Milosevic Transcript 2004-01-22

³¹²⁸⁸

Thursday, 22 January 2004

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we were following the summary, not the statement. There comes a passage which we must seek to deal with in private session. For those viewing, it won't last very long.

WITNESS: HRVOJE SARINIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter]

[Private session]

(redacted)

(redacted) ³¹²⁸⁹ Pages 31289 to 31295 redacted, private session

³¹²⁹⁶

(redacted)

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session. ³¹²⁹⁷

MR. NICE: Your Honour, tab 4 in the Exhibit 641 is the second statement of the witness admitted under 89(F) dealing with intercepts so far as he was able to, and documents produced relating to the existence of the State of Croatia. If I could invite your attention to tab 5. It's a table where the witness sets out comments on various intercepts. The typical course would be for these documents to be produced for identification purposes only at this stage.

The Court will recall that in respect of counter-intelligence intercepts, we are still awaiting the possibility of a witness being in the hands of others. We would particularly invite your attention to the comments of the witness which he adopts in respect of transcript number 4 where he says that he recognises the voice and that this was the type of tape he received contemporaneously from Tudjman. We would invite your attention to transcript 9 where he says that he recognises the intercept as one of those given by Tudjman a day or two after it was taken.

To number 11, where he says the same thing, one of the ones he was given by Tudjman at the time. And number 14 where at the end of the entry he says: This is one of the intercepts that I would have received at the time from Tudjman or from the intelligence services directly because I am name. And invite the Court's consideration in the possibility in respect of those four, not of admitting them for identification purposes only, but of admitting them because of the additional evidence that he can give to the effect I've summarised.

Your Honour, I don't desire to delay proceedings for that ³¹²⁹⁸ purpose. Having made the application, perhaps the exhibits generally can be reviewed at the end of the cross-examination. That, therefore, produces all the material before you, subject to the decision of the Court, because at tab 20 you will find the documents, his second 89(F) statement produces in respect of the existence of Croatia as a separate state, and those documents then go from tab 20 through to tab 35, I think. Sorry -- yes, 35. And the only other document that's here is a document that you can see at tab 36, which is in a sense a formal document. It deals with how intercepts came with transcripts but that those transcripts needed reviewing and correcting, and this is the declaration of the person who dealt with it.

Your Honour, that's -- and again, it may be that it will be preferable and appropriate to deal with the formal position of all the exhibits at the end of the evidence. If so, I have nothing further to ask of this witness.

JUDGE MAY: It will be necessary to go through these documents again in order to ensure that all the proper documents have been added. It will be necessary to, I suspect at some stage, for the whole lot to be considered, say in this case in particular, as to which should be admitted and which should not. Thank you.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. You've got an hour now to cross-examine. You will have some longer time after the adjournment. Make sure that the witness can understand what it is that you're putting.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume that the witness will ³¹²⁹⁹ ^{BLANK PAGE} ³¹³⁰⁰ understand what I'm saying to him, but what I'm interested in is how much time I'll have for this witness. As you can see, in the examination-in-chief he had a whole session and another half hour now. So as you're introducing pursuant to 89(F) a series of written materials, I consider that I ought to be given more time than you said yesterday. Yesterday you mentioned two hours and 15 minutes, which is almost the same as what you're giving me now.

JUDGE MAY: That is the time which is available. That was the ruling which we're going to follow on that, so you should follow that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I'm asking you for more time.

JUDGE MAY: Well, if you do not waste your time and you are making useful time, we might consider a short addition, but at the moment, that is the current amount that you must follow.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, you can switch my microphone off any time you like, and it wouldn't be the first time either. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Sarinic, as the closest associate of Tudjman, his advisor for a time, the Prime Minister for a time, the head of the service, the intelligence service for a time and so on and so forth, you participated in decision-making?

A. I occupied various posts, including the ones you mentioned. As for decision-making, my part in that was limited to a certain number of decisions and players in the decision-making process. So I wasn't the one who took part in all the decisions that were made, nor was I always present. However, on those occasions where I was present, I do agree with ³¹³⁰¹ what you said, yes.

Q. Many of those decisions had an influence on the activities of the Croatian leadership and the development of events in the region.

A. Do you mean the decisions that were made by President Tudjman?

Q. I mean the decisions made by the leadership of the Republic of Croatia and in which process you took part when you held all these high offices.

A. Well, yes, as I said, I was one of the people who talked to the president, and I attended various meetings at which decisions were made.

Q. Very well. Now, is it true that for you and the leadership, from the very outset there was never the possibility of having Croatia remain in Yugoslavia? That was never a possibility or, rather, the preservation of Yugoslavia.

A. No, that is not how it was. You know full well yourself that the Croatian leadership, when it saw what was happening and the turn of events and that the 1974 constitution was being obstructed and that Yugoslavia, to all intents and purposes, was disintegrating, then President Tudjman, in the name of Croatia, proposed a sort of flexible confederation which on your part -- loose federation which you rejected for your part.

Q. Well, Mr. Sarinic, you know full well that even before the elections at the founding Assembly of the HDZ party one of the goals was an Independent State of Croatia.

A. Well, I'm talking about the facts, the proposals that were made at the time, and in many of the pre-electoral campaigns, as you yourself are aware of, many things are said. All sorts of things are said. But let's ³¹³⁰² stick to the facts and discuss those.

Q. Yes, I am going to talk about the facts, Mr. Sarinic, and I'm going to ask you questions about those facts. But what I've just asked you is a fact itself as well. I don't suppose you said all sorts of things in the pre-election campaign, things you didn't actually believe in or think.

A. What I told you was that Croatia had proposed a confederative set-up for Yugoslavia which was not accepted, and that is a fact.

Q. Along with the explanation that it was a provisional stage for the independence of states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

A. That is your interpretation. I would like to stop where I stopped when I gave you an answer, and that was that during those critical moments, in order to avoid the atrocities of war and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, this was a proposal that President Tudjman made. Now, what happened after that we would see. But let me repeat that a confederation was the proposal put forward.

Q. Well, I'm not challenging that that was one of the episodes, but this entire process that was waged by the leadership of Croatia was very clear cut. It was geared towards an independent Croatia and breaking away from Yugoslavia. Wasn't that right?

A. Now, if we're talking about that, then, let me say that the first people to topple Yugoslavia by changing unilaterally the constitution was the Serb leadership headed by you yourself.

Q. Well, I don't know how it is that we toppled Yugoslavia, but let's move on. ³¹³⁰³ Tell me, please, all the events that came to pass as the result of cooperation between your leadership and those elements in European politics, I have in mind Germany first and foremost who stood behind the toppling of Yugoslavia and incited it.

A. We, like you, had contacts with the international community, and the international community, seeing what was going on and realising what was happening, came to see you. It came to see us in Croatia and so on and so forth. However, the internationality community did not at the very beginning support the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which would be Pandora's box as they called it, for many other problems, unleashing many other problems. And let me just remind you that the man, the person, the politician who was considered to be a great friend of Croatia, Mr. Genscher, that is to say he was the Foreign Minister of Germany at the time, was opposed to that. And then he was proclaimed to be -- and you yourself proclaimed him to be -- a friend of Croatia and the man in favour of toppling Yugoslavia and giving Croatia its independence.

Q. Well, let's make a slight digression here with respect to that. On the 2nd of July, 1991, that is to say a long time before the recognition of Croatia, et cetera, and the events that happened at the time and afterwards, the French paper, the Paris paper Liberation wrote, and I have a chronology of events down here, an official chronology of events, the Paris Liberation said that the international plot -- an international plot was behind the Croatian secession, that Austria was behind it and so was Germany, and according to the Liberation, the latest step by Bonn and Vienna is explained by the idea to create a German zone ³¹³⁰⁴ of influence in central Europe once again in which, as the fulcrum, we could see Germany, Austria and Slovenia. And it says that it is a nostalgia for the Austro-Hungarian Empire dating back to before the First World War. I'm sure you'll remember that.

A. No, I don't remember that, but the papers at that time wrote many things and that was probably an analysis by a journalist who was probably subjective in writing that analysis, and I can't take that to be fact because you can find many similar articles and lines of thought in other papers and not only along the lines you're talking about but to bring out the opposite thesis as well.

Q. I'm sure you'll remember, Mr. Sarinic, that for example, when the president of Slovenia, Mr. Kucan, testified in this courtroom, he confirmed a conversation he had with Mesic, which was televised where Mesic explained that with Genscher and the Pope he had agreed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and that they helped out most. This was publicly broadcast and televised at the time. This took place in 1995 when they explained how much -- who had made a contribution to the fact that Yugoslavia ceased to exist and its break-up. So it wasn't a speculation on the part of the newspapers and journalists. It was reality.

A. I must say that I don't know about those statements made by Mr. Mesic. That's the first point. And the second point is that the truth is that the Vatican and Germany were the first to recognise Croatia and that after that the entire European Community, and there were 12 members at that time, also recognised Croatia, I think less than a month ³¹³⁰⁵ ^{BLANK PAGE} ³¹³⁰⁶ later. That is a fact. However, I assume that they realised that Yugoslavia as such could not survive, exist in that way. They realised that before anyone else did, and I suppose that the whole problem of a Greater Serbia and the creation of a Greater Serbia had advanced so far that nobody could believe that Yugoslavia could be preserved. However, as I said at the beginning, President Tudjman, despite this, and not wanting to have war and casualties of war, did put forward a confederative solution to the problem.

Q. All right. Mr. Sarinic, you quoted this a moment ago, and you said that they were labelling us as to a Greater Serbia, which was never our policy, and you have that in the documents. So where do you get this idea? Where do you get the idea that this was about the creation of a Greater Serbia.

A. Well, the creation of Greater Serbia, and I'm very surprised that you bring that up in this way and that you are denying that and challenging that because this is -- it will be well known as they say, as the saying goes, that's one side of the question, and the other side of the question is that it was a historical process which dates back to the Nachertaniye of 1884, and then the declaration of the Sanu [phoen], Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. So that when you have people in a country like Serbia with those ideas, that is to say intellectuals speaking and planning something of the kind, then it seems to me very strange that you are surprised by it.

Q. Well, I don't suppose you've read the Nachertaniye or the Sanu document. Or, rather, the memorandum. ³¹³⁰⁷

A. Well, let me tell you, I recently read a book by General Milisav Sekulic entitled Knin Fell in Belgrade where in the first part of the book he speaks about those relationships and writes about precisely that, what was going on, and he mentions the problem of a Greater Serbia as well. So I don't know whether you've read that book.

Q. No, I haven't read that book, books written by individual generals, but I don't think that's the point here. To be more efficient, let's -- let me more forward with specific questions. I'm sure you will remember the 40th session of the Supreme State Council of the Republic of Croatia held on the 21st of November, 1991. The chairman was Tudjman and in addition to him there, there was you yourself, Mesic, Manolic, Palovic, Susak and the rest. That's right, isn't it?

A. Well, since you have information about that, it was probably like that. If you have an original document. But of course there were many meetings, and I can't quite focus on this particular meeting. It doesn't come to mind straight away so would you be so kind as to tell me the contents of the meeting?

Q. Well, you sent out the documents from the meetings with Tudjman. When I say "you," I mean you personally as well as Mesic and the rest. Isn't that right?

A. No, I didn't send out those documents.

Q. Well, I received them. I was disclosed them by the opposite side. So I suppose Mesic provided them with those documents?

A. You'll have to ask him that. ³¹³⁰⁸

Q. All right. Now, do you remember that on that occasion you discussed terminological issues, the terminology to be used in the final realisation of the project to topple Yugoslavia so that the JNA and the Serb leadership should be pinpointed as the main culprits? Is that right?

A. That was probably, if that was the way it was worded, that was probably what it was, but at that time we were faced with a situation in which that could have been concluded, that conclusion could have been drawn, because there was an invasion, if I can put it that way, against Slovenia, and the situation which existed at that time in the Yugoslav state Presidency was such that it wasn't difficult to draw that conclusion, and -- what you're saying now, and it wasn't difficult to conclude who stood behind it.

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to -- I'm going to stop this for a moment to be fair for the witness and indeed for the accused to have the opportunity of any documents which are relevant. It may be that the simplest course is for the Prosecution to assist if documents are referred to, so that the witness can follow anything which is brought and used by the witness when -- the accused, I mean, which the witness would find it difficult to answer.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we'll do what we can.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. As the accused goes through this, there should be the opportunity for witnesses and others to answer. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Sarinic, do you remember that Mesic at the time proposed that ³¹³⁰⁹ after his resignation he should address the United Nations, that it should be made public, that Yugoslavia is ceasing to exist, its Presidency, its parliament, its institutions, et cetera? Surely you remember that.

A. I don't remember it being referred to in that document, but that was the policy of Croatia. Once we had exhausted all possibilities, then in the Croatian parliament, or Sabor, it was stated that Croatia was going forward with its independence. And this was an act which had its theoretical and formal effect.

Q. Mr. Sarinic, I'm talking about your activities to break up Yugoslavia. Is it true that at the time there was a discussion between Mesic and Tudjman regarding the terms to be used? Would it be sufficient to say Yugoslavia no longer exists, for it simply to have become an illegal organisation as Mesic advocated but -- or, rather, to say that it continued to exist but not in the form it existed but that it should be identified with the Putschist Serbian Montenegrin leadership?

A. I do not remember that kind of terminology. I described the general climate that existed, but if you are asking me to comment on individual words and phrases, I can't say that I can remember, because I would need to look at the document and tell you -- to be able to tell you whether I agree with what you say or not.

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. It is the minutes from the 40th session of the Supreme State Council of the Republic of Croatia, and I'm reading from it as it says here. It was held on the 21st of November, 1991.

JUDGE MAY: You can't refer to things without others being able to refer to them too. Now, what is the date? 21st of November, 1995. Have ³¹³¹⁰ we got that?

MR. NICE: 1991, we haven't got it yet. We are trying to track it down. If the accused can identify it in some more particular way, that would assist.

JUDGE MAY: Which page is it? Which page are you referring to?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the front is our 01510131, and I am quoting from 436, being the last three digits. I received all these documents from them. I didn't procure them myself. It was the Croatian leadership that provided them to you, and it was your obligation to give me copies. And I'm reading now from the page ending with 436. "With my resignation, the Presidency ceases to exist," says Mesic.

JUDGE MAY: There is a fair way to deal with this. The Prosecution must try and find this document, if you please.

