⁴⁶²⁵⁷

Wednesday, 9 November 2005

[Open session]

[The accused entered court]

[The witness entered court]

--- On commencing at 9.05 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you are -- [French on English channel].

Let's try again. Mr. Milosevic, you are to conclude your re-examination.

WITNESS: VLATKO VUKOVIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Nice dwelt a very long time on this question of cleaning or cleansing; "ciscenje." Bearing in mind what your deputy recorded in the war diary on that day when the anti-terrorist action was on, please take a look at your tab 5, where there is an analysis of what was done in this anti-terrorist action.

A. Number 5, Mr. Milosevic? Oh, yes. I found this document.

Q. Yes, document number 5. On page 2 -- on page 2 in this analysis there is brief reference to the first day of the war or, rather, the first day of these activities during the first day and everything that was carried out, everything that it says here. Then the next paragraph -- ⁴⁶²⁵⁸

JUDGE KWON: Can we have it? Put it on the ELMO, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 2.

JUDGE KWON: It's not a logbook -- or one of the already exhibited ones. Delic binder, tab 359.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, but number 5 in the list of admitted exhibits that you have along with this witness.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Have we found it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it on the ELMO now? I assume it is. Oh, this is in English.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have the document in front of me, my own document.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. If you have the document in front of you, please take a look at the first day of the war and then the task is explained and what happened, and the next paragraph is the second day. During the second day --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down and give us a reference, thank you, interpreter's note.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreter is asking you to slow down and provide the correct reference.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is on page 2, the fourth paragraph from the bottom in the Serbian text. I am reading the fifth paragraph, actually. It refers to the second day of the war.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. During the second day of the war -- or, rather, during the second ⁴⁶²⁵⁹ day of combat activities, what was carried out was the destroying of STS blocked in Velika Krusa, and so on and so forth. Have you found that?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, please, the next paragraph. During the third day of combat action, what does it say?

A. "During the third day of combat activities, the cleaning up of the remaining area was carried out around Donje Retimlje," et cetera.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Page 3 on the English version.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Page 3, English, yes. Yes, proceed now.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So in this document from that time, the contemporaneous document that we're looking at, day one, day two, day three of the combat activities, is "ciscenje" referred to, cleaning up?

A. Yes.

Q. In what sense was the word used?

A. Only in the -- in one single sense, and that is that kind of mopping up of the terrain from the enemy. In this sense and in this case, these are the armed terrorists. That is the only thing that I explained over these past days, that this term only refers to fighting against terrorists in this case, because we carried out combat activities against them.

Q. Colonel, what I'm going to put before you now is a document that I received this morning, Mr. Robinson, through Professor Rakic. This is a document called "Battalion Rules." ⁴⁶²⁶⁰ You talked tactics from what I heard in your explanation before the other day.

A. Tactics and tactical training. And there's no need for you to put that document on the ELMO in front of me because I basically know it by heart. You can ask me anything from that rule. That was my job for 17 years.

Q. All right. But for the transcript I'm going to ask that this be placed on the ELMO. There are a few references to "ciscenje" here, but let us have a look.

So this is the rule --

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Vukovic, how is it you know what document Mr. Milosevic has in his hand?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He said "Battalion Rules," sir, and I was commander of --

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I'm going to ask you to place on the ELMO this document -- or, rather, just a small excerpt, and then we're going to see what the front page looks like. We have, two pages on, the regulation of the rule, passed by the Chief of Staff of the JNA as far back as 1977. So it's combat rules.

Please take a look. Please place this on the ELMO. It is page 101. I've marked with a highlighter.

All right. What does it say, the document? It's a printed document, "Combat Rules." This is the battalion rule. ⁴⁶²⁶¹

A. This is obviously a copy of the battalion rule. You just have to tell me which paragraph you want.

Q. Just what I've highlighted. What does it say there?

A. "A building that is taken is examined in detail (especially cellars and attics), cleansed from remaining enemy groups and ..."

Q. Thank you. So it's cleansed of enemy groups. Please, let's look at the front page now.

A. I can see that straight away. It is the "Battalion Rule." It's just photocopied. Battalion Rule, and in parentheses it says, "Infantry, motorised, mountain, partisan and marine battalions."

Q. Can we have a look at this.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Is there anything in this document that shows the year when this rule was made? Mr. Milosevic says it goes as far back as 1977. I see, it's published 1988.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document is from 1988 because that is when the existing Battalion Rule was amended.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Just open the other page. Just open it. Just open the next page. What does it say there? Let's have a look. Let's place it on the ELMO.

A. It says "Federal Secretariat for National Defence, the General Staff of the JNA, the infantry department," number such-and-such, the 16th of March, 1977. And then it entered into force, the Battalion Rule did. And the amended version is the one from, obviously, 1988.

THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Milosevic please not speak prior to the witness. ⁴⁶²⁶²

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Who signed the document?

A. The chief of General Staff of the JNA, Colonel General Stane Potocar.

Q. Is this part of the combat rules that you taught at the tactics department?

A. That's right. That is the basic rule that is studied. In addition to the company and platoon rules, this is studied by first and second-year students at the military academy. Of course, there's also the brigade rule, but that is less voluminous.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Mr. Robinson, I received this only this morning, so could it please be admitted into evidence or, rather, marked for identification and, once it's translated, could you please admit it? This is an original document or, rather, it's a photocopy of the original document. It is a general document.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It's marked for identification pending translation.

THE REGISTRAR: That will be D324.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel, would 1977 be the first time, as you're aware, that the concept of cleansing the territory of enemy be used in your combat instructions?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know, Mr. Robinson, and I am very well aware of this, this term "cleansing" or "mopping up" has been used for as long as standing armies have been in existence. And this Battalion Rule that was adopted in 1977 replaced the Battalion Rule that ⁴⁶²⁶³ was, as far as I can remember, adopted in 1965. And it's not terms that are changed. What is changed are tactical principles of using a unit in accordance, first and foremost, with the development of war technical equipment, techniques, experience from modern warfare, et cetera. However, most things were taken over from the old rule. The old rule, which I think was adopted in 1965, it was a successor of the previous rules, to a certain extent, and after all, this is dealt with in the professional literature of all countries of the world. It is only tactical principles that are improved, as I say, on the basis of the development of modern equipment and experience.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You're saying, then, that other armies also use the same terminology, mopping up the enemy?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, what I'm saying is that I assume they're using that. I haven't read, to be honest, the combat rules of the English army, for example, or the American army, but I assume they would be along the same lines. The principles are always identical once we attack an inhabited area, for example, or when we're fighting terrorists, and for the most part all the armies use other people's experience, among other things.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. In any event, it has been in use in Yugoslavia for many, many years?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Colonel, Mr. Nice asked you a question. He asked you why you had ^{46264 BLANK PAGE 46265} started the campaign, what the reasons for that were to launch a campaign at precisely that moment on the 24th in fact. Why did the anti-terrorist operation start then? And you didn't agree that it was a campaign, but anyway, anti-terrorist operation on the 24th. Would you now please take a look at tab 2. You were asked for the reasons, what the reasons were for the anti-terrorist action.

A. Do you mean tab 2 or number 2?

Q. I mean number 2. They're admitted exhibits.

A. Well, I answered that question in part and said that it was our assessment --

Q. Let me ask you -- let me tell what you it says here first. First of all, is the date the 24th or is it an earlier date?

A. The date is the 23rd when that order was compiled.

Q. I see. The order was on the 23rd. And what does it say under 1, "The enemy"? The question was what were the reasons for the anti-terrorist action, and tell us what it says at the beginning of that document, starting with sentence number 1, "The enemy."

A. "The Enemy: In the past 15 to 20 days, the STS Siptar terrorist forces increased their combat activities and attacks on VJ units, Yugoslav army units, and members of the Ministry of the Interior, MUP members, together with intensified sabotage and terrorist actions in urban areas. The most indomitable strongholds of the Siptar terrorist forces are in the following sectors: Retimlje village, Mount Milanovac, Studencane village, Samodreza village, Dobrodeljane village, and Pagarusa village. "The Siptar terrorist forces have established a Podrimlje-Pastrik ⁴⁶²⁶⁶ operation zone with two brigades (of around 1.500 terrorists). "The 122nd Brigade --"

Q. All right. Fine, thank you, we needn't read on.

A. Do you want me to answer the question now?

Q. Yes, please.

A. So according to the assessments and the evaluation made of the 2nd command and my command and my superior command and the area around me, indicated that strong terrorists forces had appeared to our rear, and the regions, the sectors, are stipulated here.

Now, may we have a map put up? But I can't see that the easel is here today. I'd like to show it on the map and that would make things clearer. But what we can see is that the communication lines were cut off. We can see that there was more intensive combat in urban areas, that is to say in towns as well. And on the other hand, on the basis of monitoring the movements and groupings --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]...

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think that we've seen the map and we don't need to dwell on the map again and go back to it. I think the explanation will suffice.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. But just one more detail: You quoted from the document a moment ago, and in the sentence it says, "The sector of the village of Retimlje"; is that right?

A. Precisely. The command was in the village of Retimlje.

Q. You needn't go into an explanation, but all this terrorist action ⁴⁶²⁶⁷ referred to the broader area of Retimlje?

A. Yes, Retimlje, Studencane, Dobrodeljane, Pagarusa; they're all in the same sector.

Q. That's what it says here: Retimlje, Studencane, Dobrodeljane, Pagarusa. Everything is listed there.

A. Yes. And also forces on Mount Milanovac.

Q. So according to your assessment, there were the 122nd and 124th KLA Brigade; is that right?

A. Yes. The 124th KLA Brigade was in the broader area around Suva Reka, Orahovac, and Velika Krusa. That was where it was deployed, which was proved by the maps and documents that were seized, et cetera.

Q. Thank you. Now, you were also shown a picture of a man who obviously was wounded and had severe burns. Do you remember that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Did you have an opportunity of seeing charred bodies, the pictures of charred bodies, people who had been burnt during all those activities of yours in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. Unfortunately, I did have an opportunity of seeing things like that. My own soldiers, who suffered from the results of the NATO bombings and bombs and prohibited weapons, weapons that were prohibited pursuant to international conventions. I saw a large number of charred civilian bodies as well. I showed you some of them. I can show you some of them again if need be.

Q. No, there's no need for us to see those pictures again. But was there any doubt, perhaps, that some of the -- that -- or suspicions that ⁴⁶²⁶⁸ our forces had poured petrol on those individuals and set fire to them, or do you know what had happened?

A. No. I knew what happened specifically speaking, and in cases where they were my soldiers and when they were civilian casualties, they were exclusively the result of the NATO Air Force bombings, NATO airstrikes, and I explained that. I explained that both to you and to Mr. Nice.

Q. Just one more question: Since Mr. Nice said that it was a large-scale offensive and campaign, you mentioned here a piece of information that taking part from your unit were 186 members or, rather, you said 185, I believe, and you were the 186th. Is that what you said?

A. Yes, that's exactly what I said. And on the second day another platoon was engaged from a reserve force but along a completely different axis because the terrorists were pulling out. So the commander asked that we prevent the terrorists from pulling out.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, in one of those reports of yours that we saw on the overhead projector, not to have to put it back on the ELMO again, when you tell us the number of men in your unit, did you see a figure or mention a figure 1.600?

A. That was for the first stages of the war when mobilisation hadn't been fully completed. There were about 1.600 soldiers and officers in the battalion, and later on that figure rose to 2.500. But from that we can see that a very small portion was engaged.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, from this can we deduce -- or, rather, what was the percentage, if there were about 2.000, your unit, 186 was ⁴⁶²⁶⁹ engaged -- men were engaged from your unit, what was that percentage?

A. Well, barely 10 per cent, not even 10 per cent, because we couldn't have had more people set aside because of the organisation of defence at the border itself. And our assessments were such that -- or, rather, by the brigade commander that that was the number of men that I could have, be assigned to me.

Q. All right. So as Mr. Nice said, in that large-scale campaign you had less than 10 per cent of your unit engaged, less than 10 per cent of your men.

A. Yes, that's quite correct.

Q. In that anti-terrorist operation. Now, just a few more questions. Or just one brief explanation with respect to the crossings at Cafa Prusit. You mentioned that your command post was -- where did you say it was?

A. My command post was at that time in the village of Zub, which is the command post that had been raised to a third level of preparedness, and that was the situation or had been the situation for 20 years. To cross from Djakovica across the border crossing Cafa Prusit, you have to take the road and pass through my command post.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, all the civilians who were there, did -- and crossed the border, do you have any information and knowledge about whether there was civilians, for example, during the first, second, and third months of the NATO aggression near your command post? I mean Albanians, Albanian civilians.

