39487
Tuesday, 17 May 2005
[Open session]
[The witness entered court]
[The accused entered court]
--- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the witness is scheduled to be here for a long time in chief, so let us proceed as quickly as possible.
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Milosevic. Microphone. Microphone, please. The microphone is not switched on. Could the microphone be turned towards Mr. Milosevic, please. It's facing right the other way. Thank you.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, proceed now, Mr. Milosevic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope you have received a proper translation of tab 10, which we dealt with last week. I'll just dwell on that for a while.
WITNESS: OBRAD STEVANOVIC [Resumed]
[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
Q. Good morning, General. I hope you have tab 10 in front of you. It is the decision to establish a ministerial staff for the suppression of terrorism.
What is the date of the decision? When was it passed?
A. The decision was passed on the 16th of June, 1998.
Q. We have here the staff members appointed by the minister, and apart from that, it says here after listing all the individuals one by one 39488 that the expanded Staff shall also include chiefs of the Secretariats for Internal Affairs centres and branches of the RDB, Department of State Security, in the AP, autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija.
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Does that mean that the expanded staff incorporates all these individuals as well as the chiefs of secretariats in the Kosovo and Metohija area, all of them?
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Now, what is defined here as the staff's assignment?
A. Last time, I said that under II the task of the staff was defined, and it was defined in such a way as being tasked with planning, organising and managing the activities and use of the organisational units of the ministry, both the sent and attached units, to suppress terrorism in the area of the AP of Kosovo and Metohija. And then para 2, also the staff is tasked with planning, organising, directing, and coordinating the activities of the organisational units of the ministry in Kosovo and Metohija in carrying out complex security operations, special security operations.
Q. In the documents here we have a number of these decisions on the staff for suppressing terrorism. Now, what is the difference between them?
A. The difference between these various decisions basically is in the personnel composition of the staff. Of course, the difference between this decision and the previous decision, if I remember that correctly, is negligible with respect to the mandates of the staff. This decision is 39489 focused more on the suppression of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija and, therefore, the title of the staff, the name of the staff has been changed.
Q. Thank you, General.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you said that we shall be tendering exhibits into evidence at the end of a tab. Is that how we're going to proceed?
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Let us now continue with your testimony where you left off at the end of our last working session. I asked you whether there were any -- was there any overlapping in what the police and the army did.
A. I said that the overlapping of competencies in the negative sense did not exist but that the army carried out, pursuant to the rules governing the ministry of the interior just as the police did in conformity with the rules of resubordination, did tasks that came under the duties of the army and vice versa.
Q. Could you explain that to us more closely, please, bearing in mind several excerpts contained in tab 4 taken from the law on the army and the other relevant provisions, the law on defence, and other law in point.
A. Yes, I can do that. In tab 4, on page 2, Article 30, para 1 of the law on the army of Yugoslavia says: "The rights and duties of authorised personnel of the organs of the interior in the army is performed by authorised personnel of the organs of security and the military police." 39490 Then Article 31, para 2, once again the law on the army of Yugoslavia, states the following: "Authorised persons in the service of the organs of security and military police may in performing their duties in the field of security or military police use firearms and other means as prescribed by separate provisions in conformity with the rules governing the organs of the interior."
So this article deals with what military officials can use and others. Of course, these duties carried out by the organs of the military police and public security refers to military personnel. Now, Article 17 of the law on defence of Yugoslavia prescribes the means of resubordination of police units to the units of the army of Yugoslavia, how they are resubordinated and attached to them. But I think that we'll discuss this article at greater length in due course most probably.
Q. Thank you, General. Now, the army and the police, did they engage in joint operations; and if so, how did they engage in them? How did they carry them out?
A. The army and police in Kosovo and Metohija in the course of 1998 and 1999 had joint operations to suppress terrorism. Those operations were conducted according to a uniform, united plan for the suppression of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, and according to individual plans or, rather, orders for each specific operation and action.
Q. General, would you please take a look now at tabs -- you mentioned orders just now.
A. Yes, that's right. 39491
Q. So -- now, please take a look at tab 145 onwards, and then I shall be asking you some questions pertaining to some of the material there, some of these documents.
Tab 145 contains one such order. Have you found it?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. I'd like us to look at tabs 146, 145, 7, 8, and 9, now, please. This is a document --
MR. NICE: No translation for any of these, unless the Chamber's been provided with more material than I have.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, any explanation?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, my information tells me that this has been translated. However -- well, anyway, I hope that the general will briefly be able to explain this. We can place it on the ELMO. And I will check during the break what material has already arrived.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It's relatively short, so it may be placed on the ELMO.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Let's take the portions that have been translated. Tab 148 has been translated.
JUDGE ROBINSON: If it has been translated, why is it we don't have the translation? That's right. We don't have the original either. We don't have the original.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll investigate during the break and see what all that is about, Mr. Robinson, check it out. But let's go 39492 back to tab 145, since it's a brief document.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in your index, beside tab 148 is the following: "Requested document not yet received from the authorities in Belgrade." How does that tie in with the explanation that you give?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What I have here is it says tab 148, in English, the 24th of May, 1999. Probably in the meantime what happened, that document came in. I don't know.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, do you have that document, document tab 148? Do you have it in the Serbian?
A. Only in the Serbian version, yes.
JUDGE ROBINSON: How long is the document, how many pages?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document, I have it here in English, is four pages long.
THE INTERPRETER: Could the English version be placed on the ELMO, please.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we're going to lose time because of the maladministration of your case, but let the English version be placed on the ELMO.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. It's tab 148, General. You can follow it in the Serbian, the copy in front of you. Have you found tab 148?
A. Yes, I have. Do you want me to say something?
Q. Just quote the characteristic points, what you think should be highlighted. All the documents we find in 146, 7, 8, and 9. 39493
A. In all these tabs, what we have are orders, the ones that I mentioned in responding to your previous question, and those orders relate to disbanding --
JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt, but can we see the title of this document. It looks like the ones already exhibited. "Order." Thank you. Yes. Proceed, Mr. Stevanovic.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Judge. In tab 148, just like in the other tabs, we have a series of orders of the command of the Pristina Corps to disband and destroy, or break up and destroy the Siptar operations in different operations and different geographical regions. This tab 148 specifically is an order. It is an order to break up and destroy the Siptar terrorist forces in the Lipovica sector. The date is the 24th of May, 1999, and of course its contents or, rather, the contents of this order have been standardised. It is the customary way in which these orders are written for things of this kind.
From this particular order we can see that in the anti-terrorist operations, specifically this particular operation, was one in which the joint forces of the army and police took part. And of course this can be seen straight away on point 2 of page 1 where the main tasks of the units are specified, and in line 1, if I can read it out, it says: "The 15th Armoured Brigade, together with parts of the 124th MUP Intervention Brigade (3 companies), the 36th Detachment of the special police units (3 companies) --" and then the next portion is not easy to read but quite obviously it refers to tasks for units of the police and army in that same 39494 anti-terrorist operation.
Of course, in continuation, once again it is a standardised form, we have the tasks that are specified in the usual manner. All the other tabs that you mentioned are very similar, with the proviso that they refer, of course, to other operations and are usually titled "Zapovest," "Order," rather than the word "Naredjenje," as is the case in tab 148.
Q. General, these orders in tabs 145, 6, 7, 8, and 9 all pertain to anti-terrorist activities where the army and police operated in concert?
A. Yes, that's right. It all has to do with anti-terrorist operations. But they are carried out at different points in time and in different areas. Different military and police units take part in them.
Q. The order in tab 145 bears which date?
A. The order in tab 145 is dated the 25th of May, 1999.
Q. What about the next tab?
A. That was the 27th of May, 1999.
Q. Tab 147?
A. The 24th of April, 1999.
Q. Oh, the 24th of April, 1999.
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. And what about 149?
A. 149 is the 22nd of May, 1999.
Q. During the NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was there any resubordination of the police units to the army of Yugoslavia? 39495
A. Yes, there was resubordination of the police to the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but this response requires a detailed explanation.
Q. Through questions we'll try to get to that. First of all, the resubordination of the police to the army, is that something that regulations envisage at all, and was it limited in terms of its tasks and the area involved?
A. Yes, precisely. In the law on the defence of the FRY, and that is Article 17 that we mentioned a few minutes ago, in accordance with that article, an order was passed on the resubordination of the forces and organs of the interior to the army of Yugoslavia. However, as I already said, that resubordination was limited in terms of its tasks because it pertained only to carrying out combat operations or, rather, anti-terrorist operations. Also, it was limited in terms of the police units involved because it pertained to specific police units only. In accordance with the orders that we have just seen, those were the police units that were involved in individual operations. In addition to that, resubordination was limited in terms of the area and time involved. That is to say that the resubordination of police units to the army can be reduced to the adoption of a plan for carrying out anti-terrorist operations and also issuing orders that we quoted in response to the previous question.
Q. General, I asked you about the regulations and you mentioned Article 17 of the law on the defence of Yugoslavia. That is contained in tab 4. I'm going to quote it very briefly. All of it has been 39496 translated.
THE INTERPRETER: Could the interpreters please have a reference.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreters just asked for a reference so that they can follow you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Tab 4, page 2, Article 17 of the law on defence of Yugoslavia, the one that the witness mentioned in response to my question whether there were any regulations pertaining to resubordination, and he indicated that particular article of the law on defence.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you proceed, I wanted to ask the witness, and perhaps you but more the witness, is there any special significance in the word "resubordination"? Why not just "subordination"? "Re" in English has a specific connotation; subordinating again.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, of course these are synonyms. They have the same meaning but that is quite simply the wording in the law.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, the MUP units are subordinated to their commands, but in case of a threat of war, the law envisages that they should be resubordinated to the army in terms of possible combat operations within the zones of command of the army. I don't know whether "resubordination" is the best solution possible, but anyway, that is the word that is used. The wording of the law is rather clear, so I think that will make it clearer for you. It says: "In the event of imminent threat of war, a state of war, a state of emergency, internal affairs units and organs may be used to 39497 carry out combat tasks, provide support for combat or offer armed resistance. In carrying out their combat tasks, these units and organisations shall be subordinated to the Yugoslav army officer who is in command of combat operations." Subordination. Subordination to the officer of the army of Yugoslavia who is in command of combat operations. That is the wording of this provision.
As far as regulations are concerned, that is the legal basis for resubordination.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, in relation to the resubordination of the police to the army, was there any problem involved, General?
A. Well, it can be said that there were certain problems which primarily boiled down to a different interpretation of documents on subordination and resubordination, especially at lower levels, both in the army and in the police. However, after certain consultations were carried out in terms of these different interpretations of the mentioned documents were overcome. And as I said, subordination or resubordination was reduced to planning anti-terrorist operations by the military commands and issuing orders in order to carry out joint operations by the military and police units.
Q. All right. Did resubordination pertain to all forms of police work and all police units or police units that take part in combat operations or, rather, in this combat against terrorism in the zone of responsibility of the commander of the unit to which they were subordinated? 39498 BLANK PAGE 39499
A. Of course resubordination pertained only to specific tasks, specific units and only while these tasks were still under way in a given area. Apart from that, both the military and the police carried out their own tasks or, rather, those belonging to their own province of work. They had horizontal coordination throughout, though. That is to say exchange of information, et cetera.
Q. All right, General. We saw what this was like in the regulations as we saw this brief paragraph in tab 4. Could we please see what this looked like in practical terms. We have tabs 45, 46, 7, 8, 9, 50, and 51. So could you please take a look at tab 45 now. It's just one page.
A. Yes.
Q. Have you found it?
A. Yes.
Q. This is the -- this is an order of the commander of the Pristina Corps --
A. Yes.
Q. -- dated the 20th of April, 1999.
A. That's right.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, again this is not translated.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can put it on the overhead projector. I believe it was translated, though. Perhaps it wasn't grouped properly, but I'm quite sure that all these documents were translated.
JUDGE KWON: Tab 46 is translated.
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the speaker, please. 39500
THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters cannot hear anything. The microphone has not been switched on.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Please have the microphone switched on. Who switches it on; Mr. Milosevic or the control room? Yes. Will the control room please have the microphone of Mr. Milosevic switched on.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's on now. I see that it's on now. I see that the light is on.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I?
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Please go ahead, General.
A. This is an order of the commander of the Pristina Corps that has to do with the subordination of the units and the organs of the MUP of Serbia in the zones of responsibility of the brigades. It is dated the 20th of April, 1999. And it also invokes, in the preamble, the order of the staff of the Supreme Command, and it issues an order which we explained a bit earlier on.
Point 1 says: "Units and organs of the interior of the MUP of Serbia in the zones of responsibility of the brigades shall be resubordinated to commands of brigades for carrying out combat tasks." That was point 1.
Point 2: "In accordance with the organisation of the organs and units of the MUP and the deployment in the territory of the zone of responsibility of the brigades, plans of use should regulate concrete 39501 obligation in carrying out combat operations according to levels of command."
