⁴⁵⁰⁹⁶

Tuesday, 4 October 2005

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9:02 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, you may continue.

WITNESS: BOGOLJUB JANICEVIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. Mr. Janicevic, the OSCE, as you know, reported regularly on what they observed. Do you have any reason to doubt the accuracy of their observations generally?

A. Yes and no.

Q. Why yes?

A. Well, because sometimes their information was not objective.

Q. Give me an example.

A. The example of Kacanik, for instance.

Q. We'll come to Kacanik later. Anything in relation to the earlier period or Racak?

A. I didn't read their reports on Racak.

Q. Very well. Before I come to look at some of their reporting, Shukri Buja was the KLA leader in your area, wasn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. He made a statement in the course of 2001, which is an exhibit in this case. It's Exhibit 212, which we're going to look at. Tell me, by ⁴⁵⁰⁹⁷ September 2001, the Serbs had left and the -- not the KLA, but the interests served by the KLA were in the ascendancy in Kosovo; correct?

A. The interests of the KLA in the sense of the interests of the Serbs? I don't understand your question.

Q. Well --

A. The interests of --

Q. The Serbs had left Kosovo in large numbers.

A. They were expelled. They did not leave of their own accord.

Q. Those seeking independence for Kosovo, or even the irredentists seeking joinder with Albania, were better placed in 2001 than they were in 1999; correct?

A. Well, of course they were in a better position.

Q. What I want to know is, right before we start looking at his statement, are you going to be able to give any reason why Shukri Buja should tell untruths in the year 2001 about the deployment of his forces in Racak and thereabouts in January of 1999? Can you think of any reason why such a man should tell untruths about that part of his own history?

MR. KAY: That's a very difficult question to answer. I mean, in the adversarial system it's one of the golden rules that you don't ask a witness to comment on what someone else may have been thinking or what they may have given evidence about before. You should ask them what they saw or knew or heard themselves. It's impossible for this man to answer it.

MR. NICE: I highly disagree with my learned friend. He has expressed general knowledge about the area, and we know that what happens ⁴⁵⁰⁹⁸ is that when witnesses are confronted with things that they find difficult, they sometimes say - I'm not, of course, suggesting it about this witness - that the person has made something up and then they have to give a reason for it. I want to know if this witness can identify now, in advance, any reason that he can think of from the circumstances why a supporter of the KLA should, in 2001, be untruthful about what had gone before. He may not be able to answer, but if he can, I'd like his assistance.

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'll allow the question.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You will have to ask Shukri Buja that, first and foremost. I've never spoken to him. I don't know what he thinks.

MR. NICE: Very well. Your Honours should know that Shukri Buja gave evidence in another case, in the Limaj case, and was called by the Defence and was effectively turned hostile at the application of the Prosecution in respect of part of the history he gave about 1998, but nothing, as I am advised, that related to what is said in the statement he gave in relation to these proceedings, but you should certainly know that and have it in mind, if it's judged helpful in any way to the accused. Your Honours, I have had provided copies of Shukri Buja's 1990 -- 2001 statement, although it's an existing exhibit, as it occurred to me it might be helpful for you to have it recopied as I hadn't asked you to bring it with you.

Q. Going into the background to this limited extent, going back to 1998, Shukri Buja says that he was abroad at the time, a journalist, and ⁴⁵⁰⁹⁹ he was in Switzerland, having been convicted and served some time in Kosovo for being a demonstrator, and he says this, Mr. Janicevic, he says that following the killings of the Jasharis in March of 19 -- of Adem Jashari in March of 1998, the KLA received quite an increase in support and a lot more people joined up.

Just as a matter of fact, is he right about that?

A. I don't know whether he's right. I don't know how many people joined up after Adem Jashari got killed -- after the death of Adem Jashari, rather.

MR. NICE: If we can lay on the overhead projector, please, page 4 of the statement, with copies for the Chamber, if they'd like them, and for the accused, of course. The B/C/S version of this does exist and it will be coming down to assist the witness if he wishes it, but at the moment I just want to see, if we look at his statement ...

Q. I don't believe you necessarily read English, and if not, I'm sorry we haven't got the B/C/S version for you yet, but he in his statement identifies seven zones of the KLA under Azem Syla, and as to number 6, identifies Nerodimlje, which included Lipjan and Stimlje. Does that appear to you to be about correct as an analysis of the structure of the KLA?

A. I don't understand the translation here. Azem Syla was the first commander of the KLA.

Q. Yes?

A. Azem Syla from Kisna Reka.

Q. And he -- this is the statement of Shukri Buja. He says that of ⁴⁵¹⁰⁰ the seven zones, the sixth was Nerodimlje and that included Stimlje and Ferizaj. Do you accept his analysis, in broad terms, given in this statement?

A. I agree with that part of the statement. The zone of Nerodimlje included that area, the area of the SUP of Urosevac, but that zone was established only in the autumn of 1998, not, as you had put it, immediately after the killing of Adem Jashari.

Q. At the top of the next page, please, Mr. Nort. The number of men attached --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice is asking the witness about Urosevac, and under number 6, Nerodimlje, there is no mention of Urosevac.

MR. NICE: Ferizaj is the alternative name for Urosevac. You can see that on the atlas.

Over to the top of the next page, please, Mr. Nort.

Q. Mr. Buja estimated the number of men attached to zone 6 as between 1.400 and 1.700 at various times. Do you dispute that calculation by him, the commander, of the numbers available to him?

A. According to our information, during the war, after the 24th of March, there were over 2.000 terrorists in the area.

Q. So you think he was better supported than he calculates. If we go over, please, Mr. Nort, to I think it's page 6 but it may be slightly different in this, the way the printout comes. He says -- yes, at the bottom of this page, dealing with the ⁴⁵¹⁰¹ process of arming, that they -- between March and May of 1998, a big influx took place, and he explains that people had to be escorted to Albania to get weapons. There were about a thousand, mostly young people, escorted in groups of 2 to 300 per day. He said they had no difficulty in buying weapons but it was hazardous getting them back, with a lot of men being killed from ambushes.

Does that fit with your recollection, being on the other side, of setting up ambushes to stop groups of KLA young supporters bringing their weapons in?

A. Please, you are talking as if you were the KLA spokesman. First of all, these young groups were not ambushed. They illegally crossed the state border. The state border is a line that is protected on both sides, guarded. On the other side, they had absolute support, on the Albanian side; and on the other side, of course they did not.

Q. Mr. Janicevic, let me make it quite clear: I'm not on one side or the other. As you know, this Tribunal prosecutes people on all sides of this conflict. I just want to know if what Mr. Buja said is true and accurate, that people came from Albania with weapons and the Serb forces tried to ambush them. Is that about right?

A. It is correct that they went to Albania, that they illegally crossed the state border, and that they came across military patrols or whatever the military did by way of organisation - I don't know whether they really had ambushes - but many managed to get in and vast quantities of weapons were brought into the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

Q. Pretty much what he says. Next page, please, Mr. Nort. Top of ⁴⁵¹⁰² the page. He says that he was in command of two brigades, one on the Stimlje to Ferizaj area and one on the Kacanik-Strpce area. Does that fit with your recollection, by way of intelligence, of what Shukri Buja was doing?

A. Yes, from the month of November 1998, but excluding Strpce. In the area of Strpce they did not have a single brigade.

Q. Well, next paragraph -- move the page a little please, Mr. Nort. He says: "We had bunkers and trenches in the area above and around Racak. I was given the plans of the bunker and trench positions in the village, which I approved, and the work commenced in the beginning of December 1998."

Does that fit with your recollection of what happened there?

A. Our information indicated that it had started a bit earlier, a month earlier, that it was continued only in the month of November, that is.

Q. Very well.

A. Around Racak, around Belince, and down the Crnoljevo gorge by the road, on the left-hand side facing Prizren.

Q. He says that the civilians and KLA soldiers dug the bunkers and trenches. Does that fit with your understanding, that it was civilians and soldiers who dug the trenches?

A. Our information was that they were making the villagers dig trenches. They were coercing them, and they even kidnapped some for ten or 15 days so that they would complete the job, and then they would release them. ⁴⁵¹⁰³

Q. Very well. If we go on to the -- oh, he says in the next paragraph: "The bunker and trench positions were to protect the Luzak gorge and to offer an escape route for Racak villagers." Does that fit with your understanding of the purpose of the trenches?

A. No.

Q. What do you say the purpose of the trenches was if it was different from what Mr. Buja says?

A. The purpose of the fortification of that area was to protect the terrorists from possible clashes with the police and the military and to protect the Luzak pass, the area of Luzak, because Luzak-Laniste was the main road, for their purposes.

Q. Well, clearly the trenches --

A. They could not protect the villagers, because practically there weren't any villagers in Racak.

Q. I'll come to that in a minute. And of course the trenches were there to protect the soldiers, and I accept that and I'm sure he does. If you go on, please, Mr. Nort, to the next page, top of the page, I think.

Yes, well, actually in the middle of our screen he says that there was a company command in Rance and they had four houses there with about 30 to 40 soldiers. Is that about right?

A. Our information was that there were between 100 and 120 soldiers.

Q. Is he right about there being four houses that they had at their disposal?

A. I don't know how many houses, but our information was that they ⁴⁵¹⁰⁴ have a terrorist group there that involved between 100 and 120 members.

Q. He then, in the next paragraph, says that in July or August there was a Serb offensive and that they had to evacuate villagers from Zborce in the municipality of Stimlje and that that place was levelled to the ground as a result of shelling. Is he right that there was shelling at Zborce?

A. He is right that they expelled citizens from Zborce. That's correct. And also, he's right that there was terrorist action in the area. However, that the village was razed to the ground, that it was levelled, he's not right on that.

MR. NICE: Well, Mr. Nort, if you could turn on, please, I think a couple of pages, and I'll see whether we -- could you go on two pages, please. Yes.

Q. He deals, at the top of this page -- and I may be able to find it, I've now got the B/C/S, but I'm afraid that I may have difficult without Ms. Dicklich in finding the B/C/S parallel, so to save time I'll read it to you in English.

He speaks of the officer killed in Dulje, in the Suva Reka municipality, and he says this: That he later learnt that the local Serbs put on police uniforms and took part in the attack on Racak as revenge. He got this information from civilians in Vitina. Now, just thinking back, and I'm going to pause then in my examination of this statement of Mr. Buja, is it the case that there were civilians dressed as soldiers or as policemen involved in the attack on Racak? ⁴⁵¹⁰⁵

A. That is an absolute untruth, not to say a pure lie.

Q. Very well. Can we now, please, look at another --

A. Just one more thing, please. The way you translated it for me, he says that he learned about it in Vitina. Vitina is 35 kilometres away from Stimlje. It is a completely different municipality. The municipality and city of Urosevac are between the two and Vitina was the area of the SUP of Gnjilane at the time. How could he learn anything from civilians at that time?

MR. NICE: Very well. Can we now look, please, at another source of information, this one contemporaneous. It's part of Exhibit 321. The Court may recall that the blue book as entered into exhibit is not entirely correctly or perfectly page ordered. It's always been a possibility that we replace it by a better ordered set but we haven't done that yet, so I'm using the exhibited document, and the page references for Mr. Nort can be found at the top right-hand corner. So we start with 13555.

Q. What we have here, Mr. Janicevic, is a diagram prepared by the OSCE on a daily basis, with supporting statements, and they set out what's been happening on the day in question. And I just want to go through a few earlier entries before we get to Racak to see if you agree that they appear to be reporting things accurately. So although it's a little hard immediately to get used to the notation, if you look at the top, this relates to the 3rd of January, between midnight and midnight. And as to your area, you'll see a little box there with a number 2 there. That relates to Stimlje. And it says at 0900 hours their group 5 reported ⁴⁵¹⁰⁶ information about a murder that occurred in Stimlje and the deceased man, Enver Gashi, was shot by two assailants. Do you remember that incident?

A. Yes. I spoke about that incident here, as a matter of fact.

Q. Indeed you did. If we go on, please, Mr. Nort, and the pages run backwards in number, to 13553, and we'll lay that on the overhead projector. But before we do, as to the man Enver Gashi, do you remember a visit from the OSCE representative Tommy Olofsson on the 4th of January, the following day, when he spoke to you about this?

A. You mean before the killing of Enver Gashi?

Q. No.

A. That was my understanding, the previous day.

Q. No, the following -- my mistake if it was, I apologise. Olofsson visited you on the 4th of January. That's the day after. Do you remember that visit?

A. Olofsson visited me practically every other day. I cannot remember the exact content of our conversation on that particular day.

Q. Is it right, putting this very briefly because it's only a peripheral issue, that they were of the opinion that in fact it was the Serbs who carried out this killing and they didn't necessarily accept the version that was advanced to the effect that it was the Kosovo Albanians who'd carried out the killing?

A. Mr. Olofsson didn't say that to me. He only asked me about this particular case, when it happened, who was killed, and whether we had any information about this. I said that we still did not have any ⁴⁵¹⁰⁷ information, that an on-site investigation had been carried out, and that we're searching for the killer, the perpetrator of that crime.

Q. Very well.

A. And that our assumption is that it's the terrorists.

Q. Well, we'll look just at one other page, 13553, and I'll read the relevant part of this to you. Again, it has the OSCE patrol giving an account of what had happened. I needn't go through it in detail, but saying that a witness overheard men in Serbian dressed in black civilian clothes, getting into their car, saying, "Hurry up," and driving off. Do you remember his raising that as an explanation for what had happened, that Serb speakers had been overheard?

A. You mean that Tommy Olofsson mentioned that explanation?

Q. Yes.

A. No. I don't remember him saying that to me.

Q. Move on to another topic -- sorry?

A. Excuse me. If I may.

Q. Yes, of course.

A. The second or third time we met to discuss this issue, specifically this case, we had already received information that this killing was perpetrated from a VW Golf vehicle that had been seized in the Dramjak village during the kidnapping of nine persons about a week before this event, and that corroborated our suspicion that it was the terrorists who were responsible.

Q. And indeed the OSCE monitors challenged the identity of the vehicle, challenged its colour, whether it was black or black and red. Do ⁴⁵¹⁰⁸ you remember that?

A. I said a moment ago I can't remember the colour. It could have been grey, maybe red. I don't know. It was a long time ago.

Q. 13596, please, Mr. Nort. The last preliminary matter before we come to Racak.

A. But if you allow me.

Q. Yes.

A. The police did not know what kind of vehicle it was until they talked to his family - to his brother, I believe - and it was his brother who described the vehicle. There was no dilemma about the colour of the vehicle. We took the word of his brother, because he was the only eyewitness.

Q. 13596, last preliminary matter, please. Another report, this time for the 4th of January, your area, Stimlje, and it's said that, if we look at the box -- wrong page, I think. 13596 at the top. It may be 546. No, it's -- it's 546, Mr. Nort. My apologies. I misread it. 13546. This for the 4th of January, box number 1 in the top right-hand corner, says that an unconfirmed report was received on the 4th of January for Stimlje, that a truck with MUP passed through the town of Belince, firing weapons. No person or building was hit. But just try and give us a picture of events. Were things that bad by the 4th of January that your police would be driving through towns, just firing weapons?

