³⁴⁵⁸⁹

Thursday, 16 December 2004

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.10 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness be brought in.

MR. NICE: While the witness is coming in, to prepare for his arrival [Albanian on English channel].

And I'm not sure what channel we're supposed to be on this morning.

JUDGE ROBINSON: There's something wrong technically.

MR. NICE: I think the Albanian is coming on the English channel but ... It was a pleasure to explore the depths of our linguistic ignorance.

[The witness entered court]

WITNESS: CEDOMIR POPOV [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: If the witness could have his exhibits at tab 2, and if he, on the page numbering in the Serbian, could go to page 161 and lay on the overhead projector the translation obtained from the Internet, at page 26 of 29, the top right-hand corner.

Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. Thank you very much. Professor Popov, we were discussing yesterday the Garasanin document Nacertanije, Garasanin having been in office for some decades at a high level but his document having been kept ³⁴⁵⁹⁰ in a safe for some 60 years, and the document being significant because of its reflection in, I suppose, 19th century Serb policy. You spoke to us about it and how it was a non-violent document. You agreed yesterday with one or two points of general principle, and we're now looking -- if you look, please, at the Serbian version where it says, "The third basic principle," on page 161. We have --

A. I can see that.

Q. And we have here from this document in the English translation the following: "The third basic principle of this policy is that of unity of nationalities, whose diplomatic representative is to be the government of the Principality of Serbia. Whenever the validity of this principle is in question, it is to the government that the Bosnians and other Slavs should turn to for protection and every assistance. Serbia, in this respect, must realise that she is the natural protector of all Slavs living in Turkey, and that other Slavs will only concede her that right when she takes upon herself the duty of doing and saying something in their name." And if you would be good enough, please, then to turn over to, in your page the following page, which is page 162, and in the Russian -- in the Serbian version it's paragraph number 5.

If the usher would be good enough to turn over to page 27 of the English version where we'll see similarly a paragraph numbered 5. And after a first sentence in the English and the Serbian we can see this: "Direct trade contact with foreign states through Zemun will always be a distressing affair. Consequently, Serbia must secure a new trade route which will connect her with the sea and provide her with a ³⁴⁵⁹¹ port. For the present, the only route possible is the one which leads through Skadar to Ulcinj"

Now, with those passages in mind and going back to yesterday's questions, it's right, is it not, that the concept from Nacertanije included Serbia having historic borders defined also ethnically, although I suppose you might say linguistically, and that there was always to be access to the sea, and the Serbs were to lead it with their dynasty; correct?

A. Serbs would be under the protection and would be assisted by the principality of Serbia. Any national movement of the Serbs and their struggle for equal rights and liberation. That is one thing. The second point is that in addition to this national interest, Serbia has its economic interest, which it intends to fulfil through its territories. That is to say in the direction of Ulcinj, which was predominantly populated by Serbs. Nowadays Montenegrins, but at that time in those days they felt profoundly Serb. So there was no clash of interests between the two. I do not see this brings into question in any way my interpretation from yesterday that Garasanin's Nacertanije is a programme which does not advocate an aggressive policy.

Q. We are in agreement on that point.

MR. NICE: May the translation be given an exhibit number before I forget about it, there being -- there may, of course, be forthcoming a translation from our own department, I just don't know, but to avoid any problem, may this be provided for the time?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. ³⁴⁵⁹²

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, if you could help us whether the tab 2 contains all of Nacertanije or it's only a part of it?

MR. NICE: I think it probably contains pretty nearly all of it, because we got towards the end of both documents in the last extracts. I think it probably does but I haven't checked it paragraph for paragraph.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, there is developing in this Chamber a science of exhibit marking which I don't like myself. I think the point that is being made is that we haven't yet given a number to the Defence exhibits.

MR. NICE: May I respectfully suggest that we give this a Defence -- a Prosecution exhibit number and return later to the general issue of the Defence exhibits. The witness has spoken about Nacertanije, therefore it would have been open to me to put this document in in cross-examination in any event whether the original was available or not.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, we'll do that.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

Q. Professor --

THE REGISTRAR: This will be Prosecution Exhibit number 805.

MR. NICE:

Q. Whatever Garasanin's intentions were in the 19th century, Professor, things changed at the beginning of the 20th century because Unification or Death, with its paramilitary wing the Black Hand came onto the scene, that organisation being responsible in 1903 for the murder of King Aleksandar Obrenovic, and then most famously in 1914 for the assassination of Ferdinand in Sarajevo; correct? ³⁴⁵⁹³

A. Not quite, because it's not the same organisation. In 1903, there was a conspiracy of a group of officers, and they liquidated the Obrenovic dynasty. After that, the group fell apart. However, a large number of the same persons who took part in the conspiracy of 1903 established in 1911 a new organisation, the Black Hand, which was indeed involved, as far as present-day historiography knows, in the Sarajevo assassination. That is what known on the basis of the admission of the leader of the Black Hand organisation, Colonel Apis, who, among other things, was sentenced for that at his trial in 1917, and was executed afterwards.

Q. Yes. We may come to that detail, maybe not, but the important point is that the unification of Unification or Death, remind us, was unification of Bosnia with Serbia; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So that the concept of a Greater Serbia has moved from whatever the peaceful connotations lying within Garasanin's policy and in his hidden document, had moved from peaceful connotations to really unacceptable violence.

A. Is that the end of the question?

Q. Yes, it is.

A. This paramilitary organisation, the Black Hand, did change the methods. However, the objectives did not change. The unification of Serbs from Bosnia and Serbs from Serbia was the foremost objective of the Serb population in Bosnia, which at that part accounted for 44 per cent of the total population, with about 32 per cent of Muslims and 22 per cent of Croats. So the Bosnian Serbs almost unanimously sought unification with ³⁴⁵⁹⁴ Serbia.

Since the Serbian government at that point in time did not believe that that could actually be implemented, not even in the near future, the Young Bosnian organisation, which included Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, among others, the Croats included Ivo Andric, who later became Yugoslavia's foremost writer --

Q. Excuse me. I'm going to --

A. So, they could not get support from the government, they got in touch with this paramilitary organisation which helped them carry out the assassination.

Q. I'm asked or I'm reminded that there was, I think, no referendum to support these statistics. Perhaps you'd just like to tell us what your source is. Just identify the source, but I don't want to take time on it.

A. There was no referendum, but there was a census of the Habsburg Monarchy from the year 1910.

Q. Okay. No time. But let's go back to my question. The concept of Greater Serbia, enlarging Serbia, is now one that has with it violence and death. Unification or Death. And I want you to think of this, please, and I'm going to put the Prosecution's position to you for you to deal with: Greater Serbia remained in some ways an unacceptable concept right the way through to the '90s because it was always recognised as a concept that could be effected only by violence. I'm going to suggest there's a parallel. You as an historian and knowledgeable man will want to have this in mind.

The IRA has been around for a long time. Any respectable ³⁴⁵⁹⁵ politician, until very recently supporting it, would have been associating himself or herself with a known violent plan.

I come back to Serbia. By the time we come to the '90s, and we've heard from lots of witnesses, Professor Popov, who have used the phrase "Greater Serbia." Witnesses like Marinovic, the admiral in Dubrovnik; witnesses like Stipe Mesic, and so on. We've understood the concept of Greater Serbia from the other side, and we've heard that the accused was careful never to use the phrase "Greater Serbia." My question is this: From the moment Greater Serbia became a known violent scheme if it was ever to be implemented, it became difficult for people to espouse it publicly; is that correct?

A. That is not correct, because I do not accept at all the concept of the existence of a plan for a Greater Serbia or the existence of a Greater Serbia in any historical period of time, especially not in the 19th and 20th century. What you call a Greater Serbia, and now you are invoking Stipe Mesic, Marinovic, and others, that does not speak of a concept of a Greater Serbia at all. These testimonies and these positions actually equate Yugoslavia to a Greater Serbia, and that is something that cannot be equated. Yugoslavia was the country of all the Southern Slavs, and in all fairness, a Greater Serbia never existed. Greater Serbia is only a myth that I spoke of in the report I submitted here. This myth has its origins and I think that I explained it sufficiently. It would be interesting to hear how small should Serbia be so that it would not be greater greater.

Q. Well, that's a concept I may myself raise with you, but let's move ³⁴⁵⁹⁶ sequentially and swiftly. In 1914, you drew to our attention the Nis declaration. It's at tab 3 of your exhibits, if they are to be produced, and it's the one document for which we have an English translation. You read one sentence, or the accused invited you to read one sentence, and I'm just going to turn to that. It's on the second of the two sheets of translations that we have, and it makes an important point, Professor, because it says this: "Assured of the resolve of the entire Serbian nation to endure in this sacred struggle to defend their homes and their liberty, the government of the kingdom considers securing the successful completion of this great war which when it began at once became a struggle to liberate and unite all our shackled brother Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, to be its main and indeed sole task in these fateful times." It was clear, wasn't it, by this declaration that Serbians or Serbs wanted, and they've always wanted, a unitary state; is that correct? They've always wanted a unitary state.

A. That's absolutely correct. All European nations wanted the same thing.

Q. And indeed, this has been one of the problems, I must suggest, that Serb -- Serbia, right up until the 1990s, would not tolerate federation but always wanted a unitary state of which it would be the majority controller; isn't that correct?

A. No, that's not correct.

Q. Can you give me an example of --

A. Yes, I will, right away.

Q. -- of Serbia's willingness to be a confederate partner or to be ³⁴⁵⁹⁷ part of a body of which it was not the majority controlling partner?

A. Serbia never controlled the entire territory. The issue of centralisation or federalism, that was the main problem between the two world wars, and after the war it was accepted by Serbia. That is, the federal solution was. What you're doing now is switching theses, saying it did not accept confederation, but as you know, confederation and federation are not one and the same thing.

Q. No, but my question, I think, remains unanswered. Can you please point to an event showing Serbia's willingness to tolerate federation or to be in any way a part of an arrangement where it wasn't the majority or the largest component part?

A. Serbia accepted all the constitutions of the second Yugoslavia, from the one of 1946 to the one of 1974. That was three different constitutions and one constitutional law which governed the federal relations within Yugoslavia. Serbia had its own republic. I have the impression that you are now wondering why the Republic of Serbia had the majority in its own republic. In every other republic, the majority nations had their majority and dominated within their own republic.

Q. Very well, we'll come from '46 to '74 very shortly, but can we go to the Corfu declaration. I'm afraid there's still no English version of that, but it can be found at tab 5 of your documents, and there's one short passage I'd like you to read on -- it's tab 5. I think it's -- 5 tab whatever it is, 3. I can't read it, 5 point something --

JUDGE KWON: 5.4 or --

MR. NICE: ³⁴⁵⁹⁸

Q. It's hard to read. But on page 36, 20th of July 1917, and if the -- I'm sorry I haven't got --

MR. NICE: If the usher has got that, could you lay it on the overhead projector. Bring it to me and I'll find it for you. I'm so sorry. I should have made arrangements a little earlier. And the -- this is a tab that is actually a collection of a whole lot of books, I think.

JUDGE KWON: Tab 5.5. Page 36.

MR. NICE: Yes.

Q. While this is going on the overhead projector, Professor, would you read simply on the right-hand side the numbered 1 paragraph, starting "Drzava Srba ..."

A. "The authorised representatives of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes --" is that it? The state of the Serbs -- oh, yes, I see. "The state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, also known under the name of Southern Slavs or Yugoslavs, will be the free independent kingdom with a unified and single citizenship. It will be a constitutional, democratic and parliamentary monarchy headed by the Karadjordjevic dynasty which has proved that through its ideas and feelings it is not separate from the people and that it places the freedom and will of the people above everything else."

Q. Now, the negotiations that led the Serbian government in exile to be able to make this arrangement are complex and we don't have time to go into them, and of course it involved dealing with Apis and having him tried and executed, but what we see from this part of the agreement that led to the establishment of the first Yugoslavia is that the Serbs had ³⁴⁵⁹⁹ obtained a unitary state with their monarch in charge or their monarch at its head; correct?

A. That's correct. Others did not have dynasties.

Q. Now, before we move on from 1914, just two points. If academics differ about something, serious academics differ about something, why, then, the point is not beyond question, is it? It remains an open question.

A. Of course, but I don't understand what you mean by "serious academics." Do you mean to say there are academics who are not serious?

Q. Well, the answer to my next question may provide an answer to yours. There are, are there not, serious Kosovo Albanian academics who will take the view that Serbia did not have the right in 1914 to rule Kosovo?

A. That is one of the possible scholarly opinions which may be defended but which has to be set up against a number of other opinions by other historians. This is an interesting issue in scholarship but not relevant for the Court.

Q. That's all I need. Would you go to what is in English page 14 of your report, and Ms. Dicklich will probably be able to alert me in -- my mistake, Professor. Ms. Dicklich has been tracking the pages, and I didn't give her warning. At page 14 in the English, you will find ...

A. Just tell me what document you're referring to. Oh, my report. Yes, yes.

Q. 15 in your report, and it's in the paragraph that begins, "First of all, all the territories that Garasanin considered as Serbia ..." ³⁴⁶⁰⁰ That's the paragraph I want you to look at, and I want you to look at the last sentence of it.

A. You said page 15?

Q. Yes, I did. The paragraph begins, "First of all, all the territories that Garasanin considered as Serbian ..."

A. Yes, yes, I found it.

Q. The last sentence of that -- now, of course this may be that there's been a typographical error here, because the last sentence reads: "The Serbs had an unquestionable historical right to Kosovo and Metohija ..."

In light of your last answer to me about the approach to differing academic views would lead to the correct position must be that the Serbs had a questionable right to Kosovo and Metohija in 1914, mustn't it?

