⁴⁶³⁶⁶

Thursday, 10 November 2005

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, being sensitive to the health problems of the witness, we'll sit at one-hour intervals, taking 20 minutes for the break, for each break, and stopping at 2.00.

WITNESS: GEZA FARKAS [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. Mr. Farkas, sensitive thus to your health issues, it's been forecast that you're simply not available tomorrow --

A. I'm not getting any interpretation. No tone. Yes, thank you, I can hear now.

Q. Then sensitive to your health issues, it's been forecast for some time that you're not available tomorrow. Are you not available tomorrow for health reasons, or for business reasons, or for social reasons?

A. For health reasons.

Q. You have medical appointments?

A. I do.

Q. I asked you yesterday when we closed about the movement of bodies to Batajnica. Can you now please tell us what you were told about this, when, and by whom.

A. Nothing was told to me in connection with that, and I said that I ⁴⁶³⁶⁷ heard about the movement -- that movement after the war, from the newspapers.

Q. You didn't actually say that yesterday. I'll just check exactly what you said. If I can find it quickly.

Press on. You only heard about it from the newspapers. Is that your evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did you learn from the newspapers, then?

A. Well, I learnt that it was about some bodies which were taken from a refrigeration truck from the Danube and were buried somewhere, and only after those burials were they moved, and things like that.

Q. Did you make no inquiries into this?

A. Well, I had no reason to make inquiries. It didn't have anything to do with the army, so I had no reason to.

Q. What about the work of the commission? Did the commission not look into the movement of these bodies?

A. I've already told you that the commission didn't deal with problems like that.

Q. Why not?

A. The problems of the commission had quite a different -- because it had other tasks.

Q. Here you were, a very senior position, covering Kosovo, visiting Kosovo, and this extraordinary allegation is raised about the movement of bodies. No interest whatsoever in discovering what happened, none of you?

A. I didn't deal with Kosovo alone. I had the security situation of ⁴⁶³⁶⁸ the army to deal with on the whole territory of Yugoslavia, and this particular case, after the war, that happened came under the competence and authority of the Ministry of the Interior and not the army.

Q. Well, we had a lot of evidence about this, and just to tell you one piece of it, in case you haven't, perhaps extraordinarily, picked this up, one piece of it is that your wartime colleague Rade Markovic -- would it be fair to describe him as a wartime colleague?

A. I don't know what you mean when you say "wartime colleague." We were in the war, true. He did his work in the MUP; I did my work in the army --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. -- and together -- what?

Q. Did you go to meetings together?

A. Yes. We would meet each other. I said last time that we attended a meeting at Mr. Milosevic's office --

Q. Exactly.

A. -- on one occasion.

Q. Now, he signed a statement he may now seek to deny, but the statement is before the Court and the Judges will decide where the truth lies. He made a statement explaining how, at a meeting with this accused as early as March of 1999, plans were laid to move bodies so that they could not be discovered by The Hague Tribunal. Were you aware of that? Exhibit 283, if the Court wants to remind itself. Were you aware of that?

A. I don't know what Rade Markovic said or did not say to the Court ⁴⁶³⁶⁹ and to you. However, at that meeting and at no meeting that I attended and that he attended was there any discussion of that.

Q. Since then, some 800 bodies have been found in mass graves in Serbia, some at any event either on or very near to military installations, Batajnica. With your military experience, would you accept that digging up, transporting, and re-burying anybody, any single corpse, is a serious exercise, and to do it for 800 bodies is a major exercise. Would you accept that?

A. If that was done, then most probably you're right.

Q. And it had to be done before the arrival of the international community, so it was done before June, and we have the dates from the Danube truck and other things. For such an exercise to happen on the territory of Kosovo would have demanded that vehicles moving the bodies would have free passage, wouldn't it?

A. I don't know when that was done. I don't know of that date. And as to vehicles, I really can't say whether it was a convoy, what was done. The territory, both during the war -- supervision over the territory was in the hands of the MUP, not the army.

Q. I'd like you to help us a little further with that. We've had one or two Defence witnesses who have sort of approached the suggestion that the international community moved the bodies or that Kosovo Albanians moved the bodies. You tell us. That would be nonsense, wouldn't it, to suggest that either the Kosovo Albanians were able to dig up 800 of their own bodies, most or many of them with bullets in their heads, and drive them up to Serbia. That's nonsense, isn't it? That couldn't happen. ⁴⁶³⁷⁰

A. I don't know about that. I just don't know who said that, under what circumstances they made the statement. I really can't say whether it happened or did not happen. If it happened, then of course it is not all right.

Q. Mr. Farkas, you've been brought here because we're told of your supreme knowledge of security, KOS matters at the material time. Kosovo is quite a small territory and you were there on your visit, so you know what the security position was. Is any suggestion that the Kosovo Albanians themselves dug up these bodies and drove them to Serbia simply nonsensical because, apart from absurd in itself, also physically impossible to achieve?

A. Probably not.

Q. You mean probably not possible?

A. Probably not possible for them to dig up and transport those bodies to Serbia.

Q. Now, if we discount the suggestion insofar as anybody has made it that NATO dug them up and moved them around, it follows that they were dug up and moved before June of 1999, and I want you to listen very carefully to the next question. Think about it before you answer it. Do you on behalf of the army say that it's possible that this was done by the MUP on their own, without the army knowing about it, or would that also simply not be possible?

A. All I can say is that the army didn't know about that. Now, who did it, whether NATO did it or the hypothesis that the Kosovo Albanians did it, or anybody else who had an interest, if those bodies existed at ⁴⁶³⁷¹ all, be found on the territory of central Serbia, the army and the military security service, military organisation, had no knowledge of that.

Q. Well, on what basis did you say the military had no knowledge of that? Let me tell you first of all what appears in Rade Markovic's statement to those who were implicated. Stojiljkovic, Ilic, and he says that Djordjevic, Obrad Stevanovic, Dragan -- Branko Djuric and Sreten Lukic and Dragisa Dinic must have known.

Now, that's what he says. On what basis do you say the army was not involved?

A. Well, all the generals or, rather, the individuals that you enumerated here are members of the MUP.

Q. Precisely.

A. Therefore --

Q. Is it possible that it was all done by the MUP?

A. I don't know. I can't claim that one way or another because I don't know.

Q. My last question on this topic, at least for the moment is this, and I want you again to think about this carefully. You were there, you know what the security position was, you know what the security position at the borders of Kosovo and Serbia were. Is it remotely possible that the MUP could have moved all these bodies in lorries without -- or had them moved in lorries without the agreement of the army not to stop, not to search, not to interfere with the lorries as they moved? Is that remotely possible? ⁴⁶³⁷²

A. First of all, the army wasn't at the border between the province and Serbia. The army was along the state borders. Therefore, at that particular locality there was no supervision by the army of the territory in-depth. The army was at the border, at the frontiers, and at their positions to conduct combat operations in the defence of the country. Now, what happened there, no soldier could have known that. They were in quite another location.

Q. Now, of course the Court will decide what the history of these bodies was and who is involved, but help me with this: If by your last answer you're allowing that the MUP could have done this entirely without the army's knowledge, responsive to a direction of this accused, what does that tell us about the integration of the army and the MUP or the separation of the army and the MUP?

A. Well, this is a very hypothetical question. One can allow, hypothetically speaking, that NATO transported the bodies, or somebody else. So I can't really answer hypotheticals like that. I say that I do not know about it.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I agree with the witness. Please move on to another question. It's inviting speculation.

MR. NICE: Well, it's a hypothetical question but I want to deal with it with one other question.

Q. Looking back, Mr. Farkas, and thinking of the meetings that you attended and of any other things that you saw, was there any evidence coming to you that the accused dealt with the MUP privately or separately ⁴⁶³⁷³ and kept things from the army? Is there any experience you have that would show that to be part of what he did?

A. Mr. Nice, once again you're asking a hypothetical question. I have to guess and speculate what Mr. Milosevic did privately. I didn't accompany him --

JUDGE ROBINSON: General, it's simply for you to say whether there was any evidence coming to you that the accused dealt with the MUP privately or separately. Did you have any evidence to that effect? This is not speculation. Either you had it or you did not.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't have it. No evidence.

MR. NICE:

Q. Thank you. Now, let's go back very briefly because I want to look at events through your eyes and with your experience. A little bit, only a few minutes. As you started to tell the learned Judges yesterday, you had some prior KOS experience before 1999 when you were placed in the position you were by this accused. You had some as a junior officer, and then you had some between 1985, I think, and 1988; is that correct?

A. Yes, that's right. I was present in 1968 at Kosovo when the demonstrations took place, those difficult, destructive first demonstrations. And then later, from 1985 onwards, I was the chief of security of the 2nd and now the 3rd Army.

Q. You started to mention Paracin, the incident at Paracin where one man ran amok, which you say happened in 1987. Are you aware that in respect of that incident the late one-time President Stambolic wrote in his book how this was an event that was in some way a media show, was used ^{46374 BLANK PAGE 46375} by the army for political purposes and was manipulated? Are you aware of that in his book?

A. Mr. Nice, first of all, it was not one man who ran amok, lost control and killed four soldiers while they were sleeping and seriously wounded others. It was an organised group of six or, rather, seven individuals who went into a terrorist operation in the barracks of Paracin in a planned manner. And they were convicted by the military court, by court-martial, and were given very serious sentences. They are already at liberty now, Mr. Nice, and all the mothers can do of the deceased is to go to visit the graves of their sons.

Now, as far as Mr. Stambolic is concerned, I really don't know about that, what he wrote. I just can't believe that Mr. Stambolic could have written that the army was speculating and manipulating with obvious bodies and people who had obviously been wounded there.

Q. We'll pass through the next period of your history which takes us through the first half of the 1990s, but can we -- no, not -- before we do, as you explained to us yesterday, in the early 1990s, your role was not in KOS but in -- I'm going to say civil defence. Have I got it right? Territorial defence?

A. Yes, that's right. First of all, I worked in civilian structures, which means I was secretary of the -- or provincial secretary for national defence.

MR. NICE: My mistake. I distributed the wrong document. Could we have that back, please. It's the next one in the bundle.

Q. If you would like to look at this document, please, Mr. Farkas. ⁴⁶³⁷⁶ It's a document of the 16th of November of 1991. It comes from the 1st Military District Command, signed by Lieutenant General Stojanovic, and based on a verbal request, it encloses a list of the units of the 1st Military District with strength and technical equipment and a list of the Socialist Republic of Serbia Territorial Defence units. And if Mr. Prendergast can take us, when he's distributed it all, to the table that looks like this. It's got page 11 at the bottom in the English, Mr. Prendergast, and in the original it -- In the original for you, Mr. Farkas, it is a table that's headed "Survey." Have you got a table described as "Survey"? With a reference to Baranja. Have you found that? It's page 8 of 9, I think, at the bottom right-hand corner.

Now, what this shows is the engagement of Territorial Defence units of the Republic of Serbia in the composition of the 1st Military District on the 15th of November of 1991. So this is within your term of office on this topic and something of which you should be aware; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And what we can see - we don't have to go through all of them - is that all these Territorial Defence units of the Republic of Serbia were working -- well, whereabouts? Where are these places on the right-hand side; Banjska Kosa, Kopacki Rit, Kamenac, and so on? Where are they?

A. Those places are in Baranja.

Q. Yes. Over in what was and is Croatia; correct?

A. Mr. Nice, at the time it was Yugoslavia.

Q. Yes. And we can see, if we look down, places that will be ⁴⁶³⁷⁷ familiar to the Court. Dalj, for example, or, further down, Lovac; places where crimes and serious crimes are said to have been committed. And then right at the foot of the page, Vukovar.

So these Territorial Defence units of Serbia were fighting in places where it is said crimes were committed up and until the end of November 1991; correct?

A. Well, looking at it time-wise, I don't know what period it was, exactly, whether those units were exactly in those locations where quite obviously crimes had been committed, so I can't say. But, yes, these units were organised and prepared and were within the composition of the army of Yugoslavia, and they were deployed later in combat.

Q. And who sent them there? What was the mechanism by which Serbian Territorial Defence units were sent to, for example, Lovac or Dalj or anything like that?

A. On the basis of the total national defence law and a decision by the federal secretary of national defence, who was in charge and had the authority to determine and organise the army and Territorial Defence.

MR. NICE: No, this is a new exhibit. May we have this produced, please, as an exhibit?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

JUDGE BONOMY: What is it?

MR. NICE: Sorry. It's a report. Sorry, I'll go back to it and read it out to you again.

It comes from the 1st Military District Command, and it responds to a verbal request and provides a list of the units of the military ⁴⁶³⁷⁸ district by numerical strength and personnel, together with a list of the Republic of Serbia Territorial Defence units. It's signed by the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Vladimir Stojanovic.

Q. So can you just explain from your understanding of the document, please, Mr. Farkas, what this document is if what I've read out isn't self-explanatory? What was this document?

A. This is an overview. It's a military document. And from this overview we see which units from the Territorial Defence were sent where with which numerical strength. I can't see the signature of Colonel General -- oh, yes. It is here.

Q. Incidentally, since I've been brought back to the document and happy just to ask one more question, where we see the presence of these Territorial Defence units functioning in places like Dalj or Lovac, would there exist somewhere reports back, written reports back of what they did over time on these deployments?

A. These units were assigned to regular units within the JNA, and quite naturally there were combat reports reflecting all the activities that took place in that territory over a certain time. I see now from this document that it is the first theatre of war, and it's practically the General Staff of the armed forces of Yugoslavia that sent this report.

Q. How easy should it be for the Office of the Prosecutor to get reports of the kind you say exist from these various territorial units if we wish to? Should they be readily available?

A. First of all, we don't have TO reports, and I can't provide them ⁴⁶³⁷⁹ because such reports did not come to the command of the Territorial Defence. If such reports do exist, then they could possibly be obtained from the archives of the army of Yugoslavia.

Q. Your last answer I thought was that written reports in fact would exist. You now say, "We don't have Territorial Defence reports." Well, surely the Territorial Defence units, like any other military unit, would provide records and reports of what they did, or are you saying something different about the Territorial Defence?

A. No, I'm not saying something different, but they were incorporated into the VJ and the Territorial Defence organisation and competencies ceased over those units when they were incorporated into the VJ. So all their combat reports and the combat engagement of these units was within the purview of the VJ at that time. The TO only conducted mobilisation, preparation, and training, after which they were incorporated into the regular units of the VJ.

