³¹⁵⁰⁷

Tuesday, 27 January 2004

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice. How long do you anticipate being?

MR. NICE: I hope half an hour.

WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed] Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. With an eye to the index, we now having read from the executive summary in respect of your Bosnian report, does the Bosnian report start with a section on the JNA support to the Bosnian Serb defence structure and then go on to deal with the JNA's transition to the VJ and the VRS?

A. Your Honours, that's correct. It starts -- the Bosnia-Herzegovina part starts at paragraph 15 of the executive summary.

Q. We've already looked at -- we've already gone through the executive summary yesterday. So in the report itself, I'm going to take you straight to part 3 because the first two parts speak adequately for themselves. Part 3 is the VJ support to the VRS, and in this part of your report you'd like us, I think, to focus, first of all, at page 18; is that correct? Or, no, not 18, more 21, but if we look at page 18 and then go to 21, one matter you want to draw to our attention.

A. That's correct, Your Honours. From page 18 on, the report deals with operational support. That means the involvement of VJ units, combat units, in operations on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the ³¹⁵⁰⁸ formal withdrawal of the JNA in May 1992.

Q. And at page 21, in paragraph 44, is there a particular reference to war booty that merits some attention?

A. Indeed, Your Honours. Now we also have an exhibit, if you prefer to show that, or I can also comment on --

Q. The exhibit being number --

A. I apologise. It's not among the list. I can comment from the report. It's document which was already introduced in court by another witness. It emanates from the MUP, so the Ministry of Interior, local department, police department in the area of Bajina Basta, so on the border area with Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it allows for the passage of war booty. The war booty as such is not so important but it refers also to an agreement with Colonel -- exactly General, excuse me, General Mile Mrksic, commander of Tactical Group 1, VJ Tactical Group 1. Now the use the term "war booty" indicates that the unit, the Tactical Group 1 has been involved in military operations and these military operations must have taken place on the other side of the border, i.e., in Bosnia-Herzegovina because usually you don't seize war booty from your own territory you control.

Q. Moving on to the section that deals with operations outside of Sarajevo. It's in the general section of Sarajevo but it's in the subsection areas outside of Sarajevo on page 26, please, and at paragraph 57.

MR. NICE: It's the bottom of the page, if the usher would be so good. ³¹⁵⁰⁹

Q. Under Pancir -- it may be that you want page 20 --

A. 26, Your Honours.

Q. 26. I mistook and said 27. It's 26. We have here a passage on Pancir. Explanation and comment please, Mr. Theunens.

A. In the report, there is a particular attention for -- or in the Bosnia-Herzegovina section of the report, there is particular attention for the operations around Sarajevo taken into account its importance on the -- or its impacts on the overall situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the conflict, and this particular section deals with an operation during which, according to a document, an order we have from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, so from the VRS unit in the area, a document indicating the involvement of 120 specials from the VJ. Now, "specials" would normally be a term that is used for special forces, and based on analysis of other military documents, including orders of battle of the VJ, these people are most likely members of the VJ special forces corps, and therefore they would belong to one of the three main units of that special forces corps, namely they could belong to the Guards Brigade or the 63rd Parachute Brigade, or the 72nd Assault and Strike Brigade.

There's also a Armoured Brigade in the VJ special forces corps, but taking into account the nature of the operations in the area of Sarajevo and also the mentioning of helicopters, it's unlikely that these people belonged to the Guards Brigade -- to the -- excuse me, to the Armoured unit.

Q. Two pages further on, you've turned your attention to operations ³¹⁵¹⁰ in Western Bosnia-Herzegovina at paragraph 63, and we may have to look at the foot of page 28 and the top of page 29. Paragraph 63, your comment please.

A. We have an exhibit for that. It's Exhibit B15, number 15 on the list. I don't know whether time is available to look at the exhibit or I can limit myself to commenting on the report.

Q. Comments first and then we'll turn to the exhibit.

A. The operations in Western Bosnia-Herzegovina are related to the existence of the autonomous province of Western Bosnia directed by Mr. Fikret Abdic. This province was created in September 1993 when it seceded from the post Sarajevo forces in the Bihac pocket. Interesting aspect is it's located on the border with Croatia, in this case on the border with that part of the RSK, and that during the -- when it started to exist, it didn't have its own armed forces and these armed forces were then developed in relation or with support of the SVK and the VRS. And this particular exhibit, B5050 also refers to the involvement of elements of the VJ, i.e., it refers to agreements that have been concluded with the VJ to prepare operations against the 5th Corps of the Sarajevo pro-government forces in the Bihac area.

Q. Let's lay Exhibit 15 on the overhead projector briefly. Take it very shortly, Mr. Theunens, the comment.

A. The comment is as follow: The document was issued by the General or the Main Staff of the VRS. It's dated 2nd of July, 1994. At the bottom, in paragraph 2, it refers to an agreement between the army of Yugoslavia, so the VJ, the army of Republika Srpska, so the VRS, and the ³¹⁵¹¹ Serbian army of Krajina, also known as the SVK. And it continues on the second page: "And the forces of the autonomous province of Western Bosnia also known as the APWB." Later in the document it also refers to a meeting. Actually, it's two lines lower. To meetings that have taken place between representatives of the aforementioned armed forces in Vojnica. Vojnica is located in former UN Sector North so in territory held by the RSK just north of the Bihac enclave in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. So it's --

JUDGE KWON: So is this tab 15 -- it's B5050 that you referred to just now.

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. And the document not only refers to an agreement but it really identifies meetings and places where those meetings could have occurred for an agreement to be forged?

A. Indeed, Your Honour. It also shows the organised nature of the support. It is not like a spontaneous initiative; it has been prepared with staff meetings and further plans.

Q. If you can go back, please, to page 29 of the report which was on the overhead projector. I'm not sure whether you want to add anything to what's contained at paragraph 65 about Pauk. We're becoming increasingly familiar with it and what it was about. Anything you want to add?

A. The documents that I refer to in this paragraph consist of an operational -- operations logbook as well as other documents. These ³¹⁵¹² documents, official documents, indicate the involvement of officials and personnel of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, and as mentioned earlier, there's also indication of VJ involvement at least in the planning. The parade on the 28th of June, 1995, very briefly, I think it has already been discussed here in court. It was more or less the inauguration parade for General Mile Mrksic who had been assigned on the 18th of May from the VJ to the SVK to replace Milan Celeketic as chief of General Staff and at that parade, that individual and a number of personalities from the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia as well as VJ officials are visible.

Q. Your report on Bosnia turns at page 34, paragraph 80, to personnel support. And at page 36 in the middle of this section there's a comment I think you wish to make.

A. Initially -- and when I mean initially I talk about the time period between the formal withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina in May 1992 and November 1993. I mean by November 1993 the creation of the 30th personnel centre in the personnel department of the General Staff of the VJ. During this initial time period there seemed to be sometimes problems with the status of formal JNA or of JNA or VJ members who went to serve, in this particular case, in the VRS or also in the SVK. These problems were mostly related to the -- so the status problems were mostly related to their financial status as well as to citizenship issues, and this, for example, one of the documents that raises those problems.

Q. Over now to page 45 in the section on logistical support, and paragraph 99 is headed "Continued Supply from the FRY to the VRS," on page ³¹⁵¹³ 45. Reference in the third line to Izvor. Your comment, please.

A. In the report, Your Honours, we discuss a number of documents related to the Izvor plan. Izvor plan is a resupply plan for the VRS which was agreed between the relevant sections of the Main or General Staff of the VRS and its counterparts in the VJ. It is correct that the VRS as well as other warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina in -- received actually, or took large stocks of ammunition and also fuel when the JNA withdrew, but taking into account the intensity of the military operations especially in the beginning of the conflict, there was a clear need for resupply and that resupply in the case of the VRS could only come from FRY. And Izvor plan is the first plan we are aware of for an organised and a massive resupply in this particular case of ammunition. Further in the paragraph the sum -- amounts are mentioned, 225 tonnes of ammunition and an announcement that 220 further tonnes would followed. So that equals more or less 445 tonnes.

Q. And the last page, reference is at page 54 in the section or the subsection Technical and Military Industrial Support, paragraph 121. Your comment on paragraph 121, please.

A. This paragraph briefly deals with -- talks about relations between Unis Pretis, which is a factory in Sarajevo which was controlled by VRS, and FRY military industry. Now, in this paragraph we talk about the testing of ammunition on proofing grounds so on training grounds in FRY. Later on in this section, actually, when we go over to the other paragraphs, also the contacts between Unis Pretis in Bosnian Serb control and Zinvoj - Zinvoj being the association for arms and military equipment ³¹⁵¹⁴ production in Yugoslavia - between these two organisations. And it is interesting to mention that in the SFRY, military production or arms production, military equipment production was under -- was one of the competencies of the SSNO, the Federal Secretary for People's Defence. One can assume that the same existed in FRY, so when the Ministry of Defence was in control of this production and more particularly in control of transfers and trade in arms and ammunition.

Q. That's all I want to ask you about the detailed contents of the report. If you have to hand the extract or index identifying the 18 exhibits that are before the Judges, in the remaining five minutes or thereabouts that I want to allow myself at most, I think we should, now that we've considered both the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres, just lay on the overhead projector tab 8. Produce that.

You've spoken of this document. Now we see it, or we see it in translation. The 15th of November, 1993. Said to be pursuant to the FRY president's order with a number of the 10th of November in relation to the formation of the personnel centres in the VJ, orders for the creation of the 30th Personnel Centre, and so on.

Your comment on this and your understanding of what these personnel centres were in a couple of sentences.

A. So this order creates the 30th Personnel Centre, which deals with VJ personnel serving the VRS, as well as to paragraph 1, the 40th Personnel Centre, dealing with VJ personnel serving in the SVK. The aim of this was actually to regularise a situation that already existed, that people -- members of the JNA, and afterwards the VJ, were serving in the ³¹⁵¹⁵ VS and the SVK and there was an urgent need to I won't call it legalise, that's a too strong term, but at least to regularise it, so that towards the outside world it was not visible that people were actually serving in an armed force abroad because when -- like we saw yesterday, in the documents for Milan Celeketic, who was then commander of the 18th Okucani Corps in Western Slavonia, so in SVK, his posting, his official posting at that time was the 40th Personnel Centre. So the 30th and 40th Personnel Centre took care of the administration. They kept records of where the people were serving in order to prepare documents related to their compensation, not only financial compensation for the time served in hardship but also for extra pensionable time. People serving in operations received benefits for that and that was taken into account for their pensionable time.

Q. In fact, do you know one way or another what the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres were? Were they centres or were they rooms or were they a desk? Or don't we know?

A. I would -- I would consider them as another section of the Personnel Department. There will be a section for -- there can be a section for keeping records of careers, there can be a section that keeps a record of -- of reassignments of people, and this section, was it one desk or several desks at least it was well-organised because we also saw computer prints, kept track of people serving abroad. Each military has that. My own military has such a centre too with the only exception that it doesn't deal in war operations then.

Q. Looking at the index, excluding what we can in order to save time, ³¹⁵¹⁶ Exhibit 9, anything that you want to draw to the Judges' attention beyond what's contained in the report about that?

A. Your Honour, I think we discussed that yesterday. It actually deals with the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia, from the RSK done in the framework of the Vance Plan, and it just means that procedures are being prepared for the hand-over of equipment and infrastructure to the RSK TO, which later became the SVK.

Q. We laid that on the overhead projector. If that's all we need say about it we'll move on then. Exhibit 10 -- or tab 10, I beg your pardon, Vladimir Stojanovic's document. Required to add anything on that?

A. I think the summary's clear as well as the quotation in the report. It's a proposal from Vladimir Stojanovic, who was a lieutenant colonel general at the time serving in the 1st Military District. He proposes to hand over military equipment that is being phased out, in this case tanks, tanks that are not being used any more in the VJ, to hand them over to the Territorial Defence of Serbia and the Territorial Defence in Eastern Slavonia, so that the Territorial Defence of the RSK in the -- in the -- in Croatia. We -- from the document it's not visible whether this -- this order was implemented. Now, if I can refer to my previous job experience, we know from -- so from service in UNPROFOR, that such tanks were available in Eastern Slavonia.

Q. Thank you. Exhibit 11 we should look at probably in light of the summary of it. Very briefly just tell us the obvious significance of this from the index.

A. Your Honour, I think we discussed this yesterday too. The ³¹⁵¹⁷ relevant part here is the addressee list. We discussed that after November 1993 that's at least -- those are at least the documents that we have available. Daily or regular combat reports, regular operations reports of the SVK were sent to the president of the Republic of Serbia and to the Chief of General Staff of the VJ, and quite often these documents include not only a description of the enemy situation, which is normal in the military situation report, but they also include information that is relevant for FRY or Serbia as it deals with the involvement of personnel of the VJ or support that has -- material support that has been provided or not provided.

Q. Exhibit -- tab 12, were we to produce it, anything beyond what's contained in your report?

A. No, Your Honours. We mentioned in the report, and I think we discussed it yesterday too, that mechanisms for coordination of tasks between the SVK and the VJ and also the VRS were established after. Based on documents we have, it's after November 1993. Several documents are being quoted in the report dealing with the time period of 1994. The documents we have all come from the SVK but it can be assumed that the same coordination also existed with the VRS --

JUDGE KWON: We don't think the Chamber has the English translation.

JUDGE MAY: No. We haven't got the English. We've got a long copy but not in English.

MR. NICE: I'll withdraw that tab for the time being to save time. The witness has given his account of it. ³¹⁵¹⁸

Q. Tab 13, the war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, Human Rights Watch from Helsinki. Any comment?

A. Only this, Your Honour: This report was prepared in 1995, and it provides an overview based on the information that Human Rights Watch Helsinki had at its disposal about the prosecution of war crimes in the republics, the different republics of the former Yugoslavia. For the interest of my report, I focused on war crime trials in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. And we've already heard from authors of such reports that their addressee lists and practices.

Tab 14, the order from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command for carrying out operations around Sarajevo with reference to reinforcements including MUP forces and VJ special forces. I think you've already dealt with this.

A. Yes. Just to -- to confirm what I mentioned, the reference to the VJ special forces in the middle of the first paragraph. And from the sender, so it's a document issued by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command, the VRS unit that was responsible for the operations around Sarajevo.

Q. Tab 16, please. We've already looked at 15 this morning. Is it an excerpt from instruction for engagement of the VRS? Its significance, please, Mr. Theunens?

A. The significance of this document, Your Honour -- Your Honours, is that it deals with a particular scenario of possible developments in the -- in the former Yugoslavia. The scenario is discussed in the report. Basically, it deals with the scenario where Croatia would attack the RSK, ³¹⁵¹⁹ there would be NATO involvement, and then as a directive has been prepared by the Main Staff, the General Staff of the VRS, it talks about how the VRS would react. Most interestingly there is extensive references in the different parts of the report, not only the main body but also the annexes -- annexes, for example, for engineer support or air defence support, there's extensive reference to VJ involvement.

Now, from a military point of view, the production of such a document would require significant planning by all departments of the Main Staff of the VRS, and the fact that other armed forces like the VJ are being mentioned implies that there has been coordination or at least an exchange of information with these other armed forces, in this case the VJ.

This scenario, this plan was not implemented, but it shows at least that there is -- that major planning took place involving the various participants or potential or possible participants in the operation.

JUDGE KWON: If you can give me some examples of VJ involvement in this document.

THE WITNESS: We would have to go to the document in detail. It would be helpful if I could have the part of the report on the ELMO to refer to it.

