²⁹⁰⁸¹

Tuesday, 18 November 2003

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

WITNESS: WITNESS B-1[Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. 1524, first of all, I wish to ascertain your profession. In the introduction to your statement which you gave on the 11th of November and 5th of December, you said you work as an isolation mechanic for isolation devices -- insulation. And then you say you went to a higher pedagogical school, is that right, at Dula?

A. No. The highest school for defectology in Belgrade.

Q. And then you say in Belgrade you attended a course for work with handicapped children, especially with minors who are delinquents; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Afterwards, as you say in paragraph 4, you worked in the financial and personnel department. I don't want to give the name of the factory, but it was in Zvornik, not to disclose your identity, but that is by and large what you did professionally speaking; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. I assume that there's been some misunderstanding here in the ²⁹⁰⁸² translation because mention is made of the military academy here and I assume that you didn't mean the military academy but school for reserve officers. Is that right?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. And you did that during your regular military service; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. But I understood it that you were very active in the organisation for reserve officers. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Those are the questions you dealt with, and defence matters; is that right?

Now let's clear up one more point in this regard: You never worked in the JNA. That's right, isn't it?

A. Not actively, no, but as a reserve officer, until I became a member of the Territorial Defence, that was the operative unit within the composition of -- or, rather, one-third were active soldiers, active-duty soldiers, and the rest were reservists.

Q. But as a reserve officer you were involved and engaged like any other men. You didn't have any special activities or assignments, did you?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Very well. Thank you. In paragraph 7 you say that in 1991, a lieutenant colonel called you, approached you, and he said that he was in charge of morale and political matters and moral guidance in the garrison ²⁹⁰⁸³ and asked you whether you wanted to be a volunteer in Croatia. Is that how it was?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Now, when was that exactly? Do you happen to remember?

A. I think it was sometime in the summer of 1991, but I can't give you an exact date, I'm afraid.

Q. And then you go on to say that he called you individually so that the JNA would cover up its true reasons for its involvement in Croatia. Is that something that you were able to deduce in talking to him?

A. No. I did manage to conclude some things from talking to him, but I think that the things he asked me, the kinds of things he asked me was what he asked other reserve officers too. They were asked the same kinds of questions, whether they would like to take part as volunteers.

Q. All right. But nothing was secret or clandestine in any way, because I assume that you know that the JNA never covered up its involvement in Croatia in any way. It was present there, it was active there as the legitimate armed force in conformity with the Yugoslav constitution; right?

A. Yes. That's what I said. I didn't say it was covering up anything, but the talks that were conducted did have a certain level of confidentiality to them.

Q. Well, where do you get the idea that talks like that were confidential?

A. Because I was never called up officially. I never was officially invited to attend the meeting. It went through the TO headquarters. And ²⁹⁰⁸⁴ it is common knowledge how army officers and reserve officers are called up. There is an official written invitation unless it is a mobilisation, and then calls up for the mobilisation take place, and they're not done in the way this was done, not how they approached me to come in and have a talk.

Q. All right. Now, as the majority, as you say, talked about these things, do you know that the mobilisation of the reserve officers corps was conducted in June, as early on as June 1991 and that this related to everyone, not especially to you?

A. You mean the mobilisation? The mobilisation was never put into effect in Zvornik.

Q. Well, can you remember the name of that lieutenant colonel from the barracks, from the Tuzla barracks who talked to you?

A. No, I didn't really make an effort to learn his name. Perhaps I did know it at the time, but a lot of time has gone by since then and I wouldn't be able to tell you. I don't know.

Q. Now, in paragraph 7 you also say that you knew that the JNA did not contact the members of other ethnic groups. "I was aware no other nationalities were approached in the same way, and if they had, I'm sure I would have found out about it." That's what you say.

A. Well, what I heard about was that they were all Serbs, and on the other hand, during that period of time the Muslims did not wish to respond at all.

Q. Well, that's the point, isn't it? What I'm asking you is do you know how many official invitations went out and were tried to -- people ²⁹⁰⁸⁵ tried to send out to members of other ethnic groups, other nationalities?

A. Probably a larger number.

Q. Well, then, on the basis of political instructions, I assume you know, the majority of Muslims refused to respond to the military obligations they were invited to assume.

A. Yes, I do know about that.

Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, going on to paragraph 8, you say that at that time there was a growing tension between Muslims and Serbs in the Zvornik area, and you say that everybody knew that there would be a war, but nobody knew exactly when it would break out.

A. Yes. That's precisely how it was.

Q. Does that in fact mean, and I deduce this from what you say, that war in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was unavoidable, and that was common knowledge both to the Muslims and the Serbs?

A. Now, whether it was unavoidable, that would be a debatable point, because whenever a war -- if a war hasn't broken out yet it can be stopped if there is goodwill on all sides, and there was no goodwill on either side.

Q. Could you describe to us what you mean when you say there was no goodwill on either side? What -- how did the Serbs behave and how did the Muslims behave?

A. Well, the two sides were afraid of each other. And in the winter of 1992 when the Ramadan festivities were being -- were taking place, the Muslims would frequent their mosques, but individuals were already armed at that time, individuals of the Muslim population. They would stand ²⁹⁰⁸⁶ guard around the mosques. Of course they were armed. They had pistols, automatic weapons, or whatever they had, and there was sporadic shooting around town frequently, in the centre of town especially from that ethnic group, and also around Zvornik as well. There was retaliation and fire on both sides from the places where Serbs lived. So fear was growing from one day to the next. People were becoming afraid, those of them who weren't armed. And I assume that the city population wasn't keen to have a war at all.

Q. All right. Now, tell me, from what you've been saying, in the town of Zvornik itself, what could be seen out on the streets was in fact armed Muslims, and they gathered mostly around the mosques; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any armed Serbs there?

A. Not around the mosques, no, but as -- I've already told you where they were. They were in the suburbs or settlements several hundred metres away, in those districts and the slopes around Zvornik, in fact, where these settlements were. So from time to time there would be bursts of gunfire from that area.

Q. But as far as the town itself is concerned, there were just the Muslim forces in town. That's right, isn't it? According to what you yourself were able to see.

A. Well, not Muslim forces, just Muslim individuals who were armed in town.

Q. Tell me, please, from what point in time, roughly speaking, would you say that you saw these armed Muslims standing round the mosques and ²⁹⁰⁸⁷ generally speaking an atmosphere of that kind where it became clear to the inhabitants of the Zvornik municipality that something was about to happen, or happening?

A. Well, that was at the beginning of the month of Ramadan, when the fast began, and when they were quite open, standing guard in front of the mosques because they said they were afraid that some Serbs might throw a bomb into the mosques. That was the justification and explanation they gave.

Q. Well, was there any incidents that occurred prior to that which gave rise to the sentiments and this justification for what was going on?

A. Well, no direct incidents, no, but there were some things like when a taxi driver went missing and small incidents that took place on a daily basis without necessarily being ethnically based or provoked on ethnic grounds, but not direct ones, no, just indirect.

Q. So this arming and deployment of Muslims around certain points in town was not caused by any particular incident that the Serbs had caused vis-a-vis the Muslims?

A. As far as I know, no. Now, whether they had been deployed or whether these people on their own initiative individually took up their positions where they happened to be, where these people were standing who were armed, as I say, they were individuals. There was no kind of unit at all, numerous unit.

Q. All right. I can see from your statement that you spent a large part of your time socialising both with the Muslims and the Serbs, and there was no - how shall I put this? - in this socialising and social ²⁹⁰⁸⁸ contacts around town, there were no divisions along those lines. People socialised normally, lived together normally; is that right?

A. Yes, absolutely. Until the war actually broke out - even the night before the war - we were on watches together around buildings. People who weren't armed did their best to protect their thresholds, their families and children, so we would stay up all night, standing watch in front of the buildings, both sides, the Muslims and the Serbs, because we didn't know who would be attacking or why or anything like that.

Q. All right. Now, what you did standing guard and standing watch in front of your buildings, as you say, there were Serbs and Muslims there or mostly Muslims?

A. Everybody, all sorts, both. However, during that period of time, rather just two or three days prior to the war, just before the war broke out, most of the population, if they had anywhere to go to leave Zvornik, they did so.

Q. And the people that you at that time when all this tension started were with, they were mostly Muslims; is that right?

A. No, they were both Muslims and Serbs.

Q. Do you know anything about the preparations that were under way within this Muslim community or, rather, the Party of Democratic Action and the Patriotic League, any preparations that were going on linked to the conflicts, anything as a forerunner to what was going to happen?

A. All I do know is by talking to people. I had a lot of friends on both sides, so I talked to them. I know that both sides were arming themselves and preparing themselves and that that started straight after ²⁹⁰⁸⁹ the New Year. Anybody who could get weapons got them, whether legally or illegally or however the weapons were procured, but both sides were busy arming themselves as far as they were able to.

Q. Did you know anything about the activities of the Party of Democratic Action and the Patriotic League, for instance?

A. Well, I was friends with a narrow circle of people who were in the SDA party, and there wasn't any national division, ethnic division. And by -- from talking to them during the conversations we had, we were sort of speculating what could happen. They said, "Well, we're armed and you're armed." That was common knowledge. So it wasn't any secret. Everybody was wondering what was going to happen.

Q. Did you know Abdulah Music, vice-president of the SDA in Zvornik?

A. Yes, of course I knew him. We even visited each other at home.

Q. And he was trying to talk you into joining the SDS?

A. Well, it's not that he was trying to talk me into it. It was sort of a friendly conversation.

Q. Why wouldn't you join in on that side; more or less along those lines?

A. At that time, the SDS or the SDA did not have a right-wing orientation. Quite simply, they represented two political communities, and they were supposed to give people who could do so.

Q. It was my understanding that this Abdulah Music - how should I put this? - suggested to you that you should join the SDS because, as you say yourself, he considered you to be a respectable man, an honest man, and that would have contributed to better cooperation. ²⁹⁰⁹⁰

A. That's what he was too.

Q. That's what you stated?

A. Yes. That is exactly what I think about him, too. We were friends. We visited each other at home, and we even trusted each other with our children. So it was a mutual thing.

Q. Do you know that at that time precisely Abdulah Music, together with another friend and neighbour of yours, Dr. Asim Juzbasic, Tica, actively worked on the arming of the Muslim population of the Zvornik municipality?

A. Well, not at that time. You're asking me about a particular time when I joined in. But this was almost a year before that. But at the time when they were being armed, both sides were being armed in the same way.

Q. I'm asking you specifically now when you say they were arming themselves at a particular point at time. Do you know that this Music together with this Juzbasic actively worked on the arming of the Muslim population of the Zvornik municipality?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Thank you. And do you know that it is precisely Asim Juzbasic and Izet Mehinagic, an activist of the SDP and director of the Paruga company, Tuzla, Zvornik, on the 10th of April, 1992 - this was carried by the Sarajevo newspaper Oslobodjenje - they said they were coming from Zvornik right then and the Serb forces had a quite a few casualties and quite a few wounded men and that the Muslim forces had 15 wounded and one casualty. ²⁹⁰⁹¹

A. Unfortunately, that could not have been clear to me because by then I was already in prison.

Q. All right. All of this that was carried by Oslobodjenje, is it in accordance with the facts that you had at your disposal at the time? They say the Serb forces had quite a few persons killed and wounded; the Muslims have one casualty. This conflict had broken out; right?

A. The conflict had broken out, but I think that was a lie.

Q. What do you mean "lie"?

A. Well, not that many. Not that many Serbs were killed. Perhaps they were just alluding to something that they wanted to become part of the propaganda with which they would go into the rest of the world.

Q. What do you think? How many Serbs were killed in the conflict then, in this conflict that was started by the Muslims?

A. Well, who started the conflict I don't know, but I know that in town two persons were killed, two Serbs who were at home, and Luka Radovic was killed who did take part in the fighting. I don't know about the others because I was arrested in the meantime.

Q. All right. The two Serbs who were at home, I assume they did not attack anyone; right?

A. No. But they were killed by Arkan's people.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the question, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Latus [phoen] was quite simply found in his apartment when they were searching all the apartments in Zvornik and looting them. He was my next-door neighbour. And beforehand, he had had open-heart surgery, I think it was in the States or somewhere. ²⁹⁰⁹² The man was ill, he could not leave his home.

And as for Madam Nada, he wanted to protect two neighbours of hers, Futovic Taib and his son. They were killed on that day. She thought that through her own authority she could prove that they were honest men, but these people did not listen to anyone so she was killed in front of her house too. That's the only thing that I heard and that I know. That's all. I don't know about any other cases.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You don't know about any other cases? Then we're going to move on to a different topic.

Is it correct, Mr. 1524, that at the first multi-party elections held in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the area of municipality of Zvornik the SDS won?

A. That's correct. The SDS. And the next party in line was the SDA, so they shared power in town.

Q. Tell me, then, because the Serbs won in the multi-party elections, the first multi-party elections that were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina, why would the Serbs forcibly take over power in Zvornik when they had one power through the elections? As a person from Zvornik, although you were not born there but you lived there for decades, I believe that you could assist with that matter, in explaining this matter.

A. Immediately after the elections, power was shared on a reciprocal basis, depending on the number of votes won. This was quite all right. It was legal. What was not right was the way in which they shared power, both sides, the first few days. They simply barged into the committee ²⁹⁰⁹³ building or, rather, the social political organisation's building, and they simply threw everyone out, not asking who were mere employees, staff members, and who were politicians. But in the time that preceded the war, there was a sharing of power, and during the last few months, it was said and it was somehow agreed quite simply that Zvornik, the town itself with the majority Muslim population should belong to the Muslims or, rather, that they would not cede it without a war most probably. On the other hand, the Serbs already had a vision that perhaps in the area of Celopek they could build some institutions of their own, a municipality, a bank for starters, where they could live and work. So what was being worked for was a division, a peaceful division, but that's not what happened.

Q. Why were they working for that, on this division? Do you have an explanation for that?

A. Well, they were probably receiving instructions from higher places.

Q. If I simplify matters, did I understand you correctly, when they won the elections, both the SDS and the SDA together, first threw out the communists; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. They considered them to be the common political enemy?

A. Yes.

Q. Irrespective of ethnicity?

A. Precisely.

Q. And then they fought between themselves. ²⁹⁰⁹⁴

A. No, they did not fight. For about a year or so, they co-existed on the basis of tolerance. They even shared the communal buildings. The president of the municipality was a Muslim, the deputy was a Serb. The head of the SUP was a Muslim, the commander of the police was a Serb. What I'm saying is that it was quite normal. It was a tolerable political situation. However, on the other hand, the people who came in were not that capable. They were less capable from a political point of view, if I can put it that way, and in every other way. So they were not really up to the offices they held. Quite simply, it was the party leaders who were giving jobs in high places to people around them, their cronies.

Q. So it is your assessment that these people in high places were for the most part not capable of performing these jobs.

A. Yes, because the people who left were people who were working for years, perhaps even decades, on their jobs very professionally.

Q. I believe this is an important point by way of explanation. Now, let's move on to something else. You say that in June 1991, at the invitation of Grujic -- and it says here that he was president of the SDS. Is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. You say that you went to a meeting so that you could explain your position there; is that right?

