³⁴⁷¹⁵

Friday, 17 December 2004

[Open Session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.22 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We lost some time this morning, and this is how we plan to make up the time: Mr. Milosevic to spend another hour, to 10.45 in examination-in-chief -- sorry, yes. Mr. Milosevic, another hour, to 10.20. And we take the first break at -- we take the break at 10.45, and with the indulgence of the interpreters, for five minutes -- for ten minutes, resuming at 10.55, and working until ten past twelve when we will have to break to allow for the changeover for the Appeals Chamber. Mr. Milosevic.

KOSTA MIHAILOVIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Milosevic. Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. Good morning.

A. Good morning.

Q. Yesterday we left off at Fred Singleton's paper. The title of its paper and especially its content lead to the conclusion that the increase in development in Slovenia and Croatia, on the one hand, he saw as the main reason of political tensions in Yugoslavia. This is what follows from the article.

In connection with this, do you have any comment? ³⁴⁷¹⁶

A. Yes. I think that Professor Singleton saw perfectly clearly what the regional situation was in Yugoslavia and that he identified the issues quite rightly; the deepening of differences in development between Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand and the rest of Yugoslavia on the other hand. This was almost obvious, and it was not hard to establish this, especially, of course, if somebody wished to see what the real situation was.

Q. As proof of his thesis that economic relations had a decisive influence on interethnic or international tensions, he points out that the mass movement in Croatia and the demonstrations of 1971 was important. Something very strange happened: The students demanded a change in the foreign currency regime.

Please look at page 293 of his paper, where he says: "The figures show that both Croatia and Slovenia [In English] [Previous translation continues]... last 25 years steadily improved, both in absolute per capita income and also their relative income in comparison with the less-developed republics."

[Interpretation] He goes on: "[In English] [Previous translation continues]... what has been taken from the wealthier republics then to assess the benefits they have received from the cheap food and raw materials and more recently the cheap, unskilled labour which they have been able to import from the poorer regions."

[Interpretation] In connection with what I asked you, and I ask you to comment on this, on page 294, in his paper, in tab 7, he says: "It is interesting to note [In English] [Previous translation continues]... ³⁴⁷¹⁷ that the students who protested in the streets of Zagreb in November 1971 used to slogans such as 'End the plunder of Croatia,' and 'Foreign exchange resources to those who earn' them. Foreign exchange resources --" [Interpretation] Foreign exchange sources. "[In English] [Previous translation continues]... those who earn them, those who really --" [Interpretation] These were the slogans.

He goes on, and I quote -- he goes on to say that the then president of the party in Croatia, Savka Davcevic-Kucar, spoke "[In English] [Previous translation continues]... Socialist Sovereign State of Croatia within the framework of Socialist Yugoslavia which is a national state of the Croat nation."

[Interpretation] Do you see in this a correct description of the growth in tensions and what caused them?

A. I think that this example that you gave of the student demonstrations, which came out with slogans about the lack of hard currency to the detriment of Croatia, I think that this is pure ideology, nationalist ideology within the mass movement that took place in Croatia. From what was said yesterday and today, we have seen that Croatia was a republic with above average development and pulling a detail out of context could not be justified. Also, it is not true in itself, because Croatia insisted on the -- on using more foreign exchange because it was the exporter of final products. It did not, however, take into account the input coming from other republics; for example, electric power, raw materials such as copper and lead, labour, and so on and so forth, and this was met with severe criticism by economists who saw this demand as ³⁴⁷¹⁸ totally unjustified.

It's interesting to note that this did yield some results, because in spite of these demonstrations which were nationalist and which had to be condemned even in Croatia itself, Croatia did obtain an increase in the quota of foreign exchange remaining at its disposal.

Q. Thank you, Professor. What was Tito's attitude to Croatia?

MR. NICE: I didn't object to that question, but I shouldn't like it to be thought that it's concession that this is an appropriate way of using somebody else's writings and opinions. It doesn't seem to me from my understanding of the question and of the document of Singleton that he's an eyewitness. Now, it's one thing to ask a witness to comment on what's in somebody else's report reflecting eyewitness evidence. It's entirely another thing to simply put before a witness an article of someone else and then to try and get the article in and to try and get comment based on it.

It seems to me we are entering a difficult area, and I would ask the Chamber to limit the accused in his use of other materials to the same parameters that applied to us.

Before I sit down, this of course, an expert is entitled to and typically does cite authorities. So he might cite in a footnote Singleton, something like that. If not cross-examined on the point, then the document will typically not go in. If cross-examined on it, then typically it may go in. That seems to me the normal practice we've been following.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. We take account of the ³⁴⁷¹⁹ point that you have made.

Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume, gentlemen, that you have in mind that these assessments by an expert such as Fred Singleton are fully in accordance with the assessments made by Professor Mihailovic. So that from the viewpoint of an economist from Yugoslavia and from the viewpoint of a foreign observer who was also highly competent, we see that they say the same thing.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, did you know Fred Singleton personally?

A. Yes. I once met him while he was studying in Belgrade, and we had a long conversation, but this was after he wrote his article.

Q. Even this meeting of yours could not affect what he wrote in this article?

A. No.

Q. And he represented the situation objectively, as far as I can see. Do you agree?

A. I do for the most part.

Q. Tell me, please, what was the attitude of Tito towards the Croatian mass movement, the nationalist wave in the '70s?

A. I think it was ambivalent. Professor Singleton established that Tito acted decisively, but this is true only at one point in time. This was a very bizarre situation.

In the summer of 1971, manoeuvres were held on the -- and on the 16th of September, when the manoeuvres ended, there was a reception in the ^{34720 BLANK PAGE 34721} Hotel Esplanade. Tito welcomed the party chief from Croatia, Savka Davcevic-Kucar, and he toured Croatia and learned precisely what was going on in Croatia, that all kinds of things were being said.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I've just stopped you because you have already answered the question that Mr. Milosevic asked. You said his attitude was ambivalent. We don't have much time. Move on to another question, We don't have much time. Move on to another question, please, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I just want to say that in tab 14 and tab 15, you have reports from that time, from the leading newspaper Politika, and I will quote only a small part where Tito says, that was on Tuesday the 9th of May, 1972, and the article is entitled what Tito Told The Croatian Leadership Last Summer, and it says that the demons of nationalism are gathering under the wing of nationalism, all kinds of opposing opinions, and so on and so forth. And then he goes on to say that the situation in Croatia is not good, that Croatia has become a key problem in the country because of rampant nationalism. Tito, the unchallenged leader of the country at the time, said that Croatia had become a key problem because of rampant nationalism.

And then in tab 15, you have what Professor Mihailovic now said. He said that I -- "This time I saw that there are some really absurd stories about Croatia, that a lot of chauvinism exists and flourishes there. This is incorrect." And this was followed by applause. Does this, Professor, express what you just said, his ambivalent ³⁴⁷²² attitude? I wouldn't even use the word ambivalent; I would call it two-faced. Is this a two-faced attitude?

A. Yes.

Q. In your opinion, did Tito actually support Croatian nationalism at the time?

A. Well, that's what follows from his statement. Maybe he felt personally threatened because he had a young and aggressive political team which was probably threatening his personal position. And this could have been a reaction.

Q. Very well. We'll move on a bit faster. What was the response of the party in Serbia? You were then a member of the administration of the Literary Association.

A. Well, according to the principle of symmetry, nationalism had to be discovered and pointed out in the other republics, and they wanted to find a counterpart to the Croatian nationalism in Serbia. However, I think that this attempt by the Serbian party to discover nationalism, especially in the Serbian Literary Association, was unsuccessful. In Serbia -- or, rather, in Croatia it was the Matica Hrvatska that was the brain of this movement. So the counterpart in Serbia would have been the Literary Association. However, they were unable to discover any nationalist activities in that institution.

In Serbia, there were only isolated and trivial and unimportant responses to that situation.

Q. Thank you, Professor. There was a party commission at that time which attempted to find nationalism in the Serb Literary Association at ³⁴⁷²³ any cost.

A. Yes. This was a three-member commission: Milan Milutinovic, Professor Kaparovic, and Bakocevic were its members.

Q. Thank you, Professor. Now, tell me, was there any direct or indirect recognition by the official bodies in Croatia that the Yugoslav republic -- this Yugoslav republic had above-average economic development? In pages 58 and 59 or -- in your version, and 47, 48 in the English version, speak about the improvement of the economy in Croatia. The negotiations about secession showed this because the Croatian delegation suggested that the principle of justice in division of the assets of the former SFRY had to redress the situation.

THE INTERPRETER: This is too fast for the interpreters to follow.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreters are complaining about your speed.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The interpreters have Professor Mihailovic's paper, and they can read from the English translation. I assume this is not too difficult.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. There is no doubt, then, that this confirms that even they admitted that Croatia's development had been above average. Is this correct?

A. Yes. This was a bizarre detail.

Q. Yes, but this fact was established, is it not beyond doubt, Professor?

A. Yes. It was surprising that they themselves put forward such a ³⁴⁷²⁴ proposal, and the Yugoslav side accepted this immediately, to their surprise. When they got home and realised how well Croatia had done, they gave up their own convictions and even the principle of justice, which was to have been the foundation of any agreement.

Q. Professor, what were the causes and the differences in development between Croatia and the other republics and provinces?

A. This was the territorial distribution of assets. Croatia and Slovenia, especially Slovenia, had above-average investment and a very favourable structure of investments. Also, there was the institutional system which provided conditions of exchange. There was customs protection, there was the pricing system, there were subsidies for exports, and these were all measures favouring the more developed republics.

What came from the more developed republics, what they gave for the development of the less developed republics was seen only as compensation for this. If that is so, then these measures were neutralised, in a way, and investments were used to their fullest.

