41514
Thursday, 30 June 2005
[Open session]
[The witness entered court]
[The accused entered court]
--- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
JUDGE KWON: Judge Robinson will be absent for the first session due to urgent -- some personal reasons, so two of us will sit pursuant to 15 bis.
Mr. Milosevic, for you to continue your examination.
WITNESS: BOZIDAR DELIC [Resumed]
[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
A. Good morning, Mr. Milosevic.
Q. In the past few days, we looked at what your tasks were, and you demonstrated this through your orders and analyses. Yesterday we established that the situation in Kosovo and Metohija grew increasingly more complex. Now we will see what kind of tasks you issued with regard to defence and attack to your motorised brigade in your area of responsibility in the in-depth securing of the state border. This is an order signed by you on the 14th of February, and it's in tab 295. Along with it there is a map, so that I would like you to explain what the tasks were, to show us the map, and to tell us only the most essential points contained in this order.
MR. NICE: I'm afraid I don't have a map at 295. 41515
JUDGE KWON: We don't have a map either.
MR. NICE: While I'm on my feet and while we're mentioning maps, the witness returned this morning having selected a map to deal with the Ashdown evidence. He's marked it in a way that he's explained to Ms. Dicklich, and therefore he's in a position to deal with this. I don't think the accused had a chance to look at it yet. I'm, of course, entirely in the Court's hands. We could get it copied now or we could wait for it to be used on the overhead projector and then get it copied later.
JUDGE KWON: Well, I think you can deal with it during your cross-examination, but I have to consult with -- yes, I see nodding, so that can be explored during the cross-examination. Mr. Milosevic, do we have a separate map for tab 295?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We do have a map, Mr. Kwon, and I can tell you that I was surprised by the fact that things were missing yesterday because a CD was provided with all the documents, so the service here and my documents were taken from the same CD. So what was printed out for me must be available for everyone in the courtroom. It's all on the CD, it can all be found there.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, have you found it?
A. Just let me find it, please.
Q. It's tab 295.
A. Among the maps I was given, I can't find this particular map.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I put the map I have on the 41516 ELMO. It's black and white.
JUDGE KWON: So, General, can you see the map on the ELMO?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I can.
JUDGE KWON: Then let us proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, please read out what it says here on the map. Tell us what this map shows, who approved the map, who signed it, and whether the map says it's an order for defence and attack given to the 549th.
A. Yes. This is my order accompanying the order for attack and defence. It is an order issued at 1000 hours on the 14th of February, 1999, at the temporary command post. And from this map we can see how the mixed companies are deployed which were allowed under the agreement. And we can see that they were deployed each in its own area. We can also see the disposition of the border posts. And these arrows show the directions of the possible engagement of these mixed companies, indicating also the tasks assigned to them. Although, through the order attached to this decision on the map, all the tasks given to the units are defined with precision.
Q. General, the point of my question is in the tasks. Let me explain right away that there is no mystery here. Mr. Nice keeps saying that our forces had tasks other than those mentioned here, that their task was to perpetrate ethnic cleansing, to kill the civilian population, the non-Serb population, that is. He has various kinds of constructions that he has presented here, so I want to see what the order is that you as the brigade commander issued. And there were others in the chain of command, 41517 both superior to you and junior to you. What were the tasks?
A. There can be no question.
Q. Yes, that's clear to every normal person. But look here. What does it say here in paragraph 2?
A. To prevent the infiltration, to "prevent weapons and military equipment being brought in, break up and destroy terrorist groups infiltrated. Use the other forces in cooperation with the MUP to secure control of the territory within the zone of responsibility, and an unhindered flow of traffic on the Prizren-Djakovica axis, step up the security of military facilities --"
JUDGE KWON: Could you read a little bit slower. Bear in mind the interpreters. Thank you.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "-- and to be prepared to intervene in -- with regard to the sectors or facilities under threat and to break up and destroy sabotage and terrorist forces." I received this task directly from the corps command, and as such it entered my order and could not be changed. And also, my -- the location of my forward command post and command post are mentioned. And then the neighbouring units are assigned tasks.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. The map, as I see, was approved by the higher command as part of your order.
A. Yes. Paragraph 4 practically is my own decision. And this is what is shown on the map. The decision says that: "In the zone assigned, by using the main brigade forces, to secure the DG and combat control of 41518 the territory and prevent the infiltration of DTS, and with the auxiliary forces protect military facilities, personnel and TMS in the barracks and outlying facilities, with part of the forces at readiness to intervene on axes under threat."
The goal of this task -- rather, this decision is to secure the state border in depth. That's one thing. And monitor -- monitoring and combat control of the territory, prevent the transfer of DTS and military equipment to Kosovo and Metohija, break up and destroy infiltrated DTS, protect military facilities, units, and the materiel, and establish conditions for the rapid engagement of other forces. And further, the combat deployment is described.
Q. Very well, General. What does it say in the last sentence in paragraph 4.7 of your order to the units subordinate to you?
A. That "in the execution of all tasks assigned, fully respect the prescribed procedures for dealing with prisoners of war, and the regulations of the Geneva Convention, humanitarian law, and the law of war." That is the last paragraph.
Q. Very well.
JUDGE KWON: General, if you could remind me of what is a DTS.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sabotage terrorist forces.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now we are entering the third decade [as interpreted] of February, and in view of the threats issued by the NATO pact we now have here your decision about redeploying materiel and equipment. Can you 41519 explain the purpose of your decision and why you arrived at this decision and how it was carried out.
A. It's well known that the equipment and materiel of every army is located in certain depots and warehouses which are concentrated in one place in order to be more easily secured. In a situation where there is an imminent threat of war, these -- the equipment and materiel are dislocated to various locations so that if they are destroyed, they are not all destroyed together and the unit can still have resources left. The purpose of scattering the equipment and materiel is to have it in various locations.
Q. Very well, General. This is a clear explanation. Tell me now, as you carried out an analysis, yesterday you said every time there is a movement of troops, after that every commander, including you, carries out an analysis of what has been done and documents the aim and what happened.
In tab 297, you have an analysis of what was done on the 29th of February, 1999. What do you say in this analysis?
A. On the 29th of February, 1999 -- on the 20th of February, 1999, a group of officers was looking for the right kind of terrain for this kind of redeployment. Metohija Vino is a very well-known company, so they went to that area, and they were attacked by terrorist forces in those vineyards belonging to that company.
Since this was a small group of officers with a very small security detail, these combat vehicles were hit and these units -- or rather, officers asked for assistance. This analysis practically shows 41520 our intervention -- or rather, the intervention of the forces that came to assist them; that is to say, those who deblocked this group of officers, who chased away the terrorist forces.
Q. Let's just deal with this so it's quite clear what was actually going on. Because of the imminent threat of a NATO aggression, you were dispersing your materiel resources; ammunition, fuel, equipment, what the brigade had.
A. Yes.
Q. A group of officers went out to reconnoiter, to see where all of this would be redeployed. They have no combat tasks. And then they were attacked by terrorists. They call a combat unit to their aid because they're not capable of defending themselves, this unit comes, intervenes, and on the basis of all of that, you make this analysis as to what actually happened.
A. Yes. This is presented through this analysis. As a rule, such things are contained in the verification team of the OSCE, because they were present too. Soon after that, five vehicles of the OSCE from Suva Reka and Prizren arrived in the immediate vicinity of this particular locality. Three vehicles arrived to the side where the terrorists were, those who were attacking, and two vehicles arrived to where my unit was.
Q. And you also wrote an analysis on the basis of reconnaissance on the 20th -- on the 21st of February, and you informed the corps command. Can it be seen in this analysis what the actual task of your unit was? That is in tab 298.
A. Yes. Again, on the basis of orders issued by the superior 41521 command on the 21st of February we moved in two directions, Prizren-Suva Reka, Recane, Sopina, Musutiste, Dvorane, and Prizren, Bela Crkva, Orahovac, Zociste, and the other way around.
The command is informed that during these activities there were no contacts with terrorist forces and also they are informed of the observations made during the reconnaissance. Near Suva Reka, persons in uniform were noticed, towards Budak [phoen] and Matica [phoen]. When arriving in the village of Vranic, the population was surprised to see the army and they started fleeing towards the mosque, and that shows that possibly there were terrorists hiding in the village itself. In the village of Recane, they noticed the movement of persons in civilian clothes in the area. Then they fled into the bushes. All of this was observed by members of the OSCE and there were also cameramen from Western countries who actually filmed the movement of troops. Near Maleso [phoen], we came to Vran Stena, and that is where we noticed certain persons and we assumed that they were observers. Near Zociste, we noticed that from Samodreza and Studencani the population was moving out on their own vehicles in the direction of Neprebiste and others, and there were only terrorist forces left there.
Q. Before that, it says here they're intensively working on digging communication trenches and bunkers.
A. Yes. Yes, that's what it says. For the area of Retimlje, they're building trenches, communication trenches, and bunkers intensively. MUP organs that are in Vran Stena noticed during contact with them that the trenches dating back to 1998 were being renewed at the 41522 Troja pass and that they were going to Orahovac-Malisevo but only with members of the OSCE and that they practically observed terrorist forces in uniform by the road.
Q. You see, already in document 299, you indicate the information that you gathered over those days about the number of persons who were carrying out tactical training in the area of the village of Pojate.
A. That was characteristic of the entire territory of the Albanian HAS; that is to say, the part of the territory that is on the Albanian side, that there was intensive training in the immediate border area. In the previous order -- in my previous order, there is mention of that, how many terrorist forces are in my zone -- or rather, in Albania neighbouring my zone, ranging between 4.000 to 6.000.
Q. So all of that is going on already in the third week of February.
A. Yes.
Q. General, I'm just going to put a few short questions to you in relation to your relationship with the verification mission during the month of February. The documents that pertain to the verification mission are in numbers 300 to 320 inclusive. In order to save time and since these are documents that provide day-to-day information about contacts between the army and the verification mission and the regular functioning of this relationship, I don't think I have to deal with all the documents individually one by one, but I'm simply asking you to give us your briefest possible comment about these documents, 300 to 320, that all pertain to the month of February and the verification mission.
A. First of all can I say something in relation to myself. In tab 41523 BLANK PAGE 41524 301 on the 1st of February, I met up with the leader of area one, General Maisonneuve, and he told me that he had 160 verifiers and 160 assistants. There are three centres and three -- in Slapusevo, Malisevo, and Rastane, and that he was -- and that he intended to open three other centres in Zupa, Planeja, and Velika Krusa. I gave some proposals then that in some other places these sub-centres should be open too, and the general accepted that. However, that did not happen, because everything that happened in the month of March prevented that from happening. In tab 301 also, the representatives of the OSCE highlight that only the Siptars were asking them for help, and the impression therefore was that they were the only ones who were jeopardised, not the Serbs. In all the tabs from 300 to 320 the first thing mentioned is that our side informs the mission on a daily basis about troop movement and about military convoy movement.
Q. General, is this the pattern how the relationship functioned with the mission? Can we take any one of these reports? Again, is paragraph 1 always troop movement?
JUDGE KWON: Well, we are on tab 301. If the general could explain in more detail how this report is written, written by whom, in what context. And I note it's written by team leader Major General Tomislav Mladenovic.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In all units, in all independent battalions -- that is to say, there are three battalions that were within the Pristina Corps -- and in every brigade there were liaison officers. Liaison officers sent daily reports to the liaison team of the Pristina 41525 Corps. And also, there was the liaison team of the 3rd Army that was in Pristina too. The liaison team of the 3rd Army on a daily basis, when they received reports from the ground, from the field, they would send their own reports to the General Staff, and that's the kind of report you have before you now. This is practically from the entire territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Everything that happened and that had to do with the OSCE mission was forwarded to the operative centre of the General Staff in Belgrade.
JUDGE KWON: So all these tabs are of the same category, so written by a report of the 3rd Army command mission liaison team.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. Yes. These are top-level reports that reached Belgrade.
JUDGE KWON: One housekeeping matter: Tab 300, the index says: "A translation is provided," but in my binder, translation is missing. Just -- is it just my case?
That can be sorted out. Yes. Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Kwon.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, while we are still dealing with tab 301 that Mr. Kwon devoted particular attention to, can we see a pattern here according to which these reports are written? Actually, is paragraph 1 always movements by units? Does the movement of every unit have to be recorded and submitted to the OSCE?
A. That is in accordance with the agreement from the level of 41526 company further up.
Q. Any kind of movement, whether they're coming or going, that is always paragraph 1, and in paragraph 1 any movement of any troops is referred to.
A. Yes.
Q. Number 2: "Incidents."
A. Incidents that are caused by terrorists, or, for example, incidents that involved the OSCE mission, that were directed against the OSCE mission. So it has to do with everything that happened in the field.
Q. And number 3 is observations on activity by the OSCE mission and its members.
A. Contacts of the mission, meetings, and everything else that the mission did vis-a-vis the units where liaison officers had contacts; that is to say, this team was informed of all these contacts.
Q. And it always says who led the team of the OSCE, who they talked to, at which particular localities, where they were, and so on and so forth. So the entire activity is invariably registered. Is that the pattern that was used?
A. Yes. Even the vehicles, the OSCE vehicles, and the persons who were present, except in some cases when the persons present did not want to introduce themselves, but most often there is reference to the name and surname of the persons involved, the countries they came from, and the role they play in the mission itself.
Q. Thank you, General. Is that roughly how information was provided each and every time and the length of the text depends on what actually 41527 happened?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there any incidents in the relations between the army and the mission in any respect? Was any such thing referred to in any one of these tabs?
A. No, not in these 20 tabs. I just wish to point out that in tab 303, this was characteristic for my zone. There was a group of villages, Dobruste, Vrbnica, especially Dobruste, which is in the border area. Every day the mission was invited to come and visit these villages, and every day they sought approval for that and toured the villages, allegedly because the population was under threat. Also, on the 7th of February the locals denied what the mission claimed, that they were moving out because the army was opening fire.