A. Well, I've already answered that. Later on my command post was ⁴⁶²⁷⁰ moved to the Brekovac village area, and of course civilians lived there, Serbs and Gypsies and Siptars; a diverse population. And I quoted the example of the Maka Lifaj [phoen] family, his household. I remember him for some other reason. We had very good cooperation with him. And I also remember the Cehu family. And what was characteristic for that man was that his cousin Aqir Cehu was, for instance, the commander of the local terrorists in Djakovica. And that didn't matter. That was no obstacle for them living there. But there were also other examples. For example, after that first wave of moving out, of the population moving out, a lot of Siptar civilian refugees would take refuge in their friends' homes. And I mentioned the village of Ferza [phoen], and they were -- there was the village of Moglica and Raca. But in Brekovac, near Srbinje, Scekic Vukasin had taken about 20 Siptar refugees from the Pec and Orahovac areas, which means he took them in, into his home. He informed us that they were being accommodated in his own house, and there was no problem there. They stayed there throughout the war.

Q. Colonel, all I want you to do is to tell us precisely, and you've said that now, you said that Albanians lived near your command post throughout the war.

A. Yes, exactly. The command post, of course, Mr. Milosevic, is not just one building. The battalion is distributed over a surface area of half a square kilometre. So at the command post and around the command post is where the civilians lived.

Q. Did it ever happen that anybody harmed any of those civilians, killed any of those civilians or expulsed them from their homes or forced ⁴⁶²⁷¹ them to go to Albania?

A. Of those civilians from Brekovac, no one was killed. There was just one incident involving the civilian population, the civilian Siptar population. I can tell you about that incident if you want to hear it.

Q. There's no need.

JUDGE ROBINSON: No, we don't want to hear it. Mr. Milosevic, the earlier exercise in which you introduced the document showing that the term had been used, "ciscenje," from 1970 something was a very good use of re-examination. This is not. Just bring your re-examination to an end very quickly. You are not to regurgitate matters that have been raised in examination-in-chief.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. I do not wish to bring up those questions again.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Just tell me briefly, since you were asked by Mr. Bonomy something about your relationship towards Muslims and you didn't have the time to explain your position towards Muslims, Albanians, Gypsies and other ethnic groups, tell us briefly.

A. My attitude towards the Siptars, towards Gypsies, towards Muslims is the same as is my attitude towards any other ethnic group or member of an ethnic group. I don't know how else to explain that, except to say that I was born and grew up in a multinational environment, which was Vojvodina, where people were never divided on the basis of their ethnic affiliation or on the basis of their religious affiliation. So that my attitude and relationship towards citizens of the Federal Republic of ^{46272 BLANK PAGE 46273} Yugoslavia as a whole was the same to one and all regardless of their nationality or religious affiliation.

Now, as far as the Muslims are concerned, I have so many Muslim friends, excellent friends, family friends, that I don't think I need go into that at all. And I find it insulting if somebody in this courtroom thinks otherwise, differently from what I have said. And I can give you the names and surnames of my family friends and even some of my relations, if it comes to that.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, Mr. Nice asked you the following question: Why did the citizens not go to Mother Serbia? Now, let's leave aside his sarcasm in asking that question. Did the citizens, and here I mean the Albanians, Colonel, were there instances when Albanian citizens would flee to the inner regions of Serbia?

A. Yes, there were many such examples. I can quote a couple where we even organised their departure to the Red Cross in Nis because they were afraid for their lives. Specifically, there was a woman with five children, and she didn't dare go to Albania because they threatened to kill her. And they threatened to kill her because she had helped, among other things, our forces. She told us who the terrorists were and who weren't the locals from her village. And I have the name and surname of that woman and --

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... next question. Next question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. There's no need for that. My question was just to ask you whether ⁴⁶²⁷⁴ the Albanians fled to the inner regions of Serbia. You answered in the affirmative. I have got my answer, so we needn't dwell on that. And I have no further questions. Thank you, Colonel.

A. Thank you too.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel, that concludes your testimony. Thank you for coming to give it. You may now leave.

[The witness withdrew]

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, what is your position on the admission of the leaflets and the book "Traces of Humanity"?

MR. NICE: I still haven't been able to find further material on the accuracy or otherwise of the transcript, although I'm still pursuing the matter, and I would prefer that matter to be put off, if it can be, until I've got further information. I think it's unlikely that the transcript is as recorded in that book, but I need to get some more information on that.

As to the leaflet allegedly dropped by NATO, I'm unable to express a view one way or the other. I think it's probably the case that such -- that leaflets were dropped in the course of this campaign. This one, I think, bears no indicia of being written by a non-native, but that doesn't, in a sense, help us one way or the other. If it was dropped by NATO, they might have access to perfect language speakers. If it was left around by others in order to make it look as if it came from NATO, they would also have perfect language speakers. So I simply am in no position to deal with that one way or another. But I don't object to its ⁴⁶²⁷⁵ production. We have had other such documents in before. But the transcript is another problem. I would rather have time to look into that.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Were there two leaflets, Mr. Kay, or was it one?

MR. KAY: I think it was a front side and a back side that was referred to. We would say original material dropped down, and he says that it came from NATO, should be admissible.

On the transcript, if I could address you on that, just simply this, to say that he heard a broadcast and says that reproduction in that book was the same as the broadcast that he heard. In our submission, he would be entitled to rely on that as the best evidence he can produce as to what was said in the broadcast of that conversation.

MR. NICE: Ms. Dragulev reminds me that I think the witness said something about his ability to produce the transcripts but I don't know whether he has any intention of doing that. Our prospects of getting to the transcript may not be particularly good, but we are still pursuing it.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. The leaflet we'll admit, and the book "Traces of Humanity" we'll mark for identification pending further order. And we encourage Mr. Milosevic and the Prosecutor to continue their efforts to find further verifying material in relation to contents of the book.

THE REGISTRAR: D325 for the leaflet. D326 for the book.

[Trial Chamber confers] ⁴⁶²⁷⁶

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It must be some mistake. The book is called not "Traces of Humanity." It's called "Trails of Inhumanity."

JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Very well. Thanks for the correction.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before I call my next witness, Mr. Robinson, I wish to ask you to treat him just as you treated the previous witness, because he is a very serious cardiac patient. If possible, we should make breaks after each hour. I think you lose only five minutes that way.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll do that, but there's another matter. In the 65 ter list, there's a note to the effect that, in view of his health, he has to return by the 10th, which is tomorrow, and you have him scheduled for four hours. It means, therefore, that you must finish examination-in-chief today.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will try.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, if you respect his health, you will do more than try.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Certainly. Apart from that, that is precisely why I asked that he testify earlier, namely today, because he was planned to testify before another three witnesses.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness be called.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Incidentally, there is a small mistake. He can testify today and tomorrow. He should leave the day after tomorrow. So we should complete the examination-in-chief and ⁴⁶²⁷⁷ cross-examination in the course of these two days.

[The witness entered court]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit. Mr. Milosevic, you may begin.

WITNESS: GEZA FARKAS

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General Farkas.

A. Good morning.

Q. General, please introduce yourself briefly and describe briefly your training and career.

A. I was born on the 1st of October, 1942, in Beqaj. That is in the municipality in the autonomous province of Vojvodina. That's where I finished primary school, secondary school as well, after which I continued my education in the military academy of ground forces, and in 1964 I became an officer of the Yugoslav People's Army. For the most part, I served in the territory of Serbia, and I also took part in the Peace Corps of the United Nations in Sinai, Mount Sinai. Among the important positions I occupied in the army I could mention that I was head of the counter-intelligence group the 1st Army, chief of security of the 3rd Army, which is now 2nd Army, chief of security of the 1st Army District, provincial secretary for national defence of Vojvodina, Chief of Staff of the Territorial Defence of Vojvodina, assistant federal ⁴⁶²⁷⁸ defence minister for civilian defence, and at that time I was also head of the security department of the army of Yugoslavia. I graduated from all high military schools, including the School of National Defence as it was called then.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in order to accommodate the witness, we'll -- we'll break at 10.00 and then thereafter at one-hour intervals, taking 15-minute breaks.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What was your position during the NATO aggression in Kosovo?

A. During the NATO aggression in Kosovo, I was chief of the security department of the army of Yugoslavia.

Q. Were you the highest-ranking officer or, rather, VJ general in charge of security?

A. Yes.

Q. Ex officio were you also a part of the Supreme Command?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your main task? Describe briefly your methodology of work or, rather, how your service functioned.

A. The security department is in charge of three areas. One: It detects and prevents the operation of foreign intelligence services. It combats enemy activity within the units of army of Yugoslavia against the army of Yugoslavia, and provides counter-intelligence security of military institutions. It is from these tasks that the competencies of the chief follow. ⁴⁶²⁷⁹

Q. Who is your immediate superior?

A. My immediate superior is, in wartime, Chief of Staff of National Defence, General Ojdanic.

Q. I forgot to ask about your rank.

A. I am a retired colonel general.

Q. Thank you. Tell me, were you aware of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija even before 1998?

A. Yes. As a young officer, I served in Kosovo -- in Pristina, rather, and that is where I had my first unpleasant experiences, because that is when the first destructive demonstrations took place. They were especially impressive because the demonstrators pushed children in front of them. They had stones in their rucksacks which they used to throw at the police. That is the first time in my career that I witnessed abuse of children for the purpose of attaining certain objectives.

Q. When was that?

A. In 1968.

Q. You saw that for yourself?

A. Yes. My family was there at the time as well, but I had to remove my family from Kosovo due to that situation.

Q. Later on --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, plunge in medias res. Get to the point. The witness has a health problem.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. In view of your experience and the job you performed, what, according to your knowledge, were the objectives of Albanian terrorists in ^{46280 BLANK PAGE 46281} Kosovo and Metohija?

A. They had long-term objectives, and those long-term objectives remained the same to this day.

MR. NICE: We may or may not be assisted by answers of this kind, but the general question, "In light of your experience and the job you performed..." don't we need to know a little bit more about the sources he's going to rely on before he gives this kind of expert opinion?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, at this stage in the presentation of your case, do you need to get information from this witness about the objectives of Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija? Haven't you led enough evidence in relation to that already? What more can this witness add?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think this witness is very well placed to tell us about his experience of all of this because he is -- or, rather, has had the highest ranking -- the highest rank in the army of Yugoslavia, and he was in charge of security. It is these facts that add additional weight to his evidence.

JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Very well. But then you would have to bear in mind what Mr. Nice said.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I am with Mr. Nice on this point, because the witness has told us what areas he was in charge of, which was -- or were protecting -- preventing and protecting the operation of foreign intelligence services, combatting enemy activity within the units of the army of Yugoslavia, against the army of Yugoslavia, and counter-intelligence security of military institutions. Now, these don't, ⁴⁶²⁸² on the face of it, give him competence to express the view he's been asked to express any more than any other officer from whom -- and we've heard from a number about the activities and ambitions of the KLA.

JUDGE ROBINSON: So, Mr. Milosevic, unless you can provide another foundation for the witness's testimony in this area, ask another question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, could you please tell us, what were the sources and what are the grounds, the base of your knowledge?

A. They follow immediately from the functions I discharged. In the positions I occupied, I gained that knowledge firsthand. Apart from the things I saw with my own eyes in Kosovo, I was later chief of security of the 2nd Army, which had competencies in terms of security over Kosovo and Metohija as well. So in that way I gained knowledge by controlling these services.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that apart from what Mr. Bonomy just quoted, Mr. Farkas was also chief of security of the 2nd Army for a while, and that 2nd Army covered Kosovo as well. So he's familiar with all the security problems there.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Farkas, when was that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1968 I was in Kosovo serving a stint as a young officer. And later in 1985 until 1990. That's when I occupied the position of chief of security of the 2nd Army.

JUDGE BONOMY: You see, the point's been made repeatedly here that there was an upsurge in activity of the KLA in 1998 and 1999. That's what ⁴⁶²⁸³ all the evidence concentrates on, and plainly it's historical knowledge that this witness would be talking of from his direct experience in Kosovo.

I urge you, Mr. Milosevic, to get to the point, as Judge Robinson has already invited you to do, and get to the year of 1999 that really concerns us.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I asked you a question which was as follows: Based on your knowledge and your experience, what were the objectives of Albanian extremists in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. Their objectives were to achieve an ethnically pure Kosovo, first and foremost. Kosovo as a republic, and later, reunification of all areas and territories inhabited by Albanians into one great Albanian state.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, stop for a minute.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the Chamber rules that you must move on to another question. We have had evidence on this issue before. Move on to another area.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will no longer dwell on that topic, Mr. Robinson, but I think it's very important, because this witness could have confirmed to you that an ethnically pure Kosovo was the main objective of Albanian extremists.

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... move on. No further comments, just move on. ⁴⁶²⁸⁴

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, do you know anything about the setting up of illegal terrorist groups within the JNA itself? The creation of illegal terrorist groups within the JNA by Albanian extremists.

A. Yes. From the 1980s, the extremists' activities were very intensive, and we had a lot of incidents of creation of illegal terrorist Albanian groups within the very units of the Yugoslav People's Army. From that period, we have over 200 adjudicated cases involving crimes committed by illegal Albanian groups, including the most serious terrorist action from Paracin barracks that took place in 1987 where one member of a terrorist organisation killed four and seriously wounded five --

JUDGE ROBINSON: You're wasting time. We don't want to hear about 1987. Move on to 1998, 1999.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, do you know who General Aleksandar Vasiljevic is?

