⁴¹⁸⁴⁰

Wednesday, 6 July 2005

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you may continue.

WITNESS: BOZIDAR DELIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

A. Good morning, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. We heard testimony here from a witness of Mr. Nice's, Beqe Beqaj. He testified on the 29th of August, 2002, and the transcript is somewhere from line or page 9116 to 9120. It's in that part of the transcript where you'll find that passage. He was talking about the fact that in August 1998, the population of Racak and other villages left the village for the first time when the army and the police arrived in both villages and other surrounding villages in the valley.

And on the 14th of August, 1999, he says the army of Yugoslavia MUP again arrived to the village of Raca, and the witness says that they ordered the villagers to leave their homes. Also, that on the 27th of April, five Serb policemen were killed after which the Serb forces attacked the village of Dobrosh where a number of villagers were killed, and the inhabitants fled from the village in the direction of Meja where the Serb forces stopped the convoy at a checkpoint in Meja and then ⁴¹⁸⁴¹ separated 24 men that they sent to the fields as -- which was known as Hasan's valley. They separated 30 of them there, and the policemen said that they were responsible for the killing of the Serb policemen, and the witness says that he never saw them again.

Tell me if you know anything about that and what all this was about. I hope that you paid attention to the dates, the 27th of April when five of our policemen were killed, and then it says our forces attacked the village of Dobrosh.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: They separated 13 of them, not 30.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When you mention 1998, the witness probably made a mistake in stating the date because when dealing with 1998 ourselves, we had some orders linked to the return of the population to those villages. That means that the inhabitants, in 1998, could have left in the month of May, whereas in August when the witness and the witnesses mentioning August, they were already back in their homes. Now, as far as 1999 is concerned, this particular date, the 27th of April that you mentioned, I said yesterday already or, rather, I indicated on the map that on the 27th of April, the operations started in that region and that the object of those operations was to break the terrorist forces which had gathered in the immediate vicinity of the state border. That is to say they are the villages that I pointed to yesterday beginning with Smonica towards Junik. So it's a broader territory.

Q. Yes, I understand that, General, but what I'm asking you now is this: What this witness stated, that some men were separated and then ⁴¹⁸⁴² nothing is known of their fate after that, is that true?

A. As far as the separation of men goes, it was often usual that the terrorists together with the civilians, that they should mingle with the civilians, take off their uniforms, because they were wearing civilian clothing and uniforms. They'd just discard their uniforms and become civilians straight away. So the police or, rather, the army couldn't do that. The army didn't have that kind of information. So the police would sometimes stop certain individuals to search them and to see if they were indeed civilians or not. Otherwise, I don't know anything about that. The killing of some policemen was mentioned. All I know is that during those days four policemen were killed, in fact, and that one policeman was seriously wounded and that he remained an invalid after that wounding. That's what I know linked to that particular situation.

Q. Tell me, was it at all possible for somebody to set aside, to separate these individuals, to search them, check them out, anybody, and then to kill them? So to separate them, single them out, and kill them?

A. When people are singled out, separated, and in 1998 I was present when that was -- that situation took place, when you separate a group of people, what you do is you look for their names. You can't do that on the spot. You can't check them out on the spot, but you have to ring up headquarters, then you give the person's name, then this is checked through the computer. You do a computer process check on them for the individuals and so on.

Q. What I'm asking you is is it possible that some killing could have taken place in that procedure, that checking procedure that you mention ⁴¹⁸⁴³ now?

A. Well, during that procedure that is quite impossible because, had something like that happened, it would have been a crime.

Q. Well, we're not contesting that, but do you know that anything like that happened?

A. No, I don't know about anything like that happening.

Q. Okay, fine. Now, Nike Peraj, a Prosecution witness, said that at the beginning of 1999 that the Serb artillery and army deployed in the Djakovica municipality, Pec, Prizren and Orahovica, that they were there, and he testified from the 9th to the 13th of May, 2002 and that is mentioned in this fillbox of Mr. Nice's.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly slow down. Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic and the witness, there is a request from the interpreter for you to both slow down.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm interested, General, since these are large towns, or relatively large towns, not to categorise towns and the size of them, Djakovica, Pec, Prizren and Orahovac, he says that in 1999, the Serb artillery and the army, without going into what he means by artillery and what he means by army, but he says the artillery and army were deployed in the Djakovica. Pec, Prizren, Orahovac municipalities and towns. Now in those towns, were there any Yugoslav army garrisons located there?

A. In Pec there was a garrison, yes, in which there were several units of the rank of a battalion, strength of battalion. In Djakovica, there were two barracks, a garrison with two barracks, that is. In one of ^{41844 BLANK PAGE 41845} the barracks there was the Border Battalion and my own 2nd Motorised Battalion, and in the other barracks there was the entire brigade put up with five divisions, the PVO Brigade, and the command and all the units of the brigade and the border battalions, as well as the command of the military district of Prizren, which means -- which means that no units were deployed, and they were always there in that garrison.

Q. That's where the barracks exist?

A. Yes, that's where the barracks exist, and they have existed there since World War II.

Q. All right. Fine. He said that in April 1999, the KLA killed Milutin Prascevic, who was the chief of the MUP in Djakovica, as well as four other policemen, after which, on the 27th, 28th of April, there was a large-scale operation in the valley north of Djakovica. He talks about Serb forces, and he testified from the 9th to the 13th of May, and I've already told you that, 2002.

What was happening? What happened? So we're talking about April 1999, the 27th and 28th of April, 1999.

A. In those observations by this witness, there is -- there are untruths. I knew this man Milutin Prascevic. He wasn't the chief of MUP at all. He could have been just a lower-ranking officer in the MUP of Djakovica, and I've already said that four policemen were killed, one among them was an Albanian, and one was seriously wounded. However, those policemen, when they were called by some Roma, as far as I was informed, some Roma called them up and they went out in the direction of Ponosevac and Smonica to intervene and that's where four of them were killed and one ⁴¹⁸⁴⁶ seriously wounded. But to bring that into connection, that is to say the death of those policemen and this activity on this other territory has nothing to do with one another.

Q. Well, the activity you've explained to us, that is to say the defence of the border and the onslaught from -- coming from Albania, the attack from Albania --

A. Yes. That was the greatest amount of fighting during the war. 120 of our soldiers were killed in defending our borders, and these were supposed to be forces which would hit from the rear to join up with the forces attacking from Albania, this other side.

Q. Thank you, General. Let's not dwell on that any longer, then. The witness Xhevahire Syla said here -- she said here that on the 14th of April, the Serb forces entered Novokaz, Djakovica municipality -- or Djakovo municipality and they went into Albania houses, giving the people, the inhabitants five minutes to leave, and this led to the formation of a convoy moving to Djakovica, and that the police attacked the people in the convoy, told them to go to Albania, and that the refugees were not allowed to leave the route they had taken towards Prizren and which was a circuitous route to the border, a roundabout way, and it says that the convoy was stopped at the Bistrazin bridge, that the Serb forces separated from -- the people from the convoy, that the convoy was later hit by NATO bombs, and then three low-flying planes later on, carrying Serb flags, flew over their heads and bombed the convoy seven times, killing 70 to 80 persons. And she testified on the 17th of July, 2002 and the transcript is 8186, that page of the transcript. I hope that you listened to what I ⁴¹⁸⁴⁷ read out and said carefully; so the NATO bombing, then our planes bombing and then killing 70, 80 people. That's what she claimed.

A. That's quite nonsensical, ludicrous, because NATO -- on the first day NATO didn't recognise this, but they did admit to it on the second or third day, of having bombed on the 14th of April columns of refugees, but not only in that area that the witness is referring to. The refugees were bombed on -- in some five or six separate positions from the place that the witness mentions, that is from Bistrazin right up to Prizren, and a large number of civilians were killed as a result and especially large number wounded. And there is footage, there is a film of that, film by state television, and I also think that foreign journalists were later on able to come to the spot and film the column the next day. But first of all there was this state television footage, and it's quite nonsensical that NATO planes bombed first and that our planes appeared later on. Our planes absolutely never flew, did not fly at all from the end of March. They were not airborne from the end of March to the end the war. Our planes never took off during that period of time because they were inferior, because they were not able to stand up to NATO planes, NATO aviation, that had complete supremacy over the airspace of our country.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Did your planes also bomb? Generally speaking, not speaking about in relation to that particular incident. During the conflict, did your planes drop bombs?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you should know first of all the kind of air force that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had. So as far as fighter planes go, it only had 12 planes, MiG-29, the MiG-29 type ⁴¹⁸⁴⁸ that were located in Belgrade, the -- a MiG-, which just before the war was supposed to be overhauled, and seven of those 12 planes were destroyed in the vicinity of Belgrade; Belgrade, Valjevo, in that general area. As to the other planes -- and that was all in March. As to the other planes, they were no longer flying. Now, the other planes we had were the MiG-21, and that is the second generation of aeroplanes which had absolutely no chance against the aeroplanes of the fourth generation which NATO had in its possession. And then there was a third plane, a third aeroplane in our possession. It was the Orao, or eagle plane, which is a light plane for combat operations with very limited capabilities, and it was a support plane, as we call it, for support operations. However, as those planes had absolutely no chance against the other side --

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, never mind that. What is the answer to the question that I asked? You have this habit of not answering a question. You go off on your own tangent. I asked you whether your planes dropped bombs. Were they equipped to drop bombs? If they were not equipped to drop bombs, then that would settle it.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Our aircraft never bombed a single target during the war. You are now asking me if they were equipped to do so. Of course they were equipped to do so, but only if there had been no NATO supremacy in the airspace. Since NATO had supremacy in the airspace, they could make no sorties in the first place.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... that your low flying planes dropped bombs on the convoy, and you're saying that didn't ^{41849 BLANK PAGE 41850} happen. What is the basis for saying that didn't happen?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because I'm a military man. I know my army. Although I'm a soldier of the ground forces, I also know the aviation and to some extent its tactics, and at the end of the day I know when our planes made sorties. NATO did admit to bombing this column of refugees. What the witness is saying is pure nonsense.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You say NATO admitted to this bombing.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you have evidence of this, this admission?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was a well-known commentator of the NATO, Jamie Shea. He was their spokesperson. I don't have this evidence with me, I didn't know I would need it, because the entire world knows that NATO bombed both this column of refugees and another column of refugees a month later in Korishte.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Another witness, Merfidete Selmani stated on the 16th of July, 2002, that on the 14th of April - that is on the same day - Serb soldiers entered the village of Dobros, making the villagers flee, and when they passed Djakovica and came near the Bistrazin bridge the witness heard an explosion and heard or, rather, saw smoke coming from a part of the convoy. There were corpses around. A tractor was hit, et cetera. Does this relate to the same event or something else?

A. I was there on the spot after it happened. What the witness is talking about I saw with my own eyes. I saw the corpses. I saw ⁴¹⁸⁵¹ assistance being given in my military hospital after the incident, to the wounded. From Bistrazin all the way to Prizren, the convoy was hit by many bombs. There were many dead. There were many destroyed vehicles. There were many dead people, people who were completely incinerated on their tractor trailers. It was a very terrible sight to see. We managed to lend some assistance to the wounded. We transferred some of them to the hospital in Djakovica, some to Prizren. They were taken care of there. There were many serious wounds and many amputations of limbs. That is the same incident.

Q. Well, there are many witnesses who claim that it was our forces who did that, and it's very important to emphasise this here.

A. We have a recording of the communication between NATO pilots. We have it in our country. It has been published. One of the NATO pilots, after receiving command to attack, says that he only sees tractors on the road, he only sees red tractors, because all the tractors produced in our country are red. But he received a command to attack. So that was an attack on civilians, pure and simple.

If the Court needs this evidence, I can provide a transcript of this communication. It has been published in our press.

