Milosevic Transcript 2004-02-12

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Thursday, 12 February 2004

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Very briefly, may I address you in private session on a procedural matter?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Private session.

[Private session]

(redacted)

(redacted) ³¹⁹⁵⁷

(redacted)

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the Prosecution calls General Morillon. While we're waiting for General Morillon to be brought in, could I ask that a number be assigned for a binder of exhibits containing 35 tabs.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

THE REGISTRAR: 648, Your Honours.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, that binder, the Prosecution is withdrawing three of those exhibits but will not renumber the tabs given the volume of them. The tabs that the Prosecution is withdrawing are tabs 1, 3, and 31.

Your Honour, pursuant to an order of the court, there are two representatives of the French government in Court. I will state their name for the Court. There is Mr. Olivier Barrat and Mr. Daniel Warin. They are seated behind me and will pass me written notes if they wish a point to be raised.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we take note of that.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. ³¹⁹⁵⁸

JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

WITNESS: PHILIPPE MORILLON

[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Groome. Examined by Mr. Groome:

Q. I ask that we begin by having the witness shown tab 2 of Exhibit 648. This is a statement of General Morillon.

General, first, are you able to hear me in French?

A. Very well.

Q. Could I ask you to look at that document before you. Is that an account of or a summary of your testimony regarding events in the spring of 1993 -- or 1992 and 1993?

A. Yes.

Q. And now --

A. Yes, Your Honour, this is correct, perfectly.

Q. Now that you have taken the solemn declaration, is the document before you accurate and truthful to the best of your knowledge?

A. Yes, for as much I can remember, yes, Your Honour.

Q. And does it also -- this document also include your observations regarding the documents that are listed in the binder that you now have a copy and are listed on the front of this document?

A. Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Groome, he hasn't signed the document.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour I can -- I can ask him to sign it here in court if the Court wishes. ³¹⁹⁵⁹

JUDGE KWON: So he read his statement by English or in French?

MR. GROOME: I will clarify that.

Q. General, even though you are testifying in your native tongue, French, is it true that you speak and read English?

A. [In English] That's correct, Your Honour.

Q. And this document, have you reviewed it in its English and is it that English document that you are saying is truthful and accurate?

A. [Interpretation] Yes.

Q. Could I ask you to sign the last page of that document.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, continue Mr. Groome.

MR. GROOME:

Q. General, in this document it states that -- or one of your current occupations as being a member of the European parliament. It also talks about your service in UNPROFOR, which is of particular interest in these proceedings, and it summarises your service in UNPROFOR as beginning in March of 1992 as deputy commander responsible for Croatia, a command you held until September of 1992, at which time you became the UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina until the 12th of July, 1993. Is that correct regarding your time and service in UNPROFOR?

A. Perfectly correct, yes.

Q. Can I ask you to describe for the Chamber, what was your mandate during the time that you served in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. Yes, thank you. I think to understand matters, it's important to see things in context, matters in context. We had a term of office by the Security Council of the United Nations to perform, support the Vance Plan, ³¹⁹⁶⁰ to consolidate the cease-fire in Croatia, which was put in place in Croatia. Our mission, therefore, was to enable the evacuation of the federal army of the zone it was occupying in the territory of Croatia and also having interim protection of the population. And we had no mandate for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been mentioned in New York. It had been said that the headquarters of UNPROFOR and its commander, General Nambiar, could be in Sarajevo -- could have been in Sarajevo, but the idea was to be in a neutral capital in order to be able to help and for the consolidation of this cease-fire and the establishment of peace in Croatia. It had been decided that it would be preferable to be neither in Belgrade nor in Zagreb in order to avoid being exposed to any form of pressure from one or the other government which was in conflict. Sarajevo was considered as a neutral capital halfway in between the two, and therefore the decision had been made for that reason to have the headquarters there while the forces were to deploy on the territory of Croatia.

There was secretly a hope that the presence of this headquarters, the presence of blue berets, blue helmets in the city of Sarajevo could help to avoid or prevent drama, the threat of which could be felt at the time, but we didn't have any real force except for the secretaries of the offices of this headquarters in Sarajevo. We deployed as from the middle of March.

When the drama started in the beginning of April, we found ourselves in the position and we were solicited, we were asked to play a mediator part. In particular one has to remember perfectly to help with ³¹⁹⁶¹ the evacuation of part of the forces of the federal army which was blocked in Sarajevo, the headquarters of General Kukanjac, commander of the corps, and also a school of cadets at the barracks at Marsal Tito. The Bosnian Serbs had Izetbegovic prisoner when he had come back from his trip, and upon the request of all parties, we tried to mediate in order to have President Izetbegovic freed and that General Kukanjac could then evacuate the city. It was one of the important roles.

Q. General --

A. And this is what a general must endeavour to do. Unfortunately, matters continued to deteriorate in such a way that we were -- found ourself in a position where we didn't have even the possibility of fulfilling the mission which we had been given for Croatia because of the situation. We were cut off --

JUDGE ROBINSON: General. General, thank you for the background information, which is helpful, but please allow counsel to ask specific questions.

MR. GROOME:

Q. General, you've just been telling us about mediation that you were engaged in in particular events. During the course of your duties did you meet regularly with both political and military leaders from the region?

A. Yes.

Q. Can I draw --

A. Yes, in particular. As long as we stayed in Sarajevo, that is until mid-May, because at mid-May, we had angrily to abandon Sarajevo provisionally because we couldn't perform. ³¹⁹⁶²

Q. Can I draw your attention to the 30th of May, 1992. Did you have a meeting with the accused, Mr. Milosevic, in Belgrade with respect to what was going on in Sarajevo?

A. Yes. I repeat, we were led to leave Sarajevo because of the anarchy which was there and the possibility -- an impossibility for us to exert our command, and we went to Belgrade, thinking of deploy alternatively to Belgrade and Zagreb in order to fulfil our mandate, a mandate which the United Nations had bestowed on us. So it's quite naturally that on the 30th of May, a few days after our arrival in Belgrade, there was a meeting, a meeting was held between the headquarters of UNPROFOR and General Nambiar, commanding the force, and the government and Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Can I ask you to summarise what was discussed at that meeting. In particular attention, what was said to Mr. Milosevic and what he said to the delegates or the delegation from UNPROFOR.

A. Naturally, we took stock of the situation in Sarajevo, and General Nambiar insisted on the absolute need to have the shelling stopped on the city. Mr. Milosevic, as is reported in this document which was given to the Chamber, members of the Chamber, Mr. Milosevic admitted that these shellings were unacceptable and specified that he would do all he could to have them stopped and to ask Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic to make sure that they would be obliged to stop this shelling. This is, therefore, the report which has been presented to the members of the Chamber and which reflects very correctly what was said at the time. ³¹⁹⁶³

Q. And did Mr. Milosevic say what -- what he would do to help stop the bombardment of Sarajevo?

A. He said, as is specified in this document number 4 --

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, that's tab 4 of Exhibit 648.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document was drafted by General Nambiar himself, but I know that he looked at every detail. Mr. Milosevic said that he would be do everything he could, he would use his influence in order to have this shelling stopped, this bloody criminal bombardment, and he indicated that he would tell Karadzic that he couldn't count on any support if he didn't stop these bombardments.

Q. When Mr. Milosevic said that Karadzic could not count on any support if he continued these bombardments, what did you understand that support to include?

A. I think one should avoid any hypocrisy in this business. The army of the Serbs of Bosnia was the federal army. Quite plainly overnight the federal army, one which was under the orders of General Kukanjac in his barracks of Lukavica, overnight was repainted with new insignia and became officially the army of the Serbs of Bosnia, but they were the same forces, the same officers, the same equipment. Part of the conscripts is true came back to the federal republic, but most of the forces were, of course, originally of that army. And therefore, the ammunition, the fuel, all logistics and weapons themselves came directly from the federal army, which was always submitted to the authority of the president. Therefore, this sort of assistance or help, sort of direct help, was obvious for everybody, and of course for us. ³¹⁹⁶⁴

Q. General, in the document, the term "bloody criminal" is in quotation marks. What do those quotation marks indicate in the context of this document?

A. I think that the details which General Nambiar was looking to, he wanted indeed to say that it was the very words used by President Milosevic.

Q. Now, can I ask you in a few sentences to describe for the Chamber the condition or the situation that existed in the eastern enclaves of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time you assumed your command in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A. I believe that indeed we had a mission in Bosnia to perform. It was the mission I had been entrusted as commander of the forces on the ground to help. Essentially a humanitarian aid operation. I was there to assist Mrs. Ogata, the HCR, in her mission, which was to do everything that was possible so that hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of Bosnia which had taken refuge in enclaves, who were we besieged, who had absolutely no means of subsistence would not starve or die of exposure, which was the case of the besieged cities and it was in particular the case for the enclaves in the east.

Q. Now --

A. In those enclaves, to be more specific, there was a great insecurity, greater than anywhere else. These enclaves were partly occupied by forces, Muslim forces under the command of Naser Oric, who engaged in regular fights. So the possibilities of getting supplies of food for the population from Bosnia, which it was hoped would come both ³¹⁹⁶⁵ from Belgrade and from Split through Mostar were considerably hampered and hindered, and the Bosnian Serbs were telling us that it was due to the fighting which took place.

The Presidency in Sarajevo complained regularly about the fact that the population were threatened within these enclaves, and tension was gradually focused on this region with an insistent request on my part to see that the local population could get supplies and food as was the case elsewhere and could be free and have a freedom of movement and freedom of passage for the humanitarian aid.

Q. General, your statement details attacks by Naser Oric, particularly the Orthodox Christmas Eve attack. Did there come a time when you had a conversation with Naser Oric with which -- during which you confronted him with respect to what his policy was or what he did respect to the prisoners that he obtained during his operations?

A. I met Naser Oric much later, in March, when I intervened directly on the ground. The actions that you are referring to were one of the reasons for the deterioration of the situation in the area, especially in the month of January.

Naser Oric engaged in attacks during Orthodox holidays and destroyed villages, massacring all the inhabitants. This created a degree of hatred that was quite extraordinary in the region, and this prompted the region of Bratunac in particular - that is the entire Serb population - to rebel against the very idea that through humanitarian aid one might help the population that was present there.

Q. General -- ³¹⁹⁶⁶

A. Naser Oric, and I repeat, I met him only in March.

Q. If I could ask you, what if anything did Mr. Oric himself say to you with respect to what he had been doing with prisoners during this time period?

A. I think you will find this in other testimony, not just mine. Naser Oric was a warlord who reigned by terror in his area and over the population itself. I think that he realised that those were the rules of this horrific war, that he could not allow himself to take prisoners. According to my recollection, he didn't even look for an excuse. It was simply a statement: One can't be bothered with prisoners.

Q. And you understood him to mean what precisely when he said that?

A. It -- I wasn't surprised when the Serbs took me to a village to show me the evacuation of the bodies of the inhabitants that had been thrown into a hole, a village close to Bratunac. And this made me understand the degree to which this infernal situation of blood and vengeance -- I think Subotic spoke very well about this blood and vengeance, the degree to which this led to a situation when I personally feared that the worst would happen if the Serbs of Bosnia managed to enter the enclaves and Srebrenica.

Q. Now, General, the statement details your trip to Srebrenica on the 10th and 11th of March, 1993. Can I ask you to briefly describe the general conditions, the living conditions of the people in the town of Srebrenica when you entered it at that time.

A. It's true that there were tens of thousands trapped by the snow and exposed to the risk in the case of the slightest shelling, of being ³¹⁹⁶⁷ wounded and killed in the hundreds, because other towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as opposed to other towns, Srebrenica had no shelter. They used as food what they could collect from the trees, and I was informed that there was such a degree of hunger and famine in Srebrenica that supplies had to be provided by air and air drops were decided to provide the means of survival for the area. This is what we could do. And again, there were thousands converging there throughout the nights with -- including elderly, women and children. They were very numerous, who had been victims of shellings. There were many wounded. There was a young medical student who operated on the spot, and I obtained confirmation of this situation when I arrived on the spot. That is what I saw, a degree of --

Q. Now --

A. -- absolute misery with a real risk of tens of thousands being killed.

Q. Now, in your statement you describe five different ways in which the Republic of Serbia had some involvement in the attacks on -- in Srebrenica and the surrounding area. I'm going to ask you to just comment briefly on each of those.

With respect to artillery bombardment, what did you know at that time with respect to the involvement of artillery in Serbia bombarding Srebrenica and the surrounding area? If I could draw your attention to tab 8 of Exhibit 648.

A. I had with me a small team of observers, and they informed me of the fact that when the offensive was being launched that it was supported ³¹⁹⁶⁸ by fire coming from the other side of the Drina, which meant from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Also, you know that there were two air raids by non-identified planes without obvious markings which came to bomb the front, and again they were coming from Serbia.

Finally, I was informed about identity cards of specifically two Serb soldiers. One was a police officer who was a resident of the Republic of Serbia and who had permission to enter the area of Srebrenica and an identity card of another Serb soldier.

So these were several elements that support the conviction that I had, and that was that everything that was happening in the area enjoyed the support of the federal army itself, the Serb army. And this did not surprise anyone, because that army had a common goal with the Serbs of Bosnia, the Serbs of Mladic.

Q. Now, I'm going to ask that you take a look at tab 11 of Exhibit 648. I want to read a portion of that to you and ask for your comment. It's going to be displayed on the screen in front of you or you may find it in your copy of the exhibits that you have on the desk. This is a Special Situation Report on Srebrenica from Colonel Leentjes, and in it he says: "There is systematic cleansing of the Srebrenica enclave that had been going on full force now since at least the beginning of March and perhaps since early January. The Serbs are ethnically cleansing one village at a time first by shelling the village and then attacking with ground forces."

My question to you is: With respect to the involvement of Serbia ³¹⁹⁶⁹ ^{BLANK PAGE} ³¹⁹⁷⁰ in what was happening, what was the relationship between the ethnic cleansing that Colonel Leentjes is talking about and the involvement of the forces from across the Drina?

A. At a minimum, there was direct support, which we called close air support, and Colonel Leentjes reported things himself, and Colonel Leentjes was the head of the team of observers who were with me in Srebrenica.

Q. With response to the events, was the United Nations Security Council notified and did it issue warnings and requests to the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cease this activity, to investigate these claims?

A. That is what I personally requested, and that is what was done. You know that there was a prohibition, a no-flight zone imposed with regard to the entire Serb air force, and the Security Council insisted that the no-fly zone be respected.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Groome, if you can tell me where I can find that passage in tab 11 once again, please.

MS. HIGGINS: I think it's paragraph 6, Your Honour.

MR. GROOME: Yes, it is, Your Honour. Thank you.

Q. Now, General --

JUDGE KWON: The passage that the Sanction showed is the wrong one then.

MR. GROOME: We'll try to call up the correct one now, Your Honour.