Is it necessary for me to read on?
Q. I would just like to draw your attention to the second paragraph of paragraph 4: "At the time when combat operations are not carried out, the forces of the MUP shall be engaged in carrying out other specific tasks according to the plans and orders of the staff of the MUP of -- for Kosovo and Metohija."
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. General, can we conclude that all these orders from tabs 41 through 51 are quite a precise concretisation of this resubordination?
A. All these tabs from tab 45 onwards, including 1950 -- including 51, actually pertain to this order of -- on resubordination and spell it out in more concrete terms, if I can put it that way.
Q. The resubordination of the police in the area of operations of a certain brigade, that means that the unit of police within the zone of operations of a particular brigade is resubordinated to the commander of the brigade?
A. Only in terms of carrying out the tasks we mentioned.
Q. Only in terms of the specific tasks mentioned?
A. Yes.
Q. They respect their own chain of command with regard to all other tasks and they act independently of the army in all other respects?
A. Yes. I can just add one thing; that policework was not resubordinated to the army in any way. There were certain interpretations 39502 when we discussed problems, that it was necessary to resubordinate the entire police jurisdiction to the army, which was not logical at all and that was not the underlying idea of this order. So in wartime, practically the police carried out all its work as in peacetime.
Q. I hope that this was sufficiently explained now. General, now we're going to move on to a different subject, a new subject. It has to do with the joint command in Kosovo and Metohija. I'm going to put a very specific question to you. Please listen to it carefully.
Do you know that during 1998 and 1999 a command organ called the Joint Command was operating in Kosovo?
A. Precisely speaking and briefly speaking, there was not that kind of organ called the Joint Command in Kosovo and Metohija in 1998 and in 1999.
Q. All right. So there wasn't a command organ.
A. That's right.
Q. And had you heard this word "Joint Command" in relation to this period in Kosovo and Metohija?
A. Yes, I have heard of that, but of course it did not pertain to any kind of command organ. It represented something completely different.
Q. So it was not a command organ. What was it? You say that it was something completely different. What was it in actual fact?
A. The term "Joint Command" in Kosovo and Metohija during 1998 until the Verification Mission was established in Kosovo and Metohija, the term was used for horizontal coordination and cooperation among military police 39503 organs and state organs at all levels. In a practical sense, this joint command represented a series of meetings that were attended by representatives of the military, the police, and the state organs. At these meetings they exchanged information and data that were of relevance to all the participants. And after these meetings, everybody went back to their own line of work.
Q. General, this form of cooperation, you explained just now that this term was used. It was used regularly, that's my understanding on the basis of what you've said just now, in 1998, until the Verification Mission arrived, and that was the method of work actually.
A. It can be put that way.
Q. So horizontal cooperation among organs, was that your explanation?
A. Yes, that's right. That's what the term denoted. It could also be explained if we say horizontal coordination in every way, but there is certainly no subordination or resubordination involved.
Q. All right. Did you attend any of those meetings of this coordination that was called the Joint Command?
A. Yes, about ten or so, approximately.
Q. All right. This form of cooperation under that term, did it go beyond the chain of command in any way, either in the police or in the military, or did it in any way infringe upon the regular chain of command either in the army or in the police?
A. No, it didn't. This horizontal cooperation or coordination did not infringe upon the chain of command either in the army or in the police in any way. Everybody consistently observed their own vertical chain of 39504 command.
Q. General, I'm asking you these questions because an allegation was made here that this term "Joint Command" represented some sort of command body that was outside the vertical chain of command in the army and in the police. Do you have any information to the effect that this coordination between the police, the army, and state organs in Kosovo went in any way beyond or outside the regular chain of command as envisaged by the law?
A. All chains of command at the time in Kosovo and Metohija were in conformity with legal provisions. This method of work, therefore, this type of coordination, did not affect in any way of normal chain of command either in the police or in the army, it only contributed to the better functioning of both forces because of frequent exchange of information about the situation on the ground.
Q. For this occasion, just to clarify this allegation that this form of work was somehow outside the normal of -- normal chain of command, I would like you to look at tab 144. That is -- actually, those are minutes of a meeting in my office that took place on the 2nd of November, 1998. Have you found it?
A. Give me just a second. I found it.
Q. We will come back later to this document when discussing some other issues. For the moment, I only want to use this document to establish whether it shows clearly that all the bodies involved are within the chain of command, not outside of it. So I will ask you a couple of questions.
It says here at the very beginning -- and these are minutes drawn 39505 up by the chef de cabinet. At the very beginning we see the order of contributions by various speakers who make proposals that will eventually become proposals of the Joint Command. So does it say proposals of the Joint Command?
I opened this meeting, and after me spoke the commander of the Pristina Corps.
MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues]... translation.
JUDGE KWON: We haven't got it translated.
JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not translated, and I see it runs to 15 pages.
MR. NICE: So that if it's going to be referred to, with the Court's leave, at all, it should be on the overhead projector so we know what we're looking at.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we'll allow you to refer to it. You can refer to short passages, but it has to be on the ELMO.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Place page 1 on the ELMO. At the bottom of the page, we see an entry. Could you scroll it down a little. Now we can see the whole page. Please leave it that way.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. It says: "The commander of the Pristina Corps, Lieutenant General Nebojsa Pavkovic, gave a summary report on the implementation of the plan for combatting terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija and suggested a draft conclusion," et cetera, et cetera.
This passage mentions this term "Joint Command," because it says in the second paragraph, "Speaking on behalf of the Joint Command for 39506 Kosovo and Metohija."
Please, do not lose this upper part on the ELMO where the participants in the meeting are enumerated.
General, at the time when he is making this report, General Pavkovic is a member of the Pristina Corps?
A. Correct.
Q. I just want to show the chain of command. Is he subordinated to the commander of the 3rd Army?
A. Of course he is.
Q. And what about the commander of the 3rd Army? Is he subordinated to the commander of the General Staff?
A. Yes.
Q. So in this passage where General Pavkovic is reporting on these matters, is the commander of the 3rd Army present?
A. Yes. That's Lieutenant General Dusan Samardzic.
Q. Sixth line from the top, Lieutenant General Dusan Samardzic, commander of the 3rd Army. And above him is the Chief of the General Staff?
A. Yes. At the time it was Momcilo Perisic, Colonel General.
Q. And so it is stated in the first paragraph. In the military chain of command, all the links above Pavkovic are present, such as the commander of the 3rd Army, to whom he reports personally; the Chief of the General Staff is present as well; and of course the president of the republic to whom the Chief of the General Staff reports. Is the chain of -- is this the complete chain of command? 39507
A. Correct. All the links in the chain of command are present, in the military chain of command.
Q. Very well. Let me just see where the next passage is, on which page. Page 7.
JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stevanovic, were you at this meeting?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I was, Your Honour. We can see that from this introductory part, line 3 from the top. Line 3 from the bottom of paragraph 1.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. We saw who was present on behalf of the entire military chain of command from the commander of the Pristina Corps to the president of the republic.
Now, let us see on page 7. We see there was a contribution by Major General Sreten Lukic, who was a general of the police force. As we saw in that decision in tab 10, he was commander of the MUP staff.
A. Correct. So he is speaking at this meeting.
Q. Very well. Now, let us go back to page 1. Is it the case that this meeting was attended by Colonel General Vlastimir Djordjevic, who is directly above Sreten Lukic?
A. Correct.
Q. He was head of the public security sector?
A. Yes.
Q. And his direct superior, Minister of the Interior Vlajko Stojiljkovic is also present?
A. Yes, he is, but I can't find him. 39508
Q. The fifth line from the top of the paragraph. Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia Vlajko Stojiljkovic.
A. Yes.
Q. Is the president of the Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, also present?
A. Yes, he is.
Q. Of course the meeting was attended by you as well and other participants on behalf of public and military security -- civilian and military security, that is. Let us look at the chain of command, however. Are all the links in the chain above Lukic present, from himself to the president of the republic?
A. Yes. Not a single link in the chain was omitted.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I hope this is enough by way of response to the allegation that there was something outside of the chain of command, particularly this type of coordination.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. I will now move on to a different subject, General. It concerns local security or, rather, local police and confidence-building measures in Kosovo and Metohija.
Could you tell us, please, what is understood by the term of "local security" in Kosovo and Metohija, and what was the purpose and the intent of establishing local security in this area?
A. Local security in Kosovo and Metohija implied a specially organised system of engagement of local Albanians for the purpose of maintaining public law and order and some other affairs within their local 39509 communities. The establishment of such a system of local security was geared at building up the confidence between local Albanian communities and members of the police force, the MUP, of the Republic of Serbia.
Q. General, who were the members of this local police force or local security?
A. Members of the local security were Albanians who accepted to work in the local police on the terms and conditions stipulated by a contract that they signed with organs of local self-management.
Q. Please look at tab 26. This document provides us with a very specific list of a local police such as in the municipality of Djakovica.
A. Correct. That is a list of the local police force in the municipality of Djakovica at a certain point in time. I would like to ask that names of individuals not be mentioned here for their own safety.
Q. Well, those names were well known at the time, but it is entirely appropriate that you should ask for this protective measure, and I hope Mr. Robinson will grant it.
A. So we have two lists. One is horizontal, the other is vertical. The names are the same but they are arranged slightly differently. From this first list we can see their names, the village they were in charge of, their registration number, the type of uniform they had, and the weapon they had.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I understand that you have requested that the names not be mentioned. You have to provide a reason, because this is a public trial, as you know.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Stevanovic indicated that 39510 BLANK PAGE 39511 individuals -- that those who survived, although I believe most of these people have been killed, could experience problems because they used to be local policemen, and as such they were targets of the KLA during the entire time of terrorist activities and after 2000, after 1999 as well. I suppose that is the reason why the general is suggesting that their names not be placed on the ELMO.
[Trial Chamber confers]
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, do you --
MR. NICE: I am afraid I'm at a loss to understand the reasoning. It seems to me these men were well known at the time and I can't see any reason for them not to be named now. I can't see what the risk is in their being identified as to what they were doing at the time, which must have been well known at the time. There it is.
JUDGE BONOMY: It's surely for the accused, though, to decide how he presents this, and if he wants to do it by using the numbers, what can anyone do about it?
MR. NICE: If he wants to do it by using the numbers and if he persuades the Chamber not to lay the document on the overhead projector, and if I don't raise the question of the names specifically in cross-examination, then Your Honour is quite right, but is that an appropriate way to get around the requirement that the material should basically be public unless good reason is shown for it to be dealt with otherwise?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if you allow me, I could try to -- 39512
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, go ahead.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I did not suppose that this was going to be complicated, but bearing in mind the fact that these people were well known in their areas, wore the uniforms of the police, we can make their names public. My only intention, my only thought was to protect individuals from possible problems.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well. Well, we'll proceed in the normal way.
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will continue in the normal way, but out of consideration for these people, I will skip their names, which of course imposes no obligation on Mr. Nice to do the same, but I'm going to make sure that I not the cause of any problems for them.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, here we see, village by village, the names of these policemen. There are mainly two per village. So in the first list there is a total of 30 villages in that municipality alone, the municipality of Djakovica, where the local police functioned.
A. Correct. The big numbers denote villages, and the smaller number next to it in the next column is the number of the member of the local security.
Q. Yes. That is self-explanatory. We also see the registration number of every member of the local police and information whether his uniform was drawn from supplies and the type of pistol also drawn from supplies. In this case that is the 7.65 millimetre pistol. So this is a 39513 list for the municipality of Djakovica.
Now, tell me, General, in those places where local security was established as we see in the list under tab 26, was there any need for members of the MUP to be present?
A. Well, that need was considerably reduced once the local security was established. The police, of course, continued to do their regular work but with considerably smaller presence in those areas where the local police maintained public law and order.
Q. So in those villages where there was no special reason for them to go in, the police did not enter?
A. I said at the beginning that the basic object of this whole system was precisely that the local Albanians should come to understand that the police had no goal of being present in the village itself but that their goal was to provide law and order in the village. Now, if they accepted keeping law and order, then the police accepted to go there only when the need arose or, rather, in cases where members of the local forces were not able to or did not have the authority to get a job done with respect to a given event.
Q. Now, tell us, please, in what way, under what conditions were the members of the local security recruited and engaged?
A. Members of the local security were recruited and engaged under this system according to the principle on voluntariness. That is to say if they accepted the conditions stipulated in the agreement drawn up by the organs of self-government, and those contracts or agreement specified their rights and duties. 39514
Q. All right. Let's take a look at one of those contracts or agreements, tab 24. And the date of that one is the 1st of January, 1999. So it is a contract between the individual that is becoming a local policeman by entering into the contract.
A. Yes, that's right. This contract defines the person's rights and duties, and it is the person entering into the contract with a representative of local self-government. In this case, it was the president of the Municipal Assembly of Djakovica.