MR. NICE: Well, Your Honours, I'm not sure, in light of the last answer, whether our request for assistance will have covered the reporting back of those units that we now know from this comparatively recently obtained document were functioning in places that feature in the Croatian indictment. We'll check. And if they aren't -- if they are covered, we'll either repeat the request or press by other means for production. Alternatively, we'll make fresh requests now that we know of the deployment of those forces.

Q. You changed jobs in 1995?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I had said it will be admitted. ⁴⁶³⁸⁰

MR. NICE: I'm sorry, yes. Thank you very much.

THE REGISTRAR: That will be 931.

MR. NICE:

Q. You changed jobs in 1995, but before 1995 the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres had come into being, hadn't they?

A. Yes. I think they came into being at that time, but I have no specific knowledge about them.

Q. When did -- well, what was your job again after 1995? Remind the Court.

A. In 1995, I was assistant federal minister of defence in charge of civilian defence.

Q. Did you never have occasion to deal with officers who were deployed in Bosnia or who expressed a desire to be deployed in Bosnia or who were compelled to be deployed in Bosnia?

A. No. At that time, as I said, I was assistant defence minister for civilian defence. I had no such information at the time, and in view of my position I was not able to deal with such problems.

Q. You say you have no specific knowledge of the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres. What knowledge do you have of them?

A. The little I know is that after the break-up of Yugoslavia, a great number of such personnel of the VJ, together with their families, came to the territory of Serbia. They had to be provided for in terms of social welfare and health insurance and assigned to health institutions that would cater to them. And those centres were organised in order to help accommodate those families whose husbands and fathers remained back ⁴⁶³⁸¹ in the territories of Yugoslavia that had seceded, in Bosnia and Croatia.

Q. And that's really your understanding of these two bodies, is it; entirely innocent in every particular?

A. I did not understand you.

Q. Nothing sinister, nothing that needed to be protected, nothing needed to be secret about either of these bodies.

A. Well, it couldn't be secret because women and children came to those institutions to receive assistance, receive salaries, medical books to be presented. I don't know what could possibly be secret about it. It had its location, and those families came to resolve their problems there.

Q. Can we have number 32, please. I want to deal with this problem, although in a sense I'm moving forward in time and picking up on your role as a member of the Commission for Cooperation.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was reluctant to interrupt because maybe it's not that important, but certain answers given by the general are missing from the transcript. When Mr. Nice asked him whether he was -- whether it was secret, the general answered, "What could be secret about it?" It says, "I did not understand you." There was another question by Mr. Nice mentioning Croatia, whereas Croatia isn't mentioned. It's in the transcript.

I would like you to notify the Registry of this, because I am hesitant to warn of -- about mistakes and errors in the transcripts, and I ⁴⁶³⁸² have been asking for two years for an electronic record, and I have a good reason to do that.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: When the witness said, "I did not understand you," he really said, "I did not understand you," and that's because he misheard the B/C/S interpreter. He didn't understand the word "innocent." He understood it to mean something completely different.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. There is also on the transcript coming from the witness the answer, "I don't know what could possibly be secret about it," Mr. Milosevic, but you may be right in relation to the other matters, subject to what the interpreter just said. But we take note of the concerns that you have expressed.

Croatia -- Judge Bonomy says that there is a reference to Croatia as well.

Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. Can we look at these documents which are collected together quite rapidly, and going through them page by page. The first page of this document dated the 20th of October, 2003, the Ministry of the Interior and to Deputy Minister Milic says: "Please find attached the report on the currency security situation," and it's signed by Goran Zivaljevic. And the next page says: "According to available information, the bringing of an indictment ... against Lukic ... has caused discontent amongst members of the Republic of Serbia MUP ..."

And then it goes on to deal with various other matters, and says: ^{46383 BLANK PAGE 46384} "... the possibility that reaction of the aforementioned police structure would be directed at disputing the clearly defined obligations of Serbia and Montenegro towards the International Criminal Court should not be excluded."

Then we have on the following page - just look at this - a two-page document from Vladimir Djeric, deputy minister of the interior of the Republic of Serbia, Nenad Milic: Further to consultations on the instigation of proceedings ... and deals with various matters. And then, over the page, he deals with matters of jurisdiction and other matters. I'm sorry. He provides a legal opinion. Perhaps we needn't trouble with that too much. But as part of the same documentation dated the 29th of October - this is a collection of documentation coming to the Prosecution - we have this: 29th of October, 2003, "To: National Council for the Cooperation of Serbia and Montenegro with The Hague Tribunal. Esteemed gentlemen."

Now, is this the form of address that would be used for the commission of which you were a member?

A. First of all, Mr. Nice, these documents were created on the 29th October, 2003. The previous one a little earlier. At that time, the commission was no longer in existence. It was disbanded, I think at your request as well, sometime in April 2003. So I never had any opportunity to familiarise myself with these documents, and I can't tell you anything about them. We simply no longer had any physical access to the premises. And these documents were created long, long after the entire commission terminated its work. I didn't read any of these documents. I didn't know ⁴⁶³⁸⁵ the mechanism used to address somebody, who to address, or whatever.

Q. To which body, if not to your body or its successor body, could it be properly addressed? It comes from lawyers and it goes to the National Council for the Cooperation of Serbia and Montenegro with The Hague Tribunal.

A. Well, after the adoption of the law on which the commission had insisted, this commission that was later disbanded had first raised the issue of urgent adoption of a law on cooperation with the ICTY. After the law was adopted, this National Council, this national commission, was established to deal with issues of cooperation. That's as far as I know.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel. Colonel, can you just clarify something for me. General, rather. You say that the commission was disbanded "at your request" sometime in April 2003. Whose request is that? At whose request was it disbanded?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think at the request and after an invention by Mr. Nice. That's what I heard. I'm not sure of it, however. I think it was after an intervention by Mr. Nice that Mr. Tadic did it practically overnight. After a night session in Montenegro of the council, he came back to Belgrade and it was already closed. We could no longer enter the premises.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. One more question arising from these documents, please. In the English, Mr. Prendergast, if you could take us to page 10.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson. ⁴⁶³⁸⁶

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I really don't know what these documents have to do with this witness. It makes no sense to abuse his time with these questions, just like the refrigerator truck. The question to him is to who it was addressed. It is said exactly who wrote it and who -- to whom it was addressed. It was provided by the Chief of General Staff. It has nothing to do with the witness. It's pure waste of time.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let us hear the questions and the answers, Mr. Milosevic, and then we'll make a determination.

MR. NICE:

Q. Page 10 of 14 in the English and page 7 in the B/C/S, Mr. Farkas, something headed "Conclusion."

Now, the Court will remember, or can be reminded, that the OTP was provided with a document relating to the 30th Personnel Centre -- the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It's in evidence, it's Exhibit 927, and the issues between the parties is -- include as to whether that is a full or entirely self-serving version of events.

Now this document, Mr. Farkas, says at the conclusion, number 6: "Submission of the documentation regarding the 30th Personnel Centre, following requests of the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, numbers 85 and 219."

And it goes on at the top of the next page, please. "The Ministry of Defence of Serbia and Montenegro has submitted to the National Council the two documents that were requested by means of the ⁴⁶³⁸⁷ ICTY motions for cooperation ...

"1. Information regarding the 30th Personnel Centre, without date and number." And Your Honours, that accords with Exhibit 927. And then if you look at the bottom of this page in English and if you, Mr. Farkas, go on to about three more paragraphs, it says this: "However, by the Decision of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the case of ... Milosevic ... on the 12th of June, the request of the Office of the Prosecutor was granted and Serbia and Montenegro was instructed to submit the information on the 30th Personnel Centre within two months, as well as the Order by the Chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff on Establishing the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres.

"The aforementioned documents are marked 'military secret' ..." And then this: "The Team of Experts has examined these documents with regard to the position of the SCG in lawsuits before the International Court of Justice and has assessed them as follows: "The Order on Establishing the 30th and 40th Personnel Centre contains a minimum information regarding military formation and in itself does not indicate the responsibilities of these Centres. It does not contain data which could harm the position of SCG in the lawsuit before the International Court of Justice.

"The information on the 30th Personnel Centre identifies the responsibilities very carefully and in general terms, at the same time advocating the political standpoints of the Yugoslav People's Army defence and its role in BiH. And it does not contain data that could harm the position of the SCG in the lawsuit before the International Court of ⁴⁶³⁸⁸ Justice.

"A certain number of exhibits that refer to the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres have so far been presented in the proceedings before the ICTY. The most important of them are the testimony of ... Lilic and the statement of protected witness ... The two documents treated in this assessment do not contain anything that has not already been presented in proceedings before the ICTY ..."

Now, looking back at that and seeing that this is a reflection of what the team of experts prepared and that you were on the commission, is it right that the material information provided to us - and it's now our Exhibit 927 - was purposefully as limited as possible in its explanation of what the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres did? Do you remember this?

A. Mr. Nice --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness, are you in a position to say whether the information was purposely -- purposefully as limited as possible in its explanation of what the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres did? Are you in a position to answer that question?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm simply not in a position. I have already said that I wasn't part of the expert team. I worked on the commission. This is expert team material, and I didn't even manage to find the right passages, Mr. Nice spoke so fast. However, this document was created on the 29th of October, 2003, and I didn't participate in the development of any documents as part of the expert team, and I don't know anything about them.

MR. NICE: ⁴⁶³⁸⁹

Q. One last question on this, Mr. Farkas. The expert team that you described yesterday and that has played a role in the presentation of material, either direct to the Office of the Prosecutor or via witnesses who have responded to invitations to cooperate with the commission, that expert team's material is not before us. Can you tell us how we can find and get our hands on what the expert team did?

A. That's another thing I said yesterday. The expert team, first of all, did not complete its work due to an intervention that terminated their work. And they did not deal with issues in the way you described. They analysed and studied combat activities, combat actions. So they had a complex approach to past combat activities. And this suggestion that they worked exclusively in the direction that you describe is not appropriate, is not correct.

That's all I can say about the work of the expert team in which I did not participate for a single hour.

MR. NICE: Well, Your Honours, we will do our best to find what we can from the expert team, given the way it turns up. Yes. And, Your Honours, as to any suggestion that the Prosecution had any involvement in Minister Tadic's decision to abolish this commission, there is no acknowledgement of that. That, I understand, is what is being suggested. There is no acceptance that there is any truth in that at all, of course.

Q. We move on in time then from the time when the 30th and 40th Personnel Centres came into being. You changed jobs. Just as a matter of history, because it relates to what happens to you, in my suggestion, it's right, isn't it, and do you recall this, that at Dayton it was the accused ⁴⁶³⁹⁰ - if you know this, and if you don't, say so - it was the accused who kept Kosovo off the agenda. Kosovo was kept away from international resolution at the time of Dayton. Do you know that?

A. I don't know that.

Q. Very well. I'm going to deal with a topic in 1998 a little later, but -- a particular topic, but just dealing with your appointment: In 1998, we find the departure of his -- well, from -- from the group around this accused, we find the departure of Perisic and of Stanisic. Are you aware, respectively, that Perisic went, inter alia, amongst other reasons, because of his determination that the process of dealing with Kosovo should be dealt with -- should be a lawful one, with the imposition of a state of emergency? Are you aware of that as one of the reasons why Perisic went?

A. I didn't know for what reasons he left. I was working outside of the army at that time, on the civilian defence, and I have no knowledge of the reasons for those decisions.

Q. Stanisic went as well. What was the reason for his going?

A. I don't know.

Q. Was it because he, along with others, were minded to have the Kosovo problem dealt with by internationals and not anxious for it to be dealt with just internally by Serbia?

A. Mr. Nice, I don't know. At that time, I was intensively involved in preparing the defence plan, and I only heard of such personnel changes in the General Staff. Of course I heard that they took place, but as to the reasons behind the changes in the top echelons of the army and the ⁴⁶³⁹¹ state authorities, I don't know.

At our meetings with the federal defence minister, we discussed completely different issues. I don't know about those issues.

Q. Well, let's come to your --

A. I just know that these people left.

Q. Let's come to your own appointment. Is it right that you'd been a school friend of Ojdanic?

A. Yes. Yes, that is right.

Q. Is it right that you were a supporter of JUL, the political party of the accused's wife, Mrs. Milosevic?

A. Well, that's not correct. I did not play any kind of role by way of supporting anyone in that party or that party. After the break-up of Yugoslavia, after Yugoslavia fell apart, I no longer belonged to any party. Previously I had been a member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, but after that, I did not belong to a single party.

Q. You told us yesterday first of a meeting that you say preceded your appointment, about a month before your appointment, but the precise circumstances of your appointment perhaps haven't emerged. Dimitrijevic was a very experienced, very senior KOS officer, and he was removed from office just before the conflict with NATO began, wasn't he?

A. I know Mr. Dimitrijevic. For awhile he was my subordinate in the security service. I have a high regard for him and his intellectual capacities and experience in the security service. I don't know when I attended a meeting in the president's office. The president said to me in response to my question, "Where is Aco Dimitrijevic going to go?" He said ^{46392 BLANK PAGE 46393} to me that he would be assistant federal minister of defence, to bring together the entire subject matter of security at the level of all of Yugoslavia. And that's what happened, because during the first days of the war I reported to him and to the federal minister. He had a role there and, in a shelter, I, as chief of security of the military, reported to the federal ministry in the presence of Aco Dimitrijevic.

Q. He was effectively sidelined. And was the reason that he was sidelined because he'd published an article proposing international resolution of the Kosovo problem and that this wasn't palatable to the accused?

A. I'm not aware of that article. I haven't read the article. Where was it published?

Q. In Vojska, a military magazine, I think.

A. I don't know.

Q. And then finally -- I see the time; the Court may be looking for a time to break -- but finally, the position is this, and I must suggest to you, you were appointed by this accused because he knew you would do anything he wanted. You would always be his yes-man. And you were appointed notwithstanding the fact that you didn't have great recent KOS experience, and because of that, the strong and sober Vasiljevic who had once been your superior was brought in as your deputy, you being there to do what was wanted and to be the head of the department. Is that about right?

A. That's not right, Mr. Nice. That's not right at all. First of all, I'm not that kind of person that could be called a yes-man. The ⁴⁶³⁹⁴ security service does its work honestly. That's the way we've been trained, educated. These questions of yours are simply wrong, and your assertions are wrong. And we weren't talking about Aco Vasiljevic, we were talking about Aco Dimitrijevic. Perhaps I misunderstood what you were saying.