A. Yes, I do know who General Aleksandar Vasiljevic is. I know that he was my deputy during the aggression in 1999, but I've known him from earlier on, from the security services.

Q. All right. General Vasiljevic, in his statement here when he testified here on the 17th of February, 2003, said that as far back as in 1997 in Kosovo and Metohija, according to intelligence sources, there was a great deal of activity by Albanian paramilitary units. Is that correct?

A. Yes. I can confirm that that statement by General Vasiljevic is ⁴⁶²⁸⁵ correct.

Q. He said that many former members of the JNA became members of these paramilitary units.

A. That's right, yes.

Q. All right. What was characteristic, then -- or, rather, just now Mr. Robinson and others said that we should concentrate on 1998 and 1999. What about Albanian extremists? What did they do in 1998 and how did they do it, to the best of your knowledge?

A. To the best of my knowledge, that was an escalation of terrorism and violence. Terrorism vis-a-vis the members of the army of Yugoslavia, and violence was displayed against the civilian population. That was a period of very lively activity on the part of the terrorists. In that area there was a blockade of roads. Almost 50 per cent of the territory was blocked by them. So it was very difficult to bring in supplies for the army, especially at the border posts. And it was also difficult to maintain communications among garrisons. So from the middle of that year onwards there was very intensive activity on the part of the terrorists. There were organised attacks. They took certain buildings, certain economic enterprises. So all of life in Kosovo was practically blocked.

Q. Can you tell us who you received information about these activities from?

A. At that time, I was assistant federal minister for civil defence. I received information from the provincial organ, and I also received information at senior staff meetings of the Federal Ministry of Defence.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us take the first break now. We'll break for ⁴⁶²⁸⁶ 15 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.06 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.26 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to draw your attention to the following: It says in the transcript here the assistant federal minister for civilian defence. There is no such thing. General Farkas was assistant federal minister of national defence in charge of civil defence.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we have that clarification.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, a few moments ago you explained the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija in 1998, and you said something about the escalation of terrorism. My question is: What was the reaction of the state to the situation there?

A. Well, of course the state reacted as any normal state would. There was terrorism and escalation of terrorism in part of the territory. There are legal authorities in that part of the state. In part the federal organs were present there, too, by way of the federal army. And in that area Serbia also had its authority. So the state reacted by delegating its own authorities -- its own organs there into Kosovo and Metohija in order to monitor the situation directly. The situation in the army was such that the level of combat readiness of the units had to be raised and the army in the barracks, ⁴⁶²⁸⁷ especially at the border posts, had to be on the ready.

Q. Thank you, General. Now we're going to move on to a subject that is often mentioned here, and that is the problem of volunteers, and in the broader sense of the word, the participation of different civilians in the war.

General, from 1995 onwards you were assistant federal minister for national defence in charge of civil defence; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. On the basis of which regulations was the civil defence organised completely?

A. Its organisation is based on the law of defence and all other bylaws that stem from that law, all the way up to certain orders, instructions that are adopted by the Federal Minister of Defence in accordance with the powers vested in him.

Q. Please look at tab 1 in your exhibits, General.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, there is a translation too.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. What is in tab 1 of your exhibits?

A. In tab 1 there is a rule book on the organisation, development, and establishment of Civilian Protection Units of the Federal Ministry of Defence.

In -- according to this rule book, there is an organisational structure of the civil defence units that are categorised into 12 categories, depending on the territory and the extent to which it is ^{46288 BLANK PAGE 46289} jeopardised and the population that is in the said territory. So you can see that there is the -- there are categories from 1 through 12, and the size of the units is referred as to well.

In addition to the general units, there are the federal civilian defence units for emergencies, in case of natural disasters, accidents, or during a state of war.

Q. General, could you please just read the second part of Article 1, which says: "For the purpose of protecting ..." what. So rule book on organisation, development and establishment of civilian protection units of the Federal Ministry of Defence.

A. "... for the purpose of protecting the civilian population and material and other resources from the ravages of war, natural and other disasters, and dangers in peace and in war."

Q. So is that the essence in the terms of the purpose of their existence and is that why they were established?

A. Yes, that is the essence. That is why they were established, and this in accordance with international conventions, the Geneva Conventions that also envisages such an organisation of civil defence.

Q. When was this rule book adopted?

A. This rule book was adopted -- I can't see now. There is no date here. Oh, here it is. On the 8th of September, 1995.

Q. Thank you, General.

A. You're welcome.

Q. Could you explain and describe the organisation of this total sector for civil defence of the Federal Ministry of National Defence. I ⁴⁶²⁹⁰ would like to draw your attention to tab 5.

A. Yes. In tab 5, the Federal Ministry of Defence is described, headed by the federal minister of national defence. He has a secretariat. He also has an office of his own and also his deputy. And directly linked to him are seven links. The first one is the sector for civilian defence, the sector for military economic activity, the sector for urban planning and construction, then the legal administration, the finance and budget administration, the administration for status and service-related matters, and the security department.

Q. All right. This sector for civil defence, which is presented here in greater detail, is the one that you headed; right?

A. Yes. I headed that sector.

Q. Could you now explain the sector for civilian defence, please.

A. The sector for civil defence has eight entities. That is, the department for organisational and mobilisation preparation of federal state organs. That's the first one.

The second one is the department for the preparation of large economic systems.

The third one is the department for civil protection and defence. The fourth one is the department for communications and cryptographic protection.

The fifth one is the federal centre for monitoring and reporting. The sixth one is the commission for the exchange of prisoners of war and tracing missing persons.

The seventh one is the department for legal affairs and personnel. ⁴⁶²⁹¹ And the department for information technology support. That's the ministry.

As for this sector, there are two regional organs that are related to it as well. That is the regional organ in the Republic of Serbia and the regional organ in the Republic of Montenegro.

Q. Thank you, General. Can you tell us what the order on the establishment of civil defence staffs contained, the one dated the 22nd of February, 1999? It is in tab 2.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, there is a translation into English.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Have you found it, General?

A. Yes, I've found that tab. This order was adopted on the 22nd of February, 1999, and this order of the federal minister for defence regulates the formation of civilian protection staffs. These staffs are established at different levels, from the municipality through the districts in the province all the way up to federal institutions. What is regulated here in detail is what kind of staffs are established at which level, and in paragraph 4 on page 2, it says what organs establish these staffs.

Q. All right. Tell me, in accordance with which laws and regulations was this order written? What does it say in the beginning?

A. "The law on defence." First of all, it's the law on defence. It's based on the law on defence of Yugoslavia. And there are also certain decrees of the federal government that make it possible to ⁴⁶²⁹² establish this kind of system of civilian defence staffs. All of that is in accordance with the defence plan.

Q. All right. Now, we're going to leave aside all other elements of these staffs that you explained in the territory of the entire Republic of Serbia and Montenegro, that is to say the territory of the FRY. My question will pertain only to the territory of the centre for defence of Pristina. I hope that you can find tab 4, where the organisation of civilian defence in the territory of the Pristina centre for defence is shown.

Tell us, please, what is the total number of units that there were at the centre and how many members did these units have? I'm referring to the centre for defence of Pristina.

A. The civilian defence units in that area in different versions contained four -- membership of 4.120, and the total number of units was 29.

Q. Thank you, General. General, we've just seen this diagram and the centre, the number of units, the number of soldiers, and so on and so forth. You as the assistant minister of defence, were you the person who in the municipalities and districts appoints commanders of civil defence staff?

A. Yes. Pursuant to authorisation by the federal minister, I was in charge of appointing the commanders of the staffs of civil defence throughout the territory of Yugoslavia.

Q. Can we now, in order to save time and having to do with what you said a moment ago, take a look briefly at tabs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. ⁴⁶²⁹³ Take a look at those tabs now, please. Let's start with tab 6. And all the other tabs are very similar. We see your signature on these documents. The question to you was whether you appointed commanders of the staffs. And this is the first decision, the assistant minister, Lieutenant General Geza Farkas, appoints for the territory, et cetera, et cetera, to the position of, et cetera, et cetera. Is that a good example of this kind of decision made by you?

A. Yes. That is an example, and those were the kinds of decisions that were made for the whole of the territory of Yugoslavia.

Q. All right. So we have tabs 6 to 11 inclusively, and they are all the same type of decision. They follow the same pattern almost to the letter.

A. Yes. These are for districts, decisions for districts. But of course the appointments went from the level of municipal staffs upwards.

Q. Yes, I understand, but we've taken these as an example. The district is, of course, a higher level than a municipality, and you appointed these people.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, may I tender these tabs as exhibits? That's one question.

And the second question is do I have to go through all these 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 numbers, tab numbers, which relate to decisions concerning the appointment of the commanders of the staffs of Territorial Defence --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Civil defence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, civil defence is what I meant to say. In order for them to be admitted into evidence. ⁴⁶²⁹⁴

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Give a number for the binder and we'll admit all of them.

THE REGISTRAR: The binder number will be D327.

JUDGE ROBINSON: 1 to 11.

JUDGE KWON: Can I ask for a minor clarification. General, could you take at look at tab 5 again. Tab 5, the organisational chart of the Federal Ministry of Defence.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE KWON: You said you would be assistant minister for civil defence sector, but at the outset of your testimony you said that you were also the head of security of army of Yugoslavia. Does it mean that you headed the security department of federal minister of defence, which we can see from this chart?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I was -- well, if I understood your question correctly, what I said was this: From 1985 until 1990, I was the chief of security of the 2nd Army, and as of another date, rather, 1985, I became -- I was appointed the assistant federal minister.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, you misspoke, I believe. You said 1985, that you were assistant federal minister. What you meant to say was 1995, wasn't it?

A. Yes, 1995.

JUDGE KWON: So you had nothing to do with the security from 1995?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. From 1995 to the beginning of the war I did not. At the beginning of the war I was appointed chief of ⁴⁶²⁹⁵ the administration for security of the army of Yugoslavia. On the 24th of March, 1999, in actual fact.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That clarifies everything. Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, may we now move on to the problem of volunteers in the units of the army of Yugoslavia. In tab 12 --

JUDGE BONOMY: If you're leaving this subject of the civilian defence, it's not clear to me what these people were doing. We've gone through the rules and the order and the structure, but were these people - I think you numbered them at 4.000 plus in Pristina - were they in uniform, doing a particular job?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right. They did wear uniforms. They had specific assignments pursuant to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions related to civilian defence. Blue uniforms with a triangle on a yellow background. That was the uniform worn by the civilian defence units.

JUDGE BONOMY: Speaking for myself, I find it pretty useless to be told about the organisational structure and the theory. What I really want to know is what actually happened on the ground and what they did, and I really am none the wiser.

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, give us an example of some of their functions.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Their functions were the following: ^{46296 BLANK PAGE 46297} The general purpose unit, for example, was there to clear up and deal with the rubble, remains of the rubble in elementary -- elemental disasters, to provide first aid to the population, and then to deal with sanitisation of the terrain, to deal with debris, corpses of animals, and a complete "asanacijacion" or cleaning up of the terrain, of the battlefield during a war.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to draw attention to the following with respect to the question asked by Mr. Bonomy: The centre for the defence of Pristina was used here, that term, but what it was was units which, if you look at the organigramme or, rather, tab 4, this relates to all the municipalities, practically speaking, all the municipalities in Kosovo and Metohija. Each municipality is comprised by this centre in Pristina, security centre in Pristina, and there are 28 of them. You will see the general said 29. That is because, with number 18, in the Gora municipality, you have an extra small unit for rescue work. It is the alpine and speleological rescue team or department, and that's what it says in the Serbian text. All it says in English is "Rescue department" but that's what it was. That's that additional unit. It's a very small unit, alpine and speleological rescue work.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Can I ask you, General, was February 1999 the first time such units were actually established?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. These units -- you can see the decision to establish those units, and that was made much earlier. The formation of the units and all the documents related to their ⁴⁶²⁹⁸ establishment are part of the war plans or, rather, defence plans, the defence plan of the Federal Defence Ministry.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, no doubt it's me, but the order, which is tab 2, which was made on the 22nd of February, 1999, says: "The following civilian protection staffs shall be formed ..." Now, are you telling me there's an earlier order for the formation of similar staffs?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Firstly, in the previous tab we saw the units of civilian defence, which have their organisational structure and purpose, and these staffs are the staffs that are established in situations of crises. The staffs exist, and they did exist over the whole territory previously. However, because of frequent changes in the structure, the commanders of the staffs of civilian defence, here we have summarised the entire territory. Because if you look pursuant to the decision by the federal minister for the commanders of the staffs of civilian defence, people are appointed from the structures -- or, rather, civilian structures of society, which means the executive organs in the assemblies of the municipalities right up to the president of the Executive Council in the provinces and republics. And that for the following reason: So that those people who hold that post are operative people. They have set competencies and authorisation to use certain resources to be found on the territory, which means civil construction services, communal services, the utilities and so on that are needed to carry out assignments of this kind. Then the commander of the civil defence staff appoints its assistants. They are professionals. If we are dealing with large scale water accumulation systems or a chemical industry ⁴⁶²⁹⁹ close by, then he appoints for his assistance experts from those particular fields.

