²⁷²⁹²

Thursday, 9 October 2003

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice. Yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the next witness is General Sir Rupert Smith. There is an application in respect of his witness statement that is before you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we've seen the statement, and we've had the chance to consider it. What we would be minded to do is to admit the statement but require you, of course, to call evidence about -- live evidence about anything which is new, not in the statement, and also any matters of evidence relating to the accused, his acts and conduct.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, there is one meeting - I'll of course deal with that - one meeting directly with the accused. I'll get the witness to deal with that.

There are two updated versions of the draft proofing document that you had. One is called "track changes," which will be familiar for those who work with the appropriate software, and therefore shows what is additional from the draft. One is free of track changes because some people find it inconvenient to work with track changes. I'm happy to work with whatever version is most convenient to the Chamber.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. There is an issue of time, as far as this witness is concerned, because he is only here today, and we do not have this courtroom in the afternoon so we have to finish at the usual time. ²⁷²⁹³

MR. NICE: I shall be brief.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. NICE: May the witness come in?

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, do you want to say something?

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honours, I would just like to say something very briefly. I respect, of course, what you've said just now, but it seems to me that the witness who is about to come in, General Rupert Smith, who was in 1991 commander over the UN Protection Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and who took over that duty on the 23rd of January, 1995, and then also throughout that year he carried out this duty all the way up to an action taken by NATO in the month of October, it seems to me that this is a witness who should perhaps be questioned in chief about all these relevant matters. It's not only relevant the fact that he had contacts with Slobodan Milosevic. He was one of the persons who followed all developments in 1995, which was an extremely important year. And I believe that there are many developments involved about which he should testify in chief, especially regarding everything that happened after Markale, after the 28th of August, 1995.

I indeed believe that you should reconsider whether this is a witness who should be questioned in chief as well.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll reconsider it.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We have considered this matter, and of course we've considered, the two of us, the arguments which Mr. Tapuskovic puts forward. We of course bear in mind the importance of the evidence which ²⁷²⁹⁴ is to be given, but on the other hand, we have had benefit of argument yesterday, detailed arguments, which we've considered. Those arguments apply to this case. I should say that the original decision was the decision of the Trial Chamber as we considered it yesterday with Judge Robinson. Judge Kwon and I, of course, have reconsidered it now. We can see no reason to change our minds. Yes.

MR. NICE: May the witness come in. And in the absence of any indication to the contrary from the Chamber, I will use the updated summary that is not the "track changes" version, but I'm entirely in your hands.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness would take the declaration.

THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much. If you'd like to take a seat.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

WITNESS: RUPERT SMITH Examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Your full name, please.

A. Rupert Anthony Smith.

Q. Retired general of the British army, with a service history from 1964 covering experience in many theatres around the world, serving in the Gulf War, and involving yourself in the Balkans as early as late 1992 and early 1993 when you were in London at a desk position which gave you an overall view of the Balkans. Did you take command of the United Nations ²⁷²⁹⁵ Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 1995, holding that position until December of 1995?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you make a statement dated the 14th of August, 1996, to investigators of this Tribunal? Did you sign that statement? Have you reviewed it, and is it accurate?

A. Yes to all of those questions.

MR. NICE: May that statement, please, become an exhibit.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Judge Kwon makes the point that we did not involve the -- yesterday, in yesterday's evidence, in the exhibit numbering, the binder of intercepts which the witness was about to produce. I don't know if we can do it this way, but it might be convenient if that is now given a number, albeit it will only be marked for identification, I suspect, and that has the next number which Judge Kwon has, I think.

JUDGE KWON: Yes. The intercept binder will be Exhibit 551, and the witness statement will be 552.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much. Your Honours, there is a binder of exhibits to which the witness will refer but only briefly. May that be given the exhibit number 553.

Q. Concluding with your -- not concluding, but concluding the summary of your experience, General, following the position in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did you command the British army, between 1996 and 1998? Did you then become Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe for NATO between 1998 and 2002? ²⁷²⁹⁶

A. Between 1996 and 1998 I commanded the British Armed Forces in Northern Ireland rather than the British army.

Q. Sorry.

A. And yes, I was the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 1998 to 2001, not 2. I retired in 2001.

Q. Thank you. I'm now on the revised summary at the first substantive page, page 3, paragraph 5.

In the course of your duties in 1995, did you meet Karadzic, Mladic, and did you form any view from your dealings with them about their relationship with the accused in this case?

A. Yes, I did meet both Karadzic and Mladic. The -- my views about Mladic's relationship with the accused was based on in some and in particular a meeting in July, but before that, there were examples for me where there were connections with Serbia and Milosevic. These were to do with the running of the Bosnian Serb forces and the state of their equipment, where they were getting ammunition from, and where they were being paid from, particularly the senior officers.

Q. Did you form any view one way or the other as to whether Belgrade in general or the accused in particular had any influence over the Bosnian Serb leadership?

A. I certainly had the view there was influence, yes, because they relied, that is the Bosnian Serbs, relied for support from the Serbian army or Serbian armed forces, and there was from their own account on occasions evidence that they were dealing with the General Staff and so forth in Belgrade. ²⁷²⁹⁷

Q. Paragraph 8 of the summary. As between Karadzic and Mladic, what did you infer to be the relationship in summary?

A. In sum, the -- Karadzic was the political leader and Mladic was the military leader. They stood together. They did this publicly as well as in more discrete forum when they were talking to me or Mr. Akashi, and the -- and Mladic made the point on plenty of occasions that he didn't do the politics. However, he drew a very wide definition of his military responsibilities, and he protected his right to direct and decide what happened in those from Karadzic and everybody else jealously.

Q. Paragraph 9. As to whether there were any discussions on matters of strategy between Karadzic and Milosevic, your view and your view as to when if at all the accused elected to be involved.

A. I think they undoubtedly, that is Karadzic and Mladic, discussed strategy and there was the case of a meeting in Jahorina where I am aware that that had actually happened in a more formal structure. The relationship with the accused, I think, was rather more that he interfered or became involved when the directions they were taking became counter to his interests and those of Serbia.

Q. Paragraph 10. To what extent and in what way did the international community rely on or use the accused in respect of what they wanted from the Bosnian Serbs?

A. Because it was seen that Mr. Milosevic had influence over the Bosnian Serbs, the international community went to him and there is at least two occasions where we can see it happening, the recovery of hostages in May/June, and then during the Dayton talks, to bring as a ²⁷²⁹⁸ route, as a source of influence and pressure over the Bosnian Serbs.

Q. Did any, and if so which, senior VRS officers say anything to you about where they were paid and how?

A. I don't remember precisely who said it, but I think it was either Mladic or General Tolimir, but I was certainly told by one of them or another on at least one occasion that they were paid by Belgrade.

Q. On the question of support, if any, from the FRY by way of ammunition, forces, mercenaries, et cetera, your experience.

A. To an extent, the Bosnian Serb forces, particularly for specialist equipment or the repair and maintenance of bits of specialist equipment, relied on support from Belgrade, and the same applied to certain items of ammunition. The provision of supporting forces, I divide them up briefly into three groups. There were specials forces of the Serbian forces. There were, let's call it units of -- from Serbia such as Arkan's forces, and I was never quite clear exactly their relationships with the Serbian army, but they were formed bodies and recognisable. And then there were mercenary units in which it was alleged - I have no proof of this - that some of the people in them had come from Greece. I certainly saw evidence in the -- amongst the Serb forces and Bosnian Serb forces around Zepa of these reinforcing forces.

Q. On an allied topic, paragraph 12 or the second part of paragraph 12, can you explain what you mean by an air defence system and give evidence of how you understood it to operate and what inferences you were to draw from NATO's attempts to destroy it.

A. For an air defence system to work, you need what is referred to as ²⁷²⁹⁹ a recognised air picture. This is collected and -- from a large number of sensors, radars, and so forth, and is disseminated widely, and the information is all collected together and fused into one picture. This defence system was set up in the time of Yugoslavia under Tito and didn't -- was not constructed on the basis of the boundaries of -- that existed in 1995.

The -- and therefore, one must -- I was working on the assumptions that there was a feed of information that crossed all those boundaries from Serbia into Bosnia. This was demonstrated to me during the bombing of September when NATO was suppressing the air defence system as we knocked out the microwave towers over which this information is transmitted. They were in Bosnia. The Serbs continued -- the Bosnian Serbs continued to collect a recognised air picture, it being available through the linkages that were coming in from Serbia.

Q. So that if you're right in the inference you draw, the feed came from an integrated system and knocking out the part in Bosnia didn't deny them a feed if it was coming from elsewhere?

A. Correct. And therefore, it was being managed and continued to be managed from within Serbia.

Q. Thank you. We move to the heading "Restriction on the enclaves," paragraph 14.

On arrival -- actually, I think you covered this in your statement, so I needn't cover it. I'll move on to paragraph 15, which is the "Evidence of shift in RS military strategy." You had a series of meetings with Mladic in early March, but they ^{27300 BLANK PAGE 27301} are covered in your statement for the most part. However, at page -- paragraph 15 and onwards, you deal with something that was to become your thesis. Can you explain why it's necessary for you to form a thesis, or desirable; what your thesis was.

A. Forming a thesis is something I've learnt to do in these rather complex circumstances. It is -- it comes from having a thesis, then there's an antithesis, then there's a synthesis. My -- what I try to do is to arrive at a judgement. It doesn't -- from the information available to me, as to what is going to happen, what other people are going to do. I can then focus my collection of information to prove that or to disprove it, but also it allows me something to test the information that comes my way, to test that information against it and assess the information. By early to mid-March, I have been in command for approaching two months, and I've begun to form this view, a thesis as to what was about to happen, and that then became the testbed, if you like, against which I collected and assessed information.

Q. What was the thesis?

A. In sum, that the cessation of hostilities agreement was going to break down, that the parties to this conflict were intent on war, they needed to have a resolution by force by the end of 1995. From the Bosnian Serb point of view, that they had a shortage of manpower to defend the space they had, that if -- one of the ways of freeing up the available manpower, making more available, was to reduce the need to guard the three eastern enclaves, Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica. They also needed to keep the UN, because the UN was something ²⁷³⁰² of a protection against them being bombed by NATO. The -- and therefore, they would -- and I then deduced from that that therefore they would squeeze and bring pressure on the eastern enclaves in such a way that they neutralised their potential to the Bosnians as a source of military activity in the Bosnian Serb rear while keeping the UN in there so that they -- there was a hostage, as it were, to protect them from NATO bombing.

Q. Paragraph 18. Regardless of what was going to happen in the enclaves, your view on the significance of Sarajevo.

A. I would make the point that Sarajevo was also an enclave. The -- and under siege. I considered Sarajevo was the decisive point, because some of the suburbs of Sarajevo were held by the Bosnian Serbs. The confrontation line ran through Sarajevo. Sarajevo was the capital, the seat of the Bosnian government. It was where the UN headquarters was. It was where the media were, and it was defended or guarded by a brigade found from a permanent member of the Security Council, France. For all of those reasons, it was a decisive point.

Q. Paragraph 19. You had a meeting with Mladic on the 6th of March. It's dealt with in your statement. Tab 1 of Exhibit 553 is a record of that. Have you reviewed that exhibit? Does it faithfully set out the contents of the meeting?

A. Yes, I've reviewed it, and yes, it does set out the contents of the meeting.

Q. Paragraph -- the follow-on paragraph is also covered in the statement, your original statement, but it's perhaps worth just ²⁷³⁰³ underlining this point: At a meeting -- at the meeting that we've been dealing with, was Koljevic present?

A. Yes, he was, yes.

Q. And did he say, as your statement reveals, talking of people going to this Tribunal "If he goes, we all go and we don't mind how many go with us"?

A. Yes, he did say that. Yes.

Q. Can we then look, please, and this is only one of the two exhibits I'll ask the Chamber probably to look at, it's tab 2. If the witness can have it, and it's in the English version at page 10, and the last few lines of page 10. We may be able to display this on Sanction. I'm very grateful to Ms. Wee and indeed Ms. Edgerton for preparing the exhibits. Just, please, this document, General Smith, and then we'll look at the one. Perhaps it's highlighted.

A. Mine understanding -- I saw this document for the first time yesterday. My understanding of this document is it's a translation of a directive signed by Karadzic on the future strategic direction of the Bosnian Serb forces, and it appears to have been the results of this meeting at Jahorina.

Q. And the passage we can see at the foot of page 10 reads in respect of the Drina Corps: "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa." And although I may not have asked Ms. Wee to prepare this, but if you go over in the original to page 11, you, I think, see some ²⁷³⁰⁴ significance in the three lines at the top of page 11: "In case the UNPROFOR forces leave Zepa and Srebrenica, the DK command shall plan an operation named Jadar with the task of breaking up and destroying the Muslims forces in these enclaves and definitively liberating the Drina valley region."

Your comment, please, on those two passages and how they affected your thesis.

A. The first extract, the last sentence of the first paragraph that we were shown, "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations ..." and then ending "... for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa," this I understand to be the -- the instructions to so squeeze and compress, both physically and in terms of a way of life, the existence of those enclaves. I do not see it because of this -- the second reference you made, the second paragraph, as an instruction to actually destroy them. They -- in the -- in that second paragraph, it -- the whole -- the whole instruction in that paragraph is dependent upon UNPROFOR leaving. It is only when the -- there is no reason for -- to keep the UN there because the UN have gone is that those enclaves are to be destroyed and done away with.

Q. Thank you. I erred when I said it was only two exhibits. I'm going to ask you to look at three. The next one, please, is tab 3 but very briefly. Your comment on tab 3 which is a directive for further operations, again a document I think you've own seen recently, signed by Mladic and dated the 31st of March. Your comment on it in general terms, because I think it's a general comment that you can make. ²⁷³⁰⁵

A. Yes. This, if you like, is a demonstration of Karadzic and Mladic working together. The first -- you can see the general directive by Karadzic, and it's then carried on with more specific instructions by Mladic to his forces, and a few days or weeks later -- I've got to look. Yes, it's about three weeks later, he issues a subsequent order clarifying or developing what the -- Karadzic had produced as the strategic direction.

Q. Summary page 8, paragraphs 20 and 21, substantially covered in your statement. Your visit to Srebrenica on the 6th of March revealed - last line of paragraph 20 - on which some amplification - that every movement in and out of the enclave was checked and monitored by the Bosnian Serb checkpoint, and then this sentence, and there was "... the sense of being under the direct control of the VRS was palpable." Any further qualification for that and how general or long-standing that sense of VRS control was?

A. It was deeply felt by the inhabitants of Srebrenica and by the unit DutchBat and the UNPROFOR forces that were in the pocket. I think it had been going on -- this was a developing sense that the longer you were there the longer and deeper this feeling pertained.

Q. It may be a tangential point, but in a sentence, in your judgement was the degree of VRS control over Srebrenica and the pockets properly broadcast around the world to different capitals or was it information that was for some reason or other not fully disseminated?

A. I do not think the circumstances in those enclaves, or to some extent in the whole of Bosnia, was properly understood in capitals. ²⁷³⁰⁶

Q. You can amplify that, if asked, by anybody else. Paragraph 21. At the same time as you were rotating positions following General Rose, DutchBat was replacing a Canadian Battalion at Srebrenica. Had they been able to get all their weapons and ammunitions into the enclave or not?

