³²⁵⁰⁶

Wednesday, 8 September 2004

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, you are to continue your cross-examination.

WITNESS: SMILJA AVRAMOV [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter]

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you allow me, Mr. Nice, I owe you an explanation from yesterday. I've read this article that you gave me that you said was my article. I stand by the content of it, but this is not an article, Mr. Nice. It's a speech which I gave quite a long time ago on the occasion of the publication of the book that is being mentioned there.

I repeat, I stand by what is written there. These are my thoughts. But probably when this was recorded and edited, I didn't quite -- and the title actually was probably given by the person who recorded it. So there's no doubt.

If you allow me a question. It is not clear. I've written several articles about the Tribunal, so it is not clear to me what that has to do with testifying in the case against Mr. Milosevic. Well, may I give this back to you? I didn't see it from the time that I actually gave this speech, so it was ten or 15 days ago. Please could you take this.

Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued] ³²⁵⁰⁷

MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I just correct a couple of matters from yesterday, one indeed to deal with the points of authorship of this witness. She didn't single-handedly write a book called Genocide Against the Serbs but she did contribute an essay to a book of that name, and my understanding is that she wrote a forward to An Atlas of the Ustasi Genocide of the Serbs, 1941 to 1945.

Q. Is that correct, Professor?

A. I don't know which one you are thinking of. I have a lot of forwards that I wrote for at least ten books.

Q. Very well. Let's move on.

A. The --

Q. You must understand, Professor, we are limited as to time and the longer your answers, either the longer I will detain you or the less will I be able to explore your evidence to the assistance of the Chamber.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, one correction: The mine I was referring to yesterday when I was dealing with the Kosovo miners' strike was Stari Trg in Trepca. And two other questions of this witness on very general matters.

Q. It's right, isn't it, Professor Avramov, that you were an advisor both to the RSK and to the Republika Srpska and that you subsequently indeed became a senator in Republika Srpska in February of 1997, having earlier held the position of a member on the Education Council of the Republika Srpska Krajina in March 1995?

A. No, that is wrong. You have the incorrect information. I was never anyone's advisor. I was a member of the Educational Advisory ³²⁵⁰⁸ Council in Republika Srpska because there was a university there where we taught, professors from the Faculty of Law, the faculty of philosophy, and some other faculties from the University of Belgrade. I was not an advisor. I was a member of the Educational Advisory Council. And I did go to Knin to give lectures at the university there. I also gave lectures in Pristina.

Q. I have a number of short points to cover from the evidence you gave yesterday.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I have a transcript that has page numbers 1 to whatever it is. I don't -- if the Chamber has a transcript, I don't know if it's similarly paginated.

Q. You made a reference --

JUDGE BONOMY: Before you go on, Mr. Nice, can we clarify the answer to the question whether the witness was a senator in Republika Srpska, which was part of the question.

MR. NICE: Yes, certainly.

Q. Can you answer His Honour that question, please.

A. No, I wasn't a delegate or a member. I was a member of the Senate of Republika Srpska for a short period if that Senate was actually operating at all.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. A few points arising from yesterday. In my transcript page 11, speaking of the period after 1945, you spoke of the Croats organising illegal groups which turned into terrorist organisations. Professor ³²⁵⁰⁹ Avramov, I just alert you to the fact that as far as I know, this may be the first time --

A. Yes.

Q. -- you've heard of this. A very simple question. Please answer it, if you can, shortly. The terrorist groups to which you are referring, did they in any way relate to or turn into the bodies with which we're concerned now as we explore the falling apart of the former Yugoslavia or are they entirely independent of that?

A. There were links. I wrote about that. I will give you my book. I wrote in detail about it in my book Genocide In Yugoslavia in the Light of International Law. These groups were organised, the illegal groups, and later they linked up with groups in the country. I don't know if you recall or if you have information about this attempt at an uprising in Bosnia when these groups infiltrated the country. I cannot remember exactly when this was. I think it was in 1969 or 1970. I don't remember the exact date.

Q. Very well.

A. They infiltrated Bosnia in order to organise an uprising and to link up with the groups that were in the country.

Q. By what names or initials, if any, were these groups known?

A. These groups joined together and a united movement was created called the Croatian Liberation Movement or HOP. The illegal organisation, and I provided proof about that, was formed in Zagreb in 1965, and then all of these groups joined together.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... of the transcript, you told ³²⁵¹⁰ us that the suggestion that at the Karadjordjevo meeting Milosevic and Tudjman had drawn borders. You said that was a lie, a notorious lie. You then explained that your working group actually dealt with borders. You've written about various things, but you've never covered, I think, the Karadjordjevo meeting in -- you may never have covered it in your books.

You, in your account to this Court, don't know what passed between the two presidents at that meeting, do you?

A. Two things. You misunderstood me. And secondly, it's not true that I did not write about it in my book. The Post Heroic War of the West Against Yugoslavia, which was published, I think, in 1997 or 1998, I dealt with that problem on two pages. I think that is one problem. I stressed that I did not attend the Karadjordjevo meeting and that I don't know the content of the talks between them, but the group that I talked about and which I was a part of, I assume was formed based on the agreement from Karadjordjevo. I was a member of that group. And I said I wasn't talking about borders at Karadjordjevo, but I talked about how we discussed borders in principle, whether they can be drawn based on the revolutionary division of Yugoslavia or based on international treaties. I was in favour of the concept that only international treaties can be the basis for future borders.

Q. Very well. Then we'll move on to the next point. At page 23, you suggested that the order to send reinforcements to Slovenia was issued by Mr. Markovic as Prime Minister. Now, you know that is simply not true. Constitutionally as Prime Minister, he had no power to do so. ³²⁵¹¹

A. Sir, Markovic and Mesic were the top leadership at that time in Yugoslavia. According to our press, it says that this decision was made by Markovic. I don't know whether our press conveyed this correctly. Perhaps it wasn't Mr. Markovic, but who else could it have been other than Mr. Markovic and Mr. Mesic? They were the federal bodies, the highest ranking federal officials.

There is another thing. Please. The country was under threat. Does that country have the right to defend itself? Of course it does. That is the natural basic right of every country. This wasn't you know --

Q. The Commander-in-Chief was the Supreme Command or Supreme Defence Council, as it was later known, but -- and of that body at the time Mesic was to be the president. Jovic was also a member of it; correct?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. And if the evidence shows that Jovic exercised power to send the army to Slovenia in the absence of Mesic to stop him doing so, you can't say that that's wrong, can you?

A. I don't have any information about that. I wasn't nearby, and I had nothing to do with these top leadership organs in our country. I didn't have any political functions, sir, so I cannot really answer that question.

JUDGE KWON: Before moving on, Mr. Nice, I don't think the witness answered your previous question properly.

Professor, the previous question was whether Mr. Markovic, Prime Minister, had power to do so, to make a decision to send the troops. As a legal expert, can you answer this question. ³²⁵¹²

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Quite certainly he did not, but our press published this information, and it was the general conviction that this was so. This was never denied. So -- under the constitution, there were many deviations from it. The constitution was pushed aside as such and anti-constitutional, unconstitutional decisions or things were carried out, scores of such things at the time. We would need to go through each one individually. But he was not authorised to do that; it's clear that he was not.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. You've been prepared to give this evidence effectively about him. Just help us -- against him. You've told us what you learnt at the time from reading newspapers. Did you also learn of the same Mr. Markovic voluntarily going to Ljubljana when the JNA was about to send airstrike in order that he could be there to be a victim along with others should that airstrike happen? Do you remember reading about that?

A. No, I don't remember that at all.

Q. Very well.

A. I don't remember that detail.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice is confusing the witness, because Mr. Nice knows very well that I presented here the stenogram from an extended Presidency meeting and the presidents of the republics where you can see what the president of Slovenia at the time, Milan Kucan, said, ³²⁵¹³ who confirmed that Markovic created that whole incident in Slovenia which they described as war but which was actually a crime against the soldiers and where all of this is stated. Therefore, what he's claiming is actually an attempt to confuse the witness so that the witness would justify something that is broadly known.

At this meeting, which was attended by President Mesic, president of Yugoslavia at the time, Ante Markovic, Mr. Kucan who was the president of Slovenia at the time. So this is not quite correct.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I hear the comments that you have made. No doubt Mr. Nice has also heard them.

What I'd like to say is that you have an opportunity, by virtue of the order which we made, to ask questions, and it would have been perfectly proper for you to put that by way of re-examination of this witness.

Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

Q. Page 27 of the transcript of yesterday deals with the passage I've already spoken of whereby the witness described the accused not being the only person to make decisions, in case that helps you. But if we go to page 30 in the transcript, we are reminded, madam, that you told the Judges yesterday, when speaking of the meeting at Brioni, that everyone was invited from the republics with the exception of Serbia, and you said that Serbia wasn't represented. Now, that wasn't true, was it? Serbia was invited.

A. No. Serbia was not represented at that meeting. And at the last ³²⁵¹⁴ moment, according to the minutes from the Brioni meeting, at the last minute they noted, well, we don't have a representative from Serbia, and then Mr. Jovic, who represented the federation and was there on behalf of the federation, was asked to be a representative of Serbia at the same time. Now, that is correct.

Q. And --

A. I cited sources about that in my book.

Q. -- not only was Jovic there, well able to represent Serbia, given his position and his relationship with this accused, but Kadijevic was there as well, wasn't he?

A. Kadijevic was representing the army and not the Republic of Serbia.

Q. If we go on, please, to page 34. You made an observation yesterday, as translated, that I'd like your help with, when you were talking about the rights to self-determination and secession, and you spoke about what you described as not a territorial principle, a subjective principle of a people, going on to say, "So the Serbs as a core, c-o-r-e as it's been translated, as a core, as a constituent nation, had the right to self -- it's not clear what the next word is. Did you in some way regard the Serbs as being a core of Yugoslavia?

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note it was corps, c-o-r-p-s.

MR. NICE: In which case, what did you -- I'm very grateful, interpreters. I should have checked with you earlier this morning but I didn't find the time.

THE INTERPRETER: Or corpus, c-o-r-p-u-s, in the original. ³²⁵¹⁵

MR. NICE: In which case, I think that probably means --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sir, there is a difference between a corps and between a constitutive people. These are two different terms. I was speaking about constitutive peoples. One of the constitutive peoples is, of course, the Serb -- are, of course, the Serb people. Not only constitutive but also they were the foundation of Yugoslavia because only the Kingdom of Serbia which participated in World War I had the legal right to discuss the problem of a future state during the Versailles negotiations. The other parts were under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. So this is what I had said, a constitutive people, yes.

Q. And does that -- just so we can understand it, although I expect we all generally follow it, this puts, for example, in your mind the Serbs above people such as who; Kosovo Albanians, Croats, Muslim?

A. Nobody ever said that, least of all myself, sir. What I said, I said -- well, maybe I didn't tell you before, but I'm saying it now. Perhaps I expressed it in a different way perhaps.

Q. I'm asking you -- I'm asking you -- is your --

A. Please go ahead.

Q. Is your judgement that the Serbs as a corpus of people, and you've given the historical context by which you view them, rank above Kosovo Albanians, Bosnians, or even Croats in their rights, or are they equal?

A. I never said that, and I always believed that the peoples were equal, but I would also like to remind you, sir, that under the Resolution of the General Assembly, and I will tell you exactly which number Resolution it is, it is 1514 from 1960, it is clearly stated that ³²⁵¹⁶ secession or the desire to secede cannot be done based on self-determination, that self-determination cannot be the reason to destroy a state.

This is stated in 1514/60, that Resolution. Also, it states that self-determination cannot be carried out by force, and in particular it is stressed that minorities in a country cannot use self-determination in order to achieve or carry out a secession.

Q. I'm just going to ask you part of my last question again. I'm not going to try and trap you or trick you because I'm going to come back to this at a later stage when we look at the treatment of different parts of the Yugoslavia in the plans that were laid.

Do you regard the Serbs as equal to the Kosovo Albanians?

A. Today in Kosovo they are subjugated, oppressed, expelled, and there has been an attempt to effect a genocide over part of the Serb people living in Kosovo. I should also like to remind you --

Q. I'm sorry, madam --

A. No, they are not equal in Kosovo.

Q. So in some way, and we'll look at this perhaps later, the thinking of the intellectuals, including yourself, was that the Kosovo Albanians were lesser in their status and lesser in their rights than the Serbs; correct?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

JUDGE BONOMY: That -- sorry.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I just wonder whether that's fair to the witness.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please. ³²⁵¹⁷

JUDGE ROBINSON: The witness is addressing the factual situation today.

MR. NICE: She was now but my question is directed -- I'm so sorry if I misled her, of course.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. My concern, Professor Avramov, is this; to know whether in your judgement --

JUDGE ROBINSON: As a matter of principle.

MR. NICE:

Q. -- as a matter of principle and at the material time, they were equal to the Serbs or they had for some reason less status and less rights than the Serbs. What was your judgement at the time?

JUDGE ROBINSON: You mean as a matter of law.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, sir, you did attempt to trap me, because you don't differentiate the status of an individual and the status of a minority from the concept of autonomy. If we view the concept of autonomy in relation to the state, then autonomy has less rights than does the state, according to international law. Now, as far as human rights are concerned and the position of minorities, they were not only equal with the Serbs but they had the highest status that a minority enjoyed in Europe. You couldn't conceive of any greater status. They received their own Albanian university. They had their schools in their own language. They had absolutely all rights accorded them and were absolutely equal to the Serbs. And in relationship ³²⁵¹⁸ to the constitution of 1974, the Serbs had a lower status than did the Albanians in Kosovo because the Albanians could voice their veto to any amendments to the Serbian constitution whereas Belgrade couldn't do the same vis-a-vis Pristina.

MR. NICE:

Q. Thank you. I'll come back to that a little later. On page 57 of the transcript, you told us this yesterday when asked by His Honour pressing on an earlier question that had been asked by Mr. Kay, and you said of the Croats that not a -- not a single Croat was harmed. This was in Serbia. "Not a hair on their head was harmed in Serbia. They're still living there today."

A. Yes, yes. That is what I said, and that is what I claim. Now, it's another matter if laws are violated or if people are brought before a court of law for any illegal acts that they might have committed. I don't exclude that. But in principle, that is it, and I have Croats living in my own neighbourhood.

Q. Professor Avramov, we've heard evidence from witnesses, C-47, C-48, about Subotica, about Hrtkovci, in which there were not just forced movements but also killings, about the involvement of Seselj in that Vojvodina region forcing people to move.

A. Sir, you're asking me questions about things that I did not take part in, where I was not present. So I can only tell you indirectly what I heard, what I read, and on the basis of what the press wrote, what I'm able to conclude.