Q. Very well. Thank you, General. Another witness of Mr. Nice's, Martin Pnishi, who testified on the 29th of August, 2002, transcript 9216 and 17, says that on the 27th of April, around 9.30, he saw from his house that Serb forces had set up a checkpoint about 200 metres from his house in Meja. The checkpoint was set up by the army, police officers, and armoured vehicles. ⁴¹⁸⁵² What happened in Meja on the 27th of April, 1999? Do you have any knowledge of this?

A. I do have as much knowledge as I received from my subordinate commanders' reports. I knew that this operation against terrorists was being carried out in this area, and I knew that my unit or, rather, part of the unit that had already been there defending the state border was allocated in order to block the road about a kilometre from Meja towards Ponosevac to prevent the overflow or withdrawal of terrorist forces. Over those few days in the written reports of my subordinate commander, I saw that his units were blocking, in blocking position, and that from one column fire was opened at his unit and two of his soldiers wounded plus another soldier the next day, and I have reports concerning this.

Q. Thank you, General. I already opened my binder while we were dealing with these witnesses to deal with your document 438. It's a command to support MUP forces in crushing and destroying Siptar terrorist forces in Malisevo sector, strictly confidential, 455-90. What is the substance of this order under your tab 438?

A. After the completion of operations in this area, Orahovac, Suva Reka, Pirane, Krusa, and so on, upon orders of the corps command, operations were moved to the other side of Malisevac Mountain towards Krusevo because there was a larger concentration of terrorist forces there.

The map under 439 goes together with this document.

Q. Precisely. The map is under the next tab. Does it indicate everything that should, according to the order, be included in the ⁴¹⁸⁵³ disposition of your forces?

A. Yes. This is the decision to crush Siptar terrorist forces in the Malisevo sector, and it says an excerpt for the 549th Brigade. This is just an excerpt showing the assignment for my brigade and the neighbouring units, 243rd Brigade and 15th Brigade.

In this order we see information about terrorist forces, where they are located, their strength. Then we see the assignment of the corps, the decision of the commander, and towards the end, assignments of particular units.

As far as my unit is concerned, my assignment was to support MUP forces from this axis here where operations had been carried out earlier on the 27th combat group 5, which near Dobrodeljane village acted towards the north was now acting together with the others, across Mount Milanovac to crush terrorist forces located here on the slopes of Mount Milanovac and to use part of the forces to go area of Orahovac-Ostrozub-Dragobilje road, and to act from the flank to support forces and act in coordination with them in their attack from the direction of Suva Reka. And you see the axes of operation on this map.

In the Dragobilje area, the terrorist headquarters were located.

Q. On the first page we even have an enumeration of these forces: 122nd KLA Brigade, around 300 terrorists; 115th Brigade, around 250 men; 116th KLA Brigade, around 250 men; and the Gani Pacarizi KLA Brigade, there is no strength indicated, but that makes four brigades active in this area.

A. Yes. This is the information we had at the time about those ^{41854 BLANK PAGE 41855} terrorist forces.

Q. General, under para 9, let me quote just the last line. Does it say here: "In all situations, consistently comply with the provisions of the international laws of war"?

A. Yes. This is under paragraph 9, Morale and Psychological Support.

Q. It says in another paragraph: "Escort captured terrorists to the prison for prisoners of war and prohibit members of units from entering villages, from looting, from entering enemy headquarters and bases prior to the arrival of expert teams."

A. Yes. Those were the orders.

Q. We had -- we have already dealt with the map. Now under tab 440 -- my copy is very bad.

A. That is my order for the same operation.

JUDGE KWON: General, the map we just saw before, the map on the easel, was it drawn at that time or drawn at a later stage?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, that was a contemporaneous map, a map from that time. This is a copy, a section of the main map, and it says here "Section or excerpt for the 549th Motorised Brigade." That is my brigade.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. General, under tab 441, we see your decision, that is a map indicating your decision. It says "Decision of the commander of the 549th Brigade for crushing and destroying Siptar terrorist forces in Malisevo sector." This map is signed by you. In the upper left corner, ⁴¹⁸⁵⁶ what does it say?

A. "Approved by Commander General Lazarevic."

Q. So it's the same technology that you described in your earlier answers: You receive an order, then you prepare your own order, your decision is shown on the map, the map is then approved by your superior commander, head of the Pristina Corps. Is that the same technology that is repeated on a day-to-day basis in operations on the ground?

A. Yes. I receive a map and an order, and then I develop my own map and my own order.

Q. So you get an order and a map from the corps level and then you make your own map and order.

A. Yes.

Q. And then, as you described in your previous analysis of earlier operations, after each and every completed assignment you prepare an analysis. Do we see under tab 442 your analysis of what we have just seen? The order, the map, your map, your order, and then your analysis?

A. Yes, this is a complete analysis of this operation. A very detailed analysis of all the activities of the unit.

Q. It relies upon the same order, 455-90, of the 28th. Could you please point out the main elements of this analysis. Let me just emphasise the estimates towards the end of the first page, where you say: "We estimate that the Siptar terrorist forces suffered the following losses: Around 70 dead."

In the previous operation, your estimation was 85 dead. Here it's 70 members of the KLA killed. That's your estimate for this operation. ⁴¹⁸⁵⁷

A. Here in Pagarusa area, which is just behind the first lines, we found 30 terrorists buried. That is our estimate of their losses. What is characteristic of this operation? Particularly on this axis leading from Suva Reka, that is a part of the territory which we never, in 1998 or 1999, entered. That is a well-fortified mountainous terrain. It's called a multi-storey defence. From this area towards Pagarusa our forces were unable to advance for several days, not even a step forward. All the forces coming from Orahovac via Ostrozub and via Milanovic village managed to hit the flank and the rear of the forces that were defending themselves from the direction of Suva Reka. And only then did the defence of the terrorists weaken.

Q. In conclusion, you say: "The assignment set to the unit was successfully implemented. Terrorist forces were successfully crushed and control was established over the territory, in particular over the Pagarusa sector, for the first time since the start of the armed rebellion of last year. Units of the 549th Motorised Brigade and MUP forces have now been relieved from the provocations in this area. They are relieved from the pressure by the Siptar terrorist forces on the town of Suva Reka and Orahovac. While we were carrying out the given assignment, forces of the NATO aggressor air force continuously performed reconnaissance flights and on some occasions attacked our forces with no negative consequences for them."

A. That's the analysis of this particular operation.

Q. All right. Well, in relation to what I've quoted from the order, in tab 443 you have your own order? ⁴¹⁸⁵⁸

A. Yes.

Q. Which pertains to implementation of international law of war and the army of Yugoslavia. And then you say: "I hereby order: Apply international humanitarian law," et cetera, et cetera, "against persons violating international humanitarian law, to sentence them to lawfully prescribed sanctions." You particularly prohibit unorganised entry into villages and any kind of arbitrary behaviour.

Is that your order, General?

A. Yes, that's my order which was written on the basis of the order received from the Pristina Corps.

Q. All right. We've seen that already, we've dealt with that earlier on. And we have here in tab 445 the order of the 30th of March of General Lazarevic, Commander of the Pristina Corps.

A. Yes.

Q. He also says, inter alia -- he says: "With a view to protecting the population leaving the jeopardised areas --"

THE INTERPRETER: Could the interpreters please have a reference.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, stop. Let us know where exactly you're reading from.

JUDGE KWON: I think it is tab 444, not 445. Could you check it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have said 444, or at least I think I said 444.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You said 445.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm sorry, General. I opened 444, and I probably read the next ^{41859 BLANK PAGE 41860} tab number, although it is actually a document with the previous number. So it's a technical error. 444 is the number.

A. This is an order of the commander of the Pristina Corps on measures to protect the civilian population.

Q. It says: "Regarding the entire population leaving the threatened areas, they should have unhindered passage towards the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Macedonia.

"Secondly, use command measures to protect the population from improper conduct of individuals and groups and enable their free passage in the direction they choose. In dealing with the population, fully comply with international law of war and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions."

Paragraph 3: "The responsible officers have the duty to start proceedings against persons violating the provisions of the international law of war, to sentence them to lawfully prescribed sanctions." Now, I assume and I'm going to ask you to give an explanation: "The population leaving the threatened areas in convoys in motor vehicles or on foot shall be directed along the routes leading towards the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Macedonia and any improper conduct towards it shall be prohibited."

You explained in one of your answers, since some witnesses referred to this too, completely free, unhindered passage is referred to here whereas you talked about some parts of the territory that were mined, that there were mines along roads, et cetera. Why was it necessary to indicate the exact direction in which people were supposed to move in ⁴¹⁸⁶¹ relation to what this order of General Lazarevic's also says?

A. Well, primarily this meant assist the population so that they would know where they could move safely. In my area, there were only three -- two directions or, rather, two border crossings; Cafa Prusit and Vrbnica. For four or five days the population was leaving through Cafa Prusit and they could only leave on foot. This is very difficult terrain to negotiate.

Q. Please explain now since it was said here, not once, mind you, that they had to leave their vehicles and then walk all the way to the border. Why did they leave their vehicles and walk all the way to the border?

A. In this direction everything was mined. There were anti-tank mines and anti-personnel mines. Cafa Pruse makes it possible to use armour, so all the way up to the village of Zup, that's about two or three kilometres in depth, there were minefields. So up to the village of Zup it was possible to ride on a motor vehicle, and from Zup there was only a single path going through the minefields, and we used it at that time, but it was so narrow you could only walk on foot. Therefore, those who wanted to walk went that way on foot, or they took motor vehicles via Prizren and then crossed into Albania through Vrbnica.

Some witnesses say that here, and it is considered that the army assisted the civilians when they were leaving. Really here by Cafa Pruse the army was helping them, but in the following sense: Women, children, and the elderly were helped. They were brought through the border post of Zulfaj closer to the Cafa Prusit border crossing and they helped them ⁴¹⁸⁶² negotiate the minefield and finally leave the territory of the country and go to a safe area.

This has to do with transporting only women, children, or persons who were weak and taking the road via Zulfaj, going all the way around, because that was a better way of getting to the state border.

Q. I understand that but I'm going back to the order now. It says here the population leaving the threatened area in convoys should be provided free passage in the direction they choose. That is to say they should be protected and enabled free passage in the direction they choose. Does that mean that you are not allowed to stop the population, to prevent them from leaving the war zones? Rather, you're supposed to help them leave where they wanted to?

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... material to the indictment, I suppose?

JUDGE ROBINSON: It is leading.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, I don't think this is of marginal importance, because persecutions are referred to all the time and it is due to persecutions that the population was leaving the area, and obviously the territory is being left by the population --

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice was in fact suggesting that it is an issue.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'm quoting the order. I'm quoting a document. If that is leading, quoting an order, then probably my question is leading too. ⁴¹⁸⁶³

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, had you not taken these measures, could the population go through this area at all?

A. The population would have suffered terrible losses in the minefields had we not followed them, escorted them. After the first day, we had certain ribbons and small poles marking the path through which they could move safely. So our task was to prevent the population from suffering any losses due to the fact that our minefields were there.

Q. Since both of these routes were mined, you explained that a bit earlier on, you said that you were expecting an armoured attack -- an attack on armoured vehicles coming from Albania and that that is why the minefields were there. Was anybody hurt or killed there in spite of the minefields?

A. In Cafa Prusit there weren't any casualties, but there was only one in Vrbnica. Perhaps 20 metres from the border itself. One vehicle, a Lada vehicle, went out because only the right lane of the road had been de-mined. Due to some lack of discipline he was trying to overtake a vehicle in front of him and went to the left side therefor. The vehicle was destroyed. The persons in that vehicle were seriously injured and immediately transported to Albania. At one of these places, two policemen who were also not strictly abiding by the signs by the road, they came on the left lane and they wanted to turn around from Vrbnica to go back to Prizren, and they got off on a small byroad and were both killed by an anti-tank mine that was there.