A. No. They had an unquestionable right because this was the centre around which the Serbian medieval state was formed. And at that time --

Q. Professor Popov, I tried to deal with matters in order to save us spending too much of our time in this trial in medieval history. Serbs occupied Kosovo for a couple of hundred years up and until --

A. Yes, but if you're asking about the historical right, I have to say this.

Q. Just one minute. They occupied Kosovo for a couple of hundred years up and until 1389 when they were famously defeated. Thereafter, Kosovo was occupied by different people, the Hungarians and then the Ottoman Empire and so on. You've just told me that there will be serious ³⁴⁶⁰¹ Kosovo academics who would take a different view and would say that the rights were not with Serbia in 1914, and you told me before that that if academics differ, the question is not resolved unquestionably but it is an open question, and I simply want, so that we can move on and not spend our time in historical analysis, I want to reach the position where you will accept that what happened in 1914 was a reflection of a questionable right.

A. In 1914, nothing was happening on Kosovo and Metohija, but we cannot avoid some historical facts, because you have listed a number of erroneous facts, starting from the fact that the Serbs allegedly occupied Kosovo in the 13th century, which is not true because they settled there in the 6th and 7th centuries when the Slavs settled the Balkan Peninsula. They were at the time Slavs, not Serbs. The battle of Kosovo was in 1389, and this was almost exclusively Serb territory on which the Albanian population settled gradually, starting in the 15th and 16th centuries. The connections -- there were connections, of course, between Serbs and Albanians throughout the Middle Ages, and this was for the most part good cooperation.

In 1914, nothing happened. The Serbs liberated the cradle of their nation in the year 1912.

Q. And Kosovo was annexed to Serbia. That's the term that's used, isn't it?

A. Yes. It was taken from Turkey. This was the Turkish Kosovo Vilajet and included in the Serbian state.

Q. And to clear the decks, as we say in the vernacular, other ³⁴⁶⁰² academics write of enormous Albanian suffering, the slaughtering of thousands of Albanians by the Serbs in 1913 and thereabouts, don't they? We don't want to resolve the issue, I just want you to confirm that there is plenty of writing to that effect.

A. There is testimony in the Vienna press and in the Carnegie Foundation that there were Serb crimes on Kosovo and Metohija, but there are also numerous testimonies, as Mr. Terzic said, that there was armed resistance by Albanian units and revenge attacks against the Serb army, because the Albanians who were by that time the demographic majority did not wish to accept Serbian authority.

Q. Professor Popov, I doubt if the Court is going to want to decide the issue, and it's probably enough for us to know that there are competing -- Before we move on from the First World War, we mentioned yesterday the one -- one of the two London conference maps which was the one which showed what was ceded to Italy by way of agreement. We've now managed to track down the other map which can be produced and given an exhibit number. It was the map you were speaking of, I think.

MR. NICE: It's come off a website, Your Honours. You can see the Serbian Unity Congress, of which I think we've heard earlier.

A. You can find a much better map than this one, much clearer. There is a book that has been published in English and Serbian containing maps of our territories, and there exists a very good map, both of the London treaty and of the proposals and offers made to Serbia as compensation for the territories that the South Slav peoples would lose through the implementation of the London treaty. This is the map before me. ³⁴⁶⁰³

Q. If you'd be good enough to indulge me by just looking at the map I've produced at the moment, because we seem to be able to understand that that's authoritative, but if you've got a better map, do. It's now on the overhead projector. It isn't. Perhaps it can be placed -- there it is. Perhaps we can put a copy on the overhead projector as well, if we have a spare copy.

A. Of course I have a better one. Do you want to put my map on the ELMO?

Q. We'll work with my mine for the time being. And the point is a very simple one.

A. Very well.

Q. The point is a very simple one: If you look at the territorial limits imposed for Serbia, encompassing all of Bosnia and Montenegro and indeed, although it's not shown, I think Macedonia, it would be a truly enlarged Serbia, isn't it, or would be a truly enlarged Serbia.

A. Yes. Yes, but this is a proposal by the allied forces, not a demand made by Serbia. That's what I said.

Q. Now, but it's a much enlarged Serbia. If in 1991 any one or two persons were planning the scale of Serbia premised on this map, were that to have happened, they would be thinking very much in Greater Serbian terms, wouldn't they?

A. First of all, you say "anyone," but it's important to say who was making these plans. Certainly the Serb government and the Serb people as a whole and their legitimate political bodies were not planning this. The Serbia created at the time would not have been a Greater Serbia. ³⁴⁶⁰⁴

Q. Professor, if you'd be good enough to stick within your area of expertise and what you're here to help us with. I'm going to come back to my question, but I'm going to approach it with a couple of intervening questions.

The man on the Belgrade street in 1991, using the concept or thinking about or talking about Greater Serbia, wouldn't have in mind the wealth of historical knowledge that you have, would he?

A. I presume not.

Q. He would be thinking in very general terms.

A. I don't know. Probably.

Q. Seselj, who of all did have the candor to speak in Greater Serbian terms and indeed to title his magazine "Greater Serbia," would be attracting supporters who would be thinking in general expansionist terms of a larger Serbian state that would encompass all Serbs; correct?

A. There is no doubt that Seselj spoke of this, but in this case, in the proceedings against President Milosevic, I do not see the relevance of this, because President Milosevic was the legitimate leader at the time, not Seselj, who was simply an agitator who was attempting to win over as many voters as possible.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, don't comment on the relevance of the evidence. That's a matter for the Chamber. If we find it is irrelevant, we'll say so.

MR. NICE:

Q. So I come back to my question. Please don't worry about who we're thinking about or who we're going to identify. If anybody in the 1990s, ³⁴⁶⁰⁵ 1991, talked of Serb borders as roughly revealed in the London agreement map, he or she would be thinking in essentially Greater Serbia terms. That's correct, isn't it?

A. Do you know how many people in Great Britain spoke about colonial conquests? Should the Britons of today be held responsible because they had millions of people agitating for a colonial policy?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, if you're not in a position to answer the question, then say so, but what you just provided was a comment, not an answer to the question.

Are you in a position to answer the question?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor asked me whether there was any support to the ideas of Greater Serbia. Was that the question? Maybe I misunderstood him.

JUDGE ROBINSON: From the transcript, the question was, "If anybody in the 1990s, 1991, talked of Serb borders as roughly revealed in the London agreement map, that person would have been thinking in essentially Greater Serbia terms," and you were asked to say whether that was correct.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that person would be thinking in this way.

MR. NICE:

Q. Let's pick up the history with the end of the First World War and a little detail. We've got the democratic government, the democratic unitary government presided over by King Aleksandar Karadjordjevo until he was to make himself a dictator in 1929. The intervening governments, 26 ³⁴⁶⁰⁶ perhaps in all, were all Serb majority governments, weren't they?

A. They were mixed. The minister of foreign affairs in the first government was Ante Trulic [phoen], and for a long time the minister of the interior was Anton Korosec. These were two key positions, if I'm not wrong.

Q. They were Serb majority governments, and the proposition, I don't want to --

A. That's correct.

Q. Thank you. And the proposition I want you to deal with is a very simple one. The notion of Greater Serbia doesn't need to bubble up and doesn't need to become vital as long as Serbs were in charge, as long as Serbs were running things, and it only surfaces, as we're going to see, when Serbs start to lose control, and so up and until the dictatorship of the king, we actually -- you had Serb domination. No need for Greater Serbia to arise. Would that be correct?

A. I don't know what you imagine when you speak of Serb domination. It is true that Serbs were in a majority in the army. The Serb army immediately accepted 2.500 Austro-Hungarian officers into its ranks, many of them generals. They had been at war with them before. They accepted all the Austro-Hungarian civil servants, the entire education system, and then only gradually brought this into conformity.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Again I think you're not directing yourself to the specific question that was asked, and I think what the Prosecutor was suggesting, that the concept of a Greater Serbia only evidenced itself when the Serbs started to lose control. There was no need for reliance on ³⁴⁶⁰⁷ the concept as long as the Serbs were in charge. Do you accept that general proposition? Is that a fair analysis?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it's not a fair analysis, because in that case, the second Yugoslavia would have been a Greater Croatian state, because most of the leading people in the top stratum were Croats. I would not accept this interpretation.

MR. NICE:

Q. We're going to come to the second Yugoslavia in a second. Let's move on. The king became a dictator, the Croats became radicalised, and from your very own Vojvodina, some people, I think, think this was the cultural heart of Serbia, would be the position probably you'd take, we have the arrival of the Serb Cultural Club, don't we, and the appearance of people like Cubrilovic and his extraordinary documents proposing ethnic movements and recommending the use of violence.

A. What's your question?

Q. Well, am I right in thinking that with the radicalisation of the Croats we have the development of arguments in the Serb Cultural Club favouring now again a violent solution to Serbia's perceived problem?

A. The radicalisation of the Croatian issue began in 1920, and it was put forward publicly by Stjepan Radic, the most prominent leader of the Croatian people at the time, in 1921, and he had a very radical demands. I have submitted here an interview given by him to the Daily News in which he defines precisely what the Croatian demands were. They were very radical.

From that point on until 1941, the Croatian question dominated in ³⁴⁶⁰⁸ the politics of Yugoslavia.

Q. Professor Popov, you may not know this, but we looked at the Cubrilovic memorandum of 1937, and we discussed, although we haven't yet looked at the even more violently termed memorandum of 1944. We can make it available if necessary. In the face of difficulties from the Croats, Serb nationalism picks up its violent potential, doesn't it, and that's what happened in the lead-up to the war?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just concentrate on the specific question, Professor, before you answer it.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Cubrilovic's memorandum that you mention has nothing to do with Serbo-Croatian relations. Cubrilovic declared himself as a Serbo-Croat, as a member of the Young Bosna organisation. They all felt to be the members of one nation. So Cubrilovic's memorandum referred to Kosovo and Metohija. And unless I'm mistaken, whether it was a memorandum of 1937 about the document dating back to 1944 that you mention, I don't know anything about that, nor did anybody ever speak about that in Yugoslav historiography.

MR. NICE:

Q. As well as Cubrilovic, we have Moljevic, of whom you have spoken. Let's have a look at the Moljevic map, which comes after the war.

MR. NICE: Can we just display that? And can it go on the overhead projector, please, with the -- the second version, which is clearer than the first, and it's got English description on it. Yes. Perhaps, Usher, if you would display the first version in the Serbian language and then turn immediately, having shown it once, then turn to the ³⁴⁶⁰⁹ second page where we can see the better English version. So this is Moljevic's map - there it is - in its original form. And if we turn to the next page we have it in the English form. And it's at tab 7, for Professor Popov, of his own documents if he wants to see it.

Q. The English version makes clear thus: That at the end of the war, Moljevic was proposing an extraordinary expansion, wasn't he, of Serb territory, starting at the south, taking in Scuttarisodar [phoen], taking parts of Bulgaria, taking parts of Romania, Hungary, and leaving Croatia with a very small split territory. We can see a part to the east just north-east of Banja Luka, and then the little sort of butterfly shaped bit south of Slovenia. And I'll -- that's what the map shows, doesn't it?

A. Yes, that's right.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But please, Your Honour, might I be allowed to say something at this point? The Prosecutor is meddling in things that he has absolutely not got the right information about. Moljevic and Vasa Cubrilovic are like heaven and earth. They have absolutely nothing to do with each other. That's one point. And second, Moljevic's map, and I don't know whether the Prosecutor has followed -- followed what I said, my conversation with President Milosevic yesterday and the day before when we discussed the Moljevic map in the examination-in-chief. It dates to 1941. That is to say the very beginning of the war when the terrible terror against the Serbs was launched. And it was not accepted even in the staff of Draza Mihajlovic in its entirety. In 1944, it was definitely overruled by the Serb people fighting in the national liberation army. ³⁴⁶¹⁰

Q. Please confirm that the line that we see that would be the south-eastern border of that butterfly-shaped bit left for Croatia runs either precisely or generally along the Karlobag-Virovitica-Karlovac line. It does, doesn't it?

A. Yes, but it wasn't accepted by anybody in Serbia.

Q. You see, Professor, you're helping us by giving us an account of the overall history of the concept of Greater Serbia, and I'm just -- and we're interested to see --

A. That's why I'm here, yes.

Q. -- what other ideas were in Serbs minds, and here we have one which sets up this north-western demarcation, Karlobag-Virovitica-Karlobag and there it is in that map. So thank you very much. Let's move on now to the period that you were concerned about a little earlier. After the Second World War, under Tito's Yugoslavia, for a long time there was a tension between the weakened Serbia and the decentralised former Yugoslavia; correct?

A. No. No.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. Yes, I will correct you. There was no tension between Serbia and the new or, rather, the second Yugoslavia right up until the 1960s of the 20th century, that is to say the beginning of the policy that was waged towards decentralisation for Yugoslavia with the aim of breaking it up. It was only then that those tensions began.

Q. Very well. I'm not necessarily needing to challenge you too much on that, because we can go to what is page 36 in the English of your ³⁴⁶¹¹ report, and it's 39 - thank you - in the Serbian version of your report. Perhaps you'd be good enough. And we will find something else that you and I agree about.

A. Yes.

Q. And I'm not -- it's sort of halfway through quite a long paragraph, Professor. You make this point -- two lines down, Your Honours: "Campaigns against Serbian nationalism, centralism, and hegemony reached their climax at the time when decisive measures to weaken the Yugoslav Federation were being applied: during the constitutional changes in 1963, the Brijuni Plenary --" which I think was in 1966.

A. Yes, that's right, '66.

Q. "... the removal from the political scene of the most prominent Serb in the state leadership (Aleksandar Rankovic) in 1966, the constitutional changes between 1971 and 1974, after Tito's death in 1980, the separatist movement in Kosovo and Metohija in 1981 and the appearance of the SANU memorandum in 1986."

You see those events as landmark events in thought, politics, and so on, leading up to this conflict, don't you?