MR. NICE: We're certain trying to find it. But there is a great deal of material and we don't bring it all to court. If the accused is able over the break to tell Ms. Dicklich documents he may be referring to, we may be able to assist in relation to the second session more than at the moment.

JUDGE MAY: We shall not cease any longer for the moment. The accused may ask his questions. If the witness can't answer them without being able to read the document then, of course, he's unable to do that and won't be obliged to do so.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Fairly shortly so that we can all follow what it is that you're putting and we'll try and deal with it. Meanwhile, efforts will be made to find it. ³¹³¹¹ ^{BLANK PAGE} ³¹³¹²

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, surely it is clear to everyone that in this quantity of material that I receive, it is far more difficult for me to find documents and quote from them than it is for the gentlemen on the other side who have a whole apparatus behind them. And if it is not sufficient for me to indicate the document, the page, and everything else to be able to refer to it, I don't know what you expect me to do.

JUDGE MAY: Look, you are being given this documentation, and you are being treated very fairly, and quite rightly, in dealing with these matters and the difficulty in your case is acknowledged. You're being given the opportunity which you are doing by yourself with such assistance you get to do it.

But witnesses cannot be expected -- without any reference to the document be expected to answer without any reference to events to ten years ago.

Now, we're going to allow you to put something. You can put something to the witness and we'll see how we get on, but do so fairly -- not too quickly, and the witness will try and follow. Meanwhile, somebody will try and find this document, if they can find it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume, Mr. May, it is the duty of the side calling the witness to provide him with the documents that are being produced through him.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So Mesic says: "All federal institutions are ceasing to exist, the parliament, the government, et cetera. I thought I should inform the ³¹³¹³ United Nations that Yugoslavia has lost its legitimacy with my departure, that the army is becoming the largest paramilitary organisation without a Supreme Command, and that in the UN Yugoslavia's place be abolished, that the new realities be recognised," et cetera. This is what Mesic says. You surely remember that.

A. Whether I remember it or not, the situation was such that it was quite possible that such statements were made, for you shouldn't forget that in the rotating Presidency that the -- that for six months you, in fact, and your men, Mr. Jovic and others, would not allow Mesic to take over the position of president, which was absolutely illegal. So once he did take over that position, nothing could be done in that Presidency, as there was outvoting, and then Mesic left the Presidency, and in Croatia a decision was made for Croatia to secede from Yugoslavia, which Slovenia did as well on the same day.

Q. You know that members of the Presidency or some who didn't vote for Mesic being president of the Presidency did so giving the explanation that before being a candidate, Mesic had declared that he wanted to be the last president of Yugoslavia. Do you remember that? It was in the papers.

A. Yes, but there you're attaching significance to words. Mesic said that because Yugoslavia was falling apart, and it was clear to everyone. And he said that figuratively. But I really don't think that that is important. What is important was the situation that prevailed in Yugoslavia and not what somebody may have said, even if it was Mr. Mesic, to the effect that he was the last president of Yugoslavia. ³¹³¹⁴

Q. All right. Fine. So it's unimportant that the future president of the Presidency started his candidacy with such a statement. On page 049, Stipe Mesic says, "Yugoslavia no longer exists." And President Tudjman says, "No, it doesn't." And Stipe Mesic says, "We'll fix that," meaning the kind of attitude that would be taken towards Yugoslavia?

A. Your Honours, I must address you now. Mr. Mesic, the president of Croatia, Mr. Mesic, was here in court. So questions of this kind should have been addressed to him. And after all, I'm not here as an advocate of President Mesic but as a witness. So I'm surprised that Mesic should be quoted repeatedly as well as his statements and that I am expected to give an opinion about it.

Q. But, Mr. Sarinic, you were present. I'm talking about the attitude of the Croatian leadership at that same meeting. Josip Manolic --

A. Did you ask Mesic about that when he testified?

Q. I didn't ask him about these minutes because I didn't have them. When Mesic testified, I was not provided with any of these stenographic notes. And you were a participant in that meeting?

JUDGE MAY: Let us not waste further time. Let us not waste any more. Let's move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. At that same meeting, Josip Manolic, who was then the Prime Minister, wasn't he?

A. This was in 1991? ³¹³¹⁵

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, he was the Prime Minister at the time.

Q. He says on page 052 now at that same meeting: "Last night I had a talk with the vice-president of the -- our government of Kosovo. They visited Tirana," et cetera.

A. I can't understand that he could have said "our government".

Q. That is what it says here in these minutes.

A. This must be a typing error or something like that. How can it be our government in Kosovo?

Q. That is what I wanted to ask you, because it refers to this cooperation and it says: "I think they nevertheless agreed, and they toured Tirana -- Tirana, and they agreed that Kosovo needed to be assistant -- assisted, and now those parties are being radicalised to see which would be more -- most radical in protecting Kosovo."

A. I will answer this question by reminding you of a meeting between you and me, and this was in 1998. So I'm intentionally skipping over seven years. And I told you then that we would not interfere with your relations with Kosovo, and your response was, "It is our internal problem, and I'm grateful to you for it."

Q. That is our internal problem. That is true. But secondly, yesterday you said that I told you that the idea was to have a bicameral parliament and in one Chamber representatives of all ethnicities living in Kosovo would be represented on an equal footing, Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians, Turks, Romanies and Muslims or, rather, the Goranci, which means all ethnic groups living in Kosovo in one of the chambers where they ³¹³¹⁶ would be equal. That was our formula to regulate in a democratic manner relations and the functioning of the authorities in Kosovo, if you remember that.

But you mentioned that yesterday, a parliament with two Chambers, et cetera?

A. Yes, but not in the sense you're saying now. But allow me, since you have raised the issue, I want to comment. You didn't mention Turks, et cetera, in those days, but you were talking about a bicameral parliament consisting of Albanians and Serbs, and my response was that that was less than they were entitled to, according to the 1974 constitution, and your response was, "Yes, that is so, but that was a mistake which we will not allow, whatever the price may be." And I remind you know that better than I do, that there were 200.000 Serbs and 2 million Albanians. So this bicameral parliament in which there would be no outvoting would of course be to the benefit to the Serbs who were ten times less numerous.

Q. First of all, your figures are not correct. Secondly, that was not the way we spoke about it. But what you're saying regarding my position that 1974 was a mistake, that is quite true because that was my position. As for a bicameral parliament, there are documents about this which were proposed at the time, and it is quite clear how that bicameral parliament would look like. There would be one person, one vote in one Chamber. So there would be absolutely no doubt there would necessarily be more Albanians. And the second Chamber would be a Chamber of ethnic communities in which all ethnic communities would be represented, Turks ³¹³¹⁷ ^{BLANK PAGE} ³¹³¹⁸ and Romanies and Egyptians and all the others would be represented equally.

JUDGE MAY: I'm bringing this to a close. You're speaking for too long, and it's not fair on the witness. If the witness wishes to add anything at all in response to what this accused is putting forward.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't doubt that there are written documents about it if you say so, but at the time that we met and when you spoke about it, you did not elaborate this idea in that way.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. Let us go back to your own activities from those times. I'm still on the same meeting. I am now on page 54. The Prime Minister Manolic says: "I think it is possible to start an attack in the whole area of Western Slavonia which we should clear up and fortify ourselves towards the east."

So you're talking about clearing or cleaning at that meeting?

A. I don't know what the terminology was used.

Q. But I quoted exactly word by word from the document.

A. If that is so, then obviously you're alluding to cleansing in the sense of genocide, which is absolutely unacceptable, because you know full well that Croatia, during those dramatic times, did not seek to have the Serbs leave. You must know that the plans for the evacuation of Serbs, be it in Western Slavonia or in the Sector South, were devised at the beginning of 1993, which means two and a half years prior to the Storm operation.

Q. What plans? ³¹³¹⁹

A. Plans on the evacuation of the population. These were designed by the Serb side.

Q. When did they make those plans?

A. At the beginning of 1993.

Q. 1993? Wait a moment, please, Mr. Sarinic. I'm asking you questions about your meeting in 1991 at which your Prime Minister says that attacks should be launched, that the area should be cleansed, that Western Slavonia should be cleansed. This was 1991, mid-1991 that you were discussing this at this council meeting, Supreme Council of Croatia. That's what I'm asking you about. We'll come to the Flash and Storm operations. I'm talking about 1991.

A. Very well. If that term was used, "cleansing", I don't think it was used in that sense.

Q. Well, you will be able to look at it when the document is found for you, and then we'll easily -- you didn't answer my question with respect to Kosovo. We spoke to our government, with the vice-president of our government in Kosovo, the radicalisation. What kind of your Kosovo government is Manolic referring to?

A. I'm simply unable to answer that. I know that we did not have any relations of a political or strategic nature in Kosovo, and I simply don't understand that sentence, that phrase, because our activities in those days did not exist, in fact, in Kosovo, so that we didn't have any phantom government of our own that would have been appointed in Kosovo by Croatia, and I'm quite resolute about that.

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. Now, tell me, as we are going back to ³¹³²⁰ Croatia, to what extent the Serbs as a constituent nation that you threw out of the constitution had any chance of participating as full-fledged citizens.

A. Mr. Milosevic, what you're saying now you've said many times, and I have to elaborate on that, that is that we threw the Serbs out of the constitution. I shall try to pick my memory and tell you how this reads in the Croatian constitution. I will try to be precise, but we can check that.

Croatia is a national state of the Croatian people and a state of all other nations and minorities who are citizens of the Republic of Croatia. And then they are listed. First the Serbs, Slovenes, Muslims, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, and Jews. I may have omitted to mention someone. Who will be completely equal with members of the Croatian nation in the realisation of their national aspirations according to the highest standards of the United Nations and the free world. So they were absolutely not thrown out. I know the wording of your constitution, and it's simply a different wording, but the content is quite the same.

Q. The content is not the same, but we will not engage in a constitutional discussion now, because at least constitutions are public documents which can easily be read. In the previous constitution, it was defined that the Republic of Croatia was a state of the Croatian people, the Serb people, and other nations living in it. And then you left the Serbs out and said that it was a national state of Croats and that all other citizens were equal. ³¹³²¹

A. No, but of all nations and minorities.

Q. Very well. In Article 1 of the constitution of Serbia, it states that Serbia is a state of all its citizens. That's what Article 1 of the constitution says, that Serbia is a state of all its citizens.

A. You've just abridged that. With the elaboration I have given, it comes to the same thing ultimately.

Q. I wouldn't put it that way. Now, do you remember that at that particular meeting, and I'm still dwelling on that, Slavko Degoricija at that same session said that: "We have the force to engage in cleaning up operations"? Do you remember that or not? That is on page 072 of the original text.

A. I should like to ask Your Honours before I answer these questions to be provided with the document so that I can see it. Otherwise, I shall be speaking off the bat and from my memory, and there's no sense in having a debate like that.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Just a moment.

MR. NICE: We're on the same document. It's been found. It's being printed. It's quite a substantial document, and we're doing our very best and hope to have it down soon but I can't be any clearer than that at the moment.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. As far as the witness is concerned, you're dealing with events, as you said, a long time ago. If you can assist by answering, of course we would be grateful for that. But if you can't answer to that question, of course you have a right to be able to do so fully, given the length of time and the amount that's involved. So if ³¹³²² you're unable to get, to answer the question fairly in the circumstances and you don't think you can answer, then it's open to you to do so and we'll try and find it.

Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Take a look at what it says, what Mr. Tudjman says at the session. And it is entitled the 25th of November, 1993, 01 -- 136 are the last digits. 01865136 is the number.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have them, and it's in the B/C/S. Perhaps we could show it to the witness.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, we could try that, see how we get on. Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm just going to take an excerpt from what he says. He says: "Not only" -- and that is on page 136, being the last digits.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's try and find the number.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes. I'm now speaking -- referring to what it says here in the minutes of the 25th of November, 1993. And I'm reading from page 01865136. It says: "Not only do the Serbs from Knin to Baranja manipulate with that, but there are reasons that Croatia is preparing for a military settling of accounts and a complete ethnic cleansing like the Maslenica operation and the Gospic operation which proved this out. They manipulate with this and wave it in front of their own population and the world too. And then it is very difficult to override these arguments of ³¹³²³ theirs when it comes to Maslenica, the entire area, we cleansed the high -- the whole area up to Maceta not because we gave directives to that effect but because it was not only a military operation but turned into what it turned into as happened with the Gospic operation. And this proved our military preparedness, but it also brought political damage to us."

So he himself says that the entire area was cleansed up to Maceta. Do you remember that, Mr. Sarinic?

A. I don't remember those words, but --

THE INTERPRETER: The term "Maceta" is not clear to the interpreter the witness says that:

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Maceta" is not a word that would be used in Croatian.

Now, as far as this is concerned, if this is an authentic transcript, then that stands. However, I'll just tell you one thing. Let's not turn things upside down. Because it was the log revolution, 30 per cent of Croatia was occupied, terrible things happened, terrible misfortunes. Just remember Skabrnja and all the rest of it. So that in that context, that's how we ought to view it. 30 per cent of Croatia was occupied, and you knew that very well.

Q. Mr. Sarinic, in that area that you say was 30 per cent Croatia, the Serbs had lived there for centuries, and those territories were placed under the protection of the United Nations until a political settlement could be found. Therefore, you know all that full well.

A. So you accept that that was legal, the log revolution, was it? And ³¹³²⁴ then after that, you said that it was never Serbian and that they were madmen and so on and so forth.

Q. Mr. Sarinic, that is not so. You said that already at the meeting at Karadjordjevo, to the best of your recollections as you presented them here, Tudjman mentioned the log revolution and that the Serbs were behind it, and that is something that I refuted, because Serbia was not behind that. When I was -- when it happened, I was holidaying in Dubrovnik, and nobody from Serbia knew that that was happening. And you yourself stood behind that, not Serbia?

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's collection: Not Serbs, Serbia.

JUDGE MAY: You're supposed to be asking questions here, not making speeches. Now, what is it you want the witness to answer?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, was it clear, Mr. Sarinic, that what happened in Knin was a reaction to reprisals which your government undertook against the Serbs?

A. No. That is absolutely not correct. The log revolution was intended to occupy a portion of Croatia, 30 per cent of Croatia, and the entire international community stood up in opposition to that. And you, Mr. Milosevic, in the 14 meetings and conversations we had, also told me that you were not in favour of that and that Knin could never be a Serbian town.

