³⁶³⁶⁶

Tuesday, 22 February 2005

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, to continue your cross-examination. And we want to move as quickly as possible. The Chamber will be considering the whole question of time, use of time in relation to this case, and we'll be saying something about that shortly.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I've already made my position clear on this witness and generally.

WITNESS: VLADISLAV JOVANOVIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, as foreign minister for five years and permanent representative at the United Nations, my suggestion to you is you know full well the responsibility that this accused has for events that happened in Croatia and in Bosnia but that you haven't told us the full truth. Do you understand? It's my suggestion to you.

A. I understand what you're saying, but at the same time, I would like to say that your claim is all wrong. Mr. Milosevic had very limited abilities to influence the development of events, both in Croatia and in Bosnia, and a number of facts I mentioned point in that direction. One of the facts being that he was among the first to insist that peace forces be brought to Croatia. He also accepted immediately all five peace ³⁶³⁶⁷ proposals, and he was the key figure in the acceptance of the Dayton Peace Accords.

Q. Before I move on to matters of substance I suggest that you've completely misled us in your observations about the desire to have all Serbs living in one area eventually, and that it is as clear as can be from all the documents that I've provided to you - and we'll look at a few of them, but not very many - it was as clear as can be that that was the underlying objective of everyone on both sides of the Drina. Correct or incorrect?

A. Mr. Nice, that's incorrect. What is correct is that the Serbs across the Drina River, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, insisted upon their constitutional right to self-determination, which was equal for all constituent nations in Yugoslavia. That constituent right of theirs was guaranteed both by the constitutions of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Exercising that right did not mean that they just wanted to annex their state to Serbia but that they had a choice to remain in the state that existed until that time. We supported their right just as we supported the rights that were available to other peoples living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Croatia and in Slovenia.

Q. Your suggestion, finally, of the matters I'm going to pick out, your suggestion that you didn't know of the level of support given by Serbia for the Krajina and also for the Serbs in Bosnia is simply absurd, I will suggest to you. A person in your position had to know the percentage and part of Serbia's income going to these interests, and you ³⁶³⁶⁸ haven't told us the truth about that.

A. Mr. Nice, you are drawing conclusions too quickly, and those conclusions go against the facts. Let me reiterate that, in addition to supporting the rights of the Serbs across the Drina, both in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their right to self-determination, we supported them financially and materially in order to ensure their continued existence. We never concealed that fact. And it is true that certain financial means of Yugoslavia were sent to those former republics so as to ensure that those people would not starve to death.

Q. Are you aware of what Mladic said at the 50th session of the RS Assembly in April 1995 about the percentage of support that he'd received over the previous years from Belgrade? Yes or no.

A. I'm not aware of that.

Q. Were you aware of what the accused himself said when he was arrested about the support he had provided for weapons and ammunitions and other needs of the army of the Republika Srpska constituting a state secret? That's what he said and was made publicly known. Are you aware of that?

A. I read the statement given by Mr. Milosevic when he was in prison in Belgrade, the statement relating to the financial assistance given to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... did that come as a complete surprise to you, foreign minister for five years, permanent representative for five years, and were you at one stage also a Deputy Prime Minister?

A. For me it was quite a surprise, because I knew that we provided ³⁶³⁶⁹ material support, but I didn't know about the details. I wasn't involved in any other discussions regarding that.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... direct evidence here from Mr. Babic about direct funding provided at his request to this accused. Were you entirely unaware of that? Is that what you're telling us?

A. I've already said to you that I was not involved in any discussions concerning military support and military issues. I didn't know any details about the material support that was provided to Serbs across the Drina River.

Q. My suggestion to you is that it's simply unacceptable and unrealistic --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just a matter of the record. Direct funding provided to this accused was provided by this accused?

MR. NICE: Yes.

Q. My suggestion to you is your answer is simply and completely unrealistic. Let me remind you of a few facts: In the course of your duties, Serbia had four different Prime Ministers, the federal republic had three different Prime Ministers, there were four other foreign ministers, just to name some of the office holders. So as people were turning over, you remained a constant figure. Now, if things were being kept from government ministers and representatives at the UN, who was doing it; one of these other Prime Ministers, one of these other foreign ministers? Who was doing it? Who was keeping it from you?

A. I don't know what they had to keep from me, but in every government there is a division of tasks, and every minister is in charge ³⁶³⁷⁰ of his responsibilities. Within my domain, I had to deal with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. I had to protect the reputation of the name of Yugoslavia in the world.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... anyone, can you, who would have kept this information from you?

A. I did not have an impression that anything is being concealed from me. I did not have much time --

Q. What you're telling us is that everything that was done was correct and above board and proper for one state to do in respect of the affairs of neighbouring territories, therefore, there would be no need to keep anything from you.

A. I've already stated what I know, and what I know is not something that Yugoslavia or Serbia can be blamed for.

Q. Very well. The truth, Mr. Jovanovic, is this: That this accused, who didn't have a platform of his own, or a philosophy, rose to power in answer to the needs of others, the Serb intellectuals and probably also the Kosovo Serbs. True or false in your analysis?

A. Not true, because you're neglecting the fact that the Serb people to a great extent were dissatisfied with the status they had within the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. It was constantly kept under control by the leadership of Croatia and Slovenia, and Josip Broz Tito constantly put in offices people who were obedient to him. Therefore, the Serbian people felt oppressed, and it is not a great surprise that Mr. Milosevic in the first free elections was elected by a great majority of votes as the first Serbian President. ³⁶³⁷¹

Q. And once in office, and you shared offices -- you shared office or you had office for a long period of time, once in office, those of you there realised that, to stay in office, the accused needed to serve the interests of the constituencies that had supported him; nationalists, Kosovo Serbs, and he did everything that was necessary to stay in office; correct?

A. This is an opinion that originated from our former western republics which wanted to portray Mr. Milosevic as a Serb nationalist. To my knowledge, he was never a Serb nationalist because he acknowledged equal rights to all peoples living in the former Yugoslavia.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... you all knew that he had to serve the interests of the nationalists to stay in office, and he did whatever was necessary in support of the Bosnian Serbs and the Croatian Serbs to achieve that end; correct?

A. No, not correct. Entirely incorrect. You have absolutely accepted the thesis of the former secessionists, Tudjman and Kucan, who launched that thesis in order to conceal their own secession which could not have been recognised had there been not this attack against Serbian leadership in Yugoslavia.

MR. NICE: Mr. Nort's assistance, very rapidly, tab 8 of the defendant's documents on the overhead projector, the report of 30th of May over which some time was spent. If we just look, please, at this. First of all put it on the overhead projector for ease of reference. Page 3. I beg your pardon. Page 2, please, Mr. Nort.

The overhead projector, please, technical booth. And page 3, ³⁶³⁷² please, for the usher. Third page. Yes.

This report which we looked at included references in paragraph 8 to General Nedeljko Boskovic having conducted discussions with Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, and the suggestion is that he was unable, I think, to control Mladic. In fact, Boskovic did succeed in controlling Mladic on one occasion and bragged about it, didn't he?

A. It is possible, but I'm telling you I was not kept abreast of these military developments at all. I learned this from the report to the Secretary-General of the UN.

Q. Paragraph 9. "Given the doubts that now exist about the ability of the authorities in Belgrade to influence General Mladic ..." Then a few lines down, just to remind the Court, "While it is my hope that the shelling of the city will not be resumed, it is also clear that the emergence of General Mladic and the forces under his command as independent actors apparently beyond the control of JNA..." And then over the page, please, Mr. Nort, to paragraph 13: "The anomalous position of General Mladic and the forces under his command, who are subject neither to the authority of Belgrade nor to that of the government of Bosnia ..."

Now, at the time of this report the JNA was just on the process of disintegrating and the VRS was just in the process of being formed; correct?

A. The army of Republika Srpska, as I understood, based on this report and other sources, was created by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina who were in the JNA forces and deployed to Bosnia and ³⁶³⁷³ Herzegovina located in Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time.

Q. At the changeover or the change of forces from being JNA to becoming in large part VRS, this document reflects some uncertainty as to the ability of either the JNA, as it makes clear, or Belgrade itself to influence him, but it's only expressing uncertainty, isn't it?

A. As far as I understood it, the JNA had great difficulties in withdrawing from Bosnia and Herzegovina their formations which had soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro in it because those soldiers were --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... short, this document is expressing uncertainty about the ability at that stage, and that's all. And this is the changeover stage, expressing uncertainty about the ability to control Mladic.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, where in the document do the -- does the document cite that as the basis of the --

MR. NICE: Your Honour, paragraph 9 says "... doubts about the ability ..."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, but your thesis is that this was due to the changeover and you need to have a factual basis for that in the document itself if you're putting it to the witness.

MR. NICE: It's a question of time. Paragraph 5: "The bulk of the JNA personnel who were deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina were citizens of that republic and were not therefore covered by the Belgrade authority's decision of 4 May to withdraw the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of them appear to have joined the army of the so-called 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.'" ³⁶³⁷⁴ It goes on to deal with the statistics on all that.

Q. I'm asking the witness: It's right, isn't it, this was at the time of the establishment of that army, that new army, and the changeover of authority, and all that this document is expressing is doubts about the ability of the JNA or Belgrade to control him, correct?

A. The doubts are no proof at all. Anybody can have doubts. The JNA did have great difficulties in ensuring that they withdrew their forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina safely. The army of Alija Izetbegovic obstructed them in that endeavour. There were many victims in Dobrovoljacka street and Tuzla and so on. Therefore, the withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina was obstructed on purpose by Alija Izetbegovic in order to use it in their campaign against Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... move on. You can just help us with this: We know, and we're going to look at it very briefly, that immediately following this report there was a further Resolution of the Security Council, effectively condemning that the Serbs -- Security Council Resolutions are based on the totality of information coming to various members who are party to the Resolutions; correct?

A. I don't know what Resolution you have in mind. There was a Resolution where that was condemned and withdrawal was requested, but there was also a report of the Secretary-General confirming that the units of the JNA had withdrawn from the barracks from which withdrawal was obstructed by Alija Izetbegovic. As far as I know, the Presidency, on the 5th of June, officially informed the last soldier of the JNA had ³⁶³⁷⁵ withdrawn.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... procedural one which you as a permanent representative know, Resolutions are made on the totality of information coming to those engaged in drafting and approving the Resolution; correct?

A. I don't know whether that is correct or not. Rather, I know that based on that information, they adopted certain documents. I don't know whether that information was complete, whether they also took into account information coming from Belgrade and Yugoslavia in general.

Q. The first of the three topics I said I would speak to you about, namely the authority of the accused, I have only time for one other question this morning, and it's this: You told us about the development of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Serbia. Both those ministries, set up under the 1990 act, I think, were abolished in 1993 while the third ministry established, the Ministry for Serbs Overseas, continued in effect. The Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry, were abolished in 1993 because by then the accused had sufficient and adequate control over the FRY as not to need such ministries for Serbia. Would that be correct?

A. It is correct that they were abolished, but the explanation you provided is incorrect, because in the meantime, the former Yugoslavia was reconstituted and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was created. Therefore, one year was needed in order for the organs to establish mutual links and relations, and when that was done it was decided those two ministries should be abolished because there was no purpose in their ³⁶³⁷⁶ further existence.

Q. You understand the Prosecution's position on this, don't you, Mr. Jovanovic: There was in fact never a need for a Foreign Ministry for the Republic of Serbia nor a need for a Ministry of Defence in a country that claims it has no army. Those ministries were set up for a practical and -- for a practical purpose in 1990, and by 1993 the accused could get everything he wanted through the FRY. That is the reality, isn't it?

A. No, that is not the reality, because in 1990, or in the former Yugoslavia, the state was in a very difficult situation. We didn't know how things were going to develop. Therefore, that constitution in 1990, as a measure of precaution, decided to establish these two ministries, and the Ministry of Defence existed practically only on paper.

Q. Third topic that I was going to discuss to you, the prevailing ambition of all of you to achieve a state where all the Serbs could live together. There is one existing telephone intercept transcript -- no, I beg your pardon. I'm looking at the wrong document. My mistake. Can you look at this document, please. It's a new document, it's been referred to before, it comes from a book of documents. It's the declaration concerning the conditions for recognition of new states. Dated the 16th of December. If the usher would be good enough to put the second page on -- there it is. 16th of December, 1991, where the European Community, and we can look at the foot of that page, inviting all Yugoslav republics to state by the 23rd of December whether they wish to be recognised as independent. Do you remember this declaration and indeed this document? ³⁶³⁷⁷

A. Certainly. And I replied to this declaration. I spoke about that on the first day I gave testimony.

Q. What this -- what this document did, what this invitation did was to render forever obsolete the Belgrade initiative which sought the inclusion of Bosnia because Bosnia was bound to accept the invitation and apply for independence. It heralded the new departure of the third Yugoslavia which itself failed in the following year and it gave rise to the inevitability of war if the accused and those he represented were to have their way; correct?

A. Your approach is entirely wrong. It is prejudicial and selective. You're basically supporting the policy of European Community secessionist republics. The European Community supported from the beginning the secessionist policy which led to all the problems that ensued later. The Belgrade initiative wanted to continue the struggle for preserving the former Yugoslavia in which everybody lived together in prosperity. If a -- if an appeal was sent to Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was done precisely in order to reconstitute the new state and to turn it into a stable state where everybody would be guaranteed equality. Unfortunately, this initiative was not successful because it was undermined from elsewhere and because these republics were encouraged to proceed with their secession. Previously, it had already been decided to inflict a deadly blow upon Yugoslavia and to render it obsolete with the stroke of a pen. This was a crime against humanity and peace.

Q. I see. May tab 5 be produced, please. You're saying, are you, that the -- no, never mind. ^{36378 BLANK PAGE 36379} May tab 5 be produced.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Tab 8, please, next, from the Prosecution proposed exhibits. This, Mr. Jovanovic, is quite an extensive intercepted telephone conversation between yourself involving Karadzic and Koljevic. It's already been produced, you've had an opportunity to look at it, and I see I think you took the documents away with you over the weekend and I'm glad you did so.

Can I just look at two passages, please, Mr. Nort. In the English version at page 5, and I'm afraid I haven't checked -- it's already an exhibit. I haven't checked the parallel for page 5. I don't know if -- it's my mistake for not having that in hand. At page 5 -- page 5 has you saying in your conversation with Karadzic the only thing that is not mentioned here -- you were talking at this time - this is February of 1992 - is the unchangedness of borders, but you have no borders yet established. Now, have you found that passage? It will be about page 6 or 7.

