else? Did they ask for more than equal rights?

A. I think that Serbs in seeking a revision of the province's status, I think that there were many legitimate grievances that they were seeking ²⁴⁹⁴³ to address, but I also think that it was not possible to carry it through in this way without changing the balance of power at the federal level in a way that was bound to threaten others. I mean, just as a hypothetical case, if after the provinces were reincorporated into Serbia, if the Serbian leadership had said, "Well, now the provinces are no longer constituent parts of the confederation, they in fact should no longer have representatives on the Federal Presidency," then that would not have in the same way changed the federal balance of power. There would obviously have been many other issues. But I think that the particular way that it was carried through was not -- was not one that had the result of making Serbs simply equal in Yugoslavia but one that did raise for others the fear that Serbia was going to wield ultimate control in Yugoslavia.

Q. Well, what you are saying is precisely what happened through changes in the constitution of Yugoslavia, the provinces were erased as constituent parts of the Federation and Serbia became just one equal republic. You know that. It was a process. It couldn't happen in one day.

A. Is there a question in that?

Q. Yes. I'm asking are you aware of that.

A. Well, I'm aware that the changes had the effect of making the provinces no longer constituent parts of the federation. What I'm saying is that then to be consistent in that approach it didn't really make sense for the provincial representatives to continue to sit on federal bodies where they would act in essence as two more representatives of the Republic of Serbia. ²⁴⁹⁴⁴

Q. They continued to sit by virtue of inertia, pending changes which were immediately proposed to the constitution of Yugoslavia. So it was a process. And I suppose you are aware of that.

I have very little time. Please, on page 89, beginning of paragraph 3, you cite a part of the programme of the Socialist Party of Serbia concerning attitude to Serbs outside of Serbia. My question is: Do you know that the basis of the programme of the Socialist Party of Serbia, at least in this respect, is underpinned by the Stockholm declaration and the Socialist Internationale of 1989 and that particular part was taken over from the programme of the German SDP party which is almost identical?

A. [Previous translation continues]....

Q. Very well. You quoted yesterday from the minutes of a meeting held in Villa Dalmatia. I cannot remember exactly now, but I believe it was the first meeting of presidents of republics to discuss the future of Yugoslavia. There was a series of such meetings in Slovenia, Sarajevo, here and there later. Do you remember that?

A. Yes. This was the meeting in March.

Q. So here is my quotation where I support the idea of Yugoslavia: "Yugoslavia as a state community of equal peoples within internationally recognised borders exists, and any change of its state structure is possible only based on the freely expressed will of each of its peoples at a referendum in view of the right of every nation to self-determination, including secession. In the event of exercising this right it is necessary to previously regulate the issue of borders, while respecting ^{24945 BLANK PAGE 24946} national, cultural, historical and other interests of each Yugoslav nation." Repeat: Each. This is my approach, speaking of equality. And further below, it says: "It is not an issue of perfection. Perfect borders do not exist anywhere. But by applying this confederal formula, there is no people more divided than would be the case with the Serbian people," and so on and so forth.

Later --

JUDGE MAY: One moment. Do you remember that, Dr. Budding?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I only just received the newspaper Politika of the 29th of March. Ms. Budding knows this newspaper. "Negotiations at the Yugoslav Summit Completed in Split" is the heading. "Do everything to find a way out of the crisis." And then it goes on to say: "Presidents of republics have agreed that the state political crisis of Yugoslavia should be resolved based on respect for civil, national and other rights in a democratic way by negotiation. Yugoslav as a democratic community of equal nations within internationally recognised borders and its state structure can be changed only based on the right of nations to self-determination," et cetera. "This is the beginning, the beginning of these talks." Do you remember? I don't know whether it was the third or the fourth summit meeting of the presidents of republics but it was held in Sarajevo where Izetbegovic and Gligorov presented their platforms and gave ²⁴⁹⁴⁷ a compromise proposal, if I can call it that, as to the possible survival of Yugoslavia, do you remember that?

A. [Previous translation continues]... it was only that first meeting that I've had access to the transcript, and so my knowledge of the other meetings would be from the press and would be far more general as to what was said by whom.

Q. Well, I'm sorry to hear that, but at that meeting where two presidents acted jointly, Izetbegovic and Gligorov presenting this Izetbegovic-Gligorov plan, the Serbian leadership - that is I as its representative - accepted this approach of Izetbegovic and Gligorov, although it was a major compromise and a major sacrifice for us, but it was precisely for the sake of a peaceful solution. Do you know that? It's common knowledge.