JUDGE KWON: Very well. Go on, please. ³¹⁹⁷¹

MR. GROOME:

Q. General, in the interests of time I'm going to skip over several significant events, among those being your remaining in Srebrenica for a period of time, the fact that you were not permitted to leave voluntarily, your declaration of Srebrenica as an area protected by the United Nations, and then your issuance of an order to have a humanitarian convoy make its way to Srebrenica with humanitarian aid, and we'll rely on the Chamber's reading of this statement.

Can I jump ahead to the 19th of March during a time when you -- when you were personally escorting a convoy. Did you yourself come under fire from a Bosnian Serb checkpoint?

A. That is correct. There was a guard at a crossroads, and as I was joining the convoy that had been blocked on several occasions, he opened a burst of fire with Kalashnikovs to try and stop me. I was so convinced that it was a question of life and death for this population that I was ready for anything to ensure this first sign of hope, first sign of survival, which was received with so much relief by the population because we finally managed to pass.

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, may I ask you, would it have been clear to the guard who opened fire at you who you were, that you were part of UNPROFOR?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I think he even knew that I was General Morillon. I was well known at the time. I was known throughout Bosnia. And it was frequently very moving, because where I passed, I would say, "I'm General Morillon," and all the obstacles would ³¹⁹⁷² be opened. And that is why I went to Srebrenica. That surprised many, but I was the only one to be able to do it.

You may remember, Your Honour, of this quite extraordinary situation of a man spontaneously coming to kiss my hand when I came out of the car. And he was a Serb. It wasn't a Bosniak. It was on the territory of Serbia, in fact.

But to answer your question, the man who fired at me - no, he fired into the air, actually - he knew very well who I was.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. GROOME:

Q. Did there come a time when the situation in Srebrenica became so desperate that you took the decision to go to Belgrade and to speak to Mr. Milosevic regarding what was going on in Srebrenica?

A. Yes. I knew from the beginning that the only person who could assist me in this attempt to save the people was Mr. Milosevic, and I went to tell him. And I have very -- a very clear memory of that. "There was already a spot on the flag of your republic. Believe me, if you don't do everything to help me to disarm this dreadful bomb that is now threatening the entire population of Srebrenica because of the degree of hatred that has developed there, you will have an even worse blemish on your reputation and world public opinion will not forgive you." I think Mr. Milosevic heard the message and that he assisted later in establishing the peace process which at least started to dismantle this bomb, at least temporarily.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Groome, can we get the date of that meeting. ³¹⁹⁷³

MR. GROOME:

Q. General, can you recall the date of this meeting that you're referring to now?

A. Yes. It was the 25th. Just a moment, please. It was at the end of March.

Q. If I could draw your attention to tab 21 of 648. Is that a memorandum of this meeting?

A. Yes, the 25th of March.

Q. General, before you started talking about the substance of the meeting, you said that Mr. Milosevic was the only person in your view who could help defuse the situation. Can I ask you to expand on that a little bit and give us precise information regarding what led you to believe that he was the only person?

A. At that point in time, Mladic, who was the true person, the only person who really had authority on the territory of Republika Srpska, he was still capable of obeying orders coming from Belgrade, and I knew that. It is true that later, after the failure of the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan in May, he did what I considered to be a coup d'etat and I think he completely went out of all control. President Milosevic had put in motion a process relying on a certain number of dogs who seemed enraged, and Mladic was one of them. But at the time, I still was convinced that President Milosevic still had control over Mladic. And the concrete result of that measure proved I was not wrong. I said already that the population of Srebrenica, which kept me a prisoner for some time -- not really a prisoner, but they kept me with ³¹⁹⁷⁴ them because they considered that I would be a kind of scapegoat and a shield and I would protect them from any attack, but I said, "If you don't let me go to Belgrade, I will not be able to implement the plan to evacuate your wounded, to establish an air convoy, to allow convoys to pass that you rely on for survival." And that is then what happened.

Q. General Morillon, your statement and the accompanying official documents and reports make it clear that those immediately involved appreciated the severity of the situation in Srebrenica. Can I ask you as best you're able to assist the Court, can you convey to them, what was the reality of the people trapped in Srebrenica? What was the probable threat that was poised over them at that time?

A. I could say, and I did say through the media - you may remember that using radio amateurs the whole world learnt - that I said that this was not just a rumour of which there were many throughout that war. For example, around Christmas, apparently there was cannibalism in the enclave of Zepa, but this was false. And there was a tendency on the part of all to exaggerate the threats and to distort things. It wasn't systematic misinformation, it was a difficult situation in which rumours spread and created panic.

So I said, and I remember it quite clearly, I said to Mr. Milosevic if convoys are not allowed to pass and if the situation is not calmed down, the whole world at the time had hope that the Vance-Owen Plan would be implemented, a demilitarisation that would occur quickly, that the siege would be lifted from Sarajevo. The -- we discussed all these things. And I said, in Srebrenica something terrible could happen ³¹⁹⁷⁵ and it will block the entire peace process. There will be a terrible drama. And I repeated that the world public opinion will not forgive the Serbs, you will be satanised and you will not be forgiven. That was the personal intuition I had; and unfortunately, two years later, and I'm still haunted by this, my fears proved true.

Q. General, so the record is clear, what is the terrible thing that you foresaw in 1993 that came true two years later?

A. I feared that the Serbs, the local Serbs, the Serbs of Bratunac, these militiamen, they wanted to take their revenge for everything that they attributed to Naser Oric. It wasn't just Naser Oric that they wanted to revenge, take their revenge on, they wanted to revenge their dead on Orthodox Christmas. They were in this hellish circle of revenge. It was more than revenge that animated them all.

Not only the men. The women, the entire population was imbued with this. It wasn't the sickness of fear that had infected the entire population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the fear of being dominated, of being eliminated, it was pure hatred. One can -- such hatred cannot be worse than it is towards neighbours and brothers.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you saying, then, General, that what happened in 1995 was a direct reaction to what Naser Oric did to the Serbs two years before?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, Your Honour. I am convinced of that. This doesn't mean to pardon or diminish the responsibility of the people who committed that crime, but I am convinced of that, yes. ³¹⁹⁷⁶ There was a chance of the Vance-Owen Plan being realised soon. If I did not have that hope, Your Honour, I would have evacuated the town fully conscious of the risk. I would have undertook the evacuation even if that would mean that I personally would take part in ethnic cleansing. I didn't do it because just at that point in time I had very high hopes. And I wasn't the only one. Karadzic himself, Milosevic, they signed in Athens the Vance-Owen Plan in the month of May.

MR. GROOME:

Q. General, did you do your best to convey in the strongest terms your fears about what would happen in Srebrenica to Mr. Milosevic during your meeting with him on the 20 -- in March and subsequent meetings you had with him?

A. I think he can confirm it. In a tete-a-tete, a long one which I shall never forget, I did everything to convince him that the threat was a real one, and I think he understood.

Q. Thank you, General.

MR. GROOME: I have no further questions.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Groome.

JUDGE KWON: Before the accused starts his cross-examination, I think I have to express my concern though about the way the Prosecution is preparing the 89(F) statements. I noticed that tab 2 here is substantially different from what is tendered as 89(F) statement in January. The number is different, there is some substantial parts paraphrased and some sentences are inserted too. If you could clarify this matter. ³¹⁹⁷⁷

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, there -- since the filing of the original, which was in draft form, the general has had an opportunity to look at it, and the earlier draft was done in the third person as a witness summary. There were attempts to turn this into first person so that the language more accurately reflected the general using the word "I" in his direct observations rather than his anticipated testimony which the original document was describing.

JUDGE KWON: So my query is when this new version was disclosed to the accused?

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it was -- it was given to the accused just prior to the testimony today.

JUDGE KWON: So I don't think it will prejudice much because the most important parts were given live, but it makes his preparation very difficult. So please bear that in mind.

MR. GROOME: I will Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I will bear in mind the comments made by Mr. Nice at the beginning which indicate the intention to allot a relatively short space of time for the cross-examination of General Morillon. And General Morillon is a very important witness. He was the UNPROFOR commander precisely in Bosnia-Herzegovina and precisely at the critical time, and therefore, I consider that it would be important to give sufficient time for General Morillon to be able to explain things, and I don't doubt that he will do that. ³¹⁹⁷⁸

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, quite so.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that is why I would like to ask you to tell me whether I can count on using the rest of the time left today for us to review and have an exchange of opinions and views on the basis of General Morillon's testimony.

[Trial Chamber confers]

MR. GROOME: Mr. Milosevic, we will set a time of two hours, and if necessary, we'll review it at the end.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] General, you arrived in Sarajevo, as you yourself said and I assume that's not in dispute, on the 13th of March, 1992; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. In your statement, you said that when you arrived in Sarajevo, you found the majority of the population wanting, and I quote you, "wanting to see the situation calmed down, but at the same time the fear remained of a possible unavoidable conflict"; is that right?

A. Yes, Mr. President.

Q. Thank you. And sometime during that period when you arrived in Sarajevo, General Satish Nambiar also arrived in Sarajevo, and he at the time was the UNPROFOR commander for the whole of that region; isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. General Nambiar said at one time that in actual fact the first ³¹⁹⁷⁹ person he encountered when he came to Yugoslavia was the Portuguese diplomat Jose Cutileiro, who was head of the negotiations to solve the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, and if I understand you correctly, you met him too upon your arrival in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is that right, General?

A. Ambassador Cutileiro was the representative of Portugal who at the time -- which at the time held the Presidency of the European Union, and as such, he was entrusted by the European Union to try and mediate and avoid any drama.

Q. As to your mediation in that tense situation, you state, and I quote you again, "This lasted throughout on the basis of Nambiar's initiative and Cutileiro's initiative. With General Nambiar and his staff, the presidents Izetbegovic, Ejub Ganic from the Muslim side would meet, and Karadzic, Mrs. Plavsic and Koljevic on the Serb side," and that's what you mention in your own statements.

So Nambiar immediately started to cooperate with Cutileiro in order to calm the situation down. Am I right if I assume that you took part in that too because you were, of course, informed of all those activities.

A. I was second after General Nambiar. And if you allow, Mr. Milosevic, according to what I remember, from the very first days we met the parliament of Bosnia, and there was a speech by General Nambiar who said, "We are here to calm your fears. I am an Indian general, I am here with my head of the cabinet, a Pakistani, then there's also a French general and a German diplomat. We are here to show you that ³¹⁹⁸⁰ reconciliation is always possible." And this was a moving moment, because in response to this speech, a Serb got up, and he said, "I am a Serb, and next to me I have a Muslim. He's my brother. And I don't see how one day we could be confronted against one another." Which means that the population -- you remember there was the silent march, which prior to the drama beginning made an attempt to remove the barricades. Unfortunately, this was prevented and it was shot at by crazy soldiers of Karadzic from the Holiday Inn hotel, and that was how the drama started. But certainly I have a very clear memory of all those events.

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, we are operating under a time constraint, and I would be grateful if you would make your answers as helpful but as brief as possible. Thank you.

Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Cutileiro was known for the fact that it was under his leadership that a plan was devised which the representatives of all three sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was at the time when you were already in Sarajevo, on the 18th of March, 1992, signed. I'm sure you'll remember that. That was a very important event, I assume, wasn't it, General?

A. Yes.

Q. And I also hope you will remember the fact that a week later or, rather, on the 25th of March, Alija Izetbegovic withdrew the signature he had already placed on the Cutileiro plan. And I assume you'll remember ³¹⁹⁸¹ that too.

A. I wasn't directly involved in that event, but I was told about it, yes.

Q. I assume you remember that the ambassador of the United States at the time, Warren Zimmermann, suggested to Izetbegovic, and he confirmed that, that he take that step, that if he didn't like the plan, he could withdraw his signature. I hope you know that.

A. I learnt it, I must say once again, by what I was told, but I did not -- I was not directly implicated, I was not involved in that event, but I knew it.

Q. In view of the fact that you occupied a very high position at the time in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the top position when it comes to the international community, I'm sure you know full well that before that plan, there were no conflicts and that the plan, which all three sides signed, proved to be the last chance to preserve peace and to avoid any kind of conflict and bloodshed. Is that right, General?

A. Ambassador Cutileiro was persuaded of having achieved through this plan a way of defusing the bomb. Unfortunately, this did not happen, and I don't think that the responsibility had been -- can be placed exclusively on Alija Izetbegovic. I think that there are other -- all three are responsible; Karadzic, Mate Boban, and Izetbegovic each have their share of responsibility. This was, I would say, a sort of illusion to believe that that plan had a chance of being implemented. That is how I saw things.

Q. We're not talking here about what would have been had it been. ³¹⁹⁸² ^{BLANK PAGE} ³¹⁹⁸³ We're trying to establish the facts, and the facts are that neither Karadzic nor Boban withdrew their signatures from the plan, whereas Izetbegovic did although he had signed it to begin with. So I don't suppose we're challenging that fact.

Now, do you remember, General, that that particular plan implied the independent Bosnia -- an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is to say the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims accepted it as being independent but a cantonised Bosnia-Herzegovina at the same time; is that right?

A. Precisely. And I remember very well meeting Ambassador Cutileiro tete-a-tete and telling him how it seemed to me to be dangerous to declare too quickly the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even then, I was aware that the barrel of gunpowder that we were on could explode. Why? Because it wasn't just Izetbegovic who was reticent. I recall, Mr. Milosevic, that those who opened fire on the crowd from the Holiday Inn were Karadzic's men. So I think it was an illusion to believe that a plan could have allowed the drama to be avoided.

Q. And when was that?

A. During that period, unfortunately. Everything developed very quickly. You know that.

Q. Yes, but when did Karadzic and those people shoot at the other people in Sarajevo? I really don't know anything about that, so please tell me. When was that?

A. I think it was the 4th or 6th of April, but one can easily find that in the documents because it was recorded. So in fact, it was after, if that's what you're indicating, it was after the Cutileiro plan, the ³¹⁹⁸⁴ failure of that plan.

Q. Let's understand each other, General: The reason for the failure of the plan is clear. But tell me this, please: I'm sure you know that it was the Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina that made the first efforts, and in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, they were in favour of preserving Yugoslavia. I'm sure you'll remember that.

A. Perfectly.

Q. And I assume you know that these strivings to preserve Yugoslavia were the sole strivings in conformity with the Yugoslav constitution and the constitutions of the member republics, and also in conformity with international law, because Yugoslavia was a unified state and as such had its international legal legitimacy and sovereignty in all the constitutions and in the Yugoslav federal constitution. Its integrity and sovereignty were protected. I'm sure you will remember that, General, and that you know that full well.

A. Yes. I also know, Mr. President, that a certain number of republics composing the Yugoslav federation, Slovenia to begin with and then Croatia, had already at that time consulted their people through a referendum and decided to go independent. The federation was being to fall apart, and this spread to other republics like an infection.

