⁴³⁰⁸⁵

Wednesday, 24 August 2005

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please continue with your examination-in-chief.

WITNESS: VOJISLAV SESELJ [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Seselj. Yesterday, we started a question concerning the testimony of Shukri Buja, who mentioned the Black Hand and other politicians in Serbia. So I will read out to you what he says. I have before me page 6421 of the transcript from his testimony, where he was asked about the arrest of some citizens in Racak. He said: "We did not arrest any civilians. We detained for a very brief period. We took the risk of intervention of Serbian paramilitaries of the kind of the Black Hand [In English] in the midst of the civilians in order to cause incident that could have huge repercussions and result in another massacre." [Interpretation] I won't go on.

Reading the question: "All right. These stories about the Black Hand and paramilitary formations are stories we've already heard. They are quite -- [In English] equally inaccurate and -- they are quite picturesque and equally inaccurate and untrue. But since you've mentioned it, you claim that all politicians, and you are referring to Serb ⁴³⁰⁸⁶ politicians, had military units in Kosovo.

"You say --" that is quotation from page 9 of his witness statement: "Kostunica posed for a photograph when he toured the Serb troops in Kosovo during the conflict. He wore a bandolier on his chest, wearing an ammunition belt across his chest, holding an automatic weapon. I saw Seselj on television in a military uniform several times visiting his own units."

[Interpretation] Then I asked him "[In English] Are you referring to Kosovo yet again?

"Yes. Kostunica did pose, and that appeared in the dailies bearing those images. If you want ... we can procure a copy." Et cetera. [Interpretation] Please tell me, he goes on page 6442, again I asked him: [In English] Towards the end of the paragraph, it says: 'All the politicians have military units. They all attacked Kosovo in some way.' That's what it says."

[Interpretation] Tell us, what politicians -- he mentions you, Kostunica. So what politicians had their own paramilitary formations in Kosovo?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you answer, Mr. Seselj, Mr. Milosevic, in future when you have a passage like that which you intend to read, you should summarise it. The essence of the question you are putting to Mr. Seselj is that there has been evidence in this case from Prosecution witnesses that politicians had their own paramilitaries in Kosovo, and you ask him to comment on it, and you make a specific reference to the witness saying that he saw Seselj on television on a number of times visiting his ⁴³⁰⁸⁷ own units, and that could be said in a minute. You don't have to read out all of it. I know it's a practice which has evolved throughout this case and it's employed by the Prosecution as well, but I think we waste too much time. Just put the essence of the question to Mr. Seselj. Mr. Seselj, provide us with the answer now.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In Kosovo and Metohija, there were no Serb paramilitary formations. They simply did not exist, either in Kosovo or anywhere in Serbia throughout the duration of the Kosovo crisis culminating in war. The Black Hand was a secret organisation of officers dating from before World War I. Never, even when it existed, was it a paramilitary organisation. It was a group of officers conspiring against a dynasty and a king. They were preparing to assassinate the king and queen and bring a new dynasty to the throne. That was the exclusive role of the Black Hand.

In the Austrian media, there were suspicions that the Black Hand was also involved in the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo. The Black Hand came to an end during World War I. After that, it never existed any more.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Seselj. I think you have provided the answer by saying that there were no Serb paramilitary formations there.

Mr. Milosevic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But I only answered part of the question. I also have to answer the part that refers to Kostunica. He is currently the Prime Minister of Serbia. It's a very important question. ⁴³⁰⁸⁸ I insist on answering unless you prevent me.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's have a brief response to that.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Kostunica, like some other presidents of opposition political parties, visiting the imperiled Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. At a military checkpoint he borrowed a machine-gun from a policeman and had his picture taken with it. All of Serbia laughs when somebody says Kostunica had a paramilitary unit. That is not in his nature. It's not like him. It's quite impossible. Neither he nor the Serb Radical Party or anyone else had paramilitary units, nor did they review any paramilitary units. These are fabrications, fantastic fabrications, incredible fabrications.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Seselj, what was the date of the incident involving Kostunica?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It wasn't an incident. Why would it be an incident? It was just an event.

JUDGE BONOMY: When was it? Let's not waste time --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I can recall, this happened in the summer of 1998. As far as I can recall. But who am I to recall Kostunica's CV? This was published in the papers and it was around that time.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, so it's quite clear: Kostunica had no paramilitary formations. Is this clearly what you know about it?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. Very well. Witness K6 said there was a group active in Kosovo ⁴³⁰⁸⁹ called Arkan's Tigers, and he went on to say - that's on page 6597, and I won't read, Mr. Robinson - he said that Seselj's men were there as well as the Black Hand. He said Arkan's Tigers, Seselj's men, and the Black Hand. Is this correct?

A. I won't repeat what I have already said about any men of mine or any paramilitary units of the Serb Radical Party, which is untrue. But I also have to deny what he said about Arkan. I never spoke well of Arkan in public. We were always in conflict. But I have to tell the truth: After the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Dayton Accord, Arkan disbanded his Serb Volunteer Guard, and it never reappeared anywhere in any incident or event. It simply did not exist any longer. He continued dealing in criminal activities after the war, but the Serb Volunteer Guard no longer existed.

Arkan formed a political party. I tried to defeat it in the election campaign, and I was quite successful in that. I defeated him in a televised debate, and his party failed completely in the elections. He thought that he could take advantage of any renown he had won in the war on the political scene, but I did my best to destroy that. This lawyer, Toma Fila, was also a member of his party --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. That went a little beyond --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- who is here in two cases.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That went a little beyond what was required for the answer.

Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴³⁰⁹⁰

Q. Let's go on to the events in Krajina. How many times were you in the Krajina during 1990 and 1991 before the outbreak of any hostilities?

A. More than once. I can't give you the exact number. I remember many of my visits to the Krajina. For example, I attended the meeting in Petrova Gora, the rally that is, and the rally in Srb. Then I was in Knin when the Autonomous Province of Krajina was promulgated. Then I led that great march of Serbs to Plitvice. I cannot tell you the precise number of times I visited, but I can recall my visits. I visited Eastern Slavonia, the eastern part of Krajina, even more often. The first time was on the 9th of March, 1991. I didn't go there in 1990. In 1990, I went to the western part of Krajina. But after the 9th of March, 1991, I made several visits to Baranja, Eastern Slavonia, and Western Srem.

Q. And when was this big popular rally in Kordun that you just mentioned in Petrova Gora?

A. Well, it was officially termed rally of Serbs and Croats, and it took place on the 4th of March, 1990, and the immediate occasion for it was the fact that Franjo Tudjman, the president of the Croatian Democratic Union, I think on the 24th of February, stated that the Independent State of Croatia had been an expression of the historical tendencies of the Croatian people. And I have to say that during World War II this was a quisling formation belonging to Hitler, and the Ustasha perpetrated crimes against the Serbs, Gypsies, and Jews, surpassing in number the crimes perpetrated by Hitler. In response to this statement made by Tudjman, a steering committee - it was not a political party, and it consisted of both Serbs and Croats - organised a rally in Petrova Gora, and they called ⁴³⁰⁹¹ it a rally of Serbs and Croats, and the main speaker was retired General Dusan Pekic.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Seselj.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So you were one of several tens of thousands of participants. What organisation were you representing there?

A. At that time, I was the president of the Serb Freedom Movement, which was the first name given to our party. I was there from the people in the top leadership of Vojin Vuletic, the then vice-president Djordje Nikolic, and Mrs. Radmila Nikolic, his wife, who drove us there.

Q. You have just explained the reason why this large rally on -- in Petrova Gora on the 4th of March, 1990, was organised. Can you tell us very briefly how the Serbs in Krajina, and not just in Krajina but all over Croatia, experienced that HDZ rally in the Lisinski Hall in Zagreb, the concert hall, and the words that you have just quoted spoken by the then President Franjo Tudjman of the party?

A. Well, the Serbs had very painful memories. They had suffered a genocide in the Independent State of Croatia, in Jasenovac alone, according to official data, about 700.000 Serbs were killed, 60.000 Gypsies, and 35.000 Roma, Jews --

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 60.000 Jews and 35.000 Roma.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They encompassed Srem and part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were mass graves, mass executions in various sites. The Serb people suffered grievously throughout World War II, and ⁴³⁰⁹² Tudjman reminded the Serb people of that suffering. The Serbs were frightened throughout the Croatian federal unit. They were afraid that their terrible fate from 1941 to 1945 would be repeated.

Q. And when was the rally in Lika held which you also attended?

A. In late July. I think it was the 25th or the 27th of July, 1990. C The immediate cause for the calling of that rally was the opening of a public debate on the amendments to the constitution of Croatia. Tudjman by then had already come to power because his party had won in the parliamentary elections in late April and early May. There were two rounds and they won 41 per cent of the votes, but according to the majority election system, they had two-thirds of the seats in the Croatian parliament. They immediately proceeded to amend the Croatian constitution, and they deleted from the text of the constitution the definition that the Serbs were also a constituent nation in Croatia. According to the then Yugoslav legal constitutional theory, the status of a constituent nation meant that in one could alter --

JUDGE ROBINSON: The question really was when was the rally that you also attended. You tend to be a little prolix. You answered it. Just concentrate on answering the specific question. Don't elaborate unless Mr. Milosevic or the Chamber asks you to. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Just now you said that the immediate occasion was the beginning of the procedure of adopting amendments to the constitution of Croatia, and you indicated the most important element, that is to say the deletion of the Serbs as a ⁴³⁰⁹³ constituent people from the constitution of Croatia. In all the post-war constitutions, was the Serb people defined as a constituent people or, rather, Croatia as the state of the Croatian people, the Serb people, and the other peoples living in it?

A. That was the precondition for the existence of the Croatian federal unit within the then Yugoslavia. It was only in that variant that the Croatian federal unit could exist and include all those territories; that is to say that it included equal constituent peoples - Croats, Serbs, and other nationalities, as they were called at the time.

Q. Tell us, at that time was there similar anxiety with regard to the symbols that the new Croatian -- the new Croatian authorities adopted on the 25th of July, 1990?

A. The president of the HDZ, Franjo Tudjman, even while fighting for power, was intensively renewing Ustasha symbols, and when the Croatian state was proclaimed, the Ustasha chessboard was proclaimed the coat of arms of the Republic of Croatia and the flag of the Republic of Croatia. Then also Franjo Tudjman started returning the most extreme right wing members of the Croatian immigration. They started becoming ministers. This was a signal to the Serbs what was in the offing. There was nothing good they could expect with the Ustashas coming back to power.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please be asked to slow down. The pace is very fast.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Seselj, just look at the transcript. You will see the interpreter asking you to slow down, both of you. ^{43094 BLANK PAGE 43095}

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I do not have any transcript. I'm not following the transcript because I don't know the English language. Actually, I do know the English language as much as I need it, but I don't know as much as you'd like me to know.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Never mind. I brought it to your attention. The interpreters are asking you to slow down.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I shall bear that in mind, and I assume that Mr. Seselj will too, that the pace of speech should be slower because of the interpreters.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm going to read some paragraphs out to you, 94 and 95, that is, of this so-called Croatian indictment.

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... policy of not allowing the phrase "so-called indictment." I know it's a small point but it's a matter of respect for the Court. It's an indictment and it's nothing else.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. An inappropriate comment.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, as for the nonsense that --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't wish to debate it. Just move on with the -- with your questions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm reading paragraph 94 to you: "In April and May 1990, the Republic of Croatia held elections in which the Croatian Democratic Union won a plurality of votes and secured a majority of seats in the Croatian ⁴³⁰⁹⁶ Sabor (parliament). The new Sabor then elected the HDZ candidate Franjo Tudjman president of Croatia."

So the elections were held and the Croatian Democratic Union won a plurality of votes and secured a majority of seats in the Croatian parliament. And immediately after that, in paragraph 95, it says: "In advance of the 1990 elections, the nationalistic Serbian Democratic Party was founded in Knin, SDS, advocating the autonomy and later secession of predominantly Serb areas from Croatia."

Mr. Seselj, what is your knowledge, aware of the situation in the Krajina? Can you confirm this distinction that is made between the HDZ and the SDS? It says: "In advance of the 1990 elections, the nationalistic Serbian Democratic Party was founded in Knin..." What about the HDZ? Was it founded before the elections? Which party was founded first, the HDZ or the SDS?

A. In Croatia already in 1989, opposition political parties were established at the time when official laws had not allowed that yet. They were all Croatian parties. Ujdi Branko Horvat, the Croatian Democratic Union of Franjo Tudjman, the Liberal Party -- I don't know its exact name but there was a liberal qualification in its name. It belonged to Slavko Goldstein, and so on. Serbs did not establish their own political parties at all until the 14th of February, if I remember correctly, which is when the Croatian parliament voted on a law on a multi-party system, that is to say the free establishment of political parties. Three days after that -- I may be making an error in terms of the date but I don't really think that matters, it's the essence that matters. So only when this ⁴³⁰⁹⁷ possibility was provided by law, the Serbian Democratic Party was established. All parties that were established before that in Croatia were more or less nationalistic except for some small, very insignificant ones that failed soon. It was the Croatian Democratic Union that was the leading party.

When I say "nationalistic," I don't believe that there is a negative connotation involved per se. Nationalism is not a negative phenomenon. Chauvinism is a negative phenomenon; hatred for other people and other nations. This party proved to be a chauvinist party. The SDS was established as a reaction to the Croatian Democratic Union, and it only tried to protect Serb national interests. The first president of the Serb Democratic Party was Dr. Jovan Raskovic. He very clearly presented the programme orientation of the SDS in three words, practically. If Yugoslavia continues to exist as a federal state, the Serb Democratic Party is in favour of the life of Serbs in Croatia as was the case before. They do not ask for any kind of autonomy within Croatia. However, if Yugoslavia turns into a confederation, the SDS calls for territorial Serb autonomy within Croatia in the territory where there is a majority Serb population. However, if Croatia secedes from Yugoslavia, then --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I'm stopping you now because you answered the question as to when the party was founded.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Yes. But before that, I put another question quoting these two paragraphs. ⁴³⁰⁹⁸

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I asked what Mr. Seselj's knowledge was in relation to these qualifications regarding these two parties and what it was that they were advocating, these two political parties.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Obviously this formulation --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... Mr. Seselj. Then, Mr. Milosevic, it was your fault. Don't put three questions to him. Put one at a time. The three questions will inevitably induce an overly long answer.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Was a single one of the objectives put forth by Dr. Jovan Raskovic, the president and founder of the SDS and that he presented when the party was established, could any one of them be called chauvinistic, anti-Croat, or in any way hostile towards Croats in Croatia?

A. Absolutely not. First of all, the wife of Dr. Jovan Raskovic was a Croat. His daughter was married to a Croat. Secondly, Dr. Jovan Raskovic at all rallies that he spoke at - I was present at some and I followed others through the media - insisted that the Serb Democratic Party and the Serb people are not against the Croats, not against the Croatian people, not against Croatia, that Serbs were only against Ustashas. And he kept repeating that time and again practically everywhere where he spoke, and I assume that the public still remembers that. Only against Ustashas. Ustashas are Croatian fascists.

Q. He said that he was against Ustashas, not against Croats and not against Croatia and the Croat people is something that he repeated so many ⁴³⁰⁹⁹ times and something that people could hear so many times on television that it truly cannot be denied by anyone.

It is obvious here -- and you explained just now how the HDZ was established, how the Serb Democratic Party was established. Do you remember who the majority of the Serbs voted for in these first multi-party elections in April, May 1990?

