³³⁶⁶⁸

Tuesday, 23 November 2004

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, before you begin, I understand that the witness has to catch a plane at a certain time, which requires that he leave here at about 9.30.

MR. NICE: I was alert to this yesterday. The loss of time this morning means that I will reorganise my questions by priority. I won't be able to cover everything.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I am to say to you that in future it is your responsibility to bring to the attention of the Chamber any particular logistical problems relating to your witnesses. Proceed, Mr. Nice.

WITNESS: NIKOLAI RYZHKOV [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. I am not going to deal with any of the documents you produced yesterday because I do not have them in interpretation and cannot deal with the rest of the context. However, one document you provided was included in the documents provided to Ms. Del Ponte. We have a translation of that.

MR. NICE: May the witness see it. It was tab 4 of his original collection of materials, and it was the one item that was not produced. ³³⁶⁶⁹

Q. And I desire to read with you, Mr. Ryzhkov, only the second paragraph of this document, which is described to be conclusions of the first session of the commission for assessing the international legal aspects of the situation regarding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And I trust on this occasion the interpreters have a translation before them. I apologise to them for the fact that the book extracts we read yesterday were not provided to them. Entirely my fault. The second paragraph of this conclusion reads as follows, Mr. Ryzhkov, please follow it in the Russian: "During a long period of time, a radical part of the Albanian population of Kosovo undertook actions aimed at separation from Yugoslavia. With this end in view, the underground groups, parallel power structures, and illegal paramilitary groups have been formed. To oppose efforts to separate Kosovo, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not use, unfortunately, all the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. In a number of cases, the reaction of the federal authorities was inadequate and times unjustifiably rigid. Limiting the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 jeopardised the rights of the Albanian population and led to the deepening of conflict. During the active phase of the conflict, cases of violence against different ethnic groups of the Kosovo civilian population took place. The commission announced its readiness to consider objectively and impartially any evidence of such facts."

The simple point then, Mr. Ryzhkov, that even the commissions with which you were involved, and there were many commissions, recognised that limiting the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 had jeopardised the rights of the ³³⁶⁷⁰ Albanian population and deepened the conflict; correct? I would be grateful for short answers this is morning, please.

A. I will try, Mr. Nice, to answer very briefly. I did not take part in the work of this commission. Therefore, to say that this is my opinion, I cannot. It was an independent commission. It worked in St. Petersburg in 1999, and in this document on page 8, you will find the signatures of all those who signed this document. My name is not among them. Thus I cannot be held responsible for the opinion of the people who drafted this document.

Q. Very well.

MR. NICE: May this be given an exhibit number. It may be Exhibit 788 tab 4, suggests Ms. Dicklich.

THE REGISTRAR: That's correct.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That document has nothing to do with this witness. How can it be tendered through my witness? It has nothing to do with him.

JUDGE ROBINSON: He has commented on it.

MR. NICE: And it was provided as one of the pieces of material that this witness was expected to deal with.

Q. It's right, is it not, Mr. Ryzhkov, that President Yeltsin at the time held a critical or negative view of the Duma and in his book described the Duma as "issuing one resolution after another, the communists" - which would include you - "establishing active communication with Milosevic, planning a military union of the two governments." Do you ³³⁶⁷¹ recall his taking that view about you?

A. In the document that we submitted, there is a list of documents, background documents. You took only one of them, one among the documents that were appended to our report. It was the opinion of the commission that met in St. Petersburg, and we thought it was our duty to submit it as a document in an annex. It is a different matter how it should be interpreted. I, for instance, cannot agree with that particular point. But you are not asking me.

And second, Mr. Prosecutor, I should like to clarify one point. Maybe I didn't understand your question correctly, but to a certain degree, you seem to be maybe not accusing but hinting that some people cooperated. I, for instance, cooperated with the leadership of Yugoslavia. Maybe I misunderstood you. But I would like to state before this Honourable Court that I have nothing to do today with the Communist Party of Russia, absolutely nothing to do with them. I used to be a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which ceased to exist in 1991. I have my convictions. As a citizen I have my civic position, which I expressed yesterday, but I can say that --

Q. Mr. Ryzhkov --

A. -- it is absolutely wrong to say that I am a mediator between the Communist Party of Russia and Mr. Milosevic.

Q. I've given you an opportunity to deal with Mr. Yeltsin's comment. There is one other fact relating to Mr. Yeltsin. It's right, is it not, that throughout the time that it would have been possible for Mr. Yeltsin to accord the accused Milosevic a formal visit to Russia he declined ever ³³⁶⁷² to afford him such a visit and indeed expressed the view of this accused that he was a most cynical politician. Do you remember his doing that, your president?

A. I do not know of such an expression of opinion by Mr. Yeltsin or anyone else from the leadership of Russia. I do know that Mr. Yeltsin did meet with Mr. Milosevic in Moscow, and they discussed precisely the issue of a peaceful resolution to that entire problem. There was a statement issued after that meeting, and we all read it. I have never heard words to the effect that you just read.

Q. The materials that you provided to Mrs. Del Ponte were recorded as having been considered in the public document that recorded the decision of the Office of the Prosecutor of this Tribunal not to pursue the inquiry into alleged NATO crimes further. Do you accept that?

A. I did not quite understand your question, but I will try to answer nevertheless. I spoke yesterday, and I will repeat today: On the 20th of October, 1999, in keeping with the decision of the state Duma, the state parliament, our commission, which I chaired, drafted a document which I signed addressed to the Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte. And on the 23rd of December, my deputy in that commission, Professor Tamara Pletneva and the secretary of that commission, Mr. Tetyorkin, arrived in The Hague and handed that document in. The document was quoted from by Mr. Milosevic yesterday. You did not allow me to quote a couple of paragraphs myself, but you heard it from him.

I told you yesterday, and I am repeating today that she stated that the demands contained specifically in paragraph 5, if you read the ³³⁶⁷³ document, which raised the issue of holding to account the head of NATO and head of states' members of the NATO who unleashed this war --

Q. I think I'm going to stop you --

A. -- was answered by her to the effect that she did not have the competence. She gave us that answer two months later, to the effect that she did not have the purview to prosecute this. And I have submitted the document to you that we received from Mrs. Carla Del Ponte.

Q. Have you read the public document that records the decision of the OTP.

A. I read the answer that we received from Madam Del Ponte. I have read no other document.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, time does not permit me to put the document in nor am I sure that it is a relevant document, but it is a public document, and if the accused wishes it to go in or anybody else wishes to see it, it's available.

Q. Mr. Ryzhkov, have you read and considered either Lord Robertson's report in relation to the civilian casualties and other events that happened as a result of the NATO bombing titled "Kosovo One Year On"? It's not an exhibit.

A. I heard that such a document exists, but I never read it.

Q. Have you read and considered the Human Rights Watch report, which is an exhibit in this case, Exhibit 206, titled "Civilian Deaths in The NATO Air Campaign"?

A. Certainly I'm not very familiar with the forensic practices of this Tribunal, but I do believe that such documents should be shown to me ^{33674 BLANK PAGE 33675} in order that I can give a qualified answer. Just from hearing it read out as a title from you, I can say nothing.

Q. I can show you what the document looks like, and we don't have time, because of your departure, to do more than ask and have answered the question, Have you read and considered it?

A. It should be translated into Russian. Here. Here are the photographs which are familiar to me. I see here many photographs that I know. You see, Mr. Prosecutor, I would be very grateful indeed if you could ask me questions as you would a person who represented the Russian parliament or, alternatively, as a man who was on site and an eyewitness. I cannot testify on the basis of documents you are showing me so perfunctorily now. I can only give you my opinion --

Q. Mr. Ryzhkov, please help us with this, which is why I've asked you the preliminary questions: In this report, reflected also in Lord Robertson's report, civilian casualties in Kosovo numbering between 488 and 527 are allowed for. You visited the area, and I want to know if you have any material that is eyewitness, hard material to show that the conclusion of that report is other than correct.

A. Mr. Nice, I'm repeating once again: I did not deal with these issues. I never participated in exhumations. I know people who did, I know people who pulled out corpses, made conclusions. I know the Finnish team. But specifically, specifically I repeat once again, I did not deal with these issues myself. This did not fall within the purview of my missions. I went there as a politician and a public figure, not as an expert who has to determine what kind of shots caused death to those ³³⁶⁷⁶ people.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Ryzhkov, would you just confirm for me that the latest time that you can be here is 9.30 if you are to make your flight.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I appreciate it very much that you are reminding the Court for the second time that I really do have to leave within three minutes in order to make my plane. There is a session of the senate tomorrow to which I am reporting, and I therefore have to be in Moscow by that time in order to make that trip. Therefore, I would be grateful if you could give me the possibility --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much. Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: I've got about two more questions in the time, Mr. Ryzhkov. The first is this: Greater Serbia. You only spoke to Karadzic twice and obviously had limited contact with him. You spoke to the accused more often. Do you accept that the overall plan of the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs would have involved the linking of lands dominated by Serbs to Serbia, making for a larger territory than the present or then existing Serbia? Do you accept that?

A. That was not my impression. As I said yesterday and I repeat now, I met twice in my life with Mr. Karadzic, in 1993 and 1994, and after that I never saw him again. In the past ten years, I did not see him. And I repeat once again that at that time I had the impression that Karadzic was unhappy with the position held by Mr. Milosevic, President Milosevic. And answering specifically your questioning whether I had the impression that ³³⁶⁷⁷ everything was being done to annex a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia, I had absolutely no such impression. And to the best of my understanding of all these issues, I believe this is pure fabrication.

Q. Very well.

A. There was a civil war in one of the former republics, and what you are saying I absolutely cannot confirm. I believe it is untrue.

Q. I've got two more questions, actually. Your first meeting with the accused was in March 1993. We have evidence from stenographically recorded notes of his explaining only a couple of months earlier how he intended through the process of negotiation to maintain de jure, in law, what he'd already obtained on the ground in fact. Did he explain his plan to you in those terms, that he wanted to keep by negotiation what he'd already got?

A. Mr. Nice, Your Honours, please take into account the following: Yesterday, when I testified before you all about my activities over 11 years when I cooperated and had contacts with Yugoslavia, I said at the outset I never was directly involved with issues concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina. I did not deal with it, and I cannot give you a qualified answer as to what whose position was, whether I agree with Vance and Owen or not, because I didn't deal with it. It wasn't my job. You asked me whether I met with Karadzic. Yes, I did. What kind of questions were raised in that discussion I have already told you. I can't you tell you any more and please don't ask me any more questions about Bosnia and Herzegovina because I can't answer them.

MR. NICE: In light of that answer, I don't think I need trouble ³³⁶⁷⁸ the witness any further.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, any re-examination? I would encourage you not to re-examine in light of the logistical problems with which the witness is faced.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course. Of course I do not have any intention of detaining Mr. Ryzhkov any further. I just wish to thank him for his testimony.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Ryzhkov, that concludes your testimony, and you may leave.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honours. Thank you very much indeed.