Q. What assets were recruited, and what was done to prevent the deepening of this gap between the more developed and less developed areas of Yugoslavia?

A. Well, generally speaking, the measures of the development policy were very meager in Yugoslavia. There was a fund for the development of underdeveloped areas, and the contributions were between 1.50 and 1.70 of the social sector of the economy, and transfer was made to the underdeveloped areas in a very strange way. There were keys according to ³⁴⁷²⁵ which funds were allocated to the underdeveloped areas. These areas authorised certain banks in their areas, and this was done automatically. Afterwards, attempts were made for those areas giving funds to this fund to take a direct part in the allocation of these resources and investments, but this was not done. The technical assistance which is normal under such circumstances was very meager. The underdeveloped areas were given the possibility of doing whatever they wanted with their means, even to use them for purposes other than those intended.

Q. Thank you, Professor. Now let's take a look at tab 18 where we have just one part of the declaration made by the federal parliament, which was published as an official declaration of the parliament in the Official Gazette which publishes laws, bylaws, official documents of the federal parliament, generally speaking.

And I'd just like to quote point 1.2, which is contained in tab 18. On the left-hand side of the column, where it says: "In keeping with the options from the long-term programme for economic stabilisation and stopping the relative lag in development in the economic development of the territory of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, outside the territories of the autonomous provinces in comparison to the overall country will be done by reliance on one's own forces, the association of labour and resources and the undertaking concrete measures of economic and developmental policy."

Now, Professor, is this a clearly stated position according to which the supreme authority in Yugoslavia at that point in time takes clear note of the lag in development of the territory of Serbia outside ^{34726 BLANK PAGE 34727} the provinces and that it is intending to apply some sort of - how shall I put this? - launch a principled appeal to rely on their own forces to improve the situation whereas there were no concrete measures and steps actually taken?

A. Yes, your observation is correct. The Republic of Serbia and Serbia proper, which despite the fact that it was constantly below the Yugoslav average in terms of per capita income and per capita social product was, from the beginning, ranked as a developed area, like Slovenia and Croatia, for example. So that the sources were allocated from one fund to another, but actually this territory received nothing from the fund which in time led to a serious lagging behind in development. And it was a typical area which did not see constant development. It continued to be below average and was never able to reach that average, which meant that it was not able to see any capital accumulation and development. And on the basis of the analyses that were compiled in all the institutes of economics, there were three institutes for Yugoslav as a whole for conducting these economic analyses, and they resulted in two five-year plans, development plans, in the 1980s, and Serbia proper was not exempt from their obligations to allocate resources. But an attempt was made through six or seven different measures that were set out and taken to stop that process.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we don't need that much detail. We just need the main points.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ³⁴⁷²⁸

Q. At any rate, the economic position of Serbia, which is confirmed and borne out by the observations made by the top organs of power and authority was below the Yugoslav average; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So let's go back to the question once again of whether Serbia dominated or whether it did not dominate.

A. Well, according to the analyses that we have before us here, the social product of Serbia per capita decreased to 80 per cent, which means that it lagged behind approximately 20 per cent. It was 20 per cent not below the Yugoslav average but in relation to the average in the rest of Yugoslavia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this aspect of his evidence has been made very, very clear, that Serbia lagged behind the other republics. I think you should move on to something else.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Just briefly, Professor, please, what were the limiting factors in Kosovo's development? Let's focus our attention now on the question of Kosovo. What were the limiting or restricting factors of Kosovo's development, and how far was economic development efficacious in comparison with the efficaciousness in the other parts of Yugoslavia?

A. Well, it was very low effectiveness. There was low investment, low labour productivity, and so forth, so that in addition to the high birth rate of the population, this was one of the main causes for the area's slow development. For example, Kosovo had a rate of development in ³⁴⁷²⁹ the entire post-war period of 4 per cent, looking at the overall social product development, which makes it 1.6 per cent per capita. So the demographic investments accounted for 2.4 per cent. And if to that we add the low efficiency of the investments and low labour productivity, then of course it lagged behind considerably.

Q. How far did the federation and the Republic of Serbia itself involve itself in the financing of Kosovo? What did they do to finance Kosovo?

A. Well, it was like this: Indirectly speaking, through the fund for the lesser developed regions, Serbia made its contributions, although Serbia also gained with Kosovo, because Kosovo increased its share annually, so ultimately used 50 per cent of the overall resources in the fund for assistance to the developing regions.

Q. Thank you, Professor. You studied not only the history of the population of Serbia but migrations within Yugoslavia and the economic emigration to other countries, to third countries. So what were these migrations motivated by? What caused them amongst the Yugoslav republics and within Yugoslavia, let's take that first.

A. Well, we have two motives, the economic and ethnocentric, as we call it. The economic migration was relatively smaller in scope and of lesser importance, and it occurred mostly between Slovenia and Croatia as the republics which were immigration republics and had a need for labour force coming in from other areas. They needed a labour force coming in. But what is characteristic and interesting to note as far as relationships go is the ethnocentric migration, as it was called, which went toward ³⁴⁷³⁰ Serbia. And as Serbia was lagging behind, it had unemployment rate that was above average but it had this ethnocentric emigration and people coming in from Croatia and Kosovo and Slovenia which was quite unusual. If was very unusual to have a majority nation, for example, prompted by non-economic measures, to leave their homes through -- for non-economic reasons and move elsewhere, migrate elsewhere, to areas -- from areas where they had been living for centuries.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Were these Serbs from Croatia, Kosovo, and Slovenia migrating to Serbia?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. Into Serbia. Into Serbia, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, so that this should not be understood in a one-sided manner, you spoke about ethnocentrism as a concept and as a reason and that there was population migration and movement whereby certain nationalities from one republic would go to their central republics. And as far as I understood you, that was a general phenomenon.

A. Well, yes. It was a phenomenon that was evident in Bosnia, for example, because the Serbs went towards Serbia, the Croats went towards Croatia, and the Muslims, not only did they not go away, but from Serbia, from Sandzak, they would move into Bosnia.

Q. But what was the main reason for the Serbs leaving Kosovo, in your opinion?

A. Well, the reason the Serbs left Kosovo, the main reason for that, was the pressure that was exerted on them. The Serbian Academy of ³⁴⁷³¹ Sciences in 1985 organised a survey organised by two university professors. They were not members of the academy themselves. Their names were Marina Blagojevic and Ruza Petrovic, and they published a report numbering 280 pages which showed all the modalities of pressure, all the ways in which pressure was exerted on the Serbs to leave, and I think that that has been attached to the documents that you already have. And that 1985 survey would be among those documents.

Q. Yes. Now, tell me, Professor, what do you think about the thesis that by the 1974 constitution the -- that Serbia abolished the autonomy of the provinces and returned the system to the system of centralisation in the whole of Yugoslavia whereas Croatia and Slovenia came out in favour of confederation and allegedly showed that they were in favour of the development of democracy? What do you think about that idea, that concept?

A. I think that autonomy was never abolished. That's my first point. The situation that was created through the 1974 constitution --

MR. NICE: I must have missed it but I'm not sure that this has been covered in his expert report, has it? And what expertise does he have? And I haven't interrupted but the questions are pretty well at large and without any reference to his either source material or his expertise.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I think that point is well taken. Move on to another point. It's not part of his expertise.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly request that the speakers make pauses between question and answer, thank you. ^{34732 BLANK PAGE 34733}

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you must make pauses, and Professor, between question and answer in the interests of interpretation.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, you were one of the authors of the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. We're going to go over several questions having to do with the memorandum. Our time is limited, of course, so we'll have to be quick.

Tell us when and where it was decided to write the memorandum in the first place. Was that an autonomous decision made by the Serbian Academy or did anybody influence that decision-making?

A. It was a completely autonomous decision by the academy, mostly people of the social sciences, and there were several of us. Academician Maksimovic, at the Assembly held in 1985, for example, put forward the proposal according to which the establishment should be presented with a memorandum stating the seriousness of the crisis that had come upon us and that serious steps should be taken to deal with it. This was adopted in 1985, and it was almost realised in 1986 because it was never actually completed.

Q. Professor, what were the reasons, the motives behind writing the memorandum?

A. The motives were first and foremost a feeling that existed that -- of the country having entered a serious crisis and that no way out was immediately visible. And the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences not only as a science institution but as a national institution as well was ³⁴⁷³⁴ deeply concerned by that. It felt that it could not keep quiet, could not keep silent, but had to state its views and present its ideas. Also, there were many scientific meetings organised by the academy that had been held beforehand in which the powers that be, the political powers that be showed themselves to be unmoved by the situation they were facing. So we felt that there should be a document which would more immediately send out a warning, an alarm to the government of the seriousness of the situation in hand. So those were the main motives.

Q. After you had taken the decision to write the memorandum or, rather, the academy, as far as I know, a commission was set up numbering 16 members, members of the academy, who were supposed to put that decision into practice. You yourself were one of those members. What issues and questions did you deal with before you actually sat down to write the memorandum itself?

A. Before we wrote the memorandum, we discussed who the memorandum should be addressed to, where to send it out to, and then it was said that it should be addressed either to the Presidency of Serbia or the Assembly. So it was a document prepared in order to be closed from the public. I saw some versions; on one it said the Presidency of Serbia, on the other it said the Assembly of Serbia. So that's one point. Now, we discussed whether it should be a sort of programme document, setting out a programme, or a document of warning, stating that the situation was very serious and that steps should be taken. So although there were ideas put forward according to which the memorandum should contain some elements of a specific programme to deal ³⁴⁷³⁵ with the situation, that was rejected. And the working group and the commission unanimously decided that it should be a strictly internal document and that if a programme was to be devised, that this should be done later on, and that's what happened. In the 1990s, or in 1990, an attempt was made to make a different -- write a different document which could resemble a national programme. However, that attempt did not succeed. We came across some misunderstandings.