JUDGE BONOMY: Well, again speaking for myself, I'm now in a state of utter confusion. I don't even understand the relevance of this to what we're dealing with. Each one of the orders we were directed to, that's number 6 to 11, are for a period either of the 22nd of February or thereafter, and it's not at all clear to me what change occurred on the 22nd of February.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here on the 22nd of February and during that period of time, the defence plan was organised and its documents were put in order, and there was an overall revision of all the organs and the plan was updated, in fact. So this can be considered as updating the plan, because it didn't refer to Kosovo alone, but it applied to the whole of the territory of the FRY.

JUDGE BONOMY: Does that mean, General, that prior to that it was all pretty disorganised?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it doesn't mean that, but it hadn't been updated because of the changes that took place constantly on the territory; frequent elections, changes in the manpower structure, changes in the power and authorities that be. It needed updating. It was out-of-date. And so then when it was updated, a cross-section was looked at and introduced into the defence plan.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, just briefly let's go back to tab 2 for a moment, please, ⁴⁶³⁰⁰ because that is the decision dated the 22nd of February, 1999.

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. What does it say in the preamble?

A. "Pursuant to Article 43, item 1, and Article 59 of the Law on Defence --" and then it says Official Gazette -- "and Article 9 of the Decree on the Organising and Training of Civilian Protection Units and Measures for the Protection and Rescue of the Civilian Population and Property (Official Gazette dating back to 1994), and in keeping with the Plan for organising preparations for the defence of the country, the Federal Defence Minister has issued the following order."

Q. All right. So that says that it is pursuant to a plan for organising preparations for the country's defence, and on the basis of rules and regulations stipulated by law.

A. Yes.

Q. And then we're updating it; right? Very well, General. Now, we have looked at the various examples of your decision to appoint certain individuals, that is to say commanders to the staffs or of the staffs. Explain, please, how this functioned. For example, did I in any way, or anybody in my name, influence you when you made your decisions to appoint people to the different staffs?

A. No. There was no influence of that kind because in fact this followed a certain automatic rota in updating the plans for the executive organs in the municipalities, and in the republic as well, or the provinces, for that matter. So they were laid down in the law and made legal pursuant to those decisions. ⁴⁶³⁰¹ So the person who was occupying that post, he was appointed in post, he was appointed in order to update the defence plan.

Q. Yes. You've already explained that to us. We needn't dwell on that. Let's now move on to the problem of volunteers in the units of the army of Yugoslavia. And take a look at tab 12 for that purpose now, please. We're going to stay with tab 12 for a while. I think that we're making good time, so we can spend a little more time on tab 12.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it has been translated into English. You have it before you.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Have you found it, General?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Here it says that this is an order by the Supreme Command Staff arranging the induction, accommodation, and distribution of volunteers in an organised manner at the following reception centres of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army commands. Does that relate to the whole territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

A. Yes, it does. This is a document of the Supreme Command Staff and it issues instructions and in fact is an order for the procedure and manner in which the volunteers are to be incorporated into the Yugoslav army structure. And this is a document which on the whole solves this problem.

Q. Does this relate to the entire territory?

A. Yes. It relates to the whole territory of Yugoslavia.

Q. All right. Fine. Pursuant to this order, can you help us out? ⁴⁶³⁰² Can we see which individuals were not -- were prohibited from entering the army?

A. Well, the problem of volunteers is a complex one, because various people applied as patriots mostly, although there were certain sick people who also applied, adventurers. So we did have problems, and also the infiltration of people belonging to foreign intelligence services who would try to have their members become army members in order to achieve their own goals.

Q. Let's limit ourselves to what it says here. Point 2.1, the second half. I asked you which persons were prohibited from joining. So at the beginning of page 2 of the Serbian text, what does it say there exactly?

A. "I prohibit admission of members of paramilitary units, groups and individuals already present in the zones of responsibility to VJ commands ..." et cetera "... without prior completion of procedures regulated by this order."

Q. From this order can we see that the volunteers, when they were admitted and registered and recorded with the army of Yugoslavia were duty-bound to sign a statement of any kind; and, if so, what was the contents of that statement?

A. Yes. This order deals with that.

Q. Is that in point 2.2, the last line? Would you read that, please.

A. Yes. Point 2, last line states as follow: "In following admission and registration, the volunteers shall sign a declaration pledging that, having been admitted and while wearing the uniform, he, as a member of the VJ with an assigned VES -" which is the military ⁴⁶³⁰³ speciality register - "shall be subject --" or, rather, "... private, non-commissioned officer or officer shall be subject to the provisions of the law on the Yugoslav army, VJ service regulations, and other regulations governing conduct and work in the VJ."

Q. Can you tell us, what were those rules that volunteers had to accept when joining the army?

A. The totality of rules that apply to the entire military personnel; all the rules of the army of Yugoslavia. It means they could not leave whenever they wished, and they were under military command. Any AWOL was considered as desertion, which is what the rule says. There would be a file for every person, but in the case of volunteers, this file would also indicate, among other things, that he had volunteered.

Q. I understand that. Since a person volunteered and signed this declaration, such a soldier who had come as a volunteer, was he any different in terms of his duties and obligations from any other soldier?

A. Absolutely not. He joined the ranks, and he would execute orders and assignments just as all the other soldiers.

I have to emphasise that special attention was paid to avoid any grouping of such volunteers. Depending on what these volunteers used to do before, they would be assigned to the signals corps, to various other units, avoiding any grouping of them in one single unit.

Q. Is anything said about their training and the application of rules in general? In the beginning of page 3 in the Serbian version, which is paragraph 3 towards the end --

A. Yes. Paragraph 3 says that they have to go through a certain ^{46304 BLANK PAGE 46305} training, and it especially emphasised that --

Q. Could you read exactly what it says in this sentence that begins "During ..." That's on page 3, fourth line from the top.

A. I found it. "During the training of volunteers, specifically warn them that unlawful and other negative behaviour shall not be tolerated (theft, looting, torching, rape, smuggling, etc.) and that legal measures applicable in wartime shall be taken against perpetrators of such acts."

Q. Thank you, General. So we have an exact order defining the treatment of volunteers, what happens with them upon induction, and it looks perfectly in order on paper. But I'm asking you now about real life. Were there any problems?

A. Of course there were problems and deviations because it was a time of combat activities and aggression that affected the entire country, the entire territory. So that in all units, especially in such a large organisation that was based on mobilisation, there were excesses and violations of rules and orders.

Q. Does the document in tab 13 deal with that? Let us see first who wrote this document and what its contents are.

A. This is another document of the Supreme Command Staff, signed -- the document originates from the Supreme Command Staff. Since information was received from the territory of the 3rd Army that certain problems had been experienced with volunteers, this document gives an example of what happened.

From a training centre in Grodska -- from a centre in Grodska some people were inducted without proper procedure, and this resulted in ⁴⁶³⁰⁶ incidents upon which 75 members were later arrested. Attention is drawn to the work, the operation of those centres that prepare volunteers.

Q. When we see that 25 volunteers were turned back and seven arrested, several crimes are mentioned, there are even some killings - one female volunteer was killed and another volunteer as well - do we see the proportions of what is happening as indicated by the Supreme Command? Is it a widespread phenomenon which is brought to the attention of the entire personnel as an example, or was it brought to their attention even if it was not wide scale?

A. Well, relative to the total number of volunteers, the number involved in these incidents was minimal, but in response to these violations of orders, the Supreme Command Staff reacted energetically. They point out what can happen when proper procedures are not followed.

Q. Very well. Do you know the reasons behind such incidents? Can you explain them?

A. Well, they have been explained. Volunteers come from various layers of society. Most of them volunteer for patriotic reasons, but there are also criminals and adventurers who apply, and they try to pursue their own interests during their stay in a unit. There were also foreign intelligence services anxious to infiltrate their people in the form of volunteers. So it is very important to have proper psychological assessment and vetting of all volunteers.

Q. We have one document that speaks about the sending of volunteers to the 3rd Army.

A. Yes. ⁴⁶³⁰⁷

Q. Twenty-five were turned back, several were arrested. And this incident inspired a reaction from the Supreme Command Staff.

A. That's correct.

Q. Let us now look at tab 14, General. What kind of document is this? Is it also a document of the Supreme Command Staff?

A. Yes. It is a document of the Supreme Command Staff, but it was the sector for logistics. The following problems are involved: The March and September classes of regular recruits whose military service expired at the time of the aggression had their military service duration extended by a decision of the federal government, and certain problems occurred as a result of that. This document is a response, suggesting various measures to deal with those problems.

This also explains that when men are demobed from the army of Yugoslavia, the relevant districts are provided with information about the physical and mental condition of these people that are to be forwarded to the MUP, that is the Ministry of the Interior on the ground, so that they should not issue weapons to such persons.

Q. This telegram was signed by the chief of the Supreme Command Staff, Colonel General Dragoljub Ojdanic.

A. Yes.

Q. Could you read part of the second sentence. It says: "There have been cases of conscripts in the reserves ..."

A. "There have been cases of conscripts in the reserves who are unfit for military service because of mental illness but who have reported as volunteers, concealing their state of health." ⁴⁶³⁰⁸

Q. So they were trying to hide their state of health, and you couldn't tell anything by their physical appearance.

A. We see that the Supreme Command Staff was taking these things very seriously.

Q. Item 3 says: "Immediately after recommendations from the relevant medical boards, unit commanders shall adopt appropriate decisions on the cessation of military service ..."

A. This is the field of competence of the sector for logistics, and this is the proper channel for dealing with this.

Q. Could you explain in detail this item 1: "Military districts and departments must excuse all conscripts ..." et cetera.

A. "Military districts and departments must report to the MUP all conscripts who have been excused from military service on the grounds of mental disorders and behavioural problems in order to avoid abuses in issuing permits to carry and possess weapons."

So after each soldier leaves the army of Yugoslavia, his file is forwarded to the relevant competent military department in his locality. So this is an instruction to help avoid similar incidents from happening after somebody's military service has been terminated.

Q. So if somebody was suffering from a mental disorder or a behavioural problem, the army is required to inform the civilian authorities to avoid any accidents.

The next tab is 15. Whose document is this?

A. That's a document by the Supreme Command Staff, signed by the Chief of Staff, General Ojdanic. This order applies or, rather, relates ⁴⁶³⁰⁹ to the existence of paramilitary formations. This order provides instruction as to what needs to be done so that paramilitary units could not be established in various areas of command. Commanders are made responsible for conducting a complete search and inspection of the terrain lest a paramilitary unit find its way there.

Q. What does it say in the beginning?

A. "Verify the existence, presence --"

Q. No. No, I mean before that. Before the words, "I hereby order ..."

A. "With the start of the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija caused by the actions of sabotage and terrorist forces, and later following the declaration of the state of war, the Supreme Command Staff dispatched many orders and warnings on the ban of and activities of any paramilitary organisations in your zones of responsibility ..."

Q. Excuse me, General. You just skipped one "and." He sent -- that is, "The command staff dispatched many orders and warnings on the ban of and activities of any paramilitary organisations ..." And then it goes on to say "treatment of volunteers." What does it say after that?

A. Let me just find this passage. "... treatment of volunteers, the application of the Laws of War and the Rules of Conduct and observation of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Bearing in mind the importance of all these issues, in the aim of consistency in observing the above, I hereby order ..."

And then it goes on to say: "1. Verify the existence, presence and operations of paramilitary formations in your zones of responsibility. ⁴⁶³¹⁰ If there are any paramilitary formations, disarm them immediately and take legal steps."

Item 2 says: "Command and security organs shall take operative measures to gather information of any violation of orders of the Supreme Command Staff in the conduct of the members of the army and MUP in combat. "Should violation be determined of the Laws of War and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions be established and proven, detect the perpetrators, apprehend them, initiate criminal procedure, and report it to superior levels of command."

"3. Implement and observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the Basis of the Laws of War -- or the fundamental laws of war, officer's handbook, and the Rules of Conduct for combatants and other documents consistently and strictly. I hereby make the immediate resubordinated commanders responsible for this."

Q. Just briefly, General, what is this summary for commanding officers that the Supreme Command Staff refers to in this document in tab 15?

A. Just before the aggression against Yugoslavia, the General Staff, and later the Supreme Command Staff through its own documents, regulated the training and familiarisation of the entire commanding personnel with the provisions of the international laws of war and international humanitarian law. Every level of command received relevant documents accompanied by the order that these should be observed. Every soldier, however, received an excerpt from these documents in a laminated pocket version so that everyone from the top, from the ⁴⁶³¹¹ Supreme Command down to the last soldier, was familiar with this.