[The witness withdrew]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Your next witness, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hereby call witness Leonid Gregori Ivasov.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

WITNESS: LEONID GREGORI IVASOV

[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General Ivasov. ³³⁶⁷⁹

A. Good morning.

Q. Could you please state your full name.

A. My name is Leonid Gregori Ivasov.

Q. Please give us a few main facts from your biography.

A. I was born on the 31st of August, 1943, in Kyrgyz Republic in the Soviet Union. When I was 17, I entered military school. I served in the army, following which I completed the military academy. Once again following that, I continued serving in the army, and from the December of 1976, I worked in the central administration of the Ministry of Defence of Soviet Union. I was at the head of the Ministry of Defence, was chief of the international affairs section within the Ministry of Defence, and once the Soviet Union fell apart, I was at the head of the department dealing with the newly independent states. And starting in 1996, I was appointed head of the main directorate of international military cooperation of the Russian Federation. At the same time, I dealt with military analyses and military sciences. I hold a Ph.D. in the field of military sciences. In 2002, I left my post within the Ministry of Defence, and since then I have been with the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. I am a vice-chairman there, and at the same time I teach in various military academies. While I was the head of military department within the newly independent states, I dealt with contacts, meetings, organised with the Ministries of Defence of many countries. I took part directly in various negotiations, including negotiations in Yugoslavia, specifically in Kosovo. I had numerous contacts with NATO, with American military representatives, and I also took part in numerous international ³³⁶⁸⁰ conferences.

Is that sufficient, Mr. President?

Q. Yes, General Ivasov, that's right. And let me just clarify that you're first vice-chairman of the Academy of Geopolitical Issues; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right. I'm first vice-chairman of the Academy of Geopolitical Issues of Russia.

Q. And you're a colonel general?

A. Yes. My military rank is colonel general in reserve.

Q. Were you intensely involved in issues dealing with Yugoslavia and the Balkan region for a period of time?

A. Yes, absolutely. Starting in 1996, I, within my military duties, was involved in the situation in the Balkans. To be more precise, I dealt with the situation developing in Kosovo and around Kosovo. And as such I had multiple contacts with all countries which were interested or perhaps not interested in resolving the problems there.

Q. Did you receive detailed information on all events in Kosovo? When I say "detailed," I'm referring both to confidential and secret information.

A. Yes. I received various types of information which was based on intelligence sources of intelligence services. It was also based on my continuous meetings with high military and political officials of various countries including NATO Member States. I received that information through the work of analytical centres within Russia and other countries, and in addition to that I received my information from the international ^{33681 BLANK PAGE 33682} conferences in which I took part or my subordinates did. I also received information directly from my contacts with President Milosevic, from Chief of Staff, and high officials, military officials of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I also received information from the Verification Mission in which my subordinate officers took part.

Q. Were you involved in any analysis? Did you take part in drafting any documents and the like?

A. Yes. That was my duty; namely, to analyse the situation unfolding in Yugoslavia, to make conclusions, and to report to the minister of defence and the president. In early 1998, in order to analyse the situation around Kosovo, a special analytical centre was established in my directorate, and it dealt specifically with those issues. And the documents generated were sent to the Main Staff and the president of Russia.

Q. In order to clarify, General Ivasov, you've already told us that you had regular and numerous contacts with the military leadership of Yugoslavia. As far as I know, you and I met seven times. We had seven various meetings.

A. Yes, Mr. President. You and I met seven times with the delegation of the Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and while I was in Yugoslavia as the head of military delegation, we had constant, almost daily contact with the leadership of the Main Staff of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This was both telephone contact and direct personal contact. We exchanged views on the situation, we attentively listened to your military officials and ours, and we conveyed results of ³³⁶⁸³ our analysis and other information to the Main Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army.

Q. Please tell me, did you have frequent contacts with the military officials of NATO countries?

A. Yes, these contacts were also regular, and as the situation in Kosovo and in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became more tense, the contacts became more frequent. I took part in the meetings between Russia and NATO. I took part in bilateral meetings between minister of defence of Russia and ministers of defence of NATO countries. I personally met with ministers of defence of those countries and with top military officials of those countries. I also had frequent contact with Mr. Solana, with Mr. Robertson, who were general-secretaries of NATO. In addition to that, with the chairman of military committee of NATO and other officials of the alliance.

Q. Now let us be more precise about the time period I want to refer to now. Could it be said that the Russian side very closely followed the events in Kosovo in 1997, 1998, and 1999?

A. Yes, that's right, Mr. President. We intensified information activity in that region. We also intensified our staff within the Russian embassy in Belgrade and gathered information from various sources in order to have an objective picture of what was going on, in order to conclude what were the intentions of all sides involved, especially the terrorist organisation KLA, in order to define what were the channels of weapons entering Kosovo, in order to locate camps and training bases where terrorists were trained, and also in order to locate what were the sources ³³⁶⁸⁴ that provided military, political, and financial source -- support to the KLA.

Q. Before I put a question related to what you've just told us, please describe briefly the then-situation in Kosovo.

A. The -- at the end of 1998, we had a full picture of what was going on in Kosovo. General Staff of Russia and my directorate analysed the situation, and based on the information obtained, based on consultations with various military experts from various countries, we concluded that as far as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was concerned, there was a broad plan to destroy the country, to discredit military and political leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia aimed at seceding Kosovo from Serbia and Yugoslavia, separating it from those two countries. We also saw the interaction of various forces. First of all, we saw that in the process of establishing KLA and destabilisation of the situation, a Mafia was established, an international Mafia and a Caucasian Mafia, which wanted to establish its strongholds in Pristina and Albania in order to distribute drugs throughout Europe.

Analysing the information, we also concluded that the National Security Council of the United States, back in 1997, adopted a decision to carry out a military operation against Yugoslavia. The plan of that operation was aimed at conducting a very powerful psychological war against Yugoslavia aimed at disrupting the negotiations and inform the international community about what was going on in Kosovo as well as to prepare the international public for the impeding military operation. This plan and these conclusions were reported by us to the ³³⁶⁸⁵ leadership of our country, and we also warned the leadership of Yugoslavia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you because the narrative has gone on too long. It's time for more specific questions to be put. I wanted to ask you whether information that you received which led you to these conclusions, was that gathered exclusively from the Russian embassy in Belgrade?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I will be brief. This information originated not only from the Russian embassy. We received it through daily contacts with NATO representatives. We also received that information through our contacts with other states which were not NATO Member States, and also from open sources. After analysing this information, we reached this conclusion that there was a broad plan to carry out this operation against Yugoslavia, the operation that I've just described.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please ask specific questions to elicit answers. The narrative approach is probably more understandable with a witness as to fact. I think for this witness you need to ask specific questions to elicit answers. Yes.

Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, may I make an observation about the last long answer of this witness, which came out in a very coherent way, probably - no objection to this - prepared. I intentionally didn't object midway, although I think it's obvious that this evidence or evidence of this kind is extremely problematic and probably inadmissible in -- under ³³⁶⁸⁶ many approaches, which is one of the reasons I rise now. By letting this answer be given, it shouldn't be assumed that I'm accepting its admissibility.

It's problematic for the following reason or reasons: First, it's clear that the witness, in his conclusions, has relied on a whole range of material, including secret material, which hasn't been provided to us, presumably isn't available to us, and upon which I'm quite incapable of cross-examining.

Second, connected to the first point, in reality, the witness is giving an expert opinion, because he is saying, without specifically holding himself out as an expert, he's saying, "I and my team have analysed a large amount of material, and this is our conclusion." Now, amongst the conclusions that he has reached is the very strong conclusion, whether it has any relevance to the case being another matter, the very strong conclusion that the plan of the operation was aimed at conducting a powerful psychological war against Yugoslavia, and this is accredited or discredited to the United States. I -- even if I had a report in advance or a statement in advance of detail, I wouldn't necessarily have been able to do any more than I will be able to do later today, because only with the supporting material and the opportunity to analyse it could one make any sensible approach to this type of evidence.

I didn't stop it, and I -- intentionally because I wanted to see what it was the witness intended or wished to say, but I must invite Your Honours to say that we are in very difficult territory. Obviously the ³³⁶⁸⁷ easiest way to deal with the problem is to say that evidence of this sort simply isn't admissible for a range of reasons, including the two I've identified, but I am in the Chamber's hands. What I can say is that my ability to cross-examine on this sort of conclusion is pretty well nil.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. Mr. Milosevic, you heard two objections made by Mr. Nice. Let me hear from you and then we will consider it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not agree with these objections. This is a very competent witness whose job it was to be aware of all the information. As you could see, he prepared information and analysis for the president of the state and the General Staff, and all secret, confidential federation passed through his hands, all information available to the Russian Federation. This is a highly credible witness, both in view of his entire career and the post he held and the information he had at his disposal.

General Ivasov, precisely because he knew all of the information, was unable to leave Russia for quite a long time, and this is the first time that he was able to leave the country and come here to testify, excluding various official visits. So this is a highly competent witness, a witness that is very well-informed.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What do you say about the point that he's giving evidence as an expert? The point being that if he's -- I'm not finished. The point is that, as you know, expert evidence has to be notified beforehand.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that he's a fact witness, ^{33688 BLANK PAGE 33689} and the fact that in addition to that he's also very competent in his job is not his fault, but he is a fact witness.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, we think the evidence is -- is admissible. You make the point that some of it is based on confidential, secret material to which you have no access. That's a matter which you would raise in cross-examination, and it would then be for the Chamber to determine how to deal with that issue. There's a whole regime of law relating to access to confidential material. But the mere fact that evidence may be based on confidential material doesn't make it inadmissible.

We do not believe the witness to be an expert witness. He's -- he has not been examined to suggest that he has expertise in any -- in any particular area. So in conclusion, we'll admit it.

MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases.

JUDGE ROBINSON: But, Mr. Milosevic, I do not want this long narrative. It becomes meaningless after awhile. You must ask specific questions, the witness will give a short answer, and then you move on to another -- another question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Ivasov, you've mentioned 1997 and the conclusion of the National Security Council of the United States concerning the attack against Yugoslavia. Does that mean that you can confirm here that you had information at your disposal concerning the fact that way back in 1997 ³³⁶⁹⁰ there was intention to attack Yugoslavia?

A. Yes, Mr. President, I confirm this. Firstly, my affirmative answer is based on the analysis of the strategic of national defence of the United States, especially of 1993, in which a bet was placed on the military force in order to establish and not to protect the US interests in the world.

I refer to the military charter of the United States army and those documents which were in force at the time when these decisions were passed. And I also base my conclusions on those materials and that data which I have at my disposal.

