⁴¹⁴⁰⁰

Wednesday, 29 June 2005

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the Chamber has been considering the best way to deal with the presentation of this evidence, which relates to 1998, you know, and which you say is important to your case. The Chamber, as you know, has a duty under Rule 90(F) to exercise control over the presentation of evidence so as to avoid needless consumption of time. There are various possibilities: As the evidence relates to 1998 and seems to be directed to the issue of clashes between the KLA and the VJ forces, one matter which we would wish to discuss -- one approach that we'd wish to discuss and on which I'd wish to hear from Mr. Kay and Mr. Nice is to admit the -- the rest of the evidence which is of the same kind. It's -- it's repetitive, you know. Subject, of course, to the right of the Prosecutor to cross-examine on that evidence. May I hear from Mr. Kay first on that -- that approach.

MR. KAY: On the basis that the evidence is cumulative, it's been cumulative of prior testimony in the Defence case, I would see no difficulty with that myself. And as a -- an advocate, it would be the kind of course I would ask the Tribunal to -- to take so that I could get more material in from the Defence witness of a more contemporaneous nature to the indictment. And that would be a -- a step that I personally would take. Whether the accused would or not, I can't speak for him, but that ⁴¹⁴⁰¹ would be my position.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The -- I am reminded that in relation to the Prosecution case, we did admit evidence along the same lines. I think the OSCE material, and there may have been other instances.

MR. KAY: Yes. The -- the ground was set for the OSCE material through General DZ, General Drewienkiewicz. And in the course of his testimony, if one looks at it, passages that were cumulative were merely skated over by Mr. Nice. And then when subsequent witnesses came to testify, that procedure was followed again, and it was on the basis that we've heard about that already, the issues are before the Trial Chamber, and we can move on to other issues. It was very much a -- a strategy that the Prosecution were inclined to take to try and maximise the amount of time available to them.

It's not a novel strategy in relation to the testimony of -- of this witness. And indeed, when we progressed further into other aspects of the trial in Croatia and in Bosnia, the same process was -- was applied again. We'd hear about it, and Judge May frequently ruled, "Well, we've got that material before us, let's move on." And indeed, Mr. Nice would often say that "You've heard about this, we're using this as a vehicle to set something up, it's before you already."

Mr. Harland produced all the UN Security Council resolutions. As Mr. Nice said at the time, he had very little to do with it, but it was just a convenient vehicle by which material --

JUDGE ROBINSON: And he did so without dealing with them individually. ⁴¹⁴⁰²

MR. KAY: Absolutely. In fact, I -- on the version of the electronic exhibits I've got at the moment -- they haven't been scanned into the system, I think there were so many of them. So it -- it was just a convenient package of -- of dealing with it, without Defence objection. Mr. Milosevic didn't -- didn't object because it -- it was rational and made sense, because --

JUDGE ROBINSON: The issue is critical to the proper use of time, because we are now at tab 25, and 1998 goes up to tab 250. Now, if we continue with the same course, we'll spend all of today on -- on this particular kind of evidence. And I don't consider that to be a proper use of the -- of the Court's time, you know.

MR. KAY: For my part, I'm concerned the accused has the maximum impact for his Defence --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. KAY: -- which goes to the indictment that this witness can deal with, with aspects of that evidence that has been called in the Prosecution case. I think I mentioned two witnesses last week. Another one I came across yesterday was John Crosland, who had mentioned Colonel Delic, as well as his brigade, which was an extra one. So it shows that there is a great degree of relevance to be had from this witness. And for my part, I -- I wouldn't be objecting if -- if the accused's cumulative testimony was to be treated in that way, and it would not be departing from previous procedures in this trial if the purpose was to -- to get to the point of the evidence.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And the 25 tabs that we have already looked at ⁴¹⁴⁰³ are illustrative of the kind of evidence -- of the rest of the evidence up to tab 250.

MR. KAY: Yes, there would be no admission here of acts and conduct of the accused. It would be cumulative testimony about which the Trial Chamber has frequently said it's -- it is aware of these issues. It is evidence that is actually reflected in the Prosecution case as well, so in many respects, although the Prosecution might not be inclined to admit any material from the Defence, as we -- we do have two poles apart here, it can be said that it reflects a dimension of their case concerning the KLA anyway through their own witnesses that we've heard about through the evidence of John Crosland, through the evidence of DZ and others in 1998.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Probably not exactly the same as the Harland evidence, but I don't think that matters for these purposes. Had the material been introduced in writing, then a witness statement would have identified all the purposes to which these exhibits would have been put, or were to be put, and there might have been some tabulated identification of the value exhibit by exhibit was to be offered in evidence, and that would have been the ideal way of dealing with it.

Having made that observation, I have no objection on this occasion to compendious production of the material, provided that we are notified -- to be sure we're on notice as to the purposes for -- for which the exhibits are to be produced. That may already have been covered by ⁴¹⁴⁰⁴ the accused's general observations when he introduced this witness or it may be that the Chamber will want to be quite sure that we know all the topics said to have been covered by these 250 tabs. My only other two observations are these: It may well be, judging from the detailed way the accused is examining this witness, that the equivalent of a witness statement in some form or another does exist which would show the accused's reliance document by document on these 250 tabs. If he'd only make that available, and he will be quite sure that his points through these tabs would be available to us in detail. The second outstanding point: Having material adduced in bulk may have consequences on the amount of time and the proportions of time required for cross-examination, but I would hope not.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you've heard the -- the idea which the Chamber proposed for dealing with the rest of this evidence. You have heard submissions from Mr. Kay. You have heard the very carefully formulated submissions from the Prosecutor. The Chamber would deal with the matter in that way, unless you can persuade us otherwise.

THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, now the microphone is on. Mr. Robinson, I also looked at all of this once again, everything that you have before you, and I have a sort of middle-of-the-road solution to save time as much as possible and at the same time not to omit the most ⁴¹⁴⁰⁵ important things that this witness is testifying about. This is the first commander of the Army of Yugoslavia whose area of responsibility was a very big area, covering a long portion of the state border. In this area, many of the events that were referred to took place. It is very important to see how the army behaved all the time. Everything can be followed as far as the conduct of the army is concerned because everything is contained in orders and analyses as things develop. There are working maps, there are orders, there are analyses of all the actions taken every time anything takes place.

So all of this fully contradicts the pattern launched here by Mr. Nice; namely, that forces of Yugoslavia and Serbia went out there and shot at the Albanians, at the innocent civilians, as they put it. This is testimony from the actual sites. These are not documents of the United Nations or whatever, this is the direct testimony of a commander who had 14.000 troops under his command during the war. When speaking of these troops, we can see how the Army of Yugoslavia functioned. Precisely what is contained here speaks of the fact that it did function as a serious, organised, disciplined, and very efficient army. So these entire dynamics are in contrast to everything that was presented previously. That is why I suggest that we deal with this in groups. We've dealt with tab 29. Never mind you said 25, but it doesn't really matter whether it's 25 or 29.

In order not to omit some of the very important things involved - for example, in May there are a few very important decisions that were taken; perhaps we should go through that month within a few minutes only - ⁴¹⁴⁰⁶ then as far as June is concerned, then we are going to dwell on some of these things a bit longer. As far as June is concerned, Paddy Ashdown, Mr. Nice's witness, testified about June. For the same period, we have the documents that this witness have. We cannot say, "Well, we're just going to submit these documents in writing and then you can have a look at this." We want this witness to look at this, we want this witness to deal with what Paddy Ashdown said here. It was those units that were concerned, his units. So I really want to deal with that here. Fully respecting your intention of speeding things up, which suits me fine, of course, I think that we should deal with groups of exhibits that we have here. We should make it possible for the witness to deal with them and point out the most important things in this regard. For example, among the documents, you have an order issued by the Chief of Staff of the corps as far back as the 26th of June, 1998. Objectively speaking, there were no war operations then but there were clashes with terrorists at the time and they also call for the implementation of the rules of international humanitarian law. This is a very important develop as far back as June 1998.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'm listening very carefully to what you say. You said you had a midway approach. It is to deal with the evidence in groups, as I understand it. And when would you finish the 1998 evidence on that basis? Because the whole idea is that we should not spend the Court's time on evidence which can be dealt with in some other way and in a shorter manner, you know. When -- when would you conclude the evidence of 1998 following the pattern that you have in mind? ^{41407 BLANK PAGE 41408}

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think I could conclude by the middle of the second session. I didn't really calculate the time - I don't have the possibility of doing that - but I think that would be about right.

There are different types of evidence involved.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the Chamber respects your right to present your case, you know, subject, of course, to our duty to control the proceedings. And for that reason, we'll allow you to present the evidence in the manner that you suggested, but you should endeavour to conclude by the end of the first session the evidence relating to 1998. Proceed.

WITNESS: BOZIDAR DELIC [Resumed] Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General. We looked at the order of General Pavkovic on the last day, and you explained that. Now, as far as May is concerned, we have a series of events that are included in documents that are contained in tab 30 through 36. Could you please just deal with this group of documents very quickly, those that are contained in tabs 30 through 36. Could you just indicate the most important things taking place then.

A. I shall try to do so in the briefest possible time.

Q. May I remind you that you have documents there that have to do with clashes in the area of Gorozup, then documents about the arrest of five armed persons in uniform, then also the incident on the ⁴¹⁴⁰⁹ Djakovica-Prizren road, and so on and so forth. You have several incidents there. Try to explain what this was all about.

A. As far as tab 30 is concerned, that is a decision of the corps command -- or rather, the Chief of Staff of the corps about deblocking Ponosevac, Morina, Junik and Ponosevac, Morina, Potok in order to give access to the border posts.

Tab 31 says that there is a continuation of this deblockade on the basis of the decision taken on the 27th of May. Also what is requested is to provide maximum security to the state border and that the military does not enter built-up areas.

Then tab 32 deals with Gorozup, various persons trying to bring in weapons. And in connection with that, there is a large quantity of grenades and ammunition that was seized then after the illegal immigrants fled back to Albania.

34 deals with the Popovac, Babaj Boks, where five armed members of the KLA were arrested. They were identified. This is a review of the weapons they had with them.

Tab 35 speaks of the attack on two officers from the Djakovica garrison on the road between Djakovica and Pristina near the village of Lapusnik. One of the officers was wounded there. They were moving along the road in their civilian vehicle, the terrorists tried to stop them. When they did not stop, they opened fire on the vehicle and one officer was seriously wounded.

As far as tab 36 is concerned, it refers to the area of Djakovica as well. It states that near Ponosevac and Popovac synchronised mortar ⁴¹⁴¹⁰ fire was opened at MUP members and two were wounded.

Q. General, throughout this month of May - you explained this just now - you were supposed to deblock the road and you had more or less regular activities. As far as clashes are concerned, everything boiled down to the defence of the units involved. There was no active position, if I can put it that way, in relation to the terrorist groups in that period.

A. No. The very deployment of the units speaks in itself. This deblockade has to do with a road which is of local importance, and it's only important for those villages and for the border organs. This had to be carried out because the border organs were cut off from their logistics and their command.

Q. Thank you, General. Let's move on to June now. The documents referring to June are in tabs 37 to 63.

A. In tab 31 -- 37, it says here that the terrorists, apart from mobilising men, gathered funds to buy weapons. It also shows that according to operative information, the terrorists were preparing to cut off the Djakovica-Prizren communication or the Djakovica-Pec communication.

In tab 38, this is an order issued by me based on the order coming from the Pristina Corps banning the use of motor vehicles, guns, and other large-calibre weapons without sufficient reason. When a unit is attacked by terrorists, fire must be opened only on the target until it is destroyed. And when the unit is not under threat, no fire is to be opened on the target. ⁴¹⁴¹¹

Q. General, let us dwell briefly on the documents in tab 40. This is a reminder for the work of members of the Army of Yugoslavia, which is attached. It is a reminder for Yugoslav Army members on the territory of areas affected by terrorism.

A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. This is a reminder we received from our superior command, and pursuant to orders. This is provided in a very brief form so that a soldier may carry it in his pocket. However, for officers, there is this extended version. It describes what army members are to do if they are deprived of their freedom -- or, rather, kidnapped by the terrorists. Then it outlines how they are to treat members of terrorist groups if they are deprived of their freedom, what officers in charge of the unit have the right to do, what security organs have the right to do, and what is prohibited. Also how they should treat material goods and citizens.

Q. Very well.

JUDGE BONOMY: Do you have the reminder there? Do you have the reminder in front of you?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do in this form, here, but I do have it, yes.

JUDGE BONOMY: It's not with our papers. That was why I ask you. We simply have the covering note, we don't have the reminder for some reason. We have the bit that doesn't matter. Well, at least, I don't have it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's probably not been translated, but it is in tab 40 in its entirety. ⁴¹⁴¹²

[Trial Chamber confers]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, as you can see, these are very important documents. They are not cumulative at all. And this reminder, according to what we can see here in the cover letter, was dated the 22nd of June, 1998. I will take it out of my documents. It can be placed on the ELMO. We'll just put the front page with the title and the way members of terrorist sabotage groups are to be treated.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Judge Bonomy's point is that the reminder is not -- is not enclosed. It says: "Please find enclosed the reminder for the work of VJ members." So Judge Bonomy was inquiring about the reminder. Do you have any information on that, General?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the next document.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The next one.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The reminder is in the same document. It's the next one.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we -- it's not number 41. We don't have this reminder.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's in tab 40. Tab 40 contains both the cover letter and the reminder.

JUDGE BONOMY: It's not in our binders. Okay? That's the only point I'm making. Give us a copy, please. We can read it -- we can all read -- we can read it for ourselves if you just give us the copies. All this trolling through the documents, reading what we can read for ourselves as if we were children of five who couldn't read is just a total waste of time. ⁴¹⁴¹³

JUDGE ROBINSON: We don't have the reminder, Mr. Milosevic. You must endeavour to find it and produce it. In the meantime, continue.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will ask the witness to put the reminder on the ELMO. I gave my copy to the liaison officer to copy, and I was convinced not only that it was in your binders, because it's in my binders, but that it was -- it had been translated. Perhaps someone took it out in order to translate it, I don't know, but it's among the documents.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... is it on the ELMO?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is page 2: "How to treat members of sabotage terrorist units when depriving them of their freedom."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, you don't have to read it all, but just read the main points. I don't have this here because I gave it to be photocopied.