A. In their naivete, most Serbs believed that Tudjman would not win the elections, that the policy of brotherhood and unity of the Serbs and Croats would win, a policy that had been promoted for half a century officially and that had been considerably espoused by the people themselves. Most Serbs opted for the former League of Communists or, rather, the Party for Democratic Change of Ivica Racan. A significant number of Serbs also voted for the Socialist Party of Croatia that was founded by Boro Mikulic.

After these elections, the Serb Democratic Party won only five seats in the Croatian Sabor. Perhaps there were another 15 or so Serbs in other political parties, but there were some in Racan's party and perhaps in others too.

So the Serbs did not believe that Tudjman would win. They thought that a democratic option would win, a nationally tolerant option. That's what mattered the most for them. Therefore, they opted for various political parties that they expected to promote political tolerance in the political life of Croatia after the elections. When Tudjman won the election and after the Ustasha order was re-established in Croatia, then the Serbs started rallying around the SDS. ⁴³¹⁰⁰

Q. As for the vote of most Serbs in these first elections in Croatia, that is to say the SKHSDP, the membership and the leadership, were they made up in such a way that they were undoubtedly ethnic Croats?

A. Yes. A vast majority were ethnic Croats but there were Serbs too. The vice-president of the Sabor was from that party, a Serb. I cannot remember his exact name, but this is reliable information. He resigned after the Sabor became so anti-Serb. But if I remember correctly, after the first elections, a Serb was the vice-president of the Sabor, and he resigned soon after that.

Q. Can it be said that actually at these first multi-party elections in Croatia most Serbs did not vote on ethnic grounds at all?

A. No.

Q. But basically on the basis of the political options of the parties they voted for.

A. That is true. Most Serbs then did not vote for that party which is called a nationalistic party here. However, the HDZ is not a called nationalistic party, which shows the partiality of whoever wrote this.

Q. That is also a fact that need not be proven further.

MR. NICE: There's a lot of commentary and effective leading in these questions. It's now for the Court where it wants to discipline the accused, but if you look at the last three questions, re: "Can it be said that..." That's leading in tendency or nature. "Basically on the basis of the political options of the parties they voted for," and so on. We're not getting responsive questions and answer, but of course, it's very difficult at this volume actually to work out what's being said in time to ⁴³¹⁰¹ raise the objections.

JUDGE ROBINSON: These are points at issue, points in dispute, Mr. Nice?

MR. NICE: I can't say whether they're in dispute or not at the moment. I'm not going to deal with --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. NICE: I can't say whether they're in dispute or not and I doubt if I'm going to deal with them in detail.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Because generally I tend to overlook leading questions where they are not matters of controversy for the Prosecution.

MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases.

JUDGE ROBINSON: But, Mr. Milosevic, we have been through this several times. When you begin a question, "Isn't it true that...", "Isn't it clear that ..." it will almost inevitably be a leading question, which is not permissible.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, a very neutral question: This kind of vote by most Serbs from the Socialist Republic of Croatia, what did it say about their attitude towards the Croats, Croatia, and the SFRY?

A. This shows that Serbs were loyal citizens of Croatia as a federal unit in Yugoslavia. It shows that the Serbs wanted a civic state after the communist regime was toppled in the first multi-party elections and that they expected this state of citizens. The outcome of the vote can show how truly disappointed the Serbs were once this democracy and ⁴³¹⁰² multi-party system was renewed.

Q. Tell me, how many times were you in Knin and when in 1990?

A. As far as I can remember, I was there twice. Once the end of August, beginning of September, 1990, and the second time sometime in December 1990. I cannot give you the exact dates, but I believe that I was in Knin at least twice.

Q. Tell me who it was that you saw and that you spoke to there on those two occasions in 1990 when you were there.

A. Well, I met a large number of Serb political activists. First of all, I had meetings with Milan Babic, first the president of the municipality of Knin, and then president of the Autonomous Region of Krajina. Then Milan Martic, who was first chief of police in Knin and, after that, was minister of the interior of the Autonomous Region of Krajina.

Q. And what was the content of these talks that you had with them?

A. Well, we talked about general matters related to the destiny of the Serb people. They told me about details, harassment, torture of Serbs, arrests, bring into custody several times. The Croat police broke into police stations in Serb areas, stole weapons, et cetera. Serbs felt jeopardised. They organised night patrols, night guards. They put up barricades or, rather, log barriers, as they were called, in order to prevent 1941 from happening all over again when the Ustashas broke in and killed everyone and everything that was Serb.

Milan Babic, at the end of August or beginning of September, asked me if it was possible for the SDS to rally together volunteers, because ⁴³¹⁰³ people were exhausted after being on duty on the barricades day and night. I promised that and I did that in Belgrade. I did that in the central street of Belgrade, Knez Mihaila Street, and your police apprehended me and I was sentenced to 15 days in prison.

Q. Tell me, do you have any knowledge about the proclamation of the SAO Krajina from the point of view of paragraph 97 that I'm going to read out to you now, where it says: "On the 21st of December, 1990, Croatian Serbs in Knin announced the creation of a 'Serbian Autonomous District' and declared their independence from Croatia."

A. As far as I remember, independence of the Serb Autonomous District was not proclaimed then because the very name Serb Autonomous District means that it is a district within Croatia. Later, when the Republic of Serbian Krajina was proclaimed, that meant definitive separation from the Croatian federal unit, but indeed in December 1990, that was proclaimed, the district was proclaimed, and the first president was Milan Babic.

Q. This new Croatian constitution that was called the Christmas constitution because it was adopted on the 22nd of December, what was new in that constitution in terms of defining Serbs as a constituent people or, rather, denying them that definition? What was their new status? Can you give us an explanation?

A. The proclamation of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina was the answer of the Serb people in Croatia to the proclamation of the new constitution which was already definitely decided. Nothing could be changed to the text any more. So this constitution denied the Serb people its rights as the constituent people, and the answer of the Serbs was to ^{43104 BLANK PAGE 43105} proclaim the autonomous district. In other words, they proclaimed their territorial autonomy as a response to the negation of their constituent status.

According to the constitution, the Croatian parliament did not have the right to abolish the Serb status as a constituent right, as a constituent people, just by outvoting. They did not have that right.

Q. Just another fact: This paragraph 97 says that Croatian Serbs announced the creation of a Serbian Autonomous District and declared their independence then. Is it true that on the 22nd of December, 1991, Serbs declared independence from Croatia?

A. I cannot quote from that enactment that was proclaimed at the time, but since they proclaimed an autonomous district, it was not independence. It was about territorial autonomy. But Serbs in Croatia had always been a constituent people. So the Serbs made it clear they would not stay as part of Croatia unless their status as constituent people was restored.

Q. But is it clear that when they declared autonomy they did not proclaim independence?

A. I believe that is clear.

Q. When you went to Krajina, did you have opportunity to see those logs, those roadblocks on access roads to Serb settlements?

A. Yes. I saw the logs, I saw the roadblocks, I saw the people who manned those roadblocks; some of them were armed, others were not. The weapons they had were mostly obsolete, old, from the depots of the Territorial Defence, such as M-48 rifle that had been withdrawn from the ⁴³¹⁰⁶ army supplies a long time ago, the Thompson rifle that had been withdrawn as obsolete a long time ago again. But everywhere I went I found that Serbs were very anxious and very afraid of what was coming. All the Serbs in the territory of Krajina were very frightened by the intentions of the new Croatian regime led by Franjo Tudjman.

Q. While you toured the area, while you met with people, what did they say to you as to the reason why they put up those roadblocks?

A. Well, already many incidents had happened. Many Serbs were harassed, maltreated, arrested, tortured. There were graffiti written everywhere. For instance, on one Serb Orthodox Church the letter U, for Ustasha, was written. Serbs were told on many occasions that they would have to leave. If they don't leave on their own, their bodies with their throats slit will slow flow along the river all the way to Belgrade. And their life had become insufferable already in many ways.

Q. What you said, that their bodies would flow down the river to Belgrade, was that their imagination or was that a memory of something real?

A. It was a memory of World War II when Ustashas killed a lot of Serbs and threw their bodies into the Sava river, even pinning notes to the bodies saying that that was meat designated for the Bajloni green market in Belgrade.

Q. This great number of roadblocks that you saw with your own eyes, or roadblocks made of logs around houses and around population centres, could that have been considered an offensive instrument or a defensive instrument? ⁴³¹⁰⁷

A. Well, a roadblock is obviously a means of defence. People who put up roadblocks are obviously expecting an attack and preparing for that attack. It's certainly not an offensive instrument.

Q. Why did you come to Krajina in early May 1991?

A. It was actually in April 1991. I came at the invitation of Milan Babic who had organised a large march of the Serbs from Korenica to Plitvice.

Q. What was the reason, what was the purpose of that march?

A. Plitvice is a majority Serb place and the police had control of the police station there. A month prior to that Serb -- sorry, Croatian special police attacked that police station. An incident was created involving bloodshed. The Yugoslav People's Army came to deal with this incident and calm things down, but the Serbs realised that the army was siding with the Croats. Instead of restoring things to their previous condition, they justified the Croats, in a way, and what they had done. So this march was a protest against the latest Croat moves but also a protest against the Yugoslav People's Army that was helping the Tudjman regime against Serb interests.

Q. Was it a peaceful march?

A. Yes, it was a march of unarmed people, a peaceful one, including dozens of thousands of people.

Q. Who was there?

A. I was there, Ljubica Solaja, who was then heading the Serbian Democratic Party, Milan Babic. And we came across seven military roadblocks. The army stopped us seven times with their combat vehicles, ⁴³¹⁰⁸ with heavy machine-guns. You could see the bandoliers full of real ammunition, live ammunition.

Milan Babic was at the head of the convoy. He balked in fear, so I took over from him, leading the march, and we found a way to go around those roadblocks. Sometimes we just went through, and sometimes we went around. Eventually, we arrived at Plitvice and surrounded the headquarters of General Raseta who was there. Then an officer appeared, asking for negotiations. On behalf of the demonstrators, I came to see General Raseta, asking him to let us go through Plitvice peacefully whereas I on my part guaranteed that there would be no incident, no problem, and that's what indeed happened. The demonstrators went through Plitvice. They were singing songs, they were shouting slogans, but there were no incidents.

Something happened only when Milan -- and in fact Milan Babic and Milica Solaja [as interpreted] caught up with us later.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The question was who was there. I think you have answered that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You just mentioned that Ljubica Solaja was heading the Serbian Democratic Party.

A. Yes. Prior to that there was a conflict between Milan Babic and Jovan Raskovic. There was a rift in the Serbian Democratic Party. I don't know the exact date, however, when the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina was proclaimed, the Serb Democratic Party was set up for that district, and it was headed by Ljubica Solaja. ⁴³¹⁰⁹

Q. Does that mean that Babic practically replaced Raskovic?

A. Yes. There was some sort of clash between them before that, but Babic practically replaced Raskovic. I believe Raskovic stayed on for a while, heading a separate wing that was not widely recognised, but it soon came to nothing anyway.

Q. Do you know anything about the relationship? Why was such an attitude taken towards Raskovic, because he was, after all, the founder of the Serbian Democratic Party?

A. He was considered to be too soft. Babic was a more hard line, you could even say dogmatic personality, whereas Raskovic, who by occupation was a psychiatrist, often came across as a therapist even among his own people. When I went there, I always tried to calm things down rather than spur them on in this conflict.

Q. How long after the proclamation of the constitution of Croatia, the new constitution, did Serb refugees start coming into Serbia?

A. In May, June 1990, as soon as the Tudjman regime came into power. And the refugees were even evermore numerous because the new Croatian authorities demanded that Serbs sign oaths of loyalty. And they introduced an institution that did not exist before, called Domovnica, which was a new document that certified one's civic rights; right to employment, right to retirement pension, some sort of certificate. And many Serb citizens were denied this paper although they wanted to have it. Many did not even apply for it because they considered the new authorities to be Ustashas. Many Serbs who worked in public enterprises did not get these certificates. Many Serbs from crisis areas simply left, ⁴³¹¹⁰ ran away. They were hard up.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... question. You answered the question.

Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You were saying something about a small number of Serbs.

A. A smaller number of Serbs lived in the Autonomous District of Krajina, Western Slavonia, Baranja, and Eastern Srem. A larger number of Serbs lived in central Croatia, in towns like Zagreb, Rijeka, and others. Maybe there were 300.000 Serbs in Krajinas, but in central Croatia there were 400.000. Plus there were around 300.000 so-called Yugoslavs, people who declared themselves as Yugoslavs during the census. There were many among them who were children of mixed marriages but also people who thought of themselves as Yugoslavs for other reasons.

Q. What about those Serbs who lived in central Croatia, throughout Croatia, not in the Krajina areas? Even this Prosecution does not claim that there were any conflicts there.

A. Well, there were no conflicts, especially not armed clashes, but they found it hard to survive there and the greatest majority of them left and went abroad. Serbs felt safe only on the territory of those self-proclaimed autonomous districts.

Q. Did your party organise some assistance and aid to the refugees, and was there a major drive in Serbia to help the refugees in general?

A. Yes, there was. Sometimes -- sometime in 1991, we formed a central headquarters for these activities to help refugees move into ⁴³¹¹¹ vacant apartments, to find them accommodation throughout Serbia in places that were available - with the approval of the owners, of course - and then these headquarters also started to deal with the issue of volunteers.

Q. Was that the only purpose of that Crisis Staff?

A. The Crisis Staff did only humanitarian work. They found clothing and food for refugees, accommodation such as in hotels. We tried to ensure their trade union rights. You can say a lot of things about the former Yugoslavia but trade union rights were on a pretty high level. There were many hotels and similar facilities available to the working class to spend their holidays, and we tried to use those buildings to accommodate the refugees.

Q. Tell us a bit more about what you knew, what you know about the signing of oaths of loyalty to Croatia, a phenomenon of that time. I want to hear this because we often hear claims here that somebody forced these oaths of loyalty on people in Serbia.

A. This oath of loyalty is in fact a discriminatory act. It never existed in Serbia. It was something introduced by the new authorities in Croatia. Croats signed these oaths immediately, unquestioningly. Serbs reacted in various ways: Some signed, others refused because they did not want to be loyal to a regime. They did not question their own loyalty to Croatia as a -- as a state, but they did not want to sign an oath of loyalty to the new fascist regime led by Tudjman.

Q. Did you know -- in fact, you knew about all the new discriminatory measures that were introduced at the time in Croatia, measures of pressure on Serbs in Croatia. So tell us about it, especially since you had a ⁴³¹¹² Crisis Staff to cater to refugees. What did the refugees themselves tell you?

A. The testimony of refugees was horrifying. They told us their stories, how they were harassed, how they were maltreated. Many of them were physically abused, beaten. They did not dare say anywhere that they were Serbs. The atmosphere of fear in Croatia was astonishing. Nobody had expected that the pervasive fear from the times of the war, from the times of the Ustasha regime can ever reappear.

Q. Did Serb -- Serbs as a group, as associations, did they give any sort of reason for that kind of treatment?

A. No. They gave absolutely no cause for such behaviour. They had no organisations of their own, neither political parties nor even cultural associations. Their national cultural organisation was formed only in 1990. The Serbs before that had no national ethnic organisation. In Croatia, they accepted the constitutional order of Croatia, but I emphasise, only as a federal state within Yugoslavia. If Croatia remained a federal state within Yugoslavia, they would respect it. This balance served to protect their interests, and they were satisfied with that, so they all took part in the political and social life of Croatia.

Q. Just awhile ago, you mentioned the volunteers that Milan Babic asked you to provide. Did he explain to you why he was requesting volunteers, and did you send any?