Q. You tend to distort matters, Mr. Sarinic. What I said to you was that Serbia had no territorial pretensions.

Now, as far as the relationship between Knin and Zagreb goes, the whole time, Mr. Sarinic, if you remember full well in our conversations ³¹³²⁵ with Tudjman and when you came to see me to convey Tudjman's messages, you insisted upon the fact that a political settlement should be found in direct negotiations between Knin and Zagreb. Well, wasn't that - how shall I say? - the thread that was weaved through all these activities, normalising relations and affecting a lull in the situation?

A. You know full well we insisted on that. However between Zagreb and Knin, that was just not possible. It was possible between Zagreb and Belgrade.

Q. Quite the contrary.

A. Yes, and you participated in it all actively. Let us not forget the problem of opening up the motorway, and in your office we had agreed upon everything. We had agreed to open the motorway. But you forced the people, and I recognised your action in this, but that you were involved up to your neck in that, that is absolutely certain and that the leadership in Knin could do nothing without having been given the green light by you.

Q. First of all, Mr. Sarinic, that's not true. And that I was involved up to my neck in efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, that is true, to normalise relations between Serbia and Croatia, to encourage negotiations between Knin and Zagreb. Of course I was an advocate of that. And I'll read out to you something. And this is not a document provided by the opposite side. It is a public document of the 16th of July, 1993, and I'm reading from my chronology here "The government of the Republic of Croatia and the Serb Krajina --"

JUDGE MAY: Before the witness can have a chance to deal with it, ³¹³²⁶ what is the document that you are claiming it to be?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is a book, a chronology, chronology taken from the papers, from the press, covering those days. And Mr. Sarinic will, I'm sure, remember this. "The governments of the Republic of Croatia and Serbian Krajina and Erdut signed an agreement according to which Croatia is duty-bound by the 31st of June to" --

JUDGE MAY: I don't know what you're talking about. What is the book that you say you are going to read for the witness so that he can answer? What is the document which you allege?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, what I'm reading out was something that appeared in all the papers at the time, and I'm talking about events now, the events that took place at the time, wishing to confirm my own assertions that we invested all our efforts to undertake to find political solutions through peaceful negotiation.

JUDGE MAY: These are your newspapers; is that right? And which date -- which date is it that you want?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm talking about the 16th of July, 1993, and the event when the government of the republic --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Sarinic, I'm sure you will remember that on the 16th of July, 1993, between Knin and Zagreb, because it says the government of Croatia and the Serbian Krajina in Erdut signed an agreement according to which Croatia would endeavour by the 31st of July to withdraw its troops from occupied territories in Krajina, Ravni Kotor and Maslenica, the Miljevac ³¹³²⁷ Plateau, the Peruca hydroelectric power station Zemunik airport in exchange for having the bridge opened across the Maslenica canal and the Zemunik airport. That was the Erdut agreement and its provisions, and that is common knowledge and it took place on the 16th of July, 1993, and the very next day --

JUDGE MAY: You cannot read on for this length of time and not allowing anybody to deal with this. The witness should have the opportunity to answer, and it's his duty to give the evidence, not for you.

Do you know anything about what the accused is talking about?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say two things? The accused at one point said that he took all steps to normalise relations between Croatia and Serbia, because peace in the region depended on those relations, relations between Croatia and Serbia, that is. However, I have to say that the accused personally refused all possibilities of having a normalisation of relations and the recognition of Croatia or the mutual recognition of Croatia and Serbia.

From 1991 up till the end, every time we insisted on this, and the accused always found some reason for not having this realised, because the public wouldn't like the sound of it.

Then we decided on another formula and incorporated it into recognition of all states which stepped out of Yugoslavia which had disintegrated.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm asking you about this specific agreement. We encouraged ³¹³²⁸ agreement between Knin and Zagreb, and you in Erdut drew up this agreement on the 16th of July, 1993. Do you remember that or do you not?

A. I do remember that, but I also remember what stood behind it.

Q. All right. Since you say you remember it, let's see what stood behind it. One day later, on the 17th of July, it says that we had a meeting, that is to say Tudjman and myself, and there is a report about that. It says: The president of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic and the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, after the meeting held in the organised cessation of the co-president of the conference at Stoltenberg and David Owen gave a joint statement. I'm not going to read the joint communique, but it happened one day after the agreement was signed between your government and the representatives of Krajina in Erdut and point 3 of that joint statement, Tudjman's and my own, and you were there with Tudjman and I'm sure you will remember that, and it was published in the papers, it says the following: Expressing satisfaction over the solution achieved to the problem Maslenica and Peruca, the presidents welcome the agreement reached on cessation to the hostilities and consider that each individual or group violating the agreement must bear the consequences of that. The presidents indicate the importance of the agreement reached as an example of how problems should be settled peacefully and considered to be an important step towards normalising Serbo-Croatian relations as a whole. That's what it says in our joint communique, and it is a statement we gave one day after the Erdut agreement of yours on the withdrawal of your army from those territories which were under UN protection and which ³¹³²⁹ were in the region of Krajina itself.

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... All these speeches. Now, the witness -- the witness must have a chance to answer, not you speaking all the time. Yes. Let the witness answer.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. This agreement, the one you signed together with President Tudjman on the 17th of July, 1993, and I'm quoting you because I think that's the date, it was a purely diplomatic document which, of course, was geared at establishing an agreement which we signed on concrete, specific issues. However, I can tell you this: That particular agreement was not respected, and what happened after it was also worthless. Quite simply, we were always -- we -- you always got the better of us in all our agreements. And I even had your support, Mr. Milosevic. But we were let down. And you would often say those madmen over there, but in Lillehamer I was with Hadzic [As interpreted]. I was in Dobranovci. I travelled the world. I came to see you, but every time we were let down when an agreement was reached.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. How agreements were let down by which side, we'll come to that, but they put you on ice and froze relations with you when you exerted armed attacks on them, whereas they never attacked you in any armed operation.

Take a look, please -- when we're talking about endeavours to normalise relations, I'm sure you will remember that in January 1994, at the Palais de Nation in Geneva, Vladislav Jovanovic, who was the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia at the time, and Mate Granic, your own Foreign ³¹³³⁰ Minister, his opposite number. Gave a joint statement on the gradual normalisation of relations between Yugoslavia and Croatia and that representative officers by the governments in Belgrade and Croatia were to be opened to facilitate interstate relations --

JUDGE MAY: I'm not going to let you go on at this great length. One of the matters the accused suggests at the beginning if you want to say anything about is -- allow the witness to answer is about the phrase "relations" and exerting, it seemed, armed attacks at the beginning. I don't know if you want to say that or indeed anything which he's responded so far.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have to say that everything the accused is now saying must be placed within the context of the entire situation and not extract two or three examples out of the general context which can then indicate one thing or another, that we were the bad guys and they were the good guys. Let us not forget that it was an aggression against Croatia. Let us not forget that everything was taking place on Croatian territory and that never a single square meeting of Serbia was ever included into those military actions, but they were included into diplomatic and strategic decisions which led to situations that were terrible and which happened in those territories. That's all I would like to say in response to what the accused just asked me.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much. It's in fact time for the adjournment for quarter of an hour. Before we do, we will consider how long the accused should have left, considering he has available an hour and a quarter. ³¹³³¹

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: What we're prepared to do, Mr. Milosevic, in this particular case is to give you an additional 20 minutes, which we've already decide, so you have one hour and a quarter and an additional 20 minutes.

We will adjourn now.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we found I think one of the transcripts in B/C/S. We are trying to mark it up with the page references. If the witness prefers to look at that rather than to rest over the 20-minute period, may the document be made available to him.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

--- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, for the record, I think that the time you have assigned to me is absolutely insufficient, because for such a witness and in view of the amount of documents that have been provided through him, I would need at least two days for cross-examination, and you have given me a total of two hours and 50 minutes.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. One wonders what is the purpose of such a cross-examination at all in that case. ³¹³³² Mr. Sarinic, do you remember that in this joint statement that Tudjman and I made in Geneva on the 17th of July, 1993, that in point 1 it says that speculations on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia are absolutely unfounded. 2, the only way of achieving a lasting peace is through the assertion of the interests of all three constituent nations and agreement being reached on three republics within the framework of a confederation.

That was our position, and that corresponded to the Owen and Stoltenberg plan which addressed the possibility of having Republika Srpska, Herceg-Bosna, and a Muslim federation as it was called then. Is that right? Do you remember that?

A. I remember. I do remember that, but I also remember what happened after that.

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. I'm just asking you whether you remember that. I am glad that you do.

Let us now quickly go through the meetings that you attended with me and you're endeavouring to distort many things from those meetings. Namely at the beginning --

JUDGE MAY: If you make that sort of an allegation, the witness has a right to answer. You can't not give the witness an opportunity to answer.

The allegation is that the accused has suggested that you have been changing or distorting the evidence about what occurred. What is the truth?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To the best of my ability and ³¹³³³ recollection, I presented what I saw and experienced in meetings with Mr. Milosevic. Of course, as these were 14 encounters, and I worked it out to be just under 40 hours of tete-a-tete meetings that we had, in my book I also wrote down that 90 per cent of it is based on notes which I made in the plane taking me back to Zagreb, and 10 per cent relied on my memory. But those 10 per cent relied on memories of events two hours prior to that, so that I absolutely do not accept the thesis of the accused that I distorted things.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Fine. Your conclusions, I would say, are questionable, because when you talk about the first meeting at Karadjordjevo, you quote me. I assume that is correct, because I did advocate that relations should be as good as possible between Croatia and Serbia, because you yourself said, in fact, that relations between Serbs and Croats and Serbia and Croatia were the key issues. And then you quoted me and said, "We can resolve all problems." Isn't that right? You said that yesterday.

A. Yes.

Q. And then you explained that that sentence was significant for you because it probably related to Bosnia.

Now, tell me, on what basis did you draw the conclusion that when we are saying that we can resolve all problems because I was advocating a peaceful solution to all problems that this related to Bosnia when there was no mention of Bosnia? And you yourself said that Tudjman mentioned the log revolution, which was in fact the product of your reprisals against the Serbs and not something directed from Serbia, and then I said ³¹³³⁴ that we could resolve all problems between Serbia and Croatia that may exist. Where did you come to that conclusion that it related to Bosnia?

A. These were my reflections and my conclusions based on what I heard over there and what happened afterwards. But since during the first ten minutes or so President Tudjman adopted a very firm stand and in fact attacked you about the log revolution, saying that you stood behind it, you denied that, saying that it was actually a problem between us and Knin, et cetera, and then you said, "But we can find a solution to that, a solution for those problems."

Now, there's a logic of drawing conclusions. If you're excluded from this process and you say that we can resolve them, then obviously you have something else in mind.

Q. Mr. Sarinic, I don't think your logic has a very firm basis. Bosnia was never mentioned. You never heard the word "Bosnia"; is that right?

A. I heard the word Bosnia later on talking to the president, and the president never lied to me.

Q. Did he perhaps tell you that we had agreed to divide Bosnia?

A. No. But he told me that you had talked about Bosnia.

Q. Fine. We had talked about Islamic fundamentalism, and I gave him some information that I had received in longhand. I don't even know who drafted it; I can't remember. But I gave him this -- I gave him this piece of information which proved to be true. And Tudjman agreed with that. Is that so?

A. Yes, that is so, but that was in Tikves, not in Karadjordjevo. ³¹³³⁵

Q. Fine.

A. Yes. And you gave him that, and I inferred from that that you actually wanted to hook Tudjman onto the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. After that meeting in Karadjordjevo, which had to do with our relationships, on the 5th of April, several days later, there was a meeting in Split attended by all the presidents of the republics, six of us, at which we said that Tudjman and I had discussed our mutual relationships in Karadjordjevo. This was no secret to the other presidents of the republics; isn't that so?

A. The fact that you met was no secret but what you discussed was a secret.

Q. But you were present at this meeting and we said that we had discussed our mutual relationship and how to promote them, improve them, et cetera. That is what we said.

A. That is using diplomatic language. Now, what is hidden behind it is another matter.

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. You mentioned, and I noted it down yesterday when you were speaking, that you mentioned Arkan to me, and then I responded something jokingly.

First of all, Mr. Sarinic, that is absolutely incorrect. And secondly --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have the chance to deal with both. The accused denies anything like this was said. Would you like to answer?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I repeat that that is the absolute ³¹³³⁶ truth, that the accused laughingly said, "Well, someone has to do part of the work for me too." These are the words still ringing in my ears. But this was stated in a semi-humourous tone, but it was stated. And as the saying goes, in every joke there is some truth. So that is my conclusion.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes, but you said yesterday that without support, such an army of 5.000 men could not function, et cetera, et cetera. You said that yesterday, didn't you?

A. I did.

Q. And do you know that the Serb Volunteer Guard of Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan never exceeded the size of a company? What 5.000 men are you talking about? Where did you get such fantastic figures from that you have uttered?

A. From our services we received those figures. That is one thing. And secondly, clearly you -- if you were not involved in that, you wouldn't know the size, whether it was a company or not. So it means you knew very well.

Q. I'm telling you about the data available, because the Serbian Volunteer Guard really did go there as a volunteer force and was always either under the command of the army of Republika Srpska when it was in Bosnia or under the command of the Serbian army of Krajina when it was in Krajina.

A. That is not correct. You have confiscated documents on the one hand, and there are also reports and intercepts saying that they were in the RSK and that they behaved as if they were above all the commands of ³¹³³⁷ the army of RSK, that they were issued weapons which they never returned, that they were hated in the army of RSK.

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. I personally met Arkan once in my life, and that was when he was an Assembly deputy, and I met him just like I met all the other deputies when I visited the Assembly. You have no document, no conversation which could link me to any of the activities of the Serb Volunteer Guards. Have you perhaps come across a document like that? Do you have it in your possession?

A. No, but you have the reputation of leaving few traces behind you.

Q. Yes, but you could have come across an intercept and you haven't even got that. Not even you could produce something like that. Mr. Sarinic, do you remember, since without a doubt you came to see me on behalf of your president, President Tudjman, to convey his messages to me and convey my messages to him.

A. That's correct.

Q. And this was always geared towards mending relations, normalising relations and our joint activities to establish peace. Wasn't that how it was?

A. That is how it was in the details.

Q. Fine. Now, Tudjman and I would meet in Geneva, and we travelled there, invited by Owen and Stoltenberg, and we attended the meetings of the three delegations there from Bosnia-Herzegovina, et cetera. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And we did our best to work constructively on both sides to ensure ³¹³³⁸ that they reached an agreement on peace; isn't that right?