A. No, they had not. I can't remember the precise shortages, but there were shortages.

Q. Paragraph 29 is dealt with in your statement, your meeting with Mladic on the 7th of March of 1995. As to paragraph 26, that is effectively dealt with in your statement save perhaps for the end. At this meeting, did Mladic express his views on the understanding of and size of enclaves?

A. Yes. The -- this particular discussion started over a discussion as to the position of the UN observation posts on the south and south-east side of the Srebrenica pocket. Because of the positioning of these observation posts, it was Mladic's opinion that the Bosnians had been able to position their own lines so that they could interdict a road that was important to the Serbs that ran on an east-west access between Zepa and Srebrenica.

He, Mladic, wanted me to reposition the OPs so as to allow Bosnian forces to drive the Muslims back and clear and allow the road -- better access to the road for the Bosnian Serbs. I refused to do this, and in this discussion it then became -- it was explained to me by Mladic that the boundaries we were occupying or that existed for these enclaves were not those that he, in his opinion, had agreed at the time of setting them ²⁷³⁰⁷ up, and he drew on the map, sketched on the map where he thought those boundaries ought to be, the ones that he had agreed, and these were small lozenges around the actual built-up areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde.

Q. The exhibit formerly -- earlier tendered as Exhibit 546, tab 21, is one you've reviewed. Does that accurately set out the meeting of the 7th of March?

A. That's tab 21.

Q. No, it's the earlier exhibit at the beginning of the binder and it's Exhibit 546.

A. I beg your pardon.

Q. Tab 21, so it doesn't fall in the sequence of tabs.

A. I'm sorry. Yes, I have seen that, and yes, it does.

Q. Thank you. Paragraph 26 --

JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt you. I'm not sure whether we received the witness's statement which is numbered.

MR. NICE: I'm sorry if you haven't had a numbered statement.

JUDGE KWON: No, we haven't received it.

MR. NICE: I'm sorry. I will have that corrected as soon as --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.

MR. NICE: My oversight. We'll send one up for copying now.

Q. Paragraph 26 on page 9 of the supplement is dealt with in the statement. That's your meeting with Mr. Akashi when you went to Pale. Paragraph 28 is covered in your statement. Paragraph 30 -- I beg your pardon, paragraph 30 is covered in your statement. Paragraph 31, ²⁷³⁰⁸ likewise, covered in your statement.

Does tab 4 of the exhibit that's before you set out accurately the meeting -- the record of the meeting of the 5th of April, 1995?

A. Yes, it does. Yes. I recognise it.

Q. We move then to paragraph 32 in the summary on page 10. Meetings in Sarajevo and Pale on the 20th of April, covered in your witness statement and no need to go into those.

Further meetings between the 30th of April and the 1st of May, covered in your statement in full. Perhaps worth observing in respect of the meeting on the 30th of April, paragraph 34 of the summary. This was where Karadzic is recorded as saying at one stage that if the international community treated Bosnian Serbs like beasts in a cage, that is how they would behave. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And have you reviewed tab 5 of the exhibit bundle? Notes of the meeting of the 30th of April.

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Does that set out accurately what happened?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. Indeed we could find a passage in there where there's a reference to humanitarian and UNPROFOR convoys being said to be commercial convoys for the benefit of Muslims.

A. Yes.

Q. Paragraph 36 deals with following events in early May and is covered in your statement. ^{27309 BLANK PAGE 27310} Paragraph 37 brings us to the 9th of May and your meeting then with Karadzic. Covered in your original statement, as indeed is your evidence that on the 16th and the 17th of May, serious fighting to the north-east and south-east of Sarajevo took place; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What about those tanks that were involved in the fighting on the 16th and 17th of May? Where were they firing from? What were they doing that they shouldn't have been?

A. Well, they shouldn't have been firing because they were in the weapon collection point. I can't remember the precise details, but the -- these weapons were either taken or these tanks were either taken from the weapon collection point or manned and fired from within the weapon collection point. These weapons collection points it must be understood as quite wide areas and the weapons dispersed within them. It wasn't -- they weren't necessarily all in a hangar or something like that.

Q. And we've heard evidence about those weapon collection points already, so we move to paragraph 40, covered in your statement. But at 40 -- which is your meeting with Karadzic on the 21st of May. Paragraph 41. At that time, were you working or was UNPROFOR working on the thesis that the Bosnians were increasing their activity from the enclaves?

A. Yes. I -- when I described the thesis, I -- for brevity, I only described the thesis from the point of view of the Bosnian Serbs, but the thesis also included that it was therefore in the interests of the Bosnian Muslims to conduct operations out of these enclaves so as to tie down as ²⁷³¹¹ much Serb forces as possible, and that appeared to be happening.

Q. Have you reviewed tab 6, and is that an accurate record of the meeting of the 21st of May?

A. Yes, I have; and yes, it is.

Q. At this stage was Sarajevo being shelled on a regular basis by the Bosnian Serbs?

A. Yes. It -- and this had been increasing, and from my memory, it had calmed down a little from the situation around the 16th, 17th but it had continued.

Q. What were the principal targets? Paragraph 42, page 12.

A. The -- generally, the Jewish cemetery, the PTT building and the vicinity around there. The -- if you like, the front lines as well. And then we would also get them, rounds coming in around the old stadium at Zetra.

Q. Paragraph 43, page 13. Retaliatory shelling of Tuzla by the VRS. Can you tell us a little bit about that?

On the 24th of May, did fighting flare up again, and did you take a decision and issue an ultimatum?

A. Yes. We -- the shelling had continued during that month, and then it became more intense during the 24th, and weapons -- further weapons were taken from the weapon collection points, and at this point I issued an ultimatum during, if I remember correctly, the evening of the 24th, that if the weapons were not returned then NATO would be invited to carry out airstrikes. The weapons were not returned, and on the 25th, a target which was one of two bunkers in an ammunition dump near Pale was attacked ²⁷³¹² by NATO.

The response that evening was for the VRS to shell all the safe areas. The shelling of Tuzla killed 71 people in the marketplace that evening.

Q. Tuzla, a safe area?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. Meanwhile in Sarajevo, what was the position there, better, worse, or about the same?

A. Well, that night it was --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Smith says the army of Republika Srpska shelled the area, and in translation that is being broadcast, an error was made and it was said that it was the army of the Republic of Serbia. So please could that error be corrected.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Very well. Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. Sarajevo, General.

A. The -- Sarajevo was also shelled, and the situation progressively deteriorated, but it didn't -- we bombed a second time, and the particular deterioration then occurred after that second bombing rather than after the first.

Q. Moving on to the taking of hostages, paragraph 46 and following. Can you give us in thumbnail outline the history of the taking of ²⁷³¹³ hostages?

A. Yes, briefly. Almost immediately after the second airstrike, the UNMOs close that were -- lived in a house close to the Pale headquarters were seized and at least one, a Canadian, was chained to a bridge which was thought to be a potential target, and this was broadcast on television. I was rung up and threatened that if I didn't stop, he would be -- have his throat cut. And at the same time, we began to receive reports of other people being taken hostage in the Bosnian Serb areas.

Q. To what extent was the taking of hostages and using of them as human shields widespread, and if so, what conclusions did you make as to coordination?

A. There were some -- eventually there were some 400 people taken hostage. I can't remember at this range the -- precisely how many were taken in the sort of first tranche, but the seizure of hostages spread beyond the immediate vicinity of Pale and it was clearly directed from -- the directed action across the complete command.

Q. Your witness statement deals with the contacts by phone you had with Mladic, your assertions, his counter-allegations. Did he maintain his right to keep these hostages and to use them in the way that you've described?

A. I -- without referring back to the statement, my memory is that he was intent on keeping the hostages and demanding that we ceased our actions altogether.

Q. Bosnian troops disguised as French soldiers, dealt with in your statement, as is the passage on the 28th of May where you had your final ²⁷³¹⁴ conversation with Mladic, informing him of the breach of Geneva Conventions in what he was doing. And does tab 7 summarise the document you've reviewed, summarise the telephone conversation that you had with him?

A. Yes, it does, yes.

Q. You refused further to negotiate with him. The pressure was brought to bear on the accused in this case. That's dealt with in your statement. Did you understand - paragraph 52 - that the accused did have a role in recovery of the hostages eventually?

A. Yes. I'm -- it was clear at the time that that was going on.

Q. Tab 11, is that a document you've reviewed, and does that constitute a letter of complaint you sent on the 26th of June to Mladic about the shelling of the safe areas?

A. Yes, I have reviewed it, and yes, it does that. It is a letter of complaint, protest even.

Q. Other events in June of 1995. Was shelling and sniping taking place? What sort of regularity, if so?

A. At this range I have difficulty remembering -- yes, they were taking place, and I have difficulty in remembering its regularity. I think it -- I would use the word it was "normal." This had become the background to life in Sarajevo.

Q. The ABiH attempt to break out of Sarajevo in June 1995 is dealt with in your statement, as is the appointment of Carl Bildt in place of Lord Owen to the European Union ICFY position. Did you have a meeting with him in June? ²⁷³¹⁵

A. Yes.

Q. Maintain contact with him. Then we come to the fall of Srebrenica in July of 1995. You were on leave at the time. This is covered in your original statement. The attack intensified in -- on Srebrenica intensified on the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th of July. That also is covered in your statement.

There are then some exhibits that you can produce but we'll deal with them very briefly. Tab 13, have you reviewed that? Is that a code cable dealing with the position on the 11th of July?

A. Yes, it's a code cable from the headquarters in Zagreb, an Akashi code cable reviewing the situation.

Q. With the accused saying that he understood that it may be necessary for close-air support to be used, stating that General Mladic might not understand the difference between close-air support and airstrike.

A. Yes.

Q. And warning of the possibility of Mladic reacting strongly.

A. Yes.

Q. Exhibit tab 14, is that another code cable for the 11th of July that you've reviewed?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the accused made contact, was briefed on the situation, and said that the Netherlands' soldiers in Serb-held areas retained their weapons and equipment were free to move about?

A. Yes. ²⁷³¹⁶

Q. And finally tab 15, a code cable for the same day, which includes the passage that "The BSA is likely to separate the military-age men from the rest of the population, an eventuality about which UNPROFOR troops will be able to do very little." Does it go on to say that "The fact that the Bosnian Serb Army will have practical difficulties controlling 40.000 people may mitigate against their desire to prolong or exacerbate the plight of the Srebrenica population"?

A. Yes, I remember reading that. I can't find it at the moment, but it's in here somewhere, I know.

Q. It's tab 15, and it's now on the screen before you. We move to paragraph 58.

A. Yes.

Q. Which is your concern for the refugee problem that was developing, and you covered that in your original statement, but have you reviewed tab 16, dated the 13th of July, a code cable dealing with the situation, which sets out that there were approximately 5.500 people displaced at the air base, that number being expected to rise, and that there were an estimated 6.000 people in Kladanj who will be going to Tuzla, many others to follow, about 25.000?

A. Yes.

Q. And also an understanding that there were about 4.000 men of draft age in Bratunac awaiting screening by the Bosnian Serb army, their fate being of concern to everyone.

A. Yes. That I can -- I recognise the code cable, yes.

Q. Tab 17 is another document you've reviewed, dated the 13th of ²⁷³¹⁷ July, setting out a meeting between you and Prime Minister Silajdzic on the 13th of July. And does that contain this passage, that "Silajdzic informed General Smith that the government had held an Extraordinary Session of Parliament today and were about to release a ... list of their demands. This would include a request for the UN to reinforce the Zepa enclave. He stated that, firstly, Zepa was the immediate priority as it had become apparent that it would certainly be the next target and that Belgrade was actively involved and no longer bothered to conceal this fact."

Paragraph 6 of the same document said: "Both the Prime Minister and Minister Muratovic raised their concerns about the as-yet-unconfirmed reports of atrocities in the Srebrenica area, in particular the rape of young women in Vlasenica area and the murder of a busload of refugees." Do you recognise that document?

A. Yes, I recognise that.

Q. And does that accurately set out --

A. Yes, it does, yes.

Q. And finally for exhibits at this stage, tab 18, a document dated the 13th of July you've considered. The aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica and the comment that the Bosnian Serbs clean -- cleansing Srebrenica. What do you say about that, if anything?

A. I wrote this document. This is me at the end of -- or at some stage during that day, I only arriving back in the late hours of the 12th of July, sending off my views as to the position we -- as to how we should approach the future, and I'm -- in there, I am producing the -- in the ^{27318 BLANK PAGE 27319} situation, and I'm saying that the Bosnian Serbs are cleansing Srebrenica, by which I mean - and I'm using the word as it was being used at the time - the process of separating the men of military age from the rest of the population, and this was the normal behaviour when people captured a village or whatever during this war and in that part of the -- and in that part of the Balkans.

Q. Summary page 17, paragraph 60 to 67 to be given live, and if you'd perhaps try and deal with it from recollection, referring only to any other documents if you need to and on request because it concerns the accused directly.

Was there a meeting on the 14th of July between yourself, the accused, and Carl Bildt in Belgrade?

A. Yes, there was, yes. I was hesitating over the date. Yes, there was.

Q. Was there also a meeting with Mladic?

A. Yes. Mladic was there with Milosevic when we arrived.

JUDGE MAY: Is that date right, the 14th? I put a reference to the 15th.

THE WITNESS: I was hesitating because I thought it was the 15th.

MR. NICE: My error. It is the 15th. The 15th.

Q. Tell us about the meeting. How did it start and --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance, perhaps Mr. Nice's service, which is rather large and effective, could perhaps find the document. There is the Akashi report to Kofi Annan dated Zagreb, the 17th of July, 1995, and it says: "For Annan, United Nations New York, ²⁷³²⁰ Information on Stoltenberg ICFY Geneva from Akashi, UNPROFOR main headquarters Zagreb, number Z-1175." The date is the 17th of July, 1995, and the reference is the meeting in Belgrade.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes. And what is the date, if there's a point? What is the date that you say from that document?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That document, the date is the 17th of July.

JUDGE MAY: The date of the meeting. What is the date of the meeting?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And the date of the meeting is Sunday, the 15th of July.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Now, let's go on.

MR. NICE:

Q. And was the meeting at --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And it is Akashi's report.

MR. NICE:

Q. Was the meeting outside a hunting lodge at Belgrade?

A. Yes.

Q. We can have the full people attending if necessary. Did the meeting split into military and political groups?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. You were in the military group. What happened in that?

A. We started with everyone together, and very soon after we started, Mr. Milosevic directed Mladic to go with me and sort out the recovery of the Dutch Battalion and access to prisoners and so forth, and we went off ²⁷³²¹ separately and held our meeting to discuss that.

Q. In what terms did the accused instruct Mladic and with what apparent authority?

A. They were -- he was clearly the superior of Mladic. He referred to Mladic by his Christian name and Mladic was deferring to him.

Q. The meeting you had with Mladic, in summary, how did that progress?

A. Slowly and in a rather combative manner, but we eventually arrived at a document which I believe you will -- you have in the pack, which became the basis of our subsequent meetings.