MR. NICE:

Q. I'm sorry, the report, yes.

A. Because actually, Your Honours, the document -- this is just an extract. The various annexes are part -- in different sections. So we ³¹⁵²⁰ would actually have to also -- need to have these different sections available.

JUDGE KWON: You can ask it in re-exam.

MR. NICE: It may be, Your Honour, that this is a matter that the witness, if he can do without the break, can research over the break and we can make the additional documents available.

Q. We'll come back to that at a later stage, Mr. Theunens. And if you can detach yourself from that exercise and just look, finally and briefly, at -- for these exhibits at tab 17, I think. It's a letter describing problems with ammunition production dated April 1994. Its significance, please.

A. Your Honours, as we discussed earlier, this document is one example of cooperation between arms -- of ammunition production in -- in facilities controlled by the VRS or in the territory -- on the territory of the RS -- VRS and similar facilities, production facilities in Serbia. In the first paragraph dealing with 120 millimetre -- it should be grenades, not mines in translation, there is reference to, for example, a Krusik factory in Valjevo, Valjevo being located on the territory of Republic of Serbia.

Q. Thank you. Responsive to His Honour Judge Robinson's questions yesterday and mindful of His Honour Judge May's request for economic use of time and material, have you identified three additional exhibits that may assist in your answer to His Honour Judge Robinson?

A. Yes, Your Honours, I did.

Q. Can we lay those, make sure that those are before the Court. ³¹⁵²¹ They're at tabs 19, 20, and 21. 19 can go on the overhead projector. It's a document which is in the original Cyrillic and is said to be a report on paramilitary units, but it's otherwise somewhat unspecific or totally unspecific - thank you very much - as to its source, authorship, and so on. So tell us what you can about it and make the comment you want to make.

A. Before coming to this specific document, I would like to emphasise that analysis of this issue is a complex matter, as we discussed yesterday, because various names, volunteers, paramilitaries, party armies, and so on are used through each other without clear references. That's one aspect. The second aspect, it is dangerous to draw conclusions or to draw -- for an analyst to make an assessment just based on one report. For example, indeed there is no source reference to this report. This report was obtained from a witness. Now, when reading the contents and how the report is written, it becomes clear that it is a report which was prepared by JNA security organs or the JNA security administration. In the first paragraph here, there is reference to connections between certain paramilitary groups, or here they are called paramilitary groups, and structures in the Republic of Serbia. And when you go through the report, it discusses a number of groups or formations who call themselves sometimes volunteers or paramilitaries, paramilitaries being an illegal name, and these groups and people involved are being discussed.

Q. Thank you very much. We can read that at our leisure. Tab 20, please. A document of the 19th October 1991, signed by Major General Mile Babic. Your comment on it, please. ³¹⁵²²

A. Indeed. Your Honour, this is a document prepared by or based on information from the security organ of the 1st Military District. In the report, the situation in Eastern Slavonia, more particularly the situation with the Serbian Volunteer Guard, or the so-called Volunteer Guard, is being discussed, and their training centre in Erdut. It's actually an information report based on information collected by a source who has been, according to this report, in contact with Arkan and has collected information from these contacts.

The bottom paragraph on the screen, for example, shows that according to the information collected by the security organ, Arkan has collected or has been supplied with ammunition, explosives -- explosives and grenades from the minister of republic -- Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia and that he's also involved -- Arkan is involved in distributing this ammunition, weapons and so on to local Serb TO staffs in the area.

Q. Finally, tab 21 a document headed as Military Secret and described as a war journal of Major Gojkovic and Trifunovic.

A. Your Honour, this is actually the war journal of the Guards Brigade, also known as the 1st Guards Motorised Brigade, which deals with the time period that the Guards Brigade was involved in the operations in Vukovar. The two individuals, Gojkovic and Trifunovic, are duty officers in the sense that the war diary is actually an official log, an official journal which in principle contains all the relevant information related to the operations of the unit, in this case the Guards Brigade, and in this case in the area of Vukovar. ³¹⁵²³ So the information one will find in such a journal deals with the operations the Guards Brigade carries out, the orders it receives, and the order the command issues and all other issue -- issues or incidents that are considered relevant.

The relevant entry is actually on another page.

Q. How many pages in, please?

A. I have to check because I don't know the page number by heart. It should be at English ERN L0100531.

Q. Page 36 on the bottom.

A. And in reference to the question of Judge Robinson, Your Honour, an interesting passage is the entry at the bottom of the page. It's an entry which is related to events at 10.30 on the 6th of November where the commander of the JOd 1 -- JOd is the acronym for assault detachment. We discussed yesterday, I explained operational groups, tactical groups, the Guards Brigade and the other forces involved in the operations in the area of Vukovar were organised as follows: There were two operational groups, north -- Operational Group North, Operational Group South, and then the Operational Group South was consisted of assault detachments, and these assault detachments consist of assault groups. An assault detachment has more or less the size -- was based on a battalion of the Guards Brigade, so there are different battalions, there were different assault detachments, reinforced with other JNA units as well as local Serb TO and these volunteers, as we explained yesterday.

Now, the entry is interesting because the commander of the 1st Assault Detachment, and that should actually be the commander of the 1st ³¹⁵²⁴ Battalion of the Guards Brigade, reported he had a problem with the engagement of some forces in combat, and it's further specified in the sense that it concerns a misunderstanding between members of volunteer units, and these members of these volunteer units are Seselj's men and members of the TO. So in this column we see the problem that is being highlighted and in the last column to the right we see actually the remark. So the command of OG Jug that means the commander of Operational Group South, Colonel Mile Mrksic, he issues an order to the commander of the 1st Assault Detachment to call the officers involved and to resolve the problem. So this entry shows that members of volunteer -- that volunteer units are operating under command of the JNA doing operations in Vukovar, and these volunteer units in this case are Seselj's -- identified here as Seselj's men. We discussed yesterday, for example, Leva Supoderica being one of these units, and members of the TO. So in Vukovar there was a close relationship between the Vukovar local Serb TO and then organisations who identify themselves as Seselj's men, but the most relevant here is that they operate under single JNA command during the operations.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Members of the TO would be considered volunteers?

THE WITNESS: In theory not, Your Honour. I mean, in theory, the TO was one component of the armed forces of the JNA. Now --

JUDGE ROBINSON: That was my understanding. So that the misunderstanding is between Seselj's men, whom you call volunteers, and members of the TO, who are part of the formal structure.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I will try to -- to explain it. The TO ³¹⁵²⁵ was officially a component -- one of the two components of the SFRY armed forces. That is how it was explained, for example, in the 1974 constitution and the 1992 -- 1982 Law on All People's Defence. Now, when the conflict in Croatia started -- or I should mention earlier that TOs were republican organisations. There was a TO for the Republic of Croatia, there was a TO for Republic of Serbia, and for all the other republics of the SFRY, whereas the JNA was a federal institution. Now, when the conflict in Croatia starts, of course the conflict between Croats and Serbs, the Croatian -- the TO of the Republic of Croatia splits in a sense that in some areas with the Serb majority Serbs create their own structures. In other areas, the Croats leave. They flee or they leave for other reasons. And so the Croatian TO splits and we -- it's kind of a de facto situation develops where the TO in the Serb-held territories is actually -- has become the local Serb TO, which was not foreseen in the legal framework. This local Serb TO remained loyal to the SFRY and cooperated with the JNA, or the JNA cooperated with the local Serb TO to achieve certain goals.

In addition, volunteer units made an appearance. These volunteer units were made up of -- originated from certain political parties in Serbia. In addition, there were also other non-official armed formations that made their appearance, like Arkan and Dragan. As we discussed yesterday, Arkan and Dragan, there are indications based on information collected by JNA security organs that these two individuals and their forces were close -- were connected to or related to the Ministry of Interior in Serbia, MUP. ³¹⁵²⁶ Because of the legal situation in SFRY which the -- 1982 All People's Defence Law, it was stated that every -- every individual who takes up weapons in defence -- the defence of the SFRY territorial integrity and who is not a member of the JNA will be considered a member of the TO. That means that SRS volunteers or the volunteers from --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Theunens, you make a reference on more than one occasion to the legal situation.

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And you cite paragraphs and passages from the constitution without showing us these passages.

THE WITNESS: That's no problem, Your Honour. If we go to the first part of the report, the first section, section 1 of the report deals with the SFRY armed forces and provides a summary of the relevant legal or doctrinal framework.

When you look at page 3, Your Honour, in the centre of the page there is a quotation from Article 240 of the 1974 SFRY constitution. It was not up to me to give some kind of analysis or assessment of these articles, I just list these articles in order to achieve better understanding for the situation -- for the issues I try to describe in --

JUDGE MAY: You are not yourself a lawyer.

THE WITNESS: No, and I don't pretend to be, Your Honour. But I think Article 240 is quite clear. First, it explains the mission; in the second paragraph it emphasises the unified nature of the SFRY armed forces; and in the third part, it says any citizen who takes part in resisting aggression towards the country is a member of the armed forces. ³¹⁵²⁷ In later articles, which are discussed later in this section, these SFRY armed forces are being further explained. And, Your Honour, when you go to page 6 of the report, in the centre of the page there is the quotation of Article 102 of the 1982 ONO or All People's Defence Law. The article in its -- in the sixth line, it explains "Territorial Defence shall comprise all armed formations that are not incorporated in the Yugoslav People's Army and the police." And in order -- it seems that there was an attempt to -- to apply this legal framework or to -- even if the situation had arisen because of the conflict was rather different. There was no talk of a local Serb TO in the SFRY constitution nor the All People's Defence Law. There was no talk about volunteer units. There is talk about individual volunteers who can join JNA or TO units under well-determined circumstances, and later -- and I mean by that from August 1991 on, attempts are made to call it legalise or regularise the situation that has arisen on the terrain, and therefore we have these various decrees and orders that were discussed yesterday. Now, to come back to this entry in the war diary, we have the particular situation of the local Serb TO in the Vukovar area. Now, from other documents that are quoted in the report in section 2 of the report, actually, and the relevant part there would start at page 57 of the second part of the report where command and control during the conflict over local Serb forces was explained.

The following pages discuss the situation with operational --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you just stop a minute? I just want to consult. ³¹⁵²⁸

THE WITNESS: Yes.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Theunens, can we just go back to paragraph -- to page 3, and Article 240 which says: "Any citizen who takes part in resisting aggression towards the country is a member of the armed forces of the SFRY," and you attach particular significance to that. On the face of it, I suppose it would mean what it says unless it is qualified in some other part of the constitution by -- by something else.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, as you rightfully commented, I'm not a lawyer, but as a military analyst, I see in this that this passage is -- is a reflection of the doctrine of all People's Defence, which is explained a few -- in -- a page earlier. In 1968, President Tito introduced this concept and it means actually the whole people is involved in the defence of the country in case of an outside aggression. There is --

JUDGE ROBINSON: In that case then we don't need to make any distinction between volunteers as individuals and groups. Is it as simple as that?

THE WITNESS: No, unfortunately, it's not as simple, Your Honour. We need to make a distinction between the legal references that existed in the SFRY prior to the conflict in Croatia and dealing with volunteers, they talk about individual volunteers, because when we look at other articles, and I quoted yesterday also, for example, the legal framework on the Law on Defence, for example, of the Republic of Serbia, there is ³¹⁵²⁹ emphasis that only legal authorities can organise armed groups. Nobody was allowed -- and I don't think that's allowed in any country -- is allowed to organise its own armed volunteer group. Volunteers, as it was seen in the legal framework that existed prior to the conflict, consisted individuals who had no military obligations but who felt, well, that they had to do something for the defence of the country. And they were not member of any other structures. They were obviously not members of the JNA --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think, Mr. Nice, you should continue.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Theunens, I think you're probably at the end of the evidence on the exhibit that you wish to give, unless there's any further comment you want to make on that. But then picking up the points you've just been dealing with, the incorporation of all people involved in the as it were alleged or asserted defence against aggression, did that prima facie cover illegally formed groups or not, as far as you could judge, given that you're not a lawyer?

A. No, because I mean, illegal groups would never be involved in defence because not only from the legal point but such groups from the military point of view, and that's actually one of the basic things one learns in the military, is that because of the concern for single command and control, all forces need to be under control, under command of a commander.

Q. Those illegally formed groups, if there were any, do they qualify, amongst others, for the title "paramilitary"? I mean, they may be called ³¹⁵³⁰ volunteers, but they may also be called paramilitaries.

A. Your Honour, if you consider the expression "paramilitary" as illegal forces, yes, but in some countries paramilitary forces are -- can also -- there can be legal paramilitary forces in some countries. You can have a police force which can have military duties under certain circumstances.

Q. Very well. And finally -- I want to be able to pass over to the accused for cross-examination. Finally, on your analysis, was the application of the People's Defence Law covering volunteers entirely appropriate for these paramilitary groups or was it a method to try and incorporate them within some form of structure, so far as you could judge?

A. Based on my reading and my analysis, it was actually a method to try to incorporate them and this method was obviously not sufficient because therefore additional decrees, orders, and orders were adopted and voted between August and December 1991.

MR. NICE: Thank you. The English translation for tab 12 is on its way if required. And I remind Mr. Theunens if he can give further thought to the detailed question arising from tab 16, and if over the break that leads to his requesting further documents from the archives, we'll dig them up for him. And that concludes my questions of the witness.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you have three hours for this witness. I'm not sure whether you'll be able to finish today, I doubt there's going to be time, but we'll see about the time. We have to finish another witness tomorrow which we have to deal with, another one, but let us begin ³¹⁵³¹ today.

Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Theunens, your examination-in-chief started with your professional career. In that connection, I wish to ask you, for how many years have you been in the army now?

A. I have been in the army since I was 18, so that means I've been in the army for 21 years now.

Q. Speaking strictly of military positions, you were only platoon commander. Is that correct?

A. That is incorrect, Your Honours, because when I was in -- in a tank battalion in Germany, I was indeed -- I started as a platoon commander but quite soon I had to replace the company commander who was following courses or was involved in other matters. When I carried out duties in the military academy it was not really a combat duty, I understand, but I had to -- I was in charge of 55 officer cadets, firstly officer cadets. I would also like to draw your attention on the staff course I followed in Belgium, which is a one-year course which deals with operations at brigade level.

Q. All right. But you did not discharge any other military functions, as far as I understand. You were involved in intelligence work for the rest of your career.

A. That is correct, Your Honour. Now, I would like to add to the previous answer that --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness slow down a little, please.

THE WITNESS: Apologies. I would like to add to the previous ³¹⁵³² answer where Mr. Milosevic referred to platoon commander. It is obvious that command and control is -- is a concept that applies to all levels of military organisation, be it a squad leader who may be responsible for five people or a corps commander. The same principles apply, yes of course on a different scale, but the same principles of single and unified command will apply.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. As for the application of principles, let's leave that aside. As for experience in terms of making judgements on military issues, I suppose there is a considerable difference between a person who has command over the smallest possible units as all of his experience and somebody who has commanded a regiment, a corps, a brigade or something larger.

So speaking of your military experience, I believe it is of the lowest possible level in terms of the army.