Yes, I do know about these Hrtkovci. I do know that there were ³²⁵¹⁹ collective exchanges of houses in villages for certain villages in Krajina, that these exchanges were made, and they live there to the present day. They exchanged their houses. Now, some people wished to go back to their own homes because some of their houses that they gave in Dalmatia in some villages are much larger and better than the ones that they exchanged their houses for. But as I say, I only know that from the press so don't involve me in questions where I did not take part myself. I am a witness here, I'm testifying here with respect to the acts of Mr. Milosevic, and in Hrtkovci that has nothing to do with Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Professor Avramov, it was you who volunteered the answer that not a single hair had been injured. I must suggest to you that Hrtkovci was extremely well known --

A. Yes, and I claim that today, too.

Q. And indeed although I'm anxious not to trouble the Tribunal with too much paper, but indeed there have been reports from the autonomous province of Vojvodina in 2003 setting out ethnic cleansing that happened there in that period. Do you accept that?

A. No, I do not accept that, certainly not. You have one opinion; I have another opinion. You have your own documents; I have my own documents because I have delved in research work and I have written three books on the subject. And of course, certainly you can bring in different witnesses from the same place, they were in a different position, and so on and so forth and had different feelings and sentiments towards one issue or another, so they would express that.

Q. Coming to my second-to-last topic arising from yesterday's ³²⁵²⁰ evidence, you dealt at pages 75, then later at 87, with something about the autonomy of Vojvodina, which you explained had an absolute majority, explaining at 88 that the point of the proposed amendments to the constitution of Serbia was to deprive the provinces of the right to veto through which they were influencing the policy of Serb -- Serbia.

That was the reason why Vojvodina's autonomy was reduced or eliminated along with Kosovo's, wasn't it; in order that Serbia would not having to be seeking consensus or agreement in relation to things like constitutional change.

A. Consensus is one matter, sir; veto is another.

Q. Vojvodina had a majority of Serbs. It wasn't vulnerable?

A. Yes, and it still does and they always were in the majority.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... centralisation, which I will suggest it was, of Serbia, by the reduction or elimination of the two autonomies or near autonomies was going to serve the purpose of this accused and his extension of control, wasn't it? That's why it was done.

A. No, sir. You can't personalise an extremely difficult situation the state was facing in which that same state had the right to self-defence and defence and to preserve itself and boil it all down and bring it all down into one personality. The state was faced with an existential difficulty. All pacts on human rights, all international covenants and conventions speak about the exceptional rights enjoyed by the state when it is faced with external attack, internal unrest, and so on. So why should Serbia not have the right to resort to extraordinary ^{32521 BLANK PAGE 32522} measures under given circumstances and in certain conditions? Now, whether this was done by Mr. Milosevic alone or with the agreement of the government, as far as I know and as far as I was included into this process, he did always ask for support from parliament. I did not attend government meetings myself so I can't speak about that, but I assume he did ask for support from the government.

And now another question I'd like to emphasise is this --

Q. I'm not sure --

A. -- Mr. Milosevic --

Q. -- it's appropriate for you to launch into topics of your own. You have, I fear, to be responsive to questions.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, at page 91 --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I answered your question.

MR. NICE: At page 91 of the transcript, I see I misspoke when identifying the number of identifiable groups living in 200 identifiable countries or thereabouts, and I think the number of identifiable groups is 2.000 rather than the 5.000 which I misspoke yesterday.

Q. Let's go back to a few matters of chronology, Professor. You as an intellectual and closely -- having closely researched this particular conflict, as you would say, know that paramilitaries have a particular effect on society, don't they? They are destabilising because they interfere with the proper monopoly of violence exercised through the army and the police.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you explain, because -- I'm going to stay with 1991 and the ³²⁵²³ beginning of 1992, the period of which you've spoken of having intimate knowledge. Can you explain, then, how it came about that the man called Dragan was first involved in preparing for paramilitary operations in April of 1991? Do you anything about Dragan?

A. No. I've never met the man myself. I know from the press that there was a man called Dragan. I don't know him personally, I never had any contact with him.

Q. Then let's move on just one month, because you were intimate or became intimate, to a degree, with the accused. What conceivable purpose was there in the accused's establishing the Red Berets in May of 1991, a paramilitary force which would have the effect of destabilisation?

A. I'm not certain --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He is deluding the witness once again. The special units or, rather, the special unit called the Red Berets was established in the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, the security service, in 1996, and I think we had a tape here from 1997 and their establishment. So it's 1996, not 1991. He is leading the witness into a total -- into total confusion, and he hasn't got the right to state facts that are incorrect in his question to the witness. So the witness is unable to understand the question, like the one about the constituent nation, because everyone will tell you that the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and so on and so forth are constituent peoples. So this term "the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia" applies to all the peoples and ³²⁵²⁴ nations. And the Muslims in 1970 also gained the status of a constituent nation.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... with our leave, you will be able to put to the witness through re-examination. Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Yes.

[Trial Chamber confers]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just as a matter of fact, the Red Berets was established when?

MR. NICE: This comes when the film comes -- according to Frenki Simatovic, not a witness, of course, but we've heard him speak on the topic, 4th of May, 1991 the unit was established.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Any questions that relate to that issue may be raised by the Court-assigned counsel.

MR. NICE:

Q. Following the accused's interjection, the Judges - I'm sure you will understand this, Professor - will have to decide in due course the nature of the unit, if any, Mr. Simatovic says was created in the 4th of May of 1991.

You as an intellectual, help us, please: Was there any conceivable legitimate ground for this accused to take such destabilising action, if he took it, at that stage of this conflict?

A. I cannot give you a precise answer because I was not involved in that segment of internal policy. My knowledge, my expertise, the area I ³²⁵²⁵ am versed in was international law and foreign political relations. I can, as a human being, as an individual and as a legal person who knows about this - of course I delved in quite different areas, not internal affairs fares, other witnesses will be better placed to tell you about that - but all I can tell you is this: That according to international law, a state does enjoy the right to take maximum steps in order to protect its integrity in case of being jeopardised, and that right emanates from the right to self-defence. That is one point.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor. Professor, I'm addressing you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I see. Go ahead.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you therefore identifying that right as -- as a basis for the establishment of the Red Berets?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It could be the case under certain circumstances. For example, the Americans have their marines in the form of special units which they attach to embassies, for example, which is a little absurd, but they consider that under situations where terrorism has become a global danger, that that is a part and parcel component part of their right to self-defence. But according to classical international law, that actually, strictly speaking, is not acceptable.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. Sorry. Two points just to follow up on this before we move on: But at the time that we are dealing with, was Serbia an international subject or was Yugoslavia an international subject?

A. Yugoslavia at all events. ³²⁵²⁶

Q. And within Yugoslavia, was Serbia being threatened by its neighbours? Was Croatia threatening to invade Serbia? Was Slovenia threatening to invade Serbia? Was it?

A. No. The only internationally recognised and protected subject was Yugoslavia, and that's what I mean. First of all, there was a rebellion, and then that rebellion grew to be a civil war and then an international war against the sole recognised international subject, which was Yugoslavia.

Q. So Serbia, as a constituent part of the legally recognised Yugoslavia, had no grounds for acting in purported self-defence at that time, did it?

A. Yes, it did have the right, because a part of Yugoslavia had seceded contrary to the law, contrary to international law. Secession is not something that is recognised. The United Nations didn't recognise it with respect to Cyprus or 22 secessionist movements. They are registered with the United Nations. The United Nations took a negative stance towards them, and this is best borne out, I don't want to remind you of Biafra, for example, where the international forces arrived in order to prevent secession, not to mention Cyprus, which was only recognised by Turkey and not a single other country. They all refused. The only case in which secession was recognised is the case of Yugoslavia. It was contrary to the law, it was illegal, and it will be the subject of a long-term examination and is indeed being examined now by the international legal public.

Q. I'm not sure that answer is responsive, but I'm going to move on. ³²⁵²⁷

JUDGE BONOMY: I can tell that you it doesn't answer the question as far as I can tell.

MR. NICE: But I have only so much time, Your Honour.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, please go ahead. Let me answer your question this way. Perhaps you didn't understand my answer: In a situation in which part of that sovereign state of Yugoslavia seceded contrary to the law and took armed action against that state, the state of Yugoslavia, then Serbia as a part, as a constituent part of Yugoslavia, as a reduced part of that country, did have the right to defend itself. Certainly it did.

MR. NICE:

Q. The trouble with that is that May 1991 precedes secession, Professor Avramov.

Can we move on to September 1991. You know of Vocin, which is on the borders of Western Slovenia, and I'm asking you these factual questions because you have volunteered to the Judges things like, for example, not a hair on the head of a non-Serb was injured in Serbia. You volunteered factual knowledge.

Vocin in Western Slavonia was attacked by a paramilitary group led by a man called Bokan. Are you aware of that man and his paramilitary activities; and if so, how could they be justified?

A. I don't know the man. I never had any contacts with him. I don't know him at all, so I can't tell you about the man. Now, as far as the volunteers are concerned, yes, when the army was withdrawn to barracks, went back to barracks and when the Serb people ³²⁵²⁸ were left to fend for themselves, deserted by its former -- how -- brethren, if I can put it that way, which the Serbs and Croats used to refer themselves to as, they were open to attack and then there was a revolt in Serbia and there were a lot of people who volunteered. I know that many people volunteered, came forward as volunteers. Some volunteers reported to the army and placed themselves under the protection and disposal of the army although the army did not send its men, its volunteers, but I also know that certain units were established outside Serbia as assistance to the Serb people in those parts. So I know about those units in principle, but I don't know the personages that you're asking me about.

Q. Before we move to the Carrington Plan, which is what I'm going to take you to, a similar question about Arkan's Tigers or the Seseljevci and their activities about which this Court has heard in Knin, Borovo Selo, places like that in the early part of this conflict, did you know about those things, madam?

A. I can only give you an indirect answer, but asking me those questions is quite unsuitable because I'm not somebody who took part in any of that so that I can give you an eyewitness account.

Q. Very well. When we come to the Carrington Plan, however, certain events have become quite notorious in the press and on television and so on, and you must have been aware, by the time you were assisting in the negotiations here in The Hague, of what had started in Dubrovnik, indeed what had started in Vukovar. Dubrovnik, an entirely Croatian city, majority -- ³²⁵²⁹

A. No. No, not entirely. Mostly.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... and Vukovar a place in which the Serbs had not only no majority but there was a majority, as it were, against them. Can you help us, please, from your perspective in 1991 of what --

A. You're not correct on that score.

Q. Very well. Correct me. What about Vukovar? They had a majority in Vukovar, did they?

A. At one point in time, the balance was 50/50 in Vukovar.

Q. What point in time?

A. During the old Yugoslavia.

Q. Yes. What about -- what about the 1990s, madam? Who had the majority then?

A. I think there was a slight majority on the Croatian side. It tipped the balance slightly.

Q. You've told us about, yesterday, the interests of those places where Serbs were in a majority, and you've told us about how things that were done were done in fear of a repetition of the Second World War genocide against the Serbs.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you offer any explanation, any justification for the attacks, well known and started before the Carrington Plan, at either Dubrovnik or Vukovar?

A. At that time, we offered Carrington, and of course the European Community, a vast number of material, of documents, about armed conflicts ³²⁵³⁰ on the soil of Yugoslavia. And in those documents we provided instances of attacks by both sides. I'm sure that Dubrovnik was a case in point, was mentioned, and I know that at that time, according to the reports that were coming in to us, they said that the centre of Dubrovnik had not been attacked and that the old city centre had not been destroyed but that there was fighting in the environs of Dubrovnik.

Q. Just help me, please, because you know the territory. You will no doubt have been to Dubrovnik probably many times. Is it --

A. Yes, of course I have.

Q. It may be that the Judges will know it and everybody knows its topography. Are you really suggesting that you would take seriously the proposition that people were fighting out of Dubrovnik on its little coast land - I don't know how we call it - plateau there against the surrounding forces? Is that really your suggestion? Or do you accept that Dubrovnik was attacked, pure and simple?

A. Perhaps. Or, rather, according to the information that we received at the time, according to which there was fighting around Dubrovnik but not in the city centre itself. And the second point that we provided documents about was that although Dubrovnik was a demilitarised town, Croatian forces did enter Dubrovnik. We offered material to that effect, which of course did not exclude the possibility and --

Q. Why -- it may be a demilitarised town, but you -- the Serbs had absolutely no entitlement to Dubrovnik. What on earth matter was it for them? We still want to know, you see, in this Court, maybe, if there's any justification for the attack on Dubrovnik, and I just wondered if you ³²⁵³¹ could help us because you were there negotiating for the accused and -- helping the accused in his negotiations at the same time.

A. Sir, we're not talking about Dubrovnik; we're talking about Yugoslavia, the state of Yugoslavia. As to Dubrovnik, that is a component part, or was a component part of Yugoslavia, not of Serbia.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, now we can move to the Carrington plan. We do have a number of documents which, I think, may be helpful, coming from The Hague conference, recently relieved of the restriction that had been on them. The witness is a witness who can deal with them, and I propose to put them through her as exhibits, taking the documents individually quite quickly. They're authoritative documents, I think, and they will then be part of the record. I hope that's not going to be too consuming of time.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice. Bear in mind the witness's travel plans.

MR. NICE: I certainly do, and I also bear in mind that I think, if I'm right, the Badinter Commission documents, which, of course, arise out of all of this, are already before the Chamber because the Chamber sought them and they were provided.

Can we have first, please -- I'll deal with them in chronological order, and I'll leave my file out so you can see where we go next.

Q. First --

A. You see, I can't read all of that now. This is a vast amount of material that you've given me, so --

Q. I'm not asking you -- I'm not asking you to read it. These all ³²⁵³² come from the authorities so as to make provenance indisputable. If you look just at this document, which we see is dated the 5th of September, and if you go to the end of it, madam, you'll see it's the representations from Milan Babic.

A. The 9th of September? The 9th of September?

Q. It comes from -- it comes from --

A. Oh, yes, I'm sorry. Yes, yes, I can see it now. Yes, the reception was on the 9th. What page are you referring to now?

Q. Just the first page and the first paragraph, please. It comes from Milan Babic, you will see, and it says that on the session of the 5th of September the government of Krajina considered the declaration on Yugoslavia brought at the ministerial meeting of European political corporation in Brussels, the cease-fire treaty and the memorandum on monitoring mission, and in that respect the government of the SAP Krajina is presenting its standpoints.

And if you'd then be good enough to go over two pages, please, to the third page - could you turn to the third page, please - where we see paragraph number 3, which reads: "Problems discussed in the declaration as expected for Serbian people in future constitution of Yugoslavia have ceased being problems for Serbian people, namely Serbian people of Krajina has decided through its referendum to live together with the rest of Serbs on the territory of Yugoslavia. It is another problem that such decisions are denied through armed aggression of Croatian neo-fascist authorities." And then if you'll turn over one, two, three, four, five pages, we come to the conclusion, where Milan Babic signs, enclosing some items, and ³²⁵³³ at number 3, he says -- he encloses the platform -- sorry, number 2: The report on the referendum on Krajina's joining Serbia and its staying in Yugoslavia; and 3, the platform of the government of Serbian autonomous province of Krajina about possible solutions.