A. Well, probably, about I wasn't always at those meetings.

Q. All right. Fine.

A. Your Honours, may I be allowed to respond?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What happened was this: An hour ago I said that in certain operations you acted positively, that you took positive action. But let us not forget that with your knowledge and with your assistance, a situation was created whereby and within that terrible situation you played the peacemaker. So that's where the problem was.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, there was a problem because your activities led to those conflicts and not the activities of Serbia. Serbia didn't attack Croatia. You attacked the Serbs in Croatia.

A. No, we didn't attack the Serbs in Croatia. The Serbs in Croatia rose up like a Trojan horse following your policies.

Q. Well, then my policies several centuries previously had thrown in those Serbs as a Trojan horse into Croatia.

A. It wasn't only the Serbs. There were Croats and others too, and we had to take in those refugees, both from the Republika Srpska and the RSK, and they amounted to about 600.000 people. There were about 600.000 refugees in Croatia, because the whole of the Republika Srpska had been cleaned up, and the Croats in the RSK. So those are the facts. And you cannot say that it was only the Serbs who lived there.

Q. Mr. Sarinic, Serbia had close to 1 million refugees from ³¹³³⁹ Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia at the time.

A. And they were organised by the RSK forces. I've already said that I have seen documents in which Mrksic is talking to Babic, and Mrksic says over Radio Belgrade that a plan to evacuate the people existed. So that these are two different matters entirely.

Q. All right, Mr. Sarinic. Let's go back to our basic thesis and premise that endeavours existed along those lines and you came from Tudjman in that name, and I sent messages to him, and I also met Tudjman in Geneva in an effort to normalise the situation. I'm sure you will remember your own Assembly of the 13th of May, 1993, in Zagreb. You attended the meeting in addition to Tudjman, and Tudjman said at that meeting, and I'm quoting him: "It is interesting to note that in addition to the contacts that we have had with Belgrade where they proposed a normalisation to the situation because they posed that a long-distance communications line to normalise the situation in Dalmatia was proposed, and we were not duped when the proposal was made." That's what Tudjman said. And then added: "Hrvoje talked about this and steps were taken vis-a-vis the Bosnian leadership because there is no full coordination between Belgrade and Bosnia and Belgrade and Knin, and they wanted our man to come tomorrow."

So, Mr. Sarinic, we, that is to say Belgrade, did our best to normalise the situation and electric power supplies were mentioned, as I said, for a political -- a political solution as well was envisaged and so on.

A. I have to say, Mr. Milosevic, that I'm very surprised that you've ³¹³⁴⁰ just asked me that, and here's why. The realistic situation, as it stood in the field, was that all the agreements were outmanoeuvred. We were let down on all agreements. And when I say all of them, I mean all of them. And you know full well the efforts you yourself made with the plus 3, plus 4 --

Q. You mean to set up joint patrols?

A. Yes. I'm referring to the joint patrols. We let you have your way and said, "Let UNPROFOR drive around." And then you insisted that some of the Serbs be in those jeeps. So I agreed to that, just to have some steps taken. But that fell through as well. And then what happened was Operation Flash. So in the formal sense you were allegedly a peacemaker, in inverted commas. But let's look at the situation. You brought about the situation to begin with and then any agreements that were reached, which I signed and managed to reach, they always fell through.

Q. Well, matters are not quite as you depict them, but I don't have the time here and now to go into that because you see that my time is limited.

Anyway, in this connection you held talks constantly. In the meantime, you sent your troops to Bosnia for operations there. Isn't that right, Mr. Sarinic?

A. No, it isn't.

Q. Well, you say no it isn't. That's an answer. Now, I'm sure you will recall a meeting of the 12th of June, 1995 attended by Tudjman, Janko Bobetko, Gojko Susak, and I'm sure you will remember that at that meeting ³¹³⁴¹ you -- and when I say you, I mean all those present -- prevailed on Bobetko to retire peacefully for health reasons because he wasn't able to keep up his job as the head of the Main Staff of the Croatian army, and he resisted that proposal to retire peacefully. I'm sure you will remember that?

A. Well, if it was a meeting that was held in the cabinet or offices of President Tudjman, then I do remember that.

Q. And then I'm sure you will remember that Bobetko threatened to go public in order to defend his military honour and honour as a man, and Tudjman saw this as a threat to the Croatian authorities on his part. Do you remember that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Well, Bobetko goes on to say, "Gojko is alive and well. I've spent hundreds of nights in Herzegovina. I fought like a lion for everything there. The president is aware of that too. Nothing was too difficult for me."

So is it quite clear then that your forces were fighting on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to that?

A. First of all, General Bobetko has also written a book, and in that book there is a portion referring to what you were saying a moment ago. However, Croatia was never at war with Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I'm going to provide you with facts to bear that out.

First of all, the constitution of the Republic of Croatia provides for the fact that all citizens in other countries who are Croatian, of Croatian ethnicity should be protected. That's the first point. And ³¹³⁴² Bosnia-Herzegovina never declared war on Croatia. There are -- is not a single document that was sent out either by the president or the parliament or the government to the effect that the Croatian army should go to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. Yes, but it was there.

A. Wait a minute. Let me finish. Now, after that, we had 600.000 refugees, mostly Muslims, let me add, whom we took care of as we did their wounded. We gave them weapons, and we gave them equipment. And you must admit that it would be paradoxical to supply somebody with arms if you're at war with that same party. So that these are all arguments that I know about.

As to the rest, I leave that to Mr. Bobetko's recollections.

Q. All right. He said, "We work together." And I went with the army, when they sabotaged something, we prevented that. The president sitting at this table asking about Roso, he means Ante Roso. When he asked him how many specials there were, he said 460, whereas he had 720-odd escaped.

A. I know there was the Split declaration signed between Izetbegovic and Tudjman and the famous 60 kilometres on each side of the border were referred to. So that's where our forces were on the basis of those requirements and that declaration and requests from the Bosnian side.

Q. That means that you in fact were not warring in Bosnia. Is that what you're saying?

A. I am saying --

JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nice. ³¹³⁴³

MR. NICE: I could probably assist the witness in relation to a record. The records themselves are subject to the usual restriction. They're supposed to be dealt with in private session. But on this occasion I do have a document that I could make available to him to assist him.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let him have it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. Now, on that occasion at that infamous meeting when you wanted to make him retire, did Mr. Bobetko show you a written order for the Flash operation issued on the 5th of December, 1994?

A. I don't know. I don't remember that.

Q. Very well. Fine. Now, as this exists on page 0134946, they are the minutes from that meeting, 01324916 is the number, we will be able to establish that and I should like to tender that, those minutes into evidence. So that the order came five months before you cleaned up Western Slavonia; is that right?

A. We didn't clean it up. It came after Operation Flash. It wasn't the cleansing of Western Slavonia at all. That is your own interpretation. And I've already said the manner in which the plan to evacuate the Serb population was compiled by the leadership, in fact, the leadership of the Serbs in those territories.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. If -- if the witness wants to add anything in light of the document which was put in front of him, he's open to do so if he wishes.

Is there anything you'd like to add? ³¹³⁴⁴

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's very difficult for me to do that, because this is a lengthy document. It has 30 or 40 pages. So I can read diagonally down the page, flash read, but it's impossible for me to go through it in its entirety. And I told Mr. Milosevic that I do remember the meeting with Bobetko. As to the details, I really can't say. I can't remember them all. I know that there was this problem of him retiring, et cetera.

Now, as to the operations and actions themselves, I don't know anything about that. I would have to read it through.

JUDGE MAY: Just before you finish -- just before you finish, it will be open to the Prosecution to clarify any of these matters which they wish rather than asking the witness to try and do all this amount of work very quickly. But if the Prosecution want to raise it, it's a matter for them.

Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. It seems that you just expect me to get through an enormous amount of work in a short space of time.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But anyway, at the time Bobetko wasn't happy about all this, and when he brought out the order issued on the 5th of December, 1994 for the Operation Flash, Tudjman said to him, and I quote from the transcript: "Wait a minute. Now that you have mentioned this, we are convincing the world that we were provoked by the extremists who cut across our motorway and killed the people and that we were going to launch ³¹³⁴⁵ the action that we have done."

And then you say: "What kind of -- prepared this?" So you are inflicting political harm. In the interests of what?

A. Well, I don't remember those words, but it is difficult for me to speak about Janko Bobetko, who is not here, and to put in his mouth something that -- but I know that he was a very sensitive man and that he found his retirement very difficult to accept, and so perhaps he was a little overemphatic in his words and said what he wouldn't have said otherwise.

Q. All right, Mr. Sarinic. Is there clear that there was no spontaneous Operation Flash? It wasn't a spontaneous operation. There wasn't an incident that broke out. It was a scenario designed by the leadership of the Republic of Croatia which was supposed to justify this, not to deblock the motorway but ethnic cleansing of Western Slavonia and the expulsion of thousands of Serb.

A. Mr. Milosevic, what are you talking about, that there was no pretext? Wasn't it enough that we spend three months negotiating about this -- these jeeps and establishing communication along those roads? And you were there, and this was impossible to put into practice. We talked about the pipeline, the oil pipeline, too. We insisted upon that and were able to get nowhere. We made no headway with that either. You told me, "Use Boro Mikelic's trump card. He is a strong man. The rest are madmen." That's what you said to me.

Q. Boro Mikelic was nominated to negotiate with you for Krajina, and you were the Croatian representative that talked to him. You discussed ³¹³⁴⁶ normalisation, and I strove for a normalisation in relations and wanted you to negotiate. And then the other questions that were discussed were the motorway, the oil pipeline, repairs to the railroad, motorways, et cetera. Isn't that so, Mr. Sarinic?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. It is true then that I was naive enough to believe that an incident had actually occurred at the time. However, from the stenogram that I received from the opposite side while spending my time here, we can see quite clearly that it wasn't the case of an incident but an intention prepared in advance on the part of the leadership of Croatia.

A. Well, that's your own tendentious interpretation. What I can tell you is this: I can give you a fact, and I'm sure you will remember this very well. What happened was this: There was an incident that broke out one evening in a coffee bar on the motorway. Somebody had a fight, a Croat entered into a brawl with a Serb. And on the occasion I think seven Croats were killed over there. So I had an information from our services about that. Then you talked to Boro Mikelic and you said, "Well, have you spoken to Sarinic?" And he said, "Yes, I have." Well, they were very cultivated in their response and conduct, whereas our men, our people, they should all be arrested. They were terrible. So what more do you want? What other incident do you need?

Q. Is it true from what you say the only thing that is true is that I believed that it was indeed an incident and that I endeavoured to bring things back to normal. And here is your report on the conversation you're referring to. It says a report, Milosevic-Mikelic. This is 02909453 -- ³¹³⁴⁷ 453 are the last digits where he tells me what's going on, and I say to him that a formula should be proposed for everyone to be released because some Croats had been arrested, that he -- that those who fired will be arrested. You should say that. You have no other way. But for both sides, and then there are dots here, and then I say to him, "All Croats are not responsible for somebody being a murderer, and not all Serbs are responsible for that idiot going out and shooting at the highway. We shoot people for killing other people out of revenge and not -- furthermore, you don't go around the highway killing people because your brother has been killed. He must be an idiot. He's an believable idiot."

A. Go on and read what Boro Mikelic says.

JUDGE MAY: Just a minute. One at a time.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. "Well, there's no problem. You have to arrest those people. There's no other way. Let us men go that you have detained and all those who have opened fire. They should arrest their man who did it and that's it. Let things be normalised." So what we are suggesting is they arrest their men, you arrest yours, they should turn their men over to you and you would take the culprits to court. In other words, I'm endeavouring to normalise things.

JUDGE MAY: One at a time.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Would you please read the -- Boro Mikelic's response in that same document?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I will try to do that, Mr. Sarinic, because I wish to draw your ³¹³⁴⁸ attention to this, Mr. May, Mr. Robinson, and Mr. Kwon, that I received the transcript of this conversation in at least three different versions which only adds to my suspicions that there are certain corrections made, because from the transcript that I'm reading from, I have nothing more to read about Boro Mikelic, but there's another transcript --

JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. The matter should be dealt with fairly.

Mr. Nice, again perhaps you would check this. It seems strange that three separate copies have been handed to him. That's what he says at the moment. That doesn't sound at all satisfactory. But no need to stop for that at the moment.

But there is another part which the witness wishes to deal with, and you will have the opportunity to deal with that. So perhaps you would note that so he has the chance.

MR. NICE: Yes. Certainly.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. This transcript that I quoted from a moment ago has 02294543, and this transcript relating to the same talk, 03416240. I can't find the third version now, but it's more or less the same thing. Mikelic says to me: "President, last night around 2100 hours, and what happened, then they killed three of their citizens. Six are wounded. Twelve of are slightly wounded. They have taken things to Okucani, the highway at 12.00 until 4.00 the highway was in communication." I don't understand this. "Then they came over the flyover. They were burning fires there, and then this happened. Now, whether they will detain some of our own who had ³¹³⁴⁹ set off from Belgrade in a vehicle not knowing what was happening on the highway because the highway was open and people were travelling. I don't know that. For the moment I will be -- I will be away for an hour, and I'll -- I'll call you."

Then I ask him: "Can you contact Sarinic?" Mikelic: "I have already spoken to Sarinic because I was the first to inform him last night. After that, this morning I spoke to their Minister of Internal Affairs, and after that I will speak to Sarinic in the next ten minutes or so. As far as they are concerned, they arrested this man, of course. They say they would take him to court, but they didn't retaliate in any other way. They behaved in a civilised manner, whereas amongst our people, you see what happens." And then I say to him: "But Perisic told me that they took measures over there that all the citizens will now," and then these are dots, it doesn't make sense --

JUDGE MAY: We cannot go on, cannot go on in this way. It's impossible for anybody to remember anything realistic and it's possible for anyone to say anything, which is not fair on anybody. But we will allow the witness if there is anything you want to add to what's been said.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Namely, I remember that transcript, and I wanted Mr. Milosevic to read it through to the end because there are two things that I wish to comment on. The first is that Mr. Milosevic said that we started the Operation Flash without any provocation, and I wanted to add this provocation as this incident. And ³¹³⁵⁰ also, Boro Mikelic said that they behaved in a civilised manner, whereas our men behaved in the way I've told you. That is one thing. And secondly, mention is made here of General Perisic. As far as I know, Mr. Perisic in those days was the Chief of Staff of the Army of Serbia. What has he got to do with it if the Serbian army was not involved there?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. He was just passing on information and that's all. He was sitting in Belgrade. He received information through his channels, and then he forwarded that information to me as to what was happening, because all of us were extremely irritated by any incident occurring on the highway. Now we'll come back to what you're saying, that it had not been planned in advance, and I would say that that is evident to everyone, because you have the meeting on the 30th of April.