A. He said that the people manning the barricades were already exhausted, that there was a large territory that had to be protected and that they could use the help of volunteers from Serbia. Also, that ⁴³¹¹³ volunteers from Serbia would raise the morale of these people who would realise that they had not been abandoned. However, as I was arrested on my return to Belgrade because I had organised the registration of volunteers to be sent to Knin, no volunteers were sent throughout 1990.

Q. Tell me, when was the first time the Serb Radical Party sent volunteers to Krajina?

A. Sometime in April there was a rally in Borovo Selo in Eastern Slavonia. I was invited there by Vukasin Soskocanin who was, I think, the president of the local commune, but in any case he was the commander of the Territorial Defence of Borovo Selo. He invited me to attend a rally, and then we visited the barricades together, those that had been set up on all the roads around the village, also protecting other Serbian villages which were sometimes exclusively Serbian in that area, which were also exposed to various forms of maltreatment and incidents by the police and the so-called National Guard established by Tudjman's regime. We toured some of these barricades, and he asked me that the Serb Radical Party help by sending some volunteers who would contribute to keeping the peace and maintaining security. He said that the work in the fields was under way, the farm work, because it was April.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. You have answered the question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did I understand you well? You went to Borovo Selo at the invitation of the commander of the Territorial Defence of Borovo Selo, Soskocanin?

A. Yes. ^{43114 BLANK PAGE 43115}

Q. And then you sent volunteers at his invitation?

A. Yes. We sent 15 or 16 volunteers. To tell you the truth, I can't remember whether it was 15 or 16. In addition to our volunteers, there was one from Mirko Jovic's Serb National Renewal Party, one single volunteer.

Q. In view of the fact that you were there and in view of what you know about this, can you explain how it came about that there was a conflict in Borovo Selo in early May 1991?

A. In late April, there were negotiations between the Serb and Croatian local authorities. It was agreed that the barricades should be removed from the roads, that an atmosphere of trust should be developed. The Croats guaranteed that there would be no attacks or police interventions on their side, no sending off members of the National Guard Corps, and so on. The unanimous decision was that a peaceful solution should be sought. The barricades were then removed.

Q. These negotiations, these talks, all this took place --

A. Late April.

Q. Yes, as you say, in late April, and this all took place at the local level, between the local commune of Borovo Selo -- or, rather, between whom?

A. The local Croatian authorities, whether in Osijek or Vukovar, I can't be precise. But the result of this agreement was the removal of all Serb barricades on the roads leading to Serbian villages. The volunteers withdrew, there were a total of 16, to the community centre in the centre of Borovo Selo. There were no longer any barricades. The atmosphere ⁴³¹¹⁶ became normal. It was quite relaxed. The volunteers were already considering going back to Belgrade, when all of a sudden on the 2nd of May Croatian policemen and members of the National Guard Corps arrived, as well as mercenaries. They burst into Borovo Selo. They arrived in a bus or two buses, and they immediately started shooting. In front of the community centre they killed Vojislav Milic. He was the only volunteer from the Serb National Renewal, although Mirko Jovic said that they had sent 700 volunteers in their Dusan Silni unit to fight in Borovo Selo, but these were all fabrications. There was only one and he was killed, although he was completely unarmed, as soon as the Croats arrived armed to the teeth.

The other Serb volunteers soon opened fire, and they managed to defeat the Croatian attackers. According to our information, there were more than 30 Croatian attackers who were killed, although the Croats admitted to only 15 victims. From this we draw the conclusion that the rest were -- who were not even registered or recorded. They were Kurds, and I know that they had false money, forged money, money dating from the Independent State of Croatia, Hitler's Reich marks, and so on and so forth.

After some fighting, the JNA intervened. They stopped the armed conflict. The Croatian attackers withdrew, they took their dead with them, and the situation then calmed down.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And the Serbs of course put up barricades again. ⁴³¹¹⁷

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. After this event, did you continue sending volunteers?

A. Not right away. A new consignment of volunteers was sent in the summer. This Serb victory in Borovo Selo resounded among the Serb people and volunteers of the Serb Radical Party, again the great renown. They were highly esteemed. Although not all had fought there. Some had just been in cafes in Borovo Selo and tried to find shelter. But because of those who fought, they became very highly esteemed. In the summer, when there was a conflict between the JNA and Tudjman's paramilitary formations who attacked JNA barracks, killed officers, seized weapons from military depots, and so on and so forth, several high-ranking JNA officers visited the headquarters of the Serb Radical Party, and they discussed with me the further gathering of volunteers and sending them to the JNA which was having great problems mobilising conscripts because the Western powers were waging a campaign against mobilisation under the pretext that this was a communist army. Unfortunately, the JNA, pursuant to orders from Veljko Kadijevic, still wore the five-pointed star on their uniforms and the Serb people found this -- they didn't like it. And then the Serbs of Croatia gathered in Zijeca Street [phoen]. There was some officers among them, and there were representatives of almost all of the opposition political parties. I was representing the Serb Radical Party. The Serb Renewal Movement was represented by Milan Komnenic, if I remember correctly; and then there was the Serb Democratic Party; then there was Gojko Djogo and there was Mirko ⁴³¹¹⁸ Jovic for the Serb Renewal Party. And all these parties agreed that the imperiled Serbs in the Croatian federal unit needed assistance and that --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Seselj. The answer is too long.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, very often there was mention here of the existence of your units. You are now saying something about sending volunteers. Up to now, you said that you sent volunteers to the Territorial Defence and to the JNA. Did you send volunteers anywhere else, and did you establish your own units?

A. No. I never formed any units of my own. At this meeting, an agreement was reached among all the opposition political parties and the JNA officers that volunteers should be organised and sent to the JNA. The JNA set aside a barracks in Bubanj Potok, close to Belgrade, as a collection centre for volunteers.

Q. What you have just explained, was it a result of the meeting of this group of JNA officers which attended this meeting and the representatives of the political parties who undertook to send volunteers?

A. Yes. That was the direct result of that meeting. The only difference is that the Serb Radical Party was the only one who consistently abided by the decisions reached at that meeting. The other parties did not.

Q. Would you explain now, because it's very important in view of the claims made about your units, your paramilitary formations, and so on and so forth, what was the status of your volunteers in the JNA? Can you explain precisely whether they had JNA documents, uniforms, and were they ⁴³¹¹⁹ treated in the same way as any other citizen who volunteered to join the JNA?

A. The volunteers from the Serb Radical Party were all JNA soldiers. They had military booklets where their time of service was entered. They received military salaries. However small they were, they received salaries from the JNA. If a volunteer was killed, he was buried according to JNA protocol. A local JNA unit would arrive to fire, and the flag was that of the JNA and not of the Serb Radical party. The JNA bore the costs of the funeral. The families of those killed regulated their rights to a pension through the JNA. Volunteers who became war invalids received their rights and benefits through the JNA. Unfortunately, these benefits were very small, but this was all regulated. Not a single case remained unregulated.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Was there any difference, then, between the volunteers that you sent and the JNA soldiers?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was no difference at all.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks. Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, you have a Ph.D. in law. You're a university professor. You are familiar with the constitution of the SFRY and the laws on national defence. According to this legislation, what was the legal basis for everything you are talking about now? I'm referring to the volunteers and their activity in the JNA.

A. We had a very good legal basis, both in the constitution of the SFRY and the law on national defence. The law on national defence ⁴³¹²⁰ provided for the following: A member of the armed forces is any citizen who in an organised manner, bearing weapons in their hands, is fighting the enemy. So no distinction was drawn between external and internal enemies, whether this was an aggression from outside or from within, an attack on the constitutional order, because it was the task of the JNA to defend the constitutional order whether the attack came from outside or from within.

Q. You said that your volunteers became members of the JNA, that they had service books in which all the usual facts were entered. These service books and these documents, were they identical to the service books of other members of the JNA or was there any difference?

A. The service books were absolutely identical. They were the only kind of service books that existed. All of us who had served our military service had the same service books, and we kept those until the end of our lives. Even when we were no longer conscripts and were liable for military service, either in the regular forces or the territorial forces, we still had our service books.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Remember to observe a pause between question and answer. I hear a certain breathlessness in the voice of the interpreter trying to keep pace with both of you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, they will be able to draw breath in about 15 minutes' time.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, I wanted to explain the following: We all had service books. Everyone was given a service book when they completed their ⁴³¹²¹ regular military service, and these are the same service books that your volunteers had.

A. Yes. All volunteers from the Serb Radical Party had service books and in their service books their command entered their time of service.

Q. Very good. Was there a single element -- as you have explained that as they were volunteers in the JNA, they became regular members of the JNA like everybody else, was there any distinction drawn between any of your volunteers and other members of the JNA?

A. No, there was no difference.

Q. Were they deployed in the regular JNA units?

A. Yes, they were deployed in the regular JNA units according to commands coming from the general staff. Neither I nor anybody else from the Serb Radical Party ever dealt with issues of deployment or deciding where they would be engaged and in what manner. This was all decided in the JNA. Our task was simply to gather the volunteers and send them to the centre in Bubanj Potok.

Before sending them off, I often held speeches for them. In these speeches I encouraged them to fight heroically against the enemy. I told them how they were to treat prisoners, civilians, women and children, elderly people, and so on. They received strict instructions which were in accordance with the provisions of international laws of war, that they should fight chivalrously, that they should fight well but treat prisoners and civilians humanely. Television cameras in Belgrade filmed some of these speeches I made to the volunteers, and many journalists attended these send-offs, and they can all testify to this. ⁴³¹²²

Q. Mr. Seselj, as you sent volunteers to the JNA, did you at that time have a clear idea, a clear awareness of who was in command in the JNA and whether the political leadership of Serbia at that time had any influence on the JNA?

A. I was a political and ideological opponent of those who were in command of the JNA, and as a deputy in the Serbian Assembly, I publicly spoke against Veljko Kadijevic and the JNA. I disagreed with many of their moves. But it was my duty as a citizen to assist the JNA in this situation because our state had no other legal armed force. My political standpoint was one thing - it was highly critical - but it was my duty as a citizen, on the other hand, to contribute to the country's efforts to defend itself. My political views had no significant affect on the JNA. It was only the federal leadership and the Presidency of the FRY that could influence the JNA. Minister Veljko Kadijevic was the main man in the JNA and he was part of the government of Ante Markovic, who was a Croat. This was the last government of the SFRY.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, not for the first time have I heard you say that you were in disagreement with an institution or an entity. Are you given to disputes by nature?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was in the opposition for many years. I was an anti-communist dissident. It's very hard for me to speak of my natural tendencies. I -- in any case, I always voiced my disagreement publicly and sometimes very vehemently. Secondly, as an anti-communist dissident, I constantly attacked Veljko Kadijevic for not removing the five-pointed star from the regular ⁴³¹²³ JNA uniforms. Sometimes we couldn't mobilise people because they refused to wear the five-pointed star.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. A very concrete question concerning those times: The volunteers of the Serb Radical Party in the JNA, were they considered to be disciplined or indisciplined?

A. According to all the information that I received from the commands of the JNA that were in charge the officers that I was in contact with, the volunteers of the Serb Radical Party were among the most disciplined and the most courageous ones, and I only heard praise about them. Of course there were certain incidents, there was some trouble, but the JNA reacted then. These volunteers were sent away from their units, and the Serb Radical Party excluded from their own membership all of those who would violate laws and regulations.

Q. Do you know who General Zivota Panic was?

A. Yes.

Q. What did General Zivota Panic say about the volunteers of the Serb Radical Party in the Yugoslav People's Army?

A. General Zivota Panic was, first of all, commander of the Belgrade army district and then he became chief of general staff. As a matter of fact, I had a major clash with General Panic, and he was removed in 1992. I revealed an affair that had to do with some kind of irregularity that he was involved in, but that doesn't matter now. I have seen part of General Zivota Panic's statement here. That is a document that is accessible to ^{43124 BLANK PAGE 43125} the public. It was given to me as part of the exculpatory material in the proceedings instituted against me. Zivota Panic states directly that all volunteers of the Serb Radical Party were within the JNA.

Q. You explained why you were guided by this in sending volunteers to the JNA. Very briefly. It was my understanding that that was the only regular armed force. Is what you said?

A. Yes. That was the only regular armed force. You see, I studied the theory of totalitarian political forms, left wing and right wing ones. I know the nature of militarism. I know that. I've dealt with it as a scholar. I know how dangerous it is to set up party armies. They lead to the fascisation of the country. Also the establishment of paramilitary formations that turn into gangs, dishevelled ones at that. However, under my leadership, the Serb Radical Party never got involved in this kind of thing.

I cannot swear that not a single volunteer of the Serb Radical Party did not steal something that could fit into his pockets or into his hands; however, there was no systematic looting in our case, there was no killing of prisoners of war, and there was no maltreatment of the civilian population.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Seselj, how many volunteers were there from the Serb Radical Party?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, sort of for propaganda reasons we said that there were about 30.000 of them, but the real figure would have been about 10.000.

JUDGE BONOMY: And how were they distributed among the various ⁴³¹²⁶ groupings in the JNA?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were directly included in JNA units. The largest concentration of volunteers was up to one company, which is about 100 to 120 soldiers. Not in a single unit was there a larger concentration. They were sent to different units, and it was the JNA command who decided where they would be sent. Some volunteers were in Eastern Slavonia. For example, in Vukovar they were with the 1st Guard Brigade. There is an order of the commander of the 1st Guard Brigade concerning their deployment. In Western Slavonia they were within the Territorial Defence that was commanded by Colonel Trbojevic as an active-duty officer of the JNA, but these volunteers were also sent to the western part of Krajina, to the Udbina airfield, and from there they were in the Plitvice theatre of war, and so on.

The entire transport of volunteers was organised by the JNA.

JUDGE BONOMY: Does that mean in the example you've given there in the 1st Guard Brigade in Vukovar that there would be an identifiable company which was comprised entirely of volunteers from the Serb Radical Party?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you cannot say entirely, but, for example, the commander of the Guard Brigade ordered that the Leva Supoderica Territorial Defence detachment that was subordinated to the 1st Guard Brigade would be the unit where volunteers of the Serb Radical Party would be taken in. That's where the volunteers of the Serb Radical Party constituted a majority, but Captain First Class Milan Lancusin Kameni [phoen] was their commander, who was on the Territorial Defence of Vukovar ⁴³¹²⁷ and who was a local person from Vukovar. Through the war he became a member of the Serb Radical Party. He was not a member of the party when the war broke out but then he liked the Serb Radical Party and he joined it as a member.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Can we summarise what is being said about the volunteers of the Serb Radical Party. Are there any exceptions to what you established and stated, that the volunteers of your party were exclusively sent to the JNA then?

A. There was not a single exception. They were exclusively sent to the JNA, and as JNA soldiers they took part in armed operations at various fronts.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Would there be any -- would there be any documentation within the Serb Radical Party to confirm that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That can be confirmed from the service books of the volunteers but the entire documentation exists in the archives commands of the army of Yugoslavia or, rather, the JNA, and they have records of how many volunteers were sent where and at which theatres of war they were engaged.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And, Mr. Seselj, your party sent volunteers to the JNA and they accepted that they would be under JNA command. Now, my question to you is: Were there other groups of volunteers that did not want to go to the ⁴³¹²⁸ JNA?

A. Yes.

Q. That were established as some kind of special units, separate units outside the JNA?

A. Other opposition political parties that took part in this agreement subsequently cheated out. The Serb renewal of Mirko Jovic established the paramilitary unit of the White Eagles, but soon the White Eagles became independent and got out of Mirko Jovic's control. They started operating independently as a paramilitary organisation with a limited number of members, but some people used them for their own political and often dishonourable purposes.