Q. Just to remind the Judges, Vasiljevic had, many years before, been your superior. He then lost office, went to prison, and was asked to come back as your deputy in 1999. When you took office in 1999, you took over from Dimitrijevic. Isn't that correct?

A. Yes, Dimitrijevic.

MR. KAY: Just one matter. Can we have an answer to the proposition that was put whether he was effectively sidelined, which was the purpose of a question about five questions ago from the Prosecutor, because otherwise, we just get comment rather than questions.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Who was sidelined?

MR. NICE: Dimitrijevic was sidelined by his movement to a ministerial position.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness?

JUDGE BONOMY: I thought it had been answered, Mr. Kay, and Mr. Nice proceeded, regardless, to reiterate the proposition.

MR. KAY: Shall we sort it out?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness, what is your answer to that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, that was not my impression, that he had been sidelined. He was appointed assistant minister of defence to bring together the entire subject matter of security throughout ⁴⁶³⁹⁵ Yugoslavia. So that position was more complex than the one I held, that is to say being chief of security of the army of Yugoslavia. That is broader than the position I held. So I really don't see that he had been sidelined.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Just one more matter before we break. Was Vasiljevic your superior at some time?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] During a short period of time, very short period of time. Precisely at the moment when I left the service. That is in the 1990s. Perhaps it was 1989, for a few months. That's when I headed the security of the first theatre of war, and he was chief of the security administration.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, are you finished with your cross-examination? We're going to take a break now.

MR. NICE: Not finished with it, but I've finished with this topic.

JUDGE ROBINSON: This topic. We'll break for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.06 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.28 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, please continue.

MR. NICE: Your Honours, I should inform you that as soon as we became aware of the existence of the expert committee or commission or whatever it is associated with or part of the VJ commission, we made a request for all its reports. Nothing has been provided.

Q. Mr. Farkas, in 1998, of course you hadn't assumed your --

JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry. Before you move on, my understanding of ⁴⁶³⁹⁶ this is certainly clearer, having heard this witness, that there are two separate bodies. There is a commission which -- and he's described its purpose, and there's also a committee of experts, and it may be that the rather loose language that's been used in any attempt to get information won't have assisted. It may have been that your knowledge wasn't sufficient before to be specific enough, I don't know. But have you not learned more from his evidence than you knew before?

MR. NICE: We've heard more and if I have time I'll take you through more of the VJ commission documents that we've got, because -- and of course it's always possible, if undesirable, that the government would take a technical point when knowing perfectly well what we wanted and give us a refusal, but we'll do our best because I can see that -- it seems to me it's important.

Q. Going back to 1998, Mr. Farkas, of course you hadn't taken on your KOS job but nevertheless you knew what was going on in Kosovo, and you knew something about prosecutions, I suggest. Was, to your knowledge, any VJ officer investigated or prosecuted for excessive use of force in dealing with people described as terrorists in 1998?

A. In that year, 1998, I was not in a position to follow the situation in the army because I was in the Ministry of Defence. So at that time there were still military courts that existed, and they went through regular channels, through these military courts. So I don't know whether proceedings were initiated or not. I did not have information to that effect.

Q. For example, we've had evidence from Lord Ashdown of tanks firing ⁴⁶³⁹⁷ at civilian properties. We've had evidence from witnesses, K32, about General Delic, as he now is, clearing civilians from their houses with no justification.

Now, matters like that, if they happened in 1998 - it will be for the Court to decide - to your knowledge there were no trials for those sorts of activities, were there? You don't know of any.

A. Whether tanks were used to expel the Albanian inhabitants in the area is something that I don't know. Perhaps the person who could see all of that should testify about that. I don't know about trials. I told you that I was very seriously involved --

Q. And I'm going to suggest to you that one of the reasons was that -- that there was no trials is something that is known to you, and that is that by 1998 there was already a determination to use whatever force on behalf of the Serbs in Kosovo was possible. And the reason you know about it is because you were engaged in arming the non-military Serbs in Kosovo. Do you accept that you were engaged in arming the non-military Serbs in Kosovo?

A. I do not accept that. I did not take part in any arming. Just a moment, please. According to the establishment and according to the document that you saw here, all these units that were established within the Ministry of Defence were entitled to a certain quantity of weapons. This was the way it was prescribed in conventions too. So that is the only kind that took place. As far as I know, it was the end of 1998, and weapons went to military warehouses.

So I was not involved in any special arming of Serbs. I realised ⁴⁶³⁹⁸ part of the defence plan.

Q. Two documents, first existing 391, tab 21, for you and for the overhead projector, at least, and for the accused. You've spoken of arming of units. This is a document, as we shall see when it's on the overhead projector, "Ministry of Defence, Federal Ministry of Defence, area organ of the Republic of Serbia, Pristina Defence Administration," and it's dated the 21st of May, of 1998. It goes to departments and sections for defence. And under the order, if you'd be good enough, Mr. Prendergast, it says this: "Chiefs of departments and heads of sections shall immediately establish contacts with municipal leaders and ensure that lists are compiled for the purpose of arming of the population -" not arming of units, arming of the population - "which will be carried out by the Federal Ministry of Defence through its organisational units throughout the territory. Take care to ensure that those whose wartime duty station is in units of the VJ units -" over the page - "are not included in the list of the issue of weapons since they will be issued them in their wartime units ..."

If, just to save time, we go over a couple of paragraphs to number 4: "Carry out the above activities in a short period of time and in strict discretion. Reveal the contents of this Order only to those participating directly in activities on the execution of this task." And perhaps the second half of paragraph 5, Mr. Prendergast: "In carrying out this task, direct the bulk of activities towards the protection of the population of settlements in which Serbs and Montenegrins are populations in a minority and are increasingly becoming ⁴⁶³⁹⁹ targets of attacks by Albanian terrorists."

So that's, as it were, to give some justification, but the reality is that what was happening is that Serb civilians were being armed by the Ministry of Defence in secret. Is that right?

A. That's not right. Serb civilians were not being secretly armed. I've already said that arming was taking place in accordance with the establishment, according to the decision of the Federal Ministry of Defence based on the law on national defence establishing units of civil defence. These also had six categories, depending on the situation on the territory involved, depending on which population was more massive. So on this basis, there is a certain establishment and then a certain quantity of weapons is provided to the military warehouses in the area.

It's a very poor photocopy, so I could not follow everything that you enumerated, so could you please be so kind as to tell me where this is stated explicitly where only Serbs are being armed? Could you please tell me that?

Q. Tell me, it's by all means --

A. Discretely, at that, as you said.

Q. There's the passage that you can find at paragraph 4 which refers to discretion, and then if you go to the second half of paragraph 5, which I hope is legible -- it's the second paragraph so it picks up on the top of the second page, I think, and it's the -- it's the paragraph or subparagraph that says, "In carrying out this task .." Have you found that, that part of the paragraph? "In carrying out this task, direct the ⁴⁶⁴⁰⁰ bulk of activities towards the population of settlements in which the Serbs and Montenegrins are populations in a minority ..."

A. Yes.

Q. Pretty clear. This was arming of Serbs. Wasn't it?

A. Yes. Well, that's what's written there. This order or, rather, this document is from the regional organ for Pristina, signed by Petar Ilic. All of this has to be looked at in context. Outside the establishment units, no weapons could be obtained, those that were defined by the order of the minister of defence. So in these villages we had those problems, namely that the Albanians were armed, and they did not respond to any calls of the civilian defence or the army, whereas these people were being attacked non-stop. And that part of the civilian population that responded to the calls, the regular calls, they were armed.

Q. Here, Mr. Farkas, before we turn to the next document, that you now are accepting that Serb civilians were armed. Am I right?

A. They were within the establishment units of the civilian defence. The civilian defence units. And according to establishment, that was envisaged. Those who responded to these calls, according to that establishment, received weapons.

Q. And to come back to my earlier point when I asked you questions about crimes committed by, for example, Delic, if you arm a local population and that local population commits offences -- not commits offences, commits crimes, kills people with its arms, it's very difficult then, isn't it, to charge them with criminal offences? ^{46401 BLANK PAGE 46402} Can you point us -- and that's a suggestion to you. It's very difficult to charge them if you've armed them. Do you accept that?

A. I don't know what crimes were committed by Delic, if I understood you correctly. As far as I know, Delic is a general of the army of Yugoslavia. I'm not aware of any crimes that he had committed. However, I claim to you that there were formations, units consisting of a definite number of people and then these people who responded according to that establishment, received weapons, and they were in the system. That is to say they were subjected to all sanctions as the case is, in the MUP and the military for any crimes that may be committed.

MR. NICE: Just one minute, Your Honour.

[Prosecution confer]

MR. NICE: The Court will have noted the fact that I -- the Court, and indeed the witness, will have noted the passage I have read summarised the groups that weren't to be armed because they already had arms coming to them another way.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, the transcript says that the exhibit number of this document is 391, tab 21. Is it not 319?

MR. NICE: Just give me one minute.

JUDGE KWON: Out of Mr. Coo's binder.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it is.

JUDGE KWON: It should be 319, tab 21.

MR. NICE: Tab 319, tab 21, is what I have written down and I should have read out. If I didn't, it's my mistake.

Q. Now, on the same topic, Mr. Farkas, will you look at another ⁴⁶⁴⁰³ document, also an existing exhibit. It's tab 248, and this picks the story up a little later in 1998 and was the subject of evidence by Shukri Aliu, and it deals with the position of civil protection units, of which you have spoken. Before we look at the documents, would you accept that the civil protection units were themselves armed? Do you accept that?

A. The units of the civil defence were not fully armed. Only in those areas where they had been mobilised. That is to say that not all units in all parts of Yugoslavia were armed. What is said here is what applied to all of Yugoslavia. So this document pertains only to those areas, those municipalities where people had been mobilised.

Q. Well, let's look --

A. And that is elderly people for the most part.

Q. This comes from Pristina and it goes to you personally, if we can see that on the screen. A little bit -- not looking at the right part of it, I think. Next page. There we are. Top of the page. It comes from the Pristina area organ of the Republic of Serbia defence administration. It goes to you personally, and it says: "In connection with the requests from your telex -" number given - "of October 1998, we would like to inform you of the following:

"In our communication -" as identified - "we requested the command of the 3rd Army to secure for us arms and ammunition for all the units that are being formed and developed by the departments and sections on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija." And then it says, "As follows," and it gives some figures.

So all the units that are being formed and developed by the ⁴⁶⁴⁰⁴ departments are to be armed. Yes?

A. Yes, that's what's written here.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... end of the document and the send page in the English and the same page for you. The last paragraph is: "We would point out that further activities regarding the taking out, distribution, and individual issue of weapons will depend exclusively on your orders should the mobilisation plans that have been drawn up and verified by the Defence Department ... be activated." So you were the person who was going to activate -- you were going to arm these people and activate the process of their arming in due course or then. What was the position? What did you do?

A. First of all, the process of activation could only have gone through me. The decision on mobilisation of certain structures is passed by the federal government. So according to the decision of the federal government on the activation of certain bodies of the civil defence, these weapons could have been distributed through me, through my orders further on to these people.

Secondly, what it says here individually, you see here in this second paragraph, this longer paragraph where all the figures are referred to, those are the units of the civil defence, the military conscripts, the communication signals corps, and also the monitoring and recording. These are regular units of the Ministry of Defence that are throughout the territory. So most weapons went to them, envisaged by the establishment, clearly defined. These are signals units that develop communication throughout the territory. They ensure communications so that civilian ⁴⁶⁴⁰⁵ structures could also issue their commands, and they had to be armed like members of the civilian defence, and also that part that had been mobilised.

This had individually been distributed because as they performed their functions in offices or elsewhere they were subjected to attacks. Also, members of the Ministry of the Interior were supposed to be given weapons and they were to keep these weapons in safe boxes.

Q. Focusing as I am through your evidence on the Civil Protection Units for that's where your interests lay at this time, Mr. Aliu was asked specifically whether all such units were armed and he said they were. He was also asked whether that was for all ethnic groups or not, and he explained that no Albanians received weapons under this project or plan. Indeed, they'd been disarmed and that they were at risk of heavy penalty if they had arms. So that what we see here, under your own orders, was a scheme to arm Serbs and not Albanians. That's the evidence. Do you accept it?

A. Mr. Ali Shukrija, he was an employee or, rather, worked in the structural defence of Pristina, and four or five days before the aggression, he deserted from his unit. He was the last Albanian to leave the structures of defence. He deserted or, rather, he asked for furlough, for leave. He went on leave and never returned. So that he, being in charge of civilian defence or protection and within that civilian protection for evacuation matters, he deserted. And the deputy federal minister at some point in time dismissed him formally from --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... please. ⁴⁶⁴⁰⁶

A. So at that time --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... right that it was only the Serbs who were armed? That's his evidence.

A. That's his evidence. We -- I had previously ordered that all members who were in the offices and working in the field be distributed weapons. I was not able to or nobody was able to provide him with weapons because he fled. He left. He deserted. And also similarly, the Kosovo Albanians did not respond to the call-up, so the weapons could not have been distributed to them. Those who did respond were given weapons, were issued weapons. I don't know whether this was because of pressure or -- by the KLA on them, but they didn't dare or didn't wish to respond to our calls for weapons distribution. So the weapons were distributed to those who did respond and came in.

Q. Are you able to provide a list or point us to a list of -- of Albanian recipients of arms under this order of yours to show that Shukri Aliu's evidence may be incorrect? Can you point us to such a list or to such evidence?

A. Ali Shukrija could not have seen this because I said he wasn't there. Who knows where he was at the time. Because already then he was probably among the ranks of the KLA. But, no, I don't have a list of that kind. I don't have it with me. Probably it does exist somewhere in the field, because there are lists of mobilised units with all the names and surnames and the equipment issued.

Q. Now, the next of two other points on this topic can be dealt with quickly. The Court was happy to admit collectively, I think, exhibits 6 ⁴⁶⁴⁰⁷ to 11, the various appointments of people to position of commanders of the civil protection staff; Popovic, Besovic, Furjanovic, Nikolic. All of those people appointed to these positions are Serbs, aren't they? Andjelkovic, Ilic, Odalovic, Tasic. That's about it. They're all Serbs.