Now, just in short, this shows, this -- this document submitted by Krajina and by Milan Babic shows a line of thinking entirely in accordance with that of the accused in this case, doesn't it?

A. Your question became a leading one at the very end. What I would say is that this simply corroborates what I had said. The people of Krajina were resolute in their wish to remain within Yugoslavia, that areas populated by the Serb people for centuries never came under the sovereignty of Croatia because in Yugoslavia there was this decentralisation status, as you know, and secondly, on the basis of the decision, the referendum that they carried out, they stated that they wished to remain within Yugoslavia.

As I said to you yesterday -- please allow me to finish.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, I think you have answered that question.

MR. NICE: May that become exhibit --

JUDGE ROBINSON: What number would that be?

THE REGISTRAR: The number will be 774.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

Q. The next exhibit is a speech made at the conference by Franjo Tudjman, and I'm only providing it as the counterbalance to what follows, which is a speech by the accused, but just very briefly to remind you: ³²⁵³⁴ This is the speech of Franjo Tudjman at the conference. And if we just look at the first paragraphs to remind you of how things developed, you'll see that he spoke of a dirty, undeclared war, set out the number of Croatian victims, set out the number of refugees, and asserted that cultural monuments and edifices were being bombed, and so on. So he set out, and I don't desire to go into it and I'm not relying on it for the truth of its content or anything like that, but he set out the Croatian side; correct?

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

A. [In English] Undeclared war against the Republic of Croatia. [Interpretation] It was not an undeclared war against Croatia. It was a rebellion. It was a war against Yugoslavia, the only internationally recognised legal subject. So there is a difference in qualification.

MR. NICE: Exhibit number, please.

THE REGISTRAR: The exhibit number is 775.

MR. NICE:

Q. Then there's the statement that --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.

MR. NICE: Statement that was made by the accused here on the 7th of September. If that can be distributed, please. And there are just two or three short passages to look at here.

Q. He gives a contrary diagnosis. If we look at the first page in the first paragraph, we see --

A. Yes, I remember that.

Q. -- he speaks of the crisis being the result of unilateral ³²⁵³⁵ secessionist policy. At the end of that first paragraph speaks of bloodshed. If we go to the second page --

A. Yes.

Q. -- the second paragraph, it makes it clear that the Serbs in the Serbian autonomous province of Krajina and the Serbian autonomous province of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem deemed -- it's deemed the accused should be present in the procedure initiated. It says that they're actually indispensable. So he wanted them there at the -- here at the conference.

Then if you go on two further pages to what is at page 5 at the top, we can see his platform. The first new paragraph. He says: "Boundaries are to be altered --"

A. Yes.

Q. "-- only in the case of secession from Yugoslavia. This does not apply to the nations and republics which remain in Yugoslavia." And then at the bottom of the page we see him saying this: "I take this opportunity to inform you that at a recent meeting in Belgrade of top level representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, the initiative has been launched on the grounds of the above principle for a peaceful and democratic solution of the Yugoslavia crisis and the adoption of a new constitution of Yugoslavia as a common state of equal republics, nations, and citizens."

So that what it comes to is this: He wants to apply -- well, he says in this last page that the boundaries are to be altered in the case of secession from Yugoslavia, but this doesn't apply to nations and ³²⁵³⁶ republics which remain in Yugoslavia. Is that an understandable single standard to you?

A. Quite understandably so. As I said to you, there are international treaties that define borders. Those who secede yet have to have their borders established at an international conference, not through unilateral enactments.

However, this is a question of principle, why there are differences and why there is a lack of understanding between you and me. You treat the territory of Yugoslavia, of the state of Yugoslavia as terra nullius. Whoever first comes and lays a stake, that's his land. No, sir. It is not the way it was. It was a sovereign state with internationally recognised borders guaranteed by the great powers, by the Paris declaration, et cetera. So when we give a legal qualification, we have to proceed from the state of Yugoslavia, not from what Tudjman thinks or about his independent state.

Q. We understand your position. And we see at the foot of the page the passage I mentioned that the concept of the -- or, rather, the Belgrade initiative, which was to keep everything within the state of Yugoslavia that could be kept within, has already taken root, hasn't it? He was referring here to the Belgrade initiative.

A. Of course.

Q. The next --

A. No, not root. What we were told was that this was the wish of the people. And why do those people have less rights than those who wish to secede? ^{32537 BLANK PAGE 32538}

MR. NICE: Exhibit number, please.

THE REGISTRAR: The next exhibit number is 776.

MR. NICE:

Q. The next exhibit is simply, for completeness, a report on what had happened so far that the Chamber may find helpful. We'll just look at one passage of it. It's this one. It's an official report. You may not have seen this but it's an official report from those organising the conference.

If you go to the second page at paragraph 2, you'll see the position of the various delegates set out. At paragraph 2, Serbia and Montenegro, both republics stress that the current situation was due to unilateral acts by seceding republics. From their point of view, the conference should decide on the right of self-determination and the right of secession of all peoples. They want a new Yugoslavia of equal nations and republics in which the federation would have control over economy, standard of living, foreign policy, and national defence. Both republics oppose union a la carte. They believe there has to be an equality in sacrifices and that one or the other republic cannot just pick up those areas of cooperation which are advantageous.

So that -- have those running the conference fairly reported the views being expressed by Serbia and Montenegro? Yes? Have they fairly reported the views being expressed by Serbia and Montenegro?

A. I don't think they did. That's my impression. As far as I can remember, we intervened a great deal during the proceedings themselves. There is one thing that is inconceivable when I see this report of theirs, ³²⁵³⁹ that there weren't any minutes taken at the conference at all, which is an unprecedented case. Such an important conference where there are no minutes and the minutes are not verified. I raised that issue. Mr. Milosevic will remember that. Quite simply, I did this professionally. What kind of a conference is this if no minutes are taken? Then everybody can have his own report and his own opinion and present them any way they wish, but they did not have minutes that were signed.

MR. NICE: The proposal is dealt with on the 18th of October and we can go to that -- sorry, the last exhibit, I imagine, will become Exhibit 777?

THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Exhibit 777.

MR. NICE:

Q. We go to the next document, which is a further report, now dated the 18th of October which brings us to the heart of the issue.

THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Nice, could you please give the number of documents for the sake of interpreters.

MR. NICE: Sorry. By number, and we'll improve the exhibit presentation system when I've worked out how best to do it for the Defence case, but it's R0414605 at the top right-hand corner, and I'm sorry not to have done that before.

Q. On the second page of this report of the 18th of October, and under the plenary session in the middle of the page, Lord Carrington invited the parties to give their agreement on chapter 1 of the agreements for a general settlement previously circulated and elaboration on the ³²⁵⁴⁰ results of the meetings between ministers on the 4th of October, ministers and Milosevic and Tudjman.

President Milosevic made a formal reserve on the first chapter of the proposed text of the chair since the paper started from the premise that an internationally recognised state should be abolished. Such a change could only come about by a just and legal procedure. The arbitration commission, Badinter, set up by the conference, should be asked to pronounce on issues like the right of self-determination of peoples as opposed to the right of self-determination of federal units. He indicated that a final decision on future arrangements between the Yugoslav components could only be taken by the peoples on the basis of a referendum.

Then if we go over the page -- I should just observe that Lord Carrington's position is expressed just at the foot of that same paragraph, where he says that Mr. Milosevic's views were principally in the approach taken, the paper starting from the concept that joint interest should be built up from the bottom rather than imposed at a federal level which is no longer credible.

Over the page. Again the summary is that in his second intervention Mr. Milosevic modified his presentation, saying that the Serbs of Croatia had been the subject of violent attacks and therefore their rights had to be internationally guaranteed. Paragraph 2.5 contains good points and then there is a valid basis for a solution but the Serb areas of Croatia would have to be demilitarised and the people of the regions have to decide their own ³²⁵⁴¹ destiny.

Does that seem to you reasonably to record events that happened at about that time, Professor Avramov?

A. No. You see, the problem is in the following: Lord Carrington and the entire team that chaired the conference made a proposal that was unprecedented in the history of international law, and that is the self-destruction of a state by way of consensus of its top leaders. That is unheard-of that a state be destroyed in such a way. President Milosevic proposed that a referendum be carried out in order to see what the feelings of the people were and what the wishes of the people were. So that was the basic divergence between the two positions. The self-destruction of a state occurred -- well, yes, in the Soviet Union when three statesmen proclaimed that that state no longer existed. We thought - we the delegation and I also supported that position of Mr. Milosevic - that the problems of Yugoslavia state that was a protected state, a state that was one of the victors from the Second World War, because do not forget the border treaties are multi-lateral treaties that do not regulate only the question of borders. The status of the victorious powers is regulated too. So a far broader basis was laid.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... this may be an elaboration of your position, but I'm simply asking you --

A. That was our position.

Q. And the impasse that developed because of the position advanced by the accused was why the Carrington Plan never took effect, wasn't it?

A. Yes, yes. ³²⁵⁴²

Q. Yes. And confederacy was on offer, which would have kept all of Yugoslavia together had Serbia and Montenegro agreed.

A. It was not a confederacy. Read Carrington's original paper. Carrington's paper said the following: Independent states within the borders of the existing federal units that may submit a request to the European Community to be recognised, and once they are recognised, they will start negotiations in order to see what kind of relations will be established.

We could not accept that. But you are personalising matters. You are reducing it all to Milosevic. Milosevic had the support of the parliament in this respect.

Q. We'll come to all this, if we have time, in a few minutes, but the position is that the other constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia were prepared to embrace a form of confederacy. The Badinter Commission had recommended, and I think Carrington was prepared to allow, extraordinary autonomy and rights to areas where Serbs were in a majority in Croatia, and it was only Serbia and Montenegro that stood in the way of this being the result, this being the settlement.

A. No. Please. The point is that individuals cannot decide, those who were in The Hague at that moment. This decision had to be verified through an internationally verified process, and that is a referendum, on the ground, that is.

Q. Now, my colleagues are reminding me that Serbia only stood in the way, but I said what I said quite deliberately because I want us to just now follow through the course of events. ³²⁵⁴³ What was on offer was initially accepted by everyone except Serbia; correct? Because Mr. Bulatovic from Montenegro said yes, didn't he?

A. Well, you see, all of a sudden we were confronted with something. We were shocked by the Carrington paper. We were unprepared, because it did not go through a procedure and --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you because that question is amenable to a very simple answer; yes or no. Did Mr. Bulatovic from Montenegro say yes to the plan?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, he did, in a very confused situation that he did not understand at that moment.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. He didn't say yes in a particularly confused situation, did he? He said yes having had agreements with De Michelis from Italy that Montenegro would receive substantial benefits; he said yes, well understanding the nature of the proposals that were going to be made; and he said yes on behalf of Montenegro. He then flew back to Podgorica, didn't he?

A. Sir, that is your interpretation. My position is exactly the opposite, and it is Mr. Bulatovic who can most probably give the most authentic position that he took himself.

Q. He's a listed witness. He's written about it. Do you agree with his view that he still holds that this was the solution, the time for a solution, the best solution for the problems of the former Yugoslavia? Do ³²⁵⁴⁴ you agree with him on that?

A. It was that moment, yes, but not in the way in which it was proposed. Absolutely that was the right moment, and we insisted on it too.

Q. And let's just be clear about this Ms. Avramov -- Professor Avramov: Had Serbia, the sole party not to agree, had Serbia agreed, then on the 18th of October and had the parties moved to some form of confederacy with special rights for Serbs in Croatia, had they moved forward, all these people who died since the 18th of October, 1991, thousands of them, and all those who were forced from their homes in the same period of time would not have suffered, would they?

A. Sir, I repeat: The Carrington paper was one thing, and relations were supposed to be regulated only pro futuro. This was composed to be resolved in a comprehensive manner, bearing in mind the wishes of the people.

Q. And just staying close in time to this conference, although the attack on Vukovar had started, the massacre hadn't taken place, those people would have survived, and of course, years later, so would the people of Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Brcko. They would all have survived, wouldn't they, Professor Avramov, if the decision had been taken then to move forward with the confederal approach to which every other part of the former Yugoslavia, except Serbia, initially agreed.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those are your --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Don't answer the question yet. Mr. Nice, the ³²⁵⁴⁵ fairness of that question is in question. It involves making some very big leaps on the basis of certain hypotheses.

MR. NICE: It makes the leap -- it only makes this leap; that if peace had been established by that confederacy at that time and there hadn't been a further break-out of violence for other reasons, then these people would have been saved, that's all.

JUDGE BONOMY: But it really doesn't help us, Mr. Nice, on the question of criminal responsibility, does it, and that's really the issue that we're addressing.

MR. NICE: It will do, but I accept entirely that at the moment we're looking at a different type of responsibility and I have that in mind and I'm going to come to the question of criminal responsibility in later questions.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that you would have to intervene when there is such abuse like the one just carried out by Mr. Nice, and this is not the first time he does it. His hypothesis from which he proceeds into this question, I am guilty because I did not agree to have Yugoslavia abolished as an internationally recognised state by the stroke of a pen rather than those who caused violent secession and who walked over the corpses of their hitherto countrymen in order to establish some ethnically pure states. If absurdity has any meaning at all, it is clearly reflected now. He takes this as a point departure as if the witness were a half-wit.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... proceed with ³²⁵⁴⁶ the next question, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. You see, Mrs. Avramov -- Professor Avramov, this, picking up on what the learned Judges have just raised, all of you at the conference with your general intellectual experience and your more particular knowledge of the Balkans and the Balkan personalities knew that there was a potential for criminal violence of the worst kind if this matter wasn't settled, didn't you?

A. Yes, quite. That is why I personally was against it, against the withdrawal of the army into the barracks, because that automatically meant legalisation of the paramilitary forces of the secessionist republics.

