⁴²⁸⁶⁰

Friday, 19 August 2005

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Saxon.

WITNESS: SABAN FAZLIU [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Saxon: [Continued]

Q. Sir, yesterday can you recall that you described to the Trial Chamber the fact that you as a forest ranger have a part of a tradition of reporting crime to the police in Kosovo? Do you recall telling us that?

A. Yes.

Q. And I -- out of fairness to you, sir, and to the accused, I learned something last night that I want to share with you. The Office of the Prosecutor had a telephone conversation with Florim Krasniqi, one of the Prosecution witnesses in this case, and Mr. Krasniqi confirmed that forest rangers in Kosovo traditionally cooperated with the police. So this is consistent with your testimony. So out of fairness to the parties, I wanted to acknowledge that and put that on the record this morning.

Yesterday, you also testified that sometimes -- when you saw persons with illegal weapons or other illegal possessions sometimes you would call the police. That's correct; right?

A. Of course. Everything that was illegal we informed the police of ⁴²⁸⁶¹ that.

Q. So, for example, you might -- you would just use your mobile phone to make a report; right?

A. No, we didn't have phones. But as I said earlier, the nearest police station, I reported there, to the nearest police station. We didn't have phones.

Q. All right. Well, one of the persons who you would have reported to in the Urosevac SUP, the Urosevac police station, would have been Boban Krstic, the inspector in charge of collecting illegal weapons in Urosevac; right?

A. I know Boban Krstic as a traffic policeman. This is how I know him.

Q. And you on occasion when it was convenient, you would have reported crimes to Boban Krstic; right? Crimes that you were aware of.

A. This is not true.

Q. Boban Krstic had a serious problem back in 1994 regarding the killing of a child by the name of Fidan Brestovci. Do you want you to tell us about that incident? It was quite notorious in the Urosevac area.

A. I know of this incident because it happened in the terrain and under my control where I worked as a forest ranger. It happened because of a criminal, Halit Trstena, who raped many females, and the victim happened to be in that same vehicle. Three days prior to this day, there were regular controls and checks, and they didn't stop to any police patrol. This incident occurred, yes. And I testified for this incident before the trial in -- before the court in Pristina, and the perpetrator ⁴²⁸⁶² was sentenced.

Q. Yes. And just so that we can make this clear for the Judges, sir, because they're not familiar with this event, Fidan Brestovci was a seven-year-old boy who was travelling in a car that was fired upon, right, by Boban Krstic the policeman; right? Just say yes or no.

A. As I said earlier, I cannot answer the way you want me to answer. I will give you an answer how things were in reality. Halit Trstena --

Q. Sir, we don't want the --

A. -- with a purpose was in the car with a weapon.

Q. Sir, we don't need -- sir, we don't need the entire story because we don't want to take up too much time. I simply want to clarify that in this incident a young boy named Fidan Brestovci was hit by gunfire and killed; right?

A. It is true that he was killed, but the question is how he got killed.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Fazliu, just answer the question. Just answer the question.

MR. SAXON:

Q. I'm going to ask --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm asking your question. I'll telling you how things were.

JUDGE ROBINSON: If we want the additional detail we'll get it from you, but for the moment just answer the questions directly. If we want additional detail, then counsel will get it from you or the Judges will ask you or Mr. Milosevic will ask you for those details, but for the ⁴²⁸⁶³ time being just answer the question that is put to you very directly.

MR. SAXON: For the Judges' benefit and for the other parties -- sir, can let me -- sir, can you let me make my submission, please. For the benefit of the parties and the Chamber, this case is mentioned in evidence already in Exhibit 188, which is a Human Rights Watch report at footnote 14.

Q. Boban Krstic was prosecuted for the killing of this child and sentenced to four and a half years in prison; correct?

A. It is correct, yes, that he was sentenced to four years and a half.

Q. However, Boban Krstic was released on appeal and never served any prison time because the police promoted him to a commander of the Kacanik police station. Isn't that true?

A. I don't know about that. In 1995, I was in Prizren. I don't know if he was a commander or something else. These are information from the KLA.

Q. Well, no, sir, this is information from a Human Rights Watch report that is in evidence in this case. What were you in prison for in 1995? In Prizren. Scratch that question. That was my mistake. That was my mistake. I apologise.

Sir, were you present at this incident -- it was my mistake. Sir, were you present at this incident when Fidan Brestovci was killed in July of 1994? Were you there?

A. I was a witness. As I said earlier, I was performing my duty. I was on duty, and this happened 50 metres away from me. I was a witness, ⁴²⁸⁶⁴ and Rexhep Lipovica [phoen] was a witness too. He is a friend of mine, a civilian, and he was a witness to what happened. So whoever happens to witness a case, it's his duty to give evidence.

I already said yesterday that I only speak the truth.

Q. You see, sir, let me make myself clear. Yesterday, you described to us how you were a forest ranger, and you walked through the hills and the mountains and the forests in Urosevac and other municipalities, and when you saw illegal activity, you reported it to the police.

A. That's correct. Of course. For whatever was illegal.

Q. How is it, sir - can you explain - that you were present at what effectively was the -- a police ambush of some Kosovo Albanian citizens? How can you explain your presence there, sir? You were just a simple forest ranger.

A. It wasn't against Albanians, an ambush against Albanians. It was an ambush against a criminal who served a prison sentence, who is killed. It's not against Albanians. It's not about Albanians in general. It's about a criminal who raped many females, carried out thefts and did harm. I know him from my childhood, this person, and now how they gave you information as it suited them, I can't comment on that because I'm speaking here before a Trial Chamber.

Q. Let me be a bit more specific, a bit more precise. Last evening, both Witness Bajram Bucaliu and Witness Florim Krasniqi were contacted by the Office of the Prosecutor. They were asked about the allegations that you made against them yesterday. Both responded that there was not a shred of truth in your allegations. But most interestingly, both of them, ⁴²⁸⁶⁵ both of these gentlemen independently told the Prosecution that you were involved in the shooting of this young boy, Fidan Brestovci. How do you explain that coincidence, sir?

A. It's not true that I participated in that. If I was a participant in that act, I would have been tried for that. And secondly, Florim Krasniqi is a good man, but he is a member of the KLA. And as for Bajram Bucaliu, he is a man of double standards. I said this yesterday, and I will repeat it today. His cousin was burnt about three months ago in his vehicle. Those who work with drugs, those with double standards, I even wonder how you can speak to me using their words.

Q. I'm going to move to another topic now. You mentioned that your daughter --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Saxon, I'd like the witness to answer the question that you asked earlier, to explain why you were present or to explain the circumstances in which you were present when this incident took place.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I was on duty. We as forest rangers, as policemen or whatever they call it, we were on duty and Halit Trstena was reported three days before because there was a car attacked in Gnjilane municipality three days earlier. I want to explain in details how things happened so that this question is clear.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me just clarify what I want to know. Did you just happen to be there or was it by -- by an arrangement with the police that you were there?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, accidentally. I accidentally ⁴²⁸⁶⁶ happened to be there.

JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Okay. Thanks. Go ahead, Mr. Saxon.

MR. SAXON:

Q. Sir, the point is and the truth is that you frequently cooperated with the police, with their operations. Isn't that true?

A. I worked with the police only in relation to forests, to thieves who would steal wood in the forest. For example, when groups of five or six would set out to steal, I then reported this to the police because I couldn't allow them to steal. And a simple forest ranger cannot intervene with the matters of the state.

Q. Moving to another topic, the problem of your daughter. Yesterday you told us that your daughter had been kidnapped shortly after you made a decision to testify in this case. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. And yesterday afternoon, the Office of the Prosecutor contacted UNMIK officials regarding your daughter's situation, and the deputy commissioner for crime in UNMIK confirmed to the Office of the Prosecutor that in April of this year there was a report filed in Ferizaj regarding a kidnapping of your daughter but that upon further investigation by UNMIK, UNMIK determined this to be what they call a missing person case with no suspicious circumstances. Do you want to make any comment about that?

A. I would have agreed to your words, but I'm asking you where my daughter is now. They know very well where my daughter is, those that gave you this information. They know very well where my daughter is. If I knew where she is, I would have completed this matter myself. I don't ⁴²⁸⁶⁷ need authorities or anything to solve this. I am a father, and maybe you are a father as well, and you know how it feels. She is only a child. She is only 17.

Q. Just to make sure that your position is clear, is it your position that the representatives of UNMIK know where your daughter is but are declining to share that information with the Office of the Prosecutor? Is that your testimony?

A. No. UNMIK is working justly, but it uses the head of criminals. Agim Ceku, Hashim Thaqi, they are all in UNMIK. But if you get your information from Rugova's party then I would agree to that information. As for Agim Ceku and other criminals who cooperate with UNMIK, these people have committed crimes in Bosnia, in Croatia, in Kosova. They have destroyed houses. And a court shall not collaborate with such persons. Such persons should be brought before trial.

Q. Sir, I'm going to cut you off now. I think you've answered the question.

A. Don't interrupt me, please. I just want to give you a broader answer.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Fazliu, you have answered the question.

MR. SAXON:

Q. Sir, is it possible, since your daughter disappeared a few days after your decision to testify in this court that your daughter suffered embarrassment because of your decision? Is that possible?

A. It is possible, yes.

Q. And is it possible that due to that embarrassment, given the ^{42868 BLANK PAGE 42869} community where your daughter has been living most recently, that that led to her decision to leave home?

A. My daughter didn't leave home. She was taken from home, because at that time when she was taken, abducted, she was alone in the house. My wife had gone to visit her own mother, a 80-year-old woman who was ill. So they knew exactly when to abduct her.

Q. Sir, I hate to correct you, but according again to the information of UNMIK, your daughter left her home in Farizaj on the 14th of April of this year without informing anyone and since then she has not been seen.

A. I already said yesterday my daughter hasn't been seen ever since. When I came here to testify she called her mother, my wife, and told her that she was alive. My father informed me about this. My wife is there in Ferizaj and UNMIK can go and confirm this with my wife. But I would suggest that UNMIK takes with them an interpreter from Rugova and not from Thaqi or Haradinaj or others who are criminals and who try to cover their own deeds.

Q. Sir, yesterday you told the Trial Chamber that until 1998, a majority of Albanians, about 80 per cent of them, worked with the Serbs. Do you recall that testimony?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you familiar with the work of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations for the former Yugoslavia, a man named Tadeusz Mazowiecki? I may not be pronouncing the word correctly. Are you familiar with this gentleman's work?

A. No, I don't remember this gentleman. ⁴²⁸⁷⁰

MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I'm referring to Exhibit 771, which contains a number of reports of the Special Rapporteur.

Q. On the 5th of July, 1990, this is what the Special Rapporteur had to say: "One of the major current problems brought to the Special Rapporteur's attention concerns discrimination against Albanians in Kosovo in labour relations. Since the administration in Kosovo was taken over by the Serbian government on 5 July 1990, thousands of ethnic Albanian workers in government and public enterprises have been dismissed from their jobs, and many were replaced by workers from Serbia and Montenegro." In a later report on the 26th of July, 1990, the Special Rapporteur referred to dismissals based on -- dismissals of Kosovo Albanians based on arbitrary criteria, forcing Kosovo Albanians to sign loyalty oaths in order to keep their jobs, and a report from October 1992 describing the dismissal of 800 university staff. Is it still your -- and I could go on. There are more instances here in Exhibit 771. These are paragraphs 99 through 114.

Is it still your position, sir, that up until 1998, 80 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian population was working with Serbs?

A. Not 80 per cent of Kosovo Albanians worked with the Serbs, because the order to abandon work came in 1991, and those who refused to obey to this order, those were killed, and there are examples of those who were killed for this purpose. Avdi Musa and many, many others. Even policemen were killed, those who did not want to abandon their jobs. Nobody forced me to sign anything for Serbia. I continued my work. This is a fantasy of someone, what you're saying, that we had to ⁴²⁸⁷¹ sign something, a document.

Q. Sir, I think you've answered my question.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Saxon, tell me what you mean by worked with the Serbs?

MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I can only go by what is in the LiveNote, and that is -- that is simply how the translation came through, Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Worked with them in the sense of collaborating with them or worked with them in an employer/employee relationship or what?

MR. SAXON: On page 15 of yesterday's LiveNote: "The majority of us Albanians socialised with Serbs and worked together with them until the year 1998. The majority. Let's say 80 per cent." So it was that testimony that I was referring to today.

Q. Sir, why did you tell us yesterday that 80 per cent of the Albanian population was working with the Serbs until 1998?

A. It is true that 80 per cent of Albanians worked for Serbia, and even today 80 per cent of Albanians are for Serbia, because even today 70 per cent of the population are unemployed. Let us imagine they didn't like Serbia and that's why they were unemployed at that time, but now Europe is there and they are still unemployed. We shouldn't deal with fantasy here. We should speak the truth.

Q. And just one last question. Your position today, then, is that 80 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian population of Kosovo is in favour of being part of Serbia? Is that your position today? ⁴²⁸⁷²

A. I will say this, and I will repeat that ever since Europe took over, over 1.000 females have been kidnapped, and 200.000 Serbs moved from Kosova. Let us not speak of Serbs alone. What about Turks, Romas?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Fazliu, you're not answering the question. Do you want to pursue it, Mr. Saxon?

MR. SAXON: No, I don't, Your Honour. I have nothing further.

JUDGE KWON: Just for the record, the page number of yesterday's LiveNote should be 29, I guess.

MR. SAXON: I'm willing to be corrected, Your Honour. The version I'm reading it's page 15. It may not be the -- it version I'm reading it's page 15. It may not be the -- it may not be the appropriate number from the machine.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you should accept Judge Kwon's correction.

