³²⁶¹⁸

Thursday, 9 September 2004

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay to continue with your examination-in-chief.

MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour.

WITNESS: JAMES JATRAS [Resumed] Examined by Mr. Kay: [Continued]

Q. Yesterday we broke, Mr. Jatras, when we were looking at the document produced in your first bunch of exhibits, the report of the select subcommittee. Could that be put back in front of the witness, please. It's the large document. In fact, put all the exhibits in front of him, please.

We were looking at page 200, which is section 4 of the document, dealing with the conclusions of the select subcommittee, committee on international relations for the US House of Representatives report of October 10th, 1996.

Are you at that page, Mr. Jatras, page 200?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The conclusions here, as we know, are those conclusions which have been subject to declassification. That's right, isn't it?

A. That's correct.

Q. But in paragraph 2, it stated: "The subcommittee feels the need ³²⁶¹⁹ to share with the American people as best it can the results of the investigation."

Is that right?

A. That is correct.

Q. And there was a hearing in which evidence was heard by the select subcommittee; is that right?

A. That is my understanding.

Q. Documents produced and witnesses questioned by counsel?

A. Yes.

Q. And even those appearing in front of the select subcommittee would have had their own counsel?

A. That would be -- generally under an American procedures, that would be the choice of the person, whether to retain counsel.

Q. Yes. The third paragraph: "It is our hope that the administration will relent in its efforts to conceal the history of this foreign policy fiasco, so that they will see a reasonably complete version of the full report."

And that's what we have here, isn't it?

A. That's correct. And of course, the blacked out portions are those that the administration would have concealed or removed for release of the unclassified report.

Q. Thank you. The heading of number 1 is: "The administration's Iranian green light policy gave Iran an unprecedented foothold in Europe and has recklessly endangered American lives and US strategic interests." We dealt with the issues that were concerned there to remind ³²⁶²⁰ everyone, yesterday, which concerned American troops being involved in IFOR and SFOR, as well as the strategic interests. "The Clinton Administration, unable to convince the United Nations to follow its lead in lifting the Bosnian arms embargo and unwilling to abandon its foreign policy philosophy of assertive multilateralism, found itself in 1994 without a vehicle it found acceptable to implement a change in foreign policy it believed to be in the national interest, the lifting of the Bosnian arms embargo. Accordingly, the administration was receptive when its ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, a man noted by his colleagues for his passionate pursuit of courses, free-wheeling style, and an open attitude towards Iran, pressed policy makers to consider a scheme whereby Iran would be allowed to act as the US surrogate in providing military assistance to the Bosnians."

Looking at that there -- in fact, the CIA were not involved in this;

is that right?

A. They were not informed at the time the decision was made, as I understand it. That is to say, it was through White House channels, through Mr. Lake, from Mr. Galbraith, the ambassador in Croatia at the time, and ultimately a decision made by the president, and only after that decision was made were the defence department and the CIA told. What involvement they may have had after that fact, after the decision had been made, I can't say.

Q. No. The policy developed through completely unofficial channels, if you like, in which it was obscured from the eyes of those with interest ³²⁶²¹ in the House of Representatives and elsewhere?

A. Yes, that is correct. I think one thing is worthy of note here, which has bearing on my paper in January of 1997. You'll note in the initial sentences of the paragraph just below conclusion 1 that the committee appears to be criticising the Clinton Administration for not securing an end to the arms embargo or finding some other way to provide weapons to the Sarajevo regime. That is to say, they agreed in substance that we should be helping the Muslims in the conflict in Bosnia. They disagreed with the way it was done through the Iranians. And this is why I believe it did not focus at all, this report, on the other aspects that I saw to bring out in the January 1997 paper, that is to say, the other network which we would now refer to as Al Qaeda and the Islamist orientation of the Izetbegovic government.

Q. You had become aware from your research in that exhibit we produced first yesterday that there was another dimension to this, that it wasn't solely Iran which had caught the focus of this particular committee?

A. That's correct. And as I said, because of particular American sensitivities surrounding our relationship with Iran, that was the focus of the committee.

Q. So outside Iran, and this was something I attempted to deal with yesterday, but it didn't make itself clear when I was questioning you, outside Iran, the other interests were what, that was -- that you were able to see were at work within Bosnia in the supply of arms or financial support? ³²⁶²²

A. Or also bringing in volunteers.

Q. People?

A. Mujahedin. It was the network through the so-called charities, like Third World Relief Agency. It has since been documented after 9/11 in many congressional hearings that are also public record that many other such organisations were involved in this, and at the time it seems there was very little objection raised by anybody on the American side, including, by the way, from the committee.

Q. Now when you say "charities," we probably have in mind here various UN-sponsored charities to deal with health, humanitarian relief, refugee agencies. Are those the sort of charities we're talking about or another dimension in the world of charities?

A. As you know, and again, I don't want to exceed the scope of what I can directly attest to, but those who are knowledgeable about the global terror network are aware that the funding mechanisms are applied to activities that may include activities of the sort that you describe, in addition to those that are violent, that we would describe as terrorism. This is classically true of an organisation like, say, Hamas, which will support terrorist activity on the one hand, but also then does support schools and the hospitals and things of this sort, so that the activities are mixed up together, and it's sometimes hard to not only trace the source of the funding but even where the funding ultimately is disposed. But again, this is something that is a matter of constant inquiry and public record, not something that I have particular direct evidence of.

Q. Thank you. Let's look, then, at the next paragraph, and I'm going ³²⁶²³ to be concentrating on this particular conclusion and then quickly going through the others. "The president's decision to give Iran a green light in the Balkans allowed Iran to expand its economic and diplomatic relations, as well as establish a military security and intelligence presence so expansive it became the largest concentration of official Iranians outside the Middle East. The consequences have been far-reaching and pernicious. They persist to this day."

A. That is indeed what the committee found, yes.

Q. Are you able to say what was established there in terms when we use -- the expression is used of "military security and intelligence presence." Are you able to give us any idea of the extent or scope of what was established, first of all, on the Iranian part of this issue?

A. Again, Mr. Kay, not beyond what the committee has documented here. As I have said before, the significance of my reports not only here on Bosnia, the January 1997 report, but I would say even more so the reports I did on Kosovo, are the extent to which I have direct knowledge in the sense that this was known or knowable to American officials. This report, in some detail, shows what the committee had become concerned about regarding the Clinton Administration's facilitation of Iranian influence, which the committee found to be quite damaging to American issues, to American interests in the way that you describe. The committee, for reasons I can't explain, since I was not part of their deliberative process, chose not to examine other presences, other assets in Bosnia which I suspected or I believe as a policy analyst should be brought to the attention of the Congress because they were at least as damaging to ³²⁶²⁴ American interests.

My testimony would be direct only insofar as my report is direct contemporaneous, direct contemporaneous account of what was known on not only the Iranian side, which is confirmed in this document, but also the parallel, largely Saudi-supported network and also the character of the Izetbegovic government. I would make the same assertion regarding the papers on Kosovo, beginning with the one in August of 1998, indicating at that time that the Clinton Administration had set itself on a course to intervene militarily in Serbia.

Q. Looking at the next paragraph, and I mention it because Croatia is referred to: "In Croatia, a government that had before the green light been a consistent ally in the US's fight against Iranian-sponsored terrorism was co-opted by the weapons it received in exchange for being a staging point for the shipment of Iranian arms into Bosnia. As a result, after the green light, there was a serious deterioration of cooperation with the US, encountering very real and imminent Iranian-linked terrorist threats. The US even now must cope with the consequences of Croatia's developing what has been referred to as an all but out of control relationship with Iran in the wake of the green light." In summary, are you able to tell us what that is about?

A. Again, Mr. Kay, I cannot go beyond the substance of what is stated in the report.

Q. It merely indicates that the Croatia had been used in this means of avoiding detection in the supply of arms to Bosnia through Iranian channels? ³²⁶²⁵

A. That is what is stated, yes.

Q. Yes. It says in the next paragraph, about the consequences being much worse in Bosnia after the green light, Iran virtually overnight became the unrivalled foreign benefactor of the Bosnian government: "As a result, the Bosnian government became less secular and democratic and more open in its embrace of a radical Islamic political agenda, acceptable to Iran but inimicable to US national security interests and democratic values."

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think, Mr. Jatras, you should just confirm what is in the report, if you can. And if you have additional comments to make, make them.

A. Yes. I will confirm the factual statements in the report as what they purport to be. The committee examined this issue. They reached certain conclusions. By and large, I would say those conclusions are accurate insofar as this is my assessment as a policy analyst at the time, not because I had direct knowledge of the matters under discussion. In fact, I would quarrel with some of the conclusions, for example, the one Mr. Kay just read, that the increasingly undemocratic Islamic orientation of the Izetbegovic government was a result of this influence from Iran because of the green light rather than an indication of what their inclinations had been for some years, that that was in fact the ideological orientation of the SDA from the beginning of the war. So, but that, as I say, is a policy judgement rather than a matter on which I have direct evidence, and if it please the Court, I would rather focus on the reports which I issued about which I do have direct knowledge, which I ³²⁶²⁶ believe have direct bearing on the matter of this case, and accept that the public reports which I have -- the committee reports which I have acknowledged in the analyses which I have prepared for the policy committee are, as I have cited them in the papers I prepared.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, you'll no doubt take account of that.

MR. KAY: Yes. For reasons at this stage in relation to the Defence, we take the view it's important to read these aspects into the record, and I'm not going to read every word, but I'm going to -- I'm moving through it in a particular way, and then we'll get on to the next stage of this witness's evidence.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY:

Q. In the next paragraph, it was stated: "Somehow the administration failed to see the short-term expediency of its Iranian green light was a long-term curse on the Bosnian people."

That's concerned with the political issues in relation to what had taken place; is that right?

A. That's correct, sir.

Q. And it's stated then in 1996: "Even now the administration is having to cope with the fallout from its policy." Further on in that paragraph: "Iranian influence in the highest Bosnian ruling circles remains pervasive, and Iranian terrorist and intelligence capabilities in Bosnia remain great cause for US concern. The Iranians are biding their time and the radicalised Bosnian Muslim political leadership may yet succeed in turning Bosnia into a radical and ³²⁶²⁷ authoritarian state."

It goes on in the report to criticise the president and those working for him as poorly serving the administration; is that right?

A. That is what is stated, and again, I would note the careful focus on the Iranians and avoiding mention of other radical assets that may be present at the same time.

Q. Yes. And in terms of what happened, it's put this way, in paragraph 4: "From the beginning, the administration realised the green light policy was dynamite and so worked to implement it without fingerprints."

And in relation to your role and your analysis, would you agree with that comment that what had happened here was a cover-up that was not meant to be generally known?

A. That is certainly what the committee is saying, and to that extent I saw my role as an analyst at the policy committee, admittedly in partisan circumstances, to be, so to speak, dusting the fingerprints that the administration had sought to conceal.

Q. This had to be discovered rather than be declared by the government?

A. It had to be discovered initially through press reports so that it became a political issue which then was one that was focused on by the relevant congressional committees.

Q. Yes. If we turn to page 204, because this might be of importance: "At the time the administration was making high-minded arguments about the need to respect both internationally agreed upon rules ³²⁶²⁸ and US allies, it was working assiduously behind the scenes to undermine them."

And was that the issue here, that what was happening was in fact not something that was official policy, nor policy that had been recognised as a valid and appropriate policy through the allies of the US?

A. Well, certainly, and this relates to a characterisation you made earlier that this somehow was not official policy. Clearly all those engaged in the policy were themselves government officials and had the power, if not the authority, to undertake what they did. At least in American law, one of the questions would be was this technically a covert operation? What laws and reporting requirements was it subject to? It certainly was not one, though, that, as a policy matter and as a matter of our alliance obligations was discussed with our allies or other partners in the international community, except obviously the countries involved.

Q. And did the committee point out a number of public statements that were made by administration officials which were in fact found to have been not true; they were deceptions?

A. That's what the committee suggests, yes.

Q. And presumably you were aware of these public statements by officials yourself whilst undergoing your analysis?

A. Yes.

Q. Secretary of State Warren Christopher: "The United States is not, underline not, covertly supplying arms or supporting the supply of arms to the Bosnian government."

National Security Council: "The US did not cooperate, coordinate, ³²⁶²⁹ or consult with any other government regarding the provision of arms to the Bosnians. We have always made clear that we were abiding by the arms embargo and that we expected other countries to do as well." Again, department of state in response to questioning: "We are certainly not contributing to it and we are certainly not turning a blind eye," the blind eye being what was known and what was happening in Bosnia?

A. That's correct. And again, Mr. Kay, I would point out that the committee is very selective in its choice of revelations on this matter, that here, when it refers to Iranian influence, they're quite free in exposing the fraudulent denials by administration officials, but, for example, regarding the numerous reports received by -- numerous reports by allied officers in Bosnia regarding flights landing at Tuzla for making deliveries, this is addressed in both the House and Senate reports simply by way of asking the relevant agencies if they knew anything about them, receiving denials, and accepting those denials.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Flights from where?

THE WITNESS: We don't know. You all I can say is, again, not as a matter of direct knowledge, but as an analyst following these reports, some of these are described in the committee report and specifically in the Senate report, which I guess has not been entered into the record, the committees make note of these reports, describe who the officers were making the reports and then show what action they took, which was to inquire of the intelligence community and the Pentagon, receiving denials and accepting those denials. So as I say, they're somewhat selective, it seems to me, in deciding which administration assurances they consider to ³²⁶³⁰ be lies and which ones they consider to be the truth.

MR. KAY:

Q. Well, the issue of the denials and what happened went all the way to the top, didn't it, because President Clinton, in response to a question: If the US was involved in orchestrating the transfer of arms to the Bosnian Muslims, said no?

A. I will not comment on Mr. Clinton's reputation for veracity.

Q. These sources are samples, aren't they, of the denials that you've talked about and were all in various public documents and they're in fact noted in this report?

A. That's correct. And you can see some of them are simply cited to media reports.

Q. In section 7, the administration was criticised for deliberately concealing the truth from Congress regarding the president's Iranian green light decision, and it stated: "Despite protests to the contrary, in the early months of this investigation, deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, recently submitted to the subcommittee that the administration had intentionally not told Congress of the green light it gave Iran in the Balkans."

A. I'm sorry, Mr. Kay. Where are you looking at here?

Q. Section 7, page 205.

A. Okay. Yes. Yes. That is what the committee found.

Q. So this committee was also being misled. There was the misleading beforehand and then there's the misleading to the Congress committee?

A. It was both public false denials and denials to the relevant ³²⁶³¹ congressional committees.

Q. Section 8: "Several administration officials gave false testimony to Congress on the development and implementation of the Iranian green light policy."