A. First of all, Belince is not a town, it's a village along the road from Suva Reka to Stimlje on the left-hand side. In that sector, terrorist attacks and provocations were a daily occurrence. They were ⁴⁵¹⁰⁹ carried out from trenches on the left-hand side of that road. I didn't hear of any such case as you describe. Maybe they fired as they drove through, but only if they were being shot at.

Q. Mr. Nort, page 13445, if my reading of the figures is correct, please.

This is for the 10th of January, as you'll see, and if you look at number 2 in the bottom left-hand corner, it sets out that on this day RC1, a different group, reported a MUP patrol had been ambushed in the vicinity of Slivovo. Is that correct?

A. Yes, correct.

Q. Thank you. Page 13426, please, Mr. Nort. For this day, the 10th of January, the OSCE reported that tensions remained high in the Stimlje area as a result of two ambushes against MUP patrols within three days. However, the KLA commander south of Stimlje said he had no knowledge of the second ambush, and so this might, in the assessment of the OSCE, suggest that the KLA command and control structure wasn't solidified.

So two points: Were tensions indeed high as a result of ambushes at this stage on MUP patrols?

A. The tensions in Stimlje itself were very high because the population was mixed. There were no tensions within the MUP, because there was no reason for that. It was not the first or the last attack on the police. I already said that on the 10th January, 1999, 25 members of the police, the army, and civilians were killed in terrorist attacks. Twenty-five were seriously injured. ⁴⁵¹¹⁰ It's impossible -- it appears impossible to me that Mr. Shukri Buja didn't know anything about that.

Q. So far we're finding accurate reporting from the OSCE, are we not? Nothing inaccurate in what they reported.

A. No, it was not.

Q. Page 13406, please, Mr. Nort. We're now on to the 11th of January, just a few days before Racak, and here we see, at the bottom left-hand corner, that team 5 reported that the VJ had positioned a combat team in the vicinity of EM, and the number is given, immediately to the west of Stimlje.

Is it right that as early as the 11th of January the VJ were positioning themselves west of Stimlje?

A. The army of Yugoslavia had positions west of Stimlje, according to the agreement. It didn't take up those positions then. It had held them there since the arrival of the verifiers.

Q. Well, if you look --

A. Since October.

Q. Very well.

A. And that was on Canovica hill.

Q. We may find more support for the accuracy of the OSCE reports at page 13396, then, on that topic, where the same position was slightly differently expressed, and they said this, as to the force to the west of the Stimlje, they said, "These are believed to be the same forces, VJ forces, that have been operating in the area since the KLA ambushed the MUP patrol on the 8th of January, killing three MUP. They have continued ^{45111 BLANK PAGE 45112} to change positions daily but array themselves primarily south-west, towards suspected KLA positions in the hills to the south-west of Stimlje."

Is that accurate to your knowledge?

A. That's not true, and I'll explain why it's not true. The army had one combat group deployed on Canovica hill. The police had six observation posts in the gorge, that is west of Stimlje, along the road, and there were 30 people on each post. That is a total of about 200 men on those observation posts. The army did not move from that area. And I'm sorry I omitted to say this before: They had another combat group pursuant to the agreement in Dulje, and maybe verifiers noticed movement in that direction. And it's about ten kilometres from Dulje to Stimlje, not more. That unit also belonged to the 243rd Motorised Brigade, I mean the unit that was in Dulje.

Q. I may have time to deal with the question of whether the employment was strictly within the agreement later, but we'll move on to page 13387, please.

Now, this -- sorry, 13387. If we look at this, please -- no, it's 13389. I misread the number again, Mr. Nort. I do apologise; my mistake. What the OSCE reported here at number 6 for Stimlje is that the KLA told them - that's the OSCE - that over a thousand people had been displaced in the vicinity of Stimlje, and the combat team, that's the OSCE -- I'm not sure about that -- first reported several days ago remains in the area oriented west south-west. Forget that.

A thousand people displaced already by this time. Were you aware ⁴⁵¹¹³ of civilians moving, being displaced by the 12th of January?

A. No.

Q. Very well. Can we now look at -- can we go back, Mr. Nort -- just leave the file where it is. Can we put Shukri Buja's statement back on the overhead projector at about page 11.

A. May I have that statement in Serbian, please?

Q. Yes, I'll try and find it for you and the right page straight away, if I can. Yes. It's at the foot of page 11. Coming your way. Okay. Foot of page 11.

And if you could hand -- Mr. Nort, if you could take this for the witness, please.

You see, what Shukri Buja says in his statement is that on the following day, on the 13th of January, and you can see it there in the B/C/S, he spoke to the villagers in Racak and told them of the dangers of a possible attack. He advised them to leave for their own safety, but many stayed as they believed they could flee when the danger arrived. Now, pausing there, do you accept that -- perhaps did you have knowledge of the fact that many villagers did indeed leave Racak on or about the 12th, 13th of January?

A. I do not accept that, and I have no reason to believe that civilians had to run away from the police. I really don't. Anyone who addressed the police for assistance received it. Shukri Buja is right when he says that they advised them. They advised them everywhere, including Malopoljce. They emptied the village there and set up their base. Racak is not the only case. ⁴⁵¹¹⁴

Q. It appears he is accurate in saying that he --

JUDGE BONOMY: The answer to the question is yes, by the sounds of it.

MR. NICE: Yes.

Q. But just looking at this same part of his statement to try and get context, he says that Seselj was in the area - well, we've heard about that from him - and that he made an inflammatory speech. Do you remember Seselj talking about retaliation? Just from the previous paragraph, but do you remember Seselj talking about retaliation for the killings of Serb police officers?

A. Please. Seselj has never been in Stimlje, and he doesn't even know where it is, let alone having made a speech there. I don't think that he even passed through, because he mostly travelled --

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. -- to Pec or Djakovica.

Q. Did you know about --

A. Do you mean to say that he made a speech to the citizens of Stimlje from a helicopter, asking for retaliation?

Q. Mr. Janicevic, that's not what I'm suggesting and I suspect you know that. The speech, as is revealed in the statement, was in Pristina. Do you remember him making a speech in Pristina, seeking retaliation?

A. No.

Q. Well, let's go back --

A. No. I didn't hear about that speech he made in Pristina, as you say, and I don't know that he demanded retaliation. Seselj was here ⁴⁵¹¹⁵ recently; you could have asked him.

Q. Now, if we stay with the statement that you're looking at, and perhaps, Mr. Nort, you'll turn it over to the next page. He says that most of the villagers of Cesta had left the area, didn't know Racak was going to be attacked. "We had information from the people that had been arrested that an attack was going to happen but not where or when. The people who were arrested were only asked questions about KLA positions, weapons ... strength and power that we had."

Pausing there, is it right that a lot of people were arrested and asked questions about KLA positions?

A. It's not true that many people were arrested --

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. First of all, if you would allow me to finish. Even that is not true. They were certainly not brought in to be questioned about such things like the positions of the KLA, the composition of their units, et cetera. We didn't need that sort of information. We had operative sources in the very headquarters of Shukri Buja.

Q. It's certainly true that a very large number of statements of one kind or another were produced by, for example, your subordinate Jasovic, weren't they, Jasovic and Sparavalo?

A. Correct.

JUDGE BONOMY: Can I ask you, what was the point of all these statements and reports that Jasovic and Sparavalo made if it wasn't to get information about the KLA? And indeed, in your evidence earlier, you said that people were arrested or detained and questioned, I think. ⁴⁵¹¹⁶

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, they were arrested, they were brought in, and they were questioned. I'm not arguing with that. But it's not correct that the only reason, the only purpose for such questioning was to find out about the KLA. There were other things to interview them about, such as weapons, possession of weapons, mutual conflicts, thefts, other criminal offences. And by the way, they were asked about that as well.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, there's not a great deal in the statements, as far as I can recollect, about these other matters, but the point that was put to you just now by Mr. Nice was they were asked questions about KLA positions, weapons he specifically mentioned, strength and power.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Certainly they were asked about that.

JUDGE BONOMY: So your blanket denial that a lot of people were not arrested doesn't seem to tie in with the evidence you gave us earlier.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, taking somebody in for an interview and arresting them are two different things. If you bring somebody in, or even invite them for an interview, that does not mean it's an arrest. An arrest, according to our law, implies detention, remand in custody for over 12 hours. That's what we qualify as detention. Taking somebody in was not regarded as an arrest, according to the laws that applied at the time.

JUDGE BONOMY: What was the law?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Taking somebody in for questioning is an operative tactical method in operational work. According to the Law ⁴⁵¹¹⁷ on Internal Affairs and the Law on Criminal Procedure, a police officer was entitled to bring in a person whom he suspected of having links with criminals or having perpetrated a criminal offence, for questioning, after which the person would be released, and the questioning would make place on the unofficial premises.

JUDGE BONOMY: And how long could a person be detained on that basis?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is not detention. The questioning would take as long as necessary but not more than 12 hours.

JUDGE BONOMY: What is it if it's not detention when you compel someone to go to the police station to answer questions?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm trying to tell you how it is stipulated in our law. Under our law, that was not considered to be detention. Detention started once a decision was issued --

JUDGE BONOMY: With all due respect, Mr. Janicevic, that's playing with words. If you compel someone to go to a police station against his will, then what can you call it other than detention?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Bringing in a person for an interview. That's what it was called under our regulations.

JUDGE BONOMY: I'll leave it to you, Mr. Nice, to see if you can -- if you wish to even try, to get any clearer explanation than that.

MR. NICE: I'm grateful.

Q. Before we come back to, perhaps, His Honour's question, could you look at the next sentence in what Mr. Shukri Buja says in his statement. Dealing with the people who were brought in, he said this: "None of them ⁴⁵¹¹⁸ were KLA, and they were all badly beaten."

Now, let me remind you about a couple of questions I asked you yesterday about your experience with other police forces, about whether the standards in your police force slipped below what was really the proper standard, and let me just remind you you were obviously in a state of crisis with some of your territory held by the KLA, some held by the MUP, the VJ, and the Serb forces.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What date is this, Mr. Nice?

MR. NICE: This is -- well, Mr. Buja's speaking generally, but the particular date is the 13th of January, so it's on or before the 13th of January that he's speaking about.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. So take your time, Mr. Janicevic, before tying yourself to a position that you might think you have to give. Were people in your police station beaten up to give information?

A. This suggestion of yours, Mr. Nice, is not correct. I, as chief of the Secretariat of the Interior, or my associates were never addressed with a complaint about maltreatment or beating.

Q. And let's go further with electrocution. Were people subject to torture by electrocution to provide information?

A. That is a blatant untruth. I assert this because if it had happened, I would certainly have known and the person who had done it would certainly not have continued to work in my secretariat.

Q. What month in 1995 did you start your position at Urosevac police ⁴⁵¹¹⁹ station?

A. On the 15th of June, 1995.

Q. And before that, where were you?

A. I was president of the municipality of Strpce.

Q. We may look at it later, but did you -- first of all --

MR. NICE: Would Your Honour just give me one minute.

[Prosecution confer]

MR. NICE:

Q. It's right, isn't it, that as a matter of law the police are obliged to respond to any form of public complaint about their work? Is that right, as a matter of law? Article 54, I think, of the inspectorate for monitoring legality of work. You have to monitor media reports and take action in respect of them. Right? Are you aware of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Spotlight is a magazine, a publication of which you're aware?

A. I am not aware of it. Never heard.

Q. I see. It's a humanitarian organisation's publication. Is that the sort of material that wouldn't find its way through to the police if it was disseminated in Belgrade to the ministries?

A. Well, it would probably find its way through, but I never received one.

Q. We can see it later, if we have the time, but a magazine in January or February, of Spotlight, gave a detailed account of electrocution by way of torture at your police station. Did nobody at your police station respond to that? Because by the law, they were ⁴⁵¹²⁰ actually obliged to do.

A. These stories about electrocution, you could hear rumours going round, even before, from members of individual groups, however, we never established nor did we ever find any such apparatus or device for electrocution of persons on the premises of the secretariat. So I say once again that is just a lie. It's a blatant lie and nothing more than that.

Q. Just a minute. Pausing there.

A. If somebody came, especially -- may I be allowed to complete what I'm saying?

For somebody to reach their goal, their objective, and the objective was to create chaos in that area and distrust in the powers that be, they had to do things of the kind that you're telling us about now. They had to disseminate misinformation, for example. And I have hundreds of Albanian friends, for example, and none of them ever said that they had heard anything like that or seen anybody who had suffered from any electrocution devices or anything like that. I have hundreds of friends, and I'm still in contact with them to this day.

Q. Where did these rumours -- when you say rumours of electrocution torture, presumably you're saying rumours of electrocution torture at your police station. Where do these rumours come from; within the police station or outside?

A. No, not in my police station, no, that's not what I meant. Not in my police station.

Q. We'll come back to this, but just tell me this: We've seen that ⁴⁵¹²¹ Shukri --

A. First of all, may I add something? You're talking about just one police station. The SUP of Urosevac had four police stations or, rather, five under it; the one in Urosevac, in Stimlje, in Strpce, in Kacanik, and the police station for the traffic police.

Q. Looking at Mr. Buja's statement, here he is in 2001 giving an account of people telling him they'd been held, detained, or whatever it may be, and beaten in order to give information. Just help me, if you can, and don't, of course, if you can't: Can you think of any reason why, when the Serbs have gone, been expelled, Mr. Buja should make this up as part of his account, why he should falsely say that people were complaining of being beaten up to give information? Can you give us an explanation for that if you want to?

A. Shukri Buja, at the end of February, I believe, pursuant to orders from the KLA was appointed commander of the Karadak zone, and during his time, that is to say while he was the commander of the Nerodimlje zone, there were a number of killings, both of Serbs, Albanians, and Roma as well. There were kidnappings that have still not been cleared up. In the Gnjilane area, where he was until the end of the war, there were hundreds of Serbs and Roma killed, hundreds of persons kidnapped or disappeared without a trace.

So think about it. Why would Shukri Buja talk about that? I wouldn't be able to sleep peacefully if I were in his place. Just give it some thought. If he's not in a position to clarify certain circumstances now, the truth will out. The truth will always out. It emerges of its ⁴⁵¹²² own.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I shan't pursue that question any further because I haven't been given an answer to it, but there it is.

Q. Can we go back to the file, please, of OSCE documentation, just to try and stay broadly chronological, and it's page 13377, please, Mr. Nort. That brings us through to the same day, the 13th of January. And on this occasion, according to box number 6, the KLA commander in Stimlje area told a reporting group that VJ forces were within 200 metres of KLA positions. The last position was in the vicinity of Belince, west of Stimlje. Now, is that, do you think, correct?

A. Whose positions were in Belince? I'm not quite clear about that.

Q. VJ. The VJ forces are within 200 metres of --

A. No, that's not correct.

Q. Where were they, then?

A. That's not correct. The army was at Canovic Brdo, hill, which was at least 700 metres -- a minimum of 700 metres from Belince.

Q. Can we go to page 13372, please. Let's just recognise where we were while it's coming to you. There's an approach to battle and war with armed units on both sides, really serious things, with people dying and being killed, but this is what was reported to a combat team on the 13th of January, last three lines: "The KLA commander reported that villagers trying to get to Stimlje or to Urosevac are regularly arrested and tortured with electricity in an attempt to get information about the KLA from them."

So here is a report to the OSCE, before Racak even, of torture by ⁴⁵¹²³ electricity, presumably at your police station, because Stimlje and Urosevac are likely to come to your police station. It's true, isn't it? Your police station was a centre of unlawful violence used against people who were detained.

A. That's not true. Let me just tell you something, since you're speaking about bringing people in and detaining them. At one point, Tommy Olofsson came to see me about 9.00 in the morning, I don't know what day it was, and he asked me, he said, "I was informed today that a person was kidnapped together with a tractor and taken to the police station in Stimlje." I took a telephone -- I picked up the telephone in his presence, called the chief of that police station, asked who had been detained, brought to the police station, and why. The person was brought in with a tractor full of timber, of wood that he had stolen in the socially owned, state owned forest, and they reported it as a kidnapping. So the information that the verifiers received they should check out first and then write reports of this kind. And I claim that there was no torture, no abuse, no beatings, no torture by electricity in my secretariat.

Q. Can we go, please, to 13364, Mr. Nort. One day before Racak, the 14th. See how things are developing.

Now, what is said here in box number 5, in the bottom right-hand corner, is that it was reported that fighting and shelling occurred at Luznica and Javor and that the VJ would not allow the KVM patrols into the area. Now, is there really any reason why the OSCE should have got that wrong? ⁴⁵¹²⁴

A. I don't know. You would have to ask somebody else that. Luznica, Javor, they're on the territory, as far as I know, of Prizren, not Urosevac.

Q. We looked at them yesterday. Mr. Nort, could we go to 13359 for a little more detail. This was their calculation. They said that they -- "RC1 reported that explosions had been heard in the vicinity of Javor and Luznica since 0830 in the morning. When they sent a patrol to investigate, they were turned back in the vicinity of Dulje."

And then they made this observation: "This could be the precursor of a major battle throughout the Stimlje area. A report at 2055 hours stated that the tanks firing on the above village were from the Urosevac Brigade."

Now, tell us, please, when was the plan to attack Racak made? 14th, 13th, 12th; when?

A. Just a moment, please. Which village? I'm not clear on which village.

Q. Racak. When was that plan made to attack Racak?

A. The plan to attack Racak, there was never any plan, but there was a plan for anti-terrorist operation in Racak, and a proposal of that plan was sent to the Staff on the 12th of January.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, can you see the place of village of Javor and Luznica and Dulje as well?

MR. NICE: Yes. Let's get it on the --

JUDGE KWON: My understanding is they are in Suva Reka. ⁴⁵¹²⁵

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. The Suva Reka municipality.

MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour will remember that they were referred to yesterday in the report of this witness himself, at least Luznica was.

JUDGE KWON: Horseshoe was mentioned.

MR. NICE: And horseshoe. And if you look at page 11 of the map Exhibit 83, you'll find them - I suspect you've found them already - in row P, boxes 20 and 21.

JUDGE KWON: But how the operation in Javor and Luznica could be related to -- as a precursor to Stimlje operation, there I have difficulty following that.

MR. NICE:

Q. Was the Racak operation part of a wider operation, Mr. Janicevic?

A. No, Mr. Nice. The Racak operation, or the anti-terrorist operation in Racak has nothing to do with Luznica and Javor. Well, take a map and have a look. It's an area of 50 kilometres, if not more. Now, you make out this horseshoe effect and let's see what it looks like on the basis of what you say.

I explained yesterday that it was a printing error with the report we saw. It was Luzak, not Luznica.

Q. Well, help me with this before we move on, I'm trying to be chronological: It happens, doesn't it, that there was a meeting of very high officials in Pristina on the 15th of January. Do you remember that visit of the high officials meeting with -- the Serb government was meeting there; is that right? ⁴⁵¹²⁶

A. I heard about that from the information media, but I don't know what happened at the meeting or anything else about it.

Q. But the decision about Racak was a decision of the Joint Command, wasn't it?

A. That's not true. Not correct.

Q. Well, whose decision was it, then?

A. A decision of the MUP staff. What Joint Command are you referring to anyway?

Q. Radosavljevic has been interviewed by the Office of the Prosecution, and he's also spoken on -- at length on the television in the "Death of Yugoslavia" film preparation -- preparation for the film "Death of Yugoslavia." And he's a policeman, isn't he, senior to you?

A. Yes.

Q. He's in charge?

A. He was the appointed commander of the operation on behalf of the Staff.

Q. By whom was he appointed, then?

A. The MUP staff.

Q. Well -- well, if only the MUP staff appointed him, tell us, please, how it was that the MUP and the VJ could act together in an integrated way without putting each other at risk. How did that come about?

A. I said during the examination-in-chief that on the 14th of January a meeting was held in the -- on the premises of the SUP of Urosevac, attended by Radosavljevic and all the participants in the operation and ^{45127 BLANK PAGE 45128} the command -- the Commander Krsman Jelic was called of the 243rd Brigade, where the plan was put forward for an anti-terrorist operation, it was proposed and he took note of that by way of information so as not to intervene at any point in time when the police starts entering Racak and takes steps to effect a blockade. The role of the army in this case, in this particular anti-terrorist operation, was just that, nothing more. I have no reason to lie. I have no reason to cover up anything, not a single reason.

Q. And if it be the case, can you think of any reason why Radosavljevic should attribute the Racak operation to the direction of something called the Joint Command?

A. I don't think he would have any reason to do that, because links with what you referred to as the Joint Command, although I don't know that anything like that existed, had no links at all, nothing to do with that.

Q. Let's look, please, at some entries for Racak itself from OSCE to see how much they appear to have seen.

Mr. Nort, if you'd take us, please, to page 13354. This tells us -- this is for the 15th of January, and this tell us that there was a report -- bottom right-hand corner -- it tells us two things, actually. If we look at number 6: "The VJ are constructing and camouflaging a new position in the vicinity near the Dulje pass." That's to the west and in the area of both Dulje and the other place we were looking at. But as to Racak, it says: "Reported at approximately 0700 hours, fighting and shelling started south-west of Stimlje in the villages of Belince, Racak, and Malopoljce." ⁴⁵¹²⁹ They seem to be about right there, don't they?

A. They are absolutely not right.

Q. What, no attack on --

A. And here's why, and here's why: From 0300 hours, the Operative Pursuit Group had already entered Racak, and 30 men, 30 policemen of the pursuit group were behind the lines held by the terrorists, and they were in Racak. Do you really think that somebody would be mad and start shelling the village, bombing the village in which his own men were located?

And I also state with full responsibility, based on reports and from what I heard because I was at a distance of 200 metres from Racak, that not a single shell fell in Racak, not a single shell coming from the army or the police that day until the afternoon hours.

Q. Well, how -- 200 metres from Racak. What period of the day were you 200 metres from Racak?

A. I was at the police station there.

Q. Stimlje.

A. The police station, that's where I was. 200 to 250 metres away from the entrance to Racak. That's the police station. That's where it is.

Q. And that's the Racak police station or the Stimlje police station?

A. The Stimlje police station is located at a distance of about 250 metres from the very entrance into Racak from the direction of the special institution there, 200 to 250 metres. If you don't believe me, take a look at the map and check it out. ⁴⁵¹³⁰

Q. We'll see it later because I think we'll get some footage of the special hospital, probably, special institution. Well, let's look at something else that was revealed by OSCE. On page 13351, please, Mr. Nort. A bit more of the detail. This is how they were keeping an eye on the territory generally.

Elsewhere they reported that a large convoy of 275 MUP was seen approaching Prizren, miles away -- kilometres away. The local chief of police stated this was only a mismanaged but otherwise normal monthly rotation of police officers, stating that they were being relieved to return to Serbia for a rest. However, the question was raised by OSCE, given the increased tempo of the battle being fought in the vicinity of Stimlje, this rotation should be closely monitored by KVM to ensure the additional police not being used as reinforcements. Now, it's right, isn't it, that by manipulating rotation of forces that was permitted by the agreement, you could temporarily increase the number of forces that were available. Was there on the 15th of January of 1999 an effort being made to increase the number of forces available because of the scale of this attack?

A. No, Mr. Nice. On the 15th of January there was a regular rotation of the observation posts where it was usually the policemen of the reserve force who were deployed there at those posts. So there was a shift rotation; those who were at the observation posts went home, and the new arrivals took up their duties, which lasted a fortnight. That was the regular fortnightly shift.

Q. Following page, 13350, please, Mr. Nort. This is what OSCE ⁴⁵¹³¹ themselves reported, and you've made the point that they were present and that their vehicles could be seen at some parts of the day. They say this: "RC5 reported that an attack by combined VJ/MUP forces started in the vicinity of Stimlje at approximately 0700 hours. The towns of Belince, Racak, Petrovo and Malopoljce came under attack. Fighting and shelling were heavy throughout the day. This attack follows the VJ/MUP build-up in the area which occurred last week after the KLA ambushed a MUP patrol. It follows on the heels of the VJ/MUP engagement of KLA forces for several days in the Decane area. It is expected that this battle will continue tomorrow. KVM patrols are, for the most part, being denied access to the battle area."

Now, that's a quite specific series of observations by OSCE about shelling throughout the day and where. Are you saying this is completely false?

A. The only thing that is correct here is that Racak was dealt with in an anti-terrorist sense. Everything else is not correct. I don't know what the purpose of this is, but it is pure untruth, and I claim again and state that not a single soldier was engaged in this anti-terrorist operation. The verifiers were informed. They were at the posts as of 7.00 a.m. Later on, at 10.00, another Verification Mission vehicle arrived and they were there throughout the day while this operation lasted at the observation post. And that particular vehicle, after the attack launched by the terrorists against the police who were in Racak, it drove down into Racak.

If they are objective, if they are even a little objective, they ⁴⁵¹³² should have told the truth. And the truth is this: The truth is that it was only the forces of the MUP who entered the area of Racak, that it was a pure police operation, that the terrorists -- they started to arrest the terrorists, however, a clash broke out, a conflict, and what happened happened. There was no shelling, and I state again - I state again - that not a single shell fell on Racak. Had it fallen, some of the policemen would probably have been killed, some of the men who were there --

Q. Let's --

A. -- at 11.00.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, the OSCE would have received this by way of a report. It says RC5 reported so-and-so.

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Who is RC5?

MR. NICE: It's Regional Centre 5. It's their team.

JUDGE ROBINSON: It's their team.

MR. NICE: Yes. If Your Honour looks -- remembers the maps with the squares, the various observation teams are described by RC1, RC2, RC3, RC4.

JUDGE ROBINSON: They are getting reports from their own teams.

MR. NICE: Their own people, yes. Of course, they sometimes report what they have been informed.

Q. So I'm not inviting you to attribute --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness repeat his answer, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Please repeat what you just said.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The information was received mostly ⁴⁵¹³³ from the citizens, from citizens of Albanian ethnicity living in that area.

JUDGE ROBINSON: So for that reason you're saying it would be coloured?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not only for that reason but I do claim and state that, objectively speaking, it was only in Racak that things happened that happened, but not as it is written down there. There was no shelling. Yes, the police did enter. Yes, they did search the terrain. Yes, they did fight with the terrorists. Yes, a certain number of terrorists did die in the clash with the police, but there was no shelling until 11.00. At 11.00 there was a cannonade from mortars coming from the Luzak area, Petrovo and that Crni Put as they call it, from the direction of Petrovo and Malopoljce. The first shell that fell was a mine from a 60-millimetre mortar, theirs, their mine.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Janicevic, you said that there were a couple of VJ positions around Racak, one in -- one to the north of Racak, which is the position of 243rd Motorised Brigade, and one to the east of Racak. I don't remember the name of the hill, but they were positioned there. Could you give me the total strength --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right.

JUDGE KWON: -- of VJ which were positioned around Racak?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Around Racak?

JUDGE KWON: Yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were two combat groups, one at the very entrance in Belince, which is 3 to 400 metres away from the ⁴⁵¹³⁴ entrance to Racak. Next to the police checkpoint that was there, there was also a military checkpoint, and it served to protect the communication lines, the roads, because that's where there were frequent attacks launched by terrorists; on roads, on military convoys, patrols, police patrols, and citizens. So that was -- they had a Praga there. How many men man a Praga, I don't know. Probably four or five. And there was another checkpoint at the hill called Kostanje which is about two and a half to three kilometres away from Racak. So that's where they were. They were above the church and school building in Stimlje. And that's where the observers were of the Verification Mission, next to them on that location, and next to the others too.

JUDGE KWON: They had Pragas; did they have a tank as well?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether they had a tank. All I know is that they had two Pragas at both checkpoints. There was Praga at each point. But those points were not established that day, set up that day. They were checkpoints that had been there for a month prior to that.

JUDGE KWON: So you do not say that they didn't have a tank. You don't know whether they had a tank or not.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether they did or not. I was informed that it was a question of Pragas being there on both those points.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. I thought you were only 200 metres from Racak, from where you ⁴⁵¹³⁵ would be able to see where they were. So either they did or they didn't have tanks. Which is it? Or wasn't there a window in the police station that gave you a view?

A. Please, this way we will never be able to reach the end. Could you please put a map up so that I can show you where Racak was, where the access roads were, et cetera. When I arrived at the police station in Stimlje on the hill of Kostanje, I saw a police patrol and a military patrol, a military checkpoint which was there, which had been there a month before that, and it was supposed to protect that part of Stimlje from possible attacks by the terrorists.

The other checkpoint was at the pass near Belince, facing Racak. That's where the Praga was.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10:32 a.m.

--- Upon resuming at 10:57 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I want to move on to -- I'm staying chronological wherever I can, but I want to play, to remind us, extracts from a Defence video which is said to be the Reuters Defence video for the 15th of January. That's the way it's been indexed, I think. And at the time that it was produced we hadn't made any inquiries. I'll explain what our current position is when we've had a look at it and I've asked a few questions, but I'd ask Mr. Reid to play selections of this, or organise the playing of selections of this on Sanction just to remind you of what it contained in general terms, and we'll stop at the place where the OSCE ⁴⁵¹³⁶ vehicles are said to be seen.

Q. Perhaps you'd look at this, please, Mr. Janicevic.

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE:

Q. Just pausing there. That thing is said to be, although it doesn't show up very well, the OSCE vehicles, and we can see vertical structures beside them and a building to the left.

I'll go back to the beginning and we'll just look at various clips from this.

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE: That's an overview in daylight hours of the village. Here we see a vehicle going through the village, again daylight, armed.

Q. Now, this is a video that's been played to us in the course of the Defence as coming from Reuters and as relating to the 15th of January. Do you know one way or another if that was taken on the 15th of January or on a subsequent day?

A. I think that it was on the 15th of January, because on the following day we did not have any access to the village. The next day, the village never entered -- the police never entered the village.

Q. You see, Mr. Janicevic, just as a matter of detail to help you and to remind the Court, the way this has been provided to us is without soundtrack, so we don't know what the broadcasters were saying. There's plenty of material, I accept, not only coming from you but also from Radosavljevic in his interview and possibly even elsewhere, to suggest that Reuters and AP and other journalists may have been around on the ⁴⁵¹³⁷ 15th, but at present Reuters are unable to accept, I understand, that they had any footage on the 15th. So we're left in a state of uncertainty as to where this material comes from.

With that information, and I think I'm giving you all the information that's available to me, when we saw the soldiers moving through the village, of course they were armed but there was either little or no sound of fighting or anything of that sort, and it looked not exactly peaceful but it looked comparatively safe, from what we could see. Can you explain at what time of day this was or anything else about what it is we've been asked to look at by the Defence, because it's a Defence video. Can you tell us what it really shows?

A. Well, I don't know what else to say to you. We can see that it's daylight, most probably in the morning hours. The verifiers' vehicles can be seen here. I'm not mistaken, two or three of them at the same spot, as far as I can see on the picture that we can see now, that is.

Q. There is, of course, no guarantee that the vehicles, even if this is the 15th, there is no way of asserting or knowing at what time the OSCE vehicles got into position. And if I were to suggest to you that OSCE monitors Marcusson, Giovanni, Fantini and Rose Jendensten, and maybe others, didn't locate until about 10.45 in the morning, would you accept that?

A. Well, perhaps some of them didn't arrive, but I claim that two vehicles of the verifiers were up there by the checkpoint, this police checkpoint here, at 7.00 in the morning, and also on the road to Kostanje. Two vehicles belonging to the verifying mission were there at 7.00 in the ⁴⁵¹³⁸ morning. Later on, I was informed that at about 10.00 another vehicle came and positioned itself there. It's probably that person called Giovanni as you said just now.

Q. And you see the -- do you know what is meant by "hill 685," by the way? It may be an OSCE reference rather than a reference you may understand. Do you understand what they would be referring to by "hill 685"?

A. Probably an elevation, but I don't know which one.

Q. And you see, I'm going to suggest to you that, as we saw in their report for the 24 hours of the 15th of January, throughout the afternoon they saw tanks and mortars firing towards Petrovo, Malopoljce. Do you accept that that was happening?

A. No. No, I do not accept that because that's not the way it was. There was shooting, there was mortar fire, but from the other side. I skimmed through this statement now. Shukri Buja himself says that mortar fire started around 11.00 from the direction of Petrovo, firing at Racak. There was mortar fire indeed.

Q. Well, let's look at Shukri Buja's statement next, still staying with the 15th of January. And it's about page 12, I think, in the English, my version still being slightly different from the one on the screen, but never mind. And the way, in summary, Shukri Buja analyses the day is that he says: "On the morning of the 15th --" next page, please. No, bottom of the page, thank you. On the morning of the 15th, the shooting began about 6.00 to 7.00. They were in a bunker. They had soldiers there. He said that the Serbs got to their positions -- next ⁴⁵¹³⁹ paragraph. Yes, it's there. That they -- three rounds were fired from his gun to signal there was a problem -- from their gun, the KLA gun, to signal that there was problem. Enver got killed pretty well immediately. This is at the bottom of the page. There were 47 soldiers there since October to November 1998.

If we go over the page, please, Mr. Nort. Then he explains that -- third paragraph: The soldiers left the house and headed for their positions, were sure that their army would be there. They were in a crossfire. They tried to escape. Those that survived managed to get over the hill to Luzac. Then the unit commander, Afet Bilalli, nicknamed Qopa, as you've told us, was shot and injured. Now, all of that, no reason to doubt his accuracy there, is there?

A. Shukri Buja is partly telling the truth, that --

Q. Which part of it is untrue?

A. Well, if I understood this correctly, because I didn't understand the translation sufficiently. Could you please give me a reference in the Serbian text so I can follow it. You read out an entire page and now I'm supposed to remember all of that.

Q. Let's see if we can find it for you just a little bit more slowly. If you go to your page 12, and if you look at the -- first of all, if you look at the second paragraph on that page, you will see the description of their having 47 soldiers there since November 1998. In the paragraph above that you'll see the reference to the bunker and to the heavy machine-gun in the bunker. If you go to the foot of the page, you'll see a description of the soldiers leaving the house and getting caught in ⁴⁵¹⁴⁰ crossfire. And if you go over the page, you'll see, I think, maybe at the foot of that page, you'll see a reference to Qopa being injured. Is there any part of this that is actually untrue or is this conceivably completely accurate, subject always to such difficulties as there are --

A. Apart from the number of soldiers. Apart from that, I think that what else Shukri Buja said was correct. The number of soldiers, according to our verified information, was 80 in the area of Racak.

Q. If we to over to what is I think still page 13 on the English and 13 in your version, please, we see -- further down or the next page, Mr. Nort, I think, maybe. Mr. Nort, next page, please. I think. Top of the page. Sorry, it is the foot of the previous page. My mistake. Last paragraph on the previous page.

And for you, Mr. Janicevic, page 13. You'll see at the top of the page a reference to Sadik Mujota, where he says this: "Another two soldiers, Sadik Mujota, from Mullopolc, was staying with his relative and also a soldier Mehmet Mustafa, 62 ... in Racak, this house is located above Sala Mustafa's house and the command is located below it in the direction of the village. They were leaving the house for the direction of the shooting when they were shot. They were attached to the Racak unit. When the firing started it was the duty of all soldiers to go to the command and that is what they were doing at the time." And then this: "After Sadik was killed, his 15-year-old daughter, Hanumshahe, was killed while running to him. She fell on top of him. She is the only civilian that is buried with the soldiers." ⁴⁵¹⁴¹ Now, no reason to doubt him on that, is there?

A. There is reason to doubt that this was a civilian. Secondly, have you thought about where Sadik Mujota came from? He's from the village of Malopoljce. Malopoljce is two and a half kilometres away from Racak. What was he doing in Racak? He and his son and his daughter, we had information that from the very beginning, from mid-1998, were in the terrorist organisation of the KLA. All three of them.

Q. You see, there's no challenge that -- sorry, Your Honour?

JUDGE BONOMY: It says that plainly. Where is the problem?

MR. NICE:

Q. You see, Mr. Janicevic, there is no doubt that Sadik Mujota, who the Serbs regarded as a very serious terrorist, we know that, was a member of the KLA. What's in dispute, maybe, is whether his 15-year-old daughter Hanumshahe was a civilian or a member of the KLA. Now, he says she was innocent. She was running towards him. He was staying in the village. Isn't he right about that?

A. Mr. Nice, I'm saying yet again we had information to the effect that Sadik Mujota, his son, and his daughter all belonged to the KLA. That they were in Racak, that they were in Racak where they belonged to the substaff of the Racak group of the KLA.

Q. Well, indeed there are documents going to suggest that his daughter is - or was - involved in the KLA, and we'll be taking you to those in due course, but what do you say was the level of your intelligence about her being a member of the KLA? Remind us or remind yourself and tell us. ⁴⁵¹⁴²

A. On the basis of what I know, I assert that she was a member of the KLA.

Q. Detail -- Mr. Janicevic --

A. And I assert that she was a bit older than 15, Mr. Nice.

Q. On any reckoning, this was a young woman or a teenager who is dead. So would you --

A. Yes, with a rifle in her hands.

Q. Will you please do us or her memory the courtesy of giving us the detail of why you say she was a member of the KLA when the KLA commander says she wasn't. The detail, if you please.

A. Mr. Nice, the commander of the KLA says that nine KLA soldiers were killed in Racak, and he said that he had 47 soldiers. I am telling you that from their Staff we have operative information that there were about 80 members of the KLA in Racak and that the girl in question, who regrettably got killed in this clash with the police, got killed in the clash, was together with her brother and her father, a member of this terrorist group.

Q. Maybe I didn't make myself clear. I'd like you, please, to give us the detail of why it is you say she's a member of the KLA. If the answer is you can't, say so and we'll move on.

A. Sir, I've told you on the basis of which information I'm stating that. Operative information and intelligence indicated that, that she was a member of the KLA, too, and we've looked at that in the previous documents. Why would somebody say that someone was a member of a terrorist organisation if that person was not a member? ^{45143 BLANK PAGE 45144}

JUDGE BONOMY: Can you direct us to the document in which it's recorded that she was a member of the KLA?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot direct you this instant because there's about a hundred statements that indicate that, that only talk about this Racak group. We've already been through that.

MR. NICE: I'll take Your Honour to the --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Janicevic, how do you know she had a gun with her when she got killed?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not see whether she had a rifle in her hands, but she certainly would not have got killed had she not had a rifle in her hands. Nobody would have shot at her if she didn't have a rifle in her hands. Had we found anything out along those lines, either I or the commanding officer in Racak, measures would have been taken against a person who would have shot at an unarmed person.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. Let -- can we stay for a minute with one other paragraph - you've already looked at it - on Shukri Buja's statement. It's on the same page. Little bit further down, I think. Can you move the page down, please, Mr. Nort. Maybe the next page. There we are. That's fine. In this statement, as you've already explained, Shukri Buja identifies nine KLA soldiers killed in Racak, and indeed you can look elsewhere and there's a reference to others who were killed elsewhere at the same general time. You know, don't you, that dying for the KLA was a matter of honour for many people. Don't you? ⁴⁵¹⁴⁵

A. It's a matter for honour for who, Mr. Nice?

Q. It's a matter of honour --

A. I mean, a matter of honour? Well, I am telling you that at least 50 per cent of KLA members were forced into going out to fight. There is information to that effect. There is intelligence. Call other witnesses. Call other Albanians. Protect them. I'm telling you that they will tell them what happened -- tell you what happened.

Q. We've seen books of the glorious fall of the KLA. We've heard accounts or we've discussed accounts of people wanting to be credited as dying for the KLA even when they had not done so, possibly because they could get a pension or financial benefits. There were many reasons why people would want to be described as dying, when they did die in battle, for the KLA. Do you accept that?

A. They certainly did die.

Q. You see --

A. Many certainly did die.

Q. What I want your help with is this, if you possibly can, it's why I asked you the question I did at the beginning that Mr. Kay objected to: We see in his statement made in 2001 that Shukri Buja identified nine people of the KLA who died in battle on the 15th of January. He makes it clear that none of the other people who died in Racak, the 40-odd people who were found in Racak dead, were members of the KLA. I want you to help us, if you can, with whether there's any reason you can think of why those who died gloriously in battle, or even if not gloriously, in battle, should not be credited with their correct KLA status. Can you think of ⁴⁵¹⁴⁶ any reason?

A. Are you sure that this status had not been credited them?

Q. If you think of a reason in the course of your answering questions to me, don't hesitate to interrupt me and we'll come back to that topic.

MR. NICE: Now, with the Court's leave, I want to ask this witness some questions about what --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I just say something now in relation to this question, this question that you put to me just now?

Q. Yes.

A. I had occasion to view the funeral in Racak when Walker came to the mosque, when 40 coffins were lined up with the bodies of the persons who died in the terrorist -- anti-terrorist operation. All the coffins were covered with an Albanian flag, the Albanian flag, all of them. That happens only when a soldier is killed, a policeman, or a state official in the interests of the state.

Q. You made that point a couple of days ago or yesterday, and what you're suggesting is that there would have been some pride, if your account is right, there would be some pride in them dying for the cause. Can you think of any reason why these people and their bereaved relations would not claim them to have been KLA activists in death, especially if that role would bring them financial benefit in the form of pension? Can you think of any reason, Mr. Janicevic, why people would do that?

A. You mean would they be proud after their death, after they had died? That's how I understood your question.

Q. Yes. ⁴⁵¹⁴⁷

A. Is there reason for these people who got killed not to be proud of the fact that they died for the KLA?

MR. NICE: I'm going to move on. I've given him a chance to deal with it.

JUDGE BONOMY: Could you tell me, please, if Shukri Buja's statement was drafted after the indictment was public?

MR. NICE: Yes, certainly.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MR. NICE: But of course it was taken on the usual terms, certainly.

Your Honours, I wish to ask this witness some questions about what Goran Radosavljevic said in an interview, for his comments on those answers. We have a copy that can go on the overhead projector. The Court will remember that I've played to other witnesses what Goran Radosavljevic said to "The Death of Yugoslavia" interviewers, and I don't think there's any need to repeat that material. It will be in the Court's mind, having heard it twice.

In light of the Court's practice, I am of course not seeking to put this material in as an exhibit, simply to have the witness's comment on the answers given.

Q. While we're getting it positioned on the screen, Mr. Janicevic, when did you last speak to Goran Radosavljevic?

A. The end of 2000.

Q. To your knowledge, is he still alive and well?

A. I know that he's alive. I don't know whether he is well. That's ⁴⁵¹⁴⁸ a relative thing.

MR. NICE: If the video booth could focus, to assist our reading, on the bottom right-hand sector of this double page and enlarge it.

Q. In the course of interview, and you'll see the format of this interview, Mr. Janicevic, we have both the English and the interpretation. So it's possible to see the whole interview as it's played out with sequential interpretation.

He was asked: "The next topic is basically the Racak interview -- Racak issue." And asked: "If you could describe, give us an overview of what the planning for Racak and the conduct of the operation?" You will then see --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, because there's a controversy as to the correctness of this interpretation, how about seeing the video ourselves?

MR. NICE: This is not a video -- it may be a video. This is an OTP interview.

JUDGE KWON: I see.

MR. NICE: And it is a transcription of both the English and of the B/C/S spoken by the interviewee.

JUDGE KWON: I see. Thank you.

MR. NICE: What happens is you have the interviewer asking the questions, you then have the -- as we're looking at it there on the screen, you have Mr. Coo asking, "If you could describe, give us an overview ..." You have the observation -- you have the interpreter putting that --

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. ⁴⁵¹⁴⁹

MR. NICE: -- then you have the reply. And if we then turn over the page in the English, please, we have the answer: "Based on the information that would arrive as was the case with the paper that we just saw."

Now, if we go down the page a little bit, what he says is this -- that's fine, thank you very much. He's asked the question: "Based on the fact that it was known --" Sorry, he makes the answer: "Based on the fact that it was known that a certain family from the village killed many members of the police." He then went on to say: "It was decided on a joint action of the police and the army against this village so we would attempt to reach the terrorists to get their equipment."

Q. Do you accept what is recorded in this interview, that it was a joint operation, a joint action of the police and the army?

A. I do not accept, and I don't see any reason for Goran Radosavljevic to say this. First of all, if it had been a joint operation of the army and police, the police would never have had to leave Racak at 1500 hours after a strong counter-attack by the terrorists, if the army had been helping them.

Around 150 policemen were involved. Around 400 terrorists mounted a counter-attack, and that's why the police had to withdraw.

Q. Well, he deals with the reason for the army's involvement a little later, but if the video booth and Mr. Nort would take us to the top right-hand part of this double sheet, he's asked: "Just before we go into it. Do you recall where the intelligence came from or the information that you based the operation on?" And his answer is: "The Secretariats ⁴⁵¹⁵⁰ in Urosevac."

Do you agree with that answer?

A. I have no choice but to repeat myself a hundred times. I told you that my secretariat made a draft operations plan relying on prior intelligence and information about the activities of the terrorist organisation. The MUP staff approved this plan and the operation itself. A member of the Staff was appointed to lead this action. He was also appointed leader of the Operative Pursuit Group. There's nothing disputable about that.

Q. We go to --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, I don't follow this interpretation. It seems that Radosavljevic spoke a bit longer than "The secretariats in Urosevac."

MR. NICE: Yes. What you get is his answer, the interpreter says: "The secretariats in Urosevac"; he says, "Prizren"; the interpreter says, "Prizren"; from, he says --

JUDGE KWON: The sentence which precedes "The secretariats in Urosevac" contains something related to Pristina and Pristina?

MR. NICE: That's correct, absolutely right, because what's happening is you're getting exactly what flows -- what comes from the tape, and so that he speaks in his own language, the interpreter starts the process of interpretation, he interrupts, "Prizren," and so the interpreter says "Prizren." He then says "State Security," he then says "and Military Intelligence Service." So that if and when it happens that the interviewee speaks over -- ⁴⁵¹⁵¹

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

MR. NICE: I'm sorry, I'm addressing the Court.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice is addressing the Court, so when he has finished, Mr. Milosevic, we'll hear from Mr. Milosevic.

MR. NICE: You're getting exactly what's coming. There's no summarising, it's exactly what words come onto the tape. And in this particular example it would appear to be the case that the interpreter gives an answer, saying, "The secretariats in Urosevac," and Radosavljevic corrects that answer. And we can see why as well, because if you look at the answer given from "Iz Podrucnih..." et cetera, he makes no reference there in the first part to Urosevac. He makes reference to, apparently, Pristina and it's corrected to Prizren.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, you wanted to say something.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon noticed the difference, the discrepancy between the lengths of answers in Serbian and in English, and I think it would be a logical solution to let the witness read the sentence so we can see what the matter is.

The sentence is: "From local secretariats, that is secretariat of Pristina or, rather, not secretariat of Pristina but the secretariat in Urosevac." And the interpreter only says "The secretariat in Urosevac." That's what the sentence in Serbian says. And then the conversation goes on, but it's just a continuation, it's not a correction of what was said previously.

MR. NICE: It seems to me the accused is right on that, that that's the answer that's given. ⁴⁵¹⁵²

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

MR. NICE: Can we go to the next page very briefly and then, more significantly, to the page after.

Q. The next page, bottom right-hand corner, one detail here. That's fine.

In the interview he says, through the interpreter: "They were told that there were no civilians in the village." Is it right that you were told - is this your position - that there were no civilians in the village or did you know there were civilians in the village? Tell us.

A. We knew that there was a total of about 50 civilians in the village.

Q. Thank you. Can we go to the next page, bottom left-hand sector to begin with, and we see PC, Mr. Coo, saying: "The next steps, you had the meeting, you developed this plan. What would the next step be to transform this plan into an order?" The question is interpreted. Mr. Radosavljevic gives an answer which is to this effect: "After the meeting all the participants that were in charge of their units signed the plan." He then said: "Since the VJ and the MUP participated, one plan went to the Joint Command."

So he uses the word "Joint Command." He goes on to say: "And as far as I know, this plan was approved."

Do you agree with the two parts of that answer given by Mr. Radosavljevic, first that both parts signed the plan; and second, that the plan went to the Joint Command for approval?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Will the Chamber give me leave to ⁴⁵¹⁵³ explain where this plan was made and where it was approved and who approved it in order not to be engulfed in these lies, because Goran Radosavljevic is lying, and I'll explain even why he's lying. May I, Your Honour?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, go ahead.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think it was on the 12th of January. Prior to that, operative intelligence was sent to the MUP staff in Pristina about the events taking place in Stimlje municipality on the axis towards Dulje, in the Crnoljevo gorge, and on the Pristina-Urosevac road.

On the 12th, at my briefing with my commanders, I agreed that we would make a draft plan for an anti-terrorist action to be submitted to the Staff in Urosevac because we knew by that time that there was a large terrorist group of about 80 men headed by Afet Bilalli, nicknamed Qopa, who were mounting daily attacks on the road, targeting anything that moves. They were kidnapping innocent people, stopping traffic, attacking police and army convoys. The last in the series of attacks was the attack on Slivovo village where policeman Przic was killed. I sent this plan to Pristina, to the MUP staff.

I asked leave from the Chamber to explain how the plan was made, and the president of the Chamber allowed me to do so. May I continue?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Come to the point, yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I arrived at the Staff, I presented this plan in the presence of Staff Commander Lukic and head of department Vlastimir Djordjevic. I told them about everything that was ⁴⁵¹⁵⁴ going on. They had known some of this information from before. They looked at the plan, and they accepted it.

Goran Radosavljevic, as Staff member, was appointed to lead this action. The action was agreed to take police on the 13th. However, on the 13th, it was not carried out because the weather did not allow it. It was too cold and there were other problems as well. We postponed it until the 15th.

On the 14th, in the evening, at the office of the head of SUP, that's where I was, in addition to company commanders, the chief of the police station was invited, Goran Radosavljevic as well, as well as the leader of the Operative Pursuit Group and platoon commanders, and Colonel --

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't hear which colonel.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- who was only invited to acquaint himself with the plan. There was no signing. Nobody signed. Radosavljevic, the Colonel Krsman Jelic, or anybody else. The plan was only approved, and the approval process is done on the map, including the participation of the head of department, because all the pre-conditions had been created for mounting this anti-terrorist operation and for eliminating this terrorist group that had already wielded a lot of evil in this area.

Goran Radosavljevic appointed his deputy, late Mr. Mekic, to lead this group, and he appeared in this area at 3.30. He hadn't been there before. He had radio communication with his subordinates before, but he only showed up on the spot at 3.30. ⁴⁵¹⁵⁵ The Operative Pursuit Group was on the positions that they had occupied in the morning, and they were told to go down, although it had been previously agreed for them to hold those positions until the on-site investigation team arrived. As soon as they did, the terrorist attack on a huge scale started. I had never seen anything like it before. They were shooting from all sides, and the policemen on the on-site investigation team had to pull out quickly.

MR. NICE:

Q. Rather move away from the issues that we were dealing with and I'll come back to your description of the attack shortly, but Radosavljevic was your superior, wasn't he? Goran Radosavljevic was your superior?

A. He was not exactly my superior, but he was the superior of that anti-terrorist group that mounted the operation.

Q. Can you give any explanation for how he, out of his own mouth, refers to a body in place in January 1999 known as the Joint Command?

A. Goran Radosavljevic was a major on the police force at the time, and he was leader of the Operative Pursuit Group. I don't know the answer to your question. You would have to ask him. I really don't know.

MR. NICE: Next page, please, Mr. Nort.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Janicevic, did you say that Colonel Krsman Jelic was the only person that participated at the meeting on the 14th from VJ?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. The only representative of the army of Yugoslavia as commander of the 243rd Motorised Brigade who attended this meeting only for information purposes, ⁴⁵¹⁵⁶ to acquaint himself with the plan of the operation to avoid friendly fire during the operation.

JUDGE KWON: Nobody else.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Nobody else. I claim that with full responsibility.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. If we can go to the next page, left-hand side, middle of the page. Mr. Coo asked Radosavljevic: "You recall -- I know that you don't know the VJ unit name -" something he dealt with earlier - "but the type of units, were the VJ providing infantry or artillery or tanks or all of the above?" And he said, "I think it was a tank unit. They had other armoured vehicles within it also."

Right about that, was he?

A. There was an artillery tank unit that was part of the border battalion, as far as I know and as far as I understand things military.

Q. Can we go on one, two -- can we go on four pages, please, Mr. Nort. One, two, three, four. And if I can just look at the top to make sure we're at the right place. Yes.

Halfway down that page, on the left-hand side, Mr. Coo asked Radosavljevic: "Why was it necessary --" further down. That's fine. "Why was it necessary to have VJ infantry as well? Was there not sufficient MUP personnel to do this?" Answer: "Yes. The police didn't have enough men."

Is that the truth of why this joint plan went to the Joint ⁴⁵¹⁵⁷ Command?

A. No, Mr. Nice. The police had 130 men involved in that anti-terrorist operation, and according to plan, there was not a single one more. That was enough to perform this assignment and to eliminate the activity of this terrorist group, because we opted for a different system of blockade and encirclement.

Q. Then finally, on the bottom right-hand side of this sheet, please, I think you'll agree with this material: " ... General Djordjevic was close to the scene, was he in a police station or a command post?" And Radosavljevic said: "I later heard he was in the police station, and I met him at night in the evening."

Next page, top left-hand corner, please, Mr. Nort. "Which police station was that?"

"The police station in Stimlje, which was the closest police station."

Then a couple of questions further down: "General Lukic, was he in the immediate area of the operation ..." Answer: "I think he was in the Staff, because I talked to him through the radio a few times." Do you agree with all that about Djordjevic and Lukic?

A. Lukic was at the Staff and Djordjevic was at the Staff too.

Q. And at the police station --

A. But -- may I just explain, please. At 11.00, Djordjevic came to the police station in Stimlje with his driver. He came to make inquiries, to find out how the operation was coming along, and at 11.30 he left for Pristina. Therefore, Goran Radosavljevic had not the slightest chance to ⁴⁵¹⁵⁸ meet him at the police station in Stimlje.

General Djordjevic spent 30 minutes at the police station all in all.

Q. What about contacts with --

A. He didn't even sit down.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... did you make phone calls to Mr. Sainovic or did --

A. What contact?

Q. Were there phone calls made to Sainovic from your police station?

A. I have never spoken to Sainovic in my life.

Q. Were you aware of his speaking to anybody else at your police station?

A. Nobody from the police station, no. No, not from the police station.

Q. The position is that there had to be a joint operation and a Joint Command because of the believed, and indeed accurately believed, presence of KLA in villages other than at Racak. They had to be pinned down, didn't they, if you were to get into Racak, to stop them coming to the Defence of those in Racak?

A. That's not true.

Q. If you look at your own Defence tab 13, you had 60 in Rance, 200 in Petrovo, 40 in Malopoljce, a hundred in Racak, and 50 in Luzak, you couldn't go into Racak without defending yourselves against what the KLA from those neighbouring locations might do, could you?

A. Since you don't know the configuration of the terrain, you keep ^{45159 BLANK PAGE 45160} saying such things. I'm telling you that we could do that. The police was there -- the police who were there from 6.30 onwards were able to protect the on-site investigation team and prevent anyone else from entering the village. However, due to a mistake in command, it so happened that the terrorists were able to reoccupy the positions that they had been driven away from before 6.00 a.m.

Q. Indeed, if you looked at, or if we look at Shukri Buja's statement, he makes it quite clear that in the middle of the day they were defeated, but by the end of the day they'd retaken positions. Do you agree with that observation of him?

You can find that in the English version at about page 14 in a paragraph beginning: "At 11.30 hours I gave the order to regain the positions." And you'll find that, I think, at the foot of page 13.

A. I found it.

Q. So he describes defeat, retreat, and retaking of positions. He's right about that, isn't he?

A. Retaking of positions. It was due to the error made by the commander leading the operation.

Q. But as a matter of fact, in Shukri Buja's analysis of what happened on the 15th, where he says that the KLA were caught by surprise, a number got killed, they withdrew, they then retook positions at 11.30, he's accurate in his description of what happened.

A. Yes. His description is correct, but look at the paragraph before that. The soldiers were coming into Luzak one after the other, and the stories were so confusing that some said that only three to four survived ⁴⁵¹⁶¹ and the rest were killed.

If several or maybe dozens fled from the front line and the rest were killed, what would that have meant?

Q. Shall we go on to the next paragraph but two and then I think I'm finished with Mr. Buja's statement probably. There may be a couple of points, but if we look on a couple of paragraphs we see -- it will be either further down the page, Mr. Nort, or the next page. Next page, please.

And for you, Mr. Janicevic, it will be on page 14, I think, where at the top or in the middle it says these two things: First it says, "The deputy commander reported that the second plan of action was achieved that the Luzak border was controlled. We concluded that the Serb Forces were not going to fight through the night, and we decided to attack at 1600 hours to regain the positions and to find our missing soldiers. It was not the first time that the Serbs did this. It was characteristic of them not to fight throughout the night. They usually just shelled areas after dark."

Is he right about that? Is that the way the VJ operated?

A. Not true. I have explained how it came about that the police left Racak and that the terrorists were able to retake their positions from which they had mounted that attack.

Q. Well, one thing is clear, that following their retreat and temporary defeat, they retook possession of the territory, and they remained in possession, because when we see the video the following day of Ambassador Walker and General Drewienkiewicz and others observing the ⁴⁵¹⁶² bodies, we know that there were KLA soldiers present. So they regained the territory, and they kept it, didn't they, for the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, I want now to go to some of the documents in the collection of Racak documents. I don't know if the Chamber has brought those with them, but we'll lay them on the overhead projector if not. And I want in a minute to go back to that document we were looking at yesterday, but I want to explore your knowledge, please, Mr. Janicevic, on the 15th. You were at the police station. I accept it's only a couple hundred metres away from the beginnings of Racak, although there's a hill, I think, there. What was your source of information in the course of that day as to what happened?

A. Information that I received through radio communication from the participants in the action.

Q. Very well. And when did you return to Urosevac police station, what time?

A. Sometime around 1900 hours. I can't remember exactly, but towards evening.

Q. Was that after the return of the various forces from the area, the police forces?

A. The police forces stayed in the area. Just one platoon returned, and that one was attacked, by the village of Kosare, I think it was, while they were returning to the police station, from a hand-held rocket launcher.

Q. Would you like to look at this document, which I think we looked ⁴⁵¹⁶³ at yesterday. This is tab 5 of the Racak documents, but it is, as an exhibit, 156, tab 16; alternatively 320, tab 27. Now, Mr. Janicevic, this is a document of yours, isn't it?

A. I said yesterday that that was so.

Q. Sent at 1932 hours in the evening.

A. Yes.

Q. Why didn't you produce this document to us as one of your documents? Because you didn't.

THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness repeat his answer.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Please repeat the answer, Mr. Janicevic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because I didn't have it. I wasn't in possession of it, Your Honour, this document, and so I -- and I couldn't find it in the archives of the Urosevac SUP either.

MR. NICE:

Q. You looked for it, did you?

A. Well, I didn't ask for this document specifically. I asked for all the documents that would be relevant to these proceedings, but this document wasn't there.

Q. This one simply wasn't there, was it? It's a document of the kind that had to be retained, didn't it? Because it was indeed produced, I think, to the Prosecution in various ways.

A. Yes.

Q. So it was just a mistake, then, in your records; is that right?

A. Yes, Mr. Nice. Had we stayed at the positions we were until 1999, all the documents would be here. All the documents would be in their ⁴⁵¹⁶⁴ proper place. But unfortunately, we weren't able to stay on there and so most of the documents were lost without any trace. And what you managed to find in the ministry, the headquarters of the ministry, or the centre, communications centre, that's it, and perhaps some other document which the members of the police had taken with their personal archives and the cases that they were involved in and that they were issued and needed to return.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be given a copy of that document to have a look at it, please?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Did you have it?

JUDGE KWON: It was given yesterday.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, I don't have it.

MR. NICE: Well, I can't keep producing it every day, the same thing.

JUDGE KWON: It was produced long ago in the Racak binder.

JUDGE ROBINSON: It was produced in the Racak binder.

MR. NICE: I don't think I have a spare hard copy for him today. He'll have to watch it on the overhead projector.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Judge Kwon will make his available to you, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. NICE: And I did invite the parties, including the accused, to bring their Racak papers.

Q. You see, this was sent to Belgrade, wasn't it. Crime ⁴⁵¹⁶⁵ investigation administration, police administration, operations centre Belgrade. This would be a document kept in multiple copies, wouldn't it?

A. Of course there ought to be multiple copies. Under normal conditions, of course.

Q. If we look at what's said on it as a document coming from you -- let's see what is said. On the first page, reference to 0300 hours. The next paragraph, that the battle with terrorists lasting until 1530 hours. The terrorist group was liquidated with maximum effort. Reference to the encircling operation and an injured policeman, Trajkovic. Then the reference to the horseshoe ambush that we covered yesterday. We'll just look at the second half of that, so I'll read the paragraph: "The horseshoe ambush was applied in the blockade and it was laid between the villages of Luznica and Rance, behind terrorist trenches and connecting trenches. During action by the unit and attempts to arrest members of the terrorist gang, police fell into the ambush. They opened fire at the same time and after some hours of fighting they were liquidated. Even though they'd been called on to surrender, none of the terrorists wanted to do so."

Can you just explain the meaning of that paragraph and the basis of your information on which it was based.

A. Well, the dispatch explains it. There's just an error in the fact that it's not Luznica but Luzak and Rance.

Q. Yes. So that takes us to a slightly different part of -- or a significantly different part of the territory, but what you're describing is -- we can't see it on this map, we can only see it on the bigger map -- ⁴⁵¹⁶⁶ efforts to arrest the terrorist gang, but even though called on, they didn't want to surrender. What does that mean?

A. It means that they took up arms and opened fire at the police.

Q. So in the trenches.

A. On the trenches and from the houses and from the yards, from the street.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... that? Where's the reference, please, to houses, yards, and streets in this report of yours made the same day on the basis of information coming to you?

A. This is a preliminary report. You see it says here that about 60 members were liquidated. It's still not a report after an on-site investigation having been conducted.

Q. Are we going to find a report of yours that says something about the locations of the places where people died, or will it always read as though they died in the trenches, Mr. Janicevic?

A. How do you mean "always read that they died in the trenches"?

Q. Did you ever set out an account based on information suggesting that these people who were found had died in streets and in yards and in houses? Did you ever?

A. I'm not a man of letters, an author to write stories. I wrote reports on the basis -- or, rather, to my superior command about what I received from the people who took part in the action.

Q. All right. So let's go to the next paragraph of this document that you didn't bring with you, which starts off with: "About 60 members of the Albanian terrorist gangs were liquidated." ⁴⁵¹⁶⁷ Well, 60 is a bit much because -- no, it's not, actually, if you add the KLA nine plus the 40-odd of the people who were found, it's getting up towards 60. How did you get the figure of 60 on the very day, the 15th of January, when you hadn't seen the bodies yourself, please?

A. On the basis of the report that my subordinates provided. On the basis of assumptions of the anti-terrorist actions that had been completed. And if you read what it says at the end here, you'll see. These are not the exact data, not the right facts, that an investigation would take place and that after an on-site investigation has taken place the number of killed members of terrorist bands would be ascertained.

Q. You see, it is quite close, isn't it? It's quite close, 60 to about 50, the mid-50s, of people who died in Racak in the course of that day's operation.

Tell us, did individual soldiers from whom we haven't heard report, "I think killed two people here"? "I think I killed one person there"? Is that what happened?

A. No, that's not how it happened.

Q. Well, then, how were you able to put "about 60"?

A. The leaders of the organisations of units who worked there, the platoon commanders and the company commander, they wrote a report, and on the basis of their assessments, they estimated that about 60 Siptar terrorists were killed in that operation. That is their assessment.

Q. Did you have these reports before you by 1932 hours when you dictated or typed this document?

A. They conveyed it to me orally, and after that, the next day, I ⁴⁵¹⁶⁸ received a written report as well.

Q. So somewhere, although it may not have been found, there's a written report setting out about in total -- or giving an account that totals about 60 dead people; correct?

A. In those reports it says that these people were killed in combat and in the fighting with members of the police, and I'm sure there are reports of that kind in the ministry. When they gave you this, they should have given you that, too, which would be the foundations for this.

Q. You can be sure, Mr. Janicevic, that we have asked every person we can for documents, and we have found no document thus far that gives an account of people dying and where they died.

Shall we read on, because this is your document contemporaneous. You deal with Marinkovic, and then you say this: "No civilians were hurt during the execution of the operation." How do you know that?

A. On the basis of the report, Mr. Nice. I asked whether there were any civilians who had been killed or injured, and they told me there were no casualties, and that was contained in the written report.

Q. You then saw three Brownings, two carbines, and 36 automatic rifles were found. That's the only reference to the weapons that were found at that stage, yes?

A. In the stage when the anti-terrorist operation had been completed, is that what you mean? At the end of the operation?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, that's the only place in this particular dispatch, yes.

Q. And the truth is that those weapons, those 36 automatic rifles, ⁴⁵¹⁶⁹ were either found in their base or they were found in trenches, but they weren't found anywhere else, were they? That's where they were found, those 36 weapons?

A. According to the reports which I received, all the weapons were found -- or, rather, only one rifle which was handmade was found in the command at headquarters. Everything else was found on the spot around the people who had lost their lives in the fighting.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... people who had lost their lives. Well, tell us a bit more about that, because this is, you see, the very first time that this Court has ever heard about this. So you tell us about it. You tell us what your source of information is, and where it's recorded, and so on.

A. The source of my information, and I'm repeating this for the hundredth time, were the reports from the leaders or commanders of the platoons and companies and the pursuit group at that time. Those people who were in the field, on the ground, they are the ones who submitted reports and told me what had happened on site.

Q. Very well. And an exact count of 1.802 rounds had already been made, had it?

A. Pieces of ammunition, pieces.

Q. Now let's move on --

A. Rounds.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... -- may, to tab 6, please, in the same document.

This is a document that's only available in English. It's report ⁴⁵¹⁷⁰ from one of the OSCE monitors. It starts off on the 15th of January, saying that they heard of the engagement west of Stimlje, that this group arrived when most of the firing had stopped, at 1730 hours, that they assisted in the movement of casualties, four adults and one child. They had a direct given for a meeting the following morning. Then on the following morning, on the 16th of January when there had been a briefing, they went off and had a meeting with the MUP chief in Urosevac. That would be you, would it?

A. Yes.

Q. At this stage, the OSCE, and we can see this from the foot of this page, were aware of numbers of people being killed, apparently at close range, and at that stage it was thought a group of ten who appeared to have been mowed down. There was also a 12-year-old boy and some other males.

So that was the state of knowledge of the OSCE when they came to meet you. And the next thing that I want you to look at, please, is tab 7A, which is your own document. This is at tab 64.8.

JUDGE BONOMY: Is tab 6 an exhibit?

MR. NICE: Yes, tab 6 is an exhibit. 180.

JUDGE BONOMY: And it refers to a report of the meeting with the MUP chief in Urosevac being attached. Is that the document, the second page of the document?

MR. NICE: No, I don't think it is, and I think we'll have to find that a little later for you. It comes about tab 9, I think.

JUDGE BONOMY: That's okay. Thank you. ⁴⁵¹⁷¹

MR. NICE: Tab 9.

Q. But I want, first of all, to look at this document, which you have produced yourself as tab 64.8, and this is dated the 16th of January of 1999. We can see that, if we look at the last paragraph, it must be a late document because it purports to cover the whole period of that day, although at the first paragraph -- no, maybe it covers the period until 1700 hours. When did you write this document?

A. Well, I can't remember exactly when I wrote the document. I wrote documents of this kind all the time. Probably after the conversation.

Q. In which case then it may help the Chamber if we instead move to tab 9 first. No, in fact I'm going to change that so the Chamber has things in order. If we go to tab 8 first. This is not a document you can help us with very much, but I'll just draw it to everyone's attention. This is -- picks up the accounting process when the OSCE went and spoke to Petrovic, the liaison officer for the VJ.

Now, you weren't there at this meeting, which was at 10.37 in the morning.

A. Petrovic, no.

Q. I'm trying to give a sequence to events. The OSCE went to Petrovic. This was Maisonneuve and others. That's the right -- we can see Maisonneuve at the top and Petrovic and Gilbertson and others, the interpreter.

And then did you know this: That they raised with Petrovic -- in the middle of the page but further down, Mr. Nort, please. Maisonneuve suggested to Petrovic: "Who coordinated tank fire on ⁴⁵¹⁷² the civilian houses when no persons were firing back, when there was smoke from chimneys, with families in basements?" He said, "Professional armies don't do these things but we may expect it from the MUP." He went on to say that: "The execution of 50 people is of War Crimes Tribunal stuff." Petrovic had nothing to say to that and indeed went on to say what they were doing was normal tasks and exercises.

Now, did you know -- did Petrovic get in touch with you, as his opposite number, to tell him what the OSCE were inquiring into?

A. As for the name of Petrovic, I hear that name for the first time. I knew quite a number of army officers, but this man Petrovic, perhaps if I were to see him I might recognise him, but just going by the name, no man by the name of Petrovic contacted me at all or asked me about the -- my contacts with the verifiers, with the OSCE.

Q. You can see as well on this page he also, however, said that Stimlje was done by the MUP with a Praga, AVs, and one tank. Can you explain how your military counterpart, as he was, liaison officer counterpart in any event, would be suggesting that the -- a tank and Pragas were involved in the overall Stimlje attack?

A. There was no attack on Stimlje. I beg to differ.

MR. NICE: Well, that exhibit, Your Honours, was -- or is 177. If we can go to tab 9, which is Exhibit 179, this --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, it's time for the break. We will adjourn for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12:19 p.m.

--- Upon resuming at 12:44 p.m. ⁴⁵¹⁷³

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Tab 9 of the Jasovic -- of the Racak papers is Exhibit number 179. It's on the overhead projector. It's in English. And it records the second meeting that they had with the OSCE - Maisonneuve, Gilbertson, and others - with you, at 11.14 on the morning of the 16th, asking what happened in Racak. You maintained that you were in charge of four communities, including Stimlje, and you spoke of terrorist attacks, the police blocking the roads to Racak, and of meeting strong resistance to entrance at Racak. Do you remember saying those things? Not remember, do you accept that you would have said those things?

A. What I remember saying, that there was an attack at the entrance to Racak? Is that what you're asking?

Q. Do you accept that you would have told the OSCE that police blocked the roads to Racak but met strong resistance at the entrance to Racak?

A. I told the OSCE that the police this blocked Racak from the Stimlje access, not only the road, and that it came upon strong resistance on the 15th at the very entrance to Racak at 0700 hours.

Q. But then you went on to explain about the terrorists who had been killed. Do you remember the last document we looked at? You gave a global figure of 60, which is roughly right for the total number of people killed.

You may not read English, but you can see what's been recorded by the OSCE. You said 15 terrorists were killed. Why did you say that?

A. I said that in the clash with the police, at least 15 terrorists ⁴⁵¹⁷⁴ were killed, because those are the figures that -- that was the figure that we had. That was the established figure.

Q. What do you mean established --

A. I didn't want to misinform, because --

Q. What you do you mean "established"? Because you'd sent a telegram the previous day, and you told us about your sources of information, where you said about 60 members of the Albanian terrorist groups were liquidated and no civilians were injured. Why have you suddenly reduced the total number of people killed to approximately the correct number of terrorists, as you would describe the KLA? Why have you reduced it?

A. The first official information that went to the Staff and was published by the Staff was that at least 15 terrorists had been killed. Until an on-site investigation is carried out --

Q. Where did you find that?

A. In the dispatches of the Urosevac SUP sent out to the Staff. Where you found the other dispatch that you read from a moment ago, that's where you'll find the other one as well.

Q. No. The one -- we're dealing with things in date order. Do you remember I said to you yesterday it's important isn't it, you know this as a policeman, to look at documents contemporaneous to events. On the 15th of January, you sent a message, a carefully crafted message, to Belgrade, saying 60 members of Albanian terrorist gangs were liquidated. No ifs or buts about it. Now, when the community, the international community appears, you spoke only of about 15, which is about right, because as well as the ones who died in Racak, there were others who were killed in the ^{45175 BLANK PAGE 45176} location. We can find reference to that. Why are you suddenly changing your position, please?

A. I'm not changing my position. What I told you was this, and I state again, that the first piece of information that went to the Ministry of the Interior and the MUP staff was -- referred to at least 15 terrorists. Now, until the end of the investigation, nobody --

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. -- had the right -- please may I be allowed to finish?

Q. You may, but I want you to --

A. Well, I can't show you that, but you have all the mechanisms to access that material. So when you received the dispatch, you could have received the other one. It's a short one, just five or six lines.

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. So you could have taken that as well, and it was dated the 15th.

Q. Is this something you've remembered all morning while I've been asking you methodically, almost slowly times, to go through the history, is it something you've always remembered that you sent a first record of 15 going? Is that right? And that somehow that record's been mislaid or lost or gone up in flames?

A. Please, at the moment you asked me about Vlastimir Djordjevic, whether he came or not, I said then, too, that Vlastimir Djordjevic received information in the police station of Stimlje whereby, according to knowledge gained so far, at least 15 terrorists had been killed, according to what we knew up until that time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson. ⁴⁵¹⁷⁷

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice is giving the witness the impression that he's quoting from the document, and the witness cannot read English. And he said a few moments ago that it was 15, whereas what it says in the text is, "Suspect 15 terrorists killed."

MR. NICE: That is exactly what it says.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we note that, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But the witness doesn't know.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, he knows now.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think he still knows, because it hasn't been interpreted for him. I am on the Serbian channel, but I haven't heard the interpretation.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, would you just read that portion so that it may be interpreted.

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Janicevic, the OSCE monitors, seeing you at 1114 hours on the 16th of January, 1999, recorded your explanation as the following, and I quote: "Suspect 15 terrorists killed." And to set it in context, you're recorded then as saying: "Tried to find them, no one in village, went to forest and bunkers little bit up from village."

Now, back to where we were. Tell us, please, what was the document --

A. Please. Could you repeat this last bit? Who was it that went to the forest and who was it that they couldn't find?

Q. These are your words recorded by OSCE in obviously abbreviated ⁴⁵¹⁷⁸ form. I will repeat them. "Suspect 15 terrorists killed. Tried to find them, no one in village, went to forest and bunkers little bit up from village."

That's what you're recorded as saying.

A. I don't know. This is sheer confusion.

Q. Oh, is it?

A. That's not what I said. This is not what I talked about when I talked to the representatives of the OSCE. I told you what I told them. If they shortened things in order to save paper or time or whatever, I told you what I said to them. I said that at least 15 terrorists were killed in the fighting. That is an official figure until the on-site investigation was carried out, and that is what I pointed out to them. Until the on-site investigation was carried out, we could not give the exact information as to how many casualties there were. Mr. Gilbertson at one point got up and said, "Sir, we're already carrying out an on-site investigation." And I said, "Mr. Gilbertson, in what capacity are you carrying out an on-site investigation? Are you an investigating judge, are you a policeman, are you the district public prosecutor? In what capacity are you carrying out an on-site investigation? And he said to me, please, it's been 27 years now that I've been a policeman and I know how this is done. I'm not challenging that, but in my country, and it's still my country, on-site investigations should be carried out in accordance with the laws of my country. That's what I said to them and I have no reason to lie. I have no reason to lie or not to say the truth, to tell the truth. ⁴⁵¹⁷⁹

Q. One possibility might be that the observers revealed that they now knew the truth, and you knew you were caught. It might be that they revealed to you what they'd seen or what they'd heard about the total number of people killed, and you knew at that stage you were only ever going to be able to identify about 15 who were terrorists. Is that what happened?

A. That's not true. That is not true.

Q. Isn't it?

A. That's not true that that's what I thought. You don't know what I was thinking, Mr. Nice.

Q. Well, tell me. You seem to have a good recollection of what Mr. Gilbertson said.

A. Please. I thought what I said. I said that at least 15 terrorists, to the best of our knowledge, got killed in the clash with the police. Further on, I said that they would get official information at the moment when the on-site investigation finishes, because that was the plan, that on that day the on-site investigation team should go out to the actual site. And he answered to me that they were already carrying out an on-site investigation. Since they were carrying out the on-site investigation, they know best what was going on. But again, I claim, had there been any intention -- let me just finish. Please let me finish. Had there been any intention along the lines of what you've been saying about what you're trying to prove, do you think we would have informed the verifiers to be there at 7.00 in the morning to observe the entire course of the anti-terrorist operation? ⁴⁵¹⁸⁰ Would we have informed the media?

Q. You're moving off the topic.

A. That's the point.

JUDGE ROBINSON: How was the conversation between the verifier and yourself recorded?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The verifiers were probably taking notes of their own. I kept notes of my own. I reported to my superiors and they probably reported to their superiors, through an interpreter.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you see them taking notes at the time when you spoke, so that when you said at least 15 were killed, did you see them write that down?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't see that. I didn't see whether they wrote it down or not, but I assume they did.

JUDGE ROBINSON: So that's what you said, at least 15 were killed, and they apparently wrote down, "Suspect 15 killed."

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't see whether they wrote it down.

MR. NICE: May I --

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I, as head of the secretariat, did not have the right to provide information without an investigating judge, because the investigation had already started. The investigation had already started, and the investigating judge is the only person who can provide information to the public and to the Verification Mission as well.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well -- ⁴⁵¹⁸¹

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And that day that person was in Stimlje.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we appear to be fighting shadows again because there doesn't seem to be a dispute that at this stage the figure was 15. What's concerning me more is if we went back to tab 5 --

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I -- if you're looking at tab --

JUDGE BONOMY: -- and the bottom paragraph on the first page --

MR. NICE: Yes, certainly.

JUDGE BONOMY: -- where there's a link made between 60 and the presence of the investigative judge. I don't know if you want to explore that at all.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I may do. In fact, in my sequence of questions it wasn't one I thought of but I may come back to it, and I'm grateful for that.

JUDGE KWON: If I can understand the point of questioning here. So it is your point that when he said, "Suspect 15 terrorists had been killed," this is true?

MR. NICE: Yes.

JUDGE KWON: So it is that he lied to the Belgrade when he reported in a dispatch when he said 60 terrorists were killed.

MR. NICE: 60 is the total number of people killed.

JUDGE KWON: Total.

MR. NICE: 45 plus 9 is about 60.

JUDGE KWON: But he says here Albanian terrorists. I see the point. ⁴⁵¹⁸²

MR. NICE: Yes. And if the Court will allow me, there's a sequence of questions and you're going to see how things develop.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: If the Court will allow me, we'll see how things develop.

JUDGE KWON: Yes, I'll leave it to you.

MR. KAY: If I can deal with one matter, because page 2 of this document the witness is asked to confirm a precise figure right in the middle - I don't want to be accused of leading or anything like that - and the Trial Chamber will see the response.

MR. NICE: Only too happy to take the witness to it, and indeed I probably will in any event.

MR. KAY: Well, I hope so, because it says, "Can't say precisely."

JUDGE KWON: Page 2 of tab 9.

MR. KAY: Yes. Page 2 of the document. I'm doing it off the original exhibit.

JUDGE KWON: Yes, we've found it.

MR. KAY: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Now, if I can go back to where I was. Mr. Janicevic, I want you to -- not to divert from the question. Focus on it, and then we'll move on.

You must understand that there is an inconsistency between writing on the 15th of January in the document to which His Honour Judge Bonomy has just drawn your attention that 60 members of an Albanian terrorist ⁴⁵¹⁸³ gang were liquidated, and indeed that the investigative judge came onto the scene but couldn't investigate matters further, and your then writing -- not writing, your then being recorded the following day as saying "Suspect 15 terrorists killed," or as Mr. Kay helpfully reminds us, can't say precisely it was 15 but something about that. Now, can you explain, for example - and I'll give you a few possibilities - why didn't -- could -- is there a document that you sent to someone that says, "Well, we've heard it's 60 but we only know about 15"?

A. Please, I don't know whether the interpreters are not capable of translating what I've been saying. I am speaking very clearly in my mother tongue. I said that in the clash with the police, according to our knowledge, at least 15 terrorists were killed. I did not say that that is what was suspected, that they were killed or wounded, but that that is what is believed. That is the information we had when we had these talks on the 15th of January.

On the 15th of January, the on-site investigation started at 1530 hours. Danica Marinkovic, investigating judge, and the deputy district public prosecutor were at the investigation. At that moment, the Secretariat of the Interior no longer -- is no longer in charge. We stop giving any information about the site itself and what is going on there. The dispatch that was sent to the MUP is by way of information, and it can be corrected during the course of the investigation or the end of the investigation.

Well, what I can tell you is that even now we don't know how many ⁴⁵¹⁸⁴ got killed there. Although Mr. Nice is trying to prove that there was 45, I'm saying even now that I don't know how many. First of all, we did not carry out the on-site investigation. Officially we never fully completed the on-site investigation.

JUDGE BONOMY: Can you tell me how the figure changed from 60 to 15?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was no change. The dispatch that was sent to the Ministry of the Interior at 1900 hours on Friday the 15th is on the basis of free estimates of members of the police who were engaged in the anti-terrorist operation. These are their reports. That was their assumption. One platoon said, for example, ten. Another one said 20. Another one said 30. So the figure adds up to about 50 or 60. That's just an assumption. That is an assumption that was not confirmed and that can either be confirmed or refuted ultimately at the end of the on-site investigation, because the investigation is the one that resolves the entire problem. However, we could not complete it on the 15th or on the 16th or on the 17th.

JUDGE BONOMY: So how did it -- by 11.00 the following morning, how had it changed to 15 - simple question - without the investigation having proceeded any further?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, the answer is very simple too. The answer is simple too. On the 15th of January, the official information that was bandied about was at least 15 terrorists. That is the official information. What was sent to the ministry was unconfirmed, unofficial, and that can only be confirmed by the end of the ⁴⁵¹⁸⁵ investigation, whether it was 40, 45, 49, or 60. Really, I still do not know the actual number of fatalities because we have not completed the investigation. Not because we didn't want to but because we couldn't.

JUDGE BONOMY: Why -- I mean, others may be satisfied with this. I'm bamboozled by it. How do you manage to write to your official body, one step up from you, the Staff, and tell them 60? Why do that when the best you can actually say is there's at least 15? I mean, there's a huge discrepancy between these figures.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the dispatch of -- containing the words "about 15" went to the MUP about 1400 hours, stating that at least 15 terrorists were killed in the fighting with the police. This dispatch --

JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry, I haven't seen that document, have I?

MR. NICE: No, we haven't seen it. It's not available.

JUDGE BONOMY: So it went from at least 15, up to 60, and then back down to at least 15; is that what you're saying?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Please clarify it.

MR. NICE: Let me put the position to you and then --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, the translation was wrong and that's why the witness reacted, that that was not mentioned. Because Mr. Bonomy said, as far as I can see in the transcript, 15 and then 60, and then down to at least 15, and the Serbian interpretation said 50, 5-0. So the Serbian interpretation was wrong. Instead of saying 15, as Mr. Bonomy said, the Serbian interpretation was 50. That is why the ⁴⁵¹⁸⁶ witness is reacting, that that figure was never mentioned.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. You see, what happened, Mr. Janicevic, was this: When the OSCE came in on this morning, you realised that you'd been caught because they suggested to you a high number, and you knew, and you gave the game away that you could only ever prove that 15 of the people who died were terrorists, and without being able to set a better plan, you just told the truth. That's what happened, isn't it? They suspected a high number, and you knew you could never prove that high number were terrorists.

A. That's not correct, Mr. Nice.

Q. Did the OSCE come in and suggest a higher number?

A. That's not correct, Mr. Nice.

Q. You're sure about that, are you? Are you sure about that? Are you?

THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat what he said.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Janicevic, please repeat what you just said. The interpreters didn't get it.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The OSCE suggested that the number was larger than the number they heard from me, that's correct. But what I said to them was that we have unverified information, but until the investigation is completed, we will not be able to give them anything officially because we don't know the actual number of fatalities.

MR. NICE:

Q. Well, let's go and have a look at the document that will help us a ⁴⁵¹⁸⁷ little bit on this. It's one of your own documents, and I think you've just remembered what you wrote. It's tab 64.8. And you can have the original. We'll have to come back to the tab we're looking at, otherwise we'll get bogged down forever, but I do need to go back to it. Let's just look at what you actually said yourself by way of a record of this meeting. On the 16th of January, the day after your previous document, you wrote to Belgrade -- well, the MUP staff in Pristina you wrote, and towards the bottom of the page - bit further down, please. B/C/S coming your way, I hope. Thank you very much. "On the 16th of January, 1999 --" perhaps you could make sure the witness has the B/C/S version. He will want to check the figures. From 11.00 to 12.00 a meeting was held with Dilbedson, Maisonneuve, and the chief of the Urosevac SUP. It goes on: "They asked questions concerning the police operation in Racak, which had been carried out in order to catch a terrorist group which had been stationed in that village and for which there had been information and intelligence to the effect that it had carried out eight terrorist acts in the Urosevac SUP ..." And it goes on a bit. Go over to the next paragraph.

"When Vel --" that's Vel Dilbedson -- "asked what kind of police operation it was, he was told it was a classic police operation, which had been held in order to catch a terrorist group and put an end to its further activity in the area. He was told that Racak village had been blocked from the direction of Stimlje and the Stimlje-Racak road ..." It goes on a bit, further down that paragraph, and if I miss anything anybody wants me to read, they'll shout. "Having searched the ⁴⁵¹⁸⁸ village, despite fierce resistance from the terrorists, who dug in, the police took control of their positions and liquidated a number of terrorists, while some terrorists withdrew in the direction of Krsine hill. Several policemen neutralised the fire from the Browning and the machine-gun was taken to the centre of Racak to an on-site investigation ..."

Next paragraph: "They were also told --" So you're simply, in this document, you're setting out what you said to the OSCE, not necessarily what was true. You said: "They were told that the police had not chased any terrorists beyond the trenches and connecting trenches, towards the woods, except for a group of policemen who had been sent to neutralise the Browning and who had carried out the assignment and returned to the centre of the village."

Next paragraph: "Vel was interested solely in 'who planned the police operation, what weapons ... police members from other areas ...'" and so on.

Next paragraph: "When he said that more than 50 civilians had been killed in the Racak village area, he was told that, according to our information, at least 15 terrorists had been killed and no civilians at all, and that the policemen had not been able to continue searching the terrain for security reasons and so we did not know whether more terrorists had been killed."

Now, then, would you like to explain to us how 15 went down -- sorry. How 60 went down to 15, even qualified in the way you've got it here? How did you identify the 15 as terrorists? ⁴⁵¹⁸⁹

A. I'm going to repeat this to you once again, but please listen so that you'd be able to understand.

On the 15th of January, a dispatch was sent to the Ministry of the Interior and to the Staff, informing them around 1400 hours that the operation was still underway and that, according to preliminary information, in the fighting at least 15 terrorists were killed. The investigation started at 1530 hours. The investigation team went to the site. At that moment, no one, according to the law, had the right --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Judge Bonomy would like to ask a question.

JUDGE BONOMY: I want to interrupt at that point because that's the very point that Mr. Milosevic corrected the translation of from 15 to 50 a short while ago, and now the witness is again, according to the interpretation I'm getting, saying 15 at 1400 on the 15th. So we're become -- it is in fact from 15 up to 60 and back down to 15. Please carry on. The point would have passed if it hadn't been made just now.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we are talking about two different days, the 15th and the 16th of January. On the 15th of January, one dispatch was sent to the Ministry in which it was stated that in that area, in fighting with the police, at least 15 terrorists were killed.

On the 16th, a group of verifiers came to the SUP with a view to receiving information as to what was going on there or what had happened there, although they knew better than we did what was going on on the ground. They asked me, and I told them what I knew and what I had to tell ⁴⁵¹⁹⁰ them. I had to tell them, because the investigation had already started. Until the investigation was completed, I as an authorised official did not have the right to give any further information except for what was said to the public by the investigating judge. Had the investigation been completed, the investigating judge would have given the exact number of terrorist casualties and everything that happened on the ground, but I cannot give a different explanation.

The fact that the dispatch went on the 15th, on the evening of the 15th, I said that this was a dispatch that was still not accurate. This was information that was gathered from the field and that was being checked out. This is information that arrived after the anti-terrorist operation in Racak was completed, and that is checked only through an investigation and at the end of the investigation. This dispatch is of an internal nature in order to inform the MUP staff only, and the ministry.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, in the absence of any document supporting the suggestion that only 15 were identified at any time between the 15th and 16th, whether coming from this witness, coming Danica Marinkovic, or anyone else --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, that's not what I said. I did not say that they had been identified.

MR. NICE: I was addressing the Court.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon.

MR. NICE: In the absence of any document supporting the suggestion, I can probably take this line of questioning no further in light of answers I'm getting. ^{45191 BLANK PAGE 45192}

Q. But what I would be grateful for you now to look at, please, Mr. Janicevic, is the same document you're looking at, and a couple of paragraphs before the paragraph that deals with 50 and 15, where you say this: "They were also told --" Up, please, Mr. Nort. "They were also told that the police had not chased the terrorists beyond the trenches and connecting trenches, towards the woods, except for a group of policemen who had been sent to neutralise the Browning and who had carried out the assignment and returned to the centre of the village. As they were returning to the village, they had been under fierce fire and so the investigation team could not continue the on-site investigation ..." So that from your note of what you told -- no, let's go back to the previous paragraph as well. It's the end of the previous paragraph, please, Mr. Nort, a bit further up. The other way. Up. Down, then. You're quite right. Perfect.

The -- you relay what you told the OSCE in these terms: You describe the, as you say, attack, and you deal with the distance of 500 metres from the trenches a heavy machine-gun. "Having searched the village, despite fierce resistance from the terrorists who had dug in, the police took control of their positions and liquidated a number of terrorists, while some terrorists withdrew in the direction of Krsine hill."

So if you put that passage and the following paragraph together, there is no evidence of people being killed in the streets or in houses, and it appears that everyone who has died, apart from any who were killed at the machine-gun point, has died in a trench. Do you accept that? ⁴⁵¹⁹³

A. Well, I do not accept that, but I do accept that they got killed near the trenches, most probably; either in the trenches or near the trenches.

Q. Very well. And indeed it's from the trench or from the base that all the weapons were seized.

A. According to the reports I received, right next to the terrorists who were killed.

Q. In the trenches. And if we go back to tab --

A. And next to the trenches.

Q. Let's now go back, if we can, to what was tab 9, just to see how the OSCE recorded the same thing.

You see, the OSCE recorded this in a broadly similar way. Said: "15 terrorists killed. Tried to find them, no one in village, went to forest and bunkers little bit up from village. Believe their central HQ in Juznice where a large group opened fire with a 12.7 millimetre gun. KLA used snipers, Chinese MGs, fired mines towards police and Chinese 81-millimetre mortar." Then this: "Over the hill ..." Then this: "Police searched until ... bunkers, stopped because of fire, and after forcing personnel out of bunkers who ran over hill, finding weapons ..."

All right. Same again. Killed in the bunkers, weapons in the bunker. Do you accept that's what you told the OSCE?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you now look, please, at this document, which is -- in the collection of papers known as the Racak papers it's tab 33, but it's ⁴⁵¹⁹⁴ Exhibit D299 tab 397, introduced through Stevanovic, and I think not otherwise available to us until then.

This is a document that you spoke of, and perhaps you'd just remind us what it is. That's the -- can he have the B/C/S original, please.

It's a chronology of events in the village of Racak. I want you to look at it and confirm that you know what it is.

THE INTERPRETER: It is very difficult for the interpreters to follow with all the shuffling.

MR. NICE: Very sorry.

JUDGE ROBINSON: The Judges were asked to ensure that their mikes are off when they are not speaking, and the other parties should do the same.

MR. NICE:

Q. Just remind us, please, what this document is. It doesn't have a date on it. It was produced by the witness Stevanovic, Obrad. Would you tell us what it is, please.

A. This is the chronology of events in the village of Racak, a document that I drew up after the event upon the request of the district public attorney and the Ministry of the Interior. The last page bearing the signature is missing. 19th January.

Q. So by the 19th of January, then, you had a pretty good idea, from reports coming to you, of what had happened, didn't you?

A. Those reports were reflected in this document, chronology.

Q. All right. And I only want you to look at one place. I'll just ⁴⁵¹⁹⁵ find it for you. In the English version it's on page 3, and for you, Mr. Janicevic, it is on the second page and it's the third paragraph and the fourth paragraph, I think. Fourth and fifth paragraphs. It goes like this: "Despite the --" oh, by the way, perhaps we ought to focus on the previous paragraph since you've drafted this yourself.

Did you draft this carefully? Did you?

A. Well, as carefully as I was able to do at that time.

Q. So you see Luznica turns up again in the previous paragraph, the place you say is of complete irrelevance. Here you have got police force members approaching the village of Racak and attempting to capture members of the terrorist gang and inviting them to surrender. And they retreated from the village towards Krsine hill, the village of Luznica. The operation was perhaps rather larger than you've described in your recently produced maps, wasn't it? It covered a much wider territory, and it's impossible for to you acknowledge the truth of that.

A. Just tell me on which page I can find that.

Q. Yes, certainly. It's on the second page, and you'll find -- I think you'll find Luznica mentioned at the end of the fourth paragraph, probably. Yes. One, two, three -- the end of the fourth paragraph, where you see Luznica, Rance, Petrovo, and Stimlje all referred to.

A. Yes, I can see that, but it's a typo.

Q. Oh, it's another typo?

A. It cannot be Luznica by any means. Please, Krsine.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... typographical error? ⁴⁵¹⁹⁶

A. The person who typed this, the typist who did this does not distinguish between Luzak and Luznica. Look at it and compare for yourself: Luznica, Krsine, Rance.

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. Luzak is -- Luznica is 15 kilometres away.

Q. Very well. [Previous translation continues]...

A. The other places are close by. We're just mentioning villages around Racak. Rance is a village. Petrovo is a village.

Q. Despite the pursuit and the appeals to surrender, the terrorist group refused to surrender and kept opening heavy fire at the police force members from all the stated types of weapons. The terrorists fiercely attacked the approaching police from the previously prepared trenches and bunkers. Forty Siptar terrorists, most of them wearing uniforms of the so-called KLA, were liquidated in the said exchange of fire." First point: It was 60, it's gone down to 15. It's now gone up to 40, which is pretty well spot on for the number of people who died who were not acknowledged as KLA, couple under. How did we get 40 Siptar terrorists?

A. This is the number established after the completion of the on-site investigation.

Q. Let's read -- would you be good enough to read for us, please, the first sentence - it's a quite long sentence, so fairly slowly - of the next paragraph.

A. "By capturing the trenches and bunkers used by the Siptar terrorists, apart from the said bodies, the police force members also ⁴⁵¹⁹⁷ found and seized 36 automatic rifles of Chinese make, one Browning 12.7-millimetre light machine-gun, two machine-guns, 1.802 bullets of different calibres, six hand grenades of Chinese make, two hand grenade bags, one Fisher Price hand-held radio transmitter, one pair of binoculars, one rifle-cleaning kit, two automatic-rifle magazines, one army rucksack and other military equipment. Apart from the bodies, a large number of cartridge cases of different calibres, which the terrorists fired at the police, were also observed and seized. The battle with the terrorists lasted until 1530 hours."

Q. There is no doubt, is there, from reading, as you would say, a carefully prepared report on the information available that all the people died in the trenches and all the weapons were found in or around the trenches. That's what it says.

A. That's what it says.

Q. Which brings us back, then, to the plans that we started looking at yesterday made by you and your colleague in his flat. Would you like, please, to point us to any document, and we can go through all the documents in the Racak collection, we can go through all of your documents, but you must know, can you point us to any document generated at any time until the maps you and your colleague prepared in his flat about three and a half weeks ago, that suggests people were killed in the ravine, on footpaths, in houses, on streets, or in yards?

A. I cannot tell you that because I don't have any such document.

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. I told you yesterday, or maybe another day earlier on, that this ⁴⁵¹⁹⁸ was drawn up based on what is remembered.

Q. Just focus on my question, if you can be -- if you wouldn't mind. If what you and your colleague are saying is accurate, then these documents that you produced are inexplicable because your colleague, through you, shows that people died all over Racak, not just in trenches, and I want you to tell us whether we can find any document available to you, written by you that suggests people were found other than in the trenches.

A. This is the document that I wrote based on the reports who were there on the ground. That's one.

Second, have you ever been to Racak, Mr. Nice?

Q. You're not allowed to ask me questions -- well, you're allowed to ask me questions, but I don't answer them, but Mr. --

A. Because I want to tell you --

Q. -- Janicevic, you can assume that I have some knowledge of the area.

A. I want you tell you that there were two rows of trenches in Racak, in the village itself. There was one bunker in the village, within the village of Racak itself. Look at the photos made by your own people --

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. -- how the trenches are laid out and where they lead.

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. I first saw that yesterday.

Q. But I think you've confirmed that so far as you are concerned, all the people died in bunkers -- in trenches. Now, perhaps the usher would ⁴⁵¹⁹⁹ be good enough to take one of the --

A. Or the immediate vicinity.

Q. Or the immediate vicinity, yes. Of course. If you would take the large map.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think Mr. Nice is asking his questions improperly. If you look at the transcript, during explanations provided by Mr. Janicevic concerning the maps, he used the word "bunker" or "shelter" at least ten times explaining the maps, not "trenches." He was saying bunker, bunker, bunker, shelter. That word was widely used in his explanations. Communicating trenches are something different. In the chronology document, in here, reference is not really made to communicating trenches. It's not about that. It's something else.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. NICE:

Q. Have a look at the map that's on your right-hand side now, or the aerial view. Have a look at it. Do you know what it is? Forget the blue stickers for the time being. Do you know what that map shows? The little figures, 2, 5, 1, 4. Do you know what that map, that aerial view is?

A. Racak village. I can't see the numbers. Sorry.

Q. Forget the little blue stickers for the time being, but look at the numbers: 6 on the hill there, 4 on the left, 5, 2. Do you know anything about what happened at those locations?

A. This is part of the settlement, part of the populated area in ⁴⁵²⁰⁰ Racak. That's where the populated area begins. That's where the village of Racak begins.

Q. Where does the village of Racak --

A. The map is not very clear, to me.

Q. I see. Well --

A. The village of Racak is this part, and this too.

Q. Your -- I've mislaid my maps. Can we look at the maps, Exhibit 70, that you produced yesterday. You don't recognise an aerial, but you appear to recognise -- that's all right, I've found them. These maps. Do you remember these maps?

A. We can use that.

Q. You can sit down. We'll hand them to you. Now, you say the aerial isn't very clear, but do you understand the map any better?

A. The image is clear but it's too large. I've never had occasion to work with aerial photographs before.

Q. Well, if we look at your colleague's drawn map or overdrawn map and we remind ourselves that he, not you, has placed positions of deaths, people dying, all over the map; not just at trenches but elsewhere. Do you see that?

A. Can I have the map, please?

Q. Yes, it's coming your way. Exhibit 70. Well, I'm looking at 0300 to 0830. Then we'll look at the second one. The third one doesn't have any deaths -- oh, it does have some deaths on it, yes. Some of them are recorded as being at or near trenches, according to the legend, but others are nowhere near trenches. That's right, isn't ⁴⁵²⁰¹ it?

A. On this map, it's not right.

Q. Well, we've tried to do our best to represent what's shown on your map by reference to where the bodies were found. Perhaps you'd like to look at this document. Yes, there are two or maps, but --

A. Even on the other map --

Q. You see, what we find -- I want to distribute this as a visual aid. Obviously, like any visual aid constructed on the basis of a map as small scale as the one produced by the witness is, subject to possibility of error or inaccuracy.

You see, your -- what we've done here, to explain it, is the following: The original map, at places like -- if you follow the original numbering on the map, 1, 2, 3, and then 3 is broken down into various sublocations, 3/6, 3/7, and 3/8; and 4, which is 4/9; 5, which is 5/10, 6 -- 5 is 5/10 and 5/11 and 5/12; and then 6, which is number 13, that original map shows the positions where bodies were found by OSCE on the 16th.

Now, your colleague has drawn bodies being found, according to his memory, in certain locations. So that if we start off at the top, it's slightly obscured by the line, but the place 3/8, said by the OSCE to be a place where two bodies were found, Ijet Emini -- I beg your pardon, one body was found, we see that, according to your map, at roughly the same place some eight bodies were found. So 3/8, roughly eight bodies. If we go to the left of that, where the original map of the Prosecution was marked 4/9, which was a scene where, as the legend shows, ⁴⁵²⁰² one, two, three, four, people were killed -- sorry, three people were killed, he's recorded on his map, at roughly the same place, six bodies were found.

If you go to the position marked 3/7, where the OSCE found two people, if we look at the top we can see that your colleague found, or says, that two people were killed there.

Now, those are some of the most closer matches. There are several which are very distant in comparison. But one way or another, your colleague, for whatever reason, seems to have been placing bodies at roughly the places where the Prosecution said those bodies were found. Do you understand that?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If you look at the screen in front of you right now, you will see that Mr. Nice's question is taking up the entire screen. I don't know what this witness can possibly answer to a question that more resembles a lecture.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice. It's time for you to put a question. We have had occasion to reprimand Mr. Milosevic for the same practice.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I have explained the position of this map I hope in a way that will help.

Q. And what I'm suggesting to this witness is revealed by this map, is that for whatever reason your colleague was actually revealing that the bodies found by the OSCE on the 16th indeed probably -- or not probably, ⁴⁵²⁰³ certainly died where they were found. Do you follow that?

A. I don't understand that at all.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... way?

A. First of all, I can see there are similarities between the one and the other map. There are similarities. I claim that the person who made this map did not have any opportunity to see the other, had no occasion or possibility nor knew of the other map's existence. He drew his map based on the reports and from his own memory.

Q. You see, until now the suggestion has been advanced, somewhat hesitantly from time to time, I think, that the Racak bodies were moved around after they died in order to make it look like a massacre. Well, what we know from your accounts given to and for the international community and certainly until the 19th of January on your own evidence was to the effect that everyone died in a trench or near a trench. The international community found the bodies spread all over Racak, none of them near trenches, and many or most -- many if not all of them photographed where they were found, and we'll look at those tomorrow. And your colleague, by this map, for whatever reason, is confirming that they were found scattered around the village and not in trenches.

A. I have never said that the international community said what you just mentioned. Please don't put words in my mouth. I never said that.

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. My colleague, that's my second point, made his map from his own memory. I'm just responding to the question as it was interpreted to me.

Q. Very well. Well, if it's ever suggested, Mr. Janicevic, if it's ⁴⁵²⁰⁴ ever suggested that these bodies found in Racak were taken from their initial positions and moved around, that's not a suggestion you'd accept, is it?

A. I don't quite understand. Could you repeat it?

Q. Yes. Do you suggest that the bodies found by the OSCE on the 16th and photographed had been moved from their positions, or do you accept - you're the man in charge - that the OSCE found the bodies where they died?

A. It's not just that I don't accept that all of them were killed where they were found. A number of them were, but another number was moved. It is a fact that the bodies were manipulated --

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. -- and not by the police. Not by our side.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... which ones were moved?

A. The bodies that were found in the gully were moved. I had occasion to read Ambassador Walker's statement.

Q. Where from?

A. On the Internet. I found his statement on the Web. I had an opportunity to see it, and I remember a portion where he says that he had been informed by a verifier that there is another number of bodies further up in the gully, and he was asked if he wanted to see them, and he said he had had quite enough.

Why didn't he go there and record them then and there to clear it up, who did it and how it happened. If it was a crime, then perpetrated by whom? ⁴⁵²⁰⁵ For one entire night, the bodies were left lying there in order to provide room for manipulation.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, we have to end the hearing now. We will adjourn and resume tomorrow at 9.00 a.m.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 5th day

of October, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.