45314
Tuesday, 18 October 2005
[Open session]
[The accused entered court]
--- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I understand there are some matters that you wish to raise in the absence of the witness, or before the witness comes in.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Robinson.
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It has to do with your decision, a ruling that I received at the beginning of the break, and it wants me to submit a list of witnesses to the end. And just briefly let me tell you that I spent a whole week making a rigorous selection. As you know, I have on my list over 1.600 witnesses, and that list is composed of, as I've already informed you, of 5.000 witnesses to begin with. So bearing in mind the need to reduce the time necessary, I was very rigorous in making a selection. I cannot say that it is perfect. There might be room for adjustment, minor ones, but having made the selection for Kosovo, I still have 15 witnesses. For Croatia, I would need a total of 74 witnesses. And for Bosnia-Herzegovina, six -- or, rather, 106. As far as the list of witnesses which I formulated as hostile witnesses, that list, and I handed in that list 20 months ago, on it there were 22 witnesses, and I have reduced that to just four, four witnesses on that list, that is say Clinton, Blair, Clark, and Schroeder. So that would make it 199 witnesses in total, and that is the bare minimum. 45315
JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the time that you would spend with these witnesses in examination-in-chief?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] According to my estimates, as precise as I could make them, of course, 422 hours would be the total time I would need to examine those witnesses. And I handed in that list yesterday, as you requested, pursuant to your ruling, because you did ask me to draw up the list and to establish and determine the time necessary for those witnesses. So that is the minimum, and I cannot reduce the list further.
As you can see, I have reduced it eight times. It is eight times smaller than an already reduced list, so from 1.600 witnesses to a bare 199.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, if you are to believed you started with 5.000 and then you went to 1.600, these figures, as you know, are wholly realistic and don't help us in arriving at a reasonable decision as to the length of time that you should have for your case, because you very well know that we can't hear 1.600 witnesses. But we are just receiving --
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I've just told you that is why I made a rigorous selection and reduced that, as I said, to 199 witnesses, which is quite a lot less than the number of witnesses produced by Mr. Nice. Mr. Nice had over 300 witnesses here. Therefore, I consider that this is very realistic, even bearing in mind all your fairly firm criteria and the time constraints that you bring up.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Have you concluded, Mr. Milosevic? 45316
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to mention another thing, and that is that once again I would like to emphasise the following fact: I was not clear from the very outset about the method of how, with 300 days which was used by Mr. Nice, the time -- my half time has been reduced to 150. How does that come about? And Mr. Tomanovic asked the Registrar to provide him with the records of how long each witness testified for the other side, and the response that he received was the following: First, it said, "I'm afraid there is no such record kept by this office [In English] since it was not created at the time, nor by the Registry."
[Interpretation] So that I'm going to persevere and raise my objection again and state that that time was calculated off the bat. And it affected my time, which I had to shorten. And the other letter my associate received is this, at his insistence. It says the following: "[In English] After consulting with the chief in CMSS --" [Interpretation] I don't know what this CMSS is -- "on the matter of the time used during Prosecution and Defence case, I can inform you that the records kept by Registry are confidential -- so kept by the Registry are confidential and therefore cannot be disclosed to the parties. Concerning the same issue and upon your request, the Office of the Prosecutor has been contacted to do likewise. No such records are kept in the OTP." [Interpretation] So all in all, I think that when we bear in mind the fact that Mr. Nice here had some 350 witnesses, then this is more than a hundred witnesses less. And let me repeat: I have made my selection applying very rigorous methods, and I think that I really do need to hear 45317 and examine these 199 witnesses. 15 would be Kosovo, 74 would be for Croatia, and 106 for Bosnia, and the remaining four are the ones on my hostile witness list, that is to say Clinton, Clark, Blair, and Schroeder. And I would once again like to emphasise, as you know already, that when the Kosovo trial started there were two other indictments which relate to a period of five years, and several hundred thousand pages were provided me for my examination or, rather, the examination-in-chief of Kosovo witnesses, and I haven't managed to get through all those pages, nor have my associates yet. That is impossible. You gave me two weeks to prepare the statement between Kosovo and the portion for Croatia and Bosnia, and it was impossible to look through all that material either. So we're faced with a situation as if somebody said you've got a heart operation to do, a lege artis heart operation, go ahead and get through it in half an hour.
So taking into account every effort that is being made to reduce the time as much as possible and make the best possible use of it, I really do need to examine these 199 witnesses. And I've already told you the total time would be 422 hours to hear them all.
[Trial Chamber confers]
MR. NICE: I don't know if the Court would allow me to make just two points, or three. I imagine they are points that the Court will have in mind, but I thought they might be helpful.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Very briefly.
MR. NICE: Yes, Your Honour. The -- so far as we can calculate, 45318 examination-in-chief for all but the largest witnesses taken so far is between 7 and 10 hours. We've been going ten months. And 199 witnesses, roughly five times as the many we've taken already. So looked at in absolutely global terms and were things to move at the same pace, another four or five years would be required for that number of witnesses taken at the same time. And looked at in terms of the accused's own analysis, even if he were right that 422 -- 422 hours would be all he would require for examination-in-chief, I think that would come to, in itself, about eight months.
JUDGE BONOMY: There's an odd statement in the transcript. You said we've been going ten months.
MR. NICE: In the Defence case.
JUDGE BONOMY: And 199 witnesses.
MR. NICE: No. We've been going ten months. 199 witnesses proposed for the future is roughly five times as many as we've taken already, so that it's about 50 months, again just looked at in very global terms.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. Mr. Milosevic, the Chamber will set a time to consider this matter. We'll set a date and perhaps have an hour at a Status Conference to deal with the matters that you've raised. But let me say that you have used absolutely wrong indices in arriving at your conclusions. The Chamber has been very, very careful and scrupulous in working out the time, and we have done it on the basis of hours so as to ensure that you have the same number of hours to present your Defence as the Prosecution 45319 had in presenting its case.
The second matter is that the Prosecution utilised quite extensively written statements, 89(F) and 92 bis. In fact, only one-third of the Prosecution witnesses were called live.
Thirdly, the Prosecution time, the time spent by the Prosecution in its case, was enlarged by the time that you spent cross-examining Prosecution witnesses.
I'm going to ask you to pass over to the Chamber the two letters that you have from the Registry, because the Chamber does not have those letters, so we can examine them. And we will announce the date and time for the Status Conference to discuss these matters. Let us have the witness called.
MR. NICE: Your Honour, the Court may know that --
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just --
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Could the microphone be adjusted.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 420 hours is less than 100 working days, and I cannot understand that Mr. Nice says that for 100 working days you would need five years. I don't understand that. Rule 89(F), on the other hand, since the Chamber allowed Mr. Nice to apply that Rule, mostly without an examination-in-chief, even if I wanted to use it, I don't have the conditions for that. 89(F) requires a great deal of time, talking to the witness, collecting all the documents, and so on and so forth and their statements. So without that basic of resources which Mr. May always said you would be considering and never 45320 considered the element of time, that is just not feasible. So if we eliminate that basic resource, then all the other conditions become meaningless. So please bear that in mind. I think that is clear to one and all.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let us not have the discussion now. We will have it at the status conference.
MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, we haven't been provided with the list of witnesses. It was ex parte. May we have one at some stage on some terms?
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let the witness be called.
[The witness entered court]
WITNESS: BOGOLJUB JANICEVIC [Resumed]
[Witness answered through interpreter]
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you are to begin your re-examination. And I had some comments to make about re-examination and how you might re-examine this witness, and accordingly I'd expect you to be as brief as possible. You may begin.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. I shall do my best to be as rational with my time as possible. Could this map be displayed, please, the one that Mr. Nice placed before the witness during the cross-examination. May it be placed on the overhead projector, because I have several questions related to that map. Thank you.
Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Janicevic, William Walker, in his statement, 45321 said, "While I was watching that terrible site somebody who was there before said there are many more corpses." And explained how, moving across the dried up riverbed, he saw individual bodies, that a large number were in civilian clothing and finally he came across a group of 12, and so on and so forth. And he called the location a ditch, a gully. Now, on the basis of this photograph, it is an aerial photograph, can you identify the place that Walker referred to as gully?
A. Yes. According to the photographs that I saw previously and on the basis of this one here, the map of Racak, the gully is here.
Q. Please answer simply and clearly. Could the verifiers see the gully from the point they were stationed at?
A. The verifiers were in this location here, at this crossroads. One group was there; and the second group, from 10.00 a.m., was at the military police checkpoint up here; and the third group was a little further off. You can't see it on this map. This group could see with their naked eyes what was happening there from this location.
Q. All right. Can you see a square 5, number 5? It says 5 of 10, and there are two arrows moving in two directions.
A. Yes, I can see that.
Q. On the left-hand side, on the legend for this aerial photograph, it says that the gully is at number 5 where 23 persons killed were found, and the white line is the road leading from Sadik Osmani's house. That is the explanation given in the legend attached to the map. It is in English on the left-hand side under number 5. It says that that is where the gully lies where 23 persons were killed, and the white line is the road 45322 running from Sadik Osmani's house.
A. This is the white line.
Q. Yes, that's right. Is there something illogical; and if there is, would you explain it to us here?
A. Yes, there is something quite illogical. First of all, on that location it is recorded that seven corpses of killed terrorists were found and not 23 as William Walker claimed, because 5/10 and the two arrows, two locations, seven bodies were found there. And if you add all that together, take it altogether, add up the figures, it would appear that in all the locations there were a total of 47 bodies of terrorists.
Q. Thank you. Now, in his statement Walker claims that one of the verifiers said that there were more bodies, 16 -- on the 16th, and he -- they asked him whether he wanted to see them, and he said that he had seen enough. Do you know that there were more bodies, and what does that mean if there were?
A. Well, there is the possibility of those who prepared the scenario, for this so-called scenario, had got hold of another location with another number of bodies to throw all this information before the world, but quite obviously the producer and director was satisfied with what he had achieved with his first contingency.
Q. Very well. Now, in the cross-examination by Mr. Nice, you answered one of his questions linked to the events in Racak and said that you had operative positions in the staff of the Nerodimlje operative zone itself, and I didn't -- I don't think you finished your answer, you completed your answer. 45323
A. Well, Mr. Nice interrupted me, but what I said was that we had operative positions in the staff and headquarters itself of the zone, of the Nerodimlje operative zone, and from there we receive the right information, valid information and accurate information. For example, that in the evening hours of the 15th members of KDOM were at a meeting -- attended a meeting in the village of Petrovo where it was decided that only nine -- the bodies of only nine terrorist KLA soldiers be shown, and that all the other bodies should be the bodies of civilians, that that was decided.
Q. We won't be needing this any longer.
A. May I just explain something else, something I've noticed?
Q. Please go ahead.
A. May I, sir? "VJ MUP tanks" is written in this particular square. I can't read this because I don't speak English. This is it. On that position, there were no members of the army of Yugoslavia, there was only an armoured vehicle of the police, with a certain number of policemen, who protected the left wing of the unit that was surrounded. The army was up here, at this location here, where the military police checkpoint was. In this area here where the forest can be seen, that's where the army was, not over here, where it says that the army was there. And the MUP was not there at all.
Q. All right. Can we remove it from the overhead projector now.
JUDGE KWON: What kind of armoured vehicle was it that was used by MUP at that time?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A combat armoured vehicle that any 45324 BLANK PAGE 45325 police force in the world has. An armoured combat vehicle which has a machine-gun of up to 12.7 millimetres calibre, which is used in emergencies. It has wheels. It doesn't have caterpillars.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Can you just briefly answer some other questions I have for you. You said in the cross-examination that you were about 250 metres away from Racak.
A. Yes, approximately.
Q. Tell me very precisely, when you came in the morning, what did you see? Did you see the Verification Mission on the spot?
A. At two locations I saw vehicles of the Verification Mission with the verifiers; the location I showed a few moments ago, and Kostanje, too, which can be seen when one enters Stimlje from the direction of Urosevac. And it can be seen from the yard of the police station where I was.
Q. All right. That's what you explained. I just want to ask you something.
Several times during your explanations you used the word "trench" or "bunker." On page 44941 of your testimony in the transcript, you explain: "[In English] Between 10.30 and 1200 hours, two more terrorists were killed in the middle of the village, in a bunker that we didn't know about, didn't know existed, or we can -- it wasn't actually a bunker. It was a shelter of some sort."
[Interpretation] When you use the word "bunker," do you use it in a broad meaning for shelters, too, or are you only talking about bunkers? 45326
A. I did not restrict myself to bunkers only but shelters too. After all, in street fighting, any wall, any shed can be used as shelter, as a bunker, anything that can protect from fire.