Q. And as you explained yesterday, the only grounds - and we'll see whether these are justified or not later - for the use of force by Serbia was its fear of a repetition of World War II genocide, the only ground you gave --

A. Not Serbia but the Serb people self-organised in the areas where they lived.

Q. And despite that knowledge, the Serb side through the accused - I must ask you about this - put pressure on Mr. Bulatovic so that he changed his mind and joined in the rejection of the Carrington proposal and that by his joining in the matter was dead because it was now Serbia and Montenegro against the rest. He was pressured to change his mind, wasn't he?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Are you putting that question to me -- ³²⁵⁴⁷

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, I've stopped you. If do you not have the information to provide an answer to the question, then just say no and we move to the next question.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Bulatovic will give you an answer on that, not me.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Nice, it's time for the break. We'll break for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: Before we restart, Your Honour, I want to, if possible, have in mind a timetable in relation to this witness. We know she's got a plane to catch, and it's important that there be a margin of time for re-examination, and I would be seeking the leave of the Court for Mr. Milosevic to be able to re-examine this witness and in preference to my own time. Whether he exercises that right or not is another matter; I can then re-examine. But I would like that built into the timetable so that there is a sufficiency.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let me ask a question of the Professor. Professor, yesterday you told us you had a plane to catch at, I think, somewhere in the region of 2.00 p.m., and you could sit here until 11.30.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I was told later, I can stay until 12.00, perhaps even until 12.15 on condition that the traffic is not too heavy on the road to Amsterdam. ³²⁵⁴⁸

JUDGE ROBINSON: 12.15. Mr. Nice, how much longer do you have?

MR. NICE: I have -- well, I certainly have half an hour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Half an hour.

MR. NICE: I have longer than that, but I'll --

JUDGE KWON: You're going to spend more time than the Defence had.

MR. NICE: There is a problem. We had no knowledge of the details this witness was able to give and on this particular witness, not knowing what other witnesses are going to come, I want a fair opportunity -- I wanted to, if I can, put points to this witness. Two more documents on The Hague Conference, four maps, some cuttings from The Death of Yugoslavia, and a couple of general questions.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, how long do you plan for your re-examination?

MR. KAY: I could certainly take 15 minutes, but I'm more concerned about Mr. Milosevic's position than my own.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, if you are to seek our leave to re-examine, we are inclined to grant it. How long would you take?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I said yesterday that in what you consider as my Defence, and which it obviously is not, I have no intention of participating with --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- re-examination. I'm asking that you restore my --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Kay, you will then re-examine for about 15, 20 minutes, where we will be within the time frame. ³²⁵⁴⁹

MR. KAY: Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Thank you. May the next document come to the witness, please. It's the second-to-last Hague document.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We didn't give a number to the last document.

MR. NICE: My oversight, I apologise. May it be given a number then.

THE REGISTRAR: The next exhibit number will be 778.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

Q. On this document, Professor Avramov, dated the 25th of October, so after the rejection, we see in the first page Lord Carrington in his opening remarks condemns the attacks of the JNA on Vukovar and Dubrovnik, expressing regret that General Kadijevic didn't attend. We turn to the second page, the only long passage I'm going to be looking at starts off at the top of the page, "... impossible to circulate the so-called Kostic proposals." Next paragraph but one, "As the general remark introducing his intervention on Chapter II of the Chairman's draft, President Milosevic stated the new paper differed little..." Next sentence, "... continued to make an unfair discrimination concerning the right of self-determination of peoples. Any solution should be based on the continuity of the Yugoslav state for those who wish and on the principle of legality and legitimacy. President Milosevic questioned the general approach of the Conference on the question of special status. A special status should only be given to the two Krajinas in Croatia. There was no point in extending this status to other regions. Furthermore --" ³²⁵⁵⁰

A. Yes.

Q. "-- relating to the return to the 1974 constitution ... was unacceptable --" referring to Vojvodina -- "was unacceptable as an intervention in internal affairs." And now, "President Milosevic concluded that the Chair's document paved the way for new instability." Then the next paragraph, "President Bulatovic of Montenegro said that although the text had certain improvements, including the demilitarisation of special status areas, these are what he termed disturbing novelties," and so on.

Two points: The accused was determined that the only group, the only ethnic national group that should enjoy special status was the Serbs out of Serbia, wasn't he? It says it here in black and white.

A. If that is what it says, then that is the position of those who wrote it, but it is their mistake that they did not take minutes which we also would sign as one of the participating parties. So these texts are not authorised. I had my own notes.

Q. Professor Avramov, you were there. The conference failed --

A. Yes.

Q. -- very special opportunities were made for the minority Serbs in the Krajinas. The accused is recorded as saying that there should be no extension of that principle to other groups. Was that, please, his position? You were there.

A. It's a little unclear to me. I don't remember. I cannot place it in the proper context, this second part of the sentence, not to allow it or permit it other groups. The question was on the status of Serbs in ³²⁵⁵¹ Croatia, as far as I recall, and this is what we insisted on. I cannot simply remember whether we talked about other groups. What other groups?

Q. Let me then make my point and explain what I was referring to earlier when I asked you about the equality of states -- of peoples and groups in your minds at the time. Is this the truth, Professor Avramov, that for the accused to have accepted the Lord Carrington proposals, generous though they were to Serbs in Croatia, would have meant his having to extend similar rights, or might have had to involve his extending similar rights to, for example, the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo, and that he could not afford?

A. The Albanians in Kosovo had the maximum status which Europe recognised to minorities. Therefore, this equality, sir, the equality of minorities was never questioned in all of our positions and proposals. We as the delegation, and Mr. Milosevic as the head of the delegation, never questioned this equality.

The second thing is the institutional solutions, autonomy and so on. What Mr. Milosevic did not want to accept and the reason -- for which he had complete support in the parliament, was the break-up of Yugoslavia based on consensus.

Q. I put my case on that and I'm going to move on to the last document for The Hague Conference. I've excised or cut out most of the others.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Number for that.

THE REGISTRAR: The exhibit number will be 779.

MR. NICE: And my apologies again to the interpreters, the one ³²⁵⁵² coming up is R0414911.

Q. And this document is dated the 4th of November, which thus comes after the rejection that's been recorded by the accused but is in fact an amended version, a corrected version, and sets out the general principles of what was on offer, and I only desire you to look at, please, two pages. On the first page, the Treaty Provisions for the Convention, paragraph 1, based on the following, "sovereign and independent republics with an international personality for those which wish it; a free association of the Republics with an international personality as envisaged in this Convention; common state of equal Republics which wish to remain a common state; comprehensive arrangements, including supervisory mechanisms for protection of human rights; European involvement, where appropriate; and in the framework of a general settlement, recognition of independence within the existing borders unless otherwise agreed..."

And then if you turn over, please, one page -- no, beg your pardon. Two -- three pages to the page at the foot is numbered 4. Special status, subparagraph C. Do you have that? Page 4, special status, subparagraph C.

"In addition, areas to which persons belonging to a national or ethnic group form a majority shall enjoy a special status of autonomy. Such a status will provide for: The right to have and show the national emblems of that area; an educational system which respects the values and needs of the group; a legislative body, an administrative structure including a regional police force and a judiciary responsible for matters ^{32553 BLANK PAGE 32554} concerning the area ... with provisions for international monitoring." Now, this is the level of generous, you may think -- you may agree, provision made for the Serbs in the Krajina where they were in a majority in Croatia and in Bosnia, but I must suggest to you that this treaty was rejected because the accused, and you must have known this, could not have accepted this for Kosovo.

A. I'm very familiar with this document. We worked through this document after we received it, and we made a series of remarks. The first one was of a principle nature. What does that mean, "Treaty Provisions for the Convention" from the standpoint of the international law? This is a contradiction in the title. That's one thing.

Secondly, before you move to the [In English] Independent republics [Interpretation] Please, before you move to establish sovereignty and independence, you have to establish their legal basis. Based on what did they become independent? What was their legal status based on violent secession? We also must note the cause and the effects and not move immediately to the derived questions of what will happen inside. So that was our principled position; first of all to establish the legal title, the legitimacy. Lord Carrington or the mediators could not be the creators of new states, and we wanted to have that on the basis of a referendum.

Q. Respecting your timetable, I must move on. I've made my case on -- I have put my case on that. Let me move on to an associated point.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the magazines I referred to yesterday I hoped were arriving by DHL this morning. They haven't. I have copies. ³²⁵⁵⁵ The originals will be with us, I hope today, probably may be in the building somewhere.

Q. Professor Avramov, I've suggested to you the reason why Carrington Plan was rejected, and I'm going to suggest to you that the underlying desire to having put the interests of having all Serbs in one state ahead of any other interest also lay at the root of the problem. And to make that -- or to help make that point good, I'd like you, please, to look at a copy of Epoka, the SPS magazine, for the 22nd of October.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Last document, 780.

MR. NICE: So sorry. I keep forgetting that.

Q. All right. Now, this -- we have a translation for this part of the magazine and its article, but to save time I'm just going to look at the map that's displayed via the other screens for those viewing, and the caption that goes with it that the Court has for this map on page 2 reads as follows: "Desirable possibility of territorial demarcation between the third Yugoslavia and Croatia." And then it sets out by reference to the shaded areas the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, number 1, Western Slavonia, number 2; 3, Serbian region of Slovenia, a little above it and to the right; 4, Western Herzegovina, which we can see not shaded but to the left of the strong black line; 5, Samac, Posavina, the small black line from the middle of the map; 6, the Dubrovnik Republic; and 7, the line to the left of all the lines marked as this "optimal western border of Serbian counties."

This map, did this reflect the underlying aim of the SPS at that time and at the time that Carrington's plan for retaining all the parts of ³²⁵⁵⁶ Yugoslavia was rejected?

A. Sir, many scientific magazines were published in Belgrade, and you cannot dispute the right of specialised sciences to express their positions, and they could be different from their prevailing or official position. So this cannot be taken, these positions cannot be taken or imputed to somebody as evidence or to accuse them. I must admit that I didn't really see this at the time. I didn't have enough time to look through all the different magazines. Just glancing at this quickly, it does not seem to be correct. More or less this was the projection of the offer to Serbia in 1915 to give up Yugoslavia and to stay as the Kingdom of Serbia. This was in London during -- in the London treaty which the allies offered to Serbia. So this was the basis for this particular map. I know the exact lines, if you're interested, but if not, I won't go into that, but I will not take this magazine at all as something that was legally relevant.

Q. I'm glad that you -- grateful to you for referring back to the 1915 agreement. You mentioned it yesterday, the London agreement of 1915, in the middle of the war, because -- and I just have to tell you this for want of time but the Chambers can find this, we have an intercept of the 29th of October of 1991. So at the same time as all this negotiation between the accused and Karadzic where they discuss the possibility of reviving the Yugoslav state according to the London agreement, which as you say exactly matches this line.

Can we look at another map, please. You'll know, of course, of the man Moljevic? ³²⁵⁵⁷

JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt, Mr. Nice. If I can give the exhibit number.

MR. NICE: I'm so sorry.

MR. KAY: Should this really be an exhibit? It wasn't adopted or accepted by the witness and its relevance is marginal to her testimony.

MR. NICE: I respectfully suggest not marginal. First of all, once we have the original or even copy of it if we're pressed for time, its connection to the SPS will be manifest from the document itself and in any event the witness effectively acknowledged it yesterday. She also acknowledges that the map is a map that matched a much earlier map, which is one of the things I was hoping to point to, and that continuity of planning is extremely significant in the mindset of the accused.

JUDGE ROBINSON: There is a basis for admitting it.

MR. KAY: If I could just reply on that issue, because if there are other means of proving it, use other means, but this is an article written by someone else that the witness said quite clearly she had never seen and never had time to consider. There's no evidence that she ever directed her mind even to the production of this document. If there is a proper way of dealing with it that is relevant to this witness or other aspects of the case, perhaps that would be better than introducing something in this form.

[Trial Chamber confers]

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you allow me, sir, to say --

JUDGE ROBINSON: The Chamber is -- the Chamber is consulting.

THE WITNESS: Sorry. Sorry. ³²⁵⁵⁸

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, the Chamber has consulted. We have decided not to admit this as an exhibit.

MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases. I will obviously attempt to deal with these maps with another witness at a later time. I might have been able to explore more with this witness, but nevertheless ...

Q. You explained how there was this plan in the London conference in 1915 for a much larger Serbia. Moljevic was a Chetnik who wrote a very famous article in about 1941; correct? And if you'd like to look at this map --

A. Yes.

Q. -- which has been taken from -- there's a map --

A. I did not know Mr. Moljevic. I know of Mr. Moljevic only from reading, from literature. So I cannot really speak about Mr. Moljevic. But I would like to ask you, did you admit into evidence the map presented by Mr. Tudjman at the annual conference of the HDZ where Croatia should reach all the way to Zemun?

Q. I would just like to look at this map. Do you recognise this as a map that was the Moljevic proposal in 1941, and do you accept that this map has its similarities with the map of the London agreement of 1915?

A. I would like to compare this, please. Do not pressure me at this point in time to do this comparison. I would have to think about it, to see it. I would have to have my own maps, the ones that I have, you know, original ones from London from 1971. I have all the maps of Croatia from 1941 and the proposals all the way up to 1999. I have all of these maps ³²⁵⁵⁹ in Belgrade but --

Q. Look at this map, then, and just yes or no. You're aware of Moljevic having published his proposals in 1941, even though you didn't know the man?

A. I don't know.

Q. Have you seen his map before?

A. No.

Q. Very well. Then without the map, just confirm this to me, because you looked at an earlier map, you confirmed it reflected a 1915 plan. My -- my suggestion is as follows: Quite regardless of the genocide in the Second World War, which wasn't concluded, I must suggest, at the time that Moljevic was writing with the genocide against the Serbs, there was a long-standing concept of all Serbs living within a single state, having the sort of borders that we've been addressing in looking at these maps although they're not exhibits. Do you accept that there was a long-standing understanding of the possibility of an enlarged Serbian state?

A. Sir, in my scientific work, I base all of my positions on official documents. I can talk about the London conference, I can talk about the London proposals, but I cannot talk about inter-party proposals and the inter-party struggles in the period between the two world wars and later. This is a question for sociologists and those who study the relationships amongst parties. I'm interested in official documents and official positions of states.

Q. And finally, because of the time, you carried on negotiating for ³²⁵⁶⁰ this accused and for Serbia into -- into 1992, dealing directly with the accused and Karadzic, didn't you, for negotiation purposes?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. And I must suggest to you this: It was the notion of all Serbs living in one state, regardless of the interests of others, that drove the rejection of the Carrington Plan and that kept alive the conflict. Do you accept that the notion of all Serbs living in one state had that effect at that time?

A. No, absolutely not.

Q. Let's move on.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Mr. Nice is absolutely distorting in the question that he's putting what the whole thing is about. This is the aspiration or support for Yugoslavia and that it is good for all Southern Slavs, that it's a good solution in particular for the Serbs, because living in Yugoslavia, all the Serbs are living in one state, all those living in Serbia and in the other republics. But this also applies to all the Muslims living in a Southern Slav state. It applies to all the Croats, that they would all be living in one single state. Yugoslavia was the right solution. We're talking about Yugoslavia here and not about some concept of Greater Serbia which is like some phantom floating over this courtroom.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The Chamber is considering the question of your interventions. Properly speaking, these interventions ought to be made through the Court-assigned counsel. We have been fairly flexible so far. ³²⁵⁶¹ You have the opportunity to request us --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sir --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Don't interrupt. You have the opportunity to ask us whether you can ask questions of the witness. I said earlier that we were disposed to consider favourably a request for you to re-examine. That would be the appropriate time for you to put -- put questions. Otherwise, such questions and comments ought to come through the Court-assigned counsel.