A. I have read this. I've read it over the weekend.

Q. Very well, then.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I see this on the transcript of the conversation. It's on page 3 of the Serbian text. The last line on page 3, but -- ³⁶³⁸⁰

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

Q. Have you got that on page 3? You've read this in any event over the weekend. This makes it quite clear, doesn't it, that you were determined there should be no changing of the then-borders created in Bosnia. Would that be right?

A. No, it wouldn't be right. If you read the entire conversation, and you should look at it as a whole and not extract a sentence out of context, this had to do with the preparations for the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for negotiations with Ambassador Cutileiro in order to establish a cantonal Bosnia. Mr. Karadzic wanted to check some of his thoughts and clarify some concepts because he wasn't clear about some legal concepts. I said here something that's correct, and that is that Bosnia and Herzegovina were yet to be constituted as an independent state on the basis of a cantonal order, and this process was under way, and they were to negotiate and reach a joint conclusion. I did not say that there would be no change of borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, what is before us is not what you are talking about.

MR. NICE: I'm so sorry if it isn't. That's my mistake for not checking. But in any event, Your Honours, because of the length of the document, because the witness has now read it and because I had to ask the interpretation of the document to be a matter for the Chamber in due course, and I put my case, if the usher would be good enough to put page 6 on it, it picks up at page 6 and goes on to page 7, the passage I'm referring to him. The only thing that is not mentioned here is ³⁶³⁸¹ unchangedness of the borders. "You have no borders yet established..." and it's that passage that follows that I was referring the witness to. But, Your Honour, may I finish with this document in this way:

Q. The cantonal approach of this, which is the Cutileiro plan, also found at our tab 25, was appealing to you and to the Serb leadership because it did indeed have ethnic borders. Isn't that correct?

A. It was acceptable for the entire Conference on Yugoslavia, and all the participants, including Mr. Izetbegovic. Later he withdrew from this position, and he was persuaded to do so by America.

Q. My case on that particular -- or my proposition on that particular intercept in mind, can we look briefly at tab 25, an existing exhibit, Exhibit 810, and to remind you of --

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, does that last one have an exhibit number?

MR. NICE: Sorry, it's an existing exhibit.

JUDGE BONOMY: Do you have the number?

MR. NICE: I certainly do. It is 613, tab 243.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. And again, it's a document we've looked at before but not with you, Mr. Jovanovic. It's a Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs document. You have seen it, you've gone through it over the weekend, I have no doubt, and without taking time on it, because it's available to the Court, the last paragraph that comes from your Ministry of Foreign Affairs, says this -- second page, please, Mr. Nort, last paragraph: "Value of the ³⁶³⁸² Cutileiro's Plan rested with that the International Community already at that time showed its readiness to legalise and verify internationally and legally the borders of Serbian territories in BiH." Now, these were ethnical borders and this was the value to you, wasn't it?

A. Ethnical borders also exist in the Dayton Accord, and that has been accepted by the whole world. It was the only way to calm down Bosnia-Herzegovina and prevent it from rushing into war.

Q. I'm dealing with things chronologically, trying to enable the Court to have a chronological picture. This is the Cutileiro plan. You're writing about it after the event in 1994 but it's a 1992 event. And at that stage the attraction of this plan, and you've gone on about how you say every peace plan was accepted, the actual attraction of this plan was its ethnical borders which were going to be recognised internationally; correct?

A. In all the other plans the internal ethnic borders were recognised. This was an expression of the right to self-determination of the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I see nothing bad or terrible about it. That's why it was accepted by the international community.

Q. The next document is tab 12, which is the stenographic record of the Council for Harmonisation that met on the 11th of August. Just while it's coming up, to remind the Court, the Council for Harmonisation, wider than the SDC, with representations from the RS and the RSK. Again you will have gone through this over the weekend so we can ³⁶³⁸³ deal with it all very swiftly, but at page 23 in the English --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice's question contains a substantive error. He can see that in the stenogram. This Council for Harmonisation was drawn up by members of the council established by the then president of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic. The members of the council are listed, and it can clearly be seen that the representatives of the RS and the RSK were not members of that council, and they were invited by the chairman to participate. Therefore, there were no representatives outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in this council, but --

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... cut into my time. I have no time to afford to give to the accused, I'm afraid.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What he's saying is you have made a misrepresentation.

MR. NICE: It's wider than the SDC.

JUDGE ROBINSON: There was no representation from the RS and RSK.

MR. NICE: If the composition is not the representation, he can deal with it in re-examination, but I'm grateful for the intervention and if I may deal with it in a question, it's in this way:

Q. This is for a council -- Perhaps Mr. Nort would put the first page of the document on the overhead projector, since the accused raises it. As translated this embodies the Council for Coordination of points of view on state policy. Incidentally, you can see it was actually held in Dobanovci. I asked you about that, you didn't recall it; never mind. ³⁶³⁸⁴ Coordination of whose points of view, Mr. Jovanovic? Whose points of view were to be coordinated? If it wasn't the RS and the RSK who were invited along, whose points of view were to be coordinated?

A. The points of view of the federal organs and the organs of the republic were to be harmonised with the new president, Milan Panic, who frequently acted very independently without a thorough understanding of the problems and issues involved. In order to protect him from his embarking on facts which were not familiar to him, he was to be familiarised with these issues and conclusions.

Q. Was there to be coordination with those coming along, if not as representatives of the council nevertheless coming along on, I think, all the occasions we've looked at from the RS and the RSK, was there to be coordination with them? Was that what it was about?

A. These meetings were convened by the president of the Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Cosic, and with reference to the representatives of the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, they were only consultative. They were to be given advice or clarifications with respect to previous meetings; for example, the London conference.

Q. Page 23 in the English, please, and 23 at the bottom. I hope it's the same pagination as mine. It's not the same as mine.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I became alert yesterday to the fact that there was a marginal difference of pagination between my pages and -- can I have the document back? Thank you very much. No, top of page 23 it will be.

Right. The top of page 23 -- top of page 23, please. Top. Right ³⁶³⁸⁵ at the top. Right.

Q. We see a passage - this is you speaking - and it says this: "However, I am really afraid that the other side, the opponents' side doesn't want that because it wants clear and clean discontinuity, that psychological second to set in. That's important for them because of their strategic aspirations for the Balkans and because they want to deny us the position of Piedmont, that is the possibility that tomorrow or in ten or fifty years we become a new centre which will bring Yugoslav peoples together."

Pausing there, Piedmont is a reference to the province of Italy that occupied a broadly similar position to Serbia at the unification of Italy in the 19th century.

It goes on: "That is something that the previous generations have put into our hands. We have no right to throw it away. We may choose not to use it at the time when conditions are unfavourable, but we should still preserve it, because if it were not so important, it would not brother our opponents so much."

This, Mr. Jovanovic, is another clear announcement by you of the desirability of leaving the situation so that all Serbs could live in one state, and it was the underlining purpose and it was as plain as could be.

A. That's not what was said. What was said was that all the southern Slavs have the right to a common state. This was their dream for centuries, and it was realised in 1918. Unfortunately, the European Community managed to turn it into dust and ashes. If Serbia was Piedmont for the southern Slavs, this a historical fact. This is why ³⁶³⁸⁶ Austria-Hungary waged the First World War against Serbia, so as to prevent that. The shedding of large quantities of blood in these unfortunate wars was a pledge that nothing like that would happen again in the future. The noble desire of all the southern Slavs are something that no other southern Slav would give up.

MR. NICE: Would the usher please bring me the papers and I'll just have a look for one other short passage from this document, because it may not be the same page number and I can just about afford the time to do it. Thank you very much.

Q. You know that, probably from reading the transcript of this trial, that an issue is whether there was equality of approach to the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia and the Serbs -- and the Kosovo Albanians. You know about that, don't you?

A. Yes, I know that. There was not and could not have been a single approach because these were constituent peoples, and this was guaranteed by the constitutions of these peoples in the former Yugoslavia.

Q. Very well --

A. The Albanians in Kosovo were an ethnic minority.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... let's look at this passage where the accused is speaking in the same meeting. He recognised full well - top of the page, please. That's fine. He recognised, we can see it at the top of the page, the validity or the problem of that argument, because he says this: "I didn't have any reservations with regards to this, but an explanation how to avoid with what arguments that the same right is requested for the Albanians, that is the problem. This is the ³⁶³⁸⁷ thorn in our argumentation. We know what our arguments are, we have to see what arguments will be acceptable to them."

The inconsistency of approach between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians was always recognised, wasn't it?

A. No. In this case, as far as I understand, Mr. Milosevic pointed out that we have a constitution which differentiates between minorities and constituent peoples. However, the international community, or rather, its western part, did not recognise this distinction. It also forcibly demoted the Serbs in Bosnia and in Croatia to the status of minorities. This led to conflicts and ultimately it was recognised that the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are a constituent people. This was not the case in Croatia where they were reduced to the status of a minority.

MR. NICE: Next exhibit, please, is tab 15, which is the shorthand notes for the meeting on the 9th of January. I've got a few rather more references to look at in this one but the page numbering won't be a problem. If the page -- if the usher could have the English, and it's page 25 at the bottom -- beg your pardon, it's page -- page 25, at the bottom of the page. Usher, that's the big page 25, in the middle, not the page on the right-hand side.

Q. This is Dobrica -- this is yourself speaking, and it's at the top of the page, Usher, please. Thank you. Top of the page. No, next page, please. It's 25 at the bottom. It's the big page number 25. This is you speaking, and you said this: "We have to make a conclusion from it that the community and conditions do not allow the ages old dream on union of all Serbs in one Serbian country to become true. We ³⁶³⁸⁸ have to move in phases towards that goal."

Mr. Jovanovic, it couldn't be clearer from all the passages I'm putting to you that this was your underlying intention and it was shared by everyone else. "Move in phases towards that goal." Tell me what that means.

A. Your conclusion is not correct. What I said here and repeated later on was that all the Serbs did live in one state, Yugoslavia, and they were expelled from it against their will. The discussion now was about their wish to remain in one state, and I told them that this was no longer realistic and possible. In one of the texts you put to me, I said expressly that the right to self-determination of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not include the right to secession --

Q. Very well --

A. -- and that's what I said.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... next is page 43 of --

A. That was the standpoint I put forward.

MR. NICE: Bottom right-hand corner, page 43 of 1167. And middle of the page, of that page. Not that one. It's page 43 of 1167. Further on. No. Page -- sorry. If you look at the bottom right-hand corner, Mr. Nort, you'll see figures 43. Bottom right-hand corner, please. Your Honours will know that these pages have been helpfully compiled so that one can cross refer to the Serbian, but that makes it more difficult for Mr. Nort and I'm sorry about that. No. Page 43 at the bottom right-hand corner, please. Can I have the papers back?

Q. This is the accused speaking in this meeting. Couldn't be ³⁶³⁸⁹ clearer: "The name of the state is not important," he said, "the essence is important. What matters here is that the ethnical division is fully accepted and that the constitutive people is accepted. These are the two elements that Alija tried to avoid by all means. There could be no unitary state with these two elements."

Now, this is dealing with the division of Bosnia along ethnical division, and it was ethnical division that was uppermost in the accused's mind; correct?

A. No. This is about the Vance-Owen Plan that the Serbs in Bosnia accepted in principle but they rejected the maps. Mr. Milosevic made an effort to convince them to accept the maps to which they had numerous objections. This was a way of having them accept a rational way of thinking and accept the maps --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. -- it was not a plea for ethnic purity.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... bottom right-hand corner. The same figures we've been looking at.

Mr. Jovanovic, in my respectful submission, you are denying what is absolutely obvious and you're doing it because you know that this lay behind the support of the Bosnian Serbs and it lay behind the crimes that were committed. And if you look at this, this is Dobrica Cosic talking. Further up the page, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, let him answer that.

MR. NICE: Certainly.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think, Mr. Nice, that you are ³⁶³⁹⁰ getting involved in your own expectations about the outcome and coming into conflict with the facts. Before the declaration and after that we kept stressing that we had no territorial pretensions, that all we wanted was the freedom and equality of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's the reason Mr. Milosevic immediately accepted the Cutileiro plan. He said that two or three weeks after that he would recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why was this not done? Why was this plan toppled and Bosnia and Herzegovina led into war?

MR. NICE:

Q. Please look at this passage from Dobrica Cosic presiding over the meeting: "In my opinion, we have to reconcile ourselves and finally agree that the achievement of our main political goal, living in one state or in the federation of states, is the long-term aim which could be achieved only step-by-step or gradually. I think that any other kind of a national and state politics would be an adventure." What does that mean if it doesn't mean what I'm suggesting?

A. It means quieting the frustrated leaders of the Bosnian Serbs who were afraid of their own shadows. They were afraid of being tricked by Alija Izetbegovic, and they persistently refused to accept the maps. Both President Cosic and President Milosevic tried to calm their fears and to convince them that what they would gain would guarantee their freedom and equality. This is the rhetoric they used which was not foreign to any real southern Slav because we used to live in a single state and we are all nostalgic and wish that state had continued.

Q. Let's see what the accused said about this. Two pages on, please, ^{36391 BLANK PAGE 36392} Mr. Nort, at page 73, starting at the top of the page, a passage we've looked at before. And Mr. Jovanovic, you will have looked at this. This is the passage where the accused says, and it's at the top of the page: "How can we --" five lines down -- "how to turn the situation which de facto exists --" no, top of the page, please. Yep. Five lines down. "How to turn the situation which de facto exists and which could not be de facto endangered into being de facto and de jure," and he deals with the small labyrinth and says how long it will take to get there. There had been achieved by force what it was now the desire of the accused to turn, by passage of time, by negotiations, into law; correct?

A. All this is part of the methodology of quieting the fears of the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs and convincing them to accept the maps.

Q. I haven't got time to go into it but let's go over four pages to page 76.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, this is a passage I would press the Chamber to read in great detail at some stage, but at page 76, at the bottom right-hand corner, middle of that page, where we see about something called cutting the boat loose. That relates to -- in fact, let's pick it up at the top of the page, please, Usher. Radovan Karadzic deals with, first of all, the assassination the previous day of the Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, saying that they'd punish the man. They never did. It's right, isn't it, they never punished the man who -- Karadzic never punished the man who assassinated Irfan Turalic [phoen], did he? As a matter of fact --

A. I don't know. Every murderer has to be tried. ³⁶³⁹³

Q. We go on, on a new topic, and Karadzic says: "We would act the way we agree, especially if we would be in a situation to endanger the position of the mother country ... We would 'cut our boat loose' ... The accused: "We're not speaking about 'cutting the boat loose.'" Cosic: "Who could sacrifice you? Who is entitled to make a decision to sacrifice the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina?" Karadzic: "I would like to say we are deluding ourselves by thinking that in a later phase we would be able to trick them." The accused: "They would already be tricked after we get the issue to the later phase. We have already 'led them up to the garden path.' That is the matter." Had they been led up the garden path, please? How had they been led up the garden path, Mr. Jovanovic?