A. I -- Your Honours, I don't agree because it's a misrepresentation of my CV. I think for the task I was given here to prepare a military analysis report of certain aspects of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, I do agree that there is a need for military experience, but again I think I have sufficient purely military experience, having been a commander of a combat unit, combat platoon, and at times of a company. Now, much more relevant, I believe, that the times, almost two years I served in peace support operations in the former Yugoslavia since end of 1994 until the course of 1999, and the experience I acquired also as a Balkan analyst in the Belgian Ministry of Defence are more than relevant. ³¹⁵³³ I think if the points that Mr. Milosevic is raising were correct, it would be rather unlikely that Belgian military authorities would designate me to brief or to write for the Belgian Chief General Staff or brief the minister when he wanted to have a briefing, or to send me to peace support operations in significant intelligence positions. And I would like to -- no, it's okay. Transcript.

Q. Well, Mr. Theunens. Is there a smaller military unit than a platoon in any army?

A. A platoon is made up of squads. Now, depending of the kind of unit, it could well be that squads can operate, for example, on their own, for example, in special forces. In my speciality, arm -- an armoured platoon would rarely operate on itself, it would always operate in the framework of a company, or a squadron as we call it in cavalry. But again, that is not the issue. Command and control, the principles - and if you refer another word, the rules or the regulations - should always be the same.

Q. All right. So you spent the rest of your career as an intelligence officer; is that correct?

A. That is correct, Your Honours.

Q. And now as an intelligence officer of the NATO, you are working for this party which brought you here as a witness; is that correct?

A. Your Honours, I don't think that this is a correct representation. There is nothing between what I'm doing here -- there's no relation whatsoever between what I'm doing in the OTP or what I did as an intelligence officer in the Belgian Ministry of Defence. Belgium is a ³¹⁵³⁴ member of NATO and so is Greece, so is France or the United States, and I think that in our system, and if you follow international politics it would be quite obvious that even in NATO different countries can have their own opinions and we're not forced, as an analyst, to adopt one kind of party line.

Q. We're not talking about a party line here. You are working for Mr. Nice. That is not in dispute. You are employed here, aren't you?

A. Your Honour, I'm employed by the OTP. Now, if I can comment, the OTP gave me the instructions for this report, in a sense they defined the topics I had to discuss, and of course through the -- the period that I -- throughout the period that I wrote the report, I was in touch with the relevant people in the OTP, but whether I wrote this report for the OTP or whether I would have written this report for another organisation, given the tasking I received, and that was looking or analysing the command and control situation during the conflict in Croatia and then also looking at the relationships between the local Serb forces and their counterparts in FRY or Serbia, there would be no difference in the result. I think the benefit of working for the OTP, or one of the benefits is I had access to numerous documents which most likely I would not have had if I was outside the OTP.

Q. Mr. Theunens, I'm not dealing with assumptions. I only want to establish facts. Are you still an active-duty officer or not? Are you an officer or are you retired from military service?

A. Your Honour, I'm still an active-duty officer. I started to work at the OTP end of June 2001. My status then was -- I was on leave without ³¹⁵³⁵ payment. Now, that status is limited to one year. After ten months, I had to announce my intentions to my superiors in the Belgian military, and theoretically there would be three options: One option would be to return to Belgian military but I found it too early because my work here hadn't finished. A second option would be to resign. That was not an option either that I liked.

And the third option would be to be put outside of the budget. I don't know the correct term for it in English, but it means that I'm still on paper a member of the Belgian armed forces, but I'm not paid by the Belgian military and I don't receive any pension rights. There are other people who enjoy that status, for example, the Belgian astronaut whose name I don't seem to recall now, but he's in the same situation. So when he was member of the European Space Agency or involved with these activities, he was outside of the budget and I think he has returned now to the Belgian military.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Perhaps the concept of secondment.

THE WITNESS: That could apply, Your Honour, except that I'm not paid by any Belgian authorities at this moment.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. But let's finish, because we're wasting time. You are an active-duty officer. You've said yourself an active-duty intelligence officer. And let me add a NATO active-duty intelligence officer employed here with the service who brought you here as a witness. Is that correct, Mr. Theunens?

A. Well, I wasn't brought here. Oh, no. I misunderstood the ³¹⁵³⁶ transcript. Well, if -- that's correct, Your Honour, but again if you look at my professional background, my curriculum vitae, I can say that the most relevant experience for my task in the OTP I actually acquired when working in the UNPROFOR, UNTAS, or the SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNPROFOR Croatia, UNTAS Croatia. Now, from these three missions, UNPROFOR and UNTAS were the most relevant ones, and these were UN operations, not NATO.

Q. I am only saying that the service that brought you here to testify is the service with which you are employed. It is implied that Mr. Nice, in a way, examining you as a witness, is giving evidence himself and making assertions.

JUDGE MAY: That is not a proper question. He's giving his own evidence and doing so under order, as you recollect, which he does the normal order.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. As for solemn declarations, we know all about them and how they are respected.

JUDGE MAY: The witness can answer.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I think that Mr. Milosevic referred to a solemn declaration. I don't know whether that's a question to me or a comment to me or to anybody else.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, we heard that. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I will move briefly through some of my notes that I made during your examination-in-chief yesterday. Mr. Nice directed you to section 3, first of all, Armed Forces of the Republic of Serbia and so on, and you ³¹⁵³⁷ discussed that. Is that correct, Mr. Theunens?

A. Your Honour, we didn't discuss that particular section yesterday. I brought up myself an article of the Law of Defence of the Republic of Serbia but I don't recall that we discussed that particular section.

Q. Do you know that Serbia does not have armed forces? Because you reviewed also the constitution of Serbia and explained the role of the president of Serbia under that constitution.

A. Yes, Your Honour. I'm aware that the Republic of Serbia does not have armed force, but when you look at page 35 of the report, there is a quotation from Article -- or Article 5 in its whole -- in entirety is quoted. Article 5 of the 1991 Law of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, and there it is mentioned under the tasks or the competencies of the president of the republic, that the president of the republic commands the armed forces in peacetime and war. So the use of the term "armed forces" does not come from me, it comes from a document I used as an analyst to prefer -- to prepare my report, and this document is actually the Serbian Law of Defence of 1991.

Q. Well, that's exactly the point, Mr. Theunens, because for that kind of analytical work, one has to know the constitution and the legislation very well. And I am now asking you: Have you read perhaps Article 135 of the constitution of Serbia of 1990, which covers, I would say, all the issues that you have touched upon here regarding the armed forces of Serbia? I'm just asking have you read it?

A. Your Honours, I read it, but again I would like to refer to the report. Part 1 of the report is a brief overview of the essential legal ³¹⁵³⁸ and doctrinal framework that is only intended to -- to achieve or to allow a better understanding of what was written in part 2 and part 3. I'm not a legal specialist, I'm a military analyst. Now, based on my experience and also what I studied in military academy about politics and related issues, laws should be in coherence with constitutions, and it means to me basic understanding that the 1991 Law of Defence of the Republic of Serbia should be in coherence with or should be coherent with the constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 1990.

Q. Of course it is in conformity with the constitution, because the 1990 constitution stipulates that the president of the republic has command over the armed forces in peacetime and in war and all of that is understood. But there is also Article 135 of the constitution of Serbia, which reads: "The rights and obligations which the Republic of Serbia as part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has under this constitution and which are exercised within the framework of the federation under this federal constitution shall be exercised in keeping with the federal constitution."

Since defence and everything related to defence is exercised on the federal level, whether we speak of the SFRY or the FRY, then those rights and obligations are exercised in keeping with the federal constitution. Maybe as an analyst you are not aware of this, but I am glad to explain it for you.

JUDGE MAY: It may well be that it's not open to the witness to deal with it. It's some story which he's putting forward and which he can produce his evidence in due course. If the witness feels like adding ³¹⁵³⁹ anything, he may, but otherwise, if he doesn't, I think there's no point.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I have nothing to add unless referring to the Articles of 1991 Law on Defence of Serbia I just quoted in the report without any analysis -- further analysis or comments.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But when you spoke of the factual basis, you also noted that I have no armed forces under me. It is clear from the constitution of the Republic of Serbia that practice is in keeping with constitutional norms. Let us just go back to a couple of things that you referred to in the very beginning. So at the very outset, you referred to the book of Veljko Kadijevic. I didn't expect that you would include it in your material, but I looked it up yesterday, and since you referred to paramilitary formations and other things, I will quote from page 111 of this book of Veljko Kadijevic. He says as follows: "The greatest threat to a peaceful denouement of the Yugoslav crisis, including the secession of those republics that wished it was the organisation of para-armies. Croatia was the leader in this respect although Slovenia had some instances of that as well. It was different in Kosovo and in Macedonia. Croatia formed these units under the guise of militia and Slovenia under the guise of Territorial Defence."

And then he says that on the 11th -- since you are using the book and documents, you should refer to dates. And then on the 11th December, 1990, the Federal Secretariat --

JUDGE MAY: Let me -- the witness must have a chance to answer, if he can, to any of this. ³¹⁵⁴⁰

THE WITNESS: Your Honours --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course.

THE WITNESS: The report is entitled "SFRY Armed Forces in the Conflict in Croatia" and then subsequently "JNA Activity in BiH and JNA Support to Bosnian Serb Forces." The study of the events in Slovenia or a detailed analysis of the creation of armed forces in Croatia was not part of my tasking and that's why it has not been discussed in this report.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, that's precisely the problem. That only shows to what extent you have a lopsided approach to this prosecution attempt led by Mrs. Del Ponte. This is titled as "Conflict in Croatia." You are quoting General Kadijevic.

JUDGE MAY: Stop using this -- abuse of this sort. Now, what is your question for the witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness just said that the report is titled Armed Forces of the SFRY and the Conflict in Croatia. Yesterday, he referred to the book of the then defence minister, army General Veljko Kadijevic, and I just quoted to him that the greatest threat to a peaceful solution was the organisation of para-armies, and that Croatia was the leader, followed by Slovenia. That fits perfectly with this title, Armed Forces and the Conflict in Croatia.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will allow the witness to answer.

THE WITNESS: My understanding, Your Honour, of the SFRY armed forces was that SFRY armed forces consists of the JNA and the TO. The ³¹⁵⁴¹ report is not a conflict analysis, it is an analysis of an aspect of the conflict. It is obvious that an analysis that focused on the activities of Croatian armed forces would have a different contents than my analysis. I would also like to emphasise that this report is not only based on Kadijevic's book. Kadijevic's book is one of many sources, and when you look at the context in which Kadijevic's book has been used, you will -- you will discover that actually it just assists to better put other sources and other official documents in a framework and to better understand them.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Since you are talking about the armed forces and the conflict in Croatia, do you know that on the 11th December, 1990, which Kadijevic states in his book - I suppose you have read it because you refer to it - "The Ministry of Defence submitted to the Presidency a brief about the unauthorised formation of paramilitary formations in the SFRY." Do you know that?

A. I am familiar with this information, Your Honours.

Q. All right. Do you know that the staff of the Supreme Command informed the JNA on the 23rd of January that unless all such units are demobilised in Croatia, they will raise combat readiness. That will guarantee the exercise of proper procedures, et cetera. Do you know that?

A. Again, Your Honour, I'm familiar with these events, but that was outside the scope of the report as it was defined to -- to me by the members of the OTP. It's obvious that the report dealing with the activities of Croatian forces or other forces in SFRY or Croatia ³¹⁵⁴² specifically would probably focus on those aspects, but for the particular tasking of this report, these issues were not considered relevant.

Q. Well, you refer to paramilitary formations, about the JNA and the conflicts in Croatia. I'm quoting here a piece of information related to massive establishment of paramilitary formations, illegal formations in Croatia that marked the beginning of the conflict when such formations attacked the citizens of that very republic of a different ethnicity. The JNA then intervened, and you are now saying that it is not within the purview of your study, Armed Forces and the Conflict in Croatia. How can it not be within your purview? And you are dealing with some group of Leva Supoderica involving 150 people, whereas it is not within your purview to cover tens of thousands involved in such units.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness speak.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the -- the first part of the report, or actually the introduction consists of an overview, and in the overview is explained what the report deals about. In this overview, it is also indicated that this report is not an analysis of the original -- original analysis of the conflict itself. It is an analysis of one aspect of the conflict, being the issue of how command and control was organised over JNA, local Serb forces, and related forces. JNA and/VJ support to local Serb defence forces both in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the Croatia part we also deal with the aspects of the implementation of the laws of armed conflict, and Bosnia-Herzegovina part of the report focuses on -- on the support from the VJ provided to the local Serb defence structures, the VRS. ³¹⁵⁴³ There is nothing -- and there is nowhere any reference to an analysis of the conflict or an analysis of the establishment of Croatian or Slovene armed forces. That was not within the scope -- that is not within the scope of this report.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Theunens, are you aware that the JNA attempted to prevent this conflict, to separate the conflicting parties that were very unequal because very large units had been established illegally in Croatia and attempts were made to separate them from the jeopardised population in Croatia of Serb ethnicity? You are not dealing with what the army did to protect the people and prevent the outbreak of civil war.

A. Your Honours, the report in its -- in the Croatian part or the second part -- actually, the first section discusses the evolution in the mission of the JNA, and there is even reference and not only from Kadijevic's book but also from other sources to the mission of interposition of the JNA between the various armed formations. However, and that is the result of my analysis, it appears that at the latest at the end of summer 1991, that mission of interposition had developed into a mission of, for most JNA units that were involved in the fighting, into a mission of providing support to the local Serb forces and operating under single command to them.

Q. All right, Mr. Theunens. It is obvious that you are not mindful of the fact that it is very, very risky for an analyst to pull out of context one single segment and view it in isolation regardless of all the elements that condition it, its origins, and all the elements that affect ³¹⁵⁴⁴ it.

You quoted here one piece of information, and I counted that in these three reports --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I don't think the previous comment of Mr. Milosevic is a correct representation of how this report was established. For example, Kadijevic's book, the section here uses Kadijevic's book as a source as well as other sources. It's not the only source. And again, the report or that section is not an analysis of Kadijevic's book in its entirety, no. The idea behind it was to read the book, look at relevant aspects, and then look at how the JNA operated during the conflict in Croatia, and I think that Mr. Kadijevic as the former minister of defence was well placed.

In addition, there were public statements both by Mr. Kadijevic, or by General Kadijevic and as well as General Adzic. One of them was published in the Bulletin, so the official information magazine of the Federal Secretary of People's Defence where there's talk about how the -- the goals have changed and now the goals have become to protect the Serbs or liberate the Serbs. There's no -- there's no -- no other comment possible on that aspect.

JUDGE MAY: In fact, that's the time to break for the usual time. Fifteen minutes -- 20 minutes. We'll adjourn now.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. ³¹⁵⁴⁵

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. May.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Theunens, when you focus in your analysis, because there are others, of course, on the relationship between the armed forces of the SFRY and, as you say, other armed groups, you mentioned the volunteer formations; is that right?

A. Indeed, Your Honours. The report talks about the command relationship that developed between the JNA, the local Serb TO, and volunteer units who by some sources were also called paramilitary units.

Q. Mr. Theunens, do you distinguish between volunteers and paramilitaries?

A. Your Honour, the distinction that needs to be made is a distinction between individual volunteers who joined the JNA or the TO - and I mean by that republican TOs, TO of the Republic of Croatia and TO of the Republic of Serbia or other republics of the former Yugoslavia - and on the other hand volunteers who acted in groups, who went in groups together to the conflict zone or were recruited otherwise and were integrated as groups in the existing command structures of operational groups, tactical groups, or as it was in the case of Eastern Slavonia, assault detachments and assault groups. These latter formations, so the volunteer groups, they are by a number of sources, and I quote from a JNA security organ and JNA security administration reports, considered paramilitary groups as they were outside the legal framework that existed in SFRY prior to the eruption of the conflict.