A. "As long as members of sabotage terrorist units are using weapons or offering resistance, treat them in accordance with the rules of combat. After they lay down their arms and stop offering resistance, treat them in the following way: Gather them into a group, disarm them, and confiscate from them anything they might use as weapons; separate them off according to gender, age, rank; identify them and establish the role of each one. Every member of a terrorist unit and their aiders and abettors are to be deprived of their freedom. The circumstances are to be established and their participation in the terrorist sabotage unit. They can be deprived of their freedom because they are caught in the act of perpetrating an act ⁴¹⁴¹⁴ of terrorism. They are to be searched in detail. All written materials and objects are to be confiscated. A file is to be opened for each person deprived of his liberty. Commanders may question them about military matters. Security organs may detain them for up to three days."

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's enough, General. Yes. That's fine.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. On page 3, it says that "A person deprived of his liberty can be --" or rather, "must be examined by a medical doctor in order to establish their state of health. They are to be treated humanely in accordance with the rules of the military police. Their families are to be informed that they have been deprived of their liberty." What does it say here that must not be done? What is prohibited?

JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't believe the Prosecution is -- is arguing that VJ army did not have proper rules of combat. I don't think that's the Prosecution's case at all. So let us -- let us move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am trying to show here not only that they had rules, but through these documents and this testimony I want to show that the army abided by those rules.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, I think that this is in tab 42. Does it contain your order on the return of the population to the abandoned villages?

A. Yes. Pursuant to an order issued by me, my command, pursuant to an order from the Pristina command, in relation to the territory where fighting had taken place, approval is granted for the return of the population to their homes. The unit commanders are to take measures and ^{41415 BLANK PAGE 41416} contact the heads of the villages in order to get information about their families, their property, where their land is, that they are to be treated correctly and properly, that no damage is to be done to their property, that their property is not to be stolen, and that --

Q. Very well. General, you have an order here from General Lazarevic in connection with steps to be taken in compliance with the rules.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So, Mr. Robinson, it is not just a book of rules but also an order from the competent commander as to how members of sabotage terrorist units are to be treated. It's in tab 43, a document signed by the Chief of Staff, Lazarevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. It says in the beginning: "Order of the command of the Pristina Corps on the -- compliance with international law." It goes on to order that they should comply with it.

A. Yes, that's what the order says. And it also mentions the reminder and that every individual in every unit is to be familiarised with it.

Tab 44 --

Q. Let's look here, because it mentions the month of June. General, I wanted you to comment, as we are now dealing with the month of June, what Paddy Ashdown, Mr. Nice's witness, said here. On page 2366 of the transcript, in a question put to Paddy Ashdown, it says - and I am saying this in order to show what time he's referring to - "... between the 20th and the 25th of June, 1998, did you ⁴¹⁴¹⁷ meet the Macedonian Prime Minister?" This was a visit that took place between the 20th and the 25th of June. This is simply to pinpoint to the witness the time period I am asking him about.

And in connection with this visit in June, he was asked whether he remembered the precise date, and he couldn't. That's irrelevant now. And this was what the other side asked him.

The time frame is quite clear. It's quite clearly defined. He said that during that visit to Macedonia he also visited Northern Albania. I won't read the entire transcript now, but the question is on page 2343: "[In English] Now, while in Albania on this visit, and in indeed this part of your visit, were you able to keep up observation, through binoculars, on the area of Junik, which we can see? Perhaps you can just point it out for us."

[Interpretation] And then Ashdown goes on to say: "[In English] [Previous translation continues] ... I was informed --"

JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the question now, Mr. Milosevic? What's the question now?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My question to the general is as follows: General, in June 1998, were your units in the area that Ashdown mentioned?

A. My units were in Batusa and Molic. These are neighbouring villages to Junik. And we contacted the units that were in Junik.

Q. Very well. But this is the area. It's not just one village. He says: "... a village which I was informed was called Gegaj..." Gegaj. Is there a village called Gegaj there? ⁴¹⁴¹⁸

A. You can't see it on this map, that part, but there is, yes. This is Junik here and that's on the other side.

Q. What other side? What do you mean by "the other side"?

A. The other side of the border. He could only have been in Albania.

Q. Very well. And from there he says he had a very good view of the entire area to the south of Junik. He says "... a very good view of the whole area around south of Junik. There are some small villages down here." He's referring to a view of the whole area south of Junik -- [In English] "And indeed I could see deep into Kosovo." [Interpretation] Can you comment on this, General?

A. I was a teacher of topography once. Absolutely. From the territory of Albania, this entire area, as far as our barracks in Morina, you can see neither Junik, which is in a depression here, nor Batusa, Molic or Ponosevac.

Q. Ashdown says that from this village of Gegaj he could see deep into Kosovo. He could see Junik, villages to the south of Junik, and the whole area.

A. From where he was standing, he could see nothing as far as the Decani-Djakovica communication. He could see only some 20 kilometres away. That is, from the border point, the Albanian border point of Kamenica, he could see only the Albanian village of Morina, which is on our side, near the Morina border point. But he could see nothing that has to do with Junik or to the south from Junik to Ponosevac. This can't be seen because it's at an angle that he couldn't view. ⁴¹⁴¹⁹

Q. Because of the high mountains?

A. Yes, because of the mountains and because of the impossibility of seeing, because the border runs along the edge and this is right next to the mountain, and Junik is in a valley, so you cannot see it from any other side except when approaching it from our territory from the east.

Q. Very well.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, before we move on from that, I'm quite happy to deal with maps in the way they're being dealt with, but for something of this particularity, if it's possible for the general to prepare a hard copy marking the positions of visibility or invisibility, it would be greatly of assistance to us before the cross-examination, otherwise I will have to deal with it on the hoof then and it may not be so easy. So if he can mark up a map with the points he says Ashdown was in and from which he couldn't see into Kosovo, I'd be very grateful.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you able to do that, General? Your topographic skills are --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That would be absolutely no problem for me if there are maps here showing that territory, because on my map you can see our territory, but you cannot see in every place the depth of Albanian territory. So if I'm unable to use these maps here, I couldn't do it right now, but generally speaking it wouldn't be a problem at all. I will have a look at all the maps that I have with me.

MR. NICE: If I can locate a suitable map that appears to cover the relevant Albanian and Kosovo territory and provide it to the witness, ⁴¹⁴²⁰ perhaps he'd mark it with the effect of his testimony and I'd be very grateful.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. If you can do that then, Mr. Nice, that he can do that possibly in the break.

Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I will repeat for you, General, in view of this assignment that you accepted to mark the map, I will repeat for you what Ashdown said: "...Albanian Kosovo border, approximately where my marker is now --" and we cannot know where it was -- "above a village which I was informed was called Gegaj [In English]... and this gave me a very good view of the whole area south of Junik. There are some small villages down here. And indeed, I could see deep into Kosovo, because this is an area of plains here --" [Interpretation] In Serbian language, that means a plain, not a valley. "-- almost as far as Pristina." So he was able to see up to Pristina.

And then the next question, asked by the opposite side was: "What did you observe in this four-hour period?" So -- I am on page 2344 now. Please listen to this carefully, General. He says: "In this area, I saw a number of VJ, Army of Yugoslavia, tanks, [In English] a number of VJ positions, Vojska Jugoslavija, in particular, a mortar position laid out in a classic military Warsaw Pact style, and that throughout this area there were small units, probably platoons --" [Interpretation] "platoons" should be "vod" in our language -- "[In English] moving about in armoured personnel carriers, and that they were bombarding, subjecting to tank ⁴¹⁴²¹ fire, subjecting to mortar fire - I would estimate perhaps 82-millimetre mortars - the houses and villages around here."

JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Ask a question now. With the help of Judge Kwon, I'm actually following the -- the transcript that you are quoting from. What is the question you're now putting to the general?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The page of the transcript is 2344. I've already said that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, I have that. I'm asking the -- what is the question that you wish to put to the general about that evidence of Mr. Ashdown?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So you heard what Paddy Ashdown said about what he had seen in the month of June on those dates when he was visiting, what he saw from Albania. I just read it out to you. Did that happen?

A. I don't know what kind of military training Mr. Ashdown has.

Q. He does have a military training. He's famous for this bloody week in Northern Ireland.

THE INTERPRETER: Bloody Sunday, correction.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, looking from the territory of Albania, the first thing mentioned is mortars. It's impossible to see the positions of mortars because they are located on the opposite side, on the other side, and their positions must always be, according to our rules, shelters, so that they cannot be seen even from a distance of 200, 300 metres, let alone several kilometres.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴¹⁴²²

Q. He said he was at a distance of 2 kilometres. That's what's written here.

A. I've already answered that. There is only a narrow belt near Morina watchtower that is visible, but that is only one Albanian village. Nothing between Junik and the south of Junik, Batusa, Morina, and Ponosevac, nothing else is visible. And at the end of the day, my unit was there too. So as for combat equipment, my unit located there had only three tanks.

Q. My question is: What were the units doing at the time? Mr. Ashdown says that they were shooting at Albanian houses, that there was no return fire, and that you were practically going around firing at Albanian houses.

A. There are many tabs here that we will not have time to go through, but in them you can see exactly what the army was doing, from which houses the army was fired upon, and how the army responded. I've already said Kosare watchtower can be reached only by going through Junik. When the road was deblocked the inhabitants of Junik village, once the terrorists left the village, accepted the army. We talked to them. That was filmed by the Television and Radio of Serbia. I don't have this footage but they are well known to the general public. And after that, the road from the Junik village until Kosare watchtower was deblocked. There are constant ambushes along the road but that has nothing to do with the villages or civilians.

This other, second road, leads from Morina watchtower to Ponosevac and it goes through Morina village. While it was being ^{41423 BLANK PAGE 41424} deblocked, there were clashes with terrorists. Fire was opened only at those who endangered the units. After Morina village, there were no particular problems.

Q. Well, he says that the army was moving in armoured personnel carriers and that it was firing at houses. Please, I'm asking you in very precise terms, since you are using -- or rather, you are referring to some tabs we will not be using, please feel free to find that document that shows us what happened there.

A. I am trying to find the official note. Here, I found one. It says: "During the deblocking of the road, in order to provide supplies to Kosare watchtower, while entering Brovina village, which is on the left of the said road, from the houses along the road simultaneous fire was opened from various weapons, at the army. On the same road, fire was returned to neutralise the sources of fire. Near the -- the houses at the very entrance to the village --"

Q. What are you reading from?

A. Tab 49. "From the first houses, looking from the direction of Djakovica, fire was opened from infantry weapons from the upper floor of the house and the area in the front of the house. Two gun projectiles were used in response."

JUDGE BONOMY: That also doesn't help us because we're talking about a very precise period in time. The point Mr. Milosevic is making is between the 25th and the 28th of June he's asking you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have already said this tab I referred to shows what the army did, and this tab contains the on-site ⁴¹⁴²⁵ investigation of the military police concerning the damages -- the damage on the -- of the houses that occurred during army activity.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What period was it, General? What period does it cover?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document speaks of one day, the 28th of May.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please be so kind, General, as to tell us whether at the time referred to by Mr. Ashdown there were any attacks by the Army of Yugoslavia on Albanian villages -- or rather, Albanian population of that area.

A. I assert with full responsibility that the Albanian population in various villages was never targeted by the army. Throughout these tabulators - and there are many of them - you can see that during those days there were daily incursions across the state border from the tripartite border Montenegro-Albania-Yugoslavia up to the end of the border with Albania, up to the Dedaj watchtower. We have Official Notes here and on-site investigation records by military police and investigating judges that record attempts of illegal border crossings and illegal import of weapons. So there was fighting. That this fighting was restricted to a very narrow space, that is, axes and tracks used for transporting weapons.

Q. Did fire -- did the army open fire exclusively at points from which it was fired at, or did it fire randomly at houses? ⁴¹⁴²⁶

A. There are certain orders here - and I already read one from the month of May - that say that fire may not be opened unless the target is precisely defined. And this rule applied to all members of the army.

Q. Could it happen that fire was opened at houses from which nobody was firing at the army? Because Ashdown says there was no return fire.

A. First of all, there is one order that says that wasteful use of ammunition is forbidden and that large-calibre weapons may not be used. Only the corps commander is allowed to approve the use of large-calibre weapons. And there were other orders, both by corps command and my own order affecting my units, that fire may be opened only on targets previously defined.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The issue is not what is written down in the orders. The issue is what happened on the field.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, that's what I'm asking you, General: What happened on the ground? Is the statement of Mr. Ashdown correct?

A. I am asserting with full responsibility that my troops never fired on a building from which there was no fire at us. We always opened fire only at sources of fire. That can be seen in tab 48.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And you are saying -- General, you are saying additionally that Mr. Ashdown's evidence is not to be relied upon because from where he was, he could not have seen mortars because your mortars are sheltered? Is that -- is that correct?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know where mortars were located, and I know where Mr. Ashdown was. It's absolutely impossible. If I'm ⁴¹⁴²⁷ given a map, I can mark exactly the territory that can be seen from his position and I can show you also the territory that is sheltered by the mountainous terrain.

JUDGE KWON: I remember tab -- Exhibit 74 was used by Lord Ashdown. If the Prosecution can offer that map.

Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Ashdown made other statements as well. Do you know the situation in Suva Reka? Was it in your zone of responsibility?

A. Yes.

Q. He says, for instance, here on page 2358: "[In English] Yesterday we heard from you about your observations from the hills above Suva Reka and how you spent an hour looking at villages being destroyed. You gave us the account of the weaponry you believe to have been deployed."