Q. All right. Could this map please be placed on the overhead projector now, the one that Mr. Nice explained that he took from our information.
On the left-hand side the killed members of the KLA are marked in green, and on the right-hand side a group of civilians who survived, almost all of them. He claimed that in your documents for the killed persons it was established that they were KLA, and for the survivors, that they were civilians.
Since Mr. Nice said that this is on the basis of our information, do you see the red line leading to this gully?
A. Yes, I can see it.
Q. This red line, is it derived from some information of ours? To the best of your knowledge, did somebody direct the civilians to go to the gully?
A. Absolutely not. I said that I have knowledge that policemen returned civilians, those who had set out in the direction where there was combat operation. They certainly did not direct them to go that way.
Q. So that red line is not based on our information in any way?
A. It most certainly is not.
Q. Thank you.
A. I just noticed one more thing. May I just say one more thing in relation to the previous map? 45327 I don't know who worked on that map or who drew that map, but it is done in such a way so as to suit to the purposes of the OTP. For example, not a single member of the staff of the terrorists who was killed was shown there. Forty-seven is the total of persons killed in combat in that area. They were dealt with in order to suit someone's purposes. So it's a pure forgery.
MR. NICE: Well, that observation is both unfortunate and ill-informed. If one goes through the series of maps of which this one is a part, you'll find maps that show the location of the KLA bunkers and identify where the KLA members were killed. The witness shouldn't be allowed to be making remarks like this, in my submission.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we have the maps before us. We'll decide. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Mr. Janicevic, the anti-terrorist action in Racak, was it planned in advance?
A. Yes.
Q. So it was planned in advance.
A. Yes, that's right. It was planned in advance.
Q. Was it approved by the MUP staff in Pristina?
A. Approved by the MUP staff.
Q. Was the Verification Mission informed about it?
A. The Verification Mission was informed about it, and they sent their representatives to certain locations from which they could see even the most remote parts of Racak. 45328
Q. All right. So is there any doubt as to whether the anti-terrorist action was approved, previously planned, that the Verification Mission was informed, et cetera?
JUDGE ROBINSON: Don't answer that question. It's leading.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. All right. This mission that you said was previously planned, planned in advance, did you say that it was planned at your proposal, your written proposal that you had sent?
A. Yes.
Q. So to the best of your knowledge, was any action ever planned against civilians?
A. Never.
Q. What was written in your proposal? What kind of action were you proposing?
A. The proposal said that an anti-terrorist operation was required in order to arrest terrorists who carried out several crimes in the area. Around 25 murders of policemen, civilians, and soldiers, 25 people were seriously wounded, and 35 citizens were kidnapped, out of which 14 never returned home.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is the kind of matter that I raised at the end of the last -- our last session. The purpose of re-examination is not simply to regurgitate evidence which was led in chief. We have that evidence before us already. If there is an area in respect of which you think the witness's evidence in cross-examination needs rehabilitation, then you can raise that, but it's a waste of time 45329 simply bringing to the Chamber evidence which is already before us.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right, Mr. Robinson. I wanted to establish this because in the cross-examination, that is precisely what had been challenged. I just wanted to draw your attention to tab 6 from the Racak binder, Mr. Nice's Racak binder. Mr. Robinson, Mr. Nice selectively quoted to the witness. This document is in English so he quoted in English. At the beginning, it says, in the second sentence, this is the 15th of January, the report of the Regional Centre of 1 Prizren, the role in the incident in the area of Stimlje, and I'm just going to read out this first item that was marked. It says: "[In English]... word came of major engagements to the west of Stimlje. DHOM opstina request that RC1 send two patrols to reinforce RC5 ..."
Q. [Interpretation] So Mr. Janicevic, what is said here was that they sent these patrols to reinforce this Regional Centre.
A. Yes, that's right. I said that around 10.00 either one or two teams of verifiers arrived. I don't know, but I'm sure that one arrived.
Q. This has to do with the reinforcement of the existing team of verifiers that was there?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.
THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the microphone of the accused please be adjusted. Thank you.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please speak to the microphone, into the microphone. 45330
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, all right. It was my understanding that I could be heard very well. I just wanted to establish this.
Mr. Robinson, you cannot reinforce something that was not there in the first place. So the verifiers were there, and then a reinforcement was sent out.
JUDGE BONOMY: I think, though, for the sake of completeness, it should be observed that the two patrols that were sent arrived about 17.30, according to this record, not 10.00 as the witness has indicated, so we must be taking about somebody else -- at least, he must be talking about somebody else.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The point was that patrols were sent to reinforce the Regional Centre. And when they arrived --
JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that's your point, but that's not what the witness is saying. There's great confusion constantly in this case about whether statements made by either you or Mr. Nice are evidence. They are not. All that is evidence in the case is what the witness says or the witness confirms, and you direct so much of your re-examination to what Mr. Nice has said but which the witness hasn't accepted anyway, in a pointless waste of time.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Bonomy.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Mr. Janicevic, you were shown here a book, "As Seen, As Told," and something was quoted to you pertaining to torture in your Secretariat of the Interior. On the basis of what was shown to you here, did you 45331 establish that something like that had been seen in your secretariat?
A. No, never. What it says in that book, "As Seen, As Told," is something that I never established, nor could I establish something like that, nor did somebody report something like that happened.
Q. Now, since it says there that they informed the representatives of the OSCE about that. Just one question: Did any representative of the OSCE ever speak to you about allegations of this kind, that somebody had been tortured at your police station?
A. No, never. In our contacts they asked why somebody had been arrested, if they had been arrested, how long they would be kept, whether detention was ordered. But beatings, torture, what that book says, that kind of thing was never mentioned.
Q. No one from the OSCE ever addressed you in that way, seeking explanation of this kind of incident?
A. Never, and I state that with full responsibility.
Q. Thank you, Mr. Janicevic. Just one more thing that Mr. Kwon said that he was interested in in particular. You said -- or, rather, you showed a criminal report against a post office worker who was charging --
A. Tax.
Q. -- taxes for leaving the country, and that he took more than was prescribed. Mr. Kwon was interested in this in view of the explanation of Mr. Nice that they were being charged this tax in order to leave the country.
Could you please have this placed on the overhead projector. This is an Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that 45332 publishes regulations. As you know, these are official documents. So let us explain this about the tax for exiting the country. If possible -- if possible, can we have it enlarged a bit, because this fax is -- the print is rather small.
Mr. Janicevic, could you please read the date of the Official Gazette first.
A. Tuesday, the 28th of December 1993.
Q. Tuesday, the 28th of December 1993?
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.
MR. NICE: I have hard copies of these because of Judge Kwon's and the Court's interest, and I was going to make them available at some later stage. There are, I think, three documents we have stapled together but if you want to see them, you can have a hard copy straight away.
JUDGE KWON: Translated?
MR. NICE: Yes, translated.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
MR. NICE: Not the whole document translated. We selected the part that appeared to be relevant for the purposes of exit tax.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. All right. Could you please just read this. On the basis of what?
A. On the basis of Article 1866, as far as I can see, of the Law on Foreign Exchange transactions.
Q. All right. A decision is brought.
A. "On paying a special tax when exiting the Federal Republic of 45333 Yugoslavia.
"1: Physical persons from the country leaving the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have the duty to pay a certain tax of 10 Deutschmarks or the equivalent of a different foreign currency. "A special tax amounting to 30 Deutschmark or the equivalent in other foreign currency will be paid in another ..." et cetera.
Q. So can it be seen here? Is 1993 the year when sanctions were imposed against our country?
A. Yes.
Q. Every citizen of Yugoslavia leaving the country pays 10 Deutschmark as an administrative tax for exiting the country?
A. Yes.
Q. And 30 Deutschmark, or the equivalent of 30 Deutschmark, is paid for a motor vehicle.
A. Yes.
Q. Did that pertain to all citizens or did it pertain to Albanians only?
A. All citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Q. The tax was -- was paid through banks, post offices, et cetera?
A. Yes.
Q. So you filed a criminal report against a post office clerk who took this 10 Deutschmark for the tax and asked for even more money.
A. Yes, he asked for even more money to be given to him.
Q. So does this tax have anything to do with any kind of -- or, rather, is it discriminatory in any way against any citizen of Yugoslavia? 45334
A. It is not discriminatory in any way or against any citizens.
Q. When you exited the country, did you have to pay that tax?
A. Everybody had to pay that tax, myself included.
Q. Thank you, Mr. Janicevic. I have no further questions. Questioned by the Court:
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Janicevic, you said you had not been aware of this existence of this exit tax at the time of the conflict, didn't you? As a policeman, you didn't know about this tax?
A. That's not what I said. I knew that the tax was introduced as far back as in 1993 and that the decision had not been abolished in the meantime. The tax was being paid.
JUDGE KWON: So is it your allegation that tax was collected from all the people who deport -- who were transferred outside Kosovo?
A. I did not say that. I don't know whether all people had to pay it or not. But there were no transfers from Kosovo. Those who left from Kosovo left of their own free will, and they were fleeing from the conflict.
I personally believe that most of these people did not have to pay the tax, but even if they had been charged the tax, there would not have been any legal restrictions in the way of that.
Further re-examination by Mr. Milosevic:
Q. [Interpretation] Just one more question, Mr. Janicevic. Did anybody charge refugees this tax?
A. I don't think so. I never heard of any refugees being charged the exit tax. 45335 BLANK PAGE 45336
Q. Thank you, Mr. Janicevic.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Janicevic -- exhibits. We will exhibit the tax document that was just presented. Is there a number for it?
MR. NICE: While the Court's considering that, the documents that I handed in, in case it is of interest or value to the Court, is both a 1993 decree, a further decree of 1994, and the abolition of the tax in 2000. It's up to the Court whether it wants them all in or just the first one, obviously.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, we will exhibit all of them.
THE REGISTRAR: That will be D320.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Janicevic, that concludes your testimony. Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give it, and you may now leave.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
[The witness withdrew]
JUDGE ROBINSON: Please call your next witness, Mr. Milosevic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next witness is General Djosan.
[The witness entered court]
JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit. And you may begin, Mr. Milosevic.
WITNESS: MILOS DJOSAN
[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Milosevic: 45337
Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
A. Good morning, Mr. Milosevic; good morning, Your Honours.
Q. Would you please introduce yourself and describe briefly your education and your career.
A. I am Milos Djosan, retired general of the Yugoslav People's Army, born on the 28th of February, 1949, in Bistrica village, Zepce municipality, former Bosnia-Herzegovina. I completed my secondary school in Zavidovici. After that, the Air Force Engineering Academy near Sarajevo; after that, the Staff Academy of Air Force and Air Defence; and after that, the School of National Defence. My title is air force electrical engineer, and I have the equivalent of a Ph.D.
Q. Where did you serve during the war in Kosovo? What was your zone of responsibility? What was the deployment of your units? And could you please show us all that on the map.
A. During the war in Kosovo and Metohija, I was commander of the 52nd Artillery Rocket Brigade of the air defence and also commander of the Djakovica garrison.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could somebody please put up this map from tab 1, which is an original. I hope you have it among your exhibits.
I will provide my map because you have the smaller version. One can better see on mine.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, my question was: What was your duty during the war in Kosovo? What was your zone of responsibility, and what was the deployment 45338 of your units?
You have a map behind you now and you can show us.
A. Yes. I was waiting for the map. I was commander of the 52nd Artillery Rocket Brigade of the air defence and simultaneously commander of the Djakovica garrison. This air defence brigade did not have an area of responsibility on the ground, but in airspace its area of responsibility completely coincides with the area of the Pristina Corps. So my area of responsibility is exactly the same as that of the Pristina Corps in the air. Air defence units normally don't have an area of responsibility on the ground.
Q. I asked you to show us where your units were deployed.
A. The units of the brigade in the initial period until the 9th of April, that is the beginning of the Kosare attack, were deployed mainly in the area of Djakovica and attached to certain combat groups within other units.
After the 9th of April, they were deployed in such a way as to defend the most important elements of the combat position of the Pristina Corps. Those are Djakovica, which was the command post of the brigade, the Logistics Battalion, and the command of the artillery battalion. The artillery battalion used to be located in Kijevo. Another artillery battalion was located in the area of Gnjilane, a third one in the area of Bec, and the fourth one in the area of Pristina. They had the assignment to protect and defend the most important elements of the Pristina Corps' combat disposition. I hope that will suffice.
Q. Thank you, General. So your units were deployed in the areas that 45339 you have just shown. From what time were you there?
A. I arrived at Djakovica on the 15th July 1998, and from that time on I had the area of responsibility as I described, and my units were in the locations described from the 9th April 1998.