JUDGE ROBINSON: 4, is that "the report on any presence ..." or "to report on any presence and measures taken against paramilitary formations"?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In paragraph 1 it says that this should be checked, that the entire territory should be looked at, and so on and so forth. So when the first paragraph is carried through, then a report should be submitted as to the existence or non-existence of these units.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Were any such reports submitted?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's time for the next break for 15 minutes. We will adjourn for 15 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 11.22 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.39 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, in this document of the Supreme Command Staff that is contained in tab 15, the one that you quoted a few moments ago, where it is indicated that several warnings were sent in relation with the activity of some paramilitary formations that should have been banned, what do you know about the existence of paramilitary units in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija?

A. Well, the first and strongest paramilitary formation in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija is the KLA. According to all theories, ^{46312 BLANK PAGE 46313} in a legal state they established these paramilitary units that they armed, and they were carrying out different actions, and there was a reign of terror in the territory. These, I believe, are paramilitary units according to international law as well.

Secondly, it is possible that the Supreme Command Staff gave these warnings so that a group of criminals, group of citizens, obtained uniforms and established units that committed crimes in a particular territory.

And secondly -- or, rather, thirdly, we had information that people were coming in from the territory of Albania, people who knew the Serbian language, that they came dressed in uniforms of the army of Yugoslavia and committed various crimes and misdeeds in that territory.

Q. These are various possibilities, various assumptions, what you referred to. Do you know about the existence of any paramilitary formation?

A. The existence of the KLA is not an assumption. That is an actual state of affairs. So we received reports that in areas of responsibility of brigades and other units there were not any paramilitary groups of this nature except for these that were brought into the country, and special forces had to deal with them. There was information that such groups were being brought in from Albania.

Q. While commenting this order, especially paragraph 3 where you explained what all officers had and what every soldier had in terms of the rules of conduct for soldiers and other documents pertaining to the law of war, the Geneva Conventions, et cetera, do you have any information, in ⁴⁶³¹⁴ view of your position at the time at the very top of military security, do you have any information as to whether members of the army of Yugoslavia observed these rules of conduct in war?

A. For the most part. However, there were individual cases of abuse and a lack of respect for these orders and provisions in spite of all the measures that had been taken, the ones I explained a few moments ago. There were individual killings, rapes, lootings, yes.

Q. All right. Let us be quite precise. The smallest tactical unit is a platoon, if I'm not mistaken.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any information about any unit, even the smallest tactical unit - so a platoon - carried out a crime as a unit?

A. There is no such information. The Supreme Command Staff or the security service had no such information that even from the lowest level of command there was not a single unit that committed a crime. It was all individuals who committed such crimes or groups of two or three soldiers who committed crimes.

Q. When you say "groups," how big was the largest such group that you knew of?

A. I think it was three or four persons in a group that committed a crime. They committed several crimes, rather, but three was the largest group that had committed a crime or crimes.

Q. And what kind of reports came in to you from the military and the MUP?

A. They went along the chain of command. The Supreme Defence Staff ⁴⁶³¹⁵ received those reports, and when such things happened they were part of these reports, crimes and measures taken against the perpetrators. So these reports came through the chain of command and through the security channels. So as soon as we heard of such things, measures were taken in order to punish the perpetrators.

Q. Were there any situations when crimes were learned of and measures were not taken against the perpetrators?

A. There were no such cases. There were cases when the investigation could not have been completed fully because of combat actions and KLA attacks on military forces that were trying to conduct a full investigation, but commands at all levels would invariably take measures against the perpetrators of any crimes they had heard of.

Q. Thank you, General. Now, let us look at this document that is in tab 16. This is the Supreme Command Staff. Who signed this document?

A. General Ojdanic.

Q. Chief of the Supreme Command Staff.

A. Yes.

Q. All right. When was this order sent out?

A. It was sent out on the 3rd of April, 1999, and it was sent to all commands and strategic groups in the territory of Yugoslavia.

Q. Was does it say in paragraph 1? It says, "I hereby order ..." and then?

A. "I hereby order: 1. All perpetrators of crimes shall be brought before a competent investigating judge of a military court immediately upon the submission of a criminal report." ⁴⁶³¹⁶

Q. In this order is there any mention of volunteers? Please look at paragraph 2.

A. "The measures from item 1 of this order shall also be taken against conscripts and volunteers, because by joining wartime units of the Yugoslav army, they acquire the status of a serviceman, to whom all the regulations governing life and work in the VJ apply, as well as the regulations on criminal responsibility."

So, again, volunteers are referred to.

Q. All right. And what does paragraph 3 say, then, because here it says that: "Perpetrators of all crimes shall be brought before a competent investigating judge of a military court immediately on the submission of a criminal report," and then there's item 2, and what does 3 say?

A. "Promptly inform the entire membership of the wartime unit of which the perpetrator of crimes is a member of all the measures taken against the perpetrator, as well as the execution of criminal sanctions."

Q. Who is responsible for carrying out this order?

A. Commanders of strategic groupings are responsible to me for the execution of this order. So these are the commanders of armies.

Q. What does item 5 say?

A. "Inform all members of the army of Yugoslavia of this order."

Q. "Inform all VJ members of this order."

A. Yes. That is from the first to the last soldier.

Q. Please let us now move on to the document that is contained in tab 17. Let us see what it pertains to. First, let's see what the date is. ⁴⁶³¹⁷

A. The 16th of April, 1999, the Supreme Command Staff, signed by Dragoljub Ojdanic.

Q. All right. What does paragraph 1 say?

A. It says: "According to some information, there have been certain cases of conduct in combat operations to date where the provisions of the instructions on conduct in combat and provisions of the international Laws of War have not been applied as a whole -- in whole."

Q. What does it say further on?

A. "A certain number of Siptar terrorist groups continue to operate in Kosovo and Metohija, infiltrating from the territory of the Republic of Albania, which may endanger the security of certain commands, units, smaller and combined forces, in position and moving. "Certain commands --" oh, all right. Well, that's it.

Q. So what is emphasised here? Certain commands what?

A. "Certain commands and units are not devoting the necessary attention to the fight against individual cases of looting and crime."

Q. And finally: "In order to adhere completely to the provisions of the international Laws of War ..."

A. "... increase security of VJ commands and units, prevent Siptar terrorist group sabotage operations, and eradicate looting and crime in the unit zones of responsibility and the complete displacement of RMR."

Q. And then: "I hereby issue the following reminder ..."

A. Yes.

Q. What does paragraph 3 say in terms of these warnings?

A. "Commands and specialist organs shall undertake effective measures ⁴⁶³¹⁸ to prevent all forms of crime (looting, theft of private property and others) ..." And then they refer to a document that was written earlier on.

Q. Of the Supreme Command Staff.

A. Yes.

Q. And then it says: "Inform all VJ members ..."

A. "... of the detriment and consequences caused by all forms of criminal activity to the reputation and morale of the army." So the detrimental effect this has on the morale of the army.

Q. Thank you, General. Let us now look at tab 18 or, rather, the document contained in tab 18. Is this also a document of the Supreme Command Staff?

A. Yes, of the 10th of May, signed by Dragoljub Ojdanic.

Q. We're not going to spend much time on this. It also pertains to full observance of international law and the laws of war, the preamble says. And what does paragraph 1 say?

A. "All commanders, unit commanders and other superior officers must undertake all (necessary) measures in their units to ensure that every individual unit member adheres to the principles, rules and regulations of the international Laws of War when conducting combat operations and beyond ..."

Q. Thank you, General. We're not going to dwell on this any longer. And then there was in attachment accompanying this document, an annex?

A. Yes, this annex had been sent earlier on, and it also says that those who violate these rules and regulations will be held accountable. ⁴⁶³¹⁹

Q. Since every soldier had these rules and everything else that you referred to a few moments ago, was there any member of the armed forces that had not been familiarised with this?

A. There were practically none. Even those who were subsequently mobilised had their attention drawn to this. The commands were supposed to pay particular attention to them and give them these documents. That is to say that every soldier received these documents. These crimes could only be committed by criminals and those who were meant to do so.

Q. And if an officer knew that a crime had been committed and did not take measures against the perpetrators, would that have been punishable?

A. Yes, that's what's written here.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you admitted the exhibits up to tab 11. What I ask for now is to admit the rest, from tab 11 to tab 18, the documents we've been through just now.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit them.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, now we're going to move on to another subject. Let us briefly deal with our meetings during the course of the war. Can you recall how many times you and I met during the course of the war, and where?

A. I cannot recall the exact number of meetings we had, but on several occasions we did meet, at the command post at that, because when I was in Belgrade, in that territory, then practically every night I came to the Supreme Command Staff, and that is where we met a great many times when various reports were being made, analyses, and orders issued. ^{46320 BLANK PAGE 46321}

Q. What were the subjects that you and I discussed?

A. Well, the subjects were always related to security, but you always emphasised and you invariably asked me to report about possible misdeeds that were committed in the units. You always sought information about that, and you emphasised that. Not only when we were one-on-one but also at meetings of the Supreme Command Staff. This was an item that was invariably dealt with.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, tab 18, Judge Kwon, who is on top of these matters, informs me is already Prosecution Exhibit 323.5. So there is no need for the admission of that one. Please proceed.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. On all these occasions, what did you inform me about in relation to your own work?

A. On these occasions I always exhaustively informed you about all the information that the service had acquired, and that included information about crimes and these crimes that happened in units. I informed you about all of that.

Q. All right. What were my positions, my reactions, and what were my instructions to you?

A. Your instructions and orders were explicit, and in many cases you criticised the fact that this kind of thing happened in the units of the army of Yugoslavia in the first place. You asked that this be prevented first and foremost, and that if such things did happen, that they be punished immediately and as soon as possible.

Q. General, in point 16 of the indictment related to Kosovo, it says ⁴⁶³²² that I, in concert with, and then it mentions the other people, planned, incited, ordered, aided -- or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of these crimes, taking part in a joint criminal enterprise, the aim of which was to expel -- the expulsion of a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from the territory of the province of Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control over the province.

Therefore, as the top military official in charge of military security, do you have any knowledge of this and may we have your comments on this?

A. I have no knowledge of this, no awareness of this, no plans, as stipulated in this point of the indictment, that it was organised, that any plan existed for the expulsion of the Albanian population from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. I am not aware of any kind of plan. And it was under my competency, the counter-intelligence protection of all plans and documents, and I would have had to have known about that had it existed, or some of my subordinates would have known. So there was no plan, no documents relating to a plan, nor was anything like that ever mentioned in our communications.

Q. All right. If there was no plan or documents about a plan, in our conversations or discussions or your conversations and discussions with anyone did the idea ever crop up like that, that somebody was supposed to expulse the Albanians from Kosovo?

A. I don't know about anything like that. Quite simply, in my communications there was never anything like that nor was anything like ⁴⁶³²³ that ever mentioned in the course of my work and in solving many other problems. Quite the contrary. There were situations where the Albanian terrorists were exerting pressure on the population, for instance.

Q. Now, would it be at all possible -- let's allow for us to look into a theoretical possibility that there was any kind of similar idea at any level. If something like that had existed would that have been possible, since you were at the head of the military security, for you not to know anything about it?

A. That would be absolutely impossible. If there was a plan, there would have to be documents, there would have to be people to carry the plan out. You would have to have the chain of command. You would have to organise it all down the chain of command down to the execution level. And in that chain of command you would have to have included a large number of people who would have known that something like that was being ordered and executed, et cetera.

Q. Thank you, General. Now, in paragraph 17 of the indictment it is stated that this joint criminal enterprise came into existence no later than October 1998 and continued throughout the time period when the crimes alleged took place, that is to say until June -- the 20th of June, 1999. Can you comment on what is being claimed here?

A. I didn't hear the period that you mentioned.

Q. From October 1998 to the 20th of June, 1999, is the material period.

A. I don't know. I have no comment to make, no comment. Quite simply, that is impossible. I never knew of anything like that. ⁴⁶³²⁴

Q. And did you ever, during your term in office as head of the security service and as a member of the Supreme Command, did you ever hear of a term such as deportation, expulsion, or some similar word which would relate to any portion of the population?

A. No, not at any meeting, either the staffs of the Supreme Command, that word was never used and that concept was never used. Quite simply, nothing that could be linked to anything like that was mentioned at those meetings of ours, nor was it discussed, nor was anything linked to anything like that ever ordered.

Q. All right. Fine. Now, at some level lower down were there any pressures, for example, or something that could be called a campaign by the forces of the FRY and Serbia against the inhabitants, the Albanian inhabitants?

A. As far as the army is concerned, I know -- don't know of anything like that organised as a campaign. No, it wasn't. I told you about individual cases which are minor if you compare them to a plan of this kind that is alleged and that requires a massive organisation and massive pressure to be exerted. So that kind of thing just doesn't hold water. And it wasn't implemented either at lower levels, to the best of my knowledge.

Q. In view of what you've just said, to the best your knowledge and according to your information, the security organs that report to you up and down the chain of command, do they exist at every level?