Q. Right. Fine. Now, the locals of a village, the villagers in which this local police force was established, did they have any influence on the election of the members of that local police force or were those names put forward from outside?
A. In principle, it was up to them to represent their own representatives, people they trusted and people who would be able to represent their interests vis-a-vis the police and local self-government authorities. And we'll see this from one of the subsequent exhibits. I can't remember which one it is just now.
Q. All right. Now, take a look at this particular contract. Let's do that. We have the name and surname of the person entering into the contract, and then it says, "Relates to security," and then 1, it says, infrastructure; 2, health protection; 3, food supplies; 4 maintaining public law and order. That is a classical task that the police does. Control and registering people who are coming into the area or passing through the area, and generally providing conditions for the normal life and work of the citizens or villagers. 39515
A. Yes. That was -- those were the basic duties for which they were remunerated and engaged in the first place. Looking at it from the security related issues, point 4 the most important one here.
Q. Yes, that's right. Now, point 3, or article 3, it says the coordinator of local security - that applies to each one - has an ID in order to present his ID to third persons.
A. That's right.
Q. So he has a sort of police card or a similar document?
A. Yes, that's right. And I think that we have attached a copy of the type of ID they would carry.
Q. Yes. That is in tab 25, a photocopy of the kind of identification papers that we mean.
Could the photocopy be placed on the overhead projector. The first page need not be placed on the ELMO, but would you please read out what it says. On the reverse as well as on the first side it says the Republic of Serbia. It says that in Serbian and Albanian. Is that what it says, the Republic of Serbia? Then it says in Albanian Republic of Serbia, and then underneath it says the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija, and then that same thing in Albanian, the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija in Albanian, in the two languages, Serbian and Albanian.
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Then it says local security, both in Serbian and in Albanian once again. Then it says municipality in Albanian and Serbian, the village in Serbian and Albanian, the first and last name, and the number. 39516
A. That's right.
Q. Now, what does it say on the reverse side of the ID for this local security? Could you read it out, please, in Serbian. And the text is the same in Albanian.
A. The reverse side of the ID says as follows -- it is written in Serbian and Albanian. In Serbian, it reads as follow: "The bearer of this identity card is authorised to work to secure the infrastructure, to provide health care protection, food supply, law and order, maintenance, and other conditions for the normal life of citizens, to issue warnings, to check identity documents, to arrest persons, to use force and to carry a firearm."
So those are the tasks and competencies which have been entered into the ID card for the local security personnel and taken from the contract.
Q. So he can take persons into custody, use force, and carry firearms; is that right?
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Tell us, please, General, the members of the local police, did they wear a uniform?
A. Yes, they did. However, the uniforms were made in a continuous period, or, rather, they didn't have uniforms to begin with until they were supplied with a uniform. However, it was envisaged that each member of the local security service should have and should wear uniforms, and most of them did. And we can see that from the list we read out a moment ago, looked at a moment ago. 39517
Q. According to that list, all of them wore uniforms -- most of them.
A. Yes.
Q. Did that uniform differ in any way from the police uniform?
A. Well, in slight details but I can't go into the details now.
Q. But it could be distinguished. You could distinguish a local policeman from a policeman which was a policeman employed by the Ministry of the Interior.
A. That's right.
Q. Just like this ID card differs in certain aspects to a police ID.
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Very well. Thank you. And where was this idea on local security first applied? Where did it start from?
A. It came from the municipality of Djakovica and that's where it proved most successful. Of course, the activities -- activities along those lines were organised in other municipalities as well or, rather, in all the municipalities with an Albanian population.
Q. And what were the work results of the members of the local security that we mentioned here and talked about?
A. In the police force, we were satisfied with their work. They worked satisfactorily. First of all, because the police had to go to those villages less frequently, on rarer occasions, and that was one of the goals for which this whole system was established in the first place. And there were very specific, concrete results that the members of the local security force had to do with respect to reporting any violations, 39518 uncovering the perpetrators of crimes, and so on and so forth.
Q. Very well. I'd like to draw your attention to tab 27 now, please, where we can see a document dated December. It is a letter sent to the staff of the Ministry of the Interior, and it says the chief of the secretariat from Djakovica for purposes of local security, winter uniforms must be issued as well as wind jackets, shirts, pants, and so on. And we saw on the basis of a previous document that they had already received weapons. So this entire equipment is listed here.
A. Yes, that's right. The local security force was established with cooperation between the provisional Executive Council, the staff of the MUP in Kosovo and Metohija, and the local self-government authorities. And the police force gave them logistical support and professional support, and here we can see that it was the police that supplied them with uniforms. You can't actually see that but they did also supply weapons for the local security force.
Q. So this document is important because it is dated 1998. There are, of course, earlier documents in 1998 as well.
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Now, as a confidence-boosting measure, did this have a positive effect on the situation in the villages where the local security force was established?
A. Yes, of course, because with the establishment of a local security force, the imposed thoughts among the citizens that the police was repressive was done away with, and that the force -- police force came into villages just for repressive measures. We managed to show the local 39519 Albanians that that was not the goal of the police force but that they were bent on providing law and order in their villages.
Q. Law and order that they could keep themselves, enforce themselves to the best of their ability. And did they -- were they able to do that?
A. Yes, they were.
Q. Can we see some examples of the results scored by the local security force? And I draw your attention to tabs 28 to 35 in that respect.
A. In these tabs we have several examples of the concrete work and conduct of the local security force in keeping with the authorisations specified in the contract we looked at a moment ago.
Q. In tab 28, we see a report by the SUP of Djakovica about the fact that a member of the local security force was subject to serious threats and that the perpetrator, in conformity with the law, was sanctioned with a misdemeanour charge.
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Now, what else do we see? We see that --
A. We see that a member of the local security force in the next document reported to the duty service in Djakovica, that on the 1st of May, 1999, at around 2200 hours, in the house of a villager, that three unidentified persons entered the house of Vitor Docaj of Yugoslavia armed with automatic rifles. So this is an example where members of the local force call in members of the Yugoslav army. They report conducts on the part of members of the Yugoslav army.
Q. In this case, the policeman was an Albanian? 39520
A. Yes.
Q. This Albanian policeman, in fact on the 1st of May, 1999; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Although the date is the 2nd of May. That was the time when, according to what is presented here, the Albanians were allegedly expulsed and terror being effected against them. So on the 1st of May, 1999, this particular Albanian, a member of the local security force, was reporting to the police the conduct of three -- inappropriate conduct of three Yugoslav soldiers who tried to abuse the female family member of a given family.
A. Yes. And we can see that pursuant to that report the organs of the police were notified about that and that the police took steps to apprehend the perpetrators of that particular offence.
Q. And all this is taking place on the 1st of May, 1999. That is to say, the local security force is functioning properly; it is reporting the misconduct of soldiers and the appropriate authorities are taking steps to act upon his report. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, take a look at tab 30, please. Here we can see that on the 13th of May, once again it is the Djakovica municipality area, where a member of the local security force, once again an Albanian, took into custody another Albanian whom he caught thieving.
A. Yes.
Q. So once again the time is mid-May, the time of the aggression, 39521 when it is assumed that Albanians were being expelled from Kosovo and Metohija. Here we have an Albanian member of the local security force who catches a thief, is taking him to the local police station. We can see all that from this Official Note, which has its number, and the date is the 13th of May, 1999.
Then we come to the next tab, tab 31, which is a receipt for items confiscated.
A. Relating to the previous case.
Q. That's right, because he was caught red handed, and the items that the person had stolen were confiscated, and this is a receipt for that, and the date on the receipt is once again the 30th of May, 1999. So two months after the aggression.
Now take a look at tab 32. The date there is the 15th of May. What is important here is --
A. Well, once again a person was taken into custody by a member of the local security force because they were found --
Q. Well, yes. He was engaged in an act and was apprehended by a local Albanian police force, and that is mid-May that we're talking about.
A. Yes.
Q. It is in fact the 15th of May, 1999; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Take a look at tab 33 now, please. This is an Official Note. It is dated the 16th of May, and once again a local Albanian policeman who took into custody and brought into the police station a certain individual, once again an Albanian. 39522 BLANK PAGE 39523
A. That's right. But this is important, because a member of the local security force in actual fact took into custody an individual whom it was supposed had taken part in the killing of several policemen in the period gone by.
Q. Right. So that means that a member of the local security force, on the 16th of May, 1999, that is to say two months -- almost two months into the aggression and the alleged persecution of Albanians, here we have an Albanian bringing in somebody who he had taken into custody, taking him to the police force -- police station concerning a murder that had been committed earlier.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, take a look at tab 34. The date there is the 19th of May.
A. This is the case where a weapon was confiscated from a citizen in cooperation with members of the local security force in this particular village.
Q. Very well. Thank you.
A. So we have a member of a local security team reporting and confiscating somebody -- confiscating a rifle that had been hidden and dug into the ground, and the person was found in illegal possession of that weapon.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what do you say this -- all this evidence indicates? Just very briefly.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Quite clearly, Mr. Robinson, these confidence-building measures and the appointment of Albanian policemen in purely Albanian villages was operational, and it denies, by virtue of the 39524 fact that it was there, that Albanians were persecuted. They were there. They carried weapons. They wore uniforms.
So this is quite contrary to what the side opposite has been saying, that the police were expelling Albanians and killing them. This is a series of examples to the contrary.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to draw your attention to the dates that are very important on these documents. All of this happened in mid-May, all the documents we provided here.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please continue.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. So we have tab 35 to deal with as well. That was compiled around the 19th of May too. It also has to do with the work of the local security.
Do you think that there is anything characteristic that has to be highlighted in this respect, General?
A. No. It's quite similar to the previous examples. Members of the local security informed us that the following persons were caught stealing in the said village. So the police was informed by the local security that some persons in the mentioned village were involved in stealing.
Q. All right, General. What kind of effect did the NATO aggression have on the operation of local security?
A. It certainly had a negative effect on this system of local security, because many members of the local security suffered the retaliation of terrorists, because the police were not in a position to 39525 protect them any more as they were before when their safety was in jeopardy.
Q. Please look at tab 84, General. What happened? What was written here to the secretariat in Kosovo and Metohija by the head of the MUP staff in Kosovo and Metohija?
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.
JUDGE ROBINSON: No translation, Mr. Milosevic. If it's brief, it may be put on the ELMO. Let's have it on the ELMO.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I proceed?
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Just give us some brief comments with regard to this. So the NATO aggression was under way. What happened to Albanians then? How did they react and how did the police react?
A. The 2nd of May, 1999, is the date of this document. It was written by the staff of the Ministry of the Interior, and it was sent to the Secretariats of the Interior in Kosovo and Metohija. It has to do with the reporting of residence of citizens so that they can be taken care of. This has to do with the regulation of the population that left their places of residence. But one of the measures in paragraph 2 -- sorry. No, not paragraph 2. It's paragraph 3, subparagraph 4. So point 3 reads as follows: "Persons who reside in a particular area should be protected from a security and safety point of view and they should be familiarised with their obligations and ensure," and now under 4: "to appoint a representative who will carry out the work of the local police and carry out contacts with the authorities in order to resolve humanitarian issues 39526 and issues related to their safety and security, the provision of food, water, electricity, and other matters of relevance to the normalisation of life and work in their places of residence."
This document practically issues an order to secretariats to communicate with the local communities by affecting them in that way, namely, that they should appoint their own representatives who would be involved in this line of work.
Q. So that they should appoint their own local policemen?
A. Yes.
Q. Who would take care of law and order among them.
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Are these internally displaced persons who moved from a particular territory because of combat operations?
A. Precisely. These are persons who were staying outside their places of permanent residence.
Q. And why were they outside their permanent places of residence, General?
A. It is quite clear that that was because of the combat operations in Kosovo and Metohija, that they had to move from the areas where they lived, and also for other reasons that I could perhaps explain in greater detail.
Q. What was the attitude of the KLA towards the representatives of this local security and do you know what the fate was of the members of the local security when the army, our army and police, withdrew from Kosovo and Metohija? 39527
A. Well, the members of the so-called KLA certainly had a negative attitude towards the members of the local security because it did not suit them to have any kind of confidence building between the local Albanians and the police. Conflicts, hatred, intolerance were things that actually suited them.
Q. Tell me, General, in addition to the establishment of this local community -- local security, what other measures were taken at the time, at the height of the crisis during the war? What other measures were taken by the Ministry of the Interior vis-a-vis the Albanian population? What other confidence-building measures?
A. Well, not only in times of war. As a matter of fact, from mid-1998 onwards, the police of Serbia tried in Kosovo and Metohija in many ways to convince the Albanians that there was no reason for them to be afraid of regular, everyday police work. In that sense, members of the police even refrained from using roads where there could be conflicts. And they also refrained from entering villages, especially Albanian villages where it was assumed that certain conflicts might break out. After that, and also in relation to that, the police, whenever possible, took a series of actions in order to return all internally displaced persons to their places of permanent residence.