Q. Not to expand upon the topic precisely for the reasons mentioned by Mr. Robinson, because our time is limited, let us -- well, we agree and you know that the primary goal of the Serb side was to preserve Yugoslavia, and therefore would you agree with me when I say that the Serb acceptance of the Cutileiro plan, in fact, which envisaged an independent ³¹⁹⁸⁵ Bosnia, represented a great concession by the Serb side precisely in order to preserve peace? Because if somebody wanted to preserve Yugoslavia at all cost and then through an international conference chaired by Cutileiro finally agrees to an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, that that is indeed a great concession and that this was a concession made by the Serbs in order to preserve peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thinking that all three nations or ethnic groups would be equal with that plan in place. Is that right, General?

A. I would accept that position, though I was not a witness of a certain number of events in the forests of Pale and all around there who were preparing for action, which unfortunately started very shortly after that. Don't tell me that the good faith of Karadzic was total in this matter. I wouldn't say so. He had this story about three brothers fighting over their territory. Each one should have his part. And he was a crazy supporter of ethnic cleansing.

Q. Yes, all right. That is your opinion, but it wasn't actually my question.

Now, do you know that the strivings on the Serb side, even after the withdrawal of Izetbegovic's signature, there was insistence to continue the Lisbon process and to achieve an agreement on peace? There were a series of letters sent by Karadzic to Cutileiro or Carrington asking that the Lisbon process be continued, and I assume you'll remember that because you were given all that information on your table as commander of the forces there. That's right, isn't it?

A. Yes. I did meet Lord Carrington, of course. ³¹⁹⁸⁶

Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, would you please tell me this: You remember that the negotiations were continued in Lisbon, but at the end of May 1992 -- so that we're already in May 1992 -- the Muslim side left the negotiating table, and that was the second time that the peace mediations by Cutileiro failed because of the negative attitude taken by the Muslim side. You'll remember that, General, won't you? And the pretext on that occasion was about the mine grenade that fell on the breadline.

A. Yes, but Sarajevo and then other towns as well were already besieged. I see very well what you would like to say in order to defend Karadzic's position. Quite sincerely, I don't think that that would be acceptable, because I believe that, unfortunately, he was the one who had the force and not Izetbegovic at that point in time.

Q. General, three parties negotiated. Karadzic represented just one of those three parties, and you know that full well. For three sides to agree, each of the three parties must voice their agreement, and there was no question of the Serb side not agreeing, and I don't believe anybody can dispute that. Isn't that right, General?

A. Probably. It's not up to me to put that question to. Perhaps to Mr. Cutileiro if you haven't done that already. I'm not denying that in this matter the Bosnian Presidency, that is President Izetbegovic, was engaged and renounced the negotiation, but I don't want to defend anyone. I was there to calm fear -- calm the fear, but unfortunately the fear continued growing due to people who, like you, reminded people of ancestral massacres in Bosnia through the media. Fear reigned in Sarajevo, that is true. And they were afraid that this cantonisation, ³¹⁹⁸⁷ this plan, could actually lead to Serb domination. It was a sickness. It was a disease, the fear of being dominated.

You know, in the hills around Sarajevo, Mr. Milosevic, most of them were not there to dominate. I wrote about that. It is the people who took the responsibility, who were responsible who are to blame, and Karadzic, of course, when he said that all Serb women in Sarajevo were in whorehouses, this was a way of exacerbating the fear, and those who fanned that fear are responsible, and Karadzic was one of them.

Q. Very well, General, but please may I ask you once again to focus on my questions.

I have several questions now here, and since you were there from the very beginning, they relate to the beginning of the armed conflict, because one must bear in mind the facts, after all. With all due respect to your opinions about anyone, I am trying to establish certain facts. You yourself said in your statement that it was only in April that the crisis began, the fighting began, and the shelling began.

A. Yes.

Q. Very well. Now, do you know that the crisis already in March took thousands -- tens of thousands of human lives, Serb lives to begin with? Do you know about that? Just say yes or no, please.

A. We have no certainty. We heard the rumours, but there were so many of them, Mr. President, so many, so many. And as we were not present there, we couldn't be certain. I was told that in Zepa, for instance, there were acts of cannibalism. Everywhere in this crazy situation there was misinformation, very often false information. ³¹⁹⁸⁸

Q. Yes, certainly there was misinformation, General. I'm not challenging that at all, but I'm sure you know that when you arrived on the 13th of March, several days prior to that the first victim of the war fell, the first man killed in the middle of Sarajevo, in the centre of Sarajevo, was a Serb, and I'm sure you'll remember that. It wasn't a rumour, it was an event that happened in downtown Sarajevo, and it happened at the doors to the Orthodox church. And there was general unrest among the Serbs, and you knew that full well. It was an event, and they saw this as a message given to them despite your goodwill and the constitution of Yugoslavia and Bosnia. We came out in favour of independence, and now we can kill you. That was what they thought. And it started with the killing of this Serb. Is that right, General?

A. Yes, the Serb in question, according to what I know, was killed during a wedding. He had a flag, apparently, a Serb flag in this wedding procession. I agree with you that this event took place prior to April and that it contributed to the sickness of fear.

Q. Tell me, please, General, do you know, and I assume you would have to know about this, that the so-called Patriotic League which was established as an armed wing of Izetbegovic's party or, rather, the SDA party, was founded, in fact, in Sarajevo already on the 31st of March, 1991, that is to say one year prior to any conflict? And otherwise, the 31st of March, 1991, is still today the official holiday celebrating the Patriotic League. It is Patriotic League Day in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there is no dispute there.

Now, do you know that that, after World War II and Hitler's ³¹⁹⁸⁹ experience, was a party army which appeared -- which was the first to appear in Europe and be established in Europe? And this was on the 31st of March, 1991. Do you know about that fact?

A. When I arrived in Sarajevo, around the 13th of March, I met a Bosniak in the Presidency. He told me, "I am the minister of defence of an army that has no soldiers." There were militiamen, but there was Juka, there was this small bum who was living nearby. I noted on the other hand that Karadzic had a very solid numerous army deployed in the woods. So I understand very well that in this matter you wish to present the Serbs as defending themselves. They were all defending themselves. They were all afraid of being dominated, of being eliminated, and those who recalled a memory of ancient fears are the most responsible; they set in motion all these forces.

Q. Fanning the flames certainly wasn't a good activity. We from Yugoslavia, or, rather, Serbia, did not fan flames of that kind. But, General, I'm sure you'll remember, and you just mentioned a criminal, their generals, the Muslim generals, including the commander of the Main Staff, speak about this in their books, because they all seem to be writing books now, and they all say that during the period that you're describing, they say they didn't have an army but yet they had over 120.000 people under arms. And that's something that Sefer Halilovic, their commander of the Main Staff, writes about in his book. And he brags about it. He boasts about it. And others write about that too. So I assume that if you were to take a look at all those writings, you wouldn't believe what you believed then. But let's not belabour the point. ³¹⁹⁹⁰ Do you know these names? You mentioned Juka Prazina, Juka Prazina yourself. He was a criminal, and he was some sort of force or actually a paramilitary formation under the command of Alija Izetbegovic. Do you remember another name, Ramiz Delalic, for instance, who was also in command of some paramilitary unit, who otherwise was known to have killed the man, but he was never taken to trial? And he maintained links with the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is another thing that --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness answer.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Juka, when he started these activities, did not obey anyone at all. I saw President Izetbegovic every day, and this Juka was no better than a criminal, a cad. And you know that he was killed in a parking lot in Brussels for, I think, stealing too much money or whatever, and he got what he deserved. To say that Halilovic allegedly had 120.000 men, that is not true. You know very well in Bosnia-Herzegovina there was this Territorial Defence, but the real force was the JNA, and the federal army had heavy weapons. There were militias, certainly, which spontaneously, unfortunately, were part of this vicious circle. I really don't accuse anyone --

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, General, do you have an estimate of the number of men under Halilovic?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the beginning, in March that we're talking about, there were a few policemen. There was virtually nothing. At least I was never able to establish that there was any kind of organised force, and certainly not an army. There were militias which ³¹⁹⁹¹ gradually, due to the siege, started to organise themselves and were formed by officers coming from the JNA originally. There were not only Bosniak Muslims, but at the beginning, I think realistically on the Muslim side, they didn't have any real forces. That is my personal impression.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes. We are at the time for the break.

General, we're going to take the break now for 20 minutes. During the break, you are not to speak to anybody about your evidence. We are adjourned.

--- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, two weeks after your arrival in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the exact date is the 26th of March, 1992, I assume you remember a large massacre of Serbs in the area of Bosanski Brod in the village of Sijekovac when entire families were massacred. Do you remember that event?

A. I remember the event as it was reported to us. We were not witnesses. There were massacres, unfortunately, from the moment this bloodshed spread throughout the country, but I remember that a report of this massacre appeared in the press on the 26th of March.

Q. Very well. All this is within the context of the suffering of Serb civilians before any conflict actually occurred between the two sides. And do you know that from the 3rd to the 6th of April, 1992, when the army of the Republic of Croatia raided Kupres in Bosnia and ³¹⁹⁹² Herzegovina again 56 Serbs were killed virtually on their thresholds? This was in your area of responsibility, so I assume you remember it.

A. The contingent placed at our disposal disembarked at Rijeka on the 4th of April. Before that, we were the staff and -- however, in Sarajevo, we didn't have anyone, as you know, Mr. Milosevic. The contingent arrived in Rijeka on the 4th of April, and I met them on the spot, I welcomed them there.

Q. I am not raising that, but you were present at the time this massacre occurred. I assume you remember it because you were in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time.

A. Unfortunately, there were so many massacres, Mr. Milosevic, throughout this area. Yes, I remember it.

Q. And do you remember also on the 4th of April that exactly when your contingent was arriving in Rijeka, that Serb refugees from Barice and Kostres were killed by armed Muslims, inhabitants of the village of Korace, when 117 Serbs were killed, including old men, women, and children. Do you remember that?

A. Quite frankly, I do not, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Very well, General. The acts formally declaring war were passed at the beginning of April, if you remember, by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the absence of Serb members who were then Nikola Koljevic and Plavsic, and in the absence of one of the Muslim leaders, Fikret Abdic, when a decision was taken on mobilisation. And then on the 8th of April, the immediate threat of war was declared and the Republican Staff of Territorial Defence was abolished and ³¹⁹⁹³ the TO of Bosnia-Herzegovina founded. Do you remember that? Just tell me yes or no, please.

A. Yes.

Q. So before that, I have given you a number of examples that you recollect. You do not recollect one. Before this formalisation of the war, tens of if not hundreds of Serbs had already been killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Did the Serbs kill anyone in that period? Do you have a single example that you could mention?

A. Rumours, of course, because once again we didn't have anyone on the ground, no one in Sarajevo. Therefore, I must repeat, to ask me and those conditions which may have happened throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia and specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I can't tell you anything except what the journalists reported, but there was no presence of ours anywhere to be able to pass on this information to General Nambiar.

So I understand your position to show that the Serbs were only responding and defending themselves, but it is a method that was developed throughout when I was there, including at the end in Srebrenica. Everyone was telling me, "We're not attacking," throughout the time I was present in Bosnia. I was always hearing people saying, like Koljevic, "We are defending ourselves." And he probably had the sincere wish to do so. Karadzic also pretended that he wanted peace, but in that case, I told him, "Stop your generals."

There was this infernal cycle. There was within each of the communities this feeling of revenge. ³¹⁹⁹⁴

Q. General, in your statement you mention that upon returning to Sarajevo after Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised, you noticed the presence of Karadzic's armed units in town. Now, tell me, with respect to the existence of the Patriotic League, ever since March in 1991 and in view of the killing of Serbs in Sarajevo and outside it, doesn't that indicate that there were armed men on the Muslim side, and how is it possible that you didn't see any such men on the Muslim side?

A. There were men. I didn't say that there weren't. I said that when I arrived, around Karadzic there were a certain number of Rambos who were completely crazy, maybe out of fear, anyway they were not controllable, and who were in Sarajevo itself. And this was before the declaration of war on the 8th of April. Police stations started to separate, the Serbs went to one side, and Karadzic assembled in the woods around Pale a certain number of men coming from Serbia, radicals. I was informed about this because I had patrols in that sector. That is what I saw on the ground.

Q. General, I asked you, in view of the fact that Izetbegovic's Patriotic League had been formed a year prior to this, how is it possible that you didn't see any of those men? You keep mentioning Karadzic's men.

A. I can only tell you what I saw on the ground.

Q. Very well. Let us move on to save time. You are saying that upon your arrival in Sarajevo, the JNA was quartered in the Marsal Tito barracks. And you say, and I quote you, "I believe that the JNA under the command of General Kukanjac truly tried to bring their influence to bear for all sides to show restraint, though it didn't conceal its sympathies ³¹⁹⁹⁵ for the cause of the Bosnian Serbs."

So is it beyond dispute that the JNA acted as a stabilising factor at the time of your arrival in Sarajevo?

A. It tried to do so. You are right.

Q. Now, you as a professional soldier know that a component part of the training of any soldier is patriotism, love for their country. Isn't it logical for people from the JNA, because you say they had sympathy for the Bosnian Serb cause, it is normal for them to favour those who advocated the preservation of the country, and the country at the time of your arrival was Yugoslavia. Isn't that beyond dispute?

A. I wrote that down, yes.

Q. And wasn't it the secessionists in the various republics who, to achieve their plans for secession, started attacking the JNA, first verbally and then physically; isn't that right?

A. All this occurred after the declaration of independence. You know that, Mr. Milosevic. And from that moment on, this attempt to forge any tanks to enter Sarajevo, fighting in the town itself, and this -- these events that happened in Slovenia, Croatia, barracks that were besieged, encircled, efforts to regain freedom of movement, we were aware of all this. At least I can say that as far as Sarajevo is concerned.

Q. Very well. In your statement, in answer to a question put to you as to when in your opinion the real siege of Sarajevo started and why, your answer was: "I believe this was on the 2nd of May, 1992, after the command and recruits of the JNA were surrounded in the Marsal Tito barracks and the JNA attempted to pull them out." Those are your words. ³¹⁹⁹⁶ Therefore, it seems the media version as to who surrounded who is not quite correct, because it was first the JNA members who were placed under siege, and then the siege of Sarajevo was actually in response to that. Is that right, General?

A. Initially, yes, but from the moment I came there, and I did everything to talk to Karadzic to make him lift the siege, I said that the way to Ilidza had to be kept open. And it wasn't initially, that this was in September or October, the siege of Sarajevo was kept up, and I believe sincerely that Karadzic wanted it lifted, but Mladic was opposed.

Q. Very well. After the agreement on withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was reached regarding members of the JNA who were not natives of Bosnia, you know that the Muslim forces obstructed this withdrawal. The best known event is the attack on the military column in Dobrovoljacka Street in Sarajevo. You remember that?

A. Yes. That was one of the dramatic events that I experienced on the spot and we all suffered because we didn't have the means to prevent it. We tried everything through negotiation to allow things to happen differently, but there was a massacre.