A. Yes, from independent battalions right up to the General Staff and the security administration department. They are included in the work of ⁴⁶³²⁵ the command and are subordinate to the commanders, and during that -- wartime, that line of reporting went through the command chain, that is to say from the operative centre of the Supreme Command downwards, but there were other lines like -- lines of communication like personal contacts for security and so on. We had this kind of chain and we received proper realistic information from the terrain.

Q. So up to the level of battalion, did you have security organs which communicated down the vertical chain of command?

A. Yes, we did. In all individual battalions, brigades, corps, and so on and so forth.

Q. Did any information appear at that kind of level about any possible pressure exerted on the Albanian population to have them leave Kosovo and Metohija?

A. Information appeared at the times of the fiercest bombing, that there was population movement. We received information about population movement, about mass population movements from the areas that were bombed heavily on a daily basis, several times.

Q. All right. Now, to the best of your knowledge and as far as you know, what was the cause of this mass exodus from Kosovo and Metohija?

A. The cause of the mass moving out of the population is very clear. First of all, the ceaseless bombing of civilian targets and whole territories along the axes of possible movement by ground forces that were envisaged and grouped along our strategic points which were to -- supposed to come from Albania and Macedonia. And it was the bombing that was the priority reason, the number one reason that the population fled, and that ⁴⁶³²⁶ was combined with strong propaganda on the part of the Siptar terrorists whose goal it was and in whose interests it was to have that space and territory vacated.

Q. Do you know anything about that propaganda?

A. Yes, I do. The propaganda was launched -- you have to know the mentality of those people, what -- they were intimidated. Fear was instilled to them during previous events and actions in Kosovo. And even those who could have been loyal towards the legal authorities, out of fear, through propaganda and violence through propaganda, coercion, anybody who did not adhere to their instructions were mistreated, and there were even many killings. And during the NATO strikes, the NATO bombing, we had widespread action on the part of the KLA who destroyed their own people and exerted terror over them. There were 300 people killed as a result of actions of that kind.

Q. All right. Was it only the Albanians who fled Kosovo and Metohija, according to your data and information, or did members of other ethnic groups flee as well, such as Serbs, Montenegrins and the other ethnic groups that lived in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. Yes, that is absolutely true, they did flee, but the most massive exodus was on the part of the Albanian population, and the Albanians fled towards Albania whereas the other ethnic groups, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Roma, they fled towards the central part of Serbia. And throughout Yugoslavia there was a lot of population movement and displacement. I myself am from Vojvodina. The Hungarians and everybody else there, women, children, pregnant women, they would be displaced, too, because there was ⁴⁶³²⁷ merciless bombing of Novi Sad and a series of towns for no reason at all. So people fled from there too.

Q. Aleksandar Vasiljevic, who was your deputy at that critical time, confirmed that he had never heard at any level anything about any acts linked to any kind of deportation. Now, since you were at a higher level, up above him, he was your subordinate, were you in a position or situation to hear about anything like that yourself?

A. I've already said I've never heard of any act, document, oral or otherwise, declaration or order or anything else about any pressure for that kind of thing to be done. Aco Vasiljevic could not have heard anything like that because there were no such documents or nothing like that was said. And if somebody would be well placed to know about that, then I would be and he would be because he was my deputy.

Q. Do you have any knowledge or awareness about whether the members of the MUP and army endeavoured to see that the people who left Kosovo for the reasons you have mentioned have to turn them back from the border crossings and to prevail upon them not to flee Kosovo and Metohija? Did you have any information about that?

A. Yes, there was information of that kind, that some units of the army and those unfortunate people who passed by the deployment of these units, they tried to persuade them not to leave the territory. However, there were bombs falling behind these people's backs. So to prevail upon them in that way did not meet with success.

Q. Now, in the groups of civilians leaving Kosovo, to the best of your knowledge were there any KLA members amongst them? ^{46328 BLANK PAGE 46329}

A. One of the goals or, rather, the reasons for which the population fled were made use of because a large number of military-able Albanians would join those columns and cross into the territory of Albania. The others stayed on the ground to await for a land aggression and provide support and reinforcement from the rear to the toughest of these. And, yes, these people did join up the centres preparing to attack Yugoslavia.

Q. Thank you, General. Now, in paragraph 53, it says that I and the others mentioned here, on or about the 1st of January, 1999, and continuing until the 20th of June, 1999, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in a deliberate and widespread or systematic campaign of terror and violence directed at Kosovo Albanian civilians living in Kosovo, and this campaign was launched with the help of the forces from the FRY and Serbia who undertook action against the Kosovo Albanians with the aim of expulsing most of the Albanian population from the territory and establish Serb control.

Now, do you have anything that would confirm or deny any operations against Kosovo Albanians implementing any operation against the Kosovo Albanian population of this kind?

A. Well, I don't know who you could order this -- issue this order to in the army. Perhaps the Chief of the General Staff or some military senior officers, that something like that be done, but I explained a moment ago that in the army that's not how it works. You can't just order something, you yourself, and then it be executed. An order can be oral or written, but it has to pass set procedure. From an order issued by you or the chief of the general command there are a series of institutions and ⁴⁶³³⁰ levels in the army that would have to know this until you reach the final level of implementation when something is done.

So that each soldier carries in his pocket his instructions, what he was not allowed to do, not permitted to do. So if anyone were to order anything like that, this would be sanctioned. So the existence of a plan of that kind and orders issued that a plan like that be implemented, no, I really don't know that that could have happened at all.

Q. Very well. Now, General, you spoke about our meetings during the war. Do you happen to remember a meeting you had with me before your appointment to the post of head of the security administration of the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia?

A. Yes. That was barely a month before the aggression started. You called me and told me of your intention to appoint me as head of the security administration.

Q. Can you remember what I told you on that occasion? Which main tasks did I pinpoint?

A. Well, you spoke about the security situation, the comprehensive security situation for the whole of the territory of Yugoslavia, and you said that we were entering a serious stage where the army would have a very difficult task, a responsible task to perform, and within the army the security service was to do its utmost, to use its competence and authority not to deface the army and soldiers, not -- and you said that the army must use its line of command and its presence in all those units to prevent any possible crimes from being committed, and that a soldier's face must be saved. And you said that the part of the army that had not ⁴⁶³³¹ been mobilised yet should be mobilised properly and that mobilisation should be protected from any infiltration of undesirables and not create an increased security problem within the units themselves.

Q. Now, the Chief of Staff or chief of the General Staff and afterwards Chief of Staff General Ojdanic, did he also speak about this to you when you were about to take up your appointment? Tell us what he told you.

A. Well, I reported to the Chief of the General Staff straight away. He was later the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. I told him of our meeting, and I gained the impression that he had already been informed about it. And we sat down and had a detailed discussion about what the service entailed and possible actions on the part of the service and the documents required to regulate the functioning of the service and of the army itself to prevent anything untoward from happening, to prevent any deviations from the rules and codes of conduct. And he particularly insisted upon the fact that that was something that you had emphasised when you spoke to him. So at these meetings until I was appointed this was a very topical subject.

Q. Thank you, General. Now, tell me, please, can you remember -- can you remember when the first signals reached you about possible abuses and criminal acts on the part of individual members of the army of Yugoslavia?

A. They would reach me sporadically at the beginning of the combat operations. However, they came in more intensively, these signals were more intensive towards the end of April 1999.

Q. How did you react to that, to those first indications you ⁴⁶³³² received?

A. Naturally, I reported these problems to General Ojdanic immediately.

Q. And how did he react?

A. He ordered me to go to Kosovo myself and to investigate all possibilities, to see if there are any such possibilities down there, and to propose specific measures.

Q. So did you go?

A. Yes, I did. I went, I think, just after the 1st of May.

Q. Did you go alone or were you accompanied by a team?

A. No. There was just one colonel with me. The two of us went down there.

Q. Upon your return, did you report your observations to General Ojdanic?

A. While I was in Kosovo, I first informed General Pavkovic, army commander, of the reasons for my visit and then I had a meeting with the entire command personnel of the security service in the Pristina Corps and in the 3rd Army as a whole where I received reports about a number of crimes that had happened down there and that they had prosecuted already by that time. So I verified that, but I had occasion to establish that appropriate reports did not reach the appropriate destination. There was a bottleneck in the channel, in the conduit of information that was later removed, but at that time the reports were not moving smoothly upwards. And later on when the -- it turned out that they had simply not thought it necessary to give us more detailed reports. ⁴⁶³³³

Q. You reported all this to General Ojdanic.

A. Yes. I reported to him immediately upon my return.

Q. Did you consider all those issues at your senior staff meeting including the commanding officers of the security service?

A. Yes. That was the first thing I did. At my own senior staff meeting I reviewed the whole situation and the data that I had gathered as well as the information that had been pooled through various channels to make a cumulative report and inform General Ojdanic to see what can be done.

Q. What did General Ojdanic do after your report?

A. Having heard me, General Ojdanic said that he would report that to you immediately.

Q. Very well. And what did he do?

A. At that time, he was already busy with his own staff, developing certain orders to be forwarded to all units, but on that occasion he told me that he had informed you and that you had convened an urgent meeting with us, people from the military security, to be attended also by representatives of the MUP.

Q. All right. You informed him, he informed me, and I convened an urgent meeting. Did any activity in the top military echelons precede this activity?

A. Yes, it did, because the situation was as follows: When you are going to see the Supreme Commander, you have to be fully prepared. So General Ojdanic invited the commander of the 2nd Army, General Pavkovic, to a meeting. If I remember correctly, it was on the 16th that they had ⁴⁶³³⁴ this meeting where General Pavkovic reported on the overall situation, combat activities, and the status of the 3rd Army.

Q. When was that meeting held in my office?

A. On the next day, the 17th of May.

Q. So on the 16th May you had a meeting with General Ojdanic to which the commander of the 3rd Army, General Pavkovic, was also invited and which was also attended by other competent high-ranking officers of the army.

A. Yes; my deputy Aleksandar Vasiljevic and General Gajic.

Q. And on the next day you had a meeting in my office?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, General, if you can, to the best of your recollection describe the discussion that took place at the meeting in my office, as briefly as you can.

A. On the 16th we had agreed that reports would first be submitted by General Pavkovic, followed by General Aleksandar Vasiljevic who was to report on the security situation, because at that precise time we were involved in a specific action as a result of the arrest of foreign intelligence agents who had been arrested and removed from Kosovo. And the day before, General Vasiljevic had talked to security organs and was in possession of fresh information about that. That's why it was decided that he should be the one to report to you about the security situation and all the developments that were related to the security of the army.

Q. Do you remember who attended that meeting in my office? Just name the people of whose attendance you're sure. ⁴⁶³³⁵

A. Mr. Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, and there was Rade Markovic as well. And on the side of our service, there was me, Aco Vasiljevic, and General -- I can't remember. There was one more person from the army.

Q. Since you are naming names now, there was chief of the Supreme Command Staff -- Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, rather. There was you, chief of the military security, and General Gajic. And representing civilian authorities, vice-president of the government or, rather, deputy Prime Minister, and chief of the security service, Rade Markovic.

A. That's correct.

Q. What about the interior minister, Stojiljkovic?

A. At the meeting you told us he had urgent business elsewhere and would be unable to attend.

Q. How was he informed about the discussion that took place at that meeting?

A. During the meeting itself, after all the reports were made and after the discussion, you gave an order to Rade Markovic to have an urgent meeting with the interior minister and to convey to him your decisions and your orders.

Q. Very well. What was discussed at that meeting? Was any data presented about the crimes committed by army members and MUP members in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. Yes. Reports were made including data that we had at that moment and including the cases reported by Aleksandar Vasiljevic and General Pavkovic, which had been already prosecuted by that time. And chief of the security service, Rade Markovic, also reported some problems that were ^{46336 BLANK PAGE 46337} being encountered down there and the crimes committed by MUP members.

Q. Tell us, were there any problems that were specially emphasised at that meeting?

A. There were. One problem was presented by General Pavkovic. He complained about insufficient cooperation with the MUP on the ground.

Q. Did I have any reaction to that?

A. You reacted very emphatically, and you said that non-cooperation between services and between the army and the MUP was tantamount to sabotage, that this should never be allowed again to happen in the future. You said again to Rade Markovic that he should urgently meet with the interior minister, convey your orders, that appropriate measures be agreed, and that this problem with the army should be resolved.

Q. Did I say anything about that problem, that particular problem about which you reported, namely the crimes committed by individual members of the army and the police?

A. Yes, you did. You were very strict in your terms. It was so strict that it sounded even unpleasant to our ears. You said that such things had to be dealt with immediately and should never happen again, that all preventive work should be done, that measures should be taken immediately, as soon as something is detected of that kind, and that prosecutions are indispensable.

Q. Was it possible that some things remained undetected, some things within the purview of our organs?

A. Well, that was precisely your order, that we should detect everything, but everybody in the world knows about the grey areas, namely ⁴⁶³³⁸ some crimes will never be detected, not even in peacetime functioning of a state let alone in wartime. We had no idea how many rapes happened last night in Belgrade, and it's a big question whether we will ever find out the true number. You ordered that all this should be investigated and that all measures should be taken against perpetrators.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We will take the 15-minute break now.

--- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.51 p.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please continue.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Robinson, but before I continue, I have one thing to raise. I was informed by the Registry that the witness finds this 15-minute break too short, and I would like that to be taken into account. Maybe not for today, because it's no longer topical, but for tomorrow maybe.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll take that into account for tomorrow. But all the more reason, Mr. Milosevic, to proceed as quickly with this witness as possible, since he's clearly not in good health.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will certainly do that, Mr. Robinson.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, at that meeting was there any mention of paramilitary units, that meeting in my office on the 17th of May?

A. Yes.

Q. How was it mentioned, in what sense, and who mentioned it?

A. It was said that certain problems existed. Earlier on I spoke ⁴⁶³³⁹ about problems between the MUP and the army of Yugoslavia. It was said that there was a number of crimes committed by members of the army and a number of crimes committed by MUP members. So at the same time another problem was mentioned. A deputy of mine said that within MUP units there are some people who were criminals, such as Boca, a person named Boca in the area of Podujevo, and in the area of Kosovo Polje it was said there was a unit that formerly belonged to Arkan.

Q. What was my position with regard to paramilitary units?

A. First of all, you asked for an explanation. You asked Rade Markovic to provide more details. Rade Markovic explained that down there in Kosovo Polje there were about 30 such persons. Some of them had already perpetrated crimes and were under investigation, and equally, near Podujevo, there was a unit of this Medic who was expelled by that time from the area of Podujevo and that measures would be taken, were pending. You said that everybody had to be held to account, that this needed to be conveyed to the interior minister who should immediately deal with such groups on the ground and do away with them. And you told us in no uncertain terms that such things must not happen any longer in Kosovo.

Q. Was there a clear joint position on our part about paramilitary units?

A. It was a unified position of all of us. You personally said that such things could only harm us, and you ordered at that meeting that the border facing the Drina River should even be closed, if necessary, to prevent the so-called greater Serbs to spread their Serbdom in their own way and that appropriate measures should be taken by the army and the ⁴⁶³⁴⁰ police.

Q. Were any instructions given to check once again if there were any paramilitary units remaining in Kosovo?

A. Yes. There had already been an order from the Chief of Staff of the General Staff who invoked earlier orders and said that the entire territory must be inspected again and anything remotely resembling paramilitary units must be removed.

Q. What was said in the report of General Pavkovic or the chief of state security about perpetrators of crimes? What was said as to who had perpetrated those crimes?

A. It was clear from our reports that those crimes had been committed by individuals, individuals in the army, as far as we were concerned. And something similar was said by Rade Markovic for his field of competence. He said that those individuals had already been arrested and measures were taken. So it was only individual perpetrators.

Q. What was my position regarding detection of perpetrators addressed to both military organs of command and control and civilian organs; you, Ojdanic, and Markovic?

A. Your unambiguous position was that everything should be investigated immediately, and in those cases where crimes and perpetrators were already known, that they should be prosecuted without delay.

Q. Do you know whether Rade Markovic really conveyed all that to the interior minister?

A. In my subsequent contacts with the interior minister I was satisfied that Markovic had indeed informed him, because he talked to me ⁴⁶³⁴¹ about certain things from that meeting.

Q. After that meeting, do you have anything to add? Did I say anything else at the end of the meeting when you finished all your reports, the question and answer session?

A. The main topic was these crimes, and you gave very specific orders and in no uncertain terms. You talked about the border to Albania -- towards Albania and Macedonia as well. You said that not a single foot of our land should be lost, that it has to be defended with all resources. And you said something to the effect that where the other side would place a flag, that is where our border would be and that should not be allowed.

Q. All right. After that meeting, did General Ojdanic give you some orders in relation to the discussion at that meeting and the reporting to me at that meeting?

A. Yes. As we were walking out of your office, he started issuing me orders and giving me assignments in terms of what should be done.

Q. So what did you do in that regard?

A. First of all, with my own senior staff I looked at the situation, and I discussed with them the meeting that was held with you and also what General Ojdanic defined. I set up a rather strong team of eminent security organs headed by Aco Vasiljevic, and I sent them down to Kosovo and Metohija so that they would go to each and every brigade and clarify with the security organs what the situation was with the units in Kosovo and Metohija.

Q. What were the results of the work of this team headed by General Vasiljevic? ⁴⁶³⁴²

A. Well, the results of their work, upon their return -- I think he was back on the 7th of June from Kosovo, and he reported that up to that time, up to his return from Kosovo and Metohija, all cases had been prosecuted, that all investigations were intensified. He said that there were some problems there, that some perpetrators had deserted. And as for them, I can say that later on they were captured in Vojvodina. So they also ended up before the judiciary. And that security organs and commands took the situation very seriously and also the warnings and orders that preventive work should be done as well, because the bombing was well advanced. People were frustrated. We had more and more people down there. So the chances of having crimes committed were, objectively speaking, on the rise.

Q. General, in paragraph 55 of the Kosovo indictment, it says that the forces of the FRY and Serbia in a deliberate way systematically and in a widespread manner, by force, expelled and internally displaced hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their homes across the entire province of Kosovo.

Please say whether that is correct, that they did this through oppression, the use of force, threats of force and acts of violence, and so on. Is that what the army did vis-a-vis the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. That's not something that I know of. This is an organised thing that cannot be done without the command of the army and without proper organisation. The army was not engaged in such things. If the civilian population was moved from one place to another by the military, it was for ⁴⁶³⁴³ the sake of the civilian population, to get them out of zones of combat operations. Such actions are allowed, in terms of our rules, at brigade level command. So if there were combat zones, then the military had the right to move the civilian population to protect them, but simply, this kind of thing never happened.

Q. All right, General. In 56, it says: Throughout Kosovo forces of the FRY and Serbia engaged in a deliberate and widespread or systematic campaign of destruction of property owned by Kosovo Albanian civilians. This was accomplished by the widespread shelling of towns and villages, the burning and destruction of property, including homes, farms, businesses, cultural monuments and religious sites and the destruction of personal property. What can you say about that? You are the most competent person who can answer that.

A. We have no such knowledge that this was done en masse, that the army lined up and marched to villages to destroy them, surround them, target them. An ordinary soldier from these units, an honest man would have to say that something like that happened had it happened. Quite simply, such things did not happen.

There were torchings, though. I did say earlier on that we had groups that had infiltrated and that had our uniforms, as a matter of fact. They even spoke the Serbian language. And they did things like that or similar things in our territory.

In that territory there were also clashes between the citizens themselves in a way. There were blood feuds there any way, so the situation was favourable for settling such scores. ^{46344 BLANK PAGE 46345} It is possible that there were such torchings, but anyway, it is not right to say that the military did it in an organised fashion.

Q. All right. In your opinion, did the military do everything within its powers to prevent this --

MR. NICE: There must be some limit to how far he could go with generalised answers.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. That's leading.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Now, let's move on to non-leading questions. Paragraph 57. Regrettably, I am reading these paragraphs to you because they contain similar accusations, but you can see that this is what they say. They say here that brutality and violence was committed against Albanian civilians.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, don't read all of that paragraph. Just summarise it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. So do you know that our forces committed acts of brutality and went from village to village issuing threats, expelling people, et cetera, that people were intimidated, assaulted or killed in public view to enforce the departure of their families and neighbours?

A. Quite simply, the military did no such thing. There were individual cases. Every crime, every murder is tragic enough in its own right and can be intimidating, but that the army went out and did such ⁴⁶³⁴⁶ things in an organised fashion, that was quite simply impossible, and it was impossible for us not to learn of such things.

Q. All right, General. Paragraph 58 is dedicated to convoys of refugees leaving Kosovo. It speaks of Albanians in these convoys subjected to further beatings, extortion, robbery, harassment, assaults, killings, illegal arrests. Do you know anything about this?

A. I know that there were columns, convoys of refugees. It was not only in Kosovo but everywhere. People were fleeing from bombs. But it's quite impossible, like in the previous paragraph that you read out to me, that the military lined up and beat these people who were passing by. This is a general lack of knowledge of how a military system and organisation functions. There could have been individual cases when somebody was taken out of such a column, but that the army did that kind of thing on orders, stood there with some kind of sticks and beat these people, setting up checkpoints, whatever, that's impossible.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me tell you that getting a general refutation from this witness of paragraphs like 55, 56, and 57, in my view, is not helping your case because there are specific allegations in the indictment that support these general paragraphs in the introductory part of the indictment. So if you took the witness to the specific allegations, say, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and he refuted those specific allegations, then it would be helpful to round it off by referring him to, say, paragraph 55 and 56. Then you would have a foundation for the general refutation which he's giving. But now there is no foundation at all for it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I bear in mind the ⁴⁶³⁴⁷ fact that General Geza Farkas was at the top of the military security pyramid. So when I put this question to him, it goes without saying that any case, any example that he could know of is an answer to this question. So it's not a question of whether he established something himself at a concrete place, but he was at the top of the military security pyramid. All information came to him, so he would have had to know had such things happened. So it only seems that these questions are general, but they have to be viewed in the context of the fact that he is at the top of the military security pyramid.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic. I have given you my own appreciation of the matter.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, tell us, is it correct that the forces of the FRY and Serbia accompanied the Kosovo Albanians to the border?

A. Yes, there were such cases, when they passed through these zones, that units or members of the units accompanied them in an organised fashion, but as far as I know, only when there were minefields there. So they were trying to prevent any problems, any casualties of these people who were moving en masse.

The only situations are those that I have heard of, of soldiers helping the people who were moving out. So that's the only thing I know of. The army helped people move along so that these unfortunate people could do so.

Q. Can you say something about paragraph 60, things that have to do ⁴⁶³⁴⁸ with the looting of property, the taking away of money and valuables, of deported Albanians, as it is put here?

A. There were cases of looting and pillage, and they were all prosecuted. Unfortunately, there were such cases even among officers who robbed and -- people of their valuables, but they didn't do that on orders. These were crimes that were committed by individuals.

Q. Are there any cases that you know of where the perpetrators were not arrested and handed over to the courts?

A. If we found out about any case, the procedure required was applied. I also mentioned that some people deserted. I mentioned a particular case of one person who was later captured in Vojvodina, a perpetrator of such an act. So measures were taken against all perpetrators. There was not a single case that we knew of -- well, it is possible that we had not brought some cases to an absolute end, because in mid-June we left the area, so we no longer had any access to the territory in order to carry out our investigations. And when the state of war ceased, the war courts no longer functioned and the reservists were moved to the authority of civilian courts.

Q. General, do you know about the allegations contained in 61, that is to say the seizure and destruction of personal identity documents and licenses of vehicles belonging to Kosovo Albanian civilians? My question is very concrete: Did the army take any documents from civilians?

A. No. The service is not aware of any such cases of documents being taken away. Perhaps this happened sporadically, but it was certainly not done in an organised fashion. I heard of a few individual cases in the ⁴⁶³⁴⁹ police, but not in the military, no.

Q. All right, General. Just a few concrete questions. You remember that during the NATO aggression the residence of the president of the republic was bombed. At that time, that was my residence; right?

A. Yes, I remember that.

Q. I personally saw General Clark on television explaining that this was a legitimate target because under the residence of the president of the republic there is a command centre. My question is: Underneath the residence of the president of the republic, was there any command centre?

A. No. Underneath your residence there was no command centre. There wasn't even a shelter, I think. There was just some basement.

Q. Thank you, General. During the course of the war, in different communications about different activities, combat activities and in that context, you undoubtedly heard the expression "ciscenje," cleaning up or cleansing.

A. Yes.

Q. What does this pertain to, this term?

A. Well, when soldiers use the term, that means searching the terrain. This word is used in our rules, and our rules exactly explain the term "ciscenje." Say the clearing of a minefield, that is one form of "ciscenje." Then "ciscenje" in the sense of terrorists is mopping up. So this is a term that is used for military actions, for the military carrying out combat tasks.

Q. Did this term ever denote any kind of violent action against civilians? ⁴⁶³⁵⁰

A. Against civilians, no. When looking at these rules, you can see by their very content that that has nothing to do with civilians.

Q. All right, General. When we met here in preparation of this, I gave you a copy of this indictment for you to read. Did you manage to read it?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Now, please, since you were at the top of military security, have you read the Kosovo indictment?

A. Yes.

Q. In its entirety?

A. Yes.

Q. What is correct out of all -- among all these allegations, I mean all these accusations contained, all the charges contained? What is correct?

A. I know that not a single contact with you, not a single meeting of the Supreme Command Staff, not a single document that the Supreme Command Staff issued - and I took part in the writing of these documents, or my organs did -- actually, all of this speaks to the contrary. It is in total contrast to what is stated here in this indictment.

Q. Thank you, General. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, as you can see, the General will be able to leave tomorrow after working hours. He will be able to leave The Hague.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Nice. ⁴⁶³⁵¹ Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

Q. Perhaps you'd help us with a bit more detail before we move on. What were you actually doing in, say, January of 1999? Were you in an office in Belgrade? Well, what were you doing?