MR. NICE: Before we move on --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, yes.
MR. NICE: Obviously with this number of documents I'm not going to be able to return to all or even many of the documents in cross-examination. This particular document, 84, has no English 39528 translation, and it is on its face in need of some explanation. It's not stamped, it's not signed, it's not a photocopy of a sent document and I wonder if the Chamber, before allowing the accused to move on to the next document, would wish to get a little more detail of what exactly we're looking at.
JUDGE KWON: I note a recent arrival contains the translation of 84.
MR. NICE: Uh-huh. But again the original is different, I think, from many other originals because it looks as much like a draft as anything else, and I'm grateful to -- and pleased to know that there is now a translation.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us have some information from the witness on the provenance of this document. General?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President of the Trial Chamber, I have indeed noticed that there aren't any signatures or stamps here, but I do know with certainty that this document was adopted and was sent on to the secretariats. At that time I was in Kosovo and Metohija and I know that action was taken by all secretariats on the basis of this document. I know that in the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia there is a document that would bear a stamp and signature or some other proof that this document was sent out in order to be carried out.
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Milosevic, please.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. The Ministry of the Interior, the staff of the ministry, and then it says, "12a Strictly Confidential number 14, 2 May, 1999." 39529
A. Yes. Obviously there's a number there.
Q. And here it says, "Head of Staff, General Sreten Lukic," and that was typed out. Is that because it was sent as a dispatch, as a telegram to everyone?
A. It's obvious that it's a document of the staff. You can see the date, you can see the number; the only thing missing here is an authentic signature. But I assert that this is a document --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, General, yes. I think we have enough information.
Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, in your previous answer you mentioned that the staff of the ministry or, rather, the police in Kosovo and Metohija organised the return of internally displaced persons. Did you personally have an opportunity of participating in any such activity? Were you present when such activity was carried out related to the return of internally displaced persons to their homes?
A. Yes. Sometime in the summer or autumn 1998, I myself spent four or five days in the village of Istinic in the municipality of Decani. After terrorist activities, tens of thousands of Albanians had moved there. They were internally displaced persons. It was very hot there, I remember, although it was already well into the autumn. I remember that three or four -- for three or four days the local government vehicles were engaged in order to return all the Albanians to their homes, to their places of residence. 39530 On that occasion in that large group of Albanians there were many terrorists with weapons, and after specific negotiations with some of the prominent local Albanians, we managed to convince them that they should hand over their weapons, that they should not fear for their safety, that they would all be returned to their homes, although they possessed weapons.
To be very brief, on that occasion they handed in perhaps over 2.000 pieces of weapons, including military equipment. They were returned to their homes at the time. So at that moment, this problem which threatened to grow into humanitarian catastrophe was overcome.
Q. In this document that we mentioned a few moments ago, the one in tab 84, in paragraph 3 it says in the first subparagraph that you did not quote because you quoted the establishment of local security, but here it says: "Persons who are residing at a particular place should be protected," et cetera, and then subparagraph 1 is that: "they should hand over weapons, ammunition, and military equipment which they were forced to receive from terrorists..." They could hand it over without any consequences. Does this mean that they would not be held accountable by anyone even though they would hand in weapons?
A. Yes, that's right. They were very frightened that they would suffer consequences because they had weapons. However, in order to resolve the more serious problem at hand, namely, to return them to their homes, our minimum requirement was that weapons be handed over without the persons who possessed the weapons suffering any consequences. I can just mention that while working in Istinic, I had a certain 39531 problem with the representatives of I think the members of the International Red Cross. And in one of these dispatches I think we can find the name of this person who did everything in his or her power to persuade the Albanians that they should not leave Istinic, and that they were the safest there and that they may be the victims of violence in their own village. That was highly unusual, and I strongly protested in this case, but persistently in various corners here and there in -- they were trying to persuade the Albanians that what we were doing was wrong. However, within a few days we did manage to persuade the Albanians that they should go back home.
JUDGE ROBINSON: We have to take the break now, but before we take it, just tell me, what was the response to the offer to have them hand over weapons without suffering any consequences? Were any weapons handed over?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps I didn't explain it properly. I said specifically in Istinic. As far as I can remember, around 3.000 different pieces of weaponry were handed over. And later on, we were always in a position to receive from citizens weapons that they had handed over themselves. This will probably become evident on the basis of various documents.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We'll now take a break of 20 minutes.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you too.
--- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.
--- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed, Mr. Milosevic. 39532
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, what did the police do in this entire period, 1998 and 1999, with regard to the reporting of temporary residence by citizens and with regard to providing temporary accommodation?
A. I have already said a couple of things about this. I can only say more specifically that both in 1998 and 1999 every effort was made so that people who were residing outside of their homes temporarily returned to their homes. Staffs for combatting terrorism and police secretariats in Kosovo and Metohija undertook during the war, I believe sometime in May, to have accommodation provided for all internally displaced people and to have them report their temporary residence so as to ensure precise statistics and for proper accommodation to be provided with precise information about who is residing where. This was reflected in a document we recently had on the overhead projector. That was an order issued to secretariats specifying what the secretariats were supposed to do in terms of organised activity aimed at reporting the residence of internally displaced persons.
Q. Was this dictated by the need to provide accommodation and protect those people? What kind of danger were they in?
A. I spoke about the reporting of temporary residence. However, the police also took steps to protect columns of people who were moving out of their places of residence from all sorts of danger, and there were all kinds of danger.
Q. Did you have any reports or requests made by certain groups or villagers to provide protection? 39533
A. According to my information, there were -- there were indeed individual requests from families to provide protection for their families in their movement from their homes to other places. I remember a visit by Mr. Rugova, Ibrahim Rugova, who wanted protection for his family which wanted to move to Macedonia from Pristina.
Q. Thank you, General. Several questions about the Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohija.
JUDGE BONOMY: Just before moving on to that, are there records of the displaced personnel?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Records on newly reported residences are to be found in every secretariat and every police station in Kosovo and Metohija. Of course they are now dislocated into Serbia proper, central Serbia.
JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, did you attend to the -- the conclusion of the agreement on the Verification Mission?
A. Yes, I did. I was a member of the delegation of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the negotiations with the representatives of NATO in Belgrade towards the end of summer, the beginning of autumn, 1998. The delegation of NATO was led by Generals Clark and Naumann, and the delegation of the Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia and included several generals of the army, several generals of the police, and some representatives of the state authorities of Serbia and Yugoslavia. 39534 BLANK PAGE 39535
Q. What were these negotiations about? What was the substance of the negotiations?
A. The substance of these talks were attempts to agree on a specific reduction of the police force in Kosovo and Metohija and on reducing the activities of the army and the police in time and in territory. The aim was to reduce the police to a number of 10.021 and to reduce the number of police checkpoints to a total of 27.
Q. General, what can you tell us about the coordination of activities with the Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohija, and specifically about this reduction of police presence and the forms of police activity in Kosovo?
A. After this agreement in Belgrade and after the signing of the document that was signed by General Djordjevic and by Mr. Shaun Byrnes, representative of the Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohija, I got an assignment from the minister, Mr. Stojiljkovic, to familiarise all heads of secretariats and the chief of the state security sector and heads of police units in Kosovo with the plan. After that, I had intensive talks with Mr. Byrnes about the timetable of implementation of this agreement.
Q. We are now going to deal with tabs 36 to 44. In 36, we see the agreement on the OSCE mission for verification in Kosovo and Metohija. That is the agreement that was signed by the then chairman of the OSCE, Minister Branislav Jeremic, and our Minister of the Interior Zivadin Jovanovic.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is not translated, what I 39536 have here. Is it -- have you received it?
THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Minister of Foreign Affairs Jovanovic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It must be a technical error, Mr. Robinson, because that agreement was originally done in English when it was signed with the OSCE. It has to exist on record. It must be a technical error. There was no need to translate it at all, not here.
MR. NICE: Your Honour, it may be that we can find it, but of course if the accused is putting in documents that he or his associates know are already translated, I'm sure -- I don't deal with communications with CLSS directly myself, but I'm sure it's of assistance to them to know that the document is one that they can find elsewhere, or alternatively, for them to find the translation and then not put it in for translation.
MR. KAY: General DZ.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Through General DZ, yes. But if you could assist us, Mr. Nice, we would be grateful.
Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, here under tab 39 we see an enactment of the Ministry of the Interior that was sent to all Secretariats of Internal Affairs in Kosovo and Metohija. Can you find it?
A. I have found it.
Q. It was signed by the commander or, rather, head of staff for Kosovo and Metohija. The subject is the OSCE agreement on verification in Kosmet. 39537
A. That is a document indeed whereby the ministry makes the text of the agreement available to all secretariats in Kosovo and Metohija with a view to implementation.
Q. Look at page 1. It says: "With a view to lawful and appropriate action on the implementation of the provisions of the agreement from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, it is necessary to familiarise all leaders and members of the police with the text of the agreement and the communique immediately at working meetings or otherwise."
A. Correct.
Q. It says: "It is necessary to take the following action: "Take appropriate measures to ensure the security of the members of the mission by locality of work and movement. "Provide them with full freedom of movement without stopping their visibly marked vehicles except when necessary for reasons of their own safety.
"At the request of the mission, district or municipal leaderships attend meetings or organise meetings to discuss issues of importance for the implementation of the agreement in areas which are in the purview of the ministry.
"Warn members of the mission as to the roads and areas where their safety cannot be guaranteed and draw up appropriate notes."
A. Yes. That was envisaged by the agreement governing the presence and movement of the members of the mission in Kosovo and Metohija.
Q. Was security indeed provided to the members of the mission for the 39538 entire duration of the KVM?
A. Absolutely. During the entire time that the mission was present in Kosovo, the police absolutely honoured all the elements of the agreement and everything that was agreed with Generals Clark and Naumann in Belgrade. These measures also include measures of protection for the mission in case of their withdrawal from Kosovo, which of course happened just before the bombing by NATO. So that all members of the mission were under the protection of the police and the army of Yugoslavia, and they managed to leave Kosovo and Metohija safely.
Q. Under the next tab we see a note on talks with the mission that took place on the 22nd of October in Pristina.
A. Yes. That is a note from a meeting - tab 40 - a meeting that I attended myself and where I talked with Mr. Shaun Byrnes about some details of implementation in high risk areas in Kosovo and Metohija, and from this we can see which measures were agreed upon in order to maintain security while at the same time implementing all the measures envisaged by the agreement.
Q. What were these specially sensitive areas? We see here that there is reference to the settlements of Ostrozub and Dragobilje, namely that citizens should return to these population centres without weapons, uniforms, et cetera. Yes?
A. This area, Ostrozub and Dragobilje, which is very near Malisevo, was very sensitive and it was very high risk because of the presence of the KLA, and the KLA, as we know, had certain demands geared at implementing the agreement more slowly. At the proposal of Mr. Shaun 39539 Byrnes, we accepted these demands by moving forward certain deadlines for deblocking roads. So there were other priorities that were more important than implementing the agreement strictly on time.
Q. So we see here that the police had assumed certain obligations that were slightly modified with the guarantees of these American representatives. Did they abide by these obligations that they had assumed?
A. In principle they did, because the Orahovac-Lapusnik road was deblocked several days later, and the police and the army were able to use that road safely. Generally speaking, however, KLA representatives frequently violated the ceasefire agreements, and we have records of that in one of these documents.
JUDGE BONOMY: General, I see that point number 3 under heading A is that each population centre designate one person or a group of persons to represent the citizens, et cetera. Is that where the idea of having Albanian quasi-police representatives in each municipality came from? The matter we looked at earlier with the list of the names of people who were involved.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the idea about establishing local security certainly precedes this agreement, and this idea was only built into this agreement that we eventually signed with Mr. Shaun Byrnes.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Then under B you agreed that all citizens returning in the prescribed manner, that the police would guarantee their safety, and then 39540 all the following stipulations.
A. Yes, that's right. Because Shaun Byrnes, in a way, represented the representatives of these inhabited areas and accepted that they should act upon everything specified in point A. And in written form, we accepted those obligations under chapter B.
Q. All right. Now, General, did the police adhere to all those undertakings?
A. Yes, absolutely so, wherever possible.
Q. In tab 41, and the date is the 26th of October, in Pristina, the year is 1998, conclusions of the meeting held in Pristina with heads of secretariats, chiefs of police stations, and commanders of the PJP, special police units, detachments.
So this was a meeting that you presided over and held in Pristina in connection with the implementation of the agreement with the Verification Mission.
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Now, pursuant to orders from the minister, you went there to explain to the leaders and staff what their duties and obligations were; is that right?
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Now, could you just briefly go through the conclusions since you presided over the meeting and you informed the participants of all these details. So what is the important point to focus on here?