Q. Those are the only two incidents that occurred in your zone of ^{41864 BLANK PAGE 41865} responsibility. All the rest you secured properly so that everyone had safe passage.

A. As far as mining is concerned, those are the only incidents that occurred.

Q. All right. In tab 445 there is an order of commander Krsman Jelic that pertains to the rules of international law of war and the army of Yugoslavia. What kind of order is this?

A. No. This is an order of mine, too, but you couldn't read it well. It's also the 549th Brigade.

Q. All right.

A. Again this is based on the order of the commander of the Pristina Corps. Again this is a warning to commanders how to act in terms of observing the provisions of international laws of war and humanitarian law. In particular, there is a warning because in the field there were already many explosive devices that were thrown from NATO aircraft, and there is a ban on walking up to these explosive devices at all. They were supposed to be reported only and it was only experts who were supposed to deal with this.

Q. I really cannot deal with this because it's a totally illegible copy. I hope you have a more legible copy. And you yourself this is your own order?

A. Yes, yes. It's my own order.

Q. Paragraph 1 is act in accordance with the international humanitarian law.

A. Chapter VII on the wounded and sick, and chapter VIII on the ⁴¹⁸⁶⁶ prisoners of war.

Q. But there's also reference to 1998, the document from 1998 that remains important. So what do you say here? Who is responsible to you?

A. The commanders of combat groups and the leaders of all units, as well as the commander of every brigade.

Q. All right. You say here in paragraph 3, as far as I can see, that against all persons violating the rules of international law on war --

A. Yes.

Q. -- proceedings shall be started immediately.

A. Yes.

Q. And what else?

A. On violations of international humanitarian law committed by the enemy, NATO forces as well, and that this should be done on prescribed forms.

Q. All right. You also made an order on the 31st of March -- no, on the 29th of March, to rationalise the use of resources in carrying out combat assignments. What does that refer to, General?

A. Since war was expected and the military industry had already been seriously damaged by then, I was issuing an order to rationally use ammunition, especially those calibres that were insufficient in the reserves.

Q. All right. And then there is an order issued on the 31st of March that has to do with the relocation of units from basic to reserve positions, or the relocation of units at the basic positions and reserve positions. That's what you signed. ⁴¹⁸⁶⁷

A. Yes. In order to prevent losses from attacks, air attacks, every unit were supposed to have several areas, and after nightfall they were supposed to relocate to other positions so as not to suffer losses due to NATO airstrikes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you must tell us the tab numbers.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This was tab 447. At the same time I wanted to say, Mr. Robinson, that you should admit into evidence those exhibits that I've already quoted from. Mr. Kwon said yesterday that when we finish this set of documents you should look at the exhibits involved. I've just completed a set of documents of this kind, so I ask that this be admitted into evidence, this set that I've dealt with now, in accordance with what Mr. Kwon said.

JUDGE KWON: You haven't dealt with tab 436 and 437, which will not be admitted, according to our practice.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 436? Let me have a look.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. 436 is an order of yours, General?

A. Yes.

Q. You talk about taking measures to protect manpower and technical equipment and materiel.

A. Yes. It's a short telegram.

Q. In the first sentence, it says: "A strong NATO attack is expected on our units in the area," and then you stipulate measures to protect your men.

And in 437, a change in the area for the unit's base just before ⁴¹⁸⁶⁸ dusk. You explain that you changed the deployment of the unit to protect them from airstrikes.

A. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So that is what those two tabs are about, Mr. Kwon. In order to save time, I thought I could gloss over them.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Move on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. Now, I'm going to ask you, Mr. Robinson, to agree, as you did last time, to having this set of documents from tab 448 to tab 469, that is to say 21 documents in all, go over this in express form, express procedure, because they relate to the Verification Mission in March. So just to indicate some of the characteristic features of the events that took place as expressed in the documents.

So this is a set of documents, and they all relate to the Verification Mission for the entire month of March.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you may do that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, you have heard what has been said, that we should try and get through those tabs quickly. So as to not to have to discuss each one in turn, I'd just like to ask you to point out some of the characteristic features in those documents, please.

A. Tab 448, for instance, that is the first document, and I should like to focus on point 3.

On the 1st of March, following a report by someone, by an ^{41869 BLANK PAGE 41870} inhabitant, the OSCE mission with liaison officers toured the village of Gornje and Donje Ljubinje, the aim of which was to see whether the report was true that the army had occupied the school in the village and that there was no tuition in the school. On the spot in the school the teachers and representatives of the village said that, if necessary, at all times they would be happy to provide the army with accommodation, that it was their army. Then they said that tuition was following its normal course, that they didn't need the assistance of the mission to regulate relations with the army because that's something they could do themselves. The liaison officer said that his stay on the school premises was of a provisional character, and the representatives of the mission were not satisfied -- were satisfied that the previous report was proved wrong. So then another place was toured on the 2nd.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, here we have a complaint by a farmer from the village, saying that some people stormed his house with socks over their heads, asking for cigarettes and brandy.

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And then -- well, he says that they were looking for brandy and cigarettes. All right.

Now, General, let's --

A. This is tab 451 that I'm looking at next, and there we have observations from a meeting and the questions that were asked by the mission or, rather, questions which were asked by the liaison officers where once again it is stated that Mr. Walker said that there were two streams, one which wanted to reach agreement and the other that did not, ⁴¹⁸⁷¹ but they said that they knew -- they proposed daily contacts and believed that the army would never open fire first and launch provocations. But he says the Siptars always, through their mobile telephones, report things like this first of all, that is to say that the army was attacked.

Q. He explained that. He said that the army would not engage in provocations but that they report the incidents and then the first people to get there would be proved right. That was the kind of principle they worked on.

A. Then that same tab, towards the very end, it says: "He also said that one of the commanders of the KLA said that the KLA had decided to create a crisis and provoke the MUP and the army to react and that in less than five days something was bound to happen so as to create conditions for NATO intervention. And with respect to this Mr. Richard, and that was Mr. Ciaglinski that was referred to, said that the efforts of the OSCE mission were geared towards calming down the KLA and asked the army forces not allow themselves to be provoked and not to react to great strength.

Q. And did you do your best not to be provoked and not to react too strongly?

A. Well, the mission always observed that. That was their conclusion, that the army always did its best to avoid being provoked and that it even dealt with provocation -- was even too tolerant towards provocations. And on 452, page 2, it says under point 3 that the threats to the KLA that it would launch large-scale operations in novi Racak or Markale, of that type --

JUDGE ROBINSON: You said that the verifiers always concluded that ⁴¹⁸⁷² the army always did its best to avoid being provoked and that it even dealt or, rather, was even too tolerant towards provocations. Could you be more specific about that? Is that in this report or is that your own assessment?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first part that you read out or mentioned, the former portion, was what the verifiers say. The latter was my response to the question put by Mr. Milosevic. That is to say whether we restrained ourselves from reacting. We restrained ourselves, held ourselves back too much, not to give cause for intervention on the part of NATO.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I thought you said in response to Mr. Milosevic that the mission observed that the army was even too tolerant towards provocations. Is that what you intended to say, that the observers said that the army was too tolerant towards provocations, or is that simply your own assessment?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is my own assessment. Here is what the observers said: It says they proposed daily contacts and they believe that the army would never open fire first and launch provocations. But then it says the Siptars have mobile telephones and always manage to call up OSCE representatives first and say we're being attacked by the army and police. And since the mission does not know who opened fires first, it tends to believe the person who called up to report the incident first.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Where is that? Where is that in the report?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is tab 451, the fourth page, at ⁴¹⁸⁷³ the beginning, top of the fourth page.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm just trying to find it to make a note of it. I don't know whether Mr. Kay has found it, or Mr. Nice.

MR. KAY: Page 3, and it's the bottom paragraph there, if you --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The end of page 3, and page 4.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't think so. No, Mr. Kay. Is this tab 451?

MR. KAY: Yes. It's just above paragraph 2, at the bottom there. Five lines above: "The Siptars have mobile phones..."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. KAY: So about ten lines up from the bottom on page 3.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic, move on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So the verifiers say that they are certain that the army would not open fire first. Does that mean and imply, since they say they're sure the army will not do that --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, when you start like that, that is -- that's going to end up as a leading question. You're telling the witness the answer.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. How did the verifiers, in contacts with representatives of the army, assess the behaviour and conduct of our forces, of our army?

A. The army was a state institution, highly organised, had very proper relations with the verifiers, and they always stressed on the whole ^{41874 BLANK PAGE 41875} that they were satisfied with their relationship with the army, but they stressed, and we mentioned this last time, in February, speaking about February and throughout that time, they said what some of the problems that they encountered were between the OSCE and the army, but generally speaking, their relationships were proper.

Q. Very well, General. Now, let's move on and get through this set of documents relating to the verifying mission. And it goes up to document 462.

A. 452, at the very beginning, as I've already said at that particular meeting at -- two KLA threats that they would launch large-scale operations, massive operations near Racak or Markale, of a New Racak or Markale, several sources have put out information that the terrorists have six huge explosive devices that they intend to use in an urban area, possibly in Pristina. And mention is made of two markets, two markets are being mentioned. The OSCE mission representatives said that everything would be done to prevent this from happening. So on the 4th of March, point 4, straight after that one it says that the verifiers spent time in the border belt, that they talked to the locals of the villages of Kusmin and Damjane and that they did not have any complaints, the residents had no complaints about the behaviour of the army, the VJ members.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we haven't found it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Would you repeat, General, what tab that was.

A. I said tab 452 -- ⁴¹⁸⁷⁶

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... tab 452, top of.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the top, yes. And the next passage I read out is point 4, paragraph 4.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. May we proceed, General.

A. I'd like to look at tab 454 now, please, point 4 of that tab. "Through conversations with OSCE mission representatives, we found out that the US policy towards Serbia regarding airstrikes had been partly altered, that is that there would be no rocket strikes even if a political agreement on Kosovo and Metohija was not signed. Strikes might be launched in case of a major incident or a major humanitarian disaster. There are indications that airstrikes should not be expected before the 15th of April, when NATO will be celebrating its 50th anniversary."

Q. All right, General.

A. Now tab 455 next. The 8th of March is the date. It is a meeting where the verifiers were present when the incident took place or, rather, when fire was opened at the army, when the army was fired at. But as they were present directly themselves, they had an office opened in Zur, they were able to verify this, the attack by the terrorists against the army, because they were personally present during that attack.

Q. Do you have anything else that you would like to highlight as characteristic in the documents?

A. Yes, towards the end. Once again touring the villages where the locals had no complaints with respect to the army's conduct. And I just wanted to highlight one more point. Once again an attack near the border ⁴¹⁸⁷⁷ on the 13th of March where a team of verifiers verified the attack on the army, which was there doing its regular duties in the region of the village of Zur.

Q. All right. Fine. May we proceed, General?

JUDGE ROBINSON: What number is that one?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is 461.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is becoming more like a local rather than an express train service.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, yes. We are getting through these documents fairly quickly. The general has already reached tab 461. So we just have another eight documents.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is there anything else characteristic there, General, in these next few documents?

A. In document 463, for instance, we have several incidents. On the 17th of March, that is to say three days before the mission left the territory of Kosovo and Metohija where they talked to the locals of the villages about their needs, the village of Vrbnica, they talked to the deputy leader and a member of the mission, Mr. Trevor confirmed that he had verified for himself that fire had been opened from their village on the army and that no army would have tolerated it. He advised them to stop such provocations of the army. He inquired -- he asked why the school was not working, and they said that it had not been working for just a few days, until Monday. And they asked -- when he asked them about any other problems they had, they asked the OSCE to provide them with a ⁴¹⁸⁷⁸ doctor and medicines. So that is to be found in tab 463.