MR. SAXON: I completely accept Judge Kwon's correction.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, any re-examination?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think so, yes. Just a few questions, Mr. Robinson.

Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Fazliu, yesterday Mr. Saxon asked you why you stayed during the bombing and then left after that. Did you say yesterday that after the 12th, when KFOR came, they looted and burned down your house?

A. Yes. I said that not only my family but others, 80 per cent of the population from the village of Mirash, Shativje [phoen], Tasli [phoen] ⁴²⁸⁷³ and so on, we were all together. Not only my close family. We were all staying together until NATO entered. We kept guard duty from criminals all night long. We were all together. I'm speaking of my own municipality.

Q. Mr. Fazliu, what happened at that time when these so-called protection forces of the UN came and the KLA? What happened to Albanians who did not support the KLA, who did not work for them --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Saxon, you say that didn't arise?

MR. SAXON: That is what I would like to say, Your Honour.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You know, the issues are so interlocked I think it's very difficult to say it doesn't arise.

But, Mr. Milosevic, you might want to consider whether it's necessary for you to pursue that line. You have pursued it with -- with other witnesses, and perhaps to far greater effect and with more success than you will have with this witness. You have to assess your witness. And I find your re-examination too long. If this trial were a trial with a jury, you would lose many points through the way you conduct your re-examination. It shouldn't be more than ten minutes, five, ten minutes. So consider whether you wish to pursue this line with this witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, yesterday the question was raised of how come Mr. Fazliu was there during the bombing and left afterwards. So the reason should be clear why he left, why people were leaving, what happened to those people who didn't cooperate with the KLA.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Put it to him, then. Put it to him.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴²⁸⁷⁴

Q. Did you understand the question, Mr. Fazliu?

A. Yes. On the 12th, as soon as they entered, Avdi Musa was killed. This is my first example. And they began to torch houses, Serb houses, Albanian houses, houses of Albanians who didn't follow their orders. And KFOR, not UNMIK, helped them in this. I heard with my own ears when two persons came to kill me in my own house. We caught one of them. One of them managed to escape. So when KFOR came, the police, I don't know if it was KFOR police or UNMIK police, when they came, the interpreter was Albanian, and she said to him, "Don't be afraid. We will release you immediately." She thought that I was a Serb and that person came to kill me. She didn't know I was Albanian. And this is what I heard with my own ears when she told me, "We will release you immediately." His name was Fadil Krasniqi from Grnijsa Evijeter [phoen], and his friend managed to escape. This is true what I am saying.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Were many Albanians killed after KFOR came to Kosovo?

A. Only from my circle of friends five were killed, Naser Haziri, Isuf Sakica, Avdyle Trstena, Islam from Belince is also killed, and Ismajl from Godance. I don't know their last names now. It's been six years.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the relationship between their killing and KFOR coming, and KFOR?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] KFOR didn't kill them. The criminals killed them, the KLA criminals, because they did not follow their rules and orders. The criminals wore KLA uniforms. The day KFOR ⁴²⁸⁷⁵ entered, both thieves and bad men, they dressed themselves in KLA uniforms. They were thieves from Albania, Italy, Macedonia, and so on.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let's just clarify one more question that Mr. Saxon insisted upon. When you said 80 per cent of Albanians worked and socialised with Serbs - socialised, that's what you said - did you mean that they worked for the government or that they socialised and worked in the fields with their livestock, a regular type of life so to speak? So what did you mean when you said 80 per cent? Did you mean that they worked for the government or are you talking about normal relations in regular life, depending on who was in what line of work, a farmer, a forester, whoever?

A. I tried to be brief and spoke in general terms. And being brief is that there were Albanians in SUP, in forest ranging, and so on. We worked together. We lived together. We attended each other's weddings. And you can prove this today. If you go out to the border and record the truth there, you will see how they greet each other, how they hug each other. They still do business together but illegally from the criminals. I can record this, film this, and I can guarantee that on a daily basis you will find 1.000 Albanians and Serbs greeting each other, kissing each other, hugging each other. But they come to the border between the two zones secretly without the knowledge of the criminals. This is the truth.

And also, an Albanian should go and escort someone who goes to the border to meet someone else because otherwise criminals are following ⁴²⁸⁷⁶ them. Even myself when I go to see my own family, my brothers come and escort me.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Just one more question, Mr. Fazliu. Albanians being dismissed from work in 1998 and 1999 is something that was mentioned here. Who ordered Albanians to leave their work? You lived there all the time. Tell us very briefly who was it that issued this kind of order?

A. The KLA leaders, the KLA. As I said earlier, they told everybody, not just me, whoever doesn't abandon their work with the Serbs, they will be killed, and this is proved.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Fazliu. I have no further questions. I don't think I went beyond your ten minutes, Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No. Well, try and maintain that in future. Thank you, Mr. Fazliu, for coming to give evidence, and your evidence is now complete and you may leave.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you for listening to my evidence with carefulness. Have a good day.

[The witness withdrew]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Your next witness, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next witness is Vojislav Seselj.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration. Give the witness the declaration so that he can make it.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak ^{42877 BLANK PAGE 42878} the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

WITNESS: VOJISLAV SESELJ

[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE ROBINSON: You may begin, Mr. Milosevic. Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Seselj.

A. Good morning, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Tell us, please, where were you born and when?

A. I was born on the 11th of October, 1954, in Sarajevo.

Q. What schools have you completed?

A. I completed elementary school and high school there, and the Faculty of Law in the record time of two years and eight months. After that, I enrolled in the constitutional legal department.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the normal time for completing law?

THE WITNESS: Normal time is four years.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After that, after that, I enrolled in a graduate source at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade, the stream for constitutional law. And after less than two years, I got my masters degree.

After a year, I defended my doctorate as well and became a doctor of law.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴²⁸⁷⁹

Q. Where did you work and what are the positions you held?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just before that, Mr. Milosevic. What was your doctoral thesis?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My doctoral thesis was the political essence of militarism and Fascism.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Was that in law, then, or in politics?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It had a legal aspect, but the political aspect was predominant. Actually, I critically dealt with the basic forms of totalitarianism, right wing totalitarianism that is. In my scholarly work after that, I dealt with the subject matter of left wing totalitarianism as well, criticism of the communist variant of totalitarianism.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You asked where I worked.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Tell us briefly. What were all the places where you worked, and what are the positions you held?

A. After completing the Faculty of Law, I was appointed assistant professor at the faculty of political science in Sarajevo. After defending my doctorate and after having completed my regular military service, I was elected lecturer in international relations. When I asserted myself as an anti-communist dissident in 1981, I was expelled from the only political party that existed then, and then I was proclaimed an ideologically and politically inappropriate person, to work with students, that is, and I was unlawfully removed from teaching. I was ⁴²⁸⁸⁰ transferred to an institute, the institute for social research, and my status was that of a scholarly associate. I remained there until 1984, which was arrested because of a manuscript I had not published. The police discovered it before I had showed it -- shown it to anyone. And I was sentenced to eight years in prison, and that is how I became jobless. When I was released from prison in 1986, I moved to Belgrade where I lived as a freelance writer. I published --

JUDGE ROBINSON: You served four or five years in prison.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was sentenced to eight years in prison for the counter-revolutionary threat to the fundamentals of the social-political system. The Supreme Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina reduced my sentence to four years and re-qualified the crime that I was sentenced for. Enemy propaganda was ultimately the crime I was sentenced for. And the Federal Court of Yugoslavia further reduced my sentence to one year and ten months, and that is the time I spent in prison. After I got out of prison, I had nothing to live on in Sarajevo, and that's why I moved to Belgrade. I worked in Belgrade as a freelance writer. I published my books privately until 1989. I published a total of 14 books. All of these books were for the most part from the domain of political and legal theory and political critique. Seven of these books were banned by courts of law. Seven were not banned. At that time, not a single periodical, not a single newspaper under the communist regime did not publish my texts.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you, Mr. Seselj. Tell me, when did you go into politics, ⁴²⁸⁸¹ although you have partly dealt with that field already.

A. Well, let me tell you two more things, Mr. Milosevic, that have to do with my professional work.

Q. Please go ahead.

A. In 1991, I was appointed associate professor at the Faculty of Law in Pristina. That is the university in Kosovo and Metohija. And I regularly taught there for a year. Introduction to law was the subject I taught or, rather, the general theory of the state and law was the alternate name of that subject that I taught.

A year later, my assistant professor who I found there, Mr. Zizic, obtained his Ph.D., and I decided to leave my professorship so that I would not hamper his own advancement. I was already in politics very intensively. Politics was my basic preoccupation, whereas he fully devoted himself to scholarly work.

Then in 1999, I was elected full-time professor at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade teaching the subject Political System. After the seizure of power by the Mafia on the 5th of October, 2000, the new traitor government unlawfully threw me out of the law school. I thought I should say that so that my CV could be complete.

Q. Would you also say that when you were unlawfully thrown from the law school you were a deputy in the parliament?

A. Yes. At that time I was a federal MP of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Q. Could you tell us when you became involved in politics?

A. Well, one could say that I became politically involved already in ⁴²⁸⁸² high school. I was a youth activist. I was the commandant of youth brigades in various labour actions, labour drives. I held some of the highest titles in the youth organisation. I was president of the association of students in my school, president of the youth association. And when I was a student at the university already in my freshman year --

JUDGE ROBINSON: The more appropriate question might be when you were not involved in politics.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's very difficult to say when I was not politically involved. I would paraphrase a friend of mine, a former friend of mine by saying that politics became my fate very early on.

So as I said, I was president of the students' association at law school, and I was the first student to be an assistant to the dean. But I have always been some sort of local dissident. I was not a rebel against the communist regime as a whole, but I incessantly rebelled against injustice, against crime, against unlawful conduct.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Tell us very briefly in which political parties have you ever been a member.

A. I was a member of the League of Communists at the time when it was the only political party in the former Yugoslavia. I was admitted into the party before I turned 17, as a good student, as a prominent participant in so-called labour actions. And it was, in fact, during one ⁴²⁸⁸³ of those labour drives in Banja Luka in 1971 that I was admitted into the party, because I had bloody, bleeding blisters on my hands that I earned working on the reconstruction of Banja Luka after a catastrophic earthquake.

Communism was then the only possible world view in our educational system.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The question was in which political parties or of which political parties were you a member. Just tell us that briefly.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have said -- I have mentioned one party I was a member of, and the second party of which I am a member to date and over which I preside is the Serbian Radical Party. Those are the only two parties of which I have been a member. But to avoid all confusion, from the day of establishment of the Serbian Radical Party, it was first called the Serbian Freedom Lovers Movement, then the Serbian Movement of Renewal, later the Serbian Chetnik Movement, and then the Serbian Chetnik Movement united with the greatest number of councils of the Radical Party to form, on the 23rd of February, 1991, in Kragujevac, the Serbian Radical Party.

So for the uninitiated who might understand this as transfer between parties, let me make it clear that this is one single party which changed names several times.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Tell us very briefly and very concisely, if you can, what does the Serbian Radical Party advocate?

A. The Serbian Radical Party is very clearly nationalist as a ⁴²⁸⁸⁴ political organisation, patriotic in its orientation, and it has its national, political, economic, social, and cultural programme. On the political level, the Serbian Radical Party works for the Greater Serbia, and that is the only Serbian political party advocating the Greater Serbia, where as the idea of Greater Serbia implies a united Serbian state including all Serb lands and the greatest majority of the Serb people, regardless of their faith, which means brotherhood and unity of Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Serbs, Muslim Serbs, Protestant Serbs and atheist Serbs.

Second, in the political sphere, the Serbian Radical Party is a clearly democratic party. From the outset, we have advocated a multi-party democratic system, full observance of all civil rights and duties, rights and freedoms, in fact, complete respect for the rights of national minorities, and a modern legal order that would be based on the rule of law.

From the economic point of view, the Serbian Radical Party is of a liberal nature. We advocate freedom of private initiative and free market competition.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In social terms, on the social level --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Judge, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me just take you back to your comment that the Serbian Radical Party is the only Serbian political party advocating the idea of a Greater Serbia. Are you saying none of the other parties ⁴²⁸⁸⁵ advocated that idea?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No. After the Second World War, there was no other political party in the entire Serb people, apart from the Serb Radical Party, that advocated the Greater Serbia. Maybe for a very short while the Serbian Renewal Movement of Vuk Draskovic advocated it as well, but Vuk Draskovic abandoned this orientation. When in 1991 he came under the control of the US ambassador in Belgrade, Mr. Zimmerman until -- in fact, at that time he turned coat completely, changed his national orientation by 180 degrees.

I would like to give a complete answer to Mr. Robinson, Mr. Milosevic, if you don't mind.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I don't mind, of course. I just wanted to draw your attention to the fact that this issue, as a very special issue, has to have its own place in your testimony. You must bear in mind that we are still dealing with the introduction, with general issues where you are presenting a picture of yourself, your party, and the positions you advocated.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic is right. Let him conduct his examination-in-chief. It is an issue which he will come to, the question of a Greater Serbia. So let him deal with it at that time. I just thought I would raise that question with you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, with your leave, I would like to say very briefly in two sentences something to complete my answer to your question, and I hope that I will have opportunity later on to explain what the concept of Greater Serbia means. ^{42886 BLANK PAGE 42887} As for other political parties, I would say such as the Socialist Party of Mr. Milosevic, not only never advocated Greater Serbia but worked strongly for the former Yugoslavia.

The Serbian Democratic Party of the Republika Srpska and the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina were also in favour of Yugoslavia alone. And later on when it was clear that Yugoslavia could not survive, they advocated a union of Serb lands.