Q. Where are you reading this from?
A. Tab 303.
Q. What page? At the end.
A. Yes.
Q. The liaison officer visited Dobruste with the OSCE representatives who talked to the villagers. The villagers denied the mission's claim that they were moving out because VJ units opened fire at night.
So the mission is telling you that they're moving out because the army opens fire at night, and then you go to the village together with the mission to establish what was actually going on in actual fact. And then they denied what the mission claimed. Did they tell you where they got 41528 this information from?
A. These were reports that they received by telephone. The same is contained in tab 308, dated the 12th of February. But this was a bigger meeting with villagers from that particular village again.
Q. Somebody was very diligent in submitting these false reports, somebody from that village was.
Now, tell me, where is this in tab 308? Yes, paragraph 3, "Observations, talks with the villagers on freedom of movement because they submitted a report to humanitarian organisations stating that they were prohibited from doing so."
A. The last paragraph in 308: "The mission -- the mission team," rather --
JUDGE KWON: I think the English translation hasn't been provided for this tab, contrary to the indication in the index.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am sorry, Mr. Kwon. All the materials for General Delic were submitted here on the 20th of April. Today is June 30th. So 70 days ago.
JUDGE KWON: So when we don't have an English translation, and if you're going to deal with it in detail, why don't you put it on the ELMO.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Kwon.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, just have a look at this page. It's on the second page, isn't it?
A. It's on the second page.
Q. Have a look at that page. We won't have a look at the entire 41529 report. Read it through. And we'd like to be able to follow it on the overhead projector, but do read out what you wanted to quote.
A. On the 12th of February, between 9.00 and 11.30 hours, a meeting was held between representatives of the OSCE, the liaison officers, and something in the village of Dobruste -- and the inhabitants of the village of Dobruste. It says in the course of the day a meeting was held with representatives from the village, a village in which they stated that they didn't have any problems with members of the Army of Yugoslavia. And the OSCE members said that they were happy to see children freely going to school.
Q. Very well.
A. The liaison officer asked senior inhabitants of the village why inhabitants were moving out. He asked how many families had left the village up until then and how many families there were working and abroad. He also wanted to know which countries they were working in. The answer was that the inhabitants were afraid of army patrols. To date, ten families had moved out and there were about a hundred families in the village who were living abroad -- or a hundred families from the village living abroad, mostly in Slovenia. Most of them had gone to Slovenia, they had moved to Slovenia.
Q. Very well.
A. And they, the inhabitants, wanted to have more frequent contact with the command of the unit who was in their immediate vicinity.
Q. Very well. And these 20 documents, which include reports --
JUDGE BONOMY: Is that not a different explanation? The 41530 villagers are on this occasion saying that army patrols are what has caused them to move out.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's something that they said, because on that day -- or rather, during that period of time, in the vicinity of their village a warehouse full of weapons and ammunition was found in a cave near a lake. If you have a look at the map, I will point to the location of that village. The village of Dobruste is here, next to the village. In the immediate vicinity of the village, in two places, large quantities of weapons and ammunition were found. These weapons and ammunition were checked by the OSCE too. On that day, until they had verified this, until they had checked this, throughout the night army patrols remained there and guarded the place where weapons and ammunition had been found. And in another report, you will be able to see that members of the mission told these villagers that they personally saw when fire was opened on the army from their village, and not a single army in the world would have tolerated such things. They said that it was necessary to put an end to such activities.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Very well --
JUDGE BONOMY: First of all, the first of these tabs you referred to, 303, the villagers denied the mission's claim that they had been abused by the army or that the army was in any way acting against their interest. But now on 308 we have the villagers themselves saying that people have moved out, not just are moving out today, but have moved out because of their fear of army patrols. They've emigrated from the area 41531 and gone to other places. Now, these two don't -- these are inconsistent with each other.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These two things are inconsistent because these reports were made on two different days. There are other reports, and we will deal with them later, we'll see them later, in which the villagers yet again state that they had no problems, because in this village the OSCE mission was present every two or three days, and they asked for permission to visit the village on such occasions. It's true that they stated what you can see in the document, but when we have a look at one of the following documents, I will draw your attention to some other facts.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Very well. But while dealing with this section, General, at the beginning of the paragraph, it says that a meeting was held between representatives of the OSCE and the liaison officer. They went to visit the village of Dobruste, and this was made possible for them.
A. Yes.
Q. And in the same paragraph, it says that there was a meeting with village representatives and at that meeting they stated that they had no problems with army members and the mission representatives said that they were happy because they could see children freely going to school. And then there is the part which states that they were afraid of patrols. So at the same meeting they said that they had no problems with the army, children were going to school, but at the same time they were afraid of patrols. 41532
A. If you have a look at this map, you can see where this unit was deployed. It's in the immediate vicinity of the village in question. Sometimes at night fire was opened, because this unit had been attacked from this feature, the Brinje [phoen] feature, which is here, and the inhabitants heard the shooting for sure, and they had good reason to be afraid because they were in the immediate vicinity of the border area and the troops were in their vicinity. When they said they had no problems with the army, that meant they had no problems because the army wasn't causing them any problems. But as for the fact that they were afraid, well, that's a totally individual matter. And the fact that they felt at threat, well, other people would have probably felt at threat too, other people of different ethnicity.
Q. In the vicinity of the border area, there was sporadic fire at that time too.
A. Yes.
Q. Very well. Are there any other examples that you could provide, examples that you have been referring to? Perhaps we could concentrate on just a few of these documents.
A. Well, at the beginning of March there is an example I could provide. Under tab 310, it says "The village of Planeja was visited, which is also located in the border area, and humanitarian aid for the school had been promised. The director said that they had no problems --"
MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... and therefore the speed at which the witness is going may be inconvenient for the interpreters but it's actually quite hard for comprehension. 41533 BLANK PAGE 41534
JUDGE KWON: Yes. We don't have an English translation. Could you put it on the ELMO.
I'm concerned about the way you're presenting the -- your evidence. Your index clearly says that translations have been provided, but it's not.
Yes, let's proceed.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here at the very beginning, it has the date of the 15th of December [as interpreted]. There was a report from the inhabitants according to which there was shooting in the village. This was in the village of Zulfaj, the village of Zulfaj is located here, and it's in the border area too, in the immediate vicinity of the border with Albania.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon, in the transcript it says the 15th of December; whereas, the witness said the 15th of February.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. The date was the 15th of February, wasn't it?
A. Yes. The mission concluded that the inhabitants weren't living in the village permanently, they were living in Djakovica and they only came to the village to feed the livestock. OSCE representatives checked the houses and noted that no damage had been inflicted on the houses as a result of shooting. The shooting that could be heard was a result of an incident that occurred in Karaula one week earlier when an illegal group of terrorists tried to cross the state border illegally.
Q. Very well. You're now explaining what happened. But here it says there was no damage inflicted on the houses which was a result of 41535 alleged shooting. The shooting was in the Karaula-Vodin [phoen] area seven days ago, and this could be heard in the village mentioned. That's what it says in the report.
A. Yes.
Q. And then it says the mission representative expressed his satisfaction because there was training that was organised and there were no incidents.
A. That's in a different area. Units of the army were involved in training and mission representatives monitored the training. This is a company from the 125th Brigade in the Vucikan [phoen] sector and they were accompanied by a mission team.
Q. So all these activities were monitored, each and every movement, any form of training was monitored. In any of these other documents, do you have reports on visits to certain villages?
A. No. The other documents refer to meetings held at various levels, meetings between local teams and liaison officers, and at higher levels, meetings in Pristina.
JUDGE BONOMY: General Delic, do any of these reports include any references to complaints by the OSCE -- complaints by the OSCE of aggressive conduct by VJ forces or complaints recorded by villagers of aggressive conduct by VJ forces, or do all the reports give the VJ a clean bill of health?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You can also find examples of such reports in the report in March. There was information on incidents that the mission reported on with regard to their members. And with respect to 41536 what we are discussing, these village visits, this is all a result of reports submitted to certain mission teams in which it was stated that there had been certain incidents or in which it was stated that the army had posed a threat to the inhabitants. In the vast majority of these reports, as you can see, the mission established quite -- something that was completely different in the field, came to a completely different conclusion in the field.
JUDGE BONOMY: Can you point to an example?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in this month, I have a report from March.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. What do you have at hand?
A. Well, the 1st of March.
Q. Which tab is that?
A. I'll tell you now. [Trial Chamber and registrar confer].
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's tab 4 -- it's tab 448. And that can be found in binder 4.
JUDGE KWON: We haven't received yet tab 400-something. We can come back to that issue, and let's -- let us proceed for the moment.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll deal with that in due course.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. So can we ignore the other documents up to tab 320, documents which include information on the work of the mission. Is it necessary for 41537 you to make any other comments with regard to some of these documents?
A. Well, yes, I'll comment on one other document.
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, it is for you to single out the important events, not for the witness. But let's proceed this time.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Tab 317. Tab 317, and it's page 3, the third paragraph from the bottom.
JUDGE KWON: If you could indicate the paragraph number.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. What are you referring to? Could you read it out?
A. "In the course of the day, OSCE representatives in Pec were trying to persuade their assistants and interpreter to leave the territory of Kosovo and Metohija together with them."
So it's page 3, and I have mentioned the tab number already, 317.
Q. So you can see that the mission is preparing to leave Kosovo and Metohija.
A. Yes, that's on the 19th of February. On the same day in Pristina a meeting was held of representatives of the OSCE at the request of General Drewienkiewicz, attended by Mr. Loncar and other team leaders. The subject of discussion was increased army activity and offering assistance to evacuate the OSCE mission. And I wanted to emphasise the fact that Mr. Drewienkiewicz said that he had information that members of MUP were preparing operations against the OSCE mission dressed up in KLA uniforms and were planning an assassination attempt on Walker. And this has nothing to do with anything.
Q. So our police provided security for the mission throughout that 41538 period of time. Do you know whether a single member of the mission came to any harm?
A. Well, only two members of the verification mission were wounded. I think they were from Scotland. But this was in the Decani area and they were wounded by terrorists.
Q. Here Drewienkiewicz is telling you that the MUP will open fire on the mission when withdrawing, dressed up in KLA uniforms. The MUP escorted the mission up to the border to ensure they could leave in safety. Are you aware of the fact?
A. Yes, I am aware of the fact that is referred to in the March reports. Ambassador Walker thanked MUP members at the border.
Q. For having escorted him, for not having shot him, and for not having attacked him. That's what he said, and Drewienkiewicz. In any event, we've seen what Drewienkiewicz has had to say and in the film we saw that he was not telling the truth.
A. Mr. Bonomy, Judge Bonomy put a question with regard to the incidents. On page 7 --
MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... it's not to be allowed. Comments like that are simply not allowed.
JUDGE KWON: Yes, you should not comment like that.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope you will give the same warning to Mr. Nice when he puts forth his comments.
MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... to understand the different functions of an advocate, which he attempts to be now, and counsel who is entitled and indeed obliged to put the nature of his case 41539 to witnesses.
JUDGE KWON: I would like the parties to proceed.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will proceed, Mr. Kwon, but that side should not falsify the facts and not obstruct the proceedings intentionally.
JUDGE BONOMY: Please proceed when you're told to proceed by the Presiding Judge.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Don't get excited, Mr. Bonomy. I will proceed.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Tell me, please, General, what is noted down here about the incidents you wanted to talk about -- you mentioned, as far as I can recall, page 7.
A. Tab 317, page 7. This is what the mission stated at the meeting about overstepping authority by the army in relation to members of the mission.
Q. Would you be kind enough to quote the passage.
A. "Pointing weapons towards the vehicles of the verifiers escorting a unit on the march, 13 times. Stopping verifiers at gunpoint and removing them from camp areas, twice. Unnecessary use of force, once. Ban on verifiers passing through unit deployment areas, ten times. Searches and confiscation of items, twice. And verbal threats, once."
Q. Very well. Are these major incidents? Did anything happen to anyone?
A. As I said yesterday, there were frequent attempts to enter the 41540 border area or even the camp premises where the verifiers tried to lift the barrier and tried to enter. And the men manning the barrier acted according to the rules of the service, to prevent such illegal actions.
Q. Very well. It says here on page 8: "In all cases, when they arrived unannounced and without the liaison officer, members of the mission were not allowed access to the unit."
A. Yes.
Q. Was this in compliance with the rules that they should arrive together with the liaison officer?
A. Yes, these were camp premises and this was the border area, and this was constantly a topic of negotiations. And finally, in late March it was agreed that the teams should not come to the border area without a liaison officer. When they arrived in the company of a liaison officer, there were never any problems.
Q. General, did this have --
JUDGE BONOMY: Could you direct me to that passage.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 8. It's on page 8, the third paragraph, where it says: "In all cases, when they arrived unannounced and without a liaison officer, the members of the mission were not allowed access and passage through the area of deployment of the units."
JUDGE KWON: In English, page 7.
JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, were there practical reasons for this? 41541
A. When a liaison officer is present, then the army takes responsibility for the safety of the members of the mission from the time they leave the garrison throughout the time of their stay. The liaison officer is the person who is familiar with the territory, the roads, the communications. And the practical reasons are that when a liaison officer turns up together with the members of the mission, this means that the superior commander knows that the mission is in the area and that the superior -- or rather, the officer on the ground doesn't have to worry about having to call his commander and inform him that a vehicle has arrived and he doesn't have to ask whether he's allowed to let it in.
Q. So everything is resolved when they follow the envisioned procedure.
A. Yes.
Q. So when they followed the procedure prescribed, everything was all right. But when they didn't, they were not allowed access.
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. That's quite clear, then.