So these two documents are essentially different.

Q. Was there a synopsis according -- for the document, and have you -- do you have the synopsis? Because as far as I understand it, it was preserved.

A. Yes, there was a four-page synopsis setting out the basic schematic for the document and some basic theses were put forward as well. The memorandum was not original, in fact. It is a synthesis of existing knowledge and information. So in the synopsis itself, we could see basic ideas and concepts and theses being put forward. So that the synopsis itself was a synthetic picture of what was developed in the memorandum itself.

Q. Now, how does the synopsis explain the writing of the memorandum, the causes for writing it or reasons for writing it? How is the position of Serbia defined? What is being requested?

A. Well, in the synopsis itself, as in the memorandum, we insisted upon equality, having Serbia on -- be on an equal footing in the political sense and in other senses. Nothing more than that was required. Equality. And it was also mentioned that that might not be in keeping ³⁴⁷³⁶ with Serbia's position or, rather, that Serbia was historically predestined to unite that portion of the population in the Balkans and that it would have compromised its historical role had it asked for anything more than full equality with other nations, to be on a footing of equality with all the other nations and nationalities.

Q. You've said a moment ago that the memorandum was a synthesis of the scientific research already conducted. So can I take it, then, that the scientific basis for the memorandum was not any separate research worked out for the purposes of the memorandum but that the group of academicians drafting the memorandum used research that had already been conducted up until then and that it represented a synthesis of what science had established up until that time; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right. And this synthesis -- and what is important here, I would like to note this, that there was an anticipatory note of events that might take place unless steps were taken. So it was a forecast of what might happen given the crisis unless certain steps and measures were taken to deal with it. So I think that the value of that document lies therein. It anticipated what might happen. It looked at where development might lead. And it also mentioned the possibility of Yugoslavia's disintegration and breakdown, and so it confirmed that the analyses and basic foundations leading to that conclusion were sound.

Q. Tell me, Professor, in view of the fact that the memorandum is said to have overly stressed the economic lagging behind of Serbia, as an economist, to what extent can you respond to such criticisms? Did the memorandum overstate the economic backwardness of Serbia? ³⁴⁷³⁷

A. Well, it could not be either overestimated or underestimated. If Serbia was truly falling behind according to its GDP, the value of its funds, if instead of maintaining its position at a little below average or rising to average, if it was falling lower and lower below average, according to all the indications, I don't know if that was cause for equanimity or whether something had to be done.

Q. Professor, in the attacks on the memorandum, its content has often been described as nationalist. It's been characterised as a nationalistic document. Are these assessments based on the text of the memorandum?

A. On the contrary. Nationalism is condemned as one of the fundamental causes of the crisis, the deformations in the economic system, and if you have patience with me I can show you ten places where there are explicit statements against nationalism. The memorandum is criticised without ever relying on the text itself.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think we have that point. If you're asked in cross-examination, you can give the references.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. The text of the memorandum is here, but for the sake of saving time, I will not ask the Professor to point out all these places.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, the memorandum is said to be a Greater Serbia programme. Is this correct?

A. I think I've already answered this question. This has already been said. I would describe the memorandum as a document of warning.

Q. Professor, if it's not a national programme or platform, how would ^{34738 BLANK PAGE 34739} you briefly describe the memorandum, as a document of warning?

A. Yes.

Q. An assessment of the situation based on scholarship and a warning of what this was leading to?

A. Yes, and that measures have to be taken, nothing more than that. That was the clear framework and goal of the memorandum.

Q. Very well. Can you explain, in view of the fact that especially in the West, in the Western propaganda, it has been said the memorandum is responsible for stoking the fires of nationalist conflicts between the peoples of the former Yugoslavia and that it contributed to the break-up of Yugoslavia, is this based on fact?

A. No. You cannot find anything like this anywhere in the memorandum. Secondly, people keep forgetting that the memorandum was not addressed to the general public at all. It was a document which was supposed to have been sent to one of the leading bodies in the republic, either the Presidency or the Assembly. The fact that it was leaked and misused in order to attack the academy, that's something that the academy's not responsible for. Neither the academy nor the document can be held responsible for this. If the language used in the memorandum is quite strong, the purpose was to wake up the top leadership which was not aware of the depth and profundity of the crisis.

Q. The memorandum is very critical of the 1974 constitution which it blames for the break-up of Yugoslavia. Are those critics of the memorandum right who see in it an advocation of a return to centralisation, the positions of AVNOJ and so on? ³⁴⁷⁴⁰

A. No. I think that very erroneous opinions are being bandied about with respect to centralism. The former Yugoslavia was a one-party state with a hierarchical structure. It was the party that was centralised, and the leader was at the top.

After the death of Tito and Kardelj, a new situation was created where the state could not simply be a place of transmission but an original organ. What sort of centralism was this? It could not be restored in the same way that it had existed up to Tito's death, because no one could become a second Tito in the former Yugoslavia or have such pretensions, especially as Yugoslavia was broken up into a polycentrist state. No one could impose this system on anyone else any longer. People who say that confederation was a prerequisite of democratisation are wrong. This is ridiculous. This was going on to its full extent, decentralisation and democratisation, and this was ridiculous.

I don't know if in other countries they -- they have to become Confederate countries in order to be democratic.

Q. Professor, have you heard about the Blue Book, and are you aware of its content? Have you read it? When you were writing the memorandum, did any member of the commission read this Blue Book? In tab 3, I will quote. The document is called the Blue Book of the Presidency of Serbia. It was drawn up in March 1977, and its full title is The Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia Constitutional Position and Practice, and the proposal was neither accepted nor rejected. Three years after the constitution of 1974, the Presidency of Serbia found that such ³⁴⁷⁴¹ systemic solutions had negative effects. They drew up the Blue Book, but they put it under the carpet, so to say.

How do you explain this?

A. I heard and I think that others have heard of the existence of this Blue Book. It was a document under seal. After the constitution of 1974 was enacted, the Presidency of Serbia set up a commission containing -- which was composed of university professors and prominent civil servants, people from the Assembly and so on, and their task was to show what the effects the new constitution were and what problems were emerging in connection with its implementation. This Blue Book was a confidential document. It was under seal.

Rumours were going around, saying that it criticised the constitution and asked for its amendment, but text itself wasn't available. You may be surprised to hear that I found this text and was able to obtain it only a few days ago. It was published in 1990 by a journalist within the framework of certain interviews, but nobody knew anything about this.

I have simply scanned it, and I think that what was said about it is correct. It is about 50 printed pages long and contains a critique of the legislation and the -- what was happening, and it shows that it was the cause of a large-scale disintegration of Serbia, that the initial -- its initial shortcomings had grown into a huge problem. This was an unsuccessful document which led to the full disintegration of Serbia, which made it an ill-defined area.

Q. This -- these were the findings of the Presidency of Serbia three ³⁴⁷⁴² years after the adoption of the constitution.

A. Let me just add that, according to reliable information, a three-day session was held, and there was a heated discussion in the comments to the text that was printed. It says that this was neither approved nor adopted, and there was even a proposal that the document should be burned. It had been printed in only 40 copies and those who received it had to keep it strictly confidential. I was unable to obtain the minutes and the transcripts of these discretions -- discussions, but everybody knows that Kardelj was there and that he prevented and suppressed the discussion - I think "suppressed" is the right word - so that it practically petered out. And this was characteristic of life in Serbia in general at the time. All the republics thought that they could meddle in Serbia's internal affairs while Serbia never meddled in the internal affairs of others. And I think this indicates how subservient Serbia was.

Q. As you were a university professor at the time, tell me, how did professional academic scholarly circles respond?

A. This was a response to the amendments which were built in as the mainstays of this constitution. At the faculty of law, there was a very strong reaction to this. Professor Mihailovic, who is now an academician, and a secretary of our department were sentenced to eight months in prison, and he served this sentence, because he was critical. He made a speech, it's five or six typewritten pages long, and I think it's in the documentation, from which it can clearly be seen that he started from the positions that nationalism and the problems of the state were issues that ³⁴⁷⁴³ should not be prominent in the 21st century, especially not in our parts. However, at that time Croatian nationalism was not only aggressive --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, according to the schedule that I outlined at the start of the proceedings, there are just another three or four minutes for you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I will put only one question, then.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Professor, how do you explain the large-scale propaganda campaign in the West against the memorandum of the Serb Academy of Sciences?

A. This propaganda did not exist from the very beginning. I even think that judging by the responses of the embassies in Belgrade, it was seen as an act of civil courage, but the situation changed with the break-up of Yugoslavia. The West accepted the thesis of Serbian -- of -- interpreter's apology -- Croatian and Slovenian propaganda. This is easy to refute, but this was propagated on a wide scale. In the press, in so-called scholarly institutions, they all copied texts from each other without ever looking at the original text and never relying on an analysis of the original text of the memorandum.

Q. Thank you, Professor.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I can imagine the circumstances where we'll be somewhat pressed for time at the end of the morning. I don't forecast asking many, if any, questions about the accused's exhibits, the ^{34744 BLANK PAGE 34745} Defence exhibits. I'm concerned that we may be facing an application to let in really a large amount of documentation that hasn't either been cited or quoted from at all and has simply been identified, and in those circumstances I wonder if it might be prudent on this occasion to deal with the Defence exhibits now in order not to avoid -- in order to avoid dealing with them in a great rush at the end of the morning. I'm happy to do it either way, obviously, but I can see problems.

JUDGE KWON: Do you have any specific opposition except for tab 19 and 20?

MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, I haven't been, I'm afraid, noting exhibits on an exhibit-by-exhibit basis because sometimes it's been going too quickly for me, but it seems to me that there's been a lot of simply identifying a document and then not referring to it or quoting from it at all. And if we are to pursue the same policy which we have been pursuing to date of dealing, in our analysis for the concluding arguments, with every document that comes in, and I suspect that the Chamber with its legal officers is doing the same thing, we are adding substantially to the burden of work without the material necessarily having any evidential value. That's my concern. There have been these very large books and I'm not sure what their status is.

JUDGE KWON: My question is whether in this case if you have some specific opposition to the specific exhibits, tabs, except for tab 19 and tab 20.

MR. NICE: Those are the very big ones. Yes, I think -- in the earlier ones -- for example, we've just looked at Klava Kniva [phoen], the ³⁴⁷⁴⁶ Blue Book. That one is probably an exhibit that we should have in because it's part of the narrative, but it's only been referred to, it hasn't actually been quoted from. I don't mind with that case. But with all the others, I think where there's simply been reference, and I haven't identified exactly which ones it is because it has been going fast, I can't see any real reason to have them in. And there was the problem, again, about the -- the problem I raised earlier about the report or the opinion of another author which was simply borrowed. It wasn't -- it wasn't being cited for any reason except to borrow it and repeat it. It may be something the Chamber would want to think about in the short break.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic was operating under the pressure of time. I think that's why he just made references.

MR. KAY: Can we just say it is a learned report with these references in these tabs plainly going to the report and the argument of this witness, which has a very clear direction when you consider the whole of the report.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will admit all of the documents in the binder except for tab 19. We admit them on the basis of the references made to them. 20 is not admitted. Those that haven't been translated will be marked for identification pending translation.

THE REGISTRAR: The expert report will be marked as D265, and the binder of the expert witness will be D266.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just a minute. Since we're dealing ³⁴⁷⁴⁷ with exhibits, I'm reminded there are three exhibits from the last witness -- four? Four exhibits. Well, three or four, and we just want to have them admitted now. Do you have them ready?

I think we're losing time. Let's continue with the --

JUDGE KWON: Next tab numbers will be given.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll come back to these. We'll come back to those at the end of the day's proceedings.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much. Your Honours, I will deal with this witness today. I shall, therefore, have to be extremely selective in the material I put to him and won't necessarily be able to advance all aspects of our case with him.

Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. How long, Professor, have you known the accused personally?

A. I have known him since 1988.

Q. You've been not only working with him but you've become friends of his -- a friend of his?

A. Well, I don't think you could call it friend. I don't know how one defines friendship. He asked me to take part, in 1988, in the work of the Commission for the Economic Reform. So I cooperated with him in the commission until 1991, until the commission lasted and worked. We had about 40 meetings, 40 sessions, and our relationship was very proper. Now, whether they were -- whether it was friendship, I can't say that it was intimate friendship.

Q. You also assisted him following the Karadjordjevo meeting in March of 1991, did you not? ³⁴⁷⁴⁸

A. No. I was never in Karadjordjevo.

Q. The meetings that followed the Karadjordjevo meeting, the meetings of the group of experts, did you take part in those?

A. I don't know which group you're referring to. Could you tell me what meetings and which group of experts you mean?

Q. I'll come back to that later because I want to deal with things chronologically, but thank you for your answer so far. Let's go to the memorandum. The memorandum, it is said, was leaked. Subsequently in 1995, there was an edition of the memorandum published together with Answers to Criticisms, and that document was prepared by you and Vasilije Krestic; correct?

A. Correct.

Q. We have that as an exhibit in this case, number D250, I think. Do you have a copy of that document before you?

A. I do.

MR. NICE: If the Chamber doesn't have their copy with them I'll lay the appropriate passages on the overhead projector. Can we ask for the assistance of the usher, please, and we'll lay the -- lay this on the overhead projector, just a couple of passages to look at, partly to remind the Judges of what it contains and to look at one or two particular items.

Q. If we look on what is the English page 17 - and it may be that we'll find the corresponding reference for you in the Serbian version - at the foot of page 17, we find this passage: "The unauthorised --" I'll read it to you, Professor, you will remember it, I expect. "The ³⁴⁷⁴⁹ unauthorised version of the text which was leaked to the public had not received approval. Finally, the chapter stated its opinion that there were compelling reasons for work on this important project to be continued."

The next paragraph begins: "Unfortunately, the public outcry over the memorandum did not die down even after the meeting of the party chapter."

Professor, we have done an analysis which I hope was made available to you by the Defence, but it may not have been, comparing the original 1986 version, which was always said to be a draft, with the version published by you in 1995, and there were found to be only six short passages that were different between the two versions. Are you aware of the fact that the limit -- the differences between the two versions were as limited as that?

A. I don't know about those differences. The only difference I know about is that a line from the economic section was left out in the typing, omitted in the typing. There was a version that was considered and copied in a number of copies --

THE INTERPRETER: I think 20, the witness said, interpreter's note.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- and there was a collective editorship which was not completed, was edited, and 16 copies were distributed among the 16 members of the commission. Three went to those who were provisional consultants, such as Dobrica Cosic, Professor Jovan Djordjevic, and Luba Tadic, those three. And one copy remained ^{34750 BLANK PAGE 34751} undistributed as far as my memory serves me. So 20 copies.

MR. NICE:

Q. Is it --

A. I don't know that there were any differences between the text that was printed and published. And if there are any differences, then they can only be negligible, minor differences, not of any substance.

Q. You see -- thank you for that. That, then, probably confirms our analysis. The limited differences between the 1986 version and the version finally published in your Answers to Criticisms in 1995 raises as a possibility that far from being accidentally leaked, the document was intentionally leaked in 1986. What do you say to that?

A. It was absolutely not leaked intentionally, and it was shocking when it appeared, the article in the Vecernje Novosti newspaper. The editorial board had a meeting and they asked the question of have you -- the rest of us, Have you read the Vecernje Novosti edition? And we said, Why should we read the Vecernje Novosti? And they said, Well, look at the article. And we interrupted our meeting straight away when we heard about it. But I think how the memorandum came out is a fact that is well known. It went through Professor Jovan Djordjevic, who was sent a copy of the version with a request for his remarks and comments, and there's no doubt that it left his house, that that's where it came from, from his house. And this was confirmed by his daughter.

The only question is which of the two versions is the correct version, whether his son-in-law, who was a journalist of the Vecernje Novosti newspaper, took the document on his own initiative or whether ³⁴⁷⁵² Professor Djordjevic himself gave the document to the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia since he had previously cooperated with Kardelj and others and so on --

Q. Very well. If I can cut you short. Can we look, please, with the usher's assistance, at page 24 in the English version. In the middle of the page, please. And we found this passage in your answer to criticism: "Even though the propaganda against the Serbian Academy and memorandum was far from innocuous, the Serbian public did not allow itself to be hoodwinked. A small section of the public might let itself be taken in out of ignorance and might believe the propaganda being drummed into them, but the majority of educated citizens who had some knowledge of the contents of the memorandum realised that the accusations levelled against the Serbian Academy were unfounded and the interpretation given of its motives and messages skewed. The Serbian Academy's prestige rose rapidly in the eyes of Serbian society, for this learned institution ..." and it goes on.

You see, did this memorandum serve to mobilise public opinion in a nationalist way, Professor?

A. I do apologise, but I can't seem to find the text in Serbian, the passage in Serbia.

As to the translation, I have a translation of the translation; I don't think you're going to have the right thing. Let me just find the passage.

Q. It begins: "Even though the propaganda against ..." In the paragraph immediately preceding the headline Croatian Criticism of the ³⁴⁷⁵³ Memorandum.

A. Well, this sounds a little different, so please give me time to read through it. "Even though the propaganda against," et cetera, et cetera, "against the Serbian Academy memorandum was far from innocuous, the Serbian public did not allow itself to be hoodwinked." A small section of the public might let itself be taken in out of ignorance and might believe the propaganda being drummed into them, but the majority of educated citizens who had some knowledge of the contents of the memorandum realised that the accusations levelled against the Serbian Academy were unfounded and the interpretation given of its motives and messages skewed. The Serbian Academy's prestige --"

JUDGE ROBINSON: The Prosecutor stopped there. Perhaps you could put your question again --

MR. NICE: Certainly.

JUDGE ROBINSON: -- now that the Professor has read it.

MR. NICE:

Q. Did this memorandum serve to mobilise public opinion in a nationalist way?

A. Please. This memorandum was not addressed to the public at all, and I repeated this. It was to be a closed document, so it was written with a -- with the kind of language that was supposed to animate the political establishment. It had no pretensions whatsoever of going public at all. And we had decided that. That was the decision we had taken previously by which the memorandum should be a restricted document.

Q. Thank you. ³⁴⁷⁵⁴

MR. NICE: If the usher would help me, and if the Chamber would permit us to use, for reasons of speed, a highlighted version of an existing exhibit, Exhibit 800, the memorandum -- the chapter from the late Ivan Stambolic's book. If you would be good enough to place it on the overhead projector. Thank you very much.

Q. As you will know, Professor, Ivan Stambolic initiated the process that led to this memorandum, didn't he?

A. I don't know how you mean "initiated the process" that led to the memorandum. What do you mean by that? I don't understand the question.

Q. I'll describe the passage in the way he described it himself later, but will you now please listen to what he himself in his book wrote about it. The first passage -- is that the first page you've got there? Yes, it is -- asked the question: "Were the nationalists the most dangerous opponents? He said: "They were and still are, but it's even worse that they are, objectively, enemies of the people. This is precisely why I immediately declared the memorandum as what it would become: An obituary of Yugoslavia. I do not find any satisfaction in this true prophecy."

He went on to say: "The advocates of pro-memorandum Serbia first tried to subdue Yugoslavia, tightening it until bursting point. After that, after they have failed, they will go to war against it, using all of their force against the policies of the cool heads, which included mine. I was not wrong in believing that the memorandum's makers, the instigators of today's fratricide, were calling upon horrible evil." Now, here is the accused's immediate predecessor as leader of the ³⁴⁷⁵⁵ Communist Party and a man who set up, as we've heard in evidence, this process of preparing a memorandum. Can you explain why, with his knowledge of your country, he could express those views?