It is very important for me to emphasise now that it was the Serbian Radical Party alone who has been for Greater Serbia from the outset. It's the only one who advocated Greater Serbia. And the idea of Greater Serbia is the raison d'etre of the Serbian Radical Party. If by chance at some point in the future the Serbian Radical Party should abandon the idea of Greater Serbia, there would be no longer any reason for it to continue existing.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Thank you very much. Mr. Milosevic, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, for us to have a complete picture of your party called the Serbian Radical Party, you said that it has a clearly national orientation. Please supplement this with a couple of clarifications. What is the national structure of the party, of its leadership? What is the ethnic make-up of the body of people from the party occupying various public offices?

A. As nationalists, we are extreme patriots. We are self-effacing in our struggle for national interests, but we are very strict and consistent ⁴²⁸⁸⁸ in our respect for the rights of all other nationalities, and what we wish for our people we wish for other peoples too.

In our party, due to such a consistent national policy, we have a large number of representatives from other ethnicities. Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians, Bunevci people, Bulgarians, the Gorani, even Albanians. Our membership includes people of all faiths, Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Jews as well.

On the other hand, the leadership of the Serbian Radical Party also includes members of other ethnicities. In the central fatherland administration, we have Slovaks, Romas. The first representative of the Roma people who has been persecuted throughout Europe for centuries, the first Roma man who became a minister was minister Jovan Damjanovic from the Serbian Radical Party. Even now we have an MP, Mehmed Spaho, a Muslim, from a well-known Muslim family, one of the most respected Muslim families in the entire former Yugoslavia. One of the vice-presidents of the national assembly of the Republic of Serbia from the Serbian Radical Party is a Bulgarian. We had Hungarian MPs from our party. This is a consistent policy of ours that has never been questioned. We never waivered about that because we believe that within a political system that is democratic, all ethnicities should take part in all political processes and have access to all public functions. We demand only one thing from members of national minorities: To be loyal to their country and not to work for its secession, its break-up, its destruction.

Q. To wrap up this general description of your party, what public ⁴²⁸⁸⁹ offices did you personally occupy as well as members of your party?

A. I used to be deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, and in the coalition government of national unity, established on the 24th of March, 1998, and it lasted until the end of 2000 or thereabouts. Out of a total of 36 members of the government, the cabinet, 15 were from the Serbian Radical Party, 15 from the Socialist Party of Serbia, and six from the Yugoslav left.

And somewhere towards the end of 1999 or the beginning of 2000, the ministers from the Serbian Radical Party became members of the federal government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That lasted all the way until the elections in September 2000.

Q. Mr. Seselj, to lay a foundation, you held all these posts. Your party, in all municipalities throughout Serbia, and it also existed on the territory of other republics, you were the deputy Prime Minister, members of your party were ministers in the republican government. What was your position -- what is the position of the Serb Radical Party today with respect to its participation in political life and political institutions?

MR. NICE: Your Honours, there does come a point at which the present political orientation of any party may be of limited or nil relevance. I hesitated to interrupt so far but I can't immediately see the value to your inquiry of the last question and its possible answer.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'm not receiving an interpretation of this.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No interpretation? Mr. Nice, perhaps you would raise your point again and then we can have interpretation. ⁴²⁸⁹⁰

MR. NICE: I'll simply repeat what I said before that there does come a point at which the present political orientation of any party may be of limited or nil relevance. I hesitated to interrupt so far but I can't immediately see the value to your inquiry of the last question and its possible answer.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, explain the relevance.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question is relevant because it doesn't illustrate only the present position but the overall position of the Serb Radical Party which is the largest party in Serbia today with the greatest number of MPs, which is --

JUDGE ROBINSON: How is it relevant to the issues in the indictment?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is relevant because --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I have only seen one area of relevance in relation to the issue of a Greater Serbia.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very good. I will establish the relevance through a question I will put to Mr. Seselj.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you have any direct knowledge of the crisis and the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and by this I mean the territory of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and especially that part of Serbia which is called Kosovo and Metohija? Have you any direct knowledge in view of the positions you held?

A. Yes. I have the most direct kind of knowledge in view of the fact that the Serb Radical Party very early on developed its party ⁴²⁸⁹¹ infrastructure throughout Serbia, and this includes Kosovo and Metohija, throughout Montenegro, throughout Republika Srpska, and Republika Srpska Krajina. Currently, we are the largest political party in Serbia. We have almost a third of the deputies in the national assembly. In Montenegro, at the relevant time mentioned in the indictments, we had eight deputies in the parliament without after total of 75 or 73.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Seselj.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But, Mr. Robinson, it's very important to mention the Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina where we had a highly developed party infrastructure. At the first elections in Republika Srpska in 1996, we had ten deputies, and in Srpska Krajina we had 16 out of 82 members of parliament. In every municipality in Serbia, including Kosovo and Metohija, Montenegro --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Thank you very much.

[Trial Chamber confers]

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic, I think there is some relevance but that has been established and you should move on to another issue now.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, according to paragraph 87 [as interpreted] of the so-called Kosovo indictment against me, I and a group of high-ranking functionaries of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ⁴²⁸⁹² participated in a joint criminal enterprise which, as it says here, arose at the latest in October 1998 and continued throughout the time period when the crimes alleged, I'm quoting from what it says here, alleged in counts 1 to 5 of this indictment occurred, beginning on or about the 1st of January --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, let's have the correct citation. Paragraph 87 you said. That's not the correct paragraph.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. I didn't say paragraph 87. I said 17.

JUDGE ROBINSON: 17. It came across as 87.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And I am quoting this paragraph which says that this joint criminal enterprise came into existence no later than October 1998 and continued throughout the time period until the 20th of June, 1999. My question to you, Mr. Seselj, is: What position did you hold in this period?

A. In this period, I was the deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, and I can testify that there was no joint criminal enterprise and that in every possible way we tried to find a peaceful political solution for the problem of Kosovo and Metohija and to prevent the aggression of the NATO pact.

Q. Mr. Seselj, did your position as party president and deputy Prime Minister make it possible for you to gain direct knowledge of events in Kosovo and Metohija in that period?

A. Yes. ⁴²⁸⁹³

Q. As well as the policies of the government of Serbia in which you participated and the other bodies and organs of Yugoslavia in which your collaborators participated, and the entire set of issues arising from the Kosovo crisis and the NATO aggression against the Republic of Yugoslavia.

A. Yes. Apart from the daily information which I received as deputy Prime Minister, including reports from ministers who belonged to the Serb Radical Party, as well as the information which as the president of the Serb Radical Party I received from every Municipal Board of our party in Kosovo and Metohija. In this period I made trips to Kosovo and Metohija myself in order to get firsthand information on the actual situation on the ground. Therefore, I feel that my information is as full as can possibly be available to a single individual. I don't think that anything could have happened without my knowledge.

Q. Thank you. To put this aside for a moment, did you deal with the issues of Kosovo and Metohija theoretically as well?

A. Yes. I wrote an extensive study about this which I published in my book "The Serbian People and the New World Order."

Q. Mr. Seselj, you have before you -- I can see a large file. These are. These are the exhibits that I wish to tender through your testimony. Could you please open tab 25. Everything has been marked for you. I assume this is the first time you have encountered this way of marking material?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, sorry to interrupt you. We are going to take the break before you come to the exhibits.

[Trial Chamber confers] ⁴²⁸⁹⁴

JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll take a break now. 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, as we're moving into the substance of your testimony, I will give you the general warning which will be applicable to all of your testimony that you are not obliged --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can the volume be turned up a little.

THE INTERPRETER: And microphone, please, for Mr. Seselj.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Can you hear me now?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't hear you very well. I can hear you, but not loud enough. Can the volume be turned up.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that Mr. Seselj's microphone is not on.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Your microphone is not on.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's better now. I can hear now.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I was saying, Mr. Seselj, that as we're now going to move into the substance of your testimony, I will give you the general warning which will be applicable to all of your testimony that you are not obliged to answer any question that might tend to incriminate you. That is pursuant to the provisions of Rule 90(E).

Mr. Milosevic, you are going to move now to the binders.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Milosevic, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's on now.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ^{42895 BLANK PAGE 42896}

Q. Mr. Seselj, in answer to my question, you confirmed that you dealt with the issue of Kosovo and Metohija theoretically as well. In tab 25, there is a part of your book entitled "The Serb Nation and the New World Order: Current Legal-constitutional and Political-theoretical Discussions."

You are the author of this work; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Could we go briefly, please, because a detailed analysis would detain us too long.

In the first part, you deal with the historical approach, and in the second part with the crisis and the involvement of the international community. Would this be a general description of your work?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Tell me --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just for the record, Mr. Milosevic, the book is entitled "The Serb Nation and the New World Order, Current Legal-Constititional and Political-Theoretical Discussions." Yes, continue.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. How were your theoretical and professional investigations reflected in your work in practice as regards Kosovo and Metohija?

A. Well, it was certainly very important. I analysed the historical background of the entire issue of Kosovo and Metohija, which has been ongoing for more than 300 years. The problem dates from the Viennese wars when the Turks were defeated before Vienna in 1683 and the Austrian army ⁴²⁸⁹⁷ penetrated the pin [phoen] to Serbia. It then raised a rebellion among the Serb people. This rebellion was widespread. It was headed by Arsenije III Carnojevic, the Serb patriarch, and thanks to the Serb rebels the Austrian general, Pikov Lemini [phoen], penetrated as far as Skopje and took Skopje in 1690. There he became ill of the plague and died in Prizren soon afterwards. His successor was not an able military man, and the Austrian army started to withdraw. The Serb people continued --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, I'm going to stop you. We have had a lot of evidence in this trial on historical matters. The question was how were your theoretical and professional investigations reflected in your work in practice as regards Kosovo and Metohija. Bring us to the present.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I was about to. I think I've been brief in all my responses so far, Mr. Robinson. However, without a historical background, one cannot provide a correct response. The political standpoints of all those involved in the Kosovo and Metohija crisis depended on this history. The essence of the crisis was in the change of the ethnic make-up of the population of Kosovo and Metohija, which started changing after the Viennese wars, and the methods by which these changes occurred are extremely important.

How did it come about that Kosovo and Metohija, which had been populated by a hundred per cent Serbs became a territory on which the Serbs were a minority? This did not come about spontaneously or peacefully. It was always done by violence. But until 1878, the Serbs were the absolute majority regardless of all the persecutions to which they were exposed. ⁴²⁸⁹⁸

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... intervene often, and I can see that with the --

JUDGE BONOMY: Unfortunately I can't get my microphone to work, Mr. Nice, but I would -- now it is working. Thank you.

MR. NICE: But I notice the nature of the witness's response to judicial rulings is sometimes somewhat forceful. There are clearly limits that must be put, in our respectful submission, on background and on general answers as well as on modern political answers, and the last answer that the witness gave despite the Court's warning is outside the confines that the Court expected.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I understand the comments that you make. I must say that I have not found the witness's answers to be forceful. It's his manner of presentation. I don't find it in any way objectionable at all.

Mr. Milosevic, bring the witness to the present, and that's my clear instruction. We have had enough evidence on history. And I appreciate the point, Mr. Seselj, that you make, that it is important to know the background, historical background. I appreciate that very well, and I don't mind your spending a little bit of time on it but we have to move to the indictment.

And that is what you will now deal with, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, you pointed out that the changes in the ethnic make-up occurred as a rule pursuant to violence and pressure from the outside.

A. Yes. That is the essence of my reply. That's how I understood ⁴²⁸⁹⁹ it.

Q. Let us deal briefly now with your theoretical treatise in tab 25. You -- I will pass over the general historical background, the beginning of the Serb exodus and what you say about it, and especially in this treatise of yours, on page 115, you deal with a document which you call the Bonn annex. That's in chapter 14.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We have to find it in the English because it's obviously not 115 in the English text. Mr. Nice is usually very helpful in that regard.

MR. NICE: Yes, Your Honour. I'm afraid we haven't prepared the document for these purposes at this stage, and it would help if the accused would have this in mind. We will do the best we can, but it will take some time, I expect.

JUDGE ROBINSON: To help us to find it in the English text, Mr. Milosevic, by giving us some guide. Maybe Mr. Seselj can find it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The guide would be that it is chapter 14.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I do not like to use the English language, especially over the past few years I've been reluctant to use it, but it's somewhere around the third, the third of this text, and the title is the Bonn annex.

JUDGE KWON: 27.

JUDGE ROBINSON: 27.

JUDGE KWON: But before that, can I ask when this was published? What date in 1999? ⁴²⁹⁰⁰

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was published, it can be seen from the contents, immediately after the NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. You will see that in this study I deal with Resolution 1244 of the Security Council of the United Nations and the so-called Kumanovo agreement. I end with an analysis of the consequences of the NATO occupation of Kosovo and Metohija and the continued mass killing of members of the Serb people.

So I could not give you the exact date, you see. You know what it's like with printing presses. But it could have been, say, the end of the summer of 1999, the beginning of the autumn.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps sometime in the month of October.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Seselj. Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, so we have found this chapter. Why did you deal with it in particular? But try to answer my question bearing in mind the need to say what your assessment was of the positions of the Contact Group which are also attached here, because the Bonn annex has to do with these positions. However, there were several such documents that came from the Contact Group. What conclusions did you reach on the basis of the positions of the Contact Group? All of this preceded the NATO aggression against Kosovo and Metohija.