A. Well, in point 1 we can see that a reduction of engaged units by 4.500 members of the police force was required, which meant that the 39541 number of members present should be reduced to the figure we already mentioned a moment ago, 10.021, and that can be seen from point 2. Now, point 3 states that the 10.021 should be the numerical strength for Kosovo and Metohija, and later that it should be submitted to the OSCE mission because it had the right to assess the numerical strength in the smaller localities and smaller police units. Now, point 4 states that by the 26th of October, 1998, all traffic control checkpoints should be lifted and the service in those places should be reinforced, and on the roads, with traffic control patrols.
Q. Very well, General. Now, pursuant to orders from the minister, in actual fact here did you address all matters related to the conduct of the police force with respect to the implementation of the agreement? Did you go through that with the participants?
A. Yes. In fact, I conveyed the positions and agreements reached in Belgrade when the agreement -- general agreement was reached, and I received orders from the minister, and I implemented it in full through this meeting and later on in agreement with the representatives of the missions and controlling the steps that needed to be taken.
Q. Very well, General. Now, in tab 24 [sic] we have an overview of obligations and rights. In tab 42, overview of obligation and rights arising from the agreement signed by Colonel General Vlastimir Djordjevic and Shaun Byrnes. We have there in tabular form the contents of the obligation and the rights. Do you need to comment on these?
A. I don't think so, not to waste time. It defines the obligations, that is the important point, in vertical column 2, and rights are defined 39542 in column 3. So our obligations, the obligations and rights of our organs with respect to the Verification Mission. So for example, in point 1, confidence-building measures among all citizens, or building trust among all citizens, and our right with respect to the mission is that we can count on assistance and support from the OSCE Verification Mission, diplomatic, international, humanitarian, and other organisations on that particular obligation and assignment, and so on and so forth. The speedy return of citizens to their homes under point 3, et cetera, et cetera.
Q. I'd just like to focus on tab 43, which is a letter from the minister of the interior sent to the staff in Pristina and all the secretariats, the public and state security systems, and I am just going to quote the last paragraph, which states as following: "We should cooperate with the verifiers and brief them on any developments and they should contribute to the realisation of the basic objectives of the agreement."
And then it says: "However, it is the undisputed duty of the MUP organs to uncover any perpetrators of crimes and all those who threaten the personal safety and property of all citizens in Kosovo and Metohija --" and I'd like to emphasise this -- "irrespective of their ethnicity and take all legally envisaged measures against them." Therefore, General, my question to you is this: With respect to the police measures, was there any discrimination at all towards citizens in view of their ethnicity?
A. Absolutely not. All the citizens in Kosovo and Metohija, citizens of Serbia and everybody else under the jurisdiction of Serbia, were 39543 treated on a footing of equality by members of the police force.
Q. Thank you, General. Now we go on to tab 44, which is a document that is titled "Plan for the evacuation of members of the Kosovo and Metohija Verification Mission."
A. Yes, that's right. And this, too, is a document which emanated from the agreement with the Verification Mission and the document signed in Belgrade between General Djordjevic and Shaun Byrnes, and it was our obligation to draw up a plan for the evacuation of members and their safety should they be evacuated from Kosovo and Metohija when they so decide, when they decide to leave.
Q. Was that plan implemented fully, this plan for the evaluation [as interpreted] of members of the Verification Mission should they make the decision to leave Kosovo and Metohija, to be able to do so under full safety and security, was this fully implemented?
A. Yes, this plan was fully implemented, probably with some of the details amended because this is a general plan and the realisation came after the general plan was drawn up. And all the requirements of the Verification Mission, once they had decided to leave Kosovo and Metohija, were respected.
Q. We're not going to dwell on your personal experience and knowledge and participation with respect to the Verification Mission any more. We're now going to move on to another area and deal with terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija.
General, tell us, please, when and how did the situation escalate, that is to say the Albanian terrorist activities during the 1990s. 39544
A. In the 1990s, terrorist acts appeared sporadically. That is to say from 1991 to 1997, even up to mid-1998, they were sporadic. But the escalation of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija occurred in mid-1998, from mid-1998 onwards, and of course the first half of 1999. And it is clear to one and all that the continuity of the terrorist acts was followed up and has been followed up to the present day of different intensity and during different periods of time.
Q. Without taking up too much time in verbal explanations, although of course they are extremely important, important testimony, General, with respect to this area, would you take a look at tab 124 now, please, which is where we will find tables that I'd like to ask you to comment on briefly.
Have you found tab 124?
A. I'm just trying to locate it, yes. I have found it. I've found tab 124, if that's the one you had in mind.
Q. All right, fine. Tab 124 is the one we're dealing with, and that tab contains a very clear list of tables which relate to terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija.
On the first page we have a list of terrorist attacks carried out in Kosovo and Metohija from 1991 to 1997.
A. Yes, that's right. And as I've already said, that is the period of sporadic terrorist acts which did not reach levels of concern but were present. And we can see that the total number of terrorist acts during these one, two, three, four, five, six, seven years in all was 134 in total. That can be seen in the first vertical column under point 1. 39545
JUDGE ROBINSON: Tell us the source of this document. Who compiled this list?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is an official statistic review by the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia. It was carried out by them. And the associates of President Milosevic received access to that in correspondence with the Ministry of the Interior. But I think that this document also was published in the white book, the first white book.
JUDGE KWON: The first page of English translation refers to the period from 1st of January to 31st December, 1998.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my tab, that is on page 2.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Explain to us briefly, please, how this list was conceived. What are the vertical columns? What are the horizontal columns? I'm going to ask you to do that with the other tables as well.
A. Well, we're talking about terrorist attacks in the region of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija, and the vertical columns show the number of attacks and the consequences of the attacks. The number is under horizontal 1, and the consequences are under 2, or the horizontal line 2. And the consequences once again are divided into vertical columns on the basis of calendar years ranging from 1991 to 1997. And of course the last vertical column is the total number of events and the total number of concrete consequences described.
MR. NICE: Your Honour, on this document, apart from the point that His Honour Judge Kwon has already identified that the English 39546 BLANK PAGE 39547 translation misses the page that relates to 1991 to 1997, if the document's part of a report, something that would seem to fit with the appearance of the original although the original is not marked as a schedule or an annex here and doesn't have page numbers, but if it is part of another report, then clearly it's a report to which we should have access. It may be, of course, it's produced elsewhere. If so, we have not identified the report of which this is a part. We should obviously have access to the whole document of which this is a selected part.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, you mentioned that page 1 was also contained in the white book.
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. The white book on terrorism of Kosovo and Metohija.
A. Yes, I seem to remember that well.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, all seven volumes of the white book have been presented here and are exhibits. They have been taken in evidence. Your conclusions were, I believe, that they should be tendered as exhibits when I bring in somebody to testify about the authenticity of their contents, and you have been provided with copies in English. General Stevanovic is able to testify to their authenticity --
JUDGE ROBINSON: They are not in evidence. They haven't yet been admitted.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I wasn't specific enough in what I said. Of course evidence, in evidence, and -- I should have said for identification, marked for identification, because the words 39548 "evidence" are different in Serbian and in English. That's what I meant to say.
General Stevanovic in the Ministry of the Interior worked on matters of this kind, that is to say an overall review of the white book, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had translated into English and transferred through its channels. So he is able authentically to confirm the exactitude and correctness of the facts and information contained in the seven volumes of the white book that have been marked for identification. So that table number 1 has not been translated here because you already have a translation of it in one of the white books, one of the volumes. But as we're dealing with figures, I assume you can follow figures. It's not difficult for us to follow figures if the General comments on the various columns and lines.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, there is nothing in the document itself which tells us where it comes from or how it was compiled. I have turned to the last page. I don't see anything so indicating. But if the witness can provide that information, then we'll hear it.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Yes. Go ahead, General.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'd like to address the President of the Trial Chamber in respect of this table, and I can say with absolute certainty that it is contained in one of the volumes of the white book. I can also state that this table was compiled by the analytics department of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia on the basis of concrete lists of concrete events and concrete consequences from those 39549 events. And of course we're referring to terrorist acts performed in Kosovo and Metohija for this period and the consequences in that period of those acts. And I'm almost absolutely certain that in the first white book you will find a list of the specific events per locality, perpetrator, consequence, and so on. And the table is just the statistics of all this, a statistics of the description of events on the basis of that list.
JUDGE ROBINSON: How did the ministry get this information? The information which is the foundation for the statistics, how did the ministry get that information?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in the usual form. It is the daily business of the Ministry of the Interior to compile things like this. The analytics department combines all the reports having to do with events in the republic, Kosovo and Metohija, as an area in which these events took place. So all the secretariats from Kosovo and Metohija send in daily reports to the Ministry of the Interior about all security related information and events which are then recorded in the ministry in one place. And on the basis of information and reports received in this way, the analytics department processes the material and draws up statistical material of this kind like this table and list compiled on the basis of the daily reports coming in from the secretariats and the staffs of the ministries in the area of Kosovo and Metohija, sent in to the ministry, of course.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] 39550
Q. General, on this first page, in the horizontal column we see number A, the total number of killed persons that throughout those years, from 1991 to 1997, as a consequence of these terrorist acts, 39 persons were killed.
A. That's right. In a total of 134 attacks.
Q. And underneath there is a column stating terrorist attacks against the Albanians. Terrorist attacks against ethnic Albanians, members of the ethnic Albanian minority loyal to the Republic of Serbia. Does that include the 39?
A. The 17 Albanians killed are part of this total number of persons killed in the upper part of the table.
Q. Thank you, General. Let's now take a look at table 2. It was my understanding that you have a translation of this. Survey of terrorist attacks carried out by Albanian separatists in the territory of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija in the period from the 1st of January until the 31st of December, 1998.
We should bear in mind what was going on until the end of 1997, and then an escalation in 1998. 134 attacks took place within the span of seven years, whereas in a single year, 1998, there were 2.010 attacks. Can that be seen in this table?
A. Yes, table 2, the one that you mentioned. And of course the structure of the attacks can be seen as well, as well as the consequences, as the table goes on.
Q. Could you please indicate the characteristic figures for 1998, the ones that have to do with terrorism. 39551
A. The characteristic figures are that the total number of attacks is 2.010, which is ten or 15 times more than the overall number of terrorist attacks for the preceding seven years. In those attacks, consequences of terrorist attacks, A, are killed persons. 328 is the total. 210 were citizens, and then the ethnic structure of the citizens killed; and then number 2, members of the MUP, 118; and number 3 are members of the army. Their number is not recorded here. Perhaps this would be the right moment to say that these tables do not include figures on the casualties of the army of Yugoslavia, which in a way is a shortcoming of these tables. B shows the number of persons wounded.
Q. Let's just have a look at this sub-heading "Citizens who were killed." Serbs and Montenegrins 41.
A. That's right.
Q. Albanians 83.
A. Yes. That's right. Others, that is to say different ethnicities, 73; and unidentified persons 13. Of course, members of MUP irrespective of ethnicity, a total of 118.
Then there are figures on wounded persons and what is characteristic is abducted persons. That is under C. And there is a total of 310. Most of them are citizens, 294. And then again there is the ethnic structure; Serbs and Montenegrins 174; Albanians 101; others 19; members of the MUP 16. Of course, what follows is the fate of the abducted persons, and it changed practically from one day to the other.
Q. In this year of 1998, a total of 310 citizens were abducted. A bit more than a half of the number were Serbs and Montenegrins, about a 39552 third were Albanians, and the rest are members of other ethnicities and the police.
In table 3 -- in table 3, do we see cumulative figures for 1999?
A. Table 3 only pertains to the calendar year of 1999 according to the same methodology. Again we have the same statistical data.
Q. General, do you think that there is anything particularly characteristic here?
A. Well, perhaps by way of clarification in terms of this third table that pertains to 1999, it is important to see that this includes the period up to the end of the war and the period after the end of the war, that is to say, after the army of Yugoslavia and the police of Serbia withdrew from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Terrorist attacks were committed in that period under the authority of the government of the Republic of Serbia and later under the administration of international authorities in Kosovo and Metohija. It can be seen that the total number of attacks and consequences is almost double. The number of attacks is double, and the number of consequences is manyfold compared to 1998. Another point: There were more attacks and more consequences, to the best of my knowledge and according to MUP statistics, after the international security and other forces arrived in Kosovo and Metohija.
Q. That is to say in the second half of 1999?
A. That's right. But there is information about that here.
Q. There is information about that in the following tables. Table number 4 shows the year 2000, terrorist attacks in 2000. That is to say when the army and the police, our army and police were not in Kosovo and 39553 Metohija; is that right?
A. Yes, that's right. The number of attacks was somewhat lower, perhaps half of those in 1998, but obviously there is still this continuity of attacks. The intensity is somewhat lower in the year 2000, but the methodology of this table is identical to that of the previous tables.
Q. 1.028 attacks in the year 2000.
A. That's right. And 90 persons who were killed.
Q. 2000 is the year when there were no authorities of ours in Kosovo and Metohija. Then also you have the year 2001, don't you?