A. I think that as we move forward in -- in 1991, there are certain events occurring publicly and others occurring behind the scenes and that I'm, for that period, much more aware of the ones occurring publicly so that it becomes harder for me to place events in their context and to say exactly what -- what weight should be given to proposals you've accepted at that time.

Q. All right. But Ms. Budding, on one of the pages you take only one minutes that was not in the public domain, but it was the same as minutes from all the other meetings. What was communicated to the public is what I read from this newspaper, namely that the understanding is to resolve the situation in a peaceful, democratic way, respecting the right of nations to self-determination and the right to equality but the solution ²⁴⁹⁴⁸ had not been found yet. That was public knowledge. And as to these other meetings, we would again have to look at the minutes to establish what the stances of respective republics were concerning the preservation of Yugoslavia. What I'm asking you is this: Do you know that this platform Izetbegovic-Gligorov offered at this summit meeting at Sarajevo was accepted by me, that is the Serbian leadership? Do you know that or don't you?

A. I don't remember that particular meeting and what was said at it.

Q. Well, then I'm not going to ask you any more questions about this. You say on page 75 that Kosmet underwent limited modernisation and urbanisation. Do you know that from the beginning of the 1960s, from the fund for the development of underdeveloped regions, for the purposes of economic development of Kosovo and Metohija, a daily allocation was made averaging 1.3 million dollars?

A. I couldn't speak to the figure but I think certainly the contributions from the fund for the less developed of Kosovo were extremely great over the period from the mid 1960s through the 1980s.

Q. Well, Ambassador Christopher Hill told me, and he was at one time head of mission in Albania, that when I go from Albania into Kosovo, it's as if I was entering Disneyland. That's what he said. Now, are you conscious of the different levels of development between Kosovo, which in Yugoslavia was considered to be a backward region, an underdeveloped region and that is why it received those allocations, and Albania, on other hand, where without any Serb terror whatsoever the Albanians themselves were able to build up their economy, ²⁴⁹⁴⁹ their country, and how shall I put it, their well-being, sought to their well-being themselves and that there was an enormous difference between the two regions?

A. I think that's very true. It -- I mean, it depends on the context you place it in because of course Kosovo's relative position in Yugoslavia worsened I think right after the war that the per capita income may have been a quarter of that in Slovenia and by the -- near the end of the state it was one-eighth. But I would not contest in any way that the Yugoslav state made great efforts to develop Kosovo.

JUDGE MAY: You have two more questions, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, is it clear to you that this continuity of care and attention devoted to the development of Kosovo was in place until the occupation of Kosovo that has just taken place under the wings of the United Nations?

A. I could not speak to the period of the 1990s, I mean obviously I have some knowledge of this, but it's not expert knowledge.

Q. Ms. Budding, I just can't get through all these questions and ask you several more things that I intended to ask, but let me just ask you one more question. In your doctoral thesis, you quote on several occasions as the reason for which Serbs couldn't agree to a confederalisation of the country and then the destruction of Yugoslavia, you say the geographic dispersion of the Serbs into several federal units. I assume that is not being contested, although you don't have before you your Ph.D. dissertation. So they couldn't agree to confederalisation and destruction within the boundaries because of this dispersion of Serbs, the ²⁴⁹⁵⁰ greatest geographic dispersion. Isn't that right?

A. In the dissertation I refer many times to the fact that the Serbs were the nation most dispersed within Yugoslavia and that this affected their political views and attitudes toward the decentralisation of Yugoslavia, but I never state that Serbs could not accept a confederal solution.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We will adjourn for 20 minutes. Mr. Tapuskovic, when we come back, it's for you to examine.

--- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.56 p.m.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You interrupted me in the middle of my last question that you authorised me to put.

JUDGE MAY: I don't think I did, but if you want to ask it again, you can. Just one more.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And that is the question half of which I put to you, that in your doctoral dissertation you said that the Serbs couldn't agree to confederalisation and the break-up of Yugoslavia along existing borders because of their dispersion beyond those borders, and in your expert report you criticise the Serbs for thinking solely about national unity and envisaged common historical experience through the Drina Serbs on a certain territory. Does that mean that this historical experience with the Croats in this territory, including the genocide they went through ²⁴⁹⁵¹ that we spoke about, is a greater motive for this than communality with the Serbs? And do you think that there is a leader who is entitled to make a decision to make discontinuity without a national referendum? Even Izetbegovic organised a referendum without the Serbs and provoked the war.