A. I would like to draw your attention to the preceding three pages ⁴²⁹⁰¹ of the study. The previous chapter number 13 which has a different title retrospective of past Western interference into Serb internal political relations. I deal with foreign interventions in the internal affairs of Serbia after the signing of the Dayton agreement. You may remember, Mr. Milosevic, that the Americans promised that after the signing of the Dayton Paris agreement Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would have all sanctions lifted. However, like many times before that, the Americans were deceitful. Immediately after the signing they proclaimed the so-called outer wall of sanctions, a category which had been unrecorded until then in international public law, and they said that this outer wall of sanctions would go on until the question of Kosovo and Metohija was resolved and the cooperation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with The Hague Tribunal. That is the beginning, the real beginning of the interference of Western powers in internal affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia.

I refer to a few meetings of the Contact Group here that consist primarily of the Western powers but Russia as well, although Russia didn't did not play any major role in this context. Sometimes they made the Western sword against Serb national interests a bit more blunt, but they do not bring into question the integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but tendentiously in the documents of the Contact Group they do not refer to Serbia. They talk about guaranteeing the territory and integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but they ask for autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija without mentioning that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia, which is very tendentious because they think that in the future ⁴²⁹⁰² there is no more Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that this would be a completely pending issue if the borders of Serbia are not guaranteed. So that is the first question that I analysed here, and the Trial Chamber has it as -- at its disposal in the English translation too. If necessary, I can go into this in greater detail.

Then we get to the Bonn annex dated 1998 when the Contact Group more decidedly and more clearly presented its views. The Bonn annex is preceded by the meeting held on the 8th of July when the basic elements were clearly spelled out to resolve the status of Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as is emphasised. Then the Contact Group started putting forth certain pre-conditions, thus bringing into question the state integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of Serbia. The Bonn annex already calls for a special status of Kosovo and Metohija. That's what they called it. And in paragraph 4 of this annex, it says that the Security Council, the OSCE, and the neighbouring states would welcome an agreement. However, before that neighbouring states would participate as signatories, witness signatories which presupposes a type of interference and foreign intervention which had been impermissible until then in international relations.

Now, what is called for in the Bonn annex. The Bonn annex seeks a status which until then was unheard of in international relations.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, I find what you are saying quite interesting, but it is going to be very difficult to follow the evidence if we have answers as long and as lengthy as this one has been. My preference in conducting trials here is for short questions and short ⁴²⁹⁰³ answers. It's more difficult to follow a long narrative, and we have to appreciate the evidence.

So, Mr. Milosevic, I want you to direct Mr. Seselj to a particular area in the book where you want a particular question answered. And you give as brief an answer as possible. I know in your background, Mr. Seselj, you have been a professor and a lecturer, but we don't want lectures here. So try to make your answers as brief as possible. If you look on the transcript page before you, when you get beyond one page and you're running over, the answer is generally, in my view, too long to be appreciated as evidence.

So, Mr. Milosevic, put another question to the witness now, and I want the witness to follow my guidelines and make the answers as short as possible.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, you looked into the Bonn annex here in particular, and you presented some reasons for doing so. What are these important reasons why you dealt with the Bonn annex in particular, as well as the other documents of the Contact Group that was dealing with the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. Well, because already in the options paper of the Contact Group, which immediately preceded the Bonn annex, I saw what the Western powers really wanted, actually.

Q. Let's just be very specific and practical. What conclusions? You mentioned the word "options" now. What did you infer on the basis of these options of the contact group? ^{42904 BLANK PAGE 42905}

A. The Contact Group attacks the constitutional solution concerning autonomies in the Republic of Serbia, invoking the communist institution from 1974. Something that is a product of a totalitarian communist system cannot be a guideline in a democratic state in order to find a legal solution to a particular problem, because if this constitution from 1974 were a good one, then one must bear in mind that there was no parliamentarianism. There was no multi-party system. There was no freedom of the press. For their political beliefs people were taken to prison. Private property was not guaranteed. They are taking us back to something that we wanted to escape from, we as a people and we as a state. This formulation from the 1974 constitution was legally impossible. Kosovo and Metohija at that time was an integral part of Serbia, but practically it -- they took part in governing Serbia whereas Serbia itself had no powers in Kosovo.

We did not bring into question the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija. However, we asked that this should be an autonomy according to world standards, to see what autonomy really meant. The Contact Group here in the Bonn annex asks us to give an autonomy state insignia, including a flag, a coat of arms, an anthem, et cetera. That is unheard of even in the case of Aland Islands and Altoadige in Italy and other examples. We cannot find such precedents that the Contact Group insisted upon. And that is the essence of this annex.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, when we look at the Bonn annex and in terms of what ⁴²⁹⁰⁶ you said just now, can we link this up with the documents of the Contact Group that are contained in tabs 13 through 18? Can we say that what can be seen here is the same approach that you indicated in the Bonn annex in terms of their attitude towards autonomy, their attitude towards the facts of life in Kosovo and Metohija, and the clarity of the intentions that can be seen in the approach of the Contact Group?

A. Their intentions were highly obvious, and that is what I dealt with. They were not interested in the real situation in Kosovo and Metohija at all. They kept insisting on negotiations, but they did nothing in order to contribute to these talks actually taking place. On the other hand, the Western powers instruct Albanian political representatives to persistently avoid a dialogue with the Serbian authorities. On the one hand, we have Serbia which does want a dialogue, which is constantly calling for a dialogue and is prepared to conduct a dialogue on all questions except for the territorial integrity of the state. On the other hand, we have the Western powers which are constantly threatening, which are constantly insisting, but actually instructing Albanian political representatives to reject dialogue as such. That would more or less be the essence of the matter.

Q. Very well. Let us look at two elements that are a red thread through these elements and these documents. Let's see how correct this is.

What is being said all the time is that there is some kind of violence exercised against civilians. That can be seen in the documents of the Contact Group. And another element is that we do not want to have ⁴²⁹⁰⁷ a dialogue. Are any of these two assumptions true, that there is violence against civilians and that Serbia does not want dialogue?

A. First of all, there was no violence against civilians. It can be said quite freely that civilians in Kosovo and Metohija lived in optimal conditions. As a matter of fact, they were not even in a position to strictly abide by legal norms which is unheard of in other countries and in Serbia itself. Civilians for the most part did not pay for their own electricity, water, public utilities. They didn't pay any taxes. And the government tolerated that wanting to secure their goodwill and to effect the political dialogue in that way, to make it possible. The authorities intervened only when there was violence.

On the other hand, you have the Western powers, members of the Contact Group, and no arguments are good enough for them. They keep telling their own story, they're persistent in this. You can do your utmost in terms of giving them any kind of arguments that you have available. They are quite simply blind and deaf to all these arguments. That is the core of the matter.

On the other hand, as for the possibility of starting a dialogue, there absolutely was none, because somebody from the West promised the Albanian political representatives strictly carry out all these instructions. Your time will come and we are going to materialise your interests as we planned together. Somebody keeps asking you for dialogue and in practice keeps impeding that dialogue all the time.

Q. Mr. Seselj, tell us, what did you know about political and intelligence preparations carried out by the West and the KLA in ⁴²⁹⁰⁸ Kosovo -- for war in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. I had a great deal of knowledge about this, and it culminated when a High Representative of the US, Gelbard, came to visit sometime in the end of February 1999. He came to Pristina. Truth to tell, he had a press conference and he presented rather neutral positions there but parallel to that he had confidential contacts with the representatives of Albanian political parties and terrorist organisations, and he incited them to start armed actions.

Then the village of Prekaz happened. Adem Jashari had built a house that resembled a true fortress. He locked up many members of his family in it. He met the police patrol that was chasing after him there because he had killed two Serbian policemen a day before that, and that was supposed to be a signal for all other terrorist groups in Kosovo and Metohija that they should start an armed rebellion against the Serbs. That was actually the motive of us, the Serb radicals, to accept a coalition government with you, although you were our ideological opponents, in order to rally together all the national resources of the country and to defend the country.

We realised whose fingers were there. Gelbard said it himself. That is very basic information, and I know from before that the Western powers persistently, patiently armed Albanian terrorists with special weapons, that they helped them financially, that they organised them, and on top of all of that the OSCE and the OSCE mission were instrumentalised in order to contribute to organising this terrorist uprising.

Q. Let us just establish one fact that you mentioned just now. When ⁴²⁹⁰⁹ you entered the national unity government this was primarily motivated by the Kosovo and Metohija problem?

A. Yes. Otherwise we would not be caught dead in the same government with our ideological opponents from the Socialist Party of Serbia if it were not for the defence of Kosovo and Metohija and opposing the looming aggression of the Western powers and NATO. That was our main motive to go into the same government with parties that were our ideological opponents.

Q. All right. So we've established that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this document from tab 25 is something that I would like to have admitted into evidence, also the documents that I referred to that pertain to the Contact Group contained in tabs 13 through 18, including 17, the Bonn annex that Mr. Seselj described and wrote about.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, so far we haven't actually been taken to any item of detail --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. NICE: We haven't been taken to any of the other exhibits and the witness has simply given his evidence. I don't see to what extent it's necessary to have or helpful to have this additional printed material. It may or may not emerge in cross-examination. That's another matter.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think the book, yes, can be admitted. But, Mr. Milosevic, you haven't really led the witness to tabs -- was it 13 through 18?

MR. NICE: Ms. Dicklich tells me, and I'm grateful to her, that 13 ⁴²⁹¹⁰ to 18 are already in exhibit --

JUDGE ROBINSON: They're already in evidence. I already understand they're already in evidence, Mr. Milosevic, Exhibit 791.

JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. They are in. I have to say I don't see the need to go to these directly. We can read them for ourselves. It's obvious what they are. If they want to be -- if the Prosecution want to take them up in cross-examination they can, but there's no need to delay proceedings by going through these in detail. I think the witness has dealt with them adequately.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, they're already in evidence. Well, we'll admit the -- tab 25. Please give a number to the binder.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the binder will be Exhibit D303.

JUDGE ROBINSON: And the book, chapters 13 and 14, Mr. Milosevic, will be admitted.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let us clear something up, Mr. Seselj, because I asked for these exhibits regarding the Contact Group to be admitted and of course I don't mind if some of them have already been exhibited. I would like to know your answer and your assessment, however.

The contacts contained in the options of the Contact Group that we see in these documents, did they indicate the preparations of the West for the secession of Kosovo and its intentions?

A. Yes. It was obvious that the West insisted on interfering in our internal relations, one, and later on we would see that the West also insisted on a ground invasion into our territory, including the territory ⁴²⁹¹¹ of Kosovo and Metohija, and that those were the real aims of the Western powers. They were looking for a pretext for stationing their troops there. We Serbs with our independent and sovereign state simply did not fit into our strategic designs, and they were looking at any cost for an outcome that would give them a ticket to come in. The war was imposed on us in order to provide a pretext for the stationing of American troops.

Q. Thank you. You mentioned the incident in the Prekaze village a moment ago. Do you think you need to add anything to the explanations you've already given about this incident that ultimately did serve as a pretext to increase pressure on Serbia?

A. When the police conducted an investigation about the murder of two policemen, they found out that Adem Jashari, a well-known criminal in Kosovo and Metohija until then, was also the organiser of the terrorist group that attacked and killed those policemen. So the policemen went into pursuit.

Several years before, Adem Jashari built his house as a real fortress in reinforced concrete with towers for rifle fire, with loop holes, and that's something I found out while I was deputy Prime Minister. After this operation -- prior to this operation, 30 civilians left the house, women and children and elderly men. Of those who remained in the house, there was some women who wanted to stay with the men and some male minors who were minors according to the law and not fit to serve in the army yet, but they were quite fit to fight according to their views. There was no other choice for our police in dealing with them but ⁴²⁹¹² to destroy the house. This was later used in the propaganda war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They claimed that we had used excessive force. That was a very disingenuous misrepresentation. Adem Jashari wanted to sacrifice himself in the same way that al Qaeda terrorists do nowadays. He wanted to sacrifice his life in order to cause an international scandal that would be used by the Western media. Our authorities had to come to terms and clash with the terrorists, and they had to prevent similar cases from happening again in Kosovo and Metohija. It was a sort of test for our police organised by the Western powers. They wanted to see whether we would react energetically or not. If we didn't, they would see it as a weakness and attack with all their might. Since we did react energetically and forcefully, there was a certain delay in their later operations and cooperation with terrorist organisations.

We learned at the same time that trenches and communicating trenches were being dug in many villages. Preparations were being made.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What is -- what is your basis for saying that Adem Jashari wanted to sacrifice himself?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The way in which he conducted all this, he released some of the civilians from his family prior to this. The family, closely knit, remained locked in this powerfully equipped fortress determined to fight to the last the police who came to arrest him. By the same token, people who are capable of killing their own compatriots -- I'm saying this because the police during their investigation later found out that some of the bodies found inside were ^{42913 BLANK PAGE 42914} killed by the weapons of Adem Jashari, post-mortems were conducted, and the Albanians didn't even want to take over the bodies. So our authorities buried them. They were undug several days later and reburied where they wanted them interred. They wanted a scandal at any cost. Those are the facts that I know as a deputy Prime Minister at the time based on the documentation that I received.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, several minutes ago you confirmed that you joined the Serbian government primarily because of the Kosovo issue. Here in tab 3 we have an excerpt from your book, one of your books, and it includes a transcript of your interview to Radio Metohija of the 4th of July, 1998 you published this in a book titled "Government of National Unity." Is that correct?

A. Yes. In the course of July 1998, as deputy Prime Minister, I toured many areas of Kosovo and Metohija. On that occasion I visited all the municipalities of the district of Pec, which means Pecani, Decani, Djakovica, Istok and Klina. And I toured the villages that were jeopardised by Albanian terrorists at the time. I inspected the units of the army of Yugoslavia guarding our border crossings and certain police units that were stationed at the most inflammatory points. I visited one village that was surrounded entirely by Albanian villages and Serbian civilians were being targeted. Killings were frequent.