A. Mr. Nice, this entire text has to be read in its entirety to understand the real meaning of this. The entirety says that the Bosnian leaders, the Serb Bosnian leaders were so terrified that they kept saying things that were not rational, and at this meeting everyone, especially Presidents Cosic and Milosevic, took a great deal of trouble to get them to see reason. If they used words to pacify them, it was only in order to get them to accept the maps. That was the only meaning of all this.

Q. Who had been led up the garden path?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I know from which page Mr. Nice is quoting? I can't find the passage, or perhaps I misheard the page number. He said page 76. ³⁶³⁹⁴

MR. NICE: 76 in the English, and in the Serbian it's page 71.

Q. And the people who were led up the garden path were the international community, weren't they, Mr. Jovanovic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't find it in Serbian, no.

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... page 72 in the Serbian.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, not on page 71.

MR. NICE: End of page 72.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you have it in front of you, Mr. Jovanovic?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have the English text in front of me. However, the page is not marked in the English version. I have it somewhere here too.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't find this expression, to trick.

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me tell you, in Serbian it says that I said that we have already been able to deal with them. I didn't say to trick. I said to deal with them, to better them. This is a substantial difference, because I'm referring to tactics here and to persuasion, as Mr. Jovanovic has explained. To deal with somebody and to trick somebody are two different things.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And then Karadzic says: "Had we realised this on time, then this border -- or we would have been in a different situation. And I responded with a joke, saying this is as ³⁶³⁹⁵ though Pero had gone to the police. And only somebody who understands the language truly can understand what this is all about. This is just all excerpted from the context.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Can we have the Serbian put on the ELMO so we can have it translated.

MR. NICE: Would Your Honour just give me one minute.

[Prosecution counsel confer]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice may at a later stage have occasion to ask you about this, Mr. Milosevic, depending on the course you take.

MR. NICE: Beg your pardon.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I said at a later stage in the proceedings you may have an opportunity to put that question to Mr. Milosevic himself, depending on the course he takes.

MR. NICE: Yes, certainly. Here it is. On the overhead projector, please, Mr. Nort. Bottom of the page. And if the interpreters please could read out the answer starting the accused.

THE INTERPRETER: Slobodan Milosevic: "We have beat them at their game. We have outwitted them if we put the matters to a later phase. What we have here is that we have managed to outwit them. This is what this is all about."

MR. NICE: Thank you. Your Honour, I must move on. The time is so --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. NICE: -- short. If I could have that page back, please, Usher. I'm going to abandoned the rest of my questions on this topic and ³⁶³⁹⁶ I'm going to move to the second topic -- I'm going to go to the second topic, crimes and knowledge of crimes. Tab 3, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, in that -- I'm sorry to go back to that passage. There was nothing in it about leading them up the garden path, from the translation.

MR. NICE: No, not from the translation. The outwitted. If we put the matter, I think it's outwitted them. I'll try and get some detail of the translation --

JUDGE ROBINSON: That is a very poor translation then, because that has a specific connotation in English.

MR. NICE: I'll try to deal with that in more detail later.

Q. Tab 3 is an existing intercept. You've had a chance to look at this, have you, over the weekend, Mr. Jovanovic?

A. Yes.

MR. NICE: If we look at the English, please, on Exhibit 613, tab 101. Two things, remind the Chamber. If the usher would put page 4, looking at the bottom, on the overhead projector. We see a discussion between Karadzic and the accused about the London agreement triggered by discussion with the previous witness, Smilja Avramov.

Q. Were you involved in any discussions about going back to the London agreement of 1915 which would have given Serbia so much more territory?

A. I don't think that I attended that meeting, if my memory serves me right.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... please, Mr. Nort. You're ³⁶³⁹⁷ aware of the London agreement and the maps that were discussed in London in 1915, are you?

A. Yes.

Q. And you accept the view that another witness called by the accused has given that to discuss the London agreement maps would constitute embracing the notion of Greater Serbia? Do you agree with that?

A. First of all, that was not the notion of Greater Serbia. Rather, an offer of Western allies extended to the Serbs during the war, namely to --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... next question was to discuss those maps. Would it be right that to discuss those maps would be to embrace the notion of a Greater Serbia?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes. Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to say, Mr. Robinson, that this is way too much. Mr. Nice is putting questions as though I discussed the London agreement here, although he can see clearly for himself that I -- that Karadzic said that the meeting ought to be prepared --

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, let Mr. Nice -- put the question again, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: I'm going to move on, Your Honour, if I may. It's dealt with already in other evidence and another intercept. Page 5, please, Usher.

Q. The accused here deals with -- ³⁶³⁹⁸

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is being done in a wrong way, Mr. Robinson. This is a manipulative way. Mr. Nice --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... manipulative -- if it is manipulative, we will deal with that. We haven't found it that way.

MR. NICE:

Q. This is the accused speaking, on page 5, halfway down. Karadzic says: "The problem are these idiots." And then expletive. "I see now they are bringing the Presidency into question." The accused says: "If they start that, then disturbances will start down there and they will be gone. We have to likewise secure Herzegovina down there up to Dubrovnik. That's what we should go for. The de facto situation in Yugoslavia is defending its territory."

That's a contemporaneous 26th of October, 1991, intercept. You were foreign minister at the time. What you were doing in Dubrovnik, attacking it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is probably not an error of Mr. Nice but an error made by somebody who prepared this, because everything is turned upside down here. Where it should be Karadzic, it says Milosevic, and vice versa. So this is one great confusion. It says here Slobodan Milosevic says: "Very well, President, we will certainly get --" and then the person speaks in Ekavian and that's not the dialect I use, and I certainly wouldn't address Karadzic as Mr. President. So this ³⁶³⁹⁹ is attributed to the wrong person. What Mr. Karadzic -- what Mr. Nice is reading out are not words uttered by me. So this is turned upside down, and does not reflect the conversation at all.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, are you saying that the passage attributed to you, which reads in English, "Yes, if they start that then disturbances will start down there and they will be gone," et cetera, that's not something that you said?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's precisely what I'm saying. This is reflected in a different way in Serbian language, and this is something I didn't utter either. "Yes, and if we do that, then unrest will break out down there. However, we also have to deal with Herzegovina, whereas --"

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- "Dubrovnik --" and then another word in the Ekavian. So these are not my words. This has been put upside down.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We understand the point. Mr. Nice, if that is so, then I don't see how you can work on this basis.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, the swapping of names has been dealt with in the report of Mrs. Tromp. It's before you in the report. I'll deal with it after the break so I can explain exactly but my understanding is that these words are the accused's --

JUDGE ROBINSON: The words that I just --

MR. NICE: Yes, the words --

JUDGE ROBINSON: -- quoted. ³⁶⁴⁰⁰

MR. NICE: The words -- it doesn't matter. Just for the avoidance of any doubt, Mr. Jovanovic -- even if they're not his words he's being seized of information.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: I think we need clarification of all this. We're trying to trace the exhibits and how this arose. We think this is an exhibit that came in through Mr. Lilic, and reference we have in the Prosecution exhibit witness list doesn't seem to tie up with the tab that we've got in the Prosecution schedule here. There's plainly an issue over the translation, as the Court will see the question mark next to the reported speech. So whoever translated it had an issue as to who was the appropriate speaker.

If my memory serves me correct, Mrs. Tromp was not a witness in the case, in the end, and so any report by her on this issue is an internal matter for Mr. Nice, but in terms of exhibits in the case, I don't think there is any explanation about this and it is an issue that has not been resolved. We're concerned that there seem to be material inaccuracies. I don't know who has translated this document, where it originates from, and whether it has been checked by the translation department in this building.

JUDGE BONOMY: Which tab number is it, Mr. Kay?

MR. KAY: It's 469, tab 40.

JUDGE BONOMY: On the Prosecution's --

MR. NICE: Tab 3.

JUDGE BONOMY: It's tab 3. ³⁶⁴⁰¹

MR. KAY: Oh, right. I've got a --

JUDGE BONOMY: That's 613 then.

MR. KAY: Oh, right.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, can I come back to that, because the time that's being taken will take me over the break.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is tab 3. This is tab 3, which I received within this binder from Mr. Nice. However, please take a look at this. Let me just prove to you that everything has been put upside down. On page 1, it says as though Karadzic said to me, "Tomorrow, here -" meaning in Belgrade - "in Sava centre, there is a large gathering of Montenegrins." And then I reply to that, "Is it really?" as though I didn't know about that.

JUDGE KWON: Put the page 1 on the ELMO.

THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

JUDGE KWON: Wait, Mr. Milosevic. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I want to compare that to what comes later. It says here, "Here in Sava centre there is a large gathering of Montenegrins." And then Slobodan Milosevic says --

JUDGE KWON: Okay. We'll deal with it later.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice will not put any more questions on that.

MR. NICE: -- put any more questions --

JUDGE ROBINSON: On the basis of that tab. We'll move on.

MR. NICE: Tab 4, please. Tab 4 is a new exhibit. It's another ³⁶⁴⁰² of The Hague document exhibits of the kind introduced by the accused when leading this witness. If the usher would lay -- the Chamber therefore has it in its own papers. It's dated the 15th of November of 1991. And if the usher would take us to the third page now.

Q. You've told us that there was nothing going on in Dubrovnik. When pressed in November of 1991, Mr. Jovanovic, "both Mr. Milosevic and Foreign Minister Jovanovic stressed that Serbia was not involved in the siege of Dubrovnik in any way. They did, however, defend JNA actions there, claiming that the JNA would deblock Dubrovnik only when mercenaries sheltering there in violation of a 1955 declaration," and so on, had been withdrawn.

What was the action of the JNA, please, that you were defending? Was it the attack on Dubrovnik Old Town?

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The JNA -- I cannot say that the JNA was at sea and remained there in order to block the city. I suppose that Croatian units were on the ramparts and were shooting from there at the valley belonging to the Serbs in Croatia.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... that. What's your evidence for that?

A. But they were -- Dubrovnik was declared to be under UNESCO's protection and no armed forces were allowed to be deployed in that city. As far as I know, that was violated and the JNA said that it would deblock the city once Croatia abided by the status of Dubrovnik.

Q. What JNA action were you defending, Mr. Jovanovic? That's what I ³⁶⁴⁰³ want to know. Because you know that by this time the evidence shows that Dubrovnik had been attacked by the JNA. Now, tell us, what were you defending?

A. I did not defend the attack on Dubrovnik. To the contrary. In one of the interviews given to Spiegel, I stated that we did not have any claims to any cities on Croatian coast, including Dubrovnik and any other city. What this refers to is that the status of Dubrovnik was abused and there were armed units there endangering Serbs' positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the JNA was at sea and said that it would deblock the city once Croatia withdrew its forces.

Q. Please tell us, as the foreign minister, did you then or have you at any time since come to appreciate that Dubrovnik was attacked by the JNA as indeed two trials in this very court have covered? Were you aware of that, Mr. Jovanovic?

A. Later on, I learned --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. -- including from the trial ---

Q. How did you learn about it?

A. I learned first at the conference in The Hague, when President Tudjman complained that there had been attacks on Dubrovnik that was denied by the then-representative of the JNA. That's all I knew at the time. There was a claim and a denial.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. Later on, I learned something more.

Q. I must take the most interesting question I can. Can you help the ^{36404 BLANK PAGE 36405} Judges, please, looking back, with how it could conceivably be that you, the foreign minister, with such a world famous problem as the alleged attack on Dubrovnik, covered by the world's press, can have been unaware of the fact that the JNA was attacking it? Just explain what happened in government that you could have been kept out of knowledge.

A. At the time in Croatia there was a conflict between Croatian forces and the JNA. Croatian forces blocked the JNA barracks, and it was difficult to ensure that they were deblocked without casualties. There were -- there were a number of hot spots in the entire territory of Croatia. Dubrovnik was one of them. We were waiting for a peaceful resolution. We worked on a peaceful resolution. I never followed the developments in Dubrovnik closely.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovanovic, the question is a fairly simple one. It is: How could Dubrovnik be attacked by the JNA and you as the foreign minister would not have been aware of that?

THE WITNESS: I knew as much as everybody else in Yugoslavia knew. I did not ever receive any special information about what was happening there.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Jovanovic -- if His Honour is finished?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. -- I am going to make it quite clear to you that my suggestion to you is that that answer by you is absolutely ridiculous. To say that you, the foreign minister, one of the only long-time serving associates of this ³⁶⁴⁰⁶ accused for a ten-year period, because this is admittedly at an early part, a trusted associate of this accused, it is ridiculous for you to say you had no more knowledge of the JNA attack on Dubrovnik than the members of the public, and it reflects your need on behalf of this accused to deny the obvious.

A. This is your conclusion, Mr. Nice. It may sound absurd, but it is true. I've sworn to say only the truth here, and that's what I did. Now, as to how logical and acceptable it is to somebody else, that's another matter, but this is truth.

Q. Let's look at tab 12 --

JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Jovanovic, then can I ask this way: When did you come to know that Dubrovnik was attacked and shelled?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot say that accurately, but I think it was the first time here, at the conference in The Hague when President Tudjman complained. He was quite angry and spoke in an agitated way. I think that General Kadijevic was there as well, if my memory serves me right. He denied that, and he linked it to the blocking of the barracks throughout Croatia. He asked that that action be ceased and the JNA units be allowed to withdraw in peace without harassment.

JUDGE KWON: Could you tell us what you did after you heard the news of shelling Dubrovnik.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was nothing else I could do. I simply heard the explanation given by the JNA representative. We never discussed that matter. For me, Dubrovnik was an unknown, although that looks perhaps illogical. I never understood why Dubrovnik would be ³⁶⁴⁰⁷ attacked, therefore, I never justified that.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: May we look briefly at tab 12, the shorthand notes for the Council of Coordination of Points of View on State Policy of the 11th of August, at page 12 on the bottom right-hand corner, Usher, middle of the page.

Q. See now this -- that's fine, thank you very much. This is one that you attended in August 1992 with, amongst others, Milo Djukanovic, who was at that time, oscillating as he does between president and Prime Minister, Prime Minister of the Republic of Montenegro, and this is what he had to say, in the middle of the page. You see it at the top of the screen: "I think that we should start from the judgement, if you agree, which has also its continuation in comparison with the judgement given by Mr. Panic, our federal Prime Minister. It is true that we did a lot of bad things during the previous period; a bad picture was created ..." What were the bad things that Mr. Djukanovic of Montenegro was talking about? Because you know that Montenegro was involved in the attacks on that part of Croatia, don't you? What was he talking about? What were these bad things?

