³²⁹⁹⁷

Wednesday, 13 October 2004

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice to continue, yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we have been provided this morning with a copy of the interview with Mladic. It's in German. And I propose to deal with it a little later on, towards the conclusion of the relatively limited number of questions I have to ask. I can just tell the Court and thus inform the witness that we made every effort through the newspapers he identified yesterday to get a published version of the article and interview but were unsuccessful, and I think we even got the newspaper concerned to search its archives, but we couldn't find it. But I'll raise that with the witness when I come to deal with the interview. The copy of the interview, we're grateful to the witness for providing. I think he made some elaborate arrangements to have it copied from home or something like that. We'll find out.

WITNESS: FRANZ-JOSEF HUTSCH [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. Mr. Hutsch, just a limited number of concluding questions. Some, as I explained yesterday, to clarify what, if any, issues there are between us.

You used the word "staged" yesterday, I think, twice in your ³²⁹⁹⁸ evidence, and I just want to identify how you use it and explain the degree, if any, to which we are at odds. I think you used it in one passage in relation to the horseshoe plan, and we've now disposed of the horseshoe plan?

A. Yes.

Q. The second possible use, and I don't think the word staging appears in any of your articles that we've been able to find, but the second possible use referring to the KLA directing people to go to the woods or to stay in towns.

A. That's part of this stage. Sorry. [Interpretation] That is part of this staging. I simply refer to, for example, the Stuttgarter Nachrichten, I think, of 22 July 1998. They already spoke about ground defensive plans within Kosovo to be undertaken by NATO. That was discussed already at that time. Also when I talk about staging, I refer to the activation order in October, what happened in the context of that order, namely, Mr. Holbrooke was returning from Belgrade, saying he needed this activation order in order to persuade Mr. Milosevic to agree to the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement. However, my research stated clearly that the agreement was already signed when Holbrooke informed the NATO council. There is also a note from the then German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, confirming this as well. So that for me the whole thing was set for war at a very early stage. And I mentioned yesterday the MPI [as interpreted] story back in 1996. Already in Bosnia people had been recruited which were then trained specifically in Turkey for a -- job capabilities the KLA did not have at the time and could not have, namely the capability for ³²⁹⁹⁹ raging their own air war.

Q. That's going back to another topic. It's a new one, and I'm not going to explore it. I'm simply concerned to deal with the second way in which you use the word "staging" which you referred to yesterday when you referred to KLA directing people to go to the woods or to stay in the villages. You agreed with me yesterday that of course with Serb forces approaching it would be sensible to leave your village.

A. Yes, of course.

Q. And unless you're able to -- you haven't pointed in either your articles or in your evidence to any particular individual KLA or non-KLA Kosovar Albanian who has given you this explanation of staging?

A. That was certainly not the intention of the KLA to tell me how they would stage their war and what means they would employ in the process.

Q. You understand that it's the Prosecution's case - and this is what I'm going to suggest to you - is that people moved and left their villages because of real fear for what was going to happen to them, and that's what you must have observed.

A. Oh, it is definitely true to say that particularly in the area Malisevo, where I was, I can name people who I did not name in my articles. I could name, for example, Ilijas Kaduli [phoen], I could mention the name of a Special Forces unit, Eagles I, still active today, by the way. They put active pressure on the civilian population to request them to leave the villages, but also they actually went and forced people to stay in their villages once these were under attack. I could name, for ³³⁰⁰⁰ example, Tahir Zenani. I could name Aljus Rama. And these are definitely matters which occurred.

Q. That's obviously very helpful because as you know we prosecute the KLA as well and we can take that information into account. But that apart, it remains the Prosecution's case here that what you must have seen was people acting, either wholly or in large part, in fear of attack that was coming from the Serb forces. And I don't want there to be any doubt about whether the issues are joined between us.

A. At any time of my statement, I made clear, and I think I gave you the matter of a pebble being chucked into water with suddenly a big wave coming back as a result. That's what I used to illustrate what I mean. Often it was sufficient to have a very small provocation to cause a totally out of proportion and also unjustified escalation. I made that clear several times. And obviously people did play on both sides, I might add, on these fears. And all this to the detriment of the civilian population. I made that clear as well, and I also made it clear time and again in my articles.

Q. This short exchange between us, another way of looking at the same history is to say that the Serbs used comparatively small acts of provocation to bring by vengeance huge suffering to the innocent villagers of populations local to where the initial act occurred?

A. I have a problem, this term sort of small. If you have Serb policemen being murdered as a result of an ambush, then that's not that small a matter. So I have a problem with the word "small incident" or provocation. Otherwise I would agree with you. ³³⁰⁰¹

Q. Thank you. I think I used the word comparatively small and I recognise your sensitivity on that point. Then we move to the next point, where it may be necessary just to clarify what's between us, if anything. That's the size of the forces of the KLA and the VJ. The evidence in -- before this Chamber includes that the KLA rose from a handful of men in 1995 to somewhere between 10.000 and 20.000 in about May of 1999. Would you accept that?

A. I would accept that, yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'd like to find out from the witness what was the strength of the KLA in the area of Kosovo that he covered; that's the central and southern parts.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to information I received from the KLA General Staff, we would name between 18 and 20.000 permanently deployed fighters. Losses incurred by the KLA were made good very quickly, so that that strength I mentioned could be maintained.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice. Sorry, Mr. Nice. I'm just noticing that in answer to you, your proposition was that the KLA rose from somewhere between 10.000 and 20.000.