Q. Do we have anything else?

A. I'm now looking at tab 464, and the date of that is the 19th of March, and a meeting with General Drewienkiewicz where we learnt that at 1400 hours it was decided to evacuate the verification mission because the mission considered that to be necessary with respect to the extraordinary situation and in conformity with the decision at the mission between the OSCE and signed on the 16th. The OSCE is calling for cooperation with the MUP in pulling out. The MUP to provide security for the mission and its facilities and equipment. And as General Drewienkiewicz says, "We are leaving for a short while and we will be back." And he said that withdrawal will begin at 4.30 on the 20th of March. The next document is dated 19 March, tab 465. In the beginning, it says, that: "We have learned that OSCE verifiers in the field are carrying out their intelligence and reconnaissance activities by using original maps (WGS-84 from the M-709 series). Using them together with electronic and satellite photo transmitters, they locate features, facilities and the positions of forces, especially the army of Yugoslavia, in the LAB operations zone and on the general territory. In a situation that might be created, NATO forces would use the established positions for guidance and to bomb targets, that is VJ positions." Then in paragraph 3: "On the 18th of March, the head of Mission William Walker visited Skopje, where he met with the Supreme Allied Commander of the NATO forces Wesley Clark. According to Walker, the evaluations could be completed very quickly, if dislocation and moving out ^{41879 BLANK PAGE 41880} were to begin today, all of which will depend on the instructions from and the views taken at the headquarters of OSCE in Vienna." Then the next paragraph, the penultimate one, is this: "We have the information that Fernando del Mundo, an UNHCR official in Pristina, recorded an alleged humanitarian catastrophe, with numerical indicators, and forwarded the TV recordings to well-known international news agencies..."

And there is one last report, that is one but last, tab 466, saying that in the course of the 20th of March planned relocation of the OSCE Verification Mission began at 0420 hours, that the mission was provided full security, and that no problems occurred during relocation. On the 21st of March we have another report saying that after departure of OSCE from the 20th onwards, about 200 to 300 members remained on the territory of Kosovo, including 30 to 50 officers "who will take on the role of forward air control officers and artillery reconnaissance, guiding and directing artillery fire.

"According to our estimate, the marking of the targets and establishing of coordinates was mostly completed within the framework of verification tasks on KiM territory."

In tab 468, towards the middle of the page, it says that with the help of the interpreter, who is still active, a message -- here it is: "Through the interpreter still working for the OSCE mission, the office of the federal government's commission received a message from General Drewienkiewicz that we should issue a denial on the telephone to the OSCE mission and General Drewienkiewicz that after their departure no ⁴¹⁸⁸¹ humanitarian catastrophe had occurred on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija as Siptar extremists stubbornly insisted in numerous telephones calls and appeals for help.

"They claimed that security forces had intensified combat operations against the Siptar population, that they were continuing to torch houses, that great numbers of people were moving out, that there were many civilian casualties, and that there was an exodus of the population. All this was calculated to bring about and force a NATO intervention.

"All of this is clear to us in the mission; we just need your denial, said General Drewienkiewicz.

"Our denial was sent to General Drewienkiewicz over my telephone, in direct contact with his official interpreter - Mrs. Marina." And the last tab, 469, is about the following: Humanitarian missions. The date is the 23rd of March. Humanitarian missions too left the territory of Yugoslavia using the border crossing Djeneral Jankovic, and Macedonia closed off the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. "A group of around 300 to 500 Siptar refugees who wished to go to Macedonia was held at the Djeneral Jankovic border crossing."

Q. You just mentioned that mission members took down some coordinates on the map. What was that about?

A. Yes. The mission had global positioning system devices of the type called Magellan. I can speak about my specific zone. Only once did members of the mission enter my barracks directly and visit my office. My office was directly hit from the air. Only once did members of the ⁴¹⁸⁸² mission visit the installation of Ceja [phoen] where they viewed tanks, took photos against the background of tanks, et cetera. This installation Ceja was hit during the first airstrike and after that it was bombed another 700 times.

Q. All right, General. Did members of the Verification Mission collect intelligence on our forces and their deployment in order to prepare the NATO aggression?

A. I cannot speak of all members of the mission, and I cannot tell you now which of them did and which didn't, because certainly there was a great number of them who did their work in all honesty. But there were also some members of the mission that did collect intelligence on our forces. And at the end of the day I can give you specific examples, a number of them, showing direct communication between members of the mission through satellite telephones with KLA commanders.

Q. You have data about this, you say.

A. Well, that is my personal experience, and I was there on the spot. So, yes, it is the case.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I would now like you to admit these exhibits, ending with 469 inclusive.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll admit them. I'm not sure if all of them are translated. If there are any that are not translated, then those will be marked for identification pending translation.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, you issued an order on the 2nd of April that relates to ⁴¹⁸⁸³ the adoption of certain measures to protect personnel in your area of deployment. That's tab 470. What is it about?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, give us an estimate now as to when you will conclude your examination-in-chief.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I hope it will be today, Mr. Robinson. I'm really trying to go as fast as I can. There are very many documents. During the preparation of this witness we used 10.000 documents, which means that I'm presenting only 6 per cent of this amount through these binders. But it is necessary to see the conduct of the army, how it operated. You see that we are going through events which are very pertinent, because they are referred to in a completely different light both in the indictment and in witness statements and testimony.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This order was based on an oral order --

JUDGE ROBINSON: It's 10.30, and I have a meeting now. We'll resume in 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please continue.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, in document 471, we have an order to smash and destroy the Siptar terrorist forces in the Jablanica sector. Could we go through it quickly, please.

A. The Jablanica sector is to the north-west of Djakovica. This territory, too, held a large concentration of Siptar terrorist forces ^{41884 BLANK PAGE 41885} precisely on the axis that emerges towards Junik and the block house of Kosare and where some of the fiercest fighting during the war took place. So this is an order of the superior command to crush and destroy the Siptar terrorist forces in the Jablanica sector. It was sent to all units of the corps that were to be involved. This is the traditional type of order specifying the assignments for all the brigades. The assignment for my brigade was to act from Crmljane and Raskoc and to support MUP forces.

Q. In paragraph 7, it says: "Escort captured terrorists to the prison for prisoner of war collection centres."

And: "Prohibit the uncontrolled entry of unit members into populated areas, looting of property and military equipment belonging to the enemy, the robbing of bodies and entering into enemy shelters prior to the arrival of the specialist organs."

A. Yes, just as in previous orders.

Q. Is there anything particular that we should dwell on here?

A. No.

Q. All right. Then in document 474 we have a map showing the 125th Brigade and 252nd Motorised Brigade and the 549th Motorised Brigade, which is yours.

A. Along with this order of the superior command, this map is given which indicates in graphic terms the assignments of various units, including my brigade.

Q. Very well. And in tab 473 we have another map. What does it relate to?

A. That is also a map from the superior command. It pertains to the ⁴¹⁸⁸⁶ assignment that has already been given but it also pertains to the control of the territory where the forces of the terrorists had already been crushed, that is the Malisevo sector in particular. This came down from the superior command.

Q. Very well. In document 474, you made a report that describes the situation in your area of responsibility, and you sent this to the command of the Pristina Corps. Could you please dwell on it a little bit.

A. Yes. This is my report to the corps command about what is going on in our territory.

Q. In the beginning you say, in line 3, a particular problem is the large number of refugees.

A. Yes. That is line 3 in tab 474.

Q. Yes. And then you go on to say how many refugees there are. You say the very incidence of refugees, especially in that number, came as a surprise. "The position of the authorities in the first days was not to allow the refugees to leave the country but for everybody to return instead to their homes; however, that was not feasible, because the refugees were coming in ever greater numbers from the remotest parts of Kosovo and Metohija."

A. Yes.

Q. Then you go on to say: "In those first days from the 24th to the 31st, the refugees were allowed to enter Albania unhindered, whereafter they were refused entry first into the Republic of Macedonia and then into Albania as well." Was it our authorities that prohibited them from entering Macedonia or -- and Albania or theirs? ⁴¹⁸⁸⁷

A. No. It was the Albanian authorities and Macedonian authorities. Something was going on at the border so that for two or three days they couldn't cross over. And after entry was finally allowed, the flow of refugees was slowed down.

We noticed that a registration process had begun, and that was what slowed them down.

JUDGE KWON: Here in this report you said that the position of the authorities in those first days was not to allow the refugees to leave the country. Have you seen this kind of document?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It says here, by the way, that I found this out in my contacts with the MUP, with the head of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs, who was my counterpart on this territory. He was in command of the MUP.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So it says not to allow the refugees to leave the country but instead to return into their homes.

A. Yes.

Q. And then it says it was not feasible because the refugees were coming in ever greater numbers from the remotest parts of Kosovo and Metohija.

A. Well, my explanation would be this: If all the refugees had been stopped and if nobody else would be coming in, we would have been able to deal with the current column, but they were coming in from all directions. There were alternate routes, for instance from Prizren or the road between Prizren and Djakovica, and they were constantly coming in by that road. ⁴¹⁸⁸⁸

Q. And then you go on to describe what you concluded from your talks with the refugees. You say: "Based on the talks we had with individuals in the columns of refugees, the following conclusions can be made as to their reasons for leaving our territory:" And then you say: "a) Fear of major fighting that is expected to follow between our forces, on the one hand, and the KLA and NATO forces on the other."

A. Yes.

Q. "They are saying that fighting will probably take place everywhere on our territory, with great intensity, and that they will have nowhere to hide. In response to our offer to go to Serbia, they say it is realistic to expect a less than warm welcome there because it is their fellow countrymen who had caused the war."

A. Yes. That is this paragraph.

Q. Then goes paragraph b): "A certain number of Siptars say that they are leaving the country to avoid forced mobilisation into KLA ranks and that it is current practice for every family to send a certain number of its members to the KLA or, alternatively, to pay a large amount of money."

A. Yes. That was the practice in 1998 and 1999.

Q. Paragraph c): "A large number of refugees say that they fear the army and the police, and they are particularly afraid of 'Arkan's troops.' Asked whether they have seen any 'Arkan's troops,' none were able to confirm, saying only that they had heard about them from others. This is probably KLA's psychological propaganda, aimed at getting as many of the populace as possible to leave." That is your estimate. ^{41889 BLANK PAGE 41890} Then you go on to say: "Asked whether they fear us, the army, and whether we have ever done anything to harm them, everyone promptly replies that they do not fear the army and that it is their army and they would stay if only there were army troops where they lived."

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. "However, despite these statements, we believed -- we believe their fear of the army and police is justified since many families had members in the KLA and were therefore afraid of how we might react when we learn about it.

"d) Fear of NATO bombing was emphasised by all groups as the primary reason, because in their words they do not distinguish between troops and civilians and do not look where they are striking." And then you say most of them have enough food.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you are reading from the document, and the interpreter is asking you to do that more slowly. In any event, it is time for you to put a question to the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, you say that all of these are reasons that you established on the basis of conversations with refugees from these columns.

A. Yes. I talked to them several times, not only once.

Q. Did you personally talk to them?

A. Yes, I myself talked to them. And on several occasions I even helped some individuals or groups of people. ⁴¹⁸⁹¹

Q. You say here: "d) That fear of NATO bombing was emphasised by all groups as the primary reason, because in their words they do not distinguish between troops and civilians and do not look where they are striking." Is that what they told you personally?

A. Yes, that's what they told me personally.

Q. We've already dealt with the other reasons, and now you say on page 2, at the beginning of page 2, so I'm going to ask you about what the attitude of the police and the army was towards persons in these columns.

A. I can say that on the whole it was correct, proper. However, our officers stated that a small number of MUP members and a small number of army members tried to take property away from refugees, primarily money or vehicles. All these cases that were reported to us by MUP patrols or military police patrols were resolved. So eight persons, that is to say two privates and six conscripts, were disciplined, and criminal reports were filed against another six conscripts who were arrested. They were members of my unit.