A. Yes, they are, except two. Lower down in the municipalities, there were Albanians there as well. I think two or three of them, in fact.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. In some of the municipalities.

Q. Show us the names, please.

A. There are no names here. I said municipalities. There are no appointments to municipalities included on this document.

Q. Now, the last point, we can find the exhibit if necessary, but the Chamber's very familiar with it: There's an order that's been relied upon by the accused through General Delic and other witnesses of the 23rd of March, Exhibit 356, and in that order the instruction is given for the Pristina Corps to operate with the armed non-Siptar population, and there may be other orders to the like effect.

By March of 1999, you're in your position where you have to know all about what's happening in the military. Were you aware that orders were being given to incorporate in the fighting the armed non-Siptar population?

And I'll just read out the terms of this particular order. The assignment is "... with reinforcements and armed non-Siptar population from Kosovo and Metohija the Pristina Corps is assisting the MUP in ⁴⁶⁴⁰⁸ crushing and destroying the SDS in their own zone of responsibility." That's terminology of the order. Were you aware of such orders being given?

A. Well, I don't know. There are three things here; the army, the MUP, and some armed civilians. And now you claim that, but I don't know about that document.

Q. Very well. We'll find it for you and show it to you in due course. Are you saying in your position as the person who has overall knowledge of military activities in Kosovo, and visited Kosovo, that you weren't aware that the army was incorporating within its ranks the armed non-Siptar population despite the fact that you, in your Ministry of Defence role, had been engaged in the arming process?

A. As you can see, the act by which I secured weapons and had them distributed dates back to the end of 1998. So that in that situation, well, I don't know. Pursuant to the law on defence, in the zone of combat operations of certain units, all armed components come under the command of different levels of command within the army; battalions, brigades. Mostly brigades. So that if some did exist, they had either been mobilised as a reserve MUP force or they were mobilised as the reserve force of the army.

Q. We'll show you the document if you don't accept -- I don't know if we can find it immediately. If that's really your -- it's 300, tab ... If you'd like to put the appropriate bits on the overhead projector. Paragraph 2, Mr. Prendergast, but I'm not sure what page it's on. Page 2, I think. ⁴⁶⁴⁰⁹ You see the context of this order. Expectation of the STS putting up fierce resistance, then the passage I've read out to you, and then the task.

A. Could you please indicate which paragraph --

Q. Certainly. Paragraph 2 in the original, and it's headed "Pristina Corps Assignment." It's a very short paragraph. The first one. You understand, Mr. Farkas, this is a document produced by the Defence.

A. Well, I don't understand. I don't see reference to civilians here.

Q. The way it's -- the way it reads in translation is, "With reinforcements and armed non-Siptar population from Kosovo and Metohija." That's how it reads in translation.

A. Well, then, we don't have the same translation. Here I have this document and paragraph 2, it says, "The assignment of the Pristina Corps." In the preamble, yes. Yes. That's what it says.

Q. So?

A. Yes, that's right. It is a document. This document is one I'm not aware of. I see this document for the first time. I see that it is dated the 23rd of March, early spring. I don't know about this document, and this is the first time that I see it. I'm not aware of it.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... the following day, don't you?

JUDGE ROBINSON: We missed the first part of the question, Mr. Nice. ^{46410 BLANK PAGE 46411}

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

MR. NICE: He took up his duties the following day and becomes the person through whom all information is passed.

Q. This very operation, the subject then of this order, lasted for some five days right at the beginning of your term of duty. Evidence about this, Mr. Farkas, includes witnesses saying they saw included in the military force people whose faces they recognised or who they recognised as local Serb villagers. Are you prepared to accept that this order did take effect with the use of armed non-Siptar civilians?

A. Since the order was issued, it probably and certainly came into force. However, this is the period when there was intensive mobilisation going on and replenishment, reinforcement of units. So the persons that you referred to could only have been mobilised. Otherwise, they wouldn't have been able to be part of the army and within the composition of the units. So before they join up with the unit they are civilians, but they are military recruits, conscripts, and they come pursuant to a call for mobilisation. They put on their uniforms and then become members of the army of Yugoslavia. So that these individuals that the witnesses recognise were probably recognised because they had been civilians before that. They were mobilised and joined the army. I don't know what kind of proof or evidence you consider this to be.

Q. It says nothing about them being mobilised. Just have the order to go on and the evidence from witnesses.

Let me ask you a question that will appear to be disconnected but I'll bring it back to this immediate topic. Do you remember yesterday how ⁴⁶⁴¹² you explained to the Court that there was no order to cleanse the area, no order to expel Albanians and that for there to be such an order there would have to be written orders, instructions passing through a chain of command. Do you remember that part of your evidence?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. As a general and an educated man, I must suggest to you that you must be aware that in fact the serious crimes of ethnic cleansing or genocide can all too easily be accomplished by much more general directions given by knowing leaders who rely on, amongst other things, local enmities and hatreds to put their plan into effect, and that that's one of the reasons that it is obviously dangerous to incorporate armed locals in otherwise formal military units? Are you aware of that as a general proposition?

A. First of all, my statement yesterday referred to or, rather, I explained what cleaning meant, cleansing meant, and the operation conducted by the army together with the MUP. It was cleansing or, rather, the struggle against -- or mopping up and the struggle against terrorists, that "ciscenje." So that's what my statement referred to. And the second part of my statement related to the fact that through the chain of command and responsibility, without orders no acts like this could be carried out. That is to say that in the sense of your interpretation of the word "ciscenje," the killing of the population and so on.

So the army exclusively led an operation or, rather, entered into combat against Siptar terrorists when they were being attacked by those ⁴⁶⁴¹³ terrorists. They responded to the attack. Had -- they passed through the territory probably to ensure communication and supplies coming in. And I said that up until the second half of that year we had 50 per cent of the territory of Kosovo cut off from the rest, which means occupied or taken over, taken control of by the Siptar terrorists, precisely as is happening in recent days. The representatives or forces of the UN who are there are unable to move around Kosovo now.

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... senior military figure I'm going to ask it once more in a slightly different way. Do you not accept as a senior military figure incorporating armed local civilians is dangerous because they may serve their own as well as military objectives in the way they perform once armed and in communities they know? Do you not accept that that's a danger?

A. They have had to be under the system of command, which means they had to have a uniform, they had to be deployed in the units, regardless of whether they were locals and what part they were from. So they were mobilised from that area and became members of those compositions, those units. I don't know the substance and essence of this order judging by the preamble, but you couldn't have civilians lined up with the army, whether they were armed or not armed. I'm quite sure that no witness will bear that out and say that they saw civilians as army members, within the composition of the army and its units. If they were included, as it says here, then they were armed and were dressed in uniforms and were under somebody's command. And that is the only way that I can interpret what I'm seeing here for the first time. ⁴⁶⁴¹⁴

Q. Now, then, let's go on. You told us --

MR. NICE: Incidentally, Your Honours, there are other similar orders before you with the use of the non-Siptar population. There's one on the 15th of April. I haven't got the number of it yet.

Q. You take up your position on the 24th of March, but you told us -- yes, 24th of March, but you told us barely a month before the aggression started this accused called you and told you of his intention to appoint you as head of security administration. While I don't challenge that meetings between you and he may have occurred privately as he was in the process of edging Dimitrijevic out, but I want to ask you about the detail of this conversation. I come back to the question I asked yesterday: Is there any note available to you of what passed in that conversation?

A. Mr. Nice, first of all, Mr. Milosevic didn't call me privately. His call went through the cabinet, the offices of the Federal Defence Ministry, and the Federal Defence Ministry called me and said that I was to report to the president. This was not a private meeting of any kind. I went to see the president, and when I arrived, there was nobody there to keep the minutes. I was supposed to go to the Supreme Commander or president of the state and keep notes? I didn't know why I was going there in the first place. I didn't know why I was being convened. I did not keep any notes, and I don't know whether that conversation was recorded in any way or taped in any way, and there was nobody else present.

So I said the -- what I said about Aco Dimitrijevic and the answer I was given. ⁴⁶⁴¹⁵

Q. What did you say about Aco Dimitrijevic in the meeting?

A. No. I didn't tell Aco Dimitrijevic anything because he wasn't there. What I said was this: I said what I stated in connection with my question to the president, What will happen to or with Aco Dimitrijevic? That's what that was about.

Q. To take up this position offered you by the accused, you would be directly answering to him or subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff, Ojdanic?

A. Directly subordinate to General Ojdanic.

Q. So is it not rather curious, do you think, to have that intervening level of management or control missing from this meeting, directly interviewed by and spoken to by this accused without Ojdanic present to hear what you should say? Doesn't that strike you as a little odd?

A. No, it didn't strike me as a little odd. I was the deputy federal minister, the president summoned me, and I thought it was a final completion of the defence plan that we were to discuss. And after that meeting, immediately afterwards, I went to see the minister. I reported to him and told him what we had discussed, and the minister told me that I should urgently speed up the final preparations for the defence of the country with all the plans. And after that reporting I went to report to Ojdanic, and Ojdanic told me that he knew about -- or, rather, that the proposal about that -- that the proposal was one he was aware of. So he probably discussed it somewhere or they probably talked on some occasion. And it's not strange for the president of the republic to summon a general ⁴⁶⁴¹⁶ to a meeting.

Q. See, I don't challenge that things will have been said and even written in meetings about the proper behaviour of the army in times of conflict. I may have time to ask you some questions about that later, maybe not, but here you told this Court that the accused told you on this occasion, one month before any bombs fell, or about one month before any bombs fell, that the army -- the security service was to do its utmost to use its competence not to, it reads "deface," the army and soldiers. It must use its line of command and its presence in all those units to prevent any possible crimes from being committed, and that a soldier's face must be saved. So that you told us that the accused was focusing a month before he was attacked on the fact that his soldiers wouldn't do bad things.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter --

MR. NICE: I'm so sorry.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note that where it was "defaced," she meant to say "lose face."

MR. NICE: Thank you. Very grateful.

Q. Now, a month before any bombs fall, according to you, he's focusing on the fact that his soldiers might do bad things. Is that true, or have you just made it up?

A. I didn't make it up. It's quite normal and natural that during mass mobilisation and a possible attack, et cetera, that certain things happen which are unwarranted in the army, and we're witness that this kind of thing happened in other parts of Yugoslavia. So this was a preventive ⁴⁶⁴¹⁷ measure and caution to undertake everything possible to avoid anything untoward happening. On the other hand, it was less than a month, but as I later learnt when I took up my appointment, there were very strong intelligence preparations and campaigns, media campaigns for a possible bombing, so that that is nothing strange, it's nothing unusual that things like that were discussed and that certain problems were pinpointed that could possibly happen and to try and prevent them, along those lines.

Q. This kind of thing happening in other parts of Yugoslavia. Where, when, and what?

A. During the combat operations we saw things like that happening. So the seceded republics. First of all, it started with Slovenia where, at the border with Slovenia, the Slovenians killed several soldiers, and that's where it started. And they were unarmed soldiers, at that.

Q. Yes. Well, that's, in a sense, rather a long time ago and it's another group of people who can be blamed because they were Slovenians. I don't think that's what you were really implying when you said there'd been problems. You may not have intended to let that slip out, but you did, so I'd now like a little bit more detail.

You said certain things happened which were unwarranted in the army and we're witness that this kind of thing happened in other parts - plural - in Yugoslavia. Just tell us, please, what you're talking about.

A. I didn't say that we were eyewitnesses and conscious of it, but we knew that things like that happen. We knew on the basis of the press, through articles coming in, refugees expelled from the territory of Croatia, 300.000 people who arrived. So that kind of thing. And all the ⁴⁶⁴¹⁸ events in Bosnia. That was known. The newspapers wrote about it. From -- at one point from Bosnia we had a very large number of Bosnian refugees, which means -- and these refugees were accepted and taken in in Serbia. And then the newspapers wrote about events like that and this was common knowledge by reading the press.

Q. You took a declaration to tell the whole truth and you seem still somehow to have overlooked the possibility that any Serb soldiers did bad things. I'll give you a third chance.

What were you referring to when you said you had experience of these things happening, by reference to Serbs doing bad things? Tell us, please.

A. What I meant was -- or what I said was what I had read about in the papers, that during those combat operations crimes happened as well. So on both sides. That means that crimes like that were committed by Croats and Serbs on the territory where those combat operations took place.

Q. Dubrovnik, Srebrenica; is that what you have in mind?

A. I had in mind other areas that you're not referring to. I meant the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Q. Tell us about the defence plan. We've been trying to get it for two years but nobody's provided it to us. What did the defence plan say for the civilians in Kosovo? What was to happen to them?

A. What do you mean what was to happen to them? What could happen to civilians?

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... the final version of a ^{46419 BLANK PAGE 46420} defence plan forecasting a conflict in a few weeks' time, as indeed it happened, where the international community would be coming down on you with bombs, as it did, or NATO did. What was the plan? Break it into two parts, if you like: What did you plan to do with the KLA? What did you plan to do with the non-KLA? Tell us.

A. Mr. Nice, first of all, you do not distinguish between the defence plan of the country from the plan of use of the army. The National Defence Plan contains a number of elements that have nothing to do with combat activities or armed combat by the army of Yugoslavia, except in the part whereby the civilian defence and civilian protection were to be armed according to Geneva Conventions.

So the National Defence Plan implies, first of all, mobilisation of civilian structures, the wartime mobilisation of the Assembly government and all the other institutions, removal into shelters of all material goods, safeguarding of the national bank and the treasury, conversion of the economy to wartime production, and safeguarding economic resources from possible damage. So the National Defence Plan has all these elements and some others, but it does not envisage combat except on the part of armed forces, such as the JNA.

For instance, if you want me to explain the part that deals with the conversion of the economy to wartime production, I can explain.

Q. You told us what you were presenting to the accused on this surprise meeting a month before hostilities began. It had to do with the final details of the plan. Did that plan have nothing whatsoever to do with how to react to NATO if they started to bomb? Because that's what ⁴⁶⁴²¹ we're interested in. You do understand that, don't you?

A. Well, that plan is the Civilian Defence Plan, and it is the role of the civilian defence, civilian protection to protect the civilian population from natural disasters in emergency situations, but also from wartime activities. That plan envisaged the sheltering of populations into proper shelters or other places that were safe from bombing.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I must stop you. We'll take the break now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 11.23 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.45 a.m.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Before I return to the questioning, the issue about the nature of the expert committee, I think I can deal with, if I find time. It's in tab 10 of the overall bundle of VJ commission documents but only some of them was -- were produced, but I'll try to find time to deal with it with this witness.