THE ACCUSED: And let me mention for your benefit, Mr. May, that pursuant to your request I have provided the assistant of the opposing side, during the break I have told her I will be using this transcript so they have been able to get hold of it. So I will read a part of the discussion from this meeting which preceded Flash and the ethnic cleansing of Western Slavonia, and I have a couple of questions about it. First of all, you have the 30th of April, 1995.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. If you have a copy for the witness. Do you have that?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is page -- I'll leave out a part that I wanted to quote, but I'll reduce it to only a few essential ³¹³⁵¹ portions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I have announced that I will use this transcript, although it is not my duty to do so because it was provided through this witness or maybe Mesic. I don't know.

It says: "The president" -- so it means Tudjman is speaking. It is on page 01325696. "It has been agreed with the soldiers that the undertaking should start tomorrow at 5.00 a.m., that it should be finished within a few hours, not later than the end of the day. We have come to the conclusion it would be a good idea for UNPROFOR to open the highway today, to open the highway and then, not giving a few hours in advance to UNCRO, giving them any information, but rather for some kind of incident to be provoked an hour prior to this. If the highway is open, then let two or three of our cars pass through and let them be exposed to some sort of fire. So this would be an incident one hour prior to the beginning. And you two should agree on that. MUP probably, the MUP." Cervenko: "We've agreed about that in the eastern sector." The president: "We agreed on the highway. If it were not to be open then in the eastern sector so that formally we should have ... It is very important that this should be accompanied with appropriate propaganda."

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. First of all, the witness should have an opportunity to deal with this part.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm just quoting from the stenographic notes, Mr. May. ³¹³⁵²

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I must observe that the accused is saying that this was part of an attack for the purpose of ethnic cleansing. I reject that absolutely, because there was no ethnic cleansing. It was an organised evacuation, organised by the Serb authorities. To corroborate that, I have provided this honourable Tribunal with a tape and newspaper clippings and on the electronic media every two hours we were calling on the Serbs to stay in their homes. However, things happened as they did. That is one point. The second is that I personally, in the morning, on the 1st of May, was instructed to inform General Crabbe, he's a Canadian that was there on behalf of the UNPROFOR, to inform him and tell him that the Croatian army is about to cleanse Western Slavonia in order to restore Croatian control over it. So I don't understand what country which was occupied or, rather, of which 30 per cent of the territory would be occupied would not agree -- accept that and would fail to do anything about it once all peaceful attempts and negotiations failed. There's no country that wouldn't engage in a military action to liberate its territory. For heaven's sake, I think that is the legitimate right of everyone. They -- they were armed systematically, and there are hundreds of documents to prove that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Sarinic, I'm asking you about this meeting, so there's really no need for you to go on. I am quoting from what you said on page 702. "After you gave me instructions, president, I wanted to contact Akashi. He's in Sarajevo. It's not certain whether he will come this ³¹³⁵³ evening. Probably tomorrow. Then I immediately contacted General Crabbe, and I spoke to him. I told him that we agreed that the highway should be opened and he welcomed that. He said he would call me between 1200 and 1300 hours to tell me that he had been in touch with Mikelic." So this is what you're referring to, isn't it?

A. Not quite. This is my second or maybe the first conversation with this general. The second was in the early morning at 5.00 to tell him to remove his soldiers because there would be a military campaign. But I'm once again underlining the legitimacy of that operation, because everyone is entitled to liberate a part of its territory that has been occupied.

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. As I have to skip over things, let me find the passage. On page 711, the president says: "Listen. We'll see in the morning. If things went smoothly within a few hours, the MUP will do, but probably in the morning we will have to see the following. Since the police came up against resistance, then armed military forces were sent there, local military forces, and then you act together. So first you are preparing an incident. Then you would say that police forces came up against resistance, and then the army was included. Isn't that so, Mr. Sarinic?

A. Listen, you're simply formalising things. It doesn't matter whether these were police forces or the army. Western Slavonia was occupied, and it is an integral part of the territory of Croatia and, therefore, Croatia was entitled to use its forces to liberate its territory, and that's as simple as that.

Q. Mr. Sarinic, there was an agreement UNPROFOR and with Mikelic that ³¹³⁵⁴ you agreed with for the highway to be opened, and now you're now planning an incident, for the army to intervene, and for everything under Operation Flash that occurred. On page 714, you president says --

JUDGE MAY: No. Let the witness answer if he wants. If he wants to.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do wish to answer, Your Honour, because these are flagrant untruths by the accused. This incident was -- didn't need to be provoked. I personally drove in a car with my bodyguards two days prior to this along the highway. They wouldn't let me pass. There were soldiers of the so-called RSK there. They wouldn't let me pass. They used derogatory terms in addressing me, et cetera. I don't want to repeat them. It is not true that the highway was open. Some people passed at their own risk, but I claim formally that the highway was not functioning. So no incident was necessary, because there were incidents every day, every hour. And on the other hand, now, whether it was the MUP, that is the police forces or the army, I think that is quite irrelevant.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You are turning things upside down. I am saying that you rigged the incident to have an alibi for such an extensive operation. On page 714, the president says: "At 6:00, once they start, the following should be done - the Serb forces have again provoked an incident, and I told the ministers two or three cars should go there and then let them shoot at them."

And then Susak says: "We will do everything in our power." ³¹³⁵⁵ The president says: "That means a new incident and that the forces of law and order were going to establish control on the motorway." Then Susak speaks: "President, Mr. President, the worst option would be for us to go with two cars, two vans, to leave them there, to riddle them with bullets, to film this for television if there is no other option."

A. Now, as that is in the transcript, I cannot deny the authenticity of it. However, I should like to repeat that I am very astonished that any incident was needed, because it was quite legitimate to free part of the country that had been occupied.

Q. Now, Jarnjak, was that the Minister of the Interior?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. He says, "Mr. President, the provoking of this incident, Gojko, let's agree upon this and Gojko was the Defence Minister of course. I'm going to agree with the police Cis leadership and they'll do what's necessary. And it will be so -- it will seem to be the real thing, that nobody will be able to doubt it."

The president says: "So on the motorway. Now, if the motorway does not work, then at the entrance."

A. Yes.

Q. Hrvoje Sarinic goes on to say, this is what you say: "Mr. President, we oughtn't to be surprised by one thing. I think all of them will insist upon it, even UNCRO, that the motorway be opened from 6:00 in the morning to 6:00 in the evening. We want it to be opened all the time. If that is not sufficient, then the incident should be provoked ³¹³⁵⁶ outside."

So you say that this incident should be provoked. And the president said at the entrance to it. And Susak says: "Mr. President, what Nikica is a warning us of, we should like to tell him we are in favour of having the motorway open, but the complete motorway opening so we can not be accused of not want to go open it." So you are discussing the incident?

A. Yes, we're still discussing the incident, but let me say once again that I don't want it to end there, and I repeat the legitimacy of our defence there to liberate the occupied territories. So we did this on time, regardless of the incident, and -- or, rather, we informed UNCRO on time, and General Crabbe that the Croatian forces were moving to liberate Western Slavonia.

Q. And this is what Jarnjak says. I haven't got time, I have to get through this quickly. He says: "I think that two matters are concerned here. If they leave it open" - and he's referring to the motorway - "we will cause an incident. If they don't open the motorway then that will be the reason. The reason that it isn't open means you will have to intervene."

The president says: "However, with an incident again to provoke an incident. And I said that Croatia as we were not satisfied," et cetera, et cetera. He is encouraging the local Serbs at this point, et cetera. I'll skip over that section. It's not an important passage. But he is encouraging the local Serbs to create, to provoke an incident. "And I said we are dissatisfied and asking our friends the Americans to see ³¹³⁵⁷ that the agreement in Copenhagen and Washington and the United Nations is respected."

And then Jarnjak says: "I should like to receive maps to show me where that incident is going -- is happening. You will receive information on that, and the government is going to meet for 45 minutes to have a brief report presented." So you're already preparing a statement for the incident that you are supposed to rig, and stage there.

A. I don't know what the accused means by what he's saying. Now, I'd like to focus on the important points. The incident is not the important point. We were the victims on our own territory, and I think that that was military tactics along those lines. However, the essential thing is something that the accused omitted to mention. There was no genocide, but that what there was, was the legitimate desire to control and liberate the territory, which undoubtedly belong to the Republic of Croatia.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I should like -- these are stenographic notes, or rather the transcript of a recording of the meeting. In view of the shortness of time I have at my disposal, I can't quote it as much as I would like to and from the quotations you can clearly say -- see that an incident was planned as a pretext, an alibi for the famous Operation Flash and I would like to tender this transcript from the security council meeting held at the president -- at the presidential palace on the 30th of April, 1995. I should like it to be exhibited and admitted into evidence.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, we'll exhibit that.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think we have an English language ³¹³⁵⁸ version of that available. It should be under seal in light of the order that the Chamber has sought about this category of document but we can do that later.

JUDGE MAY: We need to keep it as short as possible. We do not want a huge amount of detail. We will put in what the accused has said rather than a great length of material.

Yes. Has the witness got it? No. Where have we got the document, please? Have you handed the document in, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I haven't handed it in. I would like to keep it, because I was provided it by the opposite side. And it is.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused repeat the ERN number, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And you have the document. ERN 01324 -- 01325695 is the ERN number on the title page and it is dated the 30th of April, 1995. So it is an agreement to stage the incident in question in order to go ahead with the Operation Flash and the consequences of that were well known. Several hundred Serbs killed and tens of thousands expelled from the area.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have an objection to make which I have repeated, and I would like it to be entered into the records that it was a legitimate operation on the part of the Croatian forces to liberate that part of Croatian occupied territory. Now, as to the hundreds of casualties, let me say there were casualties on the Croatian side, too, that was defending itself, but those casualties were trying to liberate and assume control of territories which without a doubt belong to the ³¹³⁵⁹ territory of the Republic of Croatia which had been occupied by the Serbs living there, and they were the Trojan horse for Serbia's policies in the struggle for a Greater Serbia there.

JUDGE MAY: Before we do anything else, we will have the document introduced into the exhibits.

THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 237, Your Honours, under seal.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Sarinic, how can you say that when I've just quoted your foreign -- your Defence Minister who says, and let me just repeat one of his sentences: Mr. President, in the worst case we will take two vehicles, two vans, leave them there, riddle them with bullets and film it for television if we have no other choice, no other options. And then you have an explanation as to how the government need not be informed until this actually happens and then that you yourself will inform them once the incident that you have planned actually takes place. You will then inform the government subsequently, because only those three Ministers who were present knew about it and of course nobody else knew about it. So your citizens didn't know about it, neither did your government. So what we're dealing with here is not a military operation, because somebody had done some shooting somewhere, it is a military operation to take control of the motorway which pursuant to agreement between you and Mikelic was supposed to be open to traffic normally.

So are you challenging that, Mr. Sarinic?

A. Yes, I am. I'm challenging it because the agreement between Mikelic and me never bore fruit. It bore a lot of paper, bulky paper. And ³¹³⁶⁰ afterwards, things were written in rifles and shooting and not written down in pen and ink. The motorway was never opened, and in his office and in your own office we spent hours discussing this problem. And anyway, Mr. Milosevic, I'm wondering why you're insisting on this so much, because you said your hands were clean and that you never meddled in any of this, that you never interfered, that it was a problem between Knin and Zagreb? Isn't that what you said.

Q. Of course it was, yes.

A. And now are you the advocate of Knin.

Q. I am an advocate of the truth. They were the victims of this trick which had as a result the death of several hundred people and tens of thousands of people expelled. Therefore, of course I am an advocate of their rights, and we're talking about a trick which is so obvious that nobody can challenge it.

A. It's not a trick. It was military tactics.

Q. Oh, I see, military tactics. Yes, absolutely.

JUDGE MAY: I'm stopping you. You must allow the witness to respond. You cannot interrupt. If he wants to add anything, he can do so. And I then suggest we find some other point to move on to. Do you want to add anything?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. It would be better to move on to another topic, otherwise there will be more repetition.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I think that would be a better idea too because things are very ³¹³⁶¹ clear as they stand. Otherwise, Mr. Sarinic, with respect to your testimony yesterday, the statement you made in connection with Mikelic, I received through my associates a letter from him, his letter, and the -- it has yesterday's date, and he denies the false assessments made by Hrvoje Sarinic on Wednesday the 21st on television. "I followed the testimony of Hrvoje Sarinic on television." And then he says who you were, et cetera, and I'll skip that part. And he goes on to say: "Since Mr. Sarinic in public presented flagrant lies and false evaluations linked to my own name and linked to me personally, I should like this to be known. My only meeting with Hrvoje Sarinic in the cabinet of the former President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic took place at the end of February 1995. On that day" --

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let's deal with this. Pause. Who are you saying -- who are you saying met Mr. Milosevic in February 1995, so it's plain. Who are you suggesting met him?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. Are you asking me, Your Honours?

JUDGE MAY: No, I was asking him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Sarinic mentioned Boro Mikelic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So Borislav Mikelic, who was his collocutor on behalf of the Republic of Serbian Krajina during negotiations on the opening of the highway. All supplies, repairs of railway lines, normalisation of relations, et cetera, et cetera.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. If there's anything you want to add, let ³¹³⁶² the witness, if he wants to add anything to date.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know the contents of the letter, because the accused just started reading it. And he said that they were lies, that what I said were lies. But I don't know what specific lies he's referring to.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let us go on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So he says that, "My secretary called him and asked him whether he could come to a meeting in the office of President Milosevic, that he was in the office of the republic of the Serbian Krajina in Belgrade, street Terazia [phoen], number 3 or 13, I can't read it because it is his handwriting. It is five minutes on foot from my offer -- my office. I said I would come, and 20 minutes later I arrived in President Milosevic's office where I found Mr. Sarinic. After exchanging greetings, I asked Sarinic, how come you are here, because all my previous meetings with Sarinic were organised through the UNPROFOR staff in Zagreb. Milosevic said to me then that the conversation took place after they had agreed amongst themselves, that is that you and I wanted to review with him the newly created situation following the decision of the Assembly of the Serbian Republic of Krajina on the freezing of an economic agreement with Croatia after UNPROFOR was interrupted at the end of December. There were no differences between me and President Milosevic on that occasion, and especially not any kind of master-servant relationship, because relationships between the two of us were relations of full respect. Mr. Nice asked you, and you said it was a relationship as between ³¹³⁶³ a master and a servant.