[Interpretation] As far as I can see, on the basis of this, he was indicating in the area of Suva Reka some fires. What do you know about this? What do you know about this time and what do you know about what happened in Suva Reka -- or rather, this valley of Suva Reka that Ashdown is talking about?

A. If he was on the hill of Birac, that's up here on the road, where there was an army unit. Anyway, he could see from the hill of Birac Suva Reka and the surrounding area.

Q. I'm not asking you what he could see. So he was looking at Suva Reka and the surrounding area. What was going on in the area of Suva Reka ⁴¹⁴²⁸ at the time? What was on fire? Who had set that on fire? Do you know what was going on there?

A. It's the month of September 1998.

Q. I assume that that's it. That's when he was in Kosovo. I cannot find it exactly in the transcript now, but I assume that they did establish that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: But that's very important, Mr. Milosevic, if the witness is to provide useful evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He knows everything that was going on in that area, I assume.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You're seeking to contradict the Prosecution evidence, so you -- you have to be fairly precise. You have to be very precise, as a matter of fact.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I am very precise. I am talking about -- or rather, I quoted what Ashdown said himself.

JUDGE ROBINSON: But what period of time does it relate to?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't find the exact reference to a date here in his transcript.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, would you remember what period of time this particular piece of evidence related to?

MR. NICE: I'll do my best to find out.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It can only be the end of September.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And why would that be?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because although there had been ⁴¹⁴²⁹ some minor action taken by terrorist groups there against this road and other areas of Suva Reka, that was the antiterrorist drive at the end of the September. It was carried out in this area: From the Suva Reka-Stimlje road and in this part of Mount Sara [phoen], including these areas to the east of Suva Reka, Vranic, Musutiste, Dvorane [phoen], Budakovo, Maticevo [phoen], and so on.

After the terrorist groups were broken in all the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, this was the last big group of terrorists left. As far as I can remember, this is the fifth stage of the antiterrorist operation in accordance with the plan that was drafted in the command of the Pristina Corps and it was approved by the army General Staff.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Can you explain now what happened there in Suva Reka?

A. Specifically in Suva Reka? Nothing was going on, because it was under control of the regular police forces. However, these villages that are to the east of Suva Reka, these are villages that run in a series, from Musutiste, Popovjane [phoen], Vranic, Dvorane [phoen], and then there are very well-known villages. Budakovo is particularly well known. Later on throughout the war, it was the headquarters of a command, the command of a brigade, Maticevo and Budakovo. It is in that area that there was a concentration of strong terrorist forces. The fighting with these forces went on for three days until they were broken. The population of these villages fled to this area here, near the village of Vranic. When the fighting was over, this population returned to their villages. There were several thousand of them. I was there myself in Maticevo. ⁴¹⁴³⁰

Q. All right, General. Let's move on, then. Let's move on. June. We said that June ended with tab 63. Take a look at the other documents that have to do with that period of time.

A. What is characteristic here is that in the Official Notes - and there are many of them in the month of June - that speak of daily attacks on the state border, there are many Albanian citizens who were arrested, and in a few cases there were some Albanian citizens who got killed because they were bringing weapons for sale in the Republic of Macedonia in some cases and in the other cases they were bringing arms to sell in the territory of Kosovo. There are also quite a few notes that have to do with soldiers who were wounded either at the border or in ambushes in other parts of the territory.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Let's move on now, Mr. Milosevic. We are trying to finish 1998 by 10.30.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's very difficult, Mr. Robinson.

MR. NICE: Incidentally, we have, I think, just had brought down the map that His Honour Judge Kwon referred to. And so far as Lord Ashdown's evidence of a visit is concerned, as far as I can remember and indeed confirm, if it's his visits that we are concerned with, we are only concerned with the end of September 1998. But we'll find the map, if that's going to assist.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's what the witness said too. September.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All of it was over by the 28th of ^{41431 BLANK PAGE 41432} September.

MR. NICE: This is the map that His Honour Judge Kwon, I think, referred to. At least, it's our version of it. And I don't know if it's going to assist with this witness or provide any further detail beyond that's which is available to Your Honours --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, are you aware of the list of soldiers and officers who were killed or wounded? You have that in tab 57.

A. Yes. This is a list that was compiled by my company of the military police.

MR. NICE: There's no translation of this one, I think.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Tab 57. These are my soldiers who got killed.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Have you got anything else that is particularly characteristic of these documents that have to do with June and that end with tab 63?

A. I've already said that there were constant everyday attacks against the state border and that that is what is characteristic of this period.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, would you want to admit this into evidence by these groups, as we already mentioned?

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. ⁴¹⁴³³

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We admit -- we admit them, with the exception that those that are not translated are marked for identification pending translation, in the usual way.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, I'm going to ask you now to move on to the month of July. All the documents that have to do with July are in tabs 63 through 92. Have you got these documents before you?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Are you aware of what happened in the beginning of July in the area of Karaula-Kosare when a group of Albanians started bringing weapons in? An extraordinary report was sent.

A. Yes, the border post of Kosare. 13 horses were used to bring in these weapons, and what is characteristic is that there were a large number of anti-tank mines that were brought in and that were later placed along roads; mortars, ammunition for mortars as well, and so on.

Q. Could you please just indicate the most important things now in these documents. There is your order here dated the 7th of July. Then there is your order dated the 8th of July. Then there are many reports about illegal border crossings. Then there is the report of the 9th of July that has to do with Cafa Prusa, that area. So in July there are quite a few things that happened. So could you please go through this, the most important developments only.

A. On the basis of the order on banning any action without approval ⁴¹⁴³⁴ of the command, this has to do with my units, that I ban any kind of action without previous knowledge from the command. Every action has to be previously planned, with clearly defined objectives and duration. All actions taken out by army units shall be authorised by the VJ and those by the MUP by the MUP, and appropriate documents have to exist for all these actions; that is to say, a map, an order or command, and an operational plan. Under exceptional circumstances, when a unit is attacked, that is --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think we have heard enough of that kind of evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, please, just go through these documents that have to do with the month of July.

A. Tab 68, that's from the command of the Pristina Corps.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What is it relating to?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says that there is information in view of the observers who are coming in, the KLA units are -- intend to present themselves as a military force, and then it is said what should be done. I would just like to read two points. Paragraph 2: "Whenever terrorists attack a VJ unit or facility, fire back from all available weapons."

Then 5: "If attacked by Siptar terrorists, before returning fire units must warn the attackers to stop firing at the VJ units and move away from the facility, and the civilian population must be told to leave the ⁴¹⁴³⁵ zone."

Then there is mention of the incidents at Cafa Prusa, and the participants in this incident are citizens of Albania who brought weapons to our territory.

Then tab 70 is also a special report about that incident. Then tab 71 is an order written again on the basis of the order of the superior command when opening fire is strictly prohibited from 122-millimetre artillery pieces and tanks without authorisation of the command, and only the commander of the brigade can authorise this kind of fire in order to prevent the -- any loss of lives, and so on. "Open fire on Siptar terrorist forces only if --"

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. That's not taking us any further, you know.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The next order also pertains to --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, are you -- you must lead your witness more carefully just to points that are important. We don't wish to hear anything more about the orders.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Robinson, everything the army does it does on orders, and these are orders of this witness. That's what he's talking about. And this indicates what the activity of the army was. And after any kind of action taken, there is an analysis of how the order was carried out. That's the way the army operates.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, in tab 73, your order pertains to the presence of diplomats and monitoring missions. Not to go back to all of this now, ⁴¹⁴³⁶ what was the attitude of the military towards these foreign representatives of diplomatic missions? The verification mission was not there yet, but there are different diplomats and diplomatic missions coming in to familiarise themselves with the situation on the ground. What is your experience, your personal experience in this regard?

A. These delegations of diplomatic representatives and humanitarian organisations stayed in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. The humanitarian organisations brought in aid. They had no restrictions, as far as the military was concerned.

As for diplomatic missions, they could come to each and every unit, each and every position, except the border area, where they could not come unannounced and unescorted.

Q. Everywhere else they could come unannounced?

A. Yes.

Q. As for the border area, they had to announce their visit and to have someone escorting them.

A. Yes, some kind of liaison officer, if I can put it that way.

JUDGE BONOMY: General Delic, you've been -- your attention has been drawn to tab 73, which makes special orders in the case of -- of monitors from the international community being in the area. Why was that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says so in the preamble. The estimates are that Siptar terrorists are going to use the presence of international monitors in order to open fire and cause an incident and demonstrate to the world that they were endangered by the Army of ⁴¹⁴³⁷ Yugoslavia.

In order to prevent this kind of manipulation and this kind of opening of fire, commanders are ordered to open fire only when they deem it necessary. For example, if international monitors are where the Siptar terrorists are, they should not open fire on any account. The basic thing was to protect the lives of the international observers present; and secondly, these were obvious provocations -- these would be obvious provocations.

In paragraph 2, it says: "If the situation dictates that fire must be returned in order to protect members of our unit, take measures to return fire using the same type of weapon..." that the terrorist used.

JUDGE BONOMY: So are these different orders from the normal combat instructions of the army?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, combat rules do not envisage the presence of international observers on the other side, the enemy side. That is what is special about this. There are different diplomatic representatives present there, and the army as a state institution is responsible for their safety and security. Therefore, even if terrorists are firing, if we have information that international observers are there, the army is ordered here not to open fire. And that's what is specifically said here. That they should monitor the movement of diplomatic representatives and that they should report on it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In July, captain first class -- a captain first class was killed, Mikicevic. ⁴¹⁴³⁸

A. Yes, Captain Mikicevic was killed in July. He was my assistant for security.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, at this rate, when will you finish 1998?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am going as fast as I can, Mr. Robinson, as you can see.

JUDGE ROBINSON: It is not sufficiently expeditious, you know. You have to go to 250?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, August ends with number 127, and that's what comes next. I think that with reference to the reports on the verification mission, we can proceed even faster.

MR. NICE: As to maps, I'm not sure whether the maps we've been able to find so far would cover the relevant area. I haven't had a chance to look at them against the text of the transcript. However, if the witness would be good enough to cast an eye over these at the break and if he says that one of them enables him to mark the positions where he says Lord Ashdown was and the lines of invisibility or visibility, I'd be very grateful. That could possibly then become an exhibit and that would enable me to deal with the matter in one way or another during cross-examination. If these maps are not sufficient, we'll make further efforts over the break and in the course of the next session to find maps that are.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The maps may be passed to the witness.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, there -- we are going to take the ^{41439 BLANK PAGE 41440} break. When we return, you must begin the evidence relating to 1999. This is without prejudice to returning to 1998, if necessary. We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Please continue.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understood that I should no longer deal with 1998, Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's correct. That was the Chamber's ruling. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. But I will ask you to make one exception, referring to one event which Mr. Nice's witness referred to, but I'll come to that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Before that, before we start dealing with 1999, General, please clarify the working map, your working map, which refers to the period --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And Mr. Robinson, this is not dated the 1st of January 1998 but the 1st of December 1999 -- rather, the 1st of December, 1998, until the 9th of April, 1999. This working map covers one month of 1998 and more than three months of 1999, so I assume it falls within the material you said can be dealt with, and this is in tab 204.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Could you please briefly clarify it, Witness. We also had a working map referring to October and November 1998, but that's not something you want to see now, therefore I will not deal with it now. ⁴¹⁴⁴¹ Tab 204, General, the working map.

A. This is also the commander's working map, the fourth in sequence.

Q. General, excuse me for interrupting you. When you say "the commander's working map," you are the commander in question.

A. Yes. This is my working map. It's signed by me. And this was also something that my security officer kept updated. This shows the incidents from the 1st of December, 1998 until the 9th of April, 1999. This is the key explaining the symbols. And these are activities of the army, of the MUP, and activities against civilians. And in this map, you can see the most significant incidents. You can see where they occurred, on what date. The most significant ones can also be seen here because the consequences are shown. And you can conclude how many incidents occurred against members of the army, against members of the MUP, and against civilians.

There is a number of incidents which were not entered in the map because there were no consequences. What is characteristic here is that on the territory to the south, toward Macedonia, there were no incidents, and an especially large number of incidents occurred on the territory of Suva Reka municipality and here in this area toward the border.

Q. When you say, General, there were no incidents on the territory inhabited by the Goranci, can you please explain what this refers to.

A. Goranci is a term we use to refer -- or Gorani. It's the Muslim population which adopted Islam two centuries ago. They speak the Serbo-Croatian language. And what is characteristic of them is that they always supported Serbia -- or rather, they felt that Serbia was their own ⁴¹⁴⁴² state and they always supported all the measures taken by the state organs and the government and they always had an exceptionally correct attitude toward members of the army.

Q. Very well, General. You indicated the incidents on the map. The army had special organs to cooperate with the verification mission.

A. Yes.

Q. Although we have a large number of exhibits here dealing with the relations with the verification mission, could you explain briefly what the essence of these relations was, as can be seen in the documents presented here.

A. We omitted a part where I wanted to speak about what happened after the arrival of the verification mission. If we start in January 1999, what characterised these relations was, first of all, that the verification mission was never present in the numbers provided for in the agreement.

Secondly, individual sub-centres never became active when the mission came to carry out its role, as envisioned. Secondly, the Army of Yugoslavia was supposed to report every movement from company level upwards, and all motor vehicle movements, and this was done regularly. There were no problems. Next, the agreement provided for the army leaving all the locations it had held until the 13th of October, 1999 and to remain -- or rather, only seven company-size units were to remain in the border area. And you can see these four locations that my unit was in and also the locations towards Decani and Pec. Only one unit was to remain in the ⁴¹⁴⁴³ Djula area, which is on the Prizren-Stimlje-Pristina road and one unit in the area of Lapusnik on the Orahovac-Malisevo-Pristina road, and one in the Voljak [phoen] area which is on the Djakovica-Klina-Pristina road. In addition to this, there were to be 25 observation posts of the MUP. All other positions which, in short, control over the territory after the break-up of the terrorist forces were abandoned. According to the agreement, the opposing side, the terrorists, although at that time, as we have seen -- as we saw on Friday, there were about 5.000 of them, they were to remain at their positions.