JUDGE KWON: General, for this interview, do you remember how many Albanians you met at that time? Your report is based on how many interviews?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Albanians -- these were endless columns. I did not talk to them only on one day but at different localities, on the road between Prizren and Djakovica. I talked to them about ten times. Sometimes I would stop with my vehicle because I would see, for instance - that was on three occasions - that vehicles belonging to these Albanians had broken down and that they were standing by the ⁴¹⁸⁹² road. I stopped to ask them why they had stopped, what the problem was. On two occasions these were tractors. Their tyres had a problem and they couldn't resolve them. I said that they could freely use the abandoned tractors on the roads. There were a great many of those, because there was something wrong with those tractors, and I said that they could take off their tyres and continue their journey. And I asked them where they were from and why they were going to Albania.

The third time, I helped a man. His engine had broken down. It was no longer working. I talked to him. He had a rather numerous family, and I asked him how I could help him. He said, "Well, you can help me if you would stop a vehicle and order them to trail me to Albania." I waited for the first vehicle that I thought could do that. I stopped that vehicle, and I asked the driver, the owner, whether he'd want to help this man, and he said, "By all means. There's no problem. I want to help him." So he attached the vehicle that had broken down to his own and that's how they continued their journey.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So --

JUDGE KWON: Excuse me. This report is a result of your personal contacts with the refugees.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're asking how many refugees there were on that road? There were many of them.

JUDGE KWON: No, no. I'm asking how many interviews did you have with the refugees. You said about ten times.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] About ten times I talked to them. ⁴¹⁸⁹³

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, you say here further on towards the end that what is interesting are the views of the bodies of local self-administration on the reasons why Siptars are leaving for Albania. "In addition to the reasons we have stated, they also underline the following: "1. They are leaving the country in line with the pre-arranged scenario of a 'humanitarian catastrophe' in order to justify the bombing and the aggression.

"2. They are leaving and abandoning the territory so that the 'NATO alliance' could bomb all targets indiscriminately in the future, with only Serbs and their supporters remaining in Kosovo and Metohija."

A. That was the view of the local administration, of the Serbs for the most part.

Q. All right.

JUDGE KWON: Did you find it persuasive at that time?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I've already mentioned my own reasons, but their reasons were of interest too. That's why I put them down here. Certainly today, after all this time, I believe that there was a prepared scenario.

JUDGE KWON: Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, may I ask, what prompted you to carry out these interviews?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Quite simply, I know that there are refugees in every war, but there were many refugees. These columns were ^{41894 BLANK PAGE 41895} endless. I saw that there were refugees from other places too. Most of the refugees were from my territory, but they also came from other territories too. Quite simply, as a person I wanted --

JUDGE ROBINSON: What prompted you to carry out interviews in which you asked the kinds of questions that you did as to the reasons for their leaving?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, precisely because I wanted -- actually, I was thinking about reasons from my point of view as commander, but I wanted to hear from these people directly, from the individuals who were leaving, what the reasons for their departure.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, you brought some video footage here, people leaving Kosovo to Albania. That is from the Vrbnica border post, and the date is the 13th of April, 1999. Can we see this video? It's called The Border Post of Vrbnica, the 13th of April, 1999. I'm saying this for the sake of the technical people involved, and it is actually tab 475.

[Videotape played]

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is Albania. This is our border post.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Tab 476 are Albanians from Prizren and released Albanians from Prizren, the 14th of April, 1999.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You should tell us about the provenance of that video. ⁴¹⁸⁹⁶

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is video footage of Radio-TV Serbia, the studio in Prizren.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. If I remember correctly, it was Vrbnica.

A. Yes, the border post of Vrbnica.

Q. You said that is 14 kilometres away from Prizren.

A. Yes.

Q. And this studio from Prizren actually filmed this.

A. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next one. That's tab 476.

[Videotape played]

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. So for a while they were under KLA control until the army came and drove away the KLA. That's what they're saying here.

A. This is to the west of Prizren, Ljubizda Has, that is to say under Mount Pastrik. That's it. This is the locality. And I know that there was a terrorist group there consisting of a couple of dozen of terrorists.

Q. Can you explain why they kept those citizens there?

A. Well, these were groups that were getting ready from the in-depth territory to try to break into Albania, and this population from the village of Ljubizda was in the woods and they kept them as a kind of security, so as a kind of hostages, actually.

Q. All right, General. You brought some video footage from the road between Prizren and Djakovica on the 14th of April, the NATO bombing of ⁴¹⁸⁹⁷ civilians.

A. That's it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at this. That is tab 477.

MR. NICE: Could we have the provenance of the previous exhibit?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, let the witness tell us about the provenance of the last one.

MR. NICE: And do we know the name, as a the matter of interest, of the presenters or interviewers on either of these?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Like the previous one, Radio-Television Serbia, studio Prizren, Borivoje Ugrinovic is the name of the editor who filmed this footage. Sanjevic is the name of the cameraman who actually did the recording.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I hope that is sufficient information from the general.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They still work for Radio-Television Serbia.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Let us now watch the next video clip.

[Videotape played]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the hospital in Prizren.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. There was no translation in a portion of this videotape. Did you hear what was said about that, how many projectiles fell?

A. Yes. This footage -- I said, actually, that the column was bombed ⁴¹⁸⁹⁸ in several places, stretching from Djakovica to Prizren, and this particular location was closest to Prizren, which means it was between Pirane and Landovica, by the tile factory.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... video when?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says here on the images when it was filmed. The 14th was when the bombing took place. It was filmed on the 14th, and you were able to see the individual that I said was the editor. I mentioned him. He was there holding the microphone, and I can recognise his voice. It was Borivoje Ugrinovic. So it was Radio-Television Serbia, studio Prizren.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, you brought some footage with you from the place that was bombed by NATO. It is Podrimska Street in Prizren, and the bombing took place on the 30th of April. Let's take a look at this video. It's tab 478, in actual fact.

[Videotape played]

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] During this bombing, four persons were killed and a number of people injured.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. That's the street.

A. Yes, that is that street.

Q. Are there any military facilities nearby?

A. No. This is a Roma settlement.

Q. Is this your medical corps, General?

A. Yes. Three languages are being spoken here; Serbian, Albanian, ^{41899 BLANK PAGE 41900} and the Roma language, Romany. So they are all working together to dig up and uncover people; the police, the army, the fire brigade, all of them together.

Q. Mention is made here -- they're talking about digging out somebody here.

Were you in Prizren on that day, General?

A. Yes. And the soldiers from my medical corps could be seen, medical company, and the regular policemen, the firefighters who also belong to the police, the Roma, the Albanians, and you could hear them talking in three languages, so they were all working together to deal with the situation.

Q. In the part of the footage where you can see the whole street, can you see the whole area that was bombed, in fact, or it was a broader region that was bombed?

A. About 50 houses were destroyed in that particular location.

Q. Just in that one strike?

A. Yes, just in that one strike.

Q. All right. Very well. Thank you, General.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, may we take a look at the next video segment, also of Prizren and Korisa on the 14th of May. It is tab 479. The 14th of May, 1999, is the date.

[Videotape played]

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These are people who were burnt to death.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The hospital in Prizren. ⁴¹⁹⁰¹

JUDGE ROBINSON: How much longer is this? How much longer is this, General?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 30 seconds perhaps.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, were you at that place, in that location?

A. Yes, the next day. This happened early in the morning. People are mentioning different times here, but I think at 1230 hours on the 14th of May. It was the worst night of bombing of Prizren and the surrounding parts. The bombing went on throughout the night, and my barracks was bombed that night 47 times.

Q. But the barracks was empty?

A. Yes, it was empty. Only the equipment and various installations within the barracks were destroyed.

Q. Very well. All this footage that we have just seen, what does it represent in its totality?

A. They show NATO strikes on civilian targets.

Q. Thank you, General.

JUDGE BONOMY: Were there casualties on the 14th of May?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These people here say that casualties number over 100. However, the losses although --

JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... position.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Between 80 and 85. Because some people were completely incinerated so that the exact number could not be established. And over 100 were injured.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴¹⁹⁰²

Q. General, we will now move to our next subject. The document I would like to look at is in tab 480. Could you tell us what kind of order is this to the military police company to initiate proceedings between Pristina military court. It was issued by you on the 3rd of April.

A. Yes. This is an order specifically pertaining to the military police company, which was duty-bound to ensure that members of the army act lawfully, because the military police also has personnel dealing with combatting crime, performing on-site investigations, and other jobs.

Q. You say: "The examples of a great number of members of the VJ as a whole and of a great number of members of our unit ... are shining ones. Despite such results achieved and the high moral values which are a credit to the members of our unit, there is a certain number of members who with their impulsive conduct are causing harm to the VJ as a whole and damage to our unit in particular.

"In order to prevent the instances of crime, I hereby order..." and so on and so forth.

A. Then follow eight bullet points.

Q. Were your men familiar with this entire order?

A. Well, commanding officers had the obligation to familiarise their troops with this order and every other order and information that came down from the superior level, down to the last man.

Q. Very well.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I have already moved to another subject. I request that the documents we have gone through be admitted into evidence. ⁴¹⁹⁰³

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit them.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You have drawn up a report of sorts. It's in tab 481. What is it about?

A. It's a brief report dated the 4th of April, intended for all members of the unit whereby they are informed that the defence of their homeland, that is Yugoslavia; is being carried out successfully. The NATO expectations to bring Yugoslavia to its knees within two days were not proven right, that the army had suffered minimum losses: In Kursumlija 11, Urosevac 3, Djakovica 1, that they are about to crush Siptar terrorists forces in Jablanica, Istok and Pec, that Siptar terrorist forces are moving with the support of NATO forces from the air, that a court-martial was established in Pristina and it was operational. Several members were already court-martialed in Pristina for offences perpetrated, that it was necessary to prevent looting, that the basic tasks of individuals is to organise defence on assigned routes and directions, to take anti-aircraft protection measures, and to boost combat morale, to prevent defeatism and panic.

Q. Now, tab 482. You are writing about the data available to the NATO force intended for guiding their airstrikes.

A. This is information we got from our superior command, namely that within the ranks of the KLA there were members of foreign intelligence and security services, mainly of the US and other NATO member countries, and that according to our information, there had been about 100 SAS members ^{41904 BLANK PAGE 41905} with the task of marking and guiding NATO aviation during their attacks on our forces present on the ground.

Q. Thank you, General. In document 483; which deals with military equipment and prisoners, point 4 says, let me not quote everything: "Detention of prisoners, their interrogation by non-specialists or physical threats to them are most strictly prohibited."

A. Yes. This order pertains to both prisoners and to any collection of pieces of aircraft or equipment. It says that pilots who have been shot down or taken prisoner should be handed over to the security organs. And it says also that various objects or intriguing items found in the area may not be collected because they could well be lethal.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Before we move on, a matter of clarification. You'll see at page 52, line 20, the witness gave an answer about a hundred SAS members, whereas if we look at document 482, paragraph 2, the identified 100 people appear to be US special forces. It would obviously help me to know what is being said and of which country's forces at this stage.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was saying that they were members of special forces of the United States, in the first paragraph. That's the first paragraph of this report. And in paragraph 2, it says that for a while there have been about 100 members of the SAS force present. SAS, it is well known, belongs to the United Kingdom, not the United States.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is clearly written in the document. ⁴¹⁹⁰⁶

MR. NICE: I can see it in the original, in which case then there is a clearly an error in the translation of 482A, and we ought to note that there is an error there, because --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's noted.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, let us just try to work as expeditiously as possible. What were the tasks related to defence organisation that you yourself set in the form of an order dated the 7th of April in document under 484?

A. This order was written again pursuant to an order from the Pristina corps command, and we see from this order that we were to further intensify work on organising the defence of the area in terms of fortification and engineering and the putting up of obstacles in particular.

Q. Does the next document pertain to the same thing, 485? It says related to combat documents, the control of various routes and infiltration of Siptar terrorist forces.

A. "At all levels of command --" that's the beginning, paragraph 1 -- "draw up the necessary combat documents, conduct a command reconnaissance, and ensure that all officers know their task and that of the neighbouring units."