Yes, indeed, at the end of 1997 a wide scale, coordinated plan was being implemented, targeted at the destruction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There is an analysis of political, economic, and military reasons for that, and that plan was being implemented in a stage-by-stage basis. In the light of the duration of that plan, I will refer only to the plan of the informational and psychological warfare. In the United States, there is such a rule FM33-5, which prescribes the operations of informational and psychological warfare, and everything which was being implemented in Yugoslavia is fully in line with the provisions of that rule.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Ivasov, may I ask you whether you have brought any documents that evidence this plan.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have brought with me documents of the General Staff, analytical documents of the General Staff of the Russian Federation which were, in 2000, declassified and which were made ³³⁶⁹¹ available to the public under the title "The Balkans Today and Tomorrow." This was published by the edition of the General Staff of the Russian Federation. It includes all the specific data and conclusions, including the description of the scenario plan of those things which were being applied with regards to the -- to the former Yugoslavia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You don't have a plan emanating from the United States?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I drafted this scenario by hand, this scenario plan, but it was included into the publication which I just referred to.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before allowing the witness to go any further with this, explain how this is relevant to the issues with which we have to deal in this case.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it is relevant because this witness, in addition to others, points to the fact that the decision to attack Yugoslavia, to commit an aggression against Yugoslavia, was adopted several years before the pretext for attack was specified. So therefore, this confirms that there was an intention to commit an aggression, and then through various mechanisms, including Verification Mission, Rambouillet negotiations, they came up with a pretext to implement this.

This is absolutely clear. Something was decided upon back in 1997, and then later it was presented as though Racak and Rambouillet in March of 1999 were used as pretexts. So it is clear that those were just pretexts, false reasons, and that the real reasons date back to the time ³³⁶⁹² when the decision was made.

In addition to that, General quoted the document FM33-5 is the document specifying those preparations to carry out informational and psychological warfare on the ground. The details are contained in that document.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll consider the question -- Mr. Milosevic, you are not to continue. The Chamber is going to consult on the question of relevance.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we'll allow you to carry on. Does the witness have this -- the last document to which he referred, which I think is an American document, a document emanating from the United States.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The documents are in the United States, but such documents as the strategy of the national security, the military doctrine of the US army, those documents get published in open press. As far as the field manuals are concerned and the instructions in psychological warfare, I can say that I had them at my disposal, but I believe that it would be feasible to request those documents directly from the United States, because I do not have them with me at the moment. I have some paragraphs or excerpts from those documents but not the full texts.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is only tangentially and marginally relevant. I allow it because part of your defence is that the JNA and others were acting in self-defence against the NATO attack, and ³³⁶⁹³ this may be related to the NATO attack. It's on that very slim basis that it is allowed. But you will appreciate that the evidence will not be of much value to your case if the witness cannot substantiate what he's saying. If there is no evidence of this plan, it's of very little -- very little value.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, many things are logical here. This witness knows this information, and this information was known in autumn of 1997, and this is what this witness was testifying about. In addition to that, you've already heard some other witnesses, and you will hear new witnesses who will testify about how troops were recruited for war in Kosovo back in 1996. These are facts. Therefore, it will not be difficult to establish a factual basis indicating that already back in 1996, conflict in Kosovo was predicted and supported by those who wanted Yugoslavia to fall apart.

But let us continue further.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In addition to this informational and psychological warfare, General Ivasov, is it true that in addition to that, in parallel, a military structure was being created? You knew that airports and military bases were being prepared in Hungary, Macedonia, and neighbouring countries in order to be used for operations against Yugoslavia. This is not informational and --

JUDGE ROBINSON: That is -- that is clearly leading. "You knew that airports and military bases were ..." That's putting evidence in the witness's mouth. ³³⁶⁹⁴

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Then I will reformulate my question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What did you know about physical preparations being carried out for attack against Yugoslavia?

A. Yes, I was aware of this. The preparations were done in a complex way. I already mentioned the information on psychological preparations, but in parallel to that, certain military operations were being prepared. Starting from January 1998, there was an escalation of grouping of intelligence satellites of the United States, and military infrastructure was being prepared. In particular, ten airfields of NATO Member States expanded their operational capabilities. They were getting closer to the borders. Infrastructure was being brought closer to the Yugoslav borders. In particular, the military infrastructure was being set up in Macedonia, in Hungary, and partially in Albania. In parallel to that, additional preparations were taking place in the NATO troops. All this can be characterised as the preparation for a major military campaign. All these issues in particular Marshal Sergeyev and myself raised at the meetings of the Russian NATO Council in particular on the issues of the military pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. When did you, General Ivasov, together with Mr. Sergeyev, raise the issue of military pressure on Yugoslavia at the session of the Military Council?

A. For the first time this issue was raised by Marshal Sergeyev in May 1998, but in December 1997, at the meeting of the ministers of defence ^{33695 BLANK PAGE 33696} of Russia and NATO countries, General Rodionov - in those days he was minister of defence - also raised this question. Moreover, we transmitted some information to members of the Russian NATO Council. Marshal Sergeyev offered a concrete plan of settlement of the situation in Kosovo within the framework of the Russia-NATO operation. And this plan included the building up of the peaceful initiatives and peaceful ways of conflict settlement. However, there was no unity in NATO. When minister of defence of Italy agreed with the proposal of Marshal Sergeyev at the meeting of the Russian NATO Council that indeed it would be -- it will be possible to concentrate on the ways to seek the settlement of the Kosovo issue in a peaceful way and through the establishment of a collective security model in Europe, he was interrupted by the US representative, Mr. Cohen, and as a sign of protest he abandoned the meeting hall.

So we always raised these issues. Moreover, in December 1998, General Kvashnin, general of the army and Chief of the General Staff of Russia, at the meeting of the military staff committee of the Russian Federation, transferred to General Clark our intelligence data regarding the composition of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the training camps for terrorists and the routes of passage and transit and trafficking of weapons through Macedonia and Albania, and suggested to concentrate the joint effort on the cessation of the terrorist training activities and the supply of weapons to Kosovo. He also offered a plan of joint activities between Russia and NATO with the participation of the armed forces and the security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. ³³⁶⁹⁷ Mr. Clark took this with acknowledgement and gratitude, but sometime later he informed us that the NATO intelligence is extremely weak and is unable to confirm that data.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you go ahead with your next question. Mr. Nice, is the question of the NATO air attacks on Yugoslavia, is that an issue that is being challenged by the Prosecution?

MR. NICE: In what -- I'm sorry, I shouldn't be asking a question, but I seek clarification: In what sense challenged?

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm trying to ascertain whether there is an issue between the parties as to the attacks by NATO.

MR. NICE: Judging from the evidence of the last witness, although he subsequently acknowledged he knew nothing of any detail, it would seem that there may well be an issue between the parties. Whether it's relevant or not is for you ultimately to decide, but issue would seem to be what was the true motivation, and indeed what was the real targeting. So at the moment, it would appear on the Defence case that there is an issue.

As you will appreciate with the last witness, and indeed with an earlier witness who gave some evidence that was found to be confirmed, for example, in the Human Rights Watch report, we've been happy to live with what we would say are neutral, independent assessments and happy to live with that history, but it seems to be being challenged by the accused, so I can't say there is no issue.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Go ahead.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I really have to make ³³⁶⁹⁸ a comment. There is a Latin saying, "difficile est saturam non scribere." I can really not believe that somebody on this planet can possibly challenge the fact that there was a NATO aggression against Yugoslavia. Let me ask everybody in this room if they could possibly disagree. I am just presenting you data.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Ask your next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So, General Ivasov, you not only knew in 1997 and 1998 about the preparations of attack on Yugoslavia, but you also had talks about it with NATO representatives at the sessions of the joint Russia-NATO Council; is that correct?

A. Yes, Mr. President, this is so. And in NATO, we saw different opinions and different approaches to this issue. In particular, the majority of ministers of defence of NATO Member States did not manifest any initiative or even objected against the preparation of a military operation. The most active part was played by the minister of defence of that United States and the minister of defence of the United Kingdom. The rest were just taking a passive role, objection. And only by February 1999, General Zavarzin, the representative of Russia to NATO, reported to me that all the ministers of defence of NATO Member States have been broken and support the military aggression.

Q. Thank you, General Ivasov. What do you know about foreign participation in the support and financing of KLA? Sorry. Sorry. I made a slight mistake.

Before that question, I would like to ask you this: How would you ³³⁶⁹⁹ qualify KLA?

A. In all Russian official documents which were being developed by the Ministry of Defence and which were reported to the leadership, the Kosovo Liberation Army was referred to as an illegal military formation carrying out terrorist activities; and the president of the Russian Federation, the parliament and all the official ministries, were in agreement with that definition.

The same definition was accepted, at least it was not objected against, also in the Russian-NATO Council and also at the bilateral level between the ministers of defence and other military and political leaders of NATO Member States. And I'm not even mentioning the non-aligned or neutral countries such as Finland or Sweden. Hence the definition of the illegal military formation is the official -- is an official and legal term or definition in Russia which we use.

And moreover, we believed that the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had not only the right to combat illegal military armed formations --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to stop you, Mr. Ivasov. You've answered the question.

Move on to another question now, Mr. Milosevic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well, General Ivasov. You qualified the KLA as a terrorist organisation. Do you know that in the West, too, it was long considered to be a terrorist organisation as well? ³³⁷⁰⁰

A. This can be confirmed by the bilateral meetings in our contacts, but this can be also confirmed by the conclusions of international organisations, and I can quote here the examples both of the Contact Group, which in the beginning of 1998 defined the activities of KLA as terrorist activities. And the same definition, in fact, was also present in our discussions with NATO. They did not refer to KLA as a terrorist organisation in their official documents, but terrorist activities were recorded as such. Hence, this was an international understanding or recognition of the fact that KLA is an illegal terrorist organisation.

Q. Tell me, General Ivasov, what do you know about foreign participation in the support and financing of the KLA and the activities of outside sources, and the activities of the KLA?

A. Yes. I'm aware that support to KLA was being provided from different structures, primarily from the Caucasian-Albanian-Turkish drugs Mafia. This was a broad network, and in accordance with our data at the initial stages of the establishment of KLA, from the funds of drug trafficking, there was up to 45 per cent of the financing for the procurement of armaments and supplies.

I also know that such an international organisation as the People's Movement for the Republic of Kosovo, established as early as 1982, had a broad network in such countries as Germany, Switzerland and other European countries and in the United States. This organisation was engaged in the collection of funds for the procurement of armaments and the training of terrorists.

We were also aware that before the commencement of the military ³³⁷⁰¹ action or by the beginning of 1990 -- by the end of 1998 --

THE INTERPRETER: Correction by the speaker.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- the KLA had in its possession the modern type of equipment and armaments that could be supplied only by the Western countries. And the main armaments were procured in 1994-1996 in Northern Albania when the Albanian people and Albanian rebels basically managed to defeat them, and there were some weapons taken in battles and there were cases of sales of weapons in Macedonia. So I can confirm the participation in the -- such support being accorded to the financing and procurement of arms for KLA.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's --

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivasov, in connection with the idea of a psychological campaign against Yugoslavia, you mentioned a document which was FM33-5. What is that document and where is it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a document of the US army. It is called "Manual on the Information and Psychological Warfare." I can quote some passages from that document if Your Honour leaves me to do so.

JUDGE BONOMY: No. That's a matter for Mr. Milosevic or Mr. Nice to take up. I just wanted to be clear about the identity of the document. Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that -- is that a general manual to which you're referring? It's not specifically related, is it, to Yugoslavia?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. This is a general instruction manual or operational manual which is to be used for guidance by political and military people. And when we were considering the ^{33702 BLANK PAGE 33703} situation and I had this manual available to me, it was quite obvious that all the technological activities were being implemented in accordance with the guidelines outlined in that manual.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We'll take a break now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson. Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Ivasov, are you aware of the political objectives that this terrorist organisation, KLA, held?