What is characteristic was that as the army and police left their positions, the terrorists took them over.

Q. Did the verification mission establish this?

A. Yes, the verification mission also established this. At our request that this problem be solved, the answer was always that there were two opposing factions among the terrorists, one of which was in favour of complying with the agreement and the other against. And the answer was always that it was this other faction that was doing this. The terrorists again cut off the communications. They cut off the roads. This group at Dulje, a mixed company, ensured the road was passable, but on more than one occasion columns were attacked. The road leading from Orahovac to Suva Reka, although according to the agreement it was supposed to be controlled by the MUP, was never possible for the MUP. There always had to be a verification mission vehicle at the front and rear of the column, which means that practically MUP had no control over this territory. And the same applies to the road from Orahovac to ⁴¹⁴⁴⁴ Dragobilje. According to the agreement, Dragobilje was to be exempt from the control of the MUP, Malisevo and Dragobilje, because allegedly there was a large concentration of the civilian population. However, I state with full liability that this is not correct. Dragobilje at that time was the main headquarters of the terrorist KLA, and that is why this point was exempt and this part was not under control.

From Orahovac towards Malisevo, the police could move as far as the Troja and Ostrozub pass but only if accompanied and escorted by the vehicles of the verification mission.

JUDGE BONOMY: In your initial answer, you said that part of the agreement was for the army to withdraw from the positions they had held up until a certain date. Could you clarify that date, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The agreement was signed on the 13th of October in Belgrade. I know --

JUDGE BONOMY: It was 1998 then, and not 1999, as you said?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. But we skipped over that part. We didn't talk about it.

JUDGE BONOMY: No. But in your answer, you gave the date 1999. I just want to be clear that it was 1998 you meant to say. Thank you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. What characterised every month was that all army activities were reported, all incidents on the territory were reported, the verification mission went out, sometimes on the same day, sometimes two or three days later, to verify the incident, and also what I have just said, the retaking of the territory. And what is characteristic in this period is a ⁴¹⁴⁴⁵ large number of murders of civilians, primarily murders of civilians of Albanian ethnicity, by the terrorists, both in the towns and in villages, especially those villages that handed back their weapons in September and October 1998.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well, General. On the working map, we were able to see where all this took place. I will now put a question to you in connection with the testimony of General Drewienkiewicz about a specific incident.

MR. NICE: Before we move to that, and on the topic of maps, two small points: First, as to this map - but I suspect as to the earlier maps - the witness speaks of the map showing what occurred, consequences. Now, the legend on the map is in Cyrillic and I think is untranslated, and the expectation may be that it's never going to be translated, because normally maps and things like that we don't necessarily translate individual entries on them. If the map is to serve the purpose that the accused wants, including that you should understand what these handwritten, and indeed very neatly written, entries mean, some arrangement has got to be made to have the individual terms translated, either on the map or in the form of a legend.

The second point on maps is that the witness found the maps we provided at the last break too detailed. We have another map to show him which is less detailed but shows relief more readily, and I'd ask that he looks at that at the next break.

And if Ms. Dicklich is prepared to do this - I haven't asked her - and if the Court is happy, it's possible that he could discuss the ⁴¹⁴⁴⁶ matter with her, perhaps in the presence of the accused, in order to identify the sort of map that will enable him to do the exercise we want of him.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. That may be done in the next break.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: As for the map, Mr. Milosevic, the legend is not translated, and if it is to be of any use, there will have to be a translation.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understood, Mr. Robinson, that the witness read out the legend. It refers to the entire map according to the time from December 1998 to April 1999, to incidents against the army, against the police, and against citizens. And these few words only explain the symbols; what refers to incidents against the army, what refers to incidents against the MUP, and what refers to incidents against civilians.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Perhaps, General, you can tell us what colours were used to refer.

A. Above the triangle, the red, the colour red, means that it's an incident against the army; green means against the MUP; and brown means against civilians. And the symbols are exactly the same.

Q. So only the colours differ between the army, the MUP, and the civilians and the incidents are precisely located on the map for this period of time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it sufficiently clear now, ^{41447 BLANK PAGE 41448} Mr. Robinson?

JUDGE ROBINSON: That should be helpful.

JUDGE KWON: We can't read the consequences noted down in the map.

MR. NICE: Can I suggest, to save time, that the accused consults with Mr. Kay on the provision of code or translation of the legend and a colour-coded identification or a symbol-coded identification so that we can make use of these maps. Doing it in Court will take a great deal of time. Not doing it at all will render the map useless.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'm not clear. In addition to the explanation that the general gave as to the meaning of the different colours, you'd like something else done?

MR. NICE: If that makes sense to the Court, then the Court is just moving rather more rapidly in its comprehension than I am. We certainly need a -- a translation of this block, of the legend here on the left. We can make out -- well, Ms. Dicklich can make all of it out and I can make some of it out. There's a reference to triangles, but I imagine that means these round symbols -- well, there are both round symbols and triangular symbols. We certainly need those translated -- or interpreted. If all the other references are simply to place names, then they clearly don't need to be translated. But we would need that material conveniently available for all the maps that he's using so that anyone looking at it now or hereafter can understand what they mean.

[Trial Chamber confers] ⁴¹⁴⁴⁹

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I think that's -- that's reasonable. So, Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to ask you to have -- perhaps you can work through the liaison officer and provide a translation -- a full -- a fuller translation of the -- the legend and the other matters referred to by Mr. Nice.

Let us proceed.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would just like to draw your attention, Mr. Robinson, to the fact that the same symbols are used on all working maps and the witness has already explained them when using the first map. Only the colours differ as regards the army, the police, and civilians, and those colours are the same on all maps.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is that correct, General?

A. Yes, these colours are used in the same way. Everything related to the MUP is always green; everything related to the army is always red.

Q. And what about civilians?

A. Yes, we decided on this colour for civilians.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, on the 11th of April, 1992 [as interpreted], we heard a witness from the other side, General Drewienkiewicz, who testified to an incident on the 14th of December, 1998. He stated on that occasion that he had seen ten killed on the KLA side, including one woman, but no casualties on the other side. It's page 2851 of the transcript. "[In English] The KLA were fired at, and then they withdrew and ⁴¹⁴⁵⁰ eventually 34 KLA members were killed in -- over the period of the ambush. And it was reported that nine Albanians, nine Kosovo Liberation Army members, had been taken prisoner, including one female. The patrols photographed the bodies which were in three broad locations but were given no sight of the prisoners."

[Interpretation] So this is the evidence of General Drewienkiewicz. Regarding precisely this incident, you brought video footage which recorded this incident on Pastrik Mountain on the 14th of December. Then you also filmed the weapons seized. Could we please see this footage; that is, the incident of the 14th December 1998. It is -- it has been made available to the AV booth.

[Videotape played]

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the arrival of two KVM teams. This place is several kilometres away from the site. They are being given indications on the map where the incident happened. This is the morning of the 15th of December.

At this moment, the vehicles are abandoned because they cannot be used any more, and these are the slopes of Mount Pastrik. Fighting occurred with the terrorist group. You can see that it's very foggy and the crushed parts of the terrorist group ran into the front of the column where the members of the verification mission were. In this spot, three terrorists were killed and one woman terrorist. That is about 2 kilometres away from the site of the incident of the morning of the 14th of December.

This is the six-power sniper rifle, a state-of-the-art weapon. ⁴¹⁴⁵¹ These are the nine prisoners who were given assistance and who are warming next to the fire.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You can see one woman here.

A. Yes.

Q. Who lit the fire for them?

A. The army.

Q. So these are the prisoners about whom Drewienkiewicz said that he hadn't seen them.

A. They talked with them quite normally. This is the money found on one of the founders of the KLA, Muji Kapici Krasniqi, who was killed in this operation. He had 255.000 Deutschemark in his little bag. This is the Barrett rifle, 12.7 millimetres. It is only available to the US army. Four terrorists were killed here, and there were nine prisoners.

Q. And you can see KVM members.

A. These are special ignition devices for remote activation of explosives. Remote detonation.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness, do you know what 255.000 Deutschemarks would be in -- in euros or ...?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] About a half of the amount.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a large amount of money.

JUDGE BONOMY: I may have missed this on the film, but did we see contact between the prisoners and the KVM force?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You could see that in the beginning of the tape. What do you mean prisoners and KLA? They were members of ⁴¹⁴⁵² the KLA.

JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. But was -- were they -- were the KVM given access to the KLA prisoners, which is the issue.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They talked to them quite normally while the latter were sitting around that fire.

JUDGE BONOMY: Did we see that on the film?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The last sequence on the footage, they were filmed next to the prisoners, 2 or 3 metres away, and you can see them standing next to the prisoners. There were two teams of the KVM mission from the regional centre 1, Prizren.

JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you. Is it -- is it possible to see that again?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let it be shown again.

JUDGE BONOMY: That last part of it that you say --

MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, the -- the accused identified this as page 2851. It may be my mistake, but I don't seem to be able to find it on that page. I don't know if anybody else --

JUDGE KWON: In the electronic version it's 2849.

MR. NICE: Your Honour's very kind. Thank you very much.

JUDGE KWON: Dated the 11th of April.

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: The footage which shows the KLA prisoners, the last part of the film, I remember.

[Trial Chamber confers]

THE WITNESS: [Microphone not activated] ⁴¹⁴⁵³

JUDGE KWON: Let's start from here.

[Videotape played]

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You can see that medical assistance was given to one of the terrorists who was wounded. They are now telling which places, which municipalities they are from. The verifiers are now acting on their own accord. There were several of them. And they are filming whatever they think interesting. This was found on a number of terrorists, Zolja hand-held rocket launchers.

They even inspected individual weapons. These are these special detonators.

Here -- here it is. The wounded terrorists are in the left of the screen, 2 or 3 metres away, and I am there on the spot too.

JUDGE BONOMY: I can't see them. Are you telling me they were on the screen?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I'm saying how far they were from this group, 2 or 3 metres away, because this conversation took place right next to the group of terrorists. This conversation took place just before leaving. Several hours were necessary to get back from this spot. Two teams had to retrace their steps. I stayed behind with these soldiers and they were asking what to do with the -- those who were killed and with the prisoners.

JUDGE BONOMY: The question, though, was whether the KVM people, if that is what these people are, were able to interview the KLA terrorists. ⁴¹⁴⁵⁴

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Throughout the time they were able to talk to them. They were enabled to do so. This incident happened in a spot on a 400-metre stretch, and these people who are standing are just 2 or 3 metres away from the terrorists who are gathered around a fire. And the people who are standing are discussing how to go back using the same track and what to do with the bodies and the prisoners who were to be taken to the vehicles and in another direction, where the vehicles were waiting. This is just before dark fell, and we completed this task at 1.00 a.m. the next morning. That was when we reached the vehicles.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I don't think we've got the tab number for this document, this video, yet. The evidence seems to suppose its origin to be one source, and the cameraman to have come from one source, but it would help if we could see how it's listed on the index.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what is the tab number for this video?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It should be 216, Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE BONOMY: And all of it -- all of it was shot -- excuse me. All of it was shot on the 15th of December; is that right?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct. On the 15th of December a team -- a crew from Prizren Television - I know both the editor and the person who's speaking on the -- on this film - and it was broadcast on national television. A much longer tape was actually broadcast. The editor was Boris Ugrinovic and the cameraman was Sanjevic.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, if this a shorter version, by editing, of the longer version shown on television, then the longer version may well ^{41455 BLANK PAGE 41456} deal with and satisfy the query of His Honour Judge Bonomy. On the other hand, if the longer version, which must be available to this witness or the accused's associates and which we could probably find time to view, does not deal with the point, the point remains.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Is there a longer version, General?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In Television Belgrade, there is one, I suppose. Most probably. But I was there all the time. I had arrived in a column of ten soldiers 20 minutes earlier than this other column that you saw on the footage. I was there the whole time.

JUDGE BONOMY: You mentioned it was a production of a Prizren Television and then you mentioned Television Belgrade. Are the two related to each other?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is all the Radio and Television of Serbia, the studio in Prizren.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, everything we saw now on this footage, was it all filmed at the same time, the same place, on that particular day where the prisoners around the fire can be seen and the verifiers? Was all that filmed on one single location?

A. Yes, all of it. You saw the column arriving and you saw the direct fighting. This is about 2 kilometres away from this spot. And the verifiers were directly present. Two kilometres away is the spot that was filmed afterwards, in continuation, and it was all filmed on the same day, the 15th of December.

Q. So that's the place where the verifiers were? ⁴¹⁴⁵⁷

A. That's the place where the verifiers were.

Q. And that's where the terrorist prisoners were too?

A. Yes, that's right.

JUDGE BONOMY: General, to be absolutely clear, I take it the prisoners were actually captured on the 14th, when -- when there were 34 deaths. Is that correct?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 36 were dead and 9 were taken prisoner. I've already said --

JUDGE BONOMY: On the 14th? I just want the timing correct.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This activity? Well, that requires time if you want me to tell you exactly the timing, how everything evolved.

JUDGE BONOMY: We saw -- we saw a clash on this film which occurred on the 15th involving, what, the death of three terrorists? But the main incident in which the prisoners were taken occurred on the 14th, or have I misunderstood that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, perhaps it's my fault. Perhaps I misspoke. The incident occurred on the morning of the 14th and this footage was also taken on the 14th but in the afternoon. The day is the same, though. The first incident -- or rather, there were three incidents: One was on the 14th at 2.30; the second one was around 4.00; and the last one was here on this spot at 5.30. Between 8.00 and 9.00 on that day, the 14th, we informed the mission about this. We waited for them and we set out around 11.00. We needed time, perhaps about two hours, to get to the actual site. Then these activities took place, our ⁴¹⁴⁵⁸ activities -- or rather, the activities of the verification mission, within about one hour and 30 minutes. Perhaps an hour before night fell on that day, the 14th, everything was over. I am the one who made a mistake here; all of it happened on the same day.