A. Well, first, the point about my dissertation as I stated before, I don't say that Serbs could not accept confederalisation. The broader point about national referendums, I stated yesterday that I don't see -- I simply don't see that as a realistic proposal because there were so many heavily mixed areas, particularly urban areas. What would a national referendum have meant?

I think that people of course have national interests. They have interest in not being oppressed. They have interests in being able to use their language. But people don't live in nations. They live in houses or apartments, and they live with people of other nations.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Budding, I shall focus exclusively on your positions contained in your report, only your own opinions and nothing more. I may perhaps refer to certain well-known facts, but I will base my examination exclusively on your own positions and also on the time period between 1918 and 1945 onwards, because this is not just history for the people living in those regions in view of the average lifespan of 80. So many people are still alive who have lived through both the First and Second World Wars. Would you agree with that? ²⁴⁹⁵²

A. [Previous translation continues]...

Q. I would begin with paragraph 4B of your report which deals with the period from 1918 up until 1945 so as to provide some explanations to members of the Trial Chamber.

A. Okay.

Q. Where you talk of continuity and contrasts, 4B?

A. [Previous translation continues]... oh, yes, continuities and contrasts took place.

JUDGE MAY: Paragraph 4B.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. To avoid reading it by you I would like to read it for you, the first paragraph and ask you whether you confirm that to be your general position. "In the factors that defined Serbs' relation to the socialist Yugoslav state, there are significant continuities with the first Yugoslavia but equally important differences. Structurally, one might say that the Serb position was unchanged. The Yugoslav state continued to exist within similar borders, and Serbs were still the largest single national group. Moreover, Serbs could feel that (through their participation in the partisan movement) they had played a leading role in creating the second Yugoslavia as well as the first. These factors offered a basis for a continuing attachment to the Yugoslav state as the state that united all Serbs and a special sense of Serbian guardianship over the state." Is that correct?

A. Yes, that does represent my view.

Q. I would now like to know, is this attachment of the Serbs -- ²⁴⁹⁵³ unfortunately I have to focus on this even though Their Honours may view this differently, but I think I need to address this with you. This attachment of the Serbs to such a state reflected the need to guarantee over a longer period of time their physical integrity.

A. I'm not sure I understood. Are you saying --

Q. Allow me to explain. I should like to refer to two facts. You do know that the first Yugoslavia was formed after all the able-bodied male population of Serbia -- that 65 per cent of the male able-bodied population of Serbia had been killed. That's correct, isn't it? And you said that in the Second World War 1 million people had been killed. In your report you refer to this figure.

A. Yes.

Q. And you took the position that out of that 1 million, just over 500.000 were Serbs. This is also to be found in your report.

A. [Previous translation continues]...

Q. So the needs of the Serbs to live in that state, was it in order to avoid any such tragic situations in the future when they would get killed again?

A. I think that the deaths of the First World War happened in their own historical context of world war, obviously. The deaths of the Second World War are different in that so many of them are due to the specifically fascist nature of the regime; the Independent State of Croatia and other factors in other parts.

I think it's worth pointing out that for the Second World War that number of dead among Serbs does not include only Serbs killed by other ²⁴⁹⁵⁴ people but also Serbs killed by other Serbs in battles between Chetniks and Partisans.

Q. I agree with you. I'll come to that too, but I would just like to finish what I started.

In answer to a question from Mr. Nice, you were saying - and this is to be found in your report, too - that in those lands there were always -- the interests of the great powers were always -- had always clashed. You even said rivalry between the great powers - this is to be found in your report - that wanted to expand their influence over this area.

A. Yes, I state that.

Q. Now I would like you to explain to Their Honours, if you can, whether anything could have happened through the will of any one of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia as well as the peoples living under the Habsburg Monarchy, could they have taken any decision about unification, linking up, the formation of new states if this had not been approved by the big powers?

A. Through the Second World War, I would say that it was not possible for such things to happen independently of the will of the great powers.

Q. Thank you. That's the first point I wanted to make, though all these things are interconnected.

Then also in that same chapter, 4B, in the very next paragraph you spoke about the period after 1945, and you said: "After 1945, the Partisans' assertion that they had solved Yugoslavia's national problems by creating the federal state." Is that so?