A. That's right. We now agree, and we agree that it began in the 1960s and not immediately after the war.

Q. And --

A. Twenty years is 20 years, isn't it?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that it is -- yes, it's on ³⁴⁶¹² now. I think that the question is improper, because it forgets the first sentence of that paragraph in which Professor Popov says that in a refined form, this irrational theory on the economic and political plane was continued, et cetera, et cetera, and then it goes on to speak about the campaign against Serbian nationalism, centralism, and hegemony. So he's talking about an irrational theory first. And if we forget that and leave that behind and then start the quotation at another point, then we get a completely different picture of what Mr. -- Professor Popov is saying. So this is intellectually improper.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. That's precisely the kind of matter that you could raise in re-examination if you think the Prosecutor has omitted something.

MR. NICE: I'm grateful to Professor Popov for accepting absolutely that my question to him was one he could accept.

Q. Now, I come back to my original question -- not my original question, my earlier question. The problem here in 1966 and onwards was simply that Serbia wasn't or didn't see itself as being in charge. It was a -- a less important partner in what was a non-central state. That was its problem.

A. Its problem was that after the constitutional amendments, it says here that they started from 1971, but it started in 1967 and 1971 was the day -- was the year of the important amendments, was that it was unequal within the composition of the Yugoslav federation, and its struggles starting in those days, which was discrete in intellectual circles to begin with and in the 1980s in political circles, too, was to strike a ³⁴⁶¹³ balance to return its equal and equitable status within the Yugoslav federation, because the balance was upset by the provinces, among others, who were able to control its policy. And in its own provinces and its own territory, it had no competencies.

Q. One of my earlier questions was this. Perhaps you'd deal with it again. It's in exact -- differently cast. It's in exactly this type of political environment that you have yourself described that the concept of Greater Serbia was likely to arise again as a beacon for politicians and indeed probably did arise again; correct?

A. No. That is your combination of facts. I have not seen that anywhere, nor have I read it anywhere.

Q. But because it was starting in the lead-up to the First World War a concept that everybody recognised involved criminal violence, it couldn't be spoken about very openly.

A. Which concept? I don't think I followed you.

Q. Greater Serbia couldn't be spoken about openly because everybody knew it could only be achieved through violence. Which is exactly what happened.

A. That's not true. Throughout my testimony here and everything else I said here was to show you and prove that a concept of Greater Serbia did not exist and that the unification of Serb lands around Serbia was not a Greater Serbia.

Q. We now look at this exhibit, which is Exhibit 786.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor. Professor, in relation to that last answer, you say that unification of Serb lands around Serbia was not a ³⁴⁶¹⁴ Greater Serbia. What would you describe that as?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Serbia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Serbia. I see. Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. And of course -- I'm going to come to this quite soon with a couple of maps, but to pick up from His Honour Judge Robinson's question, unifying those Serbs around Serbia with Serbia makes for a Serbia that is a bit bigger, doesn't it?

A. That's right, yes. Somewhat bigger, yes.

Q. Very well. Can we just look at this exhibit, please, which is Exhibit 786. It comes again from this magazine Epoha. Now -- I'm glad you find the magazine entertaining. I just want to remind you of something that I think probably your friend and colleague - you must tell me if I'm wrong about that - Mihailo Markovic said about it when he was asked questions about it here in court.

He was asked, "You're aware of a magazine called Epoha, I think?" He said, "Epoha?" And I asked him, "Yes."

[Trial Chamber confers]

MR. NICE:

Q. And he said, "If that is the same magazine that was published for a while by the Socialist Party of Serbia, I do." So he seemed to be acknowledging that this was the Serbian party's magazine. And you'll remember that we looked at that one revealing, if it is, imprint detail in June of 2002, showing that the magazine was founded by the SPS party. Now, I'd like you to look at this magazine and look first of all ³⁴⁶¹⁵ at the map that I hope will be displayed --

A. I looked at it yesterday.

Q. Very well. Look at it again for me.

A. Yes. And for the Tribunal ten more times if need be.

Q. That's very cooperative of you. Thank you. I think perhaps -- can I have the copy and then I'll find it for you. Yes. That's fine. Thank you very much.

Now, the map that will be on your screen or on the overhead projector to your left has a legend, and we know what the legend says, I think, but just look at the map. It says -- the line on the top left-hand side which is said to be the preferred line, the optimum line, the best line, runs along, of course, Karlobag-Virovitica-Karlobag, doesn't it?

MR. NICE: And Your Honours can find this in the English translation on the first page after the title page where this line is marked as the Optimal Western Border of Serbian Countries.

Q. Now, the title of the article, we haven't time to go through the whole article, it's a long one, but it says, "How are we --" I emphasise the word "we" "-- going to draw new borders?" And here are the proposals put out in the SPS founded magazine. Isn't this, in effect, a proposal for a Greater Serbia? It came after the failure of The Hague conference.

A. If you recall, and if you were following what I said yesterday, I said this: First of all, that I had no idea about the Epoha magazine at all. I received it before leaving for The Hague and read it here for the first time.

Secondly, it was not a magazine of the Socialist Party. ³⁴⁶¹⁶ And thirdly, the interpretation of the title of that article is not how we are going to divide up our borders but how we and the Croats are going to do so. And that is something that you would understand on the basis of the text, the article itself. But that is one of the possible combinations that were offered up in the critical period of 1990 and 1991, 1992, and 1993, in those years, so that I do not consider this to be any particularly serious proposal which anybody put forward, that is to say any of the organs in Serbia. Otherwise, I would have known about it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I allowed you those introductory remarks, Professor, but you should still answer the question whether that in effect is not a proposal for a Greater Serbia. I allowed you the introductory explanatory remarks, but you should still answer that question.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Had it been realised, it would have been a Greater Serbia, but nobody moved towards implementing it.

MR. NICE:

Q. You see, Professor, just so that you can understand the ground rules, I think the question of who -- whose magazine this was is something for the Judges, of course, ultimately, and your answer now very helpfully --

A. That's right, yes.

Q. Thank you. Your answer now matches your answer that you gave when I asked you whether anybody talking about the London agreement map in 1990 would be thinking about a Greater Serbia. These maps are all very similar, aren't they, in their north-western boundary, along with the ³⁴⁶¹⁷ Moljevic map, and anybody thinking in these terms in the 1990s, as you already explained, would be thinking in Greater Serbian terms. That's correct, isn't it?

A. Well, I can't say what other people's thinking was like. I know that there were dozens of topics that were discussed of this kind. Now, I can't enter into other people's minds and know what other people thought.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a very good legalistic answer.

MR. NICE:

Q. Can we look at one more exhibit of the Epoha magazines, which comes from the 7th of January, 1992. But before we come to that, which is a new exhibit, do you know of the Belgrade initiative?

A. Which one do you mean? I know the one dating back to the Second World War.

Q. The one in 1992.

A. I don't know about that one.

Q. Late 1991.

A. I don't know about that.

Q. Well, could you have a look at this map even so for us. Because you've been giving us answers about the political developments in the 1990s, and here's a copy of Epoha for the 7th of January, 1992. The article in Serbian, and we can see it in English, is Yugoslavia For The Third Time. And the map which we can see, and I'd ask the usher to display, records areas in Bosnia having a Serb majority at that time, so it was believed.

We come to the text, and I'd ask you, please, in the Serb text to ³⁴⁶¹⁸ go to about the second page where the map is shown. You'll find a paragraph which begins: "All debatable territories should be put under UN protectorate." Have you found that paragraph?

A. I've found the map but not the paragraph. Is that on page 1 or page 2?

Q. It should be further. Sorry. My mistake for not marking it in advance. I think it's probably -- yes. It's on page -- if you look at the top right-hand corner, it's the page numbered 9967 and it's on the left-hand column and it's the first paragraph, "Sves Ulja" [phoen].

A. This is a poor copy. Yes. "All debatable territories should be --" et cetera. I found it.

Q. And it reads roughly as follows: "All debatable territories --" sorry, it's on English page bottom right-hand corner 3 of 10. "All debatable territories should be put under UN protectorate and UN Blue Helmets. In this way may be provided a better protection for Serbian people in Croatia against Croatian Army aggression and in the same time in the possibility to speak out about their new state would be created for inhabitants (in five or more years)." Translation could probably be improved, Your Honours.

But then this sentence: "In 90 per cent of cases the territories that had been under UN protection sooner or later got the right for independence."

Now, if we look again at the map, the questioned areas, and His Honour Judge Robinson's question to you earlier about Serb areas in Bosnia, wasn't this following the failure of The Hague conference and ³⁴⁶¹⁹ indeed the non-success of the Belgrade initiative, but you're not aware of that, I accept that, wasn't this aimed to get these territories, possibly on the back of UN protection, simply Greater Serbia by another name?

A. After this lengthy question of yours, I'm not sure I was able to follow you throughout, but never mind. Do you want my comment to the text or some other answer?

Q. I want your comment on the proposition that this plan to take these identified territories, if necessary on the backs of UN protection, if this wasn't Greater Serbia by another name.

A. I said that I didn't know about this text, but from what I'm seeing now for the first time, I don't think that there can be any question of any covert creation of a Greater Serbia, and I don't understand why the United Nations organisation and the Blue Helmets would create their protectorate if they were going to form a Greater Serbia. They fought for that justifiably and unjustifiably to begin with.

Q. Would you please look at another document which was shown in opening but has not been exhibited, but nevertheless I'd like it to be displayed with the last map of January 1992 in the SPS in mind. This map, I'm going to suggest, reflects pictorially the position as of December 1992 for Serb-controlled areas, and the Serb-controlled areas are the light blue. So if we put it on the overhead projector, we see on the -- I think the other way around. Thanks. If we look at the left hand part, we see something not dissimilar from the map in Epoha. And if we look towards the boundaries with Montenegro, Serbia to the east, we see something slightly different, because we see light blue reflecting ³⁴⁶²⁰ the capture of areas by the Drina River subject to the protected areas of Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa.

Now, assuming if you will, Professor, that this is an accurate map showing the front lines of Serb-controlled areas at the end of December 1992, and again with your answer to His Honour Judge Robinson in mind, isn't what happened simply the realisation of Greater Serbia, at least so far as possible?

A. No. This map shows, if it is a true and proper map, and I assume it is, I accept it as being such, shows which territories were controlled by the Bosnian Serbs since they had resisted the decisions taken by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly by which Bosnia should have seceded from Yugoslavia. And then we saw the conflict that came about in April 1992, which in my profound conviction was caused by the Bosnian Muslims. These were territories controlled by the armed forces of today's Republika Srpska or, rather, the Republic of the Bosnian Serbs and not Serbia proper.

MR. NICE: Will Your Honour give me one minute? I have an eye on the time, but I know we started a few minutes late. Just give me one minute.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

[Prosecution counsel confer]

MR. NICE: Your Honour, my concern is to try and -- you will understand that with the scale of evidence given by this witness, I could have spent a great deal of time asking him questions on matters of detail, but I'm trying to finish, if at all possible, in the next few minutes. If ³⁴⁶²¹ you give me just five minutes, I think I probably can.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes. Go ahead.

MR. NICE: It's more convenient to the Court, I would think.

Q. There is one matter that I just wanted to touch with you. It's out of order. It's the Cutileiro Plan, about which you gave evidence yesterday.

Can I display -- it may not be copied. I'll have it copied over the break. Can I display in English and B/C/S a document, and it's an entirely discrete topic on the Cutileiro Plan.

What we see and -- thank you. If you have a look at the top of it. It's a new document and it's my mistake for not having alerted Ms. Dicklich to getting it copied and dealt with. It comes from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 9th of August, 1994, and it's brief information on the so-called Cutileiro Plan for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

If the usher would be good enough to take us to the next page as we don't have time to read it in detail. That's fine. These two paragraphs: "From the current point of view it is obvious that it made a fatal mistake." Sorry.

"Cutileiro's plan was firstly accepted by all three involved parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But soon after it Muslim side rejected that plan, thus additionally inciting the break-out of the war in this former Yugoslavia republic.

"From the current point of view, it is obvious that it made a fatal mistake. Apart from the bloody civil war, later plans of the ³⁴⁶²² international community (save for Vance-Owen plan), including the last plan of the Contact Group, proved to be more favourable for the Serbian side.

"But the value of the Cutileiro Plan rested with that the international community already at that time showed its readiness to legalise and verify internationally and legally the borders of Serbian territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, even after the two-year war in this former Yugoslav republic, these borders have not been formally recognised."

Now I wanted you to consider that document which you may not have had a chance to consider before because it shows that the reason there was favouring of the Cutileiro Plan --

A. No.

Q. -- was -- we see the origin of the document, because there was readiness, it was perceived, by the international community to legalise and verify the borders of the Serbian territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's the reason this plan was favoured. Correct?

A. That's right, because this is about the borders of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we must be precise in differentiating between the borders of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the borders of the Republic of Serbia. So it is not the legalisation of the borders of the Republic of Serbia but the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina who were calling for protection.

Q. And if -- this is, of course, a matter for the Judges, but if there was to be in the minds of those planning these things ultimate ³⁴⁶²³ joining up of the territories of Bosnia with the Serb -- with Serbia itself, that amounts to the desire for a Greater Serbia, doesn't it?

A. No, that would not mean that, because today there are separate ties between Serbia and Republika Srpska economic, social, cultural, political, and it doesn't mean the creation of a Greater Serbia.

Q. If the plan had been to join up those territories, then in the minds of those planning that connection, there was the concept of a Greater Serbia, just as with the London agreement map, just as with the map in Epoha?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, in light of the last answer to a question like that, perhaps you should omit the reference to the minds of those planning that connection and just simply ask whether the joining up of those territories would be consistent with the concept of a Greater Serbia.

MR. NICE: Certainly, yes. I'm grateful for the formulation.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm also grateful to Mr. Robinson for having made it impossible to put questions in the conditional. I do not believe that this could be identified with efforts to make a Greater Serbia.