JUDGE BONOMY: But when did you and the film crew get there?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already said that we set out at 11.00 and we were there -- well, I cannot be very precise in terms of minutes, but we were there between 1.00 and 2.00 p.m.

JUDGE BONOMY: So you were there before the main event resulting in the death of 36 people.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The main event was at 5.30 in the morning on that day. So I came a few hours after that.

JUDGE BONOMY: What -- what has been written in the transcript is: "There were three incidents: One was on the 14th at 2.30; the second was around 4.00; and the last one was on the spot at 5.30." So these are all in the early hours of the morning?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes.

JUDGE BONOMY: All right.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, all of it is in the early morning.

JUDGE BONOMY: And at what time -- at what time were the nine prisoners taken?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At 5.30 in the morning.

JUDGE BONOMY: And all the bodies, the bodies that we saw in the film, they were all dead by 5.30 in the morning? ⁴¹⁴⁵⁹

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At 5.30. Approximately that time, 5.30. Because the fighting was going on. That's when the incident started, and the fighting went on for a while.

JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... now clear. It was very unclear before.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, could you just describe in a few sentences the details of the incident as you described them now and we saw on the footage, everything that was filmed immediately after the incident on the same day. Tell us where this place actually is, where this group came from, what they came across, and how the clash occurred.

A. The group came from Albania. Pastrik, Mount Pastrik. They were near Liken and they crossed the state border there. They entered our territory about 3 kilometres. At 2.30 -- or between 2.00 and 2.30, when they had their first encounter with the army. The army did not know then what kind of group this was because they saw only four men and these were their main scouts. When they were asked to stop, they opened fire and then the army fired back, and the duty operations officer was informed immediately and I was informed immediately. However, at that time we still didn't know what kind of forces these were. The terrorist group started going back to Albania. They come across another security organ on the border. They were also there, but they do not meet directly. They're about 150 metres away, if you look at the footpath there.

Since that group was on the alert too -- you must be aware of the ⁴¹⁴⁶⁰ fact that this was a mountain and it was foggy -- they asked who this was, because they were thinking that perhaps it was our forces. Fire was opened. They responded with their own gunfire, these border security organs, and some mines were activated that are there to protect these border organs; however, no losses were sustained by the terrorists yet. Only during the first encounter.

Later we saw that the terrorists discarded 145 rucksacks with equipment and ammunition and different types of special equipment. After that, nothing happened until 5.30. The terrorists returned to the border. The snow was about 40 centimetres deep. And they move along a valley and they come across our first border organ. They were on the alert as of the early morning and at their own positions, and when they were told to halt and when they were asked who was coming, the terrorists opened fire. The army, who were at their positions, fired and activated mines. Fighting went on for about half an hour to 40 minutes. My orders were that the military units that were about 2 kilometres away should come and help. The terrorists we saw here, that were killed here and those who were wounded, were lying in an area that was about 200 or 300 metres long, and they remained there. Part of the terrorists returned to Albania. Another group of the terrorists were firing and withdrawing towards the villages, especially the village of Kusni; whereas, yet another part of the terrorists - because later on there was fighting here - but some groups came to the village of Planeja, where the command one of one of mixed companies was and there was fighting there where two men got killed, two terrorists. ⁴¹⁴⁶¹

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. How big was this group that came from Albania? On the basis of what you learned from the prisoners and on the basis of your own insight or -- or rather, the insight of your organs, how big was that group?

A. We could see that by their rucksacks, and that's what the prisoners stated too, that the group consisted of about 145 persons.

Q. How many of our soldiers were there protecting the border at that time?

A. Where the main incident occurred, here, at 5.30, there were six soldiers and one non-commissioned officer, so a total of seven men. Also, at the other localities, there were six soldiers respectively and one non-commissioned officer or commissioned officer.

Q. So these were the security organs -- the border security organs that are about as big as a squad, or perhaps even less than that.

A. Less than a squad.

Q. Let me say --

A. Let me say that in this column there was a special unit and there were about 40 officers that were returning from Albania from training there. They had a lot of special equipment.

Q. Thank you, General. Now we are going to move on to what happened in 1999. But just a preliminary question: There is a considerable number of working maps here, and you show them to -- and there are a large number of documents showing what the army did from day to day, and there's also a large number of documents and maps showing where the army moved during their activities. Is that right or is that not right? ⁴¹⁴⁶²

A. Yes. Like in 1998, the army had their own tasks only.

Q. General, all these activities of the army are documented in terms of the dynamics involved, in terms of the localities involved, and the purpose of the movement of the military. When you bear in mind everything that happened throughout 1998 until the beginning of 1999, all these movements of the army, can this be briefly defined, why the army was on the move, what their objectives were, and why the army was moved from one place to another and why they engaged in particular activities?

A. After the agreement and after the mission came, the army was returned to the barracks, except for seven locations along the border where they were providing in-depth security for the state border. And at the border itself, there were the border units and also there were the three localities that I mentioned. All other activities of the army were regular activities. They were reflected in the following: Providing security for the state border and preventing any bringing-in of weapons in this area, and also protecting their own facilities, and also carrying out training.

Q. Thank you, General. So those were the tasks of the military. That is what the army actually did.

A. That's right.

Q. Thank you, General. Now we're going to move on to these specific events of 1999. You adopted an order on the 3rd of January, 1999 that you sent to your mixed companies. That is tab 251.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for the speaker. ^{41463 BLANK PAGE 41464}

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. I have found this tab.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You wrote this order to all mixed companies.

A. Yes. Could this map please be taken down now so that I could show what we're discussing now?

Q. You need the map that is underneath?

A. Yes.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the microphone of the accused please be adjusted. We cannot hear him properly.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, please speak to the microphone so that the interpreters can follow you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Kwon.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, do we still need this working map that has to do with the period up until April?

A. Well, during the break, I will find this larger-scale map, so I'll put it here, where the first map was. I need this one, though, to show these four out of the total of seven mixed companies that were permitted, according to the agreement reached. I wanted to show where they were stationed, and also the order contained in tab 251 was sent to them.

Q. At any rate, it says here: "To reinforce -- to step up surveillance of the most probably axis of appearance and attack of Siptar terrorist forces." That is in relation to what you explained, as to how ⁴¹⁴⁶⁵ border control was exercised.

A. Yes.

Q. All right.

JUDGE BONOMY: General, can you explain what a mixed company is?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, according to the agreement, a mixed company is not a unit according to establishment. It had part infantry, part scouts, and it was part artillery -- or rather, artillery support at the rank of battalion, mostly mortars. That's why it's called a mixed company, because it has several different units. But its total strength is a company, ranging from 120 to 150 men, depending on the situation involved.

Here on the map you can see the exact composition. Of those companies, that is.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, among the documents that you presented here, there is also an excerpt from the monthly intelligence report on electronic surveillance and anti-electronic activities from mid-December until mid-January 1999. Specific incidents are referred to by day. So, for example, on the 12th of January at 1250 hours, approximately, on the frequency authorised for the International Red Cross, communications were noticed by participants in the Siptar language exchanging information on the position of a convoy of trucks, probably a humanitarian convoy. Please take a look at this, and what is it that you can conclude on the basis of what you see here as regards the beginning of 1999? You see here this excerpt of the monthly intelligence report on electronic ⁴¹⁴⁶⁶ surveillance.

MR. NICE: Can I have the tab? What is the tab number?

JUDGE BONOMY: It's the next one, 252.

MR. NICE: 252. Thank you. I'm grateful.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 12th of January. It says here that "On the frequency authorised for the International Red Cross, information was exchanged in the Albanian language." What we know is that terrorists were also following these humanitarian convoys and that they took part of this humanitarian aid for themselves. Practically some humanitarian convoys directly went to the terrorists. It also says here that "The KLA -- the illegal KLA radio reported on its last session the KLA staff adopted a conclusion stating that soldiers who failed to withdraw from Kosovo by the 1st of March of this year will lose the right to be freed." This refers to soldiers of the Yugoslav Army.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. On this same page, it says that "On the 11th of January, there were clashes with the Yugoslav Army," and it refers to enemy losses. These enemies are our soldiers, and they say here how successful they were.

A. They stated that "Over the past two months they inflicted losses on the enemy," that is, our forces, "28 wounded and 9 killed," and that they had only one killed and several wounded. Dragobilje, I said that's where the main headquarters of the terrorist KLA was at the time. I cannot say with certainty whether or not we had losses. Here they are ⁴¹⁴⁶⁷ counting members of the army and members of the MUP together. It's possible, however, that we did have losses because there were many ambushes, so we could have had that number of killed.

JUDGE ROBINSON: When did that clash commence, the one on the 11th of January?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It doesn't say here. What it says here is that on the 11th of January they were monitoring the arrival of the army and MUP in the area, and it also said that over the past two months in clashes losses were inflicted on the army and that there were 28 wounded and 9 killed, not on that day.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue, Mr. Robinson?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, but it would have been helpful to hear how the clash started, who started it, matters of that kind. But move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. General, clashes such as the one reported on here, who initiated them?

A. What was characteristic for this entire period of time was that these clashes most often took part on the roads. There were ambushes. Columns, whether of army or of police, were ambushed. And mines were laid. Also there were attacks on individual points.

Q. Well, they boast here that they inflicted large losses on our forces and that their losses were very small.

A. Yes, they say they had only one man killed and several wounded.

Q. Let's now deal with this part of the report on the next page which talks about how many Albanians were in a dilemma as to whether they ⁴¹⁴⁶⁸ should join the KLA, as they were sending them to the most risky spots, probably to raise manpower levels of their army, and that many families were concealing their sons because they felt it was better that their sons stay alive than that they worry about what the neighbours would say, and they hoped that with the assistance of NATO they would be able to create an ethnically pure Kosovo in that year. So that's what was broadcast on the Albanian media.

A. Yes, and it says that they would never cease their armed attacks until Kosovo was liberated and completely Siptar.

Q. But they mention NATO support.

A. Yes.

Q. On the next page, it says that "On the 6th of January, information was received that Siptars were preparing to welcome the director of the verification mission," and it says that "Siptars from the Podujevo region claimed that the verifiers are closely watching every movement by the VJ and MUP forces and that in most cases they prevent them from attacking, and there is no direct information for representatives of the KLA on the movement of our forces."

Was that your experience at the time of the events of which you were an immediate participant?

A. Yes. Every movement by my units, even individual vehicles leaving the barracks, were escorted by the verifiers. There were two exits and entrances from the barracks. There were vehicles belonging to the verifiers opposite these exits and entrances. And whenever a vehicle or a column of vehicles set out to get supplies, a vehicle would escort ⁴¹⁴⁶⁹ the column wherever it was going.

Q. When you were explaining the deployment of our units, you said that the main headquarters was in the area of Dragobilje. On the last page of this document, on tab 252, on the top of the page, it says that "They learned that the main headquarters was in the area of Dragobilje, south-west of Malisevo. The same participants talked about large training centres in Albania where many soldiers were trained and had various weapons." Is this information indicating their preparations -- and then it goes on to say: "The 13th of January they personally saw that there were weapons stored in Albania for the KLA. The crates are marked 'NATO military', there are also instructors training people to use weapons. The weapons are being brought in by air, unlike last summer when they came in by land via Milan and then on to Albania by sea." And it also says that "The war does not depend on Siptars or Serbs but on America." It goes on to say that "The KLA was created by Robert Gelbard and he keeps convincing Siptars that the final victory is theirs."

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What did you know? We received these reports. What we are quoting from now is what you as a brigade commander received.

A. We knew that the main headquarters was in Dragobilje because, according to the agreement, the army couldn't go there and it was also a prohibited area for the MUP forces. As for the training centres in Albania, we had previously identified all these centres so that this was nothing new for us. We also knew that the Albanian army had given their ⁴¹⁴⁷⁰ heavy weapons to the terrorists for training.

Q. At the bottom of this page, the date is smudged here but we can see that it's January. We cannot see the precise date. It says that "They learned that the director of Maljoku, the director of the Kosovo information centre, had been killed by the terrorists because he had been a Rugova supporter and associate, and people disappearing in the same way in Malisevo last summer. There are rumours that the main executioner is a Siptar named Azem Uka." Did you know anything about this, General?

A. We knew that people who belonged to Ibrahim Rugova's party in the course of 1998, and especially in the course of 1999, were also, in addition to Albanian civilians and all those who thought that a solution for Kosovo should be found through negotiations, that all of these people were potentially targets for the KLA and that there were liquidation groups and lists of people and that a certain number of Rugova's adherents were also listed on these execution lists.

Q. Thank you, General. In the daily report of the 8th of January, there is mention of terrorist provocations being registered against MUP members in Rznic and Saptej in Decani municipality but that there had been no consequences for the MUP. What else does this report contain?

A. Which report?

Q. That's from the command of your own brigade.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Milosevic. 253?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's 253.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says here that in January, on ^{41471 BLANK PAGE 41472} the Prizren axis, the arrival of a large terrorist formation is expected from Albania, several hundred terrorists near the Vrbnica border crossing. If necessary, a combined armed attack will be mounted on members of the army and police. Both -- it's this axis here, Vrbnica. If necessary, both an attack from Albanian territory and from the territory of our country in order to enable this large group to enter.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What does "large group" mean in this context? Is it 150 or what?

A. It says "several hundred."

Q. So even larger.

A. Groups returning from training.

Q. The next document refers to the security organ drawing attention to the activities of the Siptar forces, and it's addressed to your brigade command.

A. Yes, my chief of security, the new one after Captain Mikicevic was killed, he drew attention to the nearest unit - that's the unit of Planeja, the mountain of Pastrik, that in the area of the village of Krajk [phoen], this is here next to Drin, a group in uniform had been observed. They were KLA men wearing Yugoslav army uniforms, and attention was being drawn to this so that our men would not be surprised.

Q. You wrote a report on the 15th of January, 1999 on the activities of the other side, and you say that "Pursuant to orders of the Suva Reka staff, a large group had been formed." That's tab 255. What does this report of yours contain?