"In the first years, post-war years, Yugoslav federalism served ^{24955 BLANK PAGE 24956} mainly propaganda purposes. The Yugoslav state at first followed its Soviet model formerly federal but effectively centralised by party control." Is that right?

A. Yes, I state that.

Q. My question would be, was it not only under the control of the party but also the army and especially the authority of Josip Broz Tito? Would you agree with that?

A. [Previous translation continues]... the inner party leadership, and of course especially Tito.

Q. Then you go on to say: "Partisans' speeches hammered home the contrast between their brotherhood and unity -" in quotation marks - 'based on national equality expressed through a federal system and the false forced unity of the inter-war state." Is that right?

A. Yes, I state that.

Q. Then Tito himself returned to this theme many times in the early post-war period and beyond. The Versailles process, he said, had produced an artificial creation; a Yugoslavia that existed on paper only but not in the hearts of the citizens. Is that right? You have that speech of his, don't you?

A. Yes, I incorporate that speech.

Q. "This oppressive state had sown hatred between the Yugoslav peoples and so was responsible for the catastrophe of 1941." Those are Tito's words, aren't they?

A. That's correct. I'm paraphrasing there so it's not in direct quotes. ²⁴⁹⁵⁷

Q. And then what I consider to be most important, again a quotation of his which you're perhaps also paraphrasing: "Real Yugoslav unity had been achieved only in 1945. We have divided ourselves formally by creating the federal units so that we would better unite ourselves in reality." Is that right?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. So my question is: He said here loud and clear that the federal units existed only formally, whereas in reality there was unity based on the principle of brotherhood and unity?

A. I think that's an accurate presentation of Tito's views. In fact, he has other quotes about borders such as the one at the founding party of the Congress of the Serbian -- the founding Congress of the Serbian party where he states that borders are not terribly important because we're not creating the borders of states that are going to fight with each other.

Q. Precisely so. And that is how it was up until his 82nd birthday, because that was when changes occurred linked to the constitution, especially the constitution of 1974.

A. With regard to the exact year, I would just point out that some of the most important decentralising changes are really associated with the amendments of 1971.

Q. I agree. But please look in paragraph 4B where you refer to decentralisation and the arousal of national consciousness. This is a large chapter. 4D, 4D, page 20. You say that there was a decentralisation of the Yugoslavia party and state; is that right?

A. [Previous translation continues]... to the paragraph that ²⁴⁹⁵⁸ begins -- or, rather, it has in it the sentence "Kakua Yugoslavia postijela decentralisopina" [phoen] or do you have another passage in mind?

Q. No, that one. Paragraph or chapter 4D.

A. [Previous translation continues]... yes. I see the passage now.

Q. You refer to this process that started in 1968 or 1971, doesn't matter, this process of decentralisation of the party and state; is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. And in one place you say: "The constitutional amendments of 1968 to 1971 vitally changed the position of the autonomous provinces of Serbia. Thanks to those amendments, Kosovo and Vojvodina acquired greater independence in relation to Serbia and greater authority in the process of decision-making at the federal level."

A. That's correct.

Q. And then you also said: "Pursuant to those amendments, the republics had prime sovereignty and all the other powers." Is that right?

A. I'm having trouble finding that passage. Could you perhaps give me a page number or describe --

Q. Can we assist. Page 22. "These amendments resulted in both federal decisions on economic matters being taken by consensus of the republics and provinces whereby the republics and provinces had the right to veto, which was the most radical measure." Is that right?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. And you conclude that chapter by saying that all those factors as ²⁴⁹⁵⁹ well as those factors linked to certain economic reforms and changes had created a climate which enabled unheard-of national self-consciousness, self-assertion. In these years, the Croats rallied behind a movement that shook the very political foundations of Yugoslavia and was by far the best known national movement known as the Croatian Spring, then the Slovenes claimed that they had special status, the Macedonians also claimed the right to an Autocephalous Church, then the Muslims acquire -- in Bosnia acquired the status of nation, and the Albanians came out against the Serbs and Serbia. That is your position, is it not?

A. The only thing I would note is that you seem to be reading from a slightly different translation, but broadly speaking, yes, that's correct.

Q. This is the latest version that we have been given which has been revised in relation to the first one. So I wouldn't spend any more time on that talking about the Albanians who declared themselves, as we know, the way they did. And then you end that chapter by saying that in November, in 1968, among the students in Pristina demonstrations broke out. And then you say that this period from 1961 to 1971 was typical by the emigration of Slavs from the province in drastic quantities as you mention in your report. This is the period 1961 to 1971.