A. Yes, Mr. President, I am. First of all, the leaders of the KLA never concealed their separatist ambitions, and always pursued secession from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this ambition, they received international or, rather, foreign support. That was their objective and the tactics of their struggle.

Their second objective, and in this they were influenced by foreign powers, was to destabilise the situation in the province, to carry out terrorist activities in the territory of that province. Therefore, I can confirm that their political objectives were separatist and terrorist, and the methods for attaining those goals were illegal activities against the law enforcement agencies.

Q. What do you know about the link between the KLA and NATO?

A. I know about such links. They existed on the official level when ³³⁷⁰⁴ representatives of NATO officially received representatives of this separatist movement and had contacts with KLA leaders. There were also informal secret meetings that took place with the mediation of NATO special services. With the development of the Verification Mission, Mr. Walker, too, immediately met with --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you tell us a little more about the meetings that you said took place between the representatives of NATO and the KLA leaders. When was this and where?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Most of these meetings took place after the establishment of the Verification Mission. Our representatives to the Verification Mission reported about the contacts of Mr. Walker, starting with October until January, as well as the meetings of representatives of NATO member countries to the Verification Mission. And we received information that in that period intelligence operations were carried out in the territory of the province involving jointly the representatives of NATO and representatives of the KLA. They passed on information about the location of police posts, army deployment, and military facilities in the province, and our people also reported to us about the establishment of special radio transmission devices by NATO.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What date? Do you know the date?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This happened from the summer of 1998 up until the beginning of the aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The most frequent meetings took place in the period from January to March. We also know that Mrs. Albright passed on to Hashim Thaci this piece of information; namely, if the KLA agrees to the ³³⁷⁰⁵ deployment in Kosovo of NATO troops, then she would guarantee to them the implementation of a referendum.

I met with Mr. Walker and also raised this issue. I asked him why he was meeting so often with KLA representatives, naming names, while not meeting with the representatives of Serbian authorities and Serbian law enforcement authorities.

JUDGE ROBINSON: So the meetings between NATO officials and the KLA were taking place before the airstrikes?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I can confirm that, Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Simultaneously, as just mentioned, NATO troops built up on our borders.

A. Yes, that is so. I have already said that the military infrastructure was being developed for a major military operation. Intelligence activities were being stepped up against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Specifically, a regiment of special purposes of the United Kingdom was transferred before the aggression to the territory of Macedonia and established 80 intelligence units for radio surveillance and implemented activities to gather intelligence and organise provocations. The representatives of this regiment frequently met with KLA representatives and jointly tried to infiltrate the territory of Kosovo.

Q. Is the build-up of these military activities the reason why we increased the presence of our forces in that area? ³³⁷⁰⁶

A. In NATO plans, as the General-Secretary of NATO, Mr. Solana, said more than once, it was included to implement a ground operation with broad use of aviation and ground forces. To carry out a ground operation on the territory of Macedonia and Albania, a powerful group of NATO forces was organised, including the deployment of operative and tactical missiles, a deployment of launches, and fighter helicopters as well as other powerful military equipment. That also included the deployment of two groups of special forces.

So when the representatives of NATO officially announced the readiness for an airstrike and ground operation, the armed forces of Yugoslavia were simply obligated, as the armed forces of any country would, to prepare for defence against the aggression. And I believe that the deployment of their forces and increase of their presence in the province was, in my opinion, completely in conformity with the constitution and with their own obligations.

Q. I just wish to emphasise one thing: Airstrikes, you said, plus a ground operation. That means both.

A. Yes, that means both. And indeed, NATO was preparing for both, including the ground operation. However, the ground operation didn't happen for three reasons. First, there was no consensus within the NATO to carry out this ground operation. There was a number of countries which refused to participate. Second, by that time, major losses were inflicted on the KLA by the Serb police and armed forces. And third, this ground operation didn't happen because, as a result of the airstrikes, the ground forces of Yugoslavia preserved their combat readiness. ³³⁷⁰⁷

Q. General Ivasov, is it clear, then, that our forces were mounting a defence of the country? They were busy defending the country?

A. Yes, yes. I confirm that. Moreover, the Russian military, including the Defence Minister of Russia, Marshal Sergeyev, myself, and the General Staff proposed the adoption of even more extreme measures for the defence of Yugoslavia's territory and the defence of the territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders. That is a prerogative of every country.

Q. I'm asking you this because claims are being made here that we were building up forces in order to expel our own citizens of ethnic Albanian ethnicity from the province. So was the reason for this build-up our own defence or, as they allege, the expulsion of Albanians?

A. I assert and affirm that the Serb police and the Serb security forces were forced to eliminate KLA terrorist activities in their own territory. And this is something that Russia pressed the Yugoslav leadership to do, because the terrorist activities of the KLA first destabilised the situation in Yugoslavia. Second, it spread to the territory of the neighbouring countries. And third, it caused massive flows of refugees.

Furthermore, any terrorist act, any skirmish or shooting involving both parties caused panic among the citizenry who fled for cover. And I can confirm that it was precisely KLA leaders who conducted psychological operations and exerted pressure on the civilian population to either join the KLA or to leave the area.

I met in Greece with Albanian Catholics, with a family of Albanian ³³⁷⁰⁸ Catholics who told me that one of KLA field commanders, Adem Jashari, forced Albanian Catholics to join the KLA, and anyone who refused was simply physically liquidated. Therefore, failure to act by the Serbian authorities was not the reason for this flow of refugees. It was the terrorist activity of the KLA.

JUDGE KWON: General Ivasov, in an answer to the previous question, you said that you and defence minister and the General Staff proposed the adoption of even more extreme measures for the defence of Yugoslavia. Could you give some examples of such more extreme measures.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Way back in December 1997, the defence minister of Russia, General Rodionov, suggested both to President Milosevic and the Chief of General Staff to increase the presence of security forces and police forces in the province in order to isolate terrorist groups, detect their leaders and organisers, and to stop the supply of weapons and recruits across the border. We were aware that it was necessary in order to avoid engaging the army of Yugoslavia in these operations. However, according to our information and the information available to the General Staff of Yugoslavia, it was insufficient to use only the security forces. Because the situation in the country caused deep concern, it was necessary to protect the borders and simultaneously conduct constant operations against terrorist activity. Furthermore, Marshal Sergeyev also pressed for a greater engagement of police forces and even the army. I saw many military reports and overviews where the main order for the army was to prevent the escalation of combat operations. Always those orders included - and we ^{33709 BLANK PAGE 33710} criticised them for it - but they always included the clause that in case of attack by terrorists, they should be called upon first to stop combat and warn them that in case of failure to do so, the army would use force. We, on the other hand, thought that in case of attack, one should immediately open fire on the terrorists.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know about the links between the KLA and the al Qaeda?

A. Yes. We knew that from our intelligence reports but also from the information we got from representatives of Islamic countries. I had regular contacts with the ambassadors of Islamic countries in Moscow, including the ambassador of Iran and other officials from Iran. They confirmed the links between Taliban and al Qaeda on the one hand with the representatives of the KLA on the other hand. They even indicated specific routes along which terrorists and weapons were infiltrated into the territory of the Balkans. However, they denied any official involvement of Iran or other Islamic countries in such actions except for Turkey.

Q. As far as I know, Ambassador Seferi of Iran denied the involvement of Iran but confirmed the links of Taliban and al Qaeda in his discussions with you.

A. That's correct, Mr. President.

Q. Do you have any knowledge about the activities of an organisation called MPRI, an American organisation including war veterans, military professionals? ³³⁷¹¹

A. Yes, I know about the activities of that organisation, and I know that it recruits mercenaries into different countries of the world. We also located earlier recruited instructors from the USA and other countries. We observed them in the northern areas of Albania, including the populated areas of Tropoja and Kukes. So I can confirm that fact, yes.

Q. When you say that you had talks with the ambassadors of Islamic countries, how many ambassadors would that be; two, three, five, ten?

A. At least 15 ambassadors from Arabic and other Islamic countries. They all agreed in the opinion that a terrorist war was going on in Kosovo. Some of them did not actively take part in the discussions, just tacitly agreed. However, the general opinion was that it was a terrorist operation in Kosovo, that a major military operation of NATO was being prepared against Yugoslavia, and the majority of the representatives of the Islamic countries I spoke to confirmed this.

Q. Does that mean that the representatives of Islamic countries, the ambassadors you spoke to in Moscow, also knew about the preparation of the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia?

A. Yes. I hope they were aware of it, but we received this confirmation also when we met with the highest officials of various countries, including the president of Syria, Hafez Assad, receiving Russia's Defence Minister Marshal Sergeyev, and discussing this issue named the example of how they dealt with the separatists who carried out an insurgency in the town of Homs with the use of heavy artillery and army troops that prevented the spread of terrorism and separatism in the ³³⁷¹² territory of Syria.

Q. Tell me, what was the NATO plan? What did the top echelon of Russia's military know about the NATO plan?

A. I would say that the complete plan of the aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was known by the highest officials of the USA. A lot of information was available to the defence ministry and the political leadership of the United Kingdom and other defence ministers of NATO member countries who had less information, so they gladly received the information that we gave them.

The essence of this was the following: The plan was to discredit the political and military leadership of Yugoslavia with the aim of conducting psychological and media warfare. For that purpose, the 193 Aviation Squadron of the national army of the US - those were propaganda aircraft - were deployed in Macedonia. So a media war was started. Second, in the Military Committee of NATO, preparations were made, starting with 1998, of a military operation. Every defence minister knew on a need-to-know basis only a certain portion involving their own participation. This plan involved a relationship of alliance with the KLA and the opposition in Kosovo, the build-up of intelligence gathering activities, and the preparation of specific military actions. The plan envisaged that in case Mr. Milosevic and the Yugoslav leadership failed to accept the ultimatum involving the introduction of NATO troops, then this objective would be attained by military means, which is exactly what we saw.

Mr. Walker, too, and Mrs. Madeleine Albright and other ³³⁷¹³ representatives of the US and NATO tried, through military pressure and expansion of terrorist activities in the province of Kosovo, tried to coerce the leadership into accepting this ultimatum which would violate the integrity, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the republic and an occupation of Yugoslavia by NATO forces. The Yugoslav leadership did not agree to this, and that is why the plan of military strikes was carried out.

Q. Tell me, General Ivasov, in very specific terms, what happened in summer 1998 between NATO and Yugoslavia? What do you know about major military manoeuvres organised at that time on our borders?

A. I know about that, Mr. President, indeed. Way back, early in May 1998, in the Russian NATO Council, the topic of Kosovo was discussed. Russia eyewitnessed the preparation of a major wide-scale military operation, and Russia's military marshal stated this at the Russia-NATO Council meeting and insisted that NATO should implement the provisions of the founding act governing the relations between NATO and Russia which was signed in 1997. They wanted assurances from Mr. Solana, from Mr. Clark, and General Shelton that Russia would participate in the analysis of the situation and that NATO should not take any decisions involving military pressure and even less military operations.