A. Yes. And in fact, there was a cover letter to this report, one that was submitted to the administration, asking for a justice department investigation of several of these officials. It was responded to by a letter from Attorney General Reno at the time, who found there was no grounds for such investigation.

Q. The Congress committee required Ambassador Galbraith be investigated?

A. They requested it.

Q. Yes. But Attorney General Reno did not proceed?

A. She did not.

Q. But the select subcommittee said it was truly disturbed that it received testimony and statements from the National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, deputy National Security Advisor Samual Sandy Berger, deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Ambassador Walker, that directly contradicts Ambassador Peter Galbraith's sworn testimony with respect to material issues before the subcommittee and Congress."

A. That's what the committee found, yes.

Q. "The subcommittee is further dismayed that sworn testimony provided Ambassadors Peter Galbraith and Charles Redman, both before the House International Relations Committee and the select subcommittee is not supported by evidence uncovered through this investigation." ³²⁶³² Are you able to help what that is about?

A. Again, not beyond what is stated in the committee report.

Q. Right. In section 9, it says: "Evidence that Ambassador Galbraith played a significant supervisory role with respect to at least one Iranian weapons transhipment shipment through Croatia. Galbraith's goal in facilitating this transhipment was to effect political and military conditions in Bosnia. There is also evidence that he had input or advanced knowledge of the planning and operation of the Iranian weapons pipeline that Iran used to ship arms and gain influence in the embattled Balkans."

A. Yes. And again, that's in the context of the conclusion there in number 9 --

Q. Yes.

A. -- that this may have been a covert operation which has specific consequences in American law.

Q. 11, and this is the last passage I'll deal with in this report: "The administration is holding its embarrassment behind the veil of classification."

A. Well, you'll see there are a lot of blacked-out sections of the report.

Q. Well, that's all we need deal with on that issue. And I'll move on in your evidence now to --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, your lawyer has been spending the last two hours wasting time, without allowing the witness in ³²⁶³³ actual fact to broach the main subjects that he has direct knowledge of and that he worked and was involved in. And the witness himself said yesterday when he mentioned Al Qaeda and the global network, in respect of Kosovo and Bosnia and so on --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I've stopped you because we have a procedure that we will follow. You do not set the procedure here. The Chamber sets it. And the procedure is that Mr. Kay is now examining. When he has finished, I will invite you, as I have done before, to consider asking us to allow you to put questions. That would be the appropriate time. Mr. Kay, please continue.

MR. KAY: And on one matter, Your Honour, as it does need to be addressed: I am here and ready to take instructions from the accused if and when he chooses to do so. I have been put in this position as a result of what has happened in this case, where he has been found unfit, through medical reasons, to represent himself, and without his instructions, I am attempting to put his case as we can see from his opening, from his own cross-examination previously, on the issues in this trial. And documents and exhibits that are produced from his witnesses, which have been made available by his team and have been disclosed in this case are the only materials that I have to go on. And in those circumstances, I have to use my judgement on those materials as the best way to deal with them. And some of the issues raised this morning, it seemed to us, were relevant and pertinent to his defence, because his cross-examination has been on the lines of the Iranian influence in Bosnia, the Mujahedin, and this is a public document that this witness was ³²⁶³⁴ producing on his behalf as part of his Defence Exhibit material. Now, the witness went on to deal with Al Qaeda and the other terrorist organisations and has been at pains to point out that this is all from his own research, and he wasn't there at the time, and this is as far as it can go. There are other issues about the credibility of those dealing with Mr. Milosevic, and this issue also goes to the US administration at the time, about which we've heard a lot said, and about their comments concerning Mr. Milosevic.

So for those reasons, I have embarked on this line of cross-examination, doing my best, without instructions from him. But he's willing to appoint his own lawyer as the order makes entirely clear, and we would encourage that. We have not volunteered for the role that we have been given, but in the circumstances, it seemed appropriate that we were the team to have to pick it up.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. The Chamber finds no fault with the way that you are examining the witness. The Chamber recognises the difficulty. The situation would have been much better had the accused given you instructions, and the accused will not be allowed to interrupt the examination-in-chief. If he wishes, he can instruct you. And again, if he wishes, he can, at the end, invite us to consider allowing him to put questions. And that's the procedure which we will follow. Please proceed.

MR. NICE: On an entirely separate point, Mr. Kay having indicated that he's finished the questions he wants to ask about this document, the Chamber will remember observations made yesterday by me challenging the ^{32635 BLANK PAGE 32636} admissibility of the document. I think the Court was very careful in the way it invited the document to be dealt with, it not yet having formally being admitted as an exhibit. Our objections to its admissibility stand. In our submission, this is a document that cannot assist the Chamber at all. It certainly can't support any factual findings of the matters concluded by the committee, nor can it be relied upon, in our submission, to undermine the evidence, for example, of Mr. Galbraith. I will say no more by way of repetition of my objection. It's entirely a matter for the Chamber. Our position is that this is not an exhibit which should be admitted in this trial.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will deal with it at the end, but I just pause to say that in my own view, it is very relevant to the case put forward by the accused in cross-examination as to the help that the Muslims received from Iran.

MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will deal with it at the appropriate time.

MR. KAY: Much obliged.

Q. Looking at the other exhibits that you've produced, Mr. Jatras, document number 2, we've considered already, and in it you told the Court in evidence yesterday about how you were looking at the other side, the extra support outside Iran that there had been to the Bosnian government from other Islamic sources. Is that right?

A. That is correct.

Q. And we also touched on that a moment ago in your evidence, and I have no need to take that document any further. And we shall now move to ³²⁶³⁷ Kosovo.

I've got an order here, which is not my order, how they came to me, and I won't deviate from it because I don't know if there is any great significance. But it's not quite chronological. Document 3 that we look at is dated March the 31st, 1999, and it's headed: "The Kosovo liberation army: Does Clinton policy support group with terror, drug ties?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that a document written by you?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. And again, that is in your function as advising the Republican policy committee on international relations?

A. That is correct. If I could put that into context. This paper dated March 31st, 1999, while the Kosovo war was under way, was the last of four papers I issued on that topic. Two other ones, dated February 22nd and March 23rd, are also in this group of exhibits here. For some reason, the other paper that is also cited on page 1 of the March 31st paper and in the other two as well was the first paper of the series, dated August 12th, I believe, 1998. I will, of course, comment on these other papers as well, starting with the one you have referred to, but the August 1998 paper is the one I believe is most significant and relevant to the case, in that it describes, in direct terms, the preparedness of the Clinton Administration to attack Serbia in the very near future. As it turned out, six months later. That description was two months prior to the date given in the indictment relevant to Kosovo, that there came into being, it is alleged, a joint criminal enterprise ³²⁶³⁸ regarding Kosovo.

Again, as I've stated with respect to my other papers, they are significant not because they can be taken as direct evidence of the matters described in the paper, but the papers themselves are direct contemporaneous, official assessments about the course of American policy at that time from someone in the American government.

Q. Let's start there, then, and I have not been given, and we were not supplied with that earlier paper in 1998. But you can tell us now, then, going back a year, what the issues were that you uncovered.

A. Well, the paper, which again you see the title of it here.

Q. Yes.

A. On the paper you're referring to, the March 31st paper.

Q. Yes.

A. It's about three-quarters of the way down the page. It says: "Bosnia II: The Clinton Administration sets course for NATO intervention in Kosovo, August 12th, 1998." I do have copies of that paper, for whatever use you may put them to.

Q. If I could have a copy of it now.

A. Certainly. And I have one for the Prosecution if they would like one.

Q. The Judges would obviously need one as well. So --

A. Well, maybe someone should make some copies.

Q. Thank you.

A. Thank you.

MR. KAY: If you could make copies. ³²⁶³⁹

A. Again, I don't know how you want to proceed, Mr. Kay, whether we should come back to that paper after copies --

MR. KAY:

Q. Let's start with it there. You're familiar with it and you can tell us about it.

A. Yes. To summarise what is asserted in that paper at that time, August of 1998, and the reason the paper is titled "Bosnia II" is that it was clear to me as an analyst at that time, and it was clear to me, I contend it should have been clear to others, that the administration had made a decision to intervene militarily in Kosovo, either by creating circumstances where Serbia would consent to an occupation of Kosovo or through undertaking military action to bring about that result, and as I then describe in the later papers, simply the implementation of that plan. Even as of August of 1998, I was able to assert, and I think it turns out, quite accurately, that that course had been decided upon, and the only thing lacking in implementing that course was a suitable trigger, as I refer to it in the paper, quoting an unnamed defence department official mentioned in a Washington Post article I believe in June or July of 1998. So I would say even that plan may have been decided upon by the administration even earlier.

The reason I called it "Bosnia II" was that it seemed to me it had all the hallmarks of what we had seen in Bosnia; that is to say, taking a very, very complex, very messy conflict with lots of blame to go around and boiling it down to a morality play, where we had good guys and bad guys. With the evil Serbs and the saintly Albanians and naturally the ³²⁶⁴⁰ United States would be on the side of the angels. This entailed other things which I also stated in the August 1998 report and mentioned in the subsequent reports a -- I believe a whitewashing of the character of the Kosovo liberation army, which had been called by American officials, specifically by Robert Gelbard had been described as a terrorist organisation, although it was never, as far as I know, officially listed as one. But if you're going to embark on an invention of claimed humanitarian grounds based on a very stacked presentation of the equities, you have to overlook certain things on the -- with respect to your chosen beneficiary.

As I say, I think the evidentiary value is this: You have an official source saying: Six months before the attack came, that there would be an attack, and two months before a joint criminal enterprise supposedly came into existence, which I believe lends credibility to what would -- what would be understood as the normal business of a government, which is to protect its territory and people, not to formulate plans for criminal activities.

Q. In relation to the Kosovo policy, did you write at all about the extent, how wide the intervention was going to be?

A. I did not. I described the military planning that had taken place up to that time and what appeared to be getting the political machinery in place for proceeding with the intervention. And this was something that primarily related to our NATO allies and what essentially appeared to be a negotiation between our allies and Washington over their reluctance to support air strikes and their insistence that Americans provide a major ³²⁶⁴¹ part of the manpower to be part of the occupation force when the occupation would begin.

Q. We know that in October of 1998 that there was a cease-fire that was brokered between the KLA and the Serbian government.

A. Yes. The so-called Holbrooke/Milosevic agreement.

Q. Yes. You've dealt with so far the period before then. In terms of the KLA and its influence, as you were able to see on the political machinery in Washington --

A. Yes.

Q. -- was there anything you were able to observe?

A. I'm not -- you're saying the influence of the KLA in Washington?

Q. Yes.

A. I would say this: The Albanian cause in Kosovo, which I don't dispute the validity of in the sense that every nation, every people has its right to its own perspective on matters, clearly had strong support in Washington, but I would say that also extended to a very dismissive attitude toward serious and I would say credible reports of the character of that specific organisation. These are the ones that I gave fullest description to, you can see in numerous, numerous quotes from those sources, in the March 31st paper, that the Kosovo liberation army was substantially, in its leadership, a criminal organisation, let's say tied to Albanian organised crime throughout Europe, really, and also that it had links to terrorist influences, both Iranian and also Al Qaeda, the same kind of people we saw getting their assets into Bosnia during the Bosnian war. ³²⁶⁴²

Q. In the same way that we dealt with issues yesterday concerning Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia and American perceptions of Serbia, in relation to Kosovo at this time, was there an understanding of the significance of Kosovo to the Serbian people, its historical, cultural, and its root, if you like, with the Serbian people?

A. I would on occasion hear people ask questions about that. Again, as an analyst at the policy committee, I would often receive inquiries from Senate offices, generally from staff, but I was on occasion able to brief senators on it who would ask me, you know, who are these people, what is this place, what are the Serbs' interests here, what is the Albanian interest, and so forth. In general, though, given the degree to which Serb had become almost a synonym for some kind of a -- you know, it was almost used like a word like Nazi or something. You couldn't describe in many circles a Serb interest or a Serb perspective on a matter having to do with potential violence in Yugoslavia without immediately decrediting [sic] your argument. In fact, I should note that in preparing my reports I did not use Serb sources for the simple reason that they would be immediately considered discredited. I could possibly use Muslim sources or Croatian sources, certainly European or American sources, but a Serb source was automatically not admissible in that political context.

Q. We've all now got this document. I've just written an 8 on it to indicate in the chain where it lies. And that might be a useful way of having it. August 12th, 1998, was there any misrepresentation of the sort of organisation the KLA was?

A. I wouldn't say so much a misrepresentation of saying the KLA is ³²⁶⁴³ not a criminal organisation, the KLA does not have terrorist ties, but rather a default assumption that the Albanian cause is a just one, they're freedom fighters are freedom fighters and nothing more needs to be said about it except that Mr. Milosevic and the Serbs are clearly the bad guys and we must do something. And again, I think some of those quotes along those lines are given in the paper itself from the Clinton officials. If you look on page 3, for example, that there's a quote from Ambassador Holbrooke, and I think there's another one on page 4 from Secretary Albright. The thesis being that the Serbs - let's say Mr. Milosevic - cannot do what they did in Bosnia, again giving their interpretation of what was done in Bosnia, they cannot now do this in Kosovo, and we are now going to do something about it. That doesn't entail a direct representation or misrepresentation of the Kosovo liberation army. It simply ignores the question.

Q. There's a paragraph headed "whitewashing the KLA."

A. Yes.

Q. And in the second part, you refer to media reports of recent embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania may be connected to the deportation from Albania of several members of the terrorist cell of Osama bin Laden.

A. Yes.

Q. Were the Al Qaeda links to the KLA something that had been observed and pointed out? Were they noted?

A. Certainly in that article, and again I would refer you to the March 31st paper, and I would not go beyond those reports, again to accept the Prosecution's point, I have no direct knowledge of the accuracy of ³²⁶⁴⁴ those reports. On the other hand, I do have direct knowledge that those reports from credible sources were available, certainly they were available to the administration, and there's no evidence the administration took them seriously. I would also note in retrospect, for example, we have a gentleman down in Guantanamo, Mr. Hicks from Australia, who fought in Kosovo before he was arrested fighting with the Taliban against the Americans in Afghanistan. I suggest that a Taliban-oriented Australian didn't end up in Kosovo fighting for the Albanian cause because he was recruited by the Salvation Army.

Q. Let's go now to the next paper, which we had begun to look at, paper 3, March 31st, 1999. Again, you're writing about the KLA and here tying it in with drug dealing, terror organisations. Is this again information that was being made available in Washington?

A. Well, it was being certainly made available in my report, and given the dates of the sources cited in there, which are not classified or secret sources, they were available to anybody who cared to compile the information. I would note that this report was issued while the war was under way and that the previous reports were issued before the war actually started.