Mr. Nice, continue.

MR. NICE: I have four or five --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm not hearing you further on that. Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: I have five short clips from a television series called Death of Yugoslavia. I'm not going to -- I have transcripts now if you want them at any time. The transcripts are from time to time not accurate translations, I am advised. Each of these clips is very short. If we can just play the clips, it may be better to listen to the interpretation rather than to follow on a transcript that may be inaccurate, and with your leave I'll play the first one to the witness.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, we are checking the records because we are of the view that the Chamber had refused to admit this in evidence.

MR. NICE: Refused to admit the totality of The Death of Yugoslavia. You've had clips of The Death of Yugoslavia before in evidence, passages of people speaking and parts showing this accused. I ³²⁵⁶² think the first four of these all relate to the accused himself and they're simply films of him.

I think there's also been a passage of the -- the passage played of the meeting of the generals -- I beg your pardon, a meeting of the Supreme Command in the basement room where it was very cold and they were all in overcoats and where they tried to agree on the granting of special powers and where the vote went against the proposal for special powers. You may remember that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, yes.

MR. KAY: That's right. The totality of the films was objected to and leave refused, but there have been other clips which have been specific to questioning. It might be an idea to put the question first and then show the clips and then we can see exactly what is happening.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, put the questions first.

MR. NICE: Well, what I want to suggest to the witness is that this accused and those who were working with him was indeed concerned, if necessary, to fight to have the Serbia that had -- to have an enlarged Serbia that had all Serbs living within it. That's my suggestion, and the next two clips will help me with that, but I suspect it might be more economic in time to play the clip first, but it's a matter for the Court.

Q. What do you say to that suggestion, Professor Avramov, that the accused wanted an enlarged Serbia and was prepared to fight to get it?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let her answer the question first. ³²⁵⁶³

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, but could you please repeat the question.

MR. NICE:

Q. Of course. The accused was prepared to fight to have an enlarged Serbia with all Serbs living in it.

A. No; quite the opposite. Not an enlarged Serbia but the survival of Yugoslavia. A maximum Yugoslavia, not an enlarged Serbia. That was the position taken.

MR. NICE: Can we look at the first two clips then, please?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. They are relevant to this issue.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Regardless of the fact that today as one time that the enemies of Serbia are pulling up against her with those outside the country and those inside the country, we have a message for them and that is not that we are not afraid. We will enter every fight."

MR. NICE: The second one, please.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "We are going to stop the counter revolution in Kosovo and we'll reform the political system in such a way that it will enable Serbia to regain, implement --"

MR. NICE: The text --

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "-- authority over its entirety territory."

MR. NICE: Thank you. As the Court will have observed, the translation -- the translation on the screen read slightly differently. ³²⁵⁶⁴ It read, "regain its rightful territories." The interpreters expressed a similar sentiment differently.

Q. These are two examples of speeches by this accused, and we know of another famous one at Gazimestan. He was prepared to make battle and fight --

A. I attended, yes.

Q. Yes. And this sort of sentiment, that Serbia would regain its rightful territories or gain authority over its appropriate territories is the sort of thing he expressed loudly and in a way that excited the public, didn't he?

A. Sir, there was fighting on a psychological level, on an information level, on a political level. That was the battle fought, not only on the military plane. The military plane is the last instance. So these were the battles going on. And I was -- I happened to be at Gazimestan during the celebrations of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Polje, and he is speaking about Serbia, not about an enlarged Serbia. He is speaking about the need to establish power and authority throughout the territory, because in Kosovo, from time to time, there was a rebellion against that authority. And it wasn't the Serbs who were a minority in Kosovo as you're trying to represent it. They are part of the majority population. The minority were the Albanians.

Q. You've moved from the topic. My next question arising from the same clips, the speech at Gazimestan, with which the Chamber is almost certainly familiar, is this: Although this accused didn't, so far as we discovered, let the words "Greater Serbia" fall from his mouth, by what he ³²⁵⁶⁵ did and what he said, he adopted some nationalist sentiments in order to generate enthusiasm for him, didn't he?

A. No, I don't see it that way, and I was there, I attended. I could feel the prevailing mood. Of course, you had the representatives of all possible political orientation represented there, not only socialists and so on. And you know Kosovo, for the Serb people, is a specific moment in history. That's what it represents. And it has its emotional connotations and so on.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... the second suggestion --

A. No.

Q. The second suggestion is this, that he was able to use propaganda in the form of mass meetings and to excite people by such suggestions as the people would have to be followed and obeyed. Do you accept that he used the crowd in order to generate excitement and to have his own way?

A. Well, using the crowd. Using crowds is always an element in politics and the policies of all parties and states, and I see no exception there in the case of Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Just look at clips 3 and 4 and have your comments in light of that last answer on these. Clip 3, please.

[Videotape played]

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "That means that all those should be replaced from their functions, the members of the Regional Committees, of the Presidency, according to which it is justifiably, and I say justifiably, who have received a vote of no confidence from the public justifiably." ³²⁵⁶⁶

MR. NICE:

Q. This was an example. Do you remember that incident, Mrs. Avramov?

A. Yes, I do remember but this is what I would like to say in that regard: Mr. Milosevic made a mistake because he didn't implement it. The Albanian generals who were generals in the JNA, they wouldn't have turned their backs on Yugoslavia and found themselves in terrorist organisations, the Siptars in Kosovo.

Q. He used the crowd to have his way with the Central Committee, didn't he?

A. I didn't attend the Central Committee meeting. I wasn't a party member, so I really can't say whether it was up before the Central Committee.

Q. And finally, the last clip, fourth clip which we'll play. [Videotape played].

THE NARRATOR: "The crowd had waited all day for Milosevic to tell them that Kosovo would be theirs again."

THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "There is no price or force on earth that can stop the leadership of Serbia and the people of Serbia in their fight for their cause."

MR. NICE:

Q. Thank you.

A. Sir, in the period between the 19 -- between 1970 and 1980, about 200.000 Serbs were expelled from Kosovo, and I happen to remember that exact figure because the Albanian population increased by 34 per cent between 1970 and 1980. So those are statistical data, federal statistical ³²⁵⁶⁷ data.

Q. I have two more questions, in light of the time. The first is this: As a matter of fact, although you dealt with the character of advice that you've told us about and the involvement in the political process at the international level, you were never privy to what happened in the meetings of the Council for Harmonisation, the meetings of the Supreme Defence Council, or bodies like that, were you?

A. No, never.

Q. So when you've told us, as you have, about the limited control the accused had over people like Babic or over the JNA, you're not speaking from having sat in with him and JNA generals at critical meetings or anything of that sort; you don't have that experience.

A. No. I'm only speaking on the basis of official documents that I had in my possession.

Q. And then that was what -- the first question. The second question is this: This accused emerged as a leader in circumstances that we have been exploring or will learn more about, in the late 1980s. Is the position that from that moment on - this is my suggestion to you - he used or instrumentalised, in the modern language, the opinions of others and the emotions of others simply to retain control of as much territory as he could regardless of the legitimate interests of others living on it? Is that the reality, madam?

A. That is your understanding, whereas the emotions and feelings are something that you cannot interpret. You cannot interpret the emotions and feelings of the Serbian people and under what conditions this was ³²⁵⁶⁸ done. All I can do is speak about my own emotions and feelings and sentiments. I never had the need, nor did I -- it ever enter my head that I was a Serb. It was completely irrelevant as far as I was concerned. But at the point at which the Serbs were slaughtered en masse, in their masses, when they were expelled in their masses, when they launched an appeal Help us, we've been left alone to fend for ourselves, then I said to myself I am a part of that people and I'm duty-bound to help that people. So those are my emotions and sentiments. But you cannot understand them, and that is understandable too.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Kay.

JUDGE KWON: Before that, Mr. Nice, the speech, the accused's speech at Gazimestan, do we have the full text of it?

MR. NICE: I think we do have a text of that. I'll look into it. That's not one of the clips being played now, the clips being --

JUDGE KWON: In terms of an exhibit.

MR. NICE: -- Gazimestan's in separately, yes.

MR. KAY: Thank you. Re-examined by Mr. Kay:

Q. Professor Avramov, you were asked questions about the pre-secession period of the 25th of June, 1991, and what was happening in the territory of Yugoslavia then. You mentioned the man called Dragan, paramilitaries, and forces. And you responded by saying that the state was faced with an existential difficulty. So pre-secession of the 25th of June, 1991, what was the state's difficulty? The state of Yugoslavia, what was the difficulty it was facing? ^{32569 BLANK PAGE 32570}

A. That observation and the statement I made just now was stated in much sharper terms, but of course I wasn't present, sir. Let me say that once again. It was an official statement that was given to the press. And let me see, I'll tell you exactly when that was. I think it was the 21st of March, 1991, or roughly thereabouts, during those days when the General Staff took note of the fact that the country was facing a state of civil war and that the individual terror that was being implemented, illegal bringing in of weapons from Hungary, Austria, and through various other channels was a forerunner of the need to proclaim a state of emergency in the country because the country was on the verge of war, on the verge of a civil war. So that was the observation made by the Supreme Command. And I myself, like all the other citizens, knew full well through the press about the individual terrorist acts against the Serb population that became more intensified since 1990. At the beginning of 1990, in fact.

Q. You also used the phrase that the state was faced with a rebellion and that was as a result of a speech by --

A. Yes.

Q. -- President Tudjman. Perhaps if you can just put that into context. What did you mean by "rebellion"?

A. It's like this: Mr. Tudjman held a speech -- delivered a speech in Trogir -- and I can provide you with the entire text of that particular speech. I haven't got it here with me because I assumed you would have that speech. And he appealed to the Croatian people, called them to rebellion. So what you can talk about their right to self-determination ³²⁵⁷¹ today, it is no right to self-determination, it was a rebellion against the state. And Tudjman, in that speech of his, and he was delivering it to an enormous mass of the population, even more people than at Gazimestan, just speaks about that, but you have made no mention of that here. He was appealing to the Croatian people and the friends of the Croatian people and the Muslims who had historic ties, or such some phrase that he used, and he incited them to a rebellion.

Q. Now, within the context that you speak of, again before the secession in June 1991, you mentioned the right of Serbia to defend itself and the threats to Serbia which was one of the republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What did you mean by that? What was Serbia defending itself from?

A. From the rebellion. The combat areas or armed actions, armed operations moved from Slovenia through Croatia towards Bosnia and Kosovo, and at the time throughout that territory you already saw the preparations and organisation going on, the kind that the General Staff referred to and the armed groups. And Alija Izetbegovic spoke about this in his articles. And the assumption was, and this is something that Tudjman referred to, that the rebellion should have started in Kosovo and then spread towards the north. But what actually happened due to force of circumstance, who changed that strategy I really can't say - you'll know that or be able to assess that better than myself - the strategy was changed and what happened was it began in the north and spread to the south. That's what happened.

So this linkage, this link-up made the war a unified war, an ³²⁵⁷² organically united war, an undertaking against the state of Yugoslavia.

Q. I want to turn now to one of the exhibits that was produced to you, number 776. Exhibit 776, please. And I want to turn to page 5. This is the statement made by President Milosevic to the Conference on Yugoslavia.

A. Could you just give me a moment to look at the date. Yes, that's right. I am well acquainted with the entire text. What page did you say? 7? No, 5.

Q. Page 5.

A. [In English] Five, okay.

Q. I'll put it into context for you, Professor: At The Hague, September the 7th, 1991, start of the Carrington peaks talks. And the phrase in the second paragraph, "Boundaries to be altered only in case of secession from Yugoslavia. This does not apply to the nations and republics which remain in Yugoslavia."

It has been put to you that President Milosevic's strategy was for a Serbia rather than Yugoslavia. Was that the case?

A. [Interpretation] No. That is completely incorrect. Mr. Milosevic -- I can't find a better phrase and term, but to say that he was too occupied -- he was preoccupied about how to save Yugoslavia, how to ensure the existence and survival of a state against we see suddenly Slovenia and Croatia rising up against, and the resistance was spreading. So that was the crux of the matter and you can see that from later speeches delivered by him.

Q. So the strategy was very much based on the lines of the notion of ³²⁵⁷³ Yugoslavia. Was that as a Serbian state of Yugoslavia or as a state of all the Slavic peoples?

A. Well, Yugoslavia was the state of the South Slav peoples, according to the concept at the Versailles conference, peace conference. So this concept and notion of the South Slavs implied at the time the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

Later on, during Tito's Yugoslavia, we had the production of new nations, and there was a protest against that officially from the United States of America, and I mention in my book the document in which this is expressed, the USA document mentioning this. But anyway, 1946 they already lodged a protest to the effect that the Macedonians were not in fact a nation, that it was artificial, an artificial creation. Later on, when the Muslims were upgraded to a nation, America protested again. So therefore, in socialist Yugoslavia, we saw an increase in the number of nations or constituent peoples, as they qualified in the constitution. And now you have the following situation: If you take into account the fact that the Muslims in fact were Islamised Slavs, then the notion of the South Slavs or the South Slav people can cover Yugoslavia in its totality. If you take the other view and take the view that the Muslims are not originally Slavs, which it is difficult to prove historically, then one could say that the title of the South Slav peoples does not fully cover the entire territory of Yugoslavia as it stood.

Q. I want to look now at the second sentence in that paragraph. "This does not apply to the nations and republics which remain in Yugoslavia." So the concept is that the boundaries of those states that ³²⁵⁷⁴ secede from Yugoslavia should be altered.

A. The borders remain open, that was our position. And they have to be established at an international conference, not through one-sided acts. That was the point. Please take a look at the position of the Supreme Court of Canada in respect of Quebec, or I can quote individual authors to you who are the same opinion.

Q. Was it also a factor which you mentioned in your testimony yesterday about the ethnicity of states? Was Croatia seen by those remaining in Yugoslavia as creating an ethnic Croatian state?

A. Well, you have this constant feature. Please, at the meeting of the Supreme Defence Council, which was attended by Franjo Tudjman and the generals, that was held on the 12th and 19th of September, 1993, a decision was reached to ethnically cleanse Croatia. You have an official document about that, and you have that document. In addition to that, take a look at this. This is a newspaper that is still published in Croatia until the present day, and look at the title or look at this sentence which is there throughout. This is Hrvatski Vjesnik: "Be damned, Serbs, wherever you may be." That's what it says. This is a newspaper they publish, a daily newspaper.