MR. NICE:

Q. And my last question is this: You're a member of the SPS and have been for a long time. It's right, isn't it, that the SPS cooperated with Seselj's party in 1991 and 1992? And indeed at one stage, the accused referred to Seselj as the best politician he knew. Are both those propositions correct? 1992, 1993, I'm reminded. I'm grateful. ³⁴⁶²⁴

A. I don't know about that cooperation. I know that they established a national unity government in 1998, if I'm not mistaken. If I am mistaken, Mr. Milosevic can correct me.

Q. Very well. Thank you very much.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, have you dealt with your exhibits?

MR. NICE: Oh, no, I haven't. May the second Epoha magazine, please, be exhibited?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Why don't you start from the Serbian Unity Congress. London Treaty, second map.

MR. NICE: Indeed, yes. I should have started with that. Thank you very much.

THE REGISTRAR: That will be Prosecution Exhibit 806.

MR. NICE: Then --

JUDGE KWON: Moljevic's map.

MR. NICE: The Moljevic map would come next, I think --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: It's been in before in part, but maybe the best thing is simply to put it in as a separate exhibit and be done with it. It's only two sheets.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number 807.

MR. NICE: Then the 7th of January, 1992, edition of Epoha.

THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 808. ³⁴⁶²⁵

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the map which is, as I acknowledge something that was shown in opening, has not been produced. May it be produced as a -- the word I'm looking for I've forgotten. A demonstrative guide really, because it's not produced by anyone. The witness is good enough to say that he accepts it as accurate for what it is, but I accept, of course, that it doesn't at the moment have a witness producing it, but it may serve as a demonstrative guide of what our position is.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it can be exhibited, in the Chamber's view.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number 809.

MR. NICE: And then finally the Foreign Ministry -- the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs letter on the Cutileiro Plan of the 9th of August, 1994.

THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number 810.

MR. NICE: And I'm grateful for that. So far as the Defence exhibits are concerned, I don't believe any further English translations have found their way to us since the evidence started yesterday.

JUDGE ROBINSON: At the end of the re-examination, the Chamber will give a ruling on the exhibits in the -- produced in examination-in-chief.

Mr. Milosevic, do you have -- do you plan to re-examine?

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was just saying that my re-examination will be very, very brief, because I'm in a great hurry on account of Professor Mihailovic, who is supposed to finish before you ³⁴⁶²⁶ adjourn tomorrow. So I hope that I will manage.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you. We will adjourn now for 20 minutes. The legal officer is to report to Chambers.

--- Recess taken at 10.42 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.10 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you may begin.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Professor Popov, Mr. Nice quoted part of a passage from your expert paper, on page 39, it is the one but last page in your report, and he said that that is what led to the conflict subsequently. I would like to read out the entire passage to you now and then you can give me an answer whether that kind of assertion can be made on the basis of what you wrote here or is the assertion completely different? And I'm going to read the entire paragraph now. "Following a short period of the so-called partisan Yugoslavdom (actually, Yugoslav patriotism), this irrational theory --" underlined that -- "was adopted in a refined and reduced form as an economic and political plan in the socialist Yugoslavia in the 1960s (as a kind of testament of the most prominent Croatian national-communist Andrija Hebrang) by Croatia's leading politicians ..." and then they are mentioned.

And then: "They enjoyed strong support from the separatists of other nations (Slovene Edvard Kardelj and other Yugoslav politicians) and ³⁴⁶²⁷ set off to 'disassemble' Yugoslavia gradually to the accompaniment of the increasingly deafening cries about the threat of Greater Serbian centralism and nationalism which jeopardised the development and democratisation of the state. Most Serbian communists who were unable to challenge this strident and organised group of assailants at Greater Serbian nationalism joined them in an attempt to safeguard their position in society and the government. Campaigns against Serbian nationalism, centralism, and hegemony reached their climax at the time when decisive measures to weaken the Yugoslav Federation were being applied ..." I'm asking you now, Professor, whether there was any kind of Serbian nationalism, centralism, and hegemonism at the time, because you're talking about these campaigns?

A. The aim of these campaigns were to mask the disassembling of the Federation. That's what I called it. So there was no Serbian nationalism, centralism, and hegemonism at the time, but what they were bringing out of the darks of history was this in order to create independent states of their own and to mask their own tendencies. You read this about the Serbian communists, and most of the Serbian communists didn't do anything else but from the 1960s, from 1966 until Tito's death in 1980, they simply went around saying that there was no Serbian nationalism and that they would suppress it wherever it might crop up. And they kept asking others for their understanding, saying that they should be trusted and they would thwart this nationalism wherever it may appear.

Q. Professor, the question is whether what Mr. Nice said, that Serbia ³⁴⁶²⁸ was losing its dominant position, as he put it, and that led to conflicts later on. Those were his words. Is that what led to the conflict?

A. It did not have a dominant position. Of course it did not have a dominant position. What led to the conflict was the tendency to break Yugoslavia up into national republic states.

Q. Towards the end of your paragraph -- this is the same paragraph, by the way. This is no accident that this entire passage should be read out because this completes a thought. "But in 1987-1988, when Serbia decided to fight vigorously for the defence of Yugoslavia and its equal position in the federation by disabling centrifugal trends within its own republic, the separatists launched a counter-attack with a fierce campaign against the creation of a 'Greater Serbia.' Whole-heartedly supported by powerful foreign factors, these forces managed to provoke a bloody inter-ethnical and inter-confessional war and break up Yugoslavia." So this text of this one single paragraph gives an answer as to how the war was started. Mr. Nice asked whether what the Serbs did ultimately led to a conflict or not. So please answer what Mr. Nice asked you in view of what I quoted to you just now.

A. Of course it's not correct. I stand by what I say in this text. There is no point in my explaining this through a multitude of new facts.

Q. All right, Professor. Later on, up to the end of the text, you say as following: "... the centuries' long myth and stereotype of 'Greater Serbia' and of 'the Serbs inclination' allegedly, towards aggression and hegemony has been nourished..."

"What is the most tragic for the Serbian people of our times is ³⁴⁶²⁹ the fact that it has been nourished, fostered, and spread with incomparable force for almost a decade and a half now." What is this that has been nourished, fostered, and spread for a decade and a half?

A. Well, the stereotype of Serbia as a hegemonist entity and a state that wants to conquer someone all the time, and in that way, by conquering other peoples, it will create its big and powerful state in the Balkans. This is a stereotype that was written about in many of the books I referred to here. I'm just going to quote Noel Malcolm now and two of his books. And this was a hocus-pocus thing, if I can put it that way. He wrote both books within the span of one year, and our historiography tore it into pieces but he didn't want to come to the debate that was organised about his books.

Q. And you say that there are many tendentious --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the interpreters please have a reference to the part of the text that is being read out at extreme speed?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I know you have in mind your next witness, but the interpreters are asking you to read the text more slowly and identify the passage.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's at the very end of the paper. It is the last paragraph, towards the end of the last paragraph, where reference is made to what Mr. Nice quoted yesterday.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. "The 'mutljag'" - translated as "dregs" in the text, interpreter's note - and then you mention Audrey Budding and Malcolm and other authors, ³⁴⁶³⁰ and so many others and their "lackeys have one task only, and that is to denounce 'Greater-Serbian hegemony' in order to clear the path to the new world order and globalism in this part of Europe. This propaganda, supported by much more drastic political, economic and military means, has its already discernible aim: To split the Serbian people into several parts in which they will become more likely to lose their national identity, to reduce Serbia to its borders of the time before the Kumanovo agreement and make it totally incapable of independent life, the least 'equal' among 'equals' in the contemporary 'democratic' world." So then you speak of the sources that you had in mind. Professor, I think it was a group of academicians that drafted this response to Noel Malcolm's book.

A. Yes.

Q. Is it true that at that time you assessed it as a mere forgery?

A. Yes, and that is why I used this word "mutljag" which is merchanist, and it's a harsh term but there is anything in there except for science.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before you go on, let me just clarify this with the interpreters. The word "dregs," which is in the English text, you say should be translated as "merchanist."

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that, yes, that would be a more correct translation of the word "mutljag."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, because that -- Mr. Nice, that gives a slightly different connotation.

MR. NICE: It gives a slightly different connotation although the ³⁴⁶³¹ paragraph read -- the sentence and the paragraph read as a whole remains extraordinarily critical of a fellow professional.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it does. Continue, Mr. Milosevic. Did you want to say something, Professor?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I just say that "dregs" is not the right word for this word in English.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, this was held against you, that you used some kind of harsh language. Of course I do not find the language to be harsh, but I think that you focussed on what you call the pseudo-scientific character of these books that you refer to.

A. Yes, that's the point.

Q. It doesn't matter what the words used are. What matters is that a group of Serb academicians who worked on the review of Noel Malcolm's book was that this is a pseudo-scientific book. I have not checked this, but do you know that Noel Malcolm's book was being distributed to members of KFOR in Kosovo and --

MR. NICE: This is another series of tendentious or leading questions. The first one about Noel Malcolm's book was leading but I couldn't find it in me to object at the time, but really there must be a limit.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. You know the rule. Don't put the answers in the mouth of the witness from your questions. You have to reformulate them.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ³⁴⁶³²

Q. All right. Tell us, Professor, how did you assess this book in the Academy of Sciences and Arts and on the part of competent scholars dealing in these matters?

A. It would require a lengthy explanation but I will try to give you an answer in a single sentence. It was assessed to be an improvisation, and can I say this was a pell-mell, if I can use that word in English. There are untrue facts and true facts there and it is very hard to establish the truth through all of this.

Q. Just one more question. Mr. Nice said that there are serious academics who -- or academicians who do not share your views, trying to strike a balance between what historiography established undeniably and, on the other hand, some Albanian academic that he referred to, I don't think he was very clear on that, at least not to me, can you really strike a balance that way?

A. It is difficult to strike a balance because Ali Hadri was the leading historian in Kosovo. He advocated this thesis in historiography that the Serbs occupied Kosovo in the 12th or 13th centuries, and that that is why these are Albanian territories, territories that belong to the Albanian people for centuries. However, when the -- before the Serbs came, there were many barbaric attacks on the area, and I can refer to all of them but it will take up too much time.

Q. Just to be very brief, we've just seen a text from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here, which says brief information about the Cutileiro Plan. It is a document that you looked at a few moments ago. The date is the 9th of August, 1994. That is to say, two and a half years after the ³⁴⁶³³ Cutileiro Plan, somebody from the Foreign Ministry is giving information about the substance of the plan; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. This is reference to the Cutileiro Plan from March 1992. In the first paragraph he says: "The first plan that the international community presented as an official solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the European Community that was the author of the plan and it was dealing most seriously with the resolution to the crisis at the time." That is what the document says.

So is this undeniable, then, that all peace plans that were offered by the international community, as far as the Vance-Owen Plan is concerned, as far as the later plans are concerned of Owen-Stoltenberg, the Contact Group, and the ultimately adopted and achieved plan embodied in the Dayton agreement, all these plans that the international community prepared actually wanted to establish a Serb, Croat, and Muslim entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were those proposals made by the international community all the time?

A. Well, that's what it was all about. I cannot say now that I know exactly what each and every one of these plans said but what the Cutileiro Plan says and what the Vance-Owen Plan says is something I know for sure. And probably in the Dayton agreement as well. I know that this meant that the Serbs from Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs, should have a entity of their own which would protect them from manipulations or from being outvoted by the Muslim population.

Q. Is it clear that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina asked for no more ³⁴⁶³⁴ but equal treatment, to be treated equally to other peoples because they constituted a constituent people of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Is there any doubt about that?

A. I've already said that equality of rights is a word that was used the most in Serbian political terminology both in the 19th and the 20th century, and even now at threshold of the 21st century, and that includes Bosnia as well.

Q. All right, Professor. Could you please look at this map. Could we please have it placed on the overhead projector. This dark blue and light blue map, the one that Mr. Nice presented a few moments ago. I got it when you did.

I would like to draw your attention to the borders of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the then-Bosnia-Herzegovina and the present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Is it noticeable that this map could be entitled in a different way? Because what it says here is "Regions under Serb control." That's what it says. Could this map also be entitled "Areas in which the Serbs constitute the majority population" if we were to approach the matter from that angle?

A. What I see here is that this is some kind of an ethnic map of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. All right. Tell me, did the Serbs come and occupy these territories or have they lived there for centuries?

A. These are their territories since the Slavs first came to the Balkans. ³⁴⁶³⁵

Q. All right. But doesn't it seem to you that there is a glaring similarity between these light blue territories within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the territory of the present-day Serb entity, that is to say, Republika Srpska which was established and legalised in Dayton? Do you see this glaring similarity between the two?

A. I don't know whether I can call it glaring, but there is an obvious similarity.

Q. Thank you, Professor. Now let us move on to a few other things. Mr. Nice asked you something about the Belgrade initiative. Professor Rakic has found for me an article from Herceg-Bosna. It's a Croatian article which is very anti-Serbian. I will quote only one passage from it to refresh your memory, just a brief passage which says the following: "The attempt of Belgrade to reach an agreement with the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 collapsed. The so-called Belgrade initiative named after negotiations between S. Milosevic and Mr. Zulfikarpasic, leader of the Bosniak Party, fell through. The leading Muslim party, headed by Alija Izetbegovic, did not accept Serbia's initiative that Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain within Yugoslavia." End of quote. I hope that you will remember that negotiations were held and that these negotiations were termed the Serbian initiative, that Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain within Yugoslavia. Do you remember this?

MR. NICE: The witness was quite clear that although he had knowledge and memory of an initiative at the beginning of the century, he had no knowledge of this particular one. Now, of course, if he can have his memory properly revived without a leading question and can then ³⁴⁶³⁶ assist, so much the better, but he was very clear that he didn't remember this initiative. The next witness may be one more capable of dealing with this topic, I suspect.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, in cross-examination, you said you had no recollection of this negotiation, the Belgrade initiative.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember that it was called the Belgrade initiative, but I do remember that these negotiations were held. Of course I remember that, because we were always thinking about this. It was always on our mind. However, I truly do not remember these negotiations being called the Belgrade initiative.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well, but the essence is important, which you do recall.