Q. And again it points out the Mujahedin and the other aspects, the same aspects you've referred to in Bosnia as having been present in Kosovo.

A. That's right. And if I can characterise what we saw from the green light episode in Bosnia as a reckless disregard for the consequences of such associations. I think the same thing could apply here, noting, by ³²⁶⁴⁵ the way, that the reports refer to KLA violence against Albanians as well as against Serbs, and I would say given what happened in Kosovo as of June 1999, when the Serbian forces were withdrawn and the cleansing of Serbs that occurred in Kosovo, I would say that the reports that I sought to draw attention to were very much vindicated.

Q. Document 4, dated February the 22nd, "Clinton Kosovo intervention appears imminent." This is a follow-on from the earlier article you had written in 1998, when you indicated, on the 12th of August, what the policy was going to be. And was this your characterisation of the issues that were involved in terms of US foreign policy?

A. That is correct. And one thing I would note in there is that ten days - excuse me - on -- this was issued on February 22nd.

Q. Yes.

A. If you look -- there is a report - excuse me - a hearing in the House of Representatives on February 10th that I cited in there in which a senior Defence department official, Walter Slocombe, was already referring to KFOR by its acronym at that time. So even though supposedly we did not have a Kosovo force until June of 1999, when Serbian forces were withdrawn from Kosovo, at least by well over a month before the war began, the military planning had gone so far as to even have the name of the force we were going to insert into Kosovo once the occupation began.

Q. Document 5, March 23rd: "Senate to vote today on preventing funding, military operations for Kosovo." A paper in this series dealing mainly again with what these issues were, but looking at the so-called trigger event of Racak; is that right? ³²⁶⁴⁶

A. Yes. And I would say this is one of the more significant matters I would like to point out in these papers, which, as I again remind the Court, are contemporaneous, official documents.

In August of 1998, I had said that this was essentially ready to go, this was a course that the administration had decided upon and they were lacking only a trigger, some event that would make the operation politically saleable. And I even said in that August 1998 paper that they would do so on the same, I would say, cavalier basis that they used in -- cavalier with regard to the facts, that they used in Bosnia regarding the market-place and the breadline massacres. That is to say, there are events that occur in war that are often at the time very difficult to know precisely what happened. Even when investigation is given, it's hard to know what is happening sometimes. You never know precisely what had happened. That did not change the political utility of such events for the Clinton Administration. As Secretary Albright commented with regard to one of the market-place massacres, so-called Serb mortar massacres, that we don't know exactly what the facts are; therefore, we must believe the Serbs are responsible.

This violates not only all laws of logic; I believe it may violate the laws of grammar in the English language, to say "we don't know, therefore."

I think the same pattern as I predicted in August of 1998 was followed with respect to Racak. As I discuss in some length in the March 23rd paper, which was issued the day before the bombing began, it was very unclear from the information available at that time what exactly ³²⁶⁴⁷ had happened at Racak and that the forensic team, headed by Dr. Ranta had pointedly said: "We cannot say whether there was a massacre at Racak." Maybe there was. I don't know. I wasn't at Racak. I don't know if now, years after the event, anybody is in a position to say with certainty precisely what happened at Racak.

The point is that in terms of political intention to move forward with a predetermined plan to attack Serbia, Racak was politically useful and Racak became what the Clinton Administration said it was. If they immediately want to say it was the massacre of an entire village at point-blank range, forced to kneel, et cetera, et cetera, as I have quoted Mr. Clinton and Senator Biden in my paper, that's what it was because it was useful for pursuing a course of attack that they had previously determined upon.

Q. Document number 6 is a text of a speech you gave on the Balkan war, finding an honourable exit. I don't know actually seek to go through this. I don't know whether you may be questioned on it or whatever, but it doesn't have anything here further than your testimony has been already; is that right?

A. I would take it as -- again, this is not an official document. It is a speech given at a public policy institute, a think-tank in Washington, in which I refer to the documents. I think it is possibly useful as a summary of my description of the significance of the documents plus some other material regarding Rambouillet and other aspects that I think buttress my claim made six months prior to the war that the administration had already determined upon this course and well before, it ³²⁶⁴⁸ appears, the allegation of a joint criminal enterprise took place. I would say that there are other -- for example, the famous paragraph 8 of annex B to the agreement that was discussed at Rambouillet where it appears that we were demanding not only occupation of Kosovo but all of Yugoslavia. And that, you know, there are other indications we can go into as well, but perhaps not necessary at this time.

JUDGE KWON: CATO is an acronym of what institute?

THE WITNESS: CATO. It is a think-tank. It is -- it has its name, the CATO institute. It is one of the libertarian political orientation generally that supports a fairly non-interventionist perspective on foreign policy.

JUDGE KWON: It is the abbreviation of what letters?

THE WITNESS: It evidently is not an abbreviation. It's just CATO, yes. I've wondered about that myself.

MR. KAY:

Q. You mention Rambouillet and in this paper, I mean, I'll look at it as you've mentioned it. I have it on good authority, and I'm looking here at page 3 of the document, in the middle, "I have it on good authority that one senior administration official told media at Rambouillet under embargo, we intentionally set the bar too high for the Serbs to comply. They need some bombing and that's what they're going to get."

A. Yes. And when I --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between question and answer. Thank you.

A. ³²⁶⁴⁹

THE WITNESS: Yes, I will pause between question and answer. As I stated there, "I have it on good authority," that is to say, from confidential sources, not confidential in the sense of classified, but confidential in the sense of people I know who were in a position to know and rather would not identify themselves, that this had been said by a senior official, and I think it's -- whether it was said or not, it certainly describes the situation that I think must be universally acknowledged to have existed, where a country is presented with a demand for occupation of its entire territory or to be attacked militarily. I don't know how one could describe that as not setting the bar too high, unless a country didn't consider occupation to be out of bounds.

Q. Let's look at the last document, number 7. It hadn't been one I was going to rely on with any particular detail. We don't have the date because the photocopy cut it off. It's the Navy Times, August 21st nineteen-ninety something or other.

A. Yes. Well, 1995. 1995.

Q. Is it 1995?

A. Yes.

Q. Right. It was faxed on the 25th of August, 2004?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there any significance in this newspaper extract from Navy Times that you wish to draw to the Court's attention?

A. Only this, and again, I would agree with you, Mr. Kay, that it should not be given great weight because I'm not able to say in great detail what its significance is, and my direct observations on it would ³²⁶⁵⁰ be -- direct knowledge about it would be fairly limited. But let me describe it as follows: If you look at the Kosovo war, as was initiated by the Clinton Administration, the legal grounds for it is extremely limited, slim to none, I would say. We did not get -- we, the Clinton Administration, did not get a Security Council resolution authorising it. It did not even get an authorisation from our own Congress. In fact, a resolution of authorisation was affirmatively voted down in the House of Representatives. We did secure an agreement of the North Atlantic Council, again on what basis it's hard to say, in that the North Atlantic Treaty refers only to the defence of the territory of member states and the right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN charter, none of which were at issue in Kosovo. The only thing that could possibly be said for the Kosovo operation - and again, the legal authority for this, I'm still not sure of - would be that it was necessary to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, that human rights were so violated on such a massive scale, or potentially would be, that some action was necessary.

Again, laying aside whether the humanitarian catastrophe ensued after the initiation or when the initiation of hostilities was imminent and was itself among the proximate causes of that humanitarian catastrophe --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down. Thank you.

A. -- was among the causes of that humanitarian catastrophe, my purpose in mentioning that report or alluding to it in my CATO remarks was that with respect to Krajina, the Clinton Administration was seemingly ³²⁶⁵¹ less fastidious about the massive humanitarian hardship when, even in cases where it may have had some direct connection to the infliction of that hardship.

This report in the Navy Times, which is a non-official publication but one that is widely read in military circles and in government, refers to air strikes that were directed against Serbian positions in Krajina during Operation Storm. The article refers to strikes against radars. It suggests that carrier-based planes were asked to come to the scene because Pakistani peacekeepers were receiving artillery fire from the Croatian forces, although that's not stated, and that when they came to the scene, Serbian radar locked on to them and they struck at those radar sites. The reason that struck me as significant is it was known from the Serbian side that there were false broadcasts, what we would describe as Si ops, to sow panic among their forces and population and to encourage them to leave flee the scene and flee Krajina. Striking transmitters would have been greatly -- a facilitation of such broadcasts. Inquiry was made, not official inquiry but rather on the part of a retired officer with experience in Vietnam and knowing something from a professional standpoint about the use of air power, that official happened to be my father, as it happens, who called the Congress, talked to people at the Pentagon and ultimately to people at Air South in Naples asking about this report and trying to get a little more information. The response he received was essentially that it was a mistake. There were no such planes, no such operation, nothing happened. It was a mistake. Given the names in the article, the names of the ship, the names ³²⁶⁵² of the flight leader, the specifics of the aircraft, it is hard to believe that the entire report is simply a mistake, it didn't happen. I just throw that out there, mention that in the CATO or alluded to it in the CATO remarks, for what it is worth, as an indication given the kind of falsity the Clinton Administration was capable of pedalling on the other matters we've discussed in Kosovo and Bosnia, that their humanitarian claims should also be taken with a great deal of scepticism.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly request that the speaker slow down.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, you are asked to slow down.

THE WITNESS: I think I'm asked to slow down.

MR. KAY: I have no further questions to ask you, but wait there, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, do you wish to invite us to consider allowing you to put questions to this witness? Yes or no. Did you hear the question, Mr. Milosevic?

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that Mr. Milosevic is waiting for the end of the translation.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Okay.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As I was saying, that was the end of the interpretation.

Mr. Robinson, there's no sense to this. Mr. Kay himself explained that he was not able to examine --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I've cut you off. I asked you for a yes or a no answer. ^{32653 BLANK PAGE 32654} Mr. Nice.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My answer is this: I want you to return my right to self-defence back to me.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice. Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Mr. Jatras, just a few preliminary questions to make sure I understand where we are.

Did you go to the former Yugoslavia at all in the course of the period with which we are concerned?

A. On one occasion during the Kosovo war, I accompanied a congressional delegation to Macedonia to visit the refugees there, also to Albania.

Q. That was the only occasion, was it?

A. That is correct.

Q. Do you speak the language?

A. I do not.

Q. The visit to Macedonia, I suppose, may lie behind an observation you've made about refugees stating that they had fled either because of the activity of the Serbs in Kosovo or because of the NATO bombing; correct?

A. Actually, no. I was -- again, let me pause. It's contrary to my nature. Actually, no. I was citing -- I was taking those from press reports.

Q. Very well. So I'm just trying to clear the decks a little bit. It appears you have, therefore, nothing by way of actual, direct evidence ³²⁶⁵⁵ coming from the territory that you can help us with?

A. I have nothing, actual, direct evidence coming from the territory. My direct evidence is solely that within the government and the thinking in the government in Washington.

Q. You have expressed and indeed been allowed to express conclusions, including general observations on the integrity of the Clinton Administration and indeed the honesty of its president. But this material comes to you simply from public-source material?

A. That is correct.

Q. Insofar as you have had some access in your job to confidential material, you've cut it out from consideration, so that all you're telling us is conclusions that anybody else could have reached having access to the same public material?

A. That is correct.

Q. You're currently a lawyer for the first time -- first time practicing as a lawyer. How long is that?

A. Just over two years.

Q. But you've made some references to legal issues here. You bring no legal expertise at all to the evidence you've given?

A. I would say to the extent to which I had a legal education, my service with the State Department and with the Senate was informed by that background and education, but no, that is not a specifically legal perspective on the issues.

Q. You realise there are different provisions for expert witnesses that prepare reports? ³²⁶⁵⁶

A. Absolutely. And I'm not here as an expert witness.

Q. And you're not here as an expert witness as a lawyer, you're also not here as an expert witness in any other capacity because you don't pretend to any special expertise on the matters about which you've been giving evidence?

A. I would not accept that exactly. I would claim expertise on the formulation and implementation of American policy as I have practiced it during certainly my 17 and a half years at the Senate, as well as my experience with the foreign service. However, I am not testifying as an expert based on that experience. I'm testifying on what I knew directly -- what I knew directly was the state of knowledge or reasonable -- facts that reasonably could be understood from the perspective I had at that time, at that place.

Q. As maybe we understood it, then, we have to draw a distinction between a factual finding and the fact that reference to such a finding or reference to such a possibility was generally abroad?

A. Absolutely. And that is the distinction I've sought to make during my testimony.

Q. So just to take an absolutely straightforward example, you've rather headlined this for us: Racak, was it a massacre, was it a set-up: You are in no position to help this Chamber at all with any conclusion to that as a factual problem?

A. That is absolutely correct.

Q. Your ability is limited to saying: But there were papers being distributed about which said this and that? ³²⁶⁵⁷

A. Not exactly. I would say my expertise, and I would say it was direct expertise, was to say: What was the perspective within the American government, in an area which I have direct knowledge and some expertise, about how the Clinton Administration dealt with that question, which was as unknowable then as regarding the answers and maybe even more unknowable, given its immediacy, than it is today.

Q. Well, because I want to be quite clear about your evidence and how to address the Chamber about it in due course, that last answer rather differs from the answer a couple before, where you said that you weren't testifying as an expert based on your experience in policy and foreign service, you were testifying on what you knew directly, "What I knew directly was the state of knowledge or reasonable -- facts that reasonably could be understood from the perspective I had at that time." You see, we have to distinguish between what I accept you're giving evidence about, things that were discussed, things about which there were papers, and the application of those things that were discussed. So point number one: You've given evidence about things that were being discussed.

A. All right. Yes.

Q. You now want us to accept, I think, or in answer to my questions, you're inviting perhaps the Chamber to accept, that you can bring some expertise to bear on how those things available for discussion were relied upon by the Clinton Administration.

A. Again perhaps I'm failing to catch your distinction here. It seems to me that anyone giving direct evidence about the things that he ³²⁶⁵⁸ knows, knows things and assimilates information according to his own background experience and degree of familiarity with the events surrounding him. That is to say, I was not, you know, a bricklayer or a physician in the venue as -- in the official venue in which I found myself during the time in question, but rather, somebody who was there, present, who was aware of certain discussions, information that was available from the perspective of someone with my professional background. That is to say, when I was aware of the reports that were available on policy issues and how those reports were dealt with, I was aware of them from a perspective of a person who is himself part of the governing process in the United States, not from somebody who maybe was not familiar with these types of issues.

So my direct evidence is from the perspective of someone in a segment of the government at that time and knowing how government deals with these matters.