Q. It's tab 20, I think, in the binder. Indeed it identifies the date of the 15th of July as the meeting.

A. No, I was referring to the one where -- which Mladic and I signed at Han-Cram, which I think is --

Q. 21.

A. 21.

Q. And you've reviewed both of those documents?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. You say it was combative. This is the 17th of July --

A. No, 15th.

Q. Sorry, the 15th of July but it was combative. Anything said directly about what had been happening at Srebrenica or was there any knowledge at that stage of the number of deaths at Srebrenica or anything of that sort?

A. No. I was still working on the basis that we had a substantial ²⁷³²² number of men to see, that at least 2.000 were in Bratunac, and we -- and we couldn't account -- we didn't know where to look for the balance, and that's why we were demanding access for the ICRC and the UNHCR to these people.

Q. Just in general, looking both forward and back if you can, at any stage was Mladic to make any acknowledgement about the number of deaths in Srebrenica or to express shock or any other emotion about what in due course it was known may have happened there?

A. No, he didn't, and I -- at this meeting, although for a more general reason, and then subsequently I made this point I'm about to tell you about, on other occasions when it was clear that these massacres had taken place, I was trying to impress upon him that the actions he was taking were damaging his position and that of his people, because they were being viewed and putting him in a very bad light. And he had no understanding, in my view, of the effect he was having on the world by the actions he was taking.

Q. In the meeting with you, did he refer to the vulnerability of his own mother, I think?

A. Yes. Apparently, according to him, a bomb, when we bombed Pale, had fallen within a kilometre of her.

Q. We've dealt already with paragraph 65 of the summary where you've explained your view of the accused's control over Mladic. You make something that's not in your statement, an observation about the exercise of power generally in the Balkans and the degree to which subordinate authority holders have independence. Can you just explain that in a ²⁷³²³ couple of sentences.

A. I came to the view quite early on that power was exercised in the Balkans as a society in the way that I called all power was absolute, and whoever had it exercised it absolutely. If you were running a roadblock, then you were all-powerful, and if you demanded goods, money, tax, or whatever, that was yours to take. Your superior only became involved if the consequence of this affected his affairs and doings, and he would only intervene in your exercise of power on that account.

Q. How if at all does that view of yours feed into your judgements about Milosevic and Mladic from what you were told and what you saw?

A. I think that was the relationship. Mladic had his own place to exercise power and to do so, and only when this interfered with the business of Mr. Milosevic and Serbia did he get interfered with or controlled.

Q. Did Mladic offer you an explanation about the fall of Zepa?

A. He told me that it had fallen long before it did, but the reason for him attacking it, we never discussed it, and it fitted with what I'd been expecting him to do anyhow.

Q. I should have -- I jumped over a couple of passages. You've dealt in your statement with the agreement on the evacuation of DutchBat. You've reviewed Exhibit 21, which we've already considered. And I should have got you to make clear that Mladic had reported to you that Srebrenica was finished in a correct way as you set out in your original witness statement?

A. Yes. ²⁷³²⁴

Q. We come to the fall of Zepa. Did he show you a map at the time he was dealing with that?

A. Yes. And he was endeavouring to get a -- the local representatives to deal with him at the time, if I recall correctly.

Q. You had a further meeting with Mladic on the 25th of July at Han-Cram; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Covered in your statement. You spend four hours with him, and that's also dealt with in your statement.

You've reviewed an exhibit, tab 22, which sets out a record of that meeting.

A. Yes. Yes. And that's a record of it. Yes, it is.

Q. Included in that, I think, you met -- in that meeting you met Bosnian officials, ICRC staff, and some UN civil affairs staff?

A. Well, what happened is I met them on the road, and I was trying to get these people into Zepa in order to be sure that we weren't about to have another Srebrenica.

Q. And I think -- did you form a view as to whether you were going to be able to resist cleansing of the enclave?

A. We -- we were not going to be able to prevent the evacuation of the people in the enclave. The important thing was to get them out safely. There was a -- the -- whether or not the armed people in the enclave at that stage were going to be able to extract or they would go off into the hills wasn't clear. Eventually they went off into the hills.

Q. Did you make efforts to get them registered as well? ²⁷³²⁵

A. Yes. Registered the people who had been taken so that we could account for them.

Q. You had a further visit to Zepa between the 26th and 29th of July covered in your witness statement. And Mladic was keen to exchange prisoners, also dealt with in your witness statement. It was an all-for-all exchange, I think, wasn't it?

A. Yes. The -- I was -- became something of a negotiator at that stage of carrying the message between the Bosnian government and Mladic.

Q. Deal with what else happened in Zepa, the Bosnian army's refusal to surrender in your statement. By the 30th of July, Mladic's attention had been diverted from Zepa by the start of the Croatian offensive in Western Bosnia.

A. Yes.

Q. You noted at the time, so far as Zepa was concerned, the appearance of some different organisation or force; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell us about that, please.

A. The -- the troops actually conducting the assault into Zepa were clearly of a different organisation to those more regular Bosnian Serb soldiers on the outer cordon. These men wore black uniforms. I don't recall the colour of their head gear. Many had Serbian army flashes on their sleeves.

Q. I think you also noticed something about the vehicle that Mladic was using at one stage.

A. Well, there was two captured vehicles. One was an Ukrainian APC, ²⁷³²⁶ still in its white colours. The other was a captured British APC, a Saxon that had been painted camouflage, and it came from Gorazde when hostages were taken there in May.

Q. Finally on the black uniformed groups, did you notice them once or more than once? Did you notice their disappearance and infer where they'd gone?

A. They were there all the time until the my last time of going there when Mladic had also gone because of the break out of fighting in the -- on the other side in Western Republika Srpska, and I deduced that these forces had gone with Mladic to reinforce the situation there.

Q. You deal, indeed, with further material on that topic. Your meeting with Mladic at Mrkonjic Grad on the 31st of July in your statement?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And I think your view that Zepa was not high on Mladic's agenda from this time or at this time is dealt with at paragraph 101 of your original statement. And you've reviewed tab 23, which sets out the record of your meeting of the 31st of July?

A. Yes, I have, yes. That is the record.

Q. August 1995 you cover in your original statement both as to the general position, the Lake/Holbrooke initiative, your meeting with Mladic on the 22nd of August at Borika near Zepa to discuss the withdrawal of British and Ukrainian troops; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And then paragraph 82 of the summary, your original statement ^{27327 BLANK PAGE 27328} deals with your tackling Mladic on Srebrenica, the allegations and the atrocities, and this is where you, as you've told us already, found that he didn't understand the world perception of what was going on.

A. Yes.

Q. You raised with him the Bosnian Serb refusal to allow UNPROFOR to use the route to Sarajevo airport.

A. Yes.

Q. What happened in respect of that and why, do you think?

A. The -- my memory is that he then said he'd lift the restrictions. The -- and this, as it were, was something of a quid pro quo for the UNHCR help that we'd got across to deal with the refugees that were flooding into Banja Luka and so forth.

Q. Two more very short topics, although each of them not necessarily small in significance. First, the foreseeability of the massacre at Srebrenica. You told us that you -- this is page 23, paragraph 84. You told us that you were on leave when the attack on Srebrenica began. You've told us about your original thesis and your expectation of a squeezing on the safe areas.

So far as you were concerned, were you surprised or otherwise when you learnt of the scale of the massacre?

A. I was -- was extremely surprised. I had not expected that to have happened at all.

Q. Did it fit with, not fit with your thesis or does it constitute a separate event?

A. Well, I think it is a separate event. The thesis was sufficiently ²⁷³²⁹ accurate to suppose that this squeezing would take place, and indeed that was the basis of the interpretation of the events that led up to the collapse of the pocket.

In the aftermath, you get these murders, and that was not -- I just did not consider that that would happen.

Q. Page 24 of the summary, paragraph 89. Just yes or no, were you able to form a view about whether Milosevic had any knowledge after the event of the killings at Srebrenica? Just yes or no to that.

A. Yes, I did form --

Q. The question is how were you able to form a view before I invite you to offer it to the Chamber.

A. Because of the meeting that took place on the 15th of July, there must have been -- he must have understood - and he had Mladic there - they must have known what had gone on.

Q. Thank you. The last topic, Markale II as it's described, that is the mortars going into the old town on the 28th of August and the killing of the 37 and wounding of 88 people outside the Markale marketplace. Was there an investigation into that?

A. Yes.

Q. The nature of the investigation? Who caused it to happen?

A. The -- the -- any mortaring, any shelling, the UNMOs automatically carried out an investigation and recorded the data they collected. This was of such significance that particular attention was paid to this particular attack, and because I wanted to be absolutely sure that all the data had been collected, I had a second iteration of this investigation in ²⁷³³⁰ which a -- my senior intelligence officer was instructed to collect all the information available. He didn't exactly carry out the investigation himself; he assembled all the data, and it was on the basis of that that I came to my decision.

Q. Your decision was?

A. That beyond reasonable doubt these rounds had come from the Bosnian Serb positions.

Q. Can you identify the elements of the investigation or the report following the investigation that led to your forming that conclusion.

A. The crater analysis gave a direction. The -- and the nature of the weapon systems. The observation post reports, whether they'd heard weapons fired or not, told us whether they'd been fired or not from within the siege as opposed to without. There was an acoustic system which was also interrogated to see whether they'd picked up anything in the city. It had not. And then there was the radars, and they too, by negative information, you were able to exclude certain possibilities. While no one had actually seen the mortars fired, equally they hadn't seen any of the other evidence of it being fired from inside of the siege. On that basis, I came to that conclusion that this had been fired from outside the siege.

Q. I think you've reviewed two exhibits, tabs 24 and 25 covering this. One a code cable from the office of the commander to the HQ UNPF in Zagreb, the mortar incident report?

A. Yes.

Q. And at tab 25, a document headed "Sarajevo Firing Incident." Any ²⁷³³¹ comments you want to make on those?

A. Yes. The -- the -- if I remember how it was done, the bureaucracy of it, the first document is the -- is collecting all together the various reports, the UNMOs, reports and so forth which are annexes to that first report, and the subsequent one is the memoranda from the intelligence officer, Powers, where he pulls together all these reports under the one -- under the one cover and presents them to me.

Q. As summarised, your tour of duty ended in December. But that's all I wish to ask you. You will be asked some further questions. Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: General, we're going to adjourn now for 20 minutes. Could I remind you, as we remind all witnesses, not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over. If you would be back in 20 minutes, please.

THE WITNESS: Right, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn.

--- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice needed an hour and a half just to skip through all these documents. I do not believe that I can cross-examine this witness within the rest of the time today, and I don't think that General Smith could not come perhaps again.

JUDGE MAY: More precisely, the Prosecution took an hour and a quarter rather than an hour and a half. You've got the rest of the day, ²⁷³³² so let's see what progress we can make. I advise you not to waste any time with argument and the like.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no intention of wasting time, Mr. May.

Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Let us begin with what the examination-in-chief ended by Mr. Nice and which General Smith commented on. Namely, last night I received a document in accordance with the practice for me to be given documents at the last moment. It doesn't have an ERN number. It just says the 8th of October, 2003, and in the accompanying letter in connection with witness Rupert Smith, pursuant to Rule 68, information report, information provided by Brigadier J. Baxter of the British army to Mark Ierace, et cetera. It refers to Markale, the shelling incident, on the 28th of August, 1995.

I don't know whether you have that document.

JUDGE MAY: No. I don't know what you're talking about. Mr. Nice, can you help us, please?

MR. NICE: Yes. It was a document provided under our wide comprehension of Rule 68 and is indeed an information report provided by Brigadier Baxter of the British army to officers of the Office of the Prosecutor. I'm not sure if it's document you want. I'm sure if it becomes material, we can copy it and make it available to you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, I think it should be done. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. You can ask some questions.

Certainly, Mr. Nice, the witness should have a copy of it. ²⁷³³³

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. The witness has a copy, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Smith, he says: "My tour of duty was January to November [In English] 1995. I was MA to Smith throughout." MA, military assistant, I suppose.

[Interpretation] And at the end of that first paragraph which is headed "In relation to the Markale shelling incident of the 28th of August," he says: "[In English] My original thought at that time was that this was two different attacks from two different locations - from two different directions, one from inside the lines." [Interpretation] And then he says: "[In English] When we went back to UN headquarters there was initial talk of the killing round being fired by the Bosnians. The information from the French was that the round could have been fired from within the lines. This was from the first analysis of the UNMOs and the French. It did not appear from verbal reports that there had been two attacks because the rounds were said to be within seconds."

[Interpretation] Then in the next paragraph, it says, in the third line: "Considering the reports of the UNMOs and of the Sector Sarajevo French engineers, [In English] we were troubled at the lack of correlation between the information reported."

[Interpretation] And at the end of the paragraph mention is made of the fact that you designated Colonel Powers to investigate. And at the end of the paragraph, it says: "Powers provided a subsidiary report [In ²⁷³³⁴ English] that afternoon that became the basis for the general's decisions."

[Interpretation] And then on page 2, in the fourth paragraph, it says: "[In English] The UNMOs reported one thing and the French engineers something else."

[Interpretation] And then in the next paragraph: "[In English] There were three opinions: The UNMOs, Sector Sarajevo (French engineers) who had access to the Cymbelline" - [Interpretation] I don't know what that means - "the OP reports, and UNPROFOR." Cymbelline.

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt you. The general should have a chance to deal with all this, because if we go too far, it will be impossible for a witness to be able to answer. We will return to the meaning of OPs and the like.

General, can you comment on the statement, as I understand it to be, which was made by the brigadier, or his comment in the statement, about the initial reports and the reports from the French, and then we'll come on to the reports of the UNMOs and the French engineers.

THE WITNESS: Yes, I can. I've only got on to the second page of this document, so I'll get that far.

The -- as I said before we adjourned, the UNMOs would have done an investigation as a matter of course. The responsible sector commander -- the UNMOs were a separate organisation, and the Court may know this, but reporting direct to Zagreb. They were not under my command, although they had a liaison officer and I knew what they were saying to Zagreb. The Sector Sarajevo, who is the responsible commander for the ²⁷³³⁵ vicinity, would have also carried out investigation and would normally have done this together with and in cooperation with the UNMOs. Because there was confusion in the reporting and I needed an answer, I needed to know who had perpetrated this, I directed that my own staff officer, Colonel Powers, to carry out a further investigation and to gather together all these reports so that we could reconcile them.

JUDGE MAY: The Court has now got a copy of what's described as an information report.

The other matter you can help us on, General, is the OP, observation posts.

THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. And Mr. Milosevic is correct; an MA is a military assistant. He is the senior personal staff officer to a commander, and Colonel Baxter, as he was then, fulfilled that role at that time for me.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Then he says: "My recollection is that UNMOs report was adamant that there were two firing points [In English] Theory, but the UNPROFOR report thought that it was one."

[Interpretation] And then in the next paragraph but one, it says: "The deputy commander of Sector Sarajevo (a Russian colonel) -" then there's a question mark there and I don't understand why - "publicly claimed the Bosnians had fired the killing round. [In English] UNHQ said we needed further investigation as the deputy commander had gone public and the matter had to go before the Security Council." ^{27336 BLANK PAGE 27337} [Interpretation] And then next it says: "At this time, there was almost a mutiny. [In English] UNHQ forced the need for the report on us because of the press interest encouraged by the Serbs. The deputy commander went on TV. He insisted that it could not have been the Bosnian Serbs. He resigned as a result of the position that he took."