A. Well, you know what? He was on the opposite side. He initiated the campaign. And quite clearly, he is trying to defend the campaign and his steps which were quite inappropriate. You could read what Stane Kavcic said, for example, on the other hand, about the memorandum; that the politicians did not have the reason to read the -- that they did not read the document and see that it was speaking about real things and that they didn't have the strength to come into contact with the people who wrote the memorandum.

So this is a defence of one's positions, a repression that was exerted. They are insinuations which just don't hold water, because he didn't initiate it. It now turns out that the memorandum created that crisis, whereas the memorandum was writing about the crisis once it had become a deep-seated crisis and once the situation had become explosive. And it issues warnings. It cautions people like Stambolic and like-minded people to the fact that they should open their eyes wide and take steps to do something about the situation.

Q. May we look at the next page and the next highlighted passage. Then I think that will be all I will have time for with this document. His other observations, and the Chamber can see them all in due course, when asked, "What was your opinion about the presence of the memorandum?" he replied: "I believe that science should be more present in efforts to solve our social, economic, political and other problems. ^{34756 BLANK PAGE 34757} Therefore, why should the academy, our highest institution, not join these efforts? That is why we had agreed with the academy's leadership, one year before the memorandum would appear, that it should organise several teams made up of different experts who would deal with current social issues ..."

Later asked, "Hence the story that you were the one who ordered the memorandum," he relied in part: "When I read it, I clearly knew what they meant by 'helping' us in solving social and economic problems. I immediately reacted in a speech at Belgrade University in late October 1986. At that time, I said I was expecting the academicians to help carry the load that we were carrying instead of trying to trip us! I called it political insinuation which does not create science but evil blood and darkness."

Were you aware of the late Ivan Stambolic making that speech, Professor?

A. Yes, I did, but it is an incorrect diagnosis. It's a quite deformed, distorted vision by a politician who himself was in large measure responsible for the state of affairs. So he was speaking pro domo sua. He was speaking in defence of the policy that the memorandum was criticising. So his positions were quite clear.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that it is completely valueless.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think we have a sufficient answer on that point. ³⁴⁷⁵⁸

MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, as with all the material, I'm going to have to deal with it by sample. The remainder of the material will have to be available with the Chamber.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. And we'll take a break for ten minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.46 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Nice. Please continue.

MR. NICE: Would the usher please place on the overhead projector the English language --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. NICE: Would the usher please place on the overhead projector the English language version of the memorandum at page 21 towards the top.

Q. One last passage from the memorandum, Professor. Where we see that you and your colleague recorded the following about its history. Just from the top of the page: "The memorandum struck a chord with the public which had many of its own observations about the situation in the country confirmed. The lucid -- the memorandum's lucid analysis of the situation and its clear message had a powerful effect on shaping public opinion. Overnight this document received huge popularity. It was mimeographed, passed from hand to hand, and sold on street corners." Now, you've denied that it was intentionally leaked, maintained that it was a secret document. I must ask you again: Was this document, perhaps like another famous document, Nacertanije in the 19th century, benefiting from its alleged secret nature, generating a particular interest in it? ³⁴⁷⁵⁹

A. I should like to repeat what I've already stated and that is this: The document was not intended for the public at all. Now, the fact that it found itself in the public eye without the will of its authors is a coincidence, or it happened by chance that it was, but that it started to be mimeographed, some made a good business out of it, photocopying it and selling it even at marketplaces. The authors neither wished that nor are they responsible for that. But of course once it was already in the public, it had to have a ripple effect and influence the situation. But this was not the intention or will of its authors at all.

Q. And finally on the text of the memorandum. Would you accept -- I don't have time to go over it, but would you accept that there are passages in the memorandum which are now reflected pretty well word-for-word in passages of your expert report to this Court?

A. Well, that is certainly quite possible.

Q. Thank you.

A. I certainly didn't copy out the memorandum, but I took part in its writing. So I haven't got two heads and two opinions about certain questions.

Q. Let's move on to the next point, time being so short. I'd like you, please, to comment on some passages from another chapter of Stambolic's book, yet to be produced.

MR. NICE: May it be distributed. This is -- this has been copied in both English and Serbian.

Q. Chapter 7. The title can be seen, but that's not what I'm concerned about. I'm concerned at what we can find on page 13 in the ³⁴⁷⁶⁰ English, and I'll get you the B/C/S page, please. Asked a question -- and this is on page 13 of the English and perhaps if there is a spare copy for the overhead projector, I'd be grateful. "Do you believe that you are being critical enough in measuring up your potential responsibility in our talks?" Because this book was a series of questions and answers. Gave an answer that included the following.

Bottom of the page, please, Usher. "At any rate, by electing Milosevic President of the Presidency of the Central Committee, he was not elected any kind of leader; the leader would be created later.

"A major role in the creation of the leader and building of the cult of the leader would be played by the intellectual elite in addition to the propaganda provided by the media. They composed and wrote songs about him; painters made his portraits and went to bow before him; his photos were copied in great numbers. Academicians started competing: Dobrica Cosic compared Milosevic to Nikola Pasic, Mihailo Markovic to Roosevelt, Milorad Ekmecic to de Gaulle, Milovan Danojlic to Karadjordje. Giving new meaning to Njegos, he wrote that Milosevic put 'new life into the Serbian soul.'"

And if we could look, to save time, at another short passage on page 18 in the English, before I ask the question. On page 18: "He couldn't see --" this is the accused to whom Stambolic was referring: "He couldn't see or hear from anyone sensible or responsible that policies on other peoples had been pursued by having ³⁴⁷⁶¹ rallies in their squares or that policies on his own people had been conducted by using truncheons, water-guns, cold steel and firearms. Or that we had put knives under each other's throats and shouted at the top of our voice for dialogue at the same time. There was nothing in this country or its peoples that hopelessly divided them. By separating Serbs from everyone else, he divided them within. He divided them more dangerously than it appears."

And then this: "Why was it necessary to incite Serbs outside Serbia in such an aggressive way to create new Serbian states instead of providing them with safe life and equal rights in their homeland of Herzegovina, Bosnia or Croatia? Haven't the Serbs suffered enough in the past?"

With those two passages, first, is it right that this man, the accused, emerged as leader on the back of, in a sense, the intellectuals and what they had established through, for example, the thought processes lying within the memorandum?

A. Well, I'm not of the same opinion as you. The appearance of Slobodan Milosevic meant something new in the political arena of Serbia, and the intelligentsia felt relief. Up until his arrival, there was something that was called verbal offence, that is to say intellectual restriction and censorship of the spoken word, the uttered word and phrase. So it meant an expansion of freedom. Slobodan Milosevic introduced the multi-party system in Serbia, for instance. So that was one step further towards democracy, a step that was seen as a progressive one. ³⁴⁷⁶²

Q. The question is -- the question is, and I'll rephrase it to help you focus: This was not a man who led with his own ideas. He was a man who was needed by the ideas generated or expressed by the intellectuals through the memorandum, and he used or he instrumentalised those views by becoming leader and taking the thing forward, didn't he?

A. No. You know what? It's like this: I said how within the circle of intellectuals they experienced his arrival, what they felt about it. Now, what the memorandum programme was is something else. There's a misunderstanding here. Slobodan Milosevic is certainly an intelligent man who was also well-versed in matters of the economy and politics so that his arrival --

Q. Did he show any --

A. Just a minute. May I be allowed to finish?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you may finish.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And certainly he stood out among the politicians of Serbia of the day with his own opinions. So he could have had a lot in common, not in an organised fashion but thoughts and thinking that coincided with analyses and observations set out in the memorandum. But this coincidence cannot be instrumentalised, if I can use the word, and construed as having been some sort of organisation. And let me say that there were very weak personal ties.

So at the beginning when he first arrived and emerged, he included people like me in the commission and Academician Macura and several others working in the commission, but then that ceased. And many people later on -- many of these people later on joined the opposition or took the side of ³⁴⁷⁶³ the opposition. So to look for ties and political ties, programme ties, are mere constructions.

Q. And one programme tie we can establish is that he took over the issue of reforming the 1974 constitution from what was contained in the memorandum, didn't he?

A. No. The initiative for a reform, and we didn't finish discussing the matter of the Blue Book, it was strong pressure from public opinion, and professional public opinion too. Today's Prime Minister, for example, the Prime Minister of Serbia, Mr. Kostunica, was sent away from the faculty as a result of the constitution, and that was in 1971. I will show you the annals of the faculty of law.

Q. I have so short a period of time.

MR. NICE: And with Your Honours leave, I will have to defer my second question on that passage from Stambolic's book and move forward.

Q. You explain, Professor, that you and other academics and intellectuals associated with the memorandum became advisors to the accused. Now, in March 1991, there was the meeting between this accused and the late Franjo Tudjman. A lot of evidence we've heard suggesting that at that meeting what was discussed was the division of Bosnia. I asked you at the beginning whether you had been a member of the Serbian team set up after that initial meeting, a team consisting of yourself, Smilja Avramov, Ratko Markovic, and Zlatan Kukvlesic [phoen]. Were you a member of such a team?

A. Before I answer your question, I would like to say that I was never appointed an advisor to President Milosevic. I was not appointed, I ³⁴⁷⁶⁴ received no remuneration, but from time to time he consulted me on particular issues. This was simple consultation. It is true, however, that I was part of that team.

Q. Thank you.

A. I did not even know that previously there had been a meeting between President Milosevic and Tudjman, because we were given the task of meeting with a group from the Croatian side to consider the situation that had arisen in the Krajina, to see what the intentions were, because after the adoption of the Croatian constitution there was a very tense situation in the Krajina.