A. I don't believe I spoke of a --

Q. The very end. The last sentence of that chapter?

A. What I have in my translation is "isalavenje slovena isopo Krajina dovna --" [phoen]

JUDGE MAY: I'm afraid, could you speak in English for these purposes. ²⁴⁹⁶⁰

THE WITNESS: We have different translations, but sorry. The emigration of Slavs from the province. Well, let me actually find it in English then to be sure that I'm ...

I said: "Slavic emigration from the province resulted in a net drop in its combined Serb and Montenegrin population in decade between the censuses of 1961 and 1971."

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I have to ask you first whether those emigrations actually started with the amendments or in the case of the Albanians, was it in evidence throughout those decades?

A. The emigration appears to have picked up speed after 1966, but yes, to some extent it's present throughout the 1960s.

Q. Very well. Now look at the next chapter, please, 4E, "Serbian reaction: Dilemmas of decentralisation." That is the heading?

A. Yes, I have that passage.

Q. First paragraph. And I think this is rather important for the Trial Chamber, and I hope -- I think it will be of significance. You say that: "The Croatian movement could appear threatening for different reasons. As Yugoslavia's second-largest people, the Croats could jeopardise the state's existence in a way that Montenegrins or Macedonians could not. Moreover, any moves toward Croatian independence revived memories of Serbian suffering in the fascist Independent State of Croatia. Kosovo's central place in the Serbian national myth meant that in the Serbian national imagination, the Albanian movement was arguably the most traumatic of all." That is what you say. ²⁴⁹⁶¹

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Now I have to go back to paragraph 3A.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I can have a little more time to complete my examination, please. It has to do with the Second World War in Yugoslavia.

Q. "The New Regimes of the Independent State of Croatia and in Kosovo."

A. [Previous translation continues]... Yes, I have that now.

Q. And you say here: "Hitler's April 1941 attack on Yugoslavia was followed by the state's quick collapse. In the subsequent dismemberment, various territories were awarded to the Reich, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy"; is that right?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. And then you speak of the campaign of genocide. I won't go back to that because you have been examined about it. And then you make assessments of the casualties of that war, and at the end you say a relatively small number of victims in Serbia; is that right?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. And on page 20, Partisans and Chetniks, that is 3B --

A. Yes.

Q. -- it says, and this is your position: "As the preceding discussion has indicated, during the Second World War Serbs were not only exposed to the general rigours of occupation but were also the specific targets of large-scale violence in both the Independent State of Croatia and Kosovo." ²⁴⁹⁶² So my question is the following: If you're talking about the general rigours of occupation, did you have in mind the fact that there were civilian victims in places where parts of Serbia were under the Hungarians or the -- under the Bulgarians in Eastern Serbia? Were you familiar with the civilian casualties in those places?

A. I'm more familiar with the casualties in the areas with mixed Hungarians -- mixed Hungarian populations. For instance, the New Year massacre in Novi Sad.

Q. And who were the victims?

A. The Serbs. I must say I don't know how many.

Q. I have to draw your attention to the fact that the only towns that were bombed in the area of the former Yugoslavia when Hitler decided to wage war against those lands was Belgrade and other towns in Serbia; is that right?

A. To the best of my knowledge. I can't think whether he would have had occasion to drop bombs anywhere else, but certainly the bombing of Belgrade is the greatest action at that phase.

Q. And you also know that it was only in Serbia that for one German soldier a hundred Serbs were executed, especially in Kraljevo and Kragujevac; is that correct?

A. Yes, it's absolutely true.

Q. And therefore, this was not general rigours. It was slightly different, because in the Balkan areas, the most radical measures were taken against the Serbs.

A. In terms of the German occupation, yes, I think broadly speaking ²⁴⁹⁶³ that's correct. Except that I would say that the German treatment of the Poles was really, if possible, more brutal.

Q. Very well. And now in this same chapter in which you speak about the regimes in Serbia, and at 3A you say, in the second paragraph: "In Kosovo during the Second World War, another change occurred in its status, a second change in the twentieth century, with a foreseeable disastrous effect." That's what you said. And then you referred to footnote 40, and you say: "By returning to the situation prior to 1912 and during most of the First World War, the Serbs and Montenegrin citizens of the region became secondhand citizens again, whereas the Albanians took up positions that were similar to the ones they had during the rule of the Turks." Is that right?