JUDGE MAY: Pause there. General, is that correct? Can you help as to that?

THE WITNESS: The thing that I'm missing from this report is a sense of chronology, and my memory, and it's only that, is that I had come to my decision and we were already acting on it when we're being asked to render further reports as a result of the sector Sarajevo's deputy commander, who was a Russian colonel, had said what he'd said on television.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And then in the last paragraph on that page, it says: "Almost immediately after the attack [In English] Admiral Smith --" [Interpretation] it's the same name but he was commander of the southern sector of -- "turned the NATO key." He turned the NATO key for bombing. There were two keys, one with the UN, the other one with NATO, and the NATO key was turned by this witness, General Smith. Isn't that right, General?

A. I did not turn the NATO key, no. I turned the UN key.

Q. Yes. Admiral Smith turned the NATO key, and you turned the UN key; is that right?

A. That is correct. What is not correct, in my opinion, is that he ²⁷³³⁸ did it almost immediately after the attack. I'd have to go and find out the actual, but I'm sure it's on the record somewhere. It happened -- there was discussion as to who do it before Admiral Smith turned his key, in my memory.

Q. Actually, Admiral Smith, the expression being "turned the key," he actually decided that the bombing start even before he had a precise report as to who had done it. Isn't at that right, General Smith?

A. No, I don't think that is right.

Q. And the decision for you to turn the key was yours. And then it says: "Mladic and Smith" - Smith this time being you - "had a phone conversation. Mladic promised to investigate, and wanted a joint investigation of the UN and the Serbs. [In English] This forced a quick decision."

[Interpretation] And then it says: "As to legitimate military targets within the confrontation lines, there were no static facilities, however, the ABiH maintained a mobile mortar which would be driven into position, fired, and moved on. ... [In English] The Serbs complained quite a lot about these mobile mortars and about us telling them not to fire at these mortars."

[Interpretation] And then he says: "[In English] Serb attacks would sometimes be a 'cause and effect' phenomenon; in response to an incident somewhere on confrontation lines, they would reply in force. Bosnians killed two people at a funeral or wedding the day before. Indeed, I cannot recall a Serb attack which did not have its genesis in response to something linked to the ground. For example, I recall an ²⁷³³⁹ attack explained by the Serbs as the ABiH attacked in Bihac so the Serbs responded to be -- by shelling Tuzla."

JUDGE MAY: Where are you reading from, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 3, first, second, third -- fourth paragraph.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I received it in the original in English.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Then it says in the next: "[In English] Markale attack seemed unprovoked, did not seem linked to anything else."

JUDGE MAY: Very well. The general can deal with that comment, if he wishes, of course.

Is there anything you'd like to add to that, General?

THE WITNESS: I don't remember if there was a linking effect. It is true there was usually -- you could usually follow some cause and effect somewhere. I don't remember if there was an obvious one or not on this occasion at all.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And then the last sentence in the next paragraph says: "In the days following the UNMOs said it was difficult to tell who was responsible."

And then let me skip over a paragraph to save time. The next one says: "[In English] There was significant American pressure through NATO to begin bombing as soon as possible. French had grave reservations about ²⁷³⁴⁰ the bombing taking place - delicate position. Smith consulted with Sector Sarajevo but they would not have known he was going to turn the key."

JUDGE MAY: Yes. General, perhaps you can deal with that paragraph, the reported views, as they seem to be, of Brigadier Baxter.

THE WITNESS: I don't -- I don't recall it in quite -- with quite the sense of that paragraph. Yes, there was questions from NATO. I don't recall any -- this being of particular American flavour, although clearly the Americans are in NATO. There was nothing at the time, as I remember it, from the American embassy, and normally when you knew you were -- NATO was being used by the Americans in those cases, then you got it from the American embassy as well as through NATO.

Nor do I remember any more than the argument that has been disposed here. We had conflicting views. I was needing to, as I came to a decision myself, reconcile these reports.

I don't remember the French being -- having the reservations as laid out in that position. They had produced a report, and that was their view at the time, rather than it was quite as strongly put in that paragraph.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Then in one of the following paragraphs it says: "G2 reports to the Chief of Staff, who was brigadier - he was with Powers when he briefed Smith - I produced the report because it had become a political issue. [In English] The British SNCO was only the technical advisor. I recall almost protesting having to sign off on the report - being put in a position to do this." ²⁷³⁴¹ The last sentence in this report says: [In English] "... in my view. When I wrote the report there was still doubt in my mind."

JUDGE MAY: Just read on. If we are going to do this, you must read the whole paragraph.

"What convinced me was the fuse furrow." Perhaps, General, you can help us with that. This gentleman is saying he was equivocal. There was doubt when he wrote the report, which of course is the report which we have, which we've got in our documents.

THE WITNESS: I believe --

JUDGE MAY: I think that's right.

THE WITNESS: -- that's what we're talking about.

JUDGE MAY: "What convinced me," he says, "was the fuse furrow." Since he's not here to speak about it himself, perhaps you can interpret that.

THE WITNESS: When a -- let's just deal with a mortar round hits the ground, it comes in at a fairly -- usually at a fairly steep angle. It's -- the leading point is the fuse. And you get a crater shape that looks a bit like a bat or an outline of a bat, and if you -- with the shrapnel being driven down from the inside the narrow angle of the vertical -- from the horizontal, where the round has come in is a dense hole, then you get the bat wings from the side of the round where it's exploded and the shrapnel going out more or less horizontal with the ground and then you've got the bit, as it were, on the upside of the slope as the round has come in and has gone up in the air and you don't get that mark on the ground. ²⁷³⁴² And on the leading edge of that there is a very thin edge which is called a fuse furrow. And if you want to get a bearing, a direction from which this round has come from, then you examine the fuse furrow and follow the fuse furrow down into the ground and lay a stick on it and so forth, and then you can start to work out where this round might have come from, and it would have been that analysis that was convincing of him, and I believe that had been carried out by either the UNMOs and/or the British artillery NCO that worked for General Powers.

JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you can help us with this: When you were faced with this problem, obviously, as it says here, you were under pressure and had to make a decision, but nonetheless it also says that it was all done in a calm yet on-the-hoof way, which I take to mean that it was done rapidly.

Just a moment. It was all done rapidly. Was there any reason why you came to the conclusion you did, that it came from the Bosnian Serb side? Were you anxious to make a finding in that way or were you fairly open, did you want to get to the bottom of it?

THE WITNESS: No, I approached the problem, and I had these conflicting reports, but -- open-mindedly, but I needed the evidence before me. So we gathered it all up, and that was the process of Powers getting it together, he assembled it, I was briefed, but essentially I made my own judgement. And as I said right at the beginning, I came to the view that beyond reasonable doubt this round had been coming, or these rounds had come in from outside the defended locality. ²⁷³⁴³

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know whether it has been correctly interpreted. You asked the witness whether he was under pressure, and I understood from this document that Mr. Slobodan Milosevic read out and which he is discussing that Baxter was under pressure to sign that document when he signed that document, rather than the witness.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Just to clarify that since Mr. Tapuskovic has raised it, General, did you put or did anybody put Mr. Baxter under any pressure to sign the document? It's what seems to be alleged. I don't know --

THE WITNESS: I don't recall, and my relationship with my MA was such that if he felt I was putting pressure on him, he would have told me that he was under any pressure from me to sign the document at all.

JUDGE MAY: I don't think that the suggestion is supported by the document in any way. "Because of the circumstances," it says, "and political pressure, Smith had to exercise his judgement quickly." That's the point that's made.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. This will be the subject of the testimonies of some other witnesses too, but for the time being, may I draw your attention to yet another report.

It does have an ERN number, Mr. May. 030899994. It is an information report, information provided by General Smith in August 2003. ²⁷³⁴⁴ Mike Harris prepared this, four star general, and Richard Philipps. I'm not going to deal with these other matters. For the time being, I will just deal with what has to do with Markale.

On page 3 of this report - 996 are the last numbers of the ERN number, by the way - the UN observers who were involved in the first investigation were not under my command. That is what you say in the paragraph around the middle.

And then on the next page, in the last long paragraph, the third one from the bottom: "I personally did not examine the craters. There was not unlimited time for reaching a decision. I had to reach a decision, deciding to act on the basis of something that I was convinced of to an extent. Therefore, I did not accept the first report." So you did not accept the first report, the one that said that the shell had been fired by the Muslims. Is that right, Mr. Smith? You accepted a report which was made on your instructions by Colonel Powers from your side?

A. I can't find the reference you're directing me to in the document I've been given, but as I've explained, I was receiving conflicting reports, so I asked Colonel -- that my staff bring them all together so I could arrive at a judgement.

Q. You had conflicting reports, and you drew the conclusion that the Serbs should be bombed; is that right, General?

A. I did not draw the conclusion on the basis that I had conflicting reports. I wished to reconcile the reports and then I made the judgement.

Q. All right. Just one more document that I'd like to draw your ^{27345 BLANK PAGE 27346} attention to. I have it here. I received it from the other side as well. The page has an ERN number, 03082206. And I'm just going to read out one sentence. It says "Comment" --

JUDGE MAY: Before you do, you're going to tell us what it is that you're reading from.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] To tell you the truth, it cannot be identified very precisely because I got an excerpt, but I did get it from the other side. The day, hour registered here, type of fire, source of fire, and then there are many things that are unknown, unknown, unknown, et cetera, et cetera, and then -- this is page 19, rather, of this longer report that I was given this excerpt from.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may be of assistance, I think that this is in tab 24, which has been attached to what we are dealing with now.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I would just like you to make a comment with regard to this one sentence. "Comment: Military observers of the UN cannot confirm which one of the warring parties fired the round."

JUDGE MAY: Let's see if we can track this down. Mr. Nice, can you help us?

MR. NICE: Not immediately. We're pursuing it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 03082206 that's the ERN number and towards the end it says "Comment," and that's the only thing that it says there. "Military observers of the UN cannot confirm which one of the warring parties fired the round." ²⁷³⁴⁷

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is in tab 24 for sure.

MR. NICE: Page 14 of tab 24, in handwriting, and it's about a third of the way down the page.

JUDGE MAY: Page 14, tab 24? Well, I don't see any handwriting.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You mean handwritten. I can't --

MR. NICE: Handwritten page numbers.

JUDGE MAY: Well, handwritten page numbers. Yes. We can find that here, can we? Perhaps you can tell us where it is on the page.

MR. NICE: Quarter of the way down the page, "Comment."

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So, General Smith, this is what it says here: "UNMOs are unable to confirm which warring faction fired the rounds." And that was used as a pretext for bombing the Serbs. What do you say to that?

A. It wasn't the pretext for bombing the Serbs. This report is the UNMO report and only their report at -- at five minutes past midnight on the 29th of August. The investigation is continuing, as I've described.

Q. All right. On page 23, you say in paragraph 4 of your statement, since you say that the Serbs did it, and then you say that 1300 hours on the 28th of August you spoke to General Mladic on the telephone for ten minutes. And you informed him that for the time being, all the facts that you have available point to it that this was an attack launched by his army.

So what were the facts available at the time? ²⁷³⁴⁸

A. The -- I don't recall the precise facts at that time. We've already had the initial reports from the UNMOs, and we're gathering the other information, but I couldn't tell you at this range precisely what was to hand and available to me when I had that telephone call.

Q. All right. And at 1823 hours on the same day, did General Mladic report to you that the results of his investigations had concluded that no forces of the army of Republika Srpska had been involved in the attack on the Markale market?

A. If that was the time of that telephone call, then we certainly had a telephone call in which he told me that, yes.

JUDGE KWON: It is paragraph 111, General.

THE WITNESS: Of which bit of paper?

JUDGE KWON: Your statement. Page 22.

THE WITNESS: Hang on. I'll find my statement. Here we go. No. I've put it down somewhere. I've got it. That's okay.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. General, is it correct that then the Serb side asked you to have a joint commission established consisting of the UN, the Serbs, and the Muslims in order to investigate the case?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. But you didn't want to do that; right?

A. I was intent on establishing to my -- with my own people what had happened. I did not need at this stage to have a joint investigation and further delay.

Q. Do you remember, I assume you do, what our reaction was, the ²⁷³⁴⁹ reaction of the government of Yugoslavia that most decidedly condemned this massacre of the civilian population and asked for a detailed investigation in order to find the perpetrators of this crime? I assume that you do remember that.

A. I don't, actually.

Q. All right. Despite these requests coming from their side and our side and probably from some other sides as well, you came to the conclusion that it was the Serbs who did it, beyond any reasonable doubt. And according to the information that I have here, practically 39 hours after the shell exploded, NATO started bombing the Serb positions. Is that right?

A. Again, I haven't done a calculation of the hours, but yes, it would be about that amount of time.

Q. How long did the investigation last, and what did it involve, after which the press officer of the UN, Alexander Ivankov, stated that General Rupert Smith, and then he mentions your name here, after having familiarised himself with the results of the investigation, he established beyond any reasonable doubt that the attack was launched from the Bosnian Serb side.

How much time had passed from what actually happened until this statement was released?

A. I don't recall.

Q. And was it then that Andrej Demurenko, the Russian commander, stated and I'm quoting him now too: "The technical aspects of the incident that took place yesterday in Sarajevo leaves scope for serious ²⁷³⁵⁰ doubts regarding the reliability of the claim that the mortars at the Sarajevo market were fired by the Serbs."

I assume that you remember that; right?

A. I remember him doing this. I do not remember precisely what time it was or even what day it was.

Q. Well, since he says the incident that took place yesterday, then the date is certainly the one that follows the previous one. And that's when Demurenko, according to the information that I have here, said, and I'm quoting him: "The probability of hitting that particular spot with a shell is 1 to 1 million."

Do you remember that?

A. I don't remember the specific quote. I remember him going public with this disagreement.

Q. And Mrs. Albright then said: "It is hard to believe that a government would do something like that to their own people. So although we do not know," I emphasise, "we do not know all the facts exactly, it seems nevertheless the Bosnian Serbs bear the brunt of the responsibility." Is that right?

JUDGE MAY: You know -- General, just one moment. The general really can't be held responsible or really can't answer usefully what somebody else, such as the Secretary of State, said about the incident. What he can do is give his own evidence and tell you why he came to the conclusions which he did, and that he's done. If you want to present other evidence about it, you'll have a chance to do so, but I think we've probably exhausted this topic almost. ²⁷³⁵¹

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Did you at least hear about Russian intelligence officers presenting in public in September an assertion that it was Western intelligence services that had staged the attack at the Markale market in Sarajevo? Have you heard of that at all?

A. No, I have never heard of that.

JUDGE MAY: In case it's going to be suggested that that is what happened, General, is there any reason to think that anything like that happened?

THE WITNESS: I -- I would find it incredible.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And do you know that there was a plan that was called Cyclone 2, and that Rasim Delic's men, according to what came out in public, fired this shell from a neighbouring building? Have you heard of this kind of information that was going round at the time?

A. I have no knowledge of a Cyclone 2 and nor that this shell, 120-millimetre round, had been fired from a neighbouring building. I would point out that firing a 120-millimetre round is a noisy business, and nobody heard a round being fired.