Q. Did you receive regular information about the situation in Kosovo and Metohija in the areas and locations where your units were situated?
A. We had briefings by superior commanders, we had reporters from other -- reports from other services, and we also had our own personal insight into the situation after we arrived in the area. I was regularly spending stints with all of my units.
Q. In 1998 and 1999, were there any terrorist groups in that area?
A. Yes, in both years, mainly in the area of Djakovica.
Q. So in years 1998 and 1999 while you were there, did you personally, or any unit of yours, have any information about any plan or idea or project to expel Albanians from Kosovo?
A. No. I did not have such information, and my units certainly didn't because they couldn't know more than the commander did.
Q. In addition to being commander of the brigade, you also assumed the responsibilities of the garrison commander in Djakovica when you arrived there.
A. Yes.
Q. As the most senior officer in that area, you were simultaneously commander of the Djakovica garrison. Did I understand you correctly about that?
A. Yes. 45340
Q. Tell us when, as you said, you took over command over the Djakovica garrison in July, what information was available concerning the activities of the KLA and the area in which Djakovica is located and the various activities in that area.
A. I would put it this way: I arrived at Djakovica the first time using the longest road through Pristina, Brezovica, and Prizren. That's one of the existing four roads. All the other roads were blocked. All shorter, better roads were blocked. That fact alone, that I had to take the longest round-about way testifies to the situation in Kosovo and Metohija at the time. Most roads were blocked. The territory itself was blocked, and Djakovica, and you can say Metohija, was practically cut off from the rest of Kosovo.
Q. Before I ask you about what happened in Djakovica in those days, I think you told us you arrived there as brigade commander and garrison commander, what was the ethnic structure of your units? I'm talking about officers and commanding officers.
A. The brigade that I headed was made up mainly of Serbs, but in most command positions both in the brigade command and within units there were also members of other ethnic groups. I can give you an example from my brigade command.
My assistant for information and morale, Major Vitor Zdravko, is a Slovene. My assistant for logistics was Aleksandar Angelovski, lieutenant colonel, a Macedonian. Chief of communications was Drago Ilic, a Croat. An officer in the operations organ of the command was Nik Peraj, an Albanian. An operator in the general administration section was an 45341 Albanian, Ms. Beljuzare.
As for units and unit commanders, the commander of the 1st artillery battalion was Major Savo, a Hungarian. His assistant or, rather, deputy, was a Croat. The commander of the Logistics Battalion, who was there all the time in Djakovica, was Vlatko Odak, a Croat. His deputy was Ramiz Pejcinovic, a Muslim. The commander of the command artillery battalion was a Croat.
Of course there were Serbs, too, but these people occupied key positions.
As for the soldiers and non-commissioned officers, there were people belonging to all the ethnic groups, and the soldiers were predominantly Serbs, Serb soldiers.
Q. When you came, that is to say we're talking about July 1998 when you arrived, what was the situation like in Djakovica?
A. In Djakovica itself at that time, there was no combat going on, no combat operations. The town, in view of the blockade, was in a very difficult position. Supplies -- it was difficult to come by supplies. There was a general crisis of -- supply crisis, especially for basic foodstuffs. However, what I noticed most when I arrived was that there were a large number -- or, rather, long rows and lines of women and children waiting in queues. There were no adults, or none of the adult population, especially not Albanians.
Q. Did you have an explanation as to why there were no adult males? Usually Albanians don't send their women and children to -- into town.
A. Terrorism was burgeoning, and it was my information and estimation 45342 that the men, the menfolk, had mostly taken to the woods and forests in terrorist groups, and there were probably those who weren't in the woods but didn't dare leave their houses, either because of the revenge factor, fear of retribution by extremists or for propaganda or for some other reasons of fear. But that was the state of affairs as I found it in Djakovica when I took up my post as command of the Djakovica garrison.
Q. What was actually happening in Kosovo and Metohija in the course of 1998 and 1999?
A. In Kosovo and Metohija during those years what was happening was terrorism. There was terrorism, and the worst thing was that it was terrorism being expanded. And it took all sorts of forms, beginning with threats, blackmail of various kinds, liquidations of loyal Albanians, Serbs as well. There were attacks launched on the police, on the army, and there were just no suicide bombings at that time. There was none of that. That was the sole form of terrorism that did not exist.
Q. And who were the protagonists of those terrorist actions, to the best of your knowledge?
A. To the best of my knowledge, they were members of the KLA organisation and FARK. Those were the two military organisations which had similar methods. They applied similar methods, had similar or, rather, the same goals, similar methods. They differed very slightly in the way in which they achieved their goals and in their ideas of realising their objectives.
Q. You pointed out some of the characteristic activities of terrorism in the book you wrote about those events, and we have brief excerpts here 45343 from that book. It is to be found in tab 2. We have excerpts from your book there. You wrote about things like that. So would you like to point out some characteristic features and quotations?
A. Of course I can do that. I can tell you without looking at the material because I'm the author of the book, but I shall read them out. I'll find the excerpts myself and read them out for the benefit of the rest of you.
JUDGE KWON: What's the title of the book, first of all?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The book is titled "The General's Kosmet Road." And I am the creator of the book or, rather, the author.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. You're the general, because in the title you say "The General's Road." So you are that general; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you just repeat the number of the tab, please.
A. Yes. It's tab 2.
Q. Tab 2, and in chapter 6, "The Road to Metohija" is the title of the chapter, is where I think you have that first excerpt that you want to quote. It says: "In the queues in front of shops there were mostly women and children, and that is very rare with the Siptars. The menfolk would appear in town only on the day when their pensions were being paid out and other social benefits."
A. Yes, that's right. I can read it out, if you want to.
Q. Well, you don't have to because I've already read it out. It's on page 81. It says the men would appear only on days when pensions were 45344 being paid out and other social welfare benefits. So they didn't give that up. They didn't mind taking that from the state. And then their movements would be to the post office and then back home or back to the KLA unit.
So that's what you recorded. Is that what you recorded on the basis of your observations, or were they the observations of those you came into contact and people that you commented about on the situation?
A. Those were my observations, but I also received detailed information when taking up my duties. I looked through new documents and, when taking up your duties, as a rule, the commander has to acquaint himself with the situation in -- on the terrain, with his unit, the experiences of the unit, the losses and casualties suffered, and generally speaking, everything a commander needs to know when takes up a new post, a new commander, which was what I was, so that I could take on my duties of command.
Q. Very well, General. Let's leave that tab before you for the time being, have it in front of you. And tell me this: Did anything change; and if so, what changed when the Verification Mission arrived in October 1998, or November 1998? What changed?
A. When the Verification Mission arrived, nothing changed, or, rather, it did not change along the lines we expected it to change. Quite the contrary. What happened was there was a revival of terrorist bases. There was a revival of attacks launched against the army and police. Loyal citizens were being killed again, loyal Albanians, so that we had events and occurrences which happened before the very eyes of the 45345 observers themselves. And one such event happened on the 13th of November in the region of Stimlje or, rather, in Dulje, where a soldier of mine Demar Idanovic [phoen], was killed, and he was an escort to a military column.
Q. Was that the event that you write about on page 101 of your book? You say that the first casualties, after the arrival of the Verification Mission, that is, fell.
A. Yes, that's right. It says that on page 101, and I can read it out, read the excerpt out.
Q. Go ahead.
A. "On Friday the 13th of November, 1999, halfway -- on the road halfway between Pristina and Suva Reka --" and that is in this location here --
MR. NICE: 1999 is in error.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "At the foot of Milanovac mountain, in a gorge which begins by the forester's house --" that is Sumarija Kuca is the name of the place, and ends with the infamous Dulje pass -- "a terrorist attack was carried out against a military column. Having approached the road leading up to the gorge itself and leaving the Praga and the bus, the terrorists used Zoljas and hand-held rocket launchers to attack a truck in which there were soldiers belonging to the security force. The rocket on that occasion pierced the tarpaulin and left a big round hole there and hit Dejan Arizanovic from Sudaliste, a lance corporal, and five of our soldiers were also wounded; three seriously wounded and two less seriously wounded." 45346 BLANK PAGE 45347 Is that sufficient? Do you want me to continue?
Q. No, that will suffice. Thank you.
A. I would like to add this: That particular group, immediately before the entrance into the gorge at that place where the terrorist attack took place, saw the verifiers who were located in their patrol in vehicles which were easily recognisable because they were orange in colour, or black vehicles with an orange cover which was what they knew -- used and which told us that they enjoyed diplomatic status which we had to respect and that we should be proper in our conduct towards them.
Q. Did you have any contact with the verifiers? I don't mean on that particular occasion when you were attacked, but generally speaking, did you have any contact at all with the verifiers?
A. Yes. I myself as the brigade commander and garrison commander had a number of contacts with the verifiers on a number of occasions. The first was on the 16th of December, 1998, when an officer came, or one of the verifiers - I didn't know he was an officer - with an interpreter. He came to see what was going on, and he asked to see me, of course, in my unit as head of the unit to check out the state of affairs, the situation, and the numerical strength of light rocket transmission systems of the Strela 2M type or arrow 2M type. And that's all he was interested in, these portable devices. He wasn't interested in any other vehicles or the Praga or anything else, just these light rocket portable systems. And he was very precise and looked at it in great detail. He looked at each of the rockets and compared them to the launch mechanism, launching mechanism. And only when he saw that everything was in order did he say 45348 that we were right, that we respected what was stipulated, that the FRY were in compliance with the conditions laid down.
Q. All right, General. Now, there's something characteristic there. That particular verifier was interested only in the rocket system of your brigade; is that right? Does that mean that he wasn't interested in the artillery weapons that you had?
A. Yes, you're quite right. He wasn't interested at all in the number of artillery weapons we had, that is to say the Pragas, the anti-aircraft guns, missiles, rockets. That's all he was interested in. And in a conversation we had, he said to me, he said, "Colleague," and I asked him how come we're colleagues, and he introduced himself and said he was John Pemberton, that he was a military attache, an air force attache, in fact, from Belgrade, stationed in Belgrade, and he gave me his calling card and said that he would be happy if I visited him when I had the time. Of course, that never came to pass. The occasion never arose and there was never the need.
Q. All right. Now the tasks of the Verification Mission need not be enumerated here. They're well known to all of us. The officer verifier came to your brigade, he was only interested in learning about the rocket systems that you had.
Now, tell me this as an expert yourself: These rocket systems, that is to say, did these -- could those rocket systems be used at all against targets on the ground?
A. No. Those rocket systems at -- cannot be used against targets on the ground in any event, and they cannot harm anybody who is not in an 45349 aircraft, in a plane.
Q. All right. So those rocket systems that he was interested in were devices which -- and weapons which exclusively are used to target planes; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And the artillery weapons can be used for targets on the ground; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. But he wasn't interested in artillery weapons, according to what you've just told us; is that right?
A. Yes, you're quite right.
Q. When did he come to see you?
A. He was in the unit on the 16th of December, 1998.
Q. So you said the 16th of December, 1998. Is that it?
A. Yes.
Q. That would be one month prior to the event in Racak, roughly speaking; is that right? Thank you, General.
Q. Now, your headquarters were in Djakovica where you were the commander of the garrison. Tell me, was this region important for the terrorist forces?
A. The Djakovica region was the most important part and most important region for the terrorist forces. The position of Djakovica itself in Metohija, in the area of Metohija, is such that there are two tactical axes running to Djakovica which are most suitable for an aggression from the ground and from the territory of Albania. It is the 45350 Cafa-Prusit-Djakovica axis and the Kosare-Brovina-Morina axis, and Smonica too. If you gain control of this area here around Djakovica, then you will have opened up the road for further action and advancement towards Kosovo or, rather, towards Pec, Prizren, and so on further on. So this area here is of exceptional importance because in the border belt there are sufficient inhabited areas which are linked up with roads, with Junik, Decani, Pec, and via this way via Djakovica, Prizren and further afield towards Pristina or, rather, the territory of Kosovo, generally speaking.
Q. Thank you, General.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, is this an opportune moment to take the break?
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll take the break now. We'll break for 20 minutes.
--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
--- Upon resuming at 10.56 a.m.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, did you know anything about the existence of some kind of concerted action on the part of the terrorists and some foreign representatives?
A. Yes. Inter alia, I wrote about that in my book. I saw that Holbrooke was in Junik. I heard that some diplomats, like Hill, for instance, also came to Kosovo and Metohija. I also saw and felt the activities of Walker, who was also a diplomat. But I also heard of Paddy 45351 Ashdown.
THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please be asked to speak into the microphone. Thank you.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Please speak into the microphone. Come a little closer.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, you mentioned Paddy Ashdown. I'm going to read something out to you, a brief quotation from his testimony here. It is on transcript page 2483. It has to do with the cross-examination, and I'm putting a question to him: "Mr. Ashdown [In English] is it customary for a leader of a small -- for a leader of a small opposition party to visit, some ten times, a region in which there's a war going on, in some way on behalf of the government or in the name of the government? Is that customary, standard practice, in Great Britain?" [Interpretation] Answer: "[In English] I don't think it's customary at all, and it is not what I did. I visited as the leader of a political party -- as the leader of political party, on my own account, in order to inform myself of what is going on. I did not visit either as an envoy or on behalf of the British government ..." [Interpretation] And then the transcript says: "[In English] How did you come to carry a letter from Prime Minister?" "The witness: On this occasion, the Prime Minister knew. Indeed, it was public knowledge, Your Honour, that I was going out. He asked me to convey a letter for him. I acted as a postman." [Interpretation] This is his statement here, given under oath, 45352 that he did not come as an envoy or as a representative of his government or on behalf of his government, for that matter, but in his own name. On this tape, which I would like to have played now, Ashdown says, "Prime Minister Blair sent me out here to see everything." So in one of these two statements he wasn't telling the truth. Could the tape please be played now?
JUDGE ROBINSON: How is the witness going to help you with this issue?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, he knew --
JUDGE ROBINSON: I see the point you are making, but how is the witness going to help you with this issue?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness is a highly educated soldier, a major general, and I want to ask him what Ashdown was doing there on that tape. And as you can see in the transcript --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Whether Paddy Ashdown was acting as an envoy or a postman? I don't see how that is useful, quite frankly.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. No. This is something I'm doing by way of an introduction, because the transcript says what it says, what I read out, and he is telling them here that Blair had sent him. I want to ask the general what he was doing, from a military point of view, during the time that is shown on the tape.
[Trial Chamber confers]
JUDGE ROBINSON: All right, yes. Show the tape.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please play the Ashdown tape.
[Videotape played] 45353
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot see the tape.
[Videotape played] "That's an AK-47.
"That's his. "And where did it come from? Serbia?
"He bought it, he doesn't know from where. He just bought it. "How much can buy it?
"[Inaudible] military security."
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The tape should be played on.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, let the tape be played.
[Videotape played] "Whose is this, yours?
"Kalashnikov, that's an AK-47. "That's his.
"Where did it come from? "He bought it. He doesn't know from where. He just bought it. "How much can you buy it?
"[Inaudible] military secrets. They don't want the commanders to say that they gave the weapons to somebody else. "No, no, it's okay.
"This is a -- a caser in there. I'm sorry, I didn't mean to ask him [inaudible]. Have they had many discussions on the [inaudible]? "A KLA soldier. They didn't actually to this village. There's always fire from the distance.
"From a distance. 45354 "Yeah.
"Okay. "Simanov [inaudible]."
JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you stop for a minute, please.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's all right now. It's all right now. I can see it.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Is the tape finished? Just from where we left off, though.
[Videotape played] "If you got any magazine I'll put a round any time you want me to.
"That's a sniper's rifle. "That's a Simanov, and this one also. 47 [Inaudible]. I'm glad you know what you're doing.
"Should we all be in this room? "And being shot by it. This is useless but this one isn't. [Inaudible] There's a round up the chamber. This one, you see this one is unserviceable. There are some rounds here. This one you can use straight away.
"Knows what you want. [Inaudible] "[Inaudible] used for a very long time. This one is --"
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, stop. I'm going to stop this. Put your question. I don't think we need to see any more of this in order for you to put your question. What is the question that you have for the witness? 45355
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. I hope that you noticed, and you can see it in the transcript -- have you seen this tape before, General?
A. I did not hear you.
THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note that the witness's microphone is off.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Ashdown says here, inter alia: "You can use this one. It's good. You can use it for shooting," and so on. "Be careful." So what is Ashdown doing there?
MR. NICE: How can this witness possibly answer that question?
JUDGE ROBINSON: I agree. Move on. The witness can't help you with that. We can see what he was doing. We'll determine what he was doing. There is no profit in this line of questioning at all.
THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters cannot hear the speaker.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Sorry, I didn't hear the question.
THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters could not hear the question because the microphone was off.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. What did you see Ashdown doing here?
A. According to what I saw --
MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues]...
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Judge Robinson, please.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I've told you to move on. It 45356 doesn't help the case for the witness to say what he saw Ashdown doing. We saw it.
JUDGE BONOMY: Can you tell me who did the interpretation, the transcript?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My associates translated the transcript.
JUDGE BONOMY: It has some -- it has some obvious inaccuracies in it.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is just one inaccuracy in the transcript. He says, "Is it from Bosnia?" and what it says here is Serbia. That's the only inaccuracy in the transcript.
JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let me simply identify two for you if you want to consider it further. At one point the transcript says: "And this one also ... 47 like that ... I knew you'd do anything ..." He actually says, "I'm glad you know what you are doing."
And then a few lines later he describes one, according to the transcript, as "unserviceable," and if you listen again you'll see him describe it as "very serviceable." These are just two obvious ones, and I'm sure there must be many more.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but these mistakes are at my detriment. Rather, they harm what I have been saying. So I thank you, Mr. Bonomy for drawing my attention to this.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, in your career, did you act with your soldiers in the same way or in a similar way when handling weapons? 45357 BLANK PAGE 45358
A. In this way and a similar way. What can be seen here is that Mr. Ashdown is very familiar with weapons and we could say --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. What is the question you're putting?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Whether I sometimes trained my soldiers in this way, and my answer is yes.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Next question.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Could this tape please be admitted into evidence?
MR. NICE: My recollection is that it may already have been produced by another witness. It certainly couldn't on the basis of the questions and answers being given by this witness be produced or reproduced by him.
Incidentally, while the tape's in everybody's mind, it having been looked at before, there is no suggestion of an identity of personnel between those in uniform in part 1 and those in the basement in part 2. Those are two totally different bits of event.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Is the tape --
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Nobody's saying that. No. Mr. Nice objected when I asked for it to be admitted, that it could not be admitted because this question had not been put in cross-examination. So for procedural reasons. And now I put it during my examination-in-chief in order to be able to have it admitted. And in terms of comparing it to the transcript, you can see that he was saying different things. And also from the point of view of what he was doing here and from the point of 45359 view of the explanation provided by the witness.
MR. NICE: Well --
JUDGE BONOMY: Two weeks ago this film was shown to us, and it led to an investigation into the translation.
MR. NICE: But it wasn't formally produced, I understand, at that time.
JUDGE BONOMY: All right.
MR. NICE: And I maintain my objection to its admission. It's not admissible through this witness. I observe what the accused says about the potential for inconsistency in Lord Ashdown's account of events, but the accused has not taken this witness or the Court, to remind the Court, to the earlier passage of evidence where Lord Ashdown explained how he carried the letter from Mr. Blair and why he carried the letter and what he did with it and what his instructions were, and so on.
JUDGE BONOMY: But is the part at the end of this transcript, at least the end of page 2, accurate, do you know?
MR. NICE: This is the passage which we have checked and I haven't yet laid my hands on the passage from CLSS. My recollection is that the contentious passage, which is to be found at the foot of the second page, I think, three lines up from the bottom, "It's a scandal," is not as erroneous as was being put by the accused when he was -- he was suggesting a different form of scandal.
JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, but the one I'm asking about now is the very last line.
MR. NICE: That I haven't been able to check, I'm afraid. 45360
[Trial Chamber confers]
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we'll mark it for identification pending translation. Judge Bonomy has already pointed to two areas where the translation is not correct. So the best thing is to have the translation done by the CLSS. So it's marked for identification pending translation.
THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. Can I please give D321 to the binders, and tab 2 is the 2A; right? Tab 1A is pending translation, MFI.
JUDGE BONOMY: It's, strictly speaking, not a question of translation. It's a question of obtaining an accurate transcript, and there is an issue over who is the person to do that, I suppose. Is it the CLSS or --? But it should be married up with an accurate transcript.
JUDGE KWON: And the map was admitted as well, tab 1.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, let's move on.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just note something. Mr. Bonomy is quite right when he says that your translators should do this, but I also have to say that I asked your translators to do it but they didn't do it, so then I had to give it to my associates for them to have it translated. So when your translators do it, it will be my pleasure to read out the transcript as it is. And after all, you were able to hear for yourselves what it says in the transcript.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Not my translators. It is the Tribunal's translators.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please continue. 45361
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, you explained the importance of this axis and this area where Djakovica is for various operations. Were there terrorist strongholds there in that area?
A. Yes. Most of the terrorist strongholds were precisely in the broader area of Djakovica, primarily Junik, Nivokaz, Smonica, Popovac, Dobros, Rakovac, and others along the Junik-Djakovica axis.
Q. You've explained why these particular places were important, so I'm not going to dwell on it any longer.
In paragraph 63(h), it says that: "Until March 1999, the population of Djakovica increased considerably --" "From March 1999 ... increased considerably because of a large number of internally displaced persons who were fleeing from their own villages, from the deliberate shelling of the forces of the FRY and Serbia during 1998, and fleeing from the conflicts between those forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army." Since you yourself were in Djakovica, what can you say about these allegations?
A. These allegations are not correct. First of all, it was not intentional shelling. There was no deliberate shelling. Secondly, when it says "Serb forces," this is a rather undefined notion. In that area there was the army of Yugoslavia and the MUP of the Republic of Serbia. A few moments ago, when explaining the ethnic make-up of the brigade that I commanded, I showed that these were not only Serb forces. These were units of the army of Yugoslavia and the MUP of the 45362 Republic of Serbia. As for shelling, I know for sure that there wasn't any.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. First you said it was not intentional shelling. There was no deliberate shelling. Now you're saying that you're sure there wasn't any shelling. Could you clarify that?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can. Intentional shelling would mean shelling without any target or provocation. As it was, there was no shelling in that period because at that time, just before the NATO aggression, there were no major events or incidents that would require use of support equipment, support weapons.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]. I just wish to draw your attention, Mr. Robinson, that the term "deliberate shelling," or "intentional shelling," is something I quoted from paragraph 63(h). I quoted that to the witness.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, according to the information that was available to you, why were the refugees leaving?
A. For several reasons. The main reason for them to move was their fear from the activity of NATO aviation. Another cause was their fear of being trapped in an area where combat would be taking place between the JNA and the terrorist units. And on top of that, there was propaganda and there were demands made on them to leave. It is quite certain that pressure was exerted to create an appearance of a great number of refugees 45363 and thus a humanitarian catastrophe.
Q. It says here in this same paragraph that the movement of internally displaced people increased after 24th March 1999 when, following violent expulsions in the town of Djakovica, many people internally displaced persons returned from the town of Djakovica to the outlying villages. Is this correct?
A. No. The movement of civilians started with the NATO aggression. Everybody started to leave - Albanians, Serbs; everybody - with the proviso that Serbs, who were far less in number, moved in a different direction, whereas Albanians, who were much larger in number, started moving towards Albania. But it all started at the moment when the bombing started. I wrote that in several places in my book.
Q. In paragraph 63(i), it says that: "From on or about 24 March 1999 through 11 May 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia began forcing residents of the town of Djakovica to leave. Forces of the FRY and Serbia spread out through the town and went from house to house, ordering Kosovo Albanians from their homes."
Is this correct?
A. No. I was in Djakovica at that time, and I neither saw nor heard nor received any information from my subordinates or assistants that such things were happening. I saw columns moving through Djakovica, I saw that some were moving towards Prizren, others towards Cafa Prusit, but I never received reports from my subordinates or saw for myself that somebody was forcing them to move. I think they were forced by NATO bombs.
Q. In paragraph 55, it says that: "Forces of the FRY and Serbia, in a 45364 deliberate and widespread or systematic manner, forcibly expelled and internally displaced hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their homes across the entire province of Kosovo ... by creating an atmosphere of fear and oppression through the use of force, threats of force, and acts of violence."
Tell me loud and clear, did you create an atmosphere of fear? Did you threaten Albanians or use acts of violence?
A. This is certainly not true. At that time, on the eve of the aggression, the army had many serious tasks facing it. It was with the beginning of the NATO aggression that fighting started with terrorists and our forces, so that our army and the police had the responsibility and the duty to fight simultaneously against NATO aggression on the one hand and against terrorists on the other hand. The terrorists who, with the NATO aggression, received full fire support.
Q. In this paragraph 63, it says, among other things, that in certain cases people were killed, many were threatened with being killed, and many businesses belonging to Albanians were torched while the businesses of Serbs were protected. What can you say about that?