A. [Previous translation continues]...

Q. Is it true that whenever there was a regime change and whenever other powers got involved and changes occurred this happened? Started interfering, in fact?

A. [Previous translation continues]... cycle of status reversal.

Q. I'm nearing the end of my examination. Now we come to 5A, chapter 5A, the very end of your report. And you say: "The third element of the Yugoslav crisis, the demonstrations of the Albanians in Kosovo in the spring of 1981 could have at first glance appeared to be a local problem, even a trivial one as compared to the two others, however the event in Kosovo were in fact of key significance for shaping the future of Yugoslavia. The emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo became the main national problem of Serbia in the '80s," and you end by saying, ²⁴⁹⁶⁴ "Actually this conflict assisted in speeding up long-lasting inter-republican conflicts over the '74 constitution. As a result, Kosovo became a catalyst of the break-up of Yugoslavia." Is that also your position?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. And my last question in that connection is on page 25, the paragraph just above the heading for 4B, and again your position, and I quote: "Each time when the unity of Yugoslavia weakened culturally and politically, the need arose for cultural or political unity of all Serbs." Is that what we were saying, that there was always the danger present that a repetition could occur of the things that had happened during the First World War and the Second World War?

A. I'd like to take a moment to find the passage in English because I don't believe I used a word that would be translated as "potreba." Could you perhaps remind me of what was the section where this appears?

Q. It's 4A. The very end of that passage.

MR. NICE: Page 14, I think. 15.

THE WITNESS: Thank you. What I stated was over the 30 years preceding Yugoslavia's collapse, the report will argue every decline in cultural or political Yugoslav unity evoked a mobilisation for the cultural or political unity of all Serbs. So I think in saying "evoked a mobilisation" I was simply describing what happened. I did not say that the need arose, which, in my view, would be making a value judgement.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And the apprehensions, did they exist in view of the memories of ^{24965 BLANK PAGE 24966} the Second World War?

A. Certainly. I think that this fear existed.

Q. And I will end very briefly with the problem around the memorandum. You said in that connection that in the memorandum, little new was said, that these were all the same things that the law faculty professors had said as early on as '71.

A. I don't -- yes. There's little that's new in it, and most of the intellectual currents that are present in the memorandum do appear before the memorandum itself. I wouldn't trace all of it as far as back as '71.

Q. And my last question has to do with the platform of the SPS party when you said, "The platform also says that the new constitution of Yugoslavia should enable the formation of autonomous provinces within Yugoslavia, and the main aim of that proposal which appeared in a similar form during the debate on the constitutional amendments in '71." So it's the same things that were demanded in '71, the autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia and no territorial claims at all; is that right or not?

A. In regard to the specific proposal for founding autonomous provinces, yes, I think that's right.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. NICE: One question in two very short parts. Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Dr. Budding, in the question where the accused was corrected as to his manner of questioning he nevertheless advanced the proposition that throughout your report you emphasised the thesis that the Serbs were to ²⁴⁹⁶⁷ blame for everything. Has that ever been your thesis?

A. No, and I state explicitly at various points that the subject matter of this report is Serbian nationalism but that does not mean that I hold Serbian nationalism exclusively responsible for the break-up of Yugoslavia.

Q. And the second part of the same question: At page 60 in the English version as filed, we find this represented in the following two sentences. You have page 60, in the middle of the page, where you pick it up with an analysis of your report, saying that the report is not -- the content of the report "is not intended to imply that Serbia's leaders" - so not just Serbs but Serbia's leaders - "bore exclusive responsibility for Yugoslavia's collapse. Independently of Serbian actions, forces in favour of independence existed in both Slovenia and Croatia. But Milosevic's policies and rhetoric - especially once they began to operate in the context of post-Communist electoral competition - helped those forces move from marginal to dominant political positions." That was the view in your report. Is it still your view?

A. Yes, it certainly is.

MR. NICE: No other re-examination of Dr. Budding.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A request that this doctoral thesis by Ms. Budding be exhibited.

JUDGE MAY: When we get it we will consider how best to deal with it but we'll bear that in mind and we'll deal with it tomorrow when we ²⁴⁹⁶⁸ actually physically have it.