Q. Well, that's the point. Since the shell was not heard as it whizzed by, wasn't that proof that something had detonated on the ground?

A. I'm not talking about the trajectory. I'm talking of the firing.

Q. All right. General, David Binder, editor of the New York Times and an expert in the Balkans wrote: "In the nation, on the 2nd of October, 1995," and I'm quoting him -- ²⁷³⁵²

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please be asked to slow down. The interpreters do not have any of these documents.

JUDGE MAY: Slow down. I don't think -- we've heard quite a lot of Mr. Binder's views. I don't think they're going to take us any much further, and I'm not sure he was the editor of the New York Times, was he? Perhaps he was. But we've heard quite a lot about him. Yes. Have you got something else to put, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is it correct that in his statement to the German agency, Yasushi Akashi, on the 6th of June, 1996, who at the time was head of the UN mission, pointed out that the existence of a secret report was actually never a secret, that there was a secret report that the UN had in June 1996?

JUDGE MAY: The witness can't know about a secret report of the UN.

General, did you come across any secret reports at this time, of the UN?

THE WITNESS: No. I don't know -- I've never heard that statement by the German agency. I don't know what that's talking about.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. General, do you know about the position of General Charles Boyd? I assume you know him. He was deputy commander, Deputy Supreme Commander of the American forces in Europe. In Foreign Affairs, the September/October issue, 1995, he wrote: "Some of the city's ²⁷³⁵³ suffering -- [In English] imposed on it by actions of the Sarajevo government. Government soldiers, for example, have shelled the Sarajevo airport, the city's primary lifeline for relief supplies. The press and some governments, including that of the United States usually attribute all such fire to the Serbs, but no citizens of service in Sarajevo doubts for a moment that Muslim forces have found it in their interest to shell friendly targets."

JUDGE MAY: All right. The witness can deal with those suggestions since he was there at the time.

What is being put is that -- firstly, that some of the suffering in Sarajevo, I guess, is being referred to, was inflicted by the government, the BiH government. General, would you agree with that assertion or not?

THE WITNESS: I could just also add that I don't actually recognise this report of this General Charles Boyd. He had nothing to do with me or my command, and he wasn't anywhere near Sarajevo. There were many rumours. I know that there were self-inflicted difficulties, shelling, et cetera. I was never able to establish any truth in any of those rumours on any occasion.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. General, do you know that, for example, Bernard Walker, a journalist of the first channel of French television, two years after the massacre in the Sarajevo market, carried the following piece of news: "Muslim army fired at their own people in order to provoke an intervention of the West." Then he was taken to court, and he actually ^{27354 BLANK PAGE 27355} won the case.

JUDGE MAY: What Mr. Walker or anybody else says in a paper two years after the event is not a matter for the witness. He can only deal with what he said and saw at the time, and concluded. Now, you have put, as I understand it, that this was the result of bombing and shelling by the Muslim government on their own people. The witness has given his answer as to why he was there at the time, concluded otherwise.

Now, the views of other people are neither here nor there. The within can't go on repeating what he's already said. He's given his evidence about it. If you want to call Mr. Walker, if he's got anything useful to say about what actually happened at the time, if he was there and he's got some evidence, of course we'll hear it. You can call him. But this is what I talk about wasting your time, just going on, repeating the same point over and over. It doesn't assist the Court and takes up the time which you're supposed to have.

Now, we've been going on the same point for the best part of an hour. I don't know if you've got any other points you want to make to the witness. If so, you better move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this is a very important subject. Markale became the symbol of a deception, Mr. May, and I'm sure that we are going to prove that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I just wish to ask General Rose [sic], General, do you know what the president of France, Francois Mitterrand, said - and this is what the ²⁷³⁵⁶ mentioned journalist published - that Mitterrand --

JUDGE MAY: No. Does this have anything to do with the witness at all, the views of President Mitterrand? What does it have to do with the witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is not the views of President Mitterrand. I quote President Mitterrand. He says: "A few days ago Mr. Boutros-Ghali said to me that he was sure that the round that fell on the Sarajevo Markale market was a Muslim provocation." That is what Mitterrand said.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, yes, yes. We've heard it. We've heard it. You can call Mr. Boutros-Ghali in due course. Now, let's move on to something else.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I'm not going to deal with this subject any longer.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Rose --

JUDGE KWON: Smith.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Smith. Both are English, and I misspoke truly. It was a slip of the tongue. It was not intentional.

General Smith --

A. I realise we all look the same.

Q. 1995, the year that you talk about, was a year, and I hope that you will agree with that, of the most intensive efforts made to achieve peace. Is that right? ²⁷³⁵⁷

A. There were intensive efforts to achieve peace during 1995, yes.

Q. Of course, as far as Yugoslavia is concerned, as far as Serbia is concerned, as far as I personally am concerned, these efforts had been going on from the very beginning of the conflict. I believe that you're aware of that.

A. Yes.

Q. In your statement, you bashfully refer to Dayton as well, and in Dayton, the war was finally brought to an end. Isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And since you mentioned Dayton now during the examination-in-chief, Mr. Nice asked you what my influence was, and you linked it to two events. You said something in relation to the hostages, there were about 400 hostages taken then, and Dayton. Is that right, General Smith?

A. Those were two examples I gave, yes.

Q. Yes. And I assume that you will not deny that, with respect to those examples as well as many others, the endeavours of Serbia and me personally was -- were directed towards achieving a desired, a badly needed and useful goal, both with respect to the release of the hostages and the signing of the peace agreement in Dayton.

A. Yes. You contributed to those results.

Q. But my understanding is that Mr. Nice is taking these endeavours and those results, the achievement of peace and the release of hostages, as evidence of me controlling the army of another state. Does that appear to you to be logical? ²⁷³⁵⁸

A. That's for Mr. Nice to answer, not me.

JUDGE MAY: You could ask, if you could, Mr. Nice, yes. I suppose the question could be rephrased in this way, General: Did you see any evidence of the accused controlling the Bosnian Serb army in any way, or perhaps having any influence over it?

THE WITNESS: Such as we saw in the directives issued by Karadzic, no, I don't see -- did not see such direct direction of Bosnian Serb forces, but I do see this influencing and controlling hand, and I give those examples and also the example in the aftermath of Srebrenica.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, since you mention it, I shall briefly comment on one of these meetings. You attended one meeting with me. Isn't that right, General?

A. That is correct.

Q. I even remember sitting outside, and you advised that a tree be cut because you knew that something was wrong with it. I remember this conversation we had.

A. So do I.

Q. And you made a well-intentioned suggestion, I'm sure. And here is what it says. I mentioned the reference numbers for Yasushi Akashi's report so that the other side, which has all kinds of documents available, for me to be given the original, Z1175 of the 17th of July, 1995. The subject, the meeting in Belgrade, addressed to Annan, and for information purposes to Stoltenberg, sent by Akashi, in which Akashi says: "Mr. Carl Bildt, Mr. Thorwald Stoltenberg, and I" - that is Akashi - "met in ²⁷³⁵⁹ Belgrade with President Milosevic on Sunday, the 15th of July." Carl Bildt, Stoltenberg and Akashi met with me on Sunday, the 15th of July. "I was accompanied by General Rupert Smith. Milosevic, upon the request of Bildt, allowed the presence of General Mladic at the meeting. Mladic and Smith had a bilateral discussion. Despite their disagreement on several points, the meeting re-established a dialogue between the two generals. Informal agreement was reached in the course of the meeting on a number of points between the two generals which will, however, have to be confirmed at their meeting scheduled for the 19th of July." So, General, from what Akashi told me - and Akashi endeavoured together with me to achieve as much as possible towards peace - relations between you and General Mladic were disrupted. Isn't that right, General Smith? And then the idea was for you to meet again somehow and to re-establish some sort of a dialogue and a relationship that would allow the necessary cooperation between the commander of the army of Republika Srpska and the commander of the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, you, General; isn't that right?

A. That was certainly one of the consequences. It was rather more to deal with the aftermath of Srebrenica than to advance towards a peace agreement.

Q. But, General, let's go to -- directly to the point. This report and this meeting, aren't they the best evidence that on the 15th of July, none of us present, including General Mladic, knew anything about any massacre in the environs of Srebrenica? Surely then that would have been the subject of our talk. Surely somebody would have mentioned a word of ²⁷³⁶⁰ anything so drastic. None of us had the least idea that any kind of crime, massacre, killing of a large number of people had occurred over there.

A. No, I don't find that, any evidence of that whatsoever.

Q. Of course none of us on that 15th of July had any idea as to what could have happened at Srebrenica.

JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Look at your discussions on the 17th of July. I was looking at this now when Mr. Nice referred to tab 21, I think it is. I see it is compiled in English. It follows on to the meeting in Dobronovci at which, as Akashi says, at the request of Carl Bildt I assisted in you and Mladic meeting again and talking together. Agreement between General Smith and General Mladic. "Two sides have agreed the following: [In English] To provide access to the ICRC representatives to the reception points by the end of 20 July; to provide that Dutch Battalion soldiers leave Bratunac with their personal belongings and small arms on 15 July 1995; to provide UNHCR representatives visit Srebrenica, as well as clearance for humanitarian aid convoys to enter to Srebrenica from Belgrade through Ljubovija and Bratunac."

As you see, the humanitarian convoys were going from Belgrade to Bosnia. That was also - how shall I put it? - our role, that is to assist in that way. That is where they were formed, and that is where they went to provide aid.

In point 4 you say, "A positive answer will be given to the ²⁷³⁶¹ request for the logistic convoys assigned to UNPROFOR in Potocari and to Zepa, Gorazde, and Sarajevo. [In English] The convoy routes for the present will be to Zepa from Belgrade, from Belgrade through Visegrad and Rogatica; to Gorazde from Belgrade through Visegrad; to Sarajevo from Kiseljak through Kobiljaca." [Interpretation] And then it says: "For the time being all convoys must respect the earlier agreements and usual procedures. [In English] The intention of both sides is to normalise resupply of UNPROFOR."

[Interpretation] Point 5, "A positive answer will be given to the UNPROFOR request for the rotation of forces in Gorazde and Sarajevo. And then the next one, 6, "[In English] A positive answer will be given to the UNHCR request for humanitarian aid convoys according to assessed needs to Gorazde and Sarajevo as well as to Srebrenica and Zepa. The Sarajevo convoys are to be escorted by two UNPROFOR wheeled vehicles." [Interpretation] Then it says, "To provide the UNPROFOR displacement (including military, civilian, and up to 30 locally employed personnel) [In English] from Potocari with all UNPROFOR weapons, vehicles, stores and equipment through Ljubovija ..."

[Interpretation] Ljubovija is in Serbia, which means you are asking that they be able to leave through Serbia by the end of the week, according to following displacement order.

And then "a. evacuation of wounded Muslims from Potocari, as well as from the hospital in Bratunac; b. evacuation of women, children and elderly Muslims, those who want to leave; [In English] c. displacement of UNPROFOR to start on 21st July ..." ²⁷³⁶² [Interpretation] And then there's a reference to the water supply system in Sarajevo, and it says: "The above-mentioned positive steps will be realised in order to provide a concrete and positive contribution to the peace process and to provide fair and impartial treatment of all parties. [In English] In particular, the treatment of all UNPROFOR locally employed personnel by both sides." [Interpretation] And signed by General Rupert Smith and General Ratko Mladic on the 19th of July. So that meeting, the only one you mention and at which aid was extended for you to meet again, and as far as Stoltenberg and Akashi are concerned, this was one of countless meetings that I had with them designed towards this same goal, that is the achievement of peace. You attended one of them. And there was this meeting at which no one had the least idea what had happened or what was going on in Srebrenica.

JUDGE MAY: What is the question, Mr. Milosevic?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The question is: Isn't that at least clear from this, General Smith?

A. No. I repeat, I did not know that there was -- had been the massacres in Srebrenica. I am still asking for the ICRC to be given access. Just because I don't know that, it doesn't follow that you or Mr. Mladic didn't know -- beg your pardon, did know. And just because I didn't ask the question, you didn't have to open up the subject, nor did General Mladic. I don't find it any evidence at all. Furthermore, this shows me once again that I saw a direct link between you and General Mladic that these convoys could take place and that I could deal ^{27363 BLANK PAGE 27364} with Mladic about it in the confidence that the convoys would move through Serb territory.

Q. But that is the aid provided by Serbia and me personally, that is to enable humanitarian aid to move forward and to make sure that everything is open to UNPROFOR, the international Red Cross, and the UNHCR which was something that we constantly endeavoured to achieve throughout. Surely you're aware of that.

A. ICRC was not given access.

Q. I see here that it is mentioned at the beginning, ICRC.

A. And just because that agreement had been entered into, it was not honoured. ICRC was not given access to those holding areas for the simple reason we now know, that all the people in them had been murdered.

Q. That, unfortunately, was discovered subsequently. But you believe that Mladic, at the time when he was negotiating with you, knew that somebody had killed those people?

A. Yes.

Q. On what grounds, General? Do you believe -- you met Mladic. I assume you knew -- came to know him quite well. You had a large number of meetings with him, didn't you?

A. I met him. I don't believe I know him well.

Q. How frequently did you meet Mladic, how many times?

A. I wouldn't have said I met him more than ten times in the year. We could add it all up.

Q. Very well, ten times. And you had conversations which I assume lasted each time several hours. ²⁷³⁶⁵

A. No, they didn't all last that long.

Q. Very well. Tell me, on the basis of your impressions of General Mladic, can you assume that military honour would allow General Mladic to tolerate something like the killing of prisoners of war or civilians or anything as dishonourable as that?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any, any knowledge to the effect that General Mladic could have ordered such a dishonourable act?

A. I have no evidence that he ordered the act, but he was, nevertheless, the commander, and I believe he knew what was happening in his command.

Q. General Smith, you were deputy NATO commander when Yugoslavia was bombed; isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that NATO planes bombed refugee columns, that they bombed the Chinese Embassy, that they bombed buses and trains?

JUDGE MAY: Just wait a minute. We'll deal with one thing at a time. The witness can only give evidence about the time when he was in Sarajevo.

During that time, General, were, to your knowledge, any refugee columns bombed?

THE WITNESS: When I was in Sarajevo, no.

JUDGE MAY: The other -- no. Look, what happened later, what happened later, which we've heard very much about in this trial, is not for this witness. We have other witnesses who will give evidence about ²⁷³⁶⁶ what happened then. We're talking about events in 1999.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the witness said that Mladic must have known because he was in command. Now, I'm asking the witness since he was in command in 1999, whether he knew or should have known, must have known that columns of civilians were being bombed, buses, hospitals, the Chinese Embassy, Radio-Television Serbia, et cetera.

JUDGE MAY: It's all totally irrelevant. He has dealt with the matter concerning General Mladic. I in fact let him do so, although it's doubtful if it was a question which was properly directed at him. It's a matter that we're going to have to determine as to how much Mladic knew about what was going on, whether he ordered it or did not. Now, those are all matters for us.

Now, peripheral issues of that sort are not relevant.

JUDGE KWON: General, I noticed -- just a moment. I notice that you have not answered to the question when the accused asked you what is your base in believing Mr. Mladic should have known what had happened in Srebrenica. Could you help us with that.