A. It's addressed to the commander of the combat group 131 in the ⁴¹⁴⁷³ Planeja area, and it says that as of the 15th of January the same group is expected to move through the village of Samodraze, Velika Krusa, Rogovo in the direction of the state border and that they would cross the state border between the watchtowers of Gorozup and Liken, and that they would be moving in this direction.

Q. And did this prove to be correct? Was this information correct? Who did you get it from?

A. It says here: "Starting on the 15th." This happened a few days later.

Q. Thank you, General. There is a document here in tab 256 issued by your Chief of Staff, Vladimir Stojiljkovic.

A. Yes. This document says that a group of terrorists below the Gorozup watchtower right next to the lake, because the water had receded, that they had tried to cross over to our territory and come across mines, and that one terrorist was probably wounded because mines were activated, and they withdrew to their own territory.

Q. General, you compiled an analysis of these events concerning the in-depth securing of the state border, and this analysis was written on the 17th of January, 1999 and forwarded to the corps command. It's here among your documents in tab 258. What does it refer to?

A. Yes, this has to do with the warning in tab 255. The corps here is being informed that between the 15th and the 16th and between the 16th and the 17th it is expected that strong terrorist forces will be infiltrated into our territory, and for this reason reinforcements were sent to the forces carrying out the in-depth securing of the state border ⁴¹⁴⁷⁴ and that the number of in-depth security organs had increased from five to eight. On the -- between the 15th and the 16th, there were no attempts to infiltrate our territory, but between the 16th and the 17th, at about 2100 hours, one terrorist group, which is estimated to have comprised around 15 men, tried to enter our territory.

Q. You then inform the brigade command in tab 259, which speaks of a group of 100 terrorists -- you inform them about the modern weapons they have at their disposal. Who did you get this information from and could it be considered reliable?

A. Before sending information, we checked it. When a brigade sent information to a lower-level unit, it certainly meant that the commander receiving the information had to act on it because it had already been verified at brigade level. We have already seen the electronic surveillance reports and the exchange of information with the MUP.

Q. Again, you provide an analysis several days later, and from this we can conclude that you analysed the situation weekly. What was the time period between the analyses you drew up, General?

A. An analysis was made after every movement of the unit from the barracks in order to provide assistance to the organs for in-depth securing of the border.

Q. So always, for every event.

A. Yes.

Q. Very well. The analysis in tab 260, which refers to activities on the in-depth security of the state border, which you sent to the command of the Pristina Corps, very briefly, what does it contain? It's ⁴¹⁴⁷⁵ quite long. It has two densely typed pages.

A. What it refers to is that a group of Siptar terrorists, about 50 members of them, entered the territory of our country, passed through the line security of the state border, and clashed with the in-depth security of the state border; that three terrorists were killed; that large amounts of equipment were left behind by them; and that from the traces that could be found, they had wounded men whom they were dragging along behind them. What is characteristic here is that the unit that set out from the barracks to provide assistance at the village of Dedaj encountered two vehicles. One was a van, a Volkswagen without a license plate; and the other one was a Zastava truck with wooden benches, prepared to transport men. These were vehicles which were waiting in the area of Ljubizda village. In the area of Ljubizda village, they were waiting there for the terrorists in order to transport them further on.

Q. As this document is very extensive, right after it you have an order in tab 261 on the urgent taking of additional security measures. Is this because the situation was becoming more complex?

A. I'd like to say something about the previous document. An incident was mentioned of the 29th in Rogovo. This incident of the 27th is connected with this incident because the injured persons and the terrorists who had fled from this ambush were then transported to Rogovo. And in an antiterrorist action by the MUP forces, I think 24 terrorists were killed and later on it transpired that among them were also those who had been wounded in this action on the 27th. What is characteristic in this ambush of the 27th, the commander of the 134th KLA Brigade, Drago ⁴¹⁴⁷⁶ Rama, was killed, and that was in the Dukagjin operative zone. In fact, he was wounded and he died in Rogovo.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's time for the break. We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please continue.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, these questions now have to do with 1999. We are dealing with 1999 in detail, of course, but I would like to save time here too. I'll be putting a group of questions to you that have to do with documents pertaining to the verification mission and in cooperation with the verification mission. In actual fact, in tabs 262 onwards, all the way up to 291, that is, you have documents that have to do with the work of the verification mission -- or rather, the work of the army with the verification mission. If possible, I would like us to go rather quickly through these documents, from 262 to 291. And you should indicate only some of the very important matters involved.

Already in tab 262, we see that this is a dispatch sent to the General Staff and the liaison team for the OSCE and NATO missions.

A. Yes. These reports were sent from October onwards. If I were to say what is characteristic of January now, I could say the following: Movements of the army regularly reported to the mission. We can see this in this first report too, that on such-and-such ⁴¹⁴⁷⁷ a day a convey made up of such-and-such vehicles was moving in such-and-such a direction. This was for the purpose of the mission following these convoys. So this was a regular thing, reporting all the activities of the military to the mission.

What is characteristic to all these tabs pertaining to January is that the terrorists stepped up their activity. Already from the 31st -- between the 31st and the 1st we have such an incident. There was a larger total number of such incidents too during the month, so on the 3rd, the 7th, 11th, 15th twice, the 17th, the 25th, the 26th, and the 28th two incidents. These incidents were reported to the mission. Depending on the conditions involved, the representatives of the mission would come to verify what happened. If the conditions were not right for them to do it the same day, sometimes they would do it a few days after the actual event took place.

On the 28th of January - that's what it says here, and we already mentioned that - at Liken - that's mentioned in tab -- in the tab that has to do with that date. I think it is tab -- tab 290 speaks of that too; that is to say, Goden, when one terrorist was killed, and Liken, when three were killed. So the intensity of such grave incidents was stepped up.

Another characteristic thing was that there were no incidents between the army and the mission. Another characteristic is that every day some teams, unannounced, tried to enter the border area. That was on the 31st twice, and then three times on the 3rd, and then on the 6th and three times on the 7th and on the 9th, and on the 10th of January twice, ⁴¹⁴⁷⁸ then on the 16th, and on the 18th twice again.

In all the talks with the leadership of the mission, the following was stated: When the border area is concerned, they should be announced previously and they should go with liaison teams. That's for the sake of their own safety too because incidents were possible there at any point in time. And also because, on the basis of the agreement, that was not envisaged, that the border area could be entered any way one wished.

Q. General, at any rate, in all these documents from 262 until 291 that have to do with cooperation with the verification mission, is there any incident in any one of these documents between the representatives of the army and the representatives of the verification mission which could indicate an absence of cooperation that was envisaged and regulated by the agreement?

A. No incidents whatsoever. In one of the tabs, it says that there were a few attempts made near the border positions to come unannounced, so there would be a barricade there and there would be a guard and they would call the -- the guard would call his superior officers and say that they came and they wanted to see the border post. And then they tried to remove the barrier themselves, the roadblock. They would -- the guard, the soldier involved, would react the way they were taught to; that is to say, they would cock their rifles and say that they are not allowed to pass. That would be the gravest incident I could refer to as committed by the military.

But in 1998, when the KDOM American team said that the army had ^{41479 BLANK PAGE 41480} fired at him and then after the event was reconstructed that was not -- proven not to be correct.

Q. What it was that happened, was the event reconstructed together with the representatives of the verification commission or separately from them?

A. This is an event from 1998, from November. Together with the team, together with the mission team. What was shown was that actually the combat vehicle that encountered the mission vehicle, this was a Soviet-made vehicle, a BRDM, it was moving downhill and the engine -- the sound of the engine was reminiscent of a burst of gunfire. So when this incident was reported, we investigated the matter, so the following day everything was repeated but in the presence of the team that verified that there was no gunfire, that this was a completely different matter.

Q. Oh, so what they reported was that they heard a burst of gunfire but it proved to be the engine of a motor vehicle moving downhill that sounded that way.

A. Yes.

Q. And that was verified later by the mission itself. Was any member of the mission injured in any way ever?

A. Not by the military, no. There was no such incident ever, as far as the military and the police are concerned, as far as I know. And I was there all the time.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... evidence as to the non-cooperation of the army with the verification mission?

MR. NICE: I'm not in a position to put my finger on that at the ⁴¹⁴⁸¹ moment. If the accused can direct us as to what this evidence is related, I'll turn to it, but at the moment I'm not alert to what he's focussing on, no.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I am just wondering why you're leading this evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, because an entire series of documents -- or rather, you didn't want us to deal with 1998, but in 1998, when the mission was established, for every month there is a set of documents that pertains to contacts with the representatives of the mission, contacts between the military teams that were working with the representatives of the mission. Now we have covered part of 1999 as well, so I am leading this evidence to show that the army had a very proper cooperation with the military mission all the time and they acted in each and every situation in accordance with the agreement. All the members of the mission were protected. There was not a single incident with them in which anybody was injured. They were allowed to go everywhere they wanted to go -- or rather, the army fully complied with the obligations taken upon itself by our state as regards the verification mission, and that is attested to by these documents.

MR. NICE: There is, of course, one discrete issue that may arise, and that relates to Racak, which on the Prosecution's case and on the material you've looked at recently was a joint military-police operation and for which there is a claim of advance notification to the mission which is not, I think, necessarily accepted by the witness, as we've heard. But that's a quite discrete area. ⁴¹⁴⁸²

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice and Mr. Milosevic. I just wonder whether you're not indulging in an overkill in relation to this matter of the proper conduct of the army. I thought you were moving on to issues raised by the indictment in 1999.

MR. KAY: It did feature in the Prosecution case through witnesses Vollebaek and Walker in relation to the KVM.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Very well, Mr. Milosevic, move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You just mentioned Racak. Racak is not within the area of responsibility of General Delic. But I can put this question to him -- or rather, does he have any information that the army took part in what happened in Racak at all.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you have any such information about that?

A. The first information about what happened in Racak is what I learned from my colleague from the MUP; that is to say, the head of the secretariat in Prizren, who told me that the MUP carried out an action in Racak. On the 17th of January, a meeting was requested with me by the team of the verification mission, and they asked that I explain what happened in Racak. I told them that Racak was not in my area of responsibility, and as far as the army is concerned, I told them to speak to the command of that unit; that is to say, the 243rd Brigade.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, General. It's not within his area of responsibility and he ...

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Microphone not activated] Move on, ⁴¹⁴⁸³ Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Or rather, Mr. Robinson, I assume that this group of documents can also be admitted, the group that we dealt with a short while ago, and that we can do this rather quickly. They have to do with the work with the verification mission.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, General Vladimir Lazarevic wrote a paper on the activities of the commands and units in January 1999. It was written on the 4th of February, 1999. Inter alia, it says that "During the month of January, there were several serious extraordinary events that took place, like eight persons abducted, ammunition seized, manslaughter as far as a soldier is concerned, fire," et cetera. What is -- what does all of this have to do with, this information contained in tab 292?

A. This is an order of the commander of the Pristina Corps.

Q. 292 is command of the 549th Motorised Brigade, report on the activities of commands and units in January 1999.

A. Oh, yes. So practically this is a copy of the order of the corps commander. Basically, it was copied out and then I gave six tasks to all the units at brigade level. So through these first paragraphs, all the incidents are referred to, the ones that occurred in January, on the 2nd, 3rd, 9th, 11th, 14th, all the way up to the 28th. The consequences of ⁴¹⁴⁸⁴ these incidents are referred to as well, and it says that on average every day there was a combat activity in protecting the state and the border units.

The next, it says that "The units with their high degree of combat readiness resolved these problems in the best possible way, in spite of the difficult conditions, but still there were special things that happened. The members of the 125th Brigade that were abducted, eight men. And then the fire and then the manslaughter. And there was -- there was control at all levels, and based on the order issued that -- in order to deal with the previously mentioned unusual events and willful abandonment of units as well as the order to ensure," et cetera --

Q. All right, General. Let's not go into all of that now, but basically it is proper work and lawfulness that are stressed.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before you move on, let me just clarify. The last set of documents will be admitted except for those that are untranslated, which are marked for identification pending translation. Please continue.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, you adopted measures to prevent any surprises and maintain the level of combat readiness and this order was reached on the 4th of February, 1999.

A. Yes.

Q. This document is tab 293. What did these measures pertain to?

A. This is an order of lasting nature. It's a standing order. In ⁴¹⁴⁸⁵ order to preserve the morale of the units, I order that all units with "A" classification go "to suitable sectors on special orders and undertake all measures to protect troops and materiel and technical equipment from air operations."

And then the suitable sectors are referred to: Who provides security for barracks once they are abandoned, where different units will take up positions, and in the areas of deployment there should be at least the second level of protection from an engineering point of view.

Q. General, I have to ask you to speak slower because I see that some parts of your sentences are being omitted. Probably they cannot keep up with you.

A. The most important points from this order are to continue the second level of protection; then to continue with additional obstacles towards the Republic of Albania, especially along the state border; and then also to provide in-depth security in those areas where there are incursions from Albania to Kosovo and Metohija according to the plan that relates to such incursions; and also forces for intervention - and I had two facilities - should be on the ready and that a plan of masking should be made for all units at the level of the brigade; Vrbnica-Prizren, Dragas-Prizren are the roads that should be observed. All units are given assignments.

Logistics should also be ready to move on from peacetime deployment to war levels, and also to prepare for quick call-up, to mobilise the brigade and to inform them all about the political situation - I am referring to paragraph 12 - the Siptar terrorists, and to prevent ⁴¹⁴⁸⁶ possible effects of enemy psychological propaganda. Focus morale and psychological work on motivating and mobilising all brigade members in order to execute the tasks set in a disciplined, professional, and precise manner.

And the last thing referred to here: That everyone should be made aware of the provisions of the Geneva Convention and of conduct towards captured and wounded members of the enemy forces. Who was responsible for this? Commanders of subordinate units. And also to ensure maximum command secrecy and information protection by technical protection, equipment, et cetera. That would be the content of this order in the briefest possible terms.