Q. Already in your answer to my first question or, rather, the first question in the interview, you mentioned the interference of great powers. I hope, Mr. Robinson, you will find it easily. This is Dr. Seselj's rely ⁴²⁹¹⁵ to the first question of the anchorman. You say, I quote: "It is not a great danger to us, this Siptar terrorist gang. What is dangerous for us is the great powers interfering with our internal affairs and their efforts to suppress Serbian national interests. All the more reason to warn the Siptars that the Americans are prepared to fight the Serbs until the last Albanian."

MR. NICE: The second -- the first paragraph of the first reply.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Sorry about the microphone. Four lines down on the first reply or thereabouts.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I see it.

MR. NICE: Four or six lines down, "What is dangerous for us."

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes. I did tell you that it was the first answer. So you put the stress here on what is really dangerous to our country. You say the danger lies not in the terrorist gangs but in the interference of great powers.

A. Yes. Would I like to clarify certain terminological differences. Alternately, I call Albanians as Siptars and Albanians. I don't want the Trial Chamber to understand the term Siptar as something derogatory. Siptar is the term Albanians call themselves by. I am call -- I am trying as deputy Prime Minister to send a message to the Albanians that they should not fall prey to American manipulations, that the Americans were prepared to fight the Serbs to the last Albanian. They don't care how ⁴²⁹¹⁶ many Albanians would die in the conflict, just as they don't care as many Iraqi people will die in any other part of the planet where they are fighting their own wars for their own interests. I am telling Albanians you are being manipulated by Americans, they don't care if you die. We will both suffer and they will be the only ones to profit from our conflict. So that was my attempt to discourage the Albanian population from following the terrorist policies that could not possibly have been in the interests of the ethnic Albanian community in Yugoslavia.

Q. Very well, Mr. Seselj. Now, look two paragraphs down from the previous passage. It says: "With regard to the political situation in Kosovo and Metohija we support dialogue. All three political parties that entered the coalition government of national unity constantly offer dialogue to ethnic Albanian parties."

So you are saying this as deputy Prime Minister. You are speaking on behalf of the government. You are speaking on radio Metohija, and you are saying the dialogue is being offered to all Albanian parties.

A. Yes. It was a standing policy of the Serbian government. Let me say one more thing. We did not intend to deny the national, human, and civil freedoms and rights, but they had to be the citizens of our country, and those who were acting from the standpoint of terrorism and separatism would have to leave. This was addressed to a great number of those who had come to Kosovo and Metohija from Albanian and from other countries, and even greater numbers of them came after the NATO occupation. ⁴²⁹¹⁷ So we were using every opportunity as a government to encourage members of the Albanian community to accept dialogue with the Serbian authorities, to find a peaceful solution that would not jeopardise the territorial integrity of our country. That is the essence of our policy.

Q. And you are stating it here in the interview that --

A. Radio Pec was the radio station concerned.

Q. On the 4th of July, 1998. I am stressing the date when this was being discussed and when you were saying all these things on behalf of the government.

Tell me, to what extent and what measures was the government taking to resolve the Kosovo problem?

Let me just quote another passage where you say the Republic of Serbia was making great efforts to help the Kosovo population in political, humanitarian and other issues, issues concerning the educational system. What measures was the Serbian government taking to resolve the Kosovo problem?

A. We had would types of measures. On the one hand, we wanted to suppress terrorism, and on that level all our police and army efforts were geared towards that objective. When I was visiting the area, I met with an army unit on a border crossing that had just crushed a column of illegal contraband of weapons, mounted smugglers. On the other hand, in the very difficult economic situation that Serbia itself was in, we were making great financial efforts to help the Kosovo population, regardless of ethnic background. Albanians, Turks, Egyptians, Roma, and others. So this was a two-pronged approach that we were taking. ⁴²⁹¹⁸ I often met with members of the Albanian community to convince them that we shared a common national interest to live in peace, not to be jeopardised by anything or anyone. And I say that somewhere here, to be equal before all authorities and to have autonomous rights. Which autonomous rights? Those autonomous rights of the highest international standard that they -- that exists in any other state in the world. We never ran away from that. If their children didn't want to go to our schools, they were free to open private schools. Nobody denied them that right.

Prior to that, you, Mr. Milosevic, you reached an agreement with Mr. Rugova for their schools to be able to open.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Remember to keep the answers as short as possible.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I were asked in the course of this interview to comment on the meeting of Richard Holbrooke with members of the KLA. On page 303, that is two pages later, you say: "Of course this meeting of Holbrooke's with Albanian terrorists indicates that Western powers were directly inciting and encouraging terrorism, playing into the hand of Albanian separatists, increasing their already exaggerated appetites, leading into a vicious circle, that we would not be able to leave --

MR. NICE: I think it's on -- I haven't found it exactly yet.

JUDGE KWON: It's on the foot of page 5.

MR. NICE: That's what I thought. But I couldn't find the passage that the accused had been reading from. ⁴²⁹¹⁹

MS. HIGGINS: It's page 6, line 10.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. You must wait. You must ensure that the Chamber finds the passage before you proceed. Otherwise, it may be lost on us.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I suppose you found it now. I quoted this passage already.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You say, of course Holbrooke's meeting with Albanian terrorists indicates that the Western powers directly supported terrorism and instigated it.

A. You see what happened there? Until Gelbard's arrival in Pristina in end of February 1992, the American administration called Albanian terrorists terrorists. The KLA was proclaimed by the American administration to be a terrorist organisation. This is a watershed. Holbrooke comes to Kosovo and meets with members of the KLA. He meets with them in some house, God knows where, and he even took his shoes off before entering. We remember that TV footage.

So at that moment, America openly sides with an organisation that it called terrorists until then, and it shows its cards. I said also that thereby Americans increased their already exaggerated appetites and led them into a vicious circle. We had until then several open clashes with their organisations in Kosovo and Metohija.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just tell us the significance of Mr. Holbrooke taking off his shoes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, he's playing up to ⁴²⁹²⁰ them in a way. He's respecting their customs, suggesting a dose of intimacy with them. When you enter somebody's house, you respect normal civic rules. When you go a step further, observing the national customs of your host, you are doing something more. If he hadn't take his shoes off, nobody would have held it against him, but he did, trying to show something.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, we heard several times here something that I'm not able to find right now in this interview. I hope you will assist me. It was mentioned that you advocated expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija. However, from what I heard from you, you advocated expulsion of immigrants from Albania under two cumulative conditions, that they were Albanians, foreign citizens, and that they were behaving in a way that instigates separatism. Can you help me find this in your interview?

A. Well, perhaps it wasn't in this particular interview but in some other interview, but this was the essence of everything I said in public. As you know, I published the texts of all my interviews whether on radio or television in all my books. I have nothing to be ashamed of. I'm not ashamed of anything I said on any occasion on any topic, and I have no reason to deny anything I said.

What is the essence here? For decades, Albania was under a typical Stalinist regime headed by Enver Hoxha. This regime was intolerable for the Albanian population. Frequently Albanians fled from ⁴²⁹²¹ Albania into Serbia. The Serb authorities throughout Serbia and in Kosovo and Metohija welcomed all these Albanian refugees, and they never questioned the need to provide them with protection and everything they needed to survive. However, what happened was that a certain number of these refugees, perhaps a large number, as soon as they were welcomed in Serbia began working against Serbia from separatist positions. They found asylum in Serbia and yet they wanted to annex a part of Serbia to Albania. There is no country in the world that would tolerate foreign immigrants on its territory who are acting against their own vital interests.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Seselj. Your answers tend to be a little long. So when I think you have answered the question, I'll stop you.

Mr. Milosevic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I want my answers to be as clear as possible, Mr. Robinson. That's what I'm trying to achieve. I'm sorry if I go into too much detail on occasion.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. This is what I wanted us to establish, because very often it was alleged that someone was advocating the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo. In your response to the first question, could you please turn to page 300. That's only three paragraphs below the first paragraph we quoted in answer to your first -- to the first question.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... of the book, and you are not to begin until we have found --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, 300 of the book, but it's in ^{42922 BLANK PAGE 42923} his reply to the first question, so you will find it easily. And it's in the fourth paragraph. I quoted the beginning of paragraph 4 in which you, Mr. Seselj, say: "We support" --

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... still on tab 3, and I've got a sneaking suspicion it will be at the bottom of the first page.

JUDGE ROBINSON: At the bottom. Thank you, Mr. Nice. Mr. Milosevic, all of this should have been done by you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I told you --

JUDGE ROBINSON: You should have for us the corresponding page in the English text so that the proceedings can move very quickly and as smoothly as possible.

Well, let us proceed.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's in the first paragraph of the first response -- in the fourth.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction, in the fourth paragraph.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have already quoted the first sentence of that paragraph in which, Mr. Seselj, you say: "We support dialogue. All three political parties that entered the coaliton government of national unity are constantly offering dialogue to ethnic Albanian parties."

And this is what I wanted to clarify. It goes on to say: "We have no intention of denying them their democratic and human and civil rights and liberties, but they have to be loyal to the state they live in, ⁴²⁹²⁴ and if those who are not our citizens, those who are not our citizens take action in support of separate views, they have no business staying in this country and will have to leave."

That was the purpose of my question. You are putting forward two cumulative conditions, that they are not our nationals and secondly that they are acting from separatist positions and that our hospitality should be denied them. Is this usual in international practice?

A. Yes. We cannot expel our own citizens even if we want to. What happened recently in Montenegro, Djukanovic handing over one of his own citizens to another country, this is unimaginable. We cannot expel our own nationals, our own citizens. If they violate the law, they have to be tried, they have to be sentenced and imprisoned, but whether they are good or bad they belong to us. So there is no so of all those Albanians, even if they are terrorists, being expelled. If they are our nationals, they cannot be expelled. That's clear to everyone. Until you were kidnapped in Belgrade and handed over to The Hague Tribunal, there was no citizen of our country who was extradited to anyone. It was sacred to us this principle that our own citizens cannot be extradited or expelled. If they were found guilty, they had to serve their sentence and so on. Even during the communist dictatorship, no one was expelled from Yugoslavia. Other communist citizens expelled their citizens but Yugoslavia never did.

JUDGE BONOMY: It's not only communist countries that extradite their citizens though. It's a quite common practice throughout the world.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For a country to extradite its own citizens to someone, Mr. Bonomy, do you know of any case where England ⁴²⁹²⁵ either extradited one of its citizens or expelled one of its citizens? I know of no such cases. And I deeply respect the British legal system.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, it's quite a common practice in common law countries. Very ordinary practice in many common law countries.

JUDGE BONOMY: Even for economic crime.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To expel its own citizens.

JUDGE BONOMY: No, you're perverting my comment to extradite its citizens for trial. That's a common practice. If a citizen of one country commits a crime in another, then he may be tried in that country. There are many international instruments providing for that.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know of any case where Great Britain extradited one of its citizens to a foreign country to be tried in that foreign country. If you can inform me of this, I would be happy to receive this information. But what we are discussing here is expulsion, Mr. Bonomy, expulsion of our citizens.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I practised in extradition law quite a lot, and for your own education I'll send you later a list of the cases. Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, four pages further on -- I hope that when I say four pages further on you will be able to find the passage. You speak of international humanitarian organisations. That's on page 304 of your book.

A. Yes, I found that part. ⁴²⁹²⁶

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, have you found it? "International humanitarian organisations have requested access to this area saying that they wish to help release the abducted."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So the reason they give is that they wish to help release those who have been abducted.

A. This is what happened: The Albanian terrorists abducted a large number of Serbs, but they also abducted quite a large number of Albanians. It turned out later that they liquidated most of those whom they had abducted. They abducted them, blackmailed them and so on. Then some international humanitarian organisations offered their services to mediate with the Albanian terrorists in order to get them to release the abducted. These were Serbs, Albanians, Roma, Goranies and so on. My attitude to this was negative because I felt that these were organisations who were spying on us and they were spying for the enemies of Serbia. They were working against Serbia. They were launching fabrications in the international media. This is how these so-called NGOs acted in Kosovo and Metohija. They were ostensibly engaged in humanitarian work but this concealed other interests. Our practice was -- what we saw in practice was that foreign spies were sent in the guise of religious missionaries. One much them was called David. I can't remember his last name. He was the chief of the CIA in the American embassy in Belgrade, and the first time he arrived on our territory he was a missionary of the Pentecostal church. And he tried to get Momcilo Perisic to work for him and there was a huge affair about ⁴²⁹²⁷ this in Belgrade.

Our experience with these humanitarian NGOs were mostly negative. There were indeed some such organisations that were really engaged in humanitarian work, but these were in the minority. I personally never trusted these international humanitarian organisations. David Neighbour. That was his name. I recall it now.

JUDGE BONOMY: There are two different issues, I think, in what you've just been saying. One is misinformation; in other words, issuing publicly or in the international community information about events in Serbia that's not true; and secondly, spying. Now, can I ask you about the second one? What sort of basis do you have for suggesting that there were international humanitarian organisations involved in spying in Serbia? That means undercover, secretive work.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It happened very often, for example, that the army of Republika Srpska would search members of some international humanitarian organisations, and they would find weapons that were being illegally sent on to the opposite side.

JUDGE BONOMY: Let's not confuse the issue. Let's stick to Kosovo. That's what we're dealing with.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am telling you what my political standpoint was in July 1998, before the war, as a deputy Prime Minister.

JUDGE BONOMY: I don't want to know your political standpoint. I want to know what is the factual basis for saying that in Kosovo international humanitarian organisations were involved in spying. It's a very specific question. ⁴²⁹²⁸

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, but you're forgetting, Mr. Bonomy, that I'm testifying here about my statement, not about evidence that they were really engaged in spying, because as deputy Prime Minister, I had general information.