JUDGE KWON: General, could you read the passage contained in the last paragraph under the heading (h). Could you read that passage, the 24th of February.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. "On the 24th of February, in the Donja Brnjica village sector, a member of the 52nd Battalion of the ABHO approached a member of the OSCE Mission who had come to the unit's deployment area and said: 'We'll kill you, you animals! This is Serbia.'" 41542 This is the threat I mentioned, one verbal threat. This is it.
JUDGE KWON: Do you know what happened to this soldier who made this verbal threat afterwards?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As this was not a unit of mine, I am not aware of it. But when the members of the mission listed all these incidents, they were told that everything would be checked. Whenever the mission presented, not only in relation to the mission itself but also in relation to the civilian population, whenever they presented any problems, all officers were duty-bound to check their allegations within their change of command and to take the appropriate steps.
JUDGE KWON: And these reports were sent to the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I am telling you. You can see on every page that the report was received by the operations centre of the General Staff. There is a stamp on the last page showing that it was received by the operations centre.
JUDGE KWON: And reports would be sent to the political leaders by the General Staff.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These reports became part of an operative report. They did not leave the General Staff, but the events, the most important events from these reports, would be included in the operative report of the General Staff.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Go on, Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] -- 41543 BLANK PAGE 41544
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me clarify. Mr. Kwon, you can see on this example before you now to whom this was addressed, "To: The General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia - to the team for liaison with the OSCE and NATO." So that was the part of the General Staff that would receive this.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. These documents now ending with number 320, relating to the work of the verification mission, is now something we can lay aside. I hope, General, that there is nothing left in dispute here. General, the command of the Pristina Corps -- and I can see that it says "deputy commander" here, the person acting for the commander, Colonel Veroljub Zivkovic, on the 7th of March sent to the command of the 549th Brigade, to the commander personally, or the Chief of Staff, that is to you or your Chief of Staff, this dispatch. What -- this is tab 321, General. And what is contained in it?
A. This is a telegram, a dispatch from the commander of the Pristina Corps, sent after my telegram where I reported that in the area of the village of Jeskovo terrorist forces were reassembling. This is a telegram saying that by 1400 hours on the 8th of March I should deliver to the corps command my plan for destroying this group and the composition of the forces I would deploy, and also I was to call on part of the MUP forces to participate in this activity.
Q. Very well, General. I will now put a few questions to you in view of the testimony of a protected witness here, A43, in connection with this incident. What, General, was the essence of the plan to destroy the 41545 terrorist forces in the broader area of the village of Jeskovo?
A. All this follows from what we can see from the documents that will follow. So the main idea was that around Prizren groups of terrorists numbering 20 to 30 men began to appear, and they were mobilising the population and re-taking the territory, as had happened in 1998. Their aim was to block the town of Prizren and to cut off the communications leading from Prizren into the depth of the state territory, also to cut off the logistical supply routes.
I reported on this to the corps command and requested approval to neutralise these terrorist forces and disarm them.
Q. And is your request contained in tab 322, where you write to the command of the Pristina Corps, and this contains your plan for the breaking up and destruction of terrorist forces in the broader area of the village of Jeskovo, south of Prizren?
A. This tab is a response to the telegram from tab 321, where I was asked to deliver my plan. Here I'm sending my plan after consulting the chief of the secretariat of the MUP as to what forces and units would be engaged and how the operation against the terrorist forces was to be carried out. This is my proposal to the command, and here I also propose the time of the action.
Q. Very well.
MR. NICE: Before we move on, the -- the accused's reference to protected witness A43 is clearly an error. And rather than leave that error to confuse later readers of the transcript, we better get the correct identification. 41546
JUDGE BONOMY: K41, I think, is the witness.
MR. NICE: Probably, yes.
JUDGE BONOMY: And perhaps Mr. Milosevic can clarify that.
MR. NICE: According to the LiveNote, it would appear to be probably K31 -- K41. It may be K42, but I think it's K41.
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure. In my notes, it says K43, but this may be an error. In any case, there was a witness called by Mr. Nice who testified here and whose testimony described a completely different situation from the one described by General Delic, but General Delic's forces were there and he knows exactly what happened. So that there will be no problem, it will be easy to establish the truth and discredit yet another witness as completely false.
JUDGE KWON: Yes. If the witness is K40-something, that's -- we have only K41. It should be K41.
Could you check it during the break and confirm it after the -- after the break, please. And in the meantime, let's proceed.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Let's see what happened with your proposal and your plan for the breaking-up and destruction. Tab 323 is an order issued by the command of the Pristina Corps approving my proposal for the deployment of the troops, and the order states that I should proceed to destroy the Siptar forces according to my proposal of the 11th of March.
Q. Very well. So your idea is accepted here.
A. Yes. 41547
Q. And then is this the entire technical procedure: You report, they ask for a plan, they accept your plan. After that you issue an order about the engagement of the forces. Is this the order contained in tab 324?
A. Yes. There are two ways of proceeding: If the superior command issues a direct order for the carrying-out of a task, then only a decision, an order, and an analysis or report are drawn up. If I, as you will remember from the order of 1998, for example, which said that units were not to be engaged without an order from the command. So I had to report on the appearance of terrorist forces, and I had to propose to the command what should be done. Then the corps command asks me for a plan, how I envision the carrying-out of this task. They can either approve my plan or change it. In this case, my plan was approved. So the corps command ordered me to carry out my plan. I issued the decision then, which is shown on the map, and I also issued an order to my units. It's contained in tab 324.
Q. That's the order that I'm asking you about precisely; that is to say, the order that you issued to your units that is contained in tab 324. Can you comment on it very briefly?
A. It says here that "During the night between the 3rd and the 4th of March in the village of Jeskovo a terrorist group was infiltrated consisting of 25 terrorists, and immediately the following night the villages of Leskovac, Ljubicevo, Hoca Zagradska were toured with the aim of mobilising the Siptar population."
Further on there is reference to the 5th and 6th and the 41548 activities then, that this group was joined by a large of group of some 50 terrorists from Retimlje, that on that day a diversionary attack was launched on the mixed company that was here near the lake.
JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... did you give to your forces?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That can be seen through the tasks given to the units. That is paragraph 5. "Unit tasks, 5/1, 5/2, 5/3, 5/4, 5/5 and 5/6. Precisely every unit gets its own tasks. First the composition of the unit, where they will be moving from, where the lines of blockade are, what tasks they have during the actual operations, and if you wish, I can read out any one of these.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, this is a very detailed precise order that you issued that contains all elements envisaged for such orders. Is there a map attached, as customary along with such orders?
A. Yes.
Q. The map is in tab 325. This is a map where it says "Decision of the commander of the motorised brigade to destroy Siptar terrorist forces in the wider area of Leskovo," approved by Major Lazarevic and signed by Brigade Commander Bozidar Delic. And the entire situation is depicted here on the map.
A. Red denotes the army forces that were engaged. Blue denotes the area where the terrorist forces are. Green denotes the deployment of MUP forces.
JUDGE KWON: General, in paragraph, for example, 5.6 and some -- 41549 5.4, I noticed there a mention of PJP. Are they members of special police? "37 Od PJP."
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE KWON: So police were operating together under the control of you.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE KWON: Could you elaborate further.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You misspoke. They did not operate under my control. This was joint activity of the army and the MUP. Special units of the police -- well, I'm not a police expert, but it's not a special police force as such. It is part of the regular police force, consisting of younger men who are, say, better trained and equipped than the other police. They did not have the status of any kind of special police as such. I think that General Stevanovic must have explained that.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. He explained that, but the translation that is used here is always "special police." They probably cannot find a different word.
A. They belonged to the regular police force but they are younger persons who went through some military training partially, and they are more capable than other members of the police force.
JUDGE KWON: General, if you could give us a -- some general picture, a description of a general picture how a joint operation with the police is taken.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In preparation, before this kind of map is drawn and before an order is written, it's obvious that it was me 41550 -- or rather, that my organs drew this map and that they wrote the order. That is only natural, because the army is particularly trained for that and they have organs that deal with map-drawing as such. The commander of the MUP unit is there to coordinate things together with me; that is to say, the operations of his unit, because his unit has less combat capacity. It does not have proper support. As a rule, they have small arms only. So viewing the terrain where the action will be carried out, they -- we decide where the police will be engaged. In order to coordinate command in this particular case and practically in all cases when we operated together with the police, the commander of this unit would be right next to me. We would be together. He would command his troops; I would command my troops. Of course, we give each other assistance. If he needs medical support or any kind of support, of course I will help out. Also, if I need assistance, I will get that assistance from the police.
JUDGE KWON: Who decides, first of all, that there should be a joint operation of military and the police?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, in the preceding tab, that is, tab 323 -- let me just have a look. You -- or rather, 321, tab 321, the last paragraph. The corps command says after my report, when I submit my idea how this will be done and how the forces would be grouped, and that I include in preparing the action part of the MUP forces. So the corps command says that before I actually elaborate the idea, I get in touch with the chief of the secretariat also on my territory and in that territory of mine he is responsible for that part of 41551 the zone, that we plan this activity together.
JUDGE KWON: Over all can I take it that in the end the police is subordinated to the -- to the army?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No way. No way. That cannot be inferred at all. The two systems are fully equal. As far as 1998 is concerned, the police was the proponent of activities against terrorism and the army was there to support the police. The situation was similar in the beginning of 1999. Specifically in this particular action, we can see according to the forces engaged that it was the army that was the mainstay and that it was the police that was acting in concert with them, but there was no need for me to command all these forces.
In order to avoid certain problems, I and the commander - if you look at the map here, you will see where my command post is. You will see this flag, and that denotes my command post - I and the commander of the MUP unit are together.
JUDGE KWON: It is not clear from the map. Could you -- about putting that part on the -- on the ELMO and -- if the usher could do that. Fold the map and put it on the ELMO and let the witness point to that point.
So it is your claim that we can see the command post -- the command post of MUP chief here.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Only my command post can be seen here.
JUDGE KWON: Then there's no -- there's no point in putting on 41552 the ELMO then.
JUDGE BONOMY: Can I -- General, if you look at the document we've got, 324, and if you look at paragraph 5.6.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE BONOMY: What is -- what is that paragraph?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Paragraph 326?
JUDGE BONOMY: No, 5.6.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. "The 37th Detachment of the special police units with a 30/2 PAT move from the barracks along the Kasarna-Dusanov Grad-Cviljen axis and take the --"
JUDGE BONOMY: I want you to give me a -- a definition or a description of what is that particular paragraph.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is obvious that two MUP units were engaged. That can be seen from 5.6 and 5.7.
JUDGE BONOMY: But each of these is an order, is it not?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes.
JUDGE BONOMY: And each is an order to a MUP unit. Is that right or -- sorry?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is an order issued to both MUP units. One is the company of the special police unit.
JUDGE BONOMY: And who gave the order?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It can be seen that I signed the order.
JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
JUDGE KWON: It's time to adjourn. We'll break for 20 minutes. 41553 BLANK PAGE 41554
--- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
--- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you are to continue with your examination.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. We broke off, General, when you were answering the question that was put by Mr. Bonomy about the participation of the army and the police in this activity pertaining to the terrorist group in the village of Jeskovo. You explained that from a police point of view this area was under the secretariat of Prizren.
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. The chief of the secretariat of Prizren is a police colonel; right?
A. Right.
Q. So he had the same rank as you did in the army.
A. That's right.
Q. Did you agree with him on joint activity, or did you receive this from someone else?
A. Together with him in the presence of his own commanders. These are the commanders who are under his command, that is.
Q. All right. On the basis of this agreement, when you make a plan for your overall activity, do you include the activity of his units that take part in the said activity?
A. That was practice at corps level and brigade level during 1998 and 1999. 41555
Q. All right.
A. At the end of the order, on page 5, you can see who it was submitted to. My order was submitted only to my units, not to the MUP.
Q. Yes. But your units should know where the MUP units are.
A. Yes, that's only natural. In order to avoid what is called friendly fire.
Q. So was it for those purposes that this was included, everything that has to do with the MUP units?
A. That is acting in direct concert, a unit of the MUP and a unit of the army, both of which are state organs, and it is only natural for them to closely cooperate and act in concert.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Through the kindness of the liaison officer, I received what Mr. Nice has in his box. You were right, Mr. Kwon, the witness is K41. "K41 (Prizren-Orahovac-Suva Reka)" and then there is mention of Jeskovo, 700 soldiers -- "[In English] [Previous translation continues] ... together with police special units. Tanks and anti-aircraft guns opened fire on a village and witness and others set out to clean up village, meaning to kill anyone there as were told that it was just KLA members. Witness saw ten dead but no one in KLA uniform. He believes total of 30 were killed. Witness did not see any return fire."
[Interpretation] And then it says: "[In English] He received orders from Captain Gavrilovic, commander of logistic battalion, went south of Trnje with 80 to 100 soldiers accompanied by one policeman." [Interpretation] Then it says that they killed some civilians. 41556
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, in relation to that, that is to say, what Mr. Nice's witness said, what can be seen from this operation of yours and what actually did happen?
A. There is the next tab too, which is an analysis -- or rather, a report submitted to the superior command. That is tab 326.
Q. On the map in tab 325, you explained the deployment of the units and everything you did. 326 is an analysis of what happened. General, I am endeavouring that you give an explanation in view of what this witness had said. So let's see what your analysis says and what did happen in actual fact.
A. Through the analysis, we can see the strength, deployment, and organisation of the Siptar terrorist forces. That's in paragraph 1. It says: "The Siptar terrorist forces offered no resistance in the villages of Les, Ljubicevo, Bilusa, Posliste, and Hoca Zagradska. When they saw the MUP and VJ forces, the inhabitants of these villages were agitated, but they set off in a column towards Leskovac village and Prizren. We stopped and searched them and handed over suspicious people (nine persons) to the MUP organs. We held the rest of the villagers up for a while, until the operations in Jeskovo village were over, and then sent them back home.