Q. If you could give the date of that again, of the newspaper.

A. Oh, this one, yes, I will. The 10th of April, 1994. I can leave you a copy if you wish.

Q. Thank you. I want to move now, because time is limited, to looking at Exhibit 779. It is the notes of the 25th of October, 1991, at the Carrington conference. I'd like you to turn to paragraph 2.3, which ³²⁵⁷⁵ is on page 4 of the document.

A. Which page?

Q. Page 4 at the top. It's 643 that's stamped on it. Paragraph 2.3.

A. Yes.

Q. Have you got that? It says: "President Milosevic, Serbia."

A. Yes, yes.

Q. You were asked questions about the shelling of Dubrovnik, about the territorial ambitions of -- of the accused and Dubrovnik. In this document here, it's stated: "President Milosevic indicated that he had asked General Kadijevic and Vice-President Kostic if it was true that JNA were shelling the city of Dubrovnik. They said that this was untrue. Whatever the situation was, he, Milosevic, could not accept the shelling of Dubrovnik, which could not be justified."

From your dealings with the accused, was it ever part of his strategy, so far as you knew, that he was using force to achieve territorial aims against the other parties negotiating over the future of Yugoslavia?

A. No. No. I categorically state that President Milosevic never wanted any such thing. He insisted on a peaceful settlement, because often, I have to admit that, armed actions got out of control. They got out of control -- not only out of the control of the superiors involved, even under local control. They got out of local control. Very often they -- their nature was one of anarchy. You did not know who was shooting from which side. This was a moment when discipline went down and when control over the armed forces simply disappeared. In certain moments it ³²⁵⁷⁶ simply disappeared and there was this atmosphere of panic, and there was a wish to place it under control somehow. But it was very difficult because there were individual acts of revenge. Groups here and there, groups of mercenaries who came.

You see, I remember these statements of some of these mercenaries who came from Great Britain. They were brought to Belgrade, and they were handed over to the British embassy in order to prove what mercenaries were doing in the country.

President Milosevic never had any such intentions to take anything by force. What does taking in the sense of conquest mean? This was a question of defending Yugoslavia. We had a territory that was under somebody's sovereignty. It was not terra nullius so they were violently dismembering parts of Yugoslavia. That's what the secessionists were doing, they were dismembering a member country of the UN.

Q. It was put to you that the fault for the failure of the Carrington Plan was Serbia and President Milosevic. I want to go through this in two stages.

First of all, was there an acceptance of a confederacy by all the states or were there still disagreements about trade, currency, defence? Was the Carrington Plan an overall plan that had been accepted by all the parties?

A. No. First of all, you mention a confederacy. Don't. Go back to the first sentence. Independent sovereign states are being established, and what will happen later in terms of whether it's going to be a confederacy or a union or whatever, that is something that may be ³²⁵⁷⁷ negotiated. Quite simply, it is one of the assumptions in terms of what may possibly happen. However, at the conference, Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Kucan said quite literally it's out of the question, we are not going to negotiate about anything except independent states. That is why the Carrington paper suited them at first, because after that they could say, "Sorry, we don't want to negotiate with you at all." Not even to negotiate. That's the point.

The Carrington paper was an absolutely anti-legal act from the point of view of international law. And from the point of view of the Brioni declaration, it was deceit.

Q. Now, it was put to you about the rejection of the terms and that Serbia was on its own. You are experienced in many conferences, negotiations and we've seen how you've spent, on this issue, over two years. As a negotiating --

A. Not two; 40 years.

Q. Even more. As a negotiating strategy, are you aware of that technique where when multi-parties are negotiating, you're in fact waiting for one party to be left alone with the blame for rejection even though the others may not want it? Did that ever form an issue in strategy?

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm not going to take too many technical points but I think there are limits to leading questions in re-examination and perhaps that passes beyond it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let the witness answer if she can.

MR. KAY:

Q. It's a rejection of terms and who gets left with the blame by the ³²⁵⁷⁸ international community because of rejection of terms. Is that something that enters into the thinking and strategy of those like you who have experience of this?

A. My answer to you is going to be a description of the very unpleasant situation that I found myself in and that I still am in today. As a professor, I taught my students about negotiations. The process of negotiations, the techniques of negotiations and its elements from the point of view of law, morality, ethics, et cetera. I spoke to them on the basis of history and the standards of international law. Everything that happened in the post-Cold War period refuted everything that I taught my students. Something pathological happened. Elementary rules were deviated from. And that is what I noticed at conferences that were held in the post-Cold War period. There are no standards there any more, there are no ethics any more, people work against each other's backs. Then decisions are passed I don't know where and people are confronted with a fait accompli. That is something that in my professorship, in my career spanning 40 years is something that was inconceivable.

MR. KAY: I have no further questions.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. Mr. Milosevic, I take this opportunity to reiterate that the Chamber is disposed to exercise its discretion under its order to allow you, even though you have not examined, to re-examine on certain specific issues. Without making a speech, do you wish to take this opportunity? Do you wish to avail yourself of the opportunity to ask certain specific questions? And I want to make it clear that the Chamber encourages you to ³²⁵⁷⁹ do so.

Without making a speech, what is your position?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, had I conducted the examination-in-chief, very many questions would have been raised that your appointed lawyer, of course, was not able to raise. That is why I'm saying that this examination-in-chief has nothing to do with my defence. It never crossed my mind --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Milosevic. Then that is exactly why the Chamber designed its order in the way that it did. At the end of the examination-in-chief, the Chamber would have allowed you and did offer you the opportunity to raise specific questions, and that was the precise purpose of it. If you felt that a particular aspect of the examination-in-chief had not covered a particular area or that it covered it but did not cover it sufficiently, it would then have been open to you to do so by way of asking certain questions, and the Chamber was disposed to allow you.

So I want to make it clear that at all stages the Chamber is offering you an opportunity to participate in the case. It is a matter for you to decide whether you wish to do so, but make it -- I want it to be clear that the Chamber encourages you to participate. What is your position? Do you wish to ask questions now? I don't want to hear another speech.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, please. In order to make things clear to you, I demand that you return my right to self-defence. You took it away from me, and it violates all conceivable ³²⁵⁸⁰ international norms, even your own position.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We have already gone over that ground. We will not rehearse it.

It remains for me to thank you, Professor, for coming to The Hague to give the evidence that you have given. Your evidence is concluded, and you may now leave.

[The witness withdrew]

MR. NICE: Responsive to His Honour Judge Kwon's question, the text of the Gazimestan speech from a newspaper article is to be found at Exhibit 446, tab 30.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. The documents which were not admitted will be returned. We'll take the adjournment now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.06 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.29 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: I've asked for the witness to stay out for a couple of minutes. This witness, whose name is George Jatras, is one of two in respect to whom -- I think two or three in respect of whom we have filed preliminary motions. We've made it very clear in, I think, the last of our motions that we want to move cautiously in this area, bearing in mind certainly at the time that the motions were prepared the accused was representing himself and therefore there might be some appropriate leeway allowed in his conduct of the case, and it may be if there is leeway allowed, that generosity will have to be extended even more so with the ³²⁵⁸¹ person in the position of assigned counsel.

However, with those preparatory remarks, it remains our duty that if we suspect that witnesses may not be able to help the Court at all, to raise it with the Court rather than to waste time, mindful of the fact that we have probably more abilities to research names of potential witnesses or intended witnesses than the Court has or in any event would want to exercise. And from the 65 ter summary of this witness and from the researches we've been able to make, for the reasons set out a little more fully in our motion of the 31st of August, we cannot see at the moment that there's any evidence upon which this witness could -- there's any evidence this witness could give which would assist you. Our motion, of course, sought further particulars with the second step of stopping his being called, principally sought further particulars. In the circumstances, we quite understand that Mr. Kay's been in no position to deal with something as low down on any agenda of priority as this one would be, but we would ask that we're informed in advance what material he can tell us about that seems to be relevant. Otherwise, the Chamber might decide that he shouldn't be allowed to give evidence.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: Yes, Your Honours. This witness, James Jatras, was the second on the list filed on behalf of the accused for hearing this week, being that on schedule number 5. I had the opportunity to meet Mr. Jatras last night, spend some time with him and discuss his evidence and exhibits with him. ³²⁵⁸² I looked at the Rule 65 ter summary that had been filed on behalf of the accused. I don't know who prepared it, it's not my work, in relation to this particular witness, which gave very brief details about who he was and how he fitted into the context of the case, saying vice-president of a foreign policy institute abroad, international framework and aspect of events in Bosnia, political background to events in Bosnia, personal knowledge of facts relating to the parties to the conflict.

His evidence is of a far broader scope than that and also takes into account events in Kosovo. That would have been apparent to the Prosecution from the exhibits that have been supplied in advance which came from the accused's associates.

The witness is in fact currently an attorney, and he has been a foreign policy advisor in the US Senate and is familiar with -- through his research with the US reaction in relation to events involving the dissolution of Yugoslavia starting from March of 1991, and he was required to do research upon that issue, gave advice, and then became more involved in September of 1992, and was asked to research again into the issues concerning events after the recognition of Bosnia in April 1992, and through his researches discovered Iranian involvement in the forces fighting in the conflict in Bosnia as well as Mujahedin. These are allegations that have been made frequently by Mr. Milosevic in the course of this trial and are in complete accordance with the presentation of his case by him.

As a result of what was discovered there, this became a serious ³²⁵⁸³ issue when he and others were asked to take part in a select subcommittee - and I'm reading from a title "to investigate the United States' role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia. The Iranian Green Light Subcommittee." This report was made in 1996 and was a review on what had become an embarrassing issue within American political circles that revealed that the Clinton administration at the time had permitted through what was called a nod and a wink and giving of a green light Iran in particular to establish an arms base within Bosnia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Who commissioned the report?

MR. KAY: The US -- the Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives. So this is an official public document. It is a document that arrives completely independently of the accused. It is within that status of filing of documents of Human Rights Watch, other public bodies' whose work independent of the parties has been accepted as having probative value by the Trial Chamber.

But the issue in relation to the accused on the indictment goes to the conflict within Bosnia, the right of the Serbian state to self-defend itself, the right of the state to deal with a humanitarian disaster that it was facing, which was the expulsion of Serbian residents from Bosnia in particular, Croatia as well, although this particular witness was principally focused upon Bosnia.

So allegations that he has been making in his cross-examination were proved, to the extent that the report proves it, as having been correct concerning foreign involvements in the conflict in Bosnia and where those involvements came from. ³²⁵⁸⁴ Now, the issue of the United States' involvement in this is extremely important because of its attitude to President Milosevic and Serbia, and in many respects that is where this witness takes up his evidence and is able to say about the attitudes of the senators and others, how they viewed the players within the events taking place in Yugoslavia that was causing its dissolution and where their sympathies lie and their prejudice, if you like, against President Milosevic and Serbia. Moving on from that background, the second stage of his evidence moves to Kosovo where again he was still performing his role, and his evidence is that in fact a decision had been made to invade or bomb Serbia, to bomb Serbia, attack Serbia, if you like, and use aggression against the state of Serbia before the date that is alleged in the indictment of the coming into being of the joint criminal enterprise as having been put as starting in October of 1998.

Amongst the exhibits of the witness, which is the first document I've produced before the Court being the final report of the Select Subcommittee of which this witness was a participant and author, are various documents that come about from the United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, again dealing with the Clinton administration of the United States' policy towards Kosovo and the KLA and the issue concerning the strength of the KLA, its background, its support, and the support --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, I think we have heard enough to be satisfied that the witness has evidence that's relevant to the issues in the case.

MR. KAY: Yes. ^{32585 BLANK PAGE 32586}

JUDGE ROBINSON: Of course, questions of relevance will be addressed in the normal exercise of the Chamber's functions when they arise.

MR. KAY: As they arise is perfectly as I understood the matter to be. And the witness is aware of that, and indeed I discussed with him the need of the Court to have relevant evidence and he is willing to cooperate, and he is --

JUDGE ROBINSON: As far as the question of more detailed information in the 65 ter filing is concerned, the Chamber sees no need at this stage to depart from the ruling that it made in relation to that conference, which is that it does not require the accused to produce more detailed summaries than those provided in his 65 ter filing, but the Chamber nonetheless reserves the power to make further orders to regulate procedure at any stage.

MR. KAY: Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: So you may call the witness.

MR. KAY: Thank you. I'll call James Jatras, please.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

WITNESS: JAMES JATRAS

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Kay. ³²⁵⁸⁷

MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour. Examined by Mr. Kay:

Q. Your name is James George Jatras; is that correct?

A. Jatras, that's correct.

Q. And you are a US national, Mr. Jatras?

A. Yes.

Q. And the language we will be using will be English, obviously.

A. Yes.

Q. And you are an attorney; is that correct?

A. Correct.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between question and answer. Thank you.

MR. KAY:

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... returned to private practice.

A. Not exactly returned to private practice. This is really the first time I've been in private practice.

Q. I've been asked to take things slower.

A. Oh.

Q. I'd like to deal with your career which took place in public administration. If you could start, first of all, with your involvement with the US Senate.

A. Yes. I worked as a senior foreign policy analyst at the Senate Republican Policy Committee from 1985 till 2002, a period of somewhat over 17 years. Prior to that, I was a foreign service officer of the United States from 1979 until 1985. ³²⁵⁸⁸

Q. Your -- your area of specialisation, was that in Eastern Europe?

A. Not specifically, no. My duties at the policy committee involved preparing analyses and reports and forecasts for the senators and staff of my party, the Republican party, as part of the Senate leadership. The Senate leadership is organised in a partisan fashion. There's a comparable structure on the Democratic side.

Most of the areas in which I worked were in foreign policy, but it would -- the emphasis would change according to the -- the priority of issues that were facing the Senate. For example, when I first got to the policy committee in 1985, most of my work was in the area of Central America. Later on, I did a great deal of work in the area of what was happening in South Africa, sanctions, bills, things of that sort; and later on, with the collapse of communism, the Warsaw Pact, eventually the Soviet Union. My focus then shifted to that region of the world. And since it was becoming apparent that Yugoslavia was the place where the relatively peaceful de-communisation of Central and Eastern Europe was not going to be quite so peaceful, I thought it necessary to provide some information on that issue.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jatras.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You volunteered information that the Republican party is your party.

THE WITNESS: Correct.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Does that mean you are a Republican?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I am. ³²⁵⁸⁹

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. KAY:

Q. And as an analyst, what exactly would you be doing? How would you perform your tasks for your advisory work?

A. Specifically, although I was given access to classified information, as a normal procedure I would try not to rely on classified sources primarily because they were of limited utility in what the Senate's needs were. You can't refer to classified information, or at least you cannot divulge it, in the debate on the Senate floor. You're not going to see text from classified reports incorporated into legislation.

Given the nature of debate in a legislative process, it was far more useful to me to rely on publicly available information that would be useful in that context.