A. Probably volunteers from Montenegro who went there and behaved rather badly, if I can say so, in moderate terms, and that probably embittered him.

Q. Having access to all the top brass of the army, to the presidents and Prime Minister of Montenegro, to this accused, and with the world outcry amongst -- about, amongst other things, Dubrovnik, did you ever ask ³⁶⁴⁰⁸ anybody if they'd attacked Dubrovnik or did you just not bother?

A. I asked and was told that we did not attack and that Serbia had nothing to do with that --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. -- that was a conflict --

Q. Who did you ask?

A. I asked President Milosevic, among others, and was given a clear answer that Serbia had nothing to do with it.

Q. And was any explanation given for how the world could have been looking at the videos it was on television and seeing these attacks? Was any explanation given for that? Who was it said was firing the guns?

A. We didn't go into details. What I know and what was discussed is that the Croats themselves in Dubrovnik, that's what was said and was written, set tyres on fire and that produced a lot of smoke and the international TV crews declared that to be explosions of shells fired by the JNA. I did not go into details, but this is what was presented in the press.

Q. Somebody else's fault and the Serbs entirely innocent again; is that right?

A. That's not what I said. I simply said about what I had heard and read in the press. I couldn't take it for granted, but I had no other reliable information from other sources and therefore I awaited the day when the full truth would come out.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, could you remind me, please, were you at that time foreign minister of Yugoslavia or of Serbia? ³⁶⁴⁰⁹

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If this was in October of 1991 - I think that's what we said - then I was the minister of Serbia, until July of 1992.

MR. NICE:

Q. Tab 13, please, the meeting on the 18th of August, 1992. At the bottom, right-hand corner it will be page 18. Now, here we see Milan Panic speaking. He had yet to be dismissed or removed by the accused. Milan Panic: "We are already in that position. The problem is that we've been accused for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that we support the war in Bosnia, and that we left weapons for them to fight; that we support Karadzic financially. We spoke here about the ethnic cleansing." Now, the first thing is everybody understood, didn't they, Mr. Jovanovic, the allegations being made against Serbia and the FRY by the international community; correct?

A. Mr. Panic simply conveyed what was said by the part of the international community against Serbia. These are not his claims.

Q. No. I accept that. Now let's look at the bottom of the page, please. Having set out the general allegations, he says: "We cannot get rid of it. This afternoon I received the following information - ethnic cleansing has begun: 15.000 Muslims from Sanski Most were given eight hours to leave their homes and make twenty kilometres to Jajce in order to reach the Muslims. This information was received from the United Nations. They asked me and said that I should stop it."

You told us a couple of days ago that you reacted against any suggestions of and condemned any ethnic cleansing. Where are we going to ³⁶⁴¹⁰ find - help us, please - the public condemnation of the ethnic cleansing of Sanski Most by this body or by its leaders?

A. I can't say with certainty whether we spoke about this, but the republican government and the federal government in their declarations, statements, frequently condemned ethnic cleansing, urged that there be a cease-fire and that all camps be disbanded if they existed. I don't know whether Sanski Most was mentioned specifically, but in this text and in other texts we saw here, we could see that I always condemned ethnic cleansing and insisted that humanitarian efforts be stepped up, that all camps be disbanded, that there be a cease-fire and end of hostilities, and we appealed to the other side to do the same.

Q. My suggestion to you is that when the Chamber looks at this record of the meeting as a whole, and you were there, you will not find surprise, shock, and revulsion at the ethnic cleansing but tolerance of it.

A. Not on our side, no.

Q. Very well.

A. You can't say that.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I hope to finish. I've got a few more things to deal with and I must complete the exercise that took a lot of time on the last occasion of producing the notice documents which are extremely important, not least because they cover the period of the aftermath of Srebrenica. I will ask the accused again, through the Court, whether the balance of those documents which the witness will have had an opportunity to consider simply be admitted en masse. I understand I didn't ask for tab 4 to be admitted and should have done. ³⁶⁴¹¹

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it will be admitted. We will take the break now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, two matters to tidy up. First of all, the intercept transcript at tab 3. The accused is correct. At that particular point, the names should be reversed. In fact, it was covered in -- there's no reason for anybody to know this: It was covered in an electronic filing and a filing, an electronic filing that came to the Court on the 19th of January, 2004, where the particular point the transcript having speakers reversed towards the end was made, and I think the particular speakers were also reversed. So my error to have read it out the way I did. My point would remain the same, whether the knowledge -- or substantially the same, whether the knowledge going to the accused or going from him.

The second point to deal with is the challenged translation, of course coming from the CLSS, that led to the phrase "up the garden path." The phrase that was actually used and is, in inverted commas, I believe translates to the effect of saying you take someone across the water and he remains thirsty on the other side. And it may be that it is itself a strong phrase, along the lines of leading up the garden path. So that's that.

If I can now turn back to the questions of this witness and go back in time for one purpose only, because I should have -- although I've ³⁶⁴¹² admitted many things, there's one thing I have to deal with just to put it in context. If we could go to tab 11, please, which is an existing exhibit, just simply to remind the Trial Chamber of the chronology of events when it was concerned about tab 8 of the accused's bundle.

Q. It's right, isn't it, Mr. Jovanovic, that this exhibit, tab 11, which you will have had a chance to review -- I beg your pardon.

A. Yes, but I don't have it before me right now.

Q. The usher will put it on the overhead projector. This is the Security Council Resolution that was made on the day of the report that you've been referring to, and we can see that it reaffirms its Resolutions, it reaffirms its support for the Conference on Yugoslavia. It deplores the fact that the demands have not been complied with, and it goes on to make the recommendations that it does. This led to sanctions. And as I suggested to you earlier on, the reality is that those making this Resolution would be relying on a whole range of sources of information, including the report had it, you say, not been delayed in its delivery, but they in fact have a whole range of information to rely on before making their Resolution; correct?

A. I don't know what it is based on, but the report that was delayed in arriving as the Resolution had already been adopted was the basis for this Resolution. Had the report arrived, the Resolution would not have been adopted and sanctions would certainly not have been introduced against Yugoslavia.

Q. That is a matter of conjecture, I suggest to you. You suggested to the Chamber that somebody intentionally kept it back. Do you want to ³⁶⁴¹³ name that person for me, please, so I can investigate it?

A. According to what I read, this was some Austrian clerk. I don't know what his name was.

Q. So an Austrian -- on your understanding, an Austrian clerk took the initiative to hold back a report for political reasons. Is that what you're suggesting? And may we have his name, if you want to make allegations like this.

A. I don't know what his name is, but the press said it was some sort of Austrian clerk or official. Whether he did this on his own initiative or pursuant to a suggestion from someone, I can't say. As all this is very unclear, all I can say is that the delay in the report's arrival was intentional.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The press in what country, Mr. Jovanovic?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Austria. An Austrian official.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no. I asked -- you said the press said that it was an Austrian official, and I was asking the press from what country made that allegation?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I found this in the Yugoslav press, but they were relying to sources from the foreign press. I don't know what sources. It's a long time ago.

MR. NICE:

Q. You see, Mr. Jovanovic, the report is completely out of line with all the other Resolutions and reports, I must suggest to you, and of course it's possible sometimes for the Yugoslav interest to persuade some reporting person from an embassy here or there to take a different view, ³⁶⁴¹⁴ but the vast majority of the reporting was all to the same effect over this period, wasn't it? And that's why the various Resolutions were made.

A. I don't understand your question quite well. Generally speaking, yes, but this Resolution depended to a great extent on this report. And had the report been submitted, the sanctions would not have been introduced, at least not at that time.

Q. Tab 16, please, which is the council meeting for the 21st of January of 1993. And if the usher would take us straight away to page 30, bottom right-hand corner. Apparently it's the same in the B/C/S. Here we're looking at something that Zivota Panic said. So no doubt about his military authority, could there be -- his knowledge of military matters, could there be, Mr. Jovanovic?

A. I think at that time he was the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav army.

Q. Okay. Let's see what he had to say. "Next: What should now be done in Bosnia and Herzegovina? As far as I can estimate, Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are losing both the territory and certain important facilities. We should agree here what is to be done regarding this issue. Things happening on the left bank of the Drina River, around Srebrenica, Bajina Basta, Bratunac, et cetera, are very bad, and you should know, Mr. President, that this is a disgrace for the Serbian people. They are running away, leaving everything. The help we are giving in weapons, ammunition, is located in some houses in villages. We could not pull it out. We are preparing to destroy it."

How about that? ³⁶⁴¹⁵

A. Is this a question?

Q. Yes. Leaving weapons behind for the Serbs, were you?

A. Yes. That's what General Panic said, as can be seen from the text. This is what he knew. I did not have this knowledge. I had the opportunity of hearing it at that time meeting. The meeting was an exchange of opinions about this topic, the topic of preparations for the London conference, if I remember correctly, and different views were expressed. Everyone expressed their own views. He was providing a military view of the situation.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what are you saying?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't find this. On page 30, somebody else is speaking. It has nothing to do with Panic. And then later on I can see Panic speaking but I can't find the words quoted by Mr. Nice. What page is this, please?

I've found it now. I do apologise. It's page 34.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

Q. And at the end of this page we also see this, if the usher would move the page up a little bit: "People are leaving the territory on the left bank of the Drina River. They are leaving everything and running away. The map most probably caused this. They saw that this was not their territory and wanted to leave the area as soon as possible. That should be explained to them.

"I think that somebody should come to Mt. Tara on Saturday. I will go and arrange what we should do and how. We must not lose control ³⁶⁴¹⁶ over that territory."

Mount Tara guards the Drina from the east. This is your general saying "We must not lose that territory," territory in another state. Why was he saying that without your objecting to it? You as the foreign secretary, you should be objecting, saying you can't interfere in somebody else's business. Why didn't you object, Mr. Jovanovic?

A. First of all, I think that General Panic was referring to the Serbs in Bosnia, that they were not keeping this under control. Secondly, I did keep saying at that meeting that all hostilities were to cease, that there should be no ethnic cleansing, that refugees should return, and that self-determination did not mean secession. I kept repeating our political standpoint, that we had no pretensions on the territory of the neighbouring republic but that we would support the Serbs in Bosnia in claiming equal rights to the other two ethnic groups in Bosnia. What the general had in mind was that the Serbs in Bosnia were not controlling this territory.

Q. Page 34, please. And I'll try and find it for the accused. Page 34, middle of the page, the accused speaking. I think it's probably on the accused's page 39, I think.

And we just see this sentence halfway down the page: "It suits us very much that they have accepted the principle of demarcation according to the ethnic criteria. We should not 'befog' that principle a lot with some big story on economy ..." And then the matter goes back to the point that they would create some political mixers which would mix all that. The accused's pre-concern or preoccupation Mr. Jovanovic, just ^{36417 BLANK PAGE 36418} like everybody else's, was to keep ethnic demarcation lines in order to lay the plan for ultimate union of Serb territory. Isn't this obvious from all these meetings?

A. The conclusion is not only not obvious, it's not correct. At the same meeting, I recommended to the Serbs in Bosnia that they should not pay a great deal of attention to the national issue but the economic issue. If they could not survive economically, they would all want to join third countries in order to survive. This is only confirmation. The international representatives had already offered maps divided along ethnic lines. If this was acceptable to the international community, why should it not be acceptable to President Milosevic? There were no plans for unification because we did say that we had no designs on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. President Milosevic confirmed this because this plan is a plan for the future joint state of all the three nations living in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Very rapidly and in a few more documents. First of all, as a matter of fact you've had a chance to review it and I don't need to go into it, Belgrade and Serbs generally were given the greatest possible warning of the views of the world as to what was happening in Bosnia by the interim decision, or however it was described, of the International Court of Justice on the 8th of April, 1993, wasn't it? You've had a chance to look at it. It's at tab 17. I'm not going to take the Court through it again.

A. Yes.

Q. Because that report specified as an interim order prevention of ³⁶⁴¹⁹ genocide. What was the reaction of your leadership? You were there. What was the reaction of your leadership to such an extraordinarily grave interim order being made against you, to do nothing?

A. This was in 1993. It was within the competence of the Federal Ministry of Justice and the judiciary. This was a complaint that Muslim Bosnia sent to the International Court against Yugoslavia, naming Yugoslavia as an aggressor, and these were temporary measures issued by the ICJ which informed the federal organs. I don't know what was done further about this issue, but I know that this case is still pending before that court and has been for the past ten years or so.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... cut across you. We've heard from Mr. Jovic. You know Mr. Jovic. He's explained to us in terms, both in his written statement and in his book, how the plan to develop the VRS as an army and the SPK army came from this accused because he recognised that leaving the JNA would expose Yugoslavia or the FRY to difficulties. Did he -- we've heard that.

Did the accused not even raise the possibility of withdrawing support of funds from the Bosnian Serbs when an allegation of the kind made before the International Criminal -- Court of Justice was made?

A. These allegations were put forward by the Bosnian Muslim leadership and the court then issued a temporary measure.

Q. I must focus you on the question. We've heard --

A. I want to answer your question.

Q. Well, did the accused raise with his government the possibility of withdrawing funds from the Bosnian Serbs? Yes or no. ³⁶⁴²⁰

A. He did this a year later, when very severe measures were introduced and relations broken off. In the meantime, he waged a Titanic struggle with them to get them to accept each of the plans of the Contact Group; the first, second, and then the third plan. He had a lot of problems in convincing them, and from time to time he told them that Yugoslavia would not be a hostage to their irrational policies, and he told them about the aid that was being provided.

Q. He carried on financing the offices, as we all know now, through the 30th and 40th personnel centres and carried on with the policy until he was arrested, of paying Mladic. Did he not even discuss stopping the crimes that were being committed, reported and reaching the level of interim orders about genocide from the International Court of Justice, did he not even discuss withdrawing funds?

A. In that three-sided civil war, each side had its supporters, financially and otherwise, and they were all to a greater or lesser extent involved in a series of crimes. The fact that attention was being focused on the crimes of only one side and --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... stop you there for a minute. Each side had its supporters, and you knew that you were supporting one side, didn't you?

A. Politically, financially, and diplomatically, yes. They were our people.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... militarily through finance, if nothing more.

A. I do not know about that part because, as I told you, I knew ³⁶⁴²¹ nothing of military matters.

Q. But you know because you --

A. That's true.

Q. -- referred to crimes by all three sides. You knew that the side you were supporting was committing crimes.

A. We constantly condemned ethnic cleansing, the use of violence and the shelling of those towns, and we persistently demanded that they accept a cease-fire and even to declare a unilateral cease-fire. Our resistance to violence was continuous. We did not push Bosnia and Herzegovina into war. Those who pushed Bosnia and Herzegovina into war were those who would not accept Cutileiro's plan.