In paragraph 2, it says: "Organise complete control of possible routes by which Siptar terrorist forces may be infiltrated, and ensure effective use of anti-tank devices throughout the defence depth on the routes that are difficult to traverse.

"3. Construct two or three positions and installations for the ⁴¹⁹⁰⁷ entire combat equipment, relying on populated areas and on dominant features within reach of roads and lateral to the direction of movement of enemy personnel."

Q. In document 486, cluster bombs are mentioned. This is a report dated the 8th of April. Were cluster bombs used in the way that you envisaged?

A. There was massive use of cluster bombs, not only in the border belt but throughout the depth of the territory. It is well known that they were used in attacks against Nis and other cities. As far as my area was concerned, cluster bomb attacks were almost a daily occurrence.

Q. In tab 487, it says "Working map of the commander of the 459th Motorised Brigade. "

A. Yes, this is my working map. It says "Commencement on the 9th of April."

Q. You also drew up a brief covering the period from the 30th of March to the 7th of April. Is it under tab 488?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there anything of particular interest here? Does this document reflect current activities?

A. This document is sent to units almost on a daily basis. In the introductory part, activities in a broader area are described, that is the general situation in the country, then in our immediate surroundings, and then it goes on to describe activities in the territory of the corps, and finally, towards the end, follows a description of activities of our own ⁴¹⁹⁰⁸ unit.

JUDGE BONOMY: General, each time a map has come out it seemed very neat. Are we seeing the maps that were actually used in the course of the war or are these maps that are copies of what were actually used?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a map from the war, and this map here is a copy made in the Military Geographical Institute. This is my working map. It indicates the commencement as the 9th of April, because it was our estimate that at this time a ground offensive of the NATO forces would begin. It shows the deployment of my units. It shows the routes in Albania where Albanian army forces and terrorist forces were concentrated, and this working map of mine was to be marked every day by various symbols depicting activities for that day.

JUDGE BONOMY: That particular one that is now on the board is the one that you -- that's the actual copy you used, is it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is a photocopy of my map.

JUDGE BONOMY: So where --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You see my signature on it and all the rest.

JUDGE BONOMY: Where is the original, the one you actually used? Where is it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is in Belgrade, in the archive.

JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, in document 490, you report something that we could partially see in some of the video footage here, namely a dispatch signed ^{41909 BLANK PAGE 41910} by you on the 14th of April. And you say: "The work of intelligence organs observed in the Ljubizda Has village sector a group of armed men (10-15) was observed in the village holding local people - women, children and the elderly - as hostages." Is that something that we could see in one of those video recordings? Is that the same incident or something similar?

A. That is precisely the event we saw.

Q. And this is your dispatch?

A. Yes. It's practically a report from my intelligence body that was forwarded to the assistant commander of the Pristina Corps for intelligence.

JUDGE BONOMY: Remind me --

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you, General.

JUDGE BONOMY: Remind me, General, what did we see on the video relating to this?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the video we saw the woman and the man talking, that in Prizrenski Has they were staying in a forest and that they held them there for two weeks without giving them water or food.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let's just go through this information. Is it necessary to dwell on the information of the 15th of April where you inform the command about what happened on the 13th and 14th?

A. All of this is information that goes from my command to my units. ⁴¹⁹¹¹

Q. You say that there are facilities marked by the OSCE where there had been longer stays.

A. Yes.

Q. That is on the last page. What does this pertain to, General?

MR. NICE: Tab 491, I think.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 491. During the night between the 15th and the 14th, the border post of Stojanovic and Liken were attacked by the Apache. Eight persons were killed. And now I say here that these losses could have been prevented had the officers abided by the given instructions, namely that personnel had to be in shelters all the time and that all units should move away from the facilities that had been marked by the OSCE before that. That is to say their standard facilities; border posts, barracks, and so on.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. In document 492, support of the Supreme Command to the courage and the morale of the army. Is it necessary to dwell on this in particular?

A. This is a letter of support that goes all the way down to the basic units.

Q. In tab 494, you give an order that prevents -- that is aimed at preventing surprises in terms of threats to the state border.

A. This is an order to take immediate measures to completely close axes leading from the territory of Albania into the battalion zones of responsibility and to occupy suitable features and settlements in order to organise defence of the state border and to focus engagement on defence ⁴¹⁹¹² forces in the border area, to fortify defence zones completely in terms of engineering, mass laying of obstacles along the forward defence line, junctures and flanks, make preparations for demolition and third-level fortification.

Q. In document 495, you indicate that some omissions were made in the implementation of ordered security measures, and in paragraph 6 you say in particular: "React more quickly and more determinedly against those responsible for looting, crime and indiscipline, and take criminal liability measures against them."

A. Again this order was written on the basis of --

Q. This is your order?

A. Yes, that is my order.

Q. Thank you, General. Is it necessary to dwell on document 496 where you give an order to leave peacetime location features?

A. That is for the sake of preventing any losses. In part of the barracks there was some quartermaster's -- there was some quartermaster's equipment left, and sometimes personnel would go to get them, and this order is aimed at not doing that any more.

Q. In tab 497, you provide information about important political landmarks.

MR. NICE: No translation.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You point out that NATO is trying to prevent the return of Siptar refugees to their homes. Otherwise, the engagement of NATO forces in the heralded, under quotation marks, humanitarian effort would be senseless. ⁴¹⁹¹³

A. Yes.

Q. Is this what your colleagues, what your comrades knew, and those that you were in contact with?

A. This was written right after the last bombing of the column, which took place on the 14th of April, and after various statements, because Jamie Shea, when they admitted that this column of Siptar refugees was bombed by NATO - he was the spokesman of NATO - he said sacrifices had to be made in order to achieve one's ends.

Q. All right, General.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's time for the break. I'm forming the view that much of this is just general information about the conflict and may not be sufficiently specifically related to the indictment. So when we return from the break, I'd like you to address briefly that question.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, also one other point related to the last series of documents. In the time I shall take, it obviously won't be possible to explore even a fraction of these documents at all or in detail, and where documents have been skipped over or haven't been referred to, I would ask the Chamber to say they shouldn't be produced. It's not realistic. It may not be realistic to spend any time with the others but it would certainly not be appropriate to produce documents that we haven't looked at at all in the present circumstances.

MR. KAY: Well, in the Prosecution case when we had large collections of documents that was a procedure that was often frequently used and Mr. Nice regularly used the phrase that the Court could look at ^{41914 BLANK PAGE 41915} it in their leisure and refer in a collective term to numbers of documents. When it's clear what the sense of the collective is, that would be, in my submission to the Trial Chamber, a useful and economic way of employing Court time without being too pedantic over the information that's being put before the Tribunal.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. And we have, in fact, sanctioned that approach in relation to Mr. Milosevic. Unless we are persuaded otherwise, I think we'll continue to follow it.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm simply not sure that I ever did this with this type of document. I'm not particularly concerned to thrash the point out now. I am concerned about the fact that there's plainly a quantity of material here that neither I nor probably the Chamber will ever be able to deal with in detail. Had it been served in advance and had it been the subject of some kind of report, things might have been different, but as it is, the Chamber has to decide for itself whether it wants this material in when it will almost certainly not be explored by either side at all.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm much more concerned about the relevance.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, are you referring to the -- those two tabs which were skipped or the other tabs which were briefly touched upon?

MR. NICE: I think I have to restrict it to those that were skipped.

JUDGE KWON: Yes. I understand that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m. ⁴¹⁹¹⁶

--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before the break I was asking you to tell us the relevance of this evidence, which seems to me to be more generally telling the story of the conflict rather than to be specifically relevant to the indictment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I am presenting this because I do consider it to be relevant, precisely because it shows a completely different type of behaviour of the army, which fully denies what is contained in Mr. Nice's positions in terms of what the conduct of the army was throughout this time.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We're only interested in conduct of the army insofar as it touches upon a charge in the indictment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all of these charges are contained in the indictment, all of it together. I think that's obvious. How else can we establish what it was that the army actually did, why they were at certain locations, how they moved around? You have orders, analyses every time. Their attitude toward the civilian population, also their attitude towards international humanitarian law, the functioning of the army itself, everything else.

Now we are to deal with an entire set of criminal reports. Fortunately, there aren't that many of them. The incidents are described in detail, but you can also see exactly how the army acted. Mr. Mice made some assertions --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... tabs also deal with that issue? ⁴¹⁹¹⁷

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. For example, from tab 500 onwards. I'm going to ask the general to try to go through this as quickly as possible, through these orders of his and the documents that have to do with April and May, to dwell only on some essential elements. Let us move on faster, if you agree, through a certain set of tabs, the one that follows right now, dwelling only on --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay. Perhaps Mr. Kay can refine the relevance.

MR. KAY: In relation to what we've been looking at, the effect of the NATO bombing on the infrastructure of the country, on the migration of the people, is highly relevant. The Trial Chamber will know that in the indictment there's only, in paragraph 104, one line about the NATO bombing in the indictment. The rest of the indictment concerns the responsibility of Serb forces for the refugees and people crossing the border. In the accused's case, the presentation which shows the effect of NATO bombing, the climate of fear, the concern of the people, its effect upon the movement of peoples, in our submission, is highly relevant to that issue because it was over a sustained period of time. It's not only just the bombing, it's the fact of the overflying aircraft, the number of flights, number of missions leading to that climate of fear that might cause people to leave their homes, which is of course an issue in the Defence case.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic. Let us continue as -- proceed as quickly as we can.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. But before ⁴¹⁹¹⁸ I continue, I wanted to ask you what happened to my request to make it possible for me to talk to Mr. Seselj who will be a witness here. For three days in a row now -- I mean, if I'm prevented from seeing him today as well, this is going to be the third day that I will lose in terms of my preparations, without any justification. You know how much you gave me, and now this time that I do have, which is very short, I cannot use very efficiently, and why? Because I simply cannot see the witness for reasons that I'm not going to go into now.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yesterday I instructed the Registrar to present a report on this matter, and I expect that report shortly, perhaps by tomorrow. I will not take any action before I get the report from the Registrar.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That means that I'm going to lose three days because of the wait for this report, and maybe a fourth day, too, tomorrow.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What it means is that the issue that you have raised will not be resolved before the Chamber has the report from the Registrar. That's what it means. Continue.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, in relation to the question pertaining to the authenticity of maps that was put to you by Mr. Bonomy, I wish to say here for the record that I want you to give me a clear answer: Did you personally make these photocopies and did you compare them to your original? Do you claim that these photocopies are fully identical to the ^{41919 BLANK PAGE 41920} original?

A. Absolutely.

Q. You're quite sure of that?

A. Absolutely sure. There are only the additional maps that are called Retimlje that were made in 2002 and that give a more detailed explanation from the 25th until the 28th of March, 1999.

Q. All the maps are original?

A. All are identical.

JUDGE BONOMY: When you say a photocopy, do you mean that that is a photocopy, at least the two that we can see at the moment, are photocopies, including the writing, of the originals, or are these photocopies onto which the writing has been placed by someone?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They are absolutely copied in their original size and the way they were originally. The Military Institute of Geography has the possibility of making photocopies of this size. So in terms of their size and everything else, they exactly match the original.

JUDGE BONOMY: And that includes the writing. The writing is a photograph of the original writing.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, absolutely.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely. These four maps were submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor in the beginning of 2003, these four maps here called "Working map of the commander."

JUDGE BONOMY: I'm not clear now what you are mean by four now. We've certainly seen more than four. ⁴¹⁹²¹

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But just four maps which relate to the working map of the commander, it says, and they begin from March or April 1998, and end - and this is the last map - in April 1999, which shows the incidents on the territory. So there are four such maps. And those maps were sent in at the beginning of 2003 to the Prosecution, and the Prosecution has had them in their possession since that time.