MR. NICE: Somewhere to between 10.000 and 20.000, yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: But he has just said to me that in the southern parts and the central parts, the areas that he covered, he would have estimated the strength to be between 18.000 and 20.000.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I mean the figure I mentioned referred to the Kosovo as a whole, not just to the area I covered. So it ^{33002 BLANK PAGE 33003} was information I was given by General Staff members of the KLA.

MR. NICE:

Q. To follow His Honour's question: I think we've had evidence from Witness Buja that zone 6 had about 1.400 KLA, probably at the relevant time. Would you accept that?

A. No, I would not accept that at all. The figures for manpower in defence zone 6 after the spring offensive was less than the figure given. We're talking about Nerodimlje. There were with brigade 162 just about 800 men. I mentioned yesterday that in defence zones 6 and 7, manpower had been reduced considerably to an overall strength of four brigades. 162 in defence zone 6, 171, 173, 174, in defence zone 7, that means Vitina, Gnjilane, and in both taken together I would estimate the manpower to be a maximum of 2.000. I had tried to explain that because the supply routes from Macedonia went through these aforementioned defensive zones. The situation was one of no fighting in that area. On the contrary; there -- they tried to reduce what -- their activities to, for example, the area of mine sweeping, and I have photographs showing it. So there was no stronger force in the area.

Q. Turning to the Serb forces, by April, or the end of April 1999, the evidence before the Chamber suggests that there were some 20.000 VJ soldiers and some 30.000 paramilitary or militarised police, say 50.000 in all. Would you accept that as broadly accurate?

A. The VJ strength, I would agree with. As far as the paramilitaries are concerned, I have a slight problem which I indicated yesterday. Some of the policemen who talked to me made clear that during the day or during ³³⁰⁰⁴ the night, depending on when your shifts were, you wore the MUP uniform, and then the other time, the other shift, you then wore the paramilitary uniform, or you took leave and during your leave you joined the paras. And your superiors tended to see this with a very benevolent eye.

Q. Turning to the weaponry available to each side, the Serbs had such things as armoured carriers, helicopters and tanks which were completely unavailable to the KLA?

A. Absolutely.

Q. The KLA, although their weapons increased over time, they were lightly armed, frequently at the beginning under-armed?

A. I don't see it like that. The terrain in the Kosovo actually allows the KLA, with the arms they had, to have an excellent, highly flexible, highly mobile form of waging war which is highly effective. And the Serb armed forces and security forces were therefore forced on the defensive because the equipment they had which you mentioned could not be used effectively. Compare that to southern Germany where we have an alpine unit specifically trained for mountainous use with the same equipment as the KLA and they are very successful, and they would have been very successful in the Cold War. The Austrians still have the same precepts in some of their groups. If we assume that a state of the art modern equipped army with armed equipment, where there is already a problem going through forests, moving through mountainous areas, cannot really bring this strength to bear, and there are very few areas in Kosovo where they would bring that particular strength to bear and so that's a problem we had here. Very mobile guerrilla army, flexibly lead with small ³³⁰⁰⁵ units, in a rigid hierarchy, but operating with a high degree of flexibility, particularly as far as the tactical level is concerned, and for the system which the VJ was using, the KLA was clearly superior to them. And that I would have thought was the reason why the Serb General Staff decided later on to use the VJ only for border guard duties and to put the artillery systems together to mass them into strategically important areas so that the paramilitary and other units, who as -- at the strength of infantry groups, tried to do what the KLA also did. So the VJ was just providing logistical support. That's how I would see that situation.

Q. And there maybe not much between us and it will be for the Judges to decide as necessary where success lay, but to this extent I think we're certainly in agreement that the completing nature of their armaments and their numerical strength made a hit-and-run type approach almost inevitable, didn't it?

A. I think the hit-and-run tactics is not something which was chosen the basis of available weapons. There was certainly sufficient money within the KLA and still is to acquire the necessary weaponry. No, they adapted their tactics to the terrain. Use Afghanistan as an example. Why the alliance decided in Afghanistan to use primarily special forces and special operations forces there against the Taliban. That was done for that very reason because the terrain was not suitable for the use of armoured vehicles, heavy immobile forces. And of course the alliance was very successful in that approach they adopted. And there are sufficient examples of military history even from the most recent military past ³³⁰⁰⁶ showing clearly that the approach adopted by the KLA was clear that it was the terrain which determined tactics and weaponry. Choice of weaponry in the KLA was excellent in doing that because of Agim Ceku, I suppose.

Q. Very well. Last point on this general topic, either -- see first of all if you agree with me, otherwise I'll show you two documents. So far as Pristina Corps Command is concerned, do you accept that between December 1998 and April 1999 the number of brigades - I think they're called combat arms brigades - doubled from six to twelve?

A. I would agree with you on that. And I personally would say on the situation maps of the KLA, it was only immediately following the OSCE Verification Mission observers withdrawal that I observed that particular activity.

Q. Yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I needn't.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sorry. I hadn't quite finished. I just wanted to give you time to deal with your papers. So it was very clear that the reinforcement forces only arrived after the KVM people had left. This is supported by situation reports made by the German defence ministry in Bonn and foreign ministry, and also NATO documents confirm this.

MR. NICE: First of all, Your Honour, the exhibits that show the doubling - I needn't trouble you with them - are Exhibits 319, tabs 31 and 77, and it's the address lists on those two documents that show the doubling up of brigades.