Q. If there's anything in the evidence that's going to be admitted along the lines of that last answer, and indeed along the lines of the last few answers of his questioning by Mr. Kay, it's material in respect of which a report would have been helpful, and in respect of which I might require time to meet the evidence in due course. We can turn to that if the Chamber is about to have a break, at a later point in time, because in any event I need to read the document that hadn't been produced in advance.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice. We'll take the break now for 20 minutes. ³²⁶⁵⁹

--- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. Before returning to this witness, I'm asked to deal with an administrative matter relating to the previous witness. Four clips from the film "Death of Yugoslavia," were played. They should have been prepared in advance as separate CDs, in accordance with the prevailing practice. It's my oversight not to have that done. They are now available. They may be given either sequential exhibit numbers or a single number, as the Court decides, probably sequential.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: That can be done later.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, thank you. It's just seemed, in case I find anything to produce for this witness --

JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll look at all the exhibits at the end.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Jatras, before turning to matters of detail, you, of course, understand, I think, that this is a Tribunal that deals with Serbs, Croatians, Albanians as defendants and has no interest in any particular ethnic group. Is that your understanding?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You do. So we are utterly unconcerned about matters of prejudice. Equally we represent and have no interest in any particular government. You understand that as well? ³²⁶⁶⁰

A. Yes, sir.

Q. We are here to uncover the truth. Before I look at matters in detail, just a couple of personalities who appeared and you might be able to help me with. First there was the person you referred to in the statement - we don't have to look at it again - the statement of yours, the person in the administration of America who told you that they had intentionally set the bar too high for the Serbs to comply. Can you tell us who that was?

A. I'm not sure. I heard it might have been Secretary Albright but I do not have the exact identity of that official.

Q. It wasn't told to you personally?

A. No. No, it was not. And I made that clear when I referred to it. It was told to me on good authority.

Q. My mistake for misinterpreting the statement which makes reference to something under embargo, and I assumed that that was the identity. But you don't actually know who, if anyone?

A. If anyone. It may not have been said. I heard from a source that I considered reliable that it was said. If you're suggesting it is mere hearsay, that's exactly right.

Q. Your source being, please? Your source, please?

A. A colleague in the House of --

Q. May we have his name?

A. If you insist upon it, yes. You do insist?

Q. I'd like to have it, unless there's any reason not to.

A. Only that the person told it to me on condition of ³²⁶⁶¹ confidentiality, with respect to his source. And I generally respect the confidentiality of people who tell me things in confidence if I consider them trustworthy individuals.

Q. I'll leave it there. But mindful of your answer that you, of course, can say nothing as to the accuracy itself of what you were told?

A. I freely concede that and did at the time I mentioned it.

Q. The second person about whom you just might be able to help me, because it came as a surprise that you mentioned him as your father. His role in this was what?

A. One of professional interest as a man who had served in a military capacity for a number of years, including flying over 100 combat missions in Vietnam, one familiar with the use of air power, and also a person concerned about the course of American policy that was, he felt, distinctly different from the values he thought he was defending in all of his years of professional military service. He simply saw the report and wanted to know more about it and its accuracy and received what he regarded and which I regard as a very implausible answer.

Q. He was simply making contact as a member of the public?

A. That's correct.

Q. No particular interest other than as a member of the public and as a former Vietnam combatant?

A. Correct. And with no particular obligation to receive any answer or effectual answer from the persons he contacted.

Q. Shall we go first to this rather substantial document, because I think we could use some of your assistance on it. You recognise of course ³²⁶⁶² that none of us has any particular expertise in the American way of government and we'll need your help. So if we go, please, to the pages just so we can understand this --

A. Yes.

Q. Literally the first page sets out, under -- or over II the select subcommittee members. That's Henry Hyde, and he I think was a Republican; is that right?

A. And he still is, yes.

Q. And Lee Hamilton who is still a Democrat?

A. Correct.

Q. And on the left we see Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Burton, Mr. Ballenger, Mr. Meyers - he was a replacement - and I think they are Republicans?

A. Yes. The way committees are organised in our Congress, the majority party always has a majority and all committees and subcommittees and controls the committees and subcommittees.

Q. And indeed we can see that at the bottom. It's sort of explained.

A. Yes.

Q. Under footnote 1?

A. And you will see of course the list of names on the left which is the majority party Republicans is longer than the list on the right, and that's true of all committees.

Q. And then so the two on the right are the Democrats, Berman, Bereuter and Hastings with, of course, Mr. Hamilton as the third Democratic member of the committee? ³²⁶⁶³

A. That's correct.

Q. I understand. Now, we've been taken through, at page 200, some conclusions. But insofar as these are fact finding conclusions they are findings of the committee, aren't they?

A. That's correct.

Q. They're not your findings?

A. That is correct.

Q. You are in no position to express any views yourself, as an individual but --

A. I am not in a position to give direct -- to say I am directly confirming what the committee found. I am able to take note of what the committee found as a responsible actor in our system of government.

Q. Yes. And of course you realise that all matters of fact here are for the Judges of course?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Could we just look, if we've got it, please, at the passage of evidence of Ambassador Galbraith. We've had evidence here from Ambassador Galbraith, as you know, and I hope it's going to appear on your screen. At a time when -- at the time when the accused was questioning Ambassador Galbraith, he said to him: "Tell me, Mr. Galbraith: You spent five years in Zagreb, according to what Chris Hedges from the New York Times says who wrote a text on the 24th of December, 1997" -- I'm so sorry. I hadn't checked that it was working.

You have a special place because you did not represent the true state of affairs of Washington and the relationship of the Serbian ³²⁶⁶⁴ authorities until the Serbs were expelled, were actually expelled from Croatia; is that right?

No. All right. And tell me this, then: John Galvin, the retired general who took part in the negotiations in Yugoslavia, together with Charles Redman, who was otherwise an expert for the so-called doctrine of low-intensity conflicts, was an advisor to Alija Izetbegovic, advisor to boot; is that right, Charles Redman, he was a US ambassador and American representative to the contact group, and I don't think he was an expert on low-intensity conflict.

All right. Tell me this, then, please: Is it true and correct that for the Iranian shipments of weapons to Bosnia-Herzegovina, that your president knew about that, Bill Clinton and that Holbrooke, in his testimony to Congress, recognised that arms were being infiltrated into Croatia from Iran?

Answer: Yes. Judge May: This is your last question. Your time is then up. And is it true and generally well known, said the accused, that you were included in the affair over the secret import and smuggling of arms into Bosnia, you were involved in that?

Answer: Well, first I was not involved in the -- in any way the smuggling of arms into Bosnia. This was the subject, this whole issue was the subject of a number of congressional hearings and reports, as well as a lot of press discussion. And what I did come out in the course of that, and it was very simple, I think it was the 28th of April, 1994, President ³²⁶⁶⁵ Tudjman asked me, as I knew he would, what would be the attitude of the United States if Croatia, if Croatia were to accede to the request from Bosnia to permit arms from Iran and from other countries to transit Croatia, to go to Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I told him, on instructions, of course, that I had no instructions, which he understood to mean that the United States did not object and indeed the arms went, shipments went forwards.

And then he goes to deal with some other matters of the Clinton Administration.

But that evidence that he's given this Court is the same account that he gave to the committee, in broad terms, and indeed we can see the letter in -- or a letter or memorandum of his in the document setting out his position; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Can we look at the next document. This one I think may be new. I haven't -- it may actually be in these 700 pages but I haven't been able to find everything yet.

This, therefore, must be produced as potentially an additional exhibit. And this is again, just so that we can see it at the best form, this is the position taken by Ambassador Galbraith before your committee -- or not your committee, the committee; correct?

A. This committee, yes.

Q. Expressing his gratitude at the opportunity to appear. I shan't read all paragraphs. But his position to your committee was: Two years ago, the Bosnian government asked the Croatian government to permit the ³²⁶⁶⁶ transit through Croatia of weapons for its beleaguered army. The principal suppliers of these arms would be Iran. The Croatian government asked for our reaction. The administration decided we wouldn't answer, and I told the Croatians I had no instructions. The Croatians understood this response and a subsequent colloquy described to you by Ambassador Redman to mean that we would not object to their role in helping the Bosnians. I believed then, and even more strongly now, that the administration made the right decision. Because of the arms, the Bosnians were able to survive. Eventually, the outside arms which came from countries -- which also came from countries other than Iran enabled the Bosnians to redress the military imbalance with the Serbs, recover some territory, and thus pave the way to Dayton.

The next paragraph he sets out casualties to date. In the following paragraph, he deals with a matter involving Ambassador Redman. He says that the Bosnian people left unarmed against the Serb aggressors had barely survived the winter of 1993/1994. Without help, we doubted they could survive another year. This was then the context for our decision.

Let me explore for a minute, said the ambassador, the consequences if we had said no. Under these circumstances, I think the very fragile Muslim-Croat Federation would have collapsed, that the Bosnians would have doubted the sincerity of their Croatian allies.

And I don't want to take too long because it's going to be available to the Judges. But if we go to the next page in the paper version, he said: "I do believe," top of the page, "a unilateral lifting ³²⁶⁶⁷ of the arms embargo would have provoked the Bosnian Serbs to move against the essentially undefended enclaves."

Now, that was his position before the committee, and again, as you see, it's the position in summary he gave before this Court.

A. Yes.

Q. And the views he expressed there, Mr. Jatras, the views about the consequences of not arming the Bosnians, were views that were indeed being considered in Washington?

A. As he states in his letter, the decision to lift the arms embargo to overtly take action to arm the Bosnian Muslims, was something that was debated. The secret arming of them via giving a green light to the Iranians, as I recall, was something that only became a matter of public debate after the press accounts began to emerge that this was going on.

Q. He, in his evidence - and indeed as we're going to see in a document - dealt with this on instructions in the oblique way of saying we have no instructions.

A. Yes. And as the committee makes clear, it was understood on the Croatian side what the meaning of that "no instructions" instruction was.

Q. Now let's go back, if we could, to the report. Because we've looked at page 200, at the conclusions, very strong conclusions of the committee. Well, it's not actually the conclusions of the committee, is it? Because although you didn't explain this, it's the conclusions of the majority?

A. Not exactly. Even though the majority has a weight in preparing the report, they generally will consult with the minority and take their ³²⁶⁶⁸ views into account. Again, I'd have to look through the committee report to see by what vote it was adopted, but you will generally see a vote in the committee to adopt the report --

Q. Can you find it for us now?

A. Well, I don't know. I'd have to look through this rather lengthy document.

Q. We can perhaps come to it in another way, I suspect. Because you can help us with the way of government in America. This is a fact-finding committee, composed of members of Congress?

A. Correct.

Q. Senators?

A. No.

Q. Congressmen?

A. House members. Excuse me, sir. There is also a Senate report which I also cited in my January paper, which evidently is not in evidence. I can give that to you if you want.

Q. Is it -- even in a fact-finding exercise, is it common for a committee to divide entirely on political lines? Is that what happens?

A. Again, without looking at this record, I do not know that the committee did divide on political lines.

Q. Okay. Because --

A. By the way, if it did, there would be a substantial -- well, if you look on page --

Q. We're going to come to it in a minute.

A. All right. ³²⁶⁶⁹

Q. Before we do, can we, in order to go through the document in a methodical way, just look at page 220. The Judges may find this helpful in the setting of the evidence in this trial, because this particular document, although it's been subject to redaction, no doubt, for reasons of sensitivity of confidential material, is a memorandum of Ambassador Galbraith, contemporaneously 1994, and again, setting out, we needn't go through it all, the same account, the account of saying that they had no -- he being instructed they had no position to say no and therefore replying that the answer was they had no instructions. Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. So that's --

A. I'm sorry. I'm not keeping up with your reading as quickly as you're going through it.

Q. Page 220, if you can find it.

A. Yes. I've got it.

Q. So this particular document from Ambassador Galbraith --

A. Memorandum to file.

Q. Thank you very much. Consistent with his evidence here. Would you like to turn over to the following page, please, which is number 223. Now, this is minority views.

A. Yes.

Q. And we see this is submitted by Messrs. Hamilton, Burman and Hastings, who were of course the three Democratic members; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So we haven't yet found the vote. You may be able to find that ³²⁶⁷⁰ for us; I don't know. But if we then turn over to the following pages, to guide the Judges through the immediate following pages through this very substantial document should they want to find anything else in it, we see there's an index, and that's an index, isn't it, starting at page 226, for the minority's views?

A. That is correct.

Q. Very well. So in fact the minority published an extensive report. This isn't a partially dissenting view. This is a full dissent, effectively?

A. Yes.

Q. So if we could turn now to page 232, the page numbering is a bit confusing, Mr. Jatras. It changes part way through and we can deal with that, but at the moment we're still on the same sequence of page numbers. The executive summary sets out how the House of Representatives voted to establish and fund this committee. Next paragraph, authorised to investigate and report. Next paragraph, following minority views to the report of the select committee, based on a thorough review of thousands of pages of classified and unclassified materials made available by the department of state and defence, the CIA, National Security Council, as well as press reports and so on.

Then it sets out the legislative history. Then we go to page 234, go through treatment of confidential and classified information. And then at 236, we come to the summary of the key findings and conclusions of the minority members who happen to be the three Democrats. And I read the sum in any event of what's here as the conclusions ^{32671 BLANK PAGE 32672} the majority have been read out: "The central issues of the select subcommittee investigation include whether the United States government ordered, organised, or otherwise encouraged, Iran or any other country to ship arms to Bosnia, whether the United States government provided a foothold for Iranian operations in Europe, whether the United States government engaged in covert action, without meeting the legal requirement to inform Congress, and how the United States policy regarding the arms embargo affected United States relations with NATO allies. The consequence of United States policy are not in dispute. In 1994, Bosnia was embroiled in a brutal war."

I move on to the end of this page, foot of this page: "Based upon the select subcommittee investigation, the minority finds that, one, from the outset of the Clinton Administration, it was United States policy neither to oppose nor support third-party arms transfers to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This policy was embodied in the no-instructions response to the Croatian government's question on the United States' view of the transhipment of arms. It served several important United States interests and helped establish conditions on the ground that pointed the way to peace. During the entire period in which the United Nations arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia was in effect, United States policy was to refrain from supplying arms to any party in the former Yugoslavia. Pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions, the United States agreed in 1992 to participate with its allies in Operation Sharp Guard for the primary purpose of interdicting contraband destined for Serbia. Beginning in January 1993, following the inauguration of President ³²⁶⁷³ Clinton, United States policy was neither to oppose nor support the shipment of arms to the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina from other countries, including Iran. In November 1994, following the enactment of the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment, United States officials informed United States allies that the United States would participate in Operation Sharp Guard for the sole purpose of interdicting contraband destined for Serbia, in compliance with the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment. The United States would take no action to interdict arms destined for Bosnia or Croatia. The no-instructions policy served important United States interests. The outgunned Bosnian Muslims received arms that helped them survive until such time as the circumstances were ripe for a negotiated peace. The United States avoided a confrontation with NATO. The peacekeeping force and humanitarian aid workers remained in Bosnia. No United States ground troops were forced into a combat situation, and conditions were established that paved the way for the Dayton peace accords in November 1995."