However, during the visit of Marshal Sergeyev to Greece in September 1998, we saw wide-scale military drills of NATO air and ground forces, and that was an unpleasant surprise for our marshal. Our government recalled Marshal Sergeyev to Moscow because it was expected that these drills and exercises would grow into an aggression and our ³³⁷¹⁴ marshal indeed went back to Moscow, although the Greek representatives assured him that there would be no aggression. Nevertheless, such conduct by NATO violated not only the UN charter concerning threat of aggression but also ran counter to the founding act governing the relationship between NATO and Russia.

Q. Just to clarify, General Ivasov. Pursuant to this founding act and also in accordance with the specific conversation which took place between representatives of Russia and NATO representatives, NATO was duty-bound to consult Russia and to inform it on any military activity so that there would be no surprises such as those that Marshal Sergeyev and others eyewitnessed in Greece?

A. Yes, that's right. That was observed in NATO. Regarding these military exercises, Marshal Sergeyev sent a protest letter to ministers of defence of all NATO countries. He proposed to establish a joint working group in order to come up with proposals on peaceful resolution to the crisis in Kosovo. Some ministers replied to that, and some ministers didn't.

In addition to that, if Your Honour would like me to, I can give you the names of the ministers of defence of NATO countries who complained to Marshal Sergeyev because military pressure was exerted upon them regarding a military operation.

Q. At the time, did you speak to NATO officials? What I have in mind is Mr. Solana, Cohen, Clark, and the others.

A. Yes. Every time a minister of defence visited NATO, or I myself, also involved meetings with general-secretary, also General Clark, and ³³⁷¹⁵ other officials in Europe. All of these visits and meetings took place regularly, both in Brussels and in Moscow.

Q. Is it true that minister of foreign affairs also put similar questions within the group of eight where Russian side pointed out to the Helsinki principles, UN Charter, and other international treaties?

A. Yes, that's right. This was done both within the NATO and Russia contacts, and ministers of -- ministers of foreign affairs discussed the crisis in Kosovo within the Contact Group and other groups. The position of Russia was always the same. Russian representatives always proposed a very complex plan for peaceful resolution of the crisis in Kosovo. Russian representatives, especially Russian foreign ministers, pointed out that not all peaceful and political measures were used in order to resolve the situation, and they were strongly opposed to the military operation.

Some people agreed with this position, and some people objected to it, trying to blame Belgrade for everything, Belgrade and the leadership of Yugoslavia. So the opinions varied. However, this was a very firm, uniform position that Russia always advocated, and it was approved by President Yeltsin.

Q. General Ivasov, please tell me, since you had at your disposal various information that you've mentioned here on specific points where conflicts broke out, where there was a build-up of the KLA, what routes were used to bring in weapons, what assistance was received from the outside, your then-Chief of Staff, General Kvashnin, in December of 1998, did he convey all of this vast information to General Clark? ^{33716 BLANK PAGE 33717}

A. Yes. Russian General Staff had such information, information on several camps. I think there were a total of 11 camps where terrorists had training in Northern Albania and in Kosovo.

He also reported on warehouses where ammunition and weapons were kept. He also quoted five routes used for supply of weapons, narcotics, and also routes used for troops in order to move in from Albania and Macedonia. All of these routes led to Kosovo.

This information was conveyed to General Clark. This was specific military information conveyed to him.

We decided to convey this information to NATO so that through joint effort we could put an end to terrorist activity of the KLA and disrupt the support routes for the KLA. This was unprecedented measure taken by the Russian General Staff.

Unfortunately, General Clark referred to weak information of NATO intelligence which was not true and refused to discuss this issue. Intelligence services of NATO were quite powerful. Intelligence satellites of USA were increased from ten to 30. And in addition to that, they also established various new information -- intelligence groups. So therefore, the fact that -- the claim that NATO intelligence was weak was not true.

Q. As far as I know, it took one month from the minute this information was conveyed to General Clark for him to answer that, despite all resources at their disposal, they could not confirm that information.

A. Yes, that's right. However, General Zavarzin, Russian representatives in NATO, tried to cooperate with the representatives of ³³⁷¹⁸ the Military Committee of NATO based on this information to have some bilateral context. And it turned out that Klaus Naumann and other generals within that committee knew nothing about this information, whereas General Clark confirmed what I previously told you.

Q. Therefore, not -- even those who were within the inner circle knew nothing about that information.

A. Yes. We did not receive any information telling us that Russian information was analysed and discussed.

Q. Through your representatives within the Verification Mission, were you able to find out whether the information given to General Clark was passed on to Verification Missions so that it could verify what was going on in Kosovo?

A. No. We did not receive any such confirmation. Our officers who worked within the mission had this information, and they tried to convey this information to representatives of other countries within the mission. However, they received no support from them.

Moreover, representatives of NATO countries in Verification Mission first of all reported to the Verification Mission staff the data that was not objective. In addition to that, they conducted intelligence activities aimed at establishing coordinates of police forces, military facilities, and so on. And we knew that they had the equipment needed to establish such information.

There were many honest people in the mission, both from NATO countries and neutral countries, but there were also others who conducted intelligence activities that would assist the future NATO air raids. ³³⁷¹⁹

Q. General Ivasov, these exercises in Greece, if I understand your explanation well, were seen by Russian top military leadership as a clear intention of NATO to enter Yugoslavia, and that was obvious back in the middle of 1998, wasn't it?

A. Yes, that's right. Reports of the Ministry of Defence of Russia and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were conveyed to President Yeltsin, and he agreed with such reports. That was the information at the disposal of Russian authorities, and based on that they defined their positions. The negotiations taking place and the deployment of Verification Mission was just a smokescreen needed to conceal the preparations for the aggression. In addition to that, I would like to point out that Yugoslav leadership, when conducting negotiations with Holbrooke, with Clark, with Solana and others, made serious concessions detracting from their sovereignty. Instead of increasing political activities, NATO and the international community did nothing about the intensification of KLA terrorist activities which became even more intensive when OSCE mission was deployed to the area. Therefore, we concluded that Verification Mission agreements signed in October by Holbrooke and Milosevic, as well as other agreements, were made just in order to conceal the preparation of aggression.

In negotiations, Mr. Solana and Mr. Clark more and more frequently indicated that military operation was unavoidable. Mr. Walker, in late 1998, publicly stated that Serbs have no business in Kosovo.

Q. The threats were increasing, troops were building up, Yugoslavia was under UN sanctions when it came to weapons procurement. Was that what ³³⁷²⁰ the situation was?

A. Yes. That's exactly what the situation was. General Ojdanic, Pavle Bulatovic, minister of defence of Yugoslavia, they criticised us Russian officials for the fact that the KLA was increasing its forces whereas Yugoslav army could not even receive spare parts for its equipment. We discussed these issues within NATO, and we pointed out that there was no equality of arms there. On one hand, we had illegal terrorist organisation which was becoming stronger by the day, training its forces, whereas on the other hand, Yugoslav People's Army was not allowed to do the same. We considered this to be one element of the aggression preparation aimed at weakening Yugoslav armed forces.

Q. Did the leadership of Yugoslavia apply to Russia for military assistance?

A. There were no such applications made at the official level. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia complied with the sanctions which, in my view, were not grounded. And these were sanctions imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations.

The officers of the Yugoslav People's Army blamed us for facilitating the aggression and the KLA, which was NATO's ally.

Q. When the aggression commenced, what was the position of the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian military leadership?

A. First of all, I will tell you that the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, on the 25th of March, called NATO strikes an act of aggression. And this was the position to be taken by all other ministries. Ninety per cent of Russian population also saw this as an act of aggression. Whereas ³³⁷²¹ the head of Russian Orthodox church, Patriarch Alexei II, on the 25th of March, 1999, called this a sin before God and a crime which was a violation of international law.

We carefully studied the legal provisions of the UN Charter and the provisions of the General Assembly from 1974. I even carefully analysed the documents of Nuremberg trials. All of those documents indicated that an aggression was being carried out against an independent state. That was the only position taken by Russia.

Q. At the time, did the build-up of NATO forces in Macedonia continue?

A. Yes. The build-up of forces in Macedonia and Albania continued from the beginning of the aggression, and they were creating an attack group to commence an attack against Yugoslavia. We were able to observe that.

In the second phase of airstrikes starting in May, the build-up slowed down. We received information from the ministers of defence of NATO countries indicating that there would be no ground operation as there was no consensus among NATO states.

Armed forces of Yugoslavia, except for air forces, did not suffer major losses. Therefore, plans were made not to go ahead with ground campaign, but up until that time, the build-up was increasing, yes.

Q. Could you tell us briefly, what did you discuss with Walker when he came to see you, based on my information, on the 12th of February, 1999?

A. On the 12th of February, I did see Mr. Walker, and the first ³³⁷²² question I put to him was why Russian representatives within the mission were not allowed to present objective information. Why is it that in the mission reports only opinions of NATO representatives were including -- included, disregarding Russian, Ukrainian, Swedish, and Finnish opinions? Mr. Walker replied that it was difficult to work because the only unarmed people in Kosovo were the mission members, and the rest of those present there were armed. And when I asked him who was it that armed the KLA, Mr. Walker said that there were various, numerous sources, and he wouldn't detail them.

The second question we discussed was what were the perspectives of political solution to the problem in Kosovo. Mr. Walker replied that by springtime of 1999, the situation in Kosovo would collapse and that military operation was unavoidable. And this is when he told me what I have described earlier, that Serbs have no business being in Kosovo.

Q. So that was his position, that Serbs should leave Kosovo. You understood him quite well, didn't you?

A. Yes. That was the position stated publicly somewhat earlier by him, and then after that he confirmed it to me.

The third issue I discussed with him had to do with intelligence activities of the representatives of several countries within the mission which was undertaken in the territory of Kosovo. He refused to confirm that, claiming that he was not aware of the situation.

Q. You have just mentioned that you asked him how the Albanian terrorists in Kosovo armed themselves and that he didn't know what to reply, he didn't know how that was done. ^{33723 BLANK PAGE 33724}

A. Yes, that's right. He mentioned weapons from the Second World War which allegedly had been left there. He also mentioned some other sources that he knew nothing about, but he firmly denied that NATO countries and the United States supplied the weapons, and those were the countries that he represented.

Q. Did you have information indicating that they did supply weapons to them?

A. Yes. Yes. This was indirect information. In the territory of Kosovo in Northern Albania, sniper rifles were discovered, mortars, also night vision equipment, and also portable missile launchers manufactured by NATO countries.

I don't have direct information, I only have indirect information that at least from the territory of Turkey these weapons were supplied either through official or unofficial channels. Certain weapons could have come from Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as these countries started using new NATO weaponry.

Q. The same question on arming terrorists in Kosovo were put by Marshal Sergeyev on the 18th of February to Minister Scharping, the minister of defence of Germany. What was his reply?