A. No, it's not how I could explain my position, it was how -- for Grujic to explain what they wanted.

Q. Oh, I'm sorry, you're talking about June 1991. ²⁹⁰⁹⁵

Q. Yes.

A. This had to do with party affiliation. I wanted to leave the party because of some of the things that had happened previously within the party itself.

Q. All right. You were elected to a high office in the party in Zvornik; is that right?

A. Well, one of the leading positions.

Q. And then in the month of June 1991, you went to explain your position to them. You wanted to explain that you were no longer willing to carry on.

A. Yes.

Q. Tell me, what were the reasons? What motivated you to act that way?

A. Well, first of all, my very own position. Politically speaking, it differed from the position espoused by the leading people at the SDS at the time. Can I explain this in a bit more detail? Our offices were right opposite each other. There was only a wall between us, the SDA and the SDS. There were rumours, there was whispering at meetings so that the other side could not hear what was being said at meetings and what was being agreed upon, especially when the war broke out in Croatia. So this atmosphere at the meetings and outside the meetings was quite unbearable. And also apart from that, Grujic had already risen to the ranks of a leader who was deciding on everything. He is the one who made decisions. He's the one who went to meetings with the authorities of the SDS at republican level, and he also went elsewhere. ²⁹⁰⁹⁶ He only gave others the information he was willing to share, but what he was not willing to share he did not share, and it was as simple as that. He was not really up to the high office he held.

Q. On the basis of what you've been saying just now, I assume that you felt manipulated. He reported to you what he wanted to report about, and he presented pictures the way he wanted to present them, and he was the only one who was in touch with the higher leadership; is that right?

A. Well, it's -- that's right.

Q. You did not consider that to be fair?

A. I didn't.

Q. So you went to explain your position. You wanted to say that you no longer wished to hold this position.

A. Yes, I and another friend of mine.

Q. And this friend, did he also hold a high position?

A. Yes. He was on the Executive Committee of the party.

Q. You say that you went to this meeting armed with a pistol because, as you say, you were afraid that somebody might attack you and even kill you.

A. Before that there were certain telephone calls that I received that could lead me to think that, that all sorts of things could happen. Already by then Brano Grujic and a few other persons had declared themselves as people who could do anything and who could allow themselves to do all sorts of things.

Q. Was somebody killed? Before that and by then was somebody killed? How did this kind of thought cross your mind? ²⁹⁰⁹⁷

A. A few people were, and I didn't really want to give anyone the opportunity to do that to me too. At least I wanted to try to defend myself.

Q. Was anybody else armed at that meeting?

A. Probably everybody.

Q. Did anybody attack you in any conceivable way, physically speaking? I'm going to explain why I'm putting this question to you. According to your statement, you said at that meeting that you did not want anything to do with thieves, and you left the meeting; is that right?

A. Precisely.

Q. Did they give you some kind of an explanation? Were they really thieves?

A. Not all of them, but those who I meant were aware of it.

Q. Tell me so that I could at least get an impression as to what was going on. Since you called them thieves, does that mean that before that they had stolen something, or perhaps did they mobilise into the party leadership some persons who had had a criminal record or something?

A. Some persons had had criminal records, and also some of them were involved in embezzlement.

Q. So some of them who were there had embezzled some money; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was it who had embezzled some money, and whose money was it in the first place?

A. Government money. The best thing for you would be to ask Brano ²⁹⁰⁹⁸ Grujic.

Q. I do not have the opportunity of asking Brano Grujic because you are the person who is testifying here, not him. So that's why I'm asking you.

Did he embezzle any money?

A. Before, he did, and even much more later on.

Q. He in particular?

A. Yes.

Q. So which office did he hold when he embezzled the money?

A. At that time, he did not hold any particular office. At that time, he worked in a shop.

Q. Oh. So he embezzled money in a shop that he worked in.

A. Yes.

Q. And what happened after that when you said you wouldn't have anything to do with thieves and you left? Nobody invited you to attend meetings any more, but nobody mistreated you in any way either.

A. I wasn't invited to attend meetings, but they did call me up frequently on the phone at home.

Q. They telephoned you using your home telephone number?

A. Yes, and they would make threats. And I reported this on one occasion to the post office. It wasn't out of fear, because they couldn't have protected me anyway, but I wanted to find out the numbers they were calling from.

Q. So they rang you up and made anonymous phone calls and threats and things of that kind? ²⁹⁰⁹⁹

A. They insulted me.

Q. Right, they insulted you.

A. Yes.

Q. But there were no consequences of that, as far as I understand.

A. The consequences came later on.

Q. In paragraph 11 of your statement you say that sometime in 1992, before the attack on Bijeljina - and you say you think it was the end of February as you say in your statement - you attended a meeting where a certain major was present by the name of Major Zoran Jovanovic, and as you say, he was the commander of the Zvornik Brigade, along with two other officers from the Tuzla Corps. One of them was a captain by rank, and the other man was Lieutenant Sekanic; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that after this meeting or before?

A. Ah, it was seven or eight months after the previous meeting.

Q. So they did invite you to attend meetings.

A. Yes, at that time, but not before that.

Q. So how come you were invited to attend that particular meeting at that time?

A. That's how it turned out. That's what happened. I don't know how it happened and who decided to make the move, but Zoran Jovanovic phoned me personally and invited me to come to the meeting. And prior to that, I had met him in a coffee bar, and he said that preparations were under way, as he said at the time, that both sides were preparing themselves for a defence, to defend themselves from the other side and that all the ²⁹¹⁰⁰ officers would be necessary, reserve officers, that they should all take part and that it would be a good thing if I attended the meeting.

Q. All right. So he explained to you that they were preparing to set up a defence because they assumed they would be attacked. You yourself were a reserve officer, and he was inviting you to attend the meeting in your capacity of reserve officer; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that before the attack on Bijeljina took place, sometime before the end of February, what kind of attack on Bijeljina are you referring to? What attack?

A. I'm talking about the time when Arkan's men, Arkan and his guys stormed into town and when the incidents that both I and I assume you remember very well.

Q. Well, all right, you remember these incidents. I assume you remember them because you lived there. But tell me this: How did the first clashes and conflicts come about in the Bijeljina municipality? Because you remember them whereas I don't.

A. As far as I what I know is concerned, I learned it from state television, the state television programmes and their broadcasts, and all of us know about that. I remember it very well myself. Now, I don't know the particulars and what led up to the conflict.

Q. Well, is it true that the conflicts took place at the end of March and beginning of April 1992? Which means quite some time after that meeting of yours took place where you were invited to attend as a reserve officer, according to my information. ²⁹¹⁰¹

A. I know when they called me up. Now, whether that was before or afterwards, I really don't know, and I don't think it's got anything to do with the events that took place in Bijeljina, because two or three months prior to the main conflict, both sides began to prepare themselves for war, to arm themselves and to establish some sort of -- well, not some sort of, but units in fact, made up of their own ethnic group.

Q. And in that same paragraph, paragraph 11, you go on to say that the Muslims, when they saw that there was -- that war was imminent, they began preparing themselves too, to arm themselves and so on, but all that had taken place much earlier, according to your descriptions.

A. Yes. Everybody knew about that in Bosnia-Herzegovina when the preparations started and when people began to arm themselves secretly, when the truckloads of ammunition were being driven in and weapons and so on, in some sort of illegal clandestine way. Both sides were busy arming themselves.

Q. Now, tell me, who up until the beginning of the conflicts was the president of the municipal Assembly in Zvornik?

A. It was Abdulah Pasic.

Q. He was president of the municipality?

A. Yes. He was an engineer by profession.

Q. Who was the chief of police in Zvornik?

A. It was also a Muslim.

Q. Was it Osman Mustafic?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Who was the commander of the Territorial Defence in Zvornik? ²⁹¹⁰²

A. I can't really say with any certainty.

Q. Was he a Muslim too?

A. I don't remember. Probably that kind of information can be found. Maybe it was, by I know the other two for sure.

Q. Do you know that through the mobilisation of the Muslim militia in Zvornik they ordered the president of the municipality and Abdulah Pasic, the deputy, and Nedzad Pasic, commander of the brigade of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that that's who was involved? Is that right?

A. Probably it is right. Now, as to the order itself, I don't know anything about that order. I didn't know then and I don't know now.

Q. Do you know who Sead Hadziavdic is?

A. The name seems familiar, but I can't seem to remember.

Q. He was the proprietor of the Rojal coffee bar from Drinjaca, and according to my reports and police reports dating from the autumn of 1991, he was engaged in clandestinely arming the Muslims of the area. Do you know about that?

A. Well, I do know that they were arming themselves. Now, during what period and when exactly and the details of that, I don't know, but I do know that they were armed, as I say, at the beginning of the year and that they did possess weapons. Not only pistols which were sort of sidearms but automatic weapons as well, which meant that somebody was supplying them with arms.

Q. Now, do you know what this man Hadziavdic was doing, that the same thing was going on in Kamenica by Saban Desic [phoen] and Nedzad Haskic? Do their names seem familiar and do you know anything about their ²⁹¹⁰³ activities?

A. Of course I do. Saban is now the president of the municipality of Zvornik. At the time he was an inspector, a trade inspector in Zvornik. So yes, people were arming themselves in all the villages, but who was personally responsible I really can't say.

Q. But do you at least know the role played in this arming and military organisation of the Zvornik Muslims by Captain Hajrudin Mesic, for instance, who was the former commander of the police station in Ugljevik?

A. I hadn't heard of that name, but quite possibly it was, although I don't know about him.

Q. Now, tell me, please, since you yourself were probably very well-informed with what was going on in the area, from what you say, that one of the reasons for the evacuation of the Serbs from town - and you mentioned that many people did leave town - that this took place in January 1992 because a paramilitary unit named the Mosque Doves was formed led by a Zvornik criminal by the name of Mithad Grahic. Is that true? Is that the reason they were leaving?

A. Now, whether that particular unit was established then or not, I really can't say. I have heard about certain groups. I did hear of the various groups, but what they were called I really don't know. I do know this man Midhat.

Q. He was a criminal, wasn't he?

A. Well, he was in prison. Why he was in prison, I really can't say. He didn't belong to the circle of people I socialised with. ²⁹¹⁰⁴

Q. Well, you didn't socialise with criminals, I assume, so you wouldn't know. But do you know during that during that period time in the wider region around Zvornik another Muslim paramilitary unit was set up called the Kobras, and the commander was a certain man called Suljo who before the war worked as a teacher in the village of Sapna, and it is assumed that it was actually Sulejman Terzic? Do you know anything about that?

A. Well, if that was in the area of Sapna, that's quite a long way away, some 20 kilometres away. But as I say, there were rumours that a unit was being established and that people were standing guard. Even one of their men, a Muslim man, was killed, who had worked in Belgrade. He was coming back at night from Belgrade. He was going home. He didn't know about these watches that were being set up, and he was killed. And that was along that axis in that general direction of Grbavica in fact.

Q. Killed by the Muslim guards and watches?

A. Yes. So there were watches, there were guards set up, they were armed, and everybody will tell you the same thing.

Q. Now, do you know anything about this unit called Kobra? Because later on it was commanded by Semsudin Mumerovic [phoen] whose nickname was Kobra who was later commander of the Zvornik Brigade of the BH army.

A. At that time, I was already in Holland.

Q. All right. So I'm not going to ask you any more about that. Now, have you heard of the events of March 1992 which caused a great deal of unrest amongst the Serbs when without any cause an ambush was set up and five people were arrested, five young Serb men, and they ²⁹¹⁰⁵ were interrogated by a man called Avdija Omerovic? And this took place in March 1992.

A. Well, probably it did, but as I say, information was coming in less frequently because everybody was doing their best to save their own skin and save their own lives at the time. So maybe that's quite true, but it just passed me by and perhaps I didn't pay much attention to it or perhaps I didn't hear about it.

Q. All right. But at any rate, you can't remember so I don't want to pursue that point any further.

But in paragraph 11, you say that it was precisely this man Abdulah Music who showed you a box of automatic and semi-automatic rifles which the Muslim side had procured; is that right?

A. Yes. That was on the eve of Bajram, the Bajram festival on the 5th of April.

Q. You say that he told you that he had bought it from some Serbs; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So you claim that the Serbs were preparing to attack the Muslims, whereas at the same time they were actually selling them rifles, automatic rifles.

A. Everything is possible. If those same people could have sold flour when there was a ban on flour -- they did this from Serbia and trucks would bring the flour in and reload it onto other trucks going to Tuzla and so on -- if this could be procured by the Serbs and sold to the Muslims, then why shouldn't the same people sell weapons and arms? ²⁹¹⁰⁶ Nothing strange there.

Q. Well, I assume there's some difference between flour and weapons. I understand that people are bringing in flour on the black market and selling it, but I'm asking you about arms, weapons. How is it possible that if the Serbs were preparing themselves for an armed conflict, that they would at the same time be selling arms to the side that they were allegedly to go into conflict with?

A. Those same people sold arms to the Serbs as well. One automatic rifle would cost you 1.200 German marks, for instance.

Q. I see. So these were black marketeers selling weapons to anybody, anybody they could sell them too; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So it wasn't anybody doing this in an organised fashion or organised arming or an organised Serb formation collecting weapons.

A. No, far from it. Individuals engaged in that kind of thing. You can't speak of the entire population or any legal units, lawful units doing that.

Q. All right. Thank you. That's a very essential point. Now, you also said that at the meeting held with respect to the Zvornik unit, that Grujic, Dragan Spasojevic, and Sveto Popovic had the main say. They were the main speakers at the meeting; is that right?

A. Well, you could put it that way, yes, those three.

Q. So all three men were people who were from Zvornik themselves, and they held posts and positions in Zvornik and had done so for many years; right? ²⁹¹⁰⁷

A. Well, not for many years. They were -- nobody had ever heard of them. They were anonymous citizens before that.

Q. No, what I meant was that they were from Zvornik and had lived in Zvornik for many years.

A. Yes. They lived in Zvornik for a long time, many years, except this man Sveto Popovic, Sveto Popovic. The others were from a village from the Zvornik municipality. Grujic himself was born in Montenegro.

Q. Yes, but he lived in Zvornik for a long time, didn't he?

A. Well, for 20 years.

Q. Which means that all three men were inhabitants and residents of Zvornik.

A. Yes.

Q. And they had been that for at least 20 years.

A. Yes.

Q. Which means that they hadn't come in from anywhere, from Serbia or from where else. They hadn't come in to Zvornik during that period of time; they'd been living there as residents for 20-odd years; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. You also say that Major Zoran Jovanovic was commander of the Zvornik Brigade.

A. He was appointed to that position before the war broke out. That's what he said. He would say he was commander for the Zvornik municipality. Now, what he actually was and what that was at that time establishment-wise, I can't say. Whether it was a brigade or a form of ²⁹¹⁰⁸ Territorial Defence or something else, I really can't say, but they were people who at all events were members of something above a battalion. So if they were commanders of battalions or companies or something specific, and he was their commander, then the next step up the ladder in that kind of hierarchy was a brigade commander, going up the chain of command that way.

Q. I've forgotten your number, Witness. Yes, Mr. 1524. That's all I wanted to establish. What it was was a meeting where these units were being formed, the inception of those units was discussed at the meeting. Because you yourself said that you were making the logical conclusion that if battalions had been formed that it should have been a brigade. But it was a meeting, and the brigade hadn't actually been established yet. It was in the process of being established through that meeting.