Q. All right. When a NATO attack is anticipated, you say here: "NATO forces and Siptar terrorists." You speak of them as a single enemy.

A. This is the month of February. So in February there was a real danger of bombing. The political security situation in the country was very complex. And this order actually steps up preparations in order to prevent any surprise from air attacks and attacks by NATO forces and terrorist forces.

Q. All right. Almost at the same time, already on the 15th of February, you wrote a document titled "Political security situation in the area of responsibility." What is implied is the area of responsibility of your brigade. It stipulates similar measures. What is the most important part of this document?

A. With this document, I am reporting to the command - although the command already has this information - that practically all roads leading ^{41487 BLANK PAGE 41488} to my brigade are blocked, cut off. Orahovac-Malisevo-Pristina cannot be used because it is under the control of Siptar terrorist forces. Then the road Prizren-Dulje-Stimlje is possible but only for specially organised convoys and has to be protected from ambushes.

Prizren-Brezovica-Urosevac-Pristina has been saved but ambushes are possible because it is not under the full control of the MUP.

Q. You've already told us this, General. What do you say about the second page, about findings from the ground? You say: "There's a lot of shooting among the Siptars. Many of those who are loyal to the Republic of Serbia were liquidated, so that they are either forced to respond to training and mobilisation call-ups or have to donate large sums of money." Were you familiar with these occurrences?

A. We knew about it in 1998; however, from the beginning of 1999 the terrorists became even more brutal in their approach to the civilian population, so that the number of those who were liquidated was recorded, but our information is probably not correct because the number of those who were liquidated is probably much higher. But the fact is that those who were spared were either those who complied with their demands or donated large sums of money.

Q. I will quote: "All Serbs who live -- who lived in villages where they were a minority have moved to Prizren, Djakovica, Orahovac, and Suva Reka. Serbs remained only in the villages Velika Hoca, Zociste, Mala Krusa, Novake, Smac, Zojic, Rastane and Musutiste, as well as in villages in the Sredacka Zupa locality." Why did they move out?

A. All Serbs moved out of villages where they were in the minority ⁴¹⁴⁸⁹ because they were subjected to terrorist attacks. These villages where Serbs remained, such as Velika Hoca, were purely Serb villages. Novake also. Musutiste was 50/50. In other villages, Zociste, Mala Krusa, Smac, Zojic, Rastane had a smaller percentage of Serbs but in those places they remained nevertheless. They moved out of everywhere else.

Q. You also mention here that during January and especially in February most officers, most commanding officers of the Army of Yugoslavia, sent their families to Serbia and Montenegro. You say that three officers sent their families to Macedonia to stay with family, and three to Republika Srpska. You continue to say that this had a positive effect on the officers' work since they are constantly in their units and devote themselves more to their duties.

A. That's correct. Commanding officers sent their families away upon approval, because they couldn't have done so without prior approval. However, this had a negative effect on the Serb population, so that in addition to the positive impact -- namely that the officers were free to devote themselves to their work -- there were negative impacts on the Serbian population when they saw -- when people saw that officers sent their families away.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I have, again, to -- to raise the issue of evidence of this kind. Does the general have any evidence to give that relates to the incidents mentioned in the indictment? We can't sit here just listening to evidence about the -- the proper conduct of the VJ forces, that they acted according to orders, that they were sensitive to prisoners, and so on. We're dealing with an indictment, and the ⁴¹⁴⁹⁰ indictment sets out specific charges. Does the general have evidence that relates to any of these charges? Because if he doesn't, I'll -- I'll have to consult my colleagues as to the relevance of the evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly he has specific evidence relating to specific charges of what you call the indictment, but all the evidence that is being given by the general is directly related to charges of so-called illegal action by the army in 1999. What we see from here is the actual conduct of the army. We can also see the observations of the general and the information that became available to him concerning in particular direct cooperation between the KLA and the KVM and between the KLA and NATO. You were able to see in the video footage how much state-of-the-art equipment was seized -- or, rather, left behind when some prisoners were taken.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the illegal conduct that the indictment alleges relates to the specific incidents. It's only marginally relevant to show that the army had a culture of proper conduct. Only marginally relevant. You have to deal with the incidents in the indictment and stop skirting around them.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not skirting around them. I am following the chronological sequence of events to show the conduct of the army. When we reach those incidents in the proper time line, we will deal with them. We are now dealing with 1999, which you yourself qualified as entirely relevant. And if we observe the conduct of the army across a large part of the territory that constituted the area of responsibility and activity of the unit of General Delic, that is of ⁴¹⁴⁹¹ course relevant. This relates to 1999; in other words, what you call "my conduct."

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... by your observation that we will reach those incidents in the proper time line. When will that be?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am saying we are going chronologically. I'm not saying that we will reach it eventually. Those incidents mentioned in the charges of Mr. Nice come later. None of the incidents mentioned by Mr. Nice and located in the area of responsibility of General Delic will not be omitted [as interpreted]. I'm not saying that we will deal with it in due course, I'm saying that we are going chronologically.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Delic, in that exchange, Mr. Milosevic mentioned a concern about apparent cooperation between the KLA and the KVM. Was that a matter that concerned you?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course. I was very concerned that the mission was not playing its part.

JUDGE BONOMY: The answer only needs -- the question only requires a yes or no answer. What -- what steps were taken to explain to the KVM this concern?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we look at the tabs related to team reports submitted to the General Staff, we will see that at various meetings - and meetings took place at every level on a daily basis - the mission was made aware of the problems in the territory. The mission was not there only to note the number of dead among the MUP, the army, or the ⁴¹⁴⁹² civilians. The MUP was supposed not only to follow the activities of the army, they were also supposed to follow the activities of the terrorists.

JUDGE BONOMY: So will we see a document that you are responsible for or familiar with addressed to and sent to or delivered to the KVM explaining the concern, or are you saying that all we will see is internal documentation recording that concern?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This documentation was at the highest level. That is to say, after meetings with the leadership of the mission, be it Mr. Walker or General Drewienkiewicz, those reports were sent to the team of the General Staff, after those meetings. In these reports, we can find the questions raised.

JUDGE BONOMY: What do you mean by "the team of the General Staff"?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was a team of the General Staff that was in charge of contacts with the verification mission.

JUDGE BONOMY: What I'm asking you about is whether there are documents sent to - sent to - the verification mission from the VJ explaining concern about apparent collaboration or cooperation between the KVM and the KLA. It's all very well to look at internal documentation that we're looking at at the moment, but where was something put in writing and sent to them to tell them what you were concerned about?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In our talks, these issues were raised not in so many words. It was not put that way, that the mission was cooperating with the terrorists, but it was said that the mission was not fulfilling its mission with regard to terrorists. ⁴¹⁴⁹³

JUDGE BONOMY: Why wasn't it put in so many words if that was what you were concerned about?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] One cannot say with regard to the entire mission, all the individuals, that they were cooperating with terrorists, but such cooperation certainly existed. And I can give you a specific example to show that.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, with regard to the question asked by Mr. Bonomy a moment ago, we were discussing 294, tab 294 from which you quoted. And in point 4 of this document, which I will remind you after this interruption deals with the situation in your zone of responsibility, this paragraph reads: "The OSCE Mission continues to monitor all our movements and activities around the clock. OSCE teams monitor every supply convoy and the movements of individual pieces of hardware."

And you say that civilians - I suppose you mean - make constant requests for visits to be made "to villages located in areas of our combat disposition or in the border area. Whenever there were clashes with the KLA, OSCE teams immediately went there or were already in the area. Sometimes one has the impression that they closely cooperate with the KLA, informing them of the movements of our forces. They exerted no influence on the KLA, nor did they prevent them from taking up new positions. According to our information, the Siptars are waging a kind of psychological and propaganda warfare through the OSCE Mission. Every day ⁴¹⁴⁹⁴ they report to the Mission a large number of incidents, human rights violations and such like by the MUP and the VJ; in most of the cases, it can be established that the reports were false or that the operations were completely legitimate. On the other hand, our approach to them is not good either: it is not aggressive enough, we do not confront them with the problems we have, nor do we insist that they totally fulfil their Mission obligations."

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was just asking a question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Was this what you knew about the conduct of the mission in your area of responsibility?

A. Yes. What is written here in this report reflects faithfully their conduct.

I would like to add something. Just let me find the appropriate tab. It concerns a meeting of the 27th of January between team leader Colonel Kotur and Luigi Orsini [phoen] and Colonel Guy Senza [phoen], a representative of the mission. This meeting took place in Pristina. A request was made to the mission to react and open the Orahovac-Suva Reka road because the terrorists had placed roadblocks. Colonel Orsini replied that Mr. Walker talked in Dragobilje with the terrorist commander known as Soko and that the latter ordered the roadblocks to be removed and that terrorists move away from the road. It says further on: "Mr. Walker believed there are two factions among the terrorists: One that does not wish the Rambouillet agreement to be signed and wishes to provoke a clash ^{41495 BLANK PAGE 41496} of wider proportions opposed to another faction who is in favour of the agreement."

It also says that: "An agreement exists and the army will never open fire first."

That much is true, but the terrorists have mobile telephones. These are not ordinary cell phones. These are actually radio devices with a base in a house, for instance, and they receive with a range of 20 to 40 kilometres. So it says here: "They have mobile telephones and the Siptars are always the first to call mission members and to say the police and the army are slaughtering us. Since the mission knows nothing about it firsthand, they believe the party who called them first." Those are the words of Colonel Orsini from the mission.

JUDGE BONOMY: All of -- yeah. All right.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I don't know if we are moving from this topic to another, but two very short administrative points, one not connected to the witness at all, and that is that today was the day when you had announced an intention to discuss, however briefly, the Jasovic exhibits. You've had our filing. I think I have five sentences that I would wish to add to that, which will not take very long. The second administrative matter goes back to your earlier questioning of the accused about how long he was going to spend with this witness. The witness was listed to be 12 hours. By the end of today, he will have used 10. I nevertheless assume from the way things are developing that I'm not going to be cross-examining the witness tomorrow, but it might be helpful for all of us to know how long the accused is ⁴¹⁴⁹⁷ intending, in terms of hours or days, to go on so that we can prepare for it.

The third point is that the witness was unable to deal with the question of maps for the Ashdown questioning or evidence at the last break, but I gather he is prepared to discuss them at the end of the session this morning with Ms. Dicklich.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, when will you conclude your examination of this witness, bearing in mind that you had scheduled him for - what is it - 12 hours, 10 of which have already gone by the end of today?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand this, Mr. Robinson, but I will need more time than that for this witness. Please bear in mind that I am being constantly interrupted and that there are constant discussions of procedural matters here. Today we didn't even start right away but discussed procedural matters before I could begin. Then we discussed the maps, what the witness was to do in order to assist. My time is constantly being cut short. I am trying to be as expeditious as possible but I cannot plan the length of my -- of my examination-in-chief with precision. I estimated the time as best I could; however, obviously it will not be sufficient.

JUDGE ROBINSON: But it was an estimate nonetheless. It was an estimate nonetheless, because we need to make arrangements. And I should remind you: When a Judge intervenes, that is not to be characterised as an interruption, and I hope that was a mistranslation earlier. A Judge may make an observation. A Judge does not interrupt the proceedings. ⁴¹⁴⁹⁸ What is your estimate for the rest of the witness's evidence?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At least two days more.

JUDGE ROBINSON: At least two days? That would be Friday.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please don't take me at my word. I will try to be as expeditious as I possibly can, but I really cannot give you a precise answer. If I could, I would. I cannot tell you with precision how long a witness will dwell on a certain response.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: For Jasovic we'll reserve the last ten minutes of the day's proceedings.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we did say that we would hear the parties on the question of the admission of exhibits relating to Mr. Jasovic. And I think it is appropriate to do that now, spend the last 12, 13 minutes doing that, and we'll return to your examination tomorrow. And we'll take account of the fact that we are spending the last 12 minutes on this particular matter.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand that, Mr. Robinson, and it's quite in order that these documents finally be considered; however, I understood that the issue of all the exhibits tendered with General Stevanovic would also be considered.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's being considered, but we are not going to hear any arguments on that. That's being considered by the Chamber quite actively, yes. Now we'll just hear very brief submissions on exhibits relating to Jasovic's evidence, not Stevanovic. ⁴¹⁴⁹⁹ Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: Your Honour, it falls into two categories. Now, I'll deal with them separately.

First of all, the --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, if you have decided to discuss the documents in connection with Jasovic, I feel it would be proper to let this witness go as today's session will end in 15 minutes and there's no point in the witness sitting here listening to the arguments about Jasovic.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, quite so. Yes. You may leave, General, and return tomorrow morning at 9.00. I remind you you are not to discuss your evidence with anybody.

MR. NICE: But Ms. Dicklich will accompany him for the purpose of offering him some maps.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's approved.

JUDGE KWON: Let her try page 9 of [inaudible] -- Page 9.

[The witness stands down]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: Documents fall into two distinct areas: The Defence materials, Prosecution materials. I'll deal with the Defence materials first. They were all documents arising at the time of 1988 to 1999, contemporaneous, so-called official records, being statements, intelligence reports, and other forms of memoranda derived from the police station at Urosevac, relevant to the Defence case to establish the strength of the KLA in the Stimlje area with particular regard to the ⁴¹⁵⁰⁰ strength of the KLA in Racak as well as information that would have been received over a period of time by the local police force concerning the strength of the KLA in that area.

The approach that the Trial Chamber has consistently taken throughout the trial is that documents arising not prepared for this particular litigation but arising at the time as part of an official record or compilation is admissible because it was not prepared for these proceedings and could be considered to have a degree of independence from these proceedings in relation to the content of the material. The Prosecution had a ruling to that effect in relation to a witness that they called in relation to investigative material. That was a man called Dragan Karleusa, who gave evidence on the 22nd of July, 2002, transcript page 8363. He produced the investigation documents relating to the bodies in the truck in the river. That's all I need say about it. It was objected to by the Defence, but it was ruled by the Trial Chamber as being admissible because it was material deriving from an official investigation, not prepared for these proceedings. It is exactly similar to the kind of material that this accused has brought before the Court through the witness Jasovic.