Q. Your last answer, Mr. Farkas, was to the effect that the plan envisaged the sheltering of populations or other places that were safe from bombing so -- and very shortly - just yes or no if you can - does that plan deal specifically with what should happen to the Kosovo population? If yes, does it break down how it should deal with the alleged terrorist part of the population and the non-terrorist part of it?

A. The plan does not make any distinctions either in terms of religion or ethnicity. It is defined in terms of the population, not religion or ethnicity, and it was not distinguishing between Kosovo and ⁴⁶⁴²² Vojvodina or central Serbia; it applied to the entire territory.

MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, we remain, of course, interested to see any document of the kind of the plan we've been seeking that covers the preparations for the NATO bombing.

While that document is on the overhead projector, could Mr. Prendergast perhaps take us to the top of the front page?

Q. And in light of your last answers, Mr. Farkas, about the protection of the civilians in time of war, do you accept, as a military man, that the military can only function properly in war under civilian control?

A. The military do not decide about war and peace. It is the politicians that decide on that. The state of war was introduced according to the decision of the Assembly, that is the federal government.

Q. Very well. Likewise, a police, whether militarised, as the police was here, or otherwise, cannot in time of war without being responsive to civilian leadership; correct?

A. Leaders of the MUP or, rather, the minister of the interior is a member of the cabinet. So he is a member of the government of the Republic of Serbia. The government makes its decisions jointly, and the minister of interior acts accordingly.

Q. But that's rather different from the military, then, is it? One responds directly to the government, and the military responds where?

A. The army is answerable to the federal government. It is a federal institution, and until that moment, the beginning of the war --

Q. What we'd like your help with is this: Look at the top of this ⁴⁶⁴²³ document. You'll see something called the Joint Command, and the order comes from the Joint Command.

And if Mr. Prendergast would take us, just to remind us, to what's at the end of the document.

And if you go to the end of the document, it simply is signed "Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija." So you were there, you were in the army. What was the Joint Command, please?

A. That term "The Joint Command" is something I first heard in the second half of June 1998. And in my understanding at that time, in view of my position then, it was a body for coordination and cooperation among various agencies on the ground, specifically on the territory of Kosovo. Thus, it was a body for coordination.

Q. Well, if it was a body for coordination, despite the fact that this is an order that it gave, who was giving the orders? Which is the political body giving instructions to the army? That's what we're trying to find out here.

A. Well, there was no special political body for that. The leadership of the state was entering a war, and the state is led by the head of state who is at that same time the Supreme Commander. There is also a Supreme Command, and within the Supreme Command he is the Supreme Commander. So both the Supreme Command and the Supreme Commander command the army.

Q. And likewise, the Joint Command is the Supreme Command and is the head of state; is that right?

A. No, no. ⁴⁶⁴²⁴

Q. You see, the --

A. No, that's not correct. The Joint Command cannot be what it seems to be here. I'll try to explain as I understand it, because I'm seeing this document from -- for the first time.

There is a constitutionally defined territory of the country in which suddenly terrorist activities are taking place. According to the administrative division, it is happening in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Kosovo and Metohija is a part of the Republic of Serbia, and behind Serbia there is a community of republics that have federal bodies, and naturally when something happens like what happened in Kosovo, that state, like any other state would be in its place, was anxious to resolve the problem.

So we have the involvement of political structures, the army, and the MUP. The army, as a federal institution, has its own line of subordination. The police reaches up to the republic level, and at that level it is present in Kosovo. The Ministry of Defence has its own structure down to municipalities, which are part of the federal organisation. And of course there are local governments, beginning with the level of municipalities. And among all these bodies it is normal that somebody should be required to coordinate their work when half of the territory of that wretched Kosovo is already under terrorist blockade. And naturally, the state and the federal institutions are anxious to delegate a representative to go down there to be present on the ground where all that is happening. And there were also representatives of other bodies, from the federal level through the republican, province level, ⁴⁶⁴²⁵ down to the municipal level.

Q. See if you can accept a few propositions from your experience. In time of war, an army needs to have a clear understanding of who is giving it instructions; correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Likewise, a police force, militarised or otherwise.

A. I don't know what it means in this context, "militarised." How am I to understand that?

Q. In comparison with other police forces in Europe, for example, the Kosovo -- the Serbian police force was militarised, was much more like a gendarmerie than an ordinary police force. Do you accept that? So that in time of war, it's got comparatively heavy weapons and again it's --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness received an interpretation that said "compared to other police in the army," and as I see from the transcript, the question was "compared to other police forces in Europe." The witness did not hear such a question properly in the Serbian language.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, with that clarification, will the witness answer the question.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the police is structured, to the extent material resources allow, in keeping with the structure of other police forces in Europe. As for militarisation, the police has weapons both in war and in peace. It is armed and has a reserve force, ⁴⁶⁴²⁶ just like the army. That is clear and I think that is the case in all other countries.

MR. NICE:

Q. Do you accept my suggestion that it needs -- a police force in such circumstances needs to have absolute clarity about who is giving it instructions. Do you accept that?

A. There is direct, clearly defined subordination, just like in the army. Command and subordination is very clear.

Q. And do you accept --

A. Down from -- starting with the level of minister of defence and the interior minister.

Q. Do you accept that, particularly in time of war, it's important that the army and the police of this type knows what each other is doing and acts in a coordinated fashion?

A. That is why this institution for coordination existed --

Q. Thank you.

A. -- that is referred to here as the Joint Command.

Q. And do you finally accept that in 1998, at least, the Joint Command was exactly what it appeared to be, namely a body that had the authority to issue instructions to both the army and the police?

A. I don't think so, although they coordinated at certain levels in order to avoid friendly fire in combat actions, and gathered information on the situation on the ground and among the population. That simply provided certain coordination in order to avoid friendly fire. I don't know why they called themselves the Joint Command and why ⁴⁶⁴²⁷ they created this document, but if they agreed so, there was direct subordination. The commander of the 3rd Army could not have taken a single step without asking the Chief of General Staff. Similarly, MUP commanders could not do anything, even if they had agreed to do something, until they received appropriate orders from their line of command. This is vertical subordination.

Q. All right.

A. There is also horizontal coordination in certain areas.

Q. Two things and one more document and a general proposition. The general proposition is this, Mr. Farkas: Although you're giving detailed answers now, you actually gave the game away with your first answer, which I'm going to read back to you from page 52, line 20. And the game you've given away is that in fact, as you and all the other leadership knows, this war was in the hands of this accused. You said this: I asked you about the body that was giving instructions to the army, and you said, "There was no special political body for that. The leadership of the state was entering a war, and the state is led by the head of state who is at that same time the Supreme Commander. There is also a Supreme Command, and within the Supreme Command he is the Supreme Commander. So both the Supreme Command and the Supreme Commander command the army." Now, in that answer weren't you, however reluctantly, simply revealing that this accused ran everything, and that's why -- let me just finish the proposition because you may not know about the last bit but I'm going to explain it to you in a minute -- and that's why the authorities and witnesses have never been able to explain with clarity what the Joint ^{46428 BLANK PAGE 46429} Command was, what the Supreme Command was, because in fact everybody knows it's him. Is that the truth?

A. I didn't understand. "Him" who; the accused?

Q. Yes. He ran everything; police and army.

A. Well, somebody has to manage. The Assembly reaches a decision to impose a state of war, and somebody has to run things, has to be on top of things. That is a clearly defined, constitutionally defined function of the Supreme Command Staff, the Supreme Command, and the Supreme Commander. I think it's the case in every country. If the country is at war, somebody has to control things. Our constitution envisages that the Supreme Command is headed by the president of the state. I don't see anything odd about that.

Q. So if we look at the document on the screen at the moment, and if you look at the last couple of lines of the document in the original, I think you follow English in any event so whichever, as to this comprehensive order of March of 1999, it says this: "The Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija from the Pristina section shall command and control all forces during combat operations."

So what does that mean?

A. I did not manage to find that passage. Where is it?

Q. Just above the end of the document, the last line or so, just before the signing off by the Joint Command.

It's the Joint Command from the Pristina section. Well, now the Supreme Command is Serbia-wide. The Joint Command is its --

A. Yes, I see. ⁴⁶⁴³⁰

Q. -- its alter ego or its existence in Kosovo, the Joint Command for the Pristina -- for Kosovo and Metohija from the Pristina section. And all this traces back to this accused, doesn't it? He's in charge.

A. Well, this Joint Command coordinated this action, or these activities, and it's normal that after these agreements had been reached everybody issues their relevant orders, and I believe that this was followed by the issuing of orders to relevant units which are not headed Joint Command. The same document probably went to the police as well so that they can create their documents down their chain of command and issue assignments to the police like the army issued assignments to army units. I don't believe those orders were headed Joint Command. They coordinated this, and they would probably continue to do so. Instead of "shall command and control," it should have probably said "shall coordinate," if problems occur, to provide an adequate response on the part of the army and the police.

In this case subordination is not affected, because in lower levels of command this argument, this thesis or, rather, this term "coordination" is certainly -- certainly doesn't feature as it does here.

Q. Another document I'd like you to look at, an existing exhibit, Exhibit 323, tab 3, comes from the Supreme Command Staff, 17th of April, 1999, and it says, if you follow it under the date, "Command post." Then this says "To the 3rd Army command." And then the link is: "The Kosovo and Metohija Joint Command order, strictly confidential ..." and then various other references and suggestions, and it's signed by Ojdanic as chief of the Supreme Command. ⁴⁶⁴³¹ So Ojdanic, the chief of the Supreme Command Staff, or the Supreme Command as he signs himself, recognises the existence of the Joint Command, doesn't he? And he recognises the authority of the Joint Command order. Can you explain that?

A. Well, this followed probably as soon as General Ojdanic learned about the existence of such a document with such a heading, although this does not have a signature or anything, whereas in military documents there is a stamp and a signature. General Ojdanic certainly came into possession of this order, and this is how he reacts, and then he gives his suggestions as to what should be done.

Q. A senior military officer with years and years of training isn't going, is he, to pick up a document that comes from a non-existent body and respond to it. His first response must be, "I don't recognise the authority of the body that's writing to me." Surely that is a non-controversial proposition, isn't it?

A. General Ojdanic probably, just like I before I came to the General Staff, had certain information that there was some sort of coordinating body down there, and I believe this is the only document of this kind where this Joint Command is mentioned in the documents of the army of Yugoslavia.

Q. There are in fact several others because they've slipped out, but why did you think this was the only one if you knew nothing really about it? Why did you think this was the only one, Mr. Farkas?

A. Because I practically didn't see either this document or the others you say exist. I haven't seen it in my -- ⁴⁶⁴³²

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... "I believe this is the only document of this kind where this Joint Command is mentioned." Did you say that because you and the commission know that along the way, by mistake, initially one document slipped out to reveal the truth and others have since come to light and you still only remember the one that was the first one disclosed to us in error -- or not in error, by slip of the authorities. Is that the position? Is that why you said that?

A. No, that's not correct, Mr. Nice. No, no, no. That's not my position.

The commission was not concealing anything. First of all, the commission did not have such a purpose. Its task was to establish as good cooperation as possible through the state with The Hague Tribunal. It had no other tasks. There was a request from the commission, addressed to the relevant state body, to establish some sort of agency that would give waivers to relevant persons of the official secrets act or military secrets or whatever, so that such documents can be released.

Q. A few other pieces of evidence that I want you to consider and one more document to look at, if you can help us. Two pieces of evidence are this: From the expert's report --

JUDGE BONOMY: Before you go on, Mr. Nice, what was the number of the previous document, the one that you looked at in some detail?

MR. NICE: 300, tab 356 -- sorry, D300, tab 356.

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.

MR. NICE:

Q. Two bits of evidence that I'll tell you about, Mr. Farkas, for ⁴⁶⁴³³ your comment, and then a document to look at as we try to solve this riddle. In the expert report of Mr. Coo, who happens to be sitting next to me, there's a report referred to from Pavkovic to Ojdanic of the 25th of May which says that they should continue to have the MUP under Joint Command, as has been the case until then.

The second piece of evidence: Your subordinate and deputy, Vasiljevic, has given evidence that he attended a Joint Command meeting in June 1999 and that the following people were present: Sainovic, Andjelkovic, Pavkovic, himself Vasiljevic, Lukic, Stefanovic, and Lazarevic.

Now, thinking back, bearing in mind that you're, you tell us, the recipient of a great deal of information about the army, is it not the case that there was indeed a Joint Command body representing the political will, headed in Kosovo by, at that stage, Sainovic? Yes or no.

A. It is true that my deputy attended one such meeting, and upon his return he told me that he had been there by accident because Pavkovic had taken him to that meeting. The meeting lasted only about 20 minutes, and it was an exchange of information between the MUP and the army as to where they were, what they should do, and he confirmed the fact that this meeting was chaired by Sainovic or headed by Sainovic. Since he was there from beginning to end, he also said that no decisions were made, no orders were issued to the body as a whole or to individuals. The only purpose was an exchange of information among the army, the police, the local self-government bodies, et cetera.

Q. Last document on this topic. It's to go on the overhead ⁴⁶⁴³⁴ projector. It's a submission of Serbia and Montenegro, dated -- I think it's actually undated on the body of the document, but I'll find the date of it in just a second. And it follows an order of this Trial Chamber dated the 15th of September of 2003 in litigation under Rule 54 bis. And it's dated the 29th of December, 2003. Thank you very much. If we could go, please, to paragraph 2 on the overhead projector, Mr. Prendergast.

This response of the government reflects the order to provide conclusive information on whether the entities named Supreme Command and Supreme Command Staff or other entities with similar functions existed -- it's the submission itself. Could you go another page, please, Mr. Prendergast. Thank you very much. And we're at paragraph 2. On -- "... to provide conclusive information on whether the entities named 'Supreme Command' and 'Supreme Command Staff' or other entities with similar functions existed during the state of war ... from 24 March until 10 June ..."

Here's the answer: "In this regard, Serbia and Montenegro wishes to reiterate its previous statement that no state organ with the name 'Supreme Command' existed according to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Law on Defence and the Law on the Yugoslav Army. According to Article 135 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the army of Yugoslavia in war and peace is under command of the President of the Republic in accordance with decisions of the Supreme Defence Council."