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Again, let the witness have the chance to answer if he wishes to.

Is there anything you'd like to add?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I repeat what I have already said. When Mr. Boro Mikelic walked into the office, he was surprised at seeing me there, and this is -- he confirms that in this letter. And then he asks me how come I was there. And then the accused said, "What do you care? Just sit down and listen." And I repeat that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now he's denying that. He's telling you what it was about, that the idea was to overcome the problem of the freezing of relations linked to your refusal to extend the mandate of UNPROFOR, but I won't repeat that.

And then under 2 it says: "The conversation with Mr. Sarinic in the presence of Mr. Milosevic lasted about 30 minutes. And the topic was not the functioning of the highway, as Sarinic said in the Tribunal, but he asked me to find a way of normalising traffic along four kilometres of the railway line through Western Slavonia from Novska and that Croatian experts with the assistance of the Polish battalion would carry out the repairs."

A. Your Honours, I have to deny that absolutely. The main subject, and I hope Mr. Milosevic will confirm that because he was present, he's a witness of that conversation, the main topic were the jeeps for the opening of the highway. And who would be in those jeeps? First the ³¹³⁶⁴ suggestion was two from Croatia, two from the RSK. Then the people from RSK would not agree. Then I gave way and said that they should all be from UNPROFOR. No, they said. We must add one more because, "Otherwise I will not be able to sell it to my men," said Boro Mikelic. And he said let there just be at least one of our -- the people from RSK there. And then I gave into that as well. That was the conversation, no mention of Novska or the railway line or anything like that.

Q. Very well. He's denying everything that you said in connection with him, as I am denying your distorted presentation of conversations when you were simply conveying Tudjman's messages. He says, "I assert with full responsibility that never and nowhere did I engage in any kind of conversation with Hrvoje Sarinic related to my comment on relations between Ratko Mladic and Slobodan Milosevic, and especially I never had any such conversation with Sarinic personally."

A. You must also remember that you left your office for a moment and you left Boro Mikelic and me alone in a room next to your secretary's office and that it was then that we discussed all kinds of things. And then I asked Boro Mikelic, what is the relationship with Mladic? Is Mladic more inclined towards Karadzic or has he remained loyal to Milosevic? And he says he's 200 per cent Milosevic's man. "I brought him here by car two days ago."

Q. But he's denying that. He says that the last time he saw Mladic was the beginning of September, 1994. Therefore, what you just said he is denying. He says that none of that happened.

A. I'm -- ³¹³⁶⁵

Q. Especially for him and Mladic to be in the same vehicle. Would you consider that normal, Mikelic driving Mladic to come and see me?

A. It doesn't seem normal to me, but nor is it normal for my driver from Dobranovci to Lipovac to be the President of the Republic of Serbia and Krajina, Hadzija [phoen], and yet he was my driver. So these things may happen. And I stand behind what I said.

Q. And he adds that he considers you the creator of the military operation Flash, not only of the Flash operation but also of the Operation Storm in which 250.000 people were expelled from their homes. And I can't read exactly how many were liquidated. It's in handwriting.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this into evidence.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You see from what follows how trustworthy what Mikelic says is. Everyone knows what my functions were. I couldn't have been a creator of that. So this whole writing or this whole letter I don't see has any point.

JUDGE MAY: This is a letter of yesterday of your friend; is that right, one of your friends; is that right, who has written about what this witness has said, is that right, and denies what he said.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's a letter of the then-Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

JUDGE MAY: Yesterday, that is right?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yesterday, who was the main negotiator on behalf of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

JUDGE MAY: He can give his evidence in due course. As we've said before, if he wants to come and give evidence he can come and tell us what ³¹³⁶⁶ he says about that, but no more than that when it comes to try and put it to this witness. You're entitled to do that but no more. You're not entitled to admit it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So I can't exhibit it.

JUDGE MAY: You can call him to give evidence in due course.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. Let's me try and make the best of the time left to me. So I shall leave out some things.

JUDGE MAY: You have 25 minutes left, and we shall adjourn in five minutes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have another 25 minutes; is that right?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will simply not be able to cross-examine this witness in those 25 minutes, Mr. May. There's no doubt about that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Just now, you turned things absolutely upside down, and I shall be as rational as I can with the time.

Tell me, did I say to you as well that according to information I received, the Muslims had shelled Markale in Sarajevo?

A. Yes. That's what he told me. You say, "You see how much one can trust them. They shot at themselves. But what do they care? Twenty-five dead for them is not important, but it brings them points with the international community." However, later on I saw that you said quite the ³¹³⁶⁷ opposite when you put the blame for this on Karadzic.

Q. That is absolutely not true. In your paragraph 49, you say that I said that the Muslims shelled Markale, and I continue to claim that. Markale 1 and Markale 2, and through the witnesses I will call, I will prove that.

Now, tell me please, this is paragraph 49 of your statement, did the French analyse this and their experts reconstructed the trajectory of the projectile and the possible source of fire?

A. Yes, that is true. Former Colonel De Boer, who is now a general, who told me that, because a team under his leadership made these analyses.

Q. And is it true that that position was under Muslim control?

A. That is what I was told.

Q. By the French, of course.

A. Yes.

Q. And this French colonel, later General De Boer, did he also tell you that the Muslims had done it?

A. Namely he was an analyst. He said judging by everything we know, it is clear that the projectile came from territory under Muslim control.

Q. Fine. So let's leave that. Now Dubrovnik. They produced here I don't know how many witnesses, ten or 15, in connection with Dubrovnik. You had all the relevant information in front of you. Did I keep saying to you that no one from Belgrade had anything to do with the shelling of Dubrovnik and that it was absolutely crazy to do that?

A. Yes, you did tell me that.

Q. Now, tell me quite sincerely, Mr. Sarinic, do you believe -- did ³¹³⁶⁸ you believe then and do you believe now that what I'm saying is true?

A. I said that. I said that I didn't believe that you organised it, but you certainly knew about it. I don't believe, however, that you personally organised it.

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. Half black, half white. Now, is it your conviction or have you established that not even Veljko Kadijevic, who at the time was the minister of defence, had ordered anything like that, that this was not done with his knowledge?

A. Listen, I had said that too. I have to be quite frank about it. I did say that, and I said that Veljko Kadijevic, who came from a mixed marriage, his mother or father were Croats and who was in love with the Adriatic coast and sea, that it would really surprise me for him to have ordered that. But I also said that I was quite sure that it was directed by Hadzic, and he came from Eastern Herzegovina, from the coast down there, and who was a man who orchestrated this operation and had was the initiator of it. But I also have here some seized documents that we had insight into, including an order by Admiral Mile Kandic from 1991 in which he says: "In connection with the activities of forces against vital facilities in Zadar, Sibenik, Split, and Ploce, and cutting off Dubrovnik from the rest the territory of the Republic of Croatia." This was in 1991, stated by Mile Kandic.

JUDGE MAY: The time has come. The time has come to adjourn this. Is it anticipated that the amici will be very long on this occasion?

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if possible, between 15 and 20 minutes. ³¹³⁶⁹

JUDGE MAY: We will think about that. Thank you. We will adjourn. Fifteen minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: We're going to give the times available as followed, having regard to the amount which is available. There will be half an hour -- you can have half an hour as to the accused, 15 minutes for Mr. Tapuskovic. The Prosecutor, if they require it, 20 minutes. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Sarinic, let's just round off the topic of Dubrovnik. Is it true that Bobetko wanted to win over the region of Trebinje and that everything began there, all this whole Dubrovnik unfortunate operation around Dubrovnik?

A. Well, that was discussed, but the Croatian leadership was absolutely opposed to that because it would lead to an international conflict, and that same leadership or, rather, President Tudjman didn't want to accept that at all.

Q. I believe what you've just said. I believe you, but you haven't answered my question. Bobetko did go to the operation in the hinterland of Dubrovnik, and then Tudjman stopped him afterwards?

A. Well, it was a little different. From the hinterland of Dubrovnik there was firing coming at Dubrovnik, the same Dubrovnik that you said you spent the loveliest moments of your life there and you gave me a lot of compliments with respect to Dubrovnik. ³¹³⁷⁰

Q. Yes, me and my family. That's quite true.

A. So that's where the shooting at Dubrovnik was coming from. So it was a legitimate operation to take out the snipers' nests, the nests from which this shooting at Dubrovnik was coming from. And I have no words to express the kind of people who were able to shoot at a town like Dubrovnik. So we did want to neutralise them. That is true.

Q. All right. So it wasn't Bobetko's offensive that came first. It was that his military activity was the result of what you have just told us about.

A. Absolutely correct.

Q. So that is what you're saying, is it?

A. Yes.

Q. Now to go back to point 9 of your statement, you say that the international community supported me, and the Croats and Slovenes were treated as secessionists.

A. Yes, for a time. At first that's how it was, in the initial stages. And as I've already said, until the international community saw through you.

Q. All right. Saw through me. Wasn't that before Clinton and the rest bombed Yugoslavia and then to cover that up, to cover those crimes up, this is what happened?

A. Well, I don't want to go into all that. You would have to ask President Clinton that and not me.

Q. Well, I hope to have the opportunity of asking him that in due course, but let me -- ³¹³⁷¹

JUDGE MAY: No. Let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let me just remind you of the stenographic notes of the 18th of August, 1995 meeting, just briefly. You attended the meeting, and it says the following, and Galbraith is speaking, the US ambassador of the day in Zagreb: "Since --" it says: "We have shown great sympathies in President Clinton came into office with respect to the importance of solving the question of the independence of Croatia. You were able to see that see that through our policy and the way in which it was expanded by the -- from the Bush government which wavered over recognition to Croatia. It did not agree with its present borders. Thanks to us, the UN recognised you at the beginning of 1993 and you were able to see what I myself did on the basis of instructions given to me by President Clinton and asserted that quite publicly." Therefore, Galbraith here is criticising the Bush administration and singing praises of President Clinton for participation in what you did at the time, Mr. Sarinic; is that right?

A. Peter Galbraith was a witness here. He testified. So I hope you asked him that question and that he gave you an answer to your question. It's not up to me to answer that question. You should have asked him that.

Q. Tudjman then goes on to say the following: He said -- he pointed out yesterday if it was accepted - and he's speaking about Bosnia - that the Serb part has the right to rely on Serbia, then there's no difference. ³¹³⁷² And there's no idea through which Croatia could be returned to the Yugoslav framework.

And then Holbrooke says, "No, of course not." And once again Granic says, "There are no great differences in viewpoint ...."

And then Holbrooke says "Mate" - referring to Granic - "this government never nurtured any wild ideas about the resuscitation of Yugoslavia."

And then the president goes on to say: "Mr. Eagleburger wasn't the only man to attempt."

And then Susak interrupts, and says: "That was the former government."

And then Holbrooke again, he says: "That's precisely what I wanted to say myself, so I'm very happy that you mentioned Eagleburger. The former government had that amazing idea, Baker's speech in Belgrade, Eagleburger, Skolcruk [phoen] that is all in the past." So they are explaining to you that the Bush administration had the idea of preserving the idea of Yugoslavia, that the idea was a completely mad one, that it belonged to the past and that they were supporting you. Isn't that right, Mr. Sarinic?

A. It wasn't stated as clearly as that. You are extrapolating that from what was said. I do remember that in 1990, or rather, towards the under of 1990 we were in Belgrade when James Baker was there, and it was a little strange to see the gentleman, behave because he was giving everybody lessons and instructions and saying we'll help you if you are ³¹³⁷³ reasonable, we'll help you financially. If not, you needn't count on us any more. So that was like talking to children -- small children at school. But with the arrival -- with the advent of Clinton, when Clinton came to power a balance was struck. That is quite certain, just as a balance was struck in relations with France when Mitterrand after -- when Mitterrand was replaced by Chirac.

Q. All right. Fine, Mr. Sarinic. Now, Holbrooke goes on to say here: "You had just justification for a military operation in Western Slavonia, and I kept defending it in Washington. You will recall that the two of us met in London immediately afterwards, and then we went to the US embassy to meet Gore. It was a very dramatic exchange of views. Some people wanted Gore to tell you -- tell us that you would be withdrawing from Western Slavonia and we said absolutely not. You have to stay there. You've closed the back door, that is to say, your country, and then we discussed your activities in Livanjsko Polje, and then we stated the following: Continue, carry on."

And then it says on to say that: "We publicly said that we were concerned. However, privately, you knew what we wanted." Therefore, they gave you the green light to go ahead with your military operations. Isn't that so, Mr. Sarinic?

A. Well, first of all they saw that the negotiations were leading nowhere. They were sterile and quite simply they changed their tactics. They never said to us openly, not even with a non-paper or non-document did they state that we could launch an action. They stopped the operation when it was moving towards Banja Luka. That's the truth of it. ³¹³⁷⁴ As to the rest of it, Western Slavonia, et cetera, that was along the lines of their understanding of that operation. And Holbrooke on that score was an absolutely pragmatic, normal politician.

Q. And do you know how they stopped that action when it moved towards Prijedor and Banja Luka? They stopped it by me telling Holbrooke that as far as Serbia was concerned, and I personally was concerned, we were -- would stop negotiating if they failed to stop it. And he said: "I'm going to board an aeroplane straight away. I'm going to see Tudjman, tell him to stop the operation straight away," and that's how the operation was stopped.

A. Well, you seemed to have turned into a witness so there's nothing left for me to say, no comment that I can make.

Q. All right, Mr. Sarinic. Now, you say that Vance and Owen went to Belgrade repeatedly and you criticised them. And I refer to paragraph 35. So what do you think happened? Several year -- for several years, international representatives gave full support to Serbia, and to me, myself to help peace be established and to stop the war. And then after the NATO aggression in 1999, he explains that what we did previously was not in fact efforts towards peace but that they were activities linked to war. Is that right, Mr. Sarinic? Was that how it was?