A. Well, if they had appointed commanders and if they had lists, each commander had lists of his members belonging to his unit, and this was uni-ethnic, uni-national, then the unit was being established although not mobilised.

Q. I understand that, but as I say, it was the local Territorial Defence and your joint organisation and deployment and distribution of the members of that local Territorial Defence into those units of the Territorial Defence; is that right?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. So when you say major, commander of the brigade --

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop you for one minute to tell you that you have five minutes left. ²⁹¹⁰⁹

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm very sorry to hear that, Mr. May. I wasn't watching the clock. This witness is providing some very interesting testimony, so could you at least give me a little more time and I'll do my best to skip over some of my questions.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: You will have ten minutes from now.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Let me skip over this part. That is to say, you had this particular office; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. It is written here, and I'm not going to refer to it specifically so that you won't be identified, and then you say the unit consisted of local volunteers, members of the TO; is that right?

A. Some had voluntarily joined up by then. They asked to be armed. They asked to be among the ranks of the volunteers.

Q. All right. So this was the local Territorial Defence; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And in paragraph 14, you say that the Zvornik Brigade, that Zvornik Brigade, your unit of Territorial Defence that you established from the ranks of the local population in Zvornik. It's your brigade; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And it had a total of 3 to 4.000 members, as it says here. Let's not go into all of that. Was that approximately the manpower involved? ²⁹¹¹⁰

A. Perhaps even a bit more. Not straight away, but as the war went on, certainly it involved a lot more people.

Q. You even had some tanks, and the tank crews were made up of reservists from Zvornik as well; isn't that right?

A. It wasn't some tanks. It was a tank company from Celopek.

Q. But the crews were made up of volunteers from Zvornik; is that right? That is what it says here.

A. Yes.

Q. So now you say, in paragraph 15, that Serbs would go to various weekend cottages over the weekend, as people usually do, and some went across the Drina to Serbia, to Mali Zvornik.

A. Well, that's where the weekend cottages were for the most part because the area was more conducive to that.

Q. So in the former Yugoslavia people did not pay attention to republican boundaries. People from Zvornik, that was a biggish town, had weekend cottages on the other side of the Drina River in the area of Serbia; is that right?

A. Yes, precisely. And most of them were Muslims, the people who had weekend cottages there.

Q. And then you say since they had a premonition that something bad could happen over the weekend, then they sought shelter in these weekend cottages of theirs in Serbia; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right. Some even took their furniture from their apartments there so that it would not be destroyed once the war broke out.

Q. Do you know that Kozluk, villages around Zvornik, were visited by ²⁹¹¹¹ Grujic, Pasovic, and Muhamed Jelkic, a Muslim, just before the war?

A. Yes. He was director of the hospital. But I'm not aware of this visit and these meetings, no -- this visit.

Q. And do you know that these three men, together with hodza Muhamed Efendi Ilugavica [phoen] and a Serb priest, Vasilije Kacavenda, went to see the people from Sepak and Kotici and asked them not to allow a conflict to break out and not to resort to force? You say they were asking them not to tear down barricades. Is that what you said?

A. I don't know about that. Kacavenda is the Bishop of Zvornik and Tuzla. I really don't know that anyone went there. And just before the conflict at that. Movement was already restricted for Serbs in Serb villages and for Muslims in Muslim villages. I doubt it. I don't think that on the very eve of the war anybody would have gone. The commander of the police went, though. He went towards Kula. He was a Serb. And he was killed. So I doubt it. I doubt the possibility of this kind of walking around villages and trying to talk people into doing this or that. It would have been very easy for them to get killed.

Q. I wrote this down here and I found it in your statement, but I don't have time to look through the statement now, but that can readily be established.

You say in paragraph 16 that from people from the newly established brigade you found out that there would be attack on Zvornik. Is that what you stated?

A. Yes. This was a week earlier. ²⁹¹¹²

Q. And you say in paragraph 18 that the Serbs on the 5th or 6th of April started bringing up barricades on Vidakovoj Njivi.

A. Yes.

Q. But if people are putting up barricades on a field, and this is Vidak's field, Vidakovoj Njivi, does it mean that they were defending themselves?

A. This is not a real field. This is just a place called Vidakovoj Njivi and this is on the outskirts of town.

Q. Nevertheless, isn't that something that is done by way of defence rather than by way of attacking a town?

A. It can be used for both, depending on which side of the barricade you're on.

Q. All right. In the same paragraph, you say that that night, with people of both ethnic groups, you organised within your own building some kind of a watch, and you were trying to follow everything that was going on, everything that was happening to Serbs and Muslims.

A. Everybody was together in the town until the shooting broke out, and then when the shooting broke out, a minority went towards Kula Grad and the majority, Muslims and Serbs, crossed over to Mali Zvornik in Serbia.

Q. All right. You say that you wanted to cross over the bridge to Mali Zvornik but it was held by Muslim forces. They held it under their control and they did not allow anyone to cross the bridge. That's what you say in paragraph 23; isn't that right?

A. That was just before the attack, just before the attack. It was ²⁹¹¹³ Wednesday morning. They did not allow people to get out of buildings, and they used a bus and also a truck to set up a roadblock not allowing people to leave, because they were afraid that if Serbs left town, they would be left as the only target, but this way they were both there and then God would allow things to happen one way or the other.

Q. Could you please be brief. They did not allow you to cross the bridge, the Muslim forces did?

A. Yes. On the Serb side it was the Serbs, and on the Muslim side it was the Muslims.

Q. I assume that on the side of the Republic of Serbia there was only the police. Nobody else could have been there.

Tell me you recognised an Albanian, Dzavid Behljuji, and a certain Ibrahimovic and some other people there; is that right?

A. Yes, the three of them.

Q. And all three were armed?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. This was a conflict, so it was not an attack of the Serbs on the town of Zvornik.

A. Nothing had happened by then. Nothing had broken out. There were only watches and guards.

Q. You say that in the evening of the 8th of April, as the conflicts were abating, a large number of people, 10.000 people, left Zvornik and went to Serbia via Mali Zvornik; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And among those 10.000 who fled from Zvornik, they fled because ²⁹¹¹⁴ the conflict had broken out in Zvornik. 10.000 people fled to Serbia. They were Muslims and Serbs; is that right?

A. Yes. As a matter of fact, more of them were Muslims because there were more Muslims among the population of the town.

Q. Oh, so more of them were going to Serbia because they wanted to seek shelter there as they knew that it was safe in Serbia; isn't that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. So the conflict broke out in Zvornik and the Muslims, as you said just now, were fleeing to Serbia, seeking shelter there. It was quite clear to them this was not a conflict that came from Serbia, this was a local conflict between the Serbs and Muslims in Zvornik; isn't that right? And they were going to Serbia where it was safe, to seek shelter there; is that right?

A. Well, yes, of course. 99.9 per cent of the people who went to Serbia were saved persons. This .01 [as interpreted] per cent were arrested in Serbia and returned. That would be about it.

JUDGE MAY: This must be your last question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right if it's my last question. This 0.[as interpreted] per cent that were arrested somewhere in Serbia, it was your forces in Mali Zvornik who arrested them; right? They were not arrested by the forces of the Serb police or anybody else. It was your forces.

A. I was arrested by the Serb police, I for one.

Q. You? ²⁹¹¹⁵

A. Yes. And without any kind of procedure, any kind of preliminary procedure that is customary in the civilised world, they simply sent me back to the camp in Alhos.

Q. Tell me, did they arrest you at the request of the Zvornik authorities?

A. I never saw any kind of request. They had no request. They simply arrested me in the street as if I were a criminal, with three or four cars, police cars. They surrounded me, arrested me, threw me into the car and handed me over in Bosnia, in Zvornik, to Brane Grujic.

JUDGE MAY: The time now is more than up. You've had more than sufficient time, Mr. Milosevic.

Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic. Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can we just finish the subject that was just started? I would like to deal with that only.

Q. Mr. Witness, out of these 10.000 people who decided to go to Serbia, among them were there people from Zvornik? And Zvornik is in Bosnia, and Mali Zvornik is in Serbia.

A. Yes.

Q. So these 10.000 people, they went to Serbia, didn't they?

A. Yes.

Q. And were there people who went towards the central part of Bosnia-Herzegovina during those days or was it for the most part this wave that went to Serbia?

A. I think that perhaps 2 or 3.000 went towards Bosnia, towards Kula ²⁹¹¹⁶ Grad. It's also there on the border, the Zvornik municipality, but from there people could go to Central Bosnia, but most of the inhabitants of Zvornik, the town of Zvornik which had a population that was about 80 per cent Muslim, went to Mali Zvornik, to Serbia.

Q. All right, thank you. However, when you arrived in Banja Koviljaca, as you said in paragraph 47, that is far into Serbia, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And you say that there you saw about 1.000 Muslims. Were they taken care of in Banja Koviljaca or not?

A. More than a thousand. They went individually to the houses of their friends. People socialised even before the war. All the hotels were full. They took rooms in hotels legally. Nobody prevented them from doing that. They paid for it. It was full. The town of Loznica was full. The park was full. It wasn't a thousand, it was several thousand Muslims who were there.

Q. Did any Muslims go voluntarily to other countries in Europe on the basis of an organisation that was provided by the international community like it was made possible for you to go to another country?

A. It was not made possible for me. I went to another country in another way, but I heard here, because I do socialise with people, that it was made possible for them to move on. I was even present in Belgrade when two families were given passports. They had not had passports, and they were given passports at the Belgrade SUP so they could travel legally.

Q. Could you just give me an answer to one more question so that the ²⁹¹¹⁷ Judges would be aware of that. You mentioned black uniforms yesterday.

A. Yes.

Q. Before all of these things that happened, or perhaps after all of these things that happened, did you ever see a single soldier of the Yugoslav army or of the army of Yugoslavia in a black uniform?

A. No, never.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. AGHA: Your Honour, if I may with your permission, just ask Witness B-1524 a couple of questions in re-examination. Re-examined by Mr. Agha:

Q. Witness B-1524, you mention that before the attack on Zvornik the SDA and SDS were trying to negotiate things peacefully. Can you tell me, please, which body or which group actually attacked Zvornik.

A. Sometimes I said this by way of a joke, but that is indeed true, as Mr. Milosevic noted. I always say that some people talk about the defence of Zvornik and others talk about the attack on Zvornik. So regardless of terminology, I know that on the previous day Arkan's soldiers and Arkan himself were already in Karakaj, and on that previous day, four or five of them were arrested in Zvornik in a Mercedes that was full of weapons.

In addition to these local people who took part in the attack, it was Arkan's units that participated in the attack. These were the men who were in black uniforms. These were the men who looted the town, who committed a series of crimes, murders within the town itself. These were not JNA units. These were no legal units. These were paramilitary units. ²⁹¹¹⁸

Q. Thank you. And, Witness, could you please tell the Court where Arkan and his units came from, from which republic.

A. Arkan has a house in Belgrade. He had one before the war. He was a Belgrader. These people who were questioning me after my arrest, who were down there in Alhos, spoke with a Belgrade accent. It's no secret. People know that, and people know where Arkan recruited his men, from the urban population, and there were a number of Belgraders within his ranks.

Q. Thank you. And just one final question: You mentioned that when you were in Mali Zvornik after the attack or the defence, however you call it, there was shelling coming from Mali Zvornik in Serbia. Can you kindly tell the Chamber who was carrying out this shelling of Zvornik.

A. I did not see this, but they told me that this was coming from an elevation above Mali Zvornik. A mortar unit was there, and it consisted of men from Zvornik, members of the Territorial Defence of Zvornik only. They were up there at that elevation so that they could have a good view and that they could carry out their task properly. They were perhaps a kilometre away from the Drina as the crow flies, on the Serbian side.

Q. So actually, Witness, one lead-on question from that: If that mortar battery was placed about one kilometre on the Serbian side, would it be your impression that it was a pre-arranged attack or defence?

JUDGE MAY: I don't think the witness can really answer that. He can -- all he can say is this: Did you see any signs of an arrangement before any attack as to arrangements being made for it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, if at the very moment when they were shooting -- I mean, the units would have had to have been ²⁹¹¹⁹ deployed there for a day or two before that. They would have had to have positioned themselves in order to be able to target various areas. So that unit must have been there at that elevation a day or two before the shooting actually took place.

It's not only this mortar unit. They were shooting above our heads. We were in Mali Zvornik, and sub-machine-guns were used for that. And also there were these other hills in the area, and the Bosnian side was targeted from those hills too.

MR. AGHA:

Q. Thank you, Witness.

MR. AGHA: And that completes my re-examination.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Witness B-1524, that concludes your evidence. Thank you for coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are free to go. Would you just wait while the blinds are pulled down.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

[The witness withdrew]

MR. NICE: Just before the next witness is --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: -- mention a couple of administrative matters concerning his evidence. I trust the Chamber will have received the replacement and final signed version of his statement. There were some variations as I set out in a memorandum. Inevitably, as I forecast, there were amendments. I hope they haven't been inconvenient for the Chamber. Our interpretation of the ruling as to which passages should be given live and in full is set out in the memorandum, and I hope that we've got the ²⁹¹²⁰ paragraph numbers correct. We've tended not to do so.

JUDGE MAY: It inevitably causes inconvenience when there are last-minute changes to statements, that must be said, and it is a practice which should be avoided, clearly, as far as possible. Not only is the Chamber inconvenienced but also, of course, all those others working on the case.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I have to say that from the beginning I explained that this was a draft and why it could only be a draft, the witness coming here in the circumstances he was and so on, and indeed I raised the matter on a couple of subsequent occasions thinking it clear that there would inevitably be changes in the manner in which his evidence could be given.

In any event, my calculation is that the passages that the Chamber wishes to be given live and in full are paragraphs 98 to 109, 119 and 120, and 124 to the end, and I hope that's correct.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. One thing I note is that most of the changes are in fact favourable to the cross-examiner, putting it neutrally.

MR. NICE: Exactly.

JUDGE MAY: Such clarifications as there have been have helped the Defence. But looking to the future -- we obviously have to consider this position, but looking to the future, we must try and work out a way in which this matter can be dealt with in a way which is more expeditious and fairer for all concerned.

MR. NICE: This is a particular type of witness, as I've explained for several months, and as you know, perhaps -- perhaps can we just have a ²⁹¹²¹ short private session, please.

[Private session]

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(redacted) Yes. We'll go back into open session.

[Open session]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have received this, Mr. May. As a matter of fact, I received it last night.

THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This version that Mr. Nice referred to, I received it last night. That was the first time I could receive it, because my associate and I had a meeting that was planned for 6:00 p.m. That's when I got it. As for this practice that Mr. Nice has of providing me with material at the very last moment, I asked you on several occasions to do away with this kind of practice.

There was this rule that material should be provided a month in advance, and you shortened it to ten days, but Mr. Nice has not even honoured that decision that I be provided with material ten days in advance. Sometimes he provides me with certain papers only ten minutes in advance. So I don't want to deal with anything specific in relation to this witness - I'm going to question every witness - but I ask that out of sheer decency I get all these materials at least ten days in advance, as ²⁹¹²³ you had prescribed. I'm saying this for the sake of the future. I don't want to interrupt your plan in any way now.