Over the page, please. ⁴⁶⁴³⁵ "According to all available information, the army of Yugoslavia before, during --"

A. I --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, General.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I haven't got the Serbian translation out here. All of this is written in English.

MR. NICE:

Q. I'm sorry, there isn't a Serbian version available to us. It was, I think, filed in English. And I hope I'm reading at a level that you can follow.

So far it's said there was no state organ with the name Supreme Command --

A. Well, that's precisely what I wanted to ask you, please. Could you please read slower so I can follow.

Q. I'll read the next passage more slowly. "According to all available information, the army of Yugoslavia before, during and after the state of war in 1999 was under the command of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Defence Council. However, as the Chamber has been informed, the Supreme Defence Council did not convene between the 23 March 1999, and 5 October 2000.

"3. As for the term 'Supreme Command Staff,' it seems to have been used by some offices of the Yugoslav army as synonym for the wartime organisation of the General Staff. In particular, this term seems to have been used by the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav army during ⁴⁶⁴³⁶ the time of war in 1999. This may be regarded as an oral order which, however, was never materialised in a formal decision." So that's part of the answer provided by the authority, the government. Do you have any comment? Do you accept that or do you say that doesn't adequately reflect the position?

A. This is the answer of the government. However, in order to function according to theory, for a command to be able to function, it has to have a series of elements that have to be met. First and foremost, one has to know who heads this command, and this command, in order to have official documents, has to have a stamp and a signature. That is one point.

Now, whether terms have been replaced, whether officers, instead of using "Supreme Command," that they started using "Supreme Command Staff," I don't think that would be right, if I understood properly what you read out now just in haste.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My impression is that the witness did not understand these assertions coming from the government of Serbia and Montenegro at all. Namely, what is asserted here is that there is no such forum or, rather, body which is called the Supreme Command Staff. There is no mention of the Joint Command here at all. It says here that the president of the republic commands the army in war and peace, and the term "Supreme Command Staff" does not exist in laws and other regulations. I think that the witness did not understand the assertion that is ^{46437 BLANK PAGE 46438} being made. The witness should be asked differently --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. The witness has a slight disadvantage, not having the Serbian text. Mr. Nice, would you put the question again.

MR. NICE:

Q. I asked you whether you accepted the stated position, which was the exact question I asked, and the summary of what the government has said is that no Supreme Command existed, that the army was under the command of the president of the federal republic, that no Supreme Defence Council meetings happened between the 23rd of March and the 5th of October, and that the term "Supreme Command Staff" seems to have been used by some offices as a synonym for wartime organisation of the General Staff. Those are the four points that emerge from this answer. Do you have any comment to make on any one of them?

A. Well, certainly. The Supreme Command Staff did exist. All the documents that you have here are entitled the Supreme Command Staff, and then there's a signature of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. So this body did exist. And I don't know which government it was that gave this kind of response. However, it cannot be denied the fact that the Supreme Command Staff did exist. There are many documents where this is confirmed through the command. And further on, "The Supreme Defence Council met ..." and so on and so forth. I as a member of the Supreme Command Staff don't know about that.

As for the Supreme Command Staff, I know that it existed and I was a member of that staff. So I don't know which government and in which way ⁴⁶⁴³⁹ could deny that we called the Supreme Command Staff -- or, rather, that we were confusing the terms, the General Staff and the Supreme Command Staff.

Q. Well, I must suggest --

JUDGE BONOMY: In posing that question, you said that one of the points made in the document was that the Supreme Command existed.

MR. NICE: Did not exist.

JUDGE BONOMY: I read it as saying it didn't exist.

MR. NICE: I thought I said did not exist. That was certainly my intention. May I just look at something on a colleague's screen.

JUDGE BONOMY: That led the witness to agree with you, that of course it existed.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

Q. Is the simple truth, as I suggest given away by you in your very first answer, that the political decision-maker for everything that happened in this conflict in Kosovo was this accused, and he operated in the territory through, for example, Sainovic, and he operated through whatever formal chains of command were necessary for the army, but one way and another it was he and he alone who was in charge of both the army and the police in Kosovo?

A. Well, when the state of war was declared, according to the constitution and the law, it is clearly defined how the defence of the country functions and who heads the defence. That is a constitutional category, which is elaborated further in the law. And there is the Supreme Command Staff, and how can you then have some kind of para-staffs through which the Supreme Commander can command? What is clearly defined ⁴⁶⁴⁴⁰ is the chain of command, the line of command.

As for political decisions, the Assembly passed a decision on the defence of the country, a state of war was declared, and at any rate, in any country, that kind of decision is a political decision. I mean, I don't know. It's not the generals and the military that reach such a decision. Somebody has to reach a decision on declaring a state of war, so it is really for the state, for the top state level to make that kind of decision. And then there are clearly defined structures as to the command and control of certain systems, notably the military.

Q. Again you're giving a long detailed answer, as people have been giving us long detailed answers about Joint Command and Supreme Command, and sending us filings like this. But my simple proposition is capable of a simple answer, I must suggest, Mr. Farkas, and that is that in the Kosovo conflict this accused was in charge of both the army and the military, and insofar as he needed to execute or administer political decisions locally, he operated through people such as Sainovic. Isn't that a simple question with a simple answer?

A. Well, I did not quite understand what you said. You've swallowed part of this. I haven't heard all of it. It should have been more simple.

Headed what, the army and --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

A. Yeah, the police. Well, it is only natural that the Supreme Commander is at the helm of all armed forces in a conflict. And the constitution clearly defines the powers of the police and the powers and ⁴⁶⁴⁴¹ the tasks of the military.

Q. Right. Next topic, please. The meeting on the 17th of May of 1999. We've heard about this meeting from Vasiljevic, your deputy at that time, and there are a couple of things he said about the meeting that I'd like your comment on.

He says that at that meeting paramilitaries were discussed, that Rade Markovic says volunteers were a necessary evil that accompany any war, that he had received an offer from Arkan for 100 Tigers and he had taken 30. And Vasiljevic went on to say that the accused didn't react to this in any -- in any way, negatively or otherwise.

A. This first part is correct, so that is correct. That's what Vasiljevic said here or, rather, stated here. That is correct, that Rade Markovic said that he was made this offer of 100 of Arkan's Tigers and that he took 30. That is correct.

As for not reacting or, rather, the president not reacting to that, that is not true. He said and specifically issued an order to him to find the minister of the interior and to convey his order precisely in relation to that, that such things should not happen and that he should clarify this with him and with Boca in Podujevo, and Arkan's who are here too. That is what the president said unequivocally, and ordered him to call the minister, find him as soon as possible and resolve this. And Rade Markovic said that something was already under way and that they had already withdrawn those who were already in Podujevo and now they would regulate things as regards Kosovo Polje. That's the truth.

Q. Pause there -- ⁴⁶⁴⁴²

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the transcript it says as if I had issued an order to Markovic that he should reach some kind of agreement with Arkan and Boca. That is not what the witness said. The witness said something different. The witness said that I had ordered to clarify the situation with these paramilitary formations that he had mentioned, not that he should reach any kind of agreement with that. That's not what the witness said. Perhaps you can ask the witness to clarify a bit better what he was trying to say.

It says here to "clarify the situation." It's not for clarifying the situation. On the contrary. To completely eliminate any possibility of paramilitary formations. That's what the witness was saying.

MR. NICE: It's for the witness to say it, I think.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me ask the witness to say what he intended to say, or what in fact he did say.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, when that question was raised at that meeting, the president addressed Rade Markovic and said to him that these forces and these formations should be removed and that that should be resolved as soon as possible, that he should find the minister as urgently as possible, and that such groups should no longer exist within the police. That is to say to do away with them, that such formations and groups of people should not exist within the police. That was the position of the president.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice. ⁴⁶⁴⁴³

MR. NICE:

Q. Well, I'm not accepting that for one minute, because unless my recollection is wrong, General Vasiljevic spoke from or had prepared a statement with the benefit of notes. Unless I'm mistaken, you produced to us no note of this really rather important 17th of May meeting?

A. I don't know what notes General Vasiljevic could offer you and what he could have given you. If he gave you something, you probably have it here. I'm telling you what happened at that meeting and that's exactly the way it was.

Q. On any reckoning, this was an extremely important meeting with the head of state. It has a preparatory meeting the day before. The topic is crimes committed by the very army of your country. We'll see what was said about numbers in a minute.

Was it really the way this accused ran affairs, that he would have such an important meeting without any record of what was said being made?

A. Well, everybody wrote down for himself the tasks that he had said, and at that level general positions are taken with regard to certain matters. He said sufficiently clearly to Rade Markovic to have this question resolved, and there was no need to write anything down after that. It was clear to the man. I saw later that he conveyed that or, rather, he discussed it with the minister. He told us to look into this again, whether there were any such organisations, whether there was anything bad within the military, and he gave explicit orders that not a single foot of the land should be let go. For a soldier, that was sufficient. That meant that we had to defend our borders towards Albania ⁴⁶⁴⁴⁴ and Macedonia fully. And he also said either prevent the -- any infiltration of such forces, or if necessary, completely close the border vis-a-vis on the Drina River so that we wouldn't have any complications further.

These are some of the very clear positions made by the president.

Q. I may come back to the question of notes in just a second or a minute or so, but before I do, do you accept General Vasiljevic's account that at the discussion the VJ -- the army's version, through Pavkovic, was that although the army was suggesting 800 persons had been killed improperly, the 3rd Army had established that this was not the case and that there were responsibility somewhere for 271 people being killed? Do you accept those figures were mentioned?

A. Yes, yes. Those figures were mentioned, about 200 something persons killed that the military was aware of. And the military started proceedings in order to prosecute the perpetrators, or had already started.

Q. And the MUP representation was not actually at the figure of 800, as related by Pavkovic, but was at a figure of 326 persons. Do you accept that MUP representatives put that figure forward?

A. Yes, yes, that's correct. Yes, that's the way it was.

Q. And it was then suggested that there should be an independent commission to investigate VJ and MUP crimes. Pavkovic suggested that it should be a state commission as a neutral body. Sainovic said that it wasn't a bad idea to send a neutral body from Belgrade to Kosovo, but the accused said nothing about it and gave no instructions in respect of it. ⁴⁶⁴⁴⁵ Is that correct?

A. That is not correct. This was referred to, but the president afterwards issued an order that, first of all, this be dealt with, the orders he gave to MUP and Rade Markovic, and that then they clear up the problems they have in the MUP and then that the representatives of the army and the MUP should meet and resolve these problems together about this commission or some body that will resolve matters. So first of all, that he should remove --

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... orders, please, to the MUP --

A. Oral orders. In front of all of us he said what I said.

Q. Anything in writing that you can point us to, apart from what may be in Vasiljevic's contemporaneous notes, anything you can point us to in writing supporting the suggestion that the accused behaved and reacted in this constructive way?

A. Yes, there are orders, what we did straight away as far as the army is concerned. As I've already said, General Ojdanic, while he was still walking, was talking about intentions as to what we should do. First of all, our most difficult task, our crucial task, most troublesome task, most difficult task was to completely close the border towards Albania and Macedonia. So that turned into certain orders.

Q. I'm concerned with the commission to investigate crimes committed by the army and the MUP. Was there any order, oral or written, as you would say, by this accused to establish a commission to investigate?

A. At that meeting he said that problems should be resolved first, that we should carry out the task that we have, and that then we should ^{46446 BLANK PAGE 46447} meet -- we should meet and we should try -- well, not try. We should establish this commission, but first of all there should be a meeting between the representatives of the MUP and the representatives of the army and that that should be looked into.

Q. Well, I've made my point on the absence of written material presently available to us subject to the Vasiljevic notes. And then just this: We are dealing here, on any reckoning of this meeting, with 500 to 800 deaths. Would you like to tell us, please, how many of those crimes have been solved, whether pursuant to the encouraged commission or otherwise. How many of those 5 to 800 deaths have been solved as crimes?

A. I don't know. Very soon after that we were in a situation where we had to withdraw from Kosovo and Metohija, and those investigations that started could not be completed. The state of war was abolished, the military conscripts were let go, and the proceedings that had started were moved from the jurisdiction of the military to the jurisdiction of the civilian courts. So I can not answer this Court. I don't know. But General Gojovic testified here and I think he has this information because Ojdanic ordered him to compile a complete list and to report on that after this meeting. That's the order that General Ojdanic issued, that the head of the legal department should ensure complete insight into all of this or, rather, the commission of all crimes and the degree to which they've come.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, it's time for the break, but I have to ask you how much longer you will -- you'll be.

MR. NICE: Obviously this is a witness, for several reasons, who I ⁴⁶⁴⁴⁸ will part from with many topics uncovered. I will try and finish responsibly to my case, if I can, within half an hour. I've got a couple of topics to cover.

JUDGE ROBINSON: But there is re-examination. Mr. Milosevic, how long will you be in re-examination?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'll try to fit into the remaining time, the remaining half hour, although I would need more. But I don't want to bring into question the witness's departure. But I would like to draw your attention to the fact that I used three hours for the examination-in-chief and so far Mr. Nice has used three hours and 45 minutes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: That's quite true. Mr. Nice has exceeded your time by about 40 minutes.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. Of course it's not done on a witness-by-witness basis, it's globally, and this is a witness who I'm taking slowly and who is of obvious potential significance.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, Mr. Nice, when we return, you'll try and finish as quickly as possible so that Mr. Milosevic can complete his re-examination. Certainly not more than half an hour, although you know that I am disinclined to insist on these time limits. But in the interests of the witness's health, we must.

We will break for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.44 p.m.

--- On resuming at 1.07 p.m. ⁴⁶⁴⁴⁹

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE:

Q. One other thing from the 17th of May meeting given in evidence by General Vasiljevic, who was indeed speaking from notes, contemporaneous notes, or with the assistance of. The accused did speak about Boca, or Slobodan Medic, the leader of the Skorpions, didn't he?

A. Well, General Pavkovic spoke about that. He mentioned that. And then Rade Markovic said that in that grouping -- group, some crimes had been committed and that those units or the members of that unit had been sent back, that they were no longer there. That's how I understood it.

Q. The position about that unit, which of course we're now more familiar with having seen the video of what happened at -- or, rather, after Srebrenica. What happened is that that unit committed serious crimes on its first foray into Kosovo. People were killed. They -- but they then returned again, didn't they, on a second time. They were deployed a second time in Kosovo?