JUDGE BONOMY: That also is a photocopy?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. But at the time, the investigators of the OTP had the originals in their hands in Belgrade.

JUDGE BONOMY: And does that apply to the ones on the other side of you?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is quite a different type of map.

JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed, but the ones on your left-hand side, they also are copies, are they, of what had been used during the conflict, including the writing on the maps?

Sorry, I didn't hear the answer.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Everything on these maps. This is a photocopy and everything is completely identical. There is absolutely no difference both in terms of format and --

JUDGE BONOMY: That's not the question. The question is is it a photocopy of everything that was written on the map or is it a map onto which other things have been copied by someone else?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It is a copy of everything existing on the original map. Everything that exists on the original map ⁴¹⁹²² exists on this photocopy map too.

JUDGE BONOMY: Is there any reason why we can't see at least one of the originals?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I am concerned personally, there is no reason, but the maps which are located in the archives are not given out, as far as I know, in the original. That has never been the practice. They are not issued in the original. They are issued either photocopied or photographed and then done to scale.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, continue.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. We left off discussing document 498, and you talk about cooperation with the court authorities, with the authorities in general, taking care of the population, and so on and so forth. You said that humanitarian conduct should be applied where the civilian population is concerned pursuant to all the provisions of the army of Yugoslavia and international humanitarian law, and you also say that any possible violations will take the most stringent liability measures against anyone in violation of this order. Is that right, General?

A. Yes. The superior command is requesting that in all units a separate element of combat order should be introduced to take care of the civilian population at the level of the battalions and artillery battalions.

Q. General, we have here a whole series of documents relating to April, May, and so on, and they are contained in tabs 498 onwards, right up until tab 627, I believe. May we try and go through that material as ⁴¹⁹²³ efficiently and quickly as possible?

A. Well, as far as I'm concerned, there are no problems there. We can do that.

Q. Fine. Then I'm going to ask you to focus on the most important documents and give us your comments, and I'd like to start off with the document contained in tab 500. And we have a criminal report against three individuals, members of your unit from Djakovica.

A. Yes. I said that in my area of spot there were two rapes, and this is a criminal report for rape against three soldiers. One was the perpetrator and two assisted the perpetrator, aided and abetted. And these are not men from my unit but from the brigade in Djakovica. And since my military police was territorially responsible, then it compiled the criminal report, and this whole series of documents from the criminal report, the Official Note, the various statements, and later on dating to 2001, we have the military court from Nis which is writing to the district court in Pec with respect to the -- uncovering the perpetrators so they can appear at the military court in Nis. So we had the statements of the women concerned, the injured party.

Q. All right. So we have a rather long set of documents here, including statements.

MR. KAY: Can we just observe that the date is wrong in the English translation. 17th of April 1999, it should be.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Kay.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The criminal report is indeed the 17th of April, 1999, yes. ^{41924 BLANK PAGE 41925} I suggest, Mr. Robinson, that we don't dwell on the individual documents which are attached to this criminal report. I think it's all quite clear, quite clearly set out, so I suggest that we move on.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you move on, Mr. Milosevic, I'd like to find out, what was the outcome of this case, the charges against these three soldiers. Is that revealed --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, let's ask the General.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you can see that. You can see the indictment from the military court dated 1999. And my last piece of information is that the military court, in 2001, in August, appealed to the district court in Pec on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Therefore, they contacted them via the Ministry of Defence, the sector for international military cooperation, in order to, through UNMIK, uncover and find these two women. After that, I don't know what happened, what was done after that.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You don't know the result of the trial?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It was my job to apprehend the perpetrators, to bring them to court and to be handed over to the court with a criminal report. The rest is up to the court.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, please let's move on now. I have indicated the documents that refer to April and May. Would you please take a look at those documents and draw our attention to what you consider to be important features. ⁴¹⁹²⁶ For example, in tab 502, there's another criminal report with respect to a theft; and then 503, once again criminal reports relating to theft.

A. That's what I was talking about. It is linked to soldiers who from these columns of refugees took mostly money, and they are criminal reports against them for having perpetrated that act.

Q. All right, General. Now, would you be so kind as to go on to the next documents and to do that as efficiently as possible. You have the documents before you, so once again just indicate what you consider to be the most important.

A. I think that tab 504 is especially important because it talks about NATO sorties, NATO flights --

THE INTERPRETER: Oh, sorry, NATO leaflets, interpreter's correction.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] NATO leaflets that were thrown out in Kosovo and Metohija, and we know that leaflets are classical forms of psychological warfare and propaganda activity. So these leaflets were distributed not in thousands of copies but probably in millions of copies. For each square metre in my area, at least one leaflet was dropped.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Fine.

A. So there were about 15 different types of leaflets that were dropped. Here we have two types, examples of two types, and I have with me original copies, the original leaflets that were dropped, and if necessary, we can have them placed on the overhead projector. ⁴¹⁹²⁷

Q. Well, I don't think we need waste time on that. I don't think there is anything contested.

A. Well, I would say there was, in my opinion, because these leaflets were dropped on the territory and the population read them. Let me just show you. May I place one leaflet on the overhead projector?

Q. Yes. Please go ahead.

A. Here is what it says: "A terrible death," is the title. "Projectiles with explosive chambers, such as the Apache rockets known as hell fire and mini bombs of multi-barrel rockets spray the air with metal falling on the population, and usually there is complete combustion that takes place. Return to your families alive. Leave your units and your military equipment. Leave Kosovo and Metohija before it is too late." Another leaflet, for example, or on one of the leaflets you will find my name. There's my name there and the name of the commanders, and on this particular leaflet we have a drawing of the B52 bomber, and it says: "Thousands of bombs."

JUDGE BONOMY: We don't appear to have copies of these.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The heading there is "Thousands of bombs."

JUDGE ROBINSON: You say that one had your name on it, General?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Here it is. That's where my name is. That's the leaflet with my name on it.

In all these leaflets, all these leaflets say the same thing: "Leave the territory of Kosovo and Metohija." The leaflets were geared towards soldiers, directed at soldiers, but they had a fantastic effect on ⁴¹⁹²⁸ the civilian population, a fantastic impact on them because, as I say, they were dropped in such large numbers, enormous numbers, that at least one leaflet dropped on every square metre of territory. And it says: "Don't wait for me. NATO will attack you continuously from all sides."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

Q. However, despite those leaflets, in tab 505 where this piece of information is contained about the situation, on page 2 you say that the combat morale of the forces was very good, and so on and so forth.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I observe that the leaflets that were just placed on the ELMO are not included in the tab. Or at any rate, one of them is not.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have here -- I looked at this a moment ago, is a leaflet which is contained in this tab. Tab 504 contains a leaflet or, rather, there is a piece of information, and attached to it at the end are two or three leaflets. "Don't wait for me," warnings to the forces of the Yugoslav army, NATO, et cetera. All that is contained in tab 504 as an attachment.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that the one with the general's name?

MR. KAY: Tab 622 also has this in B/C/S form. I don't know, of course, whether it's the ones that have been shown, but there is the similar with the photograph of the NATO bomber.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. KAY: I think there's a collection of them there.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In 622, we have several photocopies of the leaflets. ^{41929 BLANK PAGE 41930}

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's move on, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. May we move on, General, please. Shall we try and go through the documents. Would you do your best, please. We left off doing 506 and 505, those were the tabs. But now let's look at the more important ones.

A. Document 505 is an information, piece of information, a report talking about important political events in the country and in the world and the situation linked to the army and the unit, and it is a report sent out or piece of information that is sent out right down through the battalions, units, and individual companies, down the line to the lowest level.

Tab 506 is the next one, and it is procedure for engaging investigative judges on the facilities that were bombed by NATO planes, and recording those, the effects of that operation. 507 is a document for taking additional unit vigilance and combat readiness measures.

508, the next document, is information sent out to the units and linked to the equipment that the NATO pact has in its possession.

Q. All right. You showed us a leaflet a moment ago with the B52 bomber. According to the combat deployment of your forces, were B52 planes used?

A. Yes, at the end of May 1999, 25 times. Those strategic planes bombed 25 times.

Q. That bombing that you were exposed to by the strategic aviation ⁴¹⁹³¹ planes in the border belt, to all intents and purposes, was it in cooperation with any ground attacks?

A. Yes. It was in cooperation with the aero-ground attack that started at the end of May, and it was direct support and reinforcement to the forces of the terrorists.

Q. And how many forces, how many men were engaged in that ground attack, that ground operation, when you had these attacks from the strategic air force and planes as well?

A. Well, throughout the Pastrik Mountain zone, there were about 4 to 6.000 terrorists, and the strategic planes, after the ground attacks were refuted, the ordinary standard air force would come into play and then the strategic air force would be deployed.

Q. These were all-out massive ground force attacks, 4 to 6.000 strong, on your positions. Did your units manage successfully to repel all those ground attacks?

A. Only in one -- on one occasion were they able to break through in depth between 50 -- 500 metres and one kilometre, and we managed to deal with that attack the same day, so those attacks were not successful attacks.

Q. I'm asking you this, General, because it was claimed in certain reports and statements by NATO leaders that there were no ground force attacks across our border, that is to say on our territory.

A. There were ground attacks with the direct participation of the Albanian army. The army of the Republic of Albania took part in them directly. ⁴¹⁹³²

Q. So the KLA and the army of the Republic of Albania and the strategic planes of the NATO pact; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And all that was in May against our own forces; is that right?

A. It all lasted up until the 7th or 8th of June inclusive, 1999.

Q. Thank you, General. Could we go on through these other documents. We have finished with 508.

JUDGE ROBINSON: May I just ask either Mr. Kay or Mr. Nice, are there any charges arising from the attacks in the Pastrik Mountain?

MR. NICE: I'm reluctant to identify an area generally, but I don't think it appears as a name. We'll check.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That would be my conclusion too. This was rather like a full-scale battle between two armed forces. Yes, proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, we left off on tab 510. Should we deal with it in detail? It is a warning.

A. I don't think there's any need to do that. This is a warning related to general conduct and prevention of unlawful conduct. The same as tab 511. It speaks of incidents involving loss of life in ambushes and attacks, and members of the units are instructed to be more careful to prevent that sort of thing.

Q. Follows a document concerning measures for boosting morale and psychological preparation and improving combat readiness. Tab 513, taking ⁴¹⁹³³ measures to protect units and prevent penetration by enemy forces. Tab 14, description of the general political situation.

A. Yes. This is the sort of daily brief that was sent to all units.

Q. Then another warning to raise the level of security, 515. And in 516, the Chief of Staff Colonel Vladimir Stojiljkovic sent this intelligence report to the command of the 549th Motorised Brigade.

A. Yes. This is about information collected by intelligence organs primarily about events in the territory of the Republic of Albania, information that was collected by observation from our territory.

Q. What about 517? What does this report contain?

A. This is a report that was made available to all members of the unit. In the introduction, as usual -- the focus is actually on the fact that a large number of volunteers signed up in various towns of Serbia.

Q. Very well.

A. It says that among the volunteers there were people who had come from abroad.

Q. Now, tell me, what's in these criminal reports in 518, 519? These are criminal reports against conscripts who had perpetrated certain criminal offences.

A. Yes, that's the case with 518. 519 is a criminal report against an unidentified perpetrator, and it concerns the kidnapping of five of my soldiers on the 11th of April on the road between Prizren and Suva Reka. That is why this is against an unidentified perpetrator. These soldiers were kidnapped by Siptar terrorists. It was a group of five, and two of them were escorting the kidnapped men to a court-martial. Their fate -- ^{41934 BLANK PAGE 41935} they have never been heard from again.

Q. So this procedure -- these measures were taken in the course of abiding by the law.

A. Yes. We know that they were kidnapped somewhere on the road. We know it was done by a group of terrorists based in the area of Budakovo, but as for what happened to these people, we don't know anything yet, although new and new graves are being found in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

Q. This next document under 520 is your order, which, as a follow-up to this incident, instructs which measures should be taken to prevent such incidents.