For that reason, in Yugoslavia, as in other issues, I would collect whatever information might be available primarily from news, media sources, academic sources and so forth, to prepare either descriptions of likely legislation, amendments that might be offered, things of that sort, or sometimes if an issue was reasonably foreseeable as one that would end up as a legislative issue, I would do something of a more analytical or predictive nature to give a heads-up, so to speak, to the offices in the Senate.

Q. To make it clear, in fact, the testimony that you give today does not concern classified information.

A. Oh, absolutely not. No, no. ³²⁵⁹⁰

Q. In your role, you would advise senators or a senator; is that right?

A. I worked primarily -- in fact, I worked solely under the direction of the chairman of the policy committee, who was Senator Bill Armstrong of Colorado when I first came to work in the Senate; later Don Nickles of Oklahoma; and then Larry Craig of Idaho. Even though I worked for the chairman, you might say my consuming audience was all of the Republican senators and their staffs. Although the reports were also publicly available and also were read on the Democratic side.

Q. Again, in the performance of your roles, would you be aware of what the policy was of the current US administration?

A. Certainly. And I would say that that is where the evidentiary value of what I have to say is, because specifically on the five reports I did on Yugoslavia that I think are relevant to what I will be saying today, we can take these as a snapshot in time, as something that was documentation of what was known or knowable to someone in the legislative context where I was and reporting on them in an official document because, of course, the Congress is one of the organs of the US government. So these are government reports, not from the executive branch agencies but from an office within the legislative branch.

Q. We're going to get to a stage in your evidence when we deal with what we'll put forward as an exhibit which is the final report of the Select Subcommittee to investigate the United States' role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia, unofficially known as the Iranian Green Light Subcommittee. ³²⁵⁹¹

A. Yes. Excuse me. I believe you have a copy of the House report there.

Q. Yes.

A. I also have a copy of the Senate report. I don't know if you have that at your disposal.

Q. This was enough for me to read.

A. The Senate report is much shorter.

Q. Right. If you need to refer to it, refer to it.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And if it needs to come more formally into evidence, it can do so.

A. Okay.

Q. I suspect it's the overall substance of what you say that's going to be the importance of your evidence.

A. I believe so.

Q. Yes. The report such as this, which you were involved in producing; is that right?

A. No, not that report.

Q. Right.

A. That was prepared by the House committee that is identified. It was a select committee on the House side. On the Senate side, as I say, I can look at the report here, it was the standing committee of the Senate that prepared the Senate report. I did not prepare either of those reports although I did communicate on occasion with the staff people that were working on those reports.

Q. Right. The Court will have heard what I had represented ³²⁵⁹² originally but I'm sure they will understand how it's quite difficult for me to absorb all the information on these subjects when I've just come into dealing with the witness.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Quite so, Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY:

Q. In your involvement with the production --

A. Uh-huh.

Q. -- of a Senate report --

A. Yes.

Q. -- how would you come into it? What would be your role? You've told us about being able to advise Republican senators, consider foreign policy, but your more official involvement in the production of Senate reports, how would that come about?

A. The reports from the policy committee are official Senate reports. They're not the usual kind of committee report that we think of when we think of Senate reports. These are analyses from an office in the Senate leadership. So they're a different kind of Senate reports. And generally, I was to do these on a proactive nature. Again, I had to use my judgement as a legislative professional of what was likely to be facing the Senate and work accordingly.

Specifically, on my January 1997 report on the -- the so-called Clinton green light on Iranian arms transfers, it was based largely on those two other reports that had been issued by the House and the Senate in 1996, plus other sources of information I thought would be useful to Republican offices. ³²⁵⁹³

Q. Again, we're dealing here with all information that's in the public domain; is that right?

A. Absolutely correct, yes.

Q. And that is in fact part of the purpose of your role and the production of these reports?

A. Yes. And I think it's also relevant to the discussion here because it shows what was known or knowable universally to anyone in Washington who wanted to know.

Q. Thank you.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please slow down. Thank you.

MR. KAY:

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... 1991, and would it be right to say that at that stage, the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the Balkans was a subject that arrived on your desk?

A. Yes, that would be correct to say. I'm sorry, I had a note from the translator just then. Are you referring to June of 1991?

Q. March 1991.

A. Well, I would say -- again trying to slow down here. It's not my nature to speak slowly.

In the period leading up to June 1991, and I can't say precisely whether we're talking about beginning in March or April, but somewhere in that time period it was becoming evident that something unfortunate would be occurring in Yugoslavia that was likely to lead to violence of some sort and that some primer on what this country was and what was likely to happen would be useful to senators and their staffs who would end up ³²⁵⁹⁴ debating issues related to this.

You have to understand that most staff and even most senators were not familiar with the details of Yugoslavia as a multi-ethnic state, as a state composed of several republics, speaking several languages and so forth. If they hear that warfare has broken out between Serbs and Croats or Serbs and Albanians and so forth, they'd be starting from a very low base of information as to who these people are and what are they doing. So I felt it best to, as I say, write a primer about here is where Yugoslavia is, here's its population, here are the languages people speak, here is how it is -- I'm sorry, did I do something wrong here? -- organised politically, and -- I turned my -- I accidently turned my screen off here -- how it is organised politically. At that time we were facing the constitutional crisis of the rotation of the Presidency, again something that would be a complete mystery to almost everybody in the Congress at the time.

So I wrote a report, which I do not have a copy of -- I've looked through my files to see if I could find one. This was before the age of the Internet so it's not as easily relocatable. And my -- my goal was to be as fair and as neutral as possible regarding the various peoples of Yugoslavia and what their historic claims and grievances might be, to tell in each case the Serbs' understanding from quoting Serbian sources and the same thing with Croatian sources and Albanian sources. I was told by other leadership that this was not a permissible way to issue a report, that it had to be issued in the form of democracy versus communism, that Slovenia and Croatia were democratic, Serbia was communist, and that was ³²⁵⁹⁵ what the struggle was about, it was not an ethnic struggle. And I believe that that coloured the perceptions of Yugoslavia and at least any claims that the Serbs might have had as a constituent nationality throughout the unfolding crisis over the next several years, that they were perceived as not having any legitimate interest in how Yugoslavia dissolved or what rights they would have within that process.

In fact, the -- at that point, I even asked, having rewritten the report in the form demanded, that my name be taken off of the report. In fact, I had even asked that the report not be issued since I did not feel it was representative of -- of the accurate circumstances of what was happening. I was not successful in that regard, at least had my name taken off the report.

Q. Now, you're there at the time. The US, as we know throughout the evidence of this case, has had a -- a role to play and there's been much discussion. You said that it was viewed as being a struggle between democracy and communism.

A. Yes.

Q. We know from the evidence President Milosevic had won an election and was an elected leader of his republic.

A. I believe the prevailing view, at least among those who were active on the issue in the Senate at that time in particular, was that the elections in Croatia and Slovenia were fair and free elections with a democratic -- that adequately reflected in a democratic manner the publics of those republics but that was not the case in Serbia. So the Serbian election was not valid but the Slovenian and Croatian elections were ³²⁵⁹⁶ valid, hence the latter were democratic but the former were not.

Q. So the basis for that attitude came from where? If you're not able to say, say so, but --

A. I would say it comes from -- from two sources. One would have been, and again I cannot recall the details to this -- again I'm trying to slow down here. Let me pause.

I think it would have come from two sources as I recall the time, not having the documentation available to me any more. One would have been what election observers might have said about those elections at the time. The other one was, without going into too many details, there was a very strong pro-Croatian lobby in Washington at that time that had its effect on how issues were to be discussed and framed for public debate.

Q. Did Serbia have a visible lobby at all so far as you could determine?

A. Not as far as I can see, and to a great extent they still don't.

Q. Any other attitudes against Serbia, how it -- how it was viewed, why it was being viewed in this more negative form?

A. One of the things I had placed in my initial report on the impending Yugoslav crisis was a fairly detailed discussion in a Washington Post article, again quoting both Serbs and Croats, about how each side viewed the other, and one of the themes in that article on the Croatian side was, "We're Westerners, we're Catholic, we write in the Latin alphabet, we belong to baroque, Central European civilisation, not like those Eastern people over there."

I can recall in discussions with other staff in the Senate at the ³²⁵⁹⁷ time that there was a fairly clear perception between there are people like us in some parts of Central Europe and people over there who are not really like us. I can remember at the time being told by a staff person in one of -- in a Democratic senator's office that, for example, on the question of expanding NATO - this was later in the 1990s, so this attitude persisted for some time - that including countries like Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic would be reuniting all of Europe, and I expressed the thought, Well, what about other countries further east? And he said, What do you mean? I said, Well, I don't know, Romania, Bulgaria; and he seemed shocked at the idea at that time, and he said to me, Why not Tunisia? There seemed to be a sense that once you cross a cultural/religious/alphabetic divide, we're not talking about the same kind of affinity for people like us in the United States. It was -- I would say it was not a well-thought-out or articulate or precise definition but more of a visceral sense of they're more like us as opposed to more different from us. I think that had an effect on perceptions as well.

Q. This, of course, in 1991, is at the time of George Bush Senior's administration.

A. Yes.

Q. You've told us about your first report, which seems to have been advisory, setting out issues, and you were unhappy as to how it was received.

A. Yes. And it wasn't -- yes. And it wasn't so much advisory than explanatory and perhaps anticipatory, a description of what likely is to ³²⁵⁹⁸ happen and again some of the underlying causes.

Because of the circumstances I described, I really did not feel I could issue another substantive report on the -- on Yugoslav occurrences for some period thereafter and pretty much confined myself to only very technical references in specific legislation on the floor at that time and did not delve further into broader explanatory or analytical reports.

Q. In January 1992 --

A. Yes.

Q. -- we have a change of administration, President Clinton's administration.

A. January of 1993. He won the November of 1992 election.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Recognition of Bosnia in April 1992.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Events changing in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. When did this issue next, so to speak, come to be considered by you in an advisory capacity? When were you next more substantively involved?

A. The -- the next substantive report, and it sounds a little odd because we're talking about a five-year hiatus here, was in January of 1997. The reason I was able to issue that report at that time was -- there were a couple of reasons. One was my own green light, so to speak, was the issuance of the House and Senate reports on the Iranian green light in 1996. That I took as an indication that it was now possible for me to address some of the issues of what many people knew to be going on ³²⁵⁹⁹ in Bosnia or -- excuse me, had been reported from reliable sources was going on in Bosnia and the Clinton administration's cooperation with or at least turning a blind eye to radical Islamic activities in the Balkans. Information of this sort had been available, again from public sources, at the very least since September of 1992. As referenced in my January 1997 report, the Iranian springboard report from the House subcommittee on terrorism written by Joseph Bodansky was probably the first document of that sort that I saw, but as I'm sure is well known, there were many, many other articles and reports over the ensuing years, 1992, 1993, 1994, and so on, discussing various influences of this sort in Bosnia in support of the Sarajevo -- the Izetbegovic government.

Q. If I can just stop you there.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So I can get a fix on this, if you can give the title of that report that you authored.

A. Yes.

Q. And give its correct and full details for the record.

A. Yeah. The title is Clinton Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Helped Turn Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base, and that was issued on the 16th of January of 1997.

Q. I do have that and now I know what you're referring to.

A. Yes.

Q. At some stage we'll produce this as an exhibit before the Court.

A. All right.

Q. I want to go into now that period from, say, September 1992 -- ³²⁶⁰⁰

A. Uh-huh.

Q. -- which was the earliest date you mentioned, taking us up to this report, and what you were doing and what your involvement was so that we can see how this -- we can look, so to speak, at the sources of your knowledge and then people can determine for themselves.

A. Certainly. I would say that my activity during that period was quite minimal. It was essentially gathering information and collecting documents. These are what ultimately are reflected in the January 1997 report. And I would simply say the report stands on its own. I defend what is written in that report and the sources are given in the report, and on the substance there's very little I would add to what the report says.

I would note that I have no firsthand knowledge that the influences and the activities described in the report actually took place because I wasn't there. I wasn't involved in -- in inspecting the Iranian weapons as they passed through Croatia into Bosnia. I was not involved in administering the Third World relief agency or any of the supposedly humanitarian or charitable organisations that were described as a front for bringing weapons and fighters into Bosnia. However, I can say firsthand that these allegations were coming from serious sources and deserved serious attention during those years and were -- did not appear to be receiving them, receiving that attention, which is why I felt it would be useful to issue that report collecting and documenting this information.

I would note too that, as I mentioned, the green light reports ^{32601 BLANK PAGE 32602} issued by the House and the Senate deal almost exclusively with the Iranian pipeline, so to speak, the Iranian weapons going into Bosnia and the US -- the Clinton administration's role in giving some sort of signal to the Croatian government to allow that pipeline to proceed. Those reports did not deal with what seemed to me the other half, at least as significant, in the reports that are cited in my analysis having to do with a parallel network of largely Saudi funded or Saudi connected fund raising and recruiting for jihad activities, what we now refer to as al Qaeda although it wasn't specifically called that in those days. The reason I think this is certainly very significant in retrospect is that the 9/11 Commission, official commission in my country, recently issued its final report and they noted in there that it -- and there are many references to Bosnia and Kosovo in there, that Bosnia and Kosovo was where the "groundwork for a true global terrorist network was being laid." That is to say that the radical Islamic network that centred around Osama bin Laden that got its start in Afghanistan with, of course, American support, bipartisan support, which one might say was justified by the vicissitudes of the Cold War, that Bosnia and Kosovo were the locations where this various let's say small footprint movement was able to then become an international presence on a much wider scale. And if I --

Q. Can I just stop you there?

A. Yes, uh-huh.

Q. I must also deal with an issue so that it comes into context, of the significance being that there were sanctions against Iran by the US. ³²⁶⁰³

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And there was a policy, a US policy that was in effect meant to limit the influence of Iran. Would that be a correct way of saying it?

A. That is correct, and I would say there are two aspects to that. One is that is the factor, I think, that generated the House and the Senate reports because of the special American sensitivities about Iran. You'll see that the House committee in particular killed an awful lot of trees producing that report and devoted much ink to it. Specifically because of our concerns about Iran and also some domestic American legal concerns about was this a covert operation, how should it have been consulted or reported with with Congress and things of that sort. What they do not address is the other issue, which is that it is clear from the reports cited in my analysis, my January 1997 analysis, that the Clinton administration actually preferred the other network that was at work in Bosnia, that -- for example, there was the one Post article that I cited from February 2nd, 1996. The title is Saudi Funded Weapons for Bosnia. Official says $300 million programme had US stealth cooperation. So an unnamed Saudi official is saying that the administration was stealthily cooperating with them, partly because it was believed at that time, at least according to these reports, that this was you might say a healthier influence on the Sarajevo government than the Iranian connection which we may have grudgingly facilitated in the April 1994 green light but was not our preferable route. We would prefer that our good friends the Saudis and elements connected to them would be a primary influence in Bosnia. Again, the consequences of that were not ³²⁶⁰⁴ fully thought out at the time.