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Do you remember that the offer was then made to Izetbegovic to be the president of Yugoslavia?

A. I have to admit I don't remember that. It's probably so, but I can't recall it right now.

Q. Does it seem to you that an idea of a Greater Serbia might be realised with Izetbegovic at its head, as its president?

A. That would be a ridiculous initiative had it existed.

Q. You mean a Greater Serbia with Izetbegovic at its head?

A. It's unimaginable, unthought of.

Q. Very well, Professor. Thank you. Let us now come back to Epoha, the magazine Epoha, and let's pass over who the publisher is. But what is more important is what the magazine actually says. As you have the ³⁴⁶³⁷ Epoha --

A. I should have but I thought we had done with it.

Q. Well, so had I.

A. Well, if I haven't mislaid it. It's here. I'll try to find it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Show it to the witness.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I don't have it any more.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. This is not the copy of the Epoha we were looking at.

A. No, it's not.

Q. Do you remember, Professor -- I really wasn't expecting it to turn up again so I didn't bring a copy with me, but do you remember that the map shown by Mr. Nice was commented upon by the author of the text, Mr. Ilic, who said that --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Milosevic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. He says I remember well that a further million five hundred thousand Croats would then become part of Greater Serbia, and we do not need such a Serbia.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Therefore, the article says that what can be seen on the map is not a good solution. It doesn't propagate this map. These are various polemical viewpoints on this topic. Is this in dispute?

A. No. You have to read the text, because if you just look at the map, you don't understand very well what it's about. The author gives various possibility and challenges this so-called optimal border, if I ³⁴⁶³⁸ remember correctly, and this is what I wanted to stress.

Q. That's right. So what is important here is not who the publisher is but what is actually said about these issues. And the text says this is not a good solution.

A. Yes.

Q. And if you remember, it says that people, especially young people, should be educated in the spirit of tolerance, equality, development of international relations, and so on and so forth, and that it has a positive attitude, that it doesn't advocate nationalist hatred and so on and so forth.

A. Yes, that's what we read about yesterday.

Q. So a map is presented here which is criticised in the text, yet here it has been presented as a map advocated by the text, and I think this is truly manipulation.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What do you mean no?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Absolutely unacceptable to say it was presented as manipulation. The language is unforensic, there is no basis for it, and I told you before that we will not accept language of that kind.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When you read the text, if you have it translated, you will see that I'm right, Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: It is for the Chamber to determine what weight to attach to it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You have this copy of Epoha which was offered to you just a minute ³⁴⁶³⁹ ago by the usher, which contains a report from a large rally. It says, "After a long time, a crowd in the Assembly, representatives of the parties --" "Yugoslavia For the Third Time," it says, and then there is a subtitle. Please take a look at this. It was offered to you by the usher.

A. Yes, but he took it away again.

Q. Could we have this copy, please. "Yugoslavia For the Third Time." This is a subtitle. And then it says: "Like 70 years ago, Yugoslavia is the best ... choice for the Serbs. Can the gloomy skies over Yugoslavia clear up without a big storm - or with it?"

This is an article by a journalist who is now without doubt holding a post in the Socialist Party. Is it clear from this that this is in fact a report which begins with a quotation from Ivo Andric, our only Nobel prize winner Ivo Andric, who wrote once that every war, including the longest one, only goes over the issues that were the reason for the war but the solutions are always left over for the times after the war, the aftermath of the war, when peace is negotiated. The first week in January led to two events, the first steps towards establishing peace, the agreement of Cyrus Vance, the UN Blue Helmets arriving. So this is the agreement between the Yugoslav and Croatian authorities concerning the arrival of the UN forces in areas that had previously been inhabited by Serbs in a vast majority. Is this correct?

A. Yes. We had peace initiatives coming up very often, and we accepted each one that was made in good faith.

Q. This is page with their ERN number 03609966. This entire report ³⁴⁶⁴⁰ contains a list of parties, associations, movements taking part in the convention for a new Yugoslavia. It is a list that has taken up an entire page, and there is a photograph here, Dzevad Galijasevic, a former displaced person from Mosevici. His name is Dzevad, so he must be a Muslim.

A. Yes, probably.

Q. So, Professor, can we see from this page the last two digits of the ERN are 66 and it's page 11 of the magazine, and a whole page is taken up by the list of parties, societies, movements and organisations that participated in the convention for the new Yugoslavia. Have you seen this page?

A. Yes. There was widespread support for the preservation of Yugoslavia. People said that Bosnia was the fortress of Yugoslavia because its ethnic make-up was similar to that of the former Yugoslavia. So it was seen as a factor of cohesion. As far as I can see, there are a lot of organisations here from Bosnia, and I'm not surprised to see this, because the movement to defend Yugoslavia in early 1992 was still very strong.

Q. Well, there are very many different parties here; from Tuzla, from Sarajevo, Sekovici, and so on and so forth. In order to understand this convention, do you think it would be logical to bear in mind who the participants were and that this is a list of the representatives of the movements and parties taking part in it?

Professor, was this convention dedicated to the achievement of peace and the preservation of Yugoslavia? ³⁴⁶⁴¹

A. There is no doubt of that.

Q. There is a photograph somewhere here of the then president of the Presidency, Branko Kostic, from Montenegro, who welcomed the participants in the convention.

Just a few more questions, Professor. The question was constantly put here when Serbia is not dominant it produces problems. First of all, did Serbia dominate Yugoslavia ever from its inception? I'm referring to both the first Yugoslavia between the two world wars and the second Yugoslavia after World War II. You were asked, for example, who was in the majority in the government between the two wars. However, what I'm asking you is did Serbia dominate between the two wars?

A. The foundation of dominance is economic superiority. In this respect, Serbia not only did not dominate but lagged behind the others. The second issue is that of finances, and again it was Slovenia and Croatia who were dominant. If Serbia was dominant in any way, it was in that the Serbian population, especially from the Krajinas, dominated in the police forces because these were people who were used to uniforms and weapons because of their historical traditions. There were somewhat more Serbs in the state bureaucracy, in the lower echelons, and in the military academies, with the exception of naval and air force academies which were dominated by Croats and Slovenes, the greatest number of cadets were Serbs. That's where Serbia predominated.

Q. Very well. Who dominated in Yugoslavia all this time from the end of World War II until 1992?

A. It seems to me that up to the 1960s, there was a very good balance ³⁴⁶⁴² in the federation which was disrupted in the mid-1960s when Edvard Kardelj asked Tito, and this is well known the Croatian historian Bilandzic wrote about it. He asked him, What will happen, old man, when we disappear from the scene? The Serbs will rule. Let's do something about it. That was in 1962. He asked him that at a closed meeting at which Dusan Bilandzic, the Croatian political leader, was present or at least he saw the documents, and that was when they started thinking about disassembling Yugoslavia so as to make it impossible for the Serbs to become predominant.

Q. As a potential danger?

A. Yes.

Q. So who dominated in Yugoslavia?

A. Up to the 1960s, there was a balance. After the 1960s, it was the Croats and the Slovenes.

Q. Throughout this time?

A. Yes, throughout this time.

Q. Thank you, Professor. I have no further questions. I wish you a pleasant journey.

A. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to deal with the exhibits now. The expert report, with the footnotes, to be admitted, and the following tabs, tab 1 a book not translated, marked for identification; tab 2, the Nacertanije, not translated, marked for identification; tab 3, Nis declaration, translated, admitted; tab 5.1, the letter of Frano Supilo to Sir Edward Grey, not translated, marked for identification; the letter of ³⁴⁶⁴³ Supilo to Pasic, not translated, marked for identification.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, could you indicate the tab number of that letter?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please. I'll tell you right away. I've laid it aside now. I think it's also tab 5.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The letter of Supilo to Pasic, also 5.1.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's all in tab 5, the collection of documents, in tab 5, but I don't have the entire binder here because I thought I wouldn't need it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The Corfu declaration, not translated, marked for identification; tab 5.7, the statement of Nikola Pasic, not translated, marked for identification; similarly the letter to Pasic, not translated, marked for identification; similarly the letter by Stjepan Radic for the English government, not translated, marked for identification; the interview of Radic, not translated, marked for identification; tab 6, a map Homogenous Serbia, titled Dr. Stevan Moljevic, admitted; tab 13, another map, admitted; tab 15, another map, admitted; tab 16, another map, admitted. And those are the exhibits to be either admitted or admitted marked for identification.

Professor Popov, that concludes your testimony. Before I dismiss you, I should say, Mr. Milosevic, I'm reminded that there are three other items not included in the list that I just mentioned: The colour map of the London agreement, the second map; the Cutileiro map; and the Vance-Owen map.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It should be included. ³⁴⁶⁴⁴

JUDGE ROBINSON: It should be included.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: These are to be admitted. So the report has been given a number, and the -- what number?

THE REGISTRAR: The report is Exhibit D263, and the binder with the tabs Exhibit 264.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Professor Popov, that concludes your testimony. Thank you for testifying at the International Tribunal. You may now leave.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good-bye.

[The witness withdrew]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I wish to make use of the time until the next witness arrives to put forward a motion. During this weekend, I received your order that I was to give you the list of the next 50 witnesses. Of course I will do this. However, according to the plan, it is very important for me that the witnesses to appear now be those I have already asked to be subpoenaed. This is only a part of this list of witnesses.

I'm aware that the Christmas and New Year recess is ahead of us and that you will not be working for a full three weeks. That's why I'm asking you to issue this order which I asked for in February. I asked for Clinton, Albright, Clark, Blair, Schroeder and Scharping to be called. ³⁴⁶⁴⁵

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, haven't we been through this two or three times before? Have you presented a written motion asking for subpoenas to be issued?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have given everything to the liaison officer, and I put forward my motion orally. It's in the transcript, so it has the same weight as a motion in writing. As my collaborators have informed me that they are unable to contact these witnesses and as it's quite clear that these witnesses are important, and as in my plan for the sequence of witnesses it is their turn now to appear, I ask that you issue a subpoena. It's in the transcript, so now you have it in writing.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Not at all. You must make a written submission setting out the reasons why you want them, the evidence that they are to give, the efforts that you have made to contact them. A subpoena is not issued lightly.

If you insist that this is an application that you're making, then the Chamber will refuse it without prejudice to your right to make another application in the proper form, Mr. Milosevic. So that's the short answer. The application that you have just made is refused without prejudice to your right to make a written application complying with the procedural requirements. So that's -- I've dealt --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson. Are you saying that the reasons why Clinton, Albright, and Clark, who has already testified here but could not be cross-examined about relevant issues, why they should testify here are not clear to you, that you doubt them, or are you ³⁴⁶⁴⁶ using the procedure to make it impossible for them to appear here?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we are dealing with a matter of substance which has -- which must have as its antecedent certain procedures. It's a very important matter. A subpoena is not lightly issued. And I want to see from you the same kind of document that the Prosecution tendered on several occasions when they made requests for subpoenas. The same rule which we now insist on is the rule which was applied to the Prosecutor. It's absolutely no different. You can learn from them. Let Mr. Nice make available to you the precedents that he used and you follow them.

Mr. Kay is there. He can assist you.

MR. KAY: Just on this issue, Your Honour. I had a meeting in October with the foreign department of the American embassy in relation to this category of witnesses. They requested that if a letter was submitted which contained the details of the subject matter for questioning of the witness so that they were aware what it was about, what topics would be covered, then they would be able to submit that through their diplomatic channels and hopefully ensure the attendance of witnesses, or at least put to the witness that there could be a voluntary attendance to give evidence in this trial as part of the Defence case, but they needed the information first of all, which I obviously didn't have, so I was unable to take that any further.

I was informed, I think it was a Mr. Kay, actually, who works for the American embassy, that from the date of the submission of such a request to an end product of a witness being available, having progressed ³⁴⁶⁴⁷ through the various diplomatic channels, would take some two months or six weeks. He said six weeks to me, but it may be two months. So it was that kind of lead time to produce a witness. But they were looking to deal with it on a cooperative basis with the Defence. It was expressed to me that they had cooperated with the Prosecution, they did not wish to discriminate against the Defence, they wished to provide the same level of cooperation through diplomatic channels to both sides in this trial. And so I'm sure that if Mr. Milosevic instructed someone - Professor Rakic is here at the moment - to write a detailed account ... I know letters have been submitted, but they do not contain the details of the subject matter of the questions to be asked.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. Mr. Milosevic, you have heard that, and we have been through this before. You must get off first base. You must get off first base. You're still on first base.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Professor Rakic wrote all that down more than two months ago, and that is precisely why I'm asking for a subpoena order from you, because that was written over two months ago and submitted to them.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The Chamber will not act unless it has before it a written application of the kind that the Prosecution produced on several occasions, several occasions. Once we have that application, Mr. Milosevic, we will consider it, and if requirements are met, we will issue the subpoena, no matter who the person is.

JUDGE BONOMY: It's also important to note what Mr. Kay has just ³⁴⁶⁴⁸ said. He's just told us that the information requested by the embassy hasn't been passed to them. So no matter what's been written, it doesn't satisfy that requirement.

JUDGE KWON: Moreover, he told us on the previous occasion. Didn't you?

MR. KAY: I think we've been here before, yes. I remember dealing with this issue, I think in October. Your Honour Judge Kwon is quite right.

JUDGE ROBINSON: So that's why I said, Mr. Milosevic, that the answer I'm giving is that the application which you just made orally is dismissed without prejudice to your right to resubmit an application in the proper written form.

If you raise it again, I will be forced to conclude that you're making mischief.

Mr. Kay, yes.