A. I don't know whether it was a second time. At that meeting, that was not discussed. Now, I don't know whether there was a second time. I know we were there the first time, or one time, and that on that occasion when we discussed the issue, that it was said that they'd already been returned. I don't believe that, after an order by the president, that they could have returned.

Q. We've heard evidence about this from Vasiljevic that they killed people on both occasions, the first and the second. As to the first occasion, it's right, isn't it, because you've talked about prosecutions, ⁴⁶⁴⁵⁰ that no one from Boca's unit was prosecuted until after this accused had left office in 2000. Correct?

A. I don't know that, whether they were prosecuted or not. They -- it was ordered that they all be punished and processed. That is what the president ordered. Now, of the people who were there and who was there and around Srebrenica, whether they were there or not, what you said, we didn't know about that then. I mean, we don't know about that, and the president ordered that they had to be punished and handed over to the hands of justice.

Q. I don't accept that necessarily. He was very critical of them, but in the event, as I suggest, they weren't -- not -- Boca was never pursued for that first crime because he was absent at the time the men were killing civilians, including children, but no one was prosecuted, I must suggest, until after the accused left power. Right. And you don't know about it.

I mean, you've come here to say you know a great deal about what was happening in Kosovo, but I must suggest to you that whenever anything's tricky, you don't know the answer. You don't know about the bodies to Batajnica, you don't know about the prosecution of people in Boca's unit, the Skorpions.

Do you know this: You've talked about Gojovic's documents, and I would have taken you through them in detail if time wasn't pressing. Do you accept, as we've discovered from Gojovic's documents, that there were only about three people convicted in respect of murders arising from all the events that happened on the territory of the former Yugoslavia -- ⁴⁶⁴⁵¹ sorry, on the territory of Kosovo? Do you accept there are only about three people convicted?

A. Mr. Nice, I cannot accept anything linked to that subject matter. I said that on the 10th of July we withdrew from Kosovo and that everything that was started was handed over to the judicial organs, the court organs, and with that the military service or the military police had nothing more to do with it. Whether they were three individuals or five individuals, I can't really say. It's not a question for you to ask me. I don't know what the civilian courts did.

Q. Mr. Farkas, it is a question to be asked of you because you were introduced by this accused as somebody who can tell us really all about the prosecutions and how everything was done properly. May the 17th, 5 to 800 people acknowledged as killed at the hands of the police and the VJ. Gojovic's evidence I suggest to you shows at most three people convicted, and we don't know whether they served their sentences or anything like that yet. Are you in a position to point us to any more than the three people convicted for murders shown by Gojovic? If so, where, so we can find the records.

A. Well, I really can't seem to be able to convince, or can't convince you of something that I didn't deal with. After the 10th of July, as I said, we were withdrawing forces from the territory. We had very many problems with all the movement going on and to conduct it in a proper manner and we had vast problems. Now, what the courts did, the civilian courts did afterwards, after that had been handed over to them, I really don't know. All I do know is that during the war, that is to say ⁴⁶⁴⁵² up until the time our forces were withdrawn from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, about 382 cases, different ones, of course, amongst them were killings and rapes, they were prosecuted. And that, Mr. Nice, is four and a half cases a day in the middle of a war, what the army did. Of course, there were serious crimes amongst that. There was theft. There was rape. There was killings too. What the army could do, it did. What was in its power, it did.

Now, when the war situation came to an end, then this was done by other means. How, I don't know. I had enough work to attend to myself without being able to go into things like that.

Q. I was going too fast. The correction is three cases involving a total of seven people, not three people, as I put to the witness, but it's not going to draw any different answer.

Help us, please, with this: Fehmi Agani, famous and respected civil rights person, was murdered, brutally murdered, in the course of events following the bombing by NATO. And tell us about that. What do you know about that?

A. Well, what I know about that is that the man was killed and that the perpetrator was arrested, and I don't know anything after that. I do know of that killing, that it took place. The press wrote about that and I learnt it in other words, but with the presence of my forces I knew about that event. I know that the person was arrested, the perpetrator was arrested, and I know that he wasn't from our unit, from the army.

Q. He was a man called Djeletovic, wasn't he?

A. I don't know. I really can't remember. ⁴⁶⁴⁵³

Q. [Previous translation continues] ... we've heard about this, you see, again from Vasiljevic who reported on all these things to you, and the man Djeletovic was then eventually released by Andjelkovic, the leader of the provisional council. Do you remember that?

A. If that is what Vasiljevic told you, then I'm sure he has evidence and proof of that and knows about that. At my staff meetings with him, in my meetings with him, we didn't discuss that. I suppose that he learnt about that later on and then naturally told you.

Q. He told us that dealing with the release at the intervention of Zoran Andjelkovic he said that he reported, on the basis of all those events, to you. Did he? Because it would be important for you, wouldn't it, to hand on that information to someone else. Did he report to you on the -- please.

A. Well, not to report to me. It was common knowledge that the man was killed and the other man arrested. So I don't know. And as I say, we didn't deal with matters that didn't involve us except in cases where we knew specifically and concretely that something had been done outside or, rather, from within our competence. If the MUP did something, we would report that to the MUP straight away, and I think there were several such cases. And I don't know when the man was handed over over there what the MUP and the courts did with that. I really can't say. I don't know. So what did you say, that this man Djeletovic, if it was Djeletovic, if he did that, that was just not the topic of my discussions either with the service or what happened to people who were handed over and given over to the justice system. ⁴⁶⁴⁵⁴

Q. One other topic arising from Gojovic's documents, which we looked at on an earlier occasion. Izbica was, of course, a most notorious crime that was published or was written about internationally at an earlier stage, am I right? At a very early stage it was picked up by satellite imagery and so on. Do you remember that?

A. Yes, I do know that that happened. I think a post-mortem was conducted, that the people were buried and then exhumed. I don't know the outcome of it all because --

Q. Go on.

A. Well, I don't know what happened next, what the outcome of the autopsies was and what this indicated later on. And as soon as the court organs begin functioning on a case, then the security service ceases its work. What it does is the investigation stage and afterwards pursuant a court order perhaps.

Q. You see, Mr. Farkas, this was a huge massacre, hundreds of people, hundred or more people. Recorded in Gojovic's documents as perpetrators unknown but in the army section as it were. Can you account for the fact that a crime of this magnitude, which you had to investigate because the international community already knew about it, can you account for the fact that a crime of this magnitude goes unsolved, along with all the other massacres, unsolved? Can you account for that?

A. I think that in Gojovic's documents it doesn't say that this was done -- it says that the perpetrators were unknown, and it doesn't say that they were members of the army but that the army came across mounds and burial sites and then that's how the process started leading to the ^{46455 BLANK PAGE 46456} exhumations and so on and so forth. So the claim that you could have seen this from Gojovic's documents doesn't stand, that it was an army -- a soldier who did this. The army came across this, they took note of the crime that had been committed, and I'm very sorry that things like that happened at all, that that was reported by the army as having persons unknown as the perpetrators. That does not mean that the army committed any such thing.

Q. Whoever it was accredited or put down, can you account, please, because you were there, you visited the area you tell us - I don't know whether you visited Izbica - can you explain why such a huge crime, with all the resources of the army and police, goes undetected? Hmm?

A. What I can tell you is about the army, that's all. The army came across the traces of those crimes, and it handed over the matter to the legal organs and due process and note was taken. Now, later investigations related to that probably, and I'm certain - because we insisted upon certain things - we were not able to go back. So that was put into the hands of the international forces. We couldn't go back to Kosovo, so it was in the hands of them and the Albanian separatists with the powers that be allowing them to be there. So the organs couldn't take up the case, it was handed over to civilian structures, and they dealt with it.

But as I say once again, for any -- I am very sorry that tragedies of that kind happened, and I can state that the perpetrators should, of course, be brought to justice. And I'm sure that if the abductions took place, then the cause of death was established, but the army had no ⁴⁶⁴⁵⁷ competence and authority of going into investigations of that kind and conducting court cases and investigations of that kind.

Q. I'm just going to test you on a couple of other matters, but before I do, just tell us this: You know the various sites that are said to have been the sites of crimes committed by the VJ or the MUP, or indeed by paramilitaries in Kosovo. Were you present at any of those sites yourself on material dates, on relevant dates?

A. No. I wasn't at any of the sites myself.

Q. Have you seen reports by the VJ, or indeed by the police but principally by the VJ, have you seen reports into events happening at Bela Crkva or places like that?

A. I don't know what happened or whether anything happened in Bela Crkva. However, in the regular reports through the chain of command, reports would reach the staff of the Supreme Command and that is where we learnt about certain things, among others the Izbica case, where the army came across things like that. So this daily report incorporated that and that did reach the staff of the Supreme Command.

Q. And you realise, don't you, that on the Prosecution's case, it will be for the Court to decide, we've got many cases of multiple murders, none of them solved as crimes or even attempted to be solved as crimes by either the VJ or the MUP. You appreciate that, don't you?

A. Well, certainly had at that been known to me when I was in that position, I would certainly have been grateful to you for your assistance to help us solve it, because orders of that kind existed. So quite certainly, as from the competence and authority that the army had, I'm ⁴⁶⁴⁵⁸ sure that had they had specific concrete cases like that and had the whole thing pointed to the army or the police, then the army would certainly have taken steps to solve the case.

Q. Now, again you were introduced yesterday as somebody who had a great deal of knowledge about these matters. Nobody could know more, it was said, in respect to some aspects of them. The Dubrava prison complex killings, tell us about that, please.

JUDGE ROBINSON: What aspects of it, Mr. Nice?

MR. NICE:

Q. Do you know anything about this? Let me ask you a more specific question because time is very short. We know from evidence produced by the Defence that a special police group or a special armed group went into that prison on the 22nd of May, took it over at about 5.15 in the morning. We have evidence from the survivors, many of them, that they were lined up to be killed a quarter of an hour later, at 5.30. What do you know from your position at the time or from what you would have learnt in the commission of the VJ, what do you know about who gave the order for that special group of armed men to go into Dubrava prison?

A. Well, first of all, Mr. Nice, I'm a colonel general of the army of Yugoslavia, not of the police. So that's one point. Linked to Dubrava and to the circumstances of the bombing of Dubrava, Dubrava was a prison, if I remember correctly, that something happened around that prison. You will have to ask the people who were responsible down the chain of command in the MUP about that. And it was under their purview and remit. So I ⁴⁶⁴⁵⁹ know that some bombings took place. I don't know anything else. Do you claim that some soldiers were there, were present in the area? Is that what you're saying?

Q. Armed presence that went in, a special armed presence at 5.15. Help us, please, with this: From your general knowledge of government, to take over a prison, would that be a decision that would have to be made at the ministerial level?

A. Mr. Nice, these are legal matters, legal questions. You're asking me about certain fields -- you'll ask me about medicine in a while. This wasn't within the competence of my work. If it was, I would have attended post-mortems and would be able to answer questions about them.

Q. You know nothing about that either. Just to deal with His Honour Judge Bonomy's point, tab 10 of the VJ commission documents, coming for the overhead projector and for the witness. I would have wanted him to deal with a few more documents, but tab 10, I think, will do. This is a document in respect of your commission. It's Exhibit 921, tab 10, and this document -- this tab has not yet been admitted. It comes from Pavkovic. It's dated the 30th of April, 2002, and -- and this may reflect His Honour Judge Bonomy's concerns of this morning. At order point number 1 -- a bit further up the page, Mr. Prendergast, please: "Establish an Expert Team of the Yugoslav Army General Staff according to the temporary establishment ..." So that insofar as Pavkovic is ordering that an expert team should an expert team of the General Staff of the army as opposed to an expert team specifically of the commission, does that agree with the evidence that you've been giving us yesterday and today? ⁴⁶⁴⁶⁰

A. Well, absolutely. At the very beginning I said that the commission, pursuant to an order, was formed by the federal defence minister, and later on you can see the date, which is almost a year later. The Chief of the General Staff, through an order of his own and from within his composition, that is to say the army, is setting up an expert team in order to review combat operations.

Q. If we then, however, and my last topic, very short, turn over the page, please, to paragraph 5, whoever's creature the expert team is, the tasks of the expert team -- little bit further up the page -- are as follows: "Monitoring and analysing documents and data from the indictments of the Prosecutor ... against professional VJ members and retired officers.

"Preparation of proposals for defence and rebuttal of allegations in the indictments in the form of professional expert testimonies based on documentation from VJ archives.

"Preparation of documentation regarding the events which took place on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Kosovo ... during the combat operations with the emphasis on documenting ... crimes of other parties in the conflict, separately for every front, as per the indictment."

And then the last point in this document, "During trials analysing and estimating the data in the possession of The Hague Tribunal Prosecutor which may have a negative influence on the security of the country ..." Now, that's what's described as the commission's role in this document. Did you see any output -- sorry, the expert team's document -- ⁴⁶⁴⁶¹ function. Did you see any output from the expert team yourself?

A. No, I did not see any output. When the institution was established and the Law on Cooperation with The Hague Tribunal passed, then we, through -- first of all, through the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Ministry of Justice and later on through the National Committee, we communicated with The Hague Tribunal precisely in procuring certain data pursuant to your requests. There was no output in detail. And of course after war operations, an analysis is performed. That's quite natural. In some cases, during combat, crimes did take place, and it is quite natural that General Pavkovic compiled - and probably you'll find this in detail in the order - as to who the members of the team were, I'm sure that they are all active officers, army officers who are able to collect information in a professional way and to set right the documents in the archives, to put them in order, because they were dispersed all over the place. They moved from day-to-day, and it was very difficult to collect and put order into the archives.

MR. NICE: This is indeed my last question. Although, of course, there are many topics outstanding. The Court will also find a similar reflection of this particular construct of the expert committee in tab 8, as already exhibited. I would diffidently repeat my request that the Chamber might consider the advantage of adducing the collection of documents, which came as a collection as a whole, but failing that, can I ask for tab 10 to be produced because it deals with the point that His Honour Judge Bonomy was particularly concerned about.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. ⁴⁶⁴⁶² Mr. Milosevic.

Just give it a number for tab 10.