For example, Veljko Dzakula, who was then president of the parliament of Western Slavonia, brought the White Eagles to Western Slavonia. They were engaged in some other places, as far as I know, but my knowledge is not direct. It is based on what certain people said after I contacted them, so I imagine this is not relevant for the Court. However, if the Court deems it necessary, I can speak about that too. Then the Serb Renewal Movement decided to set up the so-called Serb Guard, and the media were full of what they were saying, that they were sending 60.000 people. And that was a lie; there was only 1.000 of them. Then they recruited the worst criminals from the streets of Belgrade for that. Djordje Bozovic Giska, a notorious criminal, was appointed commander, and he did dirty work for the federal security service in the 1980s when he killed various political emigres in Western Europe. His deputy was another dangerous criminal, Branislav Matic Beli. ⁴³¹²⁹ The commander of the so-called Komite Detachment was Miodrag Brkic, nicknamed Lale Robija, was another notorious criminal who was appointed. And he raped a male convict when he was in prison so then he got another six-year term of imprisonment. So they recruited the scum of the earth from the streets of Belgrade.

All right, I will try to slow down. Then they insisted that this guard of theirs be turned into the Serb army or the army of the Republic of Serbia. Then the Democratic Party, they promised that they would send volunteers, but that did not happen. You see, the structure of their membership was, well, sort of like this Boris Tadic nowadays. These are effeminate guys. They are not right for military service and they are not right for leaders. But later on, when Zoran Djindjic became head of that party, he had much closer ties to Radovan Karadzic than I did, for instance, or anybody else from Serbia. However, since he could not organise his own volunteers from Serbia, then he was joined by a commander of a paramilitary organisation from Republika Srpska who --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Seselj. It's time for the adjournment, but in any event, I found that answer too long.

It may be a question of culture and jurisdictional practice, but these long answers I find very, very difficult to follow, Mr. Milosevic. When you ask a question and the witness has reached a certain point, then you stop him and put another question. The narrative approach is not very helpful.

We will adjourn for 20 minutes. ⁴³¹³⁰

--- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, just before the break, you explained in general terms some questions related to paramilitary formations. Now I'm going to put a few specific questions to you, because you mentioned a few types of paramilitary organisations. You started with the Serb Guard of the Serb Renewal Movement. Could you please explain the position of the Serb Renewal Movement at the time when the Serb Guard was established and the reasons why the Serb Guard was established.

A. Well, at one time we were a single political party, and then in June 1990, approximately, Draskovic and I parted ways. Draskovic belonged to the most reactionary part of the Serb political spectrum. His party is a nationalistic party. The Serb Radical Party is a nationalistic party too, but his party is a monarchist party, a royalist party, then one that let the church interfere in political life. That is what I consider to be reactionary when I say that.

The Serb Renewal Movement had nationalist membership as well, and it was not hard for them in 1991 to use nationalistic and patriotic slogans to get some people into the Serb Guard, as it was called. In addition to these criminals who were the commanders, there were honourable people as well in this Serb Guard, people who were sincerely prepared to fight for the freedom of the Serb people and who did not have criminal motives. However, the leadership was deeply criminal. ⁴³¹³¹ This Serb Guard was actually established first and foremost for expected armed clashes in Serbia. However, since I as an MP in the Assembly of Serbia attacked them as a group of criminals, as a band that has nothing to do with justice and the fight of the Serb people for freedom, then in the summer of 1991 they were seeking ways and means of being engaged at a particular front line. The Serb Guard, with a couple of hundred of its members, tried to cross over to Eastern Slavonia so that they would be engaged in the Slavonian theatre of war, I guess. The police of Serbia, at the bridge on the Danube near Dalj stopped them from crossing over. It was impossible for them to cross over into Eastern Slavonia. Then they went to the western part of the Serb Krajina, to Lika, and they were engaged at the front near Gospic. The commander of the Serb Guard was this prominent criminal Djordje Bozovic Giska, his then deputy at the theatre of war another major criminal, a very dangerous one, Branislav Lajnovic Dugi, from Novi Sad. Giska got killed there under very suspicious circumstances. Allegedly Djordje Bozovic Giska and Branislav Lajnovic Dugi took a combat vehicle to reconnoiter. Hardly ever would a commander and deputy commander go out to reconnoiter. Then they stopped at a place where they were supposed to carry out this reconnaissance. The combat vehicle returned and they started picking plums. A sniper bullet hit Djordje Bozovic Giska during this plum picking, as far as I know, underneath his arm in the chest at a spot that was not protected by his flak jacket.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, it appears to me that we are digressing a little. ⁴³¹³² Ask another question, Mr. Milosevic. I'm going to have to control the question and answer much more intimately than I would have liked. When you ask a question, I'm going to look at it and I will make a determination as to whether the answer should be a short one or fairly long.

JUDGE KWON: Can I clarify one thing before we move on. Your party was once called Serbian Movement of Renewal. So the Serb Renewal Movement is totally different from that, I assume. How is it different in Serbian? The abbreviation or --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I could explain all of that to you. I hope that you expect me to explain this to you in-depth, the core of the matter.

JUDGE KWON: Very briefly.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the briefest possible: I set one party, Vuk Draskovic set up another party. The party that I set up was called the Serb Freedom Movement and Vuk Draskovic set up the Serb National Renewal. Soon the Serb National Renewal threw out Vuk Draskovic and we united, setting up the Serbian Renewal Movement. Then in June 1990, we clashed and he was removed, but he set up another party which had the same party as we did, the Serb Renewal Movement. At one point in time there were two parties with the same name. Then we changed the name of our party into the Serb Chetnik Movement. The Serb Chetnik Movement united with the National Radical Party into the Serb Radical Party whereas Draskovic kept the original name.

Could I have given you a briefer explanation, Mr. Kwon? ⁴³¹³³

JUDGE KWON: It has been clarified.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You did very well there, Mr. Seselj. Congratulations.

Now, Mr. Milosevic, your next question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I join in the congratulations, Mr. Robinson.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Another moment and I'll blush due to all these congratulations.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, the point of this explanation, as far as I'm concerned, is the explanation of these paramilitary formations. The Serb Renewal Movement of Vuk Draskovic established the Serb Guard.

A. Yes.

Q. Who is Vuk Draskovic?

A. Vuk Draskovic was a dissident of a nationalist orientation from the previous communist period. I already said how he set up his political party and how his own party threw him out. Vuk Draskovic is a prominent opposition leader, has been one for years, and from time to time he was in power. He was in a coalition with your party too and at that time he was vice-premier. Now he is in coalition with the other pro-Western parties so he is minister of foreign affairs of Serbia and Montenegro.

Q. What was the Serb Guard established?

A. In the summer of 1990.

Q. What was the purpose of establishing the Serb Guard?

A. The purpose was to prepare for internal armed clashes and ^{43134 BLANK PAGE 43135} settlements of account in Serbia that Draskovic was wishing for, but in his speeches he said it was the preparation for the defence of the Serbian people.

Q. Was this a paramilitary formation, this group that Draskovic set up?

A. Yes. By all its attributes it was a paramilitary organisation, and --

Q. How did the authorities view them?

A. Well, the authorities were against them, but they never actually sanctioned them. There were never enough charges to send Draskovic to prison, but Draskovic never -- was never held responsible for that in any way because the authorities took a mild attitude towards him, and Draskovic became a greater danger since he linked up with the Western representatives in Belgrade.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What are the features of a paramilitary organisation?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All organisations of military type that do not belong to the state structures, to the legal army, are paramilitary organisations. In political theory, a paramilitary organisation can be called a militia. That is an organisation that is established spontaneously and has an armed character. That is, every unit that is not part of the regular army and not under the control of the regular army is a paramilitary unit.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, yes. That's clear.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴³¹³⁶

Q. Let us move on with brief and precise questions. Who were, for the most part, members of the Serb Guard of Vuk Draskovic?

A. The most dangerous criminals from the underground. I enumerated some of them; drug dealers, murderers, extortionists, looters, robbers, et cetera. In the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, a large number of criminals found themselves back in Belgrade because they found it hard to survive in Western countries. Visas were introduced for our citizens, and whereas Yugoslavia exported -- the former communist Yugoslavia exported criminals, they started to return to Yugoslavia under the new regime. The criminal I mentioned, Lale Robija, had come back from Australia.

Q. You said the purpose of establishing that Serb Guard was defined by internal political needs having to do with the violent clash with the authorities in Serbia.

A. Starting from the 9th of March, 1990, Vuk Draskovic never completely rejected the option of a violent coup d'etat, and he spoke about it all the time.

Q. Do you know of any instance of use of the Serb Guard for political purposes?

A. Well, it was used for political purposes mainly in Belgrade throughout the summer of 1991. They had some sort of inspection of the Serb Guard in Cacak or around Cacak where a clash occurred between the commander and the deputy commander, Giska and Beli. Beli was killed immediately after that clash, whereas Djordje Bozovic Giska went to the theatre of war in Lika after that.

Q. You explained that they went to Lika after the police of Serbia ⁴³¹³⁷ prevented them from crossing over into Eastern Slavonia.

A. Yes.

Q. Where did they go exactly? You said they were around Gospic.

A. Yes.

Q. First they intended to go to Eastern Slavonia to be engaged, but they were not able to.

A. They were not able to because the police prevented them. The police had the task to prevent the crossing of any paramilitary units into Eastern Slavonia because they had already had experience with them and knew them mainly as looting and pillaging units. I cannot say that all of them were like that, because some of them really participated in fighting. Some were wounded, some got killed. But their entire leadership consisted of criminals, that much is true.

Q. What happened with that Serb Guard in the years that followed?

A. After Giska was killed, Zvonko Smajlic became commander of that guard. He was wounded near Gospic in the chest. When I went to Knin sometime in November 1991, I found him in the Knin hospital. After he was wounded, the Serb Guard was taken over by a prominent criminal from Novi Sad, Branislav Lajnovic Dugi, and he accompanied the Serb guardsmen to some front lines, but they were shunned for the most part because they mostly looted and pillaged and did not fight. They had been in Foca and Trebinje. In Trebinje, they had taken over a hotel, but they were expelled because they were mostly engaged in looting. They were also near Konjic. There they were commanded by a certain man called Boro Antelj, of whom I don't know much, but their task was to smuggle arms from the front ⁴³¹³⁸ line to Serbia and to equip Draskovic's units for a possible clash in Serbia. All I know is that they received arms from Boro Antelj, Draskovic's Serb Guard received arms from Boro Antelj.

Q. You explained a moment ago that Vuk Draskovic and the Serb Guard paid lip-service to the defence of the Serb people but they actually were more interested in looting and robbing.

A. Under the influence of the American ambassador, Vuk Draskovic soon turned coat completely. You have evidence of that in his speeches and public statements that were very inflammatory at the time, but after the war he became a peacemaker. So he always turns where the wind blows.

Q. You have some documents here in tabs 6, 7, and 8 where you can -- we can see more about this approach of his. Because it is usually I who am described as an instigator of war in all of these events. Look, for instance, at tab 5. What is it that you provided in tab?

A. Well, here are some excerpts from Draskovic's newspaper Serbian Word, "Srpska Rec."

Q. Just a moment. When you say "Draskovic's newspaper," you mean the newspaper of the Serbian Renewal Movement?

A. This is his private newspaper. It has never been the newspaper of the Serbian Renewal Movement, SPO. It was his newspaper and that of his wife. But they promoted the policy of the SPO.

Q. In any case, this is an authentic piece of writing by Vuk Draskovic dated the 7th of December, 1990.

A. Yes. ⁴³¹³⁹

Q. Could you read from this appeal.

A. Draskovic addresses the Serbian Academy of Science, Serbian Writers' Association, Matica Srpska, and the Centre of Emigrants of Serbia, calling upon them "to meet urgently and adopt a joint declaration to protect the nation." He says --

THE INTERPRETER: Will the speaker read slowly, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, read slowly. The interpreters are asking you to read more slowly.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will. I will read more slowly. "In Croatia, an Ustasha government has been re-established; armed formations of Serb-killers are being founded. The Ustasha Supreme Leadership has concluded an anti-Serb pact with the Arnauts --" he means Albanians, but this is used as a derogatory term -- "and Muslim fundamentalists, the de-Serbianized but militant and loud minority in Montenegro, and the Serbophobic staffs around Macedonia, who are openly asking for our territories.

"The Serbian people are faced with a united hatred, as they were in 1914 and 1941.

"We must oppose the menacing Evil as soon as possible, immediately. We must not allow ourselves, for the third time in this century, to be overtaken by events. It is our duty to subordinate to the defence of the nation, if we still have a historical conscience and ambitions to endure as a people, all our inter-Serbian, ideological, party, class and other disagreements and misunderstandings. "The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) proposes that the leaders, ⁴³¹⁴⁰ that is, the representatives of the leading Serbian political parties, as well as representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian Academy of Sciences, the Serbian Writers' Association, the Matica Srpska and the Centre of Emigrants of Serbia meet urgently to draw up a joint Declaration to protect the nation.

"That document, in our opinion, should be the starting point for the adoption of a Serbian National Programme."

Q. I think this is enough by way of quotation.

A. This is from Srpska Rec of the 7th of September, 1990.

Q. So he talks here about the fact that Serbs are threatened by genocide with the newly established Croatian authorities and formations of Serb killers. He speaks of Macedonia, Croatia.

A. Bosnia.

Q. What is the nature of what is called here the facsimile of Vuk Draskovic's appeal of the 7th of December, 1990?

A. Well, the reality was not far from his assessment as expressed here, but his position here is expressed in an inflammatory manner, one that instigates to war. That is obviously his approach. He's not making an appeal to negotiate, to try to exert some influence, to achieve any other option but the one of war.

Q. And that is the purpose for which this paramilitary organisation, the Serb Guard, is established?

A. And his deputies in the parliament advocate from the rostrum that the Serb parliament should proclaim the Serb Guard as the new Serbian army, that his paramilitary formation should be turned into a new Serbian ⁴³¹⁴¹ army.

Q. Very well. Look now at tab 6. You provided this also from his newspaper. It is authentic. There is just a brief quotation here. What can we read in this brief excerpt that you selected?

A. That is the Serbian Word, Srpska Rec, of the 14th of October, 1991. It says: "... The Ustasha knife is being held to the throat of the Serbian people in the western Serbian Krajinas and only Serbia can and must help them. More than 200.000 Serbs from the Croatia of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia have already abandoned their hearths, and Serbia authorities have the audacity to say that the country is not at war with the Ustashas. Had the Ustashas done nothing other than blowing up our martyr church in Jasenovac as they did several days ago, it would be reason enough to declare war on them, both as a nation and as a state."

Now, your policy was that our country was not at war with Croatia, that we were only opposing the pro-fascist regime of Franjo Tudjman, whereas Draskovic insist -- insists that the Serbian nation and the Serbian state should declare war on Croatia. That is very extreme. Even for me as a Serb nationalist, this was too much.

Q. All right, Mr. Seselj. What can we see under tab 7? These two can be associated with these activities of the Serb Guard and the political positions of the current foreign minister of Serbia and Montenegro.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No translation, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Seselj selected a very brief ⁴³¹⁴² excerpt to quote. I hope we can put it on the ELMO. It is also from a newspaper, an issue of April 1991, as far as I can see. Place this first page on the ELMO so that Mr. Seselj can quote.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just a couple of sentences.