Over to page 238: "Throughout the period of the United States arms embargo, Iran and other Islamic countries supplied arms to the Bosnians. During the entire period, the United Nations arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia, all parties to the conflict in Bosnia received arm shipments in violation of the embargo. During the entire period of the United Nations arms embargo, the Bosnian Serb military arsenal dwarfed that of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Beginning in 1991, several Islamic countries, including Iran, began supplying arms to the Bosnian Muslim forces. The supply of arms to Bosnian Muslims declined ³²⁶⁷⁴ from summer 1993 to spring 1994, due to the war between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croat forces. The supply of arms to the Bosnian Muslims increased in spring 1994 due to the Federation agreement to end the war between Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces and the delivery of the no-instruction response. A number of Iranians in Bosnia peaked before the spring of 1994, remained constant until the Dayton peace accords, and subsequently declined to the handful that is present today." Next, the conclusions, Your Honours, go on just to the following sheet, and in fairness to all involved, I think I should probably read them.

Conclusion 3 of the minority: "The United States took no action to aid arms transfers to the former Yugoslavia. At no time did any United States government official take any action to supply arms to any country or entity covered by the UN arms embargo. At no time did any United States government official undertake any covert action to supply arms to any country or entity covered by the embargo or to encourage, aid, or assist in the shipment or transfer of arms to any country in the former Yugoslavia. The proposal to expand the pipeline of arms destined for Bosnia through Croatia originated with Bosnian and Croatian government officials in the wake of signing the Federation agreement in March 1994. No United States government official coordinated, cooperated, conspired with, or suggested to Bosnian Muslims, the government of Croatia, or the Bosnian Croats, that the United States be asked to state its views of the transhipment of arms. United States government official directed ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith to respond that he had no ³²⁶⁷⁵ instructions, when asked for the reaction of the United States government to the transhipment of arms through Croatia to Bosnia by the government of Croatia. Ambassador Galbraith carried out his directions correctly and promptly. No-instructions response achieved United States objectives and was consistent with United States policy. Shipment of arms to Bosnia was not obstructed. The UN Security Council resolution was not violated and serious conflict with the allies was avoided.

4: United States government did not engage in any covert action and was not legally required to inform Congress of its diplomatic exchanges with governments in the region. However, Congress should have been better informed about the no-instructions exchange. Information about the shipment of arms by Iran and other Islamic countries through Croatia to Bosnia was made available to members of Congress on dozens of occasions through press reports, intelligence reports, briefings, and in connection with staff and congressional travel to Croatia. The administration responded accurately to every question from Congress about the shipment of arms to Bosnia from Iran and did not set out to mislead members of Congress. As a policy matter, however, the administration chose not to inform Congress about the delivery of the no-instructions response. The no-instructions response to the question posed by the government of Croatia was a traditional diplomatic exchange. The administration does not routinely disclose to Congress sensitive diplomatic exchanges between ambassadors in foreign governments. The failure of the administration to inform Congress formally about the exchange among Ambassador Galbraith and Special Envoy Redman and a senior ³²⁶⁷⁶ official of the government of Croatia is not a violation of United States law. As a matter of policy, the administration should have considered informing selected members of Congress about the delivery, the no-instructions response.

THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down, Mr. Nice. Thank you.

MR. NICE: -- conclusions.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, you're being asked to slow down.

MR. NICE: I apologise. There are a few more headlined conclusions, Mr. Jatras. If you think that in fairness to the position that you've expressed, you'd like any of them read in full, just say so. The headlines are, 5: "The impact on the Iranian arms shipment on the security, United States military and civilian personnel was minimal." Conclusion 6: "The impact of Iranian arms shipments on United States allied relations." 7: "The executive branch has acted properly in reviewing actions by United States officials and in responding to inquiries from Congress concerning the arms transfers." 8: "Lapses in communication and coordination among United States government officials in Zagreb and Washington led to confusion and erroneous impressions about United States policy among some United States government officials."

Q. And then it turns to a summary of the investigation. So what we see, Mr. Jatras, is that this very substantial document actually presents the views of five men, on the one side, and the view of three on the other. Is that correct?

A. To a great extent, that is correct, unless, as I say, and I have ³²⁶⁷⁷ not been able to find it, I find the margin by which this committee report was issued, which has a bearing on it.

Q. Mr. Jatras, if you find it and I haven't managed to dig it out in the time available, I shall be only too indebted to you.

A. Yes.

Q. We'll just look at a few more passages in this document, maybe, to get the picture. If you'd be good enough to go to --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, may I just ask: To whom does this report go?

THE WITNESS: Well, it is sent initially to the administration. It would be, in fact, there is a letter here, I believe, that would be the issuance letter.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Is there any greater significance attached to the majority view than to the minority view?

THE WITNESS: Generally, yes. The committee report is generally to be considered the majority report, and the minority report is what it suggests itself as being, is the view of the minority. They're both accorded great weight, but the majority vote is usually considered "the committee report," with the dissenting views of the minority. And that's true regardless of which party is in the majority.

JUDGE ROBINSON: So the report is the report of the majority with the minority expressing their --

THE WITNESS: Yes. And together they can be considered the report, but generally greater weight is given to the majority report. Again, as I mentioned to Mr. Nice, I would want to see how -- remember, ³²⁶⁷⁸ this is a report of just a subcommittee, a select subcommittee, within the International Relations Committee, which has a far larger membership. And I do not see anything here in this tome that suggests how that was voted out of committee and whether it was a straight party-line vote, which it may well have been, or whether it was different from that.

MR. NICE:

Q. We've seen that the minority's view is headed on a piece of paper with the three minority names, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And I mean this is not a legal document. This is in part a fact-finding document, isn't it?

A. Yes. It is a fact-finding document from a legislative body, correct.

Q. And I mean again, I don't want to make an obvious point, but America is different from other countries. We know that courts sometimes divide on apparently political lines, but fact-finding bodies by juries have to be unanimous, don't they?

A. In most cases, yes. Actually, under our system, not in all cases, but generally.

Q. If we look at page 205 just very briefly. Part of the minority's finding, the last part of 205: "The minority concludes, had it not been for this rampant speculative reporting, the May 1994 convoy would not have been -- would have been no more significant than the thousands of other convoys that traversed the region during the war." Then this: "The allegations of misconduct and possible covert action were wholly ³²⁶⁷⁹ unsupported by any evidence and should not have been accorded the level of significance that was afforded them. The minority also believes" --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, is it not 250?

MR. NICE: I'm so sorry. It's page 467 at the top and the numbering has then changed at the bottom. I think what happened was that the minority report was presented as a separate document with its own sequential page numbering. And it was then integrated into this single document, and so at this page we have two numbers. I'm so sorry. 467 at the top, 205 at the bottom.

Q. And I've been reading from the last paragraph, and I can take the second and third sentences: "The allegations of misconduct and possible covert action were wholly unsupported by any evidence and should not have been accorded the level of significance that was afforded them. The minority also believes that the CIA must do a better job of distinguishing between speculation and gossip in intelligence gathering, speculation by the DCM..." DCM, Mr. Jatras?

A. Deputy chief of mission.

Q. Thank you. "...about Special Envoy Redman was rumour and gossip, not intelligence."

And if we can then turn on, again using the page numbers at the top, to page 477. "The minority found," top of 477: "No credible evidence exists to confirm the speculation by the United States government officials, by someone, that United States government officials were colluding with Iran on weapons. In fact, the speculative, incomplete, and inaccurate nature of the reporting created suspicions within the CIA that ³²⁶⁸⁰ a covert operation, spearheaded by Ambassador Galbraith, was under way." This was wildly disproportionate to the facts. That's another finding by the minority, wasn't it?

A. That is correct.

Q. And would you now, please, go to page 578 at the top, 317 at the bottom. I don't, I think, need to read all of this, but it's a specific response by the minority to the majority conclusions regarding false testimony of witnesses' classification and executive privilege. And so if we look, for example, at the foot of page 3 -- sorry. Page 578 or 317, we find this approach, this reflection of the reality of this committee: "The most inflammatory aspect of the majority report is its referral on certain matters to the justice department for further inquiry. The majority asserts that several executive branch officers gave inconsistent testimony to the select subcommittee and suggests the possibility that some of these officials might have perjured themselves. This reckless allegation is wholly unsubstantiated. It casts aspersions on the character of dedicated public servants who performed their duties in difficult and at times dangerous circumstances for what we can only assume to be the majority's short-term political advantage." Now, that shows us, doesn't it, Mr. Jatras, part of the reality of a committee like this, it is a political committee, asserted by some, including its own members, to be serving political ends at the hands of the other side?

A. That is certainly part of the reality, yes.

Q. Thank you. And indeed, it may be that the Chamber, if it wants to ³²⁶⁸¹ have a couple of other pages in mind in evaluating this document, would like to go to pages 624 and 625, although it may need stronger spectacles or a magnifying glass to read them, and in my version they're upside down, but I make absolutely no complaint of that.

And on page 625, I'll just read a couple of paragraphs, one paragraph on the following page, and I am done with this document. At 625, in very small text: "This unprecedented legislative procedure proposed, and it gives the authority, was created for one purpose and for one purpose only. It is a political fishing expedition designed to embarrass the administration by creating a perceived problem where one does not exist. It is an expensive political ploy designed to manufacture campaign fodder in an election year. It is a perfect example of politics at its worst."

Two sentences into the next paragraph: "No laws were broken. There were no reporting requirements on the part of the administration, no government officials participated in in any prohibited activity and no charges of wrongdoing have resulted from this particular incident." Unless I'm advised to the contrary, we can go for to the next page, page --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, let me follow the line of your examination. Is it your position, then, that this being a document, which is nothing more than the views of five men representing one party and three men representing another party, which has divided on political lines; it doesn't offer any help to the Chamber in determining the facts?

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I would go further and have by my earlier ³²⁶⁸² objections all right, I think, set out my position. Fact-finding decisions by another body on issues that are for this Court, if these issues are for this Court, is -- are of no value in the decision making function of this Court, because it is for this Court to decide matters --

JUDGE ROBINSON: They could be persuasive. It's for the Chamber to make what it --

MR. NICE: If at best it could be persuasive, when it appears to be nothing more than the majority vote of five against three, it would probably be of no -- it would be very hard to justify making a preference for the five against the three. That point is even stronger when it is apparent that the division appears to be along political lines. Yes, those are my observations.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jatras, on the issue, as you've presented it, about what was known and knowable, do you see a significant difference between what the Republican position was on that and what the Democrat position was?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

JUDGE BONOMY: Can you tell me what the significant differences are?

THE WITNESS: Yes. I think there's, to start with, a very significant agreement in the majority -- in the minority views, and I think that the -- again, at the risk of providing an opinion rather than direct testimony, with Mr. Nice's indulgence --

JUDGE ROBINSON: The Court's indulgence, I would think. ³²⁶⁸³

THE WITNESS: Yes, and the Court's indulgence. That it is clear from the account of both the majority and the minority that Ambassador Galbraith gave his no-instructions response to the Croatians and that the Croatians took that to mean something. They then disagree on the interpretation of the significance of that. For example, did it or did it not result in a re-initiation of the Iranian pipeline? The Democrats seemed to argue that it was of minimal impact, which one may accept if one chooses to do so. The Republicans seem to believe it was a more significant development. There is a great deal of argument, and again this is purely a matter of American domestic law about whether this is technically a covert operation or not which then would have been statutorily under requirements for reporting in a certain way with congressional committees.

JUDGE BONOMY: But is that not an internal American domestic issue?

THE WITNESS: Absolutely. And regarding the different opinions of the majority and minority, the -- I notice the minority uses some fairly strong language in characterising the majority in how it went about its business and the extent to which it may have been politically motivated, and one could easily draw the opposite inference, which is the Democrats here are with some heat politically defending their administration having been caught in rather unfortunate circumstances. I would also note one other area of agreement, and that is the neglect of both the minority and the majority to address the other issues I sought to address in my January 1997 paper, namely, the non-Iranian ³²⁶⁸⁴ participants in bringing weapons and also fighters into Bosnia just demurely noted here as "other countries," and also the character of the Izetbegovic regime in Sarajevo, which even the minority notes was -- Iranians present in Bosnia as early as 1991, that is to say, even before Bosnia declared its independence, so it could not have been purely a product of the necessity to procure arms from somewhere. So I take even the minority's views of something of a confirmation of the picture I sought to present in my January 1997 paper, if some want to suggest there's a partisan aspect to it, well, welcome to the American political system. But that aspect is there. But just as in a courtroom situation, we have Prosecution and Defence. We don't dismiss the arguments made because each side is presenting a point of view which is in the interest of their party, the word being used in a somewhat different sense.

MR. NICE:

Q. Last passage I'll ask the witness about, page 627, the following page. Their conclusion: "If the majority feels this incident must be examined, then they should do so through the existing mechanisms and committee structures of the House. Should be deliberated in a matter that is responsible and done out of genuine concern over the existing policies with regard to embargoes and third country actions it should not be investigated as a political agenda to be used for election year gains." That's over the names Joe Moxley, and then other names. Can you explain that, it forms a minority view of another report, I think, but you must explain it to us. We can see the beginning of this report at ³²⁶⁸⁵ page 620.

A. Yes. Let me see who that is.

Q. It will help us with what we've been looking at.

A. The committee on rules. I must confess, my knowledge of House procedure is not as detailed as my knowledge on Senate procedure, since I've only served in the Senate. The Rules Committee does not perform the same functions in the Senate. What I will -- again, just looking briefly at this, what appears they're suggesting is that the set-up and structure and authorisation of the select subcommittee of the International Relations Committee should have been subject to a different rule giving its authorisation. Again, noting the partisan question you have raised, Mr. Nice, I think this is a shorthand way of saying, from the Democratic side, this should have been done in a way that we were able to block it.

Q. Mr. Jatras, you appreciate, don't you, that if this document, as His Honour Judge Robinson has raised as a possibility, should ever have persuasive effect as to factual matters, it's essential to know that it is only the conclusion of a majority, that there was a strong minority?

A. That is correct.

Q. And you bring no, as we've already explained, ability to make factual conclusions of your own? I'll simply make this point. It's unfortunate, do you accept this, that you didn't draw to our attention that there was this minority view to an entirely contrary effect?

A. I don't think it was unfortunate at all. I can explain if you wish.

Q. Yes. ³²⁶⁸⁶

A. My purpose, again, in testifying is to elucidate and explain the extent I can the documents that I issued from the policy committee, not to explain the preparation and the weight of every source that I cited in preparing those reports.