"The STS offered resistance in Jeskovo village. We estimate that the strength of the STS in the village was between 25 and 30 men. Their defence during the day consisted mainly of direct protection of the STS command in the village. The captured documents indicate that they had 41557 three guard posts at which they rotated guards every two hours," and so on and so forth.
"There were no special defence positions but had been using the existing buildings since September last year. Some houses in the village had been adapted to accommodate troops and enable preparation of meals."
JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Milosevic, so it would be better if you directed the witness to a particular passage.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I am directing him to the paragraph he's just read out, since Witness K41 said that there were civilians there, and here at the end of this paragraph it says that in the village itself there were no civilians but only Siptar terrorist forces. They offered resistance and opened fire from small arms and also used hand-held rocket launchers.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. You can see from the context that what is at stake is a hand-held rocket launcher. And then it says that "The STS tried to penetrate in the direction of Jeskovo-Hoca Zagradska. From the village of Jeskovo, they tried to obtain the Brutska Glava feature, trig point 1206. Given the fact they were encircled, this attempt to break through failed." Then you mention your estimate of losses, "nine killed, no one was captured. We seized: One POLO Armbrust, one bazooka, two light machine-guns, one 60-millimetre mortar with 16 60-millimetre shells of Chinese make, automatic rifles, and one M-48 millimetre rifle." So you are claiming that there were no civilians in this document, 41558 contrary to what the witness stated, who testified that civilians were casualties in the village of Jeskovo.
A. In the village of Jeskovo there was not a single civilian who was a victim. All the individuals were in KLA uniforms.
Q. The witness says these victims weren't in KLA uniforms; he says they were in civilian clothes.
A. The OSCE mission representatives monitored the event. There were three teams in the Hoca Zagradska village. On the following day, since night had fallen, it wasn't possible for them to carry out their verification mission, so they waited for the following day and then with members of the police they went on their verification mission. And as far as I can remember, they found seven KLA members who had been killed. Since there were two others in a different place in the village, there were a total of nine of them. They verified this, and there is a book from the fund for humanitarian law, "As Seen, As Told." They refer to the OSCE mission and to their observations in this territory. And on page 332, reference is made to the fact that the mission were afraid of the possibility of the terrorists becoming organised in that village again. They monitored the event and carried out the verification referred to. There is another book written by the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the KLA 125th Brigade. His name is Rrustem Berisha, and it is called "The Path of Freedom." That is the title of the book. On page 99 of that book, he provides the names of nine KLA members who had been killed. He lists their names. So on that occasion, we could not determine the names of the men killed. He says that they were members of 41559 a special unit from the 125th Brigade.
Q. Very well, General.
JUDGE ROBINSON: General, could you just clarify for me: In relation to this incident, you personally led your troops into the village.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was personally present.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Very well. That means that in the OSCE documents, as well as in the documents of the KLA commander, reference is made to terrorist forces and not to civilians.
A. Well, without a doubt. The command of the 2nd Battalion of the 125th Brigade referred to the heroic death of nine members of the special unit. That referred on the 11th. And as he says in his book, they were engaged in close combat at a distance of 15 to 20 metres from their enemy and they died a heroic death in the village of Jeskovo.
Q. Very well. So this means that, according to all the information that you had available - and you were present at the scene - a KLA special unit was concerned. None of what the Witness K41 said with regard to the civilians and with regard to the fact that fire was not returned, none of what he said is correct.
A. I think it is quite absurd to make such a statement. That soldier, Witness K41, was a soldier of mine, employed in the Quartermaster Service. And the reason for which he testified in this way is quite 41560 different, but what he said is completely false. This can be confirmed by each and every member of my unit, by each and every officer from my unit who was present there. In the unit that this soldier was a member of -- well, that unit did not participate in that combat and was not present at the scene of the fight.
Q. But you were present at the scene of combat. And what you have just said is something that you yourself personally witnessed.
A. Well, as I have already said, at the beginning of the fight and from 4.00 in the morning I was located here. The terrorist forces had selected the village of Jeskovo because it is in mountainous terrain and it is surrounded by very high rocks on all sides. It is very difficult to gain access to that location. So when there was ongoing combat, I descended directly to the village. Withdrawal was attempted via this stream, and I saw weapons and all those terrorists there.
JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Delic, was that the only operation which the army carried out in Jeskovo?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the previous year, 1998, in September --
JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... there weren't any operations in -- earlier in 1999?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No, there weren't. That was the first operation.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. A minute ago when I quoted from the summary provided in the box, it says: "The 2nd, 1999, Jeskovo, 700 soldiers." How many soldiers did 41561 you engage for the blockade of the village?
A. Well, it's all stated here in the report. It says that 611 men had been engaged.
Q. Thank you, General. I believe that we can move on now. Before we do move on, have a look at the report under tab 326. It says: "From 0830 hours until the end of combat, three OSCE vehicles were located in the village of Hoca Zagradska."
A. Yes. Action came to an end just before night fell. Prior to that point in time, mission members insisted on entering the village while combat was still ongoing, since we were responsible for their security. The officer who was in the Hoca Zagradska sector then suggested that the team leader sign a register so that the army wouldn't be held responsible if they were killed, having entered the area of combat. And then they finally said that they did not want to enter that area before it was safe. And on the following day, they carried out their verification together with MUP forces, and on that occasion I was not present.
Q. Thank you very much, General. We can now move on.
JUDGE KWON: General Delic, in this report, I see that the terrorist group, as you put it, consist of 25 or 3 men -- 25 and 30 men. Sorry, between 25 and 30. But your force is -- is of total strength of 600 and more and also included six tanks.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE KWON: Do you not think it's too much, disproportionate? What is your observation on this matter?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely not. You have to be 41562 familiar with the tactics employed when fighting terrorist forces. Such strong forces weren't necessary to fight 25 or 30 men, but it was necessary to block the entire sector, since we had information according to which there were forces in Bjeskovo [phoen], in the village of Dubicevo [phoen], in the village of Tustendivo [phoen], and in these other villages, Bilesa [phoen], Hoca Zagradska, Leskovac. We had no information about these villages and it was necessary to have this number of men in order to block this vast sector. It's not possible to block such a sector with fewer men. It was necessary to take the lines and to engage in this blockade. But a far smaller unit was engaged in direct combat with these forces, and in these inhabited places a MUP unit was primarily engaged and three of their members were wounded. And later on, when the terrorists attempted to withdraw via the stream, as we say, they were killed in that area because they had to confront forces the strength of one detachment deployed at that position. A detachment consists of up to about ten men.
JUDGE KWON: If you could explain to me why you needed six tanks.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The tanks were usually used for direct fire. As you can see here, they arrived from the Prizren sector. They reached the Hoca Zagradska sector. The village of Jeskovo is here. And they were not directly involved there and they didn't approach this village. They were needed in case it was necessary to fire directly on certain targets. According to the information we had, there was no civilian population there and it was possible to open fire on firing positions without this causing any problems because only the terrorists would be at threat and no one else. And in Afghanistan now 41563 BLANK PAGE 41564 Americans are using 15-tonne bombs to target a terrorist group consisting of several men, and they're also using strategic -- they're also using the Air Force in a strategic manner. It's possible to use such means against terrorists.
JUDGE BONOMY: Maybe I have misunderstood this, but does the report -- is it reasonable to draw the conclusion from the report that the majority of terrorists escaped, in spite of the 600-plus force?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. According to our estimates, there were between 25 and 30 of them. That's the information we had.
JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... nine -- you killed nine.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We found notebooks with lists as well, and probably when we imposed the blockade, the remainder, 25 or 30 men, were located here, somewhere in the area of the village of Zur or in some of the other villages where mobilisation was carried out -- or rather, where men were summoned to come to Jeskovo to be trained. We expected to find more of them there, at least 25 to 30 of them.
JUDGE BONOMY: It's either my arithmetic that's a problem or I'm not reading the same report as you are. But the report says that you estimated the strength of the terrorists in -- in this village as between 25 and 30. Nine were killed, none were captured. Does it not follow that the majority escaped?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you've read that correctly. There was an estimate. You know what an "estimate" means, an estimate of their strength. We also found a notebook. 41565
JUDGE BONOMY: Do you want to change that estimate?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't want to change it.
JUDGE BONOMY: Well --
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't want to change it in any way, because an estimate is made prior to carrying out the task on the basis of the information available. The estimate was that there were 25 to 30 of them. We only managed to find nine of them. So all one can say is that our estimate -- well, we did find a notebook containing 30 names. So at that point in time, when we imposed the blockade, all we can say is that they were not located in that area.
JUDGE BONOMY: Following your inquiries afterwards to write this, which is an analysis, I understand, of the situation, an analysis after the event, how many terrorists do you now say were in the village?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were nine of them, as it says here.
JUDGE BONOMY: So you killed them all.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They all died in the course of combat. They weren't killed.
JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I didn't mean to suggest anything other than that they died in combat, but I have to say I find it very difficult to deduce from this report, this analysis, that there were only nine of them there. But thank you for clarifying it.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, on completion of this action, was a single killed civilian found? 41566
A. No. There were no civilians there at all. The civilians from the villages of Bilusa [phoen] and Hoca Zagradska who had set out in the direction of Prizren were returned to their villages, and that was the end of this entire activity. There were no civilians killed, certainly.
Q. Thank you, General. On the 7th of March, 1999 you issued a document concerning the taking of measures of combat security, and this was in the area of deployment of the mixed company number 1. What was this about, General? It's in tab 327.
A. Yes. This is a warning that I sent to the commander of combat group 1/1 in the area of Planeja, which is in the immediate vicinity of the state border, because on the 7th of March there had been Siptar activity in his area so I warned him that he could have the following goals: To provoke --
THE INTERPRETER: That they, rather, have the following goals, interpreter's correction.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To provoke the Yugoslav Army; to check how vigilant the guards are; and thirdly, to create distraction and divert attention from the incursion in order for the Siptar terrorist forces to cross over the border in another part of the territory. So in view of the above, I asked him to undertake the following measures: To increase vigilance, to have intervention units on standby, to prepare fire to target the areas of possible activities, and to take due care to protect materiel, technical equipment, and troops, and lastly, to report to my command.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] 41567
Q. On the 9th there is another warning which differs in some elements, and it concerns the taking of additional security measures. This is number 328.
A. Yes. As incidents occurred on a daily basis, not only in my unit but in other units as well, a warning arrived from the command of the Pristina Corps dated the 9th of March from which you can see that throughout Kosovo anti-tank mines were being used on a large scale, as well as improvised mine barriers on the roads, especially those leading to the defence positions of the terrorist forces. And it says here that in the area of Stubla anti-tank mines were laid, several members of the MUP were killed and several seriously wounded, and that in the area of Djeneral Jankovic a reconnaissance vehicle on the 29th was wounded and that two soldiers were seriously injured. To prevent such occurrences, I warned all units and commands to undertake additional security measures, emphasising the assessment of envisaged routes and roads before venturing out and to examine the roads with mine detectors and so on.
Q. You say that throughout Kosovo and Metohija mines had been laid on which -- which anyone could come across who was not a member of the KLA.
A. Yes.
Q. In tab 329, you again have a warning, referring to information on large Siptar forces on the territory of the Republic of Albania.
A. Yes. And that they intended to pass over -- onto our territory in the period between the 13th and 15th of March, and therefore I issue an order as to the measures to be taken by the commanders. 41568
JUDGE BONOMY: General, is there an official record of the number of people who were killed by land-mines after the date of that order?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] By land-mines? As for my unit, no one lost their life due to a land-mine in my unit because we took special security measures on every road we travelled along. At the corps level, I can't give you a precise number, but more than one -- several dozen men were killed by land-mines. And among the MUP forces, I know that several dozen were killed by the land-mines that were laid on the roads.
JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. As we can see that you issued warnings and that they were arriving from the direction of Albania, in tab 330, there is a document issued by you which speaks of an attempt to enter the territory from Albania from several directions.
A. Yes.
Q. And you say: "On the 13th of March, 1999 between 0200 and 0245 hours Siptar terrorist forces tried to enter from several directions onto the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," and so on. You mentioned the border posts in question, and so on.
A. Yes. This happened on the 13th of March, and it was right next to the lake. As you can see on the other map, right next to the lake a group made an attempt, and after firing, they discarded their equipment and returned to the territory of Albania.
Q. So there was a clash and they were driven back. There were no losses. 41569
A. That's correct. There were no losses and they pulled back onto the territory of Albania.
Q. And what did your order in tab 331 imply, where you speak of maintaining and upgrading combat readiness in the period from the 13th to the 19th of March, 1999?
A. This is also based on an order from the higher command that combat training was to be intensified of the regular and reserve forces of the brigade according to the existing plan.
Q. Does this refer exclusively to training and exercises?
A. Yes. Yes. By the 15th of March, we were to complete the intake and deployment of soldiers from indirect recruitment. We had received young soldiers who had just completed their training and they were now to be received, issued with weapons. They were to carry out target practice and take part in the necessary number of exercises. The decision was that the -- that the soldiers from the March batch should remain in the units until their status was resolved.
Q. General, what is the content of your information on -- of the 14th of March, which is here in tab 332? What is this about actually?
A. This is similar to what happened in the village of Jeskovo. Shall I read paragraph 1? "In the past few days, an STS Staff was set up in the area of Kabas village east of Korisa village." If we can have the map, please. Here's the map.
Q. Let's first go back to the end of this document, and then I will ask you about its content. Is this a request by you to the higher command to approve the use of the unit to break up the Siptar terrorist forces in 41570 the area of the village of Kabas?