MR. KAY: Your Honours, there's a matter that concerns the assigned counsel. A filing was made ex parte confidential yesterday, and we believe that it's imperative that the Trial Chamber be able to give some time to this issue today ex parte.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think we'll deal with it at 8.15, 8.15 tomorrow morning.

MR. KAY: 8.15 tomorrow morning. In this courtroom.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: One point about applications by the accused for ³⁴⁶⁴⁹ subpoenas: Such applications can be made, I suspect, both ex parte and inter partes. We have, of course, no objection to applications being made ex parte. However, if there's any question of applications being made for witnesses to be called simply to be cross-examined by the accused, we would seek that part of the application to be on notice because that's a legal issue that has been argued before the Court, as the Court will remember, the Court having given a ruling against - by 2 to 1 decision - against the cross-examination of witnesses whom it was wanted to call to give evidence for the Prosecution in part at least. So that in the event that there are any ex parte applications, we would ask -- with that component to them, we'd ask that they be opened up for the purposes of that argument to be addressed.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll bear that in mind, Mr. Nice. Mr. Milosevic, your next witness.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I call academician, Mr. Kosta Mihailovic.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for the accused.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should like to note that you have been supplied with his report in English. It wasn't even translated here, so you have a copy of the report in English.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. ³⁴⁶⁵⁰

JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

WITNESS: KOSTA MIHAILOVIC

[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE ROBINSON: You may begin, Mr. Milosevic. Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Professor.

A. Good afternoon, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Will you give us your full name and surname.

A. My name is Kosta Mihailovic.

Q. We have supplied the Court with a brief CV of yours, but could you now please just indicate the major points in your biography.

A. I graduated from the faculty of law and have a Ph.D. in economics. Immediately after the war, I worked, that is to say from 1949, in the Ministry of Commerce of Serbia, and later on in the Alliance of Serbia and Yugoslavia. From 1949 up until the time I retired in 1984, I worked at the Institute for Economics in Belgrade. I was director of the institute to begin with and later on continued working there as an advisor. I was elected full professor of the faculty of economics in 1965, and I became a member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, as a corresponding member, in fact, in 1983, and I became a full member of the academy in 1988.

I have focused my attention on economics, general and regional development in particular, focusing on the economic development and economic system that prevailed in Yugoslavia, and as such, I also delved in theoretical issues and looked at the subject matter broader afield, at ³⁴⁶⁵¹ regional development in Europe as well. I have works written by me in that area. It was pioneer work on the regional development of Eastern Europe, published by Mouton here in The Hague, and that was a requirement or, rather, a request made of me by the United Nations. Of course I attended specialist courses and took part in many international conferences, so I had broad contacts on the international level as well.

Q. Thank you, Professor.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, could you just clarify for me: He graduated from the faculty of law, and he has a Ph.D. in economics. Does he also have qualifications in law?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We would have to ask Professor Mihailovic that. I don't think he dealt with law, but he worked in the sphere of economics throughout his life, professional life. And Professor Mihailovic, let me inform you, is a leading world expert for regional development. A moment ago you heard that it was on assignment for the United Nations that he compiled a study on regional development.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just clarify something, Professor.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. For a brief period of time I was -- I worked in a lawyer -- in a law firm office as a trainee, but when I studied in Belgrade, there was no faculty of economics. It was the faculty of law that included economics and subjects in the sphere of economics. So I studied at the faculty of law, enrolled in the stream for economics. And later on, as I worked in the economic field, applied ³⁴⁶⁵² economics and focusing on analytical work in particular, I probably showed some aptitude for economic analyses, so I was transferred to the Institute for Economics, where I spent my entire professional and scientific career.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Professor. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, what you've just told us, in fact, means that from 1949 until 1965, you were the director of the Institute for Economics in Belgrade; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And in 1965, you had differing views from official economic policy and were asked to resign; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you became a member of the academy and full professor of the faculty for economics. Is that right, Professor?

A. Yes.

Q. I'm not going to quote any more passages from your curriculum vitae - we have attached it to your report - but I'm going to ask you this: Professor, your -- and let me say first of all that I'm trying to use my time as rationally as possible. So I have some basic questions to ask you first, and my first question is this: You have submitted your report and your views in report form. In the 19th and 20th century, could you please tell us whether any Greater Serbian policy existed? Because you begin with Garasanin's Nacertanije, or plan, the only official programme that Serbia ever had. Now, could you tell us, and this is my ³⁴⁶⁵³ question in actual fact, how do you explain the fact that Serbia was in a position to articulate a programme of this kind under conditions of material poverty, if I can put it that way, when it did not have the necessary level of information, the necessary level of development, and especially the necessary level of autonomy? It was under the wings of a military feudalism but not independence, too, because Serbia did have autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, although it was not independent, it did not enjoy independence.

So how was it able to articulate a programme of this kind that was the Nacertanije with all these other handicaps that I mentioned?

A. Well, first of all, it was not a ramified programme. It was a rather narrow programme relating to Serbia's foreign policy in the most part. And that foreign policy waged by Serbia in itself, this was implied -- the circumstances implied Serbia's goal. Serbia was not a free country. It enjoyed broad autonomy but within the Ottoman Empire. So that the basic goal was complete liberation. And bearing in mind the fact that it was -- that the big power politics of Austria and Russia were evident to it, it was worried as to how -- what its international position would be like once it was free, once it had been liberated, because it did not want to come under occupation again, under one of the big powers again and become divided up between Russia and Austria. So that even if the Nacertanije as a programme had never been written, this would have imposed itself as a normal natural goal to aspire to.

Of course, Serbia did not have the intellectual force or a broader view of the world in order to be able to articulate a programme such as ³⁴⁶⁵⁴ the Nacertanije programme itself. However, as luck would have it, Western Europe, led by England and France, were very interested, not in liberating Serbia so much as they were in what the situation would look like in that part of the world once it had been liberated. And on the other hand, Poland was interested in all this because it had a highly influential emigres population living in Paris and working in Paris, led by Count Chartoriski who otherwise had previously been the foreign minister of Russia.

So here we have a meeting point of interests, and in fact the Nacertanije plan came about through the initiative of England and France, and what Academician Ekmecic says in its research, based in England, his research into the sources, he writes about that and he talks about it very exhaustively.

England already in 1831, for example, sent an envoy, Urquhart, David Urquhart, to Prince Milos Obrenovic 13 years before the appearance the Nacertanije plan, and he proposed a certain foreign policy to Serbia linked -- which was to have been linked to the interests of France and Russia. And he came again, he paid a second visit in 1833, and Bois-le-cont came on behalf of France in 1834. France sent her envoy. What I want to say is this: The Nacertanije plan had a broad European international component or background, much broader than the initiative of Serbia itself, and the text that was written down, the text of the Nacertanije itself emanated from one of the plans or, rather, an advisory document written by Frans Zach, who was a Polish emigre, and the text itself -- I have that text here with me, that original text. ³⁴⁶⁵⁵

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, I'm sorry to stop you. We're operating under time constraints here. You have given a very long answer already and I think Mr. Milosevic should put another question to you, and we would appreciate it if you would try to make your answers as concise as possible.

Mr. Milosevic, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, you mentioned the text by Frantisek Zach.

A. Yes.

Q. Is the text very similar to the text of the Nacertanije?

A. It's almost identical. Out of the seven chapters that exist, Nacertanije represents four chapters. And I counted them. What was left out or, rather, a comparative analysis of the texts shows that three chapters are lacking in the Nacertanije. Garasanin omitted 90 lines but added 64 of his own. So of the 800 lines that the Nacertanije plan numbers, this would make it more than 85 per cent of the Frantisek Zach text.

Q. They probably -- the court reporter probably didn't hear it properly, but it is Frantisek Zach.

These texts were published at the same time. Zach's text and the text of the Nacertanije. They were published at the same time, and you said that you actually have Zach's text or, rather, both texts.

A. Yes, I do. Although the text is in Serbian, it hasn't been translated, but I have marked the passages that were taken over from Zach's text into the Nacertanije and the passages that were left out, so ³⁴⁶⁵⁶ that the Court can see that this is in fact Zach's text and that the discussions and debates were held even before the war. Some people questioned the authenticity of Garasanin's text, and they quoted the fact that it was -- he had in fact taken over the bulk of Zach's text.

Q. Thank you, Professor. Let's move on. I think that in order for us to understand the Nacertanije, it is very valuable to have both texts so that we can compare the two; Zach's text and the Nacertanije text. It's an important historical fact.

But tell me this now, please: On the basis of your explanation and understanding, how would you characterise the Nacertanije in broad terms?

A. I would say that it was a programme for the liberation of Serbia, political and economic.

Q. Thank you, Professor. Now, you go on to note that the Nacertanije dwells on just one economic question, and you speak about that on page 2. So it's at page 2 of the English text and the Serbian text, on the adverse conditions in trade with Austro-Hungary, which was exacerbated by the establishment of the monopoly on its foreign trade in trading with Serbia.

A. Yes, the Nacertanije was not actually a programme. It was a programme of Serbia's foreign policy. And of course it encompassed economic issues focusing on the problem of trade, which was a very sensitive subject for Serbia, painful subject for Serbia, which had not -- which was still under Ottoman rule, Ottoman occupation, whereas Austria had established a complete monopoly over its foreign trade. And of course, just as usually happens between industrialised, developed ³⁴⁶⁵⁷ countries and a totally agricultural country as was Serbia, these trading conditions were unfavourable for Serbia, and Serbia felt this on its own skin. And the terms of trade were all the more difficult for Serbia because there was this imbalance in trade, unfavourable terms, and a monopoly which imposed further restrictions on Serbia, so that its goal was to rid itself or find a way out of this situation, to open the way to a trade route via the Adriatic and the Mediterranean Sea in order to be able to trade with Europe.

Q. Professor, as far as I can see --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we are beyond -- past the time for the break, so we're going to break now.

Professor, we are going to break for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.22 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.50 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, continue.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Can you hear me now?

A. Yes.

Q. You mentioned terms of trade or, rather, you mentioned unfavourable terms of trade. Unfavourable terms of trade from that period of time, did they actually remain proportionately in the time of the first and second Yugoslavia?

A. Yes.

Q. And now tell me, if I understood you correctly, these unfavourable ³⁴⁶⁵⁸ terms of trade both internationally and on the national level within Yugoslavia itself, did they have a broader significance and are they proof that the structure of its economy did not allow Serbia to carry out any kind of hegemonistic policy?

A. That goes without saying. If it was politically unliberated and under occupation, and if it was dominated economically, it could not have pursued an expansionist policy or a policy of domination itself. This entire period in the 19th century went on and elementary preconditions for industrialisation were created.

Q. And what about the objectives of the foreign policy of Serbia, as defined in Nacertanije? Did they remain unchanged in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century?

A. The objectives had to remain the same. That was liberation, and the idea of what would happen after the liberation. That was certainly the main concern of the policy pursued. However, there was a change in the actual assets. Urquhart suggests that Serbia make an arrangement with the Subline Port, with the Turkish government, and that they resolve their problems in that way. However, obviously Turkey never wanted on its part to agree to a full liberation of Serbia. So this had to be carried out by arms.

And then in 1862, when Garasanin was Prime Minister under Prince Mihailo Obrenovic, the first loan was taken from England with Russian guarantees. Somehow the great powers that were otherwise not very kind to Serbia, they had to see what would happen. So these three wars that were waged by Serbia from 19 -- from 1878 onwards, these were liberation wars, ³⁴⁶⁵⁹ all three of them.

Q. The loan was practically for the arming of Serbia, the loan that was taken in England; right?

A. Yes.

Q. The one that you say that was taken with Russian guarantees. And what about the nature of the wars waged by Serbia in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century?

A. Well, you see --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I hate to interrupt. This witness's evidence was allowed in the face of our opposition, as you'll remember, and on the grounds of dealing with Greater Serbia. The position on Greater Serbia has been clarified to the extent of both sides setting their cases out with the last witness, and I respectfully wonder how much real value there is going over 19th century material in any detail, but it's a matter for the Court, but it's becoming a repeat of the last witness.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, if the evidence is going to be cumulative, if it's going to be repetitive of evidence that we have already had on the issue of Greater Serbia, the Chamber will have to consider whether to hear it. I thought this witness as an economist was going to concentrate on specific economic issues. But I, for one, do not want to hear anything more about the history of this matter. We have heard enough.

So let us hear from you what this witness will testify about. ³⁴⁶⁶⁰

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He will testify precisely about what his report contains. And in the second part, since this witness is one of the authors of the memorandum, I'm going to put a few questions that have to do with the memorandum, because these questions were raised by Mr. Nice with one of the authors of the memorandum, that is to say Academician Markovic. This happened during the examination of Academician Markovic.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, we can hear from him evidence about the memorandum since there was cross-examination on that, but we don't want to hear anything more about the history. We have had enough evidence on that. So unless it is something in relation to which he has peculiar knowledge by reason of his training, but generally we have had enough of the history of this matter.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not intend to question Academician Mihailovic about history. Academician Popov spoke about that. But I would like to draw your attention to another thing: During the cross-examination of Professor Markovic, a book was used written precisely by Professor Mihailovic and Professor Krestic. It's about the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts answers to criticism. That was D250.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you can refer to that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Professor, together with Academician Krestic, is the author of that book, and that is what Mr. Nice used.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ³⁴⁶⁶¹

Q. Professor, before I put a question to you, I'm going to quote very briefly from your report on page 19.

And for you, it is page 15 of the English translation. You say that: "... Serb politicians did not think about the economic consequences that unification would have in terms of the development of Serbia. It is possible that they did not have any such knowledge."

And the quotation ends with the following words: "It should not be surprising that the Serb politicians were not aware of this in 1918 and did not draw the right conclusions. The trouble was that scant regional statistics did not show how each and every region of Yugoslavia developed."

My question is: On what basis do you claim that Serbia did not know what kind of economic relations it was entering with the creation of Yugoslavia?