THE WITNESS: He was there and he was the commander of that army.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Go on, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Was Mladic there when the crimes were committed in Srebrenica or was he there when the war was being waged in the environs of Srebrenica, when there was fighting in the environs of Srebrenica and when Srebrenica was captured? Do you have information that he was -- Mladic was present when these mercenaries killed innocent people, as we tried to establish, ²⁷³⁶⁷ that Mladic was there and he was in command over there at the time.

A. Mladic was the commander of the forces there all the time. He was certainly there at the time of the attack and its immediate aftermath. I do not know when he left the area.

Q. I don't know either. But anyone who knows him knows that he would never allow prisoners of war and civilians to be killed.

JUDGE MAY: Well, that's your assertion. We'll have to decide on the evidence what his responsibility was insofar as it's relevant. Yes, let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Since you're talking about Yugoslavia's links with the Republika Srpska, which of course we did assist, we assisted Republika Srpska, do you have any knowledge that any kind of chain of command could have existed between Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska? That's another state, another country. They had their own leadership. They had their own Supreme Command, et cetera.

Apart from the influence we exerted in order to achieve peace, what other influence could we have exerted on Republika Srpska? Do you have any information about that at all?

A. The -- the military examples I've given, the air defence, the -- and another one would be that you were paying certainly the senior officers.

Q. General Smith, when you're talking about air defences, you're talking about the exchange of information, aren't you?

A. Since the whole lot is all linked together, information would be ²⁷³⁶⁸ exchanged, yes.

Q. So exchange of information and not on -- about any firing of projectiles, just an exchange of information. Let's clear that up first. Is that what you're saying when you say air defence?

A. No, I'm not. I'm talking about a whole system which includes the firing of the missile.

Q. Do you have data that any missile from the territory of Yugoslavia was fired?

A. No, I haven't said that they were necessarily fired from Serbia. I am saying that the whole thing was a system.

Q. System of information on the situation in the air space; is that right?

A. The air defence system includes a sub-system which is the general surveillance system that you are describing, but the whole thing is dependent -- is an entity.

Q. Very well. As regards this aid that we extended in the form of salaries for officers, that is no secret at all. Does this, in your opinion, mean that they were under our command in any way? They were officers of the army of Republika Srpska. They wouldn't have anything to live on if we hadn't given them that aid.

A. The man who pays the check is usually the man who is in command eventually.

Q. Very well. Then probably our personnel administration was at the top of the chain of command. If that is the conclusion, then that would really be an absurd one. ²⁷³⁶⁹ You mentioned hostages and Dayton. Mr. Nice suggested that we in Yugoslavia were under pressure, which is not true. We, guided by our own conscience and through our own will, endeavoured to have the hostages freed, and this was in all the media, and we spoke publicly about that. Are you aware of that or not, General Smith? Who brought pressure to bear on us as if we had arrested those hostages and then were pressured to release them? On the contrary, this was an endeavour on our part to have the men freed, and this is taken as evidence as if we had committed some sort of a crime. Is that right, Mr. Smith?

A. Yes. You brought influence to bear which led to the release of those hostages.

Q. Do you remember the public statements by me and the government of Serbia that the people must be released, that they are UN staff who came there in good faith to assist peace, that it was impermissible for anyone to detain them, to restrain them in any sense, and to exert any kind of threat towards them, because on the basis of our endeavours in the form a public campaign and our own pressure that they were eventually released. Isn't that so, General?

A. [Previous translation continues] ... are statements.

JUDGE MAY: It's now time to adjourn. Mr. Milosevic, we will give you the rest of the time that the witness is here if you want it for your cross-examination. I'm afraid, Mr. Tapuskovic, we may not be able to hear from you today in relation to this witness.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know what Mr. Milosevic will have time for. The other day there was an extension, ²⁷³⁷⁰ and I do believe that the Court should give me time if Mr. Milosevic doesn't have time to clear up some points. The other day, Mr. Kay stayed on for half an hour. I may not have any questions, but I think I should be allowed to put them.

JUDGE MAY: Of course you should, but the problem is that we're short of time today. As you know, there's another case coming in, so we can't sit beyond the time.

So we'll ask you graciously to cede your time to Mr. Milosevic, unless he wants to give you any time.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I don't wish to comment on that. I'm in your hands, of course.

But I think this is such an important witness that there are really many points that we should discuss in your own interests, for you to have a better understanding, but it's up to you to decide.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, indeed. We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Smith, since you mentioned these examples, the hostages, Dayton, and there are several of them, many others, are you familiar with the -- all the efforts made by Serbia and Yugoslavia and me personally to achieve peace or, rather, to halt the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as possible?

A. I don't think I am familiar with all your efforts, no. ²⁷³⁷¹

Q. All right. You communicated and cooperated with Yasushi Akashi and Thorvald Stoltenberg directly; isn't that right?

A. They were the source of political direction in the UN command, yes.

Q. But they are also persons who took direct part in the peace process and in the peace operations, and they are people I met often. I assume that you know that.

A. Yes, I do.

Q. And tell me then, for example, can you make any comments regarding this statement of Stoltenberg's of the 12th of December, 1995, in Oslo. I quote him: "That President Milosevic played a key role in the peace process in the former Yugoslavia." On the basis of one example, do you think, or on the basis of years-long efforts involving Stoltenberg's own efforts?

A. I have no idea the context or why he was making that statement, and I've not heard it before.

Q. All right. You know that Yasushi Akashi, at his farewell press conference on the 23rd of October, 1995, paid special tribute to the active role and efforts made by me, myself, through the period of the peace process. Those are his exact words.

A. I didn't know that.

Q. And do you remember the statement of your own minister, Malcolm Rivkin, on the 17th of September in Belgrade when he said Yugoslavia had a decisive influence over speeding up the peace process?

A. Again, I wasn't there. He may have said that, but I didn't hear ^{27372 BLANK PAGE 27373} it, and you're the first person to tell it to me.

Q. All right. General Smith, tell me, please, do you remember Carter's visit in December 1994? This is just before you came to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where this was mentioned yet again, that Yugoslavia, Serbia, I personally, support peace plans or, rather, that we endeavour to achieve peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A. I remember that the former President Carter visited in December 1994. As you say, I wasn't there.

Q. And do you remember the visits of Herd and Juppe, the British and French Foreign Ministers at the time, in December 1994, precisely with a view to carrying through the peace plan and in view of the major support that Yugoslavia gave, they even quote my own words, that a peaceful settlement through negotiations is the only alternative.

A. I don't remember that occasion.

Q. And do you remember the visit of the Contact Group in Belgrade in 1995, where again they were receiving support for their peace plan? This is the 11th of April, 1995.

A. I don't recall that event either.

Q. All right. It seems that you don't remember anything of these things. And --

A. [Previous translation continues]... wasn't there.

Q. Do you remember, for example, my letter to Alija Izetbegovic on the 1st of August, 1995? This is right in the middle, in the focus of all the events that you've been testifying about, when we took in an entire Muslim brigade. They crossed the Drina, and we saved their lives in this ²⁷³⁷⁴ way. And I write to him, saying, "Your soldiers were not received here as enemies but as soldiers that the winds of war threw into a situation that was beyond their control." You know full well that we welcomed thousands of -- hundreds of thousands of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia. By the way, 70.000 were Muslim refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. And then I tell him that "More courage and strength is required for a decision to reach peace rather than continue the war, and I beseech you to reach a decision in the interests of your own people in favour of peace." And I addressed this same letter to Mladic and to the people of Republika Srpska, to stop war and to negotiate with the representatives of your army. So I sent this letter to General Mladic as well. Do you recall that?

A. No, I don't. President Izetbegovic did not share his correspondence with me.

Q. All right. You followed all the operations of the army of Republika Srpska and the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you believe, in view of the deployment of the army of Republika Srpska at the time, in view of the ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- please take a look at this map which shows the Serbs in the colour blue, the Muslims in the colour green, and Croats in the colour orange, red are the rest, others. This is a census dated back to 1991, that is to say, before the war. Can we agree, General Smith, that this army of Republika Srpska in these territories cannot be considered an aggressor army? They cannot be an aggressor in their own territory. All the rest is mere propaganda. It is false. ²⁷³⁷⁵

JUDGE MAY: That's not a question that the witness can possibly answer. Now, what do you want to ask him about this map? It shows the ethnic structure of the population. Yes, we've seen that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But this can be seen, and it can be seen how they are distributed throughout the territory. An army that is in that territory and that represents the people who live in that territory, can it be considered an aggressor army in any way?

JUDGE MAY: I don't even know what that means. It's certainly not a question that the witness can answer. All he can say is what he saw and heard at the time. Insofar as it's relevant, it may be a matter we have to answer.

Do you want to ask him anything else about the map? There were a lot of Bosnian Serbs. Is that the point that you were trying to make, there were a lot of Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia and they were scattered in particular areas? We can see that. Now, is there any other point which the witness can deal with as a general?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He's a general. He knows that this army defended its own areas, where they lived.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let's stop -- let's stop there and we'll see whether the witness can assist us.

What seems to be suggested by reference to the map, General, and if you can assist us if you think you can, were the -- or did it appear to you that the Bosnian Serb army was engaged in defending the areas in which it lived? Was that the operations in which it was involved? ²⁷³⁷⁶

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, this is a map of the population spread in 1991. It is not the situation in 1995. So I -- I -- nor does it show the military situation in 1995.

The opstinas, the electoral regions there, those are -- the majority population to it does not show the actual mix in any particular area. So I can't really comment on this as a military situation map or the actions of the military in 1995, some four years after the census was taken.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right, General Smith. Do you know that at the time when you were there in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it was officially called, in that year, 1995, had a total of about 270.000 people? Is that right?

A. I don't recall the figures at all.

Q. All right. Do you know that then in 1995 they were preparing this well-known spring offensive that caused great concern within the army of the Bosnian Serbs?

A. I saw them carry out a series of operations during the early part of the year. If that's what you're referring to, I saw those attacks occur.

I'm sorry. Is that all right? Do you want me to repeat? No. It's okay.

JUDGE MAY: We've got it.

THE WITNESS: I saw attacks occur, yes, during the early first half of that year. ²⁷³⁷⁷

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Do you know that during this first half of the year even a cease-fire had been achieved?

A. Yes. We started the year with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

Q. And do you remember that without waiting for the cease-fire to expire, and that was planned to be extended, but the first cease-fire had been agreed until the end of April. So without waiting for it to expire, the Muslim forces were ordered to attack -- to launch an offensive at Majevica, Vlasic, Ozren, and later on from the directions of Tuzla and Kladanj? Do you remember that?

A. I can remember -- I would have to check the map for the place names, but I remember attacks, at least two during that period. And the latter one was in the vicinity of Tuzla. If I recall correctly, the first was on the western side, about halfway up the pocket, but I'd have to go and look at the map to find the location.

Q. All right. Let's not go into all these details regarding localities then. Is it beyond any doubt then that the Muslim forces violated the cease-fire and re-launched attacks against Republika Srpska? It's not the army of Republika Srpska that violated the cease-fire and attacked the Muslim forces.

A. On those occasions, the Muslim forces attacked, yes.

Q. And do you recall, for example, that on 20th of March, 1995, the representative of the UN for peace operations, Fred Eckardt, stated in New York that from the cease-fire agreement that was signed in the beginning ²⁷³⁷⁸ of 1995, among the warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was most seriously violated to the south-east of Tuzla.

Actually, the Muslim forces launched a wide offensive against the army of the Bosnian Serbs. Do you remember that? You were the commander then?

A. I do not remember Mr. Eckardt's statement. I remember the attack. I've already referred to it.

Q. And this operation, then -- I'm talking about operations around Srebrenica. I'm not going into the subject of the crime committed against prisoners of war or civilians, because this is something that indeed needs to be clarified, but is that in the context of the military situation and military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time?

A. I don't understand the question.

Q. All right. Let me be more specific. The safe areas, Srebrenica and Zepa in Eastern Bosnia, were they used by the Muslims for launching offensives against the entire Serbian area around them?

A. They were certainly used as a base for operations into the Serb areas. The forces inside the enclaves were not strong enough to conduct operations against the entire area.

Q. And do you know how many Serb casualties there were in that Serb area around there precisely due to the operations directed from the safe areas?

A. No. I am aware, though, there were casualties.

Q. At the time when this operation around Srebrenica took place, the Dutch Battalion was there; is that right? ²⁷³⁷⁹

A. My memory is that when I first arrived, there was a Canadian Battalion there and then the Dutch took over, but that memory may be -- I may be wrong by a week or two.

Q. Does it seem to you that the criticism levelled against the Dutch Battalion, in view of the fact that it wasn't even an entire battalion but a rather weak formation, is quite unfounded, because the Dutch Battalion as a unit was not capable of preventing conflicts between the Serb forces and the Muslim forces in that territory?

A. I don't understand what the criticism is, and I can't comment on it until I know.

Q. Well, there were many accusations levelled at this Dutch Battalion, as far as I managed to see, in the newspapers. It seems to me that this criticism was unfounded because actually the Dutch Battalion could not have done a thing there.

A. At what stage are these accusations being made?

Q. Well, in terms of the time when the Dutch Battalion was purportedly supposed to protect this safe area of Srebrenica. They were not in a position to do so. Muslim forces were operating from Srebrenica. There was an entire division there, over 10.000 men, and the forces of the army of Republika Srpska were operating from the surrounding area. Obviously the military situation was not such that this Dutch Battalion could have prevented a conflict or the conflict that took place there. There were great tensions involved. The safe areas were used to attack Serb positions, and of course of army of Republika Srpska responded to these provocations. Is that the way it was or is that not the way it ²⁷³⁸⁰ was, General Smith?

A. I'm not clear what I'm being asked a question about. Is now it about the Dutch or about the Republika Srpska's army?

Q. Both. Do you consider the Dutch to be responsible because they did not prevent the conflict? I for one do not consider them to be responsible because they were not capable of preventing the conflict.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer the question rather than your giving evidence about things. Yes.

THE WITNESS: You want me to answer the question do I consider the Dutch to be responsible because they did not prevent a conflict? Is that the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes, yes.

A. The -- I -- they were not responsible for the conflict, no.

Q. Could they have prevented having the safe area used for incursions by the Muslim forces into Serb-held territory?

A. No, I don't believe they could have done.

Q. Just as they could not have prevented the attack of the army of Republika Srpska against the enclave; is that right?

A. No, they didn't prevent that attack.

Q. Do you know, in view of the fact that precisely Srebrenica and the operations by the Muslims from the safe areas -- this cannot be viewed outside the context of the overall situation: Do you know that the forces of the Drina Corps of the army of Republika Srpska were engaged in the defence against the Muslim offensive along a line that went all the way to ^{27381 BLANK PAGE 27382} Visegrad? So this is in the context of the overall military situation in Eastern Bosnia.

A. Whether I knew this -- at what stage I came to know this, I don't know, but I was aware at some stage that Srebrenica lay within the Drina Corps' area of responsibility.

Q. All right. Did you know that in the enclave of Srebrenica, although it was a safe area and although it was supposed to be demilitarised, the 28th Infantry Division of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was stationed there, and it was within the 2nd Muslim Corps which had its headquarters in Tuzla?

A. That was what I believe those formations were called, but I should say here it may have been called a division but it was certainly not that size or equipped to that degree.