Q. So the JNA was pulling out. The Muslim forces attacked them and committed a massacre of soldiers who were normally pulling out and withdrawing and, according to the agreement, were supposed to go to Yugoslavia. You remember that?

A. They were going towards Lukavica, yes.

Q. And you know very well that there were several such attacks on JNA ³¹⁹⁹⁷ ^{BLANK PAGE} ³¹⁹⁹⁸ columns, either on barracks or other facilities. You surely know of the event of the 15th of May, 1992, in Tuzla, when the JNA was withdrawing from Tuzla, that there was an ambush and a large number of people were killed. According to Hasan Efendic, who was commander of the TO staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, and I assume he knew the facts, he wrote in his book that 160 JNA members were killed and 200 wounded, and all they were doing was pulling out of Tuzla in accordance with the agreement. You certainly knew of that crime. Can you say anything about it?

A. I am not going to defend those who at that time contributed, from whatever side they may have been, who contributed to the very fast anarchy that spread throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. I compared this process to what happened in Lebanon. In Lebanon they spoke of Balkanisation, and throughout Bosnia they spoke of Lebanonisation, each one being -- considering themselves to be commanders of the war. And I say, unfortunately, that each community shut itself within their own borders and warlords started to reign by terror from that very period on. There were horrors, I am aware of that, and attacks against the forces that were withdrawing did indeed take place. These were attacks against soldiers. It was a state of civil war. There were other massacres as well, unfortunately, and you're aware of them. There were those committed against the civilian unarmed population as well.

Q. What I told you about were massacres of Serb populations. As you were the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia and as I assume or, rather, there's no doubt that UNPROFOR was a source of information from the ground for officials in the United Nations, I assume that reports of the ³¹⁹⁹⁹ Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina were based on your reports. Is that right, General?

A. Those of the Supreme Command as a whole and General Nambiar in particular, and when I took over command of Bosnia-Herzegovina in May, on my reports as well.

Q. I assume that you also know that on the 30th of May, Boutros-Ghali sent a report to the Security Council relating to the application of Resolution 527, and that report speaks about the withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina and the relationship between the army of Republika Srpska towards the authorities in Belgrade or, rather, says that it was not under the control of Belgrade and also speaks about the presence of the regular Croatian army on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you remember that, General?

A. Yes, yes, indeed. There again it's the 30th of May, 1992 - one has to be specific for the Chamber - as from the beginning of the process which went on. But I don't deny the fact that this report may have come from intelligence given by our headquarters, headquarters of General Nambiar of the date you have quoted. You know we had left Bosnia-Herzegovina, so this has to be specified. But unfortunately, we had only in Sarajevo a very small unit, elementary unit, left inside Sarajevo, unfortunately.

Q. General, the date of the report of the Secretary-General is the 30th, but I assume that the information received from you must have come in before the 30th, because the date of the report itself was the 30th.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, a few days ago when we ³²⁰⁰⁰ heard testimony here, or the day before yesterday, by Venezuelan diplomat Mr. Arria, he said that he hadn't seen the report. And he also said that there was no number to the report and things of that kind. Not to take up more time on this, but I now have a copy which includes the number, because it was up above the report. It says Security Council, distribution general. It says distribution general, and under that S/24049 of the 30th of May, and it says "original English." The number 24049, and that is the report which speaks about the fact that the JNA had withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the army of Republika Srpska was not under the control of Belgrade and also that the Croatian army was in place in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

Q. So those, I assume, are the observations that were made on the basis of your reports, General Morillon, and they were included into the report of the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros-Ghali.

A. What I personally observed was that, overnight, the units which I had seen with the JNA star at Lukavica had been sort of repainted with the insignia of the Republika Srpska. We were not duped. We were not completely duped by all this business. All the heavy weapons were remaining and had been transferred.

Colonel Mladic, I think he was still a Colonel at the time, he wasn't yet a general, was arriving from Knin and still belonged to the JNA. Therefore, this report you are mentioning, I do not question it personally.

As for my part, what I've seen and observed on the ground was that ³²⁰⁰¹ indeed, like with a magic wand, the JNA that was supposed to withdraw, transferred practically the whole of its equipment to what became the army of the Serbs of Bosnia during this period, around and as from the moment when General Kukanjac, having been evacuated, was relieved of his command, and this is all I can say about this.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I believe that report was already tendered. I must ask the registrar.

THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 91, Your Honours.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, you know full well, General, that the JNA had withdrawn and that Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent and recognised state and that the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina themselves who were up until then within the JNA remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the army of Republika Srpska was established on the 15th of May. Is that right or not, General?

A. Yes. This being said, I shall read that there were a certain number of conscripts who came with trucks and who had left their equipment behind in Belgrade from the JNA. But the officers were not all born in Bosnia. You know it very well. A certain number were voluntaries and asked to stay. That's all I can say. On the 15th of May, yes.

Q. Yes. And here in the report by Ghali, I'm not going to quote him because we don't have time for that, but he says quite clearly that independent actors apparently beyond the control of the JNA.

A. Apparently. You've said so.

Q. Yes, yes. And that's what it would appear to be, and that's what Ghali claims. ³²⁰⁰²

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Groome, are you familiar with this report?

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I'm just looking for it now.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. This report together with the Resolution has its number and all the rest of it, if that can be of assistance to you. I can place it at your disposal, but let's move on.

General, do you know that the then presiding officer of the Security Council, the Austrian diplomat, Mr. Peter Hohenfellner, retained this report by Mr. Boutros-Ghali and waited for the UN Security Council to pass by at which sanctions were introduced, and this was quite different from the report. Do you know anything about that? If no, tell us you don't, and if you do, tell us what you know. Thank you.

A. I don't remember that. I have no memories about that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, to be fair to the witness, I think the witness should see the report and the relevant paragraphs to which you refer.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I have located a copy of that report, if it's of assistance.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you pass the report to the witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I shall provide the general with a copy.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And what are the specific paragraphs of the report on which you rely for your contention?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. For example, take a look at this. Paragraph 3. Paragraph 3. ³²⁰⁰³ Then we have paragraphs -- within the frameworks of paragraph 5 there is (a), section (a) and section (b), and they speak about the withdrawal the JNA. Therefore, the withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then you have paragraph 8 which speaks about the fact that since the representatives of the JNA from Belgrade are conducting negotiations with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency with respect to that withdrawal, that it had become clear that their words were not binding upon the army or, rather, the army of Republika Srpska.

And finally, we have paragraph 10 which speaks about the fact that the Croatian army was now in Bosnia, as it says, and that that is without a doubt, although they refute that but all sources testify to that. So that is not in dispute because it's all set out in the report and can be easily verified.

So I'm asking you now, General, isn't it obvious that the contents of Ghali's report does not create a grounds for sanctions to be enforced against Yugoslavia? All that could be done was sanctions towards Croatia in view of the fact that it states that it was the Croatian army that was in Bosnia-Herzegovina whereas the JNA army was withdrawing. Was that clear when we are discussing this particular report, of course?

A. Mr. Milosevic, at that time, I was probably joining with some difficulty Belgrade, getting to Belgrade. We were in Sarajevo, under siege, and everything which is in this report which I've just looked at has to do with the reality. We've spoken about it, this period, the siege, the Marsal Tito barracks, and so on, and this indeed can be read. It's the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as ³²⁰⁰⁴ correctly reflecting of what we have seen. For the rest, I can't tell you anything.

Of course, I was very far from New York, and we were not at all associated during that time in the discussion between the Security Council. If you want me to say that in this business the JNA was not concerned officially, officially it wasn't concerned any more. This is the reason why in what has been written under the signature of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, there is apparently, but I can't say more. Apparently the Republika Srpska, the army of the Republika Srpska, was no more under the control of Belgrade. In reality, we knew very well that Belgrade continued to exert its authority on Mladic. We have to say things as they are. And I'm absolutely convinced. And what I said a moment ago I suppose helped the Chamber to understand what the situation really was.

Q. General, Belgrade in no way could have ordered General Mladic to do anything, and that is even written down in the quotations of our own conversation from the Srebrenica days where I endeavoured to help calm things down, which I assume is not in dispute. And it's in tab 21, I believe, where you speak about your meeting with me. And I'm going to quote from that document. Paragraph 5, in fact, towards the end of that paragraph.

"[In English] Though making unusually forthright statements of support for UN requests, Milosevic stated that he could not give orders to BSA."

[Interpretation] And at the end of paragraph 7, since we are ³²⁰⁰⁵ drawing various observations collectively, at the end of paragraph 7, the last sentence reads as follows, and it's: "[In English] Milosevic's new role as decisive peacemaker and honest broker was rather apparent." [Interpretation] Therefore, since you have spoken about the efforts made to stop that tragic event that was to come to pass in Srebrenica, I assume it is clear that for our part we used all the political influence which we had, and that was the only influence that we did have to achieve that. I assume that's not in dispute, General Morillon.

A. Right. Now, Mr. Milosevic, we pass suddenly from 30 May 1992 to March 1993. On the 30th of May, 1992, you have yourself seen the document which reports on a meeting which was General Nambiar who was presiding, and we have told the Chamber about it in this document. You said you exerted all the possible pressures which were in your power or all the power you had in your -- at your disposal to have the shelling stopped, the shelling on Sarajevo.

I will not go along your attempt to refuse recognising, acknowledging your responsibilities. You had the possibility, I repeat it and I say it to you, that's the reason why I went to Belgrade. You had the possibility until Mladic really finally escaped your authority, until the moment when he refused the Vance-Owen Plan in May, you still had the possibility to act. And this cannot be disputed. This is the reason why I went to Belgrade, to ask you to help me have this plan executed, and this is when Mladic was trying to avoid to see me, and this is what I am now saying today. ³²⁰⁰⁶

Q. Of course. I mediated, and I don't suppose you will deny that I was successful in doing so, because everything was stopped. Isn't that right?

A. Precisely. And I was saying that precisely in this document you have quoted.

Q. Therefore, the influence that I could have wielded, and that was a political influence, was used to stop any kind of bloodshed from taking place over there. I don't suppose you're disputing that. Is that right, General?

Now, to go back to the 27th of November, 1992, and the meeting with the Serb and Croatian representatives --

A. [No interpretation]

JUDGE ROBINSON: We didn't get an answer to --

JUDGE KWON: The witness said "Oui," but the stenographer didn't get it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, we don't have an answer to the last question from you. "I don't suppose you are disputing that. Is that right, General?" And the general said, "Oui." It's not on the record.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With respect to the role of mediator, the one that Mr. Milosevic played, as far as I can remember when I was with him in Belgrade, it is true that after that meeting with him, I was able to put into action the totality of the plan, but of course this proved how much political mediation during -- at the time, and that Mr. Milosevic wielded authority on Mladic and influenced Mladic and the Serb army of Bosnia, Bosnian Serb army. ³²⁰⁰⁷

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. All my political influence to stop the bloodshed seems now to have taken on some negative connotation, become a negative factor in that, but we'll come back to that General, in due course. In the 27th of November 1992 report, with the meeting of the Serb and Croatian representatives on the 26th and with the Croatians on the 27th, which you sent to the command of UNPROFOR in Zagreb, you state the following in point 2: "To answer your query at [In English] [Previous translation continued]... General Bobetko admitted the presence of Croatian forces in B and H. Admitted the presence of Croatian forces in B and H. "A. General Bobetko frequently referred to only withdrawing Croatian forces once Croatian territory was no longer under attack and once the international community has guaranteed its borders and territory. "B. In response to direct question, he refused to admitted he had any forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"C. This obvious inconsistency was not pursued as it was obvious to all parties that General Bobetko does have troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was willing to discuss practical details in the interests of pursuing peace but was not willing to acknowledge their presence formally."

[Interpretation] Therefore, half a year after this report by Boutros-Ghali of the 30th of May, where he says the Croatian army was over there, the official army of Croatia still kept under control part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Isn't at that right, General Morillon? ³²⁰⁰⁸

A. Yes. I denounced that. I was present to keep, and it was never easy to stay as impartial as possible, and I said that we had information which led us to believe that the Croatian army was still present in part. But it had exactly the same answers as the answer you gave today, which was to say: But not at all, those are the forces of Mate Boban, HDZ, et cetera. If you want me to say that in this business not only Serbs were responsible, well, I've said it from the beginning. I refuse to see the Serbs demonised, and I bore witness to this everywhere, and I said most of these men and women were in good faith. There were men and women of goodwill who had been, unfortunately, driven into these killings which tore apart Bosnia for so many years. It was those who led them into this drama which, according to me, are responsible and should be condemned. There were some in Zagreb, and this is what -- what you want me to say; there were some in Sarajevo too.

JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Mr. Groome, do we have this report in our tabs?

MR. GROOME: No, Your Honour.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon, that is the 27th of 1992, sent to the UNPROFOR command in Zagreb, R0046647 is the number, and then it says: "To answer your query," et cetera, et cetera, at ref. A, whether General Bobetko, et cetera, what I read out.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I be of assistance?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] All this that Mr. Milosevic is ³²⁰⁰⁹ presenting to the witness, General Morillon, is in fact or, rather, is pursuant to Rule 66, and I think Mr. Milosevic has this in front of him. All the information and data are questions and answers from the 19th of November, 1999, which General Morillon gave to the Supreme Court in Paris. That is his statement, a very complete one, and all that information is contained there. And as far as I can see, there is an English version and a French version, and we were disclosed that a long time ago, and those are the documents that Mr. Milosevic is referring to.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That is helpful, and perhaps the Prosecution will be in a position to locate it now.

MR. GROOME: We're getting a copy of it now, Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Now, in that statement, and I'm quoting you again, General, you say the following amongst others: "To all parties it was obvious that General Bobetko really did have units in Bosnia-Herzegovina." And you go on to explain that it was the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was north of Dubrovnik.

Now, tell me please, General, how many soldiers of the Republic of Croatia were there? How much -- many forces did it have and how many were there generally in Bosnia-Herzegovina during that period of time?

A. No, I can't give you any figure, because there once again it was in the presentation given by the Croatians themselves to protect Dubrovnik. So indeed it was this zone in the north, very much up north, from which they allege once again they were going to ensure their defence. ³²⁰¹⁰ ^{BLANK PAGE} ³²⁰¹¹ How many there were, I can't tell you, I don't know. We had relations in this region of Dubrovnik when the JNA withdrew, when we negotiated precisely with Bobetko the withdrawal. We had some observers deployed but nothing which allows me to give figures about the volume of forces. And I'm not saying at all that there was Croatian forces who were present during all the crisis period.

Q. Well, there are facts and figures about that. If you can't remember now, we'll find them quite easily. But you mention in your report members of the armed forces from Sandzak who were deployed around the airport and who were controlled by the Presidency, that is to say Izetbegovic. And you know that what you call Sandzak is in fact a region in Serbia where there is a significant concentration of the Muslim population. And I assume you also know --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, not to have to wait for the OTP to provide this document, we have the entire statement in French, and that could help the general when discussing this matter with Mr. Milosevic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. But I can perfectly see what it's about, Your Honour. Of course November. It was this negotiation which was in progress for the withdrawal of the JNA from the Dalmatian coast and from the Dubrovnik region. So I'm not at all contesting what Mr. Milosevic has said.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]...