MR. NICE: Yes, the others have already been admitted, if we can just add tab 10. Unless the Chamber takes favourably to my suggestion.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us clear up one matter first. Mr. Nice provided a rather thick document dated the 22nd of October, 2003, which includes various documents, such as a request to the National Council for Cooperation with the ICTY of Serbia and Montenegro and the witness --

MR. NICE: I'm happy for it to be produced but the witness claimed no knowledge. I recited to him the one passage that related to the origin of a document. He made his comment on it, and in line with the Court's current practice, I decided not to press the matter.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. No reliance on this document so you need not bother with it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, I'm not dealing with it at all. I just wanted to find out whether Mr. Nice tendered it, and if yes, then I would have objected. Since he didn't, it doesn't matter any more. Let me just take one minute.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, we will go very briefly through a couple of matters raised by Mr. Nice in cross-examination. He asked you whether you had ⁴⁶⁴⁶³ received, from January to March 1999, army reports or police reports. You answered no because you occupied the position of deputy or assistant minister of defence.

A. Correct.

Q. He concluded that you did not receive any information at all then. Did you receive information from auxiliary subordinate organs of the Ministry of Defence, regional organs?

A. Yes, of course. And the developments in the province were also discussed at the senior staff meetings at the Ministry of Defence.

Q. Do -- are regional organs to be found in all municipalities of Kosovo and Metohija?

A. Yes.

Q. Does the network of these regional organs cover the entire territory and can it serve as a channel of normal information providing for all -- concerning all developments?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. General, the issue of documents was raised here, but I'll ask you one specific question only. Was the headquarters of your service bombed during the NATO campaign?

A. Yes. My office was directly hit.

Q. On that occasion was your documentation damaged?

A. Yes. A large quantity of documentation was damaged. Part of it was burnt. Part of it was scattered all over.

Q. Does that provide an answer to the question why it was not possible to provide more documents, to introduce more documents through ^{46464 BLANK PAGE 46465} your testimony?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. You said your office was directly hit?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you, General. Mr. Nice asked you questions about the event in Paracin and the claim from the book of Ivan Stambolic that the army made that up. Where does your knowledge about the events in Paracin come from?

A. I was chief of security of the relevant army, and 40 minutes after that crime, I was on the spot. The bodies of those --

Q. That's what I wanted to hear. Did you personally, as chief of security of the 2nd Army at the time on whose territory the Paracin garrison was located, were you competent to find out what happened?

A. Yes, I conducted the pre-investigative work.

Q. So your knowledge about that event in Paracin that you testified to, is it based on your personal experience and the action you took?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Was it, therefore, an organised group that was involved or a mentally unstable individual?

A. An organised group of six.

Q. All right. Thank you, General. We're moving on to another subject immediately. Mr. Nice provided you a document that was exhibited which is an overview of the engagement of TO units of the Republic of Serbia within the composition -- within the territory of the 1st Military District. Do you remember seeing that document during cross-examination? ⁴⁶⁴⁶⁶

A. Yes.

Q. Please tell us, what did the 1st Military District include at that time, that is in 1991, November?

A. The 1st Military District covered the central part of the country. So its boundary in the west was the boundary of the former 7th Army, which was included in the 1st Army district, according to the new administrative division, and from Djerup [phoen], north of Paracin, all the way down to Kosovo and Metohija.

Q. And to the west, geographically speaking?

A. Well, geographically speaking, I cannot draw the line exactly, but it was somewhere from Virovitica. It followed that direction all the way through Karlobag to the sea.

Q. To the sea. So did the 1st Military District cover a part of the territory of Serbia, a part of the territory of Croatia, and part of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A. Yes.

Q. So the 1st Military District was in no way located within the administrative boundaries of any of the republics of the then SFRY?

A. The organisational structure of the army was designed not to coincide with the administrative divisions of the country.

Q. All right. So the 1st Military District covered all these places listed in the overview that have to do with Baranja, Eastern Slavonia, et cetera.

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Now, please tell us, did the republic or, rather, ⁴⁶⁴⁶⁷ republican authorities, have any competencies in terms of command and control over the Territorial Defence?

A. No. The armed forces were unified and were under the command of the federal secretary for national defence.

Q. Did the republic or province authorities -- no. Let us take it this way: Was there a Vojvodina TO staff?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a Serbia TO staff?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a Kosovo TO staff?

A. Yes.

Q. Who appointed their commanders?

A. The federal secretary.

Q. Did the Republic of Serbia, or let's take Vojvodina, for example, did they have any authority to appoint TO Staff Commanders for Serbia or Vojvodina respectively?

A. No.

Q. Did they have authority to exert command over those forces?

A. No. Command was single. They had no authority of that kind.

Q. In the specific case or, rather, the specific time to which this overview relates, did those -- were those TO units under JNA command or under any command of the Republic of Serbia?

A. They were exclusively under the command of the Yugoslav People's Army.

Q. Thank you, General. Mr. Nice asked you if you knew that I had ⁴⁶⁴⁶⁸ removed Kosovo from the agenda in Dayton. Do you know that Kosovo never featured on the Dayton agenda?

A. Yes. As far as I know, that's correct.

Q. Thank you. Mr. Nice claimed that all those who were appointed at that time just before the war and during the war were Serbs. What is your ethnicity, General?

A. I am an ethnic Hungarian.

Q. Thank you. Questions were asked --

MR. NICE: Your Honour, that's not what I asked. Of course I know this witness is ethnic Hungarian. It's well recorded in many documents, not least the SDC records where the accused speaks about him. What I asked was whether those who this witness appointed in the tabs that he produced were Serbs, and the answer to that was, clearly, yes.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Proceed. Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, Mr. Nice produced to you an enactment that was sent by the department for defence of Pristina addressed to you personally. Sector for civilian defence, General Geza Farkas. Do you remember that document?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have it in front of you?

A. No, I don't.

Q. They say here at the beginning: "We asked the command of the 3rd Army to provide us with weapons and ammunition for all units for -- that the authorities in Kosovo and Metohija are establishing and developing, ⁴⁶⁴⁶⁹ namely detachments of Territorial Defence, communications units, civilian protection --"

JUDGE KWON: Exhibit 248.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is this a reference exclusively to legal authorities that exist in keeping with the law, civilian defence, civilian protection, communications units, et cetera?

A. Absolutely. And for all of them there existed appropriate establishment, materiel and personnel.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, avoid leading questions.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know whether it's a leading question if I ask that the units of civilian defence, civilian protection and communications units were legal units envisaged by the law. I am asking the witness whether the law envisages such units.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's move on.

JUDGE KWON: I don't think this is the document on the screen.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. It goes on to say -- it says: "The said weaponry will be exclusively kept in depots of the army of Yugoslavia," and then I won't go on reading any more, but it enumerates which depots of the army of Yugoslavia.

A. Yes. It was regulated that way.

Q. Does that mean that that weaponry requested for those legal units would not even be issued to them without an appropriate order that can follow only if necessary? ⁴⁶⁴⁷⁰

A. Yes.

Q. Does it say in the last paragraph: "We emphasise that execution, distribution and issue to individual military conscripts --"

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters cannot follow this without the document.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreters are having difficulty following it without the document.

Mr. Prendergast, can you locate the --

JUDGE KWON: The last paragraph. Last page. Next page. The first paragraph there. Yes, I think that's it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General Farkas, is it clear that these orders would be issued only in the event that mobilisation plans are put into effect, that are subject to verification by the defence department?

A. Yes, that's precisely the way it was regulated.

Q. Mr. Nice asked why in that case civilian population receives such weapons.

A. Well, we can see from this order that civilian population receives weapons only in case of mobilisation.

Q. Tell me, in the event of mobilisation, does this civilian population cease to be civilian population?

A. Absolutely. They are military conscripts, and once they are mobilised, they become members of the army.

Q. Now, tell me, since Mr. Nice asked you if you meant to say -- or, rather, if these people who are mobilised were prone to hatred and ⁴⁶⁴⁷¹ animosity, whether that would be dangerous to mobilise them, what is your opinion? Were they imbued with hatred towards Albanians?

A. No. They did not hate Albanians, and we did not have any cases where such people would react in that way within the system of command and control over them.

Q. General, tell me, is there any enactment, regulation, or rule or principle according to which local population would not be subject to mobilisation?

A. On the contrary. There is a legal requirement by category of population, by age group, by professional training, et cetera, who should be mobilised.

Q. Is it a rule that civilian protection and civilian defence units draw their personnel through mobilisation precisely from local population?

A. Yes. That is a basic principle of civilian protection and defence. The people engaged there should know well the area where they work.

JUDGE ROBINSON: So if I understand you, Colonel General, that rule was not a new one.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It's not a rule. This is from the law where the material obligations and the work obligations of the population are regulated. So this is where the civilian population participates. In the first two, they are mobilised as a priority into the army, into the units of the MUP, and the units of the civilian protection. As for the rest, the military-aged able-bodied population, for example, to civil defence. ⁴⁶⁴⁷²

JUDGE ROBINSON: That law existed before the war?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. On the basis of that Law on Defence, the formations were developed and this entire structure that we refer to here was all done on the basis of that law.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, yes.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, Mr. Nice claimed that the police of the Republic of Serbia was militarised. As an educated, trained general, can you confirm that position of his that the police in Serbia was militarised?

A. Well, I even asked him what he meant by that. I cannot confirm that.

Q. Mr. Nice showed you some document of the government of the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro, and he claimed that there is no institution called the Supreme Command Staff. Did somebody just invent the Supreme Command Staff or, in wartime, is the General Staff actually the body that grows into the Supreme Command Staff?

A. Yes, that's it. With the reduction in the personnel of the General Staff, in peacetime there are more people on the staff, and in wartime there's less people involved, so then there is the establishment of the General Staff in the war. And then when there is a state of war, it is no longer called the General Staff, it is called the Supreme Command.

Q. The Supreme Command Staff.

A. Yes.

Q. Supreme Command Staff. Is that something that somebody invented ⁴⁶⁴⁷³ or is it based on regulations?

A. It's based on regulation. And all documents during the course of the war have these exact headings and signatures and this has become part of documentation on a regular basis.

Q. I'm not going to go into the background of what was written in this document quoted by Mr. Nice, I just wanted us to establish whether this was an invented institution, the Supreme Command Staff. General, they also put questions to you about the Joint Command. You said this was a form of coordination. I'm not going to ask you anything else about that, but this form of coordination, did it in any way infringe upon the singleness of the chain of command in the army of Yugoslavia?

A. In no way did it do so. Quite simply, it is not possible for it to infringe upon the chain of command. That is quite clear. It was quite simply impossible for something like that to happen, especially not in wartime.

Q. All right. General, Mr. Nice mentioned, in connection with General Vasiljevic's testimony, that representatives of the military at that meeting held in my office on the 17th of March gave information about some 800, and you said that the representatives of the military were talking about 200 something and the police about 300 something. Did anybody refer to this figure of 800?

A. No. At that meeting only these two figures were mentioned; 200 something committed by our side, and 300 something was what the police said. ⁴⁶⁴⁷⁴

Q. In position -- or, rather, what was said what should be done with the persons who perpetrated these crimes?

A. It was said unequivocally that they should be arrested momentarily and that they should be brought before a court of law without any delays. That was your position and your order.

Q. All right. You said towards the end of your answer, when you were responding to questions pertaining to General Gojovic's material, that Ojdanic immediately ordered General Gojovic to establish to what level the procedure had come. You weren't clear enough. What procedure were you referring to in relation to these crimes that had been committed?

A. Well, the procedure in terms of where the cases actually were. Quite simply, for Gojovic to make an overview as to how many crimes of this kind do we know of and where are these cases, and what stage of resolution are they in? Are they still in the state of investigations or pre-investigation or have they come to trial or have judgements already been passed? If not belonging to our own jurisdiction, have they been handed over to the judiciary?

Q. All right. Irrespective of the stage involved, in all these variants that you referred to just now, was this a procedure of criminally prosecuting the perpetrators of crimes in Kosovo and Metohija?

A. Absolutely. That is what the point of all of it was, to make an analysis of this kind and then to encourage the fastest possible resolution of those problems.

MR. NICE: I don't know if the accused is finished, but there is just one point: The document he was referring to, which is the filing of ⁴⁶⁴⁷⁵ Serbia and Montenegro, I haven't asked for it to be admitted because, of course, it's already before the Court, but he misrepresented what the document said. It didn't deny the existence of the Supreme Command Staff but it denied the existence of the Supreme Command and dealt with the way the word "Supreme Command Staff" may have been used.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to say that I don't understand this. What is being denied? What is not being denied? I clearly put a question to the general whether somebody invented the word "Supreme Command Staff" or whether it was based on regulations and he gave an answer to that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. General, Mr. Nice put questions to you in relation to some alleged statement before a court of law of the former chief of state security, Radomir Markovic, that there was some meeting held in my office and that orders were given to remove bodies. Do you know that Radomir Markovic never gave such a statement before a court of law?

MR. NICE: No. That's not an admissible form of question and indeed I think I prefaced my questioning about this with the circumstances before this Court.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, the last question not permissible. Ask another question, or reformulate it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, if it's not permissible.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know, on the basis of everything that was published in this ⁴⁶⁴⁷⁶ respect, that Radomir Markovic denied this assertion made by Mr. Nice when he testified under oath here and when he testified in Belgrade and before the committee of the parliament of Yugoslavia?

A. I'll have to remember now, but as for the previous things you mentioned before the Assembly and the Court, I think that's correct. I cannot remember exactly all the things that he stated here.

Q. Do you know his statements that he had been tortured and that the other side had given him promises?

A. I know about that.

MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... just remind the Court, the issue of this statement is to be dealt with by this Court on the basis of evidence given by Markovic himself but also by those who took the statement, and who both have been before the Court, and I don't see how these questions can do anything to help the Court at the moment and probably they're irrelevant and inadmissible.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I agree, Mr. -- I fully agree, Mr. Milosevic. Move on to another question. In any event, we are past the time for adjournment, so bring your re-examination to a close as quickly as possible, bearing in mind the health of the witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I have concluded. Thank you, I have concluded, Mr. Robinson.

Thank you, General.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. Let me just say that the document tendered by Mr. Nice at the end of cross-examination is admitted as Exhibit 921, tab 10. ⁴⁶⁴⁷⁷ Colonel General, that concludes your testimony. Thank you for attending at The Hague to give it, and you may now leave. We are adjourned until tomorrow, 9.00 a.m.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.05 p.m. to be reconvened on Friday, the 11th day

of November, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.