Q. According to the data that I have here, it was a unit which included 10.930 men, and this was on the 1st of January, 1994. Is that the information that you also had, General Smith?

A. No. As I say, I wasn't there in 1994.

Q. All right. Is it correct in respect of what I have here, this information that I received, that after these provocations and in terms of their operations against the Drina Corps from the safe area of Srebrenica, the beginning of July 1995, the forces of the army of Republika Srpska launched a counter-offensive which was aimed at demilitarising Srebrenica, and the demilitarisation of Srebrenica was the task of UNPROFOR, wasn't it?

A. No. UNPROFOR was not tasked with demilitarising Srebrenica. ²⁷³⁸³

Q. All right. The safe area, what did it mean? Was it supposed to have a concentration of Muslim forces there, and were operations supposed to be launched from that safe area against positions that were in areas in the broader environs of Srebrenica that were populated by Serbs?

A. The safe area was for the refugees from previous battles and engagements, and these areas had been set up in the specific -- Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde's case, and I would have to go look at the chronology of these events, but about 18 months earlier, as where all the refugees had collected, and it was intended -- the safe areas were intended to be able to house the refugees, feed them there, and keep them safe. That was their underlying purpose.

Q. General, I'm not trying to trap you in any way through my questions. Since you were commander of the UN forces at the time, I'm simply trying to find out what the facts involved are with regard to the entire matter within the scope provided for by the information that you have. I don't know about this, and you should know much more than I can know about this.

Is it true that parts of this 28th Infantry Division that was concentrated in Srebrenica, according to your knowledge, were they in groups of several thousands of armed men, and were they fighting their way through Serb-held territory to Muslim-held territory? Was that what was going on in the field?

A. No, not -- I don't believe that was happening as you describe.

Q. Well, what was happening? Could you please tell me? According to your own information, what was actually happening? ²⁷³⁸⁴

A. The Muslim forces within the enclave were small. I think they were smaller than I expected them to be. They were lightly armed, and they were conducting raids out from Srebrenica into the Serb-held territory. There was also some traffic between Srebrenica and Zepa, and there may have been between Srebrenica and Tuzla or the Bosnian forces around Tuzla, but I'm not sure of that latter point. There was a couple of occasions, two occasions, I think, when I was aware of a helicopter being flown by Bosnian forces into the pocket. Although, that too might have been a Bosnian Serb helicopter misidentified.

Q. I have here noted that in Srebrenica and around it, the number of Muslim forces under arms amounted to between 12 and 13.000 combatants, including soldiers and armed police officers and some paramilitary units of theirs that were also there. Would that roughly correspond to the number you had in mind, or do you believe the number was smaller than that?

A. I would be surprised if it was in excess of 1.200 armed men. There may have been 12.000 men, but I would expect in the order of 1.200 armed men.

Q. From what you've said a moment ago, would it follow that the Muslim forces that were in Srebrenica were endeavouring to link up militarily with Zepa and Tuzla, in other words, to cut across that area and to take control of it along the Srebrenica-Tuzla and Srebrenica-Zepa axis. Would that roughly be the plan of activity that they had to which the army of Republika Srpska reacted? ²⁷³⁸⁵

A. I have no evidence of their plans. What I thought I was seeing was what I said, traffic between Zepa and Srebrenica and possibly between Srebrenica and Tuzla. I did not see -- had any sense of large numbers being involved. These are small patrols.

Q. But do you have any knowledge at all about the breakthrough of larger groups consisting of several thousand Muslim men through positions held by Republika Srpska throughout that region of Srebrenica, Zepa, and towards Tuzla? In other words, do you have information about fighting between Republika Srpska forces and Muslim forces in that area?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Do you know anything at all about the fighting that was going on in that area, the battles that were being fought?

A. I'm -- unless you can give me a date, I'm not very clear when we're talking about. The only time I know of substantial fighting other than these little patrols is the attack on Srebrenica by the Serb forces.

Q. Tell me, when you say the attack by Serb forces on Srebrenica, does that imply that Muslim forces were not attacking Serb forces but only Serb forces were attacking Muslim forces?

A. No. I've told you, there were these patrol activities, there were these attacks on this road that ran between Zepa and Srebrenica on an east-west axis, there were other raids, but I -- that had occurred prior to the Bosnian Serb army's attack on Srebrenica.

Q. Very well. Did you have any idea as to the number of combatants killed on both sides during the battles around Srebrenica and the raids made out of Srebrenica? ²⁷³⁸⁶

A. Are we including in this the actual collapse of the pocket and the subsequent events or are we only referring to the casualties prior to that event?

A. I am talking about military operations. For the moment, it is still rather hazy as to how the killings occurred subsequently. I'm talking about the military operations. According to your information, how many casualties were there on both sides during those military operations?

A. I do not recall.

Q. Do you know anything at all about the measures taken by the army of Republika Srpska to secure controlled evacuation of all those wishing to leave the area?

A. No, I don't. I'm not sure what you're referring to there.

Q. Well, you see, according to information -- I'm just asking you to confirm or deny what I have here noted down. I wasn't there to be able to tell you that I saw something over there. I'm just trying to reconstruct events on the basis of documents.

For example, Mr. Akashi advocated the resettlement from Srebrenica on the 11th of July, 1995, the day before the evacuation started. He sent a telegram to the UN in New York presenting his own proposals, which would roughly be as follows: To reach agreement with the army of Republika Srpska to allow the population to go to Tuzla, and then that the convoys to Tuzla be escorted by UN forces.

So this is what I have by way of information at my disposal. Do remember that?

A. I remember the document you're referring to. I thought you were ²⁷³⁸⁷ talking about a general policy of Republika Srpska's army to relocate people. I -- you're referring to, though, the -- Mr. Akashi's idea rather than the Republika Srpska's army's idea, and I do remember that document, yes. I think it's one of the tabs in the evidence.

Q. I understand, General. I am not in a position to review each and every piece of paper because of the limited time I have, but we agree that Akashi, on the 11th of July, 1995, sent a telegram to the UN and says: "Reach agreement with the army of Republika Srpska to allow the population to go to Tuzla and that the convoy to Tuzla be escorted by UN personnel." I'm talking about this substitution of thesis. If we bear in mind Akashi's endeavours and his addressing the UN, it is hard to accept the story that the army of Republika Srpska had, in a planned and organised manner, carried out the evacuation of the population from Srebrenica as part of some sort of a plan of ethnic cleansing that it had, because the planning for relocation was the UN plan and not the plan of the army of Republika Srpska, or maybe it was of the political leadership of Republika Srpska.

JUDGE MAY: General, if you can understand that question, you can answer it.

THE WITNESS: I can't. I don't understand what I'm being asked.

JUDGE MAY: If we could just be referred, for the record, to the tab.

MR. NICE: Tab 15.

JUDGE MAY: Tab 15. That was what Mr. Akashi suggested to the UN. Now, can you reformulate the question, Mr. Milosevic, so that the ²⁷³⁸⁸ witness can answer it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me try and be very practical.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. On the 11th of July, Mr. Akashi insists on an agreement being reached for the population to go to Tuzla. Therefore, I assume that it is not possible to claim that the army of Republika Srpska was implementing a plan of its own of some kind of ethnic cleansing if we see that the idea for the population to be relocated to Tuzla is an idea advocated by Mr. Akashi.

JUDGE MAY: Let us try and break that down. On the 11th of July, Mr. Akashi, it seems to be accepted, suggested moving the population. Now, are you then suggesting that the VRS were implementing Mr. Akashi's suggestion? Is that what you're putting, Mr. Milosevic, so we can understand it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as I understand things, if this is true, and you have it in the documents, then it is not possible to say that the army of Republika Srpska had a plan to chase out the Muslim population from Srebrenica. On the basis of the documents I have, the army of Republika Srpska set only one condition for this relocation, and that was that they would not allow soldiers to be evacuated with the civilians as they were prisoners of war.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. So we can follow this step-by-step. General, I don't know if you can help or not, but what the accused seems to be suggesting is, one, Mr. Akashi made the suggestion for relocation; two, the army of Republika Srpska were carrying this out in ²⁷³⁸⁹ some way.

THE WITNESS: I have no evidence that Mr. Akashi shared his idea with General Mladic. In fact, I think that unlikely. Also, the document that we're being referred to is written in the face of a situation in which the pocket has already collapsed, I believe. I'm just looking for the -- yes.

JUDGE MAY: He refers in the first paragraph --

THE WITNESS: Yes.

JUDGE MAY: -- to the situation on the ground with the BSA presence in the town of Srebrenica.

THE WITNESS: That's right. And then you go to the second subpara (A) where he's been told the Dutch are going to be told to concentrate, around Potocari. And I think one should view the specific reference that we're being referred to in light of the general situation as viewed by a man some distance away in Zagreb.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Smith, there is no doubt that Mr. Akashi was absolutely well-intentioned, and he was endeavouring to assist for the civilian population to take shelter and to be moved away from the area of conflict. That is not disputed.

A. I wasn't arguing that.

Q. But similarly, General, this shows that the evacuation of the civilian population is not any kind of plan on the part of Republika Srpska to expel the population but that it was simply the consequence of the endeavours to evacuate the civilian population from the zone of war ^{27390 BLANK PAGE 27391} operations, as suggested by Mr. Akashi; that we're not talking about any kind of ethnic cleansing plan. Is that clear?

A. No, he is not talking about it in the document I have in front of me.

JUDGE MAY: I think the point the accused is trying to make is that it wasn't the idea of the VRS or the Bosnian Serb army to evacuate the enclave. They weren't -- sorry, let me just finish this so I've got it clear in my own mind. They weren't going to expel the population, but all they were doing was assisting in an evacuation as suggested by Mr. Akashi.

Now, I think that is what is being suggested.

THE WITNESS: Then I -- I'm looking for it in this document, but I can't find it. But in amongst this, I think you'll find that the Bosnian Serb army are bringing buses in to lift people away before this is -- this piece of paper has been -- could possibly have reached anybody in Srebrenica or Sarajevo. If we look at the time line, buses are starting to go appear to shift, and people are being taken to Kladanj, I think it is, which is the entry point, at about the same time on the 11th or very shortly afterwards. But I can't find the reference to that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But what is important is that those documents exist. General Smith, do you know, and I think that on another occasion I did produce here this order, the order of General Tolimir on behalf of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska. It's an order dated 1946/50195 dated the 9th of July, 1995, requesting from commands and units of the Drina Corps ²⁷³⁹² not to attack UNPROFOR forces in military operations, to protect the Muslim civilian population, and to guarantee its safety for as long as they are in the territory of Republika Srpska, that is, in the area under the control of the army and police of Republika Srpska. Are you familiar with that order?

A. No. No, I'm not.

Q. According to information that I have, in all the directives, orders, and commands at all levels of command, there was a provision requiring regular treatment, lawful treatment of prisoners of war and the civilian population. Are you aware of that?

A. I have not seen these orders. If I had, they probably wouldn't have been translated into English, so I couldn't have understood them anyhow.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, just before the accused goes to the next question, the witness was remembering something in the papers about buses. It may be, and it might just be helpful to deal with it now. It's tab 16, although I think the date would not be earlier than the 11th of July and this may not be the reference that the general has in mind, but it's the only one we've been able to find so far and I'm grateful to Ms. Edgerton. It's at paragraph 9 of tab 16.

THE WITNESS: So that would make it the 12th.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We have it if anyone wants to ask any more questions about it.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic. You've got another quarter of an hour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ²⁷³⁹³

Q. I just wanted to establish, General, whether you are aware that all directives, orders and commands at all levels of command in the army of Republika Srpska, there is a binding provision for lawful treatment of prisoners of war and civilians.

JUDGE MAY: I think the witness has dealt with all this.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let me move on to my next question then. You know that in the report of the Dutch government, dated April 2001, in paragraph 10, it says literally: "There are no indications whatsoever that the action was carried out in cooperation with Belgrade in the sense of political or military coordination." Is that right, General Smith?

A. I don't know. I've not read the report to that detail.

Q. Do you have any knowledge about that, that anyone from Serbia or Yugoslavia in any way whatsoever was involved in those events in Srebrenica?

A. No. I have no direct personal knowledge of that.

Q. Very well. Then tell me, please, as you say this on page 3, paragraph -- page 9, paragraph 3 of your statement, that Mladic explained to you that he was expecting a Bosnian attack from the eastern enclaves, and he told you that in that case, he would attack the enclaves; is that right?

A. Yes. He told me that.

Q. And were there attacks from the eastern enclaves that we referred to a moment ago? ²⁷³⁹⁴

A. I told you there were those patrols and raids.

Q. On page 10, paragraph 3, you refer to the 13th of March in Pale where there was a meeting with the leadership of Republika Srpska. You mention Karadzic, Koljevic, Krajisnik, and Mladic, and then you say that the atmosphere of the meeting was marred by the shooting of two Serb girls in Sarajevo.

A. Yes, I remember that.

Q. Tell me, please, at the time regarding freedom of movement and humanitarian aid, did Mladic insist on reciprocity, and did he complain of the constant activities of the Bosnian government forces in the enclaves and other safe areas that you referred to on page 10, paragraph 3 of your statement?

A. He did ask for reciprocity, and he did complain of the activities of the Bosnian forces in the enclaves, yes.

Q. Was anything done at the time for a reciprocal respect to be ensured of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, the unnecessary activities on both sides to prevent raids from the safe areas or anything like that? Did you undertake anything? Did UNPROFOR do anything? What was the material consequence of those discussions and agreements?

A. We were working extremely hard through the joint commission, and Mr. Akashi at the political level, to try to make this Cessation of Hostilities Agreement work.

Q. But what was happening at the military level?

A. I told you. That's where the joint commission worked. It was unfortunate that the -- General Mladic would not attend the joint ²⁷³⁹⁵ commission and was refusing some of his officers to come to the meetings.

Q. Who came on behalf of the army of Republika Srpska to those joint commission meetings?

A. My memory is that we -- the process broke down because neither parties would come to the meetings in the end.

Q. Is it true that the situation continued to deteriorate in the following week when the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina launched an offensive along two axes, and I draw your attention to page 10, paragraph 5 of your statement?

A. I'm not sure. My page 10 has paragraphs 41 to 45 on them.

JUDGE KWON: Probably 42.

THE WITNESS: I've got it. I quote: "Matters continued to deteriorate during the following week." Is that the one you're referring to?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes, because the Bosnian army mounted an offensive in two directions.

A. Yes, matters did deteriorate.

Q. And they deteriorated due to the activities engaged in by the Muslim side; isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Very well. On page 11, paragraph 3, you refer to a meeting on the 5th of April with Karadzic, that you heard that the Bosnian Serbs felt that they were betrayed by the former US President Carter, by the United Nations and the international community, and Karadzic simply said, "We ²⁷³⁹⁶ will respond to attacks where we are attacked." So didn't threaten anyone. He just said he would return fire where they were attacked.

A. I don't find that on page 3 in my -- beg your pardon, page 11, paragraph 3. Where are we --

JUDGE KWON: How about paragraph 46. I'm not sure.

THE WITNESS: I beg your pardon. Okay. Let's try -- I mean, there I'm reporting that Karadzic said that the Bosnian Serb army would not respect the safe areas and claimed them to be illegal.