JUDGE BONOMY: Again you misunderstand. You're not here just to recite a statement. Indeed, it would be quite inappropriate for that course to be followed. You are here to answer specific questions in this case, and I am asking you a specific question and I would like a specific answer.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, and I'm replying to you. My political standpoint in 1998, in July, was that these Western NGOs ostensibly humanitarian in character were spying on us, and you are now telling me to give you specific facts as if I was testifying about this in court in 1998. I was not testifying in court. I was talking about this in a radio interview as my standpoint. It was my standpoint then, and it's my standpoint now. If you want evidence, it will take me a few months to collect it, Mr. Bonomy.

JUDGE BONOMY: So that means you have no factual basis to present to this Tribunal to support the allegation that international humanitarian organisations were involved in spying activities in Kosovo.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it doesn't mean that. I do have a factual basis, but in order to show it, I would need to have contact with my legal advisors and have it sent to me from Belgrade. Mr. Bonomy, you may not be aware that for the past two months I have been prevented from having these contacts maybe because of this testimony here now, but I ⁴²⁹²⁹ am telling you that this was my position in 1998 as deputy Prime Minister.

JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. We can take the matter no further at this stage. Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that during the course of Mr. Seselj's testimony I will be able to present him with such evidence so that he can explain it, because he really is in a very difficult situation as he has no possibility of establishing contact and collecting such documents.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, I hope you remember the case of the Australian in the Care organisations who was a spy and this was discovered by our police.

A. This was during the war, during the bombing?

Q. I don't recall the date now. Sali Beqa [phoen] who was carrying weapons for the KLA. There are documents to this effect.

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's a very leading question. You are making a statement and providing answers to the question which you will eventually put, Mr. Milosevic. Move on.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you. We have dealt with this point sufficiently.

Move on, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴²⁹³⁰

Q. In this interview and in many other statements you made in public, and this is not only about you, it has to do with policy that was pursued at that time vis-a-vis Kosovo -- actually, what I'd like to establish now is the following: The efforts made by the government of Serbia and, generally speaking, of the political establishment in Yugoslavia, including myself and the Yugoslav authorities or, rather, the attempt to negotiate with the political representatives of the Kosovo and Metohija Albanians, was that not a reaction to the request that was made by the Security Council Resolution in that respect that had to do with Kosovo and Metohija or were all of these simply an initiative of the government of Serbia? Do you remember that? Do you have any clear knowledge about this? What can you say about this?

A. I remember that very well, because before this request was made from the outside the government of Serbia established a group consisting of its prominent officials, and they were a negotiating team for talks with Albanian and all other political parties in Kosovo and Metohija and several times these talks were called. Perhaps they went there about 20 times. I cannot recall the exact figure.

We insisted on these talks all the time but the response was rather poor. Many political parties in Kosovo and Metohija accepted this political initiative. The Turkish party, the Romani party, even two Albanian parties. But these were not mass political parties. Two Albanian political parties did accept this initiative, but not the main ones though. The main ones, upon instructions from the West, rejected all initiatives for talks. Well, that's what happened to us in Rambouillet as ^{42931 BLANK PAGE 42932} well. Under the pressure of the Western powers, the national assembly passed a resolution that a delegation would go to Rambouillet. The Serbian Radical Party was against this. We didn't want our delegation to go because we knew that it involved some kind of deceit. Our delegation went, an Albanian delegation went, and they never met themselves. There was never a single meeting between two actually.

Q. Or rather there were no negotiations?

A. There were no negotiations. It is only Western representatives who exerted pressure against the Serb delegation to accept absolutely unacceptable things.

Q. All right. In tab 20 there is Resolution 1160 of the Security Council. I don't want to go into it now because we don't have any time and it's not really of any major importance, but it is in here in order to establish when it was that the international community asked for talks to take place and in order to establish that this Resolution was passed on a particular date, that is to say, the 31st of March, 1998. That is Resolution 1160.

A. And our delegation was in Pristina before that seeking talks.

Q. That's what I wanted to establish.

A. I don't know the exact date. Perhaps it was the 28th or something. They were already in Pristina.

Q. Do you remember when I signed my agreement with Rugova about the normalisation of the school system?

A. That was two years before that, maybe even three years before that. It was through the mediation of that Vatican organisation. ⁴²⁹³³

Q. Sant'Egidio.

A. Yes.

Q. It was all over the newspapers.

A. It was two or three years before that.

Q. So my question, Mr. Seselj, was whether the efforts made by our authorities to negotiate with the representatives of the political representatives of the Kosovo and Metohija Albanians were the result of the request made by the UN or did this happen much earlier? Have we established that now? What is cause and what is consequence and what happened when?

A. All political factors in Kosovo for years wanted to stabilise the internal situation, the solution of these urgent problems. It did not suit anyone in Serbia the fact that Albanians boycotted political processes, elections. We all felt that this was a problem that could escalate in the future. We incessantly insisted that Albanians take part in political elections because they were so numerous they could have had many MPs in the republican assembly, in the federal assembly. Very often as such they could be part of the government, republican and federal, and on the other hand, we were prepared to establish a quota of ministers that would be ethnic Albanians so that we would resolve the whole problem in the best possible way. It didn't suit anyone in Serbia that the Albanians were not taking part in political processes because we knew that thus they were subject to manipulations coming from abroad and we knew that they were involved in the plans of America. Somebody learned about it sooner, someone later. It's not that I want to blow my own trumpet, but I was one ⁴²⁹³⁴ of the first who realised what was going on.

Q. Mr. Seselj, we mentioned this agreement with Rugova, my agreement with Rugova, that had to do with the school system. And you mentioned negotiations with the political representatives of the Albanians and the political representatives of other ethnic communities. Since ethnic communities there are the Turks, the Muslims, the Gorani, the Egyptians, that is to say, apart from the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Albanians, what about the other ethnic communities? Did they respond positively to this, that is to say, to the initiatives of the government of the Republic of Serbia to seek a political solution and to resolve problems by way of negotiations?

A. All other ethnic communities whole-heartedly embraced the idea of negotiations, talks, and dialogue. Many overlooked the fact that it wasn't only Albanians and Serbs who lived in Kosovo and Metohija. Before the NATO occupation, about 150.000 Muslims lived there who spoke Serbian. Then about 50.000 Turks. Turks. Aborigines who were there for centuries in Prizren and around Prizren for the most part. Then about 60.000 Gorani. These are people of Serb origin, the Islamic faith, but they have Albanian names. The process of Albanisation was not completed in their case, so they had their own ethnic and national awareness. They belonged to a separate community. Then there was over 200.000 Roma living there. There was this major mystification in terms of the actual number of Albanians because the Albanians boycotted the census of 1991. Before when they themselves were in charge of the census, they forced members of other ethnic communities to declare themselves as Albanians, especially if they ⁴²⁹³⁵ were of the Islamic faith. So many Roma, many Turks, many Gorani had to declare themselves as Albanians. Later on when the situation changed, all of these who belonged to certain ethnic groups did not wish to be pressured into representing themselves as something that they actually were not. The Western powers incessantly ignored the existence of other ethnic communities. There was even a group of 7.000 people who declared themselves as Egyptians. It was part of their own lore that their ancestors centuries ago came from Egypt, and it is their right to declare themselves as Egyptians.

Obviously all national interests were ignored there. All groups that were not prepared to be instrumentalised by the Western powers against Serbia. They were totally ignored. Afterwards, they basically shared the fate of the Serb people.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You have answered the question. Mr. Milosevic, we'll take a break now. We will adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, continue.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, please let us go back briefly to your book the Serb people and the new world order, which has already been admitted in evidence here. It is in tab 25.

A few moments ago, you mentioned the decisions of the national assembly of Serbia. I would like to draw your attention -- ⁴²⁹³⁶

JUDGE KWON: Just for the record, part 13 and 14 are admitted only, not all of tab 25.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was my understanding that you admitted tabs 13 and 14, not only these chapters. Now I'm dealing with chapter 19, and those are the resolutions of the national assembly.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let us briefly deal with the main points contained in this chapter since it has to do with the efforts to have negotiations conducted, to achieve results by peaceful means. So in chapter 19 you say --

JUDGE KWON: Page 60.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You say at the very outset that the decision for the government of the Republic of Serbia to send a delegation to Rambouillet made by the national assembly on the 4th of February, 1999, based on the discussion about the acute problems in Kosovo and Metohija and the aggressive threats by NATO as well as the initiative of the Contact Group. Then it adopted conclusions with which it condemned most seriously the NATO threats to the Serb state and nation concluding that they serve as direct support to separatism and terrorism and are contrary to the declarative commitment for finding a peaceful solution to the problem. Have you found that?

A. Yes. I would just like to remind you of something, Mr. Milosevic. Before that, we had a joint document of all the political parties in Serbia that also had to do with the way in which the Kosovo and Metohija issue was to be resolved. It preceded the session of the national assembly. All political parties in Serbia took a single view with regard ⁴²⁹³⁷ to this problem and started their own initiative. One of the key points of this initiative was within the democratic resolving of the problem itself that Kosovo and Metohija should in the future have a bicameral assembly seemably. The chamber of citizens where there would be proportionate election and the Albanians would always constitute a majority because they were the majority population in Kosovo and another chamber, a chamber of ethnic communities, where every ethnic community from Kosovo and Metohija would have an equal number of representatives so that there would not be any outvoting. So it's Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Gorani, Roma, Egyptians, et cetera.

Q. That was actually the approach as passed by our delegation in Rambouillet as well.

A. Yes. But our delegation did not have a chance of seriously presenting this over there because there was no meeting with the representatives of the Albanian political parties in Rambouillet. In Rambouillet the Western powers only exerted pressure on our delegation to accept, what was it, annex B of the agreement from Rambouillet if I remember correctly ensuring the free movement of NATO troops throughout practically all of Kosovo and Metohija which no one in Serbian political life could dream of accepting.

As far as this session of the national assembly is concerned, the one that you mentioned, views were taken unanimously there as well. The governing party and the opposition parties. And in this initiative it was the governing and opposition parties that were involved. In addition to the national unity government parties, there were representatives of ⁴²⁹³⁸ various parties of Kosovo and Metohija, the Serbian Renewal Movement, the New Serbia Party, and then it was the Hungarian parties from Vojvodina that were practically the only opposition at the time. So there was consensus among all the relevant political factors in Serbia at that time with regard to this issue.

Q. Please look at the end of chapter 19, the fourth paragraph from the end of the chapter, actually, and then we're going to move our way back. It says: "Albanian separatism and terrorism, at its highest stadium, --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... until we find it. Page 62, the next one.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The fourth paragraph from the end of this chapter. It starts with the following words: Albanian separatism and terrorism.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we have it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. "As its highest stadium have caused the current crisis in Kosovo and Metohija and they are..." and you quote here --

A. The conclusions of the national assembly.

Q. Yes. "... the main hindrance to achieve a political solution. To all the efforts, offers and goodwill of the state to join the political dialogue and together with others to search for a solution, the Albanian separatist parties and their leaders have responded by rejection and obstruction. Such a standpoint on their part has motivated and encouraged the continuation of crimes by the terrorist gangs. They have abused the ⁴²⁹³⁹ respect of the agreement by our state and the presence of the OSCE Verification Mission and continued with crimes." Then you say that the Albanian state is also involved in aggressive action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija.

What is highlighted here towards the end of the paragraph is that "Western powers never reacted to this and the OSCE has not yet completed its Verification Mission even though in the meanwhile there has been an escalation of terrorist actions. In international dealings there is policy of double standards and any serious condemnation by the UN Security Council of the terrorist activities of the Albanian separatists is efficiently prevented."

At that time was a generally known fact?

A. Yes. Mr. Milosevic, you signed an agreement with Hill, a US representative as far as I can remember correctly, sometime in October 1998. On the basis of this agreement, the observer mission of the OSCE was installed in Kosovo and Metohija with very specific tasks. It was headed by an American, William Walker.

Q. Just a correction for the transcript. You probably misspoke. You said Hill, but the agreement was with Holbrooke.

A. Yes, yes, Holbrooke. But it is the essence that matters. Perhaps I may make a mistake in terms of names sometimes but this mission very soon showed its true face. Instead of supervising matters, monitoring them, the mission started from day one renewing the Albanian terrorist organisation which our police had previously defeated almost completely. ^{42940 BLANK PAGE 42941} In the summer of 1998, our police took action and practically all terrorist groups were suppressed, broken up, scattered around, et cetera. The mission of the OSCE led by William Walker from day one started rallying them together, placing them under their protection, and preparing them to be used as the NATO infantry in the coming aggression. We had reports from our intelligence agencies at that time. As deputy Prime Minister, I received daily information in my office as to what was going on in this respect. In this way, our state authorities following the work of the mission of the OSCE established that their basic objective was to re-establish the Albanian terrorist organisation, and that proved to be true, that they did manage to re-establish it to a large extent.

Q. Look at the next passage. No, not the next paragraph. It is now the third paragraph from the -- from the end of chapter 19. "Such conduct of Western countries is open support to Albanian separatism and terrorism, assistance and support to criminal activities. Besides this, with constructed and incorrect assessments that the army and police used excessive force efforts are made to prevent the legitimate defence forces of the nation and the state to react against the terrorists the terrorists in an appropriate manner in the way this is done by the army and police in all states in the world which are faced with this evil."

Were you -- were you familiar with this refrain about excessive force being used by our army and police?