A. Yes. It instructs people never to leave their area of deployment unauthorised and to take all measures of security required to avoid such situations.

Q. I would like to go through the most important documents.

A. 521 is my report to the command of the Pristina Corps to the effect that the territorial military organs, military sections, in other words, relocated from population centres.

522 says that all the materiel collected, such as food, fuel, and other materiel collected from private persons should be properly recorded and stored.

Q. General, tell me, what does this order refer to? It was taken pursuant to an order from the Pristina Corps command. In 525 it mentioned defence stabilisation measures in the zone of your command, control over the territory. In paragraph 2 it says: "In receiving, dispersing and ⁴¹⁹³⁶ providing security for the civilian population act in line with the previously issued orders of the brigade command. Prevent any undisciplined behaviour on the part of commanding officers in relation to the civilian population."

A. This is in line with the previous order concerning civilians where paragraph 1 deals with control over the territory, paragraph 2 treatment of civilian population and their accommodation, paragraph 3 clearing of the territory, paragraph 4 organisation of administration and self-government and organisation of some sort of Crisis Staffs. It says that units of labour obligation should be set up to clear the territory, sanitise the territory, clear the rubble left by airstrikes by NATO, measures to combat crime and maximise the lawfulness of conduct.

THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down when reading.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Measures of logistical support. It says that this is a standing order and that commanders of immediately subordinate units are directly responsible for its implementation.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please go on.

A. 526 also describes the situation generally in the world and in our country and our specific situation within the unit. 527 --

MR. NICE: Some of these are not translated. I gather they're going a bit fast for the interpreters. Frankly, it's fairly fast for somebody who hasn't got a text to read. It's quite fast even when you have got a text to read.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic and the witness, please bear that ⁴¹⁹³⁷ in mind. Some of the documents are not translated, and you must observe a pause between the question and answer for the benefit of the interpreters.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let us go through the most important of these documents, please.

A. So 527 is an intelligence report from my intelligence body to the intelligence body of the corps. It says that still on the border crossing of Vrbnica large groups of journalists with cameras are still present, and that there are also vehicles with satellite aerials which beam their reports from the border crossing immediately.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the relevance of this, Mr. Milosevic, this intelligence report, to the indictment?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it is indirectly linked to the departure of refugees from our territory. You can see that the various bodies in our army were fully conscious that everything was being done within the system of propaganda to create a humanitarian catastrophe, and we know what kind of reports were sent and why allegedly Albanians left Kosovo and Metohija. You can see the organisation and the linkage of the war machine with the media machinery.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's 528.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a second. We will consult on the relevance of this particular item.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: On the basis that it relates to the question of refugees, we will allow it, but I must say that a lot of this is only ⁴¹⁹³⁸ marginally useful.

JUDGE BONOMY: Are there likely to be Albanian witnesses coming here to tell us that they left because of NATO bombing?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, they said so many times, but there will be.

JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, the answer's incomplete on the --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You asked whether I will call them. I said yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You're nearing the end of your Kosovo case. Please bear in mind what I said yesterday, that you have now used up about half of the time allocated to you, and you're still dealing with first of three parts of the case.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, as you know, you are in control of the time. I told you that my time is insufficient, and I do not have the impression that I am disposing of it irrationally. I didn't call God knows how many witnesses testifying, as this witness is, about the totality of the operation of the army with these documents which account for only 6 per cent of all the documents that General Delic could bring, that is over 10.000 documents. We have --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, let us proceed. You are in charge of the use of your time. You must manage your time as efficiently as possible.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In view of the extremely difficult and totally groundless allegations that we heard here about the conduct of the army -- ^{41939 BLANK PAGE 41940}

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I do not want a speech. I do not want a speech. Proceed.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, beginning with the tab 530 onwards, we have a series of documents covering the month of May. Could you please give us only the most pertinent highlights. Just the most important things that you can --

A. 532 is another report not unlike the previous ones sent to my units.

533 is an order, an order to improve the system of command in order to ensure complete control over personnel, and an uncompromisingly proper appearance of all members of the brigade. 534 is another intelligence report which says: "During the day on many occasions groups of refugees crossed the border. Once they crossed the border, foreign journalists gather them immediately, interview them, and then bus them or transport them in trucks further on. It has been observed that better quality cars were taken to the side by men dressed in black suits."

Q. These were your observations of what was going on on the other side of the border?

A. Yes.

Q. 535 is another intelligence report, where it says in paragraph 2: "The armed forces of Albania in the areas of their bunkers continue to clear them and to build shelters for their personnel. After airstrikes by NATO against the town of Prizren, large migration of the population has been observed." ⁴¹⁹⁴¹ Tab 536. On the 29th of April, 1999, two cluster projectiles were aimed at personnel from the block house of Krstac, hurting one commanding officer and three soldiers.

537, again an intelligence report that was sent to the Pristina Corps, and it records what was observed on the Albanian side.

Q. All right, General. Will it hurt a lot if we just skip the next few tabs which deal with those daily incidents and your daily activities in order to dwell a little on 552, which mentions cluster bombs and various types of charges and the use of prohibited weapons?

A. Yes, that would be all right. Perhaps would I like at another one before that. You said 552?

Q. In 552 it says that: "So far NATO Air Force has been using different projectiles, cluster bombs with different charges as of late, and charges that are vibration activated," and so on and so forth.

A. This is information to all members of the unit. Since as the end of April was nearing, as well as the month of May, every day many cluster projectiles were used. Even some new bombs were used. That is not stated in this document, but it is in others. CBU-99, and we did not have any information about that. So we would therefore -- or, rather, we did therefore caution that these objects should not be touched. 15 to 20 per cent of all cluster bombs were not activated. They remained there, and later on they could be activated if somebody walked up to them or touched them.

Q. General, in document 555, you have documentation about crimes, criminal offences, signed by your assistant commander, Lieutenant Colonel ⁴¹⁹⁴² Vlada Milankovic.

A. Yes. That is my assistant commander for information and moral guidance.

Q. Yes. And you say: "At the very outset, and particularly as the war operations in Kosovo and Metohija gain momentum, the number and type of criminal offences subject to more severe sanctions in wartime has seen a sharp rise; some of them were qualified as war crimes and treated in the most stringent way, especially since there is no statute of limitation for this type of crime.

"Then the activation of judicial organs is concerned and the work of investigation and security organs in the units, the perpetrators have been investigated, prosecuted and convicted more promptly and efficiently for crimes relating to military service..." Is that what it says here?

A. Yes.

Q. And then there is further mention of the percentages. "By far the highest percentage in the report of criminal offences involve the following..." It says murder, and then aggravated theft, stressing the sentence that is envisaged, then taking a vehicle, and wilful abandonment and desertion of the VJ.

A. Yes.

Q. And then two paragraphs down, it says: "Criminal reports against 297 individuals were filed with the military prosecutor attached to the PRK command; the military court received 95 indictments; and requests for investigation of 109 individuals were submitted. Of the total number of criminal reports filed, 22 involved officers, 30 non-commissioned ⁴¹⁹⁴³ officers, 227 privates, 15 civilians, and 3 unidentified persons."

A. Yes.

Q. So this is the 12th of May. Is this the time when the operations against our forces were the fiercest?

A. The fiercest fighting was in the area of Kosare, between Djakovica and Decani.

Q. At the time when the fiercest fighting was going on involving several thousands of persons attacking your units, you are acting lawfully and prosecuting criminal offences. This is the 12th of May when this information is being provided.

A. Yes. On page 2 of this information there is reference to the corps and also to my own unit, the criminal reports that were filed up to then from the 24th of May until the 10th of May.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is very relevant. Do we know the kind of offences for which the soldiers were charged?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have a survey. On page 2, if you look at page 2, these are my soldiers. There is an exact reference here as to why, what the type of criminal offence charged was.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. That's theft, wounding, rape, negligent performance, illegal crossing of the state border, wilful abandonment of duty during combat, desertion, terrorism, infliction of bodily injury, and failure to discharge one's duty during combat.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, in your area of responsibility, was there a single ⁴¹⁹⁴⁴ criminal offence that your organs had learned about and that legal action was not taken about? Rather, had the perpetrator not been arrested in any case if committing an offence for which arrests are envisaged? Is there a single case?

A. There is not a single case that we did not act in accordance with the law if we knew of any particular case. Even after the war, on the basis of subsequent knowledge, certain criminal reports were filed.

Q. Very well. In tab 562 -- I'm trying to deal with this as quickly as possible, but you draw my attention to anything that I may have omitted that is of capital importance.

In 562, you talk about Tusus, the KLA headquarters there.

A. 559. Tab 559 is something I would deal with. It speaks of a visit by foreign journalists during the war.

Q. They visited Prizren?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. I can see that from this paper which is sent to the command of the Pristina Corps, the 3rd Army.

A. Yes. They recorded NATO airstrikes at certain locations; the village of Jablanica, then two residential areas in town. It says here that they talked to random passersby because they were interested in statements primarily of ethnic Albanians. Foreign journalists were surprised by how lively the town was, as opposed to Pristina. They emphasised that Pristina was a dead city, and they also commented on the ethnic diversity of the town, the population of the town, in spite of all the troubles. ⁴¹⁹⁴⁵ The Italians visited the monastery and spent some time there recording and taking pictures. Other foreigners recorded mosques, and yet others interviewed two politicians who lived here; the president of the Democratic Reform Party of Albania, Sokol Qusha, and the president of the Roma Democratic Party, Ljuan Koka, who were also members of the state delegation of Serbia during the political talks in Rambouillet. The essence of the statement has to do with a halt to the NATO bombing, resolution of the problem by peaceful and political means, and equal respect for the interests of all the ethnic communities. When touring the border, as they moved towards the border, they saw 80 to 100 people moving in a refugee column. Then NATO aircraft bombed right next to this column.

Q. All right.

A. Let me just go on here. The refugees stated that nobody had beat them, that they were afraid of bombs. If they could, they would return to their homes straight away, that some Albanians went from one of their houses to the other, ordering them to go to Albania. The Rai Uno journalist asked the man who was leading the whole group whether he stood by these statements and whether he would give his name, at which the mentioned person took out his ID card without a word and gave it to the journalist so he could take down the necessary details, and so on.

Q. All right, General.

JUDGE BONOMY: There's a reference, General, to heaps of registration plates removed from vehicles and to a heap of personal documents. Can you tell me what that's about? ⁴¹⁹⁴⁶

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I was with this group and I was at the border myself at the time. I noticed that at the border there were quite a few registration plates that were taken off. That is what I noticed primarily. I didn't see the documents.

After returning, I went back to the head of the Secretariat of the Ministry of the Interior, and I asked him whether he knew about this and why this was being done. He said that he had no knowledge about this, that it came as news to him, and that he would take measures immediately. After this, it did not happen again.

I think that this was simply arbitrary behaviour on the part of the persons working at the border crossing. The border post continued to function, and the border policemen and customs officials were there.

JUDGE BONOMY: There's also reference to film of the events being broadcast on foreign television stations. That's at the end of the -- very end of the document. Can I take it that that's a reference to genuine --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE BONOMY: -- objective reports of these events?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, these were journalists who came to the zone and who filmed what they wanted to. These were journalists from -- from Brussels. There was a Belgian TV crew, and Rai from Italy. And then Frans De Smit (de Standaard), probably journalists in the evening. "At 10.00 p.m.," it says, "on foreign news broadcasts (especially the BBC, Sky, and others) there were reports filmed by these journalists at the border crossing." ⁴¹⁹⁴⁷ It's interesting that these journalists who were on our side of the border met the journalists who were on the Albanian side of the border at the border itself and that they spent a short period of time talking to each other because they came from the same media.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Milosevic, we are going to adjourn now. We will adjourn and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 a.m.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 7th day

of July, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.