If we move on to the Prosecution materials, our submission is that, consistent with previous rulings by the Trial Chamber on this issue relating to some of the witnesses that have -- that have been sought to be presented through the form of exhibit material, that is ammunition material for cross-examination. What they have done is attempted to produce statements from witnesses undermining the credibility of the ⁴¹⁵⁰¹ witness, alleging instances of torture, human rights abuse. We had exactly the same kind of issue in the Defence -- in the Prosecution case when Dr. Bosanac of Vukovar Hospital was called. That was on the 5th of February, 2003, transcript page 15663. The accused wanted to use two statements, one by a soldier called Sasa Jovic, the other by a doctor who had worked with Dr. Bosanac, called Dr. Djuranec. Both those statements alleged torture, alleged human rights abuses by the doctor against patients at the hospital as well as themselves. The evidence from Dr. Djuranec was in the form of a transcript that had been produced for proceedings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Again, whilst it was used as cross-examination ammunition and material, the Trial Chamber ruled that the accused could not exhibit those statements in support of the allegations that he was making. He had to call his own evidence to deal with those issues. That's exactly the same position that the Prosecution are faced with now, and indeed, Mr. Nice gave a very clear explanation for the basis of Rule, which can be found in the transcript in relation to his submissions to the Trial Chamber at the time and the reason for it.

So in our submission, the consistent approach adopted by the Trial Chamber to date in relation to the admission of materials in cross-examination should be followed to do justice between the parties and to enable both to have been treated the same.

A few specific matters relating to the Prosecution's schedule: I've been able to observe that although we have a detailed schedule, there appear to be some tabs missing, for whatever reason, during the ⁴¹⁵⁰² preparation of materials. We skip from tab 135 to tab 138; tab 138 to tab 140; tab 145 to 149. And this can be seen throughout the materials, with no apparent explanation.

We can also see that in relation to the witness statements that challenge the basis upon which they were taken by the police officer Jasovic, the statements relied upon by the Prosecution don't appear to deal with the kernel of the issue in relation to three -- three statements: Afrim Mustafa, who was interviewed on the 16th of January, his Prosecution statement sought to be adduced the 3rd of April of this year gives an account of how that statement was taken, but his statement was signed on the 17th of January, and his statement given to the Prosecution is silent on that matter. He wasn't held for just one day at the police station. He apparently went there two days, and he authenticated his statement on the 17th and he doesn't actually deal with that process of authentication.

The same point can be made for Saban Rama, tab 1.44. Again, statement dated the 16th of January but no explanation as to why he signed it on the 17th of January and what was prevailing at that time. Exactly the same observation can be made for Saban Rexhaj, tab 2.3. Interviewed on the 2nd of August, statement signed on the 3rd of August. No explanation as to why he signed it on the 3rd. These appear to be statements following a particular course of making allegations against Defence witnesses, but in fact have flaws within them in relation to key areas: As to why a statement was signed on a different day, no allegation of torture on the other day. So in our ^{41503 BLANK PAGE 41504} submission, that's a classic reason why material should not be admitted into evidence in -- in this form in these proceedings. I've dealt with this very briefly, and I --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Just looking at the two points that Mr. Kay has referred to, but having not had advance notice of them and they not having been dealt with in re-examination, I find myself at something of an unfortunate and, in the circumstances, I think unfair, disadvantage. But I'll see what I can do to deal with those two points. So far -- I'm just looking at 1.43 now. He makes it quite clear that he didn't sign the statement and that the signature is not his. This is on the statement that was produced. And he deals with the circumstances of the inaccuracy. He also deals with the circumstances in which he was taken into the prison in which he was beaten and forced to behave in the way he did. I'm not sure that that's in any sense incomplete in the material way, and if it was, it should have been raised earlier.

I think probably a similar consideration arises in relation to 1.44, which was an interview note, similar in format to some of the alleged notes of the witness Jasovic himself, and he again says that the contents is inaccurate. He doesn't recall speaking about certain names. There it is.

Incidentally, one point that -- so I don't think there's any point in that. ⁴¹⁵⁰⁵ As to missing numbers, I think Mr. Kay has probably misunderstood the purpose of the file. The file that was produced here was not an exhaustive file of all the Defence exhibits; it was those that were relevant. The schedule, on the one hand, if I've understood Mr. Kay's point, the schedule does indeed cover all the statements, including those for which there was a nil return, but the Prosecution file with the additional statements details only those that were relevant. As to our filing on the point, as I said, there were five sentences to add, and only five, but I'll deal with them in just two minutes after I deal with Mr. Kay's other points. The materials are not relied upon solely for the strength of the KLA, but they're relied upon for the function of those who died, the function and role of those who died at the time, a different and more specific issue.

He says that it's a matter of practice that official documents are admitted. It's a matter of practice that such documents have been admitted, but a general practice of permissive admission in no way overrules the general discretion about admission or exclusion of material which has to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. And unfortunately, I can't get into the precise page reference that Mr. Kay referred to for Bosanac because the electronic version doesn't turn it up for me in that format, but nevertheless here was a case-by-case consideration by the Court as then constituted on an arguably similar but indeed distinct question arising with two only different witnesses. An entirely different position from that where this Court has been supplied with a very ⁴¹⁵⁰⁶ substantial body of material going to show that this witness is wholly unreliable for reasons that are both independent in that they come from a number of different sources but themselves consistent. When you look at the filing we've made, I have my five points, I think, to make. The first, which isn't spelled out at paragraph 8, is that the standard of proof for admissibility is balance of probabilities but the burden -- we have not discussed this -- must be on the party seeking to produce the document.

We identify several reasons, quite independent of the material we've produced, that would show that none of this material can be admitted. And I only desire to emphasise two points: First, a superficially small point, like the use of the phrase "so-called KLA" is actually in itself sufficient to exclude all this material. The witness was --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, are you saying that --

MR. NICE: -- quite --

JUDGE ROBINSON: -- that by itself is sufficient to exclude all the material?

MR. NICE: Absolutely. If the Court concludes that of course that phrase was not used by each and every -- or indeed probably any of the alleged opponents, it's a nonsensical answer. But if the Court attends carefully to the way I gave the witness the opportunity to give a different explanation -- you'll remember on several occasions I said, "Don't be tempted to give the answer. Think about it." It's perfectly obvious that he was not writing down at that part the words of the ⁴¹⁵⁰⁷ individuals before him. It would be ridiculous to suggest that he was. And therefore in respect of each and every statement, part of what he has told you is inaccurate and untrue, and it makes, therefore, the whole body of his work for that simple and superficially small reason alone enough. Similarly, his answers in relation to 2.23 varied over time as between the anonymous informant and the identified but otherwise unnamed person who we were able to track down by the coordinates given. That shows you, on this potentially important source of information, completely unreliable and that then infects the rest of the body of his work. On the same paragraph as we deal with that, which is paragraph 23, an error of drafting crept through, where it was said that the witness was less than honest on occasions. Our position is quite clear: It's not that he was less than honest; it's that he was dishonest but that on the particular instances of 2.23 he showed his dishonesty without even the pressure of cross-examination because it slipped out by his own inconsistencies, or to be precise, changes of account. And finally, we make the point at paragraph 28 that we weren't able to meet all the makers of statements. I should remind the Chamber that when Jasovic first finished his examination-in-chief, he was on some terms to cooperate with the Prosecution via the Registry. The Chamber may recall - and if not, I can inform the Chamber of this - that efforts were made to get further information from him to enable us to contact those who we could not identify, but we were met with the response that that wasn't possible, in the same way as, of course, we were met at the end of the period of time between his giving evidence and returning for ⁴¹⁵⁰⁸ cross-examination not with the material that we had sought, not with the material that the Chamber had by very careful questioning of Your Honour -- His Honour Judge Robinson identified but with other material. And of course the absence of that material is one of the many matters we rely on intrinsic to his evidence and without regard to the material we offer going to show that he is an entirely unreliable witness. As to the question of the materials that we have laid before you, this is very different circumstance from other cases. And there is in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal in another case a mechanism why -- whereby this material can be admitted for purposes of credibility on this case, as a one-by-one or one-off incident if so decided. And with such a body of material before the Chamber, in our respectful submission, it would be wholly wrong to allow hearsay of this kind first coming in as third-hand hearsay through Marinkovic, then as secondhand hearsay, if it were to be allowed in through Stevanovic, and then now as firsthand hearsay through this witness. With this body of material available, either by -- well, by one mechanism or another, the material must be excluded and it mustn't be left that this trial has to deal with this issue by other means, which will be very consuming of time at a later stage, when it is quite clear that this material doesn't qualify for the reliability test that has to be passed before it can be admitted.

Unless I can help further.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]. ⁴¹⁵⁰⁹

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All this that was said -- Mr. Robinson, I believe that all that was said by Mr. Nice is completely devoid of any grounds. Namely, all the documents introduced through Witness Jasovic are public records, public documents of the Ministry of the Interior and its bodies and they were all created contemporaneously. None of them was created for the purposes of this trial. And the witness in question had worked in the Ministry of the Interior for several decades and has been a crime investigations inspector for several decades.

We established through examination that there had never been any criticism or objections to his work.

The documents are doubtlessly public. Some of them were introduced through investigating Judge Danica Marinkovic, whom Mr. Nice called a criminal, and then he found a difference between her set of documents and another set of documents. Further documents were introduced through General Stevanovic and through Witness Jasovic, who in fact came to testify at the initiative of Mr. Nice. I didn't even know about him at the time when Mr. Nice suggested that he could testify because he was here anyway to testify in the Limaj case.

Therefore, all of these documents are official and all of them are contemporaneous.

All the documents of Mr. Nice were created recently, and witness Jasovic made it crystal clear why the Albanians are saying something quite different now. And you, if you know anything at all about Kosovo, will ⁴¹⁵¹⁰ understand that they are saying something different because their lives are in danger.

The witness said this very clearly. Mr. Nice can collect hundreds of statements to say anything at all against anyone who testifies against the Albanian side. You, Mr. Robinson, and you, Mr. Kwon, could see that in the testimony of one of Rugova's assistants when I showed him a recording of his own interview. He was unable to respond. He, being a politician, responded only two years later, saying that he couldn't reply because Kalashnikovs were trained at him from the other side of the camera. He mentioned it only two years after the event. They are in mortal danger if anyone finds out that they gave any information to the organs of the interior of the Republic of Serbia. Graphological expertise established that it is impossible to say one way or another that this was not the signature of the person in question. None of the documents provided to refute these official records stands up to scrutiny. We had the opportunity to hear a witness who took these statements. These records of his contain countless facts, countless names, descriptions of events, and it's simply unbelievable for anyone who is a Homo sapiens to imagine that this was all a product of imagination. This statement was given by certain persons about others who were members of the KLA, and Mr. Jasovic explained that it was his job to collect information about KLA members, about their strength, equipment, weaponry, et cetera, and he collected this data for police purposes, not in order to deceive his own superiors but, on the contrary, to supply them with valid information. ⁴¹⁵¹¹ Every superficial observer who reads these documents will know that they are authentic. None of those documents can be refuted by the explanations given by Mr. Nice. You saw that Mr. Nice made a schedule. He informed all of us here that they found three persons who were placed in Racak schedule. And in this book authored by KLA members, I quoted 20 names from Racak. That is one piece of evidence showing what Mr. Nice's schedule is worth. It is a reversal of evidence and falsifying of evidence. It is deliberate distortion of the truth, of what actually happened. There is no comparison between a witness statement made in the month of June who was asked: Weren't you tortured by the Serbs to give this statement against us? This witness will know that his head is at stake. There is nothing in Mr. Nice's evidence to refute the official records and the official statements collected by Mr. Jasovic as an official authorised officer that need to be exhibited, and the evidence collected by Mr. Nice to shake the credibility of this witness should, in my opinion, be rejected because it doesn't meet a single criterion of authenticity.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I, with your leave -- nothing do with what Mr. Milosevic has said, but the points that I was not given advance notice of in relation to 1.44 and 1.45, may I adjust two sentences. As to 1.44, bearing in mind the difficulty that the witness had with explaining how people were detained overnight without a record of their detention being made - and this was in answer to questions from the Bench - the Court will remember the passage because these were people apparently staying there voluntarily, if at all. It is for him to have ⁴¹⁵¹² explained why for 1.44 there's an apparent interview on the 16th with an apparent signature on the 17th, something he didn't explain. With 1.45, if you look at the totality of the material, including that provided by the Prosecution, although the person concerned acknowledges that the signature is his, he doesn't acknowledge that the date of the signature is accurate. And again, that's simply a matter of what's to be found on Jasovic's material, so that the points raised by Mr. Kay don't in any sense counter the material coming from the Prosecution.

Thank you for allowing me to make those two points.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We'll adjourn now until tomorrow morning, 9.00 a.m.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I, too, raise a technical issue and ask you to issue an order in that regard? Very often I find a serious discrepancy between what was actually said and what was interpreted and what is in the transcript. I'm not going in depth of this issue. But through the liaison officer more than a year ago I raised this, and I kept repeating it every month, requiring what is my right; namely, videotapes of this entire procedure. And I keep receiving the same answer through the liaison officer: You will get it but we need time. This issue is taking too long. I have been asking for it for a long time and I have not been getting it for a long time. So I am asking you to issue an order to make available to me the video recordings of this ⁴¹⁵¹³ entire trial from the beginning.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, neither Judge Kwon nor I remember hearing this point before, but we'll attend to it. We'll consider it and do whatever is proper in the circumstances.

We are adjourned until tomorrow, 9.00 a.m.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just say one thing: You are right. I have never mentioned this to you before. I asked through the liaison officer that the relevant service make this available to me. And I am saying it to you now because I seem to be unable to exercise this right otherwise, so that you can issue an order.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you for the clarification. We'll attend to the matter.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.01 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 30th day of

June, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.