Q. I ask you to deal very briefly with this. If you say you personally were never told anything about the original meeting. Did you, as we have heard from Smilja Avramov, in those meetings, the three meetings that happened in the hunting lodge close to Osijek on Dedinje in Belgrade and in Zagreb, did you deal with maps and such like that were consistent with planning the separation or division of Bosnia, please?

A. No. We did not deal with any maps at all.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When formulating his question, Mr. Nice said that there has been a lot of evidence here as to how Tudjman and I discussed the division of Bosnia. He is misleading the witness, because no evidence has been presented here that we discussed the division of Bosnia, nor could anyone expect such evidence.

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... inappropriate ³⁴⁷⁶⁵ interruption.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just remind us of the evidence.

MR. NICE: I most certainly will. We have had evidence on the division of Bosnia coming from Paddy Ashdown. If you remember, there was a map that was drawn for him by the late President Tudjman. From Stipe Mesic, who was told by -- from Ante Markovic, who was told specifically by both sides of the division, and indeed the terms of the division. And I think from Hrvoje Sarinic as well, to name but four.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice, continue.

MR. NICE: And I think also -- I'm grateful. Also, Milan Babic covered it as well.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE: So there we are.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Well, if you weren't engaged on work -- just see your answer. If you weren't engaged on work consistent with planning a division of Bosnia, what on earth were you doing for the three of you to meet on these occasions?

A. First let me tell you, it would be difficult to define. We went without any instructions whatsoever. It consisted in getting information on what the other side's intentions were in the given situation. In the Krajina, this situation was such that it had a great impact on our discussions. They wanted Slobodan Milosevic to intervene because they failed to understand that they had a lot of independence. We had no ³⁴⁷⁶⁶ possibilities or instructions in this respect. We were not authorised, and we had no contacts with Babic.

These talks then meandered left and right. Bilandzic said that he had written an article about how the Serbs should be given autonomy and so on and so forth. There were even attempts, you know --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Professor.

MR. NICE:

Q. We then come to the summer of 1991, and two things happen in the summer of 1991, both of which you'll be familiar. First there was the Belgrade initiative which ended in November. You're acquainted with that, aren't you?

A. Yes, but I don't know anything about its content. I wasn't interested in it at all.

Q. Very well. But you know about it sufficiently for us to inform the Court through you that the Belgrade initiative was the accused's plan to retain within a former -- a reduced Yugoslavia, Serbia, Montenegro, and also Bosnia. Now, that was his plan at that stage, wasn't?

A. I don't know about that.

Q. As to The Hague, do you know about The Hague Conference?

A. What do you mean?

Q. Did you come to The Hague yourself?

A. I came to The Hague to work on issues of succession and in the group for economic issues.

Q. Very well.

A. I was the head of the delegation for these issues. ³⁴⁷⁶⁷

Q. In those circumstances, can you assist us, please, with a new document that I'd like to be exhibited, recently provided by the relevant country, which is the country of which we are resident.

MR. NICE: Perhaps it could be distributed and given a number if it's produced.

Q. Look, please, at paragraph 5. It would have to go on the overhead projector in English, I'm afraid. Paragraph 5. The document heading can be seen to refer to the conference between the 7th of September and the 5th of November. And paragraph 5 tells us that: "In the margins of the 4th plenary, a meeting was held on the 4th of October chaired by the minister for foreign affairs of the Netherlands," et cetera. "A statement was read out subsequently by the Netherlands minister at a press conference, reflecting the agreement of the Yugoslav parties involved after Minister van den Broek had obtained the acquiescence of all parties, Yugoslav parties at the plenary meeting. This included the principle that a political solution should be sought on the basis of the perspective of recognition of the independence of those republics in Yugoslavia wishing it. At the end of a negotiating process conducted in good faith and involving all parties, the recognition would be granted in the framework of a general settlement and have the following components: "A loose association or alliance of sovereign or independent republics;

"Adequate arrangements to be made for the protection of minorities, including human rights guarantees and possibly special status for certain areas; ³⁴⁷⁶⁸ "No unilateral changes in borders."

Pausing there, Professor, you were here in The Hague, and you know that this accused agreed, as Lord Carrington has said, four times to this proposal; correct?

A. I don't know what he agreed to. He didn't tell me that.

Q. You were here working for him and with him. Professor, did you not realise that all -- all but for the one thing that the accused was subsequently to do, the matter could have been settled in The Hague? Did you not appreciate that? Did you not appreciate that he'd consented at the beginning to the proposal?

A. No, I didn't know that.

Q. I'm going to ask --

A. You know, I was not fully acquainted with the political issues. Ms. Smilja Avramov was here as an advisor. I only attended a plenary session once with them. That was brief.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Nice, just bear in mind the professor has said he was there to deal with economic issues.

MR. NICE:

Q. 14, 16, 23, second paragraph of 23, again want of time, will help you.

I note what you said, Professor, about not being involved in political issues, but we're going to come to the summer of 1992 as soon as I can get us there when you did indeed become involved, you may think, in political issues, but we'll look at that shortly. ³⁴⁷⁶⁹ You know, of course, that eventually the accused declined The Hague proposal, didn't he, on the 18th of October?

A. I tell you, I did not deal with political issues. I was relatively little acquainted with the ongoing discussions on political issues.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, say no more. Professor, say no more. Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. Certainly, but --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you going to continue to press him on this? Because he said he did not come to The Hague to deal political issues.

MR. NICE: But the professor has nevertheless volunteered a number of quite general opinions and I want to get the chronology before you.

Q. Professor, do you recall The Hague Conference and the Belgrade initiative, which was aimed at keeping Bosnia within a reduced form of Yugoslavia, all ended when the European Union asked the republics, in light of the failure of The Hague conference, if they were going to go for independence? Do you recall that happening?

A. I've told you I'm not familiar with these details. I wasn't interested in the Belgrade initiative.

Q. Very well.

A. I didn't follow that course of events.

Q. Were you interested in the beginning of the following year in something called the Third Yugoslavia Convention, which was a convention of people from Serbia, Montenegro, and anywhere else who wanted to stay ³⁴⁷⁷⁰ within Yugoslavia, a convention that brought forth people from various parts of Serbia and Montenegro but also from parts of Bosnia and Croatia? Were you aware of that convention?

A. No.

Q. Very well. Then in your role as an advisor, you featured -- you didn't feature, you took part in a body called the Council For Harmonisation. Do you remember that?

A. This is the first time I've heard of it.

Q. I'm going to have to show you some documents and see if we can remind you.

A. I have never heard of A Council For Harmonisation. Harmonisation of what?

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... state policy.

A. I was a member of a commission for the economic reform of the Presidency of Serbia. I was a member of that. But this body ceased functioning in 1991.

Q. Do you remember --

A. After 1991, I participated in the work of The Hague conference on economic issues and issues of succession and --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Professor. I think the Prosecutor wants to remind you of something.

MR. NICE:

Q. I would if I could adequately pronounce the Serbian title of the committee. [Serbian spoken] Does that make any difference?

A. No. ³⁴⁷⁷¹

Q. No, I didn't think it would.

A. No, I don't know anything about it.

Q. Do you remember sitting on a body, because we've got the stenographic notes of it, with Milan Panic, with this accused, with Dobrica Cosic, with Vladislav Jovanovic, and others?

A. Oh, yes, I recall now. I recall very well. Now I know what you mean. This was a council --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. ... Dobrica Cosic, as the president or chairperson. I was not a member of the council, I only attended meetings twice because President Milosevic -- I think it was on two occasions only. I was not a member. The members were the presidents -- or, rather, the Prime Ministers of the republics and the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of the federal government. And on two occasions I was invited by President Milosevic to accompany him. And that was when the Vance-Owen Plan was being discussed. I remember that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, the microphone of Professor Mihailovic was switched off when he was explaining that this was a council established by Dobrica Cosic, the then president of Yugoslavia. He explained its functioning. His microphone had been switched off, and I see it's not in the transcript at all.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, you have just put it in, Mr. Milosevic. Thank you.

MR. NICE: ³⁴⁷⁷²

Q. I want you to -- Professor, we have the stenographic notes of this series of meetings, all but two, which are not available to us at the moment, of the 9th of January, 1993, and the 21st of January, but you were present and you contributed to them, and I'm going to ask you for your assistance in relation to them.

MR. NICE: Can they be -- the first one be placed on the overhead projector. 18th of August.

Q. You may have confined yourself by choice to particular matters of economics, but you sat in very important political bodies, and here we see -- the usher -- we see the title in English, Shorthand Notes from the Session of the Council for Coordination of State Policy held on the 18th of August, 1992. Next page, please, and we see this, Milan Panic saying -- picking it up at page 18 of a very long document: "We're already in that position. The problem is that we have been accused for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that we support the war in Bosnia, that we left the weapons for them to fight; that we support Karadzic financially. We spoke here about the ethnic cleansing. I heard from Dr. Brankovic that Serbs should get rid of others." To which the accused says: "Don't trouble us with your associates."

Milan Panic continued: "He isn't my associate ..." Next paragraph, second or third sentence: "This afternoon I received the following information: Ethnic cleansing has begun. 15.000 Muslims from Sanski Most were given eight hours to leave their homes and make twenty kilometres to Jajce in order to reach the Muslims. This information was received from the United Nations. They asked me and said ³⁴⁷⁷³ that I should stop it."

Pause there. Do you remember, Professor, sitting in with this accused, with Milan Panic, with Dobrica Cosic, on meetings where ethnic cleansing, as alleged against Serbia, was being discussed?