JUDGE MAY: We make it plain that it is not the Court's plan that these statements should arrive at the last moment, and it's a matter of concern to the Trial Chamber that you should have adequate time. We, too, received that new version at 5.00 last night, and as you've heard me raise with the Prosecution, that in the normal course of events is going to be insufficient time. However, we've looked at these particular amendments. They are all, as far as I can see, favourable to you, and therefore, we don't think it right -- or I don't think it right to keep them out. But I suggest that we use the new version for that reason.

However, in the future, we will most certainly have in mind this question of time, because plainly you must have the time in order to prepare your cross-examination, and that's a matter we're conscious of.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And may I say that any time that you need to have, as a result of the late arrival of the documents from the Prosecution, should be taken from the Prosecution's overall time. I'd just like to endorse what the Presiding Judge has said. The practice is quite unacceptable.

MR. NICE: Can I, because I think it's appropriate and indeed necessary that I should do so, explain the practical difficulties which I'm sure are not always immediately apparent. If you have a witness like this coming to court in the circumstances he does, and the Court knows about that, we can only deal with him when he's here. ²⁹¹²⁴ Preparing these documents, especially to prepare them in two languages, is an enormously difficult exercise involving a large number of people. The material from which this statement was taken has of course been available to the accused for years. He's been notified of the calling of this witness for a considerable period of time, and the books have all been available to him, and it is from the books, and to a limited degree from the witness -- from the interview of the witness, that the material has been drawn.

The only way that we could avoid it with this type of witness this type of situation is by calling him here a fortnight or a month before and keeping him here. We couldn't do that. It's not possible. So sorry. As to the particular statements, the position is that I provided you with a draft at the earliest conceivable moment, a draft that had been prepared in forecast of what we would want from the witness, knowing of the books that he'd written, alerting everyone to the fact that it was a draft on a couple of occasions last week, and I have the references that I made to that.

The Prosecution worked from last Tuesday through to last Sunday afternoon and the version was signed by the witness Sunday afternoon, he then being content with it. It was made available to the Chamber first thing on Monday morning but a red-line version was wanted and Ms. Dicklich worked on that all day and it was provided later in the afternoon.

JUDGE MAY: And very helpful it was too, but Mr. Nice, you have to appreciate that there are others in this trial besides the Prosecution whose interests have to be taken account of. That includes the Trial ²⁹¹²⁵ Chamber. And if documents arrive at the last moment, we may have to simply adjourn as being the only way that we can deal with it, and the accused by -- in fairness to him, can deal with it too, and that would be time which will have to be taken off your budget. But in any event, the matter does not arise now but let us hope that it doesn't arise in future. Let me just confer.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll go ahead on the new version. If you want more time, of course you can have it, but it will come off the rest of the week, that's the problem.

MR. NICE: Well, the Chamber will not be surprised to know that the six hours allocated for cross-examination, given the inclusion of favourable parts within the statement served, is a matter we have very much in mind. I'm simply going to do my best in the circumstances, but I am very anxious, and I know we've exhausted the topic and I'll -- but I'm very anxious that the Chamber should appreciate that I'm doing everything I can to bring material before this Chamber that is helpful and is timely, and there are simply circumstances which are beyond better organisation save by quite exponential enlargement of costs and labour, which we can't afford. We simply cannot have witnesses here for months or have people away from the office proofing them for weeks on end. It isn't possible. We'll do our best.

JUDGE KWON: Let me check one thing further.

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Was this translated, the last version of the ²⁹¹²⁶ statement?

MR. NICE: Yes. I've introduced the following system. You might like to know the practicalities of how we do this. If you have a witness who is giving a statement, typically it's given in one language and then the thing is translated by the Language Services, and that takes weeks to do it typically, because there is no overnight facility for translation of any substantial document, and there couldn't be for us or for the Chamber or the Registry without huge expense. So what we now do is we have two interpreters or language assistants working with any witness so that as a document is being drawn or amended in the language of the interview, which will be typically English, there's somebody working in parallel preparing or amending the document so that it's available pretty well instantaneously in B/C/S, and that's the way we are able now to serve the rule change under 89 to provide documents in both languages. But it has represented a substantial increase in resource allocation which we've negotiated with Registry.

JUDGE MAY: Well, we will continue after the adjournment with the witness on the new version.

We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness would take the declaration, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. ²⁹¹²⁷

JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a seat.

WITNESS: BORISAV JOVIC

[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice. Examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Your full name, please, sir.

A. Borisav Jovic.

Q. Mr. Jovic, I'm going to summarise your dealings with the Office of the Prosecutor in order to identify the materials with which we are working. But first by way of background, born in October 1928, holding various offices, government offices in your career, mostly in social and economic development, and being ambassador to Italy in the mid to late 1970s. Were you, in March 1989, elected as Serbia's representative to the SFRY Presidency, the vice-president of that Presidency from the 15th of May, 1989 to the 15th of May, 1990, president from the 15th of May 1990 to the 15th of May, 1991? Following that were you president of the Socialist Party of Serbia from the 24th of May of 1991 until the 24th of October, 1992, taking over from the accused who had at that time had to step down. When he returned to the leadership of the party, did you become vice-president of the party again, holding that position until November of 1995?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. With that much background, is the position that you have written two books, one called "The Last Days of the SFRY, A Diary," and the second book, the Book on Milosevic? Have you also been interviewed as a suspect ²⁹¹²⁸ by officers of the OTP on three occasions, in September 2002 and in April and September of 2003? Did you thereafter come to The Hague pursuant to a subpoena and have you engaged in what are called proofing sessions with the Office of the Prosecutor from last Tuesday or Wednesday and until the end of this weekend?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. As a result of those proofing sessions, which themselves drew on the books and the interview but particularly on the books, were you in a position to sign a statement yesterday afternoon of 40 pages in English and a slightly different number in B/C/S, and was that statement an accurate statement of events?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you indeed have a copy of the B/C/S version of that statement for reference purposes if appropriate and if required?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. So far as your diary is concerned, and you understand that it was for the production of your diary that the Office of the Prosecutor sought your assistance, so far as the diary is concerned, is that a document that the book called The Diary, is that a document prepared on contemporaneous notes?

A. Yes. They are notes which have not been edited or redacted. They have been printed as they were taken down in note form.

Q. And does your diary, paragraph 5 of the statement, set out something in excess of a hundred meetings or conversations you had with the accused between May 1989 and July 1992, frequently being meetings you ²⁹¹²⁹ attended with five other people, or up to five other people, the overall group being described by you as the six and the composition of that group being the accused, Kadijevic, Adzic, Kostic, and Bulatovic and yourself?

A. In addition to the other conversations these two were recorded, and that group of people I entitled the group of six, the six, for it -- to facilitate matters in my diary so that I needn't go through all the six names. But it never had the formal title of "the six."

Q. Going back to your offices, you stood down as president to be replaced by Stipe Mesic in 1990 -- 1991. The Rump Presidency with which we are familiar, did you remain a member of the Rump Presidency?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Until when?

A. Until the creation of the new Yugoslavia, which was sometime around the 15th of May, 1992, however, in formal terms we worked a little longer, until the new president of the state was elected.

Q. Your diary as a book was published in 1995, and you were immediately dismissed by the accused. He demanded your resignation from office of member of parliament which you then held. You complied immediately with his request. Can you tell us why?

A. As far as this replacement was concerned in the party leadership, I never received an explanation of the reasons why that came about, but indirectly, I was told that it was because of the book. Now, as far as the position held in the Federal Assembly of the deputy mandate there, I was asked to tender my resignation, and I accepted that because I knew that it would be put into practice even if I didn't ²⁹¹³⁰ want it to be. So to avoid any unnecessary complication, it was far simpler for me to do that myself. And the procedure was fairly simple, according to the rules and procedure --

Q. Very well. Who would have put it into practice had you declined to comply with the accused's request?

A. It would have been put into practice by the party itself. It would have excluded me from the party membership, the leadership of the party, I mean, and this would lead to a situation in which I had no right to be on the list of the Socialist Party and then the Socialist Party would report to the national Assembly who the next man on the electoral list was who had not become a deputy yet but who would be a replacement for me.

Q. And as you say in paragraph 6 of your statement in respect of resigning as a member of parliament: "I agreed to do it immediately, because I knew that if I did not agree, he would arrange for it to be done." Is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct. I was convinced that that was how things would turn out. And I'm sure they would have.

Q. Your second book, the Book on Milosevic published some five years later, focuses on the accused as an individual. You say in paragraph 7 of your statement -- perhaps I ought to deal with exhibiting the statement and all the other documents in a second but if I can deal with this first question and then get on with that. You say that the accused was the key figure and the main actor in the Serbian tragedy that you describe. Is that your opinion still? ²⁹¹³¹

A. Of course, for more than a decade, Milosevic was the main political figure in Serbia. He held absolute authority within the people and within the party, and he had the possibility of having a decisive role on all decisions made. And by the same token, he was in a way the main actor of everything that came to pass during that period of time.

MR. NICE: May the statement of the witness, under 89(F), be exhibited, and may the file of exhibits be comprehensively linked with it so that the statement becomes the first tab.

JUDGE MAY: We've got three binders here. Let's get them right. I have got exhibits, and then there is at the beginning of that page a list of contents.

MR. NICE: The second binder and third binder are simply tabs 2 and 3, which are the books.

JUDGE MAY: Tab 2 and 3. So the statement and the exhibits can all have a single exhibit number then. We'll have the next number, please.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the exhibit number is 596.

MR. NICE: The statement to which I have been referring is 596, tab 1.

Q. Mr. Jovic, you make the point in respect of both your books, at paragraph 8, that you completely stand by what is written in them and you believe them to be an accurate source of historical material for the ICTY but you accept that so far as personal views and judgements are concerned they are entirely that, personal views, and they may, of course, be open to question. ²⁹¹³²

A. Yes. As far as the facts are concerned, the ones presented in the books, they were recorded exactly as I saw them. So I consider them to be historical facts.

Now, as far as my assessments go, and judgements, they can always be questioned because that is my personal assessment.

Q. Before we move on to evidence in some detail and just to complete the picture of your dealings with the Office of the Prosecutor, in the course of your time here last week, have you been shown and have you had a chance to review several exhibits which are now contained in the binder before the learned Judges?

A. Exhibits I have looked through, yes.

Q. And indeed one or two exhibits were even shown to you this morning, they coming to attention late?

A. Yes, I have seen those.

Q. Have you been notified in general terms of some other supplementary questions that you may be asked in respect of topics covered in the statement, those matters being raised at a late stage and too late for inclusion in the statement?

A. Yes, there was that too.

Q. And you understand, Mr. Jovic, that whereas much of your evidence will be taken in chief from the witness statement itself, there are passages that we must deal with in detail and I now turn to those, although they will be slightly out of order chronologically but to ensure that they are covered in the detail the Chamber requires. So in the English version of the statement, I go to page 27, and ²⁹¹³³ for you, Mr. Jovic, if you want to find it, and with the Chamber's leave, if you could have it open, we're dealing at paragraph 97 and thereabouts. Before I come to the paragraphs that we have to deal with specifically but in order to give chronological context -- and this is a document, Your Honour, we may not need to look at, but I can refer to -- tab 19, on the 7th of October, 1991, was there a decision to promote Mladic from colonel to general of which you are aware, Mr. Jovic? A decision made by the Presidency of the SFRY?

A. I was shown the text of those minutes from the Presidency meeting, and I said during the proofing sessions, and I state again, that I don't remember that, although quite obviously I did attend that meeting. And that is for the simple reason that we had a series of other important questions on the agenda. And the last points of the agenda usually are prepared at a cadre's personnel commission or the commission for promotion and decorations and we never discussed these matters much at Presidency sessions. So I can't say that I remember the event taking place, but most probably what it says in the document is correct.

Q. Again a document we needn't review save to the extent it's necessary for you to authenticate it; did you listen yesterday to an intercept, tab 17, said to have been the intercept of a telephone conversation between you and Karadzic on the 15th of October, 1991? Did you recognise the voices and do you accept that this is a telephone conversation between the two of you?

A. Yes, I did listen to that, and I do. Confirmed it.

Q. Two days later, on the 17th of October, at a conference here in ²⁹¹³⁴ The Hague, were you present?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. And we need this from you in some detail. What did Kostic tell you about Montenegro's attitude towards Lord Carrington's plan?

A. On that day, we received, with great delay, a document which was supposed to have been considered here in The Hague in the coming days, and we did our best to study it and to assume positions. It was common knowledge that there was a difference between the proposal put forward by Lord Carrington and the positions assumed by us. The crux of those differences was that Lord Carrington's plan provided for the disbanding of Yugoslavia, whereby each republic could become independent on the basis of a referendum. We, however, considered that it was better and the right thing to do to write down that each republic may do so on the basis of a referendum by the people, a popular referendum of the people and nations, because in certain republics, there are many nationalities living there, and those who do not wish to step down from Yugoslavia can enjoy the right of staying within Yugoslavia. So we expected Montenegro to accept this too, the position that we held. However, Branko Kostic, when he just looked through the documents, said Montenegro will accept the proposal made by Lord Carrington. I didn't believe him. I thought that he was joking. And so once again, I asked him and cautioned him and said that this would be catastrophic for our overall policy, both Serbia and the Serbian people. And he said that he was informed that that would be done. And I then informed Milosevic about that, because I was going to see him anyway for us to have a look at ^{29135 BLANK PAGE 29140} the document, to go through it and see what we were to do. And first of all, he didn't believe it. Then he tried to get hold of Bulatovic over the phone to talk to him, and it was not customary not to be able to reach Bulatovic, because they said he was otherwise engaged. That was unusual. Later on, we received a telefax from Montenegro saying precisely what Kostic had told me, and that's how that matter ended. Montenegro, at that point in time, had decided to accept the Carrington Plan.

Q. At the next Presidency session of the PSFRY, you took the floor, and you dealt with the fact that Montenegro had taken this position, and your attitude was to do and to say what?

A. Well, I took the floor and then I turned towards Kostic and said, "We're going to outvote you here today because there are more of us in favour of the position backed by Serbia." However, it turned out that Kostic thought the same. And although he was president in the Presidency, he did not accept Montenegro's position but, rather, accepted the position taken by the Yugoslav state Presidency.

Q. There are then a couple of exhibits I want you to deal with, because although we're taking this passage of your evidence slightly out of sequence, I want the exhibits to be dealt with within this passage of evidence chronologically.

Tab 15, please. And if this could be simply laid on the overhead projector and I'll summarise its effect because the witness has seen it. Do you recall, Mr. Jovic, receiving on the 25th -- a document dated the 25th of October of 1991 from UNESCO, Frederico Mayor, setting ²⁹¹⁴¹ out their interest in world heritage and natural heritage sites, and in particular in the city of Dubrovnik, proposing that a mission should be sent to your country in view of what was happening and to recommend measures to be taken to ensure the protection of, amongst other things, Dubrovnik?

A. I didn't remember the document previously, but I see that it is indeed true, and I responded and said that they could come and that we would allow them to conduct an on-site investigation. So I think that the document is authentic and that we did let them go ahead with what they planned.

Q. We come back in the bundle of exhibits to tab 5, and there are two versions of this document. Was there something called a Supreme Command meeting held on the 26th of October of 1991?