A. Well, with the change in the situation on the ground, the approach taken by the international community also underwent change, their attitude to those problem. And I know and we know that especially Lord Owen was very drawn to your policy and that you had good personal relations with him. I'm not criticising you for that. It's just an observation that I'm ³¹³⁷⁵ making of the situation as it was. And you yourself said that he was a family friend of yours, et cetera.

However, what we do know is certain things that he stated, and I personally was astounded when he said, "Don't imagine that you're going to get at the negotiating table what you did not succeed in defending on the ground." So that was encouragement for aggression. He incited aggression in that way.

Q. Well, this is the first time that I've heard someone say that Lord Owen was inciting aggression. As you know, all his endeavours were along the lines of peace, and his activities were obstructed by the people in Washington who didn't want to support him, so the war went on for two more years. Is that right or not, Mr. Sarinic?

A. I don't think I can agree with that, but the sentence that I've just uttered you did not comment purposely when I said don't think that at the Green Berets' table you will get what you didn't get -- manage to win over in the field. He said that in Dobranovci. And we sat there for a long time holding meetings and negotiating.

Q. Mr. Sarinic, I really don't remember Lord Owen ever having said that, but you can claim whatever you like. This seems to me to digress from his efforts and diverge from his actual efforts towards peace. But let's clear up a few other matters. Is it true that Tudjman publicly stated that Bosnia, as he said, was a historical absurdity, in his words?

A. That's not all he said, but I make a great distinction between Tudjman the historian and Tudjman the politician and statesman. But that is indeed what he said. He said it publicly. He didn't hide it. He even ³¹³⁷⁶ said that Bosnia was the result of Turkish invasions in the 15th century, and he was drawn to the 1939 Banovina set-up and Cvetkovic-Macek agreement and so on and forth. But when this came to be put into practice, then he was quite a different man, and he realised that the division of Bosnia was something which the international community would absolutely condemn, and then we were the first to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina and the first ambassador over there helped in the referendum on independence and was -- the Split declaration came to be signed and so on and so forth. All the concrete steps were taken and made, whereas you, Mr. Milosevic, did not wish to sign -- wish to recognise Bosnia regardless of how much we tried to prevail upon you to do so. When we asked you why you wouldn't recognise Bosnia, you said, "Which Bosnia? Whose Bosnia?" As if Bosnia never existed.

Q. Well, Mr. Sarinic I assume a peaceful settlement had to be found first. So after Dayton when the new constitutional system was established in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we recognised that and recognised it. But we did so when the main goal had been scored, that all three peoples should be equal in Bosnia-Herzegovina, all three ethnic groups, and that was our thesis from the very outset.

A. Only until Dayton. You know what happened in Bosnia. Republika Srpska happened with 49 per cent of the territory, and something else that happened was ethnic cleansing and that which was your strategy, that is to say that Republika Srpska sooner or later should become part and parcel of Serbia.

Q. Please. When Republika Srpska occurred, Herceg-Bosna occurred ³¹³⁷⁷ too. But later on, Tudjman, under pressure, accepted to establish a federation. Is that how it was or not? Tudjman had the idea and supported the idea of Republika Srpska and Herceg-Bosna and the and Muslim federation as well, or rather the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as it was called by the Muslims. But later on under pressure he agreed to a bilateral agreement organised by the Americans. Wasn't that how it was?

A. Well, not really. That wasn't exactly how it was and I have my own personal notes here, the ones I made at the meeting that took place in Geneva, and that meeting was attended by President Tudjman, Alija Izetbegovic, Haris Silajdzic, and myself. And at one point Alija Izetbegovic says, "Did you think about joining Herceg-Bosna to the Republic of Croatia ever? We would have nothing against that, because then the Muslim state, although small, would be independent and autonomous and had external borders guaranteed by the international community. Of course, economically speaking it would rely on Croatia." So Alija Izetbegovic was offering Herzegovina to Croatia. Tudjman did not accept his offer. He didn't accept it because he knew this changing of the borders -- well, he didn't accept it for two reasons in actual fact. A, he knew that any changing of borders would cause great revolt from the international opportunity and wouldn't be recognised; and on the other hand, you had the Croats in Central Bosnia which in that way would be definitively left to themselves.

Q. Now, having mentioned Central Bosnia, do you consider that the Muslims performed ethnic cleansing and did a great deal of evil against ³¹³⁷⁸ the Croats in Central Bosnia? Do you consider that?

A. There was certainly that too. However, I cannot speak in general terms. I think that these were groups who perpetrated this. I don't believe that it was the official policy that was pursued by the Bosnian leadership or by Alija Izetbegovic himself.

Q. Very well. And do you remember that at a meeting in Geneva, in your presence, in fact, I remember well that only you and Tudjman were present, and Owen and Stoltenberg. And Tudjman said that he never heard of such atrocities as has been committed by the Muslim forces against the Croats in Central Bosnia. Do you remember this statement by Tudjman at the time? It wasn't made in public, but it was at this meeting attended by both Lord Owen and Stoltenberg, and you were present.

A. I don't remember those very words, but I do know that President Tudjman was critical of such acts on the one hand, and on the other, these were unfortunate times during which many things happened, and probably in Bosnia no one is innocent.

Q. I'm very glad to hear that from you, at least once from somebody. Tell me, please, do you know that a large number of inhabitants but also of soldiers of the Bosnian Croats, when the Croatian offensive was launched, withdrew across Serb positions and across Serb-held territory?

A. When I said that no one was innocent, I also had in mind those things, because everyone was fighting everyone else over there. And as days and months went by, thus alliances were formed and broken so that we do know that for a while the Croats collaborated with the Serbs. After all, there was that meeting in Graz between Karadzic and Boban, which is ³¹³⁷⁹ no secret either, at which they talked but came to no conclusions. So there were things along the lines you're referring to.

Q. In connection with point 65, is it true that Croatia, for six months, had secretly by night given weapons by helicopters to the Bosnian forces?

A. I can't say whether this went on for six months, but it did supply them and assist them. That is quite sure. But that was in the Bihac pocket, because a specific situation developed there. We had to, let us say for humane reasons, but also for tactical and strategic reasons, we had to defend Bihac from the Serb aggression. Because otherwise if Bihac had fell -- fallen, there would have been a second Srebrenica. And secondly, the RSK and the RS would have united, and this would have resulted in an all-out war. So this would no longer be within one country, but it would be a piece of Croatia taken away to another state, which is something that Croatia could not tolerate.

Q. Well, wasn't the situation quite the opposite? The Bihac pocket was under the control of Muslims but Muslims who wanted peace except for Atif Dudagovic's 5th Corps. It was under the control of the Muslims headed by Fikret Abdic whom both you and we supported and assisted. You mentioned yesterday that I told you that we had sent him 12.000 blankets. He was in an extremely difficult situation. He was a man who favoured peace, who didn't want to wage war against either side. He simply wanted to organise economic life so that the people there would have enough to eat.

A. Well, I agree with you there. It was very difficult for him to ³¹³⁸⁰ survive, so he had to enter into alliances on all sides. But you proposed to us that we form a confederation with this SAO Western Bosnia. However, we didn't accept that, because that would be a precedent. And then the same could have been asked for the Republic of Serbian Krajina. But the balance of forces was such over there that Fikret Abdic, nor the Bosniak army simply were not able to defend themselves from Karadzic and the army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina and the Republika Srpska.

Q. Surely the army of RS and the RSK did not attack Abdic. It was not SAO. It was the autonomous province of Western Bosnia, the president of which was Fikret Abdic. And the population there was predominantly Muslim by a vast majority.

A. The Serb army was attacking the Bosnian army over there, and they appealed to us for help. And that is why we gave them help, first in equipment and supplies. And when we saw that it would fall, this was a matter of days. Had we not intervened, Bihac would have fell in a single blow.

Q. Is it true that there were instructions for them to take Sanski Most and go as far as Banja Luka?

A. They did ask for that, that is true, and I remember your comments as well in that regard. You said, "Sanski Most? They can't conquer a single village alone." You probably remember that.

Q. So they asked you to attack Serb territories. Izetbegovic asked you to do that?

A. They considered Sanski Most to be historically territory belonging to the Muslims, Muslim territory. ³¹³⁸¹

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. Let's go back to Croatia. Is it true that during the war in Croatia Spegelj wanted to attack JNA barracks in Croatia? You speak about that in paragraph 16 of your statement.

A. That is something that is well known. Of course in view of the way the JNA behaved, it's no wonder that such ideas should have cropped up, that is to attack the barracks. You know that we negotiated with them. Even I personally negotiated with Raseta, Invrasin Trifunovic [phoen] surrendered his weapons, whereas everything else were taken away by them first from Slovenia in 1991 to arm the Serbs in the RSK and the RS, and then they simply pulled out the ships from the sea and everything else so that what was left, and furthermore, the weapons of the Territorial Defence were taken away from us, which normally should have been under the control of the republics. They didn't do this in Slovenia, for instance. So that it was almost logical and legitimate that Spegelj should have the idea to attack and to try and pull out the weapons from the barracks. But Tudjman didn't want it because in those days Croatia was unarmed, and this could have had tragic consequences.

Q. Will you please answer as briefly as possible, because judging by the clock, I have less than 20 minutes, under 20 minutes.

JUDGE MAY: Much less than that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How much do I have?

JUDGE MAY: Four minutes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Four?

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Get on with it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You said I had half an hour. We ³¹³⁸² didn't start at 25 to 12.00, did we?

JUDGE MAY: We certainly did. You have had the time. Now, you've got an another four minutes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, then. Let me just raise a few more questions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did you visit the Dretelj camp?

A. Never. I heard of it, but much later. However, I inquired before coming here about that camp, and I know that Mate Granic went to that camp, and that at the time these camps were discussed, Izetbegovic and Tudjman met, and they sent Mate Granic to Dretelj, and Haris Silajdzic to Konjic. And --

Q. Please be brief.

A. So my answer is I was never in Dretelj.

Q. Here on 03-8262, this is a marking of the opposite side. In the last paragraph. It is a document, and I can't decipher it because I got page 2 it of. It says: "In September 1993, escorted by the Prime Minister Jadranko Prlic, the Dretelj camp was visited by senior officials of the Republic of Croatia, Granic Mate, Sarinic Hrvoje. And upon their departure, the camps management encouraged the release of the detainees from mass going to third countries which was a form of forcible deportation of the Bosniak people to our states. Is that an untruth?

A. That I was there is absolutely not true.

Q. Very well, Mr. Sarinic. Yesterday, you mentioned the elections in ³¹³⁸³ the RSK, when Babic won, and then this was annulled, and then Martic won. First of all, do you remember that that is not true? In the first round, Babic was in the lead, and in the second round Martic won. So it wasn't Babic who won in the first round. He had a lead, but as he didn't win, according to the law there's a second round, and in the second round Martic won a majority and he was legally elected.

A. I remember teasing you a little bit about this because you were saying that Martic would certainly win. And in the first round, Babic was in the lead. And then I said to you, "Well, President, your follower appears not to be winning." And then you answered there was some irregularities. And then suddenly Martic won.

Q. He won legally in the second round. And what is true is that as far as my opinion is concerned about Babic and Martic, I thought that Babic was a dishonest man and that Martic was a honest one.

A. Yes. Martic proved that by shelling Zagreb how honest he is, but that's another story.

Q. That is another story. This is a shelling that we condemned. He did that as an act of warning, because of your attacks over there, though we never justified it, and we considered it to be absolutely impermissible to shell Zagreb.

Now, tell me, please, where did you get the idea of saying that in connection with missing Croats, nothing had been done when you know full well that in Yugoslavia and in Croatia a joint commission for missing persons was formed, that it met, alternatively in Belgrade and Zagreb on several occasions, and that an institutional framework was said to assist ³¹³⁸⁴ the families of missing persons on both sides? How can you say that nothing was done when all this was done? And those in those commissions, they were very prominent officials of both Serbia and Croatia.

A. Mr. Milosevic, I am a pragmatic person, and I am talking about the results of it. I discussed this with you. I was personally under pressure of the relatives of the missing persons, and I begged you to have something done. You said that you would do something immediately, but for the following several months not a single name came up, was discovered. But it could have been, because among the 1.800 men missing in those days, if I remember well, at least five could have been traced. So to -- as to appease the public. What happened later is another story.

JUDGE MAY: Your time is up. You have more than enough time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more question, please.

JUDGE MAY: No, you've not going to have another question this time. Yes, we need to finish this. Yes. Quarter of an hour, please, Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'll just use the words that the witness Mr. Sarinic used in certain places and which he heard himself, and I will draw his attention to things found in the documents. I asked the Prosecution to prepare for Mr. Sarinic his statement on the 24th, 25th, 26th of February and the 14th and 15th of May, 2003. I have a copy here. I can give it to the witness straight away to save time. I can give a copy to Mr. Sarinic in the -- in the B/C/S language.

Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic: ³¹³⁸⁵

Q. [Interpretation] You spoke about the Yugoslav People's Army and a meeting in your examination-in-chief in paragraphs, 15, 16, 17, and 18, and in paragraph 18 it says here: "Kadijevic said that the JNA would not fire a single round." That is what it says here. Was that so?

A. Yes. Kadijevic did say that for sure.

Q. But please look at page 6 of this statement that you made earlier on, and you say the following, that Kadijevic spoke about this, and your third sentence says: "The JNA is in favour of securing the agreed peace and then simultaneously to discuss the political future." Do you remember that that was said too?

A. Yes, I do remember, but you see, that was verba volant as one might put it. That was Kadijevic's position in words, but what actually happened on the ground is another matter.

Q. You went on to say: "Kadijevic said the JNA will not fire a single round if it is not attacked." Did he say that too?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Fine. Later on: "We believe that if the JNA leaves, there would be even more bloodshed," and you think the opposite. And later on Kadijevic said he felt that Yugoslavia should be preserved.

A. He was absolutely Tito's man, and that was his aim. But when he said that the bloodshed would be greater, you know well that the JNA, until it was transformed into a pure Serbian army, an army of Serbia, that it protected the backs of the Serbs and that it was absolutely anti-Croatian.

Q. Now, please look at page 10 when you talk about Spegelj, and you ³¹³⁸⁶ say that: "At the beginning of the year, Spegelj had proposed to Tudjman that barracks should be attacked and that Tudjman said that this should not be done and that that would be suicide." Was it so?