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No, Your Honour. ³²⁰¹² We were talking about Sandzak, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, yes. And since that's a region in Serbia, there were many volunteers from Sandzak in the army of the Bosnian Muslims. So can you tell me, General Morillon, how many Muslims there were from Serbia who fought on the side of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the period you were there? Because you mention the ones who were around the airport in Sarajevo and so on and so forth.

A. We called them the Sandzaki. There were some units which, like militias, probably several hundred but not much more. They were essentially, the Sandzak were deployed in the region of Srebrenica, and you know it, Mr. Milosevic. How many? I can't tell you. I never counted them. But we knew that there were among those who fought against each other, including targeting us when we were in the crossfire, taken in the crossfire, and this was the fate more or less permanently of our blue helmets. Some Sandzakis, and there was probably later, but you were going to tell me about that, some Mujahedin, yes.

Q. Tell me, please, then, do you know about the participation of foreigners in that so-called army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially those fundamentalists -- fundamentally inclined from the different countries, the so-called Mujahedin or the warriors of the jihad, for example?

A. They were active essentially in the region of Vitez. There was there practically a brigade. And there again I didn't count them, I couldn't, but yes, indeed, I saw them in action. It was shortly before I left the territory. They were really present with a certain number and ³²⁰¹³ active, to my knowledge, only as from year 1993. They were not there originally at the beginning of action.

Q. So only as of 1993. Now, I have here, and of course at that time you weren't -- you couldn't have known that, but I have here, for example, an indictment in the USA against Zacarias Moussaoui in that particular case before the District Court of Eastern Virginia for associating in order to perform terrorist acts outside the borders where it says that the Al Qaeda functioned from various jihad groups in different countries, including Bosnia --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, stop. What's the relevance of that?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the relevance of that, Mr. Robinson, is that at that time Al Qaeda was active in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because it says here, and this is a document, an original document, United States District Court for the District of Virginia, indictment, conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries. And the background is Al Qaeda, and then in point 4 it says that Al Qaeda functioned both on its own and through some terrorist organisations that operated under its umbrella, including [In English] Islamic jihad at the times the Islamic group, et cetera, et cetera, [Interpretation] and various countries are mentioned.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to stop you. In the Chamber's view it's not sufficiently relevant. Move to another topic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. ³²⁰¹⁴

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You said, General, that the siege of Sarajevo started once the siege of the Marsal Tito barracks took place. So it wasn't the desire to effect a siege over Sarajevo, it was a provoked reaction, in fact; is that right?

A. Initially, yes, but when I came back on the spot and that's what I was supposed to talk about because a mandate, a term of office was given to me, in that territory of Bosnia, the first thing I did was to meet Karadzic and tell him, Mr. President, if you wish, as you say, to have peace because you know everybody is now alleging they want peace, you have to lift the siege of Sarajevo. I arrived in October before deciding to take my quarters in Sarajevo. I even proposed to have my headquarters in Ilidza, in those hotels of Bosnia if you let me in there. Then you would have given obviously the proof that you are accepting to lift the siege of Sarajevo.

Karadzic, when I met him, was ready, but Mladic opposed this. So let us not start simply from what actually happened originally, and as we always do. I'm here to testify to what I have seen during my command period.

Q. Yes. I make that same suggestion. And that's why I'm asking you. In your statement you yourself say that the Serbs had the advantage with respect to heavy weaponry and the Muslims had the advantage with respect to their numbers and infantry; is that right? That is your observation. And you go on to say that Izetbegovic was fully conscious of the danger linked to lifting the siege to which his Presidency would be exposed to ³²⁰¹⁵ once the siege was lifted. That's what you say.

A. Yes. But it wasn't Izetbegovic who opposed to the lifting of the siege. It was Karadzic and Mladic. So let us not reverse the order of the fact that Karadzic was aware of the fact that if the siege of Sarajevo were lifted, there would be a total haemorrhage and everybody in their conditions of life that were theirs would only have one idea, and I think he was right, which was to flee this city owing to the fact that there were the unfortunate people who were besieged were living like rats in holes.

So the one who is responsible, and don't try and make me say something else, of continuing the siege was not Karadzic, it was Mladic.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The legal officer.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm not trying to make you say anything, General. I am just asking you questions, and it is up to you to answer them as you will. In his book, Lord Owen, who as you know was involved for a long time in the peace negotiations, he says: "In Sarajevo, it became increasingly clear that in fact there were two sieges of the town, one which was implemented by the Bosnian Serb army with shells, sniper fire and blockades, and another by the army of the Bosnian government which prevented their people from leaving through internal blockades and bureaucratic complications. Able-bodied men from 18 to 65 and women from 18 to 60 were not allowed to leave because they were essential for the defence of the town, but their main reason was a different one. The Serb siege in the propaganda war evoked compassion on the part of the world, ³²⁰¹⁶ and that is why they needed the elderly and the children to remain. That was their most emotional propaganda weapon to draw the Americans into the war, and they didn't want that to weaken."

And I quoted Lord Owen from his book. It follows from this that the Serb forces around Sarajevo did not prevent people leaving Sarajevo, because if they did, there would have been no need for any prohibitions on the part of the BH army. They would have no meaning. Isn't that right, General?

A. Well, I am not denying what Lord Owen may have written. I'm sure when he testified here he answered those questions. What I experienced was that I took responsibility in Sarajevo on the basis of an agreement that was reached with the Serb forces and regarding the airport, that was placed at our disposal. Afterwards, it was used and crossed, and I repeat, the person who really opposed lifting the siege of Sarajevo was when I made such suggestions to set up house in Ilidza, was Karadzic under the influence of General Mladic. There were no others. That the Bosniaks used the presence of their population, as you have just said, to keep the attention of the world focused on their situation, it is true, but similarly they prevented the evacuation from Srebrenica. If that is what you wanted me to say, yes, that is right. They refused to admit, at least officially, ethnic cleansing, and that is how things happened.

But I tried to convince Karadzic that it was in his interest precisely to contradict this propaganda. It was in his interest to lift the siege. And I told him on endless occasions that by doing this he ³²⁰¹⁷ would --

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, exactly on that point, we have sufficiently explored the question of who opposed and who supported the lifting of the siege.

Move to another topic, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, in your statement, you refer to the freedom on the freedom -- the agreement on the freedom of movement of civilians concluded at Sarajevo airport on the 13th of December, 1992, within the framework of the mixed working group. With regard to this agreement that envisaged three corridors for the movement of civilians from Sarajevo under supervision of UNPROFOR, you say, I quote: "The Presidency accepted the agreement with hesitation, which guaranteed freedom of movement for individuals after this demand was made by the Serbs and they were joined by the Croats."

So this statement of yours confirms what Owen said. And then you also say in your statement: "Not more than several thousand people were evacuated after the signing of that agreement. There were 20 buses of Serbs and Croats, and to the best of my recollection, there were even a few Slovenes. The Serbs were evacuated via Lukavica, and some Croats. However, the Presidency did not allow a single Muslim to leave Sarajevo." Not a single. Those are your words. So obviously the need for the means of propaganda was to sacrifice members of their own people for propaganda purposes. Is that right, General? You say the Presidency would not allow a single Muslim to leave Sarajevo. ³²⁰¹⁸

A. Maybe I didn't put it quite like that. At least I remember very well the difficult negotiations we had, like all the others that I had during my term there. And the evacuation allowed Slovenes to leave as well, you're quite right about that, among others. Also Serbs who wanted to leave.

I'm not denying. I'm accepting the fact that it was not in the interest of the Bosnian Presidency and Izetbegovic to allow the town to be deprived of its population, and I quite agree with that.

Q. As you've said that you didn't quite put it like that, please believe me, I quoted you verbatim, and that is what is written on this page 0108104 of your statement. At the very top in the Serbian translation the sentence reads: "However, the Presidency would not allow a single Muslim to leave Sarajevo." And I quoted the rest of the text a moment ago.

A. Unfortunately, at that point in time when we opened those corridors, and that was basically at the request of the Serb side, the siege was not really lifted in the hills around Sarajevo. There was still people manning the batteries, and they were Serbs, and that is what actually happened. And I think it was a serious political error on the part of Karadzic not to understand to what extent he needed to open the door. I suggested to him that to create a kind of Vatican in Ilidza for the UN so that we could regulate things over there, but this could not be done.

Q. General, that is another matter. I am just at this point not talking about that. ³²⁰¹⁹ In your statement about -- in your statement in Paris, when you referred to the devices used by the Presidency headed by Izetbegovic, I am quoting you now, you say: "The aim of the Presidency from the very outset was to ensure the intervention of international forces for their own benefit, and that is one of the reasons why they never were inclined to engage in talks. In those days, the Serbs were ready for talks since they considered that they were winning. Whenever such an agreement was signed on humanitarian corridors, the problems came from the Presidency. Finally, the corridors would be accepted. The beginning of their implementation was to be the withdrawal of heavy weapons, which should have taken place at 1700 hours on the 24th of December. However, on that day, my residence in Sarajevo was shelled. The shell was fired by the Bosnian forces. That is quite certain."

These are your words: "The position of the Presidency was highly delicate. They had been defeated on the battlefield, and it is quite certain that in the strategic sense so far as the war was concerned, at least, it is considered normal for the Presidency to reject a major step towards peace." That is what you said. And they even shelled your residence just when peace was to have been ensured, and they did not wish to make that step towards peace.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you have been speaking for some time without directing a question to the witness. Do so now.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will, Mr. Robinson. You're quite right. I have been speaking for some time, you're quite right, but I was quoting General Morillon. ³²⁰²⁰

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So can we infer that the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by Alija Izetbegovic, was ready to resort to the most radical means, including this one you mentioned, and I'm quoting you, "to achieve their strategic goals"?

A. Mr. Milosevic, there was a war. Izetbegovic had lost just then. He had lost. And Mladic had realised almost all his objectives, only he didn't manage to enter Sarajevo and to cut it in two as he wanted to to make his capital there. So Izetbegovic had no other recourse at that time, in my opinion. But I'm not passing judgement. He had only the possibility of defending himself with whatever means he had at his disposal. And he was not in a position to strategically win a battle. You know when the Vance-Owen Plan was about to be implemented, you accepted it, and Mladic, when he did his coup at the parliament in Pale, he showed two maps, one showing the conquest of the territory that he had managed to capture through the blood and sweat of his soldiers, and another map corresponding to the Vance-Owen Plan, which was of course less important.

So regarding the period we are talking about, I did everything at the time as the mandate I had was to try and establish peace. If you want me to say that it was not in Izetbegovic's interest to comply, I agree.

Q. But he rejected peace, in fact.

A. He rejected -- he rejected defeat, abdication.

Q. Now, this mentioned incident, the shelling of your residence, when you say that it was quite clear that it had been done by Muslim forces, ³²⁰²¹ did the Muslim side try to attribute that incident to the Serb side? Do you remember that?

A. No. They didn't even try, because I had the proof by analysing the crater that the shot had come from areas under Muslim control. Mr. Milosevic, as we're talking about this whole period, a little time after that I received an American senator, and he asked me, "Where are the good guys?" And I said unfortunately there are no good guys and bad guys; they're all bad guys. Caught in this infernal cycle they had no other means on all sides. They didn't have the ability to act in a different manner. That's all that I can say. At the time, my headquarters was shelled, true.

Q. But in addition to propaganda reasons, were there military reasons also behind this position that we are now talking about, that is the position of the Muslim Presidency and Izetbegovic? Did they have, in addition to propaganda aims, certain military aims?

A. Yes. That was more or less the only territory they held under their control. It was symbolic. The whole world had their eyes focused on Sarajevo, you're right. And therefore, Izetbegovic couldn't, and I believe that quite sincerely, he couldn't let Sarajevo be emptied of its inhabitants. If that's what you mean, you're right.

Q. General, could we please focus on facts, because we don't have much time. If the whole picture of the city as a victim --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, as you mentioned time, I am to say that at the break at 12.15, when we resume, you will have 12 minutes more to complete the two hours. ³²⁰²² ^{BLANK PAGE} ³²⁰²³

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I really believe that this is a very important witness, and I already requested that you let me question him until the end of the day today, because I assume General Morillon, who is very fit, wouldn't mind staying here until a quarter to two.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, regrettably, it doesn't depend on General Morillon's fitness. When your time is up, we'll make an assessment. Continue.

JUDGE KWON: And, Mr. Groome, the statements Mr. Milosevic is referring to is the different one from what we have in front of us, a different witness statement.

MR. GROOME: It's an official record of interview done by Paris authorities in 1999. If the Court wishes, I can have copies procured after the break.

JUDGE KWON: The witness should have it in front of him, and if Mr. Milosevic -- Mr. Milosevic, is it your intention that you wish to exhibit that statement into --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assumed that what accompanied the oral statement of General Morillon, that his written statement is part of the record. It is R0184013.

JUDGE KWON: It's okay. Then the Chamber would like to have them in front of us, please.

MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. Your Honour, I do have a copy, but if the Court will give me a few minutes to check that we have the entirety. ³²⁰²⁴

JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please go on, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Kwon.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. If the overall picture, General Morillon, of the town as a victim undermined the Serb position internationally, can it be said that it was not in the Serbs' interest to keep Sarajevo under siege, but quite the contrary, if you're considering their real interest?

A. Yes, but unfortunately they didn't understand that.

Q. But let me ask you a few questions about that. Could they perhaps have had to keep the town under siege, and I'm asking you as an experienced general -- let me explain my question. In Sarajevo, the Bosnian army had its 1st Sarajevo Corps and the headquarters were in the centre of town of that corps. And the Serbs had, on the edges, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the VRS, which had its main headquarters in Lukavica. So both sides had a corps each in Sarajevo or around Sarajevo. You're aware of that, aren't you, General?

A. Yes. And they confronted one another occasionally around the city, one corps against the other.

Q. Now, had the Serbs withdrawn their army that was deployed around Sarajevo, in parts of Sarajevo under Serb control, what would have the Muslim army done?

Let me just tell you that I wish to quote David Owen again from his book when he says: "I answered that when talking about lifting the siege, Juppe is not right and that he has over-simplified the situation. The parts of Sarajevo under Serb control, such as Grbavica, will not ³²⁰²⁵ surrender their heavy weapons unless through negotiations they get guarantees from the UN that the more numerous Muslim infantry will not run them over. Only through more detailed negotiations can obstacles be removed on the sniper routes and along the confrontation lines. The removal of heavy weapons is precious, but on its own it will not end the siege."

So it follows from this quotation that the Serb forces around Sarajevo could not withdraw even if they wanted to because they would have allowed a Muslim military offensive from Sarajevo itself, and this would have been an offensive by an entire corps. Did you see things similarly to the way Lord Owen saw them?