A. Yes.

Q. If we could lay the English version of this - and the witness has reviewed it - on the overhead projector, please, starting with the first page which sets out those who were present.

We can see that yourself, you rather, Branko Kostic, Bajramovic, Jovo Kostic, Kadijevic and other Supreme Command Staff members were present.

And if we turn then to the second page, at the foot of the page we see Mr. Kostic concluding that there should be the mobilisation of 220.000 additional conscripts.

We go to the next page, please. We see your contribution as recorded in this minute. Next page, please. Thank you very much. No, ²⁹¹⁴² sorry. The page before. My mistake.

And where -- I can't see it on this. Sorry. There it is. That's it. Your contribution is as follows: "We have experience from previous mobilisations and the problem of not understanding the situation. The question is if we can allow our activities to depend on the success of mobilisation. I am very afraid that wanting too much may lead to a boomerang effect with catastrophic consequences. Do not think that it is up to one man, a politician. Thus the army must not observe just the numbers of this and that, but what it should do. I am afraid of mass resistance because the situation is not the same everywhere. Perhaps the best situation is in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, it is hard to bring back the refugees, and another question is how things will proceed in Montenegro.

"The people do not know if a new state with a new army will be created: Making a decision is an immense question. Much has occurred, from Slovenia to Croatia, problems have appeared, major goals and aspirations, which could not be achieved. There is much disparity between plans for mobilisation and what can actually be done. This is because mobilisation 2.5 times as extensive should be carried out." And then if we go over to SSNO Kadijevic: "I want to ensure that nobody among us wants to impose a political solution, but rather support and secure them militarily."

Followed by Adzic saying, second line: "... regarding the Serb leadership's orientation for all Serbs to live in one state, or the orientation for any nation to live in Yugoslavia if it wants to." ²⁹¹⁴³ And I think if we go over, perhaps Kostic further down the page, saying: "I believe that the Montenegrin people are not in favour of the current decision of the Montenegrin Assembly. If the people, the Serbs in the Krajinas, are in favour of fighting for Yugoslavia, then it's very important that we know what we're going to fight for." And then finally over the page, please, Usher, to the foot of the next page where you, Mr. Jovic, are recorded as agreeing with Veljko Kadijevic. "Concerning the political situation, we need to know the following regarding the situation in Montenegro: Are we going to defend even those who do not want to go with us? We cannot change a concept building a state and army if Montenegro is against it. There will be a new international circumstance because Serbia would remain alone. I believe that the Montenegrin leadership doesn't understand that situation, because the following are the concepts: Either six states signing a cooperation agreements or two to three states in one. Our problem," you said, "currently is how to estimate the real prospect creating a bigger force, what we need to do is create such a force, within its possibilities. Thus it's very important to entrench unity on the political level and make it operational. That's why we need to clear this and confirm the level ..."

There are two notes of this meeting but that's the one I've read from. Do you accept that this reflects your contribution to the meeting of the Supreme Command?

A. This is a note. They are minutes which -- it is not a stenogram nor is it a verified minutes. It is the personal note-taking of somebody ²⁹¹⁴⁴ sitting in the room making notes for somebody else. And what I can do is to clarify the substance of the discussion. I cannot say that all this is correct as it happened, but there are certain elements there, yes. I don't think that this person recording these notes understood what was going on, but I was fully conscious of what was taking place. At that point in time, a problem had arisen between Serbia and Montenegro with respect to Carrington's plan, and also a sort of divergence of views came about between the leadership of Serbia and Montenegro with respect to their relationship towards the Serb question and towards Serbs living outside Serbia and outside Montenegro in general. And therefore, there was a problem of a lack of clarity, in what way Montenegro would behave toward the Yugoslav army and whether the Yugoslav army could exist until the problem had been resolved. So that was one aspect of the problem.

The second aspect was this: The army demanded additional mobilisation of 220.000 or 250.000 men, conscripts, because all the fronts that it held allegedly it said it was not able to hold with the number of men it had at its disposal, and especially it was not able to withdraw and free people from the barracks that had been blocked in Croatia. And there were many barracks with very few men in them, but it was both a military and a political problem.

Now, as far as the first question is concerned, the political relationship between Serbia and Montenegro, that was not able to be resolved at that meeting. It was a problem which would affect the further fate of the army and how -- what our attitude towards the army would be. ²⁹¹⁴⁵ So we expected this to be cleared up between Serbia and Montenegro, which was recorded in the notes later on and in my diary. Now, the call for mobilisation seems to be reflected here but not in precise terms. I said that we cannot accept, as the army seems to feel, that one politician, Milosevic or myself or both of us, could take a public stance and demand that the people respond to the mobilisation and that the mobilisation would succeed in rallying several thousand men. That is not something we can be expected to do or asked of us. And secondly, this requirement for over 200.000 men was a megalomaniac one and if we did ask for that many men it would have a boomerang effect and the citizens would quite simply not respond to the call-up for mobilisation and that we ought to be more realistic and to look at it in the lights of the realistic situation. And the conclusion was that nothing in fact could have -- be concluded but we ought to weigh up the questions with the republics first and see whether Serbia and Montenegro were prepared to live life together, to have that common concept and their relationship to the army and what the republics felt with respect to the proposed mobilisation. So that would be the substance of that conversation and meeting. And as I say, the notes and records and minutes are more of an aide-memoire. They're not very detailed and specific, and I cannot accept it as being a document or, rather, it can be a document to the effect that it says that the meeting did take place and the people who attended and a sort of indication of the general discussion held at the meeting.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Nice. ²⁹¹⁴⁶

MR. NICE:

Q. We're pressed for time, but thank you for that detail on this occasion.

On the 30th of October, was a text drawn up for Montenegro to send to The Hague? If so, by whom, and in very short order, what happened to it?

A. In the meantime, we had talks with the Montenegrin leadership. They promised that they would think about it a bit more. They returned home, and basically they agreed to change their position. Then there was a bit of a dispute in terms of whether this position would be proposed by Serbia and that they second it or whether it should be the other way round.

Mr. Milosevic drafted the text. Basically it is one sentence. And he insisted that they should be the ones putting forth the proposal. Ultimately, they agreed to it, and they proposed the text, and Serbia accepted that.

Q. Paragraph 103. Milosevic and Kadijevic, how did they get on at this time and in relation to this topic? Was there a meeting of the six at which Kadijevic and Adzic expressed a view contrary to the position you and Milosevic were taking? Paragraph 103.

A. Just a moment, please. As for Adzic and Kadijevic, we did not discuss this with them as far as I can remember. We talked to the Montenegrins regarding the Carrington Plan. And then, after having finished the discussion with them, then we asked Kadijevic and Adzic to join in so that we discuss the questions of the military, the joint army, ²⁹¹⁴⁷ mobilisation, and other such issues.

Of course they were kept abreast of what was going on, but this was not discussed with them. Now, if we're looking at The Diary, that's the way things were. So that's what happened at that point in time.

Q. You make a point, I think, in The Diary about Milosevic saying something about helping them abundantly. Do you remember that in the meeting?

A. Which part of The Diary is this? Oh, I see. Well, look, this is an episode. It wasn't on that day. It wasn't at that time either. Just a moment, please.

There was this one episode when they had objected to us, to Milosevic, that we no longer cared about the Serb people outside Serbia. Milosevic told them that that is not correct, that we always helped them and that we will continue to help them.

Q. We're now coming to the period of November/December 1991. I want to put a few things in chronological order. First of all, at tab 18, not for detailed review for want of time, but have you reviewed another telephone intercept of a conversation between you and Karadzic said to have taken place on the 18th of November, tab 18?

A. Yes. They showed this to me and I listened to it.

Q. And are you satisfied that the voices are yours and Karadzic's?

A. Yes.

Q. And indeed that the conversation took place?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. ²⁹¹⁴⁸

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm -- depending on time, I may come back to that.

Q. On the 23rd of November, there was a document that you've had a chance to consider, the Geneva Accord. It's already been produced. It's Exhibit 396, tab 6. So if we can just lay that on the overhead projector as appropriate.

And as you appreciate, Mr. Jovic, my questions are directed, amongst other things, at the issue of the control by the Rump Presidency of the influence over, as might describe it, the army. And this is the Geneva Accord, introduced through the evidence of Mr. -- Ambassador, I beg your pardon, Okun. It's dated the 23rd of November, 1991. It's a document with which I think you are familiar, and we can see on the overhead projector that the accused, with Kadijevic and Vance perhaps as witness, agreed that Croatia would lift its blockade of barracks; B, that the JNA with immediate effect would begin with the withdrawal from Croatia of the personnel, weapons, and military equipment in those barracks installations, and complete this process in accordance with schedules; C, that they will instruct all units under their command, control, or political influence to observe an unconditional cease-fire with effect from the 24th of November; and D, they will facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Now, the document as signed has boxes to the right which contain the following passage for your comment, please: "President Slobodan Milosevic committed the SFRY Rump Presidency to directing the JNA to withdraw from Croatia." And, "General Kadijevic committed the JNA's ²⁹¹⁴⁹ withdrawal from Croatia."

And then the next box, second bullet point: "President Milosevic committed paramilitary and irregular forces under his formal and informal authority to observing the cease-fire. Kadijevic committed the JNA to the same regarding paramilitary troops fighting in conjunction with the JNA." Your comment, please, on the role of the Rump Presidency directing the JNA's withdrawal.

A. I don't know what this is in these boxes. Is that an integral part of the document or is it someone's interpretation of it?

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, the interpreters cannot hear this.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I object, because Mr. Nice is confusing the witness on purpose. The text of the Geneva document does exist. It's legible, and it's clear. And in the boxes are the explanations that they provided here, and they do not coincide with the text.

JUDGE MAY: No. I'm going to stop you. Let us discover what the meaning of these various boxes is. Where does that come from, Mr. Nice?

MR. NICE: It comes from the exhibit, as I understand it, but if I'm wrong I will be corrected and perhaps you'd better get the original exhibit that's gone in. They're Okun's comments, as exhibited on that basis.

JUDGE MAY: They're Ambassador Okun's comments.

MR. NICE: They are indeed and the Court will remember that he ²⁹¹⁵⁰ provided a number of comments in this form on documents that he produced.

JUDGE MAY: Well, this witness should ignore the comments except insofar as he regards them as helpful and he can be asked for his interpretation of it.

MR. NICE: Yes.

Q. This is evidence we've heard, you understand, Mr. Jovic, that from -- from Ambassador Okun with whom you're familiar, I think -- that the accused committed the SFRY Rump Presidency to direct the JNA's withdrawal. What do you say to that?

A. I say that Okun can say whatever he wants to say, because Milosevic cannot bind the Rump Presidency in any way. The Rump Presidency sent General Kadijevic on behalf of the organs of the federation and stated that he could sign this kind of document on our behalf, because we wanted the army to withdraw from the barracks in Croatia. Milosevic did not even have to attend the meeting at all. So Kadijevic signed this on behalf of the federation, and that was the position of the Presidency.

Q. What about the references that Ambassador Okun made on his understanding about paramilitaries under the control or direction of either the accused or Kadijevic?

A. Paramilitary units from Serbia, if one means by that the volunteer units of Serbia, according to the decision of the Presidency, always had to be under the control of the Yugoslav People's Army. There were problems that some were trying to get out of control and not abide by military discipline, but they were duty-bound to be under the control of the Yugoslav People's Army. ²⁹¹⁵¹ This here can only be a warning that it should not be permitted for them to remain outside that control.

Q. One other document at about the same time to be just briefly looked at. It's tab 16 of our Exhibit 596, and it's another UNESCO letter to you thanking you -- lay it on the overhead projector -- for the opportunity to meet and to hear your explanations of events taking place in your country, and explaining that he, the author Daniel Janicot, returned to his director general announcing an intention to send -- and his director general announced an intention to send a permanent UNESCO observer to Dubrovnik.

Tab 16, and I'd like now to have your observations, if I can have them, on Dubrovnik, and I'm going to show a couple of videos or short clips of videos to remind the Chamber of evidence that we've seen. Do you accept, Mr. Jovic, that Dubrovnik was shelled by the JNA in 1991?

A. No. No, I do not accept it. What I accept is that there were warnings on the part of the world public, especially the Croatian public, that Dubrovnik had been shelled. Of course we were violently opposed to that.

We called the military leadership, and we asked for all the circumstances to be investigated. We received detailed information that the army had strict orders that the old part of Dubrovnik cannot be shelled and that they cannot enter it, and that no one indeed did enter the old city or shell it.

There were only two shells that came to the old town by accident, ²⁹¹⁵² but measures were taken against the persons who had fired those shells. However, it's not that anybody ordered that, it's not that the Yugoslav People's Army did that, and the General Staff had never been informed of any such thing.

We accepted this information as correct and we believed them.

Q. I'll show you a few short excerpts from evidence that the Chamber has seen to remind the Chamber and give you an opportunity to comment. The first one is Exhibit 395 or part of it, the ITN report relating to mid-November 1991, produced by Paul Davies. Thank you.

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE:

Q. And if we can now show a small extract from another one, 372, which relates to the 8th of December, and on the evidence we've had, Mr. Jovic, it's filming damage which was its -- filming a film crew that was filming damage on behalf of General Kadijevic. That's what the evidence amounts to.

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE:

Q. The people filming seen on that video were said to have been, on the evidence, filming on behalf of Kadijevic. Now, you were a member of what was the Commander-in-Chief of the army at that time, effectively. Can you help us, please, with whether you were informed about these events or whether you accepted these events occurred even?

A. We accepted that two shells strayed into Dubrovnik, and the army established that. What can be seen here is the main street of Dubrovnik. ²⁹¹⁵³ It can be seen that it wasn't damaged at all except for this one building on this street of Stradun. A hole can be seen in front of one particular building, and perhaps a shell fell there. And also there is some rubble. Perhaps that is a consequence of that in one of the smaller streets there. Whether there was more of it and whether there were more shells involved than what Kadijevic had informed us about is something I cannot say on the basis of this film either.

I can claim -- I cannot claim that there were more than two shells that the General Staff had told us about or that there were indeed only two shells as they had told us.

I have seen this film, but I cannot be certain of anything on the basis of this brief video footage of two minutes. So I'm not in a position to change my attitude towards what the General Staff told us. If the Court has firm evidence that it was otherwise, then they are going to decide accordingly. What I can say is what we had been informed about, and we were staunchly opposed to anyone touching Dubrovnik at all.

Q. Moving on to paragraph 104. I may come back to Dubrovnik a little later.

In early December of 1991, did you have a conversation with the accused about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, about how easy or difficult the problem would be there?

A. Of course. We had many discussions. This discussion that is recorded is quite important, because we made an assessment during this discussion that most probably Europe and the international community would ²⁹¹⁵⁴ soon recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state, that we, since we are constantly being criticised by the international community, although we thought that this criticism was exaggerated, should not allow ourselves to have the Yugoslav People's Army found there because they would be treated as an occupying army, and we don't want that to happen and that we should take measures in order to avoid that. The measures that were assessed to be preventive measures were the following: That citizens of the Yugoslav -- of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who were born in Serbia and Montenegro should be sent to Serbia and Montenegro, and the other way round. That was the way in which our citizens would not be in the army once Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised.