Q. I see.

A. I cited the House report, I cited the Senate report, I cited a 1995 report from Lieutenant Colonel John Sharay [phoen] from Fort Leavenworth. I cited many press reports. There are facts again from serious sources, including this one, that deserve to be given note of. But, as I said at the outset, I think there are deficiencies in the way that the report was presented, frankly, by both parties, in that there are sensitivities in the American government regarding Iran and whether something is a covert operation and they would have devoted particular attention to those things, and they would have neglected other things which are impolitic, or were certainly impolitic prior to 9/11 to note regarding other radical activities present in Bosnia, and it seemed that in drawing attention to those things which, as knowable, and indeed you note even the minority mentions the press reports as a means by which these activities were knowable to Congress anyway, seemingly in defence of the Clinton Administration neglecting to officially inform Congress. So again, I will note the report is here. It is a partisan report. It contains many assertions of fact that the two parties agree on and others on which they disagree. And that's normal in our system.

Q. Mr. Jatras, you're asserting your even-handedness and we do have one of your, as it were, raw documents before us. We've got tab 6, and ³²⁶⁸⁷ perhaps we can just look at that for an example of indeed your even-handedness, before I look at another couple of matters in detail.

A. Excuse me, I did not assert even-handedness.

Q. Very well. You don't. You are yourself partisan?

A. I am a partisan --

Q. In what sense partisan?

A. I identified myself as a Republican at the outset.

Q. But that's the only way in which you're a partisan?

A. I don't know if it's the only way. I obviously would have sensitivities about my own party that I don't have about the Democratic party. Again, in a courtroom, you try to be fair-minded and factual even though you represent one side of an issue under dispute. And I would describe my role in our partisan system in similar terms.

Q. Very well. Let's just look, then -- have you got tab 6 there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If we go -- you set out, the Judges may not have had a chance to consider it, set out the rationale on page 1 for the then policy. Page 2, we come to the nutshell and you try and paraphrase things. And then the third paragraph you say this: "To start with, pre-1989 Kosovo was hardly the fantasy land of ethnic tolerance and pro-intervention caricature that it's made out to be. Under the 1974 Tito constitution, which elevated Kosovo to effective equality with the federal republics, Kosovo's Albanians exercised virtually complete control over the political administration -- provincial administration. Tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of Serbs left during this period in the face of pervasive ³²⁶⁸⁸ discrimination and the authorities refusal to protect Serbs from ethnic violence. The result of the shift in the ethnic violence that accelerated during this period is the main claim ethnic Albanians lay to exclusive ownership of Kosovo. At the same time, Albanian demands mounted that the province be detached from Serbia and given republic status within the Yugoslav Federation. Republic status, if granted, would in theory have allowed Kosovo the right to declare its independence from Yugoslavia," and so on.

Now, just leading on, yes, one of the ironies of the present Kosovo crisis is that Milosevic began his rise to power in Serbia in large part because of the oppressive character of the pre-1989 Albanian rule, symbolised by the famous 1987 rally, where he promised the local Serbs: "Nobody will beat you again. In short, rather than Milosevic being the cause of the Croatian Kosovo crisis, it could be said -- it could be as correct to say that intolerant Albanian nationalism in Kosovo is largely the cause of Milosevic's attainment of power."

So you set that out strongly, don't you?

A. I believe so.

Q. Did you ever consider Soluvic's [phoen] filmed account of how they went prepared with stones to throw at the police in order to generate the riot that allowed Milosevic to say "we will not be beaten"? Have you considered that piece of evidence?

A. No, I have not.

Q. Very well. If we go on to the next page, then, I've dealt with the source and I'm not going to pursue that any further. But at the ^{32689 BLANK PAGE 32690} bottom paragraph, you make this point: "Fifth, nobody can doubt there are serious atrocities being committed in Kosovo by Milosevic's forces, though the extent and specifics of the reports that the media, as in Bosnia, treats as established fact."

Your view?

A. My view is, is that --

Q. Your view at the time?

A. My view at the time, and my view today, would be that it would be rare indeed, and indeed I think impossible, to find a counter-insurgency war, or war against a terrorist's internal enemy, where they are not atrocities committed on both sides.

Q. I see.

A. What I am pointing to here is that the cause and the extent of those atrocities are not necessarily the way they're being presented by the Clinton Administration.

Q. Over two pages, please, and then we come to the second paragraph, which starts off with the word "tenth." "Tenth, the notion that Milosevic's nationalist bent on creating a Greater Serbia is nonsense. Milosevic, unlike the equally thuggish Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, is an opportunist who likely would have been more than willing to sell out Kosovo as he did the Serbs of Krajina and parts of Bosnia."

Your view?

A. I think the statement stands for itself. I think again part of the backdrop to the American interventions in Yugoslav crisis was to put ³²⁶⁹¹ horns on one side and halos on the other side, and it seems to me that whatever mistakes Mr. Milosevic made are of a kind or in a question of degree compared to the adversaries, his adversaries in Croatia and Bosnia rather than of a different quality altogether. That is to say, I think some of the quality of political leadership throughout Yugoslavia could have been better.

Q. You appreciate we have no interest in the history, save to -- insofar as it informs us about where crimes were committed.

A. Naturally. And you understand here again I'm giving a policy speech here at the CATO institute. It's not -- you know, this is not direct eyewitness evidence of anything. It is my assessment, as I state at the outset, both personally and as a foreign policy professional.

Q. Last page of this speech, and very nearly the last part of the speech, in the second-to-last paragraph you quote Madeleine Albright, where she suggested that the leader of some countries, Serbia among them, "Try to grab the truth and leash it like a dog, ration it like bread, mould it like clay, their goal being to be create their own myths, conceal their own blunders, direct resentments elsewhere and instil in their people a dread of change." And you turn that saying: "However that is true of Slobodan Milosevic, the Secretary of State should look in the mirror," allowing the qualification for both?

A. I would simply note that the ability of the Clinton Administration to manage information and what we call spin is legendary in both parties in the United States.

Q. Well, now, only -- the other documents I have very little to ask ³²⁶⁹² you, save to draw to your attention or to the Judges's attention, but I think it's already clear, they are all Republican policy documents, aren't they?

A. Absolutely.

Q. They are partisan?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, the one we've had today for the first time - and I've only had a chance to look at it briefly - is the one that comes in August 12th of 1998, where you set out what you think is going to happen, so that you, as it were, forecast events. What was revealed to you was premised on the fact that there were already grave wrongs being committed against Kosovar Albanians in 1998?

A. Please explain your question.

Q. Let's go -- let's look at the bottom of the first page. My mistake, the question I asked you. Have a look at the bottom of the first page, where you set out your thesis. "That the administration is waiting for a similar trigger in Kosovo is increasingly obvious. Senior US Defence department official who briefed reporters on July 15th noted we're not anywhere near making a decision for any kind of armed intervention in Kosovo right now. One thing that might trigger a policy change, I think if some levels of atrocities were reached that would be intolerable, that would be a trigger." The position as presented and somewhat publicly presented was that things were bad, if they got worse, then action would be required?

A. That's one way to put it. I don't think that is accurately ³²⁶⁹³ reflective of what I was saying in the paper.

Q. And you would accept in any intervention by one state in the affairs of another that there will be a level of wrong or bad things being done by the other party that can be acceptable, it can then rise to a level where it is unacceptable and intervention is required?

A. If I accept the premise of humanitarian intervention as it is sometimes called without the legitimating authority of a Security Council resolution or other legal mechanism, but accept the principle as you've stated it --

Q. Thank you.

A. -- I would nonetheless say that there is a duty, just perhaps a moral duty if not a legal one, to ensure that one is not simply taking the kind of unfortunate wrongs that will be committed I think inevitably on both sides of guerrilla insurgency, indeed a terrorist insurgency, and the defending state and to seize upon one and immediately package it politically to serve a predetermined goal.

Q. Very well. In coming to give evidence here today, just help us with this: Did you volunteer or were you recruited, to the extent I can ask you the question.

A. I was asked to appear by attorneys --

Q. Very well. That's all I need to know.

A. All right.

Q. And of course, it's very important, isn't it, Mr. Jatras, that any particular interests that a witness such as you have are properly presented to the Tribunal? ³²⁶⁹⁴

A. Certainly.

Q. So if we can just look at a couple of matters of detail. A bit more about your father, please. He is, I think, by origins, an American, full American, by birth, or what?

A. Are you trying to qualify me in ethnic terms?

Q. Yes, that's right.

A. I was born in the United States, and my parents were born in the United States.

Q. Yes. Going back?

A. My grandparents were born in Greece.

Q. And your parents are still, I think, of the Greek Orthodox faith?

A. Yes, as am I.

Q. As are you. And that faith, to some degree, informs your judgement, doesn't it?

A. I would say it does, yes.

Q. Before we move on to see whether it does and to what extent it does, tell us this: There are, of course, Serb communities in America, aren't there?

A. There are.

Q. And you mix with them, don't you?

A. Yes. I have many Serbian friends.

Q. And you mix with the Serbs in America where they are collected together in Serbian organisations, don't you?

A. I have on occasion, yes, not as a regular matter.

Q. And the views that you hold, which is why I was careful to ³²⁶⁹⁵ establish that you were holding yourself out as even-handed, and you qualified it, but never -- the views that you hold, Mr. Jatras, when you raised them with the Serb expatriate community, are standard views, aren't they?

A. How do you mean?

Q. Well, you're not in any sense an extremist, are you?

A. Extremist in what respect?

Q. In any of the views you hold?

A. I believe not.

Q. So that the views that you hold and that you set out at various meetings and in various speeches are the sort of views that the Serb community you mix with finds acceptable?

A. It's not my understanding that the members of the Serbian community, or any other community in the United States, have uniform views.

Q. Tell us a little bit, please, about the Serbian Unity Congress. The word "unity" suggests what?

A. To the extent to which I am familiar with the organisation, which I am not a member of, they are a Serbian ethnic fraternal organisation of the sort that are quite common among ethnic communities in the United States, one of I think three or four major Serbian organisations in America.

Q. Is your father a member?

A. No.

Q. Is he a supporter? ³²⁶⁹⁶

A. As far as I know, he's conversant with them, but he is not a member. If he has joined, I'm unaware of the fact.

Q. Is he a donor?

A. I believe he donated on the occasion when I spoke at their congress in nineteen-ninety -- I can't remember the year. It was possibly 1999, 1998. I'm not sure.

Q. Money raised by Serb expatriate communities such as the Serbian Unity Congress in the time of these wars went to serve what purpose, please?

A. I think it primarily again, since I'm not a member of the organisation and don't look at their books, my best understanding is that it goes for essentially two purposes: One, to support the organisation's activities in the United States, which are largely informational and fraternal, that is to say, they support a website and distribute information; and secondly, I understand they do provide some relief to refugees in Bosnia, people have come to Serbia from Bosnia, Kosovo, so forth, blankets, food, sweaters, things of that sort.

Q. You know I'm not asserting it, I'm just asking you. Do you know if any money raised served any purpose of buying arms, anything like that?

A. I do not know of it and I would strongly doubt it. And I could tell you why I strongly doubt it if you wish.

Q. . Yes.

A. Partly because we have something in the United States called the Neutrality Act which makes it criminal to do that and I would note in that regard that nobody has ever accused the United States government of being ³²⁶⁹⁷ friendly, for example, toward Fidel Castro's Cuba but organisations have raised support for illegal violent actions against his government to have him prosecuted under the Neutrality Act. I note that the supporters of the Kosovo liberation army freely recruited fighters and raised money in support of the KLA, and as far as I know no action was ever taken against them. I doubt that forbearance would be shown toward any Serbian activities of that sort.

Q. Very well. Can we now, please, look at a document of yours. It will have to be given another exhibit number. Did the last document, the document --

MR. KAY: Tab 8.

MR. NICE: No. The last document that we produced, which was the submissions of Ambassador Galbraith to the --

THE REGISTRAR: If you were to give 781 to the footage of the video you've shown, and 782 will be the one given to the -- this statement, the next number will be 783.

MR. NICE: Very well.

Q. Can we now, then, please, look at the next document, which I think you will recognise, Mr. Jatras, as a speech of yours, or I beg your pardon, an article of yours. We can see that this is something headed: "A journal of Orthodox opinion. The Muslim advance and American collaboration." It's clear from the heading that although it was published later, it's adapted from a May 1998 speech you gave called -- headed: "Overcoming the schism. European division and US policy," at a conference organised or sponsored by the Rockford Institute and The Lord ³²⁶⁹⁸ Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies.

If we look at the first paragraph, Mr. Jatras, you say, in line 4: "...the Islamic resurgence that has rapidly come to mark the post-Cold War era. For the east which borders on the Muslim, the problem continues to be, as it has been since Islam first appeared in the seventh century, primarily one of direct, violent confrontation, which today stretches from the Balkans to the Caucasus and through central Asia. For the west, on the other hand, the problem today is primarily internal both in terms of ideological confusion (which in many instances leads to active collaboration), coupled with demographic infiltration." Still your view?

A. Yes. I think it's quite a factual description, and I -- since the writing of this article and especially after 9/11, a great deal more information of that from Islamist sources is available.

Q. We then see in the next paragraph your depiction, no doubt in order to excite emotion, of 100-acre Islamic academy gracing the rolling hills of the Virginia horse country, and you comment on the role of the Saudis in the school that was proposed.

If we go over the next couple of pages, we come to what is page 3 of 8 at the top, and these are your ideas on Islam, so that we can just understand them. Page 3, the very wonderful systems for displaying material occasionally take a second or two to move between pages. I'll just read this passage out. It's on page 3 of 8, and it reads as follows: "Likewise, the idea that Islam shares with Christianity and Judaism an Abrahamic pedigree, that we are all, in the Islamic phrase, ³²⁶⁹⁹ peoples of the book, is now almost universally accepted. To see how flimsy this idea is, suppose that during the early Christian era, a pagan philosopher from Athens had claimed to have received a vision from a divine messenger to the effect that Jupiter, the Greco-Roman father God, was the one and only God and in fact was the same God the father preached by the Christians," and so on.

A. I must --

THE INTERPRETER: Please pause, Mr. Nice, thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. This is part of your approach to the divisions or separateness of religious in our world?

A. I'm making a theological observation regarding the assertion, which I believe is unfounded that Islam shares a common origin with Christianity and Judaism but rather is an outgrowth of indigenous polytheism on the Arabian peninsula.