Q. You and all of you working with this accused accepted the crimes that you knew were being committed and that you were funding, because you were working according to the accused's plan, that if you waited long enough, it would all fall in, by law or by negotiation, in the same way as it had fallen in by fighting and by killing in 1992; correct? And that's what this case is about, you see. Is that correct?

A. No, it's not correct. You have to take a broader view. Serbia received the largest number of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina; about half a million. These people were not fleeing from something good. They were fleeing from something bad. The crimes that were committed were not just against Muslims, it was against the Serbs as well. We condemned all crimes and the forcible takeover of territory by all sides. We kept stressing that and we said that in our talks with the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina. You cannot accuse us of supporting crime. We ³⁶⁴²² financially supported our people there, but we did not support crimes.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I must move very rapidly, if I can. Can I just summarise the position to the witness because he's had a chance to look at some documents.

Q. It's right, isn't it, that you've been able to review, over the weekend, I hope, documents to which I will not be taking you, but the Security Council Resolution 819 of the 16th of April, 1993; the Resolution 820 of the 17th of April, 1993? Just yes or no, you've reviewed those?

A. Yes. Yes, I have.

Q. Incidentally, the Council of Harmonisation records for the 20th of April, we've only been provided by the authorities with something called a minute, a short document. We have not been provided by the authorities with the long version of the document. Can you point us to -- they say that they -- the authorities say that they don't have it. Can you point us to where we might find such a full stenographically recorded version of what is only provided by a minute for that meeting?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What tab is that, Mr. Robinson?

MR. NICE: The tab is --

JUDGE ROBINSON: 19.

JUDGE KWON: 19.

JUDGE ROBINSON: 19.

MR. NICE:

Q. Can you point us to where you --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think you're addressing the wrong ³⁶⁴²³ side, because I never had any of these documents at my disposal, and I have forgotten many things.

MR. NICE:

Q. Very well.

A. You have helped jog my memory. However, in the document you mention I cannot find anything worthy of special attention.

Q. That's because you've only been provided with the minute. [B/C/S on English channel]

Let me make it plain -- [B/C/S on English channel] We looked last week tabs 20 to 26, which covered Srebrenica and Sarajevo. We looked last week at tab 27, Resolution 819, at tab 28, which concerned Sarajevo, and then coming to 1995, we looked at tabs 30 to 34 which covered Tuzla, hostages, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica, to tab 35, Resolution 1004 which covered Srebrenica and hostages, to tabs 36 to 41 which covered Srebrenica and Zepa. Keeping your eye and mind on Zepa, can we look now at tab 42.

MR. NICE: And, Your Honours, I would ask the remaining tabs, if the accused will consent, tabs 42 to 47, which are the same kind as the bulk of the exhibits we were looking at on the last occasion, tab 48 which is Resolution of the Security Council 1010, tabs 49 to 50, which are further communications of the same type, tab 51 which is a report, and then tabs 53, 54, and 57 which are further reports, might all be admitted as documents containing allegations and information. Ms. Dicklich reminds me that tab 48 is already in, but apart -- that's my application. Because otherwise I shall have to go through, however swiftly, the exercise with ³⁶⁴²⁴ this witness.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, will you agree to those tabs going in?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not agree, Mr. Robinson, because I think that the tabs can go in if a witness is asked a question about the document and provides an answer. Otherwise, it's completely unacceptable. Otherwise, you can introduce as many things as you like into the record without anyone understanding what the documents are about.

MR. NICE: I'll see if Mr. Jovanovic will help us.

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, have you, over the weekend, had a chance to look at those tabs I've referred to, being severally communications of a certain type we dealt with last week and otherwise documents of the United Nations?

A. Yes. These are well-known documents adopted by the Security Council.

Q. And the other documents, the documents that provided information to you, having reviewed them, are they indeed all documents that did provide information to you of the same kind that we were looking at last week?

A. If the question is addressed to me --

Q. Yes.

A. -- I can confirm that these documents, up to the time I was there, which was mid-August 1995, were documents I knew about. The documents after that time are something I was not familiar with. ³⁶⁴²⁵

MR. NICE: Then, Your Honour, I shall have to deal with it. He says mid-1995, so these --

JUDGE BONOMY: August --

MR. NICE: That's fine. In which case then we are all right, I think. Perhaps they can all go in, with Your Honours' leave.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us make it clear, we're talking about tabs 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51 --

JUDGE KWON: No, not 51.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Not 50?

MR. NICE: Yes, 50 is one as well.

JUDGE ROBINSON: 50 and 51, 53, 54, 57.

MR. NICE: Yes. Those are the documents.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, those may be admitted.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'm very grateful.

Q. And the position is this, Mr. Jovanovic: In the period of time July and into August of 1995, you received repeated information from different locations expressing fear for Srebrenica, fear for Zepa; correct?

A. Yes. There's a lot of that in the documents.

Q. Zepa was saveable. Why didn't the accused or you or the government do anything to save Zepa once Srebrenica had fallen?

A. I personally had no ability to influence this, but Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had for a year had no contacts with the political leadership of Republika Srpska. Perhaps there was some lesser channels -- ³⁶⁴²⁶

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... then? If they had no contact with them, why did they still pay for their officers? It was your government. And people died as a result in large numbers of a funded army. Why did you not withdraw payment?

A. The Croatian army in Bosnia was also financed by the Republic of Croatia and nobody noticed anything. On the other hand, we kept drawing attention publicly to the fact that protected areas were not to be taken, not only Srebrenica and Zepa but others as well, Sarajevo and the others. That was our standpoint that we kept repeating. We constantly kept saying this should not be done. The facts indicate that the influence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the leadership in the Republika Srpska was not sufficient to prevent this.

MR. KAY: Can I just go back to the tabs while we're reasonably proximate to it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. KAY: The witness's answer was that the documents until the middle of August 1995 were documents he had been aware of. Tab 51 is dated the 30th of August, 1995; 53, 9th of November, 1995; 54, 27th of November, 1995; and 57 is the 21st of December, 1995. Was it the Bench's intention to rule that in although it was outside the parameters of the witness's answer?

MR. NICE: Your Honour --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kay, I notice the witness said these are well-known documents adopted by the Security Council. Line 14, page 54.

MR. KAY: I understand there are objections to postman, which we ³⁶⁴²⁷ have had as an issue raised in the context of this witness's evidence, and I'm afraid that's exactly what the Bench would be doing with this witness as he is being used by the Prosecution. It would be the same issue, to the same effect, and that is my concern.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, can I make just one obvious point?

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: He did say he was aware of them as well-known public documents.

MR. KAY: It may be that he was aware of them, but what that goes to is a completely different matter. I think it needs some care looking at. He wasn't actually accepting them in his evidence, if one goes back into it.

MR. NICE: Can I help, to save time? The witness was the representative of Yugoslavia in New York at the United Nations. If he's not aware of these documents, I have no idea who is supposed to be.

MR. KAY: It's the same issue with the white book, though, with respect.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Not really the same.

MR. KAY: That is a well-known document. The volumes of the white book is a well-known public document in Yugoslavia that he received and passed into the UN system. There is no difference here between what the Prosecution is trying to achieve and what the accused was attempting to achieve.

Now, there should not be any greater credibility given to the documents of one party at the expense of the other. ³⁶⁴²⁸

JUDGE ROBINSON: So your submission is that all the documents dated after -- is it August 1995?

MR. KAY: Yes, if there is to be consistency on the matter.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think the white book is a different matter. The accused was attempting to introduce it as evidence of the truth of those allegations of mistreatment and crimes, and we held that it could not be treated in that way at this time. We marked it for identity. We needed evidence as to how it was compiled.

Here the witness is saying that he was aware of these as they were public documents. I mean, he was, after all, a senior figure in his government, working at the United Nations.

MR. KAY: He wasn't at the UN, though, for those particular tabs. Those are outside his stewardship. He was until mid-August 1995, and those four tabs I've pointed out --

JUDGE BONOMY: My understanding, Mr. Kay, is that he goes to the United Nations in 1995 until 2000, and what you've got is moving in mid-August from being a domestic minister to the United Nations where he then represented Serbia and -- the Republic of Yugoslavia at that stage.

MR. KAY: Would it be helpful if the foundation was set? The trouble is in doing things so quickly in such a large scale, one has to keep track of what is actually going in. I don't know if that commends itself to the Bench.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I'll ask Mr. Nice to just lay a foundation for those last four tabs. ³⁶⁴²⁹

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, when did you arrive at the United Nations as the representative?

A. I arrived there, if I remember well, on the 17th of September, 1995, or perhaps the 18th.

Q. The documents we've been looking at, we've been speaking about, are reports to the Secretary-General focused on Yugoslavia dated the 30th of August, the 2nd of November, the 9th of November, the 27th of November. I may have included one that's already in. Are those documents you had a duty to read in your capacity as the representative of your country?

A. I naturally did have that duty. However, that was after the fact. As I wasn't present at the mission of Yugoslavia in New York, I had to read it subsequently because it arrived on the 30th of August.

Q. Let's just have a look, shall we, since the point is taken by my learned friend Mr. Kay, at tab 55. It was produced last time. And we'll lay on the overhead projector the first page in which the second line of the second paragraph -- next page, please. Sorry. The next page. Second line of the second paragraph reads: "In view of the shortcomings of the report of the Secretary-General of the 27th of November, 1995..."

Now, we know you said last week that somebody else wrote this report for you, but you seem to have indicated that you've read the report. Had you?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. President, I would like to reiterate that I challenged the claim that this document was sent ^{36430 BLANK PAGE 36431} to the right address. It was sent erroneously to the president of the Security Council. It was intended for the Russian representative.

MR. NICE:

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. Please. Please. I would like to confirm this once again. Mr. Nice, last time you challenged my credibility, and you did it with an emphasis, and I would like to protest against that. I would like the Court to ask, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, my associates to provide statements, namely Dragan Zupanjevac, Dragana Filipovic, and Petar Tasic [phoen]. These are my associates who can confirm that my instructions were not to send it to the president of the Security Council but to the head of the Russian mission, and afterwards everybody confirmed that they were precisely my instructions that were misunderstood by my deputy. Therefore, this should not be seen as a document reflecting my position or the position of Yugoslavia.

Q. Are you going to repeat what you said last time, that you barely read it and that somebody else wrote it for you, or are you going to accept that this is your text?

A. Once again, let me reiterate. As the session of the Security Council was to be held and it was to be devoted to Srebrenica, the head of the Russian mission asked us whether we had information. As I didn't have any information, I officially asked for the information. I was provided nothing. I pressed for it. And it wasn't until just prior to the beginning of the Security Council session that I received information from the Government of Republika Srpska. I personally did not agree with what ³⁶⁴³² was stated there. It didn't seem trustworthy. So I asked my deputy to go through it and to see whether there was anything there that could be sent to the head of the Russian mission. I was convinced it was sent to the Russian mission and not to the president of the Security Council. As I said, it was erroneously sent to the Security Council and I regret that deeply, and I would ask the Honourable Chamber to verify this with the people whose names I just gave to you.

Q. I simply haven't the time to deal with much of what you're saying but let's just go to the point I was asking you to look at. "In view of the shortcomings of the report ... of the 27th of November 1995 and insufficient evidence on the alleged violations of humanitarian law and human rights, particularly with regard to the areas of Republika Srpska, we are very much concerned that members of the Security Council will not be in a position to fully ascertain the situation ..." Do you accept authorship or responsibility for those lines? Yes or no.

A. I do not accept --

Q. Okay, very well.

A. -- because this was written by my deputy.

Q. Let's go back to 54, then, and let's look at it since you insist on taking that line. 54 is the report referred to of the 27th of November, 1995. And we'll look at it on the overhead projector. And we'll put page 2 on. And we'll look at paragraph 5, Mr. Jovanovic. You're very concerned about whose -- who sent what and to whom, but now please look at paragraph 5. This report records "Thousands of people still remain unaccounted for." Paragraph 6 says, line three: "... ³⁶⁴³³ a total of 8.000 tracing requests." Paragraph 7 says, "... ICRC has limited access to the prisoners." Paragraph 8 says, "Based on all the available information, it would appear that at least 3.000 but less than 8.000 people from Srebrenica are still missing." Well, we know that the RS has admitted to 7.000 deaths. Tell us, did you as representative of your country at the United Nations read this report dealing with, as we now know, 7.000 killings? Did you?

A. I read this, naturally. However, I did not have confirmation that it had indeed been done to 7.000 people. I was shocked by the figure. But as I said before, things need to be confirmed from several sources.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... turns out to be true. Let's go back to your letter since - I beg your pardon, the letter you inadvertently signed, at tab 55, shall we. Can we put that on the overhead projector again. Don't let me beat about the bush, Mr. Jovanovic: You're trying to mislead this court and you're not telling the truth.

You were prepared to pen --

A. I protest. I apologise, Mr. Nice, but you have no right to call me a liar. I've sworn to tell the truth and what I'm saying is an absolute truth. I would ask the Court to verify this information with the persons whose name I gave to you and they will be able to confirm whether I'm telling the truth or not.

Q. Page 3, please. Page 3, please. Let's just look at something. The end of this paragraph, on the very page where you put your signature, has Miroslav Deronjic. Now, you've heard of him, haven't you? Haven't ³⁶⁴³⁴ you?

A. I heard of him. I think that he was tried here or something like that. But prior to that, no, I never heard of him.

Q. Who was informed that they did not find any substantial evidence to confirm the alleged crimes on mass graves. That was the sort of material you were relying on in your statement against the body of the detailed report by the United Nations. And if we go back through the pieces of information that I've dealt with very briefly, you'd already learnt about the aerial photographs produced at the United Nations by Madeleine Albright, hadn't you?

A. I will say once again: The information that was erroneously sent to the Security Council was neither my position or the position of Yugoslav government. That was information provided by the Government of Republika Srpska, and it's stated very clearly at the very beginning of that unfortunate report. And let me reiterate once again: It was sent to that address erroneously.

On the other hand, what was shown by Madam Albright I cannot comment on that. I wasn't present at the Security Council at the time but I have to admit that she was quite strict when it came to Bosnian Serbs and Serbs in general and that her words could not always be relied upon.

Q. So is this the position --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just a minute. Since the witness has on two occasions asked the Court to verify what he has said today, it should be made clear that that is not a matter for the Court but for the accused. ³⁶⁴³⁵

MR. NICE:

Q. Almost my last question, Mr. Jovanovic, is this, in light of your persisting in the answers you're giving: On this occasion the words of the RS were good enough for your government. Is that because the acts of the RS were the acts of your government?