A. In January 1999, I was -- I was still the assistant federal defence minister.

Q. So you weren't in Kosovo. You were in Belgrade; correct?

A. Yes, I was in Belgrade.

Q. What range of material did you receive?

A. I received written material, telegrams, personal information from the federal minister of defence meeting teams. But I don't know in what regard, based on what material. What material are you referring to? Material and documents came in to me from different directions.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... was available to you, and the next question is going to be if this material is available to us. You see? So stay with January 1999. The material that you received, reports of one kind and another, written material, is that material available to us?

A. During that period of time, we worked intensively on updating the plan for the country's defence. I don't know what would interest you from the country's defence plan. Probably certain portions relating to our organs of power and authority. If they -- the ban on keeping secrets were lifted, then I'm sure you would be able to get this information.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... let's be --

[Trial Chamber confers] ^{46352 BLANK PAGE 46353}

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. Let's be concrete about one particular and very famous incident: Racak. Now, you're in Belgrade. Did you receive any written information on Racak?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Is that because the military provided no report on Racak, or is it because, although a report may have been provided, it never found its way through to you? Which?

A. Mr. Nice, at the time I was assistant to the federal defence minister for civilian defence, so I had no rapport in that way with the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia in command terms. If reports of that kind did indeed come in, they would have come in through the chain of command of the General Staff and they would be solved at that level and dealt with at that level, because the General Staff was separate from the Ministry of Defence. So it was not function to inform myself about things like that through the army chain of command.

Q. So does this position obtain for January and February and right into March, that you received no raw information or intelligence about military matters on the ground in Kosovo?

A. Intelligence? I didn't receive intelligence material, but I received information through the line of Defence Ministry about the problems that occurred in Kosovo at that time. Not from the army.

Q. Very well. What about from the MUP? Did you receive any raw material from the MUP throughout January, February, and March? Did you? ⁴⁶³⁵⁴

A. No, no. I was a federal organ and the MUP was organised at a republican level. So that kind of information, that kind of raw material would not have been sent to the Ministry of Defence. Possibly at meetings if the minister of defence had been apprised of that, then at the meeting of the staff members - and I was a member of that - we would be informed of problems like that if he received it through the MUP lines, from the republican MUP, because there were two republican MUPs; Montenegro and Serbia.

Q. So that we can, as it were, clear the decks: From your experience at the time, you can provide this Court with no information from raw material or from direct experience of anything that happened between January and the end of March of 1999 because you weren't involved. Hmm?

A. I did not personally take part in those events. However, the organisational structure of the Ministry of Defence goes right down to the municipalities, in-depth, right down where the municipal organs have MUP organs. So certain information did reach them as to what was going on in the field.

Q. I'm not concerned with what reached other people. We're only concerned with what's known to you, and I think you've now answered my question, but I must qualify it in this way: You subsequently had a major role to play in the VJ's body described as the Commission for Cooperation with the ICTY, didn't you?

A. I was retired, pensioned off in 2001, and as a pensioner, as a retired person, I was a member of that commission which was set up by the federal government. ⁴⁶³⁵⁵

Q. [Previous translation continues]... weren't you, a very senior member of the commission.

A. Not a senior member. I was a member.

Q. Very well.

A. There was the leader there --

Q. Well, before I move from January, February, and March, in the course of your workings at the commission, did you come across, did you look at any reports either from the MUP - not likely - or from the VJ - likely - about events in Racak?

A. The object of that commission was not, to begin with, to deal with documents like that, reports like that, but to deal with organisational problems, to establish a legal and legitimate cooperation with The Hague Tribunal, because up until then --

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. -- we didn't have --

Q. [Previous translation continues]... time is limited. Very simple question: In your work -- in fact, you were vice-chairman of the commission, weren't you?

A. No, no.

Q. But in the course of your work did you - yes or no - see any report from the VJ on Racak?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did anybody try to find one?

A. No, we didn't. I tried to explain this to you. The function of the commission was not to find documents or to conduct investigations or ⁴⁶³⁵⁶ anything of that kind. That's not what the commission did.

Q. Well, we were told by a witness last week that one of the functions of the committee of experts of the commission was to reconcile contradictory accounts or where there were differences of interpretation. Just in a sentence or so, because you were on the commission, can you explain to us, please, what it was that the commission did by way of reconciling different versions of events?

A. That was not the task of the commission, what you've just talked about. That was done by an expert team which was later set up pursuant to an order from the Chief of the General Staff from amongst the composition of officers, retired or otherwise, who were there to study the combat operations that had taken place, and that commission had nothing to do with the expert team except that at both we had the chief or, rather, the general who was in charge of them.

Q. Well, just pursue this very shortly. The expert team to study combat operations, and although the answer in translation isn't very clear, it appears that this team was dealing with reconciling different versions of events. Can you give us an example of how this team reconciled different versions of events and what the outcome of its reconciliation was?

A. First of all, that expert team did not have the task of dovetailing or reconciling or falsifying events in any way but to perfect a complete analysis of the events that had taken place during the overall combat action and the NATO aggression itself.

Q. Well, I hadn't yet alleged falsification. Have you been following ⁴⁶³⁵⁷ the evidence of other witnesses here?

A. Sporadically.

Q. The complete analysis of events, has that been made available to the ICTY? This expert committee apparently provided a complete analysis of events, of the overall combat operation. Have we seen that complete analysis?

A. You couldn't have seen it because that expert team ceased to work. It stopped working through certain interventions, I think your own. At the time you equated the commission with the expert team, I believe, we ceased to work, both us and the expert team. So that task wasn't completed, was never completed, brought to term.

Q. Minister Tadic abolished the commission on taking office as minister of defence, and it was clear that the suggestions alive from within Serbia were that the commission was a dishonest or possibly dishonest body. Do you remember that?

A. What I remember is that the commission issued an order to abolish it. Now, what you mean by from within Serbia or what you meant there, who was dishonest, who understood what within Serbia, I didn't understand that. What do you mean by saying within Serbia, from within Serbia?

Q. When it was abolished by Minister Tadic, were there reports in the newspapers that this was a body not to be trusted and arguably a body that was breaking the law? Were there such reports to explain its abolition?

A. I don't know. I don't know what the newspapers wrote about. I really don't know.

Q. Two last general questions, I think, on the commission before we ⁴⁶³⁵⁸ move on. I may come back to it tomorrow. The commission had ready and easy access to things like logbooks or, sorry, war diaries, contemporaneous records, and contemporaneous working maps, didn't it?

A. No, that's not correct. It did not have access to those kinds of things, and I said it didn't deal with problems of that kind. It was the expert team that did that.

Q. Did the expert team, if you persist in this distinction, did the expert team have access to war diaries, working maps and other contemporaneous logs of events? Yes or no.

A. The expert team conducted investigation along those lines to arrive at those source -- that source information. However, the archives had been partially bombed, partially displaced, and so it was an enormous amount of effort, since there were no archives or well-ordered archives. They made every effort to arrive at those documents, maps, documents, and so on, and that is why they would call upon certain individuals who had taken part in certain events to testify, and if they have in their possession documents of that kind to give them over so that they could have a look at them and clarify the situation.

Q. You see, we've been provided very late in the day here with logbooks that we've been trying to get for years and then became very easily available. Can you think of any reason why this VJ Commission for Cooperation should filter out logbooks and make it impossible for the OTP of the ICTY to have had access to them? Can you think of any good reason for that?

A. First of all, the expert team was not a part of the commission. ⁴⁶³⁵⁹ The expert team, as I've already said, was formed pursuant to an order by the chief of the General Staff. The commission was established pursuant to a decision made by the federal minister of defence, and in conformity with agreement from the General Staff and the federal government. And what you're asking me now about those documents, as time elapsed, probably the expert team were set on the traces of those documents and they managed to come by some of them.

Q. And can you think of any reason why Aleksandar Vasiljevic should have been leaned on, persuaded by those in the commission not to volunteer to cooperate with the OTP and to come and give evidence here? Can you think of any good reason why that could have happened?

A. That observation is not correct, persuaded by those in the commission. But when you started working with Aleksandar Vasiljevic, we still did not have the law governing cooperation with The Hague Tribunal, nor did we have any way in which we could waive senior officers and generals of their -- the requirement to not disclose secrets. At the time, talking to Vasiljevic, that we said he shouldn't do that because he could be held criminally responsible. So there was no ill intent or telling him not to do that.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... accept he was told not to talk to the OTP under pressure of some kind of criminal sanctions and notwithstanding the duty of all parties to cooperate with this Tribunal? You accept that he was given that pressure and advice?

A. No, he wasn't under pressure. He was just made aware of the situation, that is to say if there had not -- if there was not a waiver of ^{46360 BLANK PAGE 46361} keeping state secrets, then they could come under the effects of that same state which was there to protect its citizens so that they could -- so that they could cooperate in the proper way with The Hague Tribunal. So that was the object of the commission, that is to say that the commission insisted on the law on cooperation, the institution of waiving, keeping state secrets, and so that the documents that you wanted to access could be accessed by you in a legal way and legitimate manner.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... when the Court typically breaks. In 1991, what was your function?

A. In 1991, until the middle of the year I was Chief of Staff of the Territorial Defence of Vojvodina. And later on that year, somewhere towards autumn, I was the assistant commander of the 1st Army for military territorial organs.

Q. Until what time?

A. Until 1995, when I was appointed by decree as assistant federal defence minister.

Q. Holding that position until when?

A. Until the 24th of April, or, until the very start of the aggression against my country.

Q. The second topic is this: You --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A correction should be made here. It's actually the 24th of March.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, the 24th of March.

MR. NICE:

Q. You've spoken of a number of meetings. I'll give you a list of ⁴⁶³⁶² some of them. One was a meeting you had with this accused a month before your appointment as head of VJ security. Do you have any notes or minutes of that meeting?

A. Notes, no.

Q. So in order to give the evidence that you've given, how was your memory revived or refreshed?

A. Well, quite simply, Mr. Nice: You tend to remember such things when you're in the army. Until then I was assistant minister, and it was then that I was suggested as a future chief of security. Such appointments are remembered.

Q. The order that -- from Ojdanic that you should go to Kosovo to investigate perpetration and prosecution of VJ crimes, do we have a copy of that order? Do we have a copy of the report that you produced following the performance of that order, please?

A. I received a verbal order, and I went to Kosovo almost immediately.

Q. And your report --

A. So I never got a written order.

Q. I see. Your report, that must have been in writing on a matter of this importance. Do we have a copy of that report, please?

A. That report existed in writing, and it was based on that report that my deputy Aco Vasiljevic --

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. No.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... ⁴⁶³⁶³

A. Unless you have it; I don't.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... prudent to bring it with you?

A. I didn't think about that. I didn't know where it was or how to get hold of that document.

Q. Then -- but again you're acting on memory for everything you've said in it; is that right?

A. I'm not speaking from memory. When I found out that I would be a witness here, I was proofed and I refreshed my memory through these contacts, but I don't have the documents you refer to.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... contacts?

A. With the legal assistants of Mr. Milosevic.

Q. So they told you things or spoke to you about things, but you didn't have any documents to look at to refresh your memory as to the content of your report?

A. Mr. Nice, I did not understand your question because you made some statements within that question before you actually asked me something.

Q. Lastly, because I'm not sure what the time limit for today is, you gave detailed accounts of two meetings on the 16th and 17th of May with Pavkovic and others. Have you got any written record of those meetings with you?

A. No. No, I don't.

Q. Do they exist?

A. I believe they do.

Q. You've made no efforts to bring them with you?

A. I made enough effort by coming at all. ⁴⁶³⁶⁴

Q. I see.

MR. NICE: May I ask one more question?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, one more question.

MR. NICE:

Q. I take it from your evidence, Mr. Farkas, that from March onwards, either in your position in Belgrade or from your visit to the territory, you would hold yourself out as somebody who would know pretty well everything that was going on in Kosovo during what you describe as the NATO aggression. Would that be fair?

A. It's not that I describe it as a NATO aggression. It was a NATO aggression. We were bombed for 88 days.

Q. Do you hold yourself out as knowing pretty well everything that was going on? This will help me know what I want to ask you tomorrow, you see.

A. All right. I cannot assert that I know everything. I don't think anybody can do that. It's just that we did our best, based on all the orders, to find out as many details as we could.

Q. [Previous translation continues]...

A. It's -- I'm not saying that I knew everything.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... part with your answer to this question: How did it come that hundreds of bodies of Kosovo Albanians were dug up and transported to the north of Serbia for reburial? Would you like to explain that to the Court, please, in a sentence?

A. As to their being exhumed and transported to the territory of central Serbia, I learned about that, I believe, only when the war was ⁴⁶³⁶⁵ over. While the war lasted, I had no knowledge about that, in view of my position and whereabouts. All this information that later transpired after the exhumations is something that I didn't know at the time.

JUDGE ROBINSON: We must stop here today. We'll adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00 a.m.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 10th day

of November, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.