Q. Let's look at the foot of the page, indeed, to see how you depicted it on this paper. Last two lines: "In short, Islam is a self-evident outgrowth not of the old and new covenants but of the darkness of heathen Araby. Beside ludicrous historical suggestions to the contrary (such as that the Ka'bah was built by Abraham, which would have been news to him), Muslim apologists have strained to find in the Bible evidence that a new prophet would arise after Jesus, seeing Muhammad in obvious prophecies of the Holy Spirit," and so on. And if we go to the next paragraph, beginning, "Saint Gregory's," this: "...answer is no less devastating to Islam's fraudulent ³²⁷⁰⁰ self-depiction as a pacific creed. Islam was born in violence, from Muhammad's sanction of raids of pillage and plunder (starting with attacks against his own Quraysh tribe, which initially rejected his revelation) to his savage execution of hundreds of men on the Qurayzah clan (which professed Judaism) and the enslavement and enforced concubinage of their women and children."

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause to let the interpreters catch up, thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, you're again being asked by the interpreters to slow down.

MR. NICE: Apologies.

Q. And if we look down to the next paragraph and to the middle of it, we see these views of yours expressed in the form of a rhetorical question --

A. Which page are we on, sir?

Q. Page 4 of 8, the paragraph in the middle headed: "In the application of Jihad." You say: "The parallels are unavoidable to the similarly Manichaean communist concepts of the socialist camp as the zone of peace and the capitalist camp as the zone of war. I will leave it to the specialists to calculate which Islam or communism can claim the greater achievement as gigantic Christian-killing machines." I must ask you, Mr. Jatras, whether it has ever occurred to you that expressing views in such a way is irresponsible.

A. Would you like me to supply the documentation for my assertions?

Q. I'm asking you whether you -- it's a simple question. Do you take ³²⁷⁰¹ the view that expressing opinions in this way is responsible?

A. I think it is responsible to give testament to something that is historically accurate. There is a reason why there are no indigenous Christians in north Africa west of Egypt, there is a reason why there are longer indigenous Christians in Anatolia. They did not disappear because of earthquake.

Q. If I ask you the question of responsibility, you think it's a good idea to draw these facts, if they are facts, and I'm not here to debate them, in this way?

A. I think facts are their own justification, whatever they may say, however unpleasant they may be. I would note that what may seem shocking here - and perhaps I think you would suggest somehow not responsible - are commonplace on many expressions of Islamist ideology, stating them in terms not too different than I have stated them here except in a positive and proud way.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And there is also historical evidence, you say, to support the view that Islam is the outgrowth of the darkness of heathen Araby?

THE WITNESS: Yes. And if you want to express -- I would make two points. I am a Christian, and even in Christian terms we often refer to the state of my former polytheist ancestors as one of spiritual darkness and the adoption of Christianity as enlightenment. Again, I don't know if in Europe one may speak in these terms. Certainly in the United States, in a Christian context, it is permissible to do so. It is also permissible to criticise a faith. We have feminists, for example, who are ³²⁷⁰² not shy about describing Christianity as a terrible, oppressive, patriarchal system, and they're perfectly free to do so. As far as the pagan origins of Islam, I would simply point out that there is no historical evidence of Abraham having built the Ka'bah, but Muhammad himself refers to his Meccan relatives and the cult that was then established as shirk [phoen] as idolatry. I think that's proof in itself.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I don't know how much longer you'll be.

MR. NICE: A couple more minutes probably because I think there is one more sheet of paper that I'm going to need to produce as an exhibit. If the Court is minded to take the adjournment now.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll take the adjournment now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.21 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.46 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jatras and Mr. Nice, I've had what I might call an official complaint from the interpreters. They're unable to follow, to follow you, and you must observe each pause between question and answer.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. I've been shown, I think it's a red card almost by the interpreters, and I've apologised to one personally and I'll get around and apologise to the rest. I'm always happy to be corrected, and I realise that sometimes the problem is I make it impossible for them to intervene even to correct.

Q. So, Mr. Jatras, the fault is mine, not yours. And I will, in the remaining few minutes of questions, set a slower pace. ³²⁷⁰³ Just three more passages from this document of yours, the article headed: "Orthodox opinion." If we can go, please, to page 6 of the document, right in the middle, you'll see a paragraph that begins, "for example," and reads as follows: "In 1993 statements were issued by a number of Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Anglican spokesmen in the United States urging military intervention on behalf of the Islamic regime in Sarajevo. We are convinced that there is no just cause [sic] to use force to defend largely helpless people in Bosnia against aggression and" --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you say that there is no just cause?

MR. NICE: There is just cause.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE: My apologies: "...to defend largely helpless people in Bosnia against aggression and barbarism that are destroying the very foundations of society and threaten large numbers of people, wrote the chairman of the United States Catholic conference..."

Q. And Mr. Jatras, I want to be sure I understand your article. The sentence that I am about to read is, I think, your sentence rather than the report of somebody else's. That sentence, or phrase, for it is preceded by a comma, reads: "At a time when the Muslim beneficiaries of the called for intervention were not only roasting alive Serb POWs impaled on spits, but were slaughtering Roman Catholic Croats by the hundreds in an offensive in Central Bosnia."

Was that your sentence?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Does that refer to the Muslims in Bosnia? ³²⁷⁰⁴

A. Yes, it does.

Q. Did you have evidence, please help us so that we can track it down and use it, for people being roasted alive on spits?

A. I had seen photographs which I understood to have been taken by a Japanese photographer of one particular POW in Bosnia that had been roasted alive on a spit, and I had heard accounts from people on the Serbian side of similar atrocities.

I should preface this with a response to your earlier question about whether I had travelled to the region. No, I had not, but I did regularly receive people in my office from the region, including people from Croat and Albanian and Muslim opinion, or communities, as well as people from the Serbian community. I did receive more visitors from the Serbian community, including in their time Mr. Labus, Mr. Djindjic, Mr. Kostunica, and many other political leaders obviously opposed to Mr. Milosevic. The point I'm making there is consistent with the observation I made earlier in my official documents, that is, that an ugly war, with lots of atrocities, was presented as a morality play, where one side had a monopoly of guilt and suffered nothing. I should point out regarding the Croats in Central Bosnia, I did visit a receive. In fact, he visited the foreign relations committee, and I was at the meeting on the foreign relations committee with committee staff at that time. His name was a Mr. Pegarcic [phoen]. He was an advisor to Mate Boban in Herceg-Bosna, and he was describing -- and again, this was in 1993. I'm trying to remember the exact time frame. I believe it was for spring or summer. This would have been the time that we've ³²⁷⁰⁵ seen in the documents related to the green light that the -- there had been a falling out between the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia, and the Muslims had conducted an offensive, including Jihad fighters against the Croats, and great atrocities were being committed. I can tell you that there was virtually no interest in --

Q. I don't want to stop you for fear of it looking as though I'm seeking to cut you off, but I think your answer is longer than is required by the question I asked. And if I can bring you back to the significance of the question, it's this: You are, of course, an educated and articulate man, are you not?

A. There is some opinion to that extent, yes.

Q. You're capable of creating quite a reaction in an audience, as we will see, when you make public speeches. And I just want again an answer to my earlier question. Do you think that on the basis of the material coming to you, and of course if it exists and we've got it, we'll find it, we'll use it in the appropriate cases if we can, but do you think it's appropriately responsible at a time of religious or ethnic conflict to present a picture in this way on the material available to you not only roasting alive Serb POWs impaled on spits, do you?

A. I think it is comparable in no way more worthy of fault than the kind of hyperbole that was common at the time in support of the Muslims as innocent people being killed merely on the basis of their religion by Serbs, which was the nature of the discourse at that time.

Q. Two wrongs making a right even from an educated person like yourself? ³²⁷⁰⁶

A. I do not concede at all that it is a wrong. I think it is a characterisation of the fact that there was -- and again you may find numerous Muslim sources of information on this. It was considered a Jihad land by the kind of assets that were becoming present in Bosnia in part with, I believe, since again I was not there, but according to the reports available, in part with "stealth cooperation," according to the one Washington Post article.

Q. Can we look at the foot of the same page, for the second-to-last reference on this document, six lines up from the bottom, in comparing religions: "But it is beyond me what spiritual values any Christian has in common with someone whose idea of beatific bliss is..." the word reads, and I have no immediate translation for it for the interpreters, "...boinking an endless parade of well-rounded houris said to inhabit the Muslim paradise."

I think we can guess, but you must tell us. What does the word "boinking" mean in this article?

A. Certainly. It is a word that describes the sexual act in, I would say, crude but not obscene language, deliberately chosen for that reason. Because my point, since we've chosen to indulge in an exercise in comparative religions, is that there is a, I would claim as a Christian, a difference in the moral and spiritual content of what a Christian expects in the afterlife and is standard depiction - and again I would advise you to consult Muslim sources commonly available should you search for them and including, by the way, the justifications given by suicide bombers in places such places as Israel about their expectations for performing as a ^{32707 BLANK PAGE 32708} shahid [phoen]. So I would say yes, it is a crass observation, but the thing I am observing is crass and consequently so is my language for making the observation.

Q. Last page, please, and indeed last four lines. This is your thesis: "At the same time, in light of the growing volume of Muslim immigration, western Christians will soon find out - maybe sooner than they think, given western birth rates - that confronting the Islamic advance has become, as it has always been for eastern Christians, a simple matter of physical survival. But by that time, it may be too late for the west as well."

In that passage, you are referring to differentials in birth rates between Muslims and Christians?

A. Birth rates and also patterns of immigration.

Q. And you are, I must suggest, generating fear, and that is the purpose to which you put, certainly in this article, your intelligence?

A. I would again advise you, Mr. Nice, to consult Muslim sources saying exactly what I have stated there, with the intention that within the approximate period of time, some decades, the United States, Britain, and other European states will become "Shari'a" states once a sufficient demographic mass is attained. That may not be a picture that is politic to point out, but it was not I that made the point of formulating such a vision. I'm simply calling attention to it.

Q. An alternative approach to what you say is your desire is this, isn't it, that by generating adverse views of whole groups of people - in this case Muslims - you start the process of dehumanising them when you ³²⁷⁰⁹ view them as a block subject to unappealing characteristics?

A. I am speaking about an ideology.

Q. Can you answer my question. It has the -- and you know what I mean by dehumanising. Speaking of people in this way starts the process of dehumanising them, doesn't it?

A. If what you were saying were true, that would be true, but that is not correct. On the contrary, sir, it is -- if you read the literature from the Muslim side about what exactly is the status of "adeni" under "Shari'a", it is the potential "adenis" who are dehumanised. And that is exactly what -- again, in my role as a policy committee I would often receive visits from people from Sudan, from Egypt, people who were subject to "Shari'a" law in their present lives. They're dehumanised under an ideological system that I think has some very negative consequences.

Q. Come back to dehumanisation on the topic of this case in about five minutes or less.

May this exhibit have an exhibit number, please.

THE REGISTRAR: 783, the new one.

MR. NICE:

Q. One more exhibit, a single sheet, which we can distribute. I'm afraid it hasn't been put on Sanction. While it's being distributed, just to remind us all, the Greeks and those of the Greek Orthodox persuasion have a proximity in religion, as well as territory, with the Serbs, don't they?

A. They do.

Q. And indeed, with the Montenegrins? ³²⁷¹⁰

A. Yes, of course. And Bulgarians and Russians and Georgians. Yes, we are of the same faith.

Q. And the document that's now available and may be displayed on the overhead projector is a document of the Serbian Unity Congress. It comes off their website, I think.

A. Yes, that's correct. I've seen it.

Q. Perhaps we can put it on the overhead projector as well. And it describes how there was the banquet at the conclusion of the convention of the 18th to the 20th of October, 1998. Greetings for the banquet were received from the Crown prince and from president Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro. George Vojnovic was greeted with much applause. The dinner included a presentation to Stella and George Jatras, your parents. In special recognition, the Serbian community in the United States, Stella is a tireless campaigner for the Serbian cause. The highlight of the dinner was the keynote address by James Jatras, foreign policy analyst on the Senate Republican policy committee. In a speech of dazzling eloquence and soaring images, he blasted the administration's whole policy towards Serbia, stating that it was criminal and worthy of being brought to The Hague Tribunal. He spoke movingly of the union between American, Greek, and Serb core values and how these had been betrayed by the administration. He urged Serbs to hold on to their sacred vision of the heavenly kingdom."

JUDGE KWON: Sorry, Mr. Nice. The Chamber can't find the passage.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm sorry if I've been reading the wrong excerpt. It's my mistake. ³²⁷¹¹

THE WITNESS: It's the right picture, wrong text.

MR. NICE: They've distributed the wrong one. I'm so sorry, Your Honour. We had two broadly similar documents. I'm only using one of them. I'm sorry I didn't check.

While it's coming around, then: We've heard that the former president, Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro, was present, your parents were present and warmly and especially welcomed, your mother being a tireless campaigner for the Serbian cause. And in your keynote address, delivered with dazzling eloquence, you stated that the administration's policy was criminal and worthy of being brought to The Hague Tribunal. You spoke movingly of the union between American, Greek, and Serb core values and how these had been betrayed by an administration. You urged Serbs on to their sacred vision of the heavenly kingdom.

Q. May I take it, as I suggested earlier, Mr. Jatras, that the sort of views you set out in your paper document were acceptable to your audience?

A. In which article?

Q. Well, we've only got the account of your speech.

A. You're not referring to the official reports from the Senate?

Q. No, no. My mistake. The document we were looking at earlier, the document headed "A journal of Orthodox opinion," contains a number of your views, and you told me already that these would be your views -- would be views acceptable generally to the Serb people. At this speech of yours, did you raise those sort of views and find them acceptable to the people?

A. Certainly, no. The speech of which I do not have a text, it was ³²⁷¹² from improvised notes on a spontaneous basis, was specifically about, as it says, the spiritual values of the Serbian people, how those relate to my own American and also Greek identity, and again, if you read -- you neglected to read the last sentence about electrifying speech, eloquence and there was something else about something lofty values or something of that sort. These are not my words, of course. It's the website's characterisation. I mostly spoke in that vein. I obviously did not get into the details of the theory and practice of Jihad for the last 14th century, so I don't know to what extent in specific anyone in the audience would have had knowledge of that article or, you know, would have agreed with various parts of it.

Q. Just to repeat the point, that the sort of views you've been expressing in writing would be acceptable generally?

A. The generally accepted thing that I think would be universal in the Serbian community in the United States is that they have been treated unfairly by American policy and singled out in an unfair way for the blame of the violence in the Balkans in the 1990s and their own sufferings had both -- at the hands of their local adversaries and at the hands of the United States, have been minimised and I think that is a fair observation.

Q. One more quotation, about three more points, and I shall be done. Is it right that on an occasion you have asserted that Michael Dukakis, one-time I think American presidential candidate was pagan for not following the Orthdodox Church on issues such as abortion? Is that the way you would describe him, as a pagan?