A. This is a ludicrous conclusion. This document which was sent erroneously clearly indicates that that was information provided by the government of Republika Srpska. It doesn't state anywhere that it was provided by the government of Yugoslavia. So you cannot draw those conclusions.

Q. One last matter for detail that I ought to cover with this witness before he goes.

In the course of your evidence, Mr. Jovanovic, you said in an exchange with this accused that a letter was -- on the 15th of February and in the version I've got it's page 25 and 26 of the then-transcript. You said of -- you were asked about a letter sent to Alija Izetbegovic, and you answered a question about that, and you said you informed Mr. Izetbegovic that you'd sent a similar letter to General Mladic with similar contents. So you were speaking of two letters sent by the accused to Mladic and Izetbegovic, and those letters were dated, you will remember, on or about the 1st of August of 1995. Now, I don't have a version that I can lay before you at the moment of those letters, but just confirm a couple of things for us. They were both in English, weren't they?

A. I'm not sure. However, I didn't write them. Those letters were ³⁶⁴³⁶ written by President Milosevic. Now, whether they were in English or in Serbian, I don't know. Why would they be in English? Maybe they were in English.

Q. Precisely. I'm going to suggest to you that perhaps you do know. But by the 1st of August, with the flow of information coming to this accused, he needed to set up a smokescreen of innocence and to detach himself from Mladic and from what had happened in Srebrenica, and that's why he wrote letters designed to present himself in a falsely favourable light in English. Isn't that right?

A. This is your conclusion. You keep trying to sell a claim that has no value.

Mr. Milosevic already for a year had no contact with their political leadership. Therefore, he could not influence them and create a smokescreen. He had already condemned their policy and set up very strict border controls and invited international observers to monitor that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a blatant untruth. I did not send a letter to Mr. Izetbegovic in English, and I don't know how come Mr. Nice is putting that to the witness. Why would I be writing to Alija Izetbegovic in English?

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's not a matter that you can take up in that way, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. NICE:

Q. Whether the original's in another language or not I can't say, but let me just make this point to you: You know, don't you, Mr. Jovanovic, ³⁶⁴³⁷ that from the fall of Srebrenica right round and until 1996, despite the flow of information coming about Mladic, despite Mladic being indicted by this Tribunal, you and the accused met Mladic, you met him in meetings -- the accused met Mladic and there was no difficulty in contacting Mladic, was there?

A. As far as I know, many other international mediators met with Mladic too. Therefore, that cannot be reduced to contacts only with him. As far as I remember, I met him only once during that period of time, and I did that because there were international visitors. Now, as to contacts with President Milosevic, I don't know about that.

Q. You can point to no single condemnation of Mladic by this accused, no single querying of what Mladic had done, by this accused, throughout that period of time in which he was supported and in which time efforts were made to free him from ever being handed over to this Tribunal. Is that summary correct?

A. This is your summary. This is how you wish to portray matters. I don't have such information. I wasn't informed about the developments enough in order to draw conclusions. I'm afraid that your conclusion is very tendentious.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. The four documents are admitted. Mr. Milosevic, re-examination. And remember, no leading questions.

The four documents are tabs 51, 53, 54, and 57. ³⁶⁴³⁸

MR. NICE: 55, I think, is one other outstanding number.

JUDGE KWON: It was dealt with already. It was admitted.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I understand that was already admitted.

MR. NICE: Okay. Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The cables. Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Jovanovic, as you spent several years at the UN as head of the Yugoslav mission, I assume that you are very familiar with the way that Security Council Resolutions are adopted.

A. Yes, at least those which pertain to us.

Q. I'm not asking about those which pertain to us. I'm interested in the procedure for adopting Resolutions. Do you know, first of all, that there is first a draft Resolution made, then there is a proposal made, which goes to the blue file and remains there for 24 hours, and then the Resolution is adopted?

A. Yes. This is the regular procedure.

Q. Therefore, each draft Resolution is placed in the white folder as a proposal and then, after 24 hours, is being voted upon by the Security Council.

A. Yes, unless it is amended in the meantime or replaced by another draft, which is exactly the reason why it is kept in the blue file.

Q. But the date of the Resolution is the date when it was voted on and adopted. ³⁶⁴³⁹

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Now, let us compare two documents of the UN. One can be found in tab 8 of my binder, which is the report of the Secretary-General, and the other one can be found in tab 11 of Mr. Nice's binder, which is the Resolution of the Security Council containing the formulation of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I hope that you have both documents before you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: At tab 11 we don't have. Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: It's an existing exhibit, therefore it was provided for convenience to the accused but for others it was not provided as a separate repeat document.

JUDGE KWON: Can it be put on the ELMO?

MR. NICE: Of course. I have a copy here that is highlighted. I think Ms. Dicklich has one that is not highlighted.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Bear in mind that tab 11 is on the ELMO.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now please turn to page 3 of tab 11, which is Resolution 757, from 1992. 30th of May, 1992.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us find it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please place the first page on the ELMO.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Therefore, can we all see that this is the Security ³⁶⁴⁴⁰ Council Resolution which was adopted on the 30th of May, 1992.

A. Yes.

Q. In order for it to be adopted on the 30th of May, does it mean that, in accordance with the established procedure, it had to be submitted into the blue file at least on the 29th of May?

A. Yes. That would be in accordance with the procedure.

Q. Very well. Now, turn to page 3, please. Please take a look at page 3. There are several paragraphs. Item 1 in the middle of page 3 says: "[In English] Condemns the failure of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including the Yugoslav People's Army, to take effective measures to fulfil the requirements of Resolution 752." [Interpretation] Does the Resolution 752 pertain to withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A. Yes, among other things.

Q. Very well. So the Security Council condemns the failure of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including the JNA, to do so.

Now, please take a look at tab 8, which was also quoted by Mr. Nice. This is the Secretary-General report. Now, let us first establish facts pertaining to dates. Please put tab 8 on the ELMO. Page 1, please.

Can we see here that this is a report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 752, and can it be clearly seen that the date is the 30th of May, 1992?

A. Yes. ³⁶⁴⁴¹

Q. So this is the same date on which the Resolution was adopted, a Resolution that should have been placed in the blue binder the day before?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it an indisputable fact that this report was not considered before the adoption of the Resolution?

A. This is more than evident because it arrived post festum.

Q. Now, let's look at the discrepancies and contradictions between this report and the Resolution. The Resolution states that the Security Council condemns the government of Yugoslavia and the JNA for not taking effective measures.

In the report dated on the same day as the Resolution that was adopted, it says -- look at paragraph 6. "Most of these --" paragraph 6, second sentence -- can you hear me? My microphone is going on and off. We can read it all, but it says here: "[In English] Most of these are believed to have withdrawn already into Serbia and Montenegro, some of them having been subjected to attack during their withdrawal." [Interpretation] And then it goes on to say: "Others, however, remain at various garrisons in Bosnia-Herzegovina [In English] areas, including two installations on the outskirts of Sarajevo. A further category consists of personnel who have been blocked in their barracks by Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina or hostile irregular forces." [Interpretation] And then it goes on to explain where they are. Is it indisputable that this shows that the JNA forces did withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A. This is clearly stated. As long as it depended on them alone. ³⁶⁴⁴² They were unable to do so when they were prevented by the army of Alija Izetbegovic.

MR. NICE: I must, I suppose, take some steps to stop questions that begin - this is the second one - is something indisputable. I don't think the answers are ever of any value if questions are formulated in that way. I beg your pardon. It may be the Chamber will decide that they are of no such value.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Avoid that introductory phrase.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will avoid the introductory phrase, but I did not feel this to be a leading question because it points to the text of a document issued by the United Nations, a Resolution and a report by the Secretary-General. However, I will put my question differently.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, between what the Secretary-General's report dated the 30th of May, 1992, and what it says in the Security Council Resolution of the same date, which was adopted on the 30th of May, 1992, regarding the situation regarding the withdrawal of the army from Bosnia and Herzegovina, is there a contradiction?

A. There evidently is, because in paragraph 1, Yugoslavia is condemned for failing to comply with Resolution 752 and withdrawing the JNA, while here the opposite is stated, that Yugoslavia has done this. But in order for it to do this a hundred per cent, it could not do so because it was prevented by Alija Izetbegovic who blocked a barracks. ^{36443 BLANK PAGE 36444}

Q. Very well. Let us make a small digression in connection with the comparison between these two documents and my intention of showing that the Secretary-General's report was not taken into consideration when the Resolution was adopted. So I will quote paragraph 5 of the Secretary-General's report. Mr. Nice quoted only half of this paragraph, not all of it, when he put his question to you as to how the army of RSK was established.

"[In English] The bulk of the JNA personnel --" [Interpretation] Is there a translation?

A. Yes.

Q. Repeat: "[In English] -- who were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina were citizens of that republic and were not therefore covered by the Belgrade authorities' decision of 4th of May to withdraw JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina."

[Interpretation] It goes on to describe what happened to them. "[In English] Most of them appear to have joined the army of the so-called 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina'. Others have joined the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is under the political control of the Presidency of that republic. Others may have joined various irregular forces operating there." [Interpretation] What does this tell us, Mr. Jovanovic, in order to avoid putting a leading question?

A. Well, this explains that Yugoslavia -- or, rather, the JNA fulfilled the essence of its obligation from Resolution 752 and explains how this came about. All the soldiers and officers born in Montenegro and ³⁶⁴⁴⁵ Serbia withdrew. Those who were born in and were citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina remained and joined the so-called new army of the Republika Srpska or various territorial units. In any case, what happened here was what happened to the JNA from Slovenia onwards.

Q. Very well, Mr. Jovanovic.

JUDGE ROBINSON: May I just ask a question. Do you know what percentage, Mr. Jovanovic, of the JNA personnel deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina were in fact citizens of that republic?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to this report, 80 per cent of the JNA personnel were citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while 20 per cent were citizens of Serbia and Montenegro.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I go on, Mr. Robinson?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Of these 80 per cent who were citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in paragraph 5 it says that they -- let me be precise: "[In English] The bulk of the JNA personnel who were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina were citizens of that republic ..." [Interpretation] And then it goes on to say: "[In English] ... and were not therefore covered by Belgrade authorities' decision." [Interpretation] It goes on: "Most of them appear to have joined the army of the so-called 'Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina.'"

This is part of that 80 per cent. They joined the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And the next sentence goes on ³⁶⁴⁴⁶ to say: "Others have joined the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is under the political control of the Presidency of that republic." The majority of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina making up the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina separated into those who joined the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and those who joined the army under the control of Alija Izetbegovic. Is that what it says here?

A. Yes. Those soldiers who were of Muslim ethnicity or, rather, the Islamic religion, of course didn't want to stay in the army of Republika Srpska. They joined the other side.

Q. Well, I'm not going into what is natural or not, just into the facts in this report. Let us now return to paragraph 1 of the Secretary-General's report in order to establish how things happened. It says here in paragraph 2, where it says "Background": "[In English] On 26 April 1992, President Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina met at Skopje with General Blagoje Adzic, Chief of Staff of JNA and Acting Federal Secretary for Defence, and Mr. Branko Kostic, vice-president of the Federal Presidency in Belgrade, to define the role of JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its overall withdrawal."

JUDGE ROBINSON: It's "eventual withdrawal."

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. "And its eventual withdrawal." Yes, Mr. Robinson, that's correct.

MR. MILOSEVIC:

Q. "[In English] This meeting did not produce a definitive agreement, and the Belgrade authorities on 4 May announced their decision to withdraw ³⁶⁴⁴⁷ from Bosnia-Herzegovina by 18 May all JNA personnel who were not citizens of that republic. On 13 May, Vice-president Kostic proposed to President Izetbegovic that the talks be resumed with the participation of representatives of the Bosnian Serb and Croat communities. On the same day, authorities of the so-called 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina' announced their decision to form their own army, which would be composed of units of the former JNA based in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and appointed General Ratko Mladic as Commander of that army." [Interpretation] Are you aware that the vice-president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, and this was the Supreme Command of the armed forces, the vice-president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia and the chief of the General Staff and the acting minister of defence met with Izetbegovic in Skopje and attempted to solve the problems of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina? There was no agreement, as can be seen here, and the Presidency reached the decision that the JNA personnel who did not originate from Bosnia and Herzegovina be withdrawn. Are you aware that -- are you aware of what the deputy president, Mr. Kostic, proposed to Alija Izetbegovic, asking him to call upon the Serbian and Croatian communities to take over the personnel and equipment of the JNA belonging to them remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Do you know more about this?

A. I know only about the existence of such a proposal, "that this issue should be resolved in agreement with all interested parties and that the JNA should withdraw, in agreement with the wishes and will of everyone, of all concerned." As we can see from this text, this was not ³⁶⁴⁴⁸ accepted. After this, the federal leadership reached a decision to withdraw all the units of the JNA with a deadline of the 19th of May, if I remember correctly. Those who were citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina had the option of remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and most of them did so.

Q. The president of the Presidency proposed to Alija Izetbegovic that all three ethnic communities should take over the property and personnel of the JNA on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is this what happened?

A. Well, that was the essence of his proposal.

Q. Now, look at paragraph 2. "On 17 May I received a letter --" this means the Secretary-General received a letter "-- from Admiral Miroslav Simic, [In English] Chief of General Staff JNA, requesting --" [Interpretation] It's quite unclear here. I think it says assistance -- "[In English] in the safe withdrawal of JNA troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly from Sarajevo, Pazaric and Zenica. The letter referred inter alia to an agreement, to an agreement signed on 10th of May at the premises of United Nations Protection Forces in Yugoslavia, (UNPROFOR), at Sarajevo by representatives of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, JNA, the European Community Monitoring Mission, and the personal envoy of Lord Carrington, Mr. Colm Doyle. On 21st of May, vice-president Kostic again wrote to ask me to request President Izetbegovic to order the deblocking of the JNA garrison at Sarajevo. On 25 May 1992, I received a letter from President Izetbegovic in which, inter alia, he requested that UNPROFOR should supervise the withdrawal of ³⁶⁴⁴⁹ part of the JNA personnel and weapons, in accordance with the agreement of 10 May..."

[Interpretation] Are you aware, Mr. Jovanovic, of what happened in Dobrovoljacka street when the JNA column was attacked which was being escorted by UNPROFOR? UNPROFOR was overseeing the withdrawal leading the convoy, it was there on the spot, and do you remember the massacre of that convoy?