A. Yes. We were constantly faced with this reaction by the West. All our -- every action of ours was called excessive use of force, and ⁴²⁹⁴² nobody actually clarified what that means. When you are face-to-face with terrorists, then you have to use adequate force that is sufficient to destroy them, not the kind of force that would be only equal to them and lead to an impasse. On the other hand, terrorist acts were not called by their proper name. They were called provocations. Murders, attacks and other things were called provocations, even the killings of Albanians, because one has to bear in mind that the terrorist organisation known as the KLA killed a great number of Albanians. All such attacks, murders and kidnappings were called provocations. They were not provocations. They were the gravest crimes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I believe you just made an important point when you spoke of adequate force, because that is to be distinguished from excessive force, and the claim is that excessive force was used.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think, Mr. Robinson, that I am saying important things all the time here. I don't think I have said one unimportant thing in my testimony so far.

Second, we have to determine what is excessive or inappropriate force. Is it measured by the number of bullets or what? We never used bombs in dealing with terrorists. The force used was always adequate to the objective. In each case that resulted in civilian casualties, the Albanian side was to blame because they were using them as human shields. Our authorities never put civilians in the line of fire. They never put them in unnecessary danger.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Go ahead, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴²⁹⁴³

Q. In the course of 1998 and the beginning of 1999, did you go to Kosovo and Metohija?

A. I have already said that in 1998 I toured most places in Kosovo and Metohija including some police and army units. I talked to civilians. I also met with Albanians, not only Serbs. And then, it was sometime in January, as deputy Prime Minister of Serbia I participated in a cabinet session, a session of the government of Serbia that was held in Pristina. The Serbian government scheduled a session in Pristina. I think we have a report here among the documents.

Q. We'll establish that easily. Tell me, which areas did you tour?

A. Mostly I went to the Pec district because the terrorist actions were the most intensive there. I was Decane, in Djakovica, in Orahovec municipality, but also other places.

Q. Did you go to police station, police units?

A. Yes.

Q. How did they act?

A. They acted strictly in compliance with the regulations of the Republic of Serbia and their own internal regulations. I didn't come across a single case of violation. They had the task, in other words, to protect civilians regardless of ethnicity, to maintain public law and order, and to destroy terrorists wherever they might appear. Of course, it was always our aim primarily to detain them and arrest them, not to kill them. But of course clashes were so violent that there were many casualties, but there were also many casualties among policemen.

Q. We have data about this. Tell me, how did the army behave, the ⁴²⁹⁴⁴ army units that you toured in Kosovo?

A. They stood on the border and they clashed with gangs who tried to smuggle in arms. I toured several block houses, border posts, and I saw personally the army dealing with mounted groups carrying in weapons.

Q. What was the situation in towns that you toured?

A. Life was completely normal. I walked freely the streets of many towns including Pec and many other towns. There were no provocations. There were many Albanians in the street. Many passed me by pretending not to see me. Some smiled.

On one occasion I met a very honourable man, Xhafer Djuka, I believe. He was some sort of municipal official. I later heard that he was killed by terrorists. I remember it like it was yesterday. I walked with him the streets of Pec talking to him. We were approached occasionally by citizens of all ethnicities.

In towns, the situation was almost completely peaceful without a single incident. Incidents mostly happened in villages, in mountains, in woods where terrorist gangs operated.

Q. You said Xhafer Djuka, member of the leadership of the Yugoslav left was killed. Do you know that his throat was slit?

A. Yes. After the NATO troops came in, terrorist gangs got hold of him and slit his throat.

Q. Did you attend any sessions at that time?

A. I didn't miss a single one.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Xhafer --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Xhafer Djuka was an Albanian from a ⁴²⁹⁴⁵ very renowned Albanian family, a very renowned and numerous family infrastructure.

Q. So you attended all cabinet sessions. Did you miss one?

A. Not that I can recall.

Q. What was -- what were the positions and instructions of our government regarding appropriate conduct in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. The republican government was in charge of the police and the federal government was in charge of the army. The republican government provided guidelines mainly through the Ministry of the Interior for the police, and they were irreproachable as far as civilians are concerned. Civilians were to be protected regardless of ethnicity, walk of life, gender, anything, and that's how the police acted in effect. If any violations happened, appropriate disciplinary and other measures were taken.

Q. What was the attitude of the authorities in Serbia and the FRY concerning the lawful conduct of our police, army, and other agencies during the NATO aggression?

A. The same. Offenders were apprehended, handed in to appropriate authorities, and many were tried. I don't know the exact number, but trials took place. If somebody robbed, stole, or killed civilians, they were tried.

The instructions were very clear and strict. Nobody was to be robbed, tortured, or killed. Civilians were not to be abused. Of course during a war you can't avoid it completely, but if anything of that sort happened, our authorities had strict instructions to detain offenders and ⁴²⁹⁴⁶ arrest them.

Q. You said that you have extensive and detailed knowledge about everything that happened at the time as deputy Prime Minister and president of the Serbian Radical Party which had an extensive network throughout the territory of the country. And since this indictment here speaks of discrimination against Albanians in many instances, I would like you to tell us if you can give us a single instance of discrimination against a Kosovo Albanian. Is any of this true?

A. It's not only that I can't give you a single example. Even those who claimed that there was discrimination cannot give you an example of specific discrimination. Albanians were even privileged in a way because the government refrained from taking appropriate measures against them when they failed to pay their electricity, water and other utility bills, and even when the military service is concerned, if an Albanian would refuse to go and serve in the army, they were not arrested, whereas a member of any other ethnic community would be arrested for the same offence.

The state did not only not discriminate, it was tolerant in cases where it wouldn't be tolerant with regard to anyone else. The state was trying to mollify Albanians in order to avoid conflict and avoid the war that was already looming. We could see that from the west.

Q. Tell me, did the authorities in Serbia and the FRY invest efforts, especially during the NATO aggression, to protect Albanians against possible retaliation and reactions to the attack -- attack of the NATO alliance? ⁴²⁹⁴⁷

A. The authorities helped establish local security to people who were supposed to maintain law and order in their own villages. The state paid for their uniforms and other equipment. They didn't even wear any insignia to distinguish them so that they would avoid stigmatisation by their compatriots.

If you look at the total number of casualties during the NATO aggression, you would see that the casualties among the military and damage to military equipment was minimal. It was the civilians who suffered the most. Why were Albanian casualties the greatest? Because they were the largest in number. We had to deal with the terrorist organisation that planned in advance a migration of its own population so as to present it in the international media as a massive problem, as an exodus. Our authorities had the task to maintain law and order as much as possible in the conditions of war, to provide humanitarian supplies, to try to convince Albanians not to move out, and when that was impossible the police had the task to give them free passage, safe passage. Sometimes they had to prevent them from walking into minefields, because of course mine feeds were laid in anticipation of the NATO attack.

Q. Where were you on the 15th of January, 1999?

A. In Pristina attending a session of the Republic of Serbia government. We decided to hold this session in Pristina, to demonstrate our commitment to keep Kosovo and Metohija as an integral part of the country, on the one hand; and on the other hand, to make another appeal to the Albanian population to accept peaceful life and dialogue.

Q. So on that 15th of January, 1999, when you were attending a ⁴²⁹⁴⁸ cabinet session in Pristina, that incident in Racak happened.

A. Yes.

Q. How long was your visit on that occasion?

A. We had this cabinet session and then General Sreten Lukic, who was then commander of all our police forces in Kosovo and Metohija, in the headquarters of the Ministry of Interior in Pristina organised a luncheon that was attended, among others, by late Vlatko Stojiljkovic. I was seated next to a police general, Vlastimir Djordjevic.

Q. That was on the 15th of January.

A. That was immediately after the cabinet session. The ministers started leaving for Belgrade, and some of us were invited to this luncheon, to the police headquarters.

Q. It says Vlastimir Djordjevic was in Racak at the time.

A. Well, he couldn't have been in Racak at the same time as he was seated next to me. I talked to him during that entire luncheon. He received during the luncheon information, a report that there was fighting in Racak. I can confirm that, and all the others who attended that luncheon. Ratko Markovic and Milovan Bojic and other deputy Prime Ministers were there as well.

The next day, on the 16th of January, I flew on a police helicopter with Vlastimir Djordjevic, Vojislav Zekovic who was then your president of the party for Kosovo and Metohija, and Sanja Scepanovic from Pristina to Prizren. We stayed in Pristina until the evening of the 15th of January, after that cabinet session, and in the evening we walked -- we took a walk in the streets of Pristina. ^{42949 BLANK PAGE 42950} The first Vlastimir Djordjevic told us about that was that there was intensive fighting between a terrorist gang and our police units in Racak, and I know that a large number of Albanian terrorists were killed then.

Q. Look at these documents that you have before you. In tab 2, do you find an article from the Zemun newspaper? It's called the government of national unity exists because of Kosovo and Metohija. And we see a text here. It's dated 15th of January, 1999. The government of Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija is the title. It is a report that says the government is holding a session in Kosovo and Metohija. And we can see statements of various vice premiers, your own, and the statements of other vice premiers related to the situation in Kosovo at the time.

A. Let me draw your attention to the photographs here. These photographs come from many towns of Kosovo where you can see Dr. Milovan Bojic, Dr. Ratko Markovic and myself walking unhampered. We did not even need police escort. You can see from this how peaceful the situation was in towns in Kosovo and Metohija. Maybe you would find a policeman here and there in the streets but there were no armoured specially equipped police units, specially trained policemen anywhere armed to the teeth. We were accompanied wherever we went by journalists, and this is how this report came about.

Q. Very well. And what places did you visit?

A. Pristina, Prizren, Pec, Gnjilane, Podujevo, and some other places. To be quite honest, I can't recall them all at present, but these were the district seats, Prizren, Pec, Kosovska Mitrovica and Gnjilane. ⁴²⁹⁵¹ We were in Podujevo where there were about a thousand Serbs residing and a hundred thousand Albanians, and in Podujevo we walked freely about the city streets. There were no provocations. Nobody said a bad word to us. You know, when I walk around towns in central Serbia, people belonging to other political parties sometimes shout insults at me, and nothing like this happened there. I can't say that the Albanians actually welcomed us, but there were no incidents. It was so peaceful that we didn't even need police escorts.

Q. As far as I can see in the first part of this article, there are some important points from the government statement issued at the session of the 15th of January.

A. Yes, I think that the most important conclusions are listed here. Of course as interpreted by journalists.

Q. Yes. This is a newspaper report. If we look at the fourth paragraph.

I hope, Mr. Robinson, you can find the fourth paragraph. That's where I want to quote.

On the 15th of January, 1999, the government says: "The avoidance of a political dialogue by part of the representatives of the Albanian national community, who do not want a political solution and who are obstructing the political process, directly fuels the crimes of terrorist gangs. The government emphasises, as reported by the Ministry for Information of the Republic of Serbia, that the calming down of the situation would create conditions for the renewal and acceleration of the political process in the interest of all the citizens in Kosovo and ⁴²⁹⁵² Metohija and stresses that all perpetrators of terrorist acts have to be punished for the crimes they have committed."

Have you found this?

A. Yes. And then what follows are the conclusions of the government.

Q. Yes. The government goes on to say that terrorism is an evil for all and the whole world is saying that now. "The government of Serbia demands that the international community end its policy of double standards, that it condemn terrorism and prevent external support to terrorists. The government expects the Verification Mission to inform, during its mandate, the world public of the truth about the real causes of the problems in Kosovo and Metohija, of the crimes committed by terrorists and the efforts of Serbia and Yugoslavia to find solutions to the problems by political means and, thus, to discharge fully its obligation under the agreement between the government of Yugoslavia and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe."

Was there any deviation or any exception made from the continuity of our efforts to resolve peacefully the problem of Kosovo and Metohija, to achieve a consensus and to solve the problem based on principles of national equality as contained in the two-house assembly that you mentioned and the principles adopted then?

A. No, there were no deviations from that. The conclusions as interpreted here mark -- or actually they are typical of the behaviour of the overall government activity in attempting to resolve these issues. The government was always unanimous and always insisted on a peaceful solution. We were aware that there was a problem and we wanted to solve ⁴²⁹⁵³ it in a civilised and democratic manner. We could not accept terrorism, but we were ready to discuss everything and to search for solutions that would not bring into question the territorial integrity of Serbia. The territorial integrity of Serbia was the only point we were not prepared to sacrifice. Everything else was open to discussion.

Q. All these ten points are important, but in order to save time I will pass over the next one and I will quote the one after that. "The government reiterates its commitment to solving the problems in Kosovo and Metohija exclusively through political dialogue, respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia and Yugoslavia and the full equality of citizens and ethnic communities. The government once again calls upon representatives of Albanian parties to join in the political dialogue with the representatives of all ethnic communities living in Kosovo and Metohija, to condemn and renounce terrorism, and together with all to seek political solutions which will ensure equality and rule out majority outvoting and discrimination on any grounds whatsoever."

What is the essence of this approach, Mr. Seselj?

A. Well, first of all a peaceful solution of the overall problem, a democratic solution to the problem, the elimination of terrorism, and the prevention of any kind of discrimination.

You know, when we struggle against discrimination we cannot struggle only against discrimination against Albanians. We have to struggle against discrimination against Serbs, Gorani, Roma, Muslim, Turks, Egyptians, all those living in Kosovo and Metohija at the time, ⁴²⁹⁵⁴ many of whom no longer live there unfortunately. So the struggle against discrimination implies the abolishing of all forms of discrimination and the protection of all potential victims of discrimination. How can discrimination arise? Well, one way is through majority outvoting. One of the main forms of discrimination taking place in Kosovo and Metohija after Second World War occurred in this manner, by majority outvoting. If the Albanians were in the majority, it was as if the others didn't exist, and they were then forced to become Albanians to declare themselves as Albanians and so on. However, what is required is full freedom and the preservation of everyone's identity. That's why we insisted on preserving the identity of every ethnic community.