Q. Let's turn on now then -- and just one other point that I must ³³⁰⁰⁷ clarify as between us, rather than leave things unresolved. You spoke yesterday towards the end of your evidence of two particular areas which were cleared of their populations by the KLA because they were needed as command centres; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So there may have been other places where areas were cleared for command centre purposes, but this was what you saw in your area? Thank you very much.

A. Yes.

Q. And it's right that the VJ had a unit, the 72nd Special Brigade; is that right? And the 63rd Parachute Brigade together with some military police units that were dedicated to counter-insurgency, to hit and run type?

A. Absolutely, yes.

Q. Very well. Then just a couple of points on things you've already spoken about. We dealt with refugees. Velika Krusa was one site you spoke of where the Serbs attacked in a way that you found particularly I say memorable, but unforgettable, I think, and you've told us a bit about that. Were you aware of and did you see some 10.000 villagers in the forest there?

A. No. 10.000, no. I spoke of 10.000 in the Kacanik area and I did localise them in certain areas. Velika Krusa specifically I wouldn't say 10.000. I would estimate that number to be between 1.000, 1.500. But they did leave quickly and not all of these people were from Velika Krusa but also from other surrounding villages and had left there earlier. ^{33008 BLANK PAGE 33009}

Q. And at Velika Krusa there was shelling by the VJ; is that right?

A. I stated that there was mortar taking position, and I could not quite make clear whether that mortar belonged to the MUP or the VJ. But we could see from the uniform that it was pretty untypical for paramilitaries to have mortars in the first place. So there was cooperation between MUP/VJ. What specifically that cooperation was and in that specific case, I can't say, and cooperation with the Frenki boys, the paramilitaries.

Q. You've described the horror of what you saw yesterday. Vitina, another village of which you spoke, was a site where you saw forced expulsion or where you were aware of forced expulsion of the population?

A. I saw looting is there, particularly when the forces were withdrawing. What I saw here more, I don't know whether we would have that map again, the atlas of maps.

Q. Page?

A. 12. Near Vitina, near Smira, what I saw there. Smira is the place I'm pointing at. What I observed there was VJ, MUP, with armoured vehicles, with tanks, and the relevant crews were in the houses, in the buildings where some Albanians still lived. The passages and the rooms in the lower storeys were used by these fighters, and the upper floors were still inhabited by Albanian citizens. In one of my articles I call them human shields the way they were used there. And a similar thing happened that was over here between Kabas and Benac and near Begunovc [phoen]. There were two artillery positions where the ammunitions in Begunc [phoen] - not Begunovc, Begunc - and the other aforementioned villages, ³³⁰¹⁰ munitions were stored in buildings where it was very clear that there were still Albanians living in the upper floors of these buildings.

Q. In the course of this, were you aware of them being exhumed and then reburied by the VJ and MUP?

A. I did not see that. Not in the rooms I saw. All I did see was perhaps most striking and something which stuck most in my mind was the ten people in Velika Krusa, where there were clear attempts at burning the bodies. They had been interred in place, had been such an attempt, and I took numerous photographs, where the people were not a stone's throw away from the very areas where they had been massacred and been dug in.

Q. Thank you very much. Interviews. You've interviewed a number of people. We'll turn to the one with Mladic almost immediately. But did you by any chance ever interview Seselj?

A. No.

Q. So far as the Mladic interview is concerned, as I've explained, we've been unable to get it.

MR. KAY: I've got copies here of the interview, which can be distributed. I've got here one for the witness as well, which he needed.

MR. NICE: May it be distributed. I think it's still in German. It's only a side and a half. And I hope it won't be an abuse of the in-court interpreters if I simply ask the witness to read the German and then we'll have straight on the --

MR. KAY: Can you distribute that?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE: While it's being distributed: ³³⁰¹¹

Q. Mr. Hutsch, can you explain to us what is the document we're looking at because it doesn't come from a newspaper article, and we have simply been unable, even with the newspaper searching for it, to find the article concerned.

A. I asked my son yesterday to go to the CD where I burnt CDs from my articles from that time, and I asked him to mail me the material from that CD. I then assured Mr. Kay that later last night he would receive that interview. Because I live in Buxtehude near Hamburg. It was a problem for me to find this myself and in the middle of the night get all the material. I would need to check my accounts and work out which media printed which bits and I'd have to prefer this to my accountant. However, that's not a problem. That's an interview I offered to several different media and it was published.

Q. Previous -- which paper?

A. I think that the Neue Osnabrucker Zeitung at the time printed it. I'm also fairly certain it would have appeared at least in excerpts for the broadcast in NDR armed forces and strategies.

Q. You say that this --

A. That was 1996. I did the interview in 1996 and I would have used it then.

Q. You say that this interview happened in Sarajevo.

A. Yes.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... itself or ...

A. No. Of course it was in part of the suburbs which were characterised by hearses, the area belonging to Republika Srpska. ³³⁰¹²

Q. You said yesterday - and I meant to say this - that that's where Mladic still is. I don't imagine you're suggesting that you know where Mladic is now.

A. Let's put it like this: There are more than rumours on where he is staying, and I think NATO and SFOR has detailed information. However, this is probably not the matter for these deliberations here.

Q. Let's move on from that, just make this point: Even if in the RS part of Sarajevo, in the spring of 1996, you were aware, of course, that Mladic had already been indicted?

A. I knew that on the one hand. I mean, you see when you read my first question that I'm asking about that exact matter and I provoked him with that very question.