JUDGE ROBINSON: It is translated.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Draskovic says here: "The borders of our state and the entire expanse within them are fortified by Serbian culture, language, names of villages and cities, names of rivers and mountains, trees and birds, Serbian epic poems and traditions, monasteries and endowments, our blood and graves. These boundaries are removable. These Krajinas of ours are inalienable. The guns hanging from their shoulders with which they're threatening us had better remain on their shoulders. I do not wish upon anyone, including them, that which will happen if machine-guns speak." And he uses the new Croatian speak for the word "machine-gun."

"We are not afraid of those who wish to revive the head of state Ante Pavlovic or those who dream of some kind of Greater Albania. We are not afraid of those who speak our language and have our roots but have a vision of some kind of Dzamahirija or Sulltanat [phoen] on Serbian land." That is what Vuk Draskovic wrote about the boundaries of the Serbian state as he sees them, and he published his idea about those borders on the cover page of his newspaper.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Seselj, can I take it that throughout 1991 and 1992 that Draskovic was an opposition politician?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, he was an opposition ⁴³¹⁴³ politician. He was an opposition politician until 1998 when he entered the federal government.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Look at tab 8, Mr. Seselj, and present to us the quotation you have selected. This is quite a long article, but the quotation is short. This is dated the 5th of November, 1990.

A. Yes. Here Draskovic is addressing the Assembly of his party and says, among other things --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, just read selected parts of it. We don't want to hear the whole page. We can read --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot read it all. That would be too much even for me. Only -- I will read only a short passage from page 19. It would be masochistic of me to read the entire speech of Vuk Draskovic.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No. What I meant was that what you have selected here takes up an entire page and I don't think we have the time for that. So even that --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's not an entire page. It's a quarter of a page, Mr. Robinson. A quarter of a page.

JUDGE ROBINSON: It's an entire page in English. Then do your best.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know how long it is in English, but if you won't let me read, I won't.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no, you can read but I don't want -- just select the parts that are important to Mr. Milosevic's case. ^{43144 BLANK PAGE 43145}

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the only bit I selected. What is one page for you is a quarter of a page here. His speech is several pages long.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Go ahead.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right, if you insist. "We will no longer love our enemies and sacrifice ourselves for a brotherhood without brothers any more. ... the command, after all, is for Heaven and not for Earth, for saints and not for people. Serbs, finally, no longer have anything to give away or anything to renounce except the right to their existence.

"We are for Yugoslavia, but a new, completely different one. "We are for a federation, even at the price of accepting the present internal borders, which are in any case non-historical and criminally demarcated, on condition that the federal state be a multi-party and democratic republic or a monarchy with a strong central authority and on condition that autonomous provinces or regions be established everywhere where their existence is imposed by the same reasons as in present-day Serbia.

"This in effect means that the territorial autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia should be guaranteed, and then the autonomy of Istria and Dubrovnik, while Bosnia and Herzegovina would be divided into four autonomous regions: one where the Roman Catholics would predominate, one where the Muslims would be a majority and two where the Orthodox Christians would be prevalent. Applying the same yardstick, Macedonia should also be reorganised internally, so that the Macedonians and the ⁴³¹⁴⁶ Serbs and the Siptars there are satisfied in national and cultural turns. "We perceive the provinces and regions within the present republican borders in Yugoslavia more or less like the cantons in Switzerland.

"In principle, we are not opposed either to a confederation treaty or to the break-up of Yugoslavia. Simply, no one has the right to impose a federation by force on either the Croats or the Slovenes or to prevent these peoples from founding their own sovereign states. "Likewise, no one may deny the Serbian people's historical and ethnic rights or their right to go to war should the common state be made into a confederation or break up.

"In that case, the Serbian Renewal Movement will consistently and unrelentingly insist that no one can break away or place in a confederation to the detriment of the Serbs the territories of Yugoslavia that found themselves on the 1st of December 1918 within the then Kingdom of Serbia, or territories in present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia where the Serbs were a majority people before the Ustasha genocide was committed against them. This is the order of historical justice and is not for negotiation."

What does this quotation illustrate? This quotation illustrates the mood in the entire Serbian opposition at the time. The entire Serbian opposition, including the Serbian Renewal Movement, the Democratic Party, the Serb Radical Party, who all continuously criticised the federal government and the Serbian government for having a very mild attitude toward the Croatian separatists and the other separatists emerging in the ⁴³¹⁴⁷ federal units.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. More than once there is mention here and also in some counts which I will not quote for you now of some kind of inflammatory speeches inciting war on the part of the regime and me personally in order to incite ethnic hatred, instigate war and so on. Have you ever heard of any such speeches? To be sure, no such claims have been substantiated by evidence, but have you ever heard me make such a speech, or anyone belonging to the Serb or Yugoslav government at the time?

A. No, never by you. Never by any of the government bodies in Serbia under the control of your Socialist Party. Never were such statements made by any of you. It was Vuk Draskovic, me, and other opposition leaders who made such speeches, but certainly not any government officials. We were always more radical than the government concerning these issues. Draskovic sometimes really went over the top. Not even I can digest what he said about the monarchy. But we always attacked the authorities because, in our view, the authorities were not doing enough to defend the Serb national interests and to protect the imperiled Serbian people.

Q. Is there anything you can add to the description of these facts about the Serb Guard of Vuk Draskovic, their political position and their activity during the conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia?

A. The Serb Guard turned into a looting organisation. And after the withdrawal of the Serb Guard from Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was a ⁴³¹⁴⁸ conflict between Draskovic and the commander of the Serbian Guard, Branislav Lajnovic Dugi, but this was a personal conflict. It had nothing to do with their political or ideological orientation. Not long after that, the Serb Guard ceased to exist.

Q. Very well. In your general explanation about paramilitary units, you spoke about the attitude of the Democratic Party toward these paramilitary units, and then you went on to speak about the unit and the formation of a man nicknamed Mauzer which was active in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can you kindly just briefly explain what this was about.

A. Well, the Democratic Party did not lag behind the other opposition parties in this kind of orientation. Their public statements may have been a bit milder, however, Zoran Djindjic, when he became the head of the Democratic Party, had very intensive relations with Radovan Karadzic. No one on the Serbian political scene was closer to Radovan Karadzic than Djindjic and Kostunica. As far as I can remember, your Socialist Party had no inter-party relations with the Serb Democratic Party.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Serb Democratic Party did have such relations, but not as close as theirs.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I've stopped you. It's very difficult for the interpreter because you're going at much too fast a pace and the interpreters are continually asking you to slow down. I should say --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: -- it's not in the interest of Mr. Milosevic's ⁴³¹⁴⁹ case. It affects the whole efficiency of the Court if we do not have proper interpretation. So continue, bearing that in mind.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will slow down again.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, you are testifying here for the first time, so you are not aware of the logistics here. I suggest that after every sentence you wait until it is interpreted and then you can say the next sentence.

A. Well, my ideal was always to reach the speed of light when I speak. Well, now I have to try to do the opposite, but I will try, I promise.

Q. Well, please answer my question.

A. As for the Democratic Party, in 1990, 1991, or even in 1992, it did not lag behind in the general efforts of the opposition political parties in Serbia, but it was not internally capable of gathering volunteers and sending them where they were needed in the war theatre. It wanted to do this but was not able to. As I already said, the structure of their membership was effeminate. It was a bit flaccid. Then Djindjic found Mauzer, the commander of the paramilitary forces the Panthers, and he made him a member of the Democratic Party and appointed him his vice-president and the president of the Democratic Party for Republika Srpska. And that's how Ljubisa Savic Mauzer participated in the first elections after the Dayton Accords. Ljubisa Savic Mauzer headed a band of looters which, in the war, was not very effective. But he gained prominence in persecuting the Muslim civilian population. Together with Arkan, he looted a large Muslim village called Janja which was loyal ⁴³¹⁵⁰ to Republika Srpska. He entered the village, started looting their vehicles, tractors, money, and so on, and the Serb Radical Party in Bijeljina came into public conflict on more than one occasion with Ljubisa Savic Mauzer -- interrupting me?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I think you should stop. I think you have provided an answer.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Seselj, the -- you referred to the Serb Democratic Party, and you're telling us about membership and leadership. That's a party distinct from the Serb Democratic Party founded in Croatia, or is it -- are we talking about the same party?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You see, there were two Serb Democratic Parties.

JUDGE BONOMY: It helps to clarify.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] One in Croatia and the other included Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I mentioned a third called the Democratic Party of Republika Srpska. It was under Djindjic's control. It was not termed a Serb party. When these three parties were formed, they were formed by the same circle of people, former dissidents, more or less moderate in orientation, who were mutually connected: Jovan Draskovic, Radovan Karadzic, and the people around Micunovic in the Democratic Party in Serbia. For many years before the war they were friends. They had personal contacts, and so on and so forth. To begin with they wanted to form a single party but then they agreed they should establish three different parties. The party in Serbia did not have the prefix "Serbian." It was called only the Democratic Party. Their ⁴³¹⁵¹ ideology was identical. Sometimes -- somewhat later some differences emerged, later on, and there were internal differences that emerged later on.

I think that's clear now.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, you explained the existence of this paramilitary unit headed by Mauzer and the close relations between the Democratic Party or, rather, the way that this paramilitary unit joined the Democratic Party. In connection with some of the crimes that this group committed - I mean Mauzer's group - the leadership of Republika Srpska headed by Radovan Karadzic has been accused of these crimes. Tell us, did the leadership of Republika Srpska headed by Radovan Karadzic have control over Mauzer's unit and was Mauzer's unit responsible or did it answer in any way to the leadership of Republika Srpska; and if not, to whom was it responsible?

A. No.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Two questions there. Take the first one first and try to deal with it briefly.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. Radovan Karadzic had no control over Mauzer and his paramilitary unit the Panther Guard. When I met him on several occasions, he complained to me of their self-will and their causing problems in Semberija. The Serb Radical Party in Bijeljina also came into conflict with Mauzer. Sometimes he would be abduct peaceful Muslim civilians in Bijeljina and extort money from the Muslim side to send them back. Sometimes Muslim soldiers of the Serb army were ⁴³¹⁵² maltreated by him and sent over to the Muslim side. I happened to be in Bijeljina when a Muslim was wounded. He was a soldier of the Serb army on leave, and Mauzer's men threw a hand grenade into his yard. He lost a leg. I visited him in Bijeljina hospital. On more than one occasion we publicly condemned Mauzer's behaviour. In military terms, Mauzer was not especially significant, but he was very prominent in perpetrating various crimes. Mauzer, to begin with, was independent and linked to Arkan.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. And was Mauzer's unit responsible in any way to the leadership of Republika Srpska?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If Radovan Karadzic personally complained about his behaviour, I don't believe he was responsible to them. No serious state leadership can be happy with the existence of an independent and renegade paramilitary formation not answering to anyone. He was on the war theatre, for example, in Bratunac towards Srebrenica, but he was not effective in warfare.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Seselj.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The transcript does not reflect part of what Mr. Seselj said just before you intervened, Mr. Robinson, where he said that Mauzer was independent to begin with and linked to Arkan, and later on he joined the Democratic Party of Zoran Djindjic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did you say that, Mr. Seselj?

A. Yes, that's what I said.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's now in evidence. Move on. ⁴³¹⁵³

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. To whom was he responsible?

A. He was responsible to no one in military terms. Later on, he was responsible to Zoran Djindjic. He was his closest collaborator.

Q. Was he the president of the Democratic Party for Republika Srpska?

A. Yes, and Djindjic's deputy president in the entire Democratic Party. Djindjic participated in his election campaign, held speeches at rallies in Republika Srpska.

Q. And how do you view a criminal such as Mauzer being part of a party which is declaring itself to be in favour of Europe, democratic principles, democratic values, and so on?

A. No political party should be viewed only from the perspective of what it says about itself or the principles it proclaims. The Democratic Party under Zoran Djindjic is a deeply criminalised party. Zoran Djindjic is one of the Serbian politicians who contacted the Mafia, used the Mafia for his own purposes, and it turned out in the end that the Mafia used him for their purposes and liquidated him when he tried to free himself of them.

Q. You mentioned some other units but I think we need not dwell on them. You mentioned the Serbian Guard, the paramilitary units of the Serbian Renewal Movement of Vuk Draskovic.

A. There was also Arkan's Serb Volunteer Guard.

Q. What was its position? To whom was it responsible?

A. Arkan had been a criminal for many years, notorious in Europe. He had been a bank robber. But for many years he worked for the federal ^{43154 BLANK PAGE 43155} state security service and participated in the physical liquidation of political emigres.

In 1986 or 1987, I filed a criminal report against the then federal minister of the interior, Stane Dolanc, among other things accusing him of the murder of Yugoslav political emigres, the murder of Stjepan Djurekovic, and in my speech, public speech to the Authors Society of Serbia, I said that it was Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan who was the assassin and that after this the minister gave him a gun bearing an inscription saying "To Zeljko from Stane."

Q. Just pause there for a second, please. Tell us in a few words, who was Dolanc who at the time was minister of the interior of Yugoslavia; and tell me, when was this?

A. Stane Dolanc was for many years one of the strongmen of Tito's communist regime. After Tito's death, he was certainly the politically strongest person in the state. He was the minister of the interior and he was the main chief of all intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies of the then communist Yugoslavia.

Q. Give me a more precise answer: When?

A. From Tito's death onwards, 1980 onwards, until the end of the 1980s. Now, when did his last term of office expire? 1988 or 1989, I cannot remember exactly.

Q. You referred to your own speech at the Writers Association where you talk about Dolanc and his liaison with Arkan. Is this contained in tab 10? When you find it, when you find this quotation that you marked yourself on page 851, because that was published in your book on page 851, ⁴³¹⁵⁶ could you please read it.

A. Well, that is tab 10, Mr. Milosevic, at least in my papers.

Q. Well, tab 10 is what I said.

A. Inter alia, in this speech that I published in my book The Campaign Against Heretics, this is my speech at the international October meet of writers at the Writers Association of Serbia.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Is this translated, Mr. Milosevic? It doesn't appear to be translated, in which event, if you have a particularly short passage, it can be placed on the ELMO.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's just seven or eight lines, Mr. Robinson, and I thought of reading that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. By all means read it, but just put it on the ELMO.

MR. NICE: There is a translation that's come our way, of about seven or eight lines, and I'm not sure if you've got it or not.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, I don't have it.

MR. NICE: Looks like --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's as much as I intended to read, anyway. May I start Mr. Robinson?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's my speech from October 1988, at the international October gathering of writers in the Association of Writers of Serbia. So the year is 1988. Inter alia, it says: "Stane Dolanc, in agreement with Mika Spiljak and Josip Vrhovec, organised the murder of Stjepan Djurekovic in the Federal Republic of Germany. The paid ⁴³¹⁵⁷ assassin, Zeljko Raznjatovic, called Arkan, who lives in Belgrade today, according to evidence from the documents of attorney-at-law Cvetic, was rewarded with the rank of Colonel and received the gift of a pistol with the engraved dedication: 'To Zeljko From Stane.' Anyone in their right mind would ask how was it possible that a man like Dolanc was a member of the collective head of state of Yugoslavia? How is it possible for Josip Vrhovec to be that as well, a man compromised by various criminal activities and known as an overt supporter of pro-Ustasha ideology. Unfortunately, in Yugoslavia, anything goes."

Mr. Robinson, I must admit to you that I was warned from many quarters after this speech that I would not live much longer, that Dolanc would have me killed.

One of the persons who issued such a warning to me saying that Dolanc would liquidate me for sure was the former minister of the interior of Serbia, Vojin Lukic.