Q. From the smallest to the largest.

A. Yes. Because this was the only way to abolish all discrimination. If the largest ethnic group is able to discriminate against all the others, what have we achieved?

Q. Let's go on through this text. After the next subtitle it says the government of national unity a befitting name. I hope you can find that easily, Mr. Robinson.

They quote you, and here is what you say about the agreement, in paragraph 4 you say: "Commenting on the agreement between the president of FR Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, and American ambassador, Richard Holbrooke, Seselj pointed out that given the threats it is exposed to and wishing to avoid war numerous victims and large-scale devastation, the state made certain concessions to the potential aggressor but that they do not encroach upon the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the ⁴²⁹⁵⁵ country."

A. Yes. We actually did make concessions to the potential aggressor by agreeing to the arrival of the OSCE mission and by agreeing to accept foreign interference in our internal affairs. These were concessions. No other country in the world would have agreed to that.

Q. Very well. But in spite of this, matters escalated. You go on to say that the number of policemen was reduced to the number that had existed in peacetime and that they were able --

A. Mr. Milosevic, you agreed to this in your agreement with Mr. Holbrooke, that the number should be reduced to 90.000 policemen. I remember that very well.

Q. Thank you for reminding me, Mr. Seselj. And in tab 25 in your article, in chapter 19 which we quoted a little while ago where it speaks of the false and trumped up conclusions that there is an excessive use of force, and there is a sentence there which reads in the third paragraph from the end of chapter 19. It reads as follows: "In this way they're wishing to go back on the agreement with the international community," and you go on to quote from the agreement, "The state retains the right to respond adequately to any form of terrorist activity which might imperil the security of citizens and representatives the government."

A. Well, who could ask us to capitulate to the terrorists? What kind of state would we have been?

Q. Yes. We retained that right, and in accordance with that we responded to the terrorist attacks? Was there any other form of ⁴²⁹⁵⁶ violence?

A. No, absolutely not. We were exclusively responding to terrorist attacks and dealing with the terrorists.

Q. Going back to tab 23 in this article from the Zemun newspaper describing the stay of government representatives in Kosovo on the 15th and 16th of January, they continue to quote you, and this is three passages further on from the paragraph we have just quoted about the agreement between Holbrooke and me. And they say that as the Americans are making it more difficult for us to deal with terrorism, Seselj says that we are in fact waging a fight with America because the Siptars would never have risen had it not been for US support.

A. This is true. And they would certainly have tried to find a way of reaching an agreement with us and that we could all live normally in Serbia had they not been inspired by foreign powers which made them great promises which they are still unable to fulfil, because the Western powers are now endangered by terrorist actions in Kosovo and Metohija. They were promised full independence, and the Western powers do not know how to give them that independence because it cannot be made to fit into international law, however much globalism may have diluted that law. Let me remind you, Mr. Milosevic, at the time - and I'm certain of that because I was deputy Prime Minister - we had a total of 25.000 policemen in all of Serbia, and out of these 10.000 were active in Kosovo and Metohija. Today, Serbia, without Kosovo and Metohija, which is under NATO occupation, has over 30.000 policemen. And I think this piece of information is very important. Today Serbian has more policemen. I'm ⁴²⁹⁵⁷ speaking of authorised officials. I'm not referring to secretaries, clerks and so on. I'm speaking of officers who have the power to arrest people. And during the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija, just before the bombing, there were only 25.000. You can check these figures.

Q. Out of these 25.000 there were only 10.000 in Kosovo and Metohija.

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Nice here said that Serbia was a police state.

A. These are fabrications. These are frivolous statements. You cannot have a police state with such a small number of policemen in relation to the numbers of the population.

On the other hand, you cannot speak of a police state if the police do not persecute political opponents. I was such a victim of the police and I can testify to that. You need to have arguments to support the claim that Serbia was a police state. Serbia was not a police state. Serbia did have some deficiencies in the development of a democratic political system as it was still then in a state of transition, but no one can seriously contend that it was a police state.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... ratio of policemen to the population.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Kosovo and Metohija? You mean all Serbia or Kosovo and Metohija? Ten million, 25.000, it's easy to establish.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's deal with Kosovo first.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In relation to the population, do you mean the numbers or their attitude in the way they behaved? You mean ^{42958 BLANK PAGE 42959} numbers. In Kosovo and Metohija, there were perhaps 1.5 million inhabitants. As the Albanians boycotted the census we cannot be absolutely sure, but in our estimation there were between 800.000 or a million Albanians. There were over 200.000 Roma, about 150.000 Muslims, between 200 and 300.000 Serbs, and then there were others, Goranis and others.

In any case, this is a rough breakdown and this cannot be established precisely. And for all these numbers there were only 10.000 policemen under conditions where there were terrorist activities going on. You have to bear in mind that any country undergoing a threat of terrorism has to increase the number of its policemen, but there were only 10.000 policemen in total in Kosovo and Metohija, and this was agreed between Milosevic and Holbrooke.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Your colleague, the Deputy Prime Minister Milovan Bojic, said on the next page that it is no accident that what happened in Kosovo and Metohija happened when the -- pointed out that under such pressures the government of national unity was even more resolute. What is the connection between the fact that we were already exposed and had been exposed to pressures, sanctions, that we were exhausted.

A. The aggression of Yugoslavia happened -- against Yugoslavia happened in stages. First of all, foreign powers helped the Slovenian ⁴²⁹⁶⁰ separatists. After a clumsy intervention by the JNA, and it was not the Serbs who were behind this but the Croats, Ante Markovic, Stjepan Mesic, Veljko Kadijevic and others, after this unhappy intervention by the JNA where there were casualties among the young soldiers, we had several secessionist wars. The Western forces aided Croatia until they led to the exodus of almost the entire Serb populations from there. Then they helped Bosnia and Herzegovina up to the Dayton agreement. When this stage was completed, it was Kosovo and Metohija's turn, and the Contact Group had already hinted that they would open up the issues of Sandzak and Vojvodina.

The aggression against the former Yugoslavia took place step-by-step. When one item on the agenda was achieved, the anti-Serbian agenda, then they proceeded on to the next until they brought -- they cornered Serbia, because in Rambouillet we realised that we had been cornered.

Q. In the middle paragraph on this page they mention Ibro Vait and Maliq Maliqi, a Goranac and an Albanian, who sent a request to the state organs to deal with the terrorists urgently and fully irrespective of any pressures from the West so that the war they announced in the spring would not come about.

When you were there what were people saying about war in the spring?

A. The Albanians didn't want a war either but war was expected. The Western powers had let the Albanian terrorists know that war was forthcoming. They were preparing them for that war. The Albanian ⁴²⁹⁶¹ terrorists were to act as the NATO infantry because the Western powers were not prepared to send their ground forces into the war because they knew the kind of soldiers that the Serbs were and that many of them would be killed, so they wanted others to be bleed for their interests and they achieved this by organising and arming the Albanian terrorist formations. But the population was afraid of the war. The Albanians in general did not want war. Who wants war? Who wants bombing? Who wants destruction, famine, killing? No one normal can desire that and neither about the Albanians, but the war was imposed on them so they could be instruments in the hands of the NATO alliance against Serbia.

Q. Please look at the other section, destiny and the ancestors. It says there that the vice premier of Serbia visited Pec.

A. Yes.

Q. All of this was on the 15th and the 16th?

A. And the 17th.

Q. On the 17th. And then they quote your colleague Ratko Markovic who as you know testified here, and he says that the government was in favour of a political dialogue, a peaceful and just solution to the problems in Kosovo and Metohija and the humane co-existence of the inhabitants of the province.

Can you tell us whether you were together all the time with the other vice premiers? Ratko Markovic led the delegation of the Republic of Serbia at these negotiations, at these 20 attempted negotiations in Pristina.

A. Yes. And Tomislav Nikolic, the deputy president of the Serbian ⁴²⁹⁶² Radical Party, was there too. He was presents during every one of these attempts to negotiate. So he told me about everything that happened after all, we in the government of Serbia gave instructions to this negotiation delegation of ours.

Q. Let us see what the journalists quote from that day. Destiny and ancestors. The second paragraph: "Kosovo and Metohija is an ethnically heterogeneous area and must remain so. Anyone who tries to ethnically cleanse this area will not succeed in doing so, said Markovic, adding that history had made this area ethnically diversified and that this ethnic structure could not be changed."

A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, look at what is going on now with the remains of the former Yugoslavia. From all the former Yugoslav federal republics, it is only Serbia that has remained a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious society. Bosnia-Herzegovina was split up because of the civil war and Croatia practically expelled all the Serbs from the territory of the Serb Krajina, so they all had to move out. They all had to flee for their lives. It is only Serbia that remained multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and a multi-religious society in the true sense of the word. I just wish to inform the Trial Chamber of the following because the Zemun -- Zemun newspapers appear on one page and then a Greater Serbia on the other page and then they alternate. This was a special edition of these two newspapers that was a joint edition so that you do not think that these are separate newspapers. Since the same people sat on both newspaper desks this is one of their joint editions. It is a single newspaper -- a joint edition of two different newspapers. That's what I'm ⁴²⁹⁶³ trying to say.

Q. This is a useful explanation --

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Seselj, before I lose track of this completely, remind me of the objective or the purpose that you say that NATO had in seeking a foothold or a control of an area in Serbia.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] NATO has geostrategic interests in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. There are several reasons for that. First of all, you know, Mr. Bonomy, that NATO has strategic interests in fully diluting Russia and therefore they need a foothold in the Balkans, in the Ukraine, and in central Asia. Their ultimate objective is to break up all of Russia. It wasn't enough for them to break up the Soviet Union. They do not want to have a single factor in the background that is not reliable in their intentions of this nature.

So why were we Serbs always subject to NATO attacks and why did NATO always support our enemies in all the civil wars that were waged? They see us as potential Russian allies in all wars in the Balkans and they want to destroy us as the only nation, the only army, the only force that would not subject itself to a dictate. They want to have bases in the Balkans and they want to have oil coming in, but they want to go around Bosnia. Because they need oil for their tankers and they want to have a completely clear situation.

On the other hand, soon they will have to withdraw all of their soldiers from Germany. Where will they send them unless it's the Balkans? And what will their pretext be to bring their soldiers to the Balkans? This is a neuralgic area of Europe. So many troops have to be ⁴²⁹⁶⁴ there. All of this is old hat. Perhaps there is no point in discussing it any further.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, so there are six different reasons, I think, in there for -- according to you for this happening. The very first one seemed to be a strategic objective of having a place in Serbia. Can you tell me what use NATO has been making of the fact that according to you they now have control over a part of Serbia?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, no, Mr. Bonomy. NATO now has control over all of Serbia. First they took Kosovo and Metohija in order to weaken the authorities --

JUDGE BONOMY: Please concentrate on the question. Tell me what use, according to you, they are making the fact that they have control of Serbia.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Firstly on the basis of their control over Serbia they have one problem less in their further march to the east and that is the main form in which they use this. So this is from a strategic point of view.

Secondly, they have an economic interest. There are vast natural resources in Kosovo and Metohija. Zinc, coal, nickel, millions of tonnes of resources as far as I can remember. Lead as well. Although they are not authorised to do so by Resolution 1244, they have started selling Serbian state property in Kosovo and Metohija.

But what is the core of the matter? I've already told you. They helped the Croats against the Serbs, the Muslims against the Serbs, the Albanians against the Serbs so that the Serbs would be as weak as possible ⁴²⁹⁶⁵ as the only state-building factor in the Balkans. They invent new nations. The Muslims are a new nation, an invented nation. They are the descendants of Serbs who under Turkish occupation took Islam. They speak Serbian. And even this Tribunal of yours is inventing new words and new languages. They call it Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, and it's only the Serbian language according to linguists.

And under the influence of the Vatican they helped the Croats. The Croats were destroyed during the Turkish conquest, and they were a small people at the part. What you call Croats nowadays are basically Catholic Serbs. They speak Serbian as well. That is the core of the matter.

There is another thing. With the assistance of the Turkish conquerors, Albanians were moved to Kosovo and Metohija. They served the occupiers, and then they served the Austrians and the Germans in the First World War, and then they served Hitler in the Second World War. Hitler formed an entire SS division out of Albanians. It was called Skendgerbeg. Now they serve NATO against the Serb people. In Bosnia Hitler formed another SS division that was called the Handzar Division and that consisted of Muslims. Croats under the Ustasha regime waged war at Stalingrad. There were 10.000 of them there. We are reliving our tragic history yet again today. That is the basis for all the questions that are being discussed.

JUDGE BONOMY: I'm simply -- I'm trying to understand the great strategic, economic significance of Serbia, and I'm grateful to you for your answer. Thank you. ⁴²⁹⁶⁶

MR. NICE: Your Honour, before we move on, I've got a matter that I'd be grateful for two minutes to raise with you at the end of the session.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to stop now because there is a hearing here at 2.15, and we can't encroach on the time. So I'll just hear Mr. Nice and then we will adjourn.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. NICE: Private session and after the witness is withdrawn I would be grateful. It has nothing to do with his evidence at all.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. You are excused, Mr. Seselj. You will return next Tuesday, 9.00 a.m..

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Tell me, please, when I'm supposed to come next time. When I come to this courtroom next time?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Next Tuesday, 9.00 a.m.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm asking you that because yesterday I waited all day in vain. So I want to know for sure when I'm supposed to come next time. Thank you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You will not wait in vain again, Mr. Seselj.

[The witness stands down]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: If we can go into private session very briefly.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, private session, please.

[Private session]

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--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 23rd day

of August, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.