A. The macroeconomic theory and the empirical analyses in the field of macroeconomics are of a recent date. This was on the early economy, so they did not know. And even far more developed countries did not know about things like that.

I'm going to refer to something I mentioned in the footnotes. For example, in Italy, at a meeting of the International Economic Association, two of their most prominent economists who dealt with regional development expounded on the thesis that the unification of Italy was economically fatal for the south of Italy. This was a very bold thesis with an embarrassing political connotation, but they gave a very rational economic ³⁴⁶⁶² explanation. I don't think such knowledge existed among the Serbian politicians who were making decisions. Even if they did have this kind of knowledge, I think that the priority task was for Serbia to unite with the other peoples. That is say that this was a political priority, and there was no doubt about that.

Even if it did entertain some doubts as to what kind of entity it was getting into, it would have opted in favour of a Yugoslavia nevertheless.

Q. Let us now move on to the period between the two world wars. The economic level of development of Serbia - this has to do with your knowledge of the economic conditions between the two world wars - so the level of Serbia's economic development and its structure, in that stage could they have been a basis for Serbia's economic domination in Yugoslavia, or domination in Yugoslavia in general?

A. There is no way this could have happened. In the Economic Institute, we studied this period between the two world wars because there were a lot of economic speculations that were being bandied about, and we analysed this thoroughly and we explained first of all by reconstructing the growth rate between the two world wars and also the per capita investment between the two world wars in the individual republics. Statistics, regional statistics, were underdeveloped and adapted to a different administrative division. The division of the country into banovinas, I mean. The only reliable information on investment was the statistics of the industry from 1938, and these statistics were adopted to the new administrative division after the Second World War, and then it ³⁴⁶⁶³ became possible to reconstruct the per capita investment in individual republics. Then it became evident that Slovenia and Croatia had investments that were considerably above average, notably Slovenia, and Serbia had not even reached the average level. So that is one of the aspects involved.

Secondly, Serbia was exposed to unfavourable terms of trade within the country itself, because Serbia delivered raw materials to the other areas, as well as agricultural produce. Their prices had been depressed and exposed to the influence of world prices while the areas that had an industry, especially a processing industry, manufacturing industry, that was again Slovenia and Croatia, they enjoyed the advantages of tariff protection. So there were these considerable spillovers. I would also like to note that our research showed that the rate of growth between 1923 and 1938 in Yugoslavia was at zero level. However, it was not a positive zero, because in the meantime social conditions worsened. However, we could not look at individual republics and their development, but it was obvious on the basis of these figures related to investment that it is only these two republics that registered proper development between the two world wars, which is only natural, you see, because that is the nature of the market. Gojko Grdjic and many other economists wrote about this.

At this level of development of the country, the differences between underdeveloped and developed regions become increasingly deeper.

Q. Professor, the economic system that existed between the two world wars in Yugoslavia, did it permit direct influence in terms of the ³⁴⁶⁶⁴ development of individual areas or was it possible to have an economic development policy which would favour Serbia and make possible its economic domination?

A. That was impossible because of the economic system itself. The state did not have any measures in its hands which could change the actual allocations in the market itself. The market functioned as it did and only deepened the differences involved. Those who were developed and who had an initial advantage simply increased the advantage. Yugoslavia, in its history, was under two different types of occupation. There was a considerable difference between the northern parts that were under Austro-Hungary and the other parts, the southern parts, that were under Turkish occupation.

Q. Professor, in your written report, you gave a great deal of space to Rudolf Bicanic's book, The Economic Basis of the Croatian Question, and the reaction of Serb economists to that book. Why did you devote this much space to this polemic? Was that the only polemic that was taking place during those years?

A. Well, not only those years, you see. This is linked to your previous question. How much knowledge was there, generally speaking, when Yugoslavia was being established? What kind of economic relations would prevail?

So there were no debates at macro level. And in 1938 a book appeared, Bicanic's book. Of course this is an ideological political book with a thesis. The head of the Serbian Peasant -- of the Croatian Peasant Party showed clearly in his preface what he expected Bicanic to do. His ³⁴⁶⁶⁵ primary thesis was there to begin with, that Croatia was exploited in Yugoslavia, and he asked Bicanic to corroborate that. Therefore, he made such an attempt, but since reality was different from what Macek said, he had to make a great deal of constructs and adjustments in order to try to substantiate the thesis.

Q. I would like to say that this is from page 22 onwards in your report, and in the English text it is from page 18 onwards. From the beginning or, rather, from the middle of the first paragraph, it is explained that two decades after the unification, that was the political task that he was given, to do this kind of thing.

A. By your leave, Mr. President, may I add something? The reaction on the Serb side was very competent and well qualified. This was done by several people who were familiar with the subject matter. These were university professors and people working in the administration, dealing with facts. Therefore, we have a collision between political reasoning on the one hand, and on the other, a purely scholarly and scientific response.

Q. Thank you, Professor. What was the ideological platform concerning inter-ethnic relations of the Communist Party after World War II? I wish to draw your attention to the fact that you speak of this on page 40, which in English is page 32-33.

A. The Communist Party had already developed its viewpoint on this between the two world wars. This viewpoint was formed under the influence of the Comintern and the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. It is well known that Yugoslavia accepted Russian emigres on a ³⁴⁶⁶⁶ large scale, causing disaffection in the Soviet Union, and that this had a great influence on the attitude of the Communist Party to Yugoslavia. Of course, this attitude toward Russia was linked primarily to the court of the Karadjordjevics, which had links with the Russian court. And this is what gave rise to the disaffection towards Serbia and Serbian cadres. On the other hand, the working class between the two world wars in Yugoslavia was relatively small, and for this reason it was unable to serve as a class mainstay of the Communist Party. The Communist Party, therefore, used inter-ethnic tensions to a large extent, putting forward the thesis on Greater Serbian policies. This led to the Communist Party considering Yugoslavia to be an artificial construct, and this was asserted even by the right-wing parties in Croatia. However, the Communist Party was not influential between the two world wars in Yugoslavia. However, it entered the new Yugoslavia with the same ideology and same prejudices. Thus the myth of some sort of Greater Serbia hegemony, both political and economic, was prevalent and was in fact the ideological platform for inter-ethnic relations.

Q. Professor, on page 40, which is 32 and 33 English, you say the proposed five year -- that Andrija Hebrang, the then head of the federal planning commission, which was then the centre of decision-making, said that: "The proposed five-year plan is the concretisation in the economic field of the federal government's correct policy on the question. Brotherhood and unity of our peoples would be a hollow phrase if the plan did not provide for measures to abolish large economic and cultural differences in the levels of development of various republics." ³⁴⁶⁶⁷ He goes on to say: "In the old Yugoslavia, it was different. In it the tempo of development of industrial production in the various countries was in accordance with the policy of national oppression which was conducted by the great Serbian bourgeoisie." Was this based on facts and the economic and analysis that you have made?

A. No, I have spoken of this. Between the two wars those whose development was above average were the two most highly developed republics, as they later became, and those were Croatia and Slovenia. This has been proved beyond any doubt on the basis of the territorial allocation of investments. Therefore, the thesis put forward by the Communist Party were in fact taken over because it had been the opposition, and in some sort of coalition with the Croatian Peasant Party, they actually took over the thesis advocated by Bicanic. And it was with these prejudices that they came onto the scene.

This is not an isolated piece of evidence for some sort of revanchist policy, but there was no actual reason for this revanchism.

Q. Professor, in tab 6 of these exhibits, there is a meeting between the Slovenian delegation and Tito on the 1st of December, 1943, during the war. What does this document show?

A. This document shows that a coalition was created between Slovenia and Croatia.

Q. Let me draw your attention on page 254 of the document, the second paragraph, omitting the continuing paragraph. It mentions the cooperation between Slovenians and Croats, and then Comrade Sasa suggests that the ³⁴⁶⁶⁸ Slovenians have a permanent delegate with the Croats and vice versa. Comrade Tito greeted to this proposal, and so on and so forth.

A. Yes. This was Marijan Breze [phoen], a member of the Slovenian Liberation Front, who drew up the minutes and gave them to this historian, Mestrovic, and he included this in the book as he received it. Tito was speaking of the necessity for the closest possible cooperation between Slovenia and Croatia, and their well known man of letters, Vidun, said that the proposal should be made specific, made concrete, by having a representative of each nation with the other one. And Tito said that this should be implemented as soon as possible.

I think that this was the beginning of a coalition which was not only to last but which was to become the nucleus of a broader coalition which was later created in Yugoslavia.

Q. Professor, tell me, this idea of the political domination of Slovenia and Croatia, did it have its protagonists abroad?

A. Well, you know what? This is an interesting question. I have just spoken about the involvement of the Comintern, and in the personnel policy this was seen, for example, when Simo Markovic was replaced. He was a mathematician, a university professor, a Serb, and instead, Josip Broz was appointed general secretary of the party, and he was a Croat. And we know what it means for the orientation of an organisation who the general secretary is. He was able to create the policy and to channel it in whatever direction he wished.

However, it's interesting to note that during World War I, in England, Seton-Watson, who was a journalist and was considered to be very ³⁴⁶⁶⁹ familiar with Balkan conditions and who was used by the British government as an expert on these issues, at this scholarly gathering that we had a few years ago, in his paper -- or, rather, in the paper by Mr. Stenton, it is stated that he drew up a memorandum to the British government in 1915 advocating the creation of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Slovenia and Croatia.

And if one follows the situation, what happened between the two world wars, then it was fairly indicative. And if one reads Bicanic, then one can see the concept that prevailed and that was present.

Q. Professor, I apologise for interrupting, but gentlemen, we're at tab 19, and the Professor has brought in a translation of the scientific gathering in the academy of science which was copied, photocopied today. He took the first copy from the -- as it was printed, in English. It is a Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences publication, held in October 2002, the meeting was, and the article by Michael Stenton, which is entitled "Greater Serbia in Great Britain 1875-1991," is on page 107. And in view of the fact that that international meeting, and its report was printed in English, I should like to tender it in its entirety as an exhibit, because we have some highly prominent men of letters writing in it.

MR. NICE: I think this creates some problem and raises a new issue if the entire working documents of a symposium or gathering of this kind should go in without the witnesses being cross-examined. I see from the index that some of the names are somewhat familiar to us. We have Mr. Popov at page 257, and we have Mr. Terzic at page 181. We have Mr. Ekmecic, to come, at page 11. ³⁴⁶⁷⁰

JUDGE ROBINSON: Is it clear that he's seeking to tender the entire document or just certain articles by certain authors?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I consider that the entire document should be tendered because this is the first opportunity we've had that through the good offices of Professor Mihailovic that we are being able to have in our hands the English translation of the fruits of that international gathering, which I think is very important for an understanding of the case, and it was held in the year 2002 in the Academy of Sciences.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us see what use you make of it before we decide that issue.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I will reserve our position on that, but I will respectfully -- well, I'll just reserve our position on that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as Professor Mihailovic is concerned, since he is an economist, he just quoted the article by Michael Stenton -- Stenton. I don't wish to use him as a witness for the reports written by historians and people from other areas of expertise, but I do think it's useful, for purposes of understanding, in view of the fact that this is a very important international meeting, to have this entire document, as it has been translated, admitted into evidence.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Make use of it, as I said, Mr. Milosevic. Use the document and at the end we'll decide. Practice is the best teacher.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You have just indicated Michael Stenton's article in which he ³⁴⁶⁷¹ speaks of the endeavours that Seton-Watson in his day expressed as well with respect to the domination of the West over the East, et cetera, Professor; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you consider it necessary to highlight any other points that have to deal with the economic aspects of the matter in hand? Do you want to emphasise any of those on the basis of this document and use it in broad terms?

A. Well, the entire subject matter is very broad and is broadly dealt with here, so I don't want to give my critique about the historians. That is not my field of expertise, but I nonetheless think that they are people prominent in their professions, very competent in their professional knowledge, and I think that their standpoints and views do deserve our attention.

Q. Now, the position mentioned and commented on a moment ago in the Greater Serbia policy and linked to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, did it have an important influence, great influence, small influence? Tell us what kind of influence it had in the options for an economic development for Serbia.

A. I think it was decisive, the decisive factor, because we had an ideology formed which enabled domination, domination over Serbia, both political and economic domination, which was quite evident. And I think that the entire development of Yugoslavia after the Second World War was under the signs of the political and economic domination of Slovenia and Croatia, because it was thanks to their positions in the centres of ³⁴⁶⁷² political power that this was possible. I think there was a lot of talk about centralism, and centralism was always linked to Serbia, whereas in actual fact that centralism in Yugoslavia just had a name and surname. That is to say in a country, in a state where we had a one-party system, single-party system, where one party dominated, which was hierarchically very strictly organised with a political centre which was very strong, and in that centre we also had a hierarchical structure, a hierarchy in the person of Tito and in the person of Kardelj who were revolutionaries, who had come from Russia, and who were in a way in a privileged position with respect to the home-grown cadres, if I can put it that way. And they were the initiators of the entire policy waged in Yugoslavia, and they were the absolute arbiters on all matters.

Q. Professor, we see from your CV for many years you were a director at the Institute for Economics and therefore you were a participant in all these events, in everything that took place in the country, and you were a professional in the field of economics. Tell me, please, how was it possible from the standpoint of you as the director of the Institute of Economics, how was it possible for the politicians of Serbia to accept a slower development for Serbia, that concept, when its economy was at the level of development which was below the Yugoslav average, which you noted a moment ago? So that's a material fact: Serbia's economy was below the Yugoslav average, and yet a policy for Serbia's slower development was being waged, and this was not clandestine in any way, it was contained in documents. So how was that possible? How could the politicians of Serbia accept to have a go-slow development policy for Serbia, for instance? ³⁴⁶⁷³

A. Well, what we had was the party line, the party course to follow, and it wasn't simple to oppose that party course waged by somebody who had done so much. One had to deal with the consequences of that. There were attempts on the Serb side at the very beginning, at the very outset, to do something about it, and I have provided a document to that effect.