JUDGE KWON: Please look at the last sentence of paragraph 45.

THE WITNESS: I've found the reference. Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What does it say there, General?

A. You want me to read out the paragraph?

Q. What you have just found.

A. I will. "He asked -- he took the opportunity to deliver a message to me in the knowledge that I would pass it on. The message was that the Bosnian Serbs had decided that the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement had failed and that the Bosnian Serbs felt that they had been let down by former US President Carter, the United Nations, and the international community. He made it clear that they had made a decision, that is the Bosnian Serbs, to carry out a counter-offensive again the Bosnians. Karadzic accepted that this is likely to bring the Bosnian Serbs into confrontation with the UN and NATO. Karadzic did not divulge the form of this offensive but simply said, `We will counter-attack where we have been attacked.'" ²⁷³⁹⁷

Q. So where they are attacked, they will counter-attack. That's what he said. That's the gist of this, isn't it, of what he's saying? Is that right, General?

A. I -- I -- I suspect that I am reporting verbatim what he said. It's more than the gist.

Q. Very well. Since you speak about fighting around Sarajevo and in Sarajevo, as your sources of information, you used, as you say, primarily the warring parties themselves. You say this on page 23, in the second, third, and fourth paragraphs.

The point is that you used as your source the information from the warring parties themselves; is that right?

A. Not exclusively. I'm trying to find the -- where's the reference? I'm on page 23. Mr. Milosevic, would you give me the first sentence of the paragraph.

Q. I'm afraid I don't have it here. I just noted down that you referred to this on page 23, in the second, third, and fourth paragraph, but I'll find it straight away.

JUDGE MAY: I don't know that we're going to find this, and time is now moving on, so either ask a general -- just ask a general question or move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. According to your information, you gathered various information about the events in Sarajevo and in the theatre of war around Sarajevo. Do you know how many Serbs were killed in Sarajevo during the war in the period from 1992 to 1995? Did you ever receive this figure, ²⁷³⁹⁸ and did you ever ask for it?

A. Whether I asked for it directly or it was provided for me anyhow, I don't recall, and I'm sure I had that information available to me. I do not remember the figure now.

Q. Would it ring a bell if I remind you that there were about 10.000 killed Serbs?

A. No, that doesn't -- the figure doesn't help me.

Q. And do you know that the fate about 5.000 Serbs from Sarajevo is still not known, Sarajevo and the surroundings?

A. No, I don't know those figures.

Q. And do you know how many Serbs were forced to leave Sarajevo?

A. No.

Q. Close to 150.000. You don't know anything about that figure?

A. Not now.

Q. Not at that point in time, but if we have these figures in mind, I mentioned 10.000 killed and 150.000 expelled, you spent a whole year without interruption there. Could you tell me to what extent the suffering of the Serbs figured in your reports, assessments, and everything else that you produced?

A. A great deal. I was as concerned for their condition as I was for everybody else's.

JUDGE MAY: This must be your last question, Mr. Milosevic. We will then give Mr. Tapuskovic five minutes if he would like to ask some questions. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ^{27399 BLANK PAGE 27400}

Q. Just tell me, General, please, do you have any knowledge at all about Radovan Karadzic ordering units to halt the shelling, to stop sniping, to react proportionately, endeavouring as much as he could to calm down the situation around Sarajevo, which was the hot point, the hottest point? I'm just asking you whether you have any knowledge about that at all. And he did so on several occasions.

A. Not specifically. No, I don't.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes. Before we go on, we'll deal with the two documents which the accused referred to. The one was the Information Report provided by Brigadier Baxter to members of the OTP. That is not a document which we shall admit in evidence. It is, insofar as it is a statement at all, it's one which we have consistently refused to admit. If the accused wishes, he can call the witness to give evidence. The other document is a different category. It is another information report, but on this occasion it is provided by the witness himself, which puts it in a different position since he's here giving evidence and has been able to answer questions about it. Mr. Milosevic, do you want the information report of the witness to be admitted? You put a passage in it to him. Do you want it admitted or not?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not necessary.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But you didn't let me finish my last question, Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: That's right, Mr. Milosevic. I said you had one last ²⁷⁴⁰¹ question and you had it. Now, let's have Mr. Tapuskovic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but it contains an exhibit, this last question, because I have here a copy of an order signed by Radovan Karadzic about the implementation of the rules of international war law in the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina dated the 13th of June, 1992.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let's have a look at that document. It's the 13th of June, 1992, I note. I don't suppose the witness would have seen it. I don't know what language it is in. It's in B/C/S. We'll mark it for identification. We'll give it the next defence number.

THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. It will be D193.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Very well. Now, Mr. Tapuskovic, time is against us, but if you would like to take up five minutes, do.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you Your Honours, let me try and make the best of that time

Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

Q. [Interpretation] General, in your statement that has been admitted into evidence, on page 22, paragraph 2 of the English version, you said that in the evening of the 28th of August, that is the same day when the incident occurred, you took a decision together with the commander-in-chief of Sector South to launch the bombing campaign; is that right?

A. Can I have the paragraph number again?

Q. Page 22, paragraph 2 of the English version. ²⁷⁴⁰²

MR. NICE: 108.

THE WITNESS: It's okay. I have it. Yes.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And then you go on to say on page 23, paragraph 2 - turn the page please: "The unfolding of the air/land plan," as it was called, "fell into two parts. The first lasted from the 29th of August to the 1st of September. Attacks were carried out to achieve air supremacy and to show the extent and nature of the punishment." Is that right? Was that the purpose of the operation which you ordered?

A. You should complete the sentence to, "The nature of the punishment to come, and to destroy weapons, command and control, and weapon dumps." Yes, I made that decision, and that was the purpose of the first part.

Q. Thank you. The second part, could you explain why was it necessary, a few days later, and this bombing went on from the 5th to the 14th of September, and it was obvious that the Croats and Bosnians were taken advantage of the attacks to attack Western Bosnia and Ozren. Did the Bosnian and Croats take advantage of the air attacks for their own operations? Was that the purpose of those attacks or not?

A. No. The attacks continued into the second phase because the requirement to remove the weapons and so forth from around Sarajevo had not been carried out. And that was set out in another letter, as I recall, sent to the -- to General Mladic while the first part was being carried out.

Q. Please look now on page 24, paragraph 3. On the 10th of October, as it says here, upon your request NATO attacked Serb positions on Mount ²⁷⁴⁰³ Vis in retaliation. You use the term "retaliation." This was in October 1995.

Could you describe the circumstances under which this took place?

A. Yes. The headquarters of my forces in the Tuzla area was being shelled from that vicinity, and in spite of requests for them to stop, and we had a soldier killed, I retaliated by means of bringing those airstrikes.

Q. General, could you please look at the information report drafted on the 28th of August when you spoke about what was happening -- what had happened at Markale, and could you please focus on page 5, paragraph 1?

A. Do I have the -- page 5?

Q. Page 5, first paragraph.

A. It starts with "Baxter"?

Q. That's right. And it ends with these two sentences, but this is something you didn't look at a moment ago when you made your decision. Since you were convinced up to a point, that is what you said, and then you took the decision you did by not accepting the first report compiled by an UN commission. So it was on the basis of your conviction, a certain conviction that you had.

A. I don't understand your question. The -- what bit are you referring to me in this paragraph?

Q. The last sentence or, rather, the one before last, and the last sentence, because you didn't accept the UN report because up to a certain point, you were convinced. That is at least the translation we have. Wouldn't it be necessary for you to be absolutely convinced? ²⁷⁴⁰⁴

A. I'm not sure that it -- I don't quite understand how these information reports are done. Are these a verbatim report of --

JUDGE KWON: Maybe it's --

THE WITNESS: I remember the conversation but --

JUDGE MAY: I suspect they're not. They're probably made up after the event. But in any event, it's your evidence which matters. What it says is, "There is not endless time to make a decision. I needed to make a decision by selecting a course of action based on some certainty in my mind. That is why I did not accept the first report."

THE WITNESS: You have -- to understand that remark you have to read this whole conversation about the shelling, and the point I'm making is that I was receiving these conflicting reports, and I needed to arrive at an understanding and a decision of my own, and that's what I'm referring to there.

JUDGE KWON: I think there's a matter of some problem in translation, but, Mr. Tapuskovic, could you kindly conclude your examination. We have to leave.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I had to ask questions in this connection, though I had a much more important topic to raise, but let me conclude.

Q. Did you have in mind two substantive circumstances contained in the UN report of the 28th and the 29th when there is reference to the azimuth under which the shells were fires and in which precise data are given, that the first shell which resulted in strategic consequences was fired from a position of 170 degrees magnetic azimuth and that the other ²⁷⁴⁰⁵ shells were fired from a completely different position with an azimuth, magnetic azimuth of 220 degrees? These are precise data which had to be respected and which showed that the shells were fired from two different positions. Did you have this in mind? Because in the report signed by Powers, certain anomalies are referred to and certain conclusions drawn which are not of an exact nature.

A. I think -- at what point am I holding this in mind, when I'm making this comment in this information reported or whether -- when I am actually considering the matter eight years ago?

Q. No. This is information that is contained even in Lieutenant Colonel Powers' report, but he makes a certain interpretation. It is the report on the basis of which you made your decision. Even he refers to these differences in the azimuths, and these are very precise data.

A. I think if you go back into the Information Report that I believe you're holding in your hand and look at the earlier part of this section on the -- this decision, you will find a paragraph that starts "Another crater analysis was done." And that was part of me trying to bring some clarity for the -- over these anomalies in which from one salvo you appeared to have a single round.

Q. That is precisely what I'm referring to. These are anomalies that you accepted, and these data are to be found in the document signed by Powers, and those anomalies are mentioned even in that report. There was no doubt about it. Even in that document, on the basis of which the decision was made to start the operation, that data figured there too, but the explanation that was accepted was that this was some sort of a missile ²⁷⁴⁰⁶ with anomalies.

JUDGE MAY: This is the last point that Mr. Tapuskovic is going to make. General, if you want to reply, do.

THE WITNESS: I don't really understand your question. The --

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you. Thank you.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I do have four one-liners, if I may.

JUDGE MAY: One-liners literally. Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. How important, in your judgement on Markale, was the absence of sound from the position where the mortars were coming from?

A. A very important factor, because a 120-millimetre mortar makes quite a noise when it's fired off.

Q. As to presence at Srebrenica, in your meeting with Mladic, dealt with at page 17, paragraph 81 of your statement, did he indeed acknowledge after the event being at Srebrenica because he said he was just missed -- just missed being hit by a shell?

A. He -- he did say that, yes.

Q. You said he who -- in respect of command responsibility, he who pays the cheque is usually in command. The accused raised a point about personnel administration. He who pays the cheque is usually in command. Does that mean for the soldiers in your experience working in other countries but if they're paid by their home country that there will be some command responsibility lying with their home country?

A. In my own experience, yes, where I have been in a similar ²⁷⁴⁰⁷ situation.

Q. Instructions to Mladic you deal with in your statement at page 17, para 79. You speak of the accused instructing him and you speak of a pre-cooked plan. Is that still your evidence?

A. Can I have the reference again? I'm sorry.

Q. Page 17, para 79 of your statement. Pre-cooked deal, sorry.

A. I believed those two had already worked out the basis of what we were going to do.

Q. And the accused instructed Mladic to negotiate with you as you described?

A. Yes.

Q. Last question: Was the presence of Bosnian Serbs in the suburbs of Sarajevo of significance, in your judgement?

A. Very, yes, yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, that's all, and I have two matters to assist the accused in the preparation of witnesses if I can mention those, only because I shan't be here next week.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. General, that does conclude your evidence. Thank you for coming to give it. You are, of course, free to go. We will just deal with one or two administrative matters while you do so.

[The witness withdrew]

MR. NICE: Your Honour, there is a letter of witnesses for the next two weeks. It's being distributed to you already and it's coming to the accused. I shan't be here next week so I hope that if there are any substantive procedural matters they can be put back to the following week. ^{27408 BLANK PAGE 27409} Next week is the witness Milanovic followed by 92 bis witnesses. The week after, all things being well, we will start with C-028. There is likely to be two witnesses listed who will be short witnesses, and we then go on to C-062. For C-028, what's still called a proofing summary, in English, will be served today with a B/C/S version I hope by Tuesday of next week. That summary will be signed -- that summary --

JUDGE MAY: Just make sure the accused has got this list.

MR. NICE: It is coming to the accused. It's designed to help his preparation. So it's on the second side and it's C-028. He will have the English summary today, the B/C/S will come to him sometime next week. The witness will be able to sign it on return at the beginning of the following week, and I shall be asking for that document to stand as a witness statement.

So far as C-062 is concerned, there is already a signed summary, and it's been served or is -- has been served or is being served today in English and in B/C/S on the accused, and I will be asking for that signed summary to stand as a witness statement. From this stage onward, the word "witness summary" will not be used, we'll use the word "witness statement" but it happens that these were already prepared so that's the word that will be applied to them, but they are in all --

JUDGE MAY: I'm not sure if I follow that last point.

MR. NICE: Never mind. But the important point is that here are some witness summaries to be prepared. We're going to ask them to stand as witness statements for the purposes of evidence in chief. And Your Honours, can we seek your assistance in relation to one ²⁷⁴¹⁰ procedural matter now or next week. For witnesses for whom we've applied for 92 bis, and in respect of whom you have said 92 bis but with cross-examination, if we haven't yet gone through the 92 bis procedure, may we approach the Chamber on the basis that we do with other witnesses, just witness statements, rather than weary the registry with going through the 92 bis procedure?

JUDGE MAY: Yes, well, we agree to this.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: So we can follow and the accuse can hear, the first page is next week, which is Milanovic and then some 92 bis witnesses. That's the scheme. And then the week after, you will be moving on to C-028; is that right?

MR. NICE: Indeed, C-028. And at present B-116 and Robert Franken. There was going to be another witness there but I think there are probably insuperable technical difficulties with calling that witness, so that's the present plan. And then it will be C-062. C-028 and C-062, with the leave of the Chamber, by way of signed documents for examination-in-chief. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: And you can help us in order that we can deal with the calendar more expeditiously. The weekend of the 3rd -- the week, I should say, of the 3rd to the 5th, which is the week we have the witness who's been scheduled for the 3rd to the 5th, there was a problem with another witness on a Thursday. I hope that's resolved itself.

MR. NICE: I still haven't heard back. We were optimistic because it was the week that that witness was looking for, and as between ²⁷⁴¹¹ Wednesday and Thursday we hope there will be no difference, but we haven't yet had a reply. We will notify you as soon as we do.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, because there are matters which it really is important that we know about it.

MR. NICE: Still no contact but we're working on the basis that it's Monday to Wednesday and we'll move that witness to another day altogether if he can't make --

JUDGE MAY: Let us formally order that that week we will sit between Monday the 3rd and Wednesday the 5th of November so that everybody knows that. The other week which may cause us difficulty and out of the schedule of Tuesday to Thursday sitting is the week when there's a UN holiday, the 26th of November, which is a Wednesday, inconveniently. But apart from that, we sit Tuesday to Thursday.

We will adjourn now. Apologies to the next case, please, if the registrar would pass them on.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.09 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 14th day of

October, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.