A. This is my report to the effect that the terrorist forces were there, that they had arrived in that time period, that they were mobilising the population by force. And in the last part, I ask the command of the corps for approval to neutralise and break up these forces. The village of Korisa, as you can see -- or, rather, the village of Kabas -- the village of Kabas is in the mountains and the Korisa village is near the road. And from there they were threatening the Prizren-Suva Reka-Pristina road.
Q. Do you have an estimate here as to the number of Siptar terrorist forces in the area? In point 1, you say that "Around the -- according to information gathered, the STS numbered around 80 men."
A. Yes, around 40 of them were armed, and it says that part of the Siptar population from Korisa village is moving out in order to avoid forced mobilisation.
JUDGE KWON: The map we are looking at is tab 337; is it right? I guess so.
Could you read the legend there so that we can understand the meaning of it, the red and yellow ...
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The wider line of the blockade, that's one stage. And the other stage is the stage of the narrower line of the blockade. One is the broader line of the blockade and the other is the narrow line of the blockade.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] 41571
Q. General, did you get an order from a higher command in connection with this report of yours and your proposals? Is this the order in tab 333?
A. Yes.
Q. This is an order from the corps command?
A. First I received an order, as in the previous case, to begin preparations and to submit once again my plan for the carrying-out of this task and to say what forces I planned to engage. I was to submit this to the command of the Pristina Corps.
Q. In the order that you received, in point 1 it says -- what does it say?
A. It says: "Prepare, organise, and in cooperation with MUP forces clear the blockade, break up and destroy the Siptar terrorist forces in the general area of Kabas and Korisa."
Q. Very well. And what was the content of your plan in connection with this order, the plan that you submitted to the corps command and which we can find in tab 334? Is this something you sent to the corps command?
A. Yes.
Q. This is your plan for the breaking-up and destroying of the Siptar terrorist forces in the area of Kabas village.
A. Yes. What I say here is what forces will be engaged, from what compositions of the forces. Then it mentions the MUP forces, members of the 37th Detachment and the 5th Company of the special police units. I mention the number of forces and then the plan for the deployment of 41572 forces for this activity.
Q. In 335, you have an order issued by General Lazarevic in connection with the same matter in Kabas.
A. Yes. On receipt of my plan, he issued an order that I was to carry it out; in other words, he approved my plan. As of the 15th of March, 1999 I was to begin implementation of the task.
Q. And this is what you indicated on the map.
A. Yes.
Q. How were the forces deployed and what happened? There was the broader blockade, the narrow blockade, and the implementation of the plan. On the basis of this, you issued an order on the deployment of forces.
A. Yes. First it contains information on the enemy.
Q. Is this tab 336, this order of yours?
A. Yes. Yes, it is.
Q. Very well. Does it resemble the order you issued in the case of the village of Jeskovo?
A. Yes. It's very similar because it follows the rules for the use of units, as provided for by our instructions for the work of the staffs and commands, containing all the elements required.
Q. So this whole procedure of issuing an -- making a decision, receiving orders, and so on and so forth, finally led to the implementation of the order and the breaking-up of the Siptar forces in this area.
A. Yes.
Q. General, tell me now, as this action was underway, I assume that 41573 BLANK PAGE 41574 the implementation of the plan is found in your analysis in tab 338.
A. Yes.
Q. This is an analysis of the activity to destroy the Siptar forces in the Kabas village sector. Tab 338.
Before I ask you about this, I would like you to comment on something else. In paragraph -- or rather, in point 1, in paragraph 2 it says that in Kabas village there were no civilians, only the members of the Siptar terrorist forces.
A. Yes. The village of Kabas used to be a big village. But as it's in the mountains, the population moved to Korisa. They built houses there, and Korisa was a much larger village. Only about ten houses were left in Kabas and there were no civilians there.
Q. When you say there were hardly ten houses there, you mean inhabited houses?
A. There were houses that were derelict because they'd been abandoned, because the population had moved to Korisa, down to the valley. In the village of Kabas, there was no arable land. It was a mountainous area and the conditions for life were quite difficult there. It didn't even have a good road. It was quite hard to reach.
Q. Very well. And what was established -- or rather, what finally happened in this action?
A. As for this action, I will just tell you how it ended. We didn't manage to block the terrorist forces on time, so that they pulled out. The larger part of these forces managed to pull out in this direction, towards these other villages and towards the mountain. As it says here, 41575 we estimated that the terrorists had 11 killed, no one was captured. On our side, Private Markovic was killed and one soldier was wounded. As for the MUP, I'm not sure what consequences they suffered, but it says here that -- or rather, it says here what was found when we arrived there, referring to their equipment and materiel and so on.
Q. Thank you, General. In tab 339, you have an order that pertains to the organisation of the defence of axes dated the 15th of March, 1999, in order to close off these axes coming from Albania and leading to Metohija, in order to prevent any surprise. What was the reason for this order?
A. Already in February we were thinking about that, and there were quite a few indicators that NATO would carry out an aggression. In March, it became practically a certainty.
As it says here: "According to available operative information, a partial mobilisation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania is underway. That is the second division from Kuks and Bajram Curi. In addition to that, the Siptar forces from 6 to 8.000 have stepped up training in military camps in the north of Albania; Kruma, Vlahna, Zogaj, Vucidol [phoen] and others. In camps in Northern Albania they were being trained by NATO instructors. And it is possible to have engagement of stronger STS forces with stronger NATO air-ground support along the Kuks-Vrbnica-Prizren and the Cafa Pruse-Djakovica axes. Vrbnica-Prizren is this, and further on Suva Reka. That is a road of operative importance; whereas, Cafa Pruse-Djakovica is of tactical importance. In my zone, there were other tactical lines of importance, but through this 41576 order I am telling my commanders to take measures in order to close off these axes so that the Siptar terrorist forces or the forces of the Republic of Albania or NATO forces could not penetrate the country along these axes." That is what paragraph 1 speaks of. And paragraph 2 says that "By relying on the present disposition and engagement of forces additional measure should be taken to effectively defend the axes, focussing on setting up obstacles in front of the forward line, gaps," et cetera.
And then 3 is "Reinforcing existing forces, and to defend the Vrbnica-Prizren axis, additionally engage an anti-armour missile platoon and six 20/3 millimetre PAT from the PVO to that battalion." And I additionally engage a tank platoon from the armoured battalion and a mechanised platoon from the 243rd Motorised Brigade by the 18th of March. That is for my own forces.
As for this mechanised platoon, that would be by the 18th; whereas, my forces by the 17th.
Q. So that's the activity at that point in time, sealing off the axes where operations could be expected from the territory of the Republic of Albania.
A. The task of my brigade was always - and that is why it was in this part of this territory of ours - I mean, it was due to the danger that was imminent from the territory of Albania.
Q. You gave an order that has to do with the protection of troops and materiel. That is contained in tab 340. Is it necessary for us to have a special look at it? 41577
A. Any kind of non-combat conduct is energetically opposed. And also people should have proper furlough. One-third of the unit should be in the -- on the ready so that conditions can be created for engaging the unit as a whole at any point in time.
Q. All right. You've been using an expression here in this document. Let me just have a look at this. You use the expression "show of force." Could you please explain that. In the document that is in tab 343, where it says: "Demonstration of force in cooperation with the forces of the MUP on the Prizren-Orahovac axis." General, could you please be so kind as to explain what the purpose of this kind of activity is and what this demonstration of force is that is referred to in this document of yours.
A. Actually, this is a request that I'm sending to the corps command to "review the overall security situation in the Orahovac municipality area and with the aim of undertaking measures of demonstration of force in order to reassure the Serb people in this area, on the 20th of March, 1993 in the period from 1300 to 1800 hours, together with MUP forces engage in the movement of a part of the forces with a demonstration of force on the Prizren-Zrze-Orahovac axis and come out in the section of the road towards Brestovac village up to the height of the Velika Hoca village."
Q. At that time, was the Serb population moving out and was there a great degree of fear among the Serb population in the area that we're speaking of?
A. There was great fear because similarly, as in 1998, the terrorist forces again did not honour the agreement that was reached when this OSCE 41578 mission came; namely, that everybody would remain at the positions where they were. A large section of the territory was placed under their control again, about 40 per cent of it. Again, they placed these local roads under their control as well. A large number of civilians were killed and kidnapped.
There's an additional reason too: From the village of Velika Hoca, two brothers were kidnapped. One was killed and the other one was seriously wounded but returned through the mediation of the OSCE. There was this fear among the population and that is why I sought such activity. Also, the terrorists who were close to this road were supposed to see the force that the army had available in this way.
Q. In this document in tab 343 you got General Lazarevic's approval to have this movement of troops.
A. Yes, as I had proposed. And I was told that if the terrorist forces attack, I should act in accordance with the rules of combat.
Q. At any rate, the basic activity that you envisaged was movement.
A. Yes, movement, and also collecting information during movement.
Q. General, in document 345, which is dated the 20th of March, 1999, it says: "In Orahovac we learned that during the day the local Siptar people left --" now, I cannot read this word because it's illegible.
A. "Five to six."
Q. Oh, your version must be more legible: "-- five to six buses for Macedonia."
A. After this approved activity, this came as the report that we were sending to the corps command, reporting on what we noticed during our 41579 movement.
Q. Is that what you said, that the point of the activity was movement and collecting information?
A. Yes.
Q. About the situation on the ground.
A. Yes. And where we were exactly, what we observed. This is information from Orahovac, that part of the Siptar population - probably assessing the situation as being very difficult and believing that there might be an aggression - they wanted to seek shelter and they therefore went to a safe place, to Macedonia.
Q. You wrote a warning about taking safety and security measures, the 21st of March, to the command of group 1/1. Why did you draft this?
A. In this preamble, I'm telling the commanders that the situation is becoming increasingly complex and that Siptar forces can be expected to carry out various acts of provocation, attack individual and small groups of motor vehicles, isolated facilities, barracks, and parts of units in the area. It is possible that incidents may be caused on the border with the Republic of Albania and large sabotage groups may be infiltrated from the territory of the Republic of Albania. Threats of airstrikes are increasingly frequent too.
On the basis of all of that, in order to prevent surprise attacks and avoid giving reason for possible airstrikes, I caution that they take special precautionary measures, that is to say, all units in the area along the border, according to available information, preparations are underway for the infiltration of strong STS from the Republic of Albania 41580 are underway, as I said, and that they must take full measures to prevent the infiltration of weapons, and that the movement and activities of individuals, small groups and units should be reduced to a minimum in order to avoid acts of provocation by Siptar forces that would provoke a response from our forces which might then be used as a pretext or justification for airstrikes.
I ask, therefore, all units to be prepared for a dispersed deployment and that all commanders within their deployment find reserve deployment positions too and to identify possible places for setting up false positions.
Q. General, in the documents that follow, are there also warnings -- or, rather, orders improving security along the state border and the possibility of infiltration of larger groups from Albania? I'm referring to 347.
JUDGE KWON: So what we dealt with is tab 346. Please indicate the tab numbers before you come into the content of it. And for the record, I have to note that the -- Lazarevic's permission is tab 344, not 343, as indicated by the accused. Please go on.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Kwon. I probably made an error regarding the number of the tab.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. In document 347, we see that tensions are on the rise from one day to the other and also the possibility of further infiltrations from Albania. 41581
A. Information was received about a terrorist group of 80 persons, and their objective would be to carry out urban guerilla warfare in the town of Prizren, and that is why all units are being warned to take additional security measures.
Q. In document 348, then, there is reference to increasingly frequent attacks against members of the army and the MUP, and then a warning is issued as to the kind of measures that should be taken for the sake of protection. Is that the focus of activity at that moment? Defence against possible attacks, is that the focus?
A. Yes, that's it. But there is also a warning being issued because terrorist attacks had already been carried out in Podujevo and Kosovska Mitrovica using explosive devices. Therefore, the command is warning, inter alia, to avoid moving about in uniform in public places, to avoid markets and other public places because these explosive devices had been placed at marketplaces. When vehicles move about, they should be in combat lines, as was defined in earlier orders. And also, before being sent anywhere for -- on assignments outside the zone, that precise information should be provided as to where they would be moving, how they should act in different situations, and so on.
Q. Already in the next document - that is to say, number 349 - you say that a large group from Albania would cross the state border.
A. Information was received that the infiltration of a large group was expected and that in this group there would be members of the Main Staff of the KLA.
Q. And you ordered the sealing-off of all axes and the taking of all 41582 relevant positions.
A. Drina 213 and Drina 214 is a code for particular places where there is the possibility of this infiltration.
Q. All right.
MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... no translation of 349.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. And I think this applies to the last two as well.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that you will be receiving these translations because the documents had been submitted to the appropriate service 70 days ago. As usual, I tender these documents into evidence, Mr. Robinson, and again where there are no translations, could they please be marked for identification for the time being.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that is -- that's granted.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, on the 24th of March, you adopted -- you made an order that has to do with measures for maintaining the combat readiness of the brigade. What does this pertain to?
A. It's already the 24th of March. The military political situation is so serious and there are direct threats of missile attacks by NATO forces and therefore I order the units of my brigade from the 24th of March, 1999, the positions of the sectors of concentration of military hardware units shall be changed daily.
Q. All right. You do that in order to avoid airstrikes. 41583 BLANK PAGE 41584
A. Yes. That is the main and only reason. They should have camouflage and they should change their positions every day because air surveillance had been carried out throughout this period, our positions were located, and there might be airstrikes against us.
Q. And what about measures to prevent Siptar terrorist forces from being infiltrated from the territory of Albania? Unfortunately, my copy is a very, very poor photocopy, so it's basically useless. I hope yours isn't that bad. Could you just indicate what this is about. I can read that it is an order to prevent the infiltration of Siptar terrorist forces from Albania. You give a map.