A. That's right.
Q. 320 attacks.
A. Yes.
Q. And 59 persons killed.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is outside the period in the indictment.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'm quite aware of that fact. But it is very important to show that after leaving the territory of Kosovo, after our army and police left, terrorism continues. So obviously the explanations, which boil down to the supposition that they were against the Albanian -- anti-Albanian authorities that were pursuing an anti-Albanian policy, how can 2000 and 2001 and 2002 and the second half of 1999 and all of 2003 and 2004, how can that be explained? Thought those years, every one of those years, there were more terrorist attacks within one year than during the preceding ten years in Kosovo and 39554 Metohija.
So if you compare the phenomena and if you seek to find out what their causes are, obviously they could not have been caused by someone who was absent from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. There is no army. There is no police. Terrorism continues. People are getting killed. Ethnic cleansing continues.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's deal with it quickly. You're going to take us through the other pages, then, to 2003?
JUDGE BONOMY: Can I -- before you do, can I ask how the statistics for the period when the area was not governed by the Republic of Serbia were compiled.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, of course, there are international security forces. However, within the Ministry of the Interior, until the present day there is a staff of the ministry in the town of Kursumlija. And also there were relocated secretariats which do follow the situation in Kosovo and Metohija in a way. Namely, they record everything that the citizens report; Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians, if they show up and report such incidents.
Of course, since these are security related incidents in the territory of the republic and since it is a fact that the organisational units of the ministry received such information, then the appropriate department in the ministry keeps records of this kind and compiles statistics of this kind as well as surveys, like the documents we have here. 39555
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, in order to save time, let us look at table number 11, please. It has to do with terrorist attacks carried out by Albanian separatists in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija in the period from the 10th of June, 1999. That is to say, from the day when our police and army left the territory of Kosovo and Metohija and when the so-called international security forces took over. From the 10th of June, 1999, until the 30th of September 2004. These are terrorist attacks under the auspices of the UN?
A. That's right.
Q. 7.338 terrorist attacks. So at that time there was not a single policeman or soldier of ours in Kosovo and Metohija?
A. That's right. And I can just say one more thing in relation to Judge Bonomy's question: These are minimal figures involving incidents and consequences, because this is only on the basis of information received by our police. It can only mean that there were more but that the police of Serbia was not in a position to record all of them after withdrawing from Kosovo and Metohija. So the figures provided in this table are the minimal figures.
Q. You mean they can only be higher than this?
A. They can only be higher than this.
JUDGE BONOMY: Are your people in a position to investigate any of these complaints?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, unfortunately, they are not. They're in a position to -- 39556
JUDGE BONOMY: I understand. It's a simple question. And can I follow that by asking you, are you aware whether the international authorities keep similar records?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sure they do. The question is, though, how they qualify each and every incident. But I believe that they do record them.
JUDGE BONOMY: Do you ever have communications with them to compare your records?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I personally, of course, do not. But some authorised officials, including top officials from the Ministry of the Interior, who work on the staff I mentioned a few moments ago, as far as I know have weekly meetings of consultations regarding these issues, and I think they do exchange information.
JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, if you look at table 3, the number of persons killed in 1999 from the 1st of January until the 31st of December, and if you compare that to table 11, how many persons were killed from mid-June 1999 to the year 2004, you will get numbers that are basically identical.
A. That's right. 1.114 in 1999, and then after the 10th of June, 1999, the figures are on the rise.
Q. Exactly. After our forces left.
A. That's right. But table 3 includes attacks and consequences after the police force withdrew from Kosovo.
Q. In table 11, you can see that 1.151 persons were abducted from the 39557 departure of our forces from Kosovo and Metohija.
A. That's right.
Q. But let us look at the very top of the table that has to do with the time when our forces were not present. 7.338 is the number of total terrorist attacks. 7.271 are the attacks against citizens as such; 6.674 against Serbs and Montenegrins, and 248 against Albanians, and that makes up the total then?
A. That's right.
Q. 1.010 Serbs and Montenegrins were killed, and 120 Albanians were killed, 74 are other.
What does this table show, General, in terms of continuity, the continuity of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija even after the protection force came, and as a matter of fact, under their patronage?
A. It shows what you said; the continuity of terrorist attacks, irrespective of who exercises power and authority in Kosovo and Metohija.
Q. In table 12, in tab 124, there is a list of terrorist attacks carried out from the date of the deadline for the disarming of the KLA. That is to say from the 22nd of September, 1999, to the 30th of September, 2004. That is to say after their alleged disarming. Do you remember that General Jackson announced that they were disarmed immediately upon his arrival in Kosovo and Metohija?
A. I remember that.
Q. Do you have any knowledge as to whether they were actually disarmed?
A. Well, of course they were not disarmed. Weapons were never a 39558 BLANK PAGE 39559 problem in Kosovo and Metohija, and I'm sure that there were -- there was much more weapons than members of the units involved.
Q. Could we please look at tab 125 now, General. What is the underlying concept of this table, of this survey, rather? I have a few questions, so I don't interrupt you but I would like to know --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we're trying to find a translation for tab 125. Is there one?
MR. NICE: We haven't received one.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems that we don't have a translation, but it's only figures.
JUDGE ROBINSON: You are not to proceed unless and until the Chamber is satisfied about those matters. Let it be placed on the ELMO.
THE INTERPRETER: The French booth has the translation.
JUDGE ROBINSON: The French booth has a translation.
THE INTERPRETER: The Albanian booth has the translation too.
JUDGE ROBINSON: There is some kind of discrimination.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Probably.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Very well. Proceed.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, continue.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So on the overhead projector we have an overview of --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, tell us what the heading is.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- of the registered -- the heading is: Schedule of security related incidents involving abducted and missing 39560 persons from the period 1st of January, 1998, to the 31st of December, 2003 in the area of Kosovo and Metohija by period. So in various columns we have data on abducted and missing persons, such as column 2. And columns 3, 5, 6, and 7 denote certain periods. So that column 3 is 1998, column 5 is from the 1st of January until the 23rd of March, 1999, the beginning of airstrikes, the aggression. Column 4 is the period of the duration of the aggression until the 20th of June, that is the complete withdrawal of the police and army from Kosovo and Metohija. And column 6 is from the 20th of June, 1990 to the 1st of June, 2001. And the last column is from the 2nd of June 2001, to the 31st of December, 2003.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. You see in column 7, which encompasses the period from the 20th of June, 1990, that is, only after the departure of police and the army from Kosovo, a total of abducted persons that equals the totals for -- the combined totals for 1998, 1999, and the entire duration of the war. A total of 450, whereas in 1998 there were 343, and in 1999 there were 66. 787 people were abducted in Kosovo and Metohija according to the information of our police.
A. That is correct. And below, we see the ethnic structure.
Q. Albanians, Serbs and Montenegrins, Roma, Muslim, et cetera.
A. And in item 2, we have the consequences.
Q. As established so far.
A. Yes.
Q. So we still don't know what happened to 758 persons. In total it 39561 is 758. The figure of 392 is the total for the period after the withdrawal.
Very well, General. Let us look at the table under tab 126. It is very indicative. Do you have, because these are photocopies of the original document, do you have a copy in colour?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Please place it on the ELMO.
A. Which page do you want, 1 or 2?
Q. You can place both 1 and 2, and give us brief comments on what you believe is pertinent. Please explain, what is this all about?
A. We see the charts denoting terrorist attacks in Kosovo and Metohija from 1991 to the 30th of September, 2002. In the first chart we see that a total of 2.061 attacks were carried out against MUP members and facilities, and a total of 7.012 attacks against civilians and other buildings. So the total number of attacks is far higher against civilians than against MUP members.
Q. In terms of percentage, it is 77.3 versus 22.7 per cent.
A. Correct. The next chart is a survey of people killed. 82.9 per cent of civilians versus 17.1 per cent of MUP members. The total of those killed was 1.883.
And then we have chart number 3, in the form of a pie, denoting abducted persons. 96.6 per cent, an overwhelming majority, of civilians versus only 3.4 per cent of MUP members.
Q. Now, look at table number 2. That is a comparison of the number of attacks by Albanian terrorists and extremists involving certain 39562 consequences before and after the arrival of the KFOR.
A. Correct. We have the numbers for both before and after the KFOR arrival. We see that 34.29 per cent of attacks were carried out before KFOR arrived, and 65.71 per cent of the total number were carried out after KFOR arrived.
And the next chart shows us how many people were killed. In terms of percentage, 37.81 per cent were killed before KFOR arrival; and afterwards, up to 2002, 62.19 per cent.
And the third chart here shows us the number of persons abducted. Before the arrival of KFOR, 27.95 per cent; and from the arrival of KFOR until 2002, 72.05 per cent of the total number of those abducted.
Q. From these figures, which are perfectly accurate, does it follow that the situation became worse after the arrival of international forces?
A. The statistics in terms of people killed and abducted seem to confirm that.
Q. General, in tabs 127, 128, and so on until 133, we have overviews for all the Secretariats of Internal Affairs; is that correct?
A. I think so. I'm not quite sure.
Q. In 127 we have the secretariat of Kosovska Mitrovica; 128, Djakovica; 129, Prizren; 130, the secretariat for Urosevac; 131, Gnjilane; and 132, Pristina.
A. Unfortunately, I am missing Pristina and Pec. But these statistics can be explained on the basis of just one table.
Q. Then would you please deal with one of these tables. How are they designed? 39563
A. Well, they are designed in such a way as to show us an overview of terrorist activities and their consequences in the area of one single secretariat from the 1st of January, 1998, until the 1st of June, 2001, broken down into several periods.
In column 2 we see the total number of terrorist acts, and in lines horizontally, we see the types of terrorist acts, and then we see who the victims were; acts against Serbs and Montenegrins, against acts Albanians, acts against Roma and others, with unidentified or identified perpetrators. The structure of terrorist acts listed by the relevant article of the law can be understood if we look at tab 132, which explains these various articles.
JUDGE ROBINSON: We have the translation for 130 but not for the others that you have mentioned. This will, even though it's in tabular form, disadvantage the Prosecutor if he wishes to cross-examine. 132?
JUDGE KWON: No.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Did you say you have translation only for 132?
JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no, 130. We don't have 132 at all, not even in the original.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. 130, then.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, this overview under tab 130, is it completely identical to the other tabs as regards the headings?
A. Yes. It's a completely identical table in terms of structure. 39564
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So, Mr. Robinson, if tab 130 was translated, everything that is necessary has been translated. The only thing that is not translated are the numbers, which need not be translated at all. The structure, the layout of the table is the same. Everything is the same, only the numbers need to be replaced with the numbers from each of the tabs.
JUDGE BONOMY: The only difference with 130, I see in the original it's handwritten.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The only difference is that in this table under 130, the figures were handwritten into the form, whereas in other tabs they were typewritten.
JUDGE BONOMY: These various records of events in municipalities -- in regions, rather, what is the source of the material? In other words, where do these statistics -- where are the factual narratives behind these statistics?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, maybe I should have said this earlier. Behind every single figure there is a specific case file in the competent regional secretariat. So this tab 130 relates to the secretariat in Urosevac. If I remember well, under it there are four municipalities, and in each one of them in the locality where the crime was committed there is a case file which is reflected here in the form of a figure. And you can see from -- I'm sorry. I assumed something that does not exist here after all. That is the number of cases, how many cases were opened with regard to a specific type of incident. If we look at the lower part of the list, every crime is reflected 39565 in a criminal report, but it is all to be found in the relevant territorial unit, that is the relevant secretariat.
JUDGE BONOMY: Are these events also summarised in the white books or are these quite separate from what's contained in the white books?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The data should be absolutely identical for the same period. This list encompasses a slightly larger period than the white book lists, and the only difference, if any, can be explained by the fact that certain cases were solved in the meantime and, therefore, recategorised in the lists.
JUDGE BONOMY: And going back to the earlier lists which were for the whole area of Kosovo and Metohija, you told us that the very first one, which we didn't at that time have, was a reflection of material in the white books. Does that apply to all the other subsequent lists or did it only apply to the very first one that you told us about?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I was replying to your earlier question, that period related only to 1991 to 1997, and I believe I remember correctly that the table is identical in the white books, identical to the table I've shown here.
I don't think these tables can be completely identical because they do not reflect the same periods. The white books, if I remember correctly, were written in 1999 and 2000, whereas these tables cover periods after 2000 as well, and that can explain some of the differences. But other differences for the same period can only be at the level of human error or statistical error.
JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you for that explanation. 39566
JUDGE ROBINSON: It's time for the break. We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.
--- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.
--- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.