A. I certainly would, yes. ³²⁷¹³

Q. Thank you. Let's go back to what this case is all about.

MR. NICE: Can that be given an exhibit number.

THE REGISTRAR: 784.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

Q. You came here, Mr. Jatras, to give evidence essentially in relation to Bosnia section of the trial about the arming of the Muslims; correct?

A. With regard to the Bosnia section of the trial, that is correct.

Q. The position that was advanced by the majority who had the advantage of your advice would have left the Bosnians without arms, wouldn't it?

A. Of the majority in the congressional report?

Q. Yes.

A. No not at all. I think it's clear they favoured aiding the -- as I would say the Izetbegovic regime and fault the administration for proceeding in the way it did rather than pursuing an overt lift and strike strategy. That was my reading of it.

Q. Do you accept that at the time the objective of the Serbs generally would have been to have enlarged the territory under Serb control in Bosnia and in Croatia?

A. It would depend at which period of time we're talking about. My understanding of each of the ethnic groups in Yugoslavia as it fell apart was to control, preserve, and perhaps extend, since obviously there would be differing opinions as to what belonged to whom, the area that they felt they were entitled to, and that naturally would involve some conflict. ³²⁷¹⁴

Q. Very well. You were the subject of -- I don't think I need go into the detail, but you were the subject of complaints within the American administration about the expressions of your views, weren't you?

A. Not within the administration. From outside groups.

Q. Politicians?

A. No. Actually, some Muslim organisations, some of which -- remember, this was prior to 9/11. Some of these organisations themselves have interesting organisational pedigrees and have been noticeably more silent since 9/11.

Q. You say it was people outside the administration. Republican David Bonior from Michigan said that your views reflected a total ignorance of Islam as a faith, that you were bigoted and ill-informed and that you should have been disqualified from holding foreign policy position, didn't he?

A. David Bonior is a Democrat from Michigan. He is not part of the administration. He's a congressman --

Q. Sorry, not a republican, he's a democrat?

A. You said the administration. Not part of the administration. In the Congress. That is his opinion. And I would draw your attention to the complaints of the minority about political motivations in the dissenting portion of the House report.

Q. Yes. Thank you very much.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, yes. Re-examined by Mr. Kay:

Q. In re-examination, Mr. Jatras, I'd like us to go to the first ³²⁷¹⁵ large volume of the report of the committee, the US House of Representatives and turn to page 536 at the top, 275 at the bottom. 536 at the top left-hand side, and it's headed: "Chapter 3, Iranian involvement in Bosnia and Croatia, 1991 to 1996." The last section of your questioning, Mr. Jatras, was on the basis that whatever you had to say, you were biased because of your beliefs and views, and you understood that?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was the purpose of it. In the earlier phase of cross-examination, you were pointed to parts of the minority dissenting report, in which they took a contrary point of view concerning the propriety or not of the green light policy under the Clinton Administration?

A. Correct.

Q. And it was put to you, posited to you, that that issue, as expressed in the main body of the report, had an alternative point of view that the minority held?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And that this was a political point of view?

A. Yes.

Q. Just taking the first matter. Was it the case that in fact everyone agreed that there had been the supply of arms to the Bosnians by the Iranians?

A. That is, I think, evident from both the majority and minority sections of the report. ³²⁷¹⁶

Q. So there's no minority or majority in relation to that; the minority and majority dispute concerned whether it was right or wrong in how it was dealt with by Ambassador Galbraith?

A. Yes.

Q. The fact of it occurring was not in dispute by either section of the committee?

A. My reading of it does not indicate that that is in dispute.

Q. If we look, then, at the part of the minority report which you were cross-examined on by the Prosecution, under this heading of "Iranian involvement in Bosnia and Croatia, 1991-1996," we start with the proposition, the minority considers the assertion that the no-instructions response opened the door for Iran to march into Bosnia and Croatia to be insupportable. Was it not the case that in fact the minority were saying that the conditions and what was happening was already in existence before the green light policy of the Clinton Administration?

A. They are saying that and I think in this observation are minimising then the positive impact in furthering or facilitating the continuation of that pipeline or perhaps the re-initiation of that pipeline.

Q. If we turn now to the next page, page 538, the minority recorded, in the second line: "In Bosnia, Iran used a blueprint typical of its operations in other countries with a Muslim population. This blueprint included arms shipments and military support, humanitarian relief, and the establishment of religious and cultural centres." Next paragraph: "Origins of Iranian military involvement. Iran ³²⁷¹⁷ offered Bosnian president Izetbegovic economic aid as early as 1991. By 1992, the first press reports of Bosnian Serb attacks on the government's Muslim forces reached Iran. The Iranian government harshly criticised the Serbs."

I can move on: "In August 1992, Iran deployed a fact-finding delegation."

I can move on: "While in Bosnia, the delegation met with senior Bosnian and Croatian clerics and political leaders, as well as Bosnian-Muslim refugees. The trip was reported widely in the Iranian press and galvanised strong public sentiment in favour of Iranian intervention and military support for the besieged Muslim population." These basic conditions were not matters in dispute between the minority and majority in the report; is that right?

A. I believe there is no dispute on these points.

Q. Just go to 539 and I'll take this again. The last four lines: "Iran decided to implement its policy unilaterally. Iran's intention became more heavily involved in the region, was firmly fixed more than two years prior to the April 1994 meetings between Ambassador Galbraith and then US Special Envoy Redman and President Tudjman." 540: "Again, the minority, Iran began supplying clandestine military assistance to the region in 1991."

A. And I would note there, Mr. Kay, 1991, prior to independence, prior to the outbreak of full-scale war, already we had the arming of the Muslim faction in Bosnia, which I contend is an indication of the political ideological orientation of that government rather than the way ³²⁷¹⁸ it was depicted in the American case for intervention.

Q. The next sentence partly deals as well with some of the matters you've expanded on in your papers: "Following the Bosnian declaration of independence in early 1992, arms shipments from several Islamic sources, including Iran, flowed into Bosnia."

Is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. And was that the extra dimension, in fact, that you were referring to in your reports which you've provided for the Republican Senate committee?

A. Yes. And again, the demure reference to several Islamic sources without naming the countries, I think it can reasonably be inferred there, although I cannot assert it as a matter of fact, that that is a reference to the other network, largely Saudi supported.

Q. We go to the next paragraph, September 1992: "Iranian arms shipments flying into Croatia," an exchange between Iran and Croatia in relation to that facility. "This report confirms suspicions that Iran had been delivering arms to Bosnian Muslim forces via Croatia." And there are further details in this report. I won't read them all out, about the modus operandi, a reference to an Egyptian cargo ship, and unloading of cargo in Turkey.

So again, just to round that up: The minority and majority in fact did not dispute the basic conditions by which the weapons flow into Bosnia was occurring?

A. They did not. Most of their disagreement, as I see it, is a ³²⁷¹⁹ narrow one of the significance of the green light itself in facilitating that transfer and the legal definition of whether it was a covert operation or not and how it should -- the administration should have dealt with the legislature on this.

Q. That's the political argument of just blaming -- one side blaming the other --

A. Yes, I think that is largely the case.

MR. KAY: Thank you. I have no further questions. I was going to exhibit these documents now, Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. KAY: Hoping to take one exhibit number and dealing with it under a tab process, so that we can keep them together as a collection, which I think would find favour with the Registry. The next Defence exhibit number is --

THE REGISTRAR: D245.

MR. KAY: D245. And if they could be put together as tabs 1 to 8, with the numbering that we've given on them.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Which is to be 245?

MR. KAY: The whole group.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I see.

MR. KAY: With that being D1, the main report, and then the other, tabs 2 to 8.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm reminded that there is a Prosecution objection to the admission of the report.

MR. KAY: Yes. If I can just deal with that, Your Honour. The ³²⁷²⁰ report's been used so extensively in the evidence of this witness. And in fact, as demonstrated in re-examination, the issues by which it came to be put into -- or the reason for it being put into evidence dealing with the essential matters concerning the accused's defence are highlighted by the use of the report, and we submit it clearly should be used as evidence in the case.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: I don't think I really need repeat my objections, which I amplified in answer to an observation or a question by Your Honour part way through. It seems to me that this is material of absolutely no value to this case, and indeed, I make no complaint for the OTP, but having to handle it and marshal it is going to be a substantial exercise. Having said that, it's entirely up to the Court.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, its weight is another matter. We admit it. Mr. Milosevic, any questions on particular issues?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I would like to draw your attention to an obvious fact. You spent three days on two witnesses, and I have a witness list of 1.600 witnesses. Everything that is going on here shows that this is an effort to dilute and maim my defence. I ask you to re-examine --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Those comments are not appropriate. What it shows is the need for you to communicate with Mr. Kay and to instruct him, where that is appropriate.

MR. KAY: Your Honour, before the Court rises, I've got a matter to raise about issues so that the Court can keep abreast of developments ³²⁷²¹ and, in many respects, to deal with the matter raised by Mr. Milosevic. For this week's evidence, there were three witnesses contacted for availability on the schedule filed on Mr. Milosevic's behalf, and there was an estimated time for the first three witnesses, Professor Avramov, Mr. Jatras, who has given evidence, and then the third witness, Mr. or Professor, Chossudovsky, all three of them to take three days of this trial, and in fact the times listed here were just for examination-in-chief, I've been advised, rather than cross-examination. In relation to this group of witnesses --

JUDGE BONOMY: Before you go further, Mr. Kay, that's quite contrary to the remarks that have just been made by Mr. Milosevic.

MR. KAY: Yes.

JUDGE BONOMY: He suggested that there's been an extension here of the witness's evidence to deprive him of time later for other witnesses.

MR. KAY: If there's any criticism of me, I'm setting the record straight now. And the third witness, Professor Chossudovsky, who was listed for four hours as evidence in chief, did not attend this Court for hearing today. I spoke to him on the telephone on Wednesday, or Tuesday afternoon, and he was very reluctant to come without having spoken first to Mr. Milosevic, and channels have been made available so that he could speak to him. He did not want to come specifically at my request, because he felt that the issue of the representation of the accused was an issue that somehow prevented him giving evidence in defence of Mr. Milosevic, and I tried to assure him that it was in the accused's interests, as well as the witness's interest, to come here and give evidence on matters that ³²⁷²² would be in defence of the accused. I can do no more than that at this stage.

So the witnesses called this week covered the period of time available on the ones that turned up to court. I'm able to proceed at many different rates, slow or quick, and there are different ways of doing it, and I would try and work to a timetable that fitted in with Mr. Milosevic's own filing on the witness list. That we have achieved this week.

I am concerned, because for next week, witnesses had made themselves available, the first of which is Mr. Riskov, and I have had a communication, as well as there being a public statement, from him that states that he refuses to appear in the process of the trial because he finds the issue that assigned counsel has got the right to prepare and examine witnesses whom he, the lawyer, finds appropriate to invite, and that some people disagree; several legal experts disagree with what has occurred.

I'd like to publicly state that we welcome all Mr. Milosevic's witnesses to give evidence, and indeed to cooperate. Not attending will not do the defence case any good at all, whereas attendance would. And it's in his interests that they attend. To cite reasons of a ruling of this Court as a means for not coming to give evidence at the Tribunal, we do not find impressive.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, I'm sorry to interrupt you. I think the witness doesn't need to be detained any longer.

Mr. Jatras, thank you for coming to The Hague to testify. ³²⁷²³

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Your evidence is concluded and you may go.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.

[The witness withdrew]

MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour. As I said, we do not find that impressive as a public statement, because the object of the exercise is to have evidence called before this Court that goes to the defence of the accused. Mr. Ristov's statement challenges the impartiality of assigned counsel in terms that, we must submit, are not helpful, they're not the truth or the case at all, and we hope that by presenting the evidence this week, we have demonstrated our concern to call his evidence to challenge the allegations in the indictment. And we would like it made clear that all witnesses on his list are welcome, and we are calling the witnesses from the list filed by him, and that's what we are choosing to work through.

That's all I have to say on the matter, and I'm sure the Trial Chamber supports our sentiments.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we support the sentiments. We are going to adjourn for 15 minutes, so -- 10 minutes. We are adjourned for 10. So return in 10 minutes.

--- Break taken at 1.32 p.m.

--- On resuming at 1.45 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: In light of the comments just made by Mr. Kay, let me say this: It is not possible to overemphasise the willingness of the Trial Chamber to adopt a flexible approach to the presentation of the ³²⁷²⁴ defence case so as to ensure that all relevant issues which the accused wishes to explore are dealt with. To that end, we have stated on a number of occasions that we will consider permitting the accused to examine and re-examine witnesses, in addition to the examination and re-examination carried out by assigned counsel. Those counsel have made determined efforts to discuss the presentation of his defence with the accused, but so far he has refused to engage in any discussion whatsoever. The Chamber encourages all witnesses on the accused's witness list to make themselves available to counsel and the Chamber, to ensure that Defence case is fully presented.

Should the failure of the accused to cooperate with counsel result in material which is actually relevant to his case not being presented to the Trial Chamber, then he must bear responsibility for that. Mr. Milosevic, to avoid any risk that that might occur, we urge you, once more, to think carefully over the next few days about those matters and to meet with assigned counsel to discuss the situation, even initially in the broadest of terms, with a view to arriving at a satisfactory arrangement which will enable you to participate, within the limits that your health places upon you, in the presentation of your defence.

If the opportunity for the accused to participate in the presentation of his defence is not grasped by him, the trial will nonetheless proceed and none can say there was injustice. We stress that the steps we have taken are designed to help you by protecting your health, securing the presentation of your case in the most effective way, ³²⁷²⁵ and ensuring that the trial is conducted fairly and completed within a reasonable time.

We are adjourned.

MR. KAY: Your Honour, can I raise -- I'm terribly sorry.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: -- one matter that has been raised to me by Ms. Anoya, the Registry's liaison officer. We're concerned that we're sitting on Monday, and we are in witness difficulties, and we are endeavouring to obtain a witness from Canada, who I mentioned earlier, Professor Chossudovsky. He would need to see Mr. Milosevic, and we would like to see him as well. At the moment, arrangements have been put in place that have been now had to be put back. We don't know whether he'll be coming on the weekend, and there are great difficulties on the weekend in dealing with witnesses, under the conditions we have to deal with them. It would greatly assist us if the Court could sit next week on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, giving us a free hand for the Monday to make arrangements. I know that the calendar has been set by the Trial Chamber for Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, which has taken us by surprise.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, we will sit on Tuesday and Wednesday, and find another day in another week to make up the day lost. Mr. Nice, did you have anything to say?

MR. NICE: No observations.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We are adjourned.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.52 p.m. ³²⁷²⁶ to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 14th day of

September, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.