Q. Therefore, the differentia specifica is that they were outside the ³¹⁵⁴⁶ command of the armed forces; is that right?

A. Well, from a theoretical point of view, and I mean by that without taking the situation in Croatia during the conflict into account, so from purely a theoretical point of view, they were illegal groups as is specified also in the Law of Defence of the Republic of Serbia of 1991 and so they couldn't be part of the command structure. However, and that is actually the whole aim -- the main aim of section 2 --

JUDGE MAY: Let him finish.

THE WITNESS: However, and that is actually an important or one of the main aspects of part 2 of the report. From the evidence I could review - and I mean by that JNA orders, reports of security organs, sometimes even public announcements by the SSNO - it becomes obvious that these paramilitary -- these volunteer groups operated under single command and control with the JNA again through operational groups and tactical groups.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are you referring to all of them or to some of them, some of the groups?

A. As an analyst, Your Honours, I can only refer to the documentary evidence I saw. I cannot and I will not pretend that it was always the case and that all of the groups or all of whatever formation operated under JNA command and control. However, from the evidence I reviewed, and if Mr. Milosevic wants, we can go through the various orders that are quoted in the report, and these orders from JNA deal with the various parts of Croatia where the conflict took place, we will notice that when ³¹⁵⁴⁷ orders are given for operational groups to establish them or to give missions to them, that they list these volunteer formations. Now, to finalise the answer to your question, it is well possible that in the situation of a conflict independent or armed groups pop up. That can happen in any conflict. However, within the military structures, and especially within the JNA, there should be sufficient means available to act against these groups; to remove them, to disarm them, or to act otherwise in order that they are prevented from interfering with the operations of the legal armed forces or the official armed forces.

Q. Of course. Now, I don't assume you challenge the fact, Mr. Theunens, that the volunteers - and I'm speaking about volunteers, not paramilitaries now, and in conformity with the provisions that you quoted, therefore, volunteers - from the moment that they come forward as volunteers and are accepted by the commands of the units to which they have been attached represent a component part of the armed forces themselves and as such they are subordinated to the single command in the territory.

A. Your Honours, I would like to ask for clarification to the question. Is Mr. Milosevic talking about individual volunteers who join an existing JNA or TO unit or is he talking about volunteer groups that we have been referring to over the -- yesterday and today in the various JNA orders and documents we looked at?

Q. I mean both if we're talking about volunteers who placed at the command and disposal of the Territorial Defence, for example, in Eastern Slavonia, because you took Eastern Slavonia as your example, or the JNA ³¹⁵⁴⁸ which was active there. Therefore, in conformity with what it states in the law that you yourself quoted, I assume that you're not challenging the fact that volunteers, once they have been accepted by a given command and taken in represent part and parcel of the armed forces themselves. Is that right or not?

A. The answer to the question, Your Honours, is -- was actually given earlier in a sense of if the volunteers groups - and I can mention some names we discussed earlier, like Leva Supoderica or White Eagles or Seselj's men - if they are indeed accepted by the command structure as being members of the armed forces, well, then that -- that's the final situation. But my understanding of the 1982 All People's Defence Law and the other documents I looked at was that volunteers, as they were described in -- in 1982 All People's Defence Law consisted of individuals and not of groups, because groups of volunteers we're talking about private organisations who walk around in uniforms, who wear certain insignia, who have weapons, carry weapons, weapons which are not allowed by the law as to be individual weapons, and they commit certain -- they -- they commit certain activities during their activities in groups.

Q. Very well, Mr. Theunens. You said yesterday, and I made a note of it here, according to the documents there are no orders issued by the JNA mentioning a paramilitary, a para-army of any kind. That's what you said, I believe.

A. I will be more specific Your Honours. The term "paramilitaries," if it was used in JNA orders, it's used in a paragraph where the enemy situation is described in the sense that the opposing armed forces, in the ³¹⁵⁴⁹ case for the conflict in Croatia, the ZNG, the Croatian National Guard or police, were qualified as paramilitaries. Now, when these JNA orders were dealing with friendly forces, the term "paramilitaries" is not used. Instead, the term "TO detachment" or "volunteer detachment" is used. However, as we also noticed, there are also reports prepared by JNA security organs and the security administration who talk about people like, for example, Captain Dragan, Arkan. The report this morning mentions other groups where the term "paramilitary" is used for actually those formations that are qualified as volunteer formations in JNA orders that consider them friendly forces to qualify these groups and also to highlight what -- from the analysis, I believe, the illegal character of these groups.

Q. Very well. Now, since you work here, I assume that you had occasion to see that there were orders issued by the JNA in which mention is made of a para-army. However, in those orders, it is also mentioned that such groups should be disarmed and even, if necessary, with the use of weapons. Now, I presented an order here from the General Staff by the commander of the 1st Army in which he warns everyone that there were groups of paramilitaries engaged in unlawful acts and that it was the duty of the units themselves, the JNA units, to disarm them and to act in conformity with the law.

Have you had a chance of seeing documents like that, those particular documents, or do you simply stand by what you say, that the expression "paramilitary" is only used to refer to hostile forces, the enemies? If not, just say no and we can move on. ³¹⁵⁵⁰

A. Your Honour, I think the question is too complicated to give a yes or no answer. Again I'd like to correct what Mr. Milosevic said about my previous answer. I don't claim and I didn't say that the term "paramilitary" was only used for hostile forces. As I mentioned, and I will repeat it, JNA security organs and security administration used the term "paramilitary" when they wrote information reports or call it counter-intelligence reports or intelligence reports about the activities of certain formations like people affiliated to Dragan, Arkan, White Eagles and the others. There's also a document, a report written by Colonel or General Tolimir, who was responsible for intelligence in the VRS, a report he prepared in July 1992 which deals with paramilitaries and which has been quoted in the report.

To come back to the first part of the question, indeed I have seen orders from the SSNO or from the General Staff including also there is the presidential decree I mentioned yesterday from the 10th of December where indeed it is ordered that --

Q. That's not what I asked you about, the presidential decree. I asked you about a specific order by the command of the 1st Army which I presented here, and I think it was exhibited, and it speaks about the fact that the units are duty-bound to disarm those paramilitary formations and that they can resort to weapons, if necessary, to do that.

A. You -- Your Honour, if I'm requested to comment on this document, on this particular order, I would like to see it, because one has to take into account when it was issued and what is exactly written --

JUDGE MAY: Very well. You're perfectly entitled to see it. Yes, ³¹⁵⁵¹ Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I haven't got it with me. I gave you the order a long time ago during the testimony of a witness, and it was an order issued by the commander of the 1st Army to proceed according to the law when it comes to paramilitaries.

JUDGE MAY: If you don't have it -- if you don't have it, the witness can't possibly answer it. Let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assumed that a witness who engages in analysis must take into account all the documents which bear on the subject of his study, but as that is obviously not the case, I shall move on to something else.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour --

JUDGE MAY: Yes, let the witness answer.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, my comment referred to this particular order. However, if you look into the report, in part 2 on page 17, I quote a confidential letter General Adzic sent on 12th of October, so General Adzic who is Chief of General Staff of the JNA. It's on page 17, part 2.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: It is a quite extensive quote, but Adzic talks about the role of the JNA. He mentions to defend the paths of certain people from genocide and biological extermination, but to answer the question of Mr. Milosevic, Adzic also orders that all armed units, be it JNA, TO, or volunteer units, must act under the single command of the JNA. And that is included in -- in this order. So there is no discussion that efforts ³¹⁵⁵² were made to restore single command and control, and that's actually also included in the report. So if groups operated outside of the command structure, well, that would actually be a situation that couldn't last, because the commander would be obliged, would be forced to take action against that and to either have them under his command or remove these groups.

We've seen from the documents we've discussed related to Vukovar, but there are also other references included in the second part of the report, that measures were indeed taken to subordinate these groups, party affiliated groups, to the JNA during operations via operational and tactical groups.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes, there is an example like that in one of the orders, and it refers to a group which placed itself under the command of the JNA, and they were volunteers.

So is it clear that it is unacceptable to make a distinction between members of the JNA and volunteers as their component and integral part if, in keeping with the law as volunteers, they are participants in the activities engaged in by the armed forces pursuant to the 1982 law that you yourself mentioned?

A. Your Honour, if I understand the question well, then no difference should be made between the JNA and volunteer units. Now, I have a different interpretation because based on my analysis, volunteer units were not part of the legal framework. If volunteer units had been part of the legal framework and were indeed defined in the 1982 defence law, well, ³¹⁵⁵³ such orders as the one quoted now by Adzic, that volunteer units had to submit themselves to the JNA, would have been redundant. There would be no need for such orders because they would have been subordinated. There would have been no discussion if they had been legal. That's the issue.

Q. Well, that's the point. And I'm glad you've come to that matter, because we're talking about the difference and distinction between volunteers and paramilitary groups, and my question to you, Mr. Theunens, was this: Do you know that the paramilitary groups always, when we're talking about paramilitary groups, for example, which were established in Serbia, they always represented groups of individual political parties. And when we are talking about Serbia, they were opposition parties. Do you know that? Are you aware of that?

A. Your Honours, I'm aware of the existence of such groups, but based on my analysis which is contained in the report, I would not agree that this was the only kind of paramilitary groups, because there were also groups related to people like Dragan or Arkan which had no clear party affiliation, and as I explained yesterday, according to information collected by JNA security organs and security administration, these individuals, Dragan and Arkan, were actually related to the Serbian Ministry of Interior.

Q. Very well. Let's take a look at tab 5 then, and you refer to Captain Dragan in tab 5. Captain Dragan otherwise was a witness here. He testified and explained that he was not under any Ministry of the Interior. I apologise. It wasn't tab 5, it's in tab 4. I made a mistake there. Tab 4 refers to Captain Dragan. ³¹⁵⁵⁴

JUDGE MAY: Has the witness got it?

THE WITNESS: I don't have one, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let him have it.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. It says here: "By mid-June, some knowledge, information about Daniel Snedden, Australian citizen alias Captain Dragan," and you attach this in tab 4. The heading is: "Some information on Daniel Snedden." And it says: "By mid-June, security organs gathered initial information on Captain Dragan engaged in the training of the special unit of the Ministry of the Interior of SAO Krajina in the village of Golubic near Knin."

JUDGE MAY: Has the witness got the passage he's looking at?

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And he testified about that himself here, so he testified himself to that. And then it goes on to say: "In spite of the fact that a lot of information was passed regarding his identity ..." So in spite of the fact that a lot of misinformation was passed regarding his identity, the fact that he was always around and closely connected with several organs of the MUP of Serbia who were engaged on the same mission. And then mention is made of Franko Simatovic, indicated that we were talking about an organ or person engaged on behalf of the MUP of Serbia. Franko Simatovic was a man, I assume you know about that, who was engaged in ³¹⁵⁵⁵ intelligence activity in the MUP of Serbia.

So we're not talking about organs here, we're talking about an individual, in fact, an individual who met Captain Dragan. So this particular circumstance, and as it says in the footnote that this refers to his contacts with Simatovic. So this circumstance, him having met somebody, speaks of the fact that he was engaged on behalf of the MUP of Serbia. Don't you feel that to be exaggerated, that if you happen to meet somebody or see somebody, that you are immediately linked with an institution that you work for and then that the person you met, by the same token, works for that same institution? Don't you feel that to be too great a speculation with that fact?

A. I think, Your Honours, that it would be helpful for me if I could explain how intelligence or counter-intelligence services would work without going into too many details. As you notice from the last page of the document, it is --

JUDGE MAY: Let him -- let him finish. Let him finish. No. Let the witness to finish, let the reply.

THE WITNESS: The report is delivered to general of the army, Veljko Kadijevic. Now, it is highly unusual that a security service would send a report based on casual observations or only single observations to its -- to its most senior military authority. The report is titled some information. It's most likely the result of information that has been collected from various sources at various times and in different circumstances, so I would disagree with the comment of Mr. Milosevic that it's only based on one observation maybe or one private encounter between ³¹⁵⁵⁶ Simatovic and Dragan. Such a report would not be sent to Kadijevic, because then the commander would be bothered with thousands of reports on one day. No, he gets evaluated information, and evaluation means that not only the information is verified but also the source of the information is verified, and this is actually the product of such a process. It's not just a first initial report by an operator or a security organ.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But take a look at the third paragraph of that same document now, please, assessment of the work of the security organs, as you yourself say.

"At the beginning of 1990, he came to Yugoslavia --" and they're referring to Dragan Vasiljkovic -- "and actively took part in the election campaign as a member of the extreme nationalist and pro-Chetnik parties." Therefore, you're claiming that he didn't have any links with the parties. I don't think he did either, that he came as a volunteer and worked there not by any directives from the MUP because the MUP didn't know about him when he arrived, and you can see this on the second page. The MUP, since Snedden's arrival, followed him to see what his behaviour was. He monitored -- they monitored his behaviour. So if the MUP monitored him and followed him and assessed him, then I assume it is quite clear that he couldn't have come at the invitation of MUP or MUP having engaged his services. Wouldn't that be correct?

A. It could well be, Your Honours, that maybe initially Snedden came out on his own initiative but that subsequently he was recruited by the MUP. I don't think that the report is clear enough on that particular ³¹⁵⁵⁷ aspect to be able to draw a conclusion on that.

Q. Well, I would like to draw the conclusion precisely that you're claiming incorrectly that he was on assignment in Serbia, because from this piece of information we can see that the MUP monitored his movements, followed him as soon as he reached the country, gathered information about him.

And in paragraph 2 on page 2, it goes on to say: "From Slavonia he moved to Belgrade and he often stays with Klara Mandic, the president of the Serbian Jewish community. That's paragraph 2, and then there's a footnote, two stars, it says: "It was incontestably proved that a MOSAD agent is in question, who has a lot of social connections in Belgrade, through which the initial contacts were made for establishing close cooperation between Belgrade and Tel Aviv." That's complete nonsense. So, yes, Mrs. Mandic was the president of the Serbian Jewish community, he did take part in developing relations, friendly relations between the two sides, but I read for the first time here that she was a MOSAD agent. So the fact that you're claiming that that is good grounds for information, as soon as she was sent to Veljko Kadijevic, as soon as it was sent to Veljko Kadijevic, it seems to me that there are contradictions here in the information itself and that that just does not stand.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, let the witness answer.

THE WITNESS: When I include in the report a passage on possible links -- or not possible but on linkage between Mr. Snedden and the Serbian Ministry of Interior, I didn't base that comment solely on this ³¹⁵⁵⁸ one document. I'm very well aware of the many media interviews Mr. Dragan gave throughout his presence in the former Yugoslavia, one the latest ones being for Vreme, if I recall, in 2000 or 2001, in a series dealing with the history of the conflict where he emphasises once again his close relationship with the MUP of Serbia.

But coming back to this document here, it could well be and I'm not in a position to talk about what is written about Mandic and so on, but it's an information report. It is based on the information the JNA security organs have collected. Now, there is information and disinformation. It could well be that the passage on Mandic is the result of disinformation that has been produced or generated by certain organisations. It could well be that this aspect is incorrect. What is more relevant, I would believe, are the comments talking about Dragan, the people he encounters like Simatovic. There is also a comment in -- on page 3, the top paragraph there, where meetings and joint visits between Dragan and Minister Sainovic are commented. This document then, together with other documents I saw, well, I think I sufficiently ground to confirm what is actually alleged in the first paragraph of this document, that is that there were contacts or, as it is put here, closely connected -- that Snedden was closely connected with several organs of the MUP Serbia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you just clarify for me, the footnotes are your comments?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, in this document?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. ³¹⁵⁵⁹

THE WITNESS: No, no, Your Honour. This is in the original document. The footnotes have been put on the document by the author.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I suppose I can move on.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You go on to say Sainovic, the minister, met with Dragan in the town of Bor. Sainovic, by the way, is originally from the town of Bor and used to go there on private visits. And allegedly they discussed the possibility of establishing a training centre in Bor, but since there was no approval from the commander of the TO staff of the Republic of Serbia, this request was denied.