MR. NICE: Your Honour, the witness's last answer, where he says that the tables can't be completely identical because they don't reflect the same periods, and his answer on page 57 leave the Prosecution in some considerable doubt as to where these tables came from. It would obviously help us to have the witness's final position on what he can say about these tables, if anything, before we move on to another topic in evidence that's clearly going to take a long time, and if the Chamber feels it can help.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let's ask him again. General, tell us precisely where these tables come from.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These tables were collected by the associates of Mr. Milosevic in official correspondence with the Ministry of the Interior and the Republic of Serbia. Therefore, these tables were compiled in the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia on the basis of lists of events that took place in the corresponding periods in Kosovo and Metohija and which the corresponding organisational units in the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia recorded as security related events. I don't know whether that suffices. So the tables are just a statistical processing of existing cases and case files and lists of events that took place during the pertinent 39567 period of time in Kosovo and Metohija.
JUDGE ROBINSON: And the case files are made up of statements and information from the various secretariats?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. The secretariats and their organisational units are in charge of a given territory. And in those police units, they have the specific cases and case files for each event. Of course, each one will be slightly different than the other by virtue of the description of the event and so on, whereas here they have been classified and systematised following a set method which can be recognised at first glance looking at the lists and tables themselves.
JUDGE BONOMY: You started that answer, Mr. Stevanovic, by referring to the associates of Mr. Milosevic obtaining these documents from the ministry, and you went on to say and therefore they must have been compiled from information there. That sounded as if you did not personally know that to be the case. What is the position?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course I personally didn't draft the tables, the lists, but I'm certain that the service in the Ministry of the Interior dealing with this type of matter is a serious service, and I am fully convinced that the tables are correct and are based on the facts that exist in the official police files in the corresponding units in the localities. Now, the fact that they were received from the Ministry of the Interior, I considered that to be an important fact because the Ministry of the Interior certainly wouldn't send to this Tribunal a document which would not have the necessary level of seriousness and correctness. 39568
MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, I'm grateful for the inquiries that the Court has made. I realise that in the absence of either underlying material or in the absence of this material itself having been made public on an earlier occasion, which it may have been, it's probably going to be impossible for me to cross-examine on its detail in any way. I make no objection, I simply make that observation.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'd just like to draw your attention to one thing. Professor Rakic told me something with respect to the translations of the documents in the various secretariats, and it is as I have explained to you. The translation service didn't translate each and every table or list but just one in tab 131 -- 130, I'm sorry, because the tables and lists are identical for all the secretariats. So that one list and all its columns was translated, and you can apply it to each of the secretariats in the previous tabs, and you will be able to see the figures in the different columns. So that -- the translation is that of tab 130, because it is identical to all the other lists referring to the individual Secretariats of the Ministry of the Interior in Kosovo and Metohija.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you for that information, but in my view the translation service, if it takes that course, should insert a notification to that effect, but thank you for the information. Continue.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, coming back to the facts and figures relating to terrorism, you have tab 133, and you have the breakdown according to the 39569 secretariats, the instances where the ceasefire was violated by KLA terrorists during the sojourn of the Verification Mission, while they were in the area. And in one of your previous answers you did mention the agreement that was reached between you and the American representatives and taking over their obligations and not to exert any form of violence, and here we have the different secretariats and the months involved. From the arrival of the Verification Mission, we have November 1998, then December 1998, January 1999, February 1999, and March 1999.
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Now, in tab 133, in list number 1, we have Pristina, the cases in which the ceasefire was violated, the number of armed attacks. There were a total of 52 of those.
A. Yes.
Q. That was during the stay of the Verification Mission, while they were there?
A. Yes.
Q. Number 2 is Kosovska Mitrovica, and so on and so forth.
A. Right, in order.
Q. But let's take a look at this one table. You have the months when the Verification Mission was there, was in place. The first column refers to -- for the first line, the first horizontal line is the number of armed attacks per month, a total of 52 of those in Pristina, 1 against premises, 48 against civilians, 101 against individuals, and 53 against the MUP and the army of Yugoslavia. And the same thing has been compiled for Kosovska Mitrovica. So in Pristina there were 52 attacks, in the secretariat's 39570 BLANK PAGE 39571 area, not in Pristina itself. In Mitrovica there were 63 attacks, in Pec there were 61 attacks, Djakovica 62, Prizren 118, Urosevac 24.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what tab is this? 133.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is tab 133. The last tab in that series, in the binder relating to an overview of the terrorist attacks.
JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not translated.
MR. KAY: It's part of 131. It's been incorrectly attached.
JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. I was just told that.
MR. KAY: If you go to the end of the English --
JUDGE ROBINSON: The last page of 131 should be the first page of 133.
JUDGE KWON: Last page of English translation should refer to 133. 131.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic, continue.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. So, General, during this period of time while the Verification Mission was there, we have examples of several hundred attacks, terrorist attacks, against facilities, persons, members of the army and police, and of course civilians.
A. Yes, that's right. And in keeping with the agreement with the Verification Mission and the documents signed later on in Belgrade, all these events or, rather, representatives of the Verification Mission in the territory was informed about each of these events.
Q. General, in going through these tables, we have just seen a 39572 precipitous escalation in the level of terrorism in 1998; namely, you compared the period conclusive with 1997 and then 1998 onwards, and in that respect I'd like to ask you a question now. What were the prerequisites for this escalation of terrorism? What were the conditions that led up to it?
A. Well, according to our information and knowledge, the key prerequisite or reason or pretext for this kind of escalation in terrorist attacks in Kosovo and Metohija during 1998 was the infiltration of large quantities of weapons from the Republic of Albania and across the border with the Republic of Macedonia. And most of the weapons were brought in from the warehouses of military materiel and armaments looted in the Republic of Albania in the course of 1997.
Q. General, in tab -- and we'll have a look at tab 134 now, 134, 135, and 136, and 7, but let's take tab 134 first. Does tab 134 contain a list of weapons found and seized from Albanian terrorists, and MTS, in the period from the 1st of January, 1998 to the 1st of June, 2001?
A. Yes, that's right. We find that list in tab 134.
Q. Very well. Thank you.
A. It is set out in tabular form.
Q. Now, would you be so kind as to explain to us how this list and review was prepared and what the vertical columns mean, what the horizontal lines mean, et cetera.
A. This review was drafted in such a way as to show how many weapons were seized from Albanian terrorists per secretariat and what types of weapons. So the first table, which is wider than it is long, refers to 39573 Kosovska Mitrovica. The second relates to the secretariat in Pec, the third to Djakovica, the fourth to Prizren, and so on in order until we get to a total overview at the end of page 2.
Q. But this combined review in page 2, it says in brackets, "Not counting Pristina."
A. Yes, that's right. There is no information and figures from Pristina, but as a general rule, we can say that Pristina can incorporate a quantity of about a quarter to a third of the total number of weapons seized in Kosovo and Metohija. Pristina counts for that third or a quarter.
And I propose now that we look at the overall total, the combined total, because the previous totals were worked out according to identical methods for each individual secretariat territory.
Q. Right. Let's not go into the individual secretariats. So we are looking at this combined total at the end of the second page without Pristina, as we've just said. What does that contain?
A. Yes, that's right. If we look at column -- the vertical column 2, it contains the types of weapons. And in columns 3 to 7 we have the different periods. Column 3 is 1998, column 5 is 1999 up until the aggression. Column 6 is the period during the aggression; and column 7, which has not been filled in here, quite obviously, is the period after the 20th of June, 1999.
Q. That means you didn't have the figures there.
A. No, of course not. We didn't have any competence for us to be able to fill that in. 39574
Q. At any rate, these figures relate to the quantities and types of weapons seized ending with the 20th of June, 1999; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And what can we see? What does this show?
A. We see that mortars, hand-held rocket launchers and so on, of 1.045 pieces, excluding the Pristina area. Then machine-guns, semi-automatic rifles, automatic rifles and similar rifles, a total of 8.320. 360 pistols; mines and explosive devices of different types, 4.224; and different types or calibres of ammunition, 723.531.
Q. From what you've just said, can we conclude that the origins of the weapons were mostly the warehouses that were looted in the Republic of Albania in the events that took place before those periods?
A. Well, most of the weapons listed here were made in China and came from those warehouses. However, in Kosovo and Metohija, there were other types of weapons as well, including state-of-the-art rifles, armoured devices, and so on.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, that was a leading question. Properly put, it should have been: "What conclusions can we draw about the origins of the weapons?"
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't wish to ask a leading question, Mr. Robinson. What I wanted to do was to focus on what the witness had said in the previous answer, that the origins of these weapons were from the looted warehouses in the Republic of Albania. I just wanted to check that out.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] 39575
Q. Now, General, did you have any information and figures about the -- where the majority of the weapons came from?
A. Yes, we did, and those figures are the ones I have just explained and read out to you.
Q. Thank you. Now in tab -- and we now come to tab 135, which is a document which is dated the 21st of September, 1998, and we can see that it is a report on the weapons and ammunition handed over from the SUP of Djakovica, Decani, to the SUP in Pristina. So it was the SUP in Djakovica and Decani that handed over these items to the SUP of Pristina.
A. Yes, that's right. And it's -- it's an example of a document which shows that the SUP in Djakovica handed over the stipulated quantities of arms and ammunition to the SUP in Pristina. Of course, the SUP of Djakovica and Pristina are SUPs of equal level, but the Pristina SUP was the collection centre for this type of device.
MR. NICE: I expect none of us has a translation for this. For what it's worth, the right-hand part of the page is also cut off but I think it's probably only to a limited extent.
JUDGE ROBINSON: We have no translation, Mr. Milosevic. It's becoming more the norm than the exception.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I would say that it's an exception, because indeed most of these documents have been translated. This is just an example of how these weapons were taken over from various places. Ammunition too.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Let it be placed on the ELMO.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] 39576
Q. General, please, bearing in mind the fact that this is the 21st of September, 1998, were these weapons that were seized or weapons that were voluntarily surrendered, or both, or what was the predominant case?
A. This is a list of weapons. May I repeat this: The SUP of Djakovica handed this over to the SUP of Pristina, and we cannot see explicitly what the origin of the weapons was, but obviously these were weapons primarily the citizens handed over to police stations in the territory of the SUP of Pristina. Of course, it is possible that to a lesser extent there are also weapons that were seized from citizens who illegally possessed them or did not have --
Q. All right. But out of all these weapons, is there anything that citizens could have legally in their possession? For example, number 1 is a recoilless gun, Chinese made. Can a citizen legally possess a recoilless gun?
A. Well, of course not. But I don't think that there's actually a single weapon here that citizens could have in their legal possession. Most of these weapons are forbidden, prohibited in the territory of the Republic of Serbia. They cannot be held by citizens themselves. Two recoilless guns; 20 shells for recoilless gun; a 60-millimetre mortar -- rather, seven of them, shells for the 60-millimetre mortar; a machine-gun, 61 of those.
Q. That's a heavy machine-gun?
A. Yes, anti-aircraft.
Q. What we see here, is it a customary report of the type that you had occasion to have in your hands and that you received as information in 39577 the Ministry of the Interior?
A. This is just one example. Of course, from all the secretariats in Kosovo and Metohija, there was at least one such copy, because illegally possessed weapons were, in principle, collected once a year at the level of the Ministry of the Interior. In Kosovo and Metohija, certainly this may have been the case more often than that.
Q. And now in 135.1, we have what is in warehouses in the SUP of Djakovica and in the Department of the Interior in Decani.
A. That's right.
Q. Six recoilless guns, et cetera. Number 7, automatic rifle, Chinese made, 664 pieces.
A. Yes.
Q. Is that from warehouses in Albania?
A. It is generally known that the Albanian army was generally and predominantly armed by Chinese-made weapons. Item number 7 includes weapons that were certainly Chinese made, yes.
Q. Is there anything else that is characteristic of this document?
A. Not as far as this document is concerned. Of course anti-tank shells are also referred to. That is number 19, et cetera.
Q. In tab 136, do we see an example of what kind of action the police took when a citizen would hand in weapons? We see tab 136 -- in tab 136 an Official Note from the department of the traffic police in Djakovica. It says here that a certain person here, and his name is given, in the village of Glodjane, has an ID, et cetera. And it says the person walked up to us and handed over a rifle, Chinese made, and the serial number is 39578 there, with ammunition.
A. That's right. The date is the 12th of September, 1998, and it was a specific citizen who handed over a specific rifle to a policeman.
Q. Were any of these citizens who handed over weapons arrested or maltreated, those who handed over weapons?
A. I have already explained that that was not the case.
Q. What is tab 136.1? That is also an Official Note.
A. That is another example but a similar one. A woman reports to the policeman that a machine-gun belonging to her late son who got killed in the village of Eric [phoen] is in her house and she wants to hand it over to the police, and indeed she did that. We can see it from the text. And also we can see here the manufacturing number of that machine-gun.
Q. All right. Let's not dwell on the weapons handed over, then, much longer.
Tell me, what were the tactics of the terrorists and of their terrorist attacks, General?
JUDGE ROBINSON: We're trying to find 137. We don't seem to have it.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's just see what it is. We dealt with 136. I haven't got 137 either.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have 137.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Oh, General, you have 137?