A. Yes. I can confirm that this question was put to Minister Scharping. Minister Scharping also avoided answering it. He confirmed the fact that the weaponry was reaching terrorists in the area in large numbers, but he did not confirm that the source of those weapons was in NATO countries. He advised that channels originating from Middle East and Caucasus Mountains should be carefully monitored. ³³⁷²⁵

Q. In view of the fact that Russia was a member of the Verification Mission, that Russian representatives worked within that mission, could you please tell us what you think is most important and has to do with the work of that mission and the position of Russian representatives within that mission.

A. Russia agreed to establish that mission, bearing in mind that the activities of that mission should facilitate the peaceful resolution. When over 1.000 members of that mission were deployed to the region, it turned out that they were unarmed, that they had no protection, that their freedom of movement was limited, and that it was very difficult to gather objective information. However, despite that, Russia undertook all measures aimed at ensuring that its representatives would be able to collect objective information, and this is what they did. But let me point out once again that the representatives sent their reports both to the headquarters of the mission and to Moscow. To our surprise, we learned that in interim reports and the final report, the objective mission of Russian, Finnish, Swedish, and Ukrainian representatives was disregarded. Therefore, we sent these documents to the OSCE directly and to various legal organisations, and in December of 1998, I discussed this with our representatives in the mission, Mr. Ivanovski. I asked him why our opinion was disregarded. On the 12th of February, the same question was put to Mr. Walker, and on the 18th of February, minister of defence of Russia put that question to Minister Scharping as well. Therefore, we pressured, trying to ensure that the information in Kosovo was presented unbiased. ³³⁷²⁶ We asked Mr. Walker how come he met mostly with the representatives of the KLA, representatives of Albanian population. We asked him why only refugees in Albania and in Macedonia were interviewed, and the opinion of various other organisations were disregarded, and how come Mr. Walker rarely met with the representatives of Serbs and other ethnicities in Kosovo. He blamed it on the fact that he had very little time.

Q. From what you're saying, General Ivasov, can I conclude that it is based -- that based on the results of research and investigation by your services, Walker's reports were not objective?

A. Yes, I can confirm this. Moreover, when we suggested to him to strengthen the mission and to ensure security and to activate the activities, Mr. Walker would not agree to that.

Q. What can one say, then, about the reports of Human Rights Watch if the reports of the KVM, the Kosovo Verification Mission were not objective?

MR. NICE: There is a limit to --

JUDGE ROBINSON: He hasn't said that, Mr. Milosevic. Your previous question was whether Ambassador Walker's reports were objective, and he confirmed that they were not objective.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, what I'm --

JUDGE ROBINSON: And you're not asking about the reports of Human Rights Watch on the basis that the reports of the KVM, the Kosovo Verification Mission, were not objective. I think Mr. Nice is objecting that's -- ³³⁷²⁷

MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. I haven't take any point with the range of opinion evidence coming in. The immediate -- the preceding question was, of course, leading in form, but the latest question would appear to be a request for an opinion. Whether that's admissible at all, derived by the process of deduction from his previously expressed opinion, and I would invite the Chamber to say maybe the time has come to draw a limit, to draw a line.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I refer not only to my own opinion, but I -- but I can also quote the OSCE report. Kosovo, as it was seen, as it was also described in the October 1998, 1999, I will quote: "Before the operation, many of the Serb authorities and the law enforcement bodies were acting rigidly only in the areas of the location of the KLA military bases. The punitory operations were directed only against terrorist and separatist organisations openly advocating --"

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you, General. Mr. Milosevic, if he is to give evidence about the objectivity of the KVM, and we have heard evidence here from the KVM, it's a matter of some importance. You would have to establish basis for that analysis, for that evaluation by him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, General Ivasov has told you clearly here that the Russian members of the Verification Mission were subordinated to him. So at the top of the military pyramid in the chain of command there was General Ivasov himself, precisely over the Russian members of the Verification Mission. So he's basing his testimony on the reports of his subordinates who are directly located in Kosovo and ³³⁷²⁸ who told him that Walker did not take into account their reports and that they could not find their information in the collective reports that went to Vienna.

I hope that it is beyond reasonable doubt in anyone's mind that this was a manipulation.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Put to him the question about the KVM. Mr. Nice will be able to cross-examine on it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. The reports of the Russian members of the Verification Mission, were they taken into account and treated equally as others by William Walker and his associates?

A. The main issue with which we could not agree, to which the Russian officials and other members of the verification mission could not agree was who was the initiator of the terrorist activities, the aggressive terrorist activities? We believe that the initiators were the KLA, some political opposition forces in Kosovo, and some external forces. The representatives of NATO states tried to prove the opposite; that they wanted to prove the KLA and to say that they were illegal formations they -- which were trying to oppose the infringements from the side of the Serbian police forces.

We were showing to them the fact that the Serb law enforcement bodies and the army were undertaking only activities to rebuff those actions and were only acting in retaliation. And they were trying to prevent the spread of instability and terrorist activities. Unfortunately, Mr. Walker, in his report, blamed everything on the ³³⁷²⁹ Yugoslav authorities and the Serbian population. This is the main contradiction.

I can quote here --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, your next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So the findings of your members of the Verification Mission, Mr. Ivasov, if I understood correctly, was that the forces of our country only reacted to terrorism.

A. Yes, I confirm that.

Q. Let us move on then.

JUDGE BONOMY: Before doing so, are you saying there are documents that demonstrate this?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, there are documents, and primarily this will be the orders of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army, the orders to the Pristina Corps, and other official documents where the armed forces and the police forces were tasked to prevent the escalation of the conflict, to isolate terrorists, and to protect the peaceful or civilian population. We have such orders.

JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, but what I was thinking of, were reports prepared by your representatives within the KVM which were then not transmitted to the OSCE headquarters?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Such reports were oral, transmitted by telephone or in writing in the form of documents, and some of those ^{33730 BLANK PAGE 33731} documents and some of that information was also transmitted to the OSCE directly. And in the report which I already mentioned, we also reflected our position.

Moreover, the international human rights organisation Human Rights Watch also may draw a conclusion that the conclusions of the OSCE commission were biased, and we agreed to that. Our representatives also participated in the work of that commission.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, are you bringing any evidence to support what the witness has confirmed in response to your question, which is that your forces only reacted to terrorism or, rather, that the Russian members of the Verification Mission reported that your forces, the Yugoslav forces, only reacted to terrorism? Are you going to bring any evidence to support that?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Naturally. Naturally. I also have in mind witnesses, officials of our police and our army, as well as witnesses from Kosovo. I cannot enumerate all the others now, but this is a very important witness we have here because he represents the military leadership of Russia, which is the spot where all the information was --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- gathered, especially during these events in Kosovo.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I was saying that you might have been able to adduce that evidence through this witness, but it's a matter for you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As regards the evidence of this witness, I hope that it is entirely clear. I don't know if you seek proof ³³⁷³² indicating whether General Ivasov is speaking the truth. Is that what you want me to prove here?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it's a matter for you how you conduct your case, but he has made an important statement, and the Chamber will have to assess to determine the weight to be attached to it, and naturally the Chamber will give greater weight to it if it is backed up by documentary evidence.

We're going to take the break now, Mr. Milosevic. We'll break for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. General, you want to say something?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to say that I will be brief, because tomorrow I need to fly to Moscow. I have international commitments to be this week in Copenhagen, in Denmark, and therefore I would like to plead with you to bear this in mind.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What time tomorrow?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My flight is scheduled for 11.00 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: If it assists the Court, this is a witness who obviously I could apply to have put back for another day for cross-examination and make all the inquires that I'd like to make, and I would forecast that I'd have a fairly strong application if I chose to make that application. Experience of doing that in earlier parts of trial ³³⁷³³ shows how extremely inconvenient it is, how difficult it is to remember the evidence on the second session, and so on, and my intention is to prepare myself this afternoon to the degree I can to bring the cross-examination of this witness to a conclusion tomorrow, because I'm sure that will be satisfactory. I can't guarantee that I shan't make an application to have him brought back on another day, but I'll do my best. There is, of course, absolutely no way he can -- I can finish with his cross-examination today.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I have much sympathy for what you have said.

Mr. Milosevic, you cannot run your case like this. You must bring to the attention of the Chamber any difficulties that your witnesses have in terms of transportation and getting back to their homeland. This witness, in my view, is an important witness, and I would expect cross-examination to be fairly lengthy.

What was the times that you had scheduled for this witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A bit more than three hours, but I obviously need more time than that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Ivasov, is there any possibility for you to fly to Moscow tomorrow evening? There must be a flight in the evening so that we can continue working tomorrow.

A. Yes, if the staff of the personnel assists me to rebook my tickets for the evening flight, this would be possible.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll ask the Victims and Witnesses Unit to ³³⁷³⁴ look into that, yes.

Mr. Milosevic, please continue.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: I was just raising the question with my colleagues as to whether indeed his testimony will be finished tomorrow. It was pointed out to me that tomorrow is the last day, in any event, so that in that case, he would have to return if his testimony is not concluded.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Robinson, I will bear your suggestion in mind, that as many documents need to be prepared in advance and distributed as possible, although I think that the evidence given by Mr. Ivasov is authoritative enough, but I would like to ask General Ivasov whether he has any documents on him --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Since you are representing yourself, I'm going to make this intervention. His evidence is important evidence. He has touched upon what I consider to be a very important point, that is the objectivity of the reports of the Verification Mission, because a lot of the Prosecution case is based on that. He has come here to say that the reports are not objective, and he says that on the basis of the fact that the Russian soldiers who were part of the Verification Mission reported to him that their reports were not taken into account in the overall report from the mission to the OSCE. Now, I consider that to be very important. The Chamber would be able to attach much more weight to this evidence if you were to bring evidence to support that, either documentary ³³⁷³⁵ evidence or evidence from any of the -- any of the Russian officers who were a part of that mission to establish that their reports were not taken into account. Because in my view, the objectivity of the KVM is a very important factor in this case.

So that -- don't rely entirely on his evidence on this point. If you have other evidence to bring, it will boost your case, if you can, to confirm the point that you are making.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand what you're saying, Mr. Robinson. I have every intention to call several other Russian witnesses, and I just asked General Ivasov whether he has now with him any documents which can be used to support what he has been saying here. If not, we can get those documents subsequently. And I will have other witnesses who will give similar evidence.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A number of my arguments were reflected in the publication of the General Staff of Russia, which I have here with me. I also have copies of two orders of the Pristina Corps which I could tomorrow tender in, or even today after this session. However, those are copies, those are not the original documents. I could do this, bearing in mind that today I'm -- that today I'm not in military service, I need time in order to have the official authorities confirm the reports of our representatives in the mission.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please tell me very briefly, General Ivasov, why did the ³³⁷³⁶ Verification Mission leave Kosovo?

A. I believe that as far as the imitation [Realtime transcript read in error "invitation"] of the peace-making process, and I would like to outline the imitation [Realtime transcript read in error "invitation"] of the peace-making process, I believe that that mission managed to fulfil its tasks in that area, and it also provided a reason for the implementation of the plan for the military operation against Yugoslavia. That is why it was evacuated in advance prior to the commencement of the aggression. Hence, the mission managed to fulfil its objectives; namely, to create a cover-up and to create the reasons for aggression. It also conducted its intelligence part of the mission; it managed to outline the objects which could serve as targets for the assaults, and hence the mission was disbanded prematurely.