Dr. Budding, that concludes your evidence. Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give it. You are free to go.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

[The witness withdrew]

MR. NICE: May we actually deal with the exhibiting of the thesis on Monday when I'll be here? I shan't be here tomorrow.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. NICE: Ms. Bauer is going to the next witness. The only other administrative matter is that the witness list that I promised earlier, that is the complete witness list, the revised version of it will probably not now be available until Monday. Apart from presenting that to you, I don't forecast that we will need very much if any time for administrative matters next week. It may be sensible just to take five minutes to map out where we see ourselves going for the last part of the Prosecution's case of the trial.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will deal tomorrow, then -- but you say a new witness list. The order, I take it, will be --

MR. NICE: This is the -- this is not --

JUDGE MAY: The general witness list.

MR. NICE: The general witness list --

JUDGE MAY: Not the particular one.

MR. NICE: -- that explains where we are. That will be coming on Monday.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, but I should say that tomorrow we'll try and deal ²⁴⁹⁶⁹ with at least some of the 92 bis statements we've got to deal with it.

MR. NICE: Certainly. Mr. Groome is on notice to deal with that.

JUDGE MAY: He's ready to deal with that. Very well. Let's call the next witness.

MS. BAUER: Your Honours, the Prosecution calls the witness Stanko Erstic.

For Your Honours' information, pursuant to a court order on the 11th of April, 2003, portions relating to paragraphs 11 and 15 of his statement will be led viva voce.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

WITNESS: STANKO ERSTIC

[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Bauer. Examined by Ms. Bauer:

Q. Sir, please state your name. Sir, can you hear me?

A. Yes, I can hear you.

Q. Please state your name for the record.

A. Stanko Erstic.

Q. Mr. Erstic on the occasion of the 19th of June, last month, did you review your statement in the presence of a representative of the court, and did you sign a declaration attesting to its accuracy? ²⁴⁹⁷⁰

A. Yes.

MS. BAUER: Your Honours, I would offer this statement into evidence.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 510, Your Honour.

MS. BAUER: I will commence with the summary. The witness is a mason by profession. He's a resident of the village Medvidja which before the war was a mixed village of about 70 households situated in the municipality of Obrovac on the border of municipality of Benkovac.

Villages inhabited by mostly Serbs surrounded Medvidja before the war. Relationships between the to ethnic groups were good before the war. However, after the referendum for Croatian independence in 1990, the attitude of the local Serbs in the village became more antagonistic towards the Croats.

They gathered in a local bar which became a hangout for the Martic militia members and one could see them singing nationalistic songs. There was a sign at the door of the bar which stated "Drinks not allowed for Croats and dogs." The witness recalls that one of the lines of the songs that were sung went along the lines: "Milosevic send us some lettuce. There will be meat because we will be slaughtering Croats." The Croat population was scared but tolerated this kind of behaviour because local Serbs were increasingly armed. The witness noted a heightened presence of Martic's militia in Medvidja in the months preceding the war. Men of Martic's militia wore green camouflage uniforms with a patch on their shoulders that had militia and SAO Krajina written ²⁴⁹⁷¹ in Cyrillic.

Because of barricades erected by local armed Serbs travelling became more and more difficult for the Croat population. At checkpoints harassment of types against Croats increased; some of them were even arrested.

On the 2nd of November, 1991, the witness was arrested for no apparent reason by two of Martic's militiamen who were local Serbs. First he was brought to a building full of Martic's militia in Kistanje. From there he was brought to the police station in Obrovac which was also in the hands of the militia. The following day, police interrogated him about the movement of Croats, existence of weapons and the alleged personal possession of a radio transmitter in the village of Medvidja. Despite the witnesses denial of any knowledge or involvement in these events, two members of Martic's militia took him to the old prison -- old hospital in Knin which was used as a prison.

There the witness was detained with 120 other prisoners, all non-Serbs from Croat or mixed villages in the Krajina. Most of them were civilians except about 20 members of the Croat military. Martic's militia functioned as guards at the prison. Every day the guards took some of the detainees out of their cells, beat and kicked them and swore at them. The witness considered himself lucky because he only suffered from two broken ribs and one cracked rib. Further, detainees would be taunted by these guards along the lines the Croatian nation has to be destroyed, all Croats have to be killed, Split and Zadar are burning, Sibenik will burn as well. ²⁴⁹⁷² There was a section in the hospital that was being used as a dormitory by Captain Dragan's men and members of the JNA reserve force. Captain Dragan's soldiers differed from the rest. One could tell based on their speech that they were not local Serbs but came from Bosnia or even Serbia. Also, their uniforms differed from that of Martic's militia. Once during his detention, the witness saw Milan Martic in uniform walking around the compound of the prison.

