³³³⁶⁷

Tuesday, 16 November 2004

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you are to call your first witness, but before you do so, let me say something about an administrative matter. We'll sit from 2.15 to 3.45, then we take a 20-minute break, and then from 4.05 to 5.30, then another 20-minute break, and then from 5.50 until 7.00 p.m., and then we adjourn for the day. Mr. Milosevic, as far as I am aware, this is the first time you'll be conducting an examination-in-chief. It is, therefore, a brave new world for you, in a sense, and I'd just like to remind you of some ground rules. This is by way of reiterating what I said in the Pre-Defence Conference on the 17th of June, and generally I should say that the approach which I would like to take to the conduct of your examination-in-chief is that I want the evidence to flow with as little intervention or interruption as possible. We have lost a lot of time in the case, and I want the evidence to flow, to move ahead as quickly as possible.

Examination-in-chief is not necessarily easier than cross-examination. I would say it's different from cross-examination. That's perhaps the best description. Firstly, you're not allowed to ask leading questions of the witness. The witness must give the evidence. You are not to give the evidence. And of course, as I said before, you are not to make speeches. And then, most importantly, the evidence must ³³³⁶⁸ be relevant, which is to say it must relate to the indictment, to the charges, to the allegations in the indictment in a material particular, and it must be evidence which tends to prove or disprove an allegation. In your case, generally to be evidence tending to disprove an allegation. So the materiality and the probative value of the evidence is what is important.

And as I said on the 17th of June, documents must be produced in an orderly manner. If you're producing documents not already in evidence, then you must ensure that sufficient copies are available for the Bench, the Prosecution, and the witness.

Please also remember that documents not already translated into English will have to be translated, and therefore, sufficient notice must be given.

Having said that, your first witness, Mr. Milosevic. Please call your first witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I call Witness Professor Mihailo Markovic.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit. Begin, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

WITNESS: MIHAILO MARKOVIC ³³³⁶⁹

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Professor Markovic.

A. Good afternoon, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. You are a professor, a member of the Academy of Sciences. To save time, I will only read some important elements of your CV, and you will tell me whether all of it is true.

Professor of the philosophy faculty in Belgrade, member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences. From 1972 to 1990, professor at the University of Pennsylvania, further on member of the International Philosophical Institute in Paris, vice-president of the International Humanitarian and Union in Germany, professor of a federation for the research of the future, professor of Lund University in Sweden, member of the Academy for the Preservation of Peace in Vienna, Helsinki, and London; and professor at many universities in Europe and America. Secretary of the section of humanities of the Serbian Academy of Sciences. In the 1980s, member of the Council for the Defence of Public Freedom of Speech. For participation in the Praksis magazine, you were suspended at the time. You were suspended from the university in 1971. You were a member of the SPS party in Serbia since its foundation in 1990, and you are one of the authors of the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences. Is all of this true?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Can we note that you are among the most prominent active members of the social and public life; you have been for the past ³³³⁷⁰ few decades?

A. Yes, we can say note that, but can I explain? When you say that somebody is an engaged intellectual, that means that he is engaged in practice and in theory for the sake of some main human values, such as freedom, equality, equal rights, political, socio-economic rights, social rights, and human solidarity.

As far as theoretical engagement is concerned, which has been my case all my life, that means that one is a critical scientist, a critical researcher who does not only deal with description, analysis and explanation of social realities but does so with a critical attitude, identifying certain restrictions that need to be overcome. Practical engagement, however, means to a greater or lesser extent, political engagement in public life. In certain periods of my life, although I have always been engaged in theory, I was also politically active in certain periods, but always these ethical values come into confrontation with pragmatic politics, and on such occasions at such points in my life I had to withdraw in my -- into my scientific work, I was suspended from various institutions, and that occurred several times.

Without explaining the reasons, unless you ask me, that happened first when I was in high school before the war, the second time in the 1950s, after the war -- I apologise if I was too fast. The third time I was suspended for the longest time, for about 20 years, when I was engaged in the publication of this critical magazine Praksis, and was even editor of its international edition called Praksis International. I was removed for political reasons from the university for 20 years. I was even denied ³³³⁷¹ a passport, I was barred from talking to the media and appearing on television, and New York Times and Washington Post frequently wrote about this group involved in the Praksis magazine, describing us as dissidents. And I'm concluding.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And the last time was in 1990, when I was relieved of my duties in the Socialist Party.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The Yugoslav crisis which resulted in secession and the civil war has roots that go far back into our history; is that so?

A. Yes, but allow me to explain one more thing here, because it is important for everything else that we will be discussing later. That crisis has its international and internal political reasons. The international reasons derive from the fact that our territory is of great geographic and political importance. Important thoroughfares go through it linking Europe and Asia, and all conquerors throughout history have attempted to capture this territory. In the seventh century those were Avars, in the thirteenth century Mongolians, Turks in the 18th century, later on conquerors came from the west of Europe. But all of them tried to control, first of all, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, such as Germany, and most recently it was the United States. This territory was populated by South Slavs who frequently wished, although they were different peoples, to defend themselves together and live in a common state. Therefrom stemmed the idea about a common Yugoslav state. On the other hand, those peoples had lived under ³³³⁷² different historical circumstances. Some of them lived under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whereas others lived under the Turkish Empire. They were of different religions. Some were Orthodox Christians, others were Catholics, and others were Muslims, but all of them invariably wished to create their own national states. Therefrom stemmed their constant desire for separatism and secession which frequently led to internecine conflict, and what had happened in the most recent history is precisely a consequence of that type of conflict.

On the one hand, the aspiration to create one's own state; for instance, Slovenes had their own medieval state as far as back as 1.000 years ago, the Croatians as well, and they lost their independence in 1102. Others had their states in different periods in time. And on the other hand, these peoples wanted to create their new nation-based states. So on the one hand you have this aspiration for one's own state, and on the other hand you have the interference of external powers desiring control over that area spurring on internecine conflicts. So with this separatism on the one hand and foreign interference, you end up with the crisis of the kind that we had.

Q. Thank you. Thank you very much, Professor. We shall now attempt to focus ourselves on the most recent history.

Its crisis acquires its most prominent manifestation after the death of Josip Broz Tito, which was coupled by the escalation of the Albanian nationalistic movement and Albanian -- ethnic Albanian demonstrations. In March 1982, the time of the escalation of tensions and the organisation of demonstrations vying for republican status for Kosovo ³³³⁷³ and annexation of Kosovo to Albania. Is that one instance?

A. Yes. In 1968, there was an insurgency of a similar character when Tito had to bring divisions to calm them down. After the war, after the Second World War, when Albanians refused to participate in the Srem battles on the front line, there was another example of this kind. So this crisis was what led to these events in Kosovo.

Q. Especially painful issue at the time was the pressure --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'd just like him to elaborate on what happened in 1968. He says there was an insurgency of a similar character when Tito had to bring divisions to calm them down. That's what it says.

Could you elaborate on that for me. Explain a little more. What did Tito do to quell that crisis?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Albanians --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... first. What was the crisis in 1968?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was an insurgency, because Albanians demanded to get their own independent republic, and the position was that the minority, which already had its mother state, cannot get another state, which was the reason why Tito refused that, after which they turned out into the streets en masse requiring these changes requiring the status of republic, and Tito simply brought in divisions which immediately calmed the situation down. There was no fighting at all; the people withdrew immediately.

Whatever the case, Tito never agreed to the idea of giving ³³³⁷⁴ Albanians the status of republic. They had their autonomous province, they had all the rights enjoyable by minorities, not only cultural but also political, but he would never agree to give them a separate republic, because a republic is defined as a separate state, whereas he did not agree to them having a state.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor Markovic, an especially painful issue at that time was the pressure Albanian nationalists exerted in Kosovo and Metohija upon Serbs and Montenegrins in order to expel them from the province. What can you tell us about that? Very briefly, please.

A. In the briefest possible terms: The issue was that they were demanding from Serbs and Montenegrins to sell their houses and leave. And when some of them who wouldn't do that, because some did and left but others didn't, became exposed to violence. They were -- their cattle was killed, their houses was -- were damaged. There were cases of rape as well. And as a result, hundreds and thousands of Serbs left Kosovo in that period.

That happened at the times of Tito and Aleksandar Rankovic who held Kosovo in an iron fist. When Aleksandar Rankovic was eliminated, however, in 1966, they got joint government in Kosovo. They became represented in the government in Kosovo. And that was the period when these measures were beginning to be taken against Serbs leading to ethnic cleansing, because that was a figure of tens of thousands of people who left. ³³³⁷⁵

Q. All right, Professor. Is it the case that the term "ethnically pure" or "ethnic cleansing" that you just mentioned was used for the first time precisely in connection with this expulsion of Serbs, Montenegrins, and other non-Albanians from Kosovo?

A. Yes, it is the case that the term began to be used then. There were different expulsions even before that but they were not called that way. They began to be called ethnic cleansing then.

Q. Is it true that it became obvious precisely then how great shortcomings there were in the 1974 constitution which gave enormous rights to the autonomous provinces which existed in one of the republics but were practically separate from it?

A. Yes, it's true that this constitution actually determined the history of Yugoslavia according to the laws of unity. Kosovo, in name, remained autonomous province, but it did acquire, in effect, all the attributes of a republic because it had its government, its policies into which Serbia had no right to interfere, and now you had an Assembly, a parliament for the whole of Serbia, including Vojvodina as one autonomous province and Kosovo as another, plus Serbia proper, and everybody sat on that Assembly.

However, in the Assemblies in the autonomous provinces, Serbs were not represented. Serbia -- the Serbian government was governing only Serbia proper and couldn't interfere in the government of Kosovo. So you had a situation in which Kosovo could interfere in determining Serbian, all Serbian policies, whereas vice versa was not true.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, even without hearing the complaint, I ³³³⁷⁶ can notice the difficulty the interpreters are having now. Since you are speaking the same language, please put a pause between question and answer.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Kwon.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before you continue this, I'm interested in this 1968 event.

Professor, how long did that event last, the uprising, the insurgency, before it was quelled?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That insurgency lasted for three days, and as soon as the army appeared in the form of two divisions, Albanians withdrew into their homes and peace was restored immediately. There was absolutely no bloodshed during that insurgency. But it was an insurgency insofar as Tito realised he had to use force in order to calm them down. So he allocated two divisions. However, very little is written or known about this.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You described the position of the provinces, and I'm not going to waste any more time about that. However, the Serbian republic had the constitutional obligation to protect the population on its entire territory and to ensure the protection of everybody's civil rights.

A. Correct.

Q. However, there were no appropriate mechanisms ensuring that it was able to perform that function.

A. No. There was nothing Serbia could do. If a crime was committed ³³³⁷⁷ against a non-Albanian person in Kosovo, for instance, the Serbian government could not interfere at all.

Q. And that became abundantly plain when the issue of protection of non-Albanians in Kosovo was concerned but also the protection of Albanian population, those among Albanians who did not wish to support this nationalist movement of Albania.

A. Yes. Of course there were Albanians who wished to go on in their good neighbourly relations with Serbs and other non-Albanians, and they were punished in a very drastic way because they stuck out.

Q. Very well. I hope we've cleared that up now. In the mid-1980s, or more exactly in the autumn of 1985, in fact, you yourself were faced with a different separatist tendency, and that was less well known, generally speaking, and that was the Slovene separatist movement. In 1985, that's right, isn't it?

A. Yes. In 1985, I was called to attend a meeting in Slovenia, and that's where suddenly I was very much surprised to see that my Slovene friends and colleagues, intellectuals, were talking about the fact that Yugoslavia, as far as they were concerned, was dead and that they wanted to leave Yugoslavia.

Now, Slovenia, otherwise --

Q. That will be sufficient, Professor, thank you for the time being, to save as much time as possible. Let me ask you this: Is it true that the Serbs and Slovenes had a joint rich experience from World War II, an important experience when in Serbia a large number of Slovenes that had been expulsed spent their time there. When the Germans expulsed the ³³³⁷⁸ Slovenes, the Slovenes came to Serbian and they lived there and the Serbs believed that this had forged close ties.

A. Yes, that's quite correct. President Kucan of the day was also a refugee in Serbia when he was a boy, during his childhood. And before World War II the Serbs and Slovenes enjoyed very good relations because the Slovenes were rather wary of Croatian separatism, and they were afraid that if the Croats were to secede, they would be cut off, too, and they were in Yugoslavia after 1.000 years, and they received their state, their Assembly, their government, their cultural institutions, universities, academies of art -- academy of arts and sciences, and a national state of their own, briefly speaking. So at that time, there was Korosec. Korosec was the most prominent politician and leader of the day, and in actual fact, in Yugoslavia there was a coalition that prevailed between Serb politicians, mostly from the Radical Party, and then Slovene politicians led by Korosec and the Muslims led by Spaho, so that this Slovene/Muslim coalition kept up Yugoslavia, and the Croats were isolated from it although in different ways they resisted Yugoslavia. They wanted to find a way out, but we had the Serb politicians who had strong allies in the Slovenes and Muslims.

Q. Very well. Now something more about that position enjoyed by the Slovenes and Slovenia within Yugoslavia. Let me ask you this: It is well known that the key creator of the political system of Yugoslavia from 1945 onwards, that is to say from the end of World War II until his death, was a Slovene by the name of Edvard Kardelja, a closest Tito associate; is that right? ^{33379 BLANK PAGE 33380}

A. Yes. Edvard Kardelja was the number two man in Yugoslavia. Tito was the number one man and Kardelja came second. He was a fairly cautious man and he was the main theoretician and the creator of the entire system, the constitution, the laws, and he was exceptionally influential.

Q. So bearing all this in mind, then, the position that Slovenia had and its key participation in the set-up of the system of the constitution and of life generally in Yugoslavia, do you feel that it is natural that in Serbia and other parts of Yugoslavia few people could have assumed that in Slovenia there were strong separatist tendencies because the question arose as to why somebody would leave a community if it had a key role to play within that community and in creating the system of power and authority government and the economy. Isn't that right?