Q. Paragraph 105. Did you call up Kadijevic and ask him to join your discussion?

A. Yes. We called him because it was impossible to have this carried out without the military. Mr. Milosevic presented this to him, that it was necessary to redeploy the troops. Kadijevic, whose orientation was a traditional one, that is to say in favour of Yugoslavia and having a mixed ethnic composition in the army throughout the territory, he said that he simply would not accept that and that the General Staff would not accept that. But then it seems that he understood what this was all about. He left, and as The Diary shows, he had this carried out rather quickly with very few exceptions, say 10 or 15 per cent of soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro were still in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the moment when its independence was recognised. ²⁹¹⁵⁵

Q. Paragraph 107. Paramilitaries and your discussion with the accused about Arkan in particular, please. To what extent did the Presidency hear of -- the Rump Presidency hear of paramilitary activity?

A. Well, you see, we did not treat that as paramilitary units but as volunteer units. According to our regulations, it was allowed that volunteers join the army or that volunteer units be placed under army command at the front line where the war is actually being waged. There was a decision of the Presidency that volunteer units cannot act arbitrarily. They have to be subordinated to the army command. That had to be done within the orders issued by the army. From time to time when the army reported to us about what was going on, they also submitted partial reports, in a few sentences only, about the problems they were encountering with paramilitary units. These were not very long texts, but they boiled down to a few sentences, namely that the paramilitary units were not fully subordinated to the military command and that from time to time they tried to act beyond military discipline. There was never any specific mention of any particular unit, but this phenomenon was referred to in universal terms, as it were. As for my conversation with Mr. Milosevic, I spoke to him once about something that happened very often in public. Arkan, on the one hand, was a dubious person, considered a criminal, and that on the other hand, it was being rumoured that he was in touch with the state organs of Serbia, especially because at that time he started forming paramilitary units or, rather, volunteer units.

I asked Mr. Milosevic who this Arkan was and whether he was indeed ²⁹¹⁵⁶ an extended arm or a close associate of the police of Serbia or other Serb authorities. Mr. Milosevic told me quite directly and without any second thoughts that these were criminals and that we have nothing to do with them. Then I replied to him that this should definitely be cleared up and that we should not lose our good name over that. Later on, it turned out that Arkan had these units of his but that he still maintained some contacts and some connections with the army in the field too, of course, because according to these relations that I already referred to, he had to be in touch with them. The extent to which he had other contacts apart from these within Serbia itself is something I don't know.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovic, it's not entirely clear to me what you have said about the relationship between the paramilitaries and the army. On one occasion you said the army reported to you that the paramilitaries were not subordinated to them. What do you mean by that? Do you mean that the paramilitaries did not take orders from them or that they were not subject to military discipline?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I spoke about paramilitary units, I always talked about volunteer units from Serbia that went to the front line of their own free will. When I spoke about the army reporting to us that the paramilitary units were not abiding by military discipline and that they had problems with them, I said that in the sense that it was their duty to observe military discipline and to be subordinated to the commander in the field, and that they, the paramilitary units, from time to time tried to evade that. ²⁹¹⁵⁷

JUDGE ROBINSON: What made it their duty to be so subordinated? What was the basis of that duty?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the basis of a decision of the Presidency of the SFRY in order to prevent chaos in the field. These individual military units could otherwise operate outside the concept of the defence of the area. They might clash with what the Yugoslav army wanted to do.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. Your conversation with the accused had him saying that something was going to be done. In the event, was anything ever done by the accused to bring Arkan to heel or to control?

A. Well, I don't think I can answer that question because I don't know. But it is true that Arkan set up his volunteer unit just like other people set up their own volunteer units.

Now, whether that started independently and a possible cessation of relations with Arkan had they existed or perhaps those relations didn't exist or they were interrupted and re-established perhaps, that would be conjecture and surmise and I can't really say.

Q. Following on from His Honour Judge Robinson's concerns, we can all note that the phrase "state within a state" has been used by you. Can you just explain that.

A. As far as Arkan is concerned, Arkan, in the midst of Belgrade, had his guards, and they stood guard around his own house. They wore uniforms, they had weapons. So it was something that wasn't a volunteer ²⁹¹⁵⁸ unit in the field, it was something that was taking place in the heart of Belgrade. I don't think that was normal, and I think that that was something that irritated the citizens.

Q. Paragraph 108. Did you ever --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, before you go on. Mr. Jovic, you also said that Mr. Milosevic said that Arkan was a criminal and that it was unthinkable that official organs would cooperate with someone like Arkan. What did you understand that to mean then? Because on the one hand you have told us that the army felt that the paramilitaries were not subordinated to them. On the other hand, Mr. Milosevic is expressing a view that it was almost unthinkable -- it was unthinkable for official organs to cooperate with someone like Arkan. What in fact was the reality?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not say that the volunteer units were not subordinated to the army. What I said was that they tried at times not to adhere to military discipline imposed by the army. And secondly, as far as Arkan himself is concerned, I told you how things stood. I asked Mr. Milosevic, in view of the great criticisms that the public was making with regard to Arkan and the suspicions that he was the extended arm of the police in a way and the fact that people thought he might be a criminal, whether that was true, and whether it was true that Arkan, in one way or another, was linked to the police and was working in cahoots with it. He told me that that was not true, that Arkan was an ordinary criminal, and that he's a common criminal. And I said, well, if they did have some relationships, that they should be stopped so ²⁹¹⁵⁹ we shouldn't be criticised for things like that. That's what we talked about.

Now, what happened next, I really don't know.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, 108 and 109 are not included in the paragraphs we ordered to be given live.

MR. NICE: Thank you, Your Honour, for this relief. Much thanks, and I'll turn on to page, in the English, 32, paragraph 119.

Q. We're moving on again still out of sequence. I'll come back to everything else insofar as I have time later. But we're now up in April of 1992, and I'm wondering if it may not make sense, actually, to -- perhaps if I can just go back and summarise some of the material that's in your statement and, therefore, can be taken as read, starting at paragraph 116 with signing of the Vance Plan, which would be -- was a good thing, you judge, because it would be implemented at a time when all the territory inhabited by the majority Serb population had been liberated. Perhaps you would just help us, please, Mr. Jovic with the term "liberated." You apply "liberated" to the change of control of what type of population and in what setting?

A. Well, that's not perhaps the best expression, I must admit, but what I had in mind was the fact that for the most part at that point in time in all parts of Croatia populated by a majority Serb population, the Croatian paramilitary units did not succeed in taking over control. So that would be the essence of what I meant. So still or, rather, again if it hadn't been the case previously, power and authority was in the hands ²⁹¹⁶⁰ of the local regular organs of the Serbian people, and the Yugoslav People's Army was still located there. So that is the sense of it. Now, the term "liberated" was perhaps not the best choice because I was tired and didn't realise that I had used it, but that is the explanation that I'm giving now.

Q. I'm grateful for that. I think we may find the term elsewhere in your diary and I'm wondering if you could help us with what it reflects as a mind-set, as it's called, or the thinking of the leadership. This is for Serb majority areas where -- in Croatia, where they come under Serb control. How would you describe for us, please, the position of the minority residents in those areas? What happens to them at the time that, although it may be an unhappy word, the Serbs are liberated? Can you help us?

A. First of all, I have cleared up the point that the territories were still free territories. Not liberated but free. Now, if a certain territory on which the majority population were the Serbs had been taken control of by Croatian paramilitary units and then was retaken control of by the Serb army or Yugoslav army, only in that case can we say that the territory was liberated once again. So that the explanation is a relative one because you can't liberate yourself, of course, unless somebody has occupied you in the first place.

So let's leave it at that, but I do accept that I perhaps used that term erroneously and what I've just explained is the substance of the matter.

Now, the question as to what to do with others, never did anybody ²⁹¹⁶¹ in the Yugoslav state Presidency and, as far as I know, in the politics and policies pursued by Serbia either, never advocated the position or strove in favour of not having in those territories other people living there too, that other nations should live there too, not only the Serbs, just as it was always our policy to see that in Serbia, which was a multi-nationality or multi-ethnic environment, that all three nationalities should live on a footing of equality. That was never called into question. The only thing was that the territory on which the population was a majority Serb population were still under the power and authority of the Serbs as citizens exercising their power in the local government organs and they did not agree in the decision taken by the Sabor Croatian Assembly by which the Serbs would no longer be a constituent nation, which they had been, and the constitution had been amended contrary to their will, and they did not agree that Croatia secede from Yugoslavia without their will and without solving the Serb question. Otherwise, of course they -- all the other people should remain living where they had lived until then.

Q. As paragraph 116 makes clear, in your judgement, you were quick to accept the deployment of UN forces because this would have guaranteed the securing of military gains; is that correct, your view?

A. Well, this is how it was. You can interpret things with a certain goal in mind. What was going on there was a war, a civil war, and Serb territories were protected by force from the paramilitary Croatian units. It would have made no sense to wage war constantly and to have to defend oneself from those Croatian paramilitary units all the time. What should ²⁹¹⁶² have been done was to put a stop to it and seek a political solution. That was the opportune thing to do at that point in time when the Croats were on Croatian territory and the Serbs on Serbian territory. And some sort of political settlement was called for to stop going to war. And what we proposed was to have the UN troops come in until a political settlement be found.

So that was the meaning and sense of it, not that they had assumed control of the territory but because it was predominantly a Serb authority on those Serb territories or where the majority population were the Serbs, and that was advantageous to the Serbian people and that they would accept it then.

Q. Very well. Paragraph 117 records acting Secretary of State Eagleburger telling you that the American people will take a long time to forget Vukovar, to which we will return later in your evidence, and also that he couldn't understand why Dubrovnik had been shelled. But over the page in the English version and at the end of this paragraph, you deal with the postulated meeting of the accused and Tudjman at Karadjordjevo. You say you were not present. You declined to discuss it with Eagleburger, and you said at the time that you didn't know what had happened there; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you make comment elsewhere in your statement about your views on the accused if in fact there was an agreement at Karadjordjevo where the accused and Tudjman discussed the division of Bosnia if there was such a meeting to such an effect. What's your view on the accused as a result ²⁹¹⁶³ of it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have a remark to make, Mr. May, an objection.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says here in paragraph 117, which Mr. Nice is quoting from, and in fact the witness says quite clearly: "I told him that Serbia was decisively against the break-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it is a pure lie that there were negotiations between Serbia and Croatia on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina." And then he goes on to say: "It is possible that Milosevic and Tudjman did talk at the meeting in Karadjordjevo but as I wasn't there I didn't want to discuss that with Eagleburger." And Nice is now saying that if an agreement was reached, as if the witness said an agreement was reached. He never makes any mention of an agreement, and had there been anything, he must have known about it, whereas he presents the view that we were opposed to the division of.

JUDGE MAY: We will come back to that after the adjournment. Perhaps, Mr. Nice, you could rephrase it in a way which is as neutral as possible.

MR. NICE: Certainly.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Jovic, we're going to adjourn now for 20 minutes. This is the first adjournment during your evidence, and I must warn you, as we warn all witnesses, not to speak to anybody, please, about your evidence until it's over, and that does include the members of the Prosecution team. ²⁹¹⁶⁴

MR. NICE: I understand the witness wants to ask you something about contact with his lawyer.

JUDGE MAY: You can talk about that, of course. Yes. We will adjourn for 20 minutes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

--- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: We were --

JUDGE KWON: Before we begin, during the adjournment, I checked the tab 6 of Prosecution's Exhibit 396. It was an annex of secret council letter, and there were no boxes in there. The comments which is alleged -- asserted as Ambassador Okun's comments, I say that it is an interpretation of the OTP as his comments. So if you -- I don't think we have to put to the witness what other witnesses had stated, but if you'd like to do that, you have to do it very clearly.

MR. NICE: I'm sorry that that error crept in. The document came to me and I understood it to be what it was, but we have the witness's answers, but of course the observations upon which they were founded lose the force of a quotation in the form of a document.

JUDGE KWON: Okay.

MR. NICE: As to the question we were asking before the adjournment, we were at, the Chamber will recall, page 32 in the English, paragraph 117. If the Chamber would be good enough to come back, keeping a finger there, to paragraph 71, and if the witness would look at ²⁹¹⁶⁵ paragraph --

A. Just a moment, please. May I ask the volume to be put down. It's too loud. That's better now.

MR. NICE: Although paragraph 71 is one I can take from the witness statement, I was hoping for the witness to give a fresh answer to the proposition so the Chamber could hear it fresh, but the question is here in the text of his statement.

Q. And from paragraph 71, tell the Judges, please, Mr. Jovic, if it were shown that the accused indeed had had a discussion with Tudjman on the partition of Bosnia, would that show that he had withheld that from you; and if so, what would that do to your opinion of the accused?

A. Well, first of all, I should like to say that everything written in that paragraph, and the first thing is this, that I was never informed by Mr. Milosevic that at a possible meeting of that kind they discussed -- he discussed -- possibly discussed with Mr. Tudjman the partition of Bosnia. That's the first point.

The second point is that when I heard from Mr. Mesic, when I was given information of this kind which he conveyed to the public, that he was saying what he was saying in order to inflict damage on Tudjman because he had come to a political clash with him. And all the circumstances pointed to the fact that it was highly unlikely that Mr. Milosevic could have discussed anything like that. Now, the third point that I wanted to make is this: Why did I believe Mesic not to be telling the truth? Because --

Q. I'm going to interrupt you, Mr. Jovic, because we're very pressed ²⁹¹⁶⁶ for time and the Judges have heard a lot of other evidence about this, including from Mr. Markovic to whom I want to turn. If the Judges in due course decide that such a meeting occurred and it was kept from you, what does that tell you about the accused? That's the only question, hypothetical, that I want you to deal with.

A. Well, it's very simple: That means that in that case, Milosevic didn't want to inform me about that. But that was highly unlikely, as far as I was concerned, and I should now like to say that that would be another blot in our relationship which otherwise was one of trust and confidence.

Q. Back to paragraph 117 of -- yes, 117. The end of that we have four exhibits, tabs 6, 7, 8, and 9. Have you reviewed from the 21st of February - and we needn't look at any except one of these documents - an invitation for a session of the PSFRY to be held on the 27th of February, exhibit -- tab 7, the minutes in shorthand of the session actually held on the 2nd of March; tab 8, the minutes of the 89th -- 189th session held on that day; and then Exhibit 9, the shorthand notes of the session with representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 2nd of March, item 9. You reviewed all those documents?

A. Yes, I have reviewed them.

Q. And they appear to be genuine?

A. Yes.

MR. NICE: From tab 7, Your Honours, I want to just look at one passage, which I'm going to place on the overhead projector in English, and I'm going to ask the witness to read a passage for us from the ²⁹¹⁶⁷ original.

We can see, if the usher would be good enough, that Mr. Zecevic speaks following Kostic but before Kostic - on the previous page, please - we will see that Mr. Jovic was speaking.

Q. So, Mr. Jovic, the document shows that Zecevic spoke just shortly after you did, and can you please now in the original find the passage Zecevic's noted contribution, which begins, "This is a very complex issue."