Q. Mr. Erstic, did you known Mr. Martic at that time?

A. No.

Q. How did you find out that it was Mr. Martic you saw?

A. They told us that, the guards guarding us.

Q. And did you see at any time a senior military officer during your detention in the Knin prison?

A. Mr. Mladic.

Q. Did you know Mr. Mladic before?

A. No.

Q. How did you find out who he was?

A. They told me, the guards did, while I was washing the corridors down that it was Mladic.

Q. What was Mr. Mladic doing?

A. He was going round the compound, the prison compound, and with the escorts of Captain Dragan, the army.

Q. Did you see him again on another occasion?

A. Yes, when there was the exchange, when we were exchanged, between Zitnic and Pakovo Selo. ²⁴⁹⁷³

Q. And were you exchanged?

A. Zitnic, Pakovo Selo, it's in between. I don't know how to explain it better to you.

Q. No. I asked you when that was, the timing, not where.

A. On the 2nd of November, 1991.

Q. Who brought you to this exchange point?

A. We were brought there by the special police from the JNA.

Q. How did you know that it was the special police from the JNA?

A. The guards told us. They said you'd be going -- we'd be going for an exchange and the special police will provide an escort for you, and we saw by looking at them that they were the JNA soldiers.

Q. When you say by looking at them, what exactly do you refer to?

A. Well, they had the green army uniforms, the kind that the JNA had, and they had bulletproof vests on too.

Q. And how many detainees from the Knin prison were exchanged that day?

A. About a hundred.

Q. And against how many Serbian prisoners?

A. Well, approximately 60.

Q. And what was Mladic doing when you saw him at that exchange?

A. He was sitting there. There was the International Red Cross there too, and the people from Split, and they were having this discussion, and they looked at the list to see if everything was -- everyone was present and correct on both sides.

Q. Did you see Mr. Mladic anywhere or in any form again after this ²⁴⁹⁷⁴ exchange?

A. Well, just on television.

MS. BAUER: I'll continue with the summary. The witness did not go back to his family home in Medvidja until after the Operation Storm in 1995. Once he arrived in his village he found his family house and another about ten family houses had been burnt down and levelled to the ground. Also the two village churches were damaged from explosives.

In relation to exhibits, the witness reviewed some patches to -- which are attached to his 92 bis package, during his stay. He reviewed it during his stay in the Knin hospital.

Excuse me. That's a mistake. He reviewed it during the 92 bis procedure but saw these patches during his stay in the Knin hospital. Three of the patches were previously tendered into evidence as the numbers Exhibit 349, tab 11, tab 12, and tab 13, and are only attached for reference purposes to this summary. The remaining three patches, which are not yet part of the evidence, are found under tab 2 of the exhibit 510, tab 3 and tab 4. We have singled them out to make it clearer. That would conclude the examination.

JUDGE MAY: Ms. Bauer, there's one matter which needs clarification. The dates appear -- both of the exchange and of the arrest appear to have been the 2nd of November, 1991, according to the evidence. So perhaps you could just clarify that for us.

MS. BAUER:

Q. Mr. Erstic, when were you arrested by Martic's militia from your ^{24975 BLANK PAGE 24976} village?

A. In 1991, on the 2nd of October.

Q. And you were exchanged when?

A. On the 2nd of November, 1991, that is to say a month later.

Q. Thank you.

MS. BAUER: That should clarify it.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. There's one matter the registrar wants to raise.

[Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

JUDGE MAY: Ms. Bauer, the matter which is raised by the registrar is the question of the patches. We've got a binder with patches in at the moment. I forget the number. 349. And if we can have them all together, it would obviously be better.

I suggest what you do during the -- overnight, if you would, if you would liaise with the registrar and we'll try and get some common numbers for all of them together.

MS. BAUER: I will certainly do that.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much. Well, that's a convenient moment to adjourn.

Mr. Erstic, we must ask you to come back to conclude your evidence tomorrow morning. Could you remember during the adjournment not to speak to anybody about it until it's over, and that does include the members of the Prosecution team. And could you be back, please, at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. The Court will adjourn. ²⁴⁹⁷⁷

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 25th day of July, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.