A. Lord Owen was not present in Sarajevo as I was, though he visited it regularly. He didn't have knowledge of all the elements. Clearly, in the negotiations that were engaged in to open these corridors and to achieve the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo that we're talking about, the guarantees should have been given to accompany this request regarding the surrender of heavy weapons, and those guarantees should have been provided by the international community. But that was not an opportunity for the Bosniaks to start offensives or attacks. Grbavica, for example, or in Ilidza that you mentioned.

Unfortunately, I have to say here that I obtained in a regular manner announcements of goodwill, decisions on a cease-fire, of a truce, but these were all undermined, and this applied to all. To answer your question, if the siege had been lifted, as we were trying to achieve, it was with a view to implementing the Vance-Owen Plan. ³²⁰²⁶ That was the perspective, the perspective of demilitarisation of Sarajevo. And that demilitarisation would involve the demilitarisation of the Bosniak forces themselves and not just the removal of heavy weapons.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic, in quoting from Lord Owen's book, which has been exhibited, you said, and it didn't come out on the record, that he said somebody is not right and has over simplified the situation. Who is the person that was referred to, and give us the page.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The page is 289 of the book The Balkan Odyssey, and the quotation begins: "I answered that when talking to lifting the siege, Juppe ..." The French Foreign Minister at the time, Juppe.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Thank you. Continue.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So in the area of Sarajevo, in the military sense there was one corps against another, and the line of siege was actually the confrontation line between those two corps. Is that right, General?

A. Yes. A corps of Kalashnikovs, basically, and a few RPGs facing another corps which had at its disposal all the heavy weaponry left by the JNA.

Q. Very well. Now, as to whether they had heavy weapons in Sarajevo or not, there is information about that. I don't want to waste time. But is it true that the Muslim side used each agreed cease-fire to move their positions externally and closer to the Serb positions by digging trenches? Did you notice that, General?

A. We believe that the front lines hardly moved throughout the period ³²⁰²⁷ while I was present there.

Q. And do you know, General, that it was those very members of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the VRS, those soldiers who held the front lines around Sarajevo, in the vast majority of cases were actually inhabitants of the area, the peasants of the villages around Sarajevo or refugees from the city of Sarajevo itself? In fact, they took shifts on their positions, and they went home to rest.

And I have here a map made on the basis of data from 1981 from which you can see, if you would be kind enough to look at it - I've already produced this map here - showing that virtually the entire environs or surrounding -- the area surrounding the centre of Sarajevo was inhabited by Serbs here in blue. They were people who were living there. They didn't come from somewhere else to besiege Sarajevo. They were holding positions in front of their homes. Do you know that, General?

A. They were not alone, and I saw a certain number of Serbs coming who came out of solidarity, which I understand, solidarity with their brothers who came to contribute to that battle, to that struggle. I said a moment ago that the Serbs were on the hills around Sarajevo. They weren't there out of the wish to dominate. They were there out of fear. They were afraid that their wives would wear the Islamic veil. Those who spread that fear who pretended that the lions of the Sarajevo zoo were fed with Serb babies, they are the people who are responsible for everything that this unfortunate Serb population experienced. And I include Mladic who opposed the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan, who eventually were forced to leave their town Ilidza, Grbavica, and everything else and who ³²⁰²⁸ are today dreaming about returning to their roots. And I hope the international community will assist them to return.

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, we have to take a break now. Mr. Milosevic, we have considered the matter, and following the adjournment, you will have 30 minutes. The amicus will be given ten minutes.

We now break for 20 minutes. General, you are not to discuss -- I remind you, you are not to discuss your evidence with anybody during the adjournment.

--- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC:

Q. [No interpretation]

JUDGE ROBINSON: I have to stop you. We're not getting the translation. Is there a problem, Madam Registrar?

THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English now?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we can hear the English now. Continue, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Morillon, as I was saying, since Mr. Robinson has just given me half an hour more, I'll do my best to be as concise as possible and to refer to some of your observations that I would like to establish and discuss.

You said that the Bosnian forces had withdrawn before the fall of ³²⁰²⁹ Srebrenica and that Naser Oric left the enclave one week before Srebrenica fell, and it was sufficient for his forces to lay mines on the road and enable the tanks to pass. I'm quoting you. "I said that Mladic had entered an ambush in Srebrenica, a trap, in fact. He expected to find resistance, but there none. He didn't expect the massacre to occur but he completely underestimated the amount of hatred that accrued. I don't believe that he ordered the massacres, but I don't know. That is my personal opinion."

And I share that personal opinion of yours, General Morillon. And as you presented it publicly before the deputies of the French National Assembly, I assume you did so with full responsibility when you presented that view of yours. Isn't that right, General?

A. Yes. For the Chamber and in order to make the Chamber understand all this, this about the fall of Srebrenica, the final episode of Srebrenica when it fell in 1995 when I had left the territory two years ago.

Q. Yes. But you had this experience with General Mladic for a long time. And you go on to say also in the French parliament, I think where you were asked questions, you say, "I was convinced that the population of Srebrenica was the victim of a higher interest, of a state reason, the raison d'etre," as you put it, "but this higher interest which was located in Sarajevo and New York but certainly not in Paris. Had I been able to evacuate all those who had wanted me to do so at the time that I intervened in Srebrenica, we could certainly have saved a number of human lives." ³²⁰³⁰

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Groome is on his feet.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. GROOME: The representatives of the French government wish to consult with me. Could I ask that we go into private session and could I have just a moment to hear from them and then address the Court?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, but please do it very quickly.

[Private session]

(redacted)

[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you. Well, otherwise I have here the report of the Assemblee Nationale Record d'Information and who presided, and so on and so forth, so I'm quite sure General Morillon will remember that all very well. And at any rate it was a public document and I'm not going beyond that scope at all.

Now, as I was saying, you say yourself that: "The authorities of Izetbegovic were the ones who stood up against the evacuation of those towards Tuzla for all those who wanted to, and there were many of them who ³²⁰³¹ wanted to. And I said that Naser Oric in my opinion succumbed to the orders that he received from Sarajevo to leave the area. I don't wish to say that Sarajevo intentionally created this drama. This was done by the Presidency. This was done by Izetbegovic. Naser Oric in Sarajevo listened to the Presidency. Naser Oric in Sarajevo listened to the Presidency.

"When I say that he, Mladic, entered into a trap and the trap was an intentional one, I'm not criticising Izetbegovic. In my opinion, he had no other way of causing what he wanted, that is to say the -- putting the international community on his side."

Is that right, General Morillon? To provoke a reaction on the part of the international community and against the Serbs. Is that right? Is that --

A. Maybe, Mr. Milosevic, but one thing is sure: The real responsible is the one who started the offensive. It's Mladic. It's Mladic who two years earlier foiled the plan, and let us not reverse factors. I just said everything you said, and I remain convinced that the real one who is responsible for all the misfortunes, not only of the population of Srebrenica but all the unfortunate things which happened, was Mladic. I never said anything else. Thank you.

Q. Very well. Now, asked by a member of the parliamentary mission, Mr. Pierre Brane, "How do you explain this terrible massacre?" And you to that say the following: "Accumulated hatred. There were heads that rolled. There were terrible massacres committed by the forces of Naser Oric in all the surrounding villages. And when I went to Bratunac at the ³²⁰³² time when I intervened, I felt that."

I assume that that is not in dispute, General Morillon.

A. No, of course not. But I said it again in the first part of this hearing, and it is because I was convinced of this hatred that I thought I had to act when I did so, that is two years earlier.

Q. And were you aware that the beginning of 1993, within the frameworks of the offensive, Oric's forces moved towards the Drina River which was the border with Yugoslavia and that they shot at the territory of Yugoslavia as well, jeopardising the hydroelectric power station at Bajina Basta and shelling the border area, border belt in Yugoslavia?

A. Now, if we are putting Naser Oric on trial, I think he is today at the disposal of the Tribunal. I know everything you've just been saying and I know also that it was coming from other side of the Drina River, and it was Sandzaki, as you just said.

Q. Very well. Then you go on to speak about the activities in Srebrenica, and the Presidency in Sarajevo played a major role in directing all that, and I -- you say: "I think I entered Srebrenica on the night between the 13th and 14th of March. I was blocked in the afternoon of 14th of March and I later established that that was following orders of the Presidency." And then you go on to say: "In Srebrenica I was blocked by women's demonstrations. I now know that an order came from Sarajevo to prevent me in sticking to my route." So all this was rigged from Sarajevo. Is that right, General Morillon?

A. The unfortunate women who were there, they were there, and they ³²⁰³³ were playing their part. They were risking their own lives and the lives of their children, and this was no cinema. It was really an awful drama which I was confronted with and which I will never forget. This is all I can say.

Q. I completely agree with you that they weren't playing a theatre role. They were just being manipulated and stage managed. And I'm quoting you: "I informed Belgrade. I went to see Milosevic and told him, this is what will happen, and he helped me. What I -- that I had won this battle then, that was thanks to the position taken by Milosevic. However, New York was kept abreast of matters as well." Is that right, General Morillon? And I think that I have quoted you very precisely.

A. Yes. This corresponds exactly to what I said a moment ago answering the questions which were put to me by the Prosecutor, or the Prosecution.

Q. And I'm going on by quoting you: "That is why I called upon the Serbs in Srebrenica while I was there, that because of them, these are the conditions I put before the Serbs, and that's why I said there must be demilitarisation and opening of the air corridor for the evacuation of the wounded and aid columns and observers coming in. I was able to do that thanks to Milosevic's support. When I saw him for the first time, that was to discuss that particular plan." Is that right?

A. Yes, and I said so a moment ago.

Q. Asked by a deputy in the National Assembly of France whether the Franco-Serb friendship and alliance from World War II, and they could have also mentioned the First World War and the Second World War, led to ³²⁰³⁴ comments and criticisms as to bias on the part of the French forces, you said, "Even if we could have left an impression of that kind, that is because, as a rule, when we received agreement from the Serbs about something and there was just one level at which agreement could be reached and that was at the level of Mladic, he kept his word which the others did not do." And then asked by the President of the parliamentary mission, Francois Loncle, you say the following. He asked you "Which others?" And you say, "The Bosniaks and even the Croats to a lesser extent." Is that right, General?

A. Once again, in this context one has to explain why sometimes French forces were considered as too indulgent to Serbs. I'm a French general. I do not forget the statue which is in Belgrade, "Let us love France as France loved us." I'm a French general who knows also, Mr. Milosevic, that before you there was a covenant, a reconciliation pact which was installed by Tito, and if Tito is still honoured throughout Yugoslavia, it was because of this fact. And I know that those who excited the nationalism, patriotism have literally hurled people around, hurled people against each others, those are the really guilty parties, and the others were the instruments of those abominable crimes which took place during the whole duration of the fighting. This is the reason why I have continued to say that everywhere that Serbs should not be demonised but one should judge those who brought them there to that solution, to that impasse in this drama.

Q. I agree with you there, yes. And finally, in your testimony before the parliamentary mission of the National Assembly of France, you ³²⁰³⁵ present your views as to the nature of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Marie-Helene Aubert, one of the deputies, asked you the following: "Do you consider or not that there was the -- there were the aggressors and the victims of aggression and that the victims should have been defended?" And you said, "No. I was present, and I experienced all this crisis from the very beginning, April 1992, and I always rejected considering that there were the aggressors on the one side and the victims of aggression on the other. And that is why the Bosniaks criticised me for a long time." Is that right, General Morillon?

A. Well, one has to understand that the mission which had been bestowed to me, I was discussing it a week ago in a seminar on the role of the peace soldiers, was not to take sides. I had to show myself to be impartial and, therefore, since I refused to be anybody's enemy, you know very well this idea that the friend of my enemy is my enemy, I was considered by all sides as a hindrance and obstacle. Mladic was telling me all the time, "What are you doing here? Let me settle my own accounts with my Tuci [phoen] and stop putting yourself in the way with what should be the fate of this Bosnia."

So this is the reason why. Once again, my mission imposed this on me. I refused to condemn anybody. I designated, I showed those who were not respecting their commitments, of course, and I did that also for all those. Every time it was necessary, I did this in my reports, in my contacts, each time it was necessary.

Q. Well, precisely with respect to that, when you say aggression and the victims of aggression, you say, "No, I was present there. I lived ³²⁰³⁶ through the crisis from its beginning, and I always thought that there were aggressors and victims, but the Bosniaks criticised me for that." Now, could you explain to us, please, whether you consider, as many international participants noticed on time or later in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in other parts of Yugoslavia, that it was a civil war, the outbreak of which was contributed to by the premature recognition of that republic and the chaos that that unleashed.

A. History will tell, and our presence today at the Tribunal will contribute, I suppose, to enlighten this period, shed light on this period. I think that this drama once again came out of memories which were of the atrocities of the past and of ancestral fears which were fuelled, and you are one of those who are responsible for having sowed this fear, for having armed, for having pushed, in fact, dogs which were unleashed and which became enraged and which escaped your own control. This is my own conviction. I'm really convinced by that, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Do you have a single example, General Morillon, of my contributing to the sowing of fear or inter-ethnic hatred in the former Yugoslavia, or the government of Serbia, the government of Yugoslavia doing so? We strove to preserve Yugoslavia, as you know, and we strove for inter-ethnic equality throughout that time, and ultimately Serbia or the FRY was the only country in the past ten years which didn't change its population structure. I assume you're aware of that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, that's a very brave and bold question. Do you want to put it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course. It's an elementary ³²⁰³⁷ truth.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I saw the drama beginning after Tito died. We saw all these positions which were being -- certainly you were in favour of a Greater Serbia. It may have been patriotism, but it is one of the origins, one of the causes of what happened, of this disease of fear, of fear of being dominated, eliminated. And I think that the misfortunes of Yugoslavia stem from that, but I will not -- I won't say any more, anything more about that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well, General. Now, you in a way pointed to the fact that the army of Republika Srpska was under the control of Belgrade, which I of course contest because it was an independent, autonomous army. And you say yourself in your statement, and I repeat, "Mladic did not receive orders from anybody except from himself, and in fact this -- he never hid that fact." He was the commander of his own army. He's had his own political leadership, and we cannot -- or, rather, give me any example, quote me any example of any kind of pressure coming from Belgrade except for the one that was geared towards peace and a calming of the situation.

A. We're coming back on the first part of this hearing. Mladic indeed, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, obeyed nobody else but himself. He certainly didn't obey Karadzic. But I said a moment ago when I went to Belgrade I wanted to do all I could to save the population of Srebrenica, that they were still obeying you.

Then he stopped obeying you. He completely escaped your control after he refused the Vance-Owen Plan, but until that moment, he was -- ³²⁰³⁸ ^{BLANK PAGE} ³²⁰³⁹ well, the evidence of this is that, thanks to you, I managed to meet him and to meet him in Belgrade. Thank you.