MR. NICE: I repeat what I have said on many occasions: It doesn't concern me how the accused uses his time, but I wonder whether the Chamber would want to consider whether what's now being engaged in really arises out of cross-examination by doing a long textual analysis of the document again, only asked a few questions, partly for want of time and partly for other reasons, and we're now taking something out of the document and going to the underlying facts of it. It's a matter for the Chamber, but it doesn't seem to me necessarily to be re-examination.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, but I think you did raise issues relating to this report, Mr. Nice, and I think the accused is entitled to re-examine on them.

MR. NICE: Matter for the Court.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. In any case, let us be brief. The main element in the report, where it says that the JNA withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina, when this is compared with the Resolution bearing the same date, the 30th of May, 1992, points to major discrepancies between the contents of the Resolution and the contents of the report. ³⁶⁴⁵⁰ To whose detriment are these discrepancies?

A. Evidently to the detriment of Yugoslavia. As for the text you read out, I wish to mention General MacKenzie's book where he describes in detail how this all came about and who was responsible for the death of these cadets in Dobrovoljacka street.

Q. I will not quote again paragraph 6 from the Secretary-General's report which says they did withdraw and were exposed to attacks during withdrawal. Let us, rather, go to the Resolution in tab 11 and paragraph 2. In paragraph 1, the Serbs are condemned for something that was not actually true, and paragraph 2 demands that any element of the Croatian army still present in Bosnia and Herzegovina act in accordance with paragraph 4 of Resolution 752 without further delay. Would you now please look here.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... you're going to try to finish now, because we are at the time for the break.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will just round off this topic, and it will take me a minute and a half.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In paragraph 10 of the Secretary-General's report, it says: "[In English] As regards the element of withdrawal of the Croatian army now in Bosnia-Herzegovina, information currently available in New York suggests that no such withdrawal has occurred. UNPROFOR has received reliable reports of Croatian army personnel in uniform operating within, and as part of, military formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina..." ³⁶⁴⁵¹ [Interpretation] and so on and so forth.

What it says here in the Secretary-General's report in connection with the presence of the regular Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as UNPROFOR reported, does it contradict paragraph 2 of the Resolution which says that any element of Croatian army still present?

A. According to this report, the Resolution should have been passed against Croatia, not us. I wish to remind Their Honours that a week before the adoption of this Resolution, the political director, Mr. Kirsay [phoen] said that the general perception was that it was our fault and this would remain, even though it was the Croatian army that was in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it was the perception that was important.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. I will not dwell further on this Resolution of the 30th of May and the Secretary-General's report of the 30th of May. I believe that this is now sufficiently clear and that the links between those two documents which are evidently non-existent have been demonstrated.

JUDGE KWON: One question. Mr. Jovanovic, if you take a look at paragraph 17 of the Secretary-General's report, while we are on that document, that reads: "The Security Council's decision today to impose sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia creates a new situation. It is not yet clear what implications this will have for the issues discussed in this report."

Did the Secretary-General not envisage that there will be a Security Council Resolution on the very same day, imposing sanctions on Yugoslavia? ³⁶⁴⁵²

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't say what the Secretary-General thought, whether he envisaged it or not, but if he was familiar with the report which he signed, and he had to be familiar with it before the 30th, then he could not, at least intimately, have agreed with the text of the Resolution.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, the question put to you by Mr. Kwon only goes to confirm that the report was drawn up on the day when the Security Council was sitting and reaching a decision on sanctions. What does this mean? This Security Council Resolution today creates a new situation. "[In English] It is not yet clear what implications this will have for the issues discussed in this report."

Does it seem to you that the Secretary-General warned --

MR. NICE: Seems like a leading questioning coming, to me.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Rephrase, Mr. Milosevic. After the break. I think we should take the break now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.24 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, let us briefly return to the Security Council Resolution dated the 30th of May, which we can find in tab 11, where in the introductory part, as is usual, they refer to the Secretary-General's report. Please take a look at page 2 of this Resolution, where somewhere ³⁶⁴⁵³ towards the bottom -- or, rather, the fourth paragraph from the bottom, "expressing its appreciation for the report of Secretary-General of the 26th of May, 1992 Resolution 752."

What is stated here, does it point to the fact that this Resolution refers to the report of 26th of May and that the 30th of May report is not being mentioned anywhere?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Now, to go back to the question raised by Mr. Kwon about Secretary-General saying that what the Security Council is deciding upon today about the sanction creates the situation that this is not yet clear what implications this will have for the issues discussed in this report. Is this some kind of a warning or reservation expressed or it has no significance at all?

A. I think that this is both a kind of reservation and a warning, because there are always uncertainties and dangers that can follow.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I was unable to find the Secretary-General's report dated the 26th. However, I will look for it, Mr. Robinson, because it is obvious that it differs quite a lot from the report of the 30th.

Yes. This report came four days after the report mentioned in the Resolution.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Nice raised the issues contained in tab 15, which are stenograms from the extended session of the coordination council. Please take a look at the page where stenogram starts. This is not really in ³⁶⁴⁵⁴ chronological order because page 2 comes before page 1, but the title is Stenographic Notes from the Extended Session of the Council. Does it stem from the first paragraph, which lists those in attendance, that towards the end, when all the officials of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republic of Serbia and Montenegro are mentioned, at the end it states: "Members of the council," which is the ninth line from the top. Those attending, the Academician Dobrica Cosic, president of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, president of the council; Radoje Kontic, vice-president of the government; Momir Bulatovic, and so on, Dr. Svetozar Stojanovic, special advisor to the president of the Serbia is the last name, and then it says members of the council, and then they proceed to enumerate persons which in the translation that can be seen on the ELMO shows that it was done in a different form. The names are listed differently than in the original, because first they list members of the council and then the persons attending the session. Can you see that in the stenographic notes before you?

A. I can see that in the Serbian version and also in the other one.

Q. Could you please put page 1 of the Serbian version on the ELMO so that we can see just to what extent it differs from the translation. The translation, in fact, does not distinguish between the members of the council and those who, according to the person chairing the session, invite -- were invited.

Please take a look at the stenographic notes in their original version.

So after that, in line nine from the top, after they list those ³⁶⁴⁵⁵ attending, including the advisor, they proceed to say: "Member of the council," and then there's a colon and the names, Colonel General Zivota Panic, and so on, the other names.

Mr. Jovanovic, was this council a forum for exchange of opinions or was it an organ that was able to pass decisions?

A. It was mostly the former. It was a forum where positions were coordinated and opinions adopted.

Q. Whose positions were coordinated or harmonised? Because we can see that the top officials of Yugoslavia and the republics attended this session. So whose positions were harmonised?

A. The positions of representatives of these two Serb republics, because all of this has to do with Vance-Owen Plan. These issues had to be dealt with in such a way as to make the plan acceptable for them as well.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, does the Serbian document indicate the two categories that Mr. Milosevic was identifying?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, because in the Serbian document, on page 10, after enumerating members of the council, there's a dash and then members of the council follows. So this clearly distinguishes between the two categories. So it is quite clear who are the members of the council and who are the invited guests.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. Now, please tell us at whose initiative these people were invited to attend the sessions of the council. Was it the chairman of the council, or whose initiative was it? ^{36456 BLANK PAGE 36457}

A. I think it was at the initiative of the president of the council, Dobrica Cosic. I received notice to attend from his cabinet.

Q. Does it mean that everybody who was invited to the session was expected to present their views?

A. Yes. That was expected. If they were invited, then it was assumed that they would present their views about the difficulties, how to resolve them, the process, and so on; otherwise, what would be the point of inviting them?

Q. All right. Now, please go to page 34, because Mr. Nice quoted several things mentioned earlier by me -- rather, quoted my words. On page 34 it says: "Slobodan Milosevic." In the middle of third paragraph. Before that I say: "I would propose that we look at what is on the table and what we should do right now." And then I say: "First of all, I would not like to go into a scholastic discussion about small and major steps. I would rather speak about good and bad steps. A major bad step is definitely worse than a small bad step." And then in the next paragraph, I say: "Our strategic goal is to ensure that the Serb people in the Balkans are free and equal -- have equal rights with others."

Is that what it states, Mr. Jovanovic?

A. Yes. And this is the main point of your position.

Q. And then towards the end I say: "It is less important to me through how many institutional phases we need to go. What is more important is how many people will have to die for those goals and should -- should somebody die." ³⁶⁴⁵⁸ Is that what it says here?

A. Yes. However, I have to say that this was also contained in the letters sent by you to the leadership of Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina when they refused to accept certain peace plans.

Q. Now, please go to page 38, passage in the centre of the page. Still I am the one speaking. "Therefore, I opt for a pragmatic approach to existing circumstances and situations and using all available possibilities in order to go further, then opting for confrontation, because that could lead to major bloodshed or could take us to a dead alley. We have to take a number of steps. However, we have to ensure that there is additional initiative for further peace negotiations. I think that this problem needs to be viewed from several aspects in order to find a good attitude or good solution for the further work of the conference."

Is this the conference on former Yugoslavia?

A. I think so. I think the one held in Geneva.

THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Milosevic please repeat what he read out. He's reading at quite a fast pace.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreters are asking you to repeat what you just read out, and they say you are moving too quickly.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I will read slower.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Once again I speak of the goal, and then it says: "The goal which has to do with freedom and equality of Serb people in the Balkan Peninsula. However, we need to ask ourselves through which institutional ³⁶⁴⁵⁹ phases will the achievement of these goals have to pass." And then further on, on page 39: "Therefore, I suggest that we should consider that possible direction and review what steps are possible." Nikola Koljevic says: "Asking for a signature on the paper." Milosevic: "Why wouldn't we sign something that suits us if we are able to improve it?" Nikola Koljevic: "And if we're not able to improve it?" Milosevic: "There is no Atasari's constitution." If you remember, Atasari was Lord Owen's assistant. "You will be writing a constitution together with Alija and Boban."

Alija Izetbegovic, the reference is made to him, and Mate Boban, president of the Croatian Community. Are these the people referred to?

A. Yes.

Q. And then on page 40, Milosevic once again: "They are -- they have changed the principles in the discussions already. The one change is that they say three constituent people." He used the term "three constituent peoples." Is that what is stated here?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore, this took place on the 9th of January, 1993. What actually took place at this meeting where everybody expressed their attitude as to how we should deal with the negotiations? What were we trying to do?

A. What we were trying to do is convince representatives of Republika Srpska and Republic of Serbian Krajina that the most important thing was to ensure their freedom and equality and their constituent status and that to ensure that their vote is taken into account when deciding things in ³⁶⁴⁶⁰ Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were very agitated, they were very frustrated. They did not act logically. They were afraid that they would be manipulated and left without anything in the end. Therefore, your efforts to convince them, as well as efforts of President Cosic and myself, were aimed at that, to convince them that they had nothing to fear if they were granted everything that was stated in Vance-Owen Plan, and that plan offered a compromise for all three sides. And there was nothing there to indicate that there was an intention to grab the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina or perhaps create Greater Serbia.

Q. Very well. Mr. Jovanovic, let us turn to tab 16, which is again a session of this council held on the 21st of January, 1993. So the topic is practically the same. Is that obvious to you as well, Mr. Jovanovic?

A. Yes. This was on the 9th of January, 1993.

Q. Yes. And the next session was held on the 21st of January. So after 12 days. Please take a look at page 39.

On page 39, it says: "Slobodan Milosevic," and then a colon and I will quote from the beginning, what is stated here: "I propose that we try and see what can be expected in Geneva. We have a position of a principled participant committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. We invested maximum efforts to ensure that a principled position is defined."

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE: If he does want us to follow it, we don't have it yet on the overhead projector. ³⁶⁴⁶¹

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's get it on the ELMO.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Page 39.

A. I apologise. I have notes dated January 9 here but we've already covered that.

Q. Yes. We have covered that and now we have turned to tab 16.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the accused, please.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Then we have tab 16, from the session of the same council.

A. Oh, you say tab 16. Okay. I've found it.

Q. So is that a session of the same council but held on the 21st of January?

A. Yes.

Q. Please put page 39 on the ELMO.

MR. NICE: We haven't yet found the equivalent of page 39. I'm just looking for it at the moment. This is, I think, one of those versions which -- where the interpreters, when they did their work, didn't place the parallel page numbers. 34. Ms. Dicklich has found it. Page 34.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, please put page 39 on the ELMO, of the Serbian text.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You want the Serbian text on the ELMO, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that is logical, because ³⁶⁴⁶² both of us speak Serbian, and you have the English text in front of you, and you can follow whether the interpreters are interpreting correctly.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The problem is we don't have the English text. We are relying on the ELMO.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, then. All right. Then the interpreters will interpret it for you, I assume. I have what I received from Mr. Nice for his cross. This is not my exhibit. May I read out this quotation?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. "Therefore, we hold the position of a principled participant supporting a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and we invested maximum efforts to ensure that the principle platform is defined. The delegation of Yugoslavia has a completely different attitude to the issue of maps, military agreement and other specific issues which, precisely on the basis of the principles we have supported, really ought to be negotiated by these three sides. Our position should in principle favour peace and the consensus of all three sides and equal protection of interests of all three nations. But the concrete agreement based on those principles and based on our principled approach to these issues, is in their hands." Therefore, Mr. Jovanovic, specific agreement is in the hands of three sides in Bosnia. Is that clear?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. I continue to quote: "Therefore, we support all those three sides in their efforts to sit down and agree on specific issues - ³⁶⁴⁶³ maps and other military and other issues."

Please, was this the standpoint I advocated, and was this something that was the constant policy advocated by Serbia?

A. Yes. Not only in the case of Republika Srpska but the RSK. We were supporting a peaceful and principled solution, and it was up to the sides in the dispute to solve specific issues, especially those pertaining to maps and organisation. This was repeatedly expressed to the international representatives and all those interested. They kept asking you to politically support their efforts, and you did so. This can be seen from the fact that you supported all five peace proposals from the beginning.

Q. Yes, that's clear, but this is not only support for the Vance-Owen Plan, it also shows that we support a peaceful solution and all three sides sitting down together and agreeing on specific issues.

A. Yes. This was in fact the issue of maps which is what interested the most.

Q. Yes. But do you recall -- it says that the delegation of Yugoslavia, with respect to issues of maps, military agreements and other specific issues based on the principles we advocated, felt that this was really something to be negotiated by all three sides. This is something we did not want to interfere in. We felt the three sides should agree among themselves. We supported all three sides sitting down together and agreeing on it.

A. Yes.

Q. And this was the principled approach at the meeting where the ³⁶⁴⁶⁴ Yugoslav representatives were sitting, not the Muslims or the other sides but the Serbs and the Montenegrins. Is this so?

A. Yes. This was an honest approach to the problems. This was not in order to present a pretty picture to foreigners, this was what you really wanted.

Q. Very well. Let me just put these documents in order. There is a vast quantity of material here presented by Mr. Nice. I have no objection to that, but it's quite time-consuming.