JUDGE KWON: For the record, it is invitation of the peace-making process, or imitation of the peace-making process?

THE INTERPRETER: Correction by the interpreter: Imitation.

JUDGE KWON: It should be "imitation."

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was the creation of the reason for a military operation under the cover-up of peaceful diplomatic conditions. So they were creating a pretext for a military operation. This was part of the overall plan of the military operation with a view to shape the public opinion that the peace process is furthermore not possible, and the Verification Mission fulfilled those tasks.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What happened in Racak, General Ivasov? What was Racak? ^{33737 BLANK PAGE 33738}

MR. NICE: I think it might be a good idea to establish first the level of hearsay that we're going into and the nature of witness's source of information.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, by this time -- yes. Mr. Milosevic, by this time, you should have gathered that you have to lay a foundation for these things. It is true that we accept hearsay here, but you have to establish some foundation.

He wasn't at Racak, presumably, so how did he come by this information about Racak? You have to get that from him.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the basis for acquiring information on Racak was also, among other things, the Verification Mission plus the Observers Mission --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I've stopped you. We've been through this before. It's a technique. You have to elicit through the witness information which shows the basis for the evidence that he's going to give. You're not to tell me, to tell the Court. I'm not asking you to tell me, because you're not a witness. You have to ask him questions which establish the foundation for the evidence that he's giving. So I don't want to hear it from you. I want to hear it from the witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I did ask the witness what was Racak according to the knowledge acquired by his Verification Mission in Kosovo and other information he obtained.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let me ask the witness. Let me ask the witness.

Do you know anything about what happened in Racak? ³³⁷³⁹

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes or no.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: How did you come by this information?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I obtained this information from the Russian embassy, from the observers from Russia to the Kosovo Verification Mission, and the substance of that information was that, firstly, the official conclusion of Mr. Walker was --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Stop. Stop. Did you speak with these observers?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I spoke to the observers, and I can name names among the leaders of the Russian observers. I spoke with them two or three, maybe, days after we got the information.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Were these observers present at Racak?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We simply had doubts about the conclusions of Mr. Walker.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just answer the question. I want to find out if the observers to whom you spoke were present at Racak during this event.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. They were not allowed into Racak.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Then how would they have gotten the information?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They acquired information by analysing combat activities in the area. And later on, we used information from independent forensic experts from Finland, as well as the local population who did not see police raids aimed at arresting large numbers of people and did not testify that they were rallied, rounded up ³³⁷⁴⁰ into one location in order to be executed. We did not have such testimony, and that's why we have doubts about Walker's conclusions.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, continue.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So, according to the assessments you reached, what did Racak represent?

A. We have information to the effect that armed skirmishes and combat took place there between terrorist organisations and police and army units of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We have evidence and testimony to that effect. There is, however, no evidence that they conducted arrests specially. That's why we were very surprised, indeed, by the conclusions of Mr. Walker, which were not based on thorough investigation and which did not involve Russian expertise or participation.

Q. Thank you, General Ivasov. When the war operations began, from that time on, what do you know about the cooperation between NATO and the KLA?

A. We concluded that they were allies. As a result of NATO airstrikes, the KLA activities intensified at the time, and coordinated work was conducted. Terrorist operations were better organised and intensified in the territory of the province.

Some representatives of the KLA acted together and in collusion with intelligence units of NATO deployed in Macedonia. So there was coordination and intensification of activities under the cover of airstrikes and a build-up of intelligence-gathering activity. All that confirmed the existence of an alliance between NATO and the KLA. The ³³⁷⁴¹ international contacts between political representatives of the KLA with the high officials of NATO confirmed this.

Q. I will now put to you a series of questions about your own knowledge regarding the movements of population. I will read to you from para 104 of this document that indicts me. It says that on the 24th of March, 1999 - that's para 104 - NATO began its airstrikes. And then later on, it says: "After the beginning of airstrikes, the forces of the FRY and Serbia started their wide-scale and systematic campaign and forcibly expelled hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo." Thus a campaign started. You described a moment ago that in collusion with NATO, KLA attacked our army and the police, whereas here it is alleged that our forces stepped up the campaign to expel the civilian population.

A. I hereby confirm that no information to the effect that the armed forces or the police of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia conducted actions to expel civilian population was available. I can confirm that I had discussions with Albanians who had left Kosovo at the time of the bombing, including some meetings that I had here three days ago with representatives of the Albanian diaspora who confirmed that bombing marked the beginning of panic among the population, including various ethnic groups, and everybody suddenly wished to leave the area where the war was being waged.

In Brussels, the representative of Russia confirmed that by May 1999, the number of refugees who had fled to Macedonia had doubled. So the main source and the main cause of the exodus of refugees, which ³³⁷⁴² increased relative to the previous period by three times, according to our information and the information available to the High Commissioner for Refugees, it reached 600.000. There was also the threat of the ground operation, and people were leaving the area of war operations. That was the main reason for the mass flow of refugees.

And I repeat that under the threat of the ground operation and the airstrikes, the armed forces of Yugoslavia was conducting its own defence, and that explains the movement of their armed units and troops.

Q. Does that mean that people were naturally anxious to leave the risk zones? I suppose that you have a plausible explanation.

A. Yes. That was the main reason. And let me add that people were leaving that place not only to go to foreign countries. They also fled to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Among refugees, there were Serbs, Albanians, Gypsies, both Muslims and Catholics. It was a natural reaction of people who were looking for cover. And they went to Montenegro, Vojvodina, Sandzak and, of course, Serbia.

Q. You said a moment ago something about the time line. Does it mean that the exodus of refugees began precisely at the time when NATO began its airstrikes on Yugoslavia and primarily on Kosovo?

A. Yes. Yes, I confirm that.

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... I'm not taking the point every time, but this is a leading question and shouldn't have been asked.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Rephrase the question, Mr. Milosevic. And before you rephrase it, Mr. Milosevic, here again you're dealing with an ³³⁷⁴³ important point, and your case will obviously be strengthened considerably if you bring evidence which is more direct than this witness is able to give on this point.

If, for example, you're able to bring evidence from any of the persons who lived in the risk areas to say why it was that they fled, I mean that would considerably boost your case.

So rephrase the question so it is not leading.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You heard the term "humanitarian catastrophe," Mr. Ivasov, did you?

A. Yes, Mr. President.

Q. What caused this phenomenon that was later named "humanitarian catastrophe"? What was the cause?

A. Primarily it was the threat to the lives of all the civilians there. Second, it was the threat to the entire system of public utilities and infrastructure. And third, it was the absence of any normal supply of food and basic necessities. We also had information that members of the KLA army, even before the bombing, and especially after the bombing started, took their large families away from the province. And I can quote the High Commissioner of the UN for Refugees who said that in June 1998, there was only 10 to 12.000 refugees. In March 1999, there were 200.000. And until the end of the bombings, the number reached 600.000. So the previous conflict and clashes in the province did not cause such a mass flow of refugees as the airstrikes did.

Speaking of the humanitarian catastrophe, the entire population, ^{33744 BLANK PAGE 33745} not only of Kosovo and Yugoslavia but of the neighbouring countries as well, feel today that there is a real humanitarian catastrophe. Seventy per cent of Kosovo's population are unemployed, 30 per cent are starving, and so on and so forth. Life support systems are not working.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I was asking what is the relevance of the evidence that there is a humanitarian catastrophe today. That's not the issue. Move on to something else. In any event, I think you have answered the question.

Next question, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. If I understood you correctly, this affliction and this exodus of refugees was caused by the NATO aggression. Am I right in saying that that was the conclusion you made in Russia?

A. Yes, I confirm that. Yes. That is the official stance of the Russian government and my personal conviction.

Q. General Ivasov, since you had very frequent contacts indeed with the top echelons of the Yugoslavia military leadership, do you have any information to the effect that any orders were planned or given to endanger the lives of peaceful citizens in Kosovo and Metohija regarding deportation, forcible transfer, or anything like that?

A. No, I have no such information. I have seen many orders, indeed, that were issued by the Yugoslav armed forces. Moreover, the Russian side exerted pressure both on the diplomatic and the military levels to prevent the Yugoslav forces from overstepping the measures of necessary security. And the Yugoslav officials continuously showed us their documents, ³³⁷⁴⁶ including orders given to the Pristina Corps. Such orders included points saying that prior to attacks against terrorists, civilian population should be warned of impending combat activities. And these orders were in effect even during the airstrikes against Yugoslavia. And particularly important to the mass exodus of refugees were NATO strikes on civilian targets, including the columns of refugees.

Q. Did you perhaps have information to the effect that the military leadership and I personally ordered that every crime committed there should be investigated and that every perpetrator should be brought to justice?

A. General Ojdanic, Chief of the General Staff, submitted to our military leaders, including myself, orders to investigate the activities of certain servicemen who went beyond the necessary measures of security and overreacted emotionally in their activities against terrorists. We are aware of such measures, and we know that some servicemen were convicted.

During meetings with President Milosevic, I heard as Marshal Sergeyev and Prime Minister Primakov heard, terms like impermissibility of rising ethnic tensions. We constantly heard words to the effect that it was necessary to restore peace to Kosovo, and we heard nothing that would discredit Kosovo Albanians as such or any other ethnic group. The approach to all ethnic communities was equal.

JUDGE KWON: General, were you aware of the paramilitaries that had been operative during that time? Were they under control of the military leadership or not? ³³⁷⁴⁷

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For the most part, I knew the military leadership in the defence ministry and the General Staff. I can name Mr. Ojdanic, Perisic, Galic and others, and I knew corps commanders. Of course, I saw junior officers, but I didn't know them closely.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You haven't answered the question that the --

JUDGE KWON: My question is about the paramilitaries.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly. We were aware of that, and we monitored the activities of such leaders as Hashim Thaci and others. Maybe there is -- maybe we are at cross-purposes here, I'm not sure.

JUDGE KWON: Are you also aware of the paramilitaries on the Serb side?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand you, Your Honour, now. We checked out this information, and it was not confirmed. There were occasional sporadic attempts of the Serb inhabitants in Kosovo to organise self-defence units, but this was not kindly looked upon by the military command, and there was no organised establishment of such paramilitary structures. There were attempts, rather, of the local population to protect themselves from terrorist acts and violence, but there were no major large paramilitary structures, and I don't know anything of their leaders, if any.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General. Mr. Milosevic, proceed, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Ivasov, did you have any information about the crimes ³³⁷⁴⁸ committed by the KLA against peaceful citizens, not only non-Albanians but Albanians as well?

A. Yes, we had such information. And I even have some numbers of casualties on various sides. We received such numbers both from NATO and from the leadership of Yugoslavia. Terrorist acts took a toll on Albanians, both Catholics and Muslims, the Romas, and other ethnic communities, but certainly there were more casualties among the Serbs, including policemen and troops. The number of their casualties exceeded all others.

Q. And do you know anything about the organised activity of the KLA aimed at expelling civilians from Kosovo, or more specifically, sending them to Macedonia and Albania?