It's further down the page, please. It's on the next page. It must be. Yes. It's the fourth line on the page at the moment and it begins: "This is a very complex issue." Zecevic is speaking, and he says -- do you find this in the original text, please, Mr. Jovic. "This is a very complex issue. Instinctively, everything Croatian was destroyed and burned there in order to prevent them from returning. It is the truth that we cannot live together. We do not want it, and we will not." Now, you were at that meeting in March of 1992, page 78 and 79 of tab 7 in B/C/S, for the accused. Can you explain how something like that could be said in your presence at that meeting, please?

A. Well, I can't seem to find that sentence, but from the contents I see that it is there somewhere. It's like this: This is -- these are large stenographic notes numbering some 100 pages, and this can be understood only if one understands the conclusions that were made, and especially if one reads through everything that was stated on the occasion.

The substance of the meeting was this: Preparation for the ²⁹¹⁶⁸ arrival of the UN peacekeepers into the territory of Republika Srpska Krajina and also the tasks and assignments of what should be done when this happens.

One of the tasks that we discussed was to ensure all citizens who were persecuted or had to leave their homes for whatever reason to return to their homes and that conditions be provided that they can live and work there normally and that life can continue there normally. And that is stated in the Yugoslav state Presidency conclusions. One of the episodes here was that Mr. Zecevic said, "But we have a village," he said, "in which the Croats live, and they were instinctively expelled." So it wasn't pursuant to a plan or an order, it was that the citizens expelled each other, and in this case it was this group that was expelled. And he was wondering what could be done. He was complaining and wanted to see what could be done. And unfortunately, their property was burnt. And he said that he was afraid that if they come back, it will be very difficult because it was -- inter-nationality relations were such that they would have found it difficult to co-exist together. So the conclusions we made was that everybody was to return to where they had originally lived and that conditions should be provided for them to live and work normally. And if anything -- any property was burnt, it would have to be rebuilt again. That was the conclusion that the Presidency made. And the man said what he said. The conclusion was along the lines of the sole political option possible.

Q. And just so that I can understand it and then we'll move on, that's your explanation of the phrase "Destroyed and burned there in order ²⁹¹⁶⁹ to prevent them from returning"; is that right?

A. Instinctively. And I insist upon the word. He said instinctively, not that it was planned by the authorities or ordered by anyone, but instinctively, which means the revolt of the Serb people towards them because they had come to loggerheads between themselves.

JUDGE MAY: Which page is that, please?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is page 79 in that particular document.

MR. NICE: In the English version, I think it is page 84 of 149. No. Ms. Dicklich tells me I'm wrong.

JUDGE KWON: If you can find the number ending with ET number 2829.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much. Can I move on to four exhibits that Your Honours will want to know are late provided, although they have been viewed with the witness, because they were, until I think yesterday, under the grip of Rule 70. They're tabs 10, 11, 12, and 13. I can summarise them because the witness has reviewed them.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Now, what is it, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On most of the pages that I was provided in English, there is no ERN number or any other number or the page number either. So probably this was done in haste and omitted in haste. But it is very difficult to find my way around if you don't read through the whole text. I can show you the pages, and where I show you ²⁹¹⁷⁰ this document there's Gligorovic, Kostic, Grigorijevic, Kostic, and so on, but nowhere do I see a single reference, and you can take a look at my copy in the English version to the page number, or ERN number, or anything else.

JUDGE MAY: It's unpaginated. It's unpaginated. Perhaps you could have a look at that over the adjournment so we can make sure we can follow it.

MR. NICE:

Q. As to tabs 10 to -- 10, 11, 12, and 13, is it right, Mr. Jovic, that you've reviewed a letter Mendiluce UNHCR dated the 19th of March, 1992, drawing to your attention a number of recent incidents? To that, did you reply -- no. Is there another letter that you've reviewed of yours dated April the 28th of 1992 to General Nambiar referring to a letter of his from April the 24th in which he draws to your attention cases of violent expulsion of citizens of Croatian nationality from their homes and refers to a letter of Mr. Thornberry, and you express your resolve to prevent all forms of forcible eviction. You then reviewed another letter from Mr. Thornberry of the 25th of June of 1992, where he deals with 232 people of Croatian origin, including 160 wounded taken prisoner during Vukovar and for whom news was sought. And have you then reviewed a letter not by you but by Mile Pesut to Mr. Thornberry dealing with those concerns?

A. Yes, I have seen those letters.

Q. And so by those letters and your replies which can be studied in full if appropriate, you were put on notice about international concern ²⁹¹⁷¹ about forcible eviction and, in particular, about people missing from Vukovar?

A. We reacted to every letter we received, and what we did was we took steps with the relevant organs for them to look into the matter and to prepare responses to the UN organs and measures to be taken to prevent what was going on and what our attention was being drawn to in the letters. And we informed Mr. Thornberry and Mr. Nambiar immediately about that and those letters speak about that and speak about those matters at greater length, because they mention several hundred people, without saying who they were, just the numbers from Vukovar, and in our reply we said that all the people that came into the hands of our army, we told them where they were, where those people were transported to, how many of them were cared for, received treatment, how many exchanged, and so on. So detailed information and reports were sent out.

Q. Just help me with this, please, Mr. Jovic, before we move on. You know the nature of the allegations about Vukovar generally. Do you accept now that this massacre occurred, and if it did, of course it occurred at a time when you were part of the Commander-in-Chief of the army. Do you accept that it occurred?

A. I was never informed about that while I occupied my post. Much later, I learnt about this from the information media or, rather, from the work of this Tribunal.

Q. And can you offer any explanation, just to help us, with how, if the JNA were involved and you were the Commander-in-Chief, that this never came to your attention at all? Can you help us? ²⁹¹⁷²

A. Well, this conditional "if the army were involved," that is a hypothetical, and to the best of our knowledge, what we -- according to what we did, the army did not have orders to do anything like that. On the contrary, it had a strict ban on doing anything like that. And we don't know that anybody from the army ordered that or that anybody from the army carried it out. That's what I can say, and it is up to the Court to establish the truth.

Q. Did you or your successors, to your knowledge, order an inquiry into the circumstances of the Vukovar massacre that led to a report?

A. We were not informed about that, about any massacre, so we could not have given any orders under those circumstances. What happened subsequently, I don't know.

Q. Paragraph 119, which has to be given in full, and 120, I think. 30th of April, 1992, was there a conversation involving Kostic, the accused, Bulatovic, Zivota Panic who now replaced Adzic, and including Karadzic, Krajisnik, and Koljevic?

A. Yes, such a meeting was held, such a conversation did take place. It took place, and basically this was a discussion during which agreement was supposed to be reached as to what should be done with the Yugoslav People's Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the situation when the international community recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. We already said that we in Serbia, Mr. Milosevic and I, thought that we should not allow by any means for there to be a procrastination in this respect, because we would have been attacked for that, and we were under attack anyway with reason and without reason, so we held this ²⁹¹⁷³ meeting in order to see how we would withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina all citizens of Serbia and Montenegro.

Let me clarify this. The army of Yugoslavia consists of the citizens of all republics. As Yugoslavia fell apart, in terms of facilities, equipment, and personnel, they belonged to the appropriate republics. So the -- so Serbia and Montenegro were only entitled to their own citizens, to the facilities and equipment that were located in Serbia. Of course in that situation, our only obligation was vis-a-vis all the citizens of Serb and Montenegrin ethnicity, to get them out of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to return them home. This decision was passed, and the deadline involved was 15 days.

As for the people in Bosnia, they were supposed to decide about their own citizens, their own facilities, their own equipment, their own army, because that is what the international community decided, that they were, an independent state. Of course --

Q. Very well. Was the question of the wages and pensions and so on for the military raised; and if so, with what resolution?

A. Yes. All the expenses of the military until then were financed from the federal budget. So the army did belong to the federal budget, and all the officers and soldiers were paid out of that budget and everything else was paid out of the federal budget because the army was a common army. Of course, then people from Bosnia raised the question of how they would act then. We realised that there was a problem, but we did not discuss it then. We only discussed the return of Serbs and Montenegrins to their homes from Bosnia. ²⁹¹⁷⁴

Q. Was General Mladic moved as a result of this meeting?

A. Yes. In the following way: It was established that General Vukovic, who was the military commander in the area, was a Serb and therefore he had to be withdrawn. Then they said, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik, that they would then appoint Mr. Mladic as commander. And we consider that to be their decision and we did not make any comments to that effect.

Q. With what frequency did the accused have contact with Karadzic?

A. Well, that is what he and Karadzic would have to be asked, because I haven't got any records of this nature. I can assume, though, that their contacts had to exist in relation to humanitarian aid that Bosnia had constantly expected from Serbia because it was a country in war and under a blockade. And also, there were peace initiatives, and the international community always asked for Milosevic to take part in this. It was also natural for him to take part in this because Serbia was under sanctions before the war in Bosnia was brought to an end. And those are probably the reasons that made it necessary for them to be in contact often. That is a general answer, but I really do not know with what exact frequency they met.

Q. Paragraph 124 and following. On the nature of the accused, substantially drawn from your second book, the Book on Milosevic. The Court will see here many pages to get through. I'm going to ask the witness to deal with these issues very briefly.

Paragraph 124, the accused as a democrat or an autocrat, please; your comments. ²⁹¹⁷⁵

A. These are very unpleasant questions for me here before this Court. In the book, I struck a balance in terms of his own traits, if that is what this is about -- this is a personal opinion of mine and they cannot and should not serve as a basis for anybody's judgement. The entire book as a whole can be used by someone to see what my opinion of Milosevic is, except for the facts that I refer to in the book as well. As for my assessment of Mr. Milosevic, he was an undisputed leader. He was recognised by the citizens, by the population, and he was elected with a vast majority in the elections. He was very intelligent, a very capable statesman, but in my opinion, he was inclined towards reaching even major decisions without consulting even the organs that are in charge of that. So many decision were passed on the basis of his authority and some were wrong.

That is what my assessment would be. Of course, my assessment is my assessment, but it is up to others to accept this or not accept it.

Q. And I think you regard yourself as a close if not his closest associate for many years; correct?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Still on paragraph 124. To what degree was the accused able to dispose of people once he'd finished using them for a particular purpose?

A. Regrettably, this is what was done often in the leaderships of our party and our governments and our Assemblies. A great many people went through them, and they are no longer present in politics, not in traces, and quite a few people who were involved in politics were dismissed by him. ²⁹¹⁷⁶

Q. To what degree did retention of power personally drive him?

A. I did not quite understand the question. Could you please clarify it a bit.

Q. To what degree was his retaining power, his remaining in power, a goal of his?

A. Well, it is the objective of any politician to retain power. But if this is viewed in the context of achieving programme objectives or perhaps sacrificing some programme objectives in order to retain power, I think that in that case, advantage would be given to retaining power rather than abiding by programme objectives and goals. I think that that assessment would be correct.

Q. Paragraph 125, last sentence. To what extent did he find himself surrounded by people who would not only obey but also perhaps glorify him?

A. Well, that is a natural consequence. If a person that has a very strong personality is convinced that he can reach decisions on his own, conceive of them on his own and defend them - if we were to go into great detail, perhaps it would be a bit labourious - then it would only be natural for such a person to focus on persons who would simply be carrying out his decisions.

Q. Very well.

A. Those who would not change the decisions in any way. That is the kind of selection that would be made, people who would be willing to carry out these decisions and, finally, to be part of a team that is working towards the attainment of those objectives.

Therefore, in my opinion, this selection was based on taking ²⁹¹⁷⁷ trustworthy people who would carry out the decisions made.

Q. There was a personality cult at some stage with, I think, people carrying photographs of you. How did the personality cult develop for the accused?

A. Well, this was sometime in 1988 and 1989 when there were big rallies held in Serbia demanding the persecutions of Serbs to be stopped in Kosovo, and perhaps this was the biggest exodus that ever took place in Europe, the Serbs leaving Kosovo, but Europe was unwilling to see it or unwilling to say or do anything about it. Milosevic was practically the first one to start dealing with that problem and to try to stop this. And he enjoyed the massive support of citizens. At these rallies they carried photographs, big photographs of Milosevic and of a few other prominent officials.

On one occasion, I asked Milosevic for have this -- to have this brought to an end, because we had had enough of a personality cult with Stalin, with Tito, and we were not supposed to repeat this choreography, so -- Milosevic did not really say anything about it. I saw that something was done about it, though. All the other pictures were removed, and his stayed on. And the personality cult in -- was, therefore, even enhanced.

Q. Paragraph 128. Communist, socialist, and to what degree did he care about the principles of social justice?

A. We had a programme of the Socialist Party, and Mr. Milosevic was the president of the party. The main objective of this programme was the idea of social justice. Regrettably, in the period that we are talking ²⁹¹⁷⁸ about, those ten years or so, especially over the last five or six years, there were grave sanctions that were imposed on the country, and all of the people became impoverished, but a very narrow circle got very rich. So the divide between the very few very rich people and the vast majority of the poor people grew further. And I characterise this as a failure in terms of the programme that we had established. And in some way, the party that was in power had to be held responsible for that.

Q. Paragraph 129. To what degree was he a nationalist; and then at the end of that paragraph, if you can deal with this issue for the learned Judges, how did he deal with state controlled businesses and why?

A. As regards nationalism, Mr. Milosevic quite certainly, and I'm saying this not by way of a personal assessment, but I am really convinced of this, that he always advocated and pursued in practice the position that nobody should be handicapped or persecuted because he's a Serb. Everybody had to be equal. He was not a chauvinist, never. You can be sure of that. He was decidedly against separatism. Not because somebody is of a different ethnic background but because they wanted to secede. I'm talking about Serbia proper now.

The secession of Slovenia, Croatia, et cetera, is a completely different matter.

So he was not a nationalist, he was not a chauvinist. He never agreed with anything being done against someone because he's not a Serb or that he should not be equal because of that, that's for sure. As for his attitude towards socially owned property, our factories, for the most part, practically all of them, were socially owned ²⁹¹⁷⁹ property, as it was called. In a way, it was state owned but the form was slightly different, and the state had a dominant influence in terms of appointing directors, managers, and regulating the conditions for economic performance. However, by virtue of the fact that the state was influential in terms of personnel decisions, it could also use its influence in terms of the allocations made in the area. So this was the material base of power. The Socialist Party of Serbia did not have its own companies, it did not have its own property or its own capital from which it would be financed. And it is only natural that members of the Socialist Party who were in high positions in these factories were an important factor in terms of its importance. They could decide who they would assist, et cetera. But this economy was getting weaker and weaker by the day, due to sanctions but also due to the very concept underlying the economy. It did not have the strength to move on as a private economy would.

I think I cannot make any claims to this effect, but I think that Mr. Milosevic felt this. On the other hand, there were new privately owned enterprises held by the so-called nouveau riche. And again, this is my very own opinion: Mr. Milosevic I think believed that it would be very dangerous for our policies if this new economy were to get a political representative of their own, their own political parties that could suppress us with the material strength that they would have, because one always needed resources. He pursued a policy of having these owners get closer to him and thereby be under his control as well.

Q. Paragraph 132, control of mass media, television, radio, ²⁹¹⁸⁰ newspapers. You refer earlier in your statement to writing articles about Markovic, I think it is. Tell us about the accused's influence over or control over media.