A. Well, yes, but they developed more rapidly than any other republic in Yugoslavia. They quintrupled their social product from 1945 to 1985. And if we look at the relationship in the degree of development, level of development between Yugoslavia and Slovenia on average, then Slovenia already in 1947 was 163 per cent of the overall Yugoslav average, and this grew and in 1982 they had 191, and later on they reached 220. When they seceded, they had -- were -- enjoyed a -- twice as much development as the rest of Yugoslavia, and their investments were also greater on an average, though 169 per cent was invested compared to the general Yugoslav average.

Q. Thank you. Now, without a doubt they had and enjoyed under circumstances of that kind even a privileged position. Could we say that?

A. Yes, we could. They did indeed have a privileged position. In addition to the fact that they had Kardelja and they also held the Foreign ³³³⁸¹ Ministry, they had people there in the economic -- in economic and financial matters, they were always given key posts within Yugoslavia.

Q. Yes. But can we say that for the entire Yugoslav economy, the economy was interdependent in fact and there was an interdependence on the part of the republics but the Slovenia economy, which was the most highly developed, it had a privileged interest. But Yugoslavia in all its different parts relied upon each other and it was interdependent; isn't that right?

A. Yes, that is right. They were without a doubt interdependent and the price policy had a lot to do with that and was to their advantage to a great extent because prices were higher than the average world prices in branches where they were producing, where Slovenia was producing. Slovenia's industry, electronics, and so on and so forth, the machine building and construction industry, whereas the prices of agricultural products which came from the less developed and backward parts of the country, including Serbia, those prices were below an average world level, so this was the price aspect and rift that existed.

Q. Very well. Now, when you met these Slovene intellectuals you were surprised by what you heard from them; is that right?

A. Yes, I was surprised.

Q. When they said they wanted to step down and secede from Yugoslavia despite the position they occupied?

A. Yes, they said that and I must say that the meeting took place in Ljubljana in November 1985 and for our part, in addition to myself there was Dobrica Cosic, the well-known writer who was later the president of ³³³⁸² the Republic of Yugoslavia, and Ljubo Tadic, a well-known philosopher, my colleague, whose son is now president of the Republic of Serbia, in fact. On the Slovene side there were well-known Slovene intellectuals who later on were to play a very important role in Slovenia's policy. For example, there was Bucar, who was later on the president of the Assembly of Slovenia, then there was Hribar and his wife Spomenka Hribar, Niko Grafenavr was another, Janez Urbancic, Andrej Marinc, Mare Rozaj [phoen], and so on and so forth.

As soon as they started expanding their views along those lines and saying that as far as they were concerned Yugoslavia was dead, that they felt restricted within Yugoslavia and that at one time they were at the level of Central Europe whereas they had begun to lag behind Central Europe, I presented them with facts and figures and showed them that they did very well in Yugoslavia, that they developed more rapidly than other parts of the country, in fact, and that if they truly wished to step down and leave, all we could do was to wish them bon voyage because they said that they were afraid that Serbia might oppose their seceding from Yugoslavia, be against it. They expressed that anxiety and that they thought that we intellectuals would play what they thought would be a bad role. And I said rest assured, if you really wish to leave Yugoslavia, although you've done very well in Yugoslavia, we wish you every happiness and bon voyage. They no longer talked along those lines and said that they were backward. They then moved to the ideological plane and said that one had to rid one's self of bolshevism, for example, and so on and so forth, so they moved to a different plane and area altogether. ³³³⁸³

Q. Very well. A book has been written about that particular meeting with the contents of the negotiations and talks conducted; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. So can we say that a part of the Slovene intelligentsia and people when the multi-party system was introduced in the 1990s took the leadership of political life, can we say that already at that time, when we're talking about the autumn of 1985, that there was a clear tendency and clear plan for the realisation of Slovenia's secession, that is to say for Slovenia to secede from Yugoslavia; is that right?

A. I have no doubt that already at that time they had made the firm resolve to leave and Kardelja on one occasion himself said that Yugoslavia was only a transit station for them.

Q. Very well. I'm asking you that because a thesis has been put forward here that according to which separatist tendencies in Slovenia and Croatia were born as a reaction to some kind of policy waged by Serbia, and even my own efforts to keep the other ethnic groups and nationalities under Serb domination. That is the concept and thesis being put forward here and the grounds upon which the indictment is based. And it also exists, views of that kind were expressed in the propaganda of those republics and in Western propaganda as well. What do you have to say to that?

A. Well, that seems ludicrous to me because if anybody knows anything about history they will know that those secessionist tendencies existed in the past in history a long time before. In the case of Slovenia, for example, they emerged in the 1980s, but that was before you came into any ³³³⁸⁴ position of power. But they were there. When the meeting took place, you were not one of the party leaders.

But if we look at Croatia, for example, from Ante Starcevic in the middle of the 19th century, for example, there were very strong aspirations for Croatia to create a state of its own, an independent state without the Serbs. And Starcevic himself promoted the idea that the Serbs should be put paid to in the country; a third would have to accept Catholic -- Catholicism, become converted to Catholicism, a third should be expulsed, and the remaining third should be killed, and he spoke about that quite openly.

Q. Very well, now let's just take a practical example and practical approach. Count 55 of the Bosnian indictment states as follows: "The results of the elections held in November 1990 meant that the Serbian Democratic Party, as time went by, would not be able peacefully to retain the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in what existed as Yugoslavia under Serb domination."

Now, what kind of Yugoslavia was this under Serb domination in 1990, tell me, please.

A. Well, there's no question of that, no question of any kind of domination, because in Yugoslavia -- for example, take Macedonia, the Macedonians, the Tupurkovski, and before him Kolisevski said that in Yugoslavia, throughout the time after World War II, there was a non-principled coalition, as he called it, and he had in mind the coalition of the Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Muslims, Bosnian Muslims, and so on, and the two provinces, both Vojvodina province and Kosovo ³³³⁸⁵ province. And I know full well, for example, that Serbia was left in the minority. It was a 5 to 3 vote or 7 to 1 vote when vital issues were decided upon. For example, it was customary after Tito's death to have a rotating Yugoslav state Presidency president, and you would have the representatives of individual republics. When the turn came for Ivan Stambolic to become president of the federal government, the vote was in the ratio of 7 to 1 against Stambolic. So that was the way in which decision-making took place. So there can be absolutely no question of any Serb domination, although the thesis of the Serbian domination dates back to previous times, in actual fact, and the common form played a very interesting role there, because the common form -- communist international in the 1920s, you had the ties between the Serbian king and the Romanov dynasty and as Serbia and Yugoslavia did not wish to recognise the Bolshevik Soviet Union, Bolshevik Russia whereas all the other countries had already recognised it, the common tern decided that as in Yugoslavia we had the domination of Serbia and the Serb people, that Yugoslavia should be disbanded and that the national liberation movements of the different ethnic groups should be supported; the Croats, the Muslims, the Albanians in Kosovo and the Macedonians, for example, and that Yugoslavia should be broken up and a series of Soviet republics be created which would be attached and affiliated to the Soviet Union. So that is one example of this myth of domination. Serbia could not have dominated by the very fact that it was economically weak and developed more slowly.

Q. Yes, but when we go back to the 1990s now and within the ³³³⁸⁶ frameworks of this explanation of this alleged Serbian domination, you spoke about the Federal Executive Council or federal government, who at that time, and I'm talking about 1990, who was at the head of the federal government?

A. Well, Ante Markovic was the head of the federal government, and he was a Croat.

Q. Very well. A Croat. And who was the foreign minister?

A. The foreign minister was Budo Loncar, a Croat.

Q. So the Prime Minister and president were Croats. Who was the minister of defence and head of the army?

A. It was Kadijevic who was also half Croat. He always said he was a Yugoslav, in actual fact.

Q. Now, is it true that at that time the Presidency was made up of the Yugoslav state Presidency as a collective head of state and that that was made up of the representatives of all the Yugoslav republics and autonomous provinces, which means eight of them?

A. Yes, that's correct. The collective head of state was indeed the Yugoslav state Presidency composed of the representatives of six republics and two provinces. That is to say Kosovo province and Vojvodina province. And those eight made decisions. Decision-making rested in their hands, and usually they always voted against Serbia in the ratio of 7 to 1.

Q. The term "Serbian bloc" is often used and bandied about, meaning Serbia and the two provinces. Could that bloc, the Serbian Bloc ever gain the advantage in the voting?

A. No. And there was never a bloc, and you -- it was always Slovenia ³³³⁸⁷ and Croatia who voted together. They did not vote with Serbia.

Q. Well, that's precisely why I'm asking you why this term "Serb bloc" has been used.

A. No Serb bloc ever existed. Sometimes the Montenegrins would side with Serbia on some issue.

Q. Now, what about the Assembly of Yugoslavia of the day? The republics were represented on a parity level and there was the corresponding number of deputies, and in one the Chambers acquiescence from -- and agreement from all the republics and provinces was needed, isn't that right, and in actual fact in practical terms anybody could stop a decision.

A. There was no elementary democracy because we had no Chamber of citizens which would include representatives of the citizens at large and then the Serbs, as the majority nation, would have a larger number of representatives, for instance. And then if the voting were to be conducted according to the majority number of votes, then of course Serbia would have had a relatively good position. However, there was no Chamber of citizens, there was just a Chamber of Nations and Nationalities, as it was called. So it was the nations who were represented and, as you said, each nation, regardless of whether it was large or small or ethnic group, whichever you like to call it, Montenegro, Serbia, for example, would have an equal number of representatives regardless of the difference in their populations. And then complete dovetailing and agreement would have to be reached because everybody enjoyed the right of veto. For example, Kosovo, could invoke its right of veto to any decision, and that is why in the ³³³⁸⁸ 1980s Yugoslavia was no longer able to function, which led to a very serious and political and economic crisis because no decision was able to be passed.

Q. Now, General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, a Prosecution witness here, spoke about the military leadership at that period of time, and according to what he said here, and we're talking about the middle of 1991, for example, when the crisis escalated and of the 16 top men in the army, according to what he said, there was one Yugoslav, two Serbs from Serbia and Bosnia, eight Croats, two Slovenes, two Macedonians, and one Muslim. Now, is it common knowledge that Veljko Kadijevic as a Yugoslav, Blagoje Adzic as a Serb from Bosnia, Josip Greguric a Croat, Stane Brovet a Slovene, Mile Ruzinovski a Macedonia, Konrad Kolsek a Slovene, Aleksandar Spirkovski a Macedonian, Andrija Silic a Croat, Zivota Avramovic a Serb, Bozidar Grubicic a Croat, Anton Tus a Croat, Zvonko Jurjevic a Croat, Ivan Gordanovic a Croat, Ibrahim Alibegovic a Muslim, Tomislav Bjondic a Croat, and Mate Betan [phoen] a Croat - that makes 16 of them - you had one Yugoslav, two Serbs, but one Serb from Bosnia, one from Serbia, eight Croats, two Slovenes, two Macedonians, and one Muslim, and that was the top military leadership; is that right?

A. Yes, but let me explain how this came about. During the war --

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: I've hesitated interrupting for a long time, but there are serious difficulties with this evidence. First, nearly all the questions, and the last one I don't particularly object to it in ³³³⁸⁹ particular, but are either leading or at the very least tendentious in form. Second, it is just extremely fast and I suspect that it is as fast an exercise as our admirable interpreters have had to cope with in the course of this trial. And third, as the Chamber will appreciate, it's not been heralded in any way by an expert report although it's clearly touching on a large number, a wide range of expert matters. Now, many of them may be quite irrelevant for trial, but overall it's not coming out in a way that's going to be very easy for us to handle swiftly. Historical matters, of course, if subject to a report, could have been considered by us along with our own expert, if necessary. Not having the advantage of a report in advance, that may not be possible. But I would encourage the Chamber, if it thinks it right, both to slow down the speed a little bit because I can see that the interpreters are finding it very difficult, and I'm finding it difficult to make enough notes myself to pursue any lines of cross-examination.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. It may be true that some of the matters are matters in relation to which expert evidence could be given, but of course the accused can't be obliged to submit his evidence in that way.

Now, I have been fairly lenient with you on the leading questions, Mr. Milosevic. You do ask leading questions, that's very true. You put the answer to the questions in the mouth of the witness. And I was looking at the transcript to give you an example. You must ask the questions more generally and have the witness provide the answers. It's not cross-examination, and you can't -- you're not testifying. So you ³³³⁹⁰ have to be very careful about that.

And then the speed, that I can hear the -- hear it from the breathing of the interpreters that they are really struggling to keep pace with the overlapping between the evidence of the professor and your questions.

So, Professor, you have to observe a pause after Mr. Milosevic finishes his question. And Mr. Milosevic, you also have to observe the pause. And that requires a discipline, and I think you are -- you are very familiar with that -- with that technique.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson. This has to do with facts. I'm just asking the witness to confirm facts, and these facts are verifiable. We are not talking about assessments or value judgements. If I'm asking him about names of the Prime Minister, of ministers, of generals, of the top military leadership, these are mere facts. These are names and surnames. That cannot be leading. It's either that way or it isn't.

JUDGE ROBINSON: But it can be leading if -- if they are matters which may be in dispute. If they are matters which may be in dispute, then you cannot lead. You cannot lead on it unless the Court allows you or unless the Prosecution agrees.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson.

Q. So here comes a question: At the time of the secession of Slovenia and Croatia and later of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, could there have been any kind of Serb domination in Yugoslavia in the top echelons of government, that is to say the Federal Presidency, the ³³³⁹¹ Assembly, the top military echelons, et cetera? Could there have been any Serb domination?

A. What I was saying were generally known facts in our country. All intellectuals know that. I'm sorry if I spoke about a bit too fast, but everybody knows that at the time of secession, the president was a Slovene, Drnovsek, and then a Croat, Mesic, and then the federal Prime Minister was a Croat, Ante Markovic. The foreign minister was Budo Loncar until the very end. Then the chief of General Staff was a man who was a Yugoslav of mixed origin, partly Serb partly Croat. As for the military, I personally participated in the national liberation war, in the Second World War, so I know from my very own experience what it was like then. At that time, most of the people who fought against the occupiers then were Serbs. A vast majority. Regardless of whether they were Serbs from Serbia or Montenegrins who also largely considered themselves to be Serbs - as of recent, some have refused to do so - but there were a lot of Serbs of Croatia, too, from Lika, Kordun, Banija. Those who were cleansed from Croatia and who fled from there fairly recently.