A. Yes.
Q. And you talk about the enemy.
A. It is the 23rd of March, 1999, and point 1 there is direct reference to the broader situation in our area. Also, it is stated that Albania has carried out a partial mobilisation of its forces, bringing them to Kuks and Bajram Curi, that 6 to 8.000 forces are in camps along the border, and in the zone of the brigade strong forces are engaged along these two axes. And then I say what forces are expected and in which area. From the area of Kuks about 3.000 terrorists are expected, the strength of two brigades. From Kumovlaca [phoen], one brigade, about 1.500 terrorists. And from Zogaj, about 1.000 terrorists.
Q. Here in this order when you mentioned the tasks of the 549th Motorised Brigade, how could you describe these tasks, very briefly?
A. Well, very briefly these tasks could be described as tasks to prevent -- or rather, protect the state border and integrity of the state 41585 and to prevent forces from the territory of Albania from infiltrating that area.
Q. You have a map, and it says it's a decision of the commander of the 549th Motorised Brigade. It's an order that concerns the prevention of infiltration of Siptar and Albanian forces from the territory of Albania.
A. Yes.
Q. In that decision, which is also referred to in the map, can you see what the -- the task that you are now referring to?
JUDGE KWON: So that's tab 352.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE ROBINSON: It's 352.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, the map is tab 352, and the written text is under tab 351. 352 is the decision referred to in the map.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This map shows the deployment of my four units which were in the border area. Their tasks are also depicted, as well as the terrorist forces in Albania. And there's reference to the tasks of my forces. If infiltration is attempted, they should take this borderline and in cooperation with the security provided for the line at Karaula they were prevent the infiltration of these forces along these axes. The axes of Vrbnica towards Prizren and Dobragorazde [phoen] towards Prizren and then the axis from Cafka [phoen] to Brune [phoen], which leads to Orahovac, and then the axis from Cafa Pruse, the border crossing in the direction of Djakovica. 41586
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, since Mr. Nice continues to claim that our army was involved in killing civilians and expelling civilians, and given the tasks that you had that were assigned to the brigade in your order, given the specific activities they were involved in, well, were these the tasks that you had or were there any other hidden tasks that you had? Is that possible?
A. Well, no, there were no other tasks. The army just had the professional task of protecting its state border and no other tasks.
Q. You received an order to take measures on the 24th of March. That was when the NATO aggression commenced. What does your order contain? Under tab 353 you issued an order on that date. And it says: "Threats of -- that NATO will bombard the FRY and I hereby order," and then the order follows. What does your order contain?
A. Well, this is an order that I issued to commanders. And since we had realised that the airstrike was just a matter of hours - it was no longer even a matter of days - we said that in case our country, any part of our country was bombed, the units should adopt the planned positions. Before this period, the units were in the barracks and only these parts of units were in positions along the border. That was in the border belt. So each and every unit had a plan for engagement which was drawn up on the basis of its main task.
And my main task was always to prevent infiltration from the territory of Albania. Therefore, in the case of aggression against our country, my units should move from the barracks and go to the sectors 41587 assigned to them near the border and they were to prepare to defend the state territory.
And under item 2, it says as soon as the NATO air forces approach the border, they should be attacked. The air should be secured in relation to the possibility of manoeuvring for helicopters and other aircraft. If communications were interrupted -- if the NATO commenced airstrikes and if communications were interrupted, the forces were to be engaged in spite of the fact that communications with the corps could be interrupted, they were to engage in accordance with the previously issued orders. And if an airstrike had already been carried out, there was information on how to deal with the consequences. And when dealing with the consequences, priority was to be given to taking care of the wounded and preventing the spreading of panic, to preventing cases of desertion, in cases of crimes being committed, presenting -- preventing individuals from acting recklessly in the units, preventing sabotage actions against units, detecting the acts of agents and preventing them, informing the superior command or the closest command about the strike and the consequences, and reconnaissance was also to be carried out in the sectors where strikes had been carried out.
Q. Thank you, General. We have a map that is a plan for the defence operation of the Pristina Corps. Could you please have a look at that map too.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I stand up to explain this?
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a plan for the defence 41588 operation for the Pristina Corps. This is an excerpt that I was provided for my brigade. The map is a far larger one, and you can see the deployment of all the units in that map. All I have is this excerpt, this part of the map, and this map shows the sort of tasks that my unit had.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. But the entire map is a defence plan for the Pristina Corps, which covered the entire area of Kosovo and Metohija.
A. Yes, they covered the entire area of Kosovo and Metohija. As a commander, this was sufficient for me because this is where my zone of activity was, this is where my units were deployed. And I can also see where the neighbouring units were deployed. Whereas, the other adjacent units in the depth weren't even important.
Here reference is made to the NATO forces, to their strength and where they were grouped, and it was said that the main NATO forces were to carry out an attack from Macedonia towards Kacanik, Uris [phoen], and Pristina and it was said that secondary forces were to launch an attack on my axis. And this order shows that I -- or rather, my brigade were in the first combat echelon of the corps. But on the secondary axis -- I was defending two axes. The operative axis, Vrbnica-Prizren-Suva Reka-Pristina and the tactical axis, Djakovica -- or rather, from the Prusit pass to Djakovica, Klina and Pristina. Here we can see the sort of reinforcements available, how my brigade was reinforced from other units. Tasks were issued to all units and the amount of ammunition allocated for this operation is also referred to, as well as other materiel and technical equipment. And on the basis of this plan, in addition to the 41589 basic positions, there are other positions, positions in the depth, right up to the Milanovac Mountain. The objective of the action of the corps forces was that the units in the first echelon - in this case, my brigade - should engage the enemy strike, and then by mounting a defence from the first and second position and from other positions, we were to break the enemy's force, stop the enemy attack, and continue to the second echelon of the corps, which is from the Dulje pass to the Milanovac Mountain and continues in the direction of Orahovac -- or rather, the Dela peak. That would be the axis. Along that axis, the attack was to be stopped. The NATO force and Siptar attack was to be stopped. And we were to completely destroy the enemy's capability of launching attack and launch a counterattack in order to drive enemy forces out of our territory.
Q. General, in 355 there is a map -- under tab 355, there is a map which is a defence map for the 549th Brigade. Does that relate to the map for the entire corps, and could you briefly say what the defence plan for the country was?
A. Yes. This map, which was drawn up by my brigade --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, if it's a convenient time, we could take the break now.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.
--- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.
--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Continue.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] 41590
Q. General, I have already put my question to you -- I put a question to you and then we were interrupted by the break. You were explaining the map for the defence of the Pristina Corps, and now we have in front of us a map with the plan for the 449th Brigade [as interpreted] defence. That's your brigade. Tell us, what sort of a plan did they have?
A. Mr. Milosevic, in the plan for the defence operation of the Pristina Corps, we could see the deployment of my units. In this map, we also have the deployment but also for lower units, units two levels below. So you also have company positions depicted here. The plan was as follows: First of all, there's information on the enemy provided here in the zone of defence of my brigade, and if you look at the border towards Albania and then to Macedonia and to the peak of Plesko [phoen], it's about 150 kilometres long. We were expecting the aggressor forces and terrorist forces to come from two directions, Albania and Macedonia, from the Tetovo direction. Here there's reference to the purpose of those forces, the objective of those forces. And as it says here --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Sorry to interrupt you, General. What is the purpose of this evidence? Is there -- is there any charge in the indictment to which is it relevant, any incident in the indictment to which this kind of evidence is relevant?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, such evidence is relevant for all the charges in the case. Mr. Robinson, I would like to remind you of the fact that Mr. Nice has a certain position that the -- that the FRY and Serbian forces were to encircle inhabited places, they would shell them, 41591 enter those places, separate the men and women, kill the men, drive them away to Albania, et cetera. And now you're being presented with a totally different picture with regard to how the army conducted itself on a daily basis. There's analysis provided for each and every movement of the army.
JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... this picture does not contradict that. You're telling us about how well-organised, how well-trained, how orderly the VJ forces are. That doesn't in any way, in my view, rebut the -- the allegations in the indictment. You have to deal with specific -- the specific incidents in the indictment. I mean, merely to show that the VJ was well-trained, well-organised, had plans which required them to follow the rules of combat, which required them to follow the Geneva Conventions. All of that by itself is not -- is not relevant. If it is relevant, it's only marginally relevant. You have to deal with the -- with the incidents. And I have to ask myself whether this is a proper use of the Court's time. I'll consult my colleagues on this -- on this matter.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before you consult your colleagues, let me draw your attention to the essence of the matter. The thing is not only to show whether the army was well trained, well disciplined, respected the Geneva Conventions, and so on and so forth, but every document shows the precise tasks that the army had and how it carried them out.
From looking at these tasks, you can see that the army was 41592 exclusively on the defensive. It was not engaged in expelling the population, killing civilians, or anything like that. You can see that what General Delic is saying completely invalidates the testimony of particular witnesses, and he's speaking of events in which he himself participated and in which his units participated. So these are the tasks, not just on paper but the tasks that the army carried out, and we're getting evidence as to how they were carried out.
JUDGE ROBINSON: You made one point that is worth considering. You say that these plans show that the army was on the defensive. Let's consider that. How -- how do they show that? If they show that, I think that's relevant. How do they show that the army was always on the defensive?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The general will explain. He will explain what their task was. You saw in the order that we have just dealt with that it was a question of defence, the deployment of units for defence. When speaking of the enemy, reference is made to NATO and to the Siptar sabotage forces. There is not a single task either assigned to the army or carried out by the army that had anything to do with destroying villages, persecuting civilians, or anything similar to that. This was a large section of the army commanded by General Delic which is representative of the behaviour of the army as a whole.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, can you assist us on this?
MR. KAY: We can see from the tabs at 353 onwards that we are getting into pertinent dates, 24th of March, 1999, and plans for defence in relation to proposed NATO bombing. 41593 BLANK PAGE 41594 If you move further through these tabs, 356 onwards, you'll see at 356 that you have places such as Suva Reka mentioned, Velika Krusa, Donje Retimlje, all places that have been relevant to the indictment. 357 is Suva Reka.
Coming up further, we've got Celine at 369, which, of course, I think the first crime base dealt with, Vehi Melsani [phoen], I think that was Celine. And we've also got Bela Crkva at 366, 365, 363 as well. So I think we're coming into areas of explanation from the witness in relation to quite pertinent matters in the indictment. This is from the file that we've just been disclosed today.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Kay. Thanks. Well, Mr. Milosevic, let the witness concentrate on showing that the plans were defensive.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, you heard. Explain the map in the briefest possible way and then we will move on.
A. The map itself, as the title says, is a plan of defensive combat. An aggression was expected on my units from the territories of Albania and Macedonia. The goal of the enemy activity in the first echelon, in the first stage, was to take the Djakovica-Prizren line. In the second stage, to take the Orahovac-Suva Reka line, where they would introduce a second echelon for the purpose of carrying out further combat activities in the direction of Prizren.
As for the defence, there were two stages: The first stage, 41595 lasting seven to eight days, was to be carried out by my brigade. During seven or eight days my brigade was from these successive positions - these are the basic positions and the yellow ones are reserve positions and the ones with dots are the next positions in depth - so during seven or eight days they were to break the enemy force's advances from Albania and the forces advancing towards Prizren, and in the second echelon of the Pristina Corps from the line Milanovac-Dulje-Jezerska Planeja [phoen] - Nazar Planeja they were to halt the incursion of the enemy from the direction of Albania and mount a counter-attack to drive these forces from the territory of our country. In order to carry out this task, my unit was reinforced with several other units from the Pristina Corps. First of all, it was reinforced with the 354th Detachment from the 354th Brigade. The 68th territorial detachment, the 108th military territorial detachment, one battery of 122-millimetre multiple rocket launchers, the border battalions, the 55th Border Battalion and a company from the 53rd Border Battalion were also resubordinated under my command, as well as several other lower-ranking units.
Apart from this, the plan envisaged the mining of the entire state border toward the Republic of Albania, and these were to be both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. It was expected that up to 35 bomber planes were to be used against my unit, up to 50 GO rocket attacks, and 91 helicopter squadrons and other helicopters, general-purpose helicopters. In this plan, we see that the use of short-term chemical weapons was expected as well as depleted uranium weapons. As we can see from this map, my decision was to group my forces 41596 as follows: In the first combat echelon, there were to be two battalions. On the axis towards Albania and on the axis towards Macedonia, the 68th Detachment. There was to be one motorised battalion here, and on this axis from the Republic of Macedonia, the remaining forces of the military territorial Prizren detachment.
JUDGE ROBINSON: General, thanks very much. You were preparing for an assault from land.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For a ground attack and airstrikes.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Proceed, Mr. Milosevic. I think we have the --
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Before we proceed further, General, I will quote from this document 353 that we've already dealt with. And in point 1.5 of your order, you say prevent the joining-up of the Siptar forces with NATO, and in 4 you say prevent sabotage activities against the unit. From this, can we see that your defensive operations also implied firing on the Siptar terrorist forces which were still in the depth of the territory in your area of responsibility?
A. What was obvious - and we've spoken of this before - was that along with an attack from the territory of Albania and an attack from Macedonia, on the Prizren-Djakovica access there was a territory under the control of the Siptar terrorist forces, and the expectation was that when the airstrikes began, these forces which were in the depth of the territory would set out to cut off the communications and to strike in the rear of our units in order to cooperate with the forces attacking from the 41597 Republics of Albania and Macedonia.
Q. Very well, General. I hope that's clear to everybody. Now let us move on to deal with specific places, the specific places in the allegations made by Mr. Nice and which are located in your area of responsibility. We shall begin with Orahovac municipality. Is there is a document entitled "Order: To provide support to the MUP forces in breaking up and destroying the Siptar forces in Orahovac, Suva Reka and Velika Krusa." This is at tab 356. Have you found it, General?
A. Yes.
Q. Does this refer to what you have just spoken of, their cooperation with the NATO aggressors and the expected attacks from the territories of Albania and Macedonia?