Q. Well, I assume that it was under my auspices that the meeting was held precisely geared towards peace. Isn't that right, General Morillon?

A. Yes. Well, I --

Q. I did my best for you to find a common tongue.

A. Yes. I agree with that. I don't disagree.

Q. Thank you. Now, just something with regard to some information that we have, a piece of information which we have and assertions that a number of massacres were perpetrated by the forces of Alija Izetbegovic against their own population. Do you know anything about that? And to remind you, or, rather, to give you a basis for your reply, a UN document was quoted, one which is called "most immediate" of the 6th of February, 1994, UNPROFOR Zagreb, to UN New York. "[In English] Care is particularly important given the fact that UNPROFOR is almost hundred per cent sure that the Bosniaks on at least two occasions during the past 18 months have been the origin of shelling that caused casualties in Sarajevo."

[Interpretation] Are you aware of that report and what those two occasions were when the Muslims shot at their own citizens?

A. You quoted this document, February 1994. I had left. I had been relieved of my command eight months before. I --

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, if you are not in a position to answer the question, just say so.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. I'm not going to try and ³²⁰⁴⁰ dodge this.

When we were talking a moment ago of the shelling against me, against my residence during Christmas 1992, I said that the shots were coming from Bosniak lines and I also mentioned other occasions where we had this impression, but one has to say that -- there again let's not reverse things. If Sarajevo had not been in this infernal circle, if it hadn't been deprived of water, electricity, and all means of survival, if Sarajevo had not been shelled or bombed day by day and night by cannons dominating from Lukavica and the heights, the Bosniaks could not have done that.

So there were cases indeed, probably, but the proof was never actually given, that by provocation there may have been some sharpshooters or some people who may have shot against their own population, but this was in the context in which the worst possible matters which are deeply in the heart of human beings would have been unleashed, and I don't think it was the responsibility of those who were in the city, besieged city.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, how much more time do I have? I don't wish to be interrupted in mid-question.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Five minutes. Five minutes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, fine.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, General, do you know about the assertion that the bread line massacre in Vasa Miskin Street, which happened on the 27th of May 1992 - so you were there, you were the commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia at the time - in which 16 persons were killed and 140 wounded was also ³²⁰⁴¹ stage-managed by the Muslims in the name of propaganda? And it succeeded because three days later the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 757 introducing sanctions against Yugoslavia, which was, for us, completely -- we couldn't understand it at all. Do you know anything about this?

A. Well, the way it was interpreted, yes, with this idea that one has to see to whom the crime will profit. The Markale attack had the same effect, but we had -- we never had established proof of that. The question was asked, certainly, and the Serbs always affirmed that it wasn't they who were the origin of this, who -- I cannot personally tell you who had fired in those conditions. I do not deny it might have been Bosniaks, but I have no evidence of it, and there again Sarajevo at the time was besieged.

Q. Very well. I assume you will recall the -- an article by The Independent, written by Mr. Doyle from New York. It is the 22nd of August, 1992, the date of it, when he says: "United Nations officials and senior Western military officers believe [In English] some of the worst recent killing in Sarajevo including the massacre of at least 16 people in a bread queue were carried out by the city's mainly Muslim defenders, not Serb besiegers, as a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy and military intervention. The view has been expressed in confidential reports circulating at UN headquarters in New York and in classified briefings to US policy-makers, et cetera."

[Interpretation] I don't have time to end the quotation, but do you remember that and did you gather any information about that?

A. Well, this was a newspaper story talking about rumours. You had ³²⁰⁴² rumours every day, therefore I was aware of the hypothesis, this possibility, but I never had any possibility of verifying it. And certainly I do not belong to those superior officers from the West who believed on the face of it that these accusations might have been true.

Q. I'm going to read another statement --

JUDGE ROBINSON: This will be your last question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The commander of the forces, Satish Nambiar, said the following and I'm going to ask you whether you share that opinion, that position, or not. "[In English] Portraying the Serbs as evil and everybody else as good was not only counter-productive but also dishonest. According to my experience, all sides were guilty but only the Serbs would admit that they were no angels, while the others would insist that they were. With 28.000 forces under me and with constant contacts with UNHCR and the International Red Cross officials, we did not witness any genocide beyond killings and massacres on all sides that are typical of such conflict conditions."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I think you have read enough to make the point. Just tell us where that comes from, that statement by General Nambiar.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is the statement by him, and he was there, the head of the institute was speaking in New Delhi. He was ³²⁰⁴³ the head of the institute in New Delhi, and the statement is dated the 12th of April, 1999. So after all the experience and everything he lived through --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Can you -- can you, General, comment on that?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Director of the United Services Institute in India --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Can you comment on that? And then that's the end of your cross-examination.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Nambiar, whose qualities I appreciate and whose experience I recognise, of course his culture, was purely saying there what I repeated all the time from the beginning: One must not demonise Serbs in this matter; there were not good guys on one side and bad guys on the other side. All those who were taken into this whirlwind by solidarity in this --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, General.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- terrible killing process.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I shall try and cover as much as I can in the few minutes I have. I understand that.

Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

Q. General Morillon, since my time is limited, could you please give me brief answers, if you can. I would like to show you here just one paragraph from the statement you made to the investigators of the Tribunal. That is paragraph 45. As far as I understand it, you did ³²⁰⁴⁴ mention this, but you didn't explain it. You met Oric on one occasion, didn't you? Yes or no.

A. Naser Oric on several occasions; Konjevic Polje, and later in Srebrenica.

Q. Here is what it says in paragraph 45 of your statement: "Naser Oric, every night, raided Bosnian Serbs outside town. When General Morillon opposed him on this score, he said that this was the only way he had to get hold of weapons and ammunition. He admitted killing Bosnian Serbs every night."

That is what it stated that he himself told you personally.

A. Certainly not every night, if that is the point, but regarding the rest of it, yes.

Q. It says literally here: "He confessed killing Bosnian Serbs every night," but I understand your explanation.

In the statement or, rather, what has now been admitted or has been tendered as evidence, the statement you gave in court, it says in one place: "Oric said," and I'm quoting you, "that those were the rules of the game, and that in this type of partisan warfare, he cannot take prisoners." Were those your words or not?

A. Yes.

Q. And when speaking about March and April in 1993 in that statement of yours, in paragraph 3 it says: "Naser Oric's reign implied a thorough knowledge of the area held by his forces. It appeared to me that he was respecting political instructions coming from the Presidency." Is that correct too? ³²⁰⁴⁵

A. Yes. I don't see the point of the question. Naser Oric obeyed. He was head of a band. He was waging guerilla war in the enclave, but he himself considered himself to be a combatant in the service of the Presidency.

Q. I'm just quoting your words, because in the next paragraph, in the last sentence, you also say: "The fact that they held me as a prisoner in Srebrenica was orchestrated by Sarajevo." Is that true?

A. I only learnt it afterwards. And I wish to say what I already said, that the unfortunate population was totally terrorised. And this was no cinema. They considered that I was the only means, the only shield to protect them from attacks and shelling by my presence.

Q. Thank you. In paragraph 9, a meeting that you had on the 15th of March in Bratunac with Mladic, and you say with reference to Srebrenica: "Mladic wanted Oric to surrender together with all his forces. He said that he would stop everything if they were to surrender all their weapons. I refused and handed him the plan I have just described. It consisted of demilitarising the whole area, applying the measures envisaged for Sarajevo, bearing in mind the Vance-Owen Plan."

Did the demilitarisation imply that all armed men within the enclave should be relieved of their weapons? And how many armed soldiers were there within the enclave, as far as you know?

A. How many? I really don't know. But in any event, agreement envisaged that all those who did not wish to lay down their arms would have to leave the enclave, just as the agreement envisaged, but that would apply should the Vance-Owen Plan be implemented, that the Serbs would ³²⁰⁴⁶ relieve their pressure on Srebrenica and allow the villagers to live. None of that happened, as you know, because the failure of the Vance-Owen Plan.

Q. Thank you. But to gain time, let me read a sentence that you uttered before the parliamentary commission. "[French translation on English channel] ... and the 2 to 3.000 women. It was the Izetbegovic authorities who were opposed to the evacuation of all those who wanted it. And they were numerous, who wanted to evacuate towards Tuzla." Is that right?

A. Yes. Once again, it should be understood that the aim of the offensive that preceded the plan was to engage in ethnic cleansing and to evacuate all the Muslim population. Therefore, I couldn't do it because I myself would be accused of cooperating in ethnic cleansing, but that was Mladic's objective, absolutely.

Q. But for humanitarian reasons, surely the people should have been allowed to go where they wanted. They wanted to go to Tuzla, as you yourself say, to be able to live more easily. Wasn't it more important to save their lives, to reach an area where they could eat and drink instead of them staying there? Why was that necessary?

A. Today, after the drama that occurred two years later, if you want me to say this, that I regret that we didn't evacuate the population, then I agree. But having said that, the objective was to cleanse the area, not to leave any Muslims there, and that was ethnic cleansing. And the entire international community from the outset was opposed to the implementation of that policy which was unacceptable for the human being to be deprived ³²⁰⁴⁷ of his roots, of his homes, prohibited from living within its own culture. That was the drama. And the people who fanned that continued to be the main culprits for that tragedy.

Q. As my time is limited, let me finish by reference to the same document which is before Their Honours. And under paragraph 7, referring to January 1993, there is reference to the following: "A document number so-and-so, a mortar shell of 82 millimetres was fired from the Kosevo hospital, and one British soldier was killed on the 19th of January due to mortar shelling of the Sarajevo airport on the 16th of January. The question was, is it true that the Bosnian authorities frequently used mortars not far from Kosevo?"

And here is your answer, and I will read it slowly: "I recognise my handwriting. We saw a mortar there ready to provoke a reaction from the Serbs. They did that all the time. I know that some UN observers saw that mortar at Kosevo. Very frequently they used mortars at Kosevo for provocation purposes."

Was it quite so the way you put it here or not? Yes or no.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's the last question. Could we have the answer.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, but I denounced it at the very moment it happened.

MR. GROOME: Just a couple of questions, Your Honour. Re-examined by Mr. Groome:

Q. I'd ask that we return for a moment to tab 4 of Exhibit 648. Mr. Milosevic contested your assertions regarding the withdrawal ³²⁰⁴⁸ of the military and the leaving behind of weapons and his control over the military. Can I draw your attention once again to tab 4 and the particular quote that's now before you, which is: "Asked by MacKenzie as to his position with regard to the weapons of the JNA in BiH, Milosevic said that he had told them from the beginning to leave their bloody weapons behind." Does that comport with General MacKenzie's note -- I'm sorry, General Nambiar's note comport with your recollection of what Mr. Milosevic said on that occasion?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is an incorrect question, inappropriate question, because if you look at the document, it is clearly stated there that I was most concerned about bringing our children back to Serbia. And as at the time the request of the Bosnian government was to leave their weapons and the armies didn't want to leave their weapons because the Bosnian government would have seized it, I gave priority to the lives of our children from Serbia and said, "Let us have our children back, and I don't care about the weapons," because I didn't want anyone to be killed, those soldiers, those conscripts, because of a mortar. So this has nothing to do with leaving weapons behind.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Against the background of that clarification, General, answer the question.

MR. GROOME:

Q. What is your recollection of that portion of the meeting?

A. I can only confirm what I said a moment ago, and that is that the ³²⁰⁴⁹ -- one should look at the whole report and not just one paragraph, reflects in my view fully the atmosphere that continued to reign on the 30th of May during that meeting with Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Now, later on in that same document, and the entire document is before the Chamber, and you testified earlier that Mr. Milosevic said: "If they continue," referring to the bombardment of Sarajevo, "that they should not expect any assistance," assistance which you understood to be in part military assistance. What is your view regarding what would have happened in Sarajevo, in Bosnia, if Mr. Milosevic had withdrawn his assistance at that time?

A. I cannot follow you with that hypothetical, because that is not what happened, in fact. So in view of the certainty that we had that the army of Bosnian Serbs continued to receive support from their brothers in the Yugoslav army, this contributed to the strong position of Mladic. That's all I can say.

Now, if things had happened differently, I don't know.

Q. Thank you.

MR. GROOME: I have nothing further.

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, thank you for coming to give your evidence. It is now concluded, and you are free to go.

[The witness withdrew]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Can we just deal with the -- this doesn't concern you, General; you may leave -- exhibiting the document to which reference was made so many times. That's the general's appearance before the French court. Yes, a Defence Exhibit. ³²⁰⁵⁰

THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 242, Your Honours.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. There was a reference to another report.

MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if I'm not mistaken, I think it's already exhibited as D91. That's my memory now.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, if that's the same report. I thought there was another one.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Sorry, we can't hear.

THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

JUDGE ROBINSON: We're not getting any translation. We're not getting any translation.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are you getting the translation now?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Does this apply also to this report of information, information report of General Morillon's testimony before the French parliament, parliamentary commission? Because I quoted several passages from that report.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And that's separate from the -- his appearance before the court. So that should be exhibited too. Could we have a number for that.

Mr. Milosevic, we're being told it's the same. We'll investigate that and come back to it later.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just explain, Mr. Robinson. I just want to draw your attention for the record. When I intervened a ³²⁰⁵¹ ^{BLANK PAGE} ³²⁰⁵² moment ago regarding a question by Mr. Groome, it applies to tab 4. And then in the very next line, after the quotation taken out of context by Mr. Groome, it says: "He added that the most important thing for them was to get --"

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we have concluded -- we have concluded the testimony, and it is inappropriate and improper to return to it now.

Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: The next witness, the Court will remember, was subject to an application this morning that the Chamber might consider the possibility of extending the time for sitting. I don't know if it's been able to give thought to that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's --

MR. NICE: B-235. Mr. Groome, who is taking the witness, believes that examination-in-chief will last half an hour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, if the examination-in-chief would last half an hour, the cross-examination would be -- cross-examination will be an hour and a half. You'll remember that the answer that I gave is we would try to accommodate it to the extent possible, and I said to the extent that it wouldn't jeopardise the quality and fairness of the proceedings. One aspect of the fairness of the proceedings is the health of the accused. Yesterday, we received a medical report which concluded with an advice to the Chamber to return to the more abbreviated proceedings which ended at 1.45. The Chamber, however, has not conformed completely to that advice. What we decided was that for this week we would have the ³²⁰⁵³ abbreviated, the more abbreviated proceeding, and next week, Wednesday and Thursday, we would return to the longer proceeding. So what you're now asking is that, despite all that, we try to deal with this witness this afternoon. The Chamber would only do that if the accused is in a position to do it. So I will ask the accused whether he is in a position to sit for a longer period, which in our estimate would be another -- Judge Kwon.

JUDGE KWON: About two hours.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Perhaps about two hours with a break. I make it clear that it's a matter for the accused in the context of the medical report that we received.

Mr. Milosevic, you have heard.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is up to you, Mr. Robinson, to decide. I do not wish to take part in that decision.

JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not up to the Chamber. The Chamber has already said it wants to respect the advice that has been given. I'll consult.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, the Chamber has already compromised on the advice from the doctor. The Chamber can in no way ignore the advice. We have compromised. We have gone mid-way. The accused has said that he will not comment on it. The Chamber takes the view, therefore, that we will not sit beyond 1.45 today -- beyond 2.00, I'm sorry. We'll go on to 2.00.

MR. NICE: May I just consult for a moment. ³²⁰⁵⁴

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

[Prosecution counsel confer]

MR. NICE: Your Honour, in those circumstances may we call not B-235, for the security reasons I referred to this morning, but call Tore Soldal who is to be taken briefly and subject to only short cross-examination.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. For 20 minutes, I believe.

JUDGE KWON: If the accused is prepared for Soldal. He should have prepared.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Your Honour.

JUDGE KWON: You were warned that he may be a filler. Any comment, Mr. Milosevic, on hearing Mr. Soldal?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have none. I have received your decision, as he is providing some supplementary information, that he will only take 20 minutes. As far as I'm concerned, of course.

JUDGE KWON: While we're waiting, we can deal with some administrative matters; scheduling for next week?

MR. NICE: Yes, I can do one or two things. I can confirm that the witness about whom there's been some uncertainty as to whether the witness will be called or not, she will not be called. As the Chamber will recall, I made an application in respect of Mr. Bildt, and we are awaiting a decision. I said that it was -- Tuesday was the only possible date that he could make -- Monday, Tuesday, and Friday, I think. I've confirmed that he could make the Tuesday. That's him. And we have a list of witnesses prepared to fill two days on the ³²⁰⁵⁵ basis that Mr. Bildt is not included within those two days. We would need to revise the position if the Court chooses to sit or decides to sit on the Tuesday.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: We're told, Mr. Nice, Tuesday there is no courtroom available in the afternoon. In the afternoon. There's no courtroom available in the afternoon, and the Chamber is minded to call Mr. Bildt as a Court witness.

MR. NICE: Very well. The statement of this witness, forthcoming witness, Tore Soldal, has been admitted under the provisions of 89(F). There's one question, supplementary question I have to ask of him. The Chamber will recall the name of the witness he deals with was a protected witness, C-48.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

WITNESS: TORE SOLDAL Examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Your full name, please.

A. Tore Soldal.

Q. Are you an investigator working in the Office of the Prosecutor --

A. Yes. ³²⁰⁵⁶

Q. -- here at the ICTY?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you deal with a witness who subsequently gave evidence under the pseudonym C-48?

A. Yes. I interviewed him.

Q. You interviewed him in May 2002 and in June 2002?

A. That's correct.

Q. In the course of those interviews, did he refer to a diary?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take an opportunity at one stage of checking with an interpreter whether the diary contained matters that he was referring to?

A. Yeah. When he left the room we were interviewing him in, I read in the diary, I took it to an interpreter.

Q. Did what he say appear to match what was in the diary?

A. Yes.

Q. Later and after he gave evidence here at the end of April 2003, did you, on my instructions, go to meet with his mother?

A. Yeah.

Q. No names mentioned for obvious reasons. On instructions, had she been kept away from telephone calls with her son?

A. The son told her that they shouldn't be in touch because of him going to testify here.

Q. On speaking to her, did she confirm to you the existence of the diary and explain that it had been destroyed?

A. Yes. ³²⁰⁵⁷

Q. Did you further, not covered by your statement, check on recorded movements of the accused for the particular period of time spoken of by the Witness C-48 in evidence?

A. Yes, together with an analyst on the team.

Q. Just one minute. The --

A. Together with an analyst on the team, I searched all our in-house databases for information about the accused for March 1993.

Q. This being -- doing this because the evidence of C-48 had touched or concerned that period of time and concerned where the accused was, the accused saying in cross-examination that his movements would be charted?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you able to find out anything about the movements for the accused for that period of time?

A. Yeah. We had several hits during the month of March, but no hits that matched the period or the incident the witness was talking about.

Q. Were there any -- you say "hits." Were there any identification of movements of the accused that contradicted the account given by the witness?

A. No.

Q. Was there a period of days for which no account of the accused's movements was available?

A. That, I need to have a look on the searches I did.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You're looking at reports on the searches that you made?

THE WITNESS: Yeah. ³²⁰⁵⁸

MR. NICE: With Your Honours' leave.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

THE WITNESS: 8th of March, we found out the accused had a meeting with a Russian delegation, a delegation of deputies. 11th of March he held a speech in RTS, the Serbian TV, about the Vance-Owen Plan. 12th of March, it was a meeting in the Supreme Defence Council. The same day, he was also meeting a Greek -- some Greek parliamentarians. Mid-March he went to a place called Prijepolje in south of Serbia. 15 of March he had a meeting with General Morillon, meeting with him also the 26th of March.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as far as I have understood why the witness has been called, he wasn't supposed to deal with these matters at all, just with the diary, because the -- did the diary exist or not, that was all he was supposed to testify about. Now we're hearing about the movements of the accused, and this witness isn't the one to testify about that.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, yes. That was the understanding, that the testimony should be confined to the issue of the diary.

MR. NICE: Very well. In that case, I have nothing further to ask this witness. Thank you.

JUDGE KWON: And since we admitted his statement under 89(F), I think we need to exhibit it.

MR. NICE: Certainly. I thank you for that.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 649. ³²⁰⁵⁹

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. And for the purposes of the cross-examination, confine yourself to the diary, because the part of the examination-in-chief that was extraneous to that issue will be ignored.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, the witness whose alleged diary was verified by this present witness here working for Mr. Nice claimed an absurdity, and that is that I, according to what he claimed, and he states that in some alleged diary of his that I drop by in a casino, royal casino in Novi Sad together with some other officials at some point in time --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, instead of making a speech, ask a question.

Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Soldal, a moment ago in response to a question from Mr. Nice as to whether you were able to establish anything that coincided with the events that that famous witness of yours talked about or, rather, the waiter from this place, you -- your answer was that you weren't able to establish or ascertain anything; is that right?

A. Yeah, that's right.

Q. You went and conducted three conversations with that witness, each lasting five hours, and you say that he kept using or referring to a notebook of his which you claim to be his diary.

A. That's correct.

Q. And judging by what you say, this notebook was in front of him the whole time during the interview.

A. Correct. ³²⁰⁶⁰

Q. Did you at any point during the interview ask him to show you the diary or to enable you to have access to the diary or to photocopy the diary? As far as I can see from your report, you didn't do that once.

A. I asked him for the diary after he had signed the statement.

Q. Mr. Soldal, well, he told you that he didn't have it because his mother had destroyed it. Isn't that right?

A. That was after he came here to The Hague.

Q. Well, all right. Now, in view of the fact that many of your witnesses here or, rather, the witnesses of the opposite side that you work for seems to be pulling out some diaries and notebooks, and then they are given to me and others either in part or in whole. How is it possible that if he really did have a diary that you didn't take the diary from him or at least photocopy it when you spent three times five hours interviewing him?

A. As far as I can see, I don't have any authority to take anything from a witness. They asked for the diary after we had concluded the interview, and they asked for it after he came here to The Hague to testify.

Q. Tell me, please, since you say that when he went out for a minute or two that you took a look at the diary surreptitiously, so what then did you remember from the diary? What do you remember was written in the diary?

A. Today I can't remember what subject we were discussing when I had a look at the diary. I just remember that it covered the topics we were discussing at that moment. ³²⁰⁶¹

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Soldal, when you say that you don't have any authority to take anything from a witness, "They asked for the diary after we had concluded the interview. And they asked for it after he came here to The Hague." Who is "they"?

THE WITNESS: We -- or I together with the investigator that joined me during the interview asked for the diary. When I met him here in The Hague after he came to testify, I met him together with an analyst on the team, and I asked for the diary again.

JUDGE ROBINSON: So you're saying that during the interview -- is this the practice, that if something turns up in the interview which as an investigator would appear to you to be a relevant item of evidence, you wouldn't ask for it?

THE WITNESS: I asked for it in the moment we had finished the interview and he had signed the statement, and that is normal practice, at least for me, to ask for all the documents they use during the interview after the interview is concluded.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. How many pages did you manage to see in that short space of time from the diary then?

A. Only the pages that were open when he left.

Q. So you saw two, and you don't know, for example, that as he was a waiter over there, judging by his own statement - I was never there so I wouldn't know - but judging by what he says in his statement, weren't they perhaps recipes for some cooking or something? They might have been, you ³²⁰⁶² don't know otherwise.

A. It's impossible for me to say because I only saw two pages of the diary.

Q. So the two pages that were open, at the point where the diary was open.

A. That's correct.

Q. And what did it say on those two pages? Tell me, please.

A. I just told that I don't remember.

Q. All right. You don't remember that either, then. Okay. All right. And now you say that you asked -- or, rather, you asked him for the diary once he had signed the statement.

A. Correct.

Q. Is that standard practice here, that once somebody signs a statement then you ask them for the document they refer to?

A. Yes.

Q. And then in that same paragraph, you say that when he came to The Hague, he told you that he hadn't got the diary with him, taken the diary with him, and that most probably, as you say, his mother had destroyed it; is that it?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ask him to check that out, to see if it had been done away with by his mother? He could have called his mother up to ask her if she had destroyed it or not.

A. He told us that he didn't want to stay in touch with his mother before he felt it was secure enough for him, and we didn't put him under ³²⁰⁶³ pressure to -- to call the mother.

Q. Mr. Soldal, you're not really going to tell me that that waiter from that cafe was such an important personage that somebody -- if he telephoned his mother to talk to her, that somebody would jeopardise his security, whereas in fact he's saying nothing. So why all this mystification? Why are you mystifying the whole thing?

A. That was his view of the situation, and we didn't disagree with him.

Q. So it was only once the witness went back to Novi Sad that he sent you back a message saying that his mother had destroyed the diary together with some other papers, for security reasons.

A. I talked to the mother at -- at her place or her home.

Q. Well, do you know what other papers were involved? Because you say she destroyed the diary with some other papers. So what other papers and diaries would the waiter of a cafe have at all?

A. She told me that he was the kind of person that kept all kind of papers and documents, whether he needed them or not, and she was cleaning up his part of the house because his sister was about to move in.

Q. What, she kept receipts from the dry cleaners and supermarkets, bus tickets and things like that? What papers? What papers are you taking about? Did you try to establish what papers these were?

A. I asked if it was paper that had any interest to us, and she just said it was personal papers and receipts, for example.

Q. That's what I assumed, yes. Receipts, bills, things like that. What else can a waiter have? ³²⁰⁶⁴ But tell me, please, if you were able to establish that he had instructed his mother to destroy the diary, did you also ask him when the diary was destroyed, at what point in time?

A. According to the mother, they had destroyed the diary and cleaned up the flat and destroyed all these other documents just after he left.

Q. Very well. And since the question of the diary is broached during the cross-examination, Mr. Nice sent you to Novi Sad to conduct an interview with his mother with respect to the circumstances in which the diary was destroyed; is that right?

A. Sorry, can you repeat the question?

Q. I was saying that since this subject of the diary came up during the cross-examination, although this is all nonsense, but let's see what happened. Mr. Nice sent you to Novi Sad to talk to his mother after that to establish whether what she said about the diary was true; is that right?

A. That's right.

Q. That means that even Mr. Nice doubted the truthfulness of the assertions of his witness when he sent you over there.

MR. NICE: That's a very unwise remark.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes. We ignore that. Unwarranted. Continue.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Now, is it true, then, that on the basis of your research and investigation, this doubtful testimony of the witness was rendered even more suspect because you didn't find anything, any of the ³²⁰⁶⁵ things you were looking for?

A. That's correct, I didn't find a diary.

Q. Very well. I don't think there's any point in wasting our time any further.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just one question, one sentence.

Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Soldal, you say here at one point, and this is the sentence, and I'd just like one explanation in that regard for Their Honours, you say: "At one point during the interview, such-and-such a gentleman left the room, and I took advantage of the occasion together with my translator to take a look at his diary"; is that right?

A. That's right.

Q. Why was that necessary? During your many hours of interviewing him, did he prevent you in any way from looking at it? Did you ask to have a look at the diary with his permission or not?

A. I didn't ask to have a look at the diary during the interview, no.

MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. NICE: Just a couple of questions in re-examination. Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Is it common or uncommon for people to have diaries of one kind or another, potential witnesses?

A. It's quite common that they use diaries, yes.

Q. The place of the interview, was that his own home? If so, was there a photocopier there or not for you to use to photocopy the diary? ³²⁰⁶⁶

A. No. It was in his home, and it was two hours drive, almost, to the office.

Q. So at your first request for the diary, at the end of the statement, there was no machinery for copying it and he retained it?

A. No possibility to copy it there.

Q. He provided you at some later stage with extract of the diary, and we heard of that, I think, in his testimony.

A. That's correct.

Q. His mother, efforts were made to ensure that there was no contact between the son and the mother. Did you see any indication that contact had actually occurred or any indication to the contrary effect?

A. No indication. Actually, she was very nervous when I showed up, and asked if there was something wrong with the son.

Q. And in your interview did she not only give an account of destroying the diary but did she give an account of seeing the diary in the course of her son's working at the casino?

A. Yes. According to her, both her and her husband and had been negative to this diary writing from the son because they felt he was dealing with things that could more or less jeopardise his security.

MR. NICE: Nothing else of Mr. Soldal.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Soldal. That concludes your testimony --

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours --

JUDGE ROBINSON: -- and you're free to go

[The witness withdrew] ³²⁰⁶⁷

MR. NICE: May his statement please be under seal?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, statement is under seal. That's 649.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I realise we're going to rise. You've very kindly granted an extension in respect to provision of some documents until Friday. I have been actively engaged in these documents myself and my time has been diverted by other fundamental issues and I would be grateful for a further an extension, should that be possible, to some day at the beginning of next week. I think we're not sitting until Wednesday, so Monday or Tuesday.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Tuesday.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Would you be so kind as to enable me to know the schedule and the list of witnesses until the end.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us know the schedule for Wednesday.

MR. NICE: Yes. Brunborg back for continuation of his evidence, followed by B-235.

Then at present the plan is on Thursday C-1250 and Mr. Coo and Mr. O'Donnell, not necessarily in that order, but those three witnesses. Any changes to that or additions will be notified immediately we're aware.

JUDGE KWON: Maybe -- you may be working on that already, but my understanding is that there are a certain number of witness statements which have been admitted without cross-examination but not tendered.

MR. NICE: Your Honour is quite right, and Ms. Dicklich and her team are labouring under the strain that we know then transfers itself to ³²⁰⁶⁸ ^{BLANK PAGE} ³²⁰⁶⁹ the strain on those serving you, processing the material. There's a great deal of work to be done at this stage of the trial. We haven't overlooked it. We are working on it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you. On this, the second anniversary of this trial, we rise at 2.06 p.m. and adjourn until next week, Wednesday.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.06 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day of

February, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.