However, Tito's policy was, as well as that of the military leadership, to promote Serb officers as slowly as possible and to speed up promotions among Slovenes, Croats, Macedonians, and so on. So 20 or 30 years later, in the very top echelons among the generals, there was already parity. More or less the same number of all. So that was the very nature of the last question. When you look at the military leadership, indeed Serb generals were far from dominant. Actually, it was ^{33392 BLANK PAGE 33393} the other way round.

Q. All right, Professor. In the addition to the Slovene secessionism with which you had a brief and close encounter in the mid-1980s and that came as a surprise to you, Croatian secessionism was something that people were widely aware of from earlier on; isn't that right?

A. Yes, of course. It is a well known fact that it started already in the 19th century. In all fairness, at that time there were two types of Croats.

Q. We're not talking about the 19th century now.

A. All right.

Q. We're talking about those who came to power in 1990 in Croatia, politicians who manifested their secessionist tendencies early on; isn't that right?

A. All right. Those who claim to power were clearly secessionist. Tudjman and his cronies. But before, when I used to meet with Croat intellectuals, my experience was that, say, in 1971 - we didn't mention it so far - there was this so-called Croat mass movement when what they wanted first and foremost was to turn the federation into a very loose confederacy in which Croatia would be a sovereign state, which would have its own representation in the United Nations, have a separate army and so on. That was the attempt made in 1971.

One of their leading intellectuals with whom I cooperated, and we even edited a publication together, Ivan Supek was his name, and it was Encyclopedia Moderna, practically overnight from being a Yugoslav, he became a Croatian separatist, and that's why we stopped cooperating on ³³³⁹⁴ this periodical as well.

Also, there was a group of Croats who were ambivalent. They had secessionist tendencies and also Yugoslav tendencies. There was a group called the individual in the system and that was a group that I cooperated with. Eugen Pusic, a well-known lawyer, headed this group. Unfortunately, we parted ways with them because they were resolutely against returning to the Yugoslav constitution a classical form of democracy, to have a chamber of citizens in the parliament, to have citizens represented according to the principle of one citizen, one vote, and also to have majority decision-making, not to have only the Chamber of Nations and Nationalities where all nations were represented at the same level and where there had to be a consensus and where all nations had the right of veto.

Unfortunately, they were opposed to introducing a Chamber of citizens because they thought that in this way the Croats would totally lose the position they had.

The third group was the group that had a Yugoslav leftist orientation. It consisted of Croats who worked in -- on the Praksis desk. Their experience was different, but they also insisted they should have a centre of their own in Zagreb, that the entire desk of that newspaper -- of that periodical should be in Zagreb, although a lot of us from elsewhere cooperated within Praksis. That is the experience that led to a cessation of contacts before the war broke out, and some members of the academy who were elected to the Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts all resigned and left the Serb academy before the war. ³³³⁹⁵

Q. All right. What can you say about the majority of the Croatian leadership in 1990, or more precisely, to which extent were part of them recruited from the so-called Ustasha emigres, that is to say heirs of the Ustasha movement of Ante Pavelic, the collaborator of Hitler and Mussolini? Do you have any knowledge about this and does your memory serve you well in this respect?

A. Of course. In 1990, Tudjman came to power. He founded the HDZ party, which was eminently nationalist. They held a congress of the HDZ, and they invited to it many former Ustashas from abroad. About 100 persons who used to belong to the Ustasha movement came to attend this conference and take part in its work.

Very soon they changed the constitution. The constitution said that Croatia was a state of the Croatian and Serb people bearing in mind the fact that about 5 or 600.000 Serbs used to live in Croatia, in Kordun, Banija, Lika, and so on. However, they deleted the Serbs and the only thing the constitution then said was that Croatia was a state of the Croatian people. That's the only thing it said.

Also, the language was no longer called the Croatian Serbian language. It was only called the Croatian language. These were things that caused a great deal of unrest among the Serbs who lived in Croatia. And then, when Croats started arming themselves and creating paramilitary formations -- actually, in all fairness, they had paramilitary formations before. These were villagers, protection units, and city protection units, but now they created the ZNG. This was the National Guards Corps of some 10.000 soldiers. They received weapons from Germany and Hungary. ³³³⁹⁶ And this frightened the Serbs who lived in Croatia. They started putting logs on roads as barriers so that they would prevent a repetition of 1949 when they were slaughtered en masse. So this is what led directly to war conflicts.

Q. All right, Professor. Let us now go back to something you mentioned. You said a few words about what happened in Kosovo, about Albanian separatism, about Slovenian separatism and nationalism, something about Croatian separatism and nationalism. Was any of this caused by anything that was done in Serbia?

A. I don't think it was caused by anything that was done from Serbia. There was no possibility of any kind of Serb domination. But perhaps they felt that in Serbia there was a mobilisation to stop these injustices, as they had been perceived until then, so that they would lose some of the privileges they had.

Q. All right. You took part in the preparation of the Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1991; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. This memorandum, was it a kind of reaction to some of these major developments that I referred to, the situation in Kosovo, in Croatia, in Slovenia, and generally speaking in Yugoslavia? You are one of the authors of this memorandum.

By the way, Professor, this memorandum is often referred to here as the Serb nationalist programme, but let's be very precise on this: Are you one of the authors of the memorandum?

A. Yes. ³³³⁹⁷

Q. Was actually a draft, wasn't it?

A. Yes, it was a draft. At the Assembly of the academy in May 1985, the situation was analysed, especially the economic situation of the country that caused great concern, and also the fact that Yugoslavia was turned into six or even eight states. And then Ivan Maksimovic, a member of the academy, suggested that a commission be set up which would draft a memorandum which would present the views of the members of the Serb academy with regard to that crisis. Then a commission was established, I think it had 16 members, and it was headed by Dusan Kanazir, a biologist otherwise, at that time the president of the Serb academy, and this commission at its first meeting already in June 1985 established a working group consisting of seven members. I was one of the seven. This group was supposed to make this draft. And we worked on the draft for an entire year. However, at one session of the commission before the text was even completed, it was concluded what else needed to be done, and already the following day the text appeared in the newspapers. This unfinished text appeared in the newspapers, and there were virulent attacks in the media against the Serb Academy because of this so-called memorandum.

Perhaps it would be a good thing if I read out some sections of the memorandum. I don't want to take up too much time, but I think it would be very important to see what are the ideas presented there.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's for Mr. Milosevic to decide, if it is relevant to the exercise we are involved in.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it would certainly be ³³³⁹⁸ relevant, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. However, Professor, before you read anything out, do you know that the memorandum is being treated as some kind of a Serb nationalist programme?

A. I am aware of that. There was this big campaign against the memorandum.

Q. All right. Let's cut things short. People keep saying that this is a Serb nationalist programme, and I just want to quote a single sentence to you and I'm going to ask you to quote the sections that you deem necessary. I have a copy here, and I hope that you have a copy as well.

On page 164, it says, in the text of this memorandum, it says the following: "In a modern society, any kind of political exploitation and discrimination on national grounds is unacceptable from a civilisational point of view."

That is what the memorandum says.

A. Yes, precisely. This is a sentence that I had written myself.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... this memorandum is already in evidence. Are you seeking to put it in evidence?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly. But I'm just going to ask Professor Markovic to quote --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But, please, Professor, as briefly as possible, and only a few things -- ³³³⁹⁹

JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you have copies for us?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] They have been handed in. You do have them. We did bear that in mind.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... have them before. That's the discipline. And it's not translated. This is the same point which I made. It's coming? The English is coming? Okay.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, the professor was kind enough to provide a copy of the memorandum in the English language to the interpreters so that, when he quotes, their job would be easier. There will be just a few quotations.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that they need an indication of the pages that are being read from.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, it may be that I can assist on this occasion, because it occurred to us that the memorandum was likely to be an exhibit to which you would be returning from time to time with the accused's witnesses, given some of the names that are on the list. There is a version of the memorandum, I think, already produced. There have been several versions of the memorandum produced over time, but as this witness will well know and indeed as the accused will well know, the academy published its own English version of the memorandum in 1995 in a booklet you can buy on the street, buy at the academy book shop. It comes together with an Answer to Criticisms of the memorandum, which may itself be quite an interesting document with some witnesses, and I've had this booklet reproduced in actually rather larger and more easy to read type in booklet form, if it will assist you. ³³⁴⁰⁰ The memorandum, if you'd -- I've given -- I've provided a copy to your legal officer and there are plenty of others available. The memorandum starts -- itself starts at page 95, the first part of it being the answer to criticisms, but thereafter it is, as it were, the authorised version, published by the -- as I understand it, by the academy itself in English in 1995, and you may find this, and the accused might find this a helpful way to save time.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that the very same document that the witness would be using?

MR. NICE: As far as we know, yes. Yes. This is just the memorandum, which starts at page 95. The witness will be able to tell us whether there are any textual changes between this version, dated whenever it was, and the version that appears in the 1995 version.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, do you have exhibit numbers for the other occasions on which the memorandum has been produced, either in full or in part?

MR. NICE: I'll dig them out immediately. I'm sorry, I don't have then immediately at hand.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic. I do not like the idea of the witness just selecting passages. You should have gone through the evidence with him and direct the evidence to him. You are in control of the witness. It's not the witness who -- who should decide what it is that he is to tell us. You should direct him to a particular passage because you should be familiar with it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a moment ago you told me, ³³⁴⁰¹ Mr. Robinson, that if Mr. Markovic wanted to read a few passages, that is up to me. And in answer to that, I said that he should certainly read a couple of passages, the most important ones, being very rational in his use of time. I indeed thought it was the most rational approach. But let me ask him a general question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, is it true that speaking of intra-national relations within Yugoslavia, the authors of the memorandum written by the Serbian Academy of Science advocated exclusively equality among peoples and nothing more?

A. That is perfectly true. And it is emphasised time and again in the memorandum that that is the main demand of the memorandum, to ensure complete equality among nations.

I would just like to say that in those sections dealing with intra-national relations as opposed to political and economic circumstances, the emphasis is on relations among peoples. Please read: "In order to achieve the necessary changes, it is necessary to do away with the ideology which puts a nationality and territorial integrity in the foreground. Whereas in modern society there is a predominant integrative tendency, a tendency to overcome authoritarian government and decision-making, in our system disintegrating forces are gaining power, regional and national egotism and authoritarian and autocratic power which violates generally recognised human rights at all levels."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, where are you reading from, what page? ³³⁴⁰²

THE WITNESS: That's Serbo-Croatian text page 152. And I have here the English text with noted pages. I -- could I give this to you?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Go ahead, Professor. Professor -- Professor --

THE WITNESS: Yes, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Go ahead and just identify the pages in the Bosnian Croatian text.

And Mr. Milosevic, you are in control. You must control the witness. So when he has read it, you may have something to ask him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly, Mr. Robinson.

THE WITNESS: So this is fragment one, and at the end of the fragment one, there will be a note where is the next fragment. Okay. So in the middle of this first fragment --

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters can absolutely not find the passage.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- inclination towards divisions --

JUDGE ROBINSON: The interpreters are complaining that they cannot find the passage. The interpreters have -- Mr. Milosevic, you said that you have given the interpreters a copy of this.

JUDGE KWON: It's at the bottom of page 105.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just add that the passages quoted from are exactly marked for their benefit so that they can follow in English what the professor is quoting.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that they do not have that marked copy. We have it in B/C/S. ³³⁴⁰³

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The inclination towards division and fragmentation of social entities, active struggle against modern democratic integrating federation is hiding behind the smokescreen of a false ideological slogan of battling unitarianism and centralism. But the real alternative to unitarianism and centralism is not national egotism and polycentrism with one's own national (or, rather, republican and provincial) economies, violent restrictions to science, culture, and education into territorial boundaries and the subjugation of all aspects of public life to the unchecked power of republican and provincial oligarchies. The real alternative is rather a democratic, integrating federalism in which the principle of autonomy of the parts is in harmony with the principle of coordinating the parts within the framework of a single whole in which political institutions, at all levels of society are set up in a consistently democratic way, in which decision-making is preceded by free, rational and public debate and not by secret behind the scenes manoeuvring by cabals self-styled and self-appointed champions of special ethnic interests."

[In English] It is just a page later.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please speak English. They are following you.

A. "No one needs convincing that separatism and nationalism are both at work on the social scene, but there is not enough awareness that such trends were made ideological possible by the 1974 constitution. The constant strengthening and synergetic effect of separatism and nationalism have cut the national groups off from one another to a critical degree. ³³⁴⁰⁴ Machinations with language and the caging of academics in cultural personalities in republican and provincial enclosures are depressing signs of the burgeoning strength of particularism. All the new ethnogenies are not so much the unfortunate fabrications of an academic community shut up within a provincial bell jar and plagued by the incubus of regional ideologies as they are symptoms of growing alienation not only from a common present and future but even from the common past. It is as though people were in a hurry to get out of a house which is tumbling down around their ears and were trying to run away as fast and as far as possible. The intellectual climate provides a warning that the political crisis has come close to the flashpoint of complete destabilisation of Yugoslavia, Kosovo being the most obvious portent."

So the impression was that the house was tumbling down. And the next passage begins with the word "democratisation." "Democratisation is a vital prerequisite both for recovery from the deep-seated crisis and for the imperative revitalisation of society. Yugoslavia does not need lip-service to democracy which changes nothing. What it needs is democratisation of people's minds and relationships in society."

Another quotation: "The situation has reached such a pass that within the republics and provinces informal caucuses are formed to bid for the most influential positions. Similarly, at the federal level, instead of a principled and argumented battle of opinions, coalitions are formed to satisfy a republican and provincial interests to assure the autonomous monopolistic status of the ruling political cliques in them." ^{33405 BLANK PAGE 33406}

JUDGE ROBINSON: How many more passages do you plan to read?

THE WITNESS: Well, I thought I would have 12, but if you reduce it, I --

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's not a proper way to conduct an examination-in-chief. It becomes meaningless after awhile. What do these passages illustrate, Professor?

THE WITNESS: These passages -- [Interpretation] These passages illustrate the view that then prevailed at the Academy of Sciences of Serbia, namely that the disintegration of the Yugoslav society was a great problem, as was the fact that one state divided into either six or eight parts was struggling with burgeoning nationalism at the detriment of democracy and human rights and that the only solution was consistent implementation of the principle of equality among all peoples wherein Yugoslavia would remain one whole which needs to be democratic and within which all these peoples would cooperate in a democratic, equal way. Therefore, the claim made by all those who never read the memorandum in the first place is not true. It isn't true when they said it was a platform for ethnic cleansing.