Q. We are dealing with tab 4, Blagoje Neskovic, who was the head of the party in Serbia of the day, he was greatly criticised and later replaced, and we have that in tab 4, in the set of documents contained in tab 4 ranging from 1943 to 1986, ideas in reality --

A. Milovan Djilas kept the records. And we can see from that document quite plainly that it was with respect to this five-year development plan when this kind of fate was designed for Serbia, that before that there had been a meeting and a conflict, in fact, between a -- a clash between Blagoje Neskovic and Boris Kidric, and Blagoje Neskovic, as Kardelj announced at that meeting, said that that wasn't our plan in the sense of it not being Serbia's plan, that is to say that Serbia did not take part in devising and compiling that five-year development plan at all. So that was the subject of criticism.

And the other point is that they accused Serbia for the compulsory buy-up purchase that was in force when Yugoslavia was under great pressure from the compulsory crop purchase. Neskovic was replaced several years later, and that's what happened. And this repeated itself in some other cases.

Now, an explanation to this is that Tito and Kardelj had the ³⁴⁶⁷⁴ possibility in each republic to have leaders who suited them and who would implement their policies.

Q. Professor, on page 49 of your own report - which is page 40 and 41 of the English text, gentlemen, for your benefit - this is what you say, and I quote from the top of the page, top of page 49, that: "Serbia was in a subordinate economic position and that Lazar Kolisevski, the leader of the Communist Party of Macedonia, uncovered this when he pronounced the syntagm 'a weak Serbia means a strong Yugoslavia,' which was the guiding idea of the anti-Serbian policy and anti-Serbian coalition headed by Slovenia and Croatia."

And then you go on to say that Stane Kavcic, a Slovenian politician who was a dissident, in his diary wrote in 1986 the following, that the policy of a weak Serbia and a strong Yugoslavia met its downfall, and you go on to quote him: "The times have passed when Slovenian politicians led by Kardelj with Tito's help did away with certain politicians as they saw fit, and that the doors were closing." Stane Kavcic, the Slovene politician, wrote those words. How do you explain the existence of this syntagma? Just to avoid any misunderstanding, Lazar Kolisevski criticised the syntagma "a weak Serbia, a strong Yugoslavia," but he brought it to light. He brought it to the surface as a policy being waged. Now, how do you explain the existence of this syntagma which reads "a weak Serbia, a strong Yugoslavia," and how far does it reflect realistic political and economic relations in Yugoslavia?

A. I would like to say that this is very cynical. It was a cynical ³⁴⁶⁷⁵ guiding idea, the policy waged towards Serbia and in Yugoslavia after World War II, and all -- it could only have one meaning and that is that you must hold Serbia under political and economic control to make it weak and to incapacitate it for action so that others could dominate and achieve domination. There is no other way of interpreting that syntagma. There cannot be any other way.

Q. Thank you, Professor. Now you're a well known expert for regional development. That was your pet subject, if I can put it that way. What were the goals and results of the policies of regional development in the briefest terms?

A. The goals were very noble: It was the idea to have equal opportunities and to bridge the development gap, the great development gap between the republics. And the Slovene politician and leader whose name was Kidric, Boris Kidric, and he defined that even before the five-year plan in 1946 was adopted, when he said that all the republics would become industrialised and achieve a high level of development. However, the lesser developed republics would have a higher rate of development and that they would keep up and surpass the already developed republics, take them over.

However, what happened was quite the reverse, and this policy was defined not only in the first five-year development plan but was repeated as a refrain in all future development plans, independent of the obvious tendencies that existed to make the differences even greater, the gulf between the developed and developing even greater. So we see in practice something being done that was quite contrary to the goals. While the ³⁴⁶⁷⁶ goals were to bridge the gap, what was actually being done was to widen the gap. And this led to the largest differences. We had Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand, the developed republics and the other lesser developed republics on the other. Slovenia under Yugoslavia, within Yugoslavia, gained a level of development of a per capita income of over $9.000, which it hasn't been able to achieve since it seceded. That is something that it achieved while it was in Yugoslavia.

Q. All right, Professor. Now, were there attempts to determine the positions of all the nations in the former Yugoslavia regardless of the republics those nations lived in or ethnic groups lived? And by the by I'd like to draw your attention to tab 2 in which you have a table of the gross national investments of the republics and provinces in the SFRY. And although the table has not been translated, it is self-evident. It speaks for itself.

I'll help you find your way around it, gentlemen. They are all figures. Figures don't need to be translated, just the headings, and I read out the heading: "Gross Public Investments and the Population of the Republics and Provinces in the SFRY," and in that table we can see that in 1959 alone, for example, and in 1968, in columns and we're constantly comparing two columns, social investment and the population. In those two years alone, '59 and '68, investment, social investment in Serbia are just marginally greater than the participation with respect to the number of inhabitants. In all the other years the investments are lower than the population's participation share because it is 4120 as a constant ranging marginally, whereas social investments were always far below that level, ³⁴⁶⁷⁷ which is not evident and did not exist in the other republics, especially the two you highlighted. It is different for them. Now, were there attempts to establish the positions independently of the republics in which the ethnic groups lived?

A. Yes. Let me answer that question with the Court's permission, Mr. President, by your leave. If I might just be allowed to make a comment, a brief comment in response to what Mr. Milosevic was just saying. If you look at the first five-year plan, development plan, the slowest development was to have been Slovenia since it was the most highly developed republic. Then it should have the smallest growth rate. But if you look at the first year, the first year of that plan, 1947, the population was -- ranged at around 9 per cent of the overall Yugoslav population. The smallest share was about 12 per cent in social investment. So that there were 50, 60, 70 per cent more investment there than the rest.

So what I'm trying to say is that there was a complete disproportion between the plan, which seemed to be rather an irresponsible document, in actual fact, and the resources and measures that were realistically taken and invested and created different goals altogether. So it wasn't the goals that created the resources, it was the resources that set the goals and created the goals.

Now, as to your question, this is my attempt, an attempt on my part to establish how the nations or ethnic groups -- well, every ten years in Yugoslavia, at the beginning of each decade, the statistics would be compiled and recorded, and the gross national income per municipality ³⁴⁶⁷⁸ was calculated, the revenue per municipality was calculated. And following upon the logics of economic control, I arrived at fairly satisfactory results, and they were these: I started out from the assumption that at the level of the municipality, you cannot -- there won't be great differences between the individual national groups or ethnic groups. Then I looked at each ethnic group and divided it -- and multiplied it per municipality and arrived at a table which you have before you on page 79. It is just one table which will illustrate how individual ethnic groups lived, the standard of living in the different groups. It is on page 69 of the English text, that table. And there we see that the Serbs were -- that the Serb national income was at 95. That is to say that they had a 5 per cent lower income than the Yugoslav average. And for example, in Vojvodina province, some minorities, such as the Hungarians, they had higher per capita income than did the Serbs, and so on and so forth.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Professor. Mr. Milosevic, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, you quoted Fred Singleton. That's in tab 7, I believe. Let me just check that out. Tab 7. This is just the title page in German, but otherwise it's in English. So if you turn the title page, you will see Fred B. Singleton, "The Economic Background to Tensions Between the Nationalities in Yugoslavia." And you're quoting the article or, rather, this report of his. I should like to ask you, what was the influence of economic differences in the break-up of Yugoslavia based on that? Because you say on page 51 or 63 -- or 43 of the English version, ³⁴⁶⁷⁹ on page 43 in the English of your report, you say the following: You say "Figures indicate that Slovenia and Croatia in the last 25 years improved their absolute per capita income and their relative position in comparison to the lesser developed republics." And to this assessment we should add that the same trend continued to the end of the joint state, that is to say of a period of 25 years.

So what was the influence on economic differences on Yugoslavia's break-up?

A. Well, I think that there were different factors that led to Yugoslavia's dissolution, but certainly the great differences in development wielded their influence, too, precisely because some republics set themselves apart, and it was the republics that were the most developed that had separatist ideas. And that was not intrinsic to Yugoslavia. If you look at the world today, we have a phenomenon whereby the highly developed regions want to link themselves up to other highly developed economies, and they tend to forget about the development of the network of economic relations within each republic. So that was the case not only of Yugoslavia.

Look at Italy, the Lombardi district, for example.

Q. Thank you, Professor.

A. Well --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, would you stop a minute for me, please.

Mr. Milosevic, what is the relevance of this to the issues before the Court, the influence of economic differences on Yugoslavia's break-up? ^{34680 BLANK PAGE 34681} This is not a university tutorial. It's not the issue that we're considering here.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no, no. The basic question that can be established here on the basis of facts indeed is whether Serbia was dominant or not between the two world wars and after the Second World War until the break-up of Yugoslavia. It is material facts here that prove what the situation was. It's not only that Serbia was not dominant. It was dominated all the time. This is a very precise analysis corroborated by figures, something that no one could have invented or twisted in any way. The figures speak for themselves.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, since you're quoting Singleton --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Not yet. You have to wait for us to consider. You have to wait for the Chamber to consider. I have questioned the relevance. I will now consult my colleagues on the issue.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we'll allow you to ask the question, but we will be vigilant to ensure that the matters being raised are relevant to the issues. It's a very narrow issue that you are contending here, and we want to make sure that you're on point.

MR. NICE: With an eye on the clock, can I simply observe that I have a short, very short, procedural matter to raise with you which would be convenient to raise before we rise today.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. And, Mr. Milosevic, you are aware, of course, that the Chamber will be concluding its work tomorrow at 12.00. ³⁴⁶⁸²

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was informed only yesterday. I was not aware of that beforehand. I don't know whether you planned it beforehand, but I received this information only yesterday. I was not aware of it until yesterday.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The legal officer.

[Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I am told that that notification has been in the schedule for some time, at least a week now, at least a week. I think other parties had notice of it, so I don't know why you were only informed yesterday.

In any event, I make the point because you have -- you have --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know.

JUDGE ROBINSON: -- the Professor has to leave tomorrow and there has to be cross-examination. So you will take that into account. Mr. Nice, so far we have not been limiting your cross-examination to any particular time, as was done with Mr. Milosevic when he cross-examined during the Prosecution case, and maybe tomorrow we'll have to do that.

MR. NICE: Well, I'm very anxious to conclude this witness tomorrow and it will help me to know how long the accused intends to be with him and I can tailor my questions accordingly.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, how much longer are you going to be?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At least one more session, I think.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, Judge Kwon has worked it out, and if you ³⁴⁶⁸³ take one more session -- no, one hour, one hour. If you take one hour more, you will have then had 138 minutes. The Prosecutor would be entitled to two-thirds of that time, 92 minutes, and that would take us to 12.00 with a 20-minute break. So you should try to tailor your examination-in-chief to conclude in an hour.

As you know, I'm not given to these time-fixing devices, and I only enter into it because of the particular difficulties faced by this witness and the Court schedule.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the matter I was going to raise related to witnesses who might have come tomorrow had we had time for more witnesses but in fact is perhaps properly raised now because immediately after tomorrow we'll all separate and the next series of witnesses will come up fresh in January. The next two witnesses currently notified, Eve Crepin, and Patrick Barriot, according to the 65 ter summary served, would appear to be --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, it occurs to me that we're probably not being courteous to the witness.

MR. NICE: Absolutely. It has nothing to do with the witness, and I apologise.

JUDGE ROBINSON: It has nothing to do with him. Mr. Milosevic, maybe we should excuse the witness now and let him return tomorrow.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I have no other choice. I don't know whether I can conclude the examination-in-chief within one hour, but I will try to make the most rational use of time possible. At any rate, the professor is going to travel on the following day because ³⁴⁶⁸⁴ you do not work from tomorrow afternoon onwards, as far as I know.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We can't sit beyond 12.00 because the Appeals Chamber is going to make use of this Chamber to issue an important decision. And the other courtrooms are not available because there is no Albanian interpretation, I think.

But we will, again, make an inquiry through the Registrar to see whether it is possible to sit beyond 12.00 in another courtroom. We will not be able to continue in this courtroom because the Appeals Chamber will require it.

Professor Popov -- sorry. Professor Mihailovic, you may leave now and return at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

[The witness stands down]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, yes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the witnesses currently next on the witness schedule, Eve Crepin and Patrick Barriot, appear from their 65 ter summaries to cover really exactly the same topic. They were together and they wrote a book together and matters of that sort. Of course, how the accused spends the fixed amount of time that is available to him is a matter for him, which is why we don't interrupt too often on questions of relevance. Because he has a fixed amount of time, it's his choice. But if these witnesses are duplicative or repetitive, then the Chamber might want to limit him to calling only one of them. And rather than inconvenience such a witness or one of the two of them by having him or her come here and then be excluded, might it be sensible to establish with the accused, perhaps tomorrow before we break, whether there is a good ^{34685 BLANK PAGE 34686 BLANK PAGE 34687 BLANK PAGE 34688 BLANK PAGE 34689 BLANK PAGE 34690 BLANK PAGE 34691 BLANK PAGE 34692 BLANK PAGE 34693} reason for having two witnesses covering the same evidential territory.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice. We'll consider that matter tomorrow.

Do you want to say anything about it now, Mr. Milosevic?

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume that it's clear to you that I'm not going to put the same questions to them. They have the same experience but from different aspects. Of course I'm not going to put the same questions to them. I thought that their testimony should be abbreviated, both of them, so that they would not overstep the time given to one witness usually.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That would be helpful for a start, yes.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: There is a courtroom available from 10 to 3.00 tomorrow, but the contingencies are so many that it doesn't seem to be practicable; staffing, for one, and -- yes. I think we have to work on the basis that we'll conclude at 12.00 tomorrow. Well, we're adjourned until tomorrow morning at 9.00.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.58 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 17th day of

December, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.