A. You --

Q. Therefore, don't you think this is rather confusing? Some minister from the government of Serbia suggests to a private person who came from Australia something and then it's denied by the commander of the TO staff because there is no approval from the republican TO staff? Don't you think this is rather like hearsay, not very serious, and it is not even likely because all this fell through and nothing came out of it? In our language we say all rubbish and nonsense.

A. Your Honour, the transcript says, or Mr. Milosevic actually said that, "You go on to say Sainovic." This is not my claim. It's in the report, in the UB report, so it would be better to correct that.

Q. All right. All right. ³¹⁵⁶⁰

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness to say anything if he wants. Do you want to add anything?

THE WITNESS: I haven't looked. It was not part of my task in the preparation of this report to look at the particular activities of Mr. Sainovic or other individuals mentioned in this paragraph, so I wouldn't be in a position to comment on that.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So you just extracted from this report one possibility, one possible assumption because this person contacted this man from the security service and you concluded that he was engaged by the ministry of Serbia and the security services. That's how you draw your conclusion, Mr. Theunens?

A. Your Honours, first of all, I don't draw conclusions. I write -- I wrote an analysis. And secondly, as I explained earlier, not only yesterday but also this morning, this report is not the result of the work of one person, it is most likely a compilation of reports of different security organs. Now, it is an information report, and I mention again there is information in it, there could -- there are parts in it which are probably more true than others, but the first paragraph, the one I took into consideration, actually coincides or contains similar information as information that I could find back in other sources. Some of these sources were indeed media sources.

Now, that was not discussed in detail in the report, but individuals like Dragan and even Arkan enjoyed lots of attentions of not ³¹⁵⁶¹ only private but also state-owned media at the time in Serbia. That may also be an indicator of the kind of activities and the kind of -- kind of activities they were engaged in and also -- or more importantly the confidence they had or didn't have. And I also recall statements made by Mr. Dragan himself both at press conferences, his encounters with Mr. Tomislav Simovic when Simovic was minister of defence of the Republic of Serbia, the earlier interview I mentioned with -- with Dragan. So the analysis is not based on only one source or only one report but it's based on several sources, and that is the result of the analysis.

Q. Very well, Mr. Theunens. There's no point in dwelling on this so long in dealing with speculations derived from this. Now, in tab 5, you are trying to link Arkan with the Ministry of the Interior. Do you know, and this is a generally known fact, that Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, who later became commander of the Serb Volunteers Guard was associated with the Ministry of the Interior but it was the federal ministry at the time when the ministry was headed by a leading politician from Slovenia, Stane Dolanc? Are you aware of that?

A. As Arkan or Zeljko Raznjatovic was a quite relevant person for -- to understand the situation in Eastern Slavonia between let's say 1991 and 1995 and as Belgium had troops in Baranja, the sort of northern part of the area between 1992 and 1997, in the framework of my previous professional activities I am familiar with the person and the relationships he had with both Federal Ministry of Interior as well as Serbian Ministry of Interior between early 1990s or end of the 1980s until he died, or he was assassinated. ³¹⁵⁶²

Q. Then you know about these links starting with the beginning of the 1980s with the Federal Ministry of the Interior that continued in the future, and then in tab 5 we see this document titled Information, which says foodstuffs arrived as assistance from the government of Serbia, and they are distributed with the assistance of Arkan. However, the aforesaid person also pointed out to instances of abuse during these transactions, and then pointing out these instances of abuse, Arkan says that staffs of Sarvas and Erdut got 40 tonnes of meat which was sold by presidents of those staffs at the price of 40 to 50 marks or dinars. Since you studied this, all this assistance in foodstuffs and medication, et cetera, was sent by Serbia -- wasn't sent through the Red Cross and other organisations, it was sent through Arkan. Does that seem plausible to you, Mr. Theunens? Does that mean that the Red Cross of Serbia and all the humanitarian aid provided by Serbia should be associated with Arkan? And then there are instances of abuse and people who get this aid sell it instead.

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... a witness. What is the point? Unless the witness is prepared to answer, he can do so.

THE WITNESS: Your answer -- the report does not analyse the status of the Serbian Red Cross. The report analyses the -- again command and control situation in Croatia with regard to SFRY armed forces. So JNA local Serb forces, including TO, volunteers also known as paramilitaries. This document, the document Mr. Milosevic is referring to, is one of several ones quoted in the report and have been used to analyse the relationship or not only the relationship but the status of Arkan and his ³¹⁵⁶³ relationship with official instances in Serbia.

If I'm allowed, I would like to draw your attention to page 38 of the second part of the report where you can find other references to security organs and security administration information reports on Arkan and his relationships with MUP and UB Serbia.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Theunens, since you also mentioned the Belgium presence in Eastern Slavonia, is it -- is my information correct that Arkan, that is the Serb Volunteers Guard, for as long as it was in Slavonia, together with Arkan, was within the framework of the TO of Eastern Slavonia and later of the Serbian army of Krajina? Is that true?

A. Your Honours, it depends when -- when you want this period to -- start, I express myself better. Mr. Milosevic mentions for as long as it was in Slavonia, I would need more precise information because the status of Arkan changed over time. He left the area, he returned. And the training centre, as far as I recall, at a certain time period - I'm talking about 1993, 1994 - was handed over from Arkan himself to the local TO which officially didn't exist, then it was also handed over to the local milicija, so the police, and then it became back -- it returned to be a training centre for Arkan. So I would need a more precise time period.

Q. All right. But in any case, he was always subordinated either to the TO or the police of Krajina, that is to the forces that controlled that territory and which were part of the SAO Krajina; is that correct?

A. Your Honours, I'm also familiar with evidence that during the ³¹⁵⁶⁴ operations in 1991, we're talking about the operations in the area of Vukovar during fall 19 -- fall and winter 1991, there are instances where Arkan operated under command and control of the JNA.

Q. Very well. Look under tab 7. You provided a document signed by the commander, Operative Group South, 21st November, 1991, Negoslavci village, Commander Mile Mrksic. It says: "Further to the newly arisen situation --" and so on and so forth -- "I hereby order that this volunteers detachment Leva Supoderica be resubordinated to the 12th Motorised Brigade, that the Kragujevac 'Sumadinac' Detachment be resubordinated and sent to the 1st PGMD --" I don't know what that abbreviation means but it's also a JNA unit -- and that some armoured company return to its home unit.

And then it says, "Vukovar TO units shall be resubordinated to the 80th Motorised Brigade and continue with the implementation of the assigned tasks - that is providing security and control of the captured areas in Vukovar with an emphasis on the most sensitive facilities. All issues regarding the signing out, the issuing of certificates and payments shall be regulated by the assistant commander for logistics." And then we see that this was copied to commanders of volunteers units, Seseljevci and others, but this is a volunteer unit which came to that area and placed itself under the command of the JNA. Isn't this what follows from this document?

A. The question, Your Honours, would need to be clarified, but -- because which volunteer unit are we talking about and what is meant with a volunteer unit putting itself or placing itself under the command? The ³¹⁵⁶⁵ subordination isn't a measure that is taken by the superior. It's not a subordinate who decides well now I'm subordinated to X or Y, it's an action that emanates from the superior, so I would like to have the question clarified.

Q. Does this imply that this volunteer unit, because it says in the document Leva Supoderica volunteers detachment, is it implied that it is placed under the command of the JNA?

A. Your Honour, you will see from the report, and the situation in Eastern Slavonia is discussed from page 65 on of the second part of the report, that quite early, and I have an order here which is quoted on the bottom of page 65, an order from the 29th of October, 1991, that indeed Leva Supoderica volunteer unit with affiliated or related to the SRS, the Serbian Radical Party, was subordinated or was included, so that means subordination, in the assault detachment number 1. So from 29 of October on.

The situation that is referred to in this particular order has to do with the operations after the fall of Vukovar and after the evacuation of the hospital. It is that the Guards Brigade, which was the main unit of Operational Group South, is preparing itself to withdraw and is therefore handing over its responsibilities in a gradual way to another JNA unit and the 80th Motorised Brigade. So indeed the order confirms that Leva Supoderica remains subordinated to the JNA as it was already since 29 of October, only its superior unit changes.

Q. Very well. Therefore, that confirms what the Serbian Radical Party claims, that they sent volunteers exclusively to the JNA as long as ³¹⁵⁶⁶ it was there and then under the command of the Serbian army of Krajina when the JNA was no longer there but always sent these units to work under the command of the army that controlled this territory. Is that in keeping what it says here and what that party claims? They sent their people as volunteers to operate always under the command of legal military formations. Is that so or not?

A. Your Honours, I'm familiar with -- with these claims of the SRS, but I didn't really analyse them in a sense. I didn't look at all the SRS or Serbian Radical Party documentation. All I can say is based on analysis I did, which is contained in the report, that for this specific case, so the JNA operations in the area of Vukovar, that at the latest on the 29th of October 1991, volunteers related to the Serbian Radical Party, not only Leva Supoderica but there are also other groups, were indeed subordinated to the JNA during the operations, and according to this document, this subordination actually continued after the 21st of November 1991.

Q. Very well. Therefore, according to the information available to you as an analyst and which you are presenting here, their claim that they sent their volunteers exclusively to the JNA or in other situations to the Territorial Defence of Krajina or the Republika Srpska is true. Since we are dealing with documents under tabs, it would be practical for me to --

A. Um -- Your Honour, I would like to react to what Mr. Milosevic said. I am not in a position to confirm claims of political parties. What my task was to look at orders and other official documents and to analyse those documents. Whether these -- the analysis corresponds with ³¹⁵⁶⁷ what certain political parties may claim or not claim, that's not my issue. That's not my problem.

Q. All right. All right. I only wanted to compare your assertions with their claims, and I note that they were indeed subordinated to the JNA and they did not try to avoid that subordination and act in an anarchic manner.

The next thing I want to do with these tabs, to make my life easier --

A. Your Honour, the word "assertion," I'm not a native speaker but to me it doesn't mean the same as analysis. An assertion can be based on one or two observations. As you will see from the report, there were more -- many more -- and official documents used, JNA orders used, so I'm not talking about assertions, we're talking about analysis based on JNA orders. That's not an assertion.

Q. Certainly, certainly. That analysis confirms the position that they acted in a legal manner. They were subordinated to the JNA in conformity with the laws that you are quoting. That's not in dispute.

A. No, it's not in dispute for the orders I looked at.

Q. Precisely. That's what I wanted to establish. Now, please look at tab 8. That's an order of the Chief of the General Staff to establish the 30th and the 40th Personnel Centres. And these notorious personnel centres are going to be elucidated, perhaps not with you but with somebody else.

I would like to draw your attention to pages 89 and 90 of this report of yours, part 2, Armed Forces of the JNA and the Conflict in ³¹⁵⁶⁸ Croatia. I have the B/C/S version.

So it says under J: "On the 15th of November, 1993, the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, ordered the establishment of the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres. Colonel Perisic's order followed an order of the FRY president's order," number such-and-such, dated the 10th of November, 1993. And then on the next page you say, under para 1: "According to Perisic's order, the personnel centres 'are to be subordinated to the head of the personnel administration who will regulate assignments, deployments, and all the other issues related to the existence and functioning of personnel centres ...'" and so on. Thus, these notorious personnel centres, the 30th and the 40th one, through which salaries were received, social and health security for families, et cetera, were subordinated to the personnel administration. Now, answer me, Mr. Theunens, as a soldier. If there were subordination related to the army of Yugoslavia and the army of Republika Srpska and the army of Serbian Krajina, would it be possible for these personnel centres, which take care of material aid, to be subordinated to the personnel administration, and how can an army be subordinated to a personnel administration? How can troops be subordinated to a personnel administration?

A. Your Honour, I don't understand the question. Who is subordinated to the 30th Personnel Centre?

Q. Well, you say -- I'm not saying who is subordinated to the personnel centre. You say in paragraph 1, page 89 in English: "According ³¹⁵⁶⁹ to Perisic's order, the personnel centres are to be subordinated to the head of the personnel administration." And in paragraph 2: "This organ takes administrative care of them."

Is it clear that there is no subordination between the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia or the army of Republika Srpska and the army of Serbian Krajina, rather, the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres are subordinated to the personnel administration which takes care of its -- of administrative issues, social and health and pension, security, salaries, et cetera. There is nothing here that would corroborate the idea of a single chain of command linking them.

A. Your Honour, the passage Mr. Milosevic quoted from the report deals with personnel support, so it doesn't deal at all with subordination relations between SVK, VRS, or VJ. The use of the term "subordination" in this particular passage where I explain the 30th Personnel Centre is nothing more than a copy of paragraph 3 of the order signed by Perisic where it clearly states personnel centres are to be subordinated to the head of the personnel administration.

The question -- the complicated question of the relationship -- subordination relationship between VJ, SVK and VRS is not at all dealt with in this particular section of the report so I don't understand very well what reference is required for.

Q. Well, it doesn't matter in which section of the report. What matters is that this is the best proof that these 30th and 40th Personnel Centres are exclusively in charge of material assistance to former officers of the JNA serving in the VRS or the SVK dealing with their ³¹⁵⁷⁰ salaries, social and health security for their families, and have nothing to do with military operations or anything of that kind. Otherwise, they wouldn't be subordinated to the personnel administration. A personnel administration only deals with personnel issues; status, pensions, security, salaries, et cetera. Is that clear or not?

A. Your Honours, I don't need -- I don't see the need for clarification in this paragraph about personnel support.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. The matter's finished. He's made his point. You can make your own in due course if you want.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I don't see any difference. Everything is written here.

JUDGE KWON: I didn't follow the question, but if you can help me, Mr. Theunens. Personnel administration, is it not related to the army?

THE WITNESS: The personnel administration is one of the sections in a staff. Like, there will be an operations section, a logistics section, a section for morale and related matters. This paragraph in the report only deals with the establishment of the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres. Now, as Mr. Milosevic explains, these centres -- or to continue with this explanation, these centres were established to administer officers of the JNA or the VJ, so active-duty officers, serving in the armed forces of another country or on the territory of another country, and I will able be more specific, entities on the territory of another country, being the VRS and the SVK. We know from the documents that have been referred to in the -- in the report that these financial issues involved the payment of salaries, the payment of compensation for service ³¹⁵⁷¹ under hardship, as well as also to keep a kind of -- or to exercise bookkeeping in order to calculate times for pensionable age and related issues.

Whether there is a relation between the payment of salaries and command and control, from the military -- strictly military pint of view, obviously not. A Personnel Department is not involved with command and control. However, one can ask the question whether the payment of salaries to people has an impact on their behaviour, and whether this relation should be considered as command and control or influence is another matter but that matter is certainly not discussed in this section of the report.

JUDGE KWON: So my question was whether the personnel administration is an organ inside the army.

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. It's a department within the General Staff, this one.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But let me correct you, Mr. Theunens. What is dealt with here is not that they are officers of the JNA, paid by the JNA. At -- during the time while they are paid by the JNA, they are serving as officers of the army of Republika Srpska or the SDK which has no tangible link with the army of Yugoslavia. Is that true according to all the analytical data you have?