A. Yes. This refers to the terrorist forces -- or rather, the two brigades that were in my area of responsibility. One of these brigades was here in the Retimlje area and the other in the Drenovac area. Also, there were local terrorist staffs in Velika Krusa, Brestovac, Donje Retimlje, and so on. It also mentions what weapons they had.
Q. Very well. This document is very clear, well laid out, so let's not dwell on it any longer.
Will you please now look at number 357. The title is "Order on destroying Siptar terrorist forces in the general sector of the village of Retimlje, lifting the blockade of the Suva Reka-Orahovac road and establishing control of the territory."
What does this document contain? 41598
A. The first document was issued by the Pristina Corps. This second document is my own order for the implementation of the task ordered by the corps.
In the information about the enemy, more details are provided. The Siptar forces have reorganised, equipped themselves with modern weapons and trained to continue their arms struggle against the defence forces of the FRY. The strongest STS strongholds in the general areas of Retimlje, Milanovac, the village of Studencani, the village of Samodraze, the village of Dobrodeljane and Pagarusa. In this zone, the Podenje-Pastrik [phoen] operations zone, there were two brigades of the KLA, one in the village of Velika Drenovac [phoen], the other in the village of Retimlje. The commander -- command post is in Morilja [phoen] and the local staffs are in other villages. There is mention of the fact that in each of these villages there are armed local guards consisting of 30 to 50 terrorists. The aim of the terrorists was to take over military, commercial, and public facilities, expand and consolidate operation zones, broaden the scope of armed rebellion, and create conditions for taking control of Kosovo and Metohija as well as to declare an independent Kosovo.
Q. General, as this is a very detailed order, I won't go into it in detail. Everyone can read it. But let me draw your attention to page 4, to point 8.2 in which, among other things, it says the following: "Escort captured terrorists to the POW concentration point to the administrative building of Metohija Vino in the settlement of Siroka [phoen] near Suva Reka and the wine cellars in Mala Krusa." 41599 And then you go on to say: "In the course of combat operations, I exclusively forbid unsupervised ventures into populated localities, plunder of property of the local population, violations of provisions of international humanitarian law, and relocation of enemy weapons, military equipment or corps, as well as any entry into enemy shelters before the arrival of expert organs."
Well, this sentence here, this phrase, "before the arrival of expert organs," refers to teams who should deal with mines and booby-traps. But what it says here about taking captured enemy soldiers to prisoner of war points, is this part of your tender? Have I quoted it correctly?
MR. NICE: That was a leading question. I don't have at the moment any view on whether it's significant or not. I'm just looking at this part of this document for the first time. But it's not for the accused to give an explanation for what expert organs are in case there's something significant in it.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Avoid the leading questions and the comments.
JUDGE KWON: General --
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, my question was --
JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... in my tab.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, Judge Kwon was speaking.
JUDGE KWON: General, what did you say this -- was this order based upon? Was there an order from the upper level?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the previous tab. 41600
JUDGE KWON: Is that Pristina Corps?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE KWON: In tab 356, it says: "Joint command for Kosovo and Metohija." Could you explain that, what does -- what that does mean.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Regardless of the fact that it says "joint command," I received this order by post in the same way as I received other orders. And it contained attachments from other organs which said they were from the Pristina Corps, and the number also is from the Pristina Corps, but it's true that it says here "joint command for Kosovo and Metohija."
As a brigade commander, I didn't pay attention to this because when I received such orders, I always had a preparatory order from the commander, which arrived by telephone, telling me to prepare the unit and telling me I would get a written order. That's why at the time I didn't attach any significance to this. My explanation of why it says "joint command" is the following: In the course of 1998, when together with members of the MUP we carried out activities against the terrorists in those five stages that I have already explained, at the beginning of each stage we were invited to come to Pristina. We were summoned there, both the army commanders and the police commanders, with our superior officers. And there on the spot coordination was carried out between the police and the army, and we, as the members of the army, and they were handed the documents on the spot.
On the ground, we had the necessary documents that enabled us to coordinate our activities. On this occasion, I did not go to Pristina. 41601 Neither did my colleague from the Secretariat of the Interior in Prizren. My understanding of why it says "joint command" here is that were it to say "command of the Pristina Corps," then this would not be binding on the MUP. It might be binding only for me. But the two of us were supposed to carry out coordination on the ground. We were supposed to coordinate our activities on the ground, that is. And this joint command I understood as a coordinating body between the army and the MUP and the other state organs in Pristina. This was acceptable both to me and to the MUP. That's my explanation.
JUDGE KWON: Was there any legal or practical basis to establish this kind of joint command?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as far as the fight against terrorism is concerned, the state can use different mechanisms and organise all its resources, after all. This does not have to do with direct combat only or operations by the military and the police. Other institutions as well have to take part in those other forms that we call non-military forms for resolving a crisis. That is why I believe that there had to be coordination, say, at the level of Pristina or the level of the entire province, where there would be people from Belgrade who would directly, on the spot, see what the security and political situation was and where members of the military would be in order to realise part of these measures. I believe that not a single crisis can be resolved if other measures are not included as well; in schooling, health care, with regard to humanitarian and all other issues.
JUDGE KWON: Who headed this joint command? 41602
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, you're asking me that and I really don't know. I actually never saw this joint command. I never attended a single meeting. I only came across individual persons, if I can put it that way, and I had heard of some persons being in Pristina. At any rate, I was supposed to be in Prizren, and I could go to Pristina only when told to do so by the command. I know that in this coordination body Mr. Minic was there for a while, and Mr. Sainovic, and then I think Mr. Matkovic, as far as the civilian authorities are concerned. I don't know whether it was Mr. Andjelkovic too.
As for the MUP, now, was it Mr. Djordjevic? As far as the army was concerned, it was probably the corps commander. But had this been a command that had a commander, then somebody's signature would have been included here.
I think that although it was called a command, in my opinion it was a most unfortunate name that was chosen. But anyway, it was a coordination body, a coordinating body. I don't understand why it's really called joint command. It was a coordination body that coordinated the activities of state entities in Kosovo and Metohija. I know that I received several such orders, but I never saw that somebody had signed this. Again, it says "joint command" and there's no signature, but I carried out this order because from my superior officer I had previously received an order to prepare for activity and that I would get my orders in writing.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you for your detailed answer. 41603 BLANK PAGE 41604
JUDGE ROBINSON: But why do you say it's an unfortunate name, General?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, this name also makes you think of commanding. In the Pristina Corps, in my brigade, in the army in general knows "command" according to the chain of command as a rule, from the squad up to the brigade, corps, army, all the way up to the Chief of General Staff. There is a single chain of command. It is well known that in my brigade I was the only one who could issue orders. My Chief of Staff also, who had authority vested in him by me. As for other officers, they could only act within their own line of work and on my approval.
I mention these people now, but I could give orders only -- I could, rather, receive orders only from General Lazarevic or his deputy. There was no third person in the corps that could issue an order to me and have me carry that order out.
So that's what the rules of conduct envisaged, that the commander of the army can issue an order too, or his Chief of Staff, because that is also involved in the chain of command. So if I'm called directly and issued an order. In practice, this never happened, but the rules envisage that commands can be issued in this way.
Also, the rules say that if somebody is skipping over a particular ring in the chain of command, if the commander of the army calls me directly, I'm duty-bound to carry out his order, but it is also my duty to inform my superior officer, that is to say, the corps commander of the order that I received and carried out. That is how the chain of 41605 command operates in the army.
Of course, I would never accept to carry out an order issued by a civilian, because that is totally unacceptable. And that would totally infringe upon military organisation as such.
JUDGE BONOMY: What I find strange in that connection is that -- that so far we don't -- we don't appear to have seen the military order that goes with this. Where is it? You said that you weren't acting on this; you were acting on a military order. So where is the military order? This can easily be clarified and cleared up.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, I think you didn't understand. You see, in the same envelope along with this order -- I mean, this is one order. Then I received in the same envelope an order for the engineering operations and also an order for artillery, but "joint command" was not written in the heading. It said "command of the Pristina Corps," as usual.
JUDGE BONOMY: That means we'll be coming to -- they must be later in the exhibits then somewhere, are they?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. These documents do exist. Perhaps they were not considered relevant.
JUDGE BONOMY: Perhaps. Thank you.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Continue, Mr. Milosevic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Since there is a great deal of interest here in this expression "joint command," tell me, General, did you ever receive or carry out any 41606 order that had not come from your own superior command, the command of the Pristina Corps?
A. No. That's what I've already explained. It's not only that I didn't carry it out; I'd never carry out an order that did not come from persons who had the right to issue orders to me.
Q. All right. Did you show a few minutes ago the order of the Pristina Corps on the map of the Pristina Corps and did you show your own order on the map of your brigade?
A. Yes.
Q. Are these orders that include the operations pertaining to support for crushing the anti- -- the terrorist forces?
A. Yes. This has to do with a specific order for a specific area.
Q. But within something that is already covered in the orders that you quoted a few moments ago.
A. Yes.
Q. From the point of view of territory and command.
A. The plan that got in from the Pristina Corps fully covered this activity as well and all other activities that would evolve later in this territory, because the deployment in this plan would not change until combat operations stopped after the agreement. The deployment of my units would remain as depicted here.
Q. All right.
JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Delic, which -- which tab is that order in, the one that you're referring to? It's obviously a tab we've dealt with already. Which one is it? Can you remind me? 41607
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. It's a plan, the plan for the defence operation of the Pristina Corps, what Mr. Milosevic asked me about, and the plan for defence of my brigade.
JUDGE BONOMY: Look, please, at 351. Is that it?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is an order of mine.
JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From the 20th.
JUDGE BONOMY: You see, Mr. -- Mr. Milosevic's leading questions don't help me to identify -- he's now saying there is a document that we've already seen which is the order from -- a military order that you were working on and all that we were looking on -- looking at from the Supreme Command was something that we had already seen you were ordered to do by an appropriate military document. Now, I would like to see that document. And if it's not here, then we shouldn't be misled in that way. So let's have the position clear.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. All right. General, have we seen this? Have you explained on the map the defence plan of the Pristina Corps for all of Kosovo and Metohija and then the defence plan of your own brigade, which now moves, as you said, in greater detail than the plan of the Pristina Corps?
MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... is actually a subtle form of leading to try and get round the difficulty that's been identified by the question from the Bench. The accused --
JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, I doubt if it matters. I was about to ask: Is the document -- is the plan something that was sent from a higher 41608 military commander to the general? Because if it's not, then it's not the document we're looking for.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already shown it. It's under this map, the text of the map -- of the plan and the map of the plan.
JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. But is -- is the plan a document that was sent to you by someone else, or is the plan something you yourself prepared?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This part -- or rather, this map -- this plan is what I compiled myself on the basis of the document that I received from the Pristina Corps, from my superior command.
JUDGE BONOMY: I'm looking for the one that you got from the Pristina Corps, from your superior command. That's what I'm -- that's what I'd like to see.
JUDGE KWON: So Mr. Delic, if you could take a look at tab 321 or 323. It's an order -- a telegram from the Pristina command -- corps command. It's before the war. And the Pristina Corps' command, using that term, and the serial -- confidential number is 455 -- 455-20 and -21.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you just give me the tab?
JUDGE KWON: Yes, 2 -- I'm sorry, 321 or 323.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, this has something to do with a completely different operation that we explained and we presented all the documents of the corps and --
JUDGE KWON: There Pristina Corps' command are using the term "Pristina Corps command" as they stand. But now 356 they are using a different name, "joint command for Kosovo and Metohija," while using the 41609 same serial number starting with 455. So it -- what you are saying is that this is the -- exactly the order from the Pristina Corps? Or you received a separate order from the Pristina Corps other than this?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. There was no other order apart from the one that says "joint command" in the heading. I already said that in the same envelope I received something else too. I tried to explain that to you a few minutes ago.
JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, continue.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Let us just go back to the map that contains the order of the Pristina Corps to defend Kosovo and Metohija, the one that you received in part. What is the name of that order and what is the name of that map that has to do with the entire Pristina Corps? Then you had your own map that has to do with your own brigade only and that is that you formulated through your order.
A. The map of the Pristina Corps is the plan of the defence operation of the Pristina Corps. It's right here.
JUDGE KWON: Take out the first one.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is presented through the text and through the table.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Is that the order of the Pristina Corps?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it signed by the commander of the Pristina Corps? 41610
A. I got only an excerpt.
Q. All right. But an excerpt from the order of the Pristina Corps.
THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note they cannot hear the witness.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Is this from the order of the commander of the Pristina Corps?
A. On the basis of which I made my own plan.
Q. All right.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you should stop -- stop for a while.
JUDGE KWON: That's tab 354.
JUDGE ROBINSON: When you speak of the -- the order of the Pristina Corps, what order is that? The witness can answer.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the plan, the plan for a defence operation. I said that it has text of its own and a schematic breakdown which is quite clear, and you have items relating to orders for a defence operation. You have an overview of the units that will be engaged and the axis on which they will be engaged. Reference is also made to the stages involved.
JUDGE KWON: General, is the map we are now looking at an excerpt or part of the map which follows?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The map that follows was drawn on the basis of this map. This is what I received from the corps.
JUDGE KWON: Who was the map -- which contains the entire Kosovo, the fuller one, the bigger one? It's a different one? 41611
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The larger map shows all the brigades in Kosovo and Metohija. But as a brigade commander, the corps didn't send everything to me, they sent me this part that was of interest to me.
JUDGE KWON: Was the larger map drawn by the Pristina Corps?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, the larger perhaps was drawn by the Pristina Corps, but they only sent me this part, which was of interest to me.
JUDGE KWON: So do -- can we see the signature in the larger map of the commander of the Pristina Corps?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, by all means. But I don't have that map.