My personal opinion is this: When the indictment against Mr. Milosevic was being written, there was something missing in the theory of genocide and ethnic cleansing; a motive, an idea, a design, a project. And since the authors of the indictment were unable to find it elsewhere, they took advantage of the fact that at this particular time the Serbian Academy of Sciences adopted this memorandum which was the object of attacks first in Serbia then in Yugoslavia, then in Germany which was at ³³⁴⁰⁷ that time a place witnessing systematic satanisation of Serbia. And then a link was made between these two components.

On the one hand, Slobodan Milosevic was implementing the theory of ethnic cleansing, and on the other hand, motivation, the memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences.

As for me, I can tell you I see no link with the memorandum. At the time when it was made, Slobodan Milosevic was not particularly a celebrity. He had even formed a committee to establish whose fault it was and who was responsible for the memorandum, although he didn't express a personal opinion on it. But his part, his policy towards the memorandum, was negative throughout.

So in view of its contents or, rather, mainly because of its contents, the memorandum could not serve as a platform for the domination of one people over another, and especially not for ethnic cleansing. Anybody who bothers to read the document will find this to be true.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you very much, Professor. Now, do you know -- you said there could be no link, but do you know that anybody from the leadership of Serbia, anybody who was in power and, first of all, me, conducted a policy of national intolerance and particularly ethnic cleansing?

A. I don't know. I'm not aware of it because there was no such thing. Serbia, at the time, was advocating precisely the restoration of equality.

First of all, at the time, Serbia had not yet been formed as a state entity, state community, because it still consisted of those three ³³⁴⁰⁸ parts; Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Serbia proper. And precedent needed to be made in order to give it the same status, bring it on a par with all the other republics.

Q. All right, Professor. I will quote to you from the transcript of the opening statement of the 12th of February, 2002, dealing with this memorandum. Page 17, line 17: "[In English] It's a memorandum, of course, of genuine intellectuals, and they were able, in 1986, to put their names to the following lines, and I quote in translation, of course." [Interpretation] I'm quoting the introductory address by the opposite side, and then also the following provision of the memorandum is being quoted: "The physical, political, legal and cultural genocide [In English] against the Serb population of Kosovo and Metohija is the serious defeat of Serbia."

[Interpretation] And then the quotation ends there and goes on to say: "They went on in the memorandum to say: [In English] 'Except in the wartime period, never have the Serbs of Croatia be so threatened as today.'" [Interpretation] Once again end of quotation. All that is from the introductory statement made by the opposite side. Then it continues on page 18 of the transcript: "[In English] That, then, the reaction of intellectuals in 1986 of Serb persuasion to what was beginning to happen in little Kosovo.

"How slight was the face -- the threat that Serbs really faced compared with the threats what were to face others later? How could they sensibly use in that context the notion of genocide of culture? But the prevailing culture was one that could produce such thought, and there was ³³⁴⁰⁹ much talk at the time of Serbs being vulnerable and under threat, a concern that the massacres of World War II, where they had suffered badly, so badly, would happen again, concerned that they would be drowned by the Albanians in Kosovo or that they would somehow be exploited and oppressed politically and economically.

"It was onto this scene that this accused was propelled, was propelled or propelled himself. And the question may arise, when we consider this part of history of the evidence -- on the evidence, how this man, rare among former communist leaders, was able to effect the transition from party leadership under the old regime to party leadership under the new. Was he a brilliant and kindly leader or was he simply a man who had the sharpest appreciation of how to retain control through manipulation?"

JUDGE ROBINSON: You must put a question now, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I was just going to.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What can you tell us? What comment do you have to make about this assertion made in the indictment?

A. Well, there are a series of assertions, and of course it would take quite some time for me to comment on each one of them. Of course, when the Second World War is mentioned, I can say that, yes, at the time, terrible atrocious things did happen, both in Croatia and in Kosovo itself. In Kosovo, for example, Kosovo was given to Italy to administer, and Italy brought into power people from the Albanian Balli Kombitar organisation who were people who revived the idea of the Prizren League, ³³⁴¹⁰ and I was going to say that earlier on, so I say that now, in 1888. That was in fact, it was established at the initiative and with the support of Austro-Hungary, the organisation of the Prizren League, the object of which was to create --

Q. Just a moment, Professor. Not to go further on about the Prizren League.

A. Yes, but it's about World War II. And it was in World War II where the Prizren League was revived in Kosovo. And they were people -- I have to say this -- who thought that a great Albanian state should be created which would include Eastern Montenegro and Southern Serbia and the whole of Western Macedonia, parts of Greece, and the organisation called Balli Kombitari, expulsed 30.000-odd Serbs from Kosovo, and many of them were killed as well. It was retaliation for everything that had happened. So you were the one who quoted that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor. Professor. Professor. I've stopped you. We are coming to the time for a break.

Mr. Milosevic, you must give time -- give consideration during the break as to how you wish to get the evidence from this witness. Sometimes the questions are too long and almost invariably the answers are too long, and we are not getting any benefit from that kind of approach. Professor, you must give your answers as succinctly, as briefly as possible, where that is appropriate.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Milosevic, I think in relation to the last question, the real problem is that you did not make it clear which assertion you wished the witness to comment on. I consider this to be a ³³⁴¹¹ very relevant piece of evidence, but it's identifying the particular assertion relating to you, I think, that you want an answer. And perhaps if that were made clear when we come back after the break, we might get a clear answer to the question.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll take a break now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 3.52 p.m.

--- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, either now or later we can identify the marked pages in the memorandum that you wanted the witness to read but which I said wasn't appropriate for him to read, and then you can tell us if those are the passages that you would want the Court to -- to attend to, to read itself. Or indeed you may read it to him and ask him to comment on it. Mr. Nice did that in relation to some of his witnesses. So there is no difficulty with the memorandum itself, it is just the way that you were seeking to introduce the passages in evidence through the witness. So please continue.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, just before the accused does, I suspect you've already had the answer to His Honour Judge Bonomy's question. The memorandum can be found at 446, tab 28, in the evidence of Mr. de la Brosse, and is inevitably, I think, referred to in the evidence of Audrey Budding, although I haven't checked it out myself.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, I was able to dig out exactly tab 28 of Exhibit 446, but the first part is matching but the last part seems to be different a bit. So could you tell us later what kind of version this is about. ³³⁴¹²

MR. NICE: Yes. It may be a different year. I was aware that there was something less than perfectly satisfactory about that exhibit and I'll explain it to you when I've sorted it out.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for the accused.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought it was more logical for one of the authors of the memorandum should quote from the document rather than having myself quote it and then ask him whether that is so, because that would be leading. And it is precisely because I considered that this should not be a cross-examination, or I thought that it would be up to him to quote. But Professor Markovic already did quote a very vivid passage of the memorandum, if I can put it that way.

But just to complete my question. I myself was quoting the opening statement, passages from Mr. Nice's opening statement, and you said that it was a quotation -- a lengthy quotation. So there might have been some misunderstanding.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But in the opening statement by Mr. Nice, quoted a statement from the memorandum, amongst others, "the physical, political, legal and cultural genocide against the Serb population of Kosovo and Metohija [In English] is the serious defeat of Serbia." [Interpretation] End of quotation.

And then after that it is said that I manipulated that entire issue. Now, Professor Markovic, my question to you is as follows: Was it objective reality or was it my manipulation, this persecution of Serbs, ³³⁴¹³ legal, cultural, political, physical mistreatment, right up to the killing of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. Was that manipulation by me? Not to say that I manipulated the memorandum, which is ludicrous, or was it the state of affairs, the actual state of affairs?

A. Yes, it was the actual state of affairs, and the memorandum quotes the facts and figures. That 60.000, for example, Serbs were expulsed from Kosovo during the Second World War, and then, after 1968, the exodus became far more intensive when 200.000 Serbs left or were expulsed from Kosovo from 1968 up until 1990. So all that was under threat with a lot of violence; the killing of cattle and livestock, for example, seizing crops and things like that as a means of intimidation. Now, what the authors of the memorandum, I'm not sure whether I remembered the word -- whether the word "genocide" was used but cultural genocide, let me tell you, many monasteries and churches were destroyed dating back to the Middle Ages, the 13th and 14th centuries, some of which were World Heritage calibre. And this continued on the 17th of March as well. The Bugoradiska Jeviska [phoen], for example, which is a supreme artistic creation, it is a wondrous building with frescos and mosaics dating back to the 14th century, it was destroyed. So that's it. That's what happened, that's what was going on. That was the actual situation. That is fact.

Q. We don't have here from the transcript, because it was quickly stated by the professor, he said Bugoradiska Jeviska, and we haven't got that in the transcript.

A. Bugoradiska Jeviska is the name of that extremely important ³³⁴¹⁴ monastery dating back to the 13th century, and the famous Astroper [phoen], the painter, painted wondrous frescoes of the Mother and Child, and unfortunately that was set fire to and destroyed.

Q. All right, Professor. Now, can we say that during that period of time, the material period, and we're talking about the late 1980s, beginning of the 1990s and before that, of course, it was generally known just how much the Serbs and Montenegrins and other non-Albanian population were being expulsed from Kosovo and Metohija. Was that general knowledge or was that me saying it?

A. No, it was general knowledge, because groups of unfortunate people from Kosovo were coming into Belgrade constantly, and they were trying to find somebody whom they could tell their troubles to and who would help them, and for a time before you, that is to say before 1986 or 1987, there was a time where nobody wanted to receive these unfortunate people. While Ivan Stambolic was the president, for example, they would spend two or three days sleeping in parks and the grounds surrounding the national Assembly, and it was terrible to see these poor people who were there spending the night during winter, during rain, and there was no help for them because at that time people just adhered to the agreement that was made by which Kosovo was independent and outside the jurisdiction of Serbia proper, and that no Serbian government could do anything about the situation. And that was the consequence of the 1974 constitution.

Q. Let's understand each other. You wrote the memorandum in 1986; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right. ³³⁴¹⁵

Q. I'm going to remind you now of what Ivan Kristan, the Slovene professor, said and he was a witness here. He was a Slovene, a Slovenian professor, and I'm going to tell you what he wrote five years previously, before that. In the journal Socialism, and he wrote it in 1981, five years before the memorandum, in an issue of that magazine. So he wasn't a Serb intellectual, he was a Slovene. And then I'll ask for your comments and I quote Kristan: "The Albanian nationalist idea about an ethnically pure Republic of Kosovo and about the unification of all Albanians into one republic denies one of the basic heritages of the national liberation war and revolution, the brotherhood of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia which is the foundations for its life in common and joint building up of socialism. The slogan about an ethnically pure Kosovo offers, instead of true equality and communality on the part of the nations and nationalities, chauvinism and the counting of heads." That is something that the Slovene professor wrote five years before the memorandum do you happen to remember that?

A. Well, yes, I do remember. All the intellectuals that were engaged, they spoke about that, but at that time, nothing could be done about it, and the memorandum, in addition to other things, was a reaction to a situation of that kind where evil was taking place before your very eyes and nobody could do anything to stop it.

Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to draw your attention to another passage from Kristan's quotation, once again dating back to 1981, the same Slovene professor. He says: "Against other nations and nationalities there is --" ³³⁴¹⁶

JUDGE ROBINSON: You're being asked to slow down.

THE ACCUSED: Slow down. Okay.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. "Against other nations and nationalities, numerous pressure is being brought to bear and chauvinist incidents which go so far as to make members of individual nations and ethnic groups leave the region." So this has been going on for some time, and he's saying this in 1981 in Kosovo and a large number of Serbs and Montenegrins have left the area of Kosovo, and according to the 1981 population census compared to the 1971 census, the members of these two nations are relatively -- their numbers are fewer. So in 1971, there were 18.3 per cent of Serbs and 2.5 per cent of Montenegrins. In 1981, there were just 13.2 per cent or 1.7 of Montenegrins. And the absolute number was smaller too. 1 per cent for Serbs and 4 per cent for -- 4.8 per cent for Montenegrins, whereas the Albanian percentages rose by 34 per cent.

Now, my question to you, Professor, is what Professor Kristan says, does it testify to the fact that what is stated in the memorandum five years later was something that was common knowledge? It was generally known and accepted at that time in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? That is to say not in Serbia but throughout Yugoslavia. Would that be true?

A. For all those who have eyes to see and reason to think, that was what it was like, undoubtedly.

Q. Thank you, Professor. I'm going to quote another passage, one more. I'll skip one passage, but Kristan goes on to say: "The irridenta ³³⁴¹⁷ aspirations of Albanian nationalists in Kosovo are not of recent date. They actually occurred as the prolonged arm of different quisling and fascist organisations which during the war fought against the National Liberation Movement of the Yugoslav Peoples. The organs of state security have uncovered a number of hostile nationalist and irredentist organisations and groups which were active in Kosovo with the final goal of achieving Kosovo's secession and other parts of Yugoslavia inhabited by Albanians." And in brackets it says "Macedonia and Montenegro" and then "their attachment to Albania." And the slogan was "Kosovo Republic." "A similar hostile background for nationalist slogans in Kosovo were heard at the Central Committee meeting of Serbia where the slogans of 'Kosovo Republic by hook or by crook' speaks about an ethnically pure Kosovo directed against all the other nations and nationalities or ethnic groups, principally against the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Turks. The slogan about a Kosovo republic is equally dangerous, just like slogans of having that republic attached to Macedonia and Albania inhabited by Albanians. It is the integrity of Serbia that was attacked and this is just one step towards attacking the constitutional order of Yugoslavia." So this is what the Slovene professor says five years before the memorandum, and he adds that it was the irredentist aspirations of Albanian nationalists in Kosovo which were the prolonged arm of the quisling and revanchist organisations. Now, was that ever in question?