A. Your Honours, with regard to the first part of the question that we're talking about JNA or VJ officers paid by the VJ, I agree to that ³¹⁵⁷² part.

Now, the second part about the tangible links between VJ and VRS and SVK I would not agree with that conclusion and I would refer to the parts of the report we discussed already yesterday in regard -- with regard to, for example, the exchange of daily combat reports as well as the organisation of coordination meetings.

Q. Well, you found one or two of those friendly armies in any case meet and cooperate. You even claim that I received daily reports. Were you able to establish then, as a military expert, that in my office I didn't have a single employee working on military issues or anybody else who would be able to deal with such reports or receive them? You are making that assertion only because somebody wrote somewhere that those reports were submitted to me as well. They were submitted to Perisic, of course, among other people, so that he be informed, not that he be able to issue orders. Is that true, Mr. Theunens, or not?

A. I'm looking at the relevant part of the report, but in the report it is not claimed that you received them. It is only concluded, if I can use that expression, that reports were sent -- that --

Q. Thank you. That's sufficient. That's enough for me. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: If he wishes to add, he can do so. Yes.

THE WITNESS: Your Honours, that the reports were sent to Mr. Milosevic and General Perisic, and when looking at the contents of these reports that regularly they include information that deals with personnel support from the VJ to the SVK, requests from the SVK for additional material support as well as assessments of support, material ³¹⁵⁷³ support, fuel, ammunition and related matters that was received earlier from the VJ.

In addition, the coordination meetings I was talking about in the report, and that starts on page 116 of the second part, there are a number of references made to these coordination meetings between SVK, VJ, and VRS, and, for example, in the English translation, page 118, at the bottom of the page, there are -- we include references to similar meetings in January, February, and May 1994. More references can be followed in the pages afterwards, and it -- that allows or that indicates that there were organised contacts, not only contacts but coordination meetings. Now, coordination in -- in -- according to the JNA regulations I looked at can involve a subordination relationship.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, Mr. Theunens, come on. Do you have a single document, as you are an analyst yourself, and as that machinery over there collects all types of documents, can you quote me a single document in which the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia issues any kind of order whatsoever to the Main Staff of the Serbian army of Krajina or the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska?

A. Your Honours, on page 120 of the report, English version, paragraph H, there is a copy of an order dated the 7th of December, 1994, and I can actually give the exhibit number. It was already tendered, and it's Exhibit 469 -- 469, tab 18. An order of 7 December 1994 released by General Momcilo Perisic, Chief of General Staff of the VJ, to Milan Celeketic, who is Chief of General Staff of the SVK, so the Serbian armed ³¹⁵⁷⁴ force in Krajina, and to Milan Martic, president of the Serbian Republic of Krajina, and it deals with the -- of the facilitating of free passage of an UNPROFOR humanitarian convoy in Western Bosnia-Herzegovina. And it concludes as follows: "On the authority of the president of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, Lieutenant General Momcilo Perisic." So it's Exhibit 469, tab 18.

Q. Mr. Theunens, thank you very much for finding that finally. And you claim that that is in fact an order. And we're talking about 1994. The date is the 7th of December.

At that time, Mr. Akashi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, had very frequent meetings and relations with me. I did my best to help him. I assume you're well aware of that because the opposite side, the one you're testifying for, has a series of reports which will bear that out. And what you have just quoted I'm going to read in Serbian. I did not compare the translation, but it has nothing to do with any kind of order. However, it emanates from that, and you will confirm that as a military analyst yourself, that I quite obviously had no possibility of having contacts or communication and, therefore, I asked of General Perisic to do his best to convey a message to Martic for him to intervene with respect to what Mr. Akashi had asked me to do. And so this is what it says. He sent the message. How he sent it, I can't say, I don't know whether it went by courier or whether it was conveyed through the telephone, what kind of connections and links he had at that time I don't know but somebody will probably be able to tell us. And he's sending out this to the president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, ³¹⁵⁷⁵ Mr. Milan Martic, and the commander of the Main Staff, Major General Milan Celeketic.

Following instructions, not on order, but following instructions, it says here -- I see the translation here of that text in English. It says: "On the order of the president of the republic of Serbia." "Instruction" and "order" is not the same thing in the Serbian language nor am I able to issue orders. I instruct. That's what I do in the Serbian language. So in the Serbian text it says quite simply "pursuant to instructions" by the president, et cetera, et cetera, urgently to facilitate the passage of UNPROFOR humanitarian aid to Western Bosnia. What this was about was that Mr. Akashi asked that we intervene for humanitarian reasons and that for two reasons. So I did say to Perisic, "find a way of informing them that they must do that for Akashi, first, because you, Mr. Martic, promised to do this to Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and second because the decision of UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Western Bosnia is at stake. Inform UNPROFOR, Mr. Akashi, in writing that you will take this task upon yourself and that you will assume this task this evening, immediately, and carry it out."

Therefore, pursuant to this authorisation, he is conveying a message in which I ask that the promise that was made to Akashi be put into practice, be carried out, that UNPROFOR's convoy be let through. And you consider this to be a relationship of subordination, do you? So we have the same pattern here; my endeavours for peace are being taken as proof and evidence that I am in charge of the situation and managing it. So I'm asking that the humanitarian envoys be let through, and it says "on ³¹⁵⁷⁶ order." Not even the translation is correct.

Do you have any other orders of this nature? I'll be very grateful to you if you tell me.

A. Your Honours, I didn't conclude from this one single document that the SVK was subordinated to Mr. Milosevic. I only attempted to answer his question. The question, if I recall well, was whether we have any orders from -- emanating from Mr. Milosevic to the SVK or the VRS. Well, this is one example.

I'm -- I'm not a native B/C/S speaker, but as far as I understand military language, "instruction" can also have the implications of an order in the sense that when -- and this is quoted in the report on page 62 of the first part, there are actually, according to a JNA instruction from 1983, four different kinds of orders. There are directives, which are issued by the highest level, then there are instructions, then there are orders, then there are commands at the lowest level. I understand very well that this is -- it's not the most significant military matter that is being dealt with, notwithstanding that at the time there were serious problems with the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR not only in the Serb held territories in Croatia but also in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, the fact that we don't have orders don't mean that they don't exist. We sent many requests to, at the time, the FRY and subsequently Serbia and Montenegro for documents. Some have been replied to; others not. Again, the fact that we don't have them doesn't mean they don't exist, so I cannot draw any conclusion on that level.

Q. Well, it says here he should do this for two reasons; one, because ³¹⁵⁷⁷ you, Mr. Martic, promised to do so for Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and second, because the decision on the withdrawal of UNPROFOR is at stake, to endeavour not to have the situation deteriorate, and he is conveying my message. Had I been able to contact him, I would have told him that myself, and insisted upon letting UNPROFOR pass. And you're taking this to be evidence of an order. Do you have any other example of that kind? I should be very grateful if you could quote me another order like that.

A. I think I answered that question, Your Honours.

Q. That you have answered it, yes, you have, but you haven't got one because you didn't receive one, otherwise, you would have had it. There are none, that's why you haven't got one. But let's return to the paramilitary formations.

JUDGE MAY: If the witness wants to answer, he can, or otherwise, take no notice.

Yes. Let's go on to something else.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, is the witness going to answer or not?

JUDGE MAY: No. He's given you an answer. Let's move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. Fine.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Tell me, please, since you say that the armed forces of the SFRY and the conflict in Croatia -- that's the title in fact -- now the ZNG, the Croatian National Guards Corps, for the period of time you're referring to, that is to say when the SFRY was still in existence with its constitution that you have been quoting, its laws and military legal ³¹⁵⁷⁸ provisions and the provisions of the TO that you have been quoting as well, and you have also quoted passages saying that they were the sole legitimate elements of the armed forces of the SFRY, so I'm asking you, at the time, the ZNG, the Croatian National Guard Corps, was it a paramilitary formation or was it some sort of party army belonging to the then HDZ, the leading party in -- on the Croatian political arena? As an analyst, give me an answer to that, please.

A. Well, Your Honours, as an analyst, I was tasked to analyse the SFRY armed forces, JNA and TO, their situation or their status during the conflict in Croatia with regard to the issue of command and control. ZNG was not part of this -- of this work, of this analysis, so I can't answer that question.

Q. Well, you've answered it in actual fact. And you have answered it, as our friends in Croatia would say, very well. With all -- do you know that the Presidency of the SFRY as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, on the 9th of January, 1931 [as interpreted] gave an order to disarm all the paramilitaries within the space of ten days, within a ten-day time limit, and that the Croatian representatives, Mesic first of all, asked for an additional two days to be added to that deadline for disarmament, and then after consulting his allies from the West, they rejected the order to disarm the paramilitaries.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you answer, the transcript says 9th of January 1931. Rather historical.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1991. 1991, yes. It's probably a typing error. 1991 was what I said. ³¹⁵⁷⁹

THE WITNESS: The same answer to the similar question before. I am familiar with that order and the events, but they are not part of the scope of this report. So -- and I would like to add the fact that I say that they are not part of the scope of this report does not necessarily mean that I agree with what you say, Mr. Milosevic. You give your version of these events. As an analyst, I would like to look at all the documents related to these events before I would make any assessment or give any opinions on the opinions of others.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Fine, Mr. Theunens. As you're here just to speak about what the Serbs did, do you know that that same order was respected only by the Serbs in Croatia and did lay down their entire weaponry, all the weapons they had, believing that the JNA, as the Presidency had taken that decision, that the JNA would protect all the citizens? Are you aware of that?

A. This may well have happened at that time, and I was trying to find the document in the -- my report. On the other hand, there are documents, and actually you mentioned one this morning, the JNA security report on Arkan and the ammunition and weapons he was distributing in Eastern Slavonia, ammunition coming from the Serbian Ministry of Interior. It doesn't mean -- it doesn't mean if they disarmed in January that they didn't rearm themselves afterwards.

Q. Just a moment, please. You now say that I mentioned that, whereas I was talking about food and other things like that. And now I have to go back to the tab about Arkan where that is stated. I can't remember what ³¹⁵⁸⁰ tab number it was.

A. Tab number 5. There should be another one. It's later.

Q. Yes, you're right. Tab 5. Thank you very much. It says, "While performing functional tasks within the units, within the Savski Venac Municipal Territorial Defence engaged in securing the Bratstvo-Jedinstvo bridge, the security organ --" which means an officer, right? One officer, when it says "security organ," it means an officer -- "of the aforementioned staff has contracted in the -- in the Second Lieutenant Blagojevic Goran, the aforementioned staff has contracted Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, commander of the so-called Serbian Volunteers Guard several times." That's what it says in this report, in this piece of information.

And then goes on to state, speaking about Arkan: "The above-named has said that weaponry, ammunition and MES --" I suppose that means materiel -- "has been supplied by the MUP, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia and that he had been distributing them to the TO staff of Erdut, Sarvas, and Borovo Selo." Do you mean to say that it says here what that man said that Arkan had told me -- told him? Does it say anything else other than that, Mr. Theunens, here? Is that all it says?

A. Your Honour, before answering the question, MES actually means mines and explosives in B/C/S. I was only referring to this -- to this document. I mean, this is a report. Now if you want to address Arkan again, the kind of equipment and weaponry --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Just a moment. One at a time. Yes. ³¹⁵⁸¹

THE WITNESS: The kind of equipment and weaponry Arkan had in his training centre was quite sophisticated. I mean by that these were not like personal weapons or a weapon a private person may have at home, people who have an arms permit or something. These were military weapons, and when you look at the geography of the area, well, the only way how he, how Arkan could enter the area was via the Erdut bridge or via the territory of Serbia, and I would assume that he had to pass border controls or other police or maybe military personnel there and they may verify what he was transporting. So the fact that these people had these kind of weapons is a known observation.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We're going to stop now. It's time for the -- no, just a moment. You can -- you must stop now. Twenty minutes for the break.

Meanwhile, tomorrow, the proposal which we'll follow is that there is a witness from -- the general who is coming today particularly for that or, rather, giving it in a particular way. So we'll hear his evidence. The evidence shall then, when it's possible, we will finish this witness's evidence thereafter. The accused has an additional 15 minutes after today. The amicus can have 20 minutes, and the normal quarter of an hour which we allow for the final witnesses. Very well. We'll call in -- we'll finish in time to finish this afternoon. Yes. We will adjourn

--- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a moment, Mr. May. I've been ³¹⁵⁸² told to approach the microphone. I assume they can't hear me well enough.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Theunens, you said a moment ago that he crossed the border and that he had to have come from Serbia. Well, I assume it's clear to you from the sea of information that you've been inundated with that in 1991 there was no border there. It was all Yugoslavia.

A. Your Honours, I'm familiar with the situation in the SFRY as it was prior to 1992. Now, on the other hand, once the conflict in Croatia broke out, I would assume that controls on strategic objectives like the bridges of the Danube or the protection of the strategic objectives would be identified.

My earlier comments on the activities of Arkan related mainly to the activities after the arrival of the UN forces in the area, which is the period -- time period after April 1992 until 1996, 1997.

Q. Very well. The information you gave us referred to 1991. Now, do you know, Mr. Theunens, that even if we are talking about the deployment of the armies in the former or, rather, the army in the former JNA, that there were three army districts? The 1st Army District incorporated part of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and -- well, almost the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But anyway, there were three army districts, and they did not coincide with the borders of the republics. I assume you're well aware of that?

A. I am familiar with that, Your Honours.

Q. So you are aware, then, that within the competence of the 1st Army District was the area stretching to the left and right bank of the Danube ³¹⁵⁸³ River. Do you know that?

A. Yes, Your Honours. There is actually a map of the geographic organisation of the JNA included in the report. I'm just trying to locate on which page it is. Anyway, we can do that later.

Q. Very well. But it's not disputed that both the left and right bank of the Danube came under the 1st Army District and its competencies and the JNA, as you yourself observed, had under its control all the armed forces in that area, on that territory, which included the Territorial Defence, the volunteer units, et cetera. I don't assume you're challenging that.

A. No, Your Honours. This is actually one of the assessments that can be made, or conclusion that can be drawn from the orders of the 1st Military District and Operational Group South that we discussed earlier, that during operations in Eastern Slavonia, all units in the area, JNA, local Serb TO, units of the TO of the Republic of Serbia, as well as volunteers, called by some paramilitaries or volunteer groups, were subordinated to these operational groups.

Q. Yes, subordinated to these operational groups, you say, except certain paramilitary formations. Are you aware of that?

A. Put like that, I don't really understand your question. Could you be more specific, please.

Q. Well, are you aware of the fact that there were some paramilitary formations which were completely outside and beyond any control and they delved in theft, looting, et cetera? And units within that -- it wasn't done by the army and units within it. ³¹⁵⁸⁴

A. I am aware that some -- that certain units like that may have operated. However, as I explained earlier, one of the tasks of a commander is to maintain or restore discipline. If such groups appear, whether they appear locally or whether they cross the border or came from Serbia is not relevant at this moment in the sense that if such a group is active in the area, well, the commander has to act against them because such a breakdown of discipline will also have an impact on the discipline in his own units. If even such behaviour of looting or otherwise is approved or is not acted upon or no sanctions are taken against people who do that, well, the way is open for JNA or TO soldiers or volunteers subordinate to the JNA to indulge in the same activities.

Q. All right. I quoted the order by the commander of the 1st Army speaking about the need to arrest and disarm such groups, but you haven't had the order in your hands, as I understand it.