A. Yes, I do. It's a list, a longish list on the hand-over of weapons and ammunition, and it is considerably longer than the rest, the 39579 preceding ones.
Q. Can you please place it on the ELMO.
A. This is a record of a hand-over of weapons, ammunition, and explosive devices that took place on the 29th of September, 1998. This gives a specific list of every weapon that was handed over, including the manufacturing number of the weapon concerned.
On the first page we can see that the first items are automatic rifles, Chinese made, with the following numbers, so then from 1 until 120 there are the exact numbers of each and every one of these specific weapons. Page 2 continues in the same way, then all of page 3 as well, and on page 4 up to 725.
On page 5, there is a heading, "Automatic rifles, Chinese made, with --" and now this is illegible. And again we have numbers from 1 to 222.
On page 6, semi-automatic rifles, Chinese made, from number 1 to 244. And then page 7 goes all the way to 419.
Page 8 includes various rifles, M-48s, et cetera, a total of 23. Then the Spagin Russian automatic rifle, the total is 7, as far as I can see. Then sub-machine-guns, 7.62 times 39, a total of 82. Then sub-machine-guns, 7.62 times 54, a total of 70. Then a Browning submachine-gun, total 35. Then on page 9, hand-held rocket launchers, Chinese made, a total of 53. Recoilless guns, 6; mortars, 82-millimetres, 1; 60-millimetre mortars, 7; and then there are different quantities of ammunition, shells for recoilless guns, and so on and so forth.
Q. General, whose document is this? 39580
A. Let me just have a look at the first page. This is the Secretariat of the Interior from Djakovica too. They are submitting this report to the staff of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia in Pristina, and it says: "Record of hand-over of weapons, ammunition, and explosive devices that were found by MUP employees as well as those handed over by citizens of Siptar ethnicity from the village -- from the villages in the municipality of Decani."
So this is what the SUP of Djakovica had at that point in time that was handed over by Albanian citizens.
Q. I don't think it's necessary to dwell on this document in tab 137 any longer.
General, I asked you about the tactics of terrorists in their terrorist attacks.
A. Well, it could be said that the tactics of the terrorist attacks, especially in 1998 and 1999 in Kosovo and Metohija, was to attack members of the police and citizens most often from ambushes along roads where citizens and the police moved. I am primarily referring to roads that were blocked in a certain period of 1998, namely Lapusnik-Dolac along the Pristina-Pec road, and then the road between Pec and Djakovica, and part of the road between Pristina and Prizren, namely the section from Crnoljevo to the Dulje pass.
After such attacks, if the police would react, the terrorists would as a rule withdraw into the villages. From the outskirts of the villages they would attack the police by opening fire from different types of weapons, and after awhile they would discard their weapons and 39581 uniforms, they would mingle with civilians, they would get civilians on the move, and then under the protection of civilians, they tried to leave the area where they otherwise would have been arrested. In this way, they practically jeopardised the freedom of movement and safety of movement in Kosovo and Metohija. In a considerable number of terrorist attacks, the victims were killed or seriously wounded, but at the same time, when civilians are on the move and when they retreat into inhabited areas, they create the impression that there are big migrations involved and then in their propaganda they try to portray this as forceful movement of the population. They know that the police will not open fire where they know that civilians may be the casualties of that gunfire.
Q. Please, you said that they would take masses of civilians along with them when they would retreat.
A. That's right. They would take a mass of civilians because this made them feel safer. And at the same time they used that fact in order to portray the overall situation as persecution of Albanians by the police.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Give us an example, General, of the number of civilians that they would take with them.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In almost every anti-terrorist action and every reaction to an act of terrorism, that would happen on roads near villages. After the police reaction, they would always withdraw into villages and then they would open fire from villages. After a brief clash, because usually they would not put up resistance for long within the settlements where they were, they would 39582 BLANK PAGE 39583 leave the villages. Of course they would take civilians with them because they would be convincing them that the police would be repressive towards them, and it is possible that they used certain forms of coercion in order to force the civilians to come along with them. But we don't know about that now.
It is a fact that after brief clashes on the outskirts of the villages --
JUDGE ROBINSON: I asked you specifically about the number. And then could you also tell us about the ethnicity of the civilians. About how many would be with them, they would take?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As a rule, many civilians from the specific settlement. Hardly anybody would stay behind after this kind of a clash with the police once the police would enter the village. Usually when the police would enter the village, there would be no civilians left in the village, and of course no terrorists either. As far as their ethnic background is concerned, they were Albanians for the most part. They would not withdraw into settlements, villages that were not Albanian.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. When you say "they" --
A. I mean the terrorists. Of course I mean the terrorists.
JUDGE ROBINSON: No. The civilians that they took with then were for the most part Albanians?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. When I said that they attacked from ambushes, I am referring to the well-known principle of hit 39584 and run. They were not prepared to remain in combat contact with the units attacked. They would withdraw immediately into villages for the most part. In they would withdraw to areas that were outside settlements, they would remain -- that they would remain in close contact and that -- for a longer period of time and that they could be arrested during the course of that action.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, a very specific question: Did the police open fire at members of the KLA if there was any danger of hurting civilians?
A. Absolutely not. That was not the policy involved, nor were there such orders involved, nor was that the general thrust.
Q. Is there a single order that you are aware of that gunfire may not be opened if civilians could be hurt?
A. There were several orders that I saw myself, and I think that in these documents there are such orders, but at this moment I cannot find them.
Q. All right. We'll get to that. They were withdrawing, and they were forcing entire villages to withdraw with them. Does that show their awareness that the police would not target civilians or does this show that they think that the police would target civilians?
A. I've already explained that, that they were doing that inter alia because they were aware of the fact that the police in such situations did not have the right to fire or did they have any wish to fire or, rather, use firearms.
Q. Were you personally ever in a position to see an event of this 39585 kind when a number of KLA members were withdrawing with civilians?
A. I can say specifically that during 1998, in the summer, after the terrorist incursion in the town of Orahovac and during the police and military operation aimed at the deblockade of the town of Orahovac I was present there and within the operations of the police and the military I was following what was going on in the territory of Orahovac. We saw that a large number of civilians left Orahovac, that they moved towards Malisevo. I myself saw that no one fired at this group of civilians. That was only logical because it was such a big group of civilians. It was quite clear that terrorists were getting out the same way too.
Q. Could you in any way establish whether there were KLA members among the withdrawing civilians?
A. We were at quite a distance, a kilometre away or more, which was too far. But I already explained that terrorists were not wearing uniforms when they were retreating. They would only wear uniforms in Albanian settlements, when they were along roads. When they were clashing with the police they rarely wore uniforms, and if they did, they wore them only briefly.
JUDGE BONOMY: The example you've given just now relating to Orahovac, did that involve killing of Serb civilians or Serb MUP members; and if so, where is the report into the investigation?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The incident involving the capture of Orahovac is a very complex case. From the incursion of terrorists into Orahovac it involved a number of preceding actions in Velika Hoca [phoen], Zociste and a large number of other villages, when just before entering 39586 Orahovac the terrrorists kidnapped several dozens of Serb civilians from the said villages, and even the Monks from the monastery in Zociste. Some of those civilians were later found dead, others have not been found to this day and are still missing.
In this operation to lift the blockade of Orahovac, the police station was liberated after a blockade and a cut-off of water and other supplies, including food, before the surrounding roads were also deblocked. But I cannot tell you specifically whether a policeman was killed in the operation or not. I believe there were some policemen killed but I'm not sure.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, I believe that there are many written records on this incident.
A. Certainly.
Q. Thank you. General, this terrorist organisation called itself an army. Now, in view of your experience, are you in possession of any elements that would support this claim that this was an army?
A. I personally am convinced that the so-called KLA never became an army. They indeed had the capacity to mount perfidious hit-and-run attacks, but they were never organised or structured in such a way as to be able to hold a certain territory in a serious military manner and to use that territory as a base from which to mount long-term military operations. I have already said that after short-lived attacks and clashes with the army or the police, they discarded their weapons and uniforms and blended with civilians in order to retreat and avoid arrest. 39587
Q. From the viewpoint of the attributes that are necessary for a force to be called an army, you've already told us that the KLA could not be an army. Do you know, however, of any case where they honoured and respected international humanitarian law or any other convention that regulated armed conflicts?
A. It was perfectly obvious that the terrorists had no respect for any norms of international law. Earlier today we have analysed many documents that support this conclusion.
Most of the victims in terrorist attacks were civilians. Policemen, soldiers and others came second on the list of casualties. But the main casualties were civilians, and that indeed points to the conclusion that they had no respect for international norms of humanitarian law.
Q. How did you qualify the nature of their attacks on the police?
A. As far as attacks on the police are concerned, until the proclamation of the state of war, we categorised them as attacks against civilians although we did not present them as such in statistics, because as long as the police were doing their normal policework without joining any military activities, they can also be considered as civilians.
JUDGE ROBINSON: In your case, is any of these attacks on the police related to an allegation in the indictment?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, certainly they are, but I haven't come to that yet. I can ask the witness.
JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to bring the witness to that for that purpose. Or you will ask the witness questions. 39588
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will ask questions of this witness, certainly, among other things about all these allegations concerning alleged crimes listed in various paragraphs of the indictment.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, that kind of evidence will be more helpful than the sort of general framework he's outlining as to the pattern of conduct of the KLA. It will be more helpful to your case, I mean.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, with regard to what you've just said about the attacks, the terrorist attacks -- let me see. Yes, here it is. What you've just said about civilians being the predominant casualties, does that completely correspond to the charts that we saw in tabs 124 and 126 regarding attacks on civilians versus attacks on policemen, et cetera? Does your testimony completely correspond in this area to the statistics and the charts?
A. One of those pie charts in colour specifically deals with the ratio of civilian victims and the police victims, and it shows clearly that civilians were the predominant casualties of terrorist attacks.
Q. And now tell me, were Albanian civilians also the casualties of terrorist attacks in Kosovo and Metohija, the members of their own ethnic community? Let me just draw your attention to this very extensive document under tab 138. But before that, please answer my question: Were Albanians also victims?
A. According to all the operative and other information in the possession of the police, ethnic Albanians were also victims of terrorist 39589 activity in Kosovo, members of the Albanian ethnic community. And from the table -- tables we saw, there were many Albanian deaths. And in addition to that, Albanians were, according to police information, recruited by force into the KLA. They were forced to procure and carry weapons, they were forced to do physical labour for the KLA such as building fortifications, engineering work on roads, putting up obstacles, and they were forced to pay money to the KLA to buy weapons, vehicles, and anything else the KLA needed.
Q. Thank you, General. Under tab 138, it says: "Records of certain items found in KLA headquarters," translated from the original. What does this tab contain?
A. This tab contains the documents found during one of the anti-terrorist actions mounted in the village of Leskovac, in the Prizren municipality, and we can see that the date is the 3rd of September, 1998. I have yet to find the translation.
Q. It is somewhere in the middle of this tab, because in the beginning we have facsimiles of these handwritten messages in Albanian.
A. That is correct. And we have translation on pages 1 and 2. This is important in view of the previous answer.
JUDGE BONOMY: There are far more documents than this that are not translated than are translated. It makes it even more difficult to try to compare the originals and the translation.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, tab 138 has been translated. I hope you have the translation. And may I draw your attention to the fact that -- 39590
JUDGE BONOMY: Organisation of this is chaotic.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we are flooded with the additions throughout the session, and I personally have decided to leave them --
JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. It's impossible to --
JUDGE ROBINSON: -- until after to include them in the binders because it's difficult to do that during the case. So we do have a translation.
Mr. Milosevic, we have to stop at 1.43 today.
JUDGE KWON: The previous page, one page, seems to be page 2 of the document.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, since you have the translation, I will only ask the witness to direct us to some of these documents. They are in the Albanian language, translated into Serbian and translated into English. These documents refer to the pressure exerted on and intimidation of Albanians. They were pressured to do the things that the KLA wanted them to do, as the general just mentioned.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Please explain to us, General, in greater detail.
A. Perhaps the document on page 3 is convenient, if we can all find our way. So the translation is 2/346/98.
Q. Since we have a translation into English, tell us what the Serbian translation says.
A. Well, this is obviously a threat against the person in the case he does not comply with KLA demands and --
THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters would appreciate it if the 39591 witness would tell us exactly where it is.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness, let us assist the interpreters by telling them exactly where that is. I believe it's the first page, isn't it?
JUDGE KWON: The third page.
JUDGE ROBINSON: The third page.
MR. KAY: The third page.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the English translation is not sorted in my copy. [In English] "We have concluded that you are ignoring our appeal." [Interpretation] That is the quotation that the witness began to read a moment ago. It is marked in tab 138. It says translation 2/346/98. In the Serbian --
JUDGE ROBINSON: If we are not to trespass on the time of the next case, we will have to adjourn now.
We are adjourned until tomorrow, 9.00 a.m.
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day of May, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.