A. Yes. I just said that in answer to the accused.

Q. And were barracks indeed surrounded sometime in August or September 1991?

A. Not all of them, but some. I know that our men tried to negotiate with each of the barracks commands and so on, and in some places let us say that this was settled in a civilised manner. Take the example of Rijeka. But of course they took with them all the weapons and equipment. But there were no bullets fired. Trifunovic in Varazdin, he left the weapons behind, and then he was put on trial in Belgrade on that score.

Q. Thank you. Now look at page 20, please. You spoke about Bihac a moment ago and what Milosevic's position was in relation to Abdic. A moment ago you say -- you said that you don't remember, but when you were examined and when you were interviewed, rather, for this statement you said explicitly fourth sentence, Bihac: "For six months, the Croats secretly at night delivered to the BH army food, goods, supplies, and weapons by helicopters.

A. Yes. Yes. I said I had didn't remember whether it was six months, but for a while, yes. Yes, that's right.

Q. And then you go on to say: "The Bosnians could not liberate Bihac. The United States helped the Croats, but then they stopped us before we reached Banja Luka." Is that right?

A. Yes. ³¹³⁸⁷

Q. Before that, there was a talk in Split, and you referred to it. You say: "Then there was the meeting in Split when the Croats asked whether they could secure the border of the Serbs, and Izetbegovic agreed." Does that mean that Izetbegovic agreed with your request to secure the border?

A. One could read it like that, but this situation was slightly different. When Izetbegovic or, rather, the Bosniaks asked Croatia to help then militarily, Croatia said fine, ask that of us. Then they weren't want to go such an official request. And then the Croatian leadership said, "We won't do that. We can't do that on our own because then it will look as if it was an aggression against the neighbouring state."

Q. But that did happen.

A. No, it didn't happen. But after that, the Split declaration was signed.

Q. Fine. And then it was agreed that the Croatian army can act in the border belt some 60 kilometres from the border the Croats formed what the international community should have done. Does that mean that you with the Croatian army were acting within the territory of another state almost 60 kilometres within its borders?

A. No. When an agreement was signed to that effect about those 60 kilometres.

Q. And do you consider that that was legitimate, that this should be undertaken, and that you should work across the territory of another person's state and that this was later taken over in the Storm operation? ³¹³⁸⁸

A. Had that not happened, Bihac would have fallen and Srebrenica and the rest of it. That's one thing. And the other thing that -- is that the neighbouring country, if you're on good terms with it and it asks you for assistance, then you cannot interpret this as aggression. All you can interpret it is as responding to the request for aid. So this was something that was known before the 12th of July.

Q. That Srebrenica would happen?

A. Well, Srebrenica would have happened had Bihac fallen.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I asked Peter Galbraith when he was a witness here, and it was Exhibit 11, a document that was tendered. I have a copy of the transcript, and I should like to show Mr. Sarinic several things from that transcript now.

Q. You didn't attend the Brioni meeting when it was decided to take action --

A. Which action?

Q. Operation Storm?

A. No, I was not.

Q. Right. So I won't ask you what I asked Mr. Galbraith and Mr. Agotic, but on page 3, this is what President Tudjman says. It is the penultimate paragraph which is in front of you. He made an ultimatum. "However, this morning Stoltenberg came to see Sarinic and told him that this could be put right along the lines of what the president was asking for and that they proposed that between the Knin Serbs and us, a meeting be held in Geneva to discuss the matter."

A. Now, who said what, I really can't follow this. I wasn't there, ³¹³⁸⁹ so I can't either confirm or deny whether the president said that or not.

Q. Well, didn't Stoltenberg come to see you?

A. Stoltenberg came to see me a hundred times.

Q. So is what the next paragraph says correct: "I told Sarinic that in principle he can say that we're in favour of negotiations. However, that he will not lead the delegation if the meeting takes place so that" --

A. Just a minute, please. I can't find it.

Q. It's the last sentence on that page.

A. "I told Sarinic that in principle he can say that we are in favour of negotiations, if they accept my conditions, the conditions I laid down in my response to Akashi. However, that he would not be leading the delegation if the meeting actually take place."

Q. And that you would negotiate but that an agreement would not be reached and that an attack would be launched regardless of the negotiations.

A. I don't remember that.

Q. Thank you.

A. You're welcome.

Q. Today another exhibit was tendered. It was a document in tab 39, and I should like to ask Mr. Sarinic several questions with respect to those minutes. During the examination-in-chief here, you said that Slobodan Milosevic always considered that Knin was Croatian, that it belonged to Croatia.

A. That was how it was, yes. However, I also said that I didn't ³¹³⁹⁰ believe him, that that was a tactical game Milosevic was playing, because he was the master of those territories, that is to say 30 per cent of Croatia and 72 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So they were two irons in the fire. And he used them very well as levers in the negotiation. And don't forget one other thing, that sanctions were enforced against Serbia and that it needed a lost argumentation to have those sanctions lifted and that was leitmotif of all the actions undertaken by Slobodan Milosevic with the aim to having the sanctions lifted.

Q. Take a look at page 15, please.

A. Wait for me to find it. Yes, I have page 15.

Q. The last paragraph there, during the examination-in-chief, you said that his position with respect to the eastern part of Croatia was different. But this is your answer in a conversation you had with a gentleman mentioned here. You said the following, these are your words: "He never denied the fact that the eastern sector was part of Croatia, even when he proposed a referendum. I asked him -- I pressured him to give me an answer. I said, what will the referendum will refer to? What will it be a referendum on? And he said the referendum would be on the status of the eastern sector within Croatia." Is that right?

A. Yes, it is, except this status -- rather, we were against a referendum because that was an integral part of Croatia. Now, the referendum itself, upon which Mr. Milosevic insisted, was very questionable, and we couldn't agree to it. So these are the words which were uttered and which I quoted. However, the referendum would have been something that was not acceptable as an idea. ³¹³⁹¹

Q. Thank you.

A. You're welcome.

Q. On page 23, and it is page 18 of the English version. 18 in English of that same document. In the examination-in-chief you said Mr. Milosevic talked about his people that he could order one thing or another and this is what it says here: "Tudjman said here," and it is on page 23 towards the end, you say: "The president says he cannot do that again and again, I say." And Richard Holbrooke says, "That's the whole point."

A. Can't do what?

Q. Can't order whatever it is.

A. Well, I don't really believe that, because remember Dayton. At Dayton, the accused telephoned from Dayton to his people on the ground in Bosnia and in Croatia, he telephoned them and asked them to sign the Erdut agreement which I signed on behalf of Croatia. And they would never have signed had there not been that telephone conversation, which means that his forces were influenced by him. He was very important to them.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, given the time, could you just quickly wind up, please.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Of course. Yes, Your Honour. I have a document here and I'll be finishing with that. It is the 31st of August. That is the date. The 31st of August, 1995. It is a document which I showed during a closed session so if necessary we can go into private session. I showed it to General Clark. So may we go into private session. ³¹³⁹²

[Private session]

(redacted)

(redacted) ³¹³⁹³ Pages 31393 redacted, private session

³¹³⁹⁴

(redacted)

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone Mr. Nice, please Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Mr. Sarinic you have been asked many questions about documents, not all of which have been produced or reviewed by you. We have no desire to add to the burden of material in the court, but just as a preliminary, are there any particular documents that you've been asked questions about that you want an opportunity to review or you want us to dig up, if we haven't dug up already and make available to the Chamber? If not, I'll move on to about half a dozen very short questions.

A. Mr. Nice, there have been so many documents mentioned during the cross-examination that I just can't single out any one specific document. So you can go ahead with your questions.

Q. Mr. Prelec observed that I think there is an error in the transcript at page 73, the last page before the last break. Mr. Sarinic, when you were speaking of responsibility for the Dubrovnik shelling, you said what you said about the accused, and you then said who you thought was responsible. It's recorded on the transcript as being Hadzic, starting with a H. Is that what you intended to be recorded?

A. No. No. Adzic with an A.

Q. Thank you.

A. Without the H.

JUDGE KWON: That was the misinterpretation. ³¹³⁹⁵

MR. NICE: Yes, I think so.

Q. Your observation about the reaction of Mikelic to the accused in his master-servant or servant-master relationship, was that something you noted at the time or was that something that you simply recall, and if so, why?

A. Well, that's something that I noticed at the time, and I say that in my book. The book is dated 1998. Now, this other thing was in 1995, I believe. I saw that. But I didn't wish to emphasise that as being a relationship between two people. All I wanted to say is to see the power and force involved and where -- that the power was in Mr. Milosevic's hands.

JUDGE MAY: The accused had a question. Let him raise it.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It wasn't the wrong interpretation. I heard it too. I used the microphone, otherwise I find it difficult with the witness. I didn't hear the name Adzic. If it was Adzic, then it was the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the General Staff. Had I heard it here I would have reacted. I presented the order by the General Staff that Dubrovnik must not be bombed either from the land or from the sea or from the air. So Adzic could not have been responsible for that.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let's move on.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Sarinic, in light of that observation by the accused, is there anything you want to add to your answer about Adzic?

A. Well, with General Adzic, I was with him in 1991 at Brioni ³¹³⁹⁶ Islands, a meeting there, and I think I spoke about that during my testimony. He was a man who, especially when Kadijevic's power was waning, he was the one who took over the power within the JNA army and led the battle to all intents and purposes. Everybody said to me that he was from Eastern Herzegovina, from that region down there, much closer to Dubrovnik, and that he was the initiator and perpetrator of the orders to bomb Dubrovnik.

Q. Very well. A short question about your evidence of what the accused said about Arkan. Was this something you recorded, you wrote down contemporaneously, or was it something you remembered and subsequently set out in writing?

A. No. This is how it was. I think I told you that once. I couldn't, while talking to the accused, keep a diary, because that was impossible. I just jotted down a couple of words. And then on the plane, while it was still fresh in my memory, I took notes. I know that on a piece of paper I just wrote down the word "Arkan," but this was perhaps two hours after that I wrote the note in my diary.

Q. Do you have any doubts now about what was said and the manner in which it was said, the evidence you've given to this Court?

A. No. No, I don't.

Q. Two more questions. You've been asked a few questions by the accused about the Karadjordjevo meeting and the issue is whether there was any discussion about the division of Bosnia. From the material coming to you, do you have a view on what was discussed? If so, please tell the ³¹³⁹⁷ Chamber about it.

A. Well, you see, first I said what I had heard during the ten minutes that I was with the two presidents. Everything else are my own reflections, because I would form a kind of puzzle, a mosaic, from everything I heard and saw and learnt about, and all the indications that I had collected. You are lawyers, so you know very well that there are many clues pointing to the same direction which constitute proof. As regards Bosnia and the division of Bosnia, there was a lot of speculation about it, but no one else except the two presidents, one of whom is here and the other in the other world, could know what they actually said. I spoke to you about that piece of paper that was in Tikves and not in Karadjordjevo, but this had to do with Bosnia. Furthermore --

Q. Was what you saw and heard at the time and subsequently consistent with or inconsistent with the discussion about the division?

A. The division of Bosnia -- I have to tell you, I'm sorry, I may not be quite explicit in answering your question, but there's no other way I can do it. I told you how each person behaved after that with regard to Bosnia. On the one hand, there was Republika Srpska, ethnically cleansed and prepared for annexation, which was virtually half of Bosnia, annexation with Serbia. On the other hand, Croatia recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina, et cetera, sent its ambassador there and everything else that I've told you about.

Therefore, as a pragmatic person, I cannot speculate here. I must tell you about the facts that I am aware of it, but that Bosnia was ³¹³⁹⁸ discussed and that there were reflections on those lines on both sides, only one side put that into effect and the other didn't.

Q. Finally, you made an observation about Mesic speaking of the JNA becoming a large -- the largest -- the world's largest paramilitary organisation. In a sentence, explain why that phrase, if it makes sense to you, makes sense. Why paramilitary?

A. Well, you see, an organisation that doesn't have its command, anyone can command it. And since the Presidency, according to the constitution of Yugoslavia, was the Supreme Commander of the JNA, that Supreme Commander no longer existed, and the question then was who was in command of it. And if you have several masters, then it could be called a paramilitary organisation.

MR. NICE: No further questions. The Chamber wanted an explanation for the accused having been provided with three translations of a transcript. The explanation is as follows: As the document I drew to your attention earlier reveals, I've forgotten the tab number now, but all the intercepts were provided with transcripts that were not accurate or fully accurate, and they were retranscribed. Thus that gives rise to two transcripts. In addition, the provider had provided on an earlier occasion extracts from some of these transcripts. The very fact that they were extracts meant that they had to be provided under Rule 68, in case there was the possibility that the editing or the selection was itself significant, thus the third version.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let us thank the witness, first of all, for his coming here and giving his testimony. The evidence is now ³¹³⁹⁹ finished. We thank you for your assistance, Mr. Sarinic. You are now free to go.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

[The witness withdrew]

JUDGE MAY: While we are in the final days -- minutes, rather, I think can be considered, we have another four or five weeks, may less.

MR. NICE: We have a very limited number of days left. I think there is now available for you a witness schedule. It is now down to one sheet.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We now have that. What is the position as far as Monday is concerned?

MR. NICE: The position for Monday is perhaps a little uncertain, because if we look at the current list, I'd hoped to start with Mr. Manning today. As he hasn't started and as he's an in-house witness, it's better to take him off the list for the time being and use him to fill any gaps that may arise. Therefore, we can temporarily strike him from the list.

B-235 will only, of course, be heard on Monday if the Chamber so orders. If he doesn't, then I will accelerate B-1804 into Monday. If the Chamber announces its ruling on B-235 tomorrow, obviously the accused will be in a position to know whether it's B-235 or B-1804 first. The current plan is that Mr. Theunens and General Vegh should follow not necessarily in that order, although that would be the logical order, Thuenens first and General Vegh second. General Vegh would require the organisation -- first of all, the approval of and application for ³¹⁴⁰⁰ videolink testimony and then its organisation, so there may be some difficulties or certainty about that. That, I think, will fill next week, and any gap can be filled by Mr. Manning.

And then on the 3rd and 4th we come to Witness B-248, although the name on the 4th of February is still there. There is an outstanding application in respect of him, and he might have to be shifted even if allowed in.

Also, I'm reminded by Ms. Pack that -- before we depart from it, that there is the question of the status of the Sarinic exhibits.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will now adjourn until next Monday when we'll continue with the hearing. We will adjourn.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday, the 26th day of January, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.