Q. Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, if you are able to, I think you must begin now to bring the witness closer to events, specific events.

MR. KAY: That was my intention, Your Honour, having put this into context so we know the background of what we're dealing with.

Q. September 1992. You said that you started collecting more information; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. The information collecting process continued until it culminated in your production of that report on January the 16th, 1997?

A. On that specific topic, yes.

MR. KAY: If we could produce copies of that now to the Court. I'm looking at a document which is DPBU -- or K26, I think it is.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, before the document's produced --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: -- I fear, following though I have the evidence, that at the moment I can't see its evidential -- or the basis for its being admitted before this Tribunal. One possibility is that the witness is an expert in some way and preparing an expert report, but he seems not to be claiming that.

The second is that he is in some way, and I'm still not entirely clear quite to what degree, involved in the preparation of a report that is based on public sources of information.

Now, I'm quite content to be corrected if I am wrong because we ³²⁶⁰⁵ had all sorts of types of information and evidence in this case, but I don't think we've ever permitted that sort of a report. On the contrary, the Court has regularly rejected material that is the compilation by one person of other people's work. That's, for example, in this particular case with the rejection of the evidence of the summarising witness in the Racak affair.

It's rejected in an earlier case, and in of course a different composition, reports indeed by experts where the expert was dealing with essentially publicly available material. That was --

JUDGE ROBINSON: This witness is hardly a summarising witness.

MR. NICE: Well, in which case it's hard to see what evidence he's giving at all, if I may respectfully say so, because he's spoken about what he says were tendencies or approaches given in the committee for which he worked, and I'm not sure how they're relevant, and is now seeking to prepare a report built on publicly available information. I obviously have no desire to keep evidence out that's of value and interest, but I fear that if this document is substantial and then needs to be dealt with it will take some time, and I've had no advance notice of it at all.

Incidentally, and I'm grateful, one of my colleagues draws to my attention that indeed the witness has himself said that he has no firsthand knowledge of the matters he's speaking about. Now, if the report goes in and if the witness speaks to it, I may have to take time - and that will be the Court's time as well as my own - in dealing with it, and I simply don't understand -- it may be my mistake, but I don't ³²⁶⁰⁶ understand its evidential basis.

While I'm on my feet, just two other small points. I noticed at an earlier -- three points. I noticed at an earlier stage that the witness said that he by and large if not almost wholly relied on public source material for the reasons he'd given, and I have addressed this short argument on that basis. Of course if there is any information he's relied upon that is protected in any way, issues may arise - don't trouble me, it's up to the witness - but issues may arise between him and the government or a government may wish to be involved but I have no further views on that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: He has already said that the information is not classified.

MR. NICE: Effectively but not quite. The second point that he made was that he was given an instruction by an individual to prepare the first report he spoke of in a slanted way, and it would obviously help, if the witness is to continue giving evidence, if we can have at some stage the name of that witness.

The third point I'll deal with later, but in my respectful submission, there is no revealed evidential value in this material at the moment.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: This is public material. It forms exactly the same kind of basis by which the Prosecution has much evidence admitted in this trial, from reports of groups like Human Rights Watch, UN agencies, all manner of public bodies, and the Court has always made a distinction ³²⁶⁰⁷ between that which is more publicly done as a public body independent of the party producing the material which is in public domain and part of the general background, as long as it's relevant, that it can be admitted to show and understand why people made the decisions they did and perhaps why or what was causing the particular consequences that they faced. And this evidence which concerns the supply of arms from Iran, other Islamic countries, is precisely relevant to the issues in this case that the accused has been dealing with.

JUDGE ROBINSON: It is a public document.

MR. KAY: Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Publicly available. Available to any member of the public.

MR. KAY: Yes.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. The document may be shown to the witness.

MR. KAY: Thank you. Your Honour, we've got exhibit packs here for the Bench to deal with the documents. I'm grateful for the support of the Registry in the production of this material. The first document we'll be looking at will be number 2 on the index because number 1 is the larger tome and by necessity will have to be given out separately. So if that can be handed out as well and put in Their Honours' hand. As I said, we'll be looking at document 2, first of all, which is in the plain pack rather than the official House of Representatives report.

Q. To put this into context, this is a paper written by you dated ³²⁶⁰⁸ January 16, 1997. It's available on a website, isn't it?

A. That's correct, on several web sites.

JUDGE KWON: Before that, why the cover page says it's confidential?

MR. KAY: I can't see the word "Confidential," Your Honour, which is --

THE WITNESS: On the cover sheet.

MR. KAY: No. That's to do with the dissemination of exhibits in advance.

JUDGE KWON: Okay.

MR. KAY: This is part of the internal workings of the Registry and not relevant to these documents.

JUDGE KWON: Yes. Proceed, please.

MR. KAY: Thank you. If documents are supplied in advance, they're not to be distributed around generally to the public as they may not form part of the trial process and they belong to others.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you seeking to have this admitted into evidence?

MR. KAY: Yes. I was going to go through it in a moment and then do it at the end, Your Honour, and then if there are any objections in any way we can deal with it in a totality.

Q. First document we're looking at is headed Clinton Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turns Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base. Did this issue arise as a result, in fact, of public articles in newspapers concerning the Clinton administration's so-called green light policy for ³²⁶⁰⁹ the supply of arms into Bosnia from Iran during the time of the Bosnian conflict?

A. In part and to some extent indirectly. As I said earlier, the proximate cause or the signal to me that I could or should issue an analysis on this area -- in this area were the House and Senate reports that we mentioned. Those, in turn, were prompted by the press reports. If the matter had not become one of public debate and reporting, I don't think the House and Senate would have felt the need to inquire into it.

Q. The reason for it becoming a further subject of public investigation was also because at this time there were American troops in Bosnia --

A. Yes.

Q. -- as part of the Stabilisation Force, and they were protecting themselves from armed groups from either side.

A. There was some concern about what kind of terrorist assets may be present in Bosnia as the result of this strategy and the effect it might have on the safety of American forces there.

Q. The document in its introduction and summary there refers to 20.000 US troops going to Bosnia as part of IFOR and also their involvement in the Stabilisation Force and deals with the post-Dayton political and economic situation in Bosnia; is that right?

A. Yes. And the deployment of American forces there which President Clinton assured Congress would be for only one year.

Q. There is then a heading called The Iranian Connection, and I have dealt with why that is important to America politically at this time. It ³²⁶¹⁰ then deals with key issues for examination, being the policy which was called the Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments, if we turn to page 3. And the first passage states: "In April 1994, President Clinton gave the government of Croatia what has been described as a green light for shipments of weapons from Iran and other Muslim countries to Muslim-led government of Bosnia. The policy was approved at the urging of national security chief Anthony Lake, and US ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith. The CIA and departments of state and defence were kept in the dark until after the decision was made."

The supply of arms, then, was it able to be analysed or seen as to what period this had been going on for?

A. Again, not to cross over the concern that was raised earlier from the Prosecution side, because -- because I don't have direct knowledge of that. I only know what was reported and which then I compiled as part of a larger report for the people I had the duty of informing, that is the case, yes, according to those reports which I think can be taken as officially confirmed in the House and Senate reports which are cited in this analysis.

Q. Right. The scale of Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia, was that known?

A. I don't know the extent to which it was known. I think what is of particular interest would be what the American involvement was in, so to speak, turning on the spigot for such shipments and the degree of involvement, what we might call hands-on involvement in that process. One of the Senate -- it's either the House or Senate report, refers to ³²⁶¹¹ officials being present in Croatia to examine the Iranian weapons as they were being sent in, which is a remarkable degree of contact, given the relationship between Washington and Tehran.

Q. Tell us how it happened and how it developed.

A. Again, Mr. Kay, I don't want to go beyond -- for fear, first off, of making a mistake and secondly to go beyond what it is I have personal knowledge of. I don't know all of the details of how the operation worked, what kind of weapons, what number they were, you know, any of those sorts of details. What I do have direct knowledge of is that this is something that would have been concern to people some years before this report and was of concern at the time that the House and Senate issued their reports on the -- on the matter. And what I was seeking to do was, since the House and the Senate had paid attention to only one part of the issue, namely the Iranian connection, and had not addressed the larger question which was the other largely Saudi supported network through such agencies as a Third World relief agency, to address the second two points that you see there on page 3.

Again, something I do have personal knowledge of is that because I was able to document it in this report from open sources, there's no reason anybody else in Washington focused on the Balkans would not also have been aware of the presence of such assets in Bosnia or, more precisely, credible reports of the presence of such assets in Bosnia leading to at least the conclusion that the makers of the policy were aware of such assets being there and didn't -- were not particularly concerned about it or, as some of the reports indicate, were in some way ³²⁶¹² cooperating with the introduction of such assets into Bosnia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, just to let you know that today we are stopping at the normal time for the end of the hearing. That's 1.45.

MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour.

Q. The second point you made was concerning the other interests outside Iran that you were aware of and that is the militant Islamic network, which was an overall title, an umbrella title; is that right?

A. Yes. That's -- that's how I would describe it. And I would describe the attitude at the time as being, I think, a reckless disregard for the consequences of introducing such assets into Bosnia. At least, that's the way it seemed to me and why I felt it was worthy of note in the report to the Senate.

Q. What is said here is: "Along with the weapons, Iranian revolutionary guards and Vivac intelligence operatives entered Bosnia in large numbers along with thousands of Mujahedin from across the Muslim world." And then you state, "The efforts of other Muslim countries and organisations and refer to humanitarian organisations -- organisation who come within this militant Islamic network." So what else was out there in Bosnia that did not derive from Iran and what was happening? What were they doing?

A. I'm not sure of the thrust of the question.

Q. Who else was involved in supporting the conflict of the Muslims in Bosnia?

A. Well, I mean --

MR. NICE: Your Honour. ³²⁶¹³

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

MR. NICE: I'm loath to object, and I know Mr. Kay has got a very difficult job, but -- and the witness, to be fair to him, because he was no doubt brought here under the earlier regime of the accused acting for himself is being cautious, but can it conceivably be right for a question about who was supporting the conflict to be asked of a witness who on his own account is speaking from open sources from which he's able, he says, to say on one occasion leads to certain conclusions. It simply hasn't happened in this case before, anything remotely like this. Human Rights Watch is cited as a parallel example. It was a world away. Human Rights Watch was the case of reports prepared on the basis of particular exercises of evidence gathering for which the authors of the report took either direct or overall responsibility and the methodology of which they were able to set out in detail. But this is no different from really reading a newspaper article or reading a serious of newspaper articles which may or may not suggest that the Iranians were involved in this or the Clinton administration involved in that, but I don't see how it can possibly help us or be admissible.

So I apologise for objecting but it seemed to me that last -- not -- not that I apologise, I regret having to object, but it seems to me that last question goes far too far.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: Maybe it's a fault of mine in the way that it was posited.

Q. If I ask the question in this form: What other evidence did you ³²⁶¹⁴ see of there being other sources of support?

A. Again, the evidence I have --

Q. Yes?

A. -- and again this addresses the objection, I believe: I am not testifying as to the details of the global jihad network, if we can call it that, and its involvement in Bosnia. I'm not attesting as to the specifics of the Iranian arms transfers. I'm attesting to what was known at that time in Washington, or what was knowable at that time in Washington and how that impacted the policy of the United States towards Bosnia.

The reason I think it is relevant here is that the accused is, among other things, has suggested -- in the indictment it is said that he was engaged in a joint criminal enterprise, and it seems to me that if it can be shown that other powers were aware of and reportedly cooperating with an offensive activity against the government of that country, and that can be shown firsthand from what I do have direct evidence of, what was the attitude in Washington at that time about these allegations, that would have a bearing on the defendant's case.

So I'm not attesting to were Iranian weapons shipped in after the green light of April 1994, although as I say that is officially confirmed in those reports. What is not officially confirmed but is found in the very same reports and was knowable at that time was that there was a larger network also involved in Bosnia.

Now, is that a complete fabrication? Are those reports utterly inaccurate? I'm not in a position to say. I would say circumstantially, ³²⁶¹⁵ based on the confirmation officially of the Iranian side of those same reports, they should at least be given some credence and should not be dismissed out of hand, and certainly if they were known or knowable at the time of the events surrounding the charges against Mr. Milosevic, they're relevant to that discussion.

So again, not to dispute the Prosecution's point, I utterly agree; I do not have direct knowledge about the goings-on in Bosnia with regard to this network. I do have direct knowledge of how reports of those goings-on were treated in Washington.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, in the light of that, you might want to rephrase your question.

MR. KAY: I think the witness has really dealt with what I was looking at, put it into context and expressed it clearly, and for that I'm grateful, and I'm sure the Trial Chamber will consider it -- consider this evidence from the position that the witness is able to give it.

Q. What was knowable in Washington at that time, the phrase that you just used, do you know when or at what stage Washington was aware of reports, if you like, of an arms pipeline from Iran to Bosnia?

A. As I said earlier, my first awareness of it was the September 1992 report from the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, authored by Joseph Bodansky. Thereafter, other reports, including news reports, became available, and so I think at least since the fall of 1992, they must have been aware that there were serious allegations about such activities. And again, if one reason they were aware is because they were engaged in what one report calls a stealth cooperation with such activities, then they ³²⁶¹⁶ certainly would have been aware of them then, wouldn't they? And there is nothing in anything I documented that is inconsistent with such cooperation.

JUDGE BONOMY: Could I be clear about just one thing, please, Mr. Jatras. That means that this situation existed during a Republican administration.

THE WITNESS: It began under a Republican administration and then continued and I would say intensified under a Democratic administration, again if one assumes that the reports are accurate.

MR. KAY:

Q. I'm going to try and deal with this section of your evidence before we break at 1.45 and turn to the first of the documents which is the large tome which you've dealt with in part, which was the final report on Iranian arms transfers. As you've told us, your document expanded the issue from just being specific to Iran and the issues of concern for the US House of Representatives.

A. That's correct, to the other point about the other global network, and also, you might note, on page 3 the third point about the radical Islamic character of the Sarajevo regime.

Q. Yes.

A. There were again, as part of the same reports, reason to be concerned that the Izetbegovic regime had had such influences going back some years, back to the time he was imprisoned for his Islamic declaration. And again this was completely contrary to the prevailing insistence in Washington at that time which was that we were supporting a ³²⁶¹⁷ tolerant, secular multi-ethnic government.

Q. We can go to page 200, which has section 4 conclusions --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, I think we will have to adjourn now and you can return to that tomorrow morning at 9.00.

MR. KAY: Very well, Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jatras, we're going to take the adjournment for the day. You will return tomorrow at 9.00 a.m.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Thank you.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 9th day of

September, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.