A. No, Your Honours, but if I'm allowed, I would like to refer to a document, a report written by Colonel -- Lieutenant Colonel Eremija, who was the morale officer of the Guards Division, and this report is quoted in section 4 of the second part of the report, and I'm trying to -- the page number is 126 at the bottom. So this letter was sent by Eremija, deputy commander for instructions in matters of morale and political propaganda in the 1st Guards Mechanised Division, on the 23rd of October, 1991. This document has already been introduced as exhibit and it's Exhibit 342, tab 11.

Eremija talks about groups identified or who could be identified as groups mentioned by Mr. Milosevic awhile ago, and interestingly, at the ³¹⁵⁸⁵ bottom of his report, Eremija advises, he gives recommendations, which is usual in these kind of reports. He advises to undertake the disarming of these groups; in particular he identifies one formation, Dusan Silni, Chetniks, and Arkan soldiers, and he also advises that the authorities of the Republika Srpska should participate in that campaign. So we have a senior officer in the JNA who is responsible to maintain morale in the unit. He works at a division level, which is a senior command level, and he gives this kind of advice.

This letter was later published in the international press. For example, it's -- in January 1993, and was also referred to in the UN commission of experts' report. So these are all instances or examples that show actually that the competent authorities could have been or should have been aware of what was happening.

Q. Well, as you can see, you mention a high-ranking officer here whose reactions were quite proper and in order. Isn't that right?

A. That's correct, Your Honours. The only question one could raise is whether his recommendations were taken seriously, i.e., whether any action was taken upon his recommendations. Now, referring again to Arkan, there is information or we have seen information that Arkan and his people were involved in -- in similar events as they were involved in Croatia, later on in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as far as I know from the situation in UNPROFOR at that time and more specifically Sector East between 1992 and 1995, Arkan remained active and continued to have his own group and move freely from Erdut to Serbia and vice versa, and his soldiers were not disarmed. ³¹⁵⁸⁶

Q. Yes, he was within the composition of the Serbian army of Krajina. That's what I know.

A. That may well be but that's not in the recommendations made by Lieutenant Colonel Eremija, Your Honours.

Q. Very well. Let's move on. I should like to get rid of these tabs which are quite heavy. You provided a very voluminous document. It is a directive for the use of the army of Republika Srpska. That's under tab 16. And you were asked by Judge Kwon about references to Yugoslavia and the army of Yugoslavia, because this is a directive for use of the Republika Srpska army drawn up by its commander, with indications as to the authors, the typist --

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness -- if he has a copy. Do you have a copy?

THE WITNESS: I have a copy of the first part of the report, the extract, which allows to provide a partial answer, not a complete answer to the question, because the issue of the involvement or the support of the VJ is also dealt with in the annexes, and I haven't received them yet, but I can already provide a partial answer to the question.

JUDGE MAY: Let's see if we have a copy already which the witness has referred to.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we have the annexes that I think Mr. Theunens may want to see. They weren't originally attached to the exhibit but they are now available and can be distributed.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ³¹⁵⁸⁷

Q. I have this directive in its entirety, from the cover page to the last page with the signature of the commander of the Main Staff. Seventeen pages, as far as I can see, in this copy of the original.

A. Indeed, Your Honours, but that's one part of the report. That's the extract. And then as it is usual in -- in voluminous military orders or here in directive, which is an order issued at a high level, there will also be annexes to deal with specific matters like, for example, air defence and air defence matters, engineer support, logistics, and related specific military aspects.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. At any rate, it is enactment -- an enactment of the army of Republika Srpska. At least that, I hope, is not in issue.

A. That's correct, Your Honour. It's a document signed by General Mladic, and it emanates from the General Staff of the VRS.

Q. Then we have tab 17. It's a letter addressed to the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska by the authorised manager of the Pretis Vogosca enterprise, and Vogosca is in the territory of Republika Srpska; right? This enterprise is in Republika Srpska?

A. This is correct, Your Honours, but the interesting aspect of the document was actually paragraph 1 where it is mentioned that a component of the specific ammunition that is being discussed, namely grenades 120 millimetre, 120 millimetre grenades, so one component of them, the powder charge, the underlying powder charge, is produced by Krusik in Valjevo, and Valjevo is located on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. ³¹⁵⁸⁸

Q. All right. One component. What it says here is the only thing that's missing is gunpowder charge produced by Krusik from Valjevo. It's a clarification given to the Main Staff with the reference to the Krusik Valjevo enterprise which is indeed located in Serbia and which cooperates with the enterprise named Pretis in Serbia -- in Vogosca, sorry, and what is meant here is the cooperation between two enterprises.

A. That's correct, Your Honours, but one would assume, and it's actually not an assumption, in the times of the SFRY, the organisation of arms production and weapons production and ammunition production in SFRY was one of the competencies of the Federal Secretary for People's Defence. I haven't dealt with the legal framework as it existed during the existence of FRY in my report as the report of Philip Coo dealt with that aspect, but I'm pretty sure that arms and weapons trade as well as ammunition trade and ammunition production and the trade in components that are used to produce arms or ammunition is subject to the same legal constraints, i.e., that there is an involvement of the competent authorities, namely the Serbian -- the FRY Ministry of Defence, which would then have to give its approval or allow for such trade, for example, trade between a factory in Serbia and a factory in Bosnia-Herzegovina to take place.

It may also be useful to mention that since the end of 1991 an arms embargo had been decided against the former Yugoslav republics by the United Nations via Security Council Resolution.

Q. Well, I suppose you know that in keeping with that arms embargo, Iran, with the knowledge of US authorities, delivered a huge quantity of ³¹⁵⁸⁹ weapons to the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. You have had those documents in your hands, haven't you?

A. I am familiar with this information, but it's -- again, it's outside of the scope of this report. This report does not analyse arms trade between former Yugoslav republics and third parties as it is focused on relationships between VRS or SVK and VJ as well as the earlier mentioned command and control relationships.

Q. Where do you see any command and control exerted by the VJ over the VRS or the SVK? I asked you, and you showed me a document where Perisic just conveyed my request to let the UNPROFOR through. If that's what you call command and control of the army, then be it. You are an analyst who seems to have gathered all available documents. Where did you see a document whereby the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia gives an order to the army of Republika Srpska or the Serbian army of Krajina?

A. Well, first of all, I think it's important to emphasise that I looked at documents that are available. The fact that documents are not available don't mean they don't exist, and that's an important constraint or limitation to this report.

Now, the document we discussed on the instruction President Milosevic gave via the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ to Mr. Martic and General Celeketic was for me not an indication of command and control of the VJ over -- over the SVK, but as an analyst it showed to me the relationship, or it clarified or it gave some insight on the relationship that existed between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Martic. ³¹⁵⁹⁰

Q. Isn't that clarification enough of the relationship between the leadership of Serbia and me personally on the one hand and Mr. Akashi, who was Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, and whom I tried to assist as best I could so that his request be fulfilled, exerting all the influence I had over the competent authorities in Krajina and the Republika Srpska?

A. I think that you are -- Your Honours, I think that Mr. Milosevic is talking about a different topic now. The relationship between UNPROFOR and Serbia or FRY is a completely different topic than the one that is addressed within my report.

Q. All right. Let us round off this topic of paramilitaries. You mentioned that the law on the national defence of the Republic of Serbia emphasises that only legal authorities are entitled to set up any kind of armed formations. What is unusual about that? Isn't it implied, doesn't it go without saying that only legal authorities can do that? And at the same time, this makes it impossible to set up paramilitary formations at random and at will.

A. Your Honours, I think it's very important to raise this article, and indeed it sounds fully normal and actually appropriate in a functioning state. However, as Mr. Milosevic himself mentioned earlier today, what he called opposition parties were actually behind most of these groups. And a question one could ask then is to what extent are opposition parties not subjected to the law? The law is one thing, the implementation is another thing.

Q. Well, all right, that's true, but at that time -- I suppose what ³¹⁵⁹¹ you're trying to say is that the authorities were not harsh enough dealing with opposition parties that were working against the government. Is that an issue, that opposition parties were working against the government, the authorities?

A. Your Honours, this is outside the framework of my report. My analysis did not look at the internal political situation in Serbia and did not analyse the relationship between what Mr. Milosevic calls opposition parties and the authorities. My report for this specific aspect was intended to -- is intended to analyse the existence of these groups, the organisation of these groups, and their relationship, more specifically command relationship, with the JNA and the TO.

Q. Out there in the field; right? Because that's the kind of documents you found.

A. This is partially correct, Your Honour. As Mr. Milosevic has mentioned earlier, these groups were organised by opposition parties -- some of these groups were organised by opposition parties, what he calls opposition parties in Serbia. Now, to me, that implies that these groups originated from Serbia and actually, yeah, were allowed to exist. Now, that was again not the main focus of my analysis, but looking at documents and specifically documents dealing with the relationship between SRS volunteers and the TO in Western Slavonia, and that should be on page 63 of the second part of the report, it shows that these volunteer groups were actually established in Serbia.

Q. Well, that's precisely what I've been trying to tell you all this time; they were formed by all kinds of opposition parties in Serbia, and ³¹⁵⁹² do you have evidence of that?

A. Exactly, but I mean, Mr. Milosevic, if you want to ask questions about the law, I'm not a legal specialist, but I know that every citizen is expected to abide, to respect the law, and that is independent of the fact whether you're a member of a political party or not. And if you're a member of a political party, whether you're a member of an opposition party or the government party. One would even dare to assume that members of the opposition parties would be more likely to be controlled for -- or likely to be checked by the appropriate organisations, being state security or internal security, in order to verify to what extent they abide to the law.

Q. All right. Did the ruling party in Serbia set up any paramilitary organisation or unit? Do you have any information about that?

A. Your Honours, I haven't come across information indicating what Mr. Milosevic just said. It is indeed correct that a number of these groups were affiliated to parties Mr. Milosevic calls opposition parties. However, we have also discussed documents here that dealt with groups like Arkan and Arkan Tigers and the group affiliated to or controlled by Mr. Dragan, and these documents have indicated that there was a relationship between those two groups, Arkan's Tigers and Dragan's Red Berets, as they were called, and the Serbian Ministry of Interior and/or the Serbian Ministry of Defence.

Q. All right. That's what you claim based on that reference that Captain Dragan was seen in contact with one official of the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia. ³¹⁵⁹³

THE INTERPRETER: The rest of the question was not audible.

THE WITNESS: I wouldn't agree with that conclusion, Your Honours. As I mentioned earlier today, that document is one aspect or one source that I considered to come to a conclusion -- or not to come to a conclusion, to analyse the relationships Captain Dragan or Mr. Daniel Snedden and his group had with official instances in Serbia.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Just one more question that doesn't fall within this context but I'll refer to it because you mentioned it yesterday. You quoted page 81, I think, if my notes are correct. You said that you have an order from the time of the Kosovo crisis to the effect that no groups may be involved in the armed forces. No groups may be included in the armed forces, only individuals. Is that what you said?

A. What I said, Your Honours, is that an order was issued to allow for the integration of volunteers into the VJ or forces it controlled and that it -- the order included a reference that volunteers were not allowed to be integrated as groups but only on an individuals basis. There is a footnote to that order in the report and it's even an exhibit, but I'm trying to locate it now.

Q. Very well. Tell me, Mr. Theunens, from the viewpoint of your qualifications, is this order appropriate?

A. Your Honours, could the question be qualified -- could be clarified? What is meant by "appropriate"?

Q. Is it appropriate? Is it in order, from the viewpoint of your professional qualifications, this attempt to avoid involving any groups to ³¹⁵⁹⁴ limit inclusion in the armed forces only to individuals, volunteers?

A. Your Honour, I think it's very appropriate, because in all military textbooks and be it at the lowest level of military courses as well as senior staff courses, one of the important aspects for successful military operations is discipline. Discipline without wanting to -- and I would not elaborate in too many details about it, but discipline is also related to cohesion. Cohesion in the armed forces means that there is a feeling of relationship between the soldiers, and they are aware of the common goal. The common goal is the one that is -- has been explained in the orders the soldiers receive.

The problem with the volunteer groups, especially those in 1991 or those I looked at during the conflict in 1991, was that some of these people had other goals than those that were commonly -- common among the JNA. The fact that these people did not, as some of the documents suggested, not for example respect JNA commanders, that they behaved in a way which was not appropriate according to these JNA commanders which was not in accordance with the regulations, the existing regulations, created a lot of problems, and this was mainly or this was partly related to the fact that these people operated in groups and were not dispersed over existing JNA units. So it's very appropriate that in 1999 when a similar -- when a new conflict situation arises, it is very logical that then emphasis is laid on the fact that volunteers are not allowed to operate in groups, not only because of let's say the theoretical background or the theoretical problems that could arise but more specifically the practical problems and serious problems that arose in 1991. ³¹⁵⁹⁵

Q. Yes. So you know that in 1999, we prohibited all paramilitary formations precisely to prevent all illegal action, breaches of discipline, and other kinds of damage.

A. Your Honour, the only aspect of the -- of the events in 1999 I looked at for this -- for my analysis was this particular order. I didn't look into further details or further other aspects of the situation that arose in 1999, and therefore I'm not qualified to talk in detail about that.

Q. Very well. Since you also talk about Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, you said that it was not your mission to consider the illegality of paramilitary formations in Croatia unless it concerned the Serbs. Did you know that in Bosnia and Herzegovina that this so-called League of Patriots already in February 1992 had over 120.000 people under arms?

A. Your Honours, the report is not a legal analysis. The report is a military analysis focused on command and control. Of course, the first part of the report consists of an overview of the most relevant legal legislation, but as I mentioned earlier, that overview is only intended to be able to understand the second part of the report, but again it's not a legal analysis.

To answer the question, I am familiar with the existence of the Patriotic League but I would not be in a position to confirm any details like number of people or manpower Mr. Milosevic has put here.

Q. So you did not deal with the Patriotic League either, as an expert, a military analyst who is working here? ³¹⁵⁹⁶

A. Mr. Milosevic, if -- excuse me. Your Honours, if my tasking had been to write an analysis about the Patriotic League or write -- would be obvious, then I would have dealt with -- I can't hear the microphone. Okay, it functions again.

It's obvious that if that would have been my tasking, I would have focused my analysis on those organisations, but these organisations were not part of my tasking. Therefore, I didn't analyse their role or their organisation, nor other aspects related to them.

Q. All right. But as a military analyst employed here, did you ever lay hands on any information regarding the activities of Mujahedin in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. Your Honour, I didn't lay my hands on such information during my activities in the OTP.

Q. Well, there are other colleagues working with you. Maybe some other colleague of yours laid hands on such information concerning the presence of Mujahedin in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war there and their activities.

A. That -- Your Honours, that may well be the case, but then I think the best would be to ask them and not me.

Q. So you have no knowledge of anyone dealing with the activities of Mujahedin, anyone else working on it?

A. Your Honours, that was not my answer. I said that may well be the case that people in the OTP are working on that topic but I'm not in a position to talk about it nor to say -- to identify these people nor to say, well, they're doing it and what they're actually doing. ³¹⁵⁹⁷

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I don't see how the activities of the Mujahedin impact on his report. What's the relevance?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Because he speaks first of conflicts in Croatia, then conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there were several thousand of such killers who beheaded people and who were doubtlessly worse than paramilitary formations who were involved there, and nobody's dealing with them. People here are dealing with one unit in Leva Supoderica or the Serbian Volunteers Guard, which was never larger than one company, and they don't deal with activities of whole brigades and the presence of foreign armies.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]...