A. Well, I mentioned a moment ago --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE: Obviously, and it's early days in the accused's ^{33418 BLANK PAGE 33419} conducting of his own case, but it's going to help if exhibits are identified before he starts reading from them. Now, he doesn't have lawyers to help him. We will, of course, do whatever we can to assist the Court, and if, in respect of these exhibits, he notifies us in advance, or even -- I don't know how quickly we can do it, and if they've been made electronically searchable, we might be able to throw them up by Sanction onto the screen, but without identifying the exhibits, it's very hard for us to do anything very much of value apart from listening to material that comes out too fast.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, there is substance in that observation. If you are going to continue conducting examination-in-chief, you will have to develop a technique to do so. It makes no sense to just read out long passages. We do not have the text. We do not have the passages. I told you at the beginning that if you are going to do that, you must produce documents. You must identify the documents. If they're already exhibits, then you say so. And you must produce copies for the Court and for the Prosecution, because the Court may want to ask questions on it. And you are doing the same thing as the witness. There is no point in reading a passage that takes five minutes to read, because halfway through it I have forgotten what you have said at the beginning. You must summarise it and put it to the witness. We are going to have problems if you continue in that way. Evidence will not be useful to the Court, and if it is not useful to the Court, then what is the purpose of it? Because the evidence that you're adducing must be relevant to the case and must be of use to the case. It ³³⁴²⁰ must be helpful to us in discharging our responsibilities. So I'm going to tell you this is the last time. If you do that again, I'm not going to allow it. I will not allow it, because this is not the way evidence is to be led. If you have a passage from a particular document, you say first what the document is. And if you are going to read from it, then you should have provided copies for the parties here and for the Court. So after today, you must get your act together.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I quoted a periodical called Socialism, which could have been bought in all the republics throughout Yugoslavia. I said that it is issue number 10 from 1981. Whether I quoted it properly can be checked easily. But the point of my question was --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... provide it for us. You must provide copies of that for us.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'll give you copies too. I'll obtain copies, and I'll give them to you so you can make your comparisons and see that I quoted everything properly --

JUDGE ROBINSON: You must provide it before. That is the procedure. You must provide it before. If you want to lead your evidence, to conduct your evidence-in-chief, then you are entitled to do that, but you must follow the procedures, and the procedures serve a particular purpose. It enables us to follow the evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ³³⁴²¹

Q. Professor, is it undeniable that as regards to questions pertaining to the persecution of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo and their expulsion from Kosovo is something that was written about various authors from all of Yugoslavia extensively so and a lot before you wrote the memorandum?

A. Yes, of course. There is a lot of literature about this. I would just like to point out one thing here. It was mentioned that in Kosovo there were fascist and quisling organisations. There was an organisation, Balli Kombitar. Electronically, you can obtain a great deal of information about it. It was a purely fascist organisation. And the Germans also gave weapons to entire SS division in Kosovo that consisted of Kosovar Albanians. It was the Skendgerbeg SS division. I personally took part in fighting against that SS division. That is one thing. Secondly, I would like to explain how come this slogan "Kosovo Republic" came into existence. This secessionism wanted to lead to a two-step secession. The first was turning Kosovo towards an autonomous province within Serbia into a full-fledged republic, hence the slogan "Kosovo Republic."

Now, why? Because, according to the constitution of Yugoslavia, if -- or, rather, republics had the right to self-determination all the way up to the right to secession. So they wanted, as a first step, for Kosovo to become a republic, and as a second step, for Kosovo to secede. These were indeed generally known matters. There is nothing new in all of this. The facts in the memorandum are not new at all. It is only the analysis presented, and the criticism, that is what is new. ³³⁴²²

Q. All right, in view of your membership in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and your experience, what would your estimate be? How well-founded are the assertions that this document was a basis for some kind of Serb nationalism and domination, especially for ethnic cleansing or persecution on religious or ethnic grounds?

A. This document could not constitute a basis for that kind of thing by its own substance. Also, the document was never completed. The Serb Academy never managed to adopt it as such. It was not published at that time. It was published only over the past few years. It could not be a basis for anybody's policy let alone of a political party that condemned it.

Q. Isn't the truth actually the other way around; that the memorandum actually advocates a principle of national equality, that there is a struggle against hegemony there, a hegemony of any people in the former Yugoslavia and in this society that was undergoing a crisis then?

A. Yes, I've already said that, and that can be seen from the other parts that I wanted to present here. It is quite clear that what was said there was the complete opposite. It was quite contrary to what the interpretations that came subsequently said. This memorandum actually explained quite properly how indispensable it was to have a true equality of national rights in Yugoslavia.

Q. You want to quote anything from the text now?. The text of the memorandum is in front of you.

A. Well, yes, I can quote it but I don't know what I should do because the Honourable Trial Chamber said that I shouldn't quote from it. ³³⁴²³

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you may, just identify the particular passage.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So this is advocacy of national equality?

A. Yes. [In English] Maybe just the end of it, the last paragraph.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What page?

THE WITNESS: That is just three last passages. [Interpretation] "One development stage of the Yugoslav community and of Serbia was obviously being brought to an end with an ideology that was historically worn out and also with considerable regression in the economic, political, and moral and civilisational sphere. Such a situation imperatively calls for well-founded, scientifically based, resolutely carried out reforms of the entire state structure and organisation of the Yugoslav community of nations and in the direction of democratic socialism and a faster and more fruitful inclusion in contemporary civilisation. Social reforms should activate to the greatest possible degree the natural and human resources of the entire country so that we will become a productive, enlightened society, democratic society, able to earn its own living and contribute to the world community. The first precondition for our transformation and renaissance is the democratic mobilisation of all the creative potentials of a people but not only for carrying out the adopted decisions of political fora but also for elaborating --"

JUDGE KWON: Page 140, last, bottom.

THE INTERPRETER: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "This would mean that for the first ³³⁴²⁴ time in recent history expertise and experience, conscientiousness and boldness, imagination, responsibility would all come together to carry out the task of importance for the entire society on the principles of a long-term programme."

Let me see whether there is an even more explicit passage somewhere in terms of this particular requirement. Could you just give me a moment, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And all these passages illustrate promotion of national equality.

THE WITNESS: A passage before the title [Interpretation] The position of Serbia [In English] Serbian people, passage -- just one passage before that.

JUDGE KWON: Does it start from, "It follows from this analysis ..."?

THE WITNESS: From this analysis -- [Interpretation] From this analysis --

JUDGE KWON: Page 119.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "It follows from this analysis that political democratisation and infusion of new blood, genuine self-determination and equality for all members of the Yugoslav nations, including Serbs, full exercise of human, civil and economic and social rights and consistent streamlining of the Yugoslav political system and development policy are those indispensable prerequisites without which recovery from the present crisis in the Yugoslav society could not even be imagined." ³³⁴²⁵ So what is insisted upon here is genuine self-determination and equality of all members of all the Yugoslav nations. This is repeated in several passages. Also, it is here under B, three pages earlier: "[In English] Self-determination of a nation. A is a sovereignty of people, B is self-determination of a nation, and then V [as interpreted] is human rights.

Now, now B, self-determination of a nation. [Interpretation] "Self-determination of nations. In modern civilised society, any political oppression or discrimination on ethnic grounds is unacceptable from a civilisational point of view. The Yugoslav solution of the national question at first could have been regarded as an exemplary model of a multinational federation in which the principle of a unified state and state policy was happily married to the principle of the political and cultural autonomy of national groups and ethnic minorities. "Over the past two decades, the principle of unity has become weakened and overshadowed by the principle of national autonomy which, in practice, has turned into the sovereignty of the federal units, the republics, which as a rule are not ethnically homogenous. The flaws which from the very beginning were present in this model have become increasingly evident. Not all the national groups were equal. The Serbian nation, for instance, was not given the right to have its own state. Large sections of the Serbian people who live in other republics, unlike the national minorities, do not have the right to use their own language and script. They do not have the right to set up their own political or cultural organisations or to foster common cultural ³³⁴²⁶ traditions of their nation together with their co-nationals. The unremitting persecution and expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo is a drastic example showing that those principles which protect the autonomy of a minority, the ethnic Albanians, are not applied to a minority within a minority; the Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, and Roma in Kosovo. In view of the existing forms of national discrimination, present day Yugoslavia cannot be regarded as a modern or democratic state." Very well. I think there is no need for me to quote anything further.

Q. No. No, there isn't.

JUDGE BONOMY: I wonder if I could ask the professor a question, Mr. Milosevic.

Professor, you've mentioned a number of times that this document was a draft and was at the time never published. Do you know the circumstances in which a few years ago it came to be published?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When this document leaked into the public and was carried by the press, the academy called for punishing all of those -- or, rather, the public called for punishing all of those who worked on the document within the academy. So this was in 1986. However, ten years later, people started forgetting about this. The entire situation had changed, and no one paid attention to the academy any longer. Then two members of the group that worked on the memorandum, Kosta Mihailovic, who will come here later, and Vasilije Krestic revised the document and published it. Also they made comments on all the writing about this memorandum that took place as well. So this is about ten years ³³⁴²⁷ later.

In the meantime, there was no discussion about the memorandum because the Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts said that this was an unfinished document, we're not going to discuss it at all.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Can we proceed now?

JUDGE KWON: Can I ask this question to the professor: Professor, are you aware of the fact that a priest or bishop called Mihajlo Mikic tried to publish this memorandum in 1986?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. The only thing I know is that in Croatia, there was this unfinished version that had been published, and twice that. Then the Croats sent it further on to Germany and elsewhere, and then everybody started attacking the memorandum. But I was not aware of this, no. No.

JUDGE KWON: Prosecution will clarify that at a later stage. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Please proceed.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right, Professor. Now when you were giving these answers, you mentioned the need that was clearly manifested at the time, to have reforms carried out. Do you know what we in Serbia did - I'm referring to the political leadership and to myself personally - in these years, 1989, 1990, and 1991, in terms of reforms and what we were engaged in?

A. In 1989, two commissions were set up, one for the reform of the economic system. As far as I know, you took part in that as well. And the other commission was for the reform of the political system. I was appointed to that commission for the first time. Until then, I was ³³⁴²⁸ considered to be a dissident and I had no access anywhere. But then all of a sudden I was appointed member of that commission. I did not take part in its work, but I did see the final version and I gave my own comments on it.

So these two looked at the reform of the entire social system in Serbia, and these are actually the first reforms that were carried out anywhere in Eastern Europe. Later on, it was said that other Eastern European countries in the 1990s carried out certain reforms. However, this was the first time when the -- when the following conclusions were reached.

The commission on the reform of the economic system concluded that in Serbia there had to be a market economy, that every company had to be held responsible for the results of its own work, that this market economy, in all fairness, had to be regulated rather than to have anarchy reign like in the laissez-faire models of the 19th century. The Serb economy finally became a modern, regulated market economy as the economies of the developed countries are today.

The other commission for the reform of the political system established for the first time that there cannot be a monopoly of one political party over power, political and any other form of power. Rather, there had to be political pluralism. That is to say a plurality of different political forces which take part in the elections. Then what was firmly established was that all human rights had to be observed, political and socio-economic ones. And as a result of that, perhaps I should mention one practical matter which had a profound effect ³³⁴²⁹ on the attitude of Serb intellectuals towards the then-government, because Serb intellectuals were always rather critical of the state and of the regime. However, what was of major importance was that the so-called delit d'opinion, that is to say verbal crimes, were abolished and were no longer in the law. That made it impossible for anyone to be persecuted on the basis of views they expressed. So there were no more political prisoners, and this led to a great freedom of thought and speech. So in this way, I would give an answer to the question that you put before the break. You got the status of the indubitable leader of the Serb people but not because you have the characteristics that were mentioned there, the ability to manipulate, et cetera, et cetera, but the fact that people realised and deeply believed that something new was happening, that there would -- that what was taking place was a true reform of the system and that the foundations of a truly democratic socialist system were being laid, that there would be a regulated market economy, that there will be a freedom of thought, a freedom of press, and that all rights would be observed. That conviction actually led to this great massive support that you enjoyed and that became more than obvious in the rallies that were held at the time. That more than anything else.

Q. But let us come back to the memorandum. Can we note -- and I'm asking you this very precisely: Can we note, speaking of the national issue, that authors of the memorandum are advocating specifically equality among nations? They're advocating national centrism to be overcome in finding a solution for national equality?

A. Well, if we talk about the essence of the memorandum, then it is a ³³⁴³⁰ demand for national equality and democratisation.

Q. Well, don't you think, then, that those who speak of the memorandum as the Serbian political platform without having read it or having read it with extremely dishonest and evil intentions are actually manipulating the text and abusing it?

A. Well, I cannot say anything about people who never held it in their hands or never read it, but we cannot rule out the second possibility, because the greatest evil, as we know, is found among intelligent, educated people who do not have ethical principles to match. So I do not rule out the possibility that this misinterpretation was intentional.

It was a time when Serbia was vilified and satanised for all sorts of reasons, because it was disobedient, because it didn't fit. Control needed to be established over that territory, and there was Serbia in the middle of it who wouldn't go along. So it was painted as the devil, systematically, primarily in the German media. There were various authors, Reissmueller, writers of the Suddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, they satanised all the Serb institutions, the government, the army, et cetera, and that served their purpose.

Q. Let us now move on to another event and try to assess to what extent it was manipulated. Do you remember the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo battle on St. Vitus Day in 1989 in a place called Gazimestan?

A. I do remember. It was a huge event. Western media evaluated that ^{33431 BLANK PAGE 33432} there were about 100 -- 1 million people there. And the same media later turned it into a target of virulent attacks.

Q. So those who celebrated the event, or welcomed it at first, later attacked it.

A. We should perhaps look at the speech that you made there, but before that let us give a general description. Those who praised it, and we could hear them the very next day, BBC, or the Independent newspaper who was represented there with two journalists - I have their names here - they expressed their surprise at the fact that it was a very peaceful, tolerant speech which even disappointed some among those present who had perhaps expected you to attack Albanian terrorism and the oppressive measures that occurred at the time. You instead spoke about lack of unity, lack of agreement that led to all these clashes. But -- let me finish. Those were the first reactions.

Ten years later, when the systematic attacks on Serbia had already been long under way, those same media wrote that you had made a firebrand instigating, inflammatory speech. Those were the reactions of the London Times and even the Washington Post. I can name here lots of sources and tell you how they wrote about it. But before we do that, we should perhaps look at what you said --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Allow Mr. Milosevic to ask the questions and you answer them briefly. He knows the evidence that he wants to elicit from you.

Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here, Mr. Robinson, right in line ³³⁴³³ with your suggestion which was just made, and you know how broadly this speech was made use of both in the opening statement of Mr. Nice and more widely in the media in the process of satanising my own person, this is Exhibit number 5. It has been provided to you, copies have been provided to you, and I hope that you see the highlighted passages that I wish to quote.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I commend you for being a model of procedural correctness.

JUDGE KWON: I think we have it under Prosecution Exhibit 446, tab 30. Prosecution correct me if I'm wrong.

MR. NICE: We're checking for identity of versions.

JUDGE KWON: I was told that what we have is only part of it.

MR. NICE: Tab 30 is a version from a newspaper, I think. From Politika. And I'm not sure where this version comes from.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, continue, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. NICE: I have before me the text in Serbian, and I would like to tender it into evidence. And I will now quote several passages which have been highlighted in the English translation provided to you. I hope you have them. I thought I would ask the professor to do this, but if you find it more convenient for myself to quote my own speech, I will be only too pleased to oblige. So --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Rather than to quote it, just tell us what -- why are you quoting it? What is it that you are seeking to illustrate?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to illustrate that this speech has been a subject of so much manipulation, and that's a mild term. ³³⁴³⁴ It's a pure lie that this was an inflammatory, warmongering speech or that it acted in any other way against other peoples or nations or helped deteriorate or aggravate the political situation when it was made in 1989 or at any other time or that it could have been used for any such purpose whenever it was made.

So I'm picking up on what the professor has discussed earlier, and I will quote only a couple of passages so that we do not see this out of context but as a coherent theme.

I think you have the translation.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, can I check this one first? The Serbian version is -- was downloaded from Yahoo! but the English translation was offered by the Slobodan Milosevic Organisation. So can I take it that they translated the B/C/S version into English?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think they did. I don't think they did. I think they downloaded the English translation from the BBC website and just revised it. But what is authentic is what was carried in the newspapers the next day. I also wish to add that I have provided a videotape of that speech that was broadcast on television. I didn't mean to take up even more of your time, but if you want to see the videotape, it's available. I just wanted to save time by quoting it orally, but I wish to tender the videotape into evidence.

JUDGE KWON: No problem since we have the full text of Serbian. Please proceed.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You can even find the whole speech on that videotape from beginning to end. And what I wish to quote is the ³³⁴³⁵ following. So I say in my speech: "Therefore, no place in Serbia is better suited for saying this than the field of Kosovo, namely that unity in Serbia will bring prosperity both to the Serbian people in Serbia and to each one of its citizens, irrespective of his or her national or religious affiliation."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Where is that? What page on the --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is highlighted in yellow. The same copy has been made available to the interpreters, and I was hoping you have it, too, because I provided enough copies.

JUDGE ROBINSON: There is nothing highlighted in my version.

MR. NICE: Foot of the second page, I think, and the accused may not be aware that yellow, if he highlighted it in yellow, it may be that it didn't come out. Foot of page 2.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So irrespective of his national or religious affiliation. Then next passage. Beginning of quotation: "Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. The national composition of almost all countries in the world today, particularly developed ones, has also been changing in this direction. Citizens of different nationalities, religions, and races have been living together more and more frequently and more and more successfully. "Socialism, in particular, being a progressive and just ³³⁴³⁶ democratic society should not allow people to be divided in the national and religious respect. The only differences one can and should allow in socialism are between hard-working people and idlers, between honest people and dishonest people. Therefore, all people in Serbia who live honestly from their own work, honestly, respecting other people and other nations are in their own home republic.

"After all, our entire country should be set up on the basis of such principles. Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can survive only under the conditions of full equality for all nations that live in it.

"The crisis that hit Yugoslavia has brought about national divisions, but also social, cultural, religious and many other less important ones. Among all these divisions, nationalist ones have shown themselves to be the most dramatic. Resolving them will make it easier to remove other divisions and mitigate the consequences they have created. "For as long as multinational communities have existed, their weak point has always been the relations between different nations. This threat has been hanging like a sword over our heads all the time, namely the threat that the question of one nation could be endangered by another, and this can then start a wave of suspicions, accusations, and intolerance, a wave that invariably grows and is difficult to stop. Internal and external enemies of multinational communities are aware of this, and therefore they organise their activity against multinational societies mostly by fomenting national conflicts. "At this moment, we in Yugoslavia are behaving as if we have ³³⁴³⁷ never had such an experience and as if in our recent and distant past we have never experienced the worst tragedy of national conflicts that a society can experience and still survive.

"Equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its way out of the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition for its economic and social prosperity. In this respect, Yugoslavia does not stand out from the social milieu of the contemporary, particularly the developed world. This world is more and more marked by national tolerance, national cooperation, and even national equality. The modern economic and technological, as well as political and cultural development, has guided various peoples toward each other, has made them interdependent and increasingly has made them equal as well as mutually equal, equal to each other. Equal and united people can above all become a part of the civilisation toward which mankind is moving. If we cannot be at the head of the column leading to that civilisation, there is certainly no need for us to be at its tail."

And now I will quote the entire passage out of which Mr. Nice quoted just one sentence in order to qualify it as warmongering.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Remember, you are not giving the evidence. It is the witness who is giving the evidence. You have quoted a long passage. You should now ask him a question about it so that we -- we can know what the evidence is. The evidence is coming from him. Do you want to ask him whether he agrees that there is nothing in it, in that speech that you have just cited, that section, which would incite or which incited him, or ³³⁴³⁸ perhaps maybe which incited others or which promoted racial conflict? But that's the point I'm making: You're not giving the evidence. So you -- in order for us to get the evidence, you have to ask him something about what you have just read. Otherwise, it is not of any value.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, Professor, what I've just read out, is that an authentic passage from the speech you saw on tape and which you have had occasion to read and to look at the tape that was -- that has been stored here and the speech at the time?

A. Without a doubt, it is authentic. But let me also add that for people who for decades have been living in Serbia, this was the continuation of the well-known policy waged during Tito, the policy called Brotherhood and Unity. And Tito always spoke about that. And Mr. Milosevic in fact carried on from that and said that equality among nations must exist and that they should live under an atmosphere of brotherhood and unity, although he didn't use the term "brotherhood and unity," but they were the basic ideas upon which Yugoslavia itself was founded.

Unfortunately, they were -- had not taken sufficient root in the different nations, and it was separatist ideas that prevailed. But they were the basic foundations upon which Yugoslavia was formed and lived during World War II, after World War II, right up to the major crises that rocked the country in the 1970s. ³³⁴³⁹

Q. Is there any doubt that what I've just read out is authentic?

A. No, none at all. That's it.

Q. Now, do you remember the speech ending, and the final sentence is, "Long live peace and brotherhood among peoples."

A. Somebody who is preparing for war, genocide and ethnic cleansing would never call upon the people to call out this slogan for peace and brotherhood among peoples. And that is something that was always the term always used during Tito's day, brotherhood and unity, and that was the only foundation upon which Yugoslavia could exist.

Q. Very well, Professor. Now, how do you explain the fact that ten years after this speech was delivered, that is to say in 1999, the theory was bandied about according to which that speech was utilised to inflame Serb nationalism and incite Serb nationalism?

A. Well, the political needs of the day differed. At the time when the speech was made, and we're talking about 1988 --

Q. It's 1989, in fact.

A. Very well, 1989. At that time, there were no tensions. There were no problems in inter-ethnic relations, the relations of Serbia and other ethnic groups. Later on, when the conclusion was made that Serbia could not be subjugated and reined in, there was another argument -- there was one argument, first of all, that it could not be subjugated and reined in and the second was that it was the last bastion of communism. So that was the reason for this demonisation in the first place. But as I explained a moment ago, the reforms that were conducted in Serbia were reforms given to a society which had no characteristic features of ³³⁴⁴⁰ communism as interpreted by the West. If that was indeed communism, what the situation in Serbia, which was a humane democratic socialism, in fact, then this would be propaganda in favour of communism. But the dogmaticians of the day repeated again and again the fact that Serbia was the last bastion. But Serbia took the middle road, the medium ground. Social democratic in aspirations reflecting itself -- taking its image from Sweden, Norway, and those countries. That was the road that they opted for and wanted to proceed along. But that was not sufficient. It wasn't enough for these aggressive minds, militant ideologists. And so they proclaimed Serbia as being, first of all, ideologically on the opposite side, and on the other hand that Serbia wanted to subjugate other ethnic groups.

And you haven't read one portion - I have the text here - but when you speak about the battles which must be waged on the political level, cultural level, economic level, and you say, "Our main battle today is to have social prosperity," and so on and so forth, so when you say it is not an armed struggle although such are not excluded either, "although that is not excluded either," how can this be taken as an explanation for your militant policy of war cleansing or domination among other nations -- against other nations?

I said at the beginning that this was an area and territory that was always the subject of others who wanted to win it over, and it always had to be ready for defence, including armed defence.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Milosevic, it seems to me you're asking very specific and direct questions at the moment and you're getting very ³³⁴⁴¹ lengthy answers that don't entirely address the questions you're asking. Bearing in mind the limited time, it seems to me that it might be an idea to, if you wish to ask the witness, perhaps, to restrict his answers to the questions you're asking.

Can I ask you one particular question also: Are you going to be presenting to us the press cuttings from the period around 1989 and the period around 1999 to show the inconsistency between them?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In 1989, this speech was covered by the Western media, and it was covered in an entirely proper fashion and correctly. In 1999 - and I quoted this in my introductory statement but incompletely - so in 1999, it was completely incorrectly quoted. It was a falsification because there is no mention of warmongering or extreme nationalistic relationship to what we're talking about. Quite the contrary. Quite the contrary.

JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that point entirely and I understood it from your opening statement, but I have had difficulty finding the press cuttings in 1999 to which you were referring, and what I was asking is whether you are going to lead as part of your evidence these cuttings which at the moment we don't have ready access to.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.

THE WITNESS: May I answer your question? I have -- I have fragments that you're interested in.

JUDGE BONOMY: The problem, Professor, is that it's really for Mr. Milosevic to deal with that and for him to present the material that ³³⁴⁴² he wishes to lead and not for the witness to organise that for him. So he's answered my question satisfactorily. I don't need any more assistance at the moment on that point.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, for me to take the right attitude to what was -- we're talking about and what the professor mentioned a moment ago, he mentioned the quotation at the end of the speech, but let me read out the entire passage to fit it into context.

"Six centuries ago, we are still facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such are not yet excluded. But regardless of the kind of the battles they are, these battles cannot be won without the resoluteness and sacrifice and without the noble qualities that were present here in the field of Kosovo in the days past. Our chief battle today concerns implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity, finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilisation in which people will live in the 21st century. For this battle, we certainly need heroism, of course of a somewhat different kind, but that courage without which nothing serious and great can be achieved remains unchanged and remains urgently necessary." This portion, gentlemen, or this portion of the sentence, when I say that the battles are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet, and our main battle is the economic, cultural, et cetera, et cetera, political one, this has been taken as the basis for describing this speech as warmongering, which is a blatant lie and a serious attempt ³³⁴⁴³ at manipulation.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... evidence. You're not giving evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... the witness here.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I'm asking the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm asking the witness whether when this is extracted from the context in this way that it is sheer and blatant manipulation and lies.

A. Any country to the extent that the people in it wish to achieve equality must be capable of defending themselves. So if you're living in a territory like this, in a region like this, and the crossroads linking north and south, Europe and Asia, you must always be ready to defend yourself, first of all from a foreign aggressor, and secondly, if you are living in a country where there is burgeoning secessionism and separatism and the danger of a civil war looming, you must once again be ready and able to defend yourself and meet force with force, and that is the essence and substance of a self-defence, which from all humane aspects must be asserted.

Q. Professor, do you happen to remember, and you were able to see this when you were watching the tape to refresh your memory, that at the time the overall Yugoslav leadership was present, led by Mr. Drnovsek, the president of the Yugoslav state Presidency as well as the presidents of all the Yugoslav republics, they all attended. ^{33444 BLANK PAGE 33445}

A. That's right. Everyone was there and so were most the foreign ambassadors at Gazimestan.

Q. Now, did anyone in any of the republics after that speech have any comments to make or criticisms to make along the lines that it being something that does not correspond to the most progressive goals and objectives of a life in common, a life together within Yugoslavia?

A. No. Not in Yugoslavia, not in the world. No comments of that kind or negative criticisms of that kind were made at all.

Q. Very well. Thank you. I don't think I need dwell on the speech any more.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should like to tender this exhibit. It is Exhibit 5. I would like to have it tendered and exhibited in this written version and the television tape, which is an integral tape, and you'll be able to view it in 20 minutes' time. It's not a long tape. The translation --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a second.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- is --

JUDGE ROBINSON: This will be Exhibit 5.

JUDGE KWON: I think we have to exhibit the memorandum first. Would you like to exhibit this memorandum, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly. It already has an exhibit number. I seem to have mislaid my note on that, but I think you must have it. I'm sure you have it in English.

JUDGE KWON: Speaking for myself, I'd like to have it exhibited because it has the marks which is marked by Professor Markovic. ³³⁴⁴⁶

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes. Let it be exhibited. What's the number?

THE REGISTRAR: The memorandum will be D250, and then I would like to give number D251 to the speeches, together with the videotape.

MR. NICE: Can I just check before the next question is asked. D250 is the bound volume which contains both the commentary and the text. Thank you very much.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, don't proceed immediately.

[Trial Chamber confers]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to clarify a point. May I clarify something? What Mr. Nice has just said is not an exhibit. I gave this to help you because it's the translation, and it's the text from the BBC that was designed for the press. But the original is in Serbian, and you have the television tape of the entire speech, the integral speech that you have, and you can use this translation to help you. But of course you can always issue an order for the tape to be translated again and then you can compare whether there are any deviations. But the television tape is a sufficiently authentic exhibit and piece of evidence which leaves no doubt as to each word that was uttered on the occasion.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

JUDGE KWON: What Mr. Nice referred to as the memorandum, not the -- not your speech.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you have the tape there, Madam Registrar? The ³³⁴⁴⁷ tapes? Okay.