A. I don't recall attending this meeting.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Mr. Nice is referring to ethnic cleansing incited by Serbia. Where in the document does it say it was incited by Serbia? Who is he quoting? Who said it was incited by Serbia? He is construing a question. He is inventing it, in fact fabricating it. Panic is saying that he's being asked to stop something that's happening in Bosnia. Where does it say that Serbia instigated anything?

JUDGE ROBINSON: You may make the correction, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. KAY: May I intervene here. I think the Prosecution should first of all establish whether this witness was present at a meeting before putting text like that, reading it out, getting it into the record, and then the witness says, Well, I wasn't at that meeting.

MR. NICE: Should we go to page 20? If the usher would be good enough to go to page 20. Here's a passage under the name --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may I?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Professor.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something? I remember that I attended meetings, and that's all that comes to my mind now, when the Vance-Owen Plan was being discussed. I know what I said and what President Milosevic said, and I remember, with reference to Panic, that ³⁴⁷⁷⁴ once he made a statement at the airport in Moscow that he was abandoning continuity, and Belgrade was alarmed --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Thank you. I have your point. I have your point, Professor.

Mr. Nice, if --

MR. NICE: Certainly.

JUDGE ROBINSON: -- if this examination to be fruitful, if the witness was not present, there's not much point.

MR. NICE: Page 20. If we go to page 20. The witness has acknowledged being present at two meetings.

Q. And if I could read to you what appears on page 20 of the English and then again we'll turn, in light of your answers, to page 45. At page 20 you said this -- you asked for the floor of the meeting and you said: "I just want to make a remark about introducing. With reference to the Conference on Yugoslavia, we were told we were not allowed to take part in the group of experts and other places on behalf of Yugoslavia because it's the Conference on Yugoslavia, which implies participation of six republics."

Now, that's one contribution attributed to you. But if we go on beyond a long contribution from the accused, to page 45, and in mind your account of your limited interest, Milan Panic said: "And we the Serbs in Bosnia are 'naive.' They took 60 to 70 per cent of the territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina." And you, Professor are recorded as contributing: "Let me explain this 70-30 per cent ratio. It is the result of historic conditions. Even after the World War II, the Serbs held the relative ³⁴⁷⁷⁵ majority of the territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Secondly, the Serbs were a discriminated nation, living on agriculture, whereas the Muslims lived in the cities and along the river valleys, and they were rather concentrated there. "These 60 per cent is factual land owned by the Serbs. This was not conquered in the war, it's factual ownership of the Serbs. "This is subject to speculations because people do not know the historic conditions."

Now, some of that matches what's in your report, the condition of the Serbs, but despite your only being interested in economic issues, you seem to be pressing the suggestion that that large percentage of land should be retained. Do you remember making such a contribution, Professor?

A. I did say something to this effect but not as you interpreted it. My contribution was an historical and economic explanation, which is correct. The Muslims had a privileged position, and they lived in the towns and in river valleys, where the best land was, and the rest of the territory, the hills, belonged to others. That is how the situation arose that the Muslims were concentrated on a smaller -- in a smaller area and the Serbs in a broader area, and they became the owners of that land. It's a fact that Serbs owned over half the land in Bosnia. It's a fact.

Q. Thank you.

A. These are scientific scholarly facts. But this has no other meaning. I was simply trying to explain how the land was distributed --

Q. Can we -- ³⁴⁷⁷⁶

A. -- and how this came about.

Q. Can we move to a conclusion for this document. With the usher's assistance, just go to page 19.

We've already seen, Professor, how there was discussion about ethnic cleansing, discussions about weapons left to fight.

A. I don't know where we've seen that from.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... earlier. And on page 19, Milan Panic, at the bottom of that entry, is recording how he was taken aside by -- it says -- he refers to Mitterand, Boutros-Ghali, "Major takes me aside, everybody takes me aside and asks me these questions. I try to reply that I went to Sarajevo twice; all the time I am speaking about ethnic cleansing, and then I receive such a letter from the United Nations; we lose battles and we like to fight on the international scene, but we don't have ammunition. This is their ammunition. Then that one says aggressor, the Serbs are dreaming of their Greater Serbia, of the idea that the Serbs in Bosnia get rid of others and then join Serbia one day. That's what they say and they will be against us." And then one other short topic on page 38. The accused is recorded as saying: "As for the help provided to the Serbs in Bosnia, it is simply unacceptable for us to leave them helpless. This is not a war material, this is humanitarian aid - food, clothes, money. But we cannot deprive them of our assistance. I wonder, why would the assistance granted to the Muslims be humanitarian and they are getting weapons that have been apprehended in these conflicts, and our assistance is looked upon as military though our shipments do in the contain military ³⁴⁷⁷⁷ supplies ..."

Now, there you are. There's a couple of passages. Do you remember those things being discussed?

A. No, I don't remember at all. And as I said, I told you what I remember. There were two things that stand out: When the Vance-Owen Plan was being discussed and when Milan Panic, and you're mentioning Milan Panic now, when Milan Panic made a statement at the Moscow airport about the fact that he was relinquishing continuity and so on. And so that was a subject up for discussion at the council and the council decided to take a stand and insist upon continuity.

Now, what Mitterand told Panic and what Panic told the council, I really don't remember any of that nor that there was any mention at all of any ethnic cleansing. Perhaps there was, but as I say, I don't remember. I was over 70 years old at the time when I went there, but I probably would have remarked on it had I heard that, because I do have some sort of continuous memory.

Q. I'm going to ask you more briefly, then, about the other meeting at which you were present, because you may be the only witness we ever have to explain the construct of these meetings and so on, but before I do and as an intervening -- not an intervening act, you recall a conference, an international conference on the former Yugoslavia that occurred in London on the 26th to the 28th of August of 1992?

A. Yes.

MR. NICE: May the witness have, then, please, the next proposed exhibit, which is a document from Yugoslavia Through Documents From Its ³⁴⁷⁷⁸ Creation to Its Dissolution. And if the usher would be good enough to take us in the English version to what is at the bottom right-hand corner page 711.

Q. And this is a paper by the co-chairman setting out the position for Serbia and Montenegro, and I'll have to read the bullet points in full, Professor.

"We welcome the fact that all participants to the conference have subscribed to the Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. All participants must fulfil the obligations to which they have agreed. In particular, Serbia and Montenegro face a clear choice. They have undertaken to: "Cease intervention across their borders with Bosnia and Croatia; "To the best of their ability restrain the Bosnian Serbs from taking territory by force and expelling the local population; "Restore in full the civil and constitutional rights of the inhabitants of Kosovo and Vojvodina and also ensure the civil rights of the inhabitants of the Sandjak;

"Use their influence with the Bosnian Serbs to obtain the closure of their detention camps, to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions, and to permit the return of refugees to their homes. The Bosnian Croats and Muslims have given similar undertakings;

"Fully observe the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;

"Declare that they fully respect the integrity of present frontiers; ³⁴⁷⁷⁹ "Guarantee the rights of ethnic and national communities and minorities within the borders of Serbia and Montenegro in accordance with the UN Charter, the CSCE and the draft convention of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia;

"Work for the normalisation of the situation in Croatia, for implementation of the Vance Plan and for acceptance by the Serbs in the Krajina of special status as foreseen in the draft convention of the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia;" and then finally, "If, as suggested by Mr. Panic's recent letter to the president of the Security Council of the UN, Serbia and Montenegro do intend to fulfil these obligations in deed as well as word they will resume a respected position in the international community." Now, that's one of the things that followed from the London conference, and it set the terms upon which the former Yugoslavia could join the international community and indeed become a member of the UN, didn't it?

A. And what is your question?

Q. These terms that I've read out to you were the terms imposed at this time by the London conference for Serbia, Montenegro, Yugoslavia, FRY, to rejoin the international community as a respected member. Do you remember that?

A. Just one thing. I did not participate directly in the plenary session, although President Milosevic offered me to take part in the main hall. I was in the advisory body, not in the main hall, where different documents were passed around. ³⁴⁷⁸⁰ Now, I know that there was a resolution on Montenegro on the last day when the conference was to end and that the then minister came to our delegation --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, move on.

MR. NICE:

Q. And you see, if you could have, please, displayed the Council For Harmonisation, or whatever it's properly described as, record for the 17th of September, which is the other one you attended at and where I want you to just help us a little bit, if you can, from memory, and I realise it's a long time ago.

We see on page 65, at the bottom right-hand corner, the end of the passage that's been extracted -- the end of 65 --

JUDGE KWON: Could I see the name of the committee?

MR. NICE: Yes, the name of the committee is differently expressed in this version or it may be translation. Council For Reconciliation Of The Standpoints Regarding State Politics.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. But I think, just to deal with that, this committee on which you sat was non-statutory, Professor? That would be correct, wouldn't it? It wasn't a statutory identified and designated committee?

A. No. I think it was outside the constitution. It was initiative taken by President Cosic, and that they were a body which wished to expand its competencies and authority in some way.

Q. Now, we have this entry at the foot of 65 associated with you: ³⁴⁷⁸¹ "Mr. President, awhile ago --" and we can find it but I needn't trouble you with it: "Awhile ago I used the expression 'The King is dead, long live the King,' but the King needs to be murdered or to commit suicide." And then you went on to say: "As far as I can understand the things, the United Nations are facing the problem of expulsion of Yugoslavia from its membership and very serious legal and other problems. Of course, it is much simpler job for them - if Yugoslavia does it by itself." You said more, but can you remember discussing the issue to which the London conference requirements and membership of the United Nations connected? Can you remember discussing those things?

A. I don't remember them at all, and that doesn't -- those don't seem to be the kind of words I used. Are you sure that that comes under my name?