A. Yes, I know about that. It was precisely the KLA that organised two itineraries, two routes for refugees across the border to Macedonia. That was one route, and another was to Albania. In addition to that, they spread information to the effect that in European countries, refugees have a good life, and that only helped the mass exodus. I know that even Albanian Catholics who refused to join the KLA became victims of violence or were forced to flee. We also have evidence that after forced recruitment of certain men into KLA units to prevent their desertion, their families were taken hostage.

Q. And do you know anything about civilians being used as live shields in various activities in Kosovo?

A. Yes. We received such information from our Serb colleagues, from the military attache at our embassy in Belgrade, and also from our ³³⁷⁴⁹ intelligence services. This issue was also discussed by the representatives of the Yugoslav army at our joint meetings. They showed us convincing documents confirming that during combat operations terrorists would go into populated areas and use the local inhabitants as shields. And even in their military bases they held citizens as human shields. I can confirm that, yes.

Q. General Ivasov, do you know that there were orders issued both to the army and police not to shoot even at the KLA if there was any danger that civilians would be injured?

A. Yes. I was shown such orders at the General Staff of the Yugoslav armed forces. Yes, I was shown such orders. And there was even a provision in those orders that civilian population ought to be warned about potential military activities. There were such orders, and this was reiterated by President Milosevic during various meetings. They wanted to ensure that the number of victims would be reduced to the minimum during action against terrorist organisation.

Q. A specific question pertaining to you, General, and your work. On the 22nd of December, 1998, if my information is correct, you gave a statement concerning the policy that was implemented against Yugoslavia. So that was on the 22nd of December, 1998. If I'm wrong, then I will not press this issue. You gave a statement on behalf of the Russian military leadership, top leadership.

A. Yes, there was such a statement. I was authorised to give an official statement on behalf of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. Previously I stated that by December 1998, Russian military ³³⁷⁵⁰ leadership had the full plan of the preparation and implementation of the aggression against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Following the analysis and consultations within the Ministry of Defence of Russia, we came to conclusion that the aggression will take place and also what were the objectives of the aggression.

President Yeltsin was briefed on this conclusion, and pursuant to orders from the Minister of Defence Marshal Sergeyev, I issued a statement, a statement to the effect that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be broken apart, that the current regime in Yugoslavia would be toppled, and that Kosovo would secede from Yugoslavia. I also made a statement to the effect that after the aggression NATO forces would enter the area and establish their military base there.

Q. Thank you, General Ivasov. Now a few words about the conference in Rambouillet. You followed the conference in Rambouillet, didn't you? After the first phase of the conference, did the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence believe that there would be an aggression carried out against Yugoslavia?

A. Yes. I have this information. On the one hand, we Russian representatives believed that the international community in Europe would prevent the escalation of the crisis and, therefore, proposed various mechanisms in order to ensure that the conference in Rambouillet would lead to a peaceful resolution. We were convinced that not all peaceful mechanisms were used.

On the other hand, we also were against military operation, because that threatened not only the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but ^{33751 BLANK PAGE 33752} the entire system of international security. We believed that that would lead to the destruction of the standards of international law and disrupt the system of collective international security in Europe concerning which we negotiated with various structures in Europe. However, we also felt that military preparation for the aggression was quite far gone. It was difficult to put an end to it. And although there were many diplomats who believed that it was still possible to stop it, we, the military, believed it was not possible to stop it any more because all of the preparations were completed and the only remaining thing that was needed was a pretext.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic, next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In one of your statements - if I'm wrong, please correct me - mentioned humanitarian reasons as a smokescreen. What were the real reasons for the NATO activity against Yugoslavia?

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... statements or reference to them in some detail, it really isn't very satisfactory to have the question posed in the way it's been posed, "You mentioned humanitarian reasons as a smokescreen." Either the witness can remember his speech or there will be a printed copy of it or some other record, or questions shouldn't be asked like that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. There is merit in that objection. Does the witness have the statement? Do you have the statement at hand?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't have it with me. ³³⁷⁵³ However, I do remember that. I can confirm the conclusions of the Russian military leadership to the effect that the objectives for the NATO operation against Yugoslavia were complemented by the following: During NATO air raids, we were able to see that the entire territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was turned into an exercise field for testing new weapons.

In that territory, they tested more than 40 types of ammunition of the US manufacture. The entire American military industry participated in it, and I can give you some of the names of some of the types of ammunitions used there.

Therefore, based on that, we concluded, on the 5th of May, 1999, that Kosovo and the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was used as a testing ground. New ammunition was used there, as well as such ammunition as depleted uranium. So this is just another reason --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Next question, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please tell me, General Ivasov, whether at the time the organisers of Rambouillet and NATO really wanted to ensure a political resolution and protect innocent population, or were -- they simply wanted to provoke Yugoslavia, to make Yugoslavia accept the deployment of NATO troops in their territory?

A. Yes, I believe that that was a provocation. Should Your Honours want me, I can give you the name of the Minister of a NATO country who in February 1999 stated the following: He said that Mrs. Albright was travelling to Rambouillet and, therefore, the likelihood of reaching an ³³⁷⁵⁴ agreement was very little. Therefore, even within NATO, there was a belief that Rambouillet would not be likely to lead to a political solution.

That same minister of defence stated that even should one side agree to the terms of the US document, the other side would refuse to agree because that was an ultimatum. And therefore, failure to reach an agreement would be a reason for beginning the war.

Q. I have an impression that there is a problem with interpretation, but I have a feeling that General Ivasov did not hear my question. My question was whether NATO truly intended to protect innocent Albanian population, as they claimed, or their purpose was to force Yugoslavia to allow the entry and deployment of NATO forces in its territory.

A. Yes, I can confirm that there was such objective to deploy NATO troops in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This was contained both in requests given by Mr. Holbrooke, that was also contained in statements of Mr. Solana and General Clark, and that same objective was present in Rambouillet; to disrupt negotiations, to blame the Serbian side for everything, and to find a pretext for commencement of operation which had been prepared in advance. The planes were standing ready at their airports.

Q. General Ivasov, do you believe that during NATO aggression against Yugoslavia the armed forces of Yugoslavia overstepped the bounds of necessary defence?

A. No. ³³⁷⁵⁵

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a legal question for the Chamber. Ask another question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this witness is Colonel General, who is very familiar with the action of Yugoslav army during the war. Therefore, he is fully competent to evaluate whether the conduct of Yugoslav army overstepped the bounds of necessary defence during aggression. I don't know who would be more competent to answer this question, more competent than General Ivasov.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Necessity is one of the elements which go to self-defence, and that's an issue which the Chamber will have to address. What you could do is ask the witness questions which relate to factual situations. But I won't allow a question like that, which is an issue ultimately for the Chamber.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I will reformulate my question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What were the actions of the Yugoslav army at the time?

A. I believe that the actions of Yugoslav army were the way they had to be. They carried out manoeuvres, changed their structuring in order to respond both to airstrikes and ground aggression. Therefore, there could have been some faults in organisation of the troops. However, the army and the state are duty-bound to act in precisely that manner in order to defend their state.

Q. Well, this might be interpreted as a leading question, so I will turn to the following. General Ivasov, what do you know and what have you ³³⁷⁵⁶ heard about the concept of Greater Serbia?

A. Yes, Mr. President. I only heard about that from the mass media of some Western countries. This issue was never heard by me in my contacts with the top leadership and with the Ministry of Defence of Yugoslavia. I had no evidence of any such topic being ever discussed there.

In my contacts with NATO, that question was never raised by NATO. We discussed the issue of Greater Albania. However, in our contacts with NATO, we also were not able to agree on the fact that that was a realistic concept, Greater Albania. Our NATO colleagues always assured us that that was the concept that existed only in the heads of certain radical individuals. My Russian colleagues also never received such information and, therefore, I also cannot confirm that such a project ever existed.

Q. General Ivasov, this will be my last question. As you've said yourself, you had seven meetings with me.

A. Yes.

Q. Please tell me, on the basis of all those meetings, can you tell us, what was I mostly committed to? What was my policy? What was the policy of Yugoslavia throughout that time when the meetings were held? What was the main issue that you can tell us about now? Both positive issues and negative ones.

A. Yes. I can confirm that we had seven meetings, and as I pointed out, these meetings were not brief but, rather, lasted from three to six hours, each of them. Therefore, we had ample opportunity to discuss various aspects. ³³⁷⁵⁷ I can confirm that there was no aggressive sentiment in relation to violating the rights of Albanians or oppressing them. There was no discussion of repression or limiting the rights of Albanian population. To the contrary. President Milosevic discussed his plans. Perhaps his plans were somewhat idealistic, but they referred to establishing peace in the region. These plans also entailed the development in that region. He quoted documents which were adopted concerning the education in the area where priority was given to the education of Albanians. He spoke about the rights of Albanians to a certain level of autonomy, and also said that all of these issues need to be discussed in order to avoid any misunderstandings. He also spoke at every meeting that the main objective of the government, at the helm of which he was, was to prevent any violence in the area and to encourage development.

He put limits on the military in their fight with terrorist organisations. When NATO aggression against Yugoslavia commenced, a group of Russian military experts who were not in active service at the time --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I stopped you, General. I think you have answered -- you have answered the question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that the general started speaking about a military operation.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just have one sentence. May I?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We -- the Russian military proposed to expand to repel the aggression in the territory of other states where ^{33758 BLANK PAGE 33759} NATO forces were deployed. For example, Macedonia. This is the right of every state. President Milosevic refused to take such action which would spread the combat to other states such as Macedonia.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivasov --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I did say that that was my last question but that was a mistake and I wish to put another factual question just to clarify an event to ensure that we can know enough about this event. I am following the translation. This is why I'm pausing.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Ivasov, you were a member of the delegation which came to Yugoslavia together with Chernomyrdin when, together with Atasari on behalf of the G8 group, he proposed the term of armistice?

A. Yes, that's right. I was a member of the delegation with the special representative of the Russian president, the objective of which was to find a peaceful solution.

Q. As you probably remember, that was a proposal of G8 guaranteeing Yugoslavia sovereignty and territorial integrity --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I am going to have to stop. I'm told that we are delaying the start of the next hearing in this courtroom. That's not proper.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just need one more minute to conclude. ³³⁷⁶⁰

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, Mr. Milosevic. You will have it tomorrow morning.

MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, can I make one point: Although it's obviously likely that cross-examination will consume tomorrow morning, it must be at least possible that we will reach the position of it being preferable to ask the witness to go away and come back on a later date, maybe with documents, and with that in mind, I would invite the accused to keep his other witness ready so that he can make the best use of his time, because, of course, if I land up -- if - I hope not - but if I land up applying to adjourn the cross-examination of this witness, it will be on the grounds that he was brought here without adequate documents to be cross-examined and therefore it would be the accused's responsibility and the whole day would therefore count against his allocation.

JUDGE ROBINSON: If you make an application of that kind, we will have to consider it.

We should not delay. We are going to adjourn.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have a witness for tomorrow?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, yes, we have a witness for tomorrow, but as I understand, General Ivasov will continue giving evidence tomorrow.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We are going to adjourn until 9.00 tomorrow morning.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.56 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 24th day of ³³⁷⁶¹ November, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.