Mr. Milosevic, you'd like these tapes to be played? Just a portion?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. There's no need. It will take up too much time. But I said that you have the exhibit, the original television tape and recording, so you can ask them to have it translated again from the original tape to be able to compare and see whether there is any word which might be distorted or anything like that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll -- we'll take an adjournment for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 5.31 p.m.

--- On resuming at 5.55 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor Markovic, a principled and concrete approach to the question of national equality of rights: Do you know that that was my position all along, incessantly throughout the Yugoslav crisis and all the way to the end?

A. I believe that from that point of view, you had that position consistently. That can be explained by your origins and your previously mentioned positions and also that you grew up in a society that was based on these principles, and you consistently abided by that until the end.

Q. Also, there is no denying that in 1998, there was an escalation of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija; is that right? ³³⁴⁴⁸

A. Yes.

Q. At that time; that is to say in mid-1998, precisely when there was this escalation of Albanian separatism and terrorism in Kosovo, I spoke to the political leadership, didn't I?

A. Yes.

Q. What I said then, in spite of the fact that Albanian nationalism and terrorism were in full sway, doesn't that still confirm my advocacy of national equality?

A. I have the stenographic notes --

MR. NICE: Your Honour, reluctant to interrupt when the accused is starting his experience of taking his own witnesses, but aware that we -- the Chamber may be also concerned not to allow him to misunderstand how he should be asking questions, I think really the first four questions are all leading.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Certainly the last one.

MR. NICE: I think also in reality, Your Honour, all of them. The first one that says concrete approach to the question of national equality of rights, do you know that that was my position all along incessantly throughout the Yugoslav crisis? A question of that character, whatever the answer, leads to an answer of diminished or no value because it's led. That's the problem.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

THE WITNESS: May I say something?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, for example, in the last question, "In spite of the fact that Albanian nationalism and terrorism were in ³³⁴⁴⁹ full sway, doesn't that still confirm my advocacy of national equality?" That's definitely leading. You'd have to ask the witness -- you'd have to ask the witness more generally what does that indicate to him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor Markovic, why do you believe that my position was advocacy of national equality even in 1998?

A. First of all, I'd like to say that Mr. Milosevic cannot lead me anywhere. I am completely independent of him. We parted ways in 1995 politically when I criticised him.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, I'm stopping you. I am stopping you. That is not a matter for you. That's a matter for the Court. "Leading" is a term of art. It happens when a question is put to you and embedded in the question is the answer, and it is, as Mr. Nice said then, of little evidential value because you have not given the evidence. So "leading" is a term of art, and that is a matter for the Court to determine. I don't want to hear any comments from you on that issue. Go ahead, Mr. Milosevic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can just say that was not the way it was. I can always say that. He can put a leading question, but that does not mean that that is the answer I'm going to give, yes, that's right. I can say no, that's not right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, I am putting a completely neutral question to you. Do you have any proof that in 1998 my position was advocacy of national ³³⁴⁵⁰ equality of rights?

A. I have here the stenographic notes of the 16th session of the Main Board of the Socialist Party of Serbia. This was on the 10th of June, 1998. I will deal with this briefly.

Again, you said here, "Our policy is to resolve the question of Kosovo by political means." At that time, there was already fighting there, but you say, "We approach this solution proceeding from our convictions and our programme which implies the principle of national equality of rights. We don't want to harm the Albanians in any way. We don't want them to be second-rate citizens, and we have to distinguish clearly, and we've pointed that out several times, between the Albanian people who live there in Kosovo and the terrorists. Some of our own people think that all of them --"

JUDGE KWON: If you can help us finding the passage in the documents. I think you are referring to the Defence Exhibit 142.

THE WITNESS: I have -- I have this document. I don't know whether you have it. I simply quote in answer to the question what I have. You wanted my answer to this question, and this is my answer.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is Exhibit 142. You have it before you. In the Serbian text it's on page 52. These are stenographic notes from the session where there was a discussion about this.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please, Professor, go on and just quote what you wanted to quote.

A. "No matter what it looked like, we must have precisely that approach, a political solution, non-violent, and the affirmation of the ³³⁴⁵¹ principles of equality of national rights."

MR. NICE: We really must be able to find these passages before the witness launches into them. I think the Court is having the same difficulty that we are. The -- unfortunately, the page numbers have got cut off in the English version, but it would help if the accused identifies both page numbers when he produces documents for us to read. I'm afraid I simply haven't been able to find the passage.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you've heard that and it is quite correct. You must identify the page, both in the B/C/S as well as in English.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I do not have the English version, so could somebody please give me the English version. I'll find it. I hope I won't take up too much time doing that. The page numbers are missing in the English version.

JUDGE ROBINSON: There are no pages.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll tell you --

JUDGE BONOMY: I think, Mr. Milosevic, if you go to the end of the -- I think if you go to the end of the English version and go then into it about three pages, you'll see the heading "Chairman," and I think it may be at the foot of the page where the heading is "Chairman."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, correct. Correct. It says "Chairman," and then he started quoting a particular section: "Our policy is to solve the [In English] Kosovo issue by using political means. Our attitude towards this solution is based on our belief and our political platform which includes the principle of national equality." ³³⁴⁵²

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please go ahead, Professor, since we've identified the section in the English translation. Please go on.

A. "We must bear in mind the following: That some people have been manipulated in this way. These are unfortunate people that have been manipulated like any other destitute people in the world, first by power wielders in their own countries and then by world manipulaters who use them to destabilise the southern part of Europe since they constantly need to have an alibi for keeping some military forces of the great powers there. They are not the ones organising the activity. They are the vehicle that somebody else is using to carry out the activity. There are among them people like Bukoshi who is in Germany and who became a millionaire thanks to the funds he's been raising. "There is a lot of work to be done, so with regard to Kosovo, we should take the political approach and observe the principle of national equality. This should be observed in the political activity not only of our people in Kosovo but also dialogue, dialogue that was not reserved for the -- [In English] state committee which used to sit there in Kosovo from day-to-day waiting for the representatives of Albanians who never came." So here are listed Ratko Markovic. He was the head of this delegation. On the other hand, the Mahmut Bakali [Interpretation] or Bajazit Nusi or Agani. "It was not reserved for them. I mean, the dialogue was not important only from their point of view. By dialogue I do not mean just the Serbian-Albanian dialogue but also the Serbian-Albanian-Turkish and Muslim and Roma and Montenegrin dialogue. ³³⁴⁵³ There should be dialogue at all levels, in municipalities and local communes, formal and informal dialogue. Dialogue should be conducted both formally and informally because people should be encouraged to live."

Q. That will do, Professor.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into evidence, and my question was that on the basis of what he believed, even nine years later, the position remained unchanged, observing the principle of national equality. So this is a quotation from a speech made in mid-1998.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You know, Professor, that terrorism was escalating at the time; isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. In spite of that fact, our position is to observe the principle of national equality, that Albanians should not be harmed in any way and they should not be treated as second-rate citizens.

A. Yes. Fighting was already taking place in Drenica. The KLA had already organised their activity, and our police responded, but in the midst of this fighting this is the position that you took at the session of the Main Board of the Socialist Party of Serbia.

Q. Now let us go back to Gazimestan for a moment. We concluded that the entire Yugoslav leadership and the representatives of all the republics were present at Gazimestan; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And that indeed no one ever assessed the speech made at Gazimestan ³³⁴⁵⁴ in any negative terms at the time.

A. That's right.

Q. In paragraph 88 of the indictment against me, there is a description of events that took place three months earlier on. So please, 81 is the count. "The Assembly of Kosovo met in Pristina in Kosovo and adopted the constitutional amendments but most of the delegates of the Kosovo Albanians refrained from voting. Although lacking the required two-thirds majority in the Assembly, the president of the Assembly nonetheless declared that the amendments had been passed. On the 28th of March, 1989, the Assembly of Serbia voted to approve the constitutional changes, effectively revoking the autonomy granted in the 1974 constitution."

Now, my question to you is the following: I claim that what is here in the indictment is a lie, because had that been true, would all the representatives of the Yugoslav republics have been there, would the entire Yugoslav leadership have been there in --

MR. NICE: Your Honour, this is not a question. This is a way of making a proposition and giving it air time. I'm sure the accused understands the difference between asking a question and making a comment, and I must press the Chamber to ensure that he obeys the rules from the beginning of his conduct of his case.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think it's midway between a comment and a question. I'll allow the witness to answer that part of it which is a question. Briefly.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I did not mean to answer this, ³³⁴⁵⁵ whether all these people would have come. I meant to give an answer on the basis of what I know. The facts are as follows: There was a total of 190 delegates. At this Assembly there were 180 delegates present. There were ten votes against, four abstentions, and 166 voted in favour of these amendments. So it is not correct, first of all, that the majority of the Albanians abstained. Secondly, it is not correct that there was no two-thirds majority, because two-thirds of 180 would be 127, and 166 actually voted in favour of the proposal. And finally, thirdly, it is not correct that in this way autonomy had practically been revoked. Autonomy is not revoked if we mean by autonomy certain rights that are enjoyed by that region, that is to say to have an Assembly of their own that can vote and decide on certain issues.

What was revoked were certain characteristics of sovereignty, because in the constitution of 1974, in addition to autonomy, Kosovo was given certain characteristics of sovereignty. For example, it could veto certain decisions of federal institutions although it was a part of Serbia but nevertheless it could make its own decisions at federal level. It was represented at federal level. The representative of Kosovo at a given point in time was the president of the entire state, and these are the characteristics of sovereignty that these amendments have actually revoked.

So Kosovo retained only what an autonomy really means, and that is what it has today as well. These are the things about which wrong conclusions have been presented here, these three. So it is not correct that there was not a required two-thirds majority, and it is not true that ³³⁴⁵⁶ this revoked the autonomy, and also it is not true that Kosovo Albanian delegates abstained.

Q. How was Serbia regulated? How was Serbia defined at the time?

A. As the state of all its citizens.

Q. That will do. Thank you. All its citizens who live in it?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that Article 1 of the constitution?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that the case with other Yugoslav republics as well or not?

A. Well, the Croatian state, the State of Croatia, was defined as the state of the Croatian people. I've already said that. Before it was the state of the Croatian and Serb people, and then the Serb people were left out and it was only the Croatian people. That's the way it was in other situations too.

What prevailed here was that it was the state of all of its citizens, all the citizens who live in it.

Q. All right. But do you remember the adoption of the amendments to the constitution on the 28th of March, 1989, an august occasion? Do you remember who sat next to me in the first row?

A. I can't remember. I can't answer this question. I don't know.

Q. Well, who was the president of the Yugoslav Presidency at the time? Was it Sinan Hasani?

A. Yes. The representative from Kosovo.

Q. Is he an ethnic Albanian?

A. Yes, yes, Albanian. He's a representative of Kosovo. That's an ^{33457 BLANK PAGE 33458} example of what I was saying earlier. As a representative from Kosovo, an Albanian, he was the representative of the entire state.

Q. All right. We can see that on the video film of that entire session, but this will suffice as an answer.

Tell me, Professor, since in 1990 you were vice-president of the Socialist Party and one of the participants, one of the authors in -- of the platform, of the programme of the Socialist Party, tell me, do you remember how many among the membership of the Socialist Party were non-Serbs?

A. I know around 50.000 members of the Socialist Party were non-Serbs.

Q. All right. Can you tell me, what is the attitude expressed in the programme of the Socialist Party regarding national equality and the national issue as such?

A. Do you want me to give any quotations or to give you an answer in principle? I can do that briefly.

Q. Very briefly.

A. Just a minute.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, would you -- Professor, just tell us what is it that you're reading from.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm reading from Fundamental Principles, or the basic platform of the Socialist Party of Serbia, which I authored. That was the platform valid for the Socialist Party, although I haven't been a member for a long time.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You are the author of it, you said. ³³⁴⁵⁹

THE WITNESS: I'm the one who wrote the first draft, and then later there was small corrections.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Go ahead. Go ahead.

THE WITNESS: There is a section "National Equality." [Interpretation] "Human rights are primarily the rights enjoyed by individual citizens. Members of national minorities, masters, individuals have the same rights as members of a majority population. In addition to that, national minorities also have certain internationally recognised collective rights. Those are cultural rights, right to use one's own language, fostering of traditions, independent publishing, entertainment, and other activities in their own language. Those rights include cultural but not political autonomy. Among national minorities, it is necessary to ensure their representation in government, especially on the local level. Relying on the most democratic existing international norms and proceeding from centuries of experience in peaceful co-existence, the socialists of Serbia commit themselves to full equality of all citizens of Yugoslavia. The Socialist Party is a party of all the citizens of Yugoslavia who accept its programmes -- programme regardless of ethnic affiliation." And the next one is 75. "Under the circumstances of the dissolution of the former Yugoslav state, the Socialist Party of Serbia undertook to abide by the basic principle that all its citizens have to be equal. And the same right to self-determination according to which Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and others decided to secede from Yugoslavia, the Serb people as well in territories where they are a majority, may decide to continue living in one common state." ³³⁴⁶⁰ [In English] Just a moment. [Interpretation] "The quintessence of our policy in Kosovo and Metohija is full civic and national equality. The Albanians who live there as well as members of all other minorities enjoy guaranteed internationally recognised rights such as to use their own language and to attend school in their own language, to foster their cultural traditions and have the necessary institutions, publishing houses, press, et cetera."

Q. Professor, please. We have to save time. We have to move on. Are you aware that amid that entire crisis, from 1991 until the end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Serbia was the only place where the national composition, the national structure of the population did not change? Or let me rephrase it. Are you aware of any persecution on ethnic grounds for the duration of that crisis and the wars in Bosnia and Croatia?

A. This may sound as a paradox in view of all these charges concerning the expulsions of Croats and others from their territories, but it is a fact that nobody was expulsed from the territory of Serbia. Serbia still has today the same national structure that it had in the 1970s. There is no other state that can claim the same. Croatia expulsed the Serbs who lived in it. Kosovo did the same. There may be only 3 or 4 per cent Serbs remaining in Kosovo.

Serbs were expulsed from practically all the other republics, Serbia did not change.

So there were no expulsions. On the contrary, refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and other republics frequently arrived in Serbia. ³³⁴⁶¹

Q. Are Serbs the only refugees who chose to go to Serbia or there were Muslims as well?

A. Muslims as well. There were areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina where there was fighting between Muslims and Croats, and Muslims fled from such areas to Serbia. They were free to stay as long as they liked. Some of them went on to third countries, to Europe, but some of them stayed.