Q. Yes, I'm sure it comes under your name in the version that's been provided to us and the earlier -- if you have doubts, I'll take you back to --

A. I don't remember ever having spoken about that at all --

Q. We come back to --

A. -- at any time.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... and if we come back to page 28 at the beginning of the extracted passage, you're in discussion with Miodrag Mitic, Ilija Djukic, and you responded to Djukic, who said: "Is it possible to let me say bridge this gap between the demise of one thing and the birth of the other exclusively within the realms of the United Nations Charter?" To which you replied: "I would like to pose a counter ³⁴⁷⁸² question - why this is all being done? If somebody wants to admit you, why do you have to cease to exist first? What is being interpolated then, what it stands, and then, The King is dead, long live the King, what dies with the King".

Does that remind you at all?

A. No. No. Let me say there was talk about membership, so maybe on certain occasions -- and I had a very clear-cut stand. If we're insisting upon continuity, then we can't ask for membership because Yugoslavia's membership -- Yugoslavia did not forfeit its membership in the United Nations, it was just suspended. So insistence upon continuity meant lifting the suspension.

Q. Very well.

A. And agreement to seeking membership meant to give up on continuity, and that was a clear-cut stand. And I could not have had a different opinion at all.

Q. In which case, and just to give a little flavour of these meetings that may have to be considered carefully and in detail at a later stage, if you go to 62, it may be balance, but in any case I put it in to -- to assist and to encourage, perhaps, a general review of these documents. The accused, Professor, is recorded in this same meeting as saying the following: "Many others are creating serious problems. I think this has to be clarified --"

JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. "The treatment of so-called ethnic cleansing. The statements ³⁴⁷⁸³ have been given about how the ethnical cleansing will be prevented in Serbia. There is no ethnical cleansing in Serbia. There is no programme against ethnical cleansing, nor could it be because there is no ethnical cleansing. The deputy minister of the interior was replaced because he opposed the programme that does not exist..." and so on. Do you remember a discussion along those lines, or very approximately, in this meeting dealing with ethnic cleansing?

A. I never heard of any mention made of ethnic cleansing. It was the assessment made by journalists and people dealing with science connected to the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Q. Very well.

A. But that this was discussed, that ethnic cleansing was brought up in any official capacity in any official body, I didn't hear about that.

MR. NICE: Well, Your Honours, I've used the opportunity of a witness who was present at the meetings to remind you of their existence. There's a series of them of which, as I said, two are missing, and they will at some stage have to be explored by the Prosecution, if by no one else, in some detail.

Your Honours, just give me one minute.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, do you plan to re-examine?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I understood it that we have no time and that we have to close now. If you give me time, I do plan it. If you don't give me time, then I don't. So it's up to the physical feasibilities. But if there is time, I would like to see the documents that he's quoting from, because it appears that everything he's quoting ³⁴⁷⁸⁴ from goes to our advantage. Of course there was no ethnic cleansing in Serbia ever, except in Kosovo, and that was exerted by the --

JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not time for you to comment now, but you couldn't resist the opportunity.

MR. NICE: There is only one other topic that I'm going to deal with -- we have until ten past 12; is that correct?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, until ten past.

MR. NICE:

Q. There's only one other topic I have time to deal with, and that very briefly, Professor, and that's your economic evidence or your evidence about economics.

MR. NICE: For the Chamber, in our submission, this is of tangential, if any, relevance, and I'm going to deal with it very briefly.

Q. One point in general: The notion, Professor, that Serbia is a victim of the oppression -- of the economic oppression of the other republics is one that doesn't fit comfortably, does it, with the reality that since the separation of the former republics of the former Yugoslavia, the divergence in economic performance between Serbia and Slovenia and Croatia has actually increased rather than decreased?

A. I didn't comment at all on trade between Slovenia and Croatia.

Q. Not trade between them but --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, what do you mean by the divergence has actually increased? Do you mean that --

MR. NICE: The per capita wealth, the performance of the economy measured to all international standards, the difference between Serbia and ³⁴⁷⁸⁵ its former republic neighbours has increased over time rather than decreased.

Q. Is that correct?

A. Between Serbia and who?

Q. Slovenia and Croatia.

A. Of course there was an increase. There was an increase even before, and especially afterwards, after the application of the sanctions. Of course.

Q. And it's continued to this date?

A. I'm not quite clear on what you want to say by that. I said that there was a constant increase and that the trend carried on until the breakdown of Yugoslavia. The differences between Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand and Serbia on the other increased, the gulf increased to the detriment of Serbia.

Q. Very well. I can't take it further in the time.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. You have not in your report -- no, two things. First, you accept that your economic opinions as expressed in the memorandum haven't particularly changed because indeed they may well find expression in similar terms in your present expert report; yes?

A. Well, it's like this: I wrote a book, Yugoslavia's Economic Reality, and of course I present my economic convictions in the book and in the memorandum as far as I took part in it. And I stand by my convictions. ³⁴⁷⁸⁶

Q. But what you have now before you is, I think, a document with which you will be familiar or of which you will know. That is it's an article by a highly respected and well-known economist, Ljubomir Madzar, or at least -- do you know him?

A. Yes, I do know him.

Q. And if we go in the pages of the book to the top right-hand corner, page 179, we see in an article generally entitled Who Exploited Whom, we see reference to the SANU Memorandum, Expressions of Traumatisation in Economic Relations, and we see his expressions of opinion there.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, this has to be the last question I'm told.

MR. NICE: Yes.

Q. And we see that this expert reaches radically different conclusions, as you will know, Professor, from the economic conclusions of the memorandum itself.

A. It is the trait of a good economist to anticipate matters. I anticipated that you would bring this question up and ask your question and use this article. Let me say that the article contains only two tables, and they were borrowed tables, at that. And Mr. Madzar is a very good economist himself but he would have to settle accounts with himself because, and I can provide you with his text in Serbian written in 1989 in which he speaks quite differently on all these subjects, and he did so within the frameworks of a journal with a set political orientation, might I say. ³⁴⁷⁸⁷

JUDGE ROBINSON: That has to be --

MR. NICE: ... that document be exhibited. The position is that we remain of the view that the economic issue is marginal, if relevant at all. To have cross-examined this witness on matters of expertise would have taken far longer than the time available this morning at all.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Can we just deal with your exhibits.

MR. NICE: And so we ask that this document be available to you for consideration on the economic issues.

JUDGE KWON: We declined to admit tab 19 of this professor's binder. What's the difference with this one?

MR. NICE: This one, first of all, it's a document that contains contrary opinions. He's acquainted with it. He hasn't referred to it in his own report, and he's now dealt with it, and it's very important, where we are so confined in time, that there is some material available to the contrary effect. I would, of course, if there had been more time available to deal with the witness who, as you now discover, could cover a very large amount of evidence because he was a fact witness on all sorts of things, I would have covered this, but it simply wasn't possible. And in our respectful submission, it would be entirely appropriate for his evidence to be -- not his evidence, his report to be before you.

JUDGE BONOMY: You did spend a fair bit of time, Mr. Nice, asking pretty pointless of questions of the witness rather than concentrating on this kind of thing, with all respect.

MR. NICE: I'm sorry you take that view.

JUDGE BONOMY: Especially when he made it clear he couldn't answer ³⁴⁷⁸⁸ many of the questions that you tried to pose to him.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I must, if I may respectfully say so, resist that observation. This is one of the only witnesses capable of dealing with these meetings, and if we wish to draw your attention the contents of those meetings, we have to give the witnesses available an opportunity to deal with them.

We don't know if this accused is going to give evidence himself. We don't know if the only other person listed as somebody who can give evidence of these important meetings is going to be before us, and the alternative between asking questions of witnesses like this who were there, even if his memory is now faint, and not asking them at all is that it could be said to be unfair. So I respectfully differ from Your Honour's opinion on that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It will be an act of irresponsibility on the Chamber's part if we don't stop at the time, because the Appeals Chamber has to come in.

Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: Our submission is none of these documents should go in. My biggest mistake, the massive section of text there, not a single bit of it was adopted in cross-examination. It just serves as a platform to get over the contrary views of another politician who is in opposition to the accused. It wasn't material or relevant to this witness, and the other documents that were put forward weren't adopted by him in any way, and we ask what relevance did they have to do with him?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we admitted Mr. Milosevic's documents on ³⁴⁷⁸⁹ the basis of a reference, so I think parity would require that we do the same here.

We don't have the time to deal with the exhibits now. We'll issue an order on that, as well as the four outstanding exhibits from the previous witness.

MR. NICE: The Council for Harmonisation are, of course, already exhibits. They've already been exhibited by the Chamber.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Okay.

MR. NICE: And in -- I must press the issue, if I get a chance to argue it, that these documents fall very squarely within the parameters being applied to the accused, and all of them.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Perhaps we can just exhibit those -- the four from the previous -- yes, the previous witness.

THE REGISTRAR: From the previous witness, there were two maps. They will be marked as D267. The Cutileiro Plan will be D268. And the Vance-Owen Plan will be D269.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We will have to adjourn on that basis, and I wish everybody a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask just one question, please? Well, if you've adjourned, never mind.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Very quickly. Go ahead.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At the beginning of the cross-examination, Mr. Nice told you that in the delegation from -- ³⁴⁷⁹⁰

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm sorry. I thought it was a comment of an administrative nature, but I don't think we'll have to time to --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Just administrative, then. Just one administrative point. If you have accepted this article by Professor Madzar, where Mr. Nice strives to show that he had a differing opinion, then please accept professor articles -- Professor Madzar's article dating back to 1989 where Professor Mihailovic says that the same author has quite the opposite opinion in 1989, quite opposite to the opinion stated by Mr. Nice, and then you can see just how well-founded or not well-founded is his scientific thinking.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will consider all these matters when we come to decide.

We are adjourned until the 11th of January. Thank you, Professor, for coming to the International Tribunal and you may now leave. Thank you very much.

[The witness withdrew]

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.12 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 11th day of

January, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.