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In your summary, you state that the JNA was a federal body and the Territorial Defence was organised on the republican level. Is that correct, Mr. Theunens?

A. That is correct, Your Honours.

Q. Thus that should mean that the JNA was a federal army and the Territorial Defence were republican armies. Is that your position?

A. That is not my position, Your Honours, because if you analyse -- if you -- when looking at the legal framework I've laid out in the first part of the report and in particular certain measures that were taken from 1998 on, it is obvious that TOs were not intended as republican armies.

Q. All right. Is it indisputable therefore that the JNA and the TO were integral parts and components of the armed forces of the then SFRY? ³¹⁵⁹⁸

A. That is correct, Your Honours. That's established in the constitution and All People's Defence Law.

Q. All right. Do you know, speaking of the use of armed forces of the then SFRY, that means not only the JNA but also the TO, that only the Supreme Commander, that is the Presidency of the SFRY, could decide on the use of the armed forces? Not a single republican leadership was entitled to do that.

A. Well, Your Honours, if Mr. Milosevic is referring to the decision on declaration of one of the three states, state of war, state of imminent threat of war, state of emergency, then based on my analysis I would agree with -- to what Mr. Milosevic has said.

Q. All right. Do you know that even the commanders of republican staffs of TO were appointed by the Presidency of the SFRY as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the then SFRY, according to all the regulations and in conformity with the prevailing practice?

A. That's correct, Your Honour. Now, I didn't discuss that aspect in detail in the -- in the report in the sense that if I recall well, the procedure may have changed over time in the sense that in the first instance, the republics were to propose the candidates to the SFRY Presidency and then the SFRY Presidency would decide -- would confirm actually the proposal, and I seem to recall that somewhere at the end of the 1980s that procedure changed but again that's more of a legal matter outside of my military analysis expertise.

Q. If it's not in the focus of military analysis and it is a legal matter, then why do you, on page 4 of the report of yours where you quote ³¹⁵⁹⁹ the legalities in part 1, why do you say, having quoted from this, that a member of the armed forces is "each and every citizen who, with arms or in any other way takes part in resistance, setting up resistance to the enemy"? And then in the footnote you state that the document has already been tendered as an exhibit and you quote the law dating back to 1982 and the 1974 constitution as well; is that right?

A. Your Honour, it's not me who states that all citizens who with weapons or any other fashion participate in resistance are to be considered members of the armed forces. That's just a quotation of Article 91 of the 1982 All People's Defence Law.

Q. That's what I'm saying. That's precisely what I'm saying. It is a quote from the Law on National Defence, and it does say so, Article 91, yes, dating to 1982. Isn't that right?

A. That is correct, Your Honours. Now, as a military analyst reading that Article, I mention under the Article that indeed this has -- that this has command responsibility in relation to the use of armed citizens, just based on that Article of the law. That's the furthest I can go in drawing conclusions or analysing that article.

Q. That's precisely what I was going to ask you. So you've quoted that, a member of the -- "any citizen who, with weapons or in any other fashion participates in resistance against the enemy is also considered a member of the armed forces," and then your conclusion, although you say you are not a legal man yourself, that from this we are able to deduce that there is command responsibility because the 1974 constitution and the law as well in Article 91 states that anyone who participates in setting ³¹⁶⁰⁰ up resistance to the enemy is considered a member of the armed forces, and then from that you deduce this very hazy command responsibility notion for each and every armed citizen. Is that a professional military question or a legal question? Because it seems to me that sometimes you delve in military matters and other times in legal matters depending on what suits the opposite side that you're working for?

MR. NICE: That's an entirely unworthy observation, but I'll leave the witness to deal with it.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I think that this sentence in Article 91 of the All People's Defence Law, it obviously has legal implications but that's not what I was looking at. I was looking at the military implications. And I think one of the first things you learn as an officer when you enter the military and you receive training, or you're educated at the military academy is that the military is one of the organisations that is in a very privileged position as it is allowed to use violence in certain circumstances, and it's not only allowed it has the duty to use violence. I can imagine only the police as being another organisation in that privileged position. Now, this privileged position obviously or includes obviously obligations that the use of violence is -- is -- is limited by a number of legal and -- and other constraints. And my understanding based on my training and based on the analysis I did of other documents of this particular Article related then also at the events I was looking into in the conflict in Croatia in 1991 with the appearance of these private volunteer groups, actually indicated to me that this is a very important article and it means that if a citizen feels that he has to ³¹⁶⁰¹ participate in the defence of the country, well, he can only do that in a legal way or an authorised way if he's a member of the armed forces.

JUDGE KWON: Could you elaborate the meaning of "command responsibility implications regarding the use of armed citizens." What do you -- what did you have in mind when you said this?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I had in mind that when people who are normally outside the military, and I mean by that people who are not serving in the JNA or who are not mobilised or were not served in the TO -- serving in the TO or mobilised to serve in the TO, when these people want to participate in the conflict, well, they can only do so if they are integrated into the armed forces and then if they're integrated into the armed forces they become subordinated to the command of the armed forces on that level. So the use of armed -- of armed citizens - and I mean by citizens people without military obligations - has obviously implications for the commander because he becomes -- he can give them orders but he becomes not only responsible for the implementation of these orders but also for other activities these people may indulge to -- indulge in.

JUDGE KWON: So you're speaking of command responsibilities of a president of a republic?

THE WITNESS: I -- I looked more at it from the purely military point of view in the sense that if, for example, armed citizens and actually the volunteers we have been discussing about earlier could be considered armed citizens, even if, and that is referred to also in the report, many of these people actually are people who had been mobilised in the JNA but they refused to serve in JNA units, well, if such people are ³¹⁶⁰² being used to participate in the conflict, well, they can only do so, or they -- so they have to be subordinated to a command and then the command is responsible for their behaviour.

There is, of course, always the dimension of personal behaviour, of personal responsibility, but I wouldn't want to delve into that, that's a legal matter, but when you are carrying out certain tasks or certain assignments, it's the commander's responsibility for what they do during the carrying out of these assignments. Whether the presidential level is included I don't feel like being competent to draw a conclusion at that level; I would refer to a constitutional expert to handle that matter.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You make a distinction between the de jure responsibility of a commander. If, for example, as you say, the law stipulates that any person who takes up arms in defence of the country is a member of the armed forces, that's the de jure legal position, but what if in actuality the person or persons acting are not in fact subject to that responsibility, do not in fact take orders?

THE WITNESS: Your Honours, to answer to the first part of your question, it's actually people who are allowed to take up weapons and participate in the defence of the country. I think the article should be read that if someone who has no military obligations wants to participate in the defence of the country or other military task, well, he has to be a member of the armed forces, otherwise it's not possible. Now, to answer your question, and it was actually also raised by Mr. Milosevic earlier, it could well have been that there were groups ³¹⁶⁰³ acting with their own agendas, economic agendas, like referring to looting and so on, but then the military commander in the particular area where these people were acting or were operating should have acted against these people not only to have the law respected but also for his own interests. If, for example, a battalion commander who is involved with his forces -- let's take the example of Vukovar. He's involved in the operations against Vukovar. Now, if he finds out that uncontrolled groups are wandering around in his area and are creating problems, they are maybe looting or killing people, he has to act immediately because this is -- the activities of such uncontrolled groups will undermine morale in his own unit and will affect the efficiency of his own unit because it is already very difficult to maintain discipline in war conditions. If now soldiers discover that some uncontrolled or so-called uncontrolled elements can wander around and loot and kill people, they will be confused because --

JUDGE ROBINSON: But does command responsibility exist in relation to that commander and, in your own language, the uncontrolled --

THE WITNESS: Well, there is --

JUDGE ROBINSON: -- groups?

THE WITNESS: Well, in my view, and I only look at it from the military point of view, the responsibility of the commander is then to act against these groups. It's an uncontrolled group, it's inconceivable that they stay in an area for days or for weeks. If you're talking like an area, for example, like Eastern Slavonia or even other parts of Croatia where the conflict took place, you have JNA units that are involved in the ³¹⁶⁰⁴ fighting there, TO units, within the JNA there is military police, for example. Military police is responsible to enforce discipline. In a sense, they will investigate violations of military discipline, they can arrest people. I mean, they have the same competencies as the civilian police force. Now, if the commander --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Are the groups that you described as uncontrolled subject to military discipline?

THE WITNESS: They have to be subject to military discipline in the sense that -- I will try to express myself better. A commander cannot allow that such groups exist in his area because if -- if -- even if they exist for a few days, it will create problems for him independent of all the legal aspects, but it will create problems for himself because it undermines not only the morale within his own troops, it can also increase the resistance of the enemy or the opposing faction, especially in a conflict like the one in Croatia where -- well, there was an involvement of the local population in the conflict. So a commander has to act against these groups and he has the tools to act against these groups. Military police has to -- can arrest these people and remove them. I've heard of -- it's not included in the report, but during my activities here and my activities working with witnesses, former JNA officers, some of them have spoken, yeah, we had to arrest a certain group, a small group of looters, it was a difficult operation and the looters were killed.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic, continue, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So can we agree on this, that there are organs which will have the ³¹⁶⁰⁵ right to use force in order to apply the law? Isn't that right, Mr. Theunens?

A. That's correct, Your Honours.

Q. Therefore, and precisely regarding the explanation you gave emanating from the Article of the constitutional law that any citizen who sets up resistance is considered a member of the armed forces, and then you say that this triggers off command responsibility straight away. I'd like to take you back or, rather, not take you back but to go forward to page 143 of the Serbian version, towards the end where you talk about questions like this, the ones you mentioned a moment ago. You speak of the military police, for example.

I'm not going to read everything it says here, but here is an example of what you say. You say: One of the tasks of the military police is to prevent crime, and then I quote what you yourself say, or, rather, your quotes. I'm not quoting you, I'm quoting the quotes you use and the provisions and regulations that you quote yourself, and it says that if there are any grounds for doubt that a crime has been committed which comes under the competence of a military court and should be prosecuted, the officials of the military police are duty-bound to take the necessary measures to uncover the perpetrators of the crime and to prevent him from fleeing and to ensure that the traces of the crime are preserved, and so on and so forth. That measures should be taken expediently, et cetera, et cetera.

And then it goes on to say that pursuant to the law and the Criminal Code, officials of the military police should do so by virtue of ³¹⁶⁰⁶ their professional duties at the request of the Prosecution and the military court. So this can be done without the military prosecutor and the military court but there is a whole hierarchy of organs. The military police, which is duty-bound to apply the law and to prevent a crime from taking place, that is the first point. They can apprehend the perpetrator and then there are organs of the legislature that are duty-bound to take these perpetrators to court.

So as we see, there's an entire structure that is put into place that has its own logics and its own hierarchy; isn't that right?

JUDGE MAY: There is a limit for which there ought to be enough, yes, more than two minutes per question.

THE WITNESS: Yes, indeed, Your Honours, those are the regulations, and here the 1985 service regulations for the SFRY armed forces military police are being quoted. And the relevant legislation for the military court and the military prosecution is quoted further on in this part of the report in the section 7 where the aspects of the activities of these organisations and military courts and military prosecutors are detailed as well as also the activities of the role of the security organs in these matters. Page 116 to 122, section 7, first part of the report.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Fine. You also say on page 4 of your summary, paragraph 2, that the JNA was composed of the General Staff and three forms of the army; the ground forces, the air defence, and the navy. That's what you state. ³¹⁶⁰⁷

A. That's correct, Your Honours.

Q. Very well. You yourself in point 4 on page 5 of the first part, you refer to the Law on National Defence, and then you say in Article 101, you speak of the structure of the JNA. The JNA consist of branches. It says army, air force, and anti-aircraft defence, and the navy, and arms. So the arms and services. Under arms you have army, armour, infantry, artillery, and the services, logistics, engineers, and so on. So you are quoting in that section. And then it goes on to say, "The Yugoslav People's Army shall consist of branches, arms and services." And then you say what the branches are, what the arms are, and what the services are. So you're quoting from the law and say what the Yugoslav People's Army consists of. And then you deduce and draw the conclusion that it is made up of the General Staff of the three branches, arms and services. Isn't it clear to you that the article you quote yourself you have not interpreted properly, and in Serbia we say that we have a stool, a three-pointed stool, and this description of yours reminds me of that stool with three legs to stand on, not four legs, that it is made up of the General Staff and the branches, arms and services.

A. Your Honours, I'm not familiar with particularities of expressions in Serbia but when I quote Article 101 of the 1982 defence law that was in the very first part of the report when I explain the -- the structure of the JNA, the reference to the General Staff comes at a much later stage, and, I if recall well, I quoted military regulations for that, military regulations which would, of course, be in line with the Law on All People's Defence. ³¹⁶⁰⁸

Q. All I'm doing is pointing out, Mr. Theunens, and quoting from point 2, the JNA's -- the JNA was made up of the General Staff and three branches. So not even what you quote from the law pertaining to Yugoslav army structure have you transferred into your summary but you have distorted the whole picture and then say that it is composed of the General Staff and the three branches.

A. Your Honour, I --

Q. Like a three-legged stool.

A. Your Honour, the reference to General Staff is on page 80 when I discuss the operational structure of the JNA, and I give the definition for the General Staff as it is given by the JNA military lexicon. It is correct that the 1974 constitution or the 1982 All People's Defence Law don't -- do not explicitly mention the existence of the General Staff. However, there are sufficient documents available, officials orders from the JNA as well as JNA regulations and -- and other doctrinal documents which mention the General Staff and the Chief of General Staff. And there is even a mention -- I do think that there is a mention in the All People's Defence Law that says that the Chief of General Staff is the acting SSNO, the acting Federal Secretary for the People's Defence, i.e., the --

THE INTERPRETER: Slow down a little, please.

THE WITNESS: I will slow down.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Theunens, I have to interrupt.

JUDGE MAY: Wait until he's finished and you can ask one more and ³¹⁶⁰⁹ then we'll stop for the day.

THE WITNESS: So that the Chief of General Staff will replace the Federal Secretary for People's Defence in case the Federal Secretary for People's Defence is not available for a longer time period, and I mean I can find back the article if that is needed.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Theunens, you needn't find that now. Everybody knows about that and nobody is challenging the fact that the General Staff exists, for heaven's sake. What I'm saying is your distorted interpretation that the JNA was composed of a General Staff and three branches, as you say. And you yourself quoted the law on structure where it says that it was made up of the branches, arms and services; army, air force, anti-aircraft defence, navy and arms, the army, armour, infantry, artillery and services, logistics, engineers, et cetera. So like any other army it was made up of the commands, the units, the institutions. That is the bare minimum of military knowledge that you had to have had if you were to enter into analysis of the military aspects of the JNA. So you can't define things like that, say composed of the General Staff and three branches. Nobody challenges the fact that the General Staff exists, but in the structure, you quote the law and then go on to interpret it in a way which is really a caricature of what it actually says in the law itself. Is that clear to you?

JUDGE MAY: Yes?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the executive summary is what it is; it's an executive summary. It's not intended as the things Mr. Milosevic ³¹⁶¹⁰ may consider it for. It is a summary of what is discussed in the report. Of course if one limits himself or herself to reading the executive summary and then drawing conclusions, that's another issue. I believe that the General Staff as well as the structure of the JNA are sufficiently explained and described in the first part of the reports and I also believe that the relevant articles of the legal and doctrinal framework are described in the first part. That's all I have to add about that.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We're now going to adjourn this. We continue first tomorrow with the other witness first and then we'll conclude with the remainder of this witness. We will adjourn now. Nine o'clock.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 28th day of

January, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.