A. Please, let it be clear: The most important media in our country, in Serbia - because I'm talking about Serbia - those that have a crucial impact on citizens were TV Belgrade, Radio Belgrade, and up to a degree, the Politika daily, which is the major newspaper in the country. It is true that we had hundreds of other media that were not under government control and under Milosevic's influence. They were opposition media. But they were not that far-reaching as far as radio and television was concerned. Their broadcasts were not that extensive, and the circulation of these newspapers was negligible. So the most important reason was that TV Serbia reached every home, whereas local stations only reached very limited local areas.

As for the influence of Mr. Milosevic over state television and state radio and the Politika daily, it was a major influence, a decisive influence. That is true, and that is what was predominant in terms of how people were informed.

Q. Did he use the media to elevate or undermine his fellow Serb leaders - just yes or no - and if so, have you in your book given examples of how he did that?

A. To the extent to which this was necessary in terms of pursuing policy, the media were used, of course. There were situations, there were times when Mr. Milan Babic was so obstinate that did he not want to accept the Vance Plan, and of course the media had to be involved in persuading ²⁹¹⁸¹ the people that Babic had to be replaced because this was against the interest of the Serb people. Then there would come another time when somebody else was supposed to be chosen, and it was assessed that Mr. Martic could be the person, and then of course the media perhaps promoted Martic to a greater extent perhaps than he had actually deserved by way of his activity until then. And so on and so forth. This was referred to in the book and explained in the book. Of course the media were always used in the interest of the policy that was being pursued.

Q. As you know, we are concerned here, Mr. Jovic, and we discussed this the last few days, with, if the Prosecution case is right, the most terrible crimes being committed by people over a short period of time, and it may or may not be that there will be evidence about how that mechanism operates. Just for this purpose, was the accused aware of the power of media on the people he led?

A. Well, of course he was aware of it. Mr. Milosevic, by virtue of the fact that he attempted and succeeded in influencing to a great degree the orientation of the media that I refer to, TV, radio, and the Politika daily, he did understand what the mood of the people was. I don't know in which context grave crimes are exactly being referred to now, but this is information and political activity directed at the citizens, at the general public. We're talking about media in Serbia. We -- this did not go beyond Serbia except marginally, perhaps.

Q. You refer to the phrase "What is not published does not happen at all." Can you amplify that for us, please? Paragraph 134.

A. That is a - how should I put this? - a slogan, a phrase that ²⁹¹⁸² Mr. Milosevic espoused. He thought that if citizens were informed about something, then they knew that it happened, and if they were not informed, then simply they did not deal with such issues, and he simply thought that it was very important for state television and radio to report primarily in the interest of current politics.

So if something is not in the interest of current politics, it doesn't have to be published.

Q. Paragraphs 135, 136 and following, to what degree did the accused regard the party, the SPS, as his property? To what degree did party activity cease to be, at some stage, real activity, or real democratic activity?

A. Well, this has to do with what I spoke of earlier, the method that Mr. Milosevic applied basically in decision-making. Of course, according to the statute of the Socialist Party, it was envisaged that decisions, main decisions, should be reached by the Congress and then by the Main Committee between two Congresses. Then there is also an Executive Committee that is in charge of carrying these decisions out in practice. The problem was that in a way from the 3rd Congress onwards, and especially at the 3rd Congress, in my opinion, the democratic way of choosing people into the leadership was abandoned. Lists of candidates for the Main Committee were under strict control according to the characteristics of people who would be eligible. Others simply could not be elected. And then after that, it would be very easy at the meeting of the Main Committee, and that is the committee that operated between two Congresses, that any meeting of the Main Committee, any decision that was ²⁹¹⁸³ proposed would be accepted even without a debate, or if there were a debate, there weren't any dissenting voices.

This happened because, in my opinion, candidates for the Main Committee were only people who would act in that way, who would not create any problems in terms of what was being proposed originally. However, unfortunately, a single person cannot be infallible under such circumstances, no matter how intelligent and how capable, as was the case of Mr. Milosevic, and it was proven that there were many mistakes that were made in this policy. It is for such mistakes that people lose power, and ultimately he did lose power. Of course this doesn't have anything to do with other matters, but it does have to do with confidence and the loss of power.

Q. The last sentence of paragraph 136 is your language. Can you review it and tell us if you adopt it.

A. Yes. That's precisely what I was talking about. I do agree. That is the essence of the matter.

Q. "Party activity turned into a farce" is the phrase. Then if we can move on. I think you by implication already dealt with the power of the Presidency of the SPS. You held that position for a time when the accused wasn't able to hold it for constitutional reasons. The rest of the time he held it, or part of the rest of the time. And you contrast the power that he had when president of the party with the power you had. In a sentence or so, could you just explain that?

A. It was like this: Mr. Milosevic was the absolute authority regardless of whether he was party president or not. Not a single ²⁹¹⁸⁴ important decision in Serbia was taken without him nor could it have been made without him, either when I was president or when I wasn't president. Therefore, we always respected his opinions as the number one man, regardless of the fact that he wasn't president of the party at that time. And he personally was very interested in everything, and he didn't agree that decisions be made without his taking part. And of course, that problem never arose. We didn't put things that way at all.

Q. Paragraph 139. You say -- you deal with his monopoly on personal politics in all institutions. Is there anything you want to add about that, please?

A. That was the way he functioned and ruled, and in view of the fact that the method of ruling, or power and authority was, in fact, a way not of selecting people who would debate subject matter from different aspects and bring in the best decisions but people who would be obedient. And if you have a situation of that kind, then you need people you can trust. So he had to have people who he could trust to accept the decisions he made. So cadres policy for this method of work was necessary, and Mr. Milosevic understood that very well. And he paid strict attention to who was on the list for the main party board and who the candidates were for the popular deputies and the list of candidates for the government of the Republic of Serbia and the list of candidates for federal deputy, and so on and so forth, all positions where decisions were made. He took care of all that because he didn't want to clash with anybody with respect to the policies he wished to wage.

Q. Thank you. Paragraph 143. His control over Montenegrin leaders, ²⁹¹⁸⁵ please.

A. Well, I think that the leaders from Montenegro were relatively independent in Montenegro. They were autonomous, but they had a proper form of cooperation with Serbia over the long run, and with Mr. Milosevic himself. That was looking at it in general terms. That would be generally correct. Because they had come to power on the wave of changes that took place in Serbia at the end of the 1980s, for instance, and Mr. Milosevic headed those changes. So in a way, they were in Montenegro what we ourselves were in Serbia, and from that, the nature of the cooperation emerged and was based on those grounds. Of course, they were from similar kindred parties, that is to say the League of Communists of Serbia and the League of Communists of Montenegro, and that was quite understandable.

Now, somewhat later on some conflicts did arise, and I mention the fact that there was not complete agreement on all matters. For example, when the federal constitution of Yugoslavia was being drawn up, the leaders of Montenegro aspired towards great autonomy for the republics. They wanted to see the republics have at least as much power and independence as they had in the SFRY, whereas Mr. Milosevic and I myself, I agreed with him there, we worked together, we thought that we ought to strengthen the federation because the federation up until that time, the SFRY, had some serious weaknesses in its power and competence. So it wasn't able to function properly at all times.

A compromise was found, but what I want to say is that there was not an identity of opinions on all matters. And a similar situation arose ²⁹¹⁸⁶ when I mentioned the Carrington Plan, for example.

Q. Paragraph 144. You deal with the ability of republican bodies, of federal bodies -- of the employees of federal bodies to be dismissed. Can you just deal with that, please. Perhaps I should say the vulnerability of the --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection to make, Mr. May.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not believe that the witness could have said that they had -- I had the power and authority to dismiss functionaries in federal organs.

JUDGE MAY: Well, let the witness give his evidence. Yes. What was the question you wanted?

MR. NICE:

Q. I want to know from the witness the circumstances in which federal employees could be dismissed if they didn't act on the decisions of their respective republics.

A. Well, probably it wasn't federal employees. It was functionaries from the republics in the federation. So if that's what that is about, then I shall be happy to explain.

The members of the Yugoslav state Presidency were elected by the Assembly of Serbia, so it is the Assembly of Serbia electing that body and dismissing it. The Federal Assembly just takes note of those elections and they become members of the SFRY. That's the first point. The second point is that the members of the Yugoslav state ²⁹¹⁸⁷ Presidency are duty-bound to coordinate relations within the federation by means of the fact that the positions taken by their republics would be advocated in the federation and a compromise solution sought which would be in the interests of one and all. In that way, the members of the Yugoslav state Presidency can only function successfully if what they advocate there is advocated and promoted by their own republic. Otherwise, to the contrary, we'd have an impossible situation in which the Yugoslav state Presidency makes a decision on a matter, whereas the republic that one of the Presidency members represents says, "That's not our view. That's not what we want and what we advocate." So that is not possible on a legal basis.

So under those conditions, each republic has the right to dismiss the Presidency representative if he deviates from the interests of that particular republic. And this is precisely what happened when Croatia replaced Stipe Suvar, for example, who was an elected Yugoslav state Presidency member, and he was in office for approximately a year, and then sent Stipe Mesic to replace him, who was better able and they considered that he would be better capable of representing their interests. So representing the interests of a republic is a constitutional duty, and the republic does have the right to replace its own representative. Now, who it's going to put forward is another matter.

Q. And just dealing with Mr. Mesic, he says how it was that you would refer, apparently in the course of meetings, back to Belgrade and to the accused, and I think you accept in your statement you would have done so; is that right? ²⁹¹⁸⁸

A. I'm not sure I understood your question.

Q. In meetings we've heard how you would leave meetings in order to be able to make phone calls and then come back.

A. Ah, yes.

Q. And you accept that you did that because you had to refer to the accused for instructions or advice?

A. No. I never said that, and that's not true. I was in constant communication with Mr. Milosevic in building up our policies and positions. I would never leave Presidency meetings to go and telephone to Mr. Milosevic to ask him whether I was allowed to act in one way or another. That's just insinuation on somebody's part.

Q. Paragraph 145, please. You deal with the promotion of the obedient by the accused. You may have touched already on this, but you used the phrase "political purges" in your book, so perhaps you'd just help us with that.

A. Well, I explained that in my book. There were several cases to the effect that people were dismissed, replaced if they were no longer needed or what they said or the things they did did not suit or they had accomplished what they were expected to do and were no longer elected. And there were cases of direct replacement without any explanations given. But mostly a method was applied by which people were used while they had a use and while they were willing not to make any complications, and they were done away with when that was no longer the case.

Q. And in the national parliament, paragraph 146, how did the accused deal with those who thought differently from the thinking of his ²⁹¹⁸⁹ government?

A. We're not talking about the Federal Assembly, we're talking about the republican Assembly. Mr. Milosevic couldn't do anything along those lines in the Federal Assembly. Of course, he could withdraw his own deputies but he couldn't change the composition of the entire Assembly. What we're talking about here is his right as president of the republic to disband the Assembly, the parliament, which he used at the time. And what happened was that there was an organised, heated debate in the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia about the work of the government, and there was endless criticism which went on for several days or weeks. And Mr. Milosevic decided to disband the Assembly or parliament and to elect a new one, and this state of affairs was cut short with that act. That's one fact.

Q. Dealing with some of the things comparatively briefly: The history of the appointment or selection of Milan Panic and his removal from office, he being somebody from America, otherwise unknown in former Yugoslavia. Is that an example of the accused's control of individuals? It's dealt with between paragraphs 147 and 149.

A. Well, that was a drastic example, if you will. Mr. Milosevic enjoyed great authority within the party and he wielded that authority and the decisions were taken which were not sometimes checked out fully. One of those decisions was the proposal for us to elect Milan Panic as Prime Minister of the federal government. The procedure was such that our Executive Board in the party should okay that, and then our deputy group, which enjoyed the majority in parliament, together I think with another ²⁹¹⁹⁰ party, should have accepted that. There were quite a lot of difficulties at the Executive Board to have this explained to the members, because nobody knew who the man was. And I found myself explaining something I didn't know about. I told them what Milosevic had told me. And this went through. In the deputy's club it was very difficult to pull that through, and we did vote on it, but there was a great deal of criticism, and the whole thing went through respecting and in fact using Mr. Milosevic's authority or that authority being wielded.

Q. I'm going to try to get through the end of this section -- I don't know how -- to what hour we're going to be able to sit today?

JUDGE MAY: I think there may be another hearing in, so as quickly as you can, please, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think I'm going to trespass into tomorrow but I hope not by much.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: There is simply a limit to the degree to which I can require the witness to go too fast over this material if it has to be given in the ordinary way.

Q. But can you just help us with a tiny detail at the end of paragraph 150. You explained about your being dismissed and therefore barred festivities and so on. Something happened actually to a tape. Your image was removed from a tape. Can you just explain that and what that was all about.

A. Well, as to festivities and tapes, those are all marginal issues. The fact of the matter is that I was replaced, like many others, without ²⁹¹⁹¹ any explanation given and without any voting taken and without the right to appeal and without a written decision. Therefore, in a non-democratic way in the party. And I was forced to tender my resignation to the post of popular deputy. Of course the repercussions went further because I was isolated in all kinds of ways from society, and that is one detail. For example, I was never invited to attend state festivities although I was president of the Assembly of Serbia and of Yugoslavia and I held a series of other positions. And if you will, it went so far that when an official holiday was proclaimed, the day we amended the constitution, and I was president of the Assembly and constitutional committee and proclaimed the amendments to the constitution, and I myself was not invited to that national holiday let alone anything else.

Q. Your image was erased from some tapes you're saying here. I just want you to explain that.

A. Well, it was a tape on the proclamation of the constitution. That is to say the date when a national holiday was proclaimed. And each year when footage was shown of that session, it was shown without my image, without me being there, although I delivered the speech and I was up at the rostrum. So what the footage showed was all the people applauding but not the person actually delivering the speech.

Q. Finally on this point, although you have been very robust about being excluded from national events, so that the Judges, who may have no experience of this type of state can understand things, was there an incident involving a local school that was being opened where you were -- where your presence was restricted? ²⁹¹⁹²

A. First let's clarify one thing: I never protested for not having been invited.

Q. No, no. I said -- you were being robust.

A. What?

Q. I said you were being robust about it, you put up with it. Just tell us about --

A. Yes, I did accept it as a fact that I didn't have any influence on. I didn't feel happy about it, but I didn't protest at all. And as far as the local school is concerned, I mentioned that during the discussion, during our conversation as one example. At that time, what was being celebrated was the end of construction on a primary school in my local village, town, and the people in charge of the organisation came in from town and from the republic and from the municipality to attend the celebration, and they came and told me that I shouldn't be angry, but they just couldn't invite me to attend the celebration because they were told, "If you invite Boro Jovic to attend the celebration, there will be no celebration." So this was a method they used, a sort retaliation. I don't consider it to be a crime of any kind, just a method of work which was not acceptable.

Q. Thank you very much. It just paints the picture for us, you see.

MR. NICE: I don't know if the Chamber is looking for a time.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, I think we must come to it now, in fact.

MR. NICE: I will finish this passage in, I think, a short period of time tomorrow. I will review the extent, if any, to which I will seek to go over earlier ground but there are one or two topics and just one or ²⁹¹⁹³ two exhibits I haven't covered.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn until tomorrow. Mr. Jovic, could you be back, please, at 9.00 tomorrow morning to continue your evidence.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 19th day of

November, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.