JUDGE KWON: I'm looking -- I'm referring to tab 355, the one which follows that map, the bigger map, yes.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the larger map is mine. It's signed by the commander who authorised my map, and it has my signature too. It bears my signature. So this map was drawn up on the basis of the -- my map. I sent that map for -- to be approved by the corps command. The corps command approved my decision.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, I just want to clarify something.
JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ...
JUDGE ROBINSON: Judge Kwon and Judge Bonomy have questions.
JUDGE BONOMY: General, on the map that's now on the -- the board, which is 354, does it say "Pristina Corps" on it? 41612
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No, it's not there.
JUDGE BONOMY: Is it signed by anyone?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, the map was sent in an envelope with documents attached to it.
JUDGE BONOMY: Is it signed by anyone?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't understand why you fail to understand this. The map that this map is based on was signed by the corps command.
JUDGE BONOMY: But this particular one you say is the one you received.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this, as I have said, is just a part of the map, and it's for my brigade. It's based on the large map that the corps had.
JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah. But that is the one that was sent to you because it related to the area which was within your area -- it related to your area of responsibility; is that correct?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE BONOMY: So does it have the words "Pristina Corps" on it?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says: "A plan for defence operation for Pristina Corps."
JUDGE BONOMY: Does it say that?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE BONOMY: Can you show me where it says that.
THE WITNESS: [Indicates]
JUDGE BONOMY: On the top. And is it signed by anyone? 41613 BLANK PAGE 41614
THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the answer.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] How is it that you don't understand that this map is just a photocopy of part of a map that the Pristina Corps had. My map, which is based on this map, was signed by the corps commander. This map -- well, we have to have two copies of this map: One is kept in the corps and another is kept in the unit.
JUDGE BONOMY: How do you know that the original of this was signed by the corps commander?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, how do I know that the corps commander signed it? Well, the corps commander drew the map and signed it. That's common practice. That's quite usual. You can see how he signed my map. Why did he do that? Well, because that is the procedure that is followed in the army. I sign a map that I draw and the corps commander signs to show that he is approving my plan.
JUDGE BONOMY: And you -- you obviously think it's -- it's very strange for me to wonder why the document that you say is actually sent to you from your command on the basis of which you are to act should be signed. It's just very foolish of me to think that that document -- one might expect that document to be signed?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The document was certainly signed, the document in the Pristina Corps. This is part of the main map that was sent to me. The commander signed the map that was kept in the corps, and this is what he sent to me. There was no need to sign every part of that map, every excerpt from that map.
We can have a look at other documents. We can see other 41615 documents for which there was a main map and then there was an excerpt that concerned the 449th Brigade [as interpreted]; that is to say, that only concerned my brigade. So the part of the map that was relevant to me was taken. You can see that this map continues in all directions. The commander provided me with what I needed, provided me with information about his decision with regard to my zone and provided me with information on the adjacent units. That's what I had to know. And my map is completely identical to this map, because I can't change the positions that were allocated to me by my superior. And this map was sent to the corps command for approval, and I signed it ...
JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, General. Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, there is some confusion here, a misunderstanding, because Mr. Bonomy asked you whether you were surprised by the fact that he said that he expected the map to be signed. If a command issues a map, is it always signed?
A. Well, as you can see here, my map was signed by General Lazarevic, so it had been sent for approval.
Q. General, on the basis of this part of the map that relates to the entire Pristina Corps, in that part of the map, does it say "Plan for a defence operation for the Pristina Corps"?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. And on the basis of that excerpt which concerns your brigade, did you draw a map which says "Defence plan for the 549 Brigade"? 41616
A. Yes, that's the map.
Q. And does it have to fully relay the order of the higher command and then do you have to provide an analysis of it for two levels below?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you draw such a map, on the basis of an excerpt from the higher command, does it have to be sent to the superior command for approval?
A. Yes, absolutely, and it's been signed.
Q. And General Lazarevic, the commander of the Pristina Corps, signed a map that was based on his map.
A. Yes.
Q. And could he have signed a map that wasn't based on his map?
A. Well, when he checked this and compared what I had done with what he had on his map, well, he certainly wouldn't have signed it if there had been any differences, even minor differences.
Q. Are there any differences between your map and the excerpt of the corps map apart from the fact that the level of detail is different?
A. Well, only the detail is different but nothing else is different.
Q. So as far as the details are concerned, what are the differences? In your map, you also show lower units that aren't referred to in the corps map.
A. The corps map depicts the position of battalions, and I also have to depict the position of companies.
Q. So within the framework of a corps map -- with regard to the corps map, you only depicted the position of companies. 41617
A. Well, yes, the battalions were depicted in accordance with the corps plan and we depicted the position of companies. Those are the details concerned. And naturally, the scale of my map was different. The scale of the map for the corps was 1 to 200.000 and my scale was 1 to 50.000. And that's because the corps has to depict the position of all the units and I only have to show my zone of responsibility and the position of my units.
Q. Very well. I think we have managed to clarify this. Can we finally go back to the document under tab 357, which says: "Order on destroying the STS in the general sector of the village of Retimlje, lifting the blockade of the Suva Reka-Orahovac road and establishing control of the territory." This is a document that appears under tab 357.
General, is that a document of yours?
A. Yes. That is an order that I drafted on the basis of an order from the Pristina Corps command.
Q. Since this concerns the Retimlje sector and the Suva Reka-Orahovac road and the scale of the map is 1 to 50.000, what information do you have in relation to this? And we referred to your main tasks. What sort of information do you provide here as far as the enemy is concerned?
A. Well, if I could show you the map that accompanies this order.
Q. Well, I think that the map that accompanies the order is under tab 358.
A. Yes. 41618
Q. Is that correct?
JUDGE BONOMY: Before -- just before you move on, you say that you drafted this document, this order on the basis of an order from the Pristina Corps command. Now, have we actually seen that order, or are you referring again to the map that we've seen?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, here it is. It's under tab 356. That's the order.
JUDGE BONOMY: That doesn't come from the Pristina Corps command. So we're back to where we started; is that right?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, the general is trying to explain this to you. This is an order from the Pristina Corps and the fact that it says "joint command" here is of no significance in his opinion. He received this order from the Pristina Corps.
JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... beyond my comprehension at the moment, but no doubt all will become clear in due course.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope so too.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, as you have said, there is a map that accompanies this. I wanted you to comment on your order which is --
JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Delic, are you following?
The extension seems to be disconnected. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] 41619
Q. General, since you suggested that we should first have a look at the map and then we can go back to the order, what does it say here? What is the title of the map under 358, tab 358? Could you please read out the title.
A. This is a decision of the commander of the 549th Motorised Brigade to destroy the STS forces in the Orahovac-Suva Reka-Velika Krusa sector.
Q. Very well. What does it say in the upper left-hand corner? Could you read it out, please.
A. In the upper left-hand corner, it says: "I authorise Commander General Major -- Major General Vladimir Lazarevic."
Q. Is that the commander of your corps?
A. Yes.
Q. Very well. Is that in accordance with the rules of service? You issued an order, you attached a map which was approved of by the corps commander.
A. Well, whatever I do, whatever my commanders do, has to be approved at a superior level.
Q. General, tell me, throughout that period of time, did you ever see a single map on the position of your forces, on your operations, that wasn't drawn up by the Pristina Corps command but that was drawn by someone else?
A. Well, the Pristina Corps drew maps for all of its units, and only the Pristina Corps did that, and that was what I did for my units too.
Q. Thank you, General. Now, be so kind as to explain this decision. 41620 Here you say it's an order that was issued -- well, I'd first like to clarify something of general interest. Is an order at this level always issued in written form and in the form of a map?
A. Yes, that's always the case, because naturally an order contains far more information. But when you have a map, it's a lot easier to understand the nature of the commander's decision. That's why it's called the commander's decision. It's sufficient to cast a glance at the map to see what the commander's idea was with regard to carrying out a certain operation or task.
Q. Very well. So if I put this simply, would the map be a graphic depiction of an order?
A. Yes. Because on the basis of such a map, a professional, an officer, could draft an order. Perhaps not such a detailed one as this one here, but if it had arrived from some other army -- if they had such a map, they could reconstruct the order.
Q. They could reconstruct the order with the positions of all the units, their axes of action, et cetera.
A. Yes.
Q. Can you see all of this on the map?
A. Yes.
Q. This decision, the commander's decision on destroying the STS forces in such-and-such a sector - I won't mention the sector - well, this is in fact your order; is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And it was approved of, as it says in the upper left-hand corner 41621 -- it was approved of by the corps commander, who was your superior; is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Very well. So please explain the following for me -- explain this for me.
A. He ordered this and approved it, and I received the order. There was nothing else for me to do. I issued an order to allocate tasks to my units. And here reference is made to the position of the terrorist forces. And you can see that the terrorist forces were at the north-east of the Prizren-Djakovica road. And here in the Retimlje sector depicted in blue - blue stands for the enemy forces, the terrorist forces in this particular case - in the Retimlje sector, the commander of the -- the command of the 124th Brigade was located and that entire brigade was deployed in this sector.
Q. General, you have taken this as an example. You have now read this out from the map.
A. Yes.
Q. That in the Retimlje area that's where the headquarters of the 124th Brigade is located. If we go back to document 357, the text of the order, what it says here is, some ten lines from the beginning: "The 124th KLA Brigade (about 300 terrorists KM) in the village of Retimlje." What you read out from the map differs from the order only in that the order says that there were about 300 terrorists. The other information is also contained in the map. Is that correct?
A. Yes. 41622
Q. Before that, it says: "122nd KLA Brigade, about 250 terrorists, command post of Velika Drenovac."
A. It's on the other side of Orahovac, in this area here.
Q. Very well. Could you please continue your explanation of the map.
A. On receipt of the order from the command of the Pristina Corps that the terrorist forces were to be broken up and that control is to be re-established over the territory between Suva Reka, Orahovac, Zrze and Prizren in the immediate rear of the area of deployment of my brigade, I issued a decision to engage part of the forces from this area here on the communication between Prizren and Djakovica to establish a blockade there, to establish another line of blockade in the direction of Suva Reka, and to go with my main forces from the directions of Suva Reka and Orahovac and to break through this territory held by the terrorists, to link up the forces from these two directions, and then to mount a joint attack with the forces from this axis here, Bela Crkva-Hoca and so on in the Retimlje area, and there to break up the terrorist forces, disarm them, and neutralise this territory again and bring it back under the control of the army and the MUP. In other words, to remove the threat to my unit, because at the same time as an attack is mounted from across the border, these units might attack my units from the rear and cut off their communications.
Q. Thank you, General. This was the plan. These were your orders. This is what you drew on the map. I assume you also implemented it. Did you implement this order? 41623
A. Yes. There were certain problems. Here the Siptar terrorist forces defended themselves persistently. And on the 27th of March, we did not manage to link up our forces from these two axes. It was only in the early morning of the 27th of March that these forces linked up, and it was only then that we can say that we surrounded part of the forces. What was not good in these activities was that in those three days, the 25th, the 26th, and part of the 27th, the main part of the terrorist forces pulled out in the direction of Dobrodelje village.
Q. General, please, in document 359, is there an analysis of the activities of your brigade in connection with the task you are now explaining?
A. Yes.
Q. Let me read out the first sentence to you. It says here - and you sent this to the command of the Pristina Corps, your superior command - "From the 25th to the 29th --" I'm reading out -- "pursuant to the order to provide support to the MUP forces and the command of the Pristina Corps," strictly confidential number, and so on, you mentioned the numbers: "The Siptar terrorist forces were broken up in the Retimlje area," and so on and so forth. Does it say here quite clearly that this was an order issued by you pursuant to an order from the Pristina Corps?
A. Yes.
Q. General, please --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this will be the last question.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, my last question.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] 41624
Q. You mentioned a command from the Pristina Corps, number 455-63. If you go back to tab 356, is this order strictly confidential number 455-63?
A. Yes, this is the order which says "joint command" in the heading.
Q. But you say that you received a number from -- an order from the Pristina Corps. You mentioned the same number.
A. Yes, it's the same order.
Q. Very well.
A. Well, believe me, sometimes I didn't even notice that it said "joint command."
Q. So you received orders from the corps. You reported to the corps. Very well. Thank you, General. We will continue tomorrow.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We'll adjourn for today, resume tomorrow at 9.00.
Before we adjourn, Mr. Milosevic, you made a request yesterday for a videotape of the proceedings. The Chamber has considered this. The Chamber requires that you make a written motion setting out precisely what you wish, whether it is particular passages from the -- from the evidence or whether it is the -- the entire --
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The entire videotape. It's a very simple request: The entire videotape.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, make a -- make a written motion for it and explain why you need it and the basis for it.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I understood that everybody has the right to get a videotape, anyone who is undergoing 41625 proceedings here.
JUDGE ROBINSON: I've already said what the Chamber has --
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --
JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Nice, did you want to say something?
MR. NICE: No, I was --
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Only one question, please. I haven't finished.
Mr. Robinson, you recently said -- you just said "tomorrow at 9.00." According to the information I have, you are sitting in the afternoon tomorrow. Has this changed, or have I not been informed on time?
[Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
JUDGE ROBINSON: We are sitting in the morning. And you should have been advised, because originally it was the afternoon.
MR. NICE: Your Honour, as to the accused's request for a copy of the video, I probably wouldn't wish to be involved in that. But I respectfully draw to your attention one matter of concern: A video of the whole proceedings would, of course, reveal the pictures and images of protected witnesses whereas the transcript in written form, to which the accused is, of course, entitled, does not. That's a matter that the Chamber might want to have in mind as it considers making available to him such a document that would carry permanent images of protected witnesses.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we would certainly have that in mind, Mr. Nice. Yes. 41626 We are adjourned.
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.55 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 1st day of
July, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.