Mr. Jovanovic, I will now very briefly touch upon the question put to you by Mr. Nice, who spent an hour going through various tabs showing information pertaining mainly to the content of the draft Resolution of the Security Council dealing with the events in Srebrenica. I will not mention the tabs because Mr. Nice has put them under seal, but the contents were mainly about the draft Resolution of the Security Council in connection with Srebrenica.

Mr. Jovanovic, my question is the following: The draft Resolutions of the Security Council, are these public documents?

A. The draft Resolutions should not be public documents unless they were leaked to someone who was interested in seeing them. Their purpose was for the governments that were to be consulted to be informed and to prepare the final text.

Q. Yes, but am I right in assuming that these drafts are not a secret to UN officials and officials working in UN missions, that is, for diplomatic staff?

A. Well, they should be, but privately they could obtain these drafts ³⁶⁴⁶⁵ in order to gain time and study them thoroughly.

Q. Very well. We will not going into this further. But you received this information because it was available to diplomatic staff who informed you about these Resolutions?

A. Yes.

Q. This is not in dispute?

A. No.

Q. Mr. Nice spent a lot of time establishing that you, as far as I can recall from his cross-examination, were informed of the contents of this Resolution concerning the situation around Srebrenica at the latest by the 13th of July; is that correct?

A. Yes, on the basis of the telegram that arrived. At least, that's how I understood it.

Q. Very well. So you were informed about this on the 13th of July and you confirm this?

A. Yes. I confirm that I received a telegram from a certain diplomatic office.

Q. Very well. And in response to his question about when and how you learned about the events in Srebrenica, you first replied that the first you heard of it was from the press.

A. Yes, that's what I said.

Q. But it was established here that pursuant to information that you received, you should have known this on the 13th of July. Is this in dispute?

A. No. ³⁶⁴⁶⁶

Q. Very well. If it's not in dispute and you said that you found out about it from the press, I have before me a photocopy of the leading Yugoslav newspaper, Politika, of the 11th of June.

THE INTERPRETER: "July," interpreter's correction. The 11th of July.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Where on page 3 it says: "Security Council session discusses situation in Srebrenica. The council demands that all sides respect the status of the protected area."

It goes on to say that after the session, Hernando Martinez Marco [phoen], the chairman of the council, said that the council was concerned by the worsening of the situation in Srebrenica and its surroundings. I will now let you take a look at this. Let me first quote it and then it can be put on the ELMO. This is a report from New York of the 11th of July, two days before Mr. Nice's document put forward as information, which is quite mystified.

Mr. Ahmet Favci [phoen], who said that Muslims last week killed a member of UNPROFOR and threw a hand grenade on an APC of the peace forces, and so on and so forth.

You can put this on the ELMO. This is on the right-hand side. It's only partly illegible, the photocopy, because it was faxed. But I do apologise, before we put this on the ELMO, there is also a communique from the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska of the 10th of July where, according to the agency reports, it says that the combat operations are aimed only at neutralising Muslim terrorists and not against the civilian ³⁶⁴⁶⁷ population and members of UNPROFOR.

Please put this on the ELMO. What I said is underlined, what Favci says. The date is the 11th of July. This Mr. Facvi, the UN spokesperson.

Q. It's on the right-hand side.

A. Yes, I see it.

Q. Can you please help the usher to put the right-hand side on the ELMO.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what is the caption? What is the heading?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If he can move it down and to the left, please. Down. Not up, down. Down.

It says: "Session of the Security Council," and then the main heading is, "Discussion on the situation in Srebrenica." Sub-heading, "The council demands that all sides respect the status of the protected areas." And the part that is marked is Hernando Martinez saying that the council received with concern information on the worsening situation in Srebrenica. And then if you can lift it up a little so we can see the bottom of the page. The underlined part down here. A little bit more, yes. At the bottom you have a passage which says, "Favci confirmed that the Muslims over the past weekend in Srebrenica killed a member of UNPROFOR and threw a hand grenade on an APC of the peace forces." This was published in the newspapers on the 11th of July, and the news item is evidently from the 10th of July.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you must ask a question now. ³⁶⁴⁶⁸

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, before you received this material with information on the contents of the Security Council Resolution that was placed under seal by Mr. Nice, were you able to see this previously in the newspapers, like all citizens? Not only you but everybody who was able to buy a newspaper, and it was probably broadcast on the electronic media the day before.

A. Probably, yes, because I read Politika regularly. So if it's in Politika, then I probably did.

Q. So certainly the information reached the newspapers before you received that information from New York?

A. Yes.

Q. On the front page of this newspaper - and I will ask you to put this on the ELMO as well, I will give it to you - there is an interview, my interview to the weekly Time, which was published a day before. The title is "Milosevic: Only one solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the one that will equally protect the interests of the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats." I'll let you put it on the ELMO in just a minute. I only have this one copy.

Let me read a quote. Do you know that at the time the issue of the removal of sanctions, of the lifting of sanctions was being discussed?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that there had already been a decrease in the sanctions?

A. Yes, as a result of the 4th of August, 1994. ^{36469 BLANK PAGE 36470}

Q. And did this show that the international community was recognising that we were leading a peaceful policy?

A. Certainly. Otherwise, they would not have reduced the sanctions.

Q. The question was put here, and this has to do with the release of hostages, and they say that I managed to convince the leadership over there to do that, just a brief quotation: "Milosevic: Until the sanctions are lifted, Izetbegovic will count on Serbia collapsing under the weight of the sanctions. It doesn't matter to the Muslims whether this will happen in two years or 20. They're dreaming of a situation in which we will collapse and then with all their allies they will achieve their goal of establishing a Muslim state in Europe. On the other side, the leadership in Pale, since we have been under sanctions, have been counting on us interfering in that war. If the sanctions are lifted and if the relations of the main factor of stability, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, are normalised, Izetbegovic and Karadzic will have to face each other and negotiate a peace agreement without calculating any further as to what might happen."

Would you please put this on the ELMO. Would you please help the usher put this on the ELMO, first the caption and then what it says about sanctions and what my standpoint is. "Milosevic: Only one solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a solution that will equally protect the interests of Serbs, Muslims, and Croats." And then it says: "Why was it good to preserve Yugoslavia for all Serbs, all Croats, all Muslims, and all Slovenians as our common state?" And then at the bottom -- ³⁶⁴⁷¹

JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the question, Mr. Milosevic? Question. Question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Jovanovic -- could you just lift this up a little bit so we can see what it says at the bottom.

Was this the essence of our policy in advocating a solution -- more, more. Yes. Lift it up a little bit more.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You will have to reformulate that. You're giving the witness the answer, so --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, what I said in my interview to Time was published in its entirety by Politika, the leading Yugoslav newspaper. Was this my public standpoint addressed both to the international community and in Yugoslavia?

A. Yes. This was the quintessence of our policy regarding the Bosnian crisis.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you will finish in -- within 14 minutes -- ten minutes. Yes.

MR. KAY: Exhibit both newspaper cuttings.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, those may be exhibited.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, please take a look -- take a look at the Politika daily.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the Court Deputy will give the exhibit numbers. ³⁶⁴⁷²

THE REGISTRAR: The next exhibit number is D276. First Article, D276; and the second one, D277.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I also have a photocopy of the same daily, Politika daily, of the 12th of July. So still within the period of time that you were questioned about as to when the session was convened.

Now, on page 1, the Security Council about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and sub-heading says: "The fall of Srebrenica has been confirmed." And then the UN spokesperson, Mr. Favci, said, "We can confirm that the Serb forces have entered Srebrenica." And now the next sentence says: "What is the Security Council going to say about the protected zones?" And now the words of Mr. Favci, who is the spokesman of Boutros-Ghali -- I will skip over some of the words, although I suggest that you read them all.

And then it says: "We should not forget --" I marked that at the bottom of the page -- "that both sides contributed to the deterioration of the situation in Srebrenica and that Boutros-Ghali on a number of occasions demanded that the protected zones be demilitarised. However, that was not done, said Favci."

The statement of Mr. Favci goes on to the second page. However, if you put these two pages together, you will see what I just read out in its entirety.

Then they quote the following: " Marasin [phoen], representative of the US foreign affairs ministry -- or, rather, Russian foreign affairs ³⁶⁴⁷³ ministry said the same thing as Mr. Favci, namely that the attacks on the positions of the Serb army have significantly raised tensions in Srebrenica."

JUDGE ROBINSON: To what purpose are you reading out these passages? It's time for a question. We haven't yet reached the stage where you can give evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Mr. Nice on the other day spent an entire hour in order to explain how is it that Mr. Jovanovic learned about the events in Srebrenica at the latest on the 13th of July. I just showed you what the papers printed on the 11th and 12th of July, bringing words of UN officials describing problems --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the point is that you are not to give evidence. If you read out a passage from the newspaper, you must ask a question.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, may I make a point? I certainly didn't spend an hour dealing with the particular circumstances of the arrival of information about the events of Srebrenica. A few minutes. I spent time producing a flow of information of a general character into Belgrade, and I made that clear on several occasions.

I haven't stopped the re-examination on the newspapers for two reasons. There may be some relevance or tangential relevance, and it remains a matter for the accused how he spends his time. But it may help the accused to have in mind that if he wants to get material like newspaper reports of his statements into evidence, if he instructs his associates to approach me, it may be possible that I can agree about ³⁶⁴⁷⁴ matters of that sort going into evidence and saving him time. I have been able just to speak to his associates, although I understand their position may be sensitive, but it's perfectly possible to negotiate with me and I will do everything I can to accommodate the appropriate production of evidence without taking time.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. Mr. Milosevic, you will have note of that offer. You're to put a question now on the passage that you had read.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, was it known to UNPROFOR and to the officials at the Security Council as well as the Secretary-General that demilitarisation was not carried out and that there were many terrorist attacks launched from Srebrenica resulting in many deaths? Was that known?

A. It was known. The Russian delegation, starting in 1993 and onwards, insisted in the Security Council that the concept of protected zone be cleared. That's how they framed it. And the Security Council kept postponing that. It was obvious that the protected zones were abused by the Muslims who used it as a site to launch their attacks against Serb villages. And in the course of those operations, almost 2.000 Serb civilians in the villages surrounding Srebrenica died as a result of those attacks.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, are you saying that prior to the fall of Srebrenica you were aware of attacks by Muslims against Serbs but unaware of attacks by Serbs against Muslims? ³⁶⁴⁷⁵

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I knew about both. Why wouldn't I know? Those were publicly available facts. It was reported by the media that the Muslim garrison in Srebrenica raided and massacred civilians in Serb villages. It was also reported that the forces of Republika Srpska attacked Srebrenica trying to enter it on a number occasions. That was prevented by the pressure from the international community and also by the pressure exerted by us.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And that day, the spokesperson of Radovan Karadzic gave a statement to the effect that in the past 45 days, they had over 30 civilian victims because the Muslims had abused the status of protected zones and started attacks against civilians. This is what is reported by the papers on the 12th.

Were those facts known to the public?

A. Well, if this was reported by the media, then yes, it was known to the public.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I would like this to be exhibited. You can see that the date is the 12th of July. The leading Yugoslav daily Politika reports about the fall of Srebrenica being confirmed. So --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- if you wish to clarify anything further, we can put this on the ELMO.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it may be exhibited.

THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit D278. ³⁶⁴⁷⁶

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, Mr. Nice presented to you tab 21, which deals with the issues of Srebrenica, and it's from April 1993. This is Mr. Nice's tab 21.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, are you going to deal with it in private session?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No need for that, Mr. Kwon. This is not protected for its contents but, rather, for its form. I will not deal with the form, only with the contents. This refers to the Security Council's Resolution from 1993.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's fine, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. This Resolution of the Security Council, as is stated here, demands that the paramilitary forces of Bosnian Serbs cease with their attacks on Srebrenica immediately. Do you remember, what was our position regarding these attacks on Srebrenica? As far as I remember, it was not a protected zone yet, or perhaps it was. Was it or wasn't it? And when it became a protected zone, at whose initiative it was done, and who invested maximum efforts to prevent any kind of a conflict in Srebrenica and around it?

A. Srebrenica became a protected zone at the initiative of some Security Council members. Our position was in respect of all protected zones, not only Srebrenica, not to touch them and not to take control of them. This was reiterated publicly by the leadership of the state. Not only because it could have led to a retaliation, but also because we ³⁶⁴⁷⁷ wanted to limit and put an end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not flame it further.

Q. All right, Mr. Jovanovic. Now, please take a look at the document in tab 21 which shows that even at that time, in 1993, the Security Council adopted a decision to introduce the security zone.

A. Yes. It became a protected zone that year.

Q. And do you remember what activities we pursued in order to protect that area?

A. Well, I don't remember much about that. I just remember that we always warned them about not expanding military action but, rather, to turn to a political resolution.

JUDGE ROBINSON: This will be your last question. As I indicated, we are stopping at 1.43.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Jovanovic, we provided assistance to Republika Srpska. Now, please tell me the following: Was our assistance to Republika Srpska something that ever pertained to any paramilitary formations, and did the leadership of Republika Srpska ever ask us to provide any kind of paramilitary formations?

A. As far as I know, that was never the case. They never mentioned any paramilitary formations in their conversations with us, only their army.

Q. Do you remember what was my position, the position of the leadership of the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia, with respect to ³⁶⁴⁷⁸ paramilitary formations?

A. Your position was always a negative one. In talks with us and in talks with others, you always insisted that all those volunteers who at the early stage of the Yugoslav crisis signed up always ought to be under the control of the JNA.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. And thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. That concludes your testimony. Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give it. You may leave.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I did not conclude my additional examination.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I concluded it. It's 1.43, and I had indicated last week that we have to stop at 1.43 so that we don't overrun and so that the trial which is scheduled to begin at 2.15 does not begin at 2.25. I have received numerous complaints.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --

MR. NICE: May tabs --

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you have more questions to ask of this witness? Do you want this witness to return tomorrow, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly. I need to conclude my re-examination. Mr. Robinson, are you aware of the fact just how much material Mr. Nice introduced in his cross? At least three times what I introduced in my examination-in-chief. Therefore, I have to deal with the documents presented by him. I have to put questions to the witness about them. ³⁶⁴⁷⁹

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I was really thinking of the witness's own welfare. He has been here for such a long time.

Mr. Jovanovic, Mr. Milosevic needs you tomorrow. You will have to return tomorrow, and I hope your re-examination will be concluded very quickly. I had thought we had finished.

MR. NICE: Before I forget, tabs 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49 and 50 should be under seal, with your leave.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes. We are adjourned, and we will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 23rd day of

February, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.