This was an act of great courage at that time, to present this kind of thing in public. When Stane Dolanc left, Arkan was taken over by the new head of state security a Croat, Zdravko Mustac.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Just stop there. Mustac, who came from Croatia as an appointee and he was the new head of the state security service of Yugoslavia, when did he take over Arkan?

A. Well, immediately after Dolanc left. I cannot give you the exact date, Mr. Milosevic. That is really beyond my possibilities now, but as soon as Dolanc left, Mustac took him over. ⁴³¹⁵⁸

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, you had evidence to support the claim that you made in that speech?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, my evidence is there from the information that I received personally. My evidence is my personal courage. To say this in public in 1988. Don't expect too much from me. I am a lone man, a political dissident at the time.

JUDGE ROBINSON: It seems, apart from liquidation, you could also face libel charges, defamation charges if it couldn't be substantiated.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Had that been untrue, I would have certainly been sent to prison and I would have been held accountable because it would have been a serious crime, offending a high state official. However, I even filed criminal reports against Stane Dolanc, and you have that in the tab too. Two criminal reports. And then I pressed charges against Stane Dolanc. There was a civil suit that I started before a court of law, but that was completely unrelated to this. He had to retain a lawyer who represented him. So I started this offensive and --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, what you said just now is something that I'd like you to explain to the degree to which it would explain Arkan's position at the time in our country; his protectors and the connections he had, in a way.

A. With such protectors that Arkan had, he could quite literally do whatever he wanted in Belgrade. He caused incidents. The police did not dare arrest him. Once he wounded a policeman, he was not held accountable ⁴³¹⁵⁹ before a court of law. Arkan could literally do whatever he wanted to do and no one could do anything about it.

Q. Mr. Seselj, it is said here that Arkan in a way was under the control of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia. And then, since they say he was under the control of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia, that he was practically under my control. Is that correct and do you know about this?

A. No. Arkan was not under the control of the MUP of Serbia, he was under the control of the federal MUP. And the federal MUP was much stronger than the MUP of the Republic of Serbia until Yugoslavia definitely fell apart. That is to say until the archives of the federal MUP were taken over sometime in 1992.

Q. Thank you. Is there anything else you have to add to this or to the assertions that are often made here that Arkan was in a way attached to the state organs of the Republic of Serbia?

A. In 1980, before the war broke out, Arkan was arrested in Croatia and weapons were found on his person. He was held in a Croatian prison for months. And then, all of a sudden, he was released. He returned to Serbia, he established the Serb Volunteer Guard and went to war. Those are the facts.

I don't want to speculate about all the things that these facts could mean, but the facts are very, very telling, and I'm just going to restrict myself to presenting the facts.

Q. Now, is there any other paramilitary organisation that you know of, a major one? There's no need to --

A. There were others, like the Yellow Wasps and others. You know, in ⁴³¹⁶⁰ this war the situation was rather chaotic. The JNA was not always capable of stopping the establishment or preventing the existence of paramilitary formations. Then there were situations when various gangs of criminals set up their own paramilitary formations under the slogan of fighting for Serb national interests. They looted and committed war crimes.

Q. Now when you basically described everything that had to do with paramilitary formations, and before that you explained how the volunteers of the Serb Radical Party behaved, all these parties, that is to say your party and these parties that had paramilitary formations, were opposition parties at that time. On the basis of what you have presented, can it be seen that the Serb Radical Party actually sent volunteers to the JNA and under JNA command, and was it not the only opposition party that, as far as the establishment of paramilitary formations is concerned, respected the law or, rather, did not establish paramilitary organisations?

A. Yes. Yes. The Serb Radical Party was [Realtime transcript read in error "was not"] the only opposition party which strictly adhered to the law and exclusively sent its volunteers to the JNA. There is not a single case in the war that the volunteers of the Serb Radical Party operated outside the JNA.

Q. Was there a single case that you personally --

JUDGE ROBINSON: In Mr. Seselj's answer, "Yes, the Serb Radical Party was not the only party that adhered to the law." I thought he said that it was the only party. So that should be corrected on the transcript.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, well, that means that the ⁴³¹⁶¹ interpretation that you heard wasn't good. The Serb Radical Party was the only one that strictly adhered to the law and sent its volunteers exclusively to the JNA.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That has been taken care of.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, obviously you've learned Serbian.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Seselj, did I understand incorrectly that you had said that there are some volunteers who went to the local defence under the direction of JNA?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have said to you that all volunteers were in the JNA. Some were sent to the Territorial Defence of Western Slavonia. About 500 of them were there incessantly, volunteers of the Serb Radical Party, but under the command of an active-duty officer of the JNA, Colonel Trbojevic, because in a state of war and an imminent threat of war the JNA takes over control over the entire Territorial Defence. That is what our laws said.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, you personally, in any case or at any time, did you retain control or command over your volunteers that you sent to the JNA?

A. No. I had no command but I always did whatever was within the realm of my possibilities to tell the volunteers before they left how they should behave, what their morale should be and that they should observe the laws of war. ⁴³¹⁶²

Q. You've already explained that. When the JNA withdrew from Krajina and from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was set up. Our citizens were withdrawn from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Note: From outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Where did they go?

A. Most of them left with the JNA, but others joined the army of Republika Srpska and started fighting with them. That was an act of their own free will. In the future, also our members would leave Serbia, but always they were within the regular troops of the army of Republika Srpska.

Q. So even after that they were never part of any paramilitary organisation and they never set up any paramilitary organisation?

A. Absolutely. They were never any paramilitary organisation and they never set up paramilitary organisations.

Q. All right. I would like to clarify something. I hope we've clarified this fully. Let me just clarify one particular point here. A person nicknamed Zuca, was he one of your volunteers at any time?

A. Yes. Vojin Vuckovic Zuca. He was a volunteer of the Serb Radical Party in Eastern Slavonia. He was expelled from the unit where he fought due to looting, and after Eastern Slavonia, he never appeared anywhere as a volunteer from the Serb Radical Party. However, subsequently he set up some paramilitary formation of his own that he called the Yellow Wasps, and his formation was operating in the area of Zvornik until the authorities of Republika Srpska arrested him and broke up this formation of his. Later on, he was tried in Sabac, together with his brother, and ⁴³¹⁶³ since then he had no contacts with the Serb Radical Party. As a matter of fact, over here I received his statement in the investigative procedure as part of the exculpatory material I received, and in this statement he said that he left our party because of cooperation with the regime in Serbia. Of course nobody is going to say of his own free will that he was a criminal, a thief, and that that is why he was expelled, so now he's trying to find an explanation, but it's ridiculous.

Q. All right. When you expelled him from Eastern Slavonia from your ranks - I mean the ranks of your political party - he set up some paramilitary formation of his own in Bosnia. Do you know how the authorities in Serbia reacted to the knowledge of some crimes committed by the Yellow Wasps?

A. He was arrested and tried in the well-known Sabac trial. It was very difficult because it was hard to find witnesses to accuse him of all the things contained in the indictment, but as far as I can remember, both he and his brother were convicted.

Q. In tab 27, is there a document of the district prosecutor's office in Sabac dated the 9th of November, 1993? And does it involve these persons and the start of criminal proceedings due to war crimes?

MR. KAY: There's one matter we should deal with in relation to this document, and it might not be known to the accused. This document was produced earlier in proceedings through a witness who was C004 and subject to protective measures. Those protective measures were withdrawn on the request of that witness on the 16th of October, 2002. That can be seen at the transcript page 11647, and he gave ^{43164 BLANK PAGE 43165} evidence in open session. Then on the 17th of October, the next day, his evidence was thereafter given in private session again because of information that had come to the WVS concerning his personal security and that of his family. That's at transcript page 11726. Eventually, after his testimony, he then through the Prosecution said that he had no objection to the testimony he had given being made public rather than being under seal, and the Court made an order respecting that in relation to the evidence that had been given, the testimony. However, the exhibits that he had produced still remained under seal, and they had not been the subject of the Court order to permit them to be put into the public domain.

Prosecution made a filing on this on the 26th of February, 2003, and the following day, on the 27th of February, 2003, the Court made the order releasing the closed-session testimony, but as I said, the exhibits produced were not the subject of that order and therefore have still remained under seal. And we know that this document is one of those documents that was put to him as an exhibit by the accused and was given the number D57.

JUDGE KWON: 56.

JUDGE ROBINSON: D56.

MR. KAY: Tab 27 here, D56. Looking at the --

JUDGE KWON: He didn't give his evidence under pseudonym, did he?

MR. KAY: Originally he was C004, then he had his name as a result of -- his testimony.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. ⁴³¹⁶⁶

MR. KAY: And then the testimony went back into private session. So it was a rather complicated series of events. We don't need to be in private session dealing with this as it's not on the ELMO. Looking at the document, the only issues that I could see why it should remain under seal was because one particular passage refers to a sexual assault.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: If the only concern is with the identification of somebody involved in a sexual offence, then there's probably no reason why we shouldn't deal with it broadly publicly and privately so far as any reference to that part of it's concerned.

MR. KAY: I only raise that trying to think of any possible reasons why it should not be, to that extent, public, and it seems to me that that could be redacted and no harm caused in relation to the essence of this witness's testimony on the matter and to permit the issue to be properly aired and put in public.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, the Chamber is grateful to you, Mr. Kay, for the --

MR. KAY: It's paragraph 2, page 2, the only one of sensitivity that I could see.

JUDGE ROBINSON: So we can -- we can hear evidence --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --

JUDGE ROBINSON: We can hear evidence on it in public unless there is to be a reference to paragraph 2 on page 2. ⁴³¹⁶⁷

MR. KAY: And if this could be ordered now to be a public document, subject to that redaction in paragraph 2 of the sexual matters.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. And we make an order in those terms. Do you understand, then, Mr. Seselj?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand fully, Mr. Robinson, but it was not my intention to testify about that at all. I don't intend to go into the details of the charges pressed against Dusko and Vojin Vuckovic. I am just testifying that they were tried before a Serbian court in 1993, just after they committed the crimes. I don't know about the details of those crimes. And there was no danger for a moment that I would mention the name of the rape victim. Of course she has to be protected if she is a rape victim. But this is an authentic document in the Serbian judiciary.

My point is that they were tried for war crimes they committed in the area of Zvornik. I don't know about the details of the crimes. I know whatever I could read from the newspapers when the trial started. I was not an eyewitness to the crimes so that my testimony on the issue is limited to the fact that they were tried by Serbian authorities.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... question that you have about this now, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, precisely the fact that the authorities in Serbia, the first authorities in the area of the former Yugoslavia who arrested this man and tried him for war crimes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... in evidence. ⁴³¹⁶⁸

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Mr. Seselj, please, to cut a long story short, please open page 2 of this document, and please read the first four lines.

A. It says here that from the same place in the cultural hall in Celopek he took away four persons whom he later killed, whereby he committed the war crime against civilian population, article this and that from the Criminal Code of Yugoslavia.

Q. Could you read the date.

A. The 9th September, 1993.

Q. So that was initiated on the 9th of September.

A. And the events, as far as we can see from this, took place in the middle of 1992.

Q. Can we see that the events did not happen on the territory of Serbia?

A. Yes. The events happened in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Do we see that the reason he was tried in Serbia was that he was our citizen?

A. He could have been arrested and tried even if he hadn't been. Every state has the obligation to deal with war criminals and try them.

Q. Do you know that anyone in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, before our judiciary and our state authorities, prosecuted any war crimes?

A. As far as I know, there is no example of the Croatian or any other judiciary in the former Yugoslavia tried any war crimes before this case. This is the first case that somebody was tried for war crimes. ⁴³¹⁶⁹

Q. Thank you, Mr. Seselj.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that this can be exhibited or, rather, since it has already been exhibited, I hope that we can unseal the document, because it has no significance as far as the testimony of Mr. Seselj is concerned.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, that document has already been exhibited, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I tendered it during the cross examination of the witness referred to a minute ago by Mr. Kay.

JUDGE ROBINSON: As far as this enclosure is concerned, we'll admit tabs 5 to 8 and tab 10.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Seselj, I still cannot find this reference in the document, I'm afraid. You're referring to an allegation that in a cultural hall in Celopek he took away four persons whom he later killed.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is on page 2, first line of the Serb original, Serbian original. Unfortunately, I don't know the English language and I cannot help you with the English version.

JUDGE BONOMY: Does it say something about these people being taken to help transport bodies before they were killed?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. The only thing it says here is that they were taken for an alleged interrogation - nobody knows where - and that they were later found killed. It must be that their corpses were found subsequently.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] ⁴³¹⁷⁰

Q. We could have quoted a lot. It says during the same period --

JUDGE BONOMY: No, I now have it. It's 34 people. It was translated as four people. But it's on the second page of ours, if it's the same way.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is an interpretation problem. Thirty-four.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much. I have it now. It's on the second page, in the second top paragraph.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.41 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, we will now leave the issue of the Yellow Wasps. We have cleared that up. We heard several witnesses here. Some of them used the term "Seselj's men" in relation to some paramilitary units. Do you have any explanation for such a use of that term in view of all the explanations you have provided and the way in which your volunteers went to serve first as volunteers in the JNA and later in the army of the Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska?

A. Well, that term, "Seselj's men," could have different meanings in different situations. Sometimes it was used to mean volunteers of the Serbian Radical Party. In other cases, local population in various Serb places called themselves Seselj's men. I found, for instance, in some judgements, such as the judgement in the case of Brdjanin that there was a ⁴³¹⁷¹ paramilitary unit of local Serbs in Bosnian Krajina who called themselves Seselj's men. And whenever journalists would ask me about it, I would say that all honourable Serbs are Seselj's men, that all honourable Serbs agree with my political positions and views. That is what I think. But the very term "Seselj's men" doesn't mean anything in itself. It can mean political followers or something like that, but there was never any paramilitary unit backed by the Serbian Radical Party or me as the president of that party.

Q. Including the White Eagles, which some witnesses ascribed to you?

A. Well, it happened often that Muslims gave statements for their media, or Croats for their media, saying "Seselj's White Eagles." Such confusions were not infrequent. However, members of the Radical Party had strict instructions to avoid all contact with Mauzer's Panthers, with White Eagles, Yellow Wasps, Draskovic's volunteers and paramilitary groups, and we always told them keep them at army's length. We used our influence as much as we could in that respect.

Q. Do you know that members of some other paramilitary units that were active outside of the territory of the FRY and Serbia or, rather, in the area of Krajina or Republika Srpska and who were suspected of war crimes were arrested?

A. I remember Drazen Erdemovic, who was arrested on suspicion that he participated in the execution of prisoners of war in Srebrenica. I know that a group of Serbs was arrested in Knin. I don't know the outcome, but they were in the prison in Knin when I visited the area, and they were suspected of maltreating the local population somewhere. I cannot ⁴³¹⁷² remember all the details.

Q. Do you know anything -- because you mentioned Erdemovic just now, do you know anything about the circumstances under which members of the so-called Spider group were arrested and why they were arrested?

A. Members of the Spider group were arrested for two reasons; a well grounded suspicion that they were preparing an attempt to assassinate you as president of the republic, but also the suspicion that they were involved in the 10th Sabotage Detachment that was involved in the execution of Muslim prisoners of war in Srebrenica and the surrounding area. And we made a public statement expressing all these suspicions, however, they were tried and that was never completed.

Q. Why was that never completed?

A. As soon as the regime changed on the 5th of October, 2000, all those who were suspected of executing those POWs were released from prison. We had information that Milorad Pelemis was the commander on the spot. He was commander of the 10th Sabotage Detachment. We knew that he was very close with a certain Dominik Petrusic. Nobody is prosecuting them, not even this Hague Tribunal. They are free to travel the world. And Dominik Petrusic even rallied some Serbian volunteers to wage a war in the Congo under the command of the French secret service. They are directly responsible for the execution of prisoners of war in Srebrenica. Nobody is prosecuting them at all.

I, as deputy Prime Minister, worked on the issue of Srebrenica very intensively. I understood the execution of POWs in Srebrenica as a great shame on the Serbian people, and I tried to find out all I could. ⁴³¹⁷³

Q. On several occasions here, including the testimony of General Delic and General Stevanovic, Mr. Nice here made the claim that the authorities of Serbia and the FRY covered up and hushed up the crime in Srebrenica. Could you please look at tab 29. That relates to the arrest of this group Spiders, and let us see whether we have some documents here that can be opposed to Mr. Nice's claim that the authorities in the FRY and Serbia tried to cover up the crime.

A. Here we have several statements of the then minister for information of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and what he stated is in fact the position of the Republic of Serbia and the federal government. He made these statements based on the overall knowledge that was in the possession of the investigative authorities of Serbia, and he said the following to the public: First, he made public the number of those executed, the perpetrators, and those who are indirectly responsible for the execution.

Q. Please look at this report, a report published in the then most important daily newspaper of the 12th February, 2000, where the federal minister of information informs the public of these events. Do you have that in front of you?

A. Yes.

Q. Look at what is written in this short second paragraph. What does the federal minister state on behalf of the government of Yugoslavia regarding this Spider group that our authorities arrested?

A. He says that, "Elucidation of the crime near Srebrenica is our debt towards the truth," and he states the intention to identify all those ^{43174 BLANK PAGE 43175} who are responsible for that execution because that inflicted a great damage to the Serbian people. The Serbian people first of all, because we felt blemished by the whole thing. It is contrary to all our beliefs and traditions.

Q. What does this Minister Matic say to the public about the background of the crime in Srebrenica and the perpetrators?

A. Very briefly, that it was the 10th Sabotage Detachment that committed the shootings, under the command of Milorad Pelemis. The 10th Sabotage Detachment had Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Slovenians, and even many foreigners in its ranks. It was a multi-ethnic military unit.

Q. Does it follow from this that it was a mercenary unit?

A. Yes. It follows from this very directly that it was a mercenary military unit, and our intelligence services found out that it was the French intelligence service that was behind this unit, and we stated this in public in 2000.

After the war and after the Dayton agreement, accord, the members of this unit continued their activity. As mercenaries of the Western forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they kidnapped Stevan Todorovic in Zlatibor and delivered him for money to the Western forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Stevan Todorovic was later tried here at The Hague Tribunal for other crimes.

Instead of being tried and instead of being arrested as the main perpetrators of the executions in Srebrenica, they are cooperating with the Western forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milorad Pelemis and Dominik Petrusic can freely travel all over Europe without any hindrance or ⁴³¹⁷⁶ obstacle. They can obtain visas from the European Union whenever they like. They seem to be privileged citizens of the European Union.

Q. When Goran Matic was the federal minister of information and when he said this, these people were in prison?

A. Yes, they were in prison under investigation for Srebrenica and for organising an attempted assassination against you.

Q. In view of these facts published on behalf of the government, the minister of information, was there any doubt that these men were directly responsible for the crime in Srebrenica?

A. We had an abundance of evidence, many statements by eyewitnesses that it was they who were the perpetrators of these crimes. I personally dealt with these issues in the government of Serbia. I investigated various circumstances, and I was able to assure myself of the facts. Was able to ascertain this.

MR. NICE: The account being given is highly generalised, and of course the witness is referring to material that will exist in documentary form and it's going to hold things up if we wait until cross-examination to discover whether he has them with him and whether we can review them. The Chamber might think it helpful to know at this stage whether the material upon which the witness is relying is available for our inspection.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, I ask you whether that material, the abundance of evidence to which you referred in your last answer, is available.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether it's available ⁴³¹⁷⁷ here. I don't have it available because it's material belonging to the competent government authorities in Serbia. I was able to access this material while I was the deputy Prime Minister. It is the new government in Serbia that has inherited this material. Here there are facts showing that we were holding Milorad Pelemis and some others in prison under suspicion of having taken part in the shooting of Muslim prisoners in Srebrenica.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You have answered the question. Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. As for materials, Mr. Seselj, in tab 28 you have the official criminal report against Drazen Erdemovic, who was tried here. Have you got it? Have you seen it?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. In this document --

A. It's dated the 6th of March, 1996.

JUDGE ROBINSON: There is no translation, in my tab at any rate, for that. Let it be placed on the ELMO. It's fairly short.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This document is only three pages long. It's a criminal report. There is a seal, a stamp in the heading showing the date, the 6th of March, 1996.

As there is a criminal report against him here, what does it say in it?

A. It says here that a criminal report is being submitted against Drazen Erdemovic, who was not a national of Serbia, and by ethnicity he's ⁴³¹⁷⁸ a Croat, because there are grounds to suspect that in the village of Pilica on the 20th of July, as a member of the 10th Sabotage Detachment of the army of Republika Srpska, within the framework of the armed conflict on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, together with seven members of Republika Srpska, committed murders of civilians from 10.30 to 16.00 -- from 10.30 to 16.00 hours they killed about 1.200 citizens of Muslim ethnicity from firearms. The victims were previously brought by buses to the site.

Q. So the crime is a war crime against a civilian population from Article 142, item 1, of the Criminal Code of Yugoslavia.

A. Yes, but I disagree that this is an execution of civilians. In my view, this crime is actually the shooting of prisoners of war, which is against the Geneva Conventions. The shooting of prisoners of war, of course, is also punishable by the most strict sanctions.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Don't volunteer evidence; answer the questions asked. You are a learned man, but here you are a witness, and you must follow the lead from the accused who has brought you here as a witness. A witness who volunteers answers presents a danger to the party who has called him.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I cannot know to whom I am a threat, but I am certainly a threat to many. For example, the Office of the Prosecutor. But what can I do about it, because I am a threat simply by existing.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just answer the questions asked by Mr. Milosevic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand your comment, yes. ⁴³¹⁷⁹

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Seselj, you identified the force responsible for this as the 10th Sabotage Detachment, and the commander -- or one of the commanders as Milorad Pelemis, and you described that as a mercenary force. Now, who was paying them?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Listen to a direct question from Mr. Milosevic as to whether this follows from the fact that they were not only Serbs but also Croats, Muslims, Slovenians, and other ethnicities. I said yes. I don't know who and when paid them, but our investigating organs established that they were in league with the French intelligence service. So I have been quite precise in my statement.

JUDGE BONOMY: Were they part of the JNA?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, they were never part of the JNA, but they were part of the army of Republika Srpska, but a quite independent part of the army as they did not belong to any corps. The entire army of Republika Srpska was divided into corps and then brigades within the corps. But they were a rather independent unit under the banner of the army of Republika Srpska.

JUDGE BONOMY: And Pelemis, what nationality is he?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Pelemis, as far as I know, is a Serb by ethnicity.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, on that topic I decided to let the leading question from the accused about this being a mercenary force go because I simply can't deal with all the leading questions, and indeed Your Honour indicated earlier you didn't really want them all to be dealt ⁴³¹⁸⁰ with as challenges. But when we see the very careful way that the witness and the accused, in question and answer, were able to give evidence of the kind that was given, it emphasises the need that on every topic questions should not be asked in a leading form. Because but for His Honour Judge Bonomy's analysis of the answer of the witness, it might have appeared that he was volunteering at some stage that this was a paid force without ever having that knowledge himself.

JUDGE ROBINSON: On that occasion I think you should have objected, should have brought that to my attention, because that is a matter in dispute. What I said was that I'm inclined to be lenient where the issues are not in dispute between the parties.

MR. NICE: It's very difficult to get it right when we're dealing with this particular manner of questioning.

JUDGE BONOMY: He's also a difficult witness to lead, I would imagine, Mr. Nice, and for that reason also there might be a little more indulgence than would otherwise be the case.

MR. NICE: I think, Your Honour, will find that the topics being dealt with have all been --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Most difficult, Mr. Bonomy.

MR. NICE: I think you'll find that all these topics have been carefully prepared in the proofing sessions and that both the questioner and the witness knows exactly where they're going.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, to avoid putting a leading question to you, would you please read what it says in the statement of reasons on the following page ⁴³¹⁸¹ of this criminal report against Erdemovic. What does it say in the statement of reasons? Under whose orders and who shot the prisoners of war in Srebrenica?

A. It says the following: "The person reported --" that's Drazen Erdemovic -- "on the 20th of July, 1995, in the morning, as a member of the 10th Sabotage Detachment of the army of Republika Srpska under the orders of his commander, Milorad Pelemis, with seven members --" and then their names are listed. I'll read them if necessary. "-- went by van to Zvornik and reported to a lieutenant colonel unknown to him of the military police of the army of Republika Srpska. With this lieutenant colonel, escorted by two military policemen, this group went to the --"

THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down when reading.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- went to the village of Pilica where --

JUDGE ROBINSON: The interpreter just asked you to slow down.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "After the lieutenant colonel said that in 15 minutes' time the first bus with Muslims would arrive, he went off in the direction of Zvornik. Soon after his departure, a bus arrived containing about 70 to 80 Muslims from Srebrenica and the surrounding area, male, between 17 and 60 years of age, escorted by two military policemen of the army of Republika Srpska. They were taken out of buses -- out of the bus in groups of 10 to 15 men. Under the orders of the Commander Gojkovic Brano, the whole group then started killing them, shooting from M-70 automatic rifles, except for Stanko Savanovic who used a pistol to kill those who had been wounded. This was repeated until the ⁴³¹⁸² whole bus was empty. Other buses continued arriving. Another group of about 10 soldiers under the command of lieutenant colonel -- the lieutenant colonel from Zvornik, continued killing, and in this way about 1.200 people were killed."

I will tell you that I dealt with this and I feel that the number of 1.200 is an exaggerated figure, because it was impossible for this small group of soldiers to kill so many men by individual shooting. So for some reason this figure has been exaggerated. I do not deny that a total of 1.000 to 1.200 Muslims were shot in the Srebrenica area, but in this particular case I established very simply, very easily that one or two groups of 10 men could not have --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- shot so many prisoners by individual shooting.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, may I ask, is it your case that -- and bearing in mind, of course, that you don't have to prove anything -- but is it your case that the persons responsible for the killings in Srebrenica were part of a mercenary unit comprised of Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Slovenians, and even foreigners?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I have no evidence as to whether they were mercenaries as a unit, but according to what the minister of information stated on behalf of the government, and it follows from the interviews with these people who are arrested and then released after the coup d'etat of the 5th of October by the new authorities, it follows that they were paid for this. And this is what it says in tab 29, ⁴³¹⁸³ in the statements made by the minister of information, statements made public by the minister of information. There is no doubt that this was a multi-ethnic unit.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, please look at the middle column of this newspaper report from Politika which you have already quoted, where Matic says the massacre is being ascribed to the Serbs. This is the passage before the last, and read it.

A. "This was perpetrated by a multi-ethnic band containing Croats, Slovenians, Muslims, and several Serbs. The executors were said to be by Matic and by Pelemis: Kos, a Slovenian, and Zijad Zigic who later took the name of Zivko Micic. He changed his name to a Serb name. He was accompanied by Drazen Erdemovic who was supposed to testify in The Hague against Karadzic and Mladic."

Q. Will you continue reading. What does it say here? They are quoting the minister of information.

A. The minister then says he -- that is Drazen Erdemovic -- is in The Hague and they need him for something else so that he only got four years in prison for killing 1.200 people and his wife and child have been transferred to the Netherlands.

Q. Very well. We needn't go on. What does he go on to say in the third passage, the passage before the last, in the middle column?

A. "The murderers and killers are serving their interests. What is the West offering us? A democracy of paid murderers, of hitmen. The case of Milorad Pelemis proves a lot in this respect." ^{43184 BLANK PAGE 43185}

Q. If we raise the issue of money, in the third paragraph from the bottom in the middle column, it says here --

A. That Srebrenica should surrender without a struggle, and previously Naser Oric left the town. A helicopter came to pick him up. This is well known. It was agreed that members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment should carry out a massacre for which they would receive 2 million Deutschmarks. Minister Matic said this.

Q. Well, the minister of information was not in charge of the investigation.

A. No, but based on information provided by our investigating organs, he provided information for the public.

Q. So he could not have engaged in speculation here. He had to rely on information provided by the investigating organs who are holding all these people at the time.

A. Yes. And the investigation, as far as I knew as deputy Prime Minister, was proceeding very well.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You are not observing the pause between question and answer, and this is very unfair to the interpreters.

MR. NICE: I think these last passages are not translated, unless I've missed the translation. I've been trying to find them but it seems to me they're not translated.

JUDGE KWON: I couldn't locate them.

MR. NICE: And therefore they should, I suppose, be identified on the overhead projector so we know what we're looking at.

JUDGE KWON: He said it's in Politika. ⁴³¹⁸⁶

MR. NICE: Politika, and therefore -- I think he said it's in the middle column, but it's not entirely helpful to have it dealt with without identification of what we should be looking at.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, just clarify. Where was the passage taken from, the one to which you just referred?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] These paragraphs that I quoted now are in the middle column of the report from the Politika daily. However, I'd like to draw your attention to the following: Mr. Nice explained a few minutes ago that Matic gave a statement to Politika. Matic, Minister of Information. He did not make a statement to Politika. He informed the journalists at a press conference thereof. In this tab, we have this report from Politika. That is a daily. Then a report from Ekspres Politika, then a report from Novosti. So reports from several newspapers. From Ekspres. I do not have the transcript from of the report of Borba. Here it is from Borba too. I do not have the transcript of the report from the electronic media, but what this is about is that these are very important statements, and it is customary for the minister of information, on behalf of the government, to present such matters at a press conference. He does not give statements to individual newspapers but he informs journalists at convened press conferences about things that the government wishes to tell them about.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you have any experience about this, Mr. Seselj?

A. Yes. This is what the public heard --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm not allowing that question. Ask another ⁴³¹⁸⁷ question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Could you please now look at the first page of the criminal report against Erdemovic. At the end of the first paragraph, which starts with the word "Protiv," does it show when he was arrested?

A. Yes, it says here that Erdemovic was arrested on the 3rd of March, 1996.

Q. So this criminal report --

A. Half a year after the execution in Srebrenica.

Q. All right. All right. But the criminal report was filed on the 6th of March, 1996?

A. Yes.

Q. Three days after he was heard?

A. That was as long as police detention could last, according to our law. After three days, the police had to release him or to hand him over to an investigating judge, together with a criminal report.

Q. And this criminal report was based on the three days of hearings of Erdemovic?

A. Yes.

Q. In this document, can we see all the names that the -- that Erdemovic revealed during his statement?

A. Erdemovic mentioned Milorad Pelemis, his commander, and seven other members. That is Gojkovic Brano, Savanovic Stanko, Grolija Zoran, Golijan Vlastimir, Boskic or Koskic Marko, Kos Franc, and Cvetkovic ⁴³¹⁸⁸ Aleksandar. Those are the names that Erdemovic mentioned in the statement given to our police or, rather, the state security service, the centre in Novi Sad.

Q. Now, since this information was accessible to the office of Mrs. Del Ponte, since Erdemovic was sent here, are you aware of the circumstances under which Erdemovic was sent?

A. Erdemovic was arrested. He was in our prison. The Hague asked for him, and he personally expressed his wish to go to The Hague Tribunal, otherwise, according to our law, he could not have been extradited, although he's a foreign national, you see. But there would be a long, protracted process of extradition because it concerns a foreigner. However, since he personally expressed the desire to go to The Hague Tribunal, he was handed over very quickly. I don't know the exact date, but the Prosecution's side will know that better. I think it was only within ten days or so.

Q. Do you know that in the proceedings conducted here what it says here in the criminal report was confirmed. That is to say that he personally killed over 100 men?

A. Well, yes. He was convicted here for killing all these people, but only to five years in prison. And he was released soon after, which was astonishing.

Q. Since all of these facts are something that the office of the Mrs. Del Ponte knows, how come it is possible that proceedings were not instituted against any of these persons or indictments were not issued against them? ⁴³¹⁸⁹

A. These persons are under protection. They freely get visas of the European Union, they travel worldwide, and no one can do anything to them.

Q. Is this referred to in the statements made by the minister of information in relation to the arrested persons from the Pauk group?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Move to another question. This is not helpful.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, in view of these official press releases of the Yugoslav government, the arrest of the Spider group and everything that happened accompanying these events, can anyone claim that the authorities of Yugoslavia tried to hush up the crime in Srebrenica?

A. No. That claim is untenable. I'm a witness and a participant in the all-out efforts made by the authorities and government of Yugoslavia to solve that case, to discover the names the perpetrators, and that everything should be bought before a court of law, everything that was known. We thought that it was our legal, political, and moral obligation that the crime of executing Muslim prisoners of war in Srebrenica should not go unpunished. That was the policy of the government of the Republic of Serbia.

Q. Do you have any knowledge about this under which conditions the members of the Spider group, including the mentioned persons, were released after the 5th of October?

A. They were released immediately, without informing the public about this. And pro-Western political parties, even before their release and before the change of government, were mocking our official public views as to who was responsible for Srebrenica. They were mocking this. They said ⁴³¹⁹⁰ that we invented the Spider group and they were making fun of our press releases, and then they simply released them all from prison.

Q. Although it was clear that the members of this 10th Sabotage Unit -- that they were all members of the 10th Sabotage Unit together with Erdemovic?

A. Whoever wanted to know this, knew this. This was fully uncovered that they took part in what happened in Srebrenica.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Seselj.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Does that conclude your examination?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. I have other questions to put.

JUDGE ROBINSON: How much longer --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I haven't even --

JUDGE ROBINSON: How much longer will you be with this witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I envisaged as much as I announced but I'm moving a bit slower so I cannot exactly tell, Mr. Robinson. I'll try to make an estimate this afternoon and I'll tell you tomorrow morning.

JUDGE BONOMY: Before -- before you move on, the release on the 5th of October, remind me of the year?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 2000.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MR. NICE: On the topic of timetable and before we move on, I understand that the accused is going to be all day tomorrow, at least. It affects our planning and the work we do in the preparation of any material ⁴³¹⁹¹ that's to be used in cross-examination. I'd be grateful to know that he's going to be at least all day tomorrow. If he's going to be all next week that would also be helpful for me to know.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you will let us know tomorrow morning. We have to make plans. Assess the situation this evening and let us know tomorrow morning.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice raised a question whether I need all of tomorrow. I can accommodate him with this information, namely, that I will certainly need all of tomorrow and at least another day next week. So he can freely plan his cross-examination.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Seselj, in November 1991, you were in Western Slavonia and then in Banja Luka.

A. Yes.

Q. Who called you then and asked to meet with you?

A. I went to Western Slavonia by helicopter of the Yugoslav People's Army, via Banja Luka, together with Ilija Sasic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Western Slavonia, who asked me to come there and to see the people and the soldiers at the front line, because Western Slavonia was surrounded by Croatian troops on all sides.

I spent two or three days in Western Slavonia. I returned to Banja Luka. In Banja Luka I had a big rally of the Serb Radical Party, and then that evening two high officials of the Serb Democratic Party from Banja Luka came to the Bosna Hotel and told me that Milan Babic had called, asking me to come to Knin urgently because Captain Dragan appeared ⁴³¹⁹² and he is making the army rebel against him and he is preparing a coup d'etat. The same night I took a car together with those two high officials of the SDS, and they brought me to Knin the next day.

Q. All right. You explained now how you went there. Babic in his testimony here - and I'm not going into his motives now, I'm not going to put leading questions to you - mentioned to you that General Marko Negovanovic, Minister of Defence of Serbia, gave you a military helicopter in November 1991.

A. At that time, General Negovanovic was not minister of defence of Serbia. The minister of defence of Serbia at that time was General Tomislav Simovic. I'm sure of that. General Marko Negovanovic at that time was deputy chief of General Staff of the JNA. It is correct that in Belgrade I called General Negovanovic and asked for a helicopter. General Negovanovic, as deputy chief of General Staff directed me to the commander of the air force and anti-aircraft defence, General Bozidar Stevanovic. Bozidar Stevanovic gave me a helicopter with two pilots and from the Banjica heliodrome I flew to Banja Luka. That is the full truth about this. Marko Negovanovic was not minister of defence of Serbia at that time.

Q. Thank you very much. Now, when they drove you there, those two men, was there a meeting held with Babic then? And what did Babic ask you for when you met up with him?

A. When I met up with him he told me all the things that were happening in Knin and the surrounding area, what Captain Dragan was doing, and he asked me to exercise my influence over the soldiers to curb Captain ⁴³¹⁹³ Dragan's influence. I spoke twice on -- once on Radio Knin, once on Youth Radio Knin, and I toured many military positions. At the front near Benkovac I had a meeting with Captain Dragan that is recorded on camera. We actually have this recording somewhere in Belgrade. And that is when we had a verbal duel, and the public of Serbia is aware of that. After this political activity of mine, the situation calmed down considerably and the rally called by Captain Dragan was not really a very big one. Not many soldiers attended, not very many people in general, so it basically failed.

Q. Did you help Babic?

A. Of course I helped Babic, because, you see, the situation there was rather complicated. There was a conflict between Milan Matic, Minister of the Interior, and Milan Babic as Prime Minister. And then Captain Dragan interfered and started a rebellion among the army ranks. Although I thought that he had certain capabilities as a statesman, he personally was a great coward, and he didn't dare go to the front line because of that. And that's why the army didn't really like him. So it wasn't really hard to start a rebellion among the military against a person like Babic. Because someone who doesn't go to the front line cannot be popular among the military. One of the elements to which I owe my popularity at the time was that I went everywhere; to the front line, to forward positions, and I shared the fate of all soldiers irrespective of the danger involved, and the soldiers knew how to appreciate that. When I spoke at both radio stations, I said that the Serb people had to remain united, that there should be no internal conflicts, that ^{43194 BLANK PAGE 43195} those who want internal conflicts while an armed clash is still going on cannot be friends of the Serb people.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please be asked to slow down.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I have stopped you anyhow because you have answered the question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know the name of Miroslav Deronjic?

A. Yes, I know the name of Miroslav Deronjic. Throughout the war in the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, he was the absolute master of Bratunac. That is a town in Eastern Bosnia on the banks of the Drina near Srebrenica.

Q. Tell me, to the best of your knowledge, did Miroslav Deronjic have any connections with any political party in Serbia?

A. To the best of my knowledge, in the beginning he was a member of the Serb Renewal Movement of Vuk Draskovic. When sometime in 1990 Draskovic had a rally in Bratunac, Miroslav Deronjic stood on the podium together with him. After that, Miroslav Deronjic switched sides and he joined the Serb Democratic Party. Then he was president of the Crisis Staff of the municipality of Bratunac and the commander of the Bratunac Brigade while the army of Republika Srpska had not fully been established and organised.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of his relations with the White Eagles?

A. Yes. He brought some formation of the White Eagles from Serbia and held them under his control there and they carried out his orders.

Q. He testified here. He was tried here, but at the same time he ⁴³¹⁹⁶ testified for the other side. Do you know anything about the slaughter in the village of Glogova and what Deronjic had to do with that?

A. Yes. Muslims lived in Glogova. Deronjic asked these Muslims to hand over their weapons with the promise that they would be safe and secure in their homes if they handed over their weapons. Muslims did hand over weapons, and then Deronjic ordered an attack on the village of Glogova and on that occasion 65 Muslims were killed, unarmed Muslims. Deronjic killed elsewhere in Bratunac too, however he was not tried for that.

The regime of Milo Djukanovic delivered a bus load of Muslims from Montenegro to Deronjic. These are Muslims who fled during the war from Bosnia to Montenegro. The Montenegrin police arrested them there, put them onto a bus and delivered a bus load of such Muslims to Deronjic in Bratunac and these Muslims were killed immediately. This is very reliable information that I have.

Q. Do you know anything about the deal he made with the Prosecution?

A. I know he made a deal, and we haven't been talking since because I think of him as a dishonourable man. He made a deal to be tried only for Glogova and for all his other crimes in Bratunac to be disregarded, as well as his participation in the execution of Muslims in Bratunac in 1995. He also participated in the meeting where the execution was agreed and he personally admitted to his participation in that meeting.

Q. Do you know anything about any other acts that he was suspected of by the police?

A. He was suspected of murdering Zoran Zekic, a prominent Serbian ⁴³¹⁹⁷ leader, at the beginning of the war. Zoran Zekic was killed from ambush and it was presented to the public as something done by the Muslims. I know that the police of Republika Srpska conducted an investigation and that Deronjic was a suspect. However, he managed to avoid charges successfully. Then he killed his -- his first wife, presenting that as a suicide.

Q. Mr. Seselj, I would like to conclude one section, one segment of your testimony, and it has to do with your volunteers again. You mentioned, speaking of your volunteers, that some of them were in the Territorial Defence which was under the control of the JNA. I would like one thing cleared up. I'm not talking now about your volunteers in particular. You said that in general in principle they were always under the control of the JNA, but was it the case that the Territorial Defence and all its units were under the effective control of the JNA? In other words, were there any situations wherein certain parts of the Territorial Defence acted independently?

A. I don't know whether it happened in practice, but according to the law of the former Yugoslavia, the armed forces consisted of two parts; on the one hand the army of Yugoslavia, and on the other hand the Territorial Defence. And the law was very precise: When operations were conducted, then the TO would be under the direct command of the army of Yugoslavia. However, if on a temporarily occupied territory certain -- certain territorial units were caught up and left behind, the commander of the local army of Yugoslavia would have to subordinate himself to that TO unit. ⁴³¹⁹⁸ We are talking here about Western Slavonia. Territorial Defence was active in Western Slavonia but it was headed by Colonel Trbojevic, who was an active-duty officer of the JNA. I know that because I met him there.

Q. Another witness here was General Vasiljevic who testified here on the 14th of February, 2003. I think that's correct. There was discussion about the composition of the top echelon of the JNA in 1991. Would you please look at that composition.

A. Could you tell me where that is?

Q. I have only one copy with me, but in the war, in all the conflicts involving the JNA in 1991, there were 16 leading generals, one Yugoslav, two Serbs, eight Croats, two Slovenes, two Macedonians, one Muslim. Could you please put this on the ELMO so you can read the composition of the JNA leadership, which was said several times to have been under my control or under the control of the authorities of the Republic of Serbia. Could you please read this, after it is placed on the ELMO, and tell me what you think about it. Have you ever seen this list of the top leadership of the JNA in 1991?

A. I knew about this composition of the leadership. There was no secret about it. There was Veljko Kadijevic, who declared himself as a Yugoslav, and he did so because his father was Croat and mother Serbian or the other way around. In any way, he was a child of a mix the marriage. Blagoje Adzic, a Serb; Josip Greguric, Croat, deputy federal minister; Stane Brovet, a Slovene, deputy federal minister; Mile Ruzinovski, a Macedonian heading the first administration of the general staff; Konrad ⁴³¹⁹⁹ Kolsek --

THE INTERPRETER: Would the witness please slow down.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Konrad Kolsek, Slovene, commander --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj. Mr. Seselj, I am not going to ask you again. The interpreters -- you are speaking too fast. Presumably to speak more slowly will not interfere with your marital relations. You have to speak more slowly, otherwise we can't continue. Every two, three, five minutes the interpreters are intervening to ask for you to speak more slowly.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, my marriage does not depend on the speed of my speech but on the volume. If I turn down my volume, I would lose in terms of my masculinity, but I will obey your order.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... explanation. It is affecting the efficiency of the work.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will speak very slowly, Mr. Robinson.

Konrad Kolsek, a Slovene, commander of the north-western theatre of war. Command in Zagreb.

Aleksandar Spirkovski, a Macedonian, head of the central -- central district command in Belgrade.

Andrija Silic, Croat, head of the staff of the central theatre of war.

Zivota Avramovic, Serbian, head of the south-east district command in Skopje. ⁴³²⁰⁰ Bozidar Grubisic, Croat, commander of the navy, later chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the JNA. Anton Tus, Croat, heading the air force.

Zvonko Jurjevic, Croat, deputy head of the air force. Ivan Radinovic, Croat, head of the centre of higher military schools in Belgrade.

Ibrahim Alibegovic, Muslim, head of the war school. One had to finish that war school if they wanted to be in the army. Tomislav Bjondic, Croat, head of the Command Staff Academy. Mate Pehar, Croat, head of the military academy in Belgrade. And then you see a list of the ethnic composition: Yugoslav one, Serbs two, eight Croats, two Slovenes, two Macedonians, one Muslim. That was the composition, the structure of the top leadership of the JNA during the war in 1991.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You see I just waited. I waited for the interpreters to finish, the interpretation to conclude. In terms of Mr. Milosevic's question, what does this list indicate in relation to the question of the control that he might have had?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this attests that Mr. Milosevic had no control over the JNA and that the JNA was not in Serbian hands, and there is no question of the JNA having implemented Serbian policy. Serbia tried to preserve Yugoslavia and the JNA, and that is why the JNA tried to preserve Yugoslavia. It refrained from conflict as long as it could, and it did not fight until it was attacked. There were attacks on military depots, on officers and soldiers, on the families ⁴³²⁰¹ of officers. At the moment when the situation could no longer be tolerated, the army went into action.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Let us move to another subject, Mr. Seselj. But before that, I want to ask you one thing: Before you came here voluntarily, did you have occasion to view this, to follow this trial that has been going on since February 2002?

A. I followed the broadcast of these proceedings as far as my job allowed me.

Q. In view of the main points of the Prosecution case, did you have occasion to see or hear Mr. Nice making a claim that the leitmotif of all my policies was to create a Greater Serbia?

A. That's impossible. That was never the policy of either you personally or your party. Back in 1991, your ambitions were oriented towards preserving Yugoslavia. Second, you didn't -- you were not in a position to have any control over the JNA. However, the JNA had ambitions to take over power. There was a session that was scheduled of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in July 1989, and it was the Communist Party of the army that insisted on that session, and it was their attempt to take over power.

On the other hand, there was a group of generals, including, most prominently, the chief of army security, General Vasiljevic, tried to orchestrate at the very beginning of the war some crimes on both the Serbian and the Croatian side and then used that as a basis to force Western powers to support the JNA as the only guarantor of the survival of ⁴³²⁰² the Yugoslav state, because the top leadership of the army saw you as an obstacle to their ambitions.

For instance, the army leadership tried to orchestrate some crimes on the Croatian side. Explosives were set at the Jewish cemetery and the Jewish town hall in Zagreb. That was all orchestrated by this group led by General Vasiljevic, and that was geared against Tudjman, who had already made some anti-Semitic statements and said, for instance, that he was not married to a Jewish woman and things like that. He orchestrated some other --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you're going off course now. It is, in any event, time for us to adjourn. We will resume tomorrow at 9.00 a.m.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 25th day

of August, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.