JUDGE ROBINSON: May I just ask how much longer you intend to be with this witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope I'll be able to finish by the end of the session, but I'll hurry up, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let me just quote. I am charged here with heading some kind joint criminal enterprise whose objective was to create some sort of Greater Serbia. And I will quote now the Kosovo indictment, paragraph 16: "The purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was, inter alia, the expulsion of a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from the territory of the province of Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control over the province."

Similarly, in paragraph 6 of the Croatian indictment says: "The purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was coerced removal of a third or more of this -- of the population of this area --" or, rather, "was the forcible removal of the majority of the Croat and other non-Serb population from the approximately one-third of the territory of the Republic of Croatia that he planned to become part of a new Serb-dominated state through the commission of crimes in violation," et cetera, et ³³⁴⁶² cetera. "These areas included those regions that were referred to by Serb authorities and are hereinafter referred to as the Serbian autonomous district." What is mentioned here is the Serbian Krajina and then mind this: The Dubrovnik Republic.

And then it says in paragraph 6 of the Bosnian indictment: "The purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was the forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs."

THE INTERPRETER: The accused needs to read more slowly. The English interpretation here is not the only one.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I think you didn't hear the interpreters. They're asking you to read more slowly. In the future, please observe that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I will try to read more slowly.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So, Professor, you have heard all my quotations. Do you have a position on them?

A. All this is factually inaccurate. Why would Serbs be expelling Croatians from Croatia if they're not expelling them from Serbia? Why would Serbs be expelling Albanians from Kosovo if they're not expelling them from Belgrade and other parts of Serbia? You have Belgrade and many other places in Serbia full of Albanians who are experiencing no harm at all. They continue to work and live there.

Q. All right, Professor. If you have in mind that Serbia was supposed to be the main -- ³³⁴⁶³

MR. NICE: Two points. The document from which the witness was reading he says was subsequently amended, but it may be 469, tab 3 or tab 4, and it may be that we ought to ask him to provide the copy to check whether it is the exhibit we've got in evidence or not.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a document that he authored?

MR. NICE: Yes. He said he authored it. He said it was subsequently amended, but I think there are two documents at 469, tabs 3 and 4, which may be either that version or derivatives of it, and it may be we can have a look at it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll ask the witness to provide that document.

Go ahead and answer the question that you were asked.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me, what was the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I read to you parts of the indictment claiming that I was part of a joint criminal enterprise to expel Croatians from Croatia, Muslims from Bosnia, Albanians from Kosovo, in order to create some sort of Greater Serbia.

Now, if you have in mind that the greatest part of that Greater Serbia would be precisely the Republic of Serbia, which did not see any expulsions at all throughout the crisis, do you find it logical that Serbia should initiate expulsions from territories outside of Serbia?

A. Well, I already told you it seems illogical to me. Why would they be expelling Albanians from Kosovo if they're not expelling them from Serbia and so on? I think I've already answered that question. ³³⁴⁶⁴

Q. Now, about the Socialist Party, Mr. Markovic. Is that a party that was founded and active only in the territory of Serbia?

A. Correct.

Q. Were there ideas and aspirations for it to spread all across the territory of Yugoslavia, and what was my position on that?

A. There were ideas to that effect and it was my opinion that it should be founded in Montenegro. I even established contact with some people over there who wanted the same thing as well as in Republika Srpska and in the Serbian Krajina. However, you were resolutely against and I could never understand why. It would have been logical, I thought, for the Socialist Party to be established there. It later turned out it would have been a good thing.

Q. Now, tell me about the SDA, the Party of Democratic Action of Alija Izetbegovic. Did it have branches in Serbia?

A. It certainly did; in Raska, in Sandzak, in Novi Pazar and other areas populated by Bosnian Muslims. That party was organised there.

Q. Do you know about the Democratic Party, which was established in Krajina and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Do you know whether it had its own organisation in Serbia?

A. It did, and it was headed -- this branch was headed by my friends Milos Miljanic, a writer and professor of the university, and another person.

Q. Did they take part -- run in the elections?

A. They did.

Q. And did they run as opposition to the Socialist Party of Serbia? ³³⁴⁶⁵

A. They were.

Q. This so-called Prosecution is trying to push a theory --

MR. NICE: Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. -- according to which at the time when I was president --

MR. NICE: I must invite the Chamber to consider the appropriateness of allowing this accused to question witnesses in that way.

While I'm on my feet - and I hesitated to mention it last time - can I invite the Chamber at some stage to give some thought to the appropriateness of asking -- of allowing the accused to ask witnesses questions on passages of the indictment of the open-ended nature that was asked on the last occasion, but that's another matter. But really, this question is not permissible.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you heard the Prosecutor. The phrasing of your question is objectionable, and in the future I'm going to ask you to find language, and I know you can find language, which is appropriate for these proceedings. Bear that in mind.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it was you who suggested to me that in my Defence case I should rely on the indictment.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no. I wasn't referring to that. I was referring to the manner in which you made reference to the Prosecution as this "so-called Prosecution." That language is unacceptable, and I want to make that absolutely clear.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. ³³⁴⁶⁶

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. It is stated here that I headed a dictatorship of some kind, in some way. Tell me, how many times and how often did I test my own legitimacy at the elections, and do you know how many times I agreed to earlier elections before the expiry of my term of office?

A. I don't think anything similar happened anywhere else at any time. We had elections, it seemed, all the time. I didn't always follow that, in the League of Communists of Serbia, for instance, but you were elected in 1990, and already in 1992, although you were entitled to wait for another four or five years, we had new elections in which Mr. Panic tried to take the Presidency away from you, but he lost very clearly, and then there were new elections in 1996 when you became the president of the Federal Republic, and then you again ran in early elections in the year 2000.

Q. Do you know anyone who is charged with exercising autocratic authority who went in for early elections?

A. No. I know of no other such example. Tito, for instance, was a mild sort of dictator, less cruel than Stalin, certainly, and many other dictators, but Tito, during his lifetime, wrote in the constitution that he would be a life-long president. There were no elections during his time. And from that sort of republic we entered your kind of republic in which elections were held all the time. Parliamentarian elections and other elections. It is no small wonder that people are already sick of elections and of voting in our country. But time and again, people were asked to confirm their choice as far as you were concerned. ³³⁴⁶⁷

Q. Do you know that in 1992, the Socialist Party did not have a majority in the Assembly of Serbia?

A. Well, no, it did not. It was the largest party by a long chalk, but it wasn't able to surpass 50 per cent and it had to make up a coalition. So it went into a coalition, for example, with the national Democracy Party of Dusko Mihajlovic. And then a coalition with the Serbian Radical Party, and later on it was in some sort of coalition at federal level with the SPO, which was in government as a coalition, and then with the Montenegrin party. That was according to the constitution which stated that the strongest party from Montenegro had to take part, so there was a coalition with the Serbian popular national party, for example.

Q. Tell me, please, my position, was it this: That other parliamentary parties should be invited, including the opposition, to set up a joint government of national unity?

A. Yes. There were difficult situations where such proposals were made and where you negotiated and talked to their representatives and leaders with Draskovic, Djindjic, and others. I do know about that, although it never materialised, it never came about, and I wasn't kept up -- wasn't kept abreast with further developments after that.

Q. All right. Could you tell me, please, is it true that at federal level, although the Assembly majority went to the coalition party and the Montenegrin DPS party, that the first government, upon the inception of the FRY, was composed largely of people who were until then the opponents, led by Milan Panic, for example? ³³⁴⁶⁸

A. Well, Panic was the president, the Prime Minister of the federal government. In actual fact you invited him to come and try his luck -- try his hand at the elections and he was Prime Minister, federal Prime Minister.

Now, I mentioned Vuk Draskovic a moment ago, the present day foreign minister. For a time he was in the coalition government at the level of the Federal Republic.

Q. Very well. Now, I'm sure you know that for a time events in the Socialist Party of Serbia, for example, whose president I myself was and without a doubt the most influential person in the party, did I involve myself and meddle in the decisions made by the Socialist Party of Serbia; and if so, to what extent? What would you say? How was the leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia elected and how far did I wield my influence or made any decisions along those lines? Did we have democratic relations or was this just a sort of authoritarian behaviour on my part? You know this very well from those times.

A. Well, the elections took place for the leadership in 1990 at the first congress, and there was a certain amount of influence from people in the main board. They favourised certain individuals, for example, from the local organisations, the municipalities, et cetera. But at the other elections, the next elections that took place in 1992 - and I was still there - they were far more democratic already because the proposals put forward were from the basic organisations in the local communes, for example. And it is from those proposals that at the congress and the election that the leadership was elected. So those elections were truly ³³⁴⁶⁹ democratic at the time. I don't know what the situation was like later on, but at the time, yes, they were.

Now, as far as meddling is concerned, and interference, you had full confidence, I think sometimes even too much confidence in some of your associates, and you never interfered in their work at all. And of course I can also say that what happened was that something contrary to your will was decided upon. For example, you wanted to see the mayor of Belgrade to be Debotic [phoen], that he become the mayor of Belgrade, whereas it was Perucic, whereas Slobodanka Gruden was elected. You were dissatisfied with that but the main board opted to elect her. Or similarly you wanted the hymn of Serbia to be Hej Sloveni. Now, the main board didn't feel that the same hymn should be continued on for Serbia as it was for Yugoslavia and they decided to opt for the March on the Drina River tune. So -- as the hymn.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We have had a sufficient answer. Ask another question, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, did you have an opportunity of reading the indictment in its integrity and the integral form? The indictment against me, have you read it, the full text that's on the table before me?

A. I have read through all three indictments, and I have to say, and I have to be categoric in doing so, that although everybody has shortcomings, can be criticised, and I myself criticised you in 1995 at the main board, however, I do not think that you are at all to blame for the war that broke out on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. I think ³³⁴⁷⁰ that you have no -- absolutely no responsibility or accountability for that.

JUDGE BONOMY: I think your question was quite simply, Have you read the indictment?

Professor, that's all you were asked. Could you answer that, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course I've read it. Well, I wouldn't be able to comment on it had I not read it.

JUDGE BONOMY: You were not asked to comment on it. You were only asked if you had read it.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I understood it that he was asking me what I thought about it, not merely had I read it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As you have told me that you have read the indictment, answer me this question then, please: Is there a single word of truth in the accusations contained in the indictment?

MR. NICE: Your Honour, that has to be a completely inadmissible question. Imagine --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Ask another question --

MR. NICE: Imagine if I were to have asked such a question of any Prosecution witness. He is trespassing, through this question, by the witness, on the preserve of the Court.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Next question, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... coming to ³³⁴⁷¹ the end of your questioning now. You don't have to fill up the time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I am nearing the end, yes. And that's why I want to ask the professor this.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is there anything in the indictment that you can confirm as being the truth?

A. I cannot confirm anything, and I consider that you are not responsible and accountable for the war that broke out. And as I spoke about all the secessionist aspirations and so on --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I have cut you off, Professor. Professor, I have cut you off.

Mr. Milosevic, are you at the end of your questioning? If you have no more --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I ask --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... ask, then Mr. Nice will start his cross-exam.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, let me just ask you something. Do you remember how many times we heard in this courtroom the question asked whether -- asked of a witness is there a single word of truth in what the accused is claiming? How many times have we heard that in this courtroom? Do you remember?

JUDGE ROBINSON: You're not to ask me questions. Ask another question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if you won't allow the question to be answered, then let me ask a different question. ³³⁴⁷²

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What do you think, Professor? What was the motive for raising this indictment in the first place?

JUDGE ROBINSON: No. Absolutely no. And I'm going to stop now. If you -- if you have non-forensic purposes, they will not be served by examination-in-chief. You will find some other way to serve those purposes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Very well. Thank you, Professor.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I prefer, if I may --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Before -- before you proceed, Mr. Nice, I think there are some questions relating to exhibits that need to be ironed out.

MR. NICE: Certainly. And I was going to simply draw to the accused's attention, lest he's overlooked it, that there are a number of exhibits he served on us, apparently for use with this witness, that he hasn't touched on, one or two of them exhibits that I know --

JUDGE KWON: If you could hold a minute, please.

MR. NICE: So sorry.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll deal with the exhibits at the end of the evidence in its entirety. You may be referring to some of them.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. But I don't intend for you to begin your cross-examination this evening. ³³⁴⁷³ I wanted to ask the professor a question. In the early part of the -- in the first part of the examination-in-chief, you were asked about Slovenia and what prompted the Slovenian movement towards secession, and you spoke about the -- the relative rate of development in Slovenia as compared with the other republics, and I understood you to be saying that Slovenia was the most developed of the republics. But what is not clear to me is what -- were you trying to say that this was a factor that explained why they wanted to secede, the fact that they were more developed than the other republics?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were two reasons why they wished to secede. The first was this: Yugoslavia was becoming a more and more chaotic state, thanks to the 1974 constitution, and that nothing could be decided at federal level any more because each of the republics and each autonomous province had the right to use its veto. For example, the Slovene representative was Krajger, when he was president of the federal state, and he had organised a commission, set up a commission which was supposed to find a solution to that burgeoning economic and political crisis, and the crisis of the entire system. And the proposals made by the commission were unilaterally accepted, unanimously accepted. However, when this was put into operation and when a series of laws are passed in the Federal Assembly, all the laws were rejected because either one or other republic had resorted to its right to veto them. So they saw that nothing could be done, no decision could be made. As I say, the house was toppling. And no state would have survived the constitution introduced by Josip Broz Tito in 1974 -- ³³⁴⁷⁴

JUDGE ROBINSON: Give me the second reason now.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The second reason is this: There was a fund for the development of the underdeveloped regions, as it was called, and that meant that the more developed republics such as Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia were supposed to allot resources to be invested into the underdeveloped areas, and that meant Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo. So the Slovenes each year had to set aside considerable resources and funds into the fund for the underdeveloped regions, and they became more and more dissatisfied with that, having to do that, and decided to step down.

JUDGE ROBINSON: One reason was political and the other economic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right, yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will adjourn. Tomorrow morning at 9.00 a.m.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day

of November, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.