Q. And were you aware at the time of the degree of support he had already received from the accused?

A. No. On the one hand, he refused this support [as interpreted], and I gave you this, as the interview took place in the same form. When speaking to me, Mladic never admitted any connection. I have been looking to find out that there was a connection, and our colleague Andreas Suma has made this clear. He also in the Vibis [phoen] report mentioned the phone tapping protocols which are said to exist. Phone calls between Perisic and Mladic were supposed to be intercepted. And also said to be in existence intercepts between Milosevic and Karadzic conversations. These intercepts seemed to have vanished from the face of the earth.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, could you just let us clarify this. You asked him if he was aware at the time of the degree of support he had ³³⁰¹³ already received from the accused. And the transcript has his answer: No. On the one hand, he refused this support. I'm not sure whether that is a translation problem. Was that what the witness -- was that what you intended to say?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. There was no recognisable support. And he said to me: No, there was no support.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. You told us about what Andreas Suma and others have been investigating and I'm not going to go into that. In your observations such as they may have been of this trial, have you learnt now of efforts made on Mladic's behalf to free him from ever being surrendered to this Tribunal? Just yes or no.

A. That is his intention, yes. He intends to avoid capture.

Q. Were you aware that between the events in Srebrenica and the time of your interview, efforts had been made to free him from ever being surrendered to this Tribunal?

A. That is a question I would like to answer in a more intimate atmosphere.

Q. I'm not going to pursue it, because it's only really the setting for the interview and I can make the arguments about this later. I'm going to ask you, please, because we don't have an English translation of the interview, to read it, all parts of it, but please to bear in mind that once reading a document, the temptation to go faster than is fair on the interpreters is almost overwhelming. You have to go very slowly. ³³⁰¹⁴

A. [In English] I'll try my best. [Interpretation] General, how can you live as an alleged war criminal, who many people would prefer to see in front of the Tribunal in The Hague today, even tomorrow? Why war criminal? Do you know more than I do? For example, because of the more than 7.000 dead Muslims in Srebrenica. Response: Figure which is -- which I'm completely unaware of. The truth is that in Srebrenica, there was heavy fighting. On both sides people were killed. That is for me not a war crime but the risk of the life of a soldier. Question: That is a part of what people are telling. Another part is that men were separated from women and that men were shot under the eyes of the UNO Protective Forces: Answer: These are only fairy tales. The fact is, and it has been confirmed by TV reports, that I myself went through the town after it was taken and ensured the inhabitants they would be treated according to the Geneva Convention. I talked and negotiated with their leaders. We provided vehicles to bring the inhabitants to the Muslim areas. The UN did not manage to do that. Do you call that a war crime? Question: Why did you attack the protected zone and conquer it at all? Response: Do you seriously think that there would have been peace in my country if this Turkish patchwork had continued to exist? The enclaves had to fall to give peace a chance. It's as simple as that. Question: An action which was only certainly possible with the agreement of Belgrade? Response: Don't you think that we Serbs could solve our own problems in Bosnia? Question: For such complex problems, like the attack on protective zones, the support of President Slobodan Milosevic is certainly helpful. Response: Let me put it in other words. I do not accept orders from ³³⁰¹⁵ Milosevic. We are grown up enough to solve our own problems. Question: Also, those to provide your army with the weapons munition and fuel in spite of the embargo, logistic service which the Serbian armed forces would better response. I'm amused by this that you don't think that we are capable of providing for ourselves, and you think that at the same time we had massacred 7.000 Muslims. How does this go line in line with each other? This is a contradiction in itself.

Q. I'm not going to seek any of your comments on his answers about arming, about the 7.000 dead, people being killed in fighting and fairy tales. I'm only going to seek your answers on one or possibly two parts. On the first page, where he speaks of the safe areas having to fall in order for peace to be given a chance, his answer is consistent with his acting according to an understanding that already existed that the safe areas would have to fall; would you accept that?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. By whomsoever conveyed to him, it's as if he's saying there was an understanding they had to fall?

A. Absolutely.

Q. And so far as his particular answer about the accused, he says nothing about whether the accused spoke to him at the time, whether the accused gave him instructions or sought to give him instructions. He simply maintained at that time that he would be independent?

A. Precisely. This is what I also emphasised yesterday, I believe.

Q. I'm not going to ask you any more about the interview than that. Thank you very much. ³³⁰¹⁶ You also interviewed General Lazarevic of the Pristina Corps. I think the day before NATO bombing started. Do you remember that?

A. I had a co-worker who spoke to General Lazarevic, yes.

Q. So it wasn't you who spoke to him yourself?

A. I didn't do it myself, but this conversation was done by a Kosovo Serbian co-worker.

Q. And did Lazarevic acknowledge on the day before the NATO bombing began, on the 23rd of March, did he acknowledge that the VJ were already operational in the Drenica area?

A. Yes, he did confirm that.

Q. Second of, I think, two or three remaining points about what you've published. In Hamburger Abendblatt on the 21st of October of 2000, you wrote an article where you characterised the accused and his relationship with Karadzic and Mladic. First of all, do you remember that article?

A. I don't remember the details of it, no.

Q. One of the quotations from the article is as follows: "Slobodan Milosevic let off the leash his blood hounds Karadzic and Mladic."

A. Yes.

Q. Can you explain, please, what sources of material you relied on to set that phrase in writing, please.

A. Here I was relying on sources within the Western European secret services, and two things were made clear: That in a phase in 1992 to 1993, there was a clear cooperation between Belgrade, on the one hand, and Pale [phoen] on the other, between Karadzic, Mladic, on the one hand, and ³³⁰¹⁷ on the other hand, between Milosevic; that from 1994, we had a phase where directives were issued and pressure was exercised on Karadzic to agree to peace in Bosnia. And in various meetings with officers of NATO, in May 1994, it was established that NATO presented comprehensive peace proposals, a large number of maps, and it was clear that negotiations would cover every aspect, with the exception of the Drina Valleys and the electricity works.

Q. A long answer, and it may help the Court and I don't want to stop you, but my question was narrowly focused on your sources of material for the observation that Karadzic and Mladic were the accused's bloodhounds, clearly, therefore, under his control. You've identified the sources of information to that. It was the sources of information in which I was interested. Is there anything else you need to add by way of sources?

A. Okay. I maintain my statement that this was from people belonging to the secret services of Western European nations to characterise them. They were extremely plausible and their statements had been corroborated by documents.

Q. Finally, an article on the 17th of January of 2000, which I have in German not translated, so, Your Honours, at most it could be marked for identification at the moment. But I'll see whether we can deal with it by asking the witness about it, producing it and having it available for production if necessary.

This article referred to an interview that you had had with Arkan. Do you remember that interview?

A. Yes. ³³⁰¹⁸

Q. And in the interview, you made it clear that Arkan had explained to you that everything he did, he did under the command of the Serbian army and under the command of this accused.

A. That is what Arkan said, yes.

Q. And he went on to explain that he, Arkan, was, in the vernacular, dumped by this accused because he knew too much.

A. That is what Arkan said.

Q. And you went on in your article to explain that after the accused had dumped Arkan, the accused appointed Frenki as commander of the paramilitary forces in Kosovo.

A. Yes. This is precisely what I said, yes.

Q. And of course, you've given your own account of what you saw at Velika Krusa committed and unforgettably committed by Frenki. Your article goes on to make it quite clear that, as you understood it, Frenki's boys were the principal paramilitary offenders in Kosovo.

A. Yes. This is precisely what I wrote in several articles, especially in the introduction to the horseshoe plan.

Q. You also made reference to White Eagles and Arkan's Tigers, I think; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And under whose control were they?

A. The Arkan Tigers certainly were still under the control of Arkan, and the White Eagles under the command of Seselj.

Q. But the principal offenders or principal actors on the paramilitary side under the control of this accused? ³³⁰¹⁹

A. Well, they were at least in contact with him. What I didn't do in my article, because I had no evidence, was that Milosevic had given an order to use these paramilitaries. This would have been a journalistic approach to say I need evidence for this, that is, a document with a signature or a witness saying that Milosevic said: Let the paramilitaries off the line. So for me, it wasn't clarified 100 per cent whether the instruction to use the paramilitaries came from Milosevic or from paramilitary leaders who had become independent.

Q. Your interview was based on what Arkan had told you and you've set out or I've set out and you've agreed with what Arkan told you about it?

A. Would you believe Arkan?

Q. That's a matter, of course, we won't have the opportunity of testing here. But that was the information he gave you?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. Thank you.

MR. NICE: Yes. That's all. Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.

JUDGE KWON: Before the re-examination, I'd like to clarify one thing.

MR. KAY: Of course.

JUDGE KWON: Just a minor thing. Mr. Hutsch, you referred to MPRI yesterday three times, or two -- a couple of times. And I note it was -- you mentioned that also today, which was wrongly translated as MPI. So I think I heard that several times before. If you could explain it again to me today. ³³⁰²⁰

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It is MPRI in all cases.

JUDGE KWON: For the sake of translation, the transcript is appearing on page 2, line 21. Yes. Could you remind me of what it is about. I think it is a --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, exactly. That is the abbreviation. To give you an impression, it is a company, a private company of ex-officers of the US armed forces, established by them, a company which, according to their home page, offers all kinds of military training. For example, MPRI gave the -- trained the Macedonian army in 2001 and also the KLA in 2002. So they trained both sides of the war at the same time. MPRI trained the KLA to a high degree. At the moment they are training the Albanian army, I believe. If you try to penetrate this, like blackwater, for example, you are met with a wall of silence. What is clear, however, is that officers of the US -- were able to leave the US forces. They went over to MPRI. They are working there for one, two, or three years and can usually return to the US forces at a higher rank and be reintegrated.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. KAY: Yes. Just following on from that passage of your evidence, Mr. Hutsch.

Re-examined by Mr. Kay:

Q. Do you know anything about the financial structure of MPRI, how it's funded?

A. Showing it in a classic way in terms of the training support for the Macedonian army, the finance was certainly provided by the Pentagon. ³³⁰²¹ In other cases, one says that this has been taken over by the CIA. MPRI has the reputation of doing the dirty jobs of the American secret services and to bring them to completion.

Q. The level of competence and efficiency of this organisation?

A. Extremely high. In the training camps that I saw in 2001 in Macedonia or in the south of Kosovo, where American trainers were operating, I have to say that they did a first-class, excellent job, which left nothing to be desired in terms of professionality.

Q. The access to resources that MPRI has?

A. Of course, let me give you another example. During the Oluja offensive 1999 [as interpreted], the American English was used as from a certain rank and there were American consultants available, though there was a UN resolution preventing this. The Croatian army had been -- was no longer relevant. It had been conquered. And then a couple of months later they were able to launch an offensive fully equipped in terms of manpower and equipment. The Oluja Serbs were driven from a position within 72 hours, in which they had been well prepared for this case for three years. So this gives you an idea of the MPRI, the quality of their training, their resources. In spite of the weapons embargo, they were able to launch these offensives.

Q. We have on the transcript here at line 17 on the LiveNote 1999. Was that the date you gave or is that incorrect?

A. The Croatian offensive was 1995, August 1995. Oluja.

Q. I was just checking the correct translation. Yes. And in relation to the MPRI set-up at that time, in 1995, do you know where it ³³⁰²² was established?

A. MPRI was available in the entire Krajina and available to the entire Croatian army, as they were available to the KLA in 1999 and also in Macedonia 2001, in Presheva [phoen].

Q. Before I continue with your questioning, Your Honours, there's one matter I want to make entirely clear, or have the Prosecution make clear, and that is: Is it the case that the report of this interview with General Mladic is being challenged as given by this witness by the Prosecution? Because there's been slightly ambiguous remarks, and I want to be satisfied as to exactly what the nature of the issue is, if there is an issue, between the Prosecutor and this witness on this recorded conversation.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I didn't understand you to be --

MR. NICE: No. I was of course mystified that we couldn't get it from the Internet. I think actually a different newspaper was referred to today from the one referred to yesterday. And it may have been published anonymously. If I was going to challenge the account of the interview, I would have made it clear. No, no challenge.

MR. KAY: I'm grateful for that.

Q. And Mr. Hutsch, you've given evidence, you're a freelance journalist; is that right?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. And we get the impression from your evidence you have a vast amount of materials which is your work over the last eight to ten years.

A. Well, in the nine years I've been working as a journalist, of ³³⁰²³ course, a great deal of material has come up. I would consider it to be the extent of three removal cartons, round about.

Q. And I appreciate you'd have to go into your records, but it may be of help to the Court: If you were able to produce a schedule of where this particular article was published and the dates, is that possible for you to do that?

A. Well, all of the articles I have written and that have been published, it's an agreement between the client and the author that these publications are also returned in manuscript form and it's stated where it appeared or a copy of the newspaper or the newspaper itself. I've collected all of them, and all of the articles I've written and have been published have been duly archived.

Q. If you could over the period of the next week, say, if you have an opportunity, would you be able to provide a table listing where and when this was reported?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. And forward it to me.

MR. KAY: And if Your Honours' consent, if I could then distribute it, and if anything arises, that matter can at least be considered as a way of dealing with this matter perhaps once and for all.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. KAY: Thank you.

Q. You were questioned about the increase in volume of the Serb security forces, dates were given such as April, largely concentrating on 1999. At that time, we know from evidence in the case that NATO was ³³⁰²⁴ building up around Serbia, in various locations, the evidence has been from witnesses such as General Clark that there was to be the establishment of forces in various locations around the borders of Serbia. Considering this as an investigative journalist, as well as your knowledge of military matters, would it be sensible or reasonable for a state to accept and face the build-up of troops around its territory without taking any of its own steps for its defence and protection? What would you do as a military man?

A. Well, we've established that my assessment of military situations deviates from that of General Naumann because he thought that the Serbian forces needed three to four months' time of preparation, although they were already fully in operation. My opinion is that, in particular, with the introduction of Leopard 2 tanks of the Bundeswehr in March 1999 to Macedonia, it was clear that as Naumann feared, an air offensive alone was not a solution to the conflict of Kosovo. Politically - and don't hold me to the date - I believe it was the 24th of April. In a meeting of the German Defence Committee, German Defence Minister Sharping defined the war targets. And one of the targets he defined was to isolate Milosevic. He did this. The protocol or the minutes of the meeting of the Defence Committee have been made available to me. It was not simply to avoid the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo, but the war target was to bring down Milosevic. We have parallels to the Iraq war. And this was the problem. This is what they were preparing for. And this is why troops were brought in, the extraction force was not in a position to do this extraction job because they didn't have the capacity in terms of airspace. So it was ³³⁰²⁵ transformed into fighting troop to march into Kosovo with armed vehicles and tanks.

Q. In your discussion with General Naumann, this campaign wasn't viewed as just being a bombing campaign, which is the phrase that we use most commonly; this was also prepared as a ground attack campaign?

A. General Jackson, in an interview, told me that to start a ground offensive, in spite of the political reservations of all of the NATO member countries, one would need about three weeks. So a ground offensive from the military point of view would have been the first -- would have been possible on the 5th -- the 1st or the 5th of July. Of course, subject to the approval of the individual NATO states.

Q. And in these interviews that you've had with these particular figures who were involved in the planning of the NATO campaign, their position was that this was a -- or capable of being an aerial bombardment as well as a land attack?

A. Yes. Jackson was prepared for this, and this is expressed in the telephone call he made from the airport in Pristina, I think it was on the evening of the 10th, when the Russian SFOR forces had occupied the airport in Pristina, when he said clearly: I am not going to start the third world war for you, when Clark was asked to have the Russians removed from the airport.

So this shows the strength of KFOR, on the one hand, but also it shows that there were plans to enter Kosovo from the ground and the fact that the German contingent went in through Albania showed that there was a long-term preparation of these operations in terms of logistics. From the ³³⁰²⁶ bilateral negotiations to a status of forces agreement and so on, apart from that which had to be coped with on the diplomatic level.

Q. When you were in the region at this time, were you aware of this build-up that was occurring around Serbia?

A. Yes. That could no longer be hidden, especially since the Leopard tanks, the Marder type came from Thessaloniki, through Tetovo [phoen], and it was clear that this was going beyond what the extraction force would allow.

Q. You dealt with the strength of the KLA and several questions were asked about particular zones. Zone 6 and zone 7 you referred to. Just so that we've got it clear and we can pinpoint this evidence when this material is looked at at a later stage: Can you identify on the map again those particular areas, zone 6 and zone 7, which you said were relatively inactive areas for the KLA, where there was not so much happening. Is that right?

A. That is correct.

Q. If you could tell us the page of the map.

A. That would be Roman numeral VI. The defence zone 6 and 7 comprise primarily the areas Strpce, Kacanik, Vitina, Gnjilane, Kamenica. Defence zone 2 comprised primarily the areas of Dragas, Prizren, Suva Reka, Malisevo, Orahovac. And zone 1 was the region of Drenica. Zone 3 was the area around Pec and Djakovica, Decan. Zone 4 was Pristina. And zone 5 was Podujevo, Kolap [phoen], the area just outside of -- in the eastern -- anything east of Pristina, Lipljan.

Q. Just checking the transcript that we got all the numbers there. ³³⁰²⁷ Yes. Thank you very much.

You were asked about numbers around Velika Krusa, when that incident occurred in March of 1999. You challenged a figure of 10.000 that was put to you, saying you thought 1.000 to 1.500 people were in the woods. How were you able to observe the numbers that were there?

A. With all these figures, we speak of estimates. And there is always a question mark behind them. UNHCR has the same approach, because nobody could possibly ever give accurate figures. So all these figures are estimates. One has to trust one's own feeling and observation that the number given is not too large. But obviously, I cannot say that this is a scientifically proved number where I could say for every individual number here I've got the face to fit the figure. These are estimates based on experience.

Q. Your experience, then, in judging numbers, that comes from where?

A. I'm a footballer, and I always looked at the football stadium, seeing how many people were watching and that gives you a good idea of how large a particular group is and you try to use these impressions as a yardstick. That's always how I've done that. I think it's what many policemen do too.

Q. Some of us support teams which have very few in numbers following them, so it becomes easier.

Murdered policemen. There was an issue there whether it was small or comparatively small in the terms of incident. Just to give us an impression from what you saw and what you were aware of in this period that you were giving evidence how many murdered policemen did you come ³³⁰²⁸ across or see? How many such incidents? So that we can understand the background of your evidence.

A. I myself saw about 20 murdered Serb policemen. OSCE people have told me for the period from December to the withdrawal, there was a case of about 120 to 150 murdered policemen throughout the area of Kosovo. These are figures very similar to those General Laukweier [phoen] has listed in his two books on the Kosovo war. To that extent, I do not doubt that these figures are at least extremely close to reality.

Q. Any other public officials, people who were murdered, who represented the government in some form, civic leaders?

A. There are publications made by the Serb government in that time. There are also Serb government press releases. However, they are not always entirely trustworthy, because many things were put in a very confused manner there. For example, murders which had inter-ethnic reasons but were then purported to be ethnic murders. I mean, at the time there was a lot of anarchy within the Albanian group of the population there. They sort of paid reckonings which dated back 80 or a hundred years or so. And these murders were then also purported as ethnically motivated and they were added to the Serb figures in order to raise the numbers given. So personally, I always refer to what the OSCE or later Mr. Laukweier wrote in his book. I thought their figures were more realistic, particularly because it tallied with what I myself observed.

Q. One last issue again going to your journalism. The word "staging" was used by you in evidence to describe or characterise that which you were informing the Court about. You were questioned about that. Have you ³³⁰²⁹ used that word or a similar word in any of your articles?

A. I think particularly in 2001, I would have used that term several times. On the one hand, in order to describe the development in Kosovo, the transfer of the Kosovo protection corps into an army of the Kosovo, the result was basically the result of a staged process. And I also used it to describe the MPRI, the American company's involvement, where I always used the word of the staged Kosovo war.

Q. Yes. Thank you. That's all I have to ask you.

MR. KAY: Does any of Your Honours have further questions or the accused?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, you will have exhibited the --

MR. KAY: Yes. I'm grateful for Your Honour reminding me about that. I believe the next number is D248.

JUDGE ROBINSON: This is the interview with Mladic.

MR. KAY: Yes. And perhaps the month could be given again. That was in which month of 1996?

A. The interview was conducted in March 1996.

MR. KAY: And if the witness could forward the schedule to me of the relevant publication.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, during cross-examination, you made some comments, and I intimated that you would have an opportunity in re-examination to put some questions to the witness. Do you wish to do so?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this examination has ³³⁰³⁰ nothing to do with my defence. I'm going to call the witness when my right to conduct my own defence is given back to me. Whereas your lawyer is quite obviously representing the opposite side.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I've heard you, Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Hutsch, your evidence is concluded. The Chamber thanks you for coming to give it, in particular, for returning today. It is in keeping with the best tradition of cooperation with the Tribunal. You may now leave.

[The witness withdrew]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, yes.

MR. KAY: We're just coming up to the break at 10.30, Your Honour. We have under ten minutes, but it's probably an opportunity just to deal at this stage with the position of the next witness. Filed with the Court is the next witness. This witness has attended The Hague. He has been interviewed by me. He had not been interviewed previously by the defence team of Mr. Milosevic. As part of the materials that were put together as Defence exhibits, there was included a list of names relevant to people who were kidnapped or missing in Kosovo. The next witness has a personal history concerning a relative who falls within that category, but he is also a person who is a leading figure of an association for the missing and kidnapped in Kosovo. And he is here in two capacities. The first capacity being the fact that he has a personal issue, but also, more importantly for him, as he does not seek to put his personal circumstances above those others within this association, he has, with others, compiled figures and information concerning those people who are victims, who have ³³⁰³¹ had -- come within the category of missing or kidnapped during this period of conflict in Kosovo.

He falls into that category of witness more importantly, rather like Fred Abrahams, a witness for the Prosecution. I think there was a lady called Sandra Mitchell. There have been others who have been able to produce evidence before the Court of information that has been compiled. He has, in fact, met the Prosecutor on an occasion, or maybe more than one occasion. One I notice from a news report on the 5th of September, 2001. He has told me that he in fact filed his association's report with the Prosecution and expected that there would be some development of those issues on behalf of him and the other people concerned with his association.

During my interview with him, it became clear that the document that had been filed was not his document and was not actually the kind of material that they present. I don't know where that document came from, but he said it was inadequate in detail and it did not provide the kind of information that he would expect to testify upon, and having spoken to him, I sympathised with that point of view, because his role and his position is such that it is obviously of great importance that evidence concerning victims is put before the Court in an appropriate and proper way.

Over the last two days, I have contacted the Prosecution, who have searched their records to find the report that was handed over. There has been no success in relation to that, and I have no identifying characteristics that may help them within what are probably vast archives ³³⁰³² to find such a document.

In those circumstances, he does not want me to call him as a witness in this case now, as he feels that his position is not properly prepared, and he did not bring the report with him from Serbia. And it is obviously an important document. He would also like to discuss the issue of giving evidence about his personal circumstances with those other members of the victims' association whom he represents, because he would not want them to feel that he was using this opportunity to give evidence before this Tribunal as a way of elevating his personal circumstances above theirs. And in that regard, I have sympathy with him, having discussed the terms of his evidence, that this is not a self-promotion by him.

In those circumstances, I would -- or I advise the Court that his reluctance to give evidence at this stage should be respected. He has cooperated with assigned counsel. He was extremely cooperative in our interview and was wanting to give evidence. So I do not feel this is any case where there is a difficulty over his future testimony. However, the most important aspect of his evidence concerns other factual information that he should give, and this should be properly disclosed on the Prosecutor so that they're able to review it and it may indeed link up with other researches or materials that they have, which to date has not been able to be found.

His personal testimony is of a reasonably short level, but the substance of his testimony concerning the association of missing and kidnapped people in Kosovo is probably the major issue so far as his value ³³⁰³³ as a witness is concerned.

JUDGE ROBINSON: So what is your request?

MR. KAY: That he not be called, that we adjourn the defence case at this stage, in those circumstances, and that we have a Status Conference concerning witness issues perhaps this morning, if the Court is able to do that.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, would this witness be available next week?

MR. KAY: Next week we have an appeal --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. KAY: Sorry. Next week I believe there's an appeal hearing on the 21st of October, in relation to the representation issue concerning the accused. Therefore, we have two sitting days next week. And arrangements -- there is a witness coming from a foreign country. There are two other witnesses whom steps are being taken to be produced at this court, but it requires the assistance of a ministry from a foreign government. That has to go through diplomatic channels, and although we've made inquiries, we're told as yet there is nothing that can be produced. But if that information is produced by the foreign government, then those people are able to be used. I'm in a difficult position here, because I'm relying on agencies that are out of our control, and the cooperation of a ministry of a foreign government, and the Registry of the Tribunal are being very cooperative in relation to these matters, but once it leaves their hands, it then goes to the hands of another. ³³⁰³⁴ I need to speak to the witness to see if he's available next week, but there are problems then in the witness list, and maybe I could move him. He was moved to this week.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I noticed that, yes.

MR. KAY: Because of a difficulty.

[Trial Chamber confers]

[Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Next week we are due to sit Monday to Wednesday. I think that change was made to accommodate the Appeals Chamber's hearing on Thursday.

MR. KAY: I don't have that information. If dates are moved like that, I have all sorts of agencies asking me to produce people on certain dates with -- and it becomes an extremely complicated exercise, probably another 30 e-mails of correspondence.

[Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

JUDGE ROBINSON: The information was passed on, but there appears to be some miscommunication.

Mr. Nice, were you informed?

MR. NICE: I was aware of it informally, yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Informally?

MR. NICE: Yes.

MR. KAY: The Court will appreciate the logistics of getting witnesses to this building and the number of people that it involves, all of whom have a stake in a particular stage, all of whom require a decision by me, because they're reluctant to make decisions. And it takes -- it's ³³⁰³⁵ a fairly extensive process to book people.

JUDGE BONOMY: It is, though, possible, Mr. Kay, is it not, that Monday, the day you were not aware of, could be used for this witness, if what he has to do is return home, get the right report, intimate it to the Prosecution and discuss the sensitive issue you mentioned with the other members of the association?

MR. KAY: Yes. I agree. But I've got to speak to him about that, and I'm not sure these people live in circumstances and places where things are that easy to get off the ground.

JUDGE BONOMY: That point, though, must always have been in his mind. That's not a point that's suddenly developed. It's the missing report that's the issue that has developed, rather than the sensitivity of giving evidence about his own personal circumstances.

MR. KAY: Yes. All I can do is my best with him. If the Court will give us some time -- I'm not sure that he's at the building yet. There are procedures that have to be gone through, and I don't have easy access to the witness. And I would have to communicate to him. Would the Court allow us to set that in train?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Would half an hour be adequate?

MR. KAY: I'm sure that would help.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. We'll adjourn for half an hour, return for the Status Conference. We're adjourned.

--- Whereupon the proceedings adjourned at ³³⁰³⁶ 10.37 a.m., to be followed by a Status Conference