A. Many businesses were set on fire belonging both to Serbs and Albanians, but those fires were caused by NATO bombs. It is understandable that many more Albanian businesses were hit because there were simply many more Albanian businesses than Serb businesses, but that depends entirely on the ratio of these two ethnic groups, their representation in the total population. But one thing that is certain is that it was not done by soldiers. 45365
Q. You said the main reason why people fled was the activity of NATO Air Force. Do we have in tab 3 an overview of actions performed by the NATO Air Force?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this map please be placed on that board, because the general explained that he was responsible for the entire airspace of Kosovo and Metohija.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, please continue.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Show us, please, what you said on the map.
A. This map -- I can't hear. This map shows the deployment of units of the 52nd Artillery Rocket Brigade of the air defence in two periods. The first period is up to the 9th of April, 1999. We see that here. They are deployed mainly in the area of Djakovica. After that, and that is after the attack on Kosare, from the moment when ground invasion became a certainty, my units were here as well as the supporting units of air defence.
The 52nd Brigade was not the only one responsible in Kosovo and Metohija for air defence, but in the Pristina Corps it was the only air defence brigade. This is where the 52nd Brigade was until the 9th of April and after that.
After the 9th of April, one artillery battalion, the 3rd Battalion, was in Bec. The 1st Artillery Battalion was in Kijevo. The 4th artillery battalion was in the area of Pristina, Gracanica; and the 2nd Artillery Battalion was in the area of Gnjilane. Pursuant to a decision by the corps commander, they were deployed 45366 in such a way as to be able to defend all the most important elements of the disposition of the Pristina Corps.
Q. Thank you, General.
JUDGE BONOMY: The question that was asked was whether this map represented an overview of the activities of NATO. Now, you don't seem to be dealing -- so the map doesn't do that.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't hear the interpreters.
JUDGE BONOMY: The --
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can hear now.
JUDGE BONOMY: The question you were asked was whether this map showed an overview of the bombing activities of NATO. Does it show that? Because that's not what your answer has dealt with.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My answer was an attempt to show the disposition of troops, and I was intending to deal with the bombing activities of NATO when I continue.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. All right. General, look at this map which is an overview of the activities of the NATO Air Force.
Could you please place this --
JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let's be clear.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].
Q. -- on the board.
JUDGE BONOMY: Can we take it the one that's up there is not an overview of the activities of NATO and that we've just wasted five minutes on that question? Because that's what I've been looking for on the map. 45367
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will explain. This is the map, but in this case we see this overview in table form and a specific display deals only with Djakovica because Djakovica was the base for myself and my units. For the entire territory of Kosovo and Metohija, we have another map where it is shown in detail. What we see on this one is the number of sorties, the type of attacks, the number of planes involved, the increase of activities with time and the losses incurred as well as the bombs used. But we have another map that shows in greater detail certain events, certain incidents in actual places, individual places in Kosovo and Metohija. Bombing activities concerning Djakovica can be shown on this map, whereas the next map can be used for the rest of the area.
JUDGE BONOMY: Did you have anything to do with the preparation of this map?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE BONOMY: When -- when was --
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's the map I prepared.
JUDGE BONOMY: When was it prepared?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sometime in the last month, based on reports and documents that are contemporaneous.
JUDGE BONOMY: And how did you get access to them?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After the aggression ended, we made all sorts of analyses and a lot has been published about the NATO aggression. A war report was published and there were also, while it lasted, daily press conferences with detailed explanations given.
JUDGE BONOMY: Please listen to the questions I'm asking you and 45368 BLANK PAGE 45369 answer the questions. How did you get access to the contemporaneous documents?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Most of the access that I had I got through Mr. Milosevic's lawyers, but I also had access to public records, public reports, analyses that were made, and finally, we had a report that was the work product of the commission that analysed the effects of the NATO aggression against the FRY.
JUDGE BONOMY: What is that commission?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's a commission of the Office of the Prosecutor that reviewed the lawsuit filed by the FRY concerning the NATO aggression.
JUDGE BONOMY: A commission of the office of which Prosecutor?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This Office of the Prosecutor.
JUDGE BONOMY: And you used that report as a partial basis for this -- for this document; is that right?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this other map be placed on the overhead projector now, please. On the board, not on the overhead projector.
JUDGE KWON: Is that tab 46?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 46, yes, tab 46.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, does this map show -- or, rather, not to put the question that way. Tell me what the map shows. What does the map show, and what 45370 is designated on the map?
A. On this map -- this map shows the places where the NATO airstrikes took place, the targets of the NATO airstrikes, which means this is not the number of projectiles, this is not the number of bombs, this is the number of attacks on individual places.
Q. So it's not numbers, it's places.
A. Yes, places targeted by the NATO Air Force. For example, on Pristina. There were 460 attacks launched on Pristina, and on a map of this kind you couldn't put 460 triangles. The number of operations and the number of lethal weapons expulsed is impossible to show in graphic form in this way.
Q. Very well, General. Let's just clear one point up: The triangles indicate the places which were targeted by the NATO Air Force; is that right?
A. Yes.
JUDGE ROBINSON: And does it also indicate the places where -- that were actually bombed by NATO?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, I didn't hear your question properly. I couldn't hear you.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Not the places that were targeted but places that were actually bombed by NATO.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. They are places where the bombs or rockets fell. They are places that were attacked.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Very well, General. Thanks to Mr. Robinson's explanation, or the 45371 explanation you gave him, those were places where NATO projectiles fell; is that right?
A. Yes, projectiles or bombs or tank cannon balls and so forth, targeted by the air force.
Q. All right. Fine. Now, since we're dealing with this topic and you explained that the refugees or, rather, that the population fled because of the bombing, I'm going to ask you now, bearing in mind the fact that in paragraph 63.1 speaks of alleged deportations performed by our forces, carried out by our forces, I am going to quote the places in their order, and I'd like to ask you to point to their location on the map, the ones I'm going to read out, and tell us whether the bombs fell on those places.
A. All right. Fine.
Q. Point A or, rather, paragraph 63(a) is Orahovac. Show us where Orahovac lies.
A. It's here.
Q. That's Orahovac.
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Fine. Now, paragraph 63(b) mentions another place, and that is Prizren. Show us the Prizren area, please.
A. [Indicates].
Q. Paragraph 63(c) --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I consider this very important. Can you direct us as to the dates when these places were bombed and the -- so that I can try to relate it to the dates of the alleged flights of the 45372 people from those areas. Because your case, as I understand it, is that the people fled following the bombing, or are you also saying that some of the flights also took place simply in anticipation of the bombing?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Robinson, homo sapiens, once the bombing starts, you can flee from bombs that have not landed on your head. If they -- you have been hit by bombs, you cannot flee. So I wanted us to take a look at all the places, all the different places mentioned in paragraph 63 relating to deportation, under the heading of deportation, so that you can see how many places there were in those localities where the bombs fell.
For example, in the example of Orahovac and Prizren, another case in point, that was where the bombing was most dense. And we'll look at it date-wise, too, because it says from the 24th of March to the 12th of May, and in Pristina there were 409 attacks, as the general said. Whether 409 attacks took place in the same area, certainly not, but in the general Pristina area there were 409 sorties or attacks.
JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... find out as to whether the witness can help us as to the dates when the bombings took place in these villages where there were flights. So let us continue.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. So you showed us Orahovac. According to that map of yours, were there many places in that area that were bombed?
A. Yes.
Q. What about Prizren? You indicated Prizren to us. Were there many places bombed there too? 45373
A. Yes, there were 326 places that were bombed in the general Prizren area.
Q. All right. Now, paragraph 63(c) mentioned Srbica. Show us Srbica on the map. And that's where there was a lot of bombing, too; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Paragraph 63(d), Suva Reka. Indicate Suva Reka to us, please.
A. Suva Reka is here.
Q. 63(e) is Pec. Show us Pec, please.
A. Here it is.
Q. In paragraph 63(f), Kosovska Mitrovica, point that out to us, please.
A. Here it is.
Q. Paragraph 63(g) is Pristina. Show us that.
A. Pristina.
Q. Paragraph 63(h) is Djakovica. Show us Djakovica.
A. [Indicates].
Q. Paragraph 63(i) is Gnjilane. Point to Gnjilane, please.
A. [Indicates].
Q. Paragraph 63(j) is Urosevac. Show us Urosevac.
A. [Indicates].
Q. Paragraph 63(k) is Kacanik. Point to Kacanik.
A. [Indicates].
Q. That same paragraph, paragraph 63(l), is Decani. Point to Decani for us. 45374
A. [Indicates].
Q. Paragraph 63(m) is Vucitrn. Show us Vucitrn, please.
A. [Indicates].
Q. And that completes the list of locations under the heading of "Deportation."
Now, all the places that you have indicated, were they the target of intensive bombing and is that where there was a high bombardment density?
A. Yes. I have drawn up a more detailed map according to the different bombing periods for each month, month by month. I think that you have that map.
Q. I hope I've found it. I hope I can find it.
A. Anyway, it indicates monthly periods and the exact points month-by-month.
Q. Right. We'll deal with that in due course. But anyway, we've gone through all the places mentioned in this paragraph, all the letters, the paragraphs -- subparagraphs.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it would appear that our forces have been accused of deportation precisely from places which were most bombed. Where there was no bombing, there doesn't seem to be any charges or accusations of deportation.
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for the accused.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Right. I've switched it on now.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, this map, does it show the targets of NATO attacking 45375 Kosovo and Metohija and could give us additional explanation; is that it?
A. Yes.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this next map be placed on the board, please.
MR. NICE: It's not clear to me whether this is a tabbed map or not. I'm not sure if the accused would -- perhaps the accused would make it clear.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a map which is an addition to the map with the dates; is that right? It's a supplement.
A. Yes.
Q. It's a map that was drawn up, as far as I understood it -- well, it was brought in yesterday because it just defines the map we've seen more precisely according to date.
A. What we can see here is --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please go ahead.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This shows it in greater detail, the periods and the different targets in Kosovo and Metohija. I have taken three periods on this particular map. Had we taken every day, looked at it every day, we wouldn't have been able to record all the actions on the many locations.
For example, this colour here, the orange colour, shows the operations in the first month of the NATO aggression, from the 24th of March, that is, until the 25th of May. And this is where it started; Djakovica, Pristina. All the places were bombed. All these places were bombed both in the first month and later on throughout. 45376 The red, the red colour, indicates the operations and targeting for Easter, the greatest Orthodox religious holiday, Easter. The operations were launched against Djakovica, Pristina, the orange here again, and the bombing of Klina.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. And other places in mauve, in purple. Now, general, you said a moment ago that the orange denotes the first month and then you said from March to May. Is that a mistake or what?
A. From the 24th of March until the 25th of April is what I meant to say.
Q. Ah, yes. I assumed that there was an error there because you said the first month and then you said May, whereas it was April.
A. Yes, that's right. Now, the blue, the blue colour takes us from the 25th of April to the 25th of May. They are operations against these blue areas. And the next period is from the 25th of May to the end of the aggression.
Q. Very well.
A. And this also indicates places where depleted uranium was used in the bombing.
Q. What colour denotes depleted uranium? I wasn't able to see that.
A. Well, operations of bombing with depleted uranium are --
Q. No. I asked what you colour on the map shows you this.
A. Oh, it is this sign here.
Q. I see. 45377
Q. I see. This circle with the dots.
A. Yes, the circle with the dots.
Q. That is deleted uranium, when deleted uranium was used; is that right?
A. Yes. The number of charges hasn't been shown because there are 300 and upwards. So it is impossible to count them all because there were almost 200 to 300 charges.
Q. Charged from where?
A. From a cannon, a seven-barrel cannon and a high velocity cannon. That is to say the seven-barrelled cannon is the highest velocity of cannon. And in the squares, the squares shows characteristic targets where civilians were killed, is a representative example. Like Luzane, a bus with civilians in Kulina next to Rozaje; Meja, the refugee settlement at Meja, or rather, the column of refugees in Meja on the 14th of April. And further on, another attack here on a refugee Serb settlement from Krajina, Maja.
Q. Point that out on the map, please.
A. Yes, I apologise. Here it is. That is Bistrazin, the Maja settlement. It is a refugee settlement. This is Meja, the place where they targeted Siptar refugees for the first time. This is a place called Luzane, where a bus was hit with passengers in it, a civilian coach with passengers. And this is another place here, Sabina Vode [phoen] or Kulina, where a bus was hit with passengers from Metohija on their way to Montenegro.
And here we have how many civilians were killed, the figures of 45378 how many civilians were killed in Kosovo and Metohija by NATO bombing. How many were killed on the roads and how many were killed in settlements. This, of course, does not include the casualties and the victims that were found underneath the rubble and ruins of buildings and features.
JUDGE KWON: General, do you by any chance know the book titled "NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia, Documentary Evidence," which was published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of your country?
A. I've seen the book, some of it. I haven't read it in detail, just in part, but I have other information and sources because I used sources first of all on the basis of regular daily press conferences that took place parallel to the bombardment. Whenever there was a bombardment, there would be a press conference held in Pristina or Belgrade, one of the press centres in those places, but yes, I have seen the book.
JUDGE KWON: So what you're saying now should have been contained in those books.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In those books, yes, but also we have more specific concrete data. I have concrete data for Djakovica, for instance, on the basis of combat -- the combat diary of one of the commanders of the battalion, and this reflects the situation exactly. This map does not contain it all. There were many situations where the communication lines were interrupted and we in Djakovica were not able to inform our superiors in Pristina about what was going on about the bombardment for them to be able to state that at the press conferences that they gave.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you. 45379 BLANK PAGE 45380
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So this isn't final the number either, the final count.
JUDGE KWON: Just for the record, those -- those books are tabs 28 and 29 of D275, which is marked for identification pending translation. Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon, all the books were given in the English language, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gave those six, or was it seven, white books. They were all published in English and in Serbian.
JUDGE KWON: Now I remember. I was mistaken in terms of the reason why it was put -- marked for identification. We'll deal with it later.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, in view of your position, your post, the anti-aircraft defence for all of Kosovo, you had daily information about NATO attacks while you were there. Did you have such information or did you not?
A. We did. From time to time, depending on the situation on the ground. Sometimes we had communications or did not have communications with our subordinates and superiors.
Q. As for Djakovica, since you were there and you were the commander of the garrison, could you personally see for yourself what places had been hit?
A. For the town of Djakovica, yes.
Q. You could see it yourself?
A. Yes. I could see it myself, and we can prove it on the basis of 45381 documentation that my observers of the airspace saw, and also what we had reconnoitred before that.
Q. All right. Is this a map that shows NATO operations in the area of the 2nd Battalion of the 549th Motorised Brigade?
MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues]... the map that's been on the overhead -- on the board. Obviously it's going to be important for me to have a copy of it if I am to check its reliability, if I even have the potential to do so in time. I don't know how quickly we can get copies of these done. It's unfortunate that such an important exhibit, if it turns out to be important, comes without copies available for us. It is, of course, the accused's responsibility to have it copied.
JUDGE ROBINSON: I was just going to inquire about that. Would the Registry be able to assist in making copies of this? Well, we'll inquire, Mr. Nice.
Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. I don't know, General, whether -- well, it's for you to say, actually, whether it would be more visible if it were placed on the overhead projector. Is it better to view it that way or on the easel, because it has to do with the town of Djakovica only.
A. We can try, as far as I'm concerned.
Q. And then it can be moved elsewhere perhaps.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us give a number to the one that we just saw.
THE REGISTRAR: That will be D321, tab 47.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. 45382
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, did the previous map receive a number, with the exact places that were bombed in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija?
JUDGE KWON: We gave a new tab number following the last tab. So it was given the number tab 47 of this binder.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 46 was the other map, with the exact places that were bombed? 46, tab 46? Has that been admitted into evidence?
JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm not sure whether we did 46. Court deputy, can you tell us?
We haven't yet admitted that.
JUDGE KWON: The Chamber --
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'm asking for it to be admitted into evidence, tab 46, the map there, that is to say all the places that were hit by NATO Air Force.
JUDGE KWON: As for these maps, we need translations for all the legends and explanations. So we'll mark them for identification pending that translation.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you also seeking admission of tab 3?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, certainly. Tab 3, and tab 46, and now you've said that this is a new tab, tab 47. So all maps. All the maps that I placed on the easel, I'm asking for them all to be admitted.
JUDGE ROBINSON: What was the significance of tab 3? It didn't seem to relate to the question of identifying areas bombed by NATO. 45383
JUDGE KWON: Actually, the witness didn't deal with it.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Tab 3 contains tables in the upper left-hand corner, a detail of Djakovica, and tables on the attacks in that area, what could not be displayed on the map because the numbers are enormous. I think that General Djosan explained that, and he showed you the intensity of the attacks, the tables, the numbers, et cetera. So all that information is contained on the map.
[Trial Chamber confers]
JUDGE BONOMY: I at the moment have no idea what tab 3 is supposed to demonstrate, and I have no recollection of the witness saying anything about the numbers which appear on it. All I remember is him saying that it could deal -- he could deal in more detail about attacks on Djakovica, but you haven't asked him anything about that so far.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When explaining that map, he showed all of those tables in the rectangles and where you can see the number of attacks, the intensity of the attacks, et cetera, using a map of Kosovo and Metohija, where you can see the deployment of his forces. And the tables show the intensity of the attacks and the number of bombs that were used -- or, rather, the number of airstrikes. All of that can be seen on those tables, and that is precisely what he indicated. If you look at the transcript, I'm sure that you'll find that.
JUDGE BONOMY: I am looking at the transcript, and if you can assist me to identify the point, I'd be grateful.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we can ask General Djosan.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] 45384
Q. What kind of tables are contained on the map in --
JUDGE BONOMY: There seems to be confusion. Some have recollection of and I have none, and I'd like to be -- I don't want the answers again, I want to see the answers he gave already, but I can't see them. If someone can help me to identify where on this transcript he deals with the tables on tab 3, then I'd like to read it. Mr. Kay may be able to help, I don't know. I made a particular note at the time that nothing of any relevance was taken from this particular exhibit.
MR. KAY: Tab 3 was referred to but not dealt with is my recollection.
JUDGE KWON: Only the position of --
MR. KAY: Yes.
JUDGE BONOMY: Only the position of the FRY forces, I think.
MR. KAY: Yes, not actually dealt with.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, put the question to the witness in relation to tab 3.
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear the question. The answer was no.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please ask the registrar to give him the table. I gave my own copy.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, is that the map from tab 3? 45385
A. That's the map.
Q. You explained something in relation to these tables. Could you please explain every table.
A. The upper table, the upper right-hand table, indicates the number of attacks according to the type of building. It says "The total number of buildings, the number of attacks, damaged buildings, destroyed buildings." So the number of attacks and the effect of these attacks. Now, this is subdivided according to the type of building. First is industrial facilities and then power production, then infrastructure, and so on. And then there's the total number. So this indicates all the buildings, the facilities that were hit. Not every rocket hit a soldier, and not every bomb hit a column. So it was towns that were hit the most, and different settlements. And of course within these populated areas, a great many civilians were killed.
This table here shows the increase of NATO forces from the beginning of the aggression up to the end, and it shows how it developed. Sometimes there were even 500 attacks per day at various facilities. This is according to weeks. So it is from the 24th of March until the 30th of March. There were 300 attacks.
Q. On the 24th of March?
A. Yes, and further on.
Q. All right. The 31st of what?
A. I beg your pardon?
Q. The 30th of March.
A. There were 200 attacks on the 30th of March. 45386
THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please speak one at a time.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic and General, the interpreters are asking you to speak one at a time.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this is very important for the question that you had put in order for things to be clearer to you. If in a small area like Kosovo, already on the first day, the 24th of March, you have 300 attacks, and then 200 attacks on the next day, then I assume that this does have an effect on the civilian population in the broader area. Five hundred attacks. An attack is not just one bomb. An attack implies a large number of bombs.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] By your leave, an attack can be successful or unsuccessful. There were attacks that did actually hit a building or a soldier or a civilian, and there were attacks that did not hit anybody or anything. So specifically in my reports, I referred primarily to those attacks when there were effects, specifically in Djakovica. Every day, every night there was some kind of firing. Most often they would hit nothing. Sometimes they would hit a particular facility or a soldier, or sometimes a civilian, sometimes a house, sometimes the bridge, and so on. So that's what it's all about.
JUDGE BONOMY: General, when you say that on one day there were 200 attacks, does that mean that on at least 200 separate occasions a NATO attacking aircraft dropped a bomb successfully, struck something significant on that one day?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No.
JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I'm confused, so perhaps you could clarify 45387 it.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When there is an attack, then an aircraft drops something lethal. If this falls into a forest where there are no soldiers or policemen or civilians or buildings, this is still an attack, but it doesn't mean that at that point in time there was any effect of that attack.
JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I understand that, except that you did say, "Specifically in my reports I referred primarily to those attacks when there were effects," and what I was deducing from that was that when you give a figure of 200 --
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE BONOMY: -- when you give a figure of 200, that's a minimum figure. There must have been on that particular day at least 200 occasions when a NATO attacking aircraft actually did something by bombing. It may have been unsuccessful because it landed in the forest, but it may have been successful, but that's what you're saying: On at least 200 occasions on that one day an attack was mounted by NATO.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This table here is not a table that pertains only to Djakovo -- Djakovica or only Kosovo and Metohija. This table pertains to all of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this table here. This table pertains to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. Just one moment, though, 'til I go back a little. You gave evidence that on the 30th of March there were 200 attacks; is that right? 45388
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. In the period from the 24th of March until the 30th of March. So this is according to weeks. Increase of NATO forces by weeks of attack. So this is the week from the 24th of March until the 30th of March. That was the number of attacks during that week.
JUDGE BONOMY: No. Well, your evidence on that was that from the 24th of March until the 30th there were 300 attacks, and then you were asked some more questions, and you went on to say, and I'm quoting exactly your words as translated: "There were 200 attacks on the 30th of March," and that led me to raise the various questions I've raised. So are you now trying to tell me that that is not your evidence?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I said, that this is a table according to weeks. That's the table. From the 24th of March until the 30th of March. In that week there were 300 attacks.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. A bit more, as we can see on the table.
A. Yes; 325.
JUDGE BONOMY: So should I regard you as withdrawing the answer that there were 200 attacks on the 30th of March?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to hear when I said that. Where did I say that, that on that day there were that many attacks?
JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you said it this morning. It's here in front of me. But can I take it that that's wrong?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Maybe it was a slip of the tongue, 45389 because all of this is by weeks.
JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that. It's a simple --
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Seven days.
JUDGE BONOMY: It's a simple question: Is it wrong to say that there were 200 attacks on the 30th of March? Is that inaccurate?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'd have to calculate that. I would have to do the arithmetic involved. Perhaps that was the case.
JUDGE BONOMY: So it may be right. Okay. Thank you.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Well, let us admit, then, that map. We'll mark it for identification pending translation. And tab 2 as well. That's the book. His book, yes.
And then we'll take the adjournment now for 20 minutes.
--- Recess taken at 12.22 p.m.
--- Upon resuming at 12.45 p.m.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, continue.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, what else do we find on that map as far as tables are concerned? Could you read it.
A. We see an overview of registered sorties of the combat aviation by countries involved and an overview of lethal weapons, projectiles used, and we can see Djakovica specifically.
Q. What do we see on that specific Djakovica map?
A. We see the number of buildings that were targeted, where it says 18 per cent were on the territory of Djakovica. And we see the buildings that were targeted during these attacks. 45390 BLANK PAGE 45391 So specific attacks and the number of attacks per building or feature. Number of features, number of attacks per feature. As I said, the number of features, number of attacks per feature, and features that were targeted with the number of attacks per feature.
Q. How many strikes were there?
A. 236 strikes on 38 features.
Q. And the number of bombs and projectiles is larger than those numbers?
A. Yes, of course. Depending on the type of plane and the type of weapon it carries, the number of projectiles is always higher. There were 12 strikes on the town itself, and then on the barracks, Devet Jugovica barracks, which was in the centre, there were 13 strikes. Cabrat feature, 46 strikes. Installations of the reserve, 28 strikes. All this is in the centre of Djakovica. Furthermore, we see strikes in the border area Brovina, Batusa, Molici, each of them six times, one of them 18 times.
Q. All right, General. You showed us on the map all places that were targeted by the NATO aviation, and I read out to you a list of towns mentioned in paragraph 63 where some sort of deportation is claimed. According to your assessment and from what we see on the map, was the density of targets large in all those places?
A. Sometimes it's higher, sometimes it's lower. In Vucitrn, for instance, it was lower, whereas Djakovica, Prizren, Pristina, Urosevac, Pec, Decani, the density of strikes was extremely high.
Q. When you say that in Vucitrn the density of strikes was lower, 45392 what do you mean by that?
A. Well, the town of Vucitrn is small, and that's why, relatively speaking, there were less strikes against it. You can also calculate it on the basis of number of strikes per square kilometre.
Q. I read out to you all the places from which there was alleged deportation. Did you show us all of them?
A. Yes, all of them. Urosevac was hit many times, the town and its suburbs. Gnjilane, Pec.
Q. We won't go back to all those places.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But that's the point, Mr. Robinson. It transpires that, according to paragraph 64, our forces are charged with deportation only from those places that were bombed. There seem to be no deportation from other places.
MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues]... accused is going to give evidence, he should be restrained from --
JUDGE ROBINSON: I know it's a comment, and we'll treat it that way, Mr. Nice.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. General, it is alleged that on the 24th of March, 1999, the old mosque in Rogovo, Bazar mosque, Hadum and the Islamic library next to it were among cultural facilities that were partially or completely destroyed. What do you know about that?
A. That is not true. The first rocket fell on Djakovica at 2000 hours. My operations duty officer received a report from a MUP unit that 45393 the centre of the town was hit. I was at Cabrat at the time, which is a hill overlooking Djakovica from which you can see the town as on the palm of your hand. Since we had equipment that was not suited for night action, we were mainly located in our shelters. After several detonations, I saw from that hill that the Catholic street where the said mosque was located was on fire.
The mobile post of the brigade was next to Marsenica house, next to the hill itself, in a sheltered place at the foot of the hill. That is the truth that I can tell you.
Q. So according to what you say, there was no activity on the part of our forces.
A. No, there wasn't.
Q. You are saying that only the NATO aviation was active that night.
A. That night there was only action by the NATO Air Force.
Q. Thank you, General. It is also said that: "From the 2nd to the 4th of April, 1999, thousands of Kosovo Albanians living in the town of Djakovica and neighbouring villages joined a large convoy, either on foot or driving in cars, trucks, and tractors, and moved to the border of Albania." What do you know about that? What would be the reason?
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, which paragraph?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me see.
MR. NICE: 63(h)(i) may be right.
JUDGE ROBINSON: 63 ...
MR. NICE: (h)(i).
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 63(h)(i). Then Djakovica is also 45394 mentioned in (ii).
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, General, below that map is the map we discussed before we reached tab 3, the one that you explained a moment ago. That one relates only to Djakovica. It is still up there, although in the meantime we had returned to tab 3. So we haven't looked at it at all.
A. Yes, that's the one.
Q. It's my impression, General, that the format of that map is much smaller, and maybe it would be better to put it on the overhead projector, because we can't see anything.
JUDGE ROBINSON: On the overhead projector, Mr. Usher.
JUDGE KWON: So it's not included in this binder?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, it's not. It's a map that has just been made.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. What does that map show, General? It's only Djakovica.
A. This map shows NATO action in the area of defence of the 2nd Battalion of the 549th Brigade that was in the area of Djakovica. So it's in this area where Djakovica is. And the map shows the places and activities of NATO aviation by type of weapon used and by period. According to the same principle, from the 24th of March until the 25th of May, from the 26th of April until the 24th of May, and from the 25th of May until the end. That's how we distinguish between periods; by colour.
Q. Explain that. 45395
A. The orange -- orange depicts action of NATO aviation from the 24th of March until the 25th of April. So it includes the first day. Blue shows the period from the 26th of April to the 24th of May. As for lethal charges or weapons, the arrows show rockets. This diamond shows one type of bomb, the circle shows a cluster bomb, this shows fluorescent bombs, and the small triangle shows depleted uranium, and this little truck shows action or strikes on refugee columns, and the last symbol shows strikes on settlements.
Q. Columns or settlements?
A. A column was in Meja, and a settlement was in Bistrazin. From this map we see that in the first month, until the 24th of April, there were several strikes on the town of Djakovica, on features around Djakovica, including the Devet Jugovica barracks, and several features in the vicinity of Djakovica in the direction of the border. We also see that, as time went on during the aggression, the number of weapons increased, but it is typical that cluster bombs, regular bombs, and rockets were used all the time, and only depleted uranium was used solely in the later period.
All this information can be found in war logs and combat reports, and we can take this as detailed, accurate information. If, for instance, there was a break in communication and we were unable to inform the corps command, which was in Pristina, in such cases we were unable to report certain incidents of action, certain strikes, at press conferences. This was particularly due to the fact that there were many repeaters in this area, many towers and communication equipment. 45396 This is, generally speaking, the area of responsibility of the 549th Brigade, where my brigade command was also located. We can also see on the map which features were targeted and how the intensity grew. With the attempt to break through the line, the defence line at Kosare, a large number of NATO planes carrying cluster bombs were used, and that can be considered as support to the forces that were trying to break into the territory of our state from the area of Kosare.
Q. General, you have explained the intensity of action, the density of strikes in particular places from which refugees fled. So what is your conclusion about the main reason why people fled?
A. My basic conclusion is that refugees started leaving in order to flee NATO action but also -- but especially in the area of Djakovica, also fearing that they might be trapped in an area where forces of our country, the army, and the MUP would clash with the terrorists. Plus, as I said, there was propaganda. There were threats. There were people who were forced to leave their homes.
Q. The opposite side claims that the forces of the FRY and Serbia directed people to go in certain directions and then at the border took away identity papers and licence plates from the people who were fleeing. Do you know anything about that?
A. As for direction, the direction was set by the NATO aviation. It was perfectly logical that people from Djakovica would go across the Fatucit [phoen] pass, taking the shortest route to safety. It was also normal that people from Prizren would go via Grbica, that people from 45397 Urosevac would go via Kacanik. So it was NATO action that determined who would be going where. Everybody took the shortest route to safety. As for your second question, there was not a single incident that I know of or that was reported to me where our army, our security forces, would be taking people's identity papers. Why would they do that?
Q. In paragraph 65(ii), it says that the forces --
THE INTERPRETER: Could we have a reference, please, to the paragraph?
JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute, please, Mr. Milosevic. The interpreter would like an accurate reference. It's paragraph 65 --
MR. NICE: More likely to be 63, again, I think.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 63.
JUDGE ROBINSON: And what subparagraph?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] (ii). (k)(ii). No, wait a minute. My mistake.
MR. KAY: It's (h).
JUDGE ROBINSON: It's (h)(ii).
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. It is (h)(ii), subparagraph (ii). We have (h), then (h)(i), and then (h)(ii), et cetera.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have it.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know if you've found it.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. It says: "... the forces of FRY and Serbia launched a massive attack against the Carragojs, Erenik and Trava valleys (Djakovica municipality), including the remaining residents of the aforementioned 45398 villages, in order to drive the population out of the area."
A. That's not true. The Carragojs valley is in the border belt, rear border belt, between the communication lines of Korenica, Ibrovina [phoen], and Junik, those roads, and another communication line, Djakovica-Pec. And it is very important -- a very important area. There's a lot of forest, wooded area, and it was a stronghold, a very strong stronghold of the terrorist forces.
At that time, there was the danger looming that these terrorist forces would be support and reinforcement to the forces which would come from Kosova, penetrating into our territory. And on the other side, they prevented -- on the other hand, they prevented supplies from coming in to our forces who were fighting the terrorists in the area of Kosare, Morina, Batusa, and so on and so forth.
In order to avoid this situation and avoid holding our forces under siege, and at the time there was great support from NATO -- the NATO Air Force at the Kosare area, the corps command took the decision to neutralise the terrorists. Before that, in that same area, we had a number of conflicts and clashes between the terrorists and the forces of the police and army, and there were also attacks launched against the civilian population.
So there was absolutely no question of the fact that the army of Yugoslavia, or as it says here the forces of the FRY and Serbia, that they launched an offensive. Quite the contrary. It was an anti-terrorist operation aimed at weakening the enemy forces which were concentrated at that location during that period of time, where there were three brigades 45399 of the Siptar terrorists. And there was great danger that they would, in a way, be a descent axis for the ground forces which might have succeeded in reaching Kosare.
Q. All right. But in the same paragraph that I mentioned, it says: "In Meja, Korenica, and Meja Orize, a large, and as yet undetermined, number of Kosovo Albanian civilian males were separated from the mass of fleeing villagers, abducted and executed. Throughout the entire day, villagers under direct threat from the forces of the FRY and Serbia left their homes and joined several convoys of refugees using tractors, horse carts, and cars, and eventually crossed into Albania." Once again, identity documents are mentioned. I don't want to ask you about that, we've already discussed that issue, but what I'm asking you now is about these people in Meja, Korenica, Meja Orize, in those places.
A. Meja, Meja Orize, and Korenica are located in the Crnogorac valley, and by virtue of their location, they were no less important than the valley mentioned a moment ago. On the other hand, neither I nor any of our people had any knowledge of anything untoward happening in the sense of a crime having taken place. I was the garrison commander, and I never heard at any briefing when anybody reported to me that anybody mentioned any operations or crimes there, having been committed there. And in addition to that, many of my officers from my brigade lived in Djakovica, had lived in Djakovica for ten years, in fact, and all my commanding officers were duty-bound, had the obligation to inform the commander of the brigade about all events that took place. Nobody ever 45400 informed me about anything like that nor at the briefing sessions did I ever hear from anyone that an event of that kind had ever taken place. So I don't believe it. I don't believe anything like that could have happened.
Q. Right. That anything like that could have happened. Here it says: "... a large, and as yet undetermined, number of Kosovo Albanian civilian males were separated from the mass of fleeing villagers, abducted and executed."
A. That is impossible. Our army and police would certainly never do anything like that.
And the second point that remains unclear: How come that it always says "civilian males"? It never mentions terrorists anywhere. The terms used are never KLA members. It is never uniformed persons, terrorists, that are referred to. It is not possible that they were only civilian males, civilians and only civilian males, and that they alone were allegedly the victims of attacks by the FRY and Serbia, or their forces. Quite simply, no mention is made of a basic fact here, and that is that we fought against terrorists. It was terrorists that we fought against. And by the by, who was it that Paddy Ashdown spoke to during the training session if they were all civilians?
Q. Now, this same thing, General, is mentioned in paragraph 66, the same thing.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Can I ask, was there any bombing in that area at the time referred to in that paragraph?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In that area along the ridges, on 45401 BLANK PAGE 45402 the outskirts of the area there were bombings. Cabrat, for example, was bombed a maximum number of times. Then in Meja there was an attack on a refugee column. In Duzanj, in Zur, Zub, Ponosevac, on the road from Brovina to Junik.
JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... refugee column.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] NATO -- the NATO Air Force. I saw that.
JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. In that same paragraph -- I'm not going to repeat what it says in paragraph 63 and then is repeated in paragraph 66 about the attack on the Carragojs valley with the intention that is alleged here and which you are denying. Anyway, in that same paragraph, 66, the following is stated that: "A large number of members of the forces of FRY and Serbia were used setting up several checkpoints. Throughout the day, the villagers left their homes faced with an onslaught of FRY forces and joined up with some of the convoys of refugees on tractors, carts ..." and so on.
THE INTERPRETER: May we have a reference, please.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] So they go on --
JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a moment. The reference to that is 66(i).
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Without a doubt, there was control over the territory. There was control over the roads, and that is indeed the obligation on the part of the MUP, to control movement. That is not 45403 something that is challenged. But what I want to say is this: The army and the police never expelled anybody, nor did they influence the decision of Albanian refugees to leave. In Djakovica, I saw many columns. They weren't as large, truth to tell, as is mentioned in some media, but those columns did go on foot. There were never any males in them. For the most part, they were women and children.
Now, as far as the attack in Meja is concerned, the air force strikes, I arrived there five minutes after an airstrike had taken place, and I was an eyewitness myself of the event.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, in that same paragraph it says: "In Meja, Korenica, and Meja Orize, a large, and as yet undetermined, number of Kosovo Albanian civilian males were separated from the mass of fleeing villagers and abducted. Many of these men were summarily executed, and approximately 300 persons are still missing. Identity documents pertaining to at least seven persons who were last seen at Meja ... were found on bodies exhumed from a clandestine mass grave located in Batajnica ..." What can you tell us about those allegations in the indictment?
A. Well, that seems to me to be quite unbelievable. I explained a moment ago that the army and police never engaged in such activity. There was simply no need for them to act that way. The army and the police settled accounts with the terrorists. They clashed with the terrorists in cases where they were directly attacked by them and where they had to defend their units and positions.
All the rest, and constant mention is made of this, that they were 45404 all males, that they were all civilian males, loses all meaning and sense when we know how many, just how many terrorists there were in Kosovo and Metohija. Everybody talks about them. Everybody mentions them. Everybody saw them. And it is quite inconceivable that suddenly no mention is made of the fact that these people were terrorists or KLA fighters, whichever you -- whichever way you like to put it. It always says "civilian males."
JUDGE BONOMY: Do you accept, or do you have knowledge of, I think is the correct question, of bodies being exhumed from a clandestine mass grave in Batajnica?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I heard something about that. There was -- it was rumoured, especially after 2001. However, I don't believe it, and it seems to me quite unimaginable that somebody could have done something like that.
JUDGE BONOMY: You don't believe that there was a mass grave?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that it was not a mass grave. Possibly someone brought in the bodies, but I know that it is not a mass grave. I -- after Markale, I know of all the kinds of things that could be done and could happen, and I have had experience with manipulations, and I claim that they were sheer manipulations, conducted with a specific intent which I'm sure you all know what it was.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Very well. In paragraph 66(e), it says that: "On the evening of the 26th of March, 1999 --" "On or about the evening of the 26th of March, 1999, in the town of Djakovica, forces of the FRY and Serbia came 45405 to a house at 134a Ymer Grezda Street. The women and children inside the house were separated from the men, and were ordered to go upstairs. The forces of the FRY and Serbia then shot and killed the six Kosovo Albanian men who were in the house."
See we're dealing with the 26th of March, here, 1999. Were you in Djakovica then?
A. Yes, I was in Djakovica at that time.
Q. And you were the commander of the Djakovica garrison at that time, were you not?
A. Yes, I was the commander of the Djakovica garrison at that time, and I did have talks with the president of the municipality and also head of the Ministry of the Interior, and also -- well, I said that some of my officers in fact lived in Djakovica and had lived there before the beginning of the fighting.
Q. Very well. Let's just clarify this point. When you say "talks," did you have regular meetings? You were the garrison commander.
A. Yes.
Q. You just mentioned the mayor, the president of the municipality, and the head of the Secretariat of the Interior. Did you have any regular meetings with those leaders; civilian, police, and other leaders at the level of Djakovica municipality?
A. Yes, we did have meetings from time to time when the need arose.
Q. How frequent would that have been?
A. Well, two or three times a week, depending on the situation. And therefore we exchanged information, each other's information, and at no 45406 point did I receive any information to that effect which would indicate that anything like that was going on in town or had happened in town.
Q. All right. As the garrison commander, your military policemen were there. You spoke to the chief of MUP, the president of the municipality. Would you have had to have known if an event like that had taken place? You were there on the spot. Djakovica is not New York, it's a relatively small town. Would you have had to have known about it if it had happened?
MR. NICE: Can't be said to be free of comment. Can't be said to be free of leading.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, reformulate the question without comments and without leading.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Q. All right, General. You've explained this, how often meetings were held at municipal level, that is to say the municipal leaders and the garrison commander. Could something like that have happened without you knowing?
A. No. That could not have happened. Something like that could not have happened without me knowing about it, learning about it from the head of the municipality, or from the chief of police of Djakovica.
Q. In paragraph 66(h) it says that: "On or about the late evening of the 1st of April, 1999, and continuing through the early morning hours of the 2nd of April, 1999, the forces of the FRY and Serbia launched an operation against the Qerim district of Djakovica. Over a period of several hours, forces of the FRY and Serbia forcibly entered houses of 45407 Kosovo Albanians in the Qerim district, killed the occupants, and then set fire to the buildings."
Where were you on the 1st and 2nd of April?
A. On the 1st and 2nd of April I was in that area. I was in Djakovica but I was in Ljug Bunar, in that neighbourhood, which is right next to Qerim. Ljug Bunar cannot be reached without going through Qerim. As for the night in question --
Q. The 1st of April and the early morning hours of the 2nd of April; right?
A. That night one of my radars was hit and two of my soldiers were killed, Simbaljevic Djordje and Ivanovic Zoran. We spent the entire night, most of us did, over there, trying to save the soldiers and to extinguish the fire on the radar. I was there myself. That night a medical team came from the town of Djakovica, also fire fighters, and all of them have to go through Qerim on their way there. I had a unit of mine there, platoon size, that was at the winery here right behind Qerim. It's at an elevation, and they can see everything from there. All of them stated that on that night they did not notice anything. So the road had not been blocked. Truth to tell, there was no electricity in town, nothing could be seen, but they didn't hear anything either.
I have no knowledge whatsoever about this from relevant sources. Nobody informed me about this. Nobody reported to me about this, and I would have had to know had this happened.
Q. You've said just now that you'd have to go through this 45408 neighbourhood of Qerim that is mentioned here in order to get to Ljug Bunar, the neighbourhood that you mentioned.
A. Yes.
Q. What is the distance between Ljug Bunar and Qerim?
A. Five hundred metres as the crow flies.
Q. So you were 500 metres away from the place where it is alleged that buildings were entered and residents were killed?
A. Yes, I was 500 metres away. This is the airport. That's what it's called. And it is actually a continuation of the Qerim neighbourhood. It's called Ljug Bunar, and that's where I was that night, on I saw what was going on.
Q. So from this 500 metre distance, could you see somebody shooting, torching houses in Qerim, whatever?
A. Quite certainly shooting and torching could have been heard from that spot, but that night all of those who were with us, and there were quite a few of us there when we were trying to save the radars, they all stated that they heard nothing. I didn't hear anything either until I read about this in Natasa Kandic's book. "Crimes in Kosovo," that's the name of the book, I think.
JUDGE BONOMY: Twice you've said the same thing, that everyone there said they heard nothing. When was it that everyone was expressing a view about hearing nothing that night?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I read this information or, rather, when the commission that was established for investigating the alleged crimes, when they called me to ask me about that, then I called my 45409 subordinates, officers who were also there, because I hadn't seen anything or heard anything. I asked them whether they knew anything about it, and they all stated that they knew nothing. Lieutenant Colonel Odak, among others, said so, commander of a battalion. Then Colonel Vukasinovic, who was commander of that unit from which these killed soldiers came and also whose soldiers were in that winery. When I said "everybody," I was actually referring to them.
JUDGE BONOMY: Which commission are you referring to this time?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The commission that was established in order to clarify matters after the book was published. The book called "Kosovo: As Seen, As Told." I think that's the name of the book. That was the first time I heard about this alleged crime. Of course, I did mind, and the commission called me to ask me about this. I reacted after that. I called my own officers who could have known had this happened.
JUDGE BONOMY: Please confine yourself to answering the questions I'm asking. The commission was established by whom?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know who established the commission.
JUDGE BONOMY: Who were the members of the commission?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that members of that commission were people for the most part who were professors, doctors, experts from different fields. From the military there were responsible officers, then retired officers, and so on.
THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to speak into the microphone, interpreter's note. 45410
JUDGE BONOMY: And can you tell me when it was established?
THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please speak into the microphone.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a second. Just a second, please come closer to the microphone and speak into the microphone. It's a request from the interpreter.
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I personally do not know when this commission was established, but I know when they invited me to come. They invited me to come when the book came out. That was in 2001 or something like that. I think it was the end of 2001. I think. I'm not quite sure.
JUDGE BONOMY: Just finally, can I take it that on the night in question there is no question of there being terrorists located in houses in Qerim?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know on the basis of what you make that assumption.
JUDGE BONOMY: So are you saying -- well, I made the assumption on the basis that you said there was no information about any activity leading to deaths in Qerim, but perhaps I've misunderstood you. Are you saying that perhaps there were people killed in Qerim and perhaps these people were terrorists, or are you saying there was no activity there at all?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I said was that I did not have any knowledge of anything having happened in Qerim. I did not say that there were terrorists there. I did not say that any such thing happened. I said that I had no knowledge until I read this book. 45411
JUDGE BONOMY: That's why I asked the question the way I did, which was, if I can repeat it: Can I take it that on the night in question there is no question of there being terrorists located in houses in Qerim?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot say anything about whether there were or whether there were not or whether that happened. I don't want to engage in guesswork. I'm just saying what I know.
JUDGE BONOMY: I thought from the way in which you were answering questions, in view of all the discussions we've been told that you had, that if there had been terrorists in Qerim, you would have known about it, but am I wrong about that now?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not say that I would have known had there been any terrorists. I said that I would have known about this event having happened. Of course I did not know where each and every terrorist was, where every particular terrorist was.
JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
JUDGE KWON: General, as for the commission you told Judge Bonomy about, is it not the Commission for the Cooperation with the ICTY? Are you referring to a different --
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE KWON: The --
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] 45412
Q. General, in that same paragraph, that is 66(h), it says that: "Tens of houses were destroyed and dozens of people were killed. For example, in Milos Gilic Street, number 57, forces of the FRY and Serbia shot the occupants and then set the house on fire. As a result of the shooting and the fire set by the forces of the FRY and Serbia at this single location, 20 Kosovo Albanians were killed. Of whom 19 were women and children."
What is your knowledge about this particular event?
A. In response to that, I could answer the same way I did about Qerim: Had this happened, I would have known about it. As for this, no one informed me about it. No one reported to me about this, and I did not have any knowledge about this, nor do I believe that this happened until I read it in the book that you were talking about. So I certainly would have known had it happened. Somebody would have informed me about this. After all, in the unit we had officers who lived in Djakovica and they would have known.
I was absent often from Djakovica because I had units throughout the area of Kosovo and Metohija, but my other organs were there, and they were also responsible and they would be duty-bound to react to any event that they knew of had something like this happened.
Q. Thank you, General. In paragraph 105, it says: "In addition to the forced expulsions of Kosovo Albanians, forces of the FRY and Serbia also engaged in a number of killings of Kosovo Albanians since the 24th of March, 1999. Such killings occurred at numerous locations, including but not limited to ..." and then a large number of villages are mentioned and 45413 towns, including Djakovica, Meja, then Bela Crkva, Mala Krusa, Velika Krusa, Djakovica, Padaliste, Izbica, Vucitrn, Meja, Dubrava, Suva Reka, Kacanik. Of course you don't know about these other places but I assume that you would have to know about Djakovica.
A. Yes. Again, I have to say that I've been answering the same question several times now. I cannot believe that the question is always being put in this way, "men, civilians". The MUP and the army of Yugoslavia were fighting against terrorists, and when they were attacked, then of course they applied force against the attackers, as envisaged in the combat rules. But that there was wanton killing, that's not true. Civilians were never the object or target of the members of the army or police. After all, these are our own citizens. Why would the army or the police kill their own citizens?
Q. Do you know where Racaj is?
A. Yes.
Q. Is this in the area of --
A. Yes, the municipality of Djakovica.
Q. Beqe Beqaj, a witness who testified here on the 29th of August, 2002, the page is now 9117 and 9116 in the transcript, he says in August 1998, and you said you assumed your duty in July 1998 --
A. Yes, the 15th of July, 1998.
Q. So he says that in August 1998, that is to say after you took over the garrison in Djakovica, the population of Racaj and other villages first leave the area of the village when the army of Yugoslavia arrived in the village and in the territory of other villages. That's when they 45414 first left the village, when the army and the police came to that area. And then he says that on the 14th of April, 1999, the army and the police came to the village of Racaj again, and the witness says that they ordered them to leave their homes. That is page 9116 of the transcript. Do you know anything about that? Is this true?
A. I assert that this is not true. If the population left the village of Racaj in that period, that happened only if there was fighting between the terrorists and our forces. At that time, there was heavy fighting between the terrorist -- the terrorists and our forces precisely in that area. When the anti-terrorist operation was over, the population returned to their homes.
Q. What about April 1999? It says that yet again they came to Racaj, and he says that they ordered them to leave their homes. On the 14th of April, 1999, that's what he says: The army of Yugoslavia and the MUP came to Racaj again and told them to leave their homes.
A. Civilians were leaving those areas where terrorists came and where fighting between the terrorists and the forces of the army of Yugoslavia was expected, or it was assumed that it could happen, or between the terrorists and the MUP. And it is only natural that sensible people would leave the area.
So fleeing from that and afraid that they would be in a war situation or, rather, that they would be engulfed by the operations that were indeed taking place against the terrorists, they would leave their villages.
Q. All right. But my point is what the witness said, that members of 45415 the army ordered the residents to leave their homes in the village.
A. It is quite certain that members of the army never ordered anyone to leave their homes. On the contrary. It was in our interest for the civilian population to be where they were. It was in our interest that columns not be created, that any problems be created in the combat deployment of our unit. So it was very important for us to have them stay where they were.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we have to stop now. There is a trial here at 2.15.
We will adjourn --
JUDGE KWON: I think you yourself should have prepared for all this, but I mention two tabs from Jovanovic binder, which is 275. So that those -- we didn't admit those tabs because Mr. Jovanovic is a suitable person to lay foundation to the document, because he, as a Minister of Foreign Affairs, he just compiled and published the book. So consider overnight whether you can deal with that book with this witness.
JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We will adjourn until tomorrow